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Justice Thomas
| 2,015 | 1 |
second_dissenting
|
Rodriguez v. United States
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2795278/rodriguez-v-united-states/
|
them perhaps innocent in itself, together warranted further investi- gation,” and it has reiterated that analysis in a number of cases, see, e.g., ; United This one is no different. * * * I would conclude that the police did not violate the Fourth Amendment here. Officer Struble possessed prob- able cause to stop Rodriguez for driving on the shoulder, and he executed the subsequent stop in a reasonable manner. Our decision in requires no more. The majority’s holding to the contrary is irreconcilable with and a number of other routine police practices, distorts the distinction between traffic stops justified by probable cause and those justified by reasonable suspicion, and abandons reasonableness as the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment. I respectfully dissent. Cite as: 575 U. S. (2015) 1 ALITO, J., dissenting SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 13–9972 DENNYS RODRIGUEZ, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT [April 21, 2015] JUSTICE ALITO, dissenting. This is an unnecessary,1 impractical, and arbitrary decision. It addresses a purely hypothetical question: whether the traffic stop in this case would be unreason- able if the police officer, prior to leading a drug-sniffing dog around the exterior of petitioner’s car, did not already have reasonable suspicion that the car contained drugs. In fact, however, the police officer did have reasonable suspicion, and, as a result, the officer was justified in detaining the occupants for the short period of time (seven or eight minutes) that is at issue. The relevant facts are not in dispute. Officer Struble, who made the stop, was the only witness at the suppres- sion hearing, and his testimony about what happened was not challenged. Defense counsel argued that the facts recounted by Officer Struble were insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion, but defense counsel did not dispute those facts or attack the officer’s credibility. Similarly, the Magistrate Judge who conducted the hearing did not question the officer’s credibility. And as JUSTICE THOMAS’s opinion shows, the facts recounted by Officer Struble “easily meet our standard for reasonable suspi- cion.” Ante, at 11 (dissenting opinion); see also, e.g., United —————— 1 See Brief in Opposition 11–14. 2 RODRIGUEZ v. UNITED STATES ALITO, J., dissenting (finding reasonable suspicion for a dog sniff based on implausible travel plans and nervous conduct); United 641 F.3d 3, 8–1250 (finding reasonable suspicion for a dog sniff where, among other things, the officer smelled “strong masking odors,” the defendant’s “account of his travel was suspect,” and the defendant “was exceptionally nervous throughout his encounter”). Not only does
|
Justice Thomas
| 2,015 | 1 |
second_dissenting
|
Rodriguez v. United States
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2795278/rodriguez-v-united-states/
|
defendant “was exceptionally nervous throughout his encounter”). Not only does the Court reach out to decide a question not really presented by the facts in this case, but the Court’s answer to that question is arbitrary. The Court refuses to address the real Fourth Amendment question: whether the stop was unreasonably prolonged. Instead, the Court latches onto the fact that Officer Struble deliv- ered the warning prior to the dog sniff and proclaims that the authority to detain based on a traffic stop ends when a citation or warning is handed over to the driver. The Court thus holds that the Fourth Amendment was vio- lated, not because of the length of the stop, but simply be- cause of the sequence in which Officer Struble chose to perform his tasks. This holding is not only arbitrary; it is perverse since Officer Struble chose that sequence for the purpose of protecting his own safety and possibly the safety of others. See App. 71–72. Without prolonging the stop, Officer Struble could have conducted the dog sniff while one of the tasks that the Court regards as properly part of the traffic stop was still in progress, but that sequence would have entailed unnecessary risk. At approximately 12:19 a.m., after collecting Pollman’s driver’s license, Officer Struble did two things. He called in the information needed to do a records check on Pollman (a step that the Court recog- nizes was properly part of the traffic stop), and he re- quested that another officer report to the scene. Officer Struble had decided to perform a dog sniff but did not Cite as: 575 U. S. (2015) 3 ALITO, J., dissenting want to do that without another officer present. When occupants of a vehicle who know that their vehicle con- tains a large amount of illegal drugs see that a drug- sniffing dog has alerted for the presence of drugs, they will almost certainly realize that the police will then proceed to search the vehicle, discover the drugs, and make arrests. Thus, it is reasonable for an officer to believe that an alert will increase the risk that the occupants of the vehicle will attempt to flee or perhaps even attack the officer. See, e.g., United (CA8 1995) (recounting scuffle between officer and defendant after drugs were discovered). In this case, Officer Struble was concerned that he was outnumbered at the scene, and he therefore called for backup and waited for the arrival of another officer before conducting the sniff. As a result, the sniff was not com- pleted until seven or eight minutes after
|
Justice Thomas
| 2,015 | 1 |
second_dissenting
|
Rodriguez v. United States
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2795278/rodriguez-v-united-states/
|
was not com- pleted until seven or eight minutes after he delivered the warning. But Officer Struble could have proceeded with the dog sniff while he was waiting for the results of the records check on Pollman and before the arrival of the second officer. The drug-sniffing dog was present in Of- ficer Struble’s car. If he had chosen that riskier sequence of events, the dog sniff would have been completed before the point in time when, according to the Court’s analysis, the authority to detain for the traffic stop ended. Thus, an action that would have been lawful had the officer made the unreasonable decision to risk his life became un- lawful when the officer made the reasonable decision to wait a few minutes for backup. Officer Struble’s error— apparently—was following prudent procedures motivated by legitimate safety concerns. The Court’s holding there- fore makes no practical sense. And nothing in the Fourth Amendment, which speaks of reasonableness, compels this arbitrary line. The rule that the Court adopts will do little good going 4 RODRIGUEZ v. UNITED STATES ALITO, J., dissenting forward.2 It is unlikely to have any appreciable effect on the length of future traffic stops. Most officers will learn the prescribed sequence of events even if they cannot fathom the reason for that requirement. (I would love to be the proverbial fly on the wall when police instructors teach this rule to officers who make traffic stops.) For these reasons and those set out in JUSTICE THOMAS’s opinion, I respectfully dissent. —————— 2 It is important to note that the Court’s decision does not affect pro- cedures routinely carried out during traffic stops, including “checking the driver’s license, determining whether there are outstanding war- rants against the driver, and inspecting the automobile’s registration and proof of insurance.” Ante, at 6. And the Court reaffirms that police “may conduct certain unrelated checks during an otherwise lawful traffic stop.” Thus, it remains true that police may ask questions aimed at uncovering other criminal conduct and may order occupants out of their car during a valid stop. See 555 U.S. 323, 333 ; 519 U.S. ;
|
Justice Marshall
| 1,981 | 15 |
majority
|
Hodel v. Indiana
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110517/hodel-v-indiana/
|
This appeal, like Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., ante, p. 264, also decided today, involves a broad constitutional challenge to numerous important provisions of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 17, 30 U.S. C. 1201 et seq. (16 ed., Supp. III) (Surface Mining Act or Act). Many of the specific provisions attacked in this case, however, differ from the "steepslope" provisions that were the primary focus of the challenge in Virginia Surface Mining. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana ruled that the provisions of the Act challenged here are unconstitutional and permanently enjoined their enforcement. We noted probable jurisdiction sub nom. and we now reverse. I A The basic structure of the Surface Mining Act is described in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., *318 ante, at 268-272, and it will therefore suffice here to briefly describe the specific provisions drawn into question in this case. Several of the challenged sections of the Act are known collectively as the "prime farmland" provisions. These sections establish special requirements for surface mining operations conducted on land that both qualifies as prime farmland under a definition promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and has historically been used as cropland within the meaning of the regulations of the Secretary of the Interior (Secretary) implementing the Surface Mining Act. 701 (20), 30 U.S. C. 1291 (20) (16 ed., Supp. III).[1] A permit for surface coal mining on such lands may be granted only if the mine operator can demonstrate its "technological capability to restore such mined area, within a reasonable time, to equivalent or higher levels of yield as nonmined prime farmland in the surrounding area under equivalent levels of management" 510 (d) (1), 30 U.S. C. 1260 (d) (1) (16 ed., Supp. III). The operator must also show *319 that it can "meet the soil reconstruction standards" for prime farmland set forth in 5 (b) (7), 30 U.S. C. 1265 (b) (7) (16 ed., Supp. III). That section specifies that the distinct soil layers on prime farmland must be separately removed, segregated, stockpiled, and then properly replaced and regraded. Furthermore, 519 (c) (2), 30 U.S. C. 1269 (c) (2) (16 ed., Supp. III), provides that upon its completion of mining activities on prime farmland, a mine operator can have its performance bond released only on a showing that soil productivity "has returned to equivalent levels of yield as nonmined land of the same soil type in the surrounding area under equivalent management practices"[2] Also challenged here are some of the Act's more
|
Justice Marshall
| 1,981 | 15 |
majority
|
Hodel v. Indiana
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110517/hodel-v-indiana/
|
practices"[2] Also challenged here are some of the Act's more general provisions that are applicable throughout the country. These include 5 (b) (3), which requires restoration of mined land to its approximate original contour,[3] and the directive in 5 (b) (5), 30 U.S. C. 1265 (b) (5) (16 ed., Supp. III), that surface mine operators remove topsoil separately during mining activities and preserve it for use during reclamation if it is not to be replaced immediately on the backfill area of the mining cut. Section 508, 30 U.S. C. 1258 (16 ed., Supp. III), requires applicants for surface coal mining permits to submit proposed reclamation plans specifying the intended postmining use of the land and the method by which that use will be achieved. In addition, 522 (c), (d), 30 U.S. C. 1272 (c), (d) (16 ed., Supp. III), require States wishing to assume permanent *320 regulatory authority over surface coal mining to establish an administrative procedure for determining whether particular lands are unsuitable for some or all kinds of surface mining.[4] Section 522 (e), 30 U.S. C. 1272 (e) (16 ed., Supp. III), proscribes mining activity within 100 feet of roadways and cemeteries or within 300 feet of public buildings, schools, churches, public parks, or occupied dwellings. Finally, the Act's procedures for collecting proposed civil penalties contained in 518 (c), 30 U.S. C. 1268 (c) (16 ed., Supp. III), are also drawn into question here. B These suits were filed in August 18, one by the State of Indiana and several of its officials, and the other by the Indiana Coal Association, several coal mine operators, and others. The complaints alleged that the Act contravenes the Commerce Clause, the equal protection and due process guarantees of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Tenth Amendment, and the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The District Court held a 1-day hearing on plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction and defendants' motion to dismiss, and the court ultimately decided the case on the merits without taking further evidence. On June 10, the District Court issued an order and opinion sustaining each of plaintiffs' constitutional challenges and permanently enjoining the Secretary from enforcing the challenged sections of the Act.[5] *321 II The District Court gave two rationales for its decision on the Commerce Clause issue. The court first held that the six "prime farmland" provisions[6] are beyond congressional power to regulate interstate commerce because they are "directed at facets of surface coal mining which have no substantial and adverse effect on interstate commerce." The court reached this conclusion by
|
Justice Marshall
| 1,981 | 15 |
majority
|
Hodel v. Indiana
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110517/hodel-v-indiana/
|
effect on interstate commerce." The court reached this conclusion by examining statistics in the Report of the Interagency Task Force on the Issue of a Moratorium or a Ban on Mining in Prime Agricultural Lands (17) (Interagency Report).[7] These statistics compared *322 the prime farmland acreage being disturbed annually by surface mining to the total prime farmland acreage in the United States. The Interagency Report stated that approximately 21,800 acres of prime farmland were being disturbed annually and that this acreage amounted to 0.006% of the total prime farmland acreage in the Nation. This statistic and others derived from it, together with similar comparisons for Indiana, persuaded the court that surface coal mining on prime farmland has "an infinitesimal effect or trivial impact on interstate commerce."[8] With respect to the other substantive provisions which apply to surface mining generally,[9] the District Court reasoned *323 that the only possible adverse effects on interstate commerce justifying congressional action are air and water pollution and determined that these effects are adequately addressed by other provisions of the Act. The court therefore concluded that these provisions as well as the 6 prime farmland provisions "are not directed at the alleviation of water or air pollution, to the extent that there are [any] such effects, and are not means reasonably and plainly adapted to [the legitimate end of] removing any substantial and adverse effect on interstate commerce." We find both of the District Court's rationales untenable. It is established beyond peradventure that "legislative Acts adjusting the burdens and benefits of economic life come to the Court with a presumption of constitutionality" See also Duke Power A court may invalidate legislation enacted under the Commerce Clause only if it is clear that there is no rational basis for a congressional finding that the regulated activity affects interstate commerce, *324 or that there is no reasonable connection between the regulatory means selected and the asserted ends. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., ante, at 276; ; Heart of Atlanta Motel, We are not convinced that the District Court had reliable grounds to reach either conclusion in this case. In our view, Congress was entitled to find that the protection of prime farmland is a federal interest that may be addressed through Commerce Clause legislation. The Inter-agency Report provides no basis for the District Court's contrary view. That report dealt only with the question whether a complete moratorium or ban on surface coal mining on prime farmland was advisable as a matter of policy. The report neither purported to examine the full impact of surface mining
|
Justice Marshall
| 1,981 | 15 |
majority
|
Hodel v. Indiana
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110517/hodel-v-indiana/
|
neither purported to examine the full impact of surface mining on interstate commerce in agricultural commodities, nor concluded that the impact is too negligible to warrant federal regulation.[10] More important, the court below incorrectly assumed that the relevant inquiry under the rational-basis test is the volume of commerce actually affected by the regulated activity. This Court held in that "[t]he power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce is plenary and extends to all such commerce be it great or small." The pertinent inquiry therefore is not how much commerce is involved but whether Congress could rationally conclude that the regulated activity affects interstate commerce. See *325 Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., ante, at 276-277; 4-6 ; at ; Cf. Polish National ; United[11] Against this background, we have little difficulty in concluding that the congressional finding in this case satisfies the rational-basis test. The Senate considered information from the Interagency Report about the prime farmland acreage that might be affected by surface coal mining. See Cong. Rec. 713 (17) (remarks of Sen. Percy). In addition, Senator Percy called the Senate's attention to testimony presented at the Senate Committee hearings about the losses in agricultural productivity attributable to surface mining.[12] at 713-717. See also at 720-721 721 (remarks of Sen. Stevenson). Similar evidence was presented during the contemporaneous hearings before the House Committee,[13] and the Committee *326 Report referred to this testimony in explaining the origins of the "prime farmland" provisions. The Report stated: "The Committee heard testimony from citizens and local officials of Illinois and Indiana requesting that special attention be given in the bill to the protection of prime agricultural lands. Working with officials of the Soil Conservation Service, the Committee added a number of provisions to H. R. 2 designed to insure the proper reconstruction of soil strata within those areas classified as prime agricultural lands." H. R. Rep. No. p. 184 (17). In our judgment, the evidence summarized in the Reports mandates the conclusion that Congress had a rational basis for finding that surface coal mining on prime farmland affects interstate commerce in agricultural products. As we explained in : "Whatever amounts to more or less constant practice, and threatens to obstruct or unduly to burden the freedom of interstate commerce is within the regulatory power of Congress under the commerce clause, and it is primarily for Congress to consider and decide the fact of danger and meet it. This court will certainly not substitute its judgment for that of Congress unless the relation of the subject to interstate commerce and its effect upon
|
Justice Marshall
| 1,981 | 15 |
majority
|
Hodel v. Indiana
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110517/hodel-v-indiana/
|
of the subject to interstate commerce and its effect upon it are clearly non-existent." The court below improperly substituted its judgment for the congressional determination.[] *327 We also conclude that the court below erred in holding that the prime farmland and other substantive provisions challenged by appellees are not reasonably related to the legitimate goal of protecting interstate commerce from adverse effects attributable to surface coal mining. The court incorrectly assumed that the Act's goals are limited to preventing air and water pollution. As we noted in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., ante, at 277-280, Congress was also concerned about preserving the productive capacity of mined lands and protecting the public from health and safety hazards that may result from surface coal mining. All the provisions invalidated by the court below are reasonably calculated to further these legitimate goals.[] For example, the approximate-original-contour requirement in 5 (b) (5) is designed to avoid the environmental and other harm that may result from unreclaimed or improperly restored mining cuts.[16] As the Senate Committee Report explained: "If surface mining and reclamation are not done carefully, *328 significant environmental damage can result. In addition, unreclaimed or improperly reclaimed surface coal mines pose a continuing threat to the environment, and at times are a danger to public health and safety, public or private property." S. Rep. No. p. 50 (17). See also ; H. R. Rep. No. The same is true of 508's requirement that applicants for surface mining permits under the permanent program must inform the regulatory authority of the intended postmining use for the land and the manner in which such use will be achieved. This requirement was among the remedial actions specifically recommended to the House Committee by the United States Army Corps of Engineers. The Corps recommended "[a]dvanced submission of mining and reclamation plans to a responsible government agency having authority to grant or deny approval to engage in mining, based upon the information in the plans and the requirements of the regulations." House Hearings, pt. 2, at 86. These requirements obviously enable the regulatory authority to ascertain, before mining begins, whether the prospective mine operator has given adequate consideration to the postmining fate of the land, and whether the operator possesses the technological capability to restore the land in the manner proposed. Similarly, the relevance of the topsoil-replacement requirement in 5 (b) (5) to the congressional goal of preserving the productive capacity of mined land should be self-evident. See H. R. Rep. No. Again, this measure was included among the Corps of Engineers' recommendations *329 to the
|
Justice Marshall
| 1,981 | 15 |
majority
|
Hodel v. Indiana
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110517/hodel-v-indiana/
|
included among the Corps of Engineers' recommendations *329 to the House Committee. The Corps spokesman advised the Committee to require "[s]egregation and preservation of topsoils during, or preceding, mining operations [in order] to provide soil conditions conducive to rapid revegetation after mining" House Hearings, pt. 2, at 86. Section 522 (e)'s prohibition against mining near churches, schools, parks, public buildings, and occupied dwellings is plainly directed toward ensuring that surface coal mining does not endanger life and property in coal mining communities. Congress adopted the Surface Mining Act in order to ensure that production of coal for interstate commerce would not be at the expense of agriculture, the environment, or public health and safety, injury to any of which interests would have deleterious effects on interstate commerce. See 30 U.S. C. 1202 (f) (16 ed., Supp. III); S. Rep. No. ; H. R. Rep. No. Moreover, as noted in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., ante, at 281-282, the Act reflects the congressional goal of protecting mine operators in States adhering to high performance and reclamation standards from disadvantageous competition with operators in States with less rigorous regulatory programs. See 30 U.S. C. 1201 (g) (16 ed., Supp. III). The statutory provisions invalidated by the District Court advance these legitimate goals, and we conclude that Congress acted reasonably in adopting the regulatory scheme contained in the Act.[17] *330 III The District Court also held that the 21 substantive statutory provisions discussed above violate the Tenth Amendment because they constitute "displacement or regulation of the management structure and operation of the traditional governmental function of the States in the area of land use control and planning" The District Court ruled that the real purpose and effect of the Act is land-use regulation, which, in the court's view, is a traditional state governmental function. The court below, like the District Court in Virginia Surface Mining, relied for its Tenth Amendment analysis on this Court's decision in National League of For the reasons stated in our opinion in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., ante, at 286-293, we hold that the District Court erred in concluding that the challenged provisions of the Act contravene the Tenth Amendment. Like the provisions challenged in Virginia Surface Mining, the sections of the Act under attack in this case regulate only the activities of surface mine operators who are private individuals and businesses, and the District Court's conclusion that the Act directly regulates the States as States is untenable. This Court's decision in National League of Cities simply is not applicable to this
|
Justice Marshall
| 1,981 | 15 |
majority
|
Hodel v. Indiana
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110517/hodel-v-indiana/
|
National League of Cities simply is not applicable to this case.[18] *331 The District Court next held that the prime farmland and approximate-original-contour provisions of the Act violate the equal protection and substantive due process guarantees of the Fifth Amendment. The court noted that the Act makes no allowance for variances from the prime farmland requirements, and that variances from the approximate-original-contour provisions are available only for steep-slope and mountaintop operations. The court reasoned that the absence of a variance procedure from these statutory requirements impermissibly discriminates against coal mine operators and States in the Midwest, where there are significant coal reserves located under prime farmland and few or no steep-slope or mountaintop mining operations. Relying on this Court's decision in the court ruled that this discriminatory treatment could not withstand equal protection scrutiny because it is not justified by "an overriding national interest." The court further held that both the prime farmland and approximate-original-contour provisions "constitute a deprivation of substantive due process" because they are "irrational, arbitrary and capricious requirements in situations where they are not reasonably necessary to achieve a particular postmining use" Although its decision was couched in terms of the arbitrariness of the challenged provisions, we fear that the court below did no more than substitute its policy judgment for that of Congress. Social and economic legislation like the Surface Mining Act that does not employ suspect classifications or impinge on fundamental rights must be upheld against equal protection attack when the legislative means are rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose. ; U. S. Railroad Retirement Moreover, such legislation carries with it a presumption of rationality *332 that can only be overcome by a clear showing of arbitrariness and irrationality. Duke Power 438 U. S., ; 428 U. S., at As the Court explained in social and economic legislation is valid unless "the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that [a court] can only conclude that the legislature's actions were irrational." This is a heavy burden, and appellees have not carried it. Neither the court below nor appellees have identified any instance in which the prime farmland or approximate-original-contour provisions have been applied to a mining operation so as to produce an irrational or arbitrary result. More important, even were appellees correct that the challenged provisions impose a greater burden on mine operators in the Midwest, that is no basis for finding the provisions unconstitutional. A claim of arbitrariness cannot rest solely on a statute's lack of uniform geographic impact. Secretary of
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Justice Marshall
| 1,981 | 15 |
majority
|
Hodel v. Indiana
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110517/hodel-v-indiana/
|
on a statute's lack of uniform geographic impact. Secretary of Agriculture v. Central Roig Refining ; As the Court explained in Central Roig Refining at 616: "Nor does the Commerce Clause impose requirements of geographic uniformity Congress may devise a national policy with due regard for the varying and fluctuating interests of different regions." The characteristics of surface coal mining obviously will vary according to the different geographical conditions present in affected States. Congress has determined that the measures appropriate for steep-slope mines are not necessarily desirable in flatter terrain and prime farmland areas. In allowing variances from the approximate-original-contour requirement applicable to steep-slope mines. Congress may have been influenced by the relative shortage of level land in the steepslope *333 areas of the country which does not exist in the flatter terrain areas of the Midwest. Similarly, Congress presumably concluded that allowing variances from the prime farmland provisions would undermine the effort to preserve the productivity of such lands. In our view, Congress acted rationally in drawing these distinctions, and the fact that a particular State has more of one kind of mining operation than another does not establish impermissible discrimination under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Furthermore, by invalidating the challenged provisions of the Act under the rubric of "substantive due process," the District Court essentially acted as a superlegislature, passing on the wisdom of congressional policy determinations. In so doing, the court exceeded its proper role. See New 427 U.S. 2, ; V As did its counterpart in Virginia Surface Mining, the District Court here ruled that some of the Act's provisions take private property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The court found fault with three of the prime farmland provisions. One is the provision requiring an operator seeking a permit for mining on such land to show that he has the capacity to restore the land, within a reasonable time after the completion of mining, to at least the productivity levels of "non-mined prime farmland in the surrounding area under equivalent levels of management" 510 (d) (1), 30 U.S. C. 1260 (d) (1) (16 ed., Supp. III). The second provision conditions the release of a mine operator's performance bound on the completion of this restoration. 519 (c) (2), 30 U.S. C. 1269 (c) (2) (16 ed., Supp. III). The third provision directs mine operators to include information about the premining productivity of the land in the reclamation plans they file as part of "prime farmland" permit applications. 508 (2), 30 *334 U. S. C. 1258 (2) (16 ed., Supp. III). The
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Justice Marshall
| 1,981 | 15 |
majority
|
Hodel v. Indiana
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110517/hodel-v-indiana/
|
U. S. C. 1258 (2) (16 ed., Supp. III). The District Court concluded that these three provisions effect an unconstitutional taking of private property because, in the court's view, "it is technologically impossible to reclaim prime farmland in a postmining period so that equal or higher levels of yield under high levels of management practice can be achieved." The court also ruled that the requirement in 522 of a procedure for designating areas unsuitable for mining operations, as well as 522 (e)'s proscription of mining on certain lands and near particular structures, takes private property without just compensation. In this case as in Virginia Surface Mining, appellees' takings claims do not focus on any particular properties to which the challenged provisions have been applied. Similarly, the District Court's ruling did not pertain to the taking of a particular piece of property or the denial of a mining permit for specific prime farmland operations proposed by appellees.[19] Thus, this case resembles Virginia Surface Mining in that the only issue properly before the District Court was whether "mere enactment" of the Surface Mining Act effected *335 an unconstitutional taking of private property. For the reasons discussed more fully in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., ante, at 294-2, we conclude that this question must be answered in the negative. Like the steep-slope provisions reviewed in Virginia Surface Mining, the prime farmland provisions do not prohibit surface mining; they merely regulate the conditions under which the activity may be conducted. The prime farmland provisions say nothing about alternative uses to which prime farmland may be put since they come into play only when an operator seeks to conduct mining operations on the land. We therefore conclude that these provisions do not, on their face, deprive a property owner of economically beneficial use of his property.[20] VI The court below joined the Virginia Surface Mining District Court in holding that the Act's civil penalty provisions deprive coal mine operators of their right to due process. However, like their counterparts in Virginia Surface Mining, appellees have made no showing that they were ever assessed civil penalties under the Act, much less that the statutory prepayment requirement was ever applied to them or caused *336 them any injury. As in Virginia Surface Mining, we hold that appellees' challenge to these provisions is premature. VII Our review of the questions presented by this case leads us to the same conclusion that we reached in Virginia Surface Mining. The Surface Mining Act is not vulnerable to appellees' pre-enforcement constitutional challenge. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of
|
Justice Thomas
| 2,002 | 1 |
dissenting
|
Harris v. United States
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/121164/harris-v-united-states/
|
The range of punishment to which petitioner William J. Harris was exposed turned on the fact that he brandished a firearm, a fact that was neither charged in his indictment nor proved at trial beyond a reasonable doubt. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit nonetheless held, in reliance on that the fact that Harris brandished a firearm was a mere sentencing factor to which no constitutional protections attach. however, conflicts with the Court's later decision in as the dissenting opinion in recognized. See The Court's holding today therefore rests on either a misunderstanding or a rejection of the very principles that animated just two years ago. Given that considerations of stare decisis are at their nadir in cases involving procedural rules implicating fundamental constitutional protections afforded criminal defendants, *573 I would reaffirm overrule and reverse the Court of Appeals. I Harris was indicted for distributing marijuana in violation of 21 U.S. C. 841 and for carrying a firearm "in relation to" a drug trafficking in violation of 18 U.S. C. 924(c)(1)(A). Harris pleaded guilty to distributing marijuana but disputed that he had carried a firearm "in relation to" a drug trafficking The District Court disagreed,[1] and he was convicted by the judge, having waived his right to trial by jury. Although the mandatory minimum prison sentence under 924(c)(1)(A)(i) is five years in prison, the presentence report relied on 924(c)(1)(A)(ii), which increases the mandatory minimum prison sentence to seven years when the firearm is brandished.[2] At sentencing, the District Court acknowledged that it was a "close question" whether Harris "brandished" a firearm, and noted that "[t]he only thing that happened here is [that] he had [a gun] during the drug transaction." App. 231-232, 244-247. The District Court nonetheless found by a preponderance of the evidence that Harris had brandished a firearm and as a result sentenced him to the minimum mandatory sentence of seven years' imprisonment for the violation of 924(c)(1)(A). Relying on the Court of Appeals affirmed the sentence and held as a matter of statutory interpretation that brandishing is a sentencing factor, not an element of the 924(c)(1)(A) offense. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals *574 concluded that the allegation of brandishing a firearm did not need to be charged in the indictment or proved beyond a reasonable doubt in order for the 7-year mandatory minimum to be triggered. II The Court construes 924(c)(1)(A) to "defin[e] a single offense," ante, at 556, rather than the multiple offenses the Court found in a similarly structured statute in[3] In reliance on it then discounts the increasing mandatory minimum
|
Justice Thomas
| 2,002 | 1 |
dissenting
|
Harris v. United States
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/121164/harris-v-united-states/
|
In reliance on it then discounts the increasing mandatory minimum sentences set forth in the statutory provision as constitutionally irrelevant. In the plurality's view, any punishment less than the statutory maximum of life imprisonment for any violation of 924(c)(1)(A) avoids the single principle the Court now gleans from : "`Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a beyond the prescribed statutory maximum,' whether the statute calls it an element or a sentencing factor, `must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.' " Ante, at 550 (quoting ). According to the plurality, the historical practices underlying the Court's decision in with respect to penalties that exceed the statutory maximum do not support extension of `s rule to facts that increase a defendant's mandatory minimum sentence. Such fine distinctions with regard to vital constitutional liberties cannot withstand close scrutiny. A The Federal Constitution provides those "accused" in federal courts with specific rights, such as the right "to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation," the right to be "held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous " only on an indictment or presentment of a grand jury, and the right to be tried by "an impartial jury of the State *575 and district wherein the shall have been committed." Amdts. 5 and 6. Also, no Member of this Court disputes that due process requires that every fact necessary to constitute a must be found beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury if that right is not waived. See In re Winship, As with this case thus turns on the seemingly simple question of what constitutes a "." This question cannot be answered by reference to statutory construction alone solely because the sentence does not exceed the statutory maximum. As I at great length in the original understanding of what facts are elements of a was expansive: "[I]f the legislature defines some core and then provides for increasing the punishment of that upon a finding of some aggravating factof whatever sort, including the fact of a prior convictionthe core and the aggravating fact together constitute an aggravated just as much as grand larceny is an aggravated form of petit larceny. The aggravating fact is an element of the aggravated Similarly, if the legislature, rather than creating grades of s, has provided for setting the punishment of a based on some fact that fact is also an element. No multifactor parsing of statutes, of the sort that we have attempted since is necessary. One need only look to
|
Justice Thomas
| 2,002 | 1 |
dissenting
|
Harris v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/121164/harris-v-united-states/
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have attempted since is necessary. One need only look to the kind, degree, or range of punishment to which the prosecution is by law entitled for a given set of facts. Each fact for that entitlement is an element." The fact that a defendant brandished a firearm indisputably alters the prescribed range of penalties to which he is exposed under 18 U.S. C. 924(c)(1)(A). Without a finding that a defendant brandished or discharged a firearm, the penalty range for a conviction under 924(c)(1)(A)(i) is five *576 years to life in prison. But with a finding that a defendant brandished a firearm, the penalty range becomes harsher, seven years to life imprisonment. 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). And if the court finds that a defendant discharged a firearm, the range becomes even more severe, 10 years to life. 924(c)(1)(A)(iii). Thus, it is ultimately beside the point whether as a matter of statutory interpretation brandishing is a sentencing factor, because as a constitutional matter brandishing must be deemed an element of an aggravated offense. See I agree with the Court that a legislature is free to decree, within constitutional limits, which facts are elements that constitute a See ante, at 550. But when the legislature provides that a particular fact shall give rise "`both to a special stigma and to a special punishment,' " ante, at 560 (plurality opinion) (quoting ), the constitutional consequences are clear. As the Court acknowledged in society has long recognized a necessary link between punishment and This link makes a great deal of sense: Why, after all, would anyone care if they were convicted of murder, as opposed to manslaughter, but for the increased penalties for the former offense, which in turn reflect the greater moral opprobrium society attaches to the act? We made clear in that if a statute "`annexes a higher degree of punishment' " based on certain circumstances, exposing a defendant to that higher degree of punishment requires that those circumstances be charged in the indictment and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. *577 This constitutional limitation neither interferes with the legislature's ability to define statutory ranges of punishment nor calls into question judicial discretion to impose "judgment within the range prescribed by statute." But it does protect the criminal defendant's constitutional right to know, ex ante, those circumstances that will determine the applicable range of punishment and to have those circumstances proved beyond a reasonable doubt: "If a defendant faces punishment beyond that provided by statute when an offense is committed under certain circumstances but not others, it is obvious that both the loss of liberty and the
|
Justice Thomas
| 2,002 | 1 |
dissenting
|
Harris v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/121164/harris-v-united-states/
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is obvious that both the loss of liberty and the stigma attaching to the offense are heightened; it necessarily follows that the defendant should notat the moment the State is put to proof of those circumstancesbe deprived of protections that have, until that point, unquestionably attached." B The Court truncates this protection and holds that "facts, sometimes referred to as sentencing factors," do not need to be "alleged in the indictment, submitted to the jury, or established beyond a reasonable doubt," ante, at 550, so long as they do not increase the penalty for the beyond the statutory maximum. This is so even if the fact alters the statutorily mandated sentencing range, by increasing the mandatory minimum sentence. But to say that is in effect to claim that the imposition of a 7-year, rather than a 5-year, mandatory minimum does not change the constitutionally relevant sentence range because, regardless, either sentence falls between five years and the statutory maximum of life, the longest sentence range available under the statute. This analysis is flawed precisely because the statute provides incremental sentencing ranges, in which the mandatory minimum sentence varies upward if a defendant "brandished" or "discharged" a weapon. As a matter of common sense, an *578 increased mandatory minimum heightens the loss of liberty and represents the increased stigma society attaches to the offense. Consequently, facts that trigger an increased mandatory minimum sentence warrant constitutional safeguards. Actual sentencing practices appear to bolster this conclusion. The suggestion that a 7-year sentence could be imposed even without a finding that a defendant brandished a firearm ignores the fact that the sentence imposed when a defendant is found only to have "carried" a firearm "in relation to" a drug trafficking offense appears to be, almost uniformly, if not invariably, five years. Similarly, those found to have brandished a firearm typically, if not always, are sentenced only to 7 years in prison while those found to have discharged a firearm are sentenced only to 10 years. Cf. United States Sentencing Commission, Datafile, USSCFY01, Table 1 (illustrating that almost all persons sentenced for violations of 18 U.S. C. 924(c)(1)(A) are sentenced to 5, 7, or 10 years' imprisonment). This is true even though anyone convicted of violating 924(c)(1)(A) is theoretically eligible to receive a sentence as severe as life imprisonment.[4] Yet under the decision today, those key facts actually responsible for fixing a defendant's punishment need not be charged in an indictment or proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The incremental increase between five and seven years in prison may not seem so great in the abstract
|
Justice Thomas
| 2,002 | 1 |
dissenting
|
Harris v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/121164/harris-v-united-states/
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in prison may not seem so great in the abstract (of course it must seem quite different to a defendant actually being incarcerated). However, the constitutional analysis adopted by the plurality would hold equally true if the mandatory *579 minimum for a violation of 924(c)(1) without brandishing was five years, but the mandatory minimum with brandishing was life imprisonment. The result must be the same because surely our fundamental constitutional principles cannot alter depending on degrees of sentencing severity. So long as it was clear that Congress intended for "brandishing" to be a sentencing factor, that fact would still have to be neither charged in the indictment nor proved beyond a reasonable doubt. But if this is the case, then can easily be avoided by clever statutory drafting. It is true that concerned a fact that increased the penalty for a beyond the prescribed statutory maximum, but the principles upon which it relied apply with equal force to those facts that expose the defendant to a higher mandatory minimum: When a fact exposes a defendant to greater punishment than what is otherwise legally prescribed, that fact is "by definition [an] `elemen[t]' of a separate legal offense." 530 U.S., Whether one raises the floor or raises the ceiling it is impossible to dispute that the defendant is exposed to greater punishment than is otherwise prescribed. This is no less true because mandatory minimum sentences are a 20th-century phenomena. As the Government acknowledged at oral argument, this fact means only that historical practice is not directly dispositive of the question whether facts triggering mandatory minimums must be treated like elements. Tr. of Oral Arg. 47. The Court has not previously suggested that constitutional protection ends where legislative innovation or ingenuity begins. Looking to the principles that animated the decision in and the bases for the historical practice upon which rested (rather than to the historical pedigree of mandatory minimums), there are no logical grounds for treating facts triggering mandatory minimums any differently than facts that increase the statutory maximum. In either case the defendant cannot predict the judgment from the face of the *580 felony, see -479, and the absolute statutory limits of his punishment change, constituting an increased penalty. In either case the defendant must be afforded the procedural protections of notice, a jury trial, and a heightened standard of proof with respect to the facts warranting exposure to a greater penalty. See ; III rested on the premise that the "`applicability of the reasonable-doubt standard has always been dependent on how a State defines the offense that is charged in
|
Justice Thomas
| 2,002 | 1 |
dissenting
|
Harris v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/121164/harris-v-united-states/
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how a State defines the offense that is charged in any given case.' " ). Thus, it cannot withstand the logic of at least with respect to facts for which the legislature has prescribed a new statutory sentencing range. broke from the "traditional understanding" of definition, a tradition that "continued well into the 20th century, at least until the middle of the century." The Court in did not, therefore, acknowledge that the change in the prescribed sentence range upon the finding of particular facts changed the prescribed range of penalties in a constitutionally significant way. Rather, while recognizing applicable due process limits, it concluded that the mandatory minimum at issue did not increase the prescribed range of penalties but merely required the judge to impose a specific penalty "within the range already available to it." -88. As this analysis is inherently flawed. called into question, and firmly limited, a related precept underlying : namely, the State's authority to treat aggravated behavior as a factor increasing the sentence, rather than as an element of the Although the plurality resurrects this principle, see ante, at 559-560, 565, it must do so in the face of the Court's contrary *581 conclusion in which adopts the position taken by the dissent in : "[I]f a State provides that a specific component of a prohibited transaction shall give rise both to a special stigma and to a special punishment, that component must be treated as a `fact necessary to constitute the ' within the meaning of our holding in In re Winship. " See Nor should stare decisis dictate the outcome in this case; the stare decisis effect of is considerably weakened for a variety of reasons. As an initial matter, where the Court has wrongly decided a constitutional question, the force of stare decisis is at its weakest. See Ring v. Arizona, post, at 608; And while the relationship between punishment and the constitutional protections attached to the elements of a traces its roots back to the common law, was decided only 16 years ago.[5] No Court of Appeals, let alone this Court, has held that has retroactive effect. The United States concedes, with respect to prospective application, that it can charge facts upon which a mandatory minimum sentence is based in the indictment and prove them to a jury. Tr. of Oral Arg. 42. Consequently, one is hard pressed to give credence to the plurality's suggestion that "[i]t is critical not to abandon" "at this late date." Ante, at 567. Rather, it is imperative that the Court maintain absolute fidelity to the protections
|
Justice Thomas
| 2,002 | 1 |
dissenting
|
Harris v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/121164/harris-v-united-states/
|
imperative that the Court maintain absolute fidelity to the protections of the individual afforded *582 by the notice, trial by jury, and beyond-a-reasonabledoubt requirements. Finally, before today, no one seriously believed that the Court's earlier decision in could coexist with the logical implications of the Court's later decisions in and In both cases, the dissent said as much: "The essential holding of conflicts with at least two of the several formulations the Court gives to the rule it announces today. First, the Court endorses the following principle: `[I]t is unconstitutional for a legislature to remove from the jury the assessment of facts that increase the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed. It is equally clear that such facts must be established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.' Ante, (quoting ). Second, the Court endorses the rule as restated in Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in See ante, There, Justice Scalia wrote: `[I]t is unconstitutional to remove from the jury the assessment of facts that alter the congressionally prescribed range of penal- ties to which a criminal defendant is exposed.' Thus, the Court appears to hold that any fact that increases or alters the range of penalties to which a defendant is exposed which, by definition, must include increases or alterations to either the minimum or maximum penalties must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. In however, we rejected such a rule to the extent it concerned those facts that increase or alter the minimum penalty to which a defendant is exposed. Accordingly, it is incumbent on the Court not only to admit that it is overruling but also to explain why such a course of action is appropriate under normal principles of stare decisis. " 530 U. S., *583 See also ("[B]y its terms, Justice Scalia's view would call into question the validity of judge-administered mandatory minimum sentencing provisions, contrary to our holding in Once the facts triggering application of the mandatory minimum are found by the judge, the sentencing range to which the defendant is exposed is altered"). There is no question but that stare decisis may yield where a prior decision's "underpinnings [have been] eroded, by subsequent decisions of this Court." United Further supporting the essential incompatibility of and Justice Breyer concurs in the judgment but not the entire opinion of the Court, recognizing that he "cannot easily distinguish from this case in terms of logic. For that reason, I cannot agree with the plurality's opinion insofar as it finds such a distinction." Ante, at 569 (opinion concurring in part and
|
Justice Brennan
| 1,972 | 13 |
dissenting
|
Duncan v. Tennessee
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108469/duncan-v-tennessee/
|
In dismissing the writ of certiorari in this case, the Court lets stand a conviction secured in violation of petitioner's right, under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, not to be placed in jeopardy twice for a single criminal offense. The infringement of this *128 fundamental right is so plain on the record before us that I am compelled to dissent. Petitioner and a codefendant, Brooks, were brought to trial in the Criminal Court of Montgomery County, Tennessee, on an indictment charging armed robbery "by the use of a deadly weapon, to-wit: A Gun to-wit: a pistol"[1] The jury was selected and sworn, the indictment read, and a plea of not guilty entered on the defendants' behalf. The 's first witness, the officer investigating the robbery, testified that he had been looking for a "22 rifle" used in the commission of the crime. Defense counsel immediately objected to this evidence as immaterial to a charge of armed robbery with a pistol, and after some discussion out of the jury's presence, his objection was sustained. The prosecutor then informed the court that he had used the word "pistol" in the indictment by mistake and that in view of the court's refusal to admit evidence of the rifle, the could proceed no further with its case and would move for a directed verdict of acquittal on the ground of erroneous indictment. The trial court granted this motion over defendants' objection and instructed the jury "to find, or to acquit the Defendants of the charge in view of that error in the indictment." About eight months later, in March 1969, the defendants were again brought to trial for the same armed robbery. The new indictment was identical to the old *129 as to date, victim, and amount of money stolen and differed only in its description of the weapon as a "22 caliber rifle." Nevertheless, defendants' plea of double jeopardy was overruled by the court, and they were convicted and sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment. The Court of Criminal Appeals sustained defendants' double jeopardy claim on appeal, but the Supreme Court of Tennessee reversed. It agreed that evidence of the rifle was properly excluded at the first trial, since under Tennessee's "strict" variance rule " `an allegation in an indictment which is not impertinent or foreign to the cause [such as specifying the weapon as a pistol] must be proved, though a prosecution for the same offense might be supported without such allegation'" 462 S. W. 2d, at 494 (italics omitted), quoting See also The court went on to hold, however, that since the
|
Justice Brennan
| 1,972 | 13 |
dissenting
|
Duncan v. Tennessee
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108469/duncan-v-tennessee/
|
The court went on to hold, however, that since the variance between "pistol" and "rifle" was sufficient to render the initial indictment defective, it was likewise sufficient to distinguish the second indictment from the first for double jeopardy purposes. " `To entitle a prisoner to the benefit of the plea of autrefois acquit, it is necessary that the crimes charged in the last bill of indictment be precisely the same with that charged in the first, and that the first bill of indictment is good in point of law. The true test by which the question whether such a plea is a sufficient bar may be tried is whether the evidence necessary to support the second indictment would have been sufficient to procure a legal conviction * upon the first.' " 462 S. W. 2d, at 493, quoting Though recognizing the application of the Double Jeopardy Clause to the s, the court concluded that the strict variance rule "when consistently applied as a test for both variance and double jeopardy, will affect equally both the state and the defendant, and in our opinion not offend the Fourteenth Amendment." 462 S. W. 2d, at 494. A petition for rehearing based on this Court's decision in was denied on the ground that Ashe "has no application to the question whether there has been double jeopardy where the first indictment is void for variance." 462 S. W. 2d, at 495. The guarantee against double jeopardy is "fundamental to the American scheme of justice,' " designed to ensure that "the with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty." Green v. United s, Thus, we must view with a cautious eye any suggestion, as in the denial of rehearing below, that a particular trial, once commenced, might not result in the attachment of jeopardy under the Constitution. As the conceded at oral argument, that suggestion is not sustainable here. Had petitioner's first trial gone no further than the impaneling of a jury, this in itself would have served to invoke the constitutional guarantee, for it is now settled that "a defendant is placed in jeopardy once he is put to trial before a jury so that if the jury is discharged without his *131 consent he cannot be tried again." There are exceptions to this
|
Justice Brennan
| 1,972 | 13 |
dissenting
|
Duncan v. Tennessee
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108469/duncan-v-tennessee/
|
he cannot be tried again." There are exceptions to this rule, of course, as in the case of a hung jury, United s v. Perez, or military emergency requiring withdrawal of charges, but they do not apply here. In any event, we need not rely on the calling of a jury to find an attachment of jeopardy, for it is clear that petitioner was not only tried for robbery in the initial proceeding, but was in fact acquitted at the direction of the court. His acquittal, being the final verdict in a court of competent jurisdiction, automatically precluded the from retrying him for the same offense, even though, as the court below pointed out, the direction to acquit arose from a defect in the indictment. It has long been the rule of this Court that "former jeopardy includes one who has been acquitted by a verdict duly rendered, although no judgment be entered on the verdict, and it was found upon a defective indictment. The protection is not against the peril of second punishment, but against being again tried for the same offense." Kepner v. United s, See also United s v. Ball, ; Fong Foo v. United s, ; -797. Nor is this rule a mere nicety of abstract constitutional theory. The prosecution might have any number of reasons for wanting to halt a trial at midpoint and begin anew, and the indictment offers a fertile source for the discovery of error. To permit the to obtain a final verdict by asserting its own mistake in the indictment and then to retry the defendant on the theory that jeopardy had not attached is to subject him to the very dangers that the Double Jeopardy *132 Clause was designed to avoid. The very properly conceded at oral argument that petitioner "was placed in jeopardy in the first trial." Tr. of Oral Arg. 23. The only question, then, is whether the petitioner was tried twice for the same offense. Tennessee argues that under its strict-variance rule the specification of "pistol" in the first indictment charged an entirely different offense from the armed robbery with a "rifle" alleged in the second, since the "same evidence" could not be used to prove both charges. Whatever relevance this doctrine may have in determining a variance between indictment and proof within a single trial, it certainly does not comport with the double jeopardy standards of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. In my view, "the Double Jeopardy Clause requires the prosecution, except in most limited circumstances, to join at one trial all the charges against a
|
Justice Brennan
| 1,972 | 13 |
dissenting
|
Duncan v. Tennessee
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108469/duncan-v-tennessee/
|
to join at one trial all the charges against a defendant that grow out of a single criminal act, occurrence, episode, or transaction." This the has clearly failed to do. At petitioner's first trial the was prepared to proceed on evidence that a rifle had been used in the robbery. The first witness testified as to a rifle, and the rifle itself was apparently in the courtroom in full view of the jury. Following petitioner's acquittal, the again tried him for armed robbery with a rifle. The same witness was called to testify about the rifle as in the first trial, and the same rifle was present in the courtroom. In short, though the first indictment charged petitioner with using a "pistol," the could also have charged him with use of a rifle, based on the very same evidence, both physical and testimonial, on which he was eventually convicted at the second trial. Having failed to do so and having obtained a final verdict at the first trial, the was barred, in my opinion, from bringing a *133 second prosecution based on this "single criminal act."[2] The majority's refusal to address these issues is inexplicable. It may be that the prosecution in this case did not have available to it a ready means, under state law, of amending the first indictment and thus had no choice but to end the trial and begin again. If so, its remedy lies in changing Tennessee's criminal procedure, not in denying petitioner the constitutional protection to which he is entitled. Petitioner was tried twice for the same offense, and his conviction should be reversed. United s v. Jorn, I would grant him that relief.
|
Justice Rehnquist
| 1,983 | 19 |
second_dissenting
|
INS v. Chadha
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110985/ins-v-chadha/
|
A severability clause creates a presumption that Congress intended the valid portion of the statute to remain in force when one part is found to be invalid. ; Champlin Refining A severability clause does not, however, conclusively resolve the issue. "[T]he determination, in the end, is reached by" asking "[w]hat was the intent of the lawmakers," at and "will rarely turn on the presence or absence of such a clause." United Because I believe that Congress did not intend the one-House veto provision of 244(c)(2) to be severable, I dissent. Section 244(c)(2) is an exception to the general rule that an alien's deportation shall be suspended when the Attorney General finds that statutory criteria are met. It is severable only if Congress would have intended to permit the Attorney General to suspend deportations without it. This Court has held several times over the years that exceptions such as this are not severable because "by rejecting the exceptions intended by the legislature. the statute is made to enact what confessedly the legislature never meant. It confers upon the statute a positive operation beyond the legislative intent, and beyond what anyone can say it would have enacted in view of the illegality of the exceptions." By severing 244(c)(2), the Court permits suspension of deportation in a class of cases where Congress never stated that suspension was appropriate. I do not believe we should expand the statute in this way without some clear indication that Congress intended such an expansion. As the Court said in : "Where an excepting provision in a statute is found unconstitutional, courts very generally hold that this does not work an enlargement of the scope or operation of other provisions with which that provision was enacted and which was intended to qualify or restrain. The reasoning on which the decisions proceed is illustrated in State ex rel. In dealing with a contention that a statute *1015 containing an unconstitutional provision should be construed as if the remainder stood alone, the court there said: `This would be to mutilate the section and garble its meaning. The legislative intention must not be confounded with their power to carry that intention into effect. To refuse to give force and vitality to a provision of law is one thing, and to refuse to read it is a very different thing. It is by a mere figure of speech that we say an unconstitutional provision of a statute is "stricken out." For all the purposes of construction it is to be regarded as part of the act. The meaning of the legislature must
|
Justice Rehnquist
| 1,983 | 19 |
second_dissenting
|
INS v. Chadha
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110985/ins-v-chadha/
|
part of the act. The meaning of the legislature must be gathered from all that they have said, as well from that which is ineffectual for want of power, as from that which is authorized by law.' "Here the excepting provision was in the statute when it was enacted, and there can be no doubt that the legislature intended that the meaning of the other provisions should be taken as restricted accordingly. Only with that restricted meaning did they receive the legislative sanction which was essential to make them part of the statute law of the State; and no other authority is competent to give them a larger application." See also The Court finds that the legislative history of 244 shows that Congress intended 244(c)(2) to be severable because Congress wanted to relieve itself of the burden of private bills. But the history elucidated by the Court shows that Congress was unwilling to give the Executive Branch permission to suspend deportation on its own. Over the years, Congress consistently rejected requests from the Executive for complete discretion in this area. Congress always insisted on retaining ultimate control, whether by concurrent resolution, as in the 1948 Act, or by one-House veto, as in the present Act. Congress has never indicated that it would be willing to permit suspensions of deportation unless it could retain some sort of veto. *1016 It is doubtless true that Congress has the power to provide for suspensions of deportation without a one-House veto. But the Court has failed to identify any evidence that Congress intended to exercise that power. On the contrary, Congress' continued insistence on retaining control of the suspension process indicates that it has never been disposed to give the Executive Branch a free hand. By severing 244(c)(2) the Court has " `confounded' " Congress' " `intention' " to permit suspensions of deportation " `with their power to carry that intention into effect.' " quoting State ex rel. Because I do not believe that 244(c)(2) is severable, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
|
Justice Rehnquist
| 1,989 | 19 |
dissenting
|
Missouri v. Jenkins
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112299/missouri-v-jenkins/
|
I agree with JUSTICE O'CONNOR that the Eleventh Amendment does not permit an award of attorney's fees against a State which includes compensation for delay in payment. Unlike JUSTICE O'CONNOR, however, I do not agree with the *296 Court's approval of the award of law clerk and paralegal fees made here. Title 42 U.S. C. 1988 gives the district courts discretion to allow the prevailing party in an action under 42 U.S. C. 1983 "a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs." The Court reads this language as authorizing recovery of "a `reasonable' fee for the attorney's work product," ante, at 285, which, the Court concludes, may include separate compensation for the services of law clerks and paralegals. But the statute itself simply uses the very familiar term "a reasonable attorney's fee," which to those untutored in the Court's linguistic juggling means a fee charged for services rendered by an individual who has been licensed to practice law. Because law clerks and paralegals have not been licensed to practice law in Missouri, it is difficult to see how charges for their services may be separately billed as part of "attorney's fees." And since a prudent attorney customarily includes compensation for the cost of law clerk and paralegal services, like any other sort of office overhead from secretarial staff, janitors, and librarians, to telephone service, stationery, and paper clips in his own hourly billing rate, allowing the prevailing party to recover separate compensation for law clerk and paralegal services may result in "double recovery." The Court finds justification for its ruling in the fact that the prevailing practice among attorneys in Kansas City is to bill clients separately for the services of law clerks and paralegals. But I do not think Congress intended the meaning of the statutory term "attorney's fee" to expand and contract with each and every vagary of local billing practice. Under the Court's logic, prevailing parties could recover at market rates for the cost of secretaries, private investigators, and other types of lay personnel who assist the attorney in preparing his case, so long as they could show that the prevailing practice in the local market was to bill separately for these services. Such a result would be a sufficiently drastic departure from the traditional concept of "attorney's fees" that I *297 believe new statutory authorization should be required for it. That permitting separate billing of law clerk and paralegal hours at market rates might " `reduc[e] the spiraling cost of civil rights litigation' " by encouraging attorneys to delegate to these individuals tasks
|
Justice Rehnquist
| 1,989 | 19 |
dissenting
|
Missouri v. Jenkins
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112299/missouri-v-jenkins/
|
" by encouraging attorneys to delegate to these individuals tasks which they would otherwise perform themselves at higher cost, ante, at 288, and n. 10, may be a persuasive reason for Congress to enact such additional legislation. It is not, however, a persuasive reason for us to rewrite the legislation which Congress has in fact enacted. See I also disagree with the State's suggestion that law clerk and paralegal expenses incurred by a prevailing party, if not recoverable at market rates as "attorney's fees" under 1988, are nonetheless recoverable at actual cost under that statute. The language of 1988 expands the traditional definition of "costs" to include "a reasonable attorney's fee," but it cannot fairly be read to authorize the recovery of all other out-of-pocket expenses actually incurred by the prevailing party in the course of litigation. Absent specific statutory authorization for the recovery of such expenses, the prevailing party remains subject to the limitations on cost recovery imposed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) and 28 U.S. C. 1920, which govern the taxation of costs in federal litigation where a cost-shifting statute is not applicable. Section 1920 gives the district court discretion to tax certain types of costs against the losing party in any federal litigation. The statute specifically enumerates six categories of expenses which may be taxed as costs: fees of the court clerk and marshal; fees of the court reporter; printing fees and witness fees; copying fees; certain docket fees; and fees of court-appointed experts and interpreters. We have held that this list is exclusive. Crawford Fitting Since none of these categories can possibly be construed to include the fees of law clerks and paralegals, *298 I would also hold that reimbursement for these expenses may not be separately awarded at actual cost. I would therefore reverse the award of reimbursement for law clerk and paralegal expenses.
|
Justice Breyer
| 2,006 | 2 |
second_dissenting
|
Rapanos v. United States
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145642/rapanos-v-united-states/
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In my view, the authority of the Army Corps of Engineers under the Clean Water Act extends to the limits of congressional power to regulate interstate commerce. See Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook (Stevens, J., dissenting). I therefore have no difficulty finding that the wetlands at issue in these cases are within the Corps' jurisdiction, and I join Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion. My view of the statute rests in part upon the nature of the problem. The statute seeks to "restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters." 33 U.S. C. 1251(a). Those waters are so various and so intricately interconnected that Congress might well have decided the only way to achieve this goal is to write a statute that defines "waters" broadly and to leave the enforcing agency with the task of restricting the scope of that definition, either wholesale through regulation or retail through development permissions. That is why I believe that Congress, in using the term "waters of the United States," 1362(7), intended fully to exercise its relevant Commerce Clause powers. I mention this because the Court, contrary to my view, has written a "nexus" requirement into the statute. ; ante, at 779 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment) ("[T]he Corps' jurisdiction over wetlands depends upon the existence of a significant nexus between the wetlands in question and navigable waters in the traditional sense"). But it has left the administrative powers of the Army Corps of Engineers untouched. That agency may write regulations defining the termsomething that it has not yet done. And the courts must give those regulations appropriate deference. Chevron U. S. A. If one thing is clear, it is that Congress intended the Army Corps of Engineers to make the complex technical judgments *812 that lie at the heart of the present cases (subject to deferential judicial review). In the absence of updated regulations, courts will have to make ad hoc determinations that run the risk of transforming scientific questions into matters of law. That is not the system Congress intended. Hence I believe that today's opinions, taken together, call for the Army Corps of Engineers to write new regulations, and speedily so.
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Justice Stevens
| 1,994 | 16 |
majority
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ABF Freight System, Inc. v. NLRB
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112925/abf-freight-system-inc-v-nlrb/
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Michael Manso gave his employer a false excuse for being late to work and repeated that falsehood while testifying under oath before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). Notwithstanding Manso's dishonesty, the National Labor Relations Board (Board) ordered Manso's former employer to reinstate him with backpay. Our interest in preserving the integrity of administrative proceedings prompted us to grant *319 certiorari to consider whether Manso's misconduct should have precluded the Board from granting him that relief. I Manso worked as a casual dockworker at petitioner ABF Freight System, Inc.'s (ABF's) trucking terminal in Albuquerque, New Mexico, from the summer of 1987 to August 1989. He was fired three times. The first time, Manso was 1 of 12 employees discharged in June 1988 in a dispute over a contractual provision relating to so-called "preferential casual" dockworkers.[1] The grievance Manso's union filed eventually secured his reinstatement; Manso also filed an unfair labor practice charge against ABF over the incident. Manso's return to work was short lived. Three supervisors warned him of likely retaliation from top management alerting him, for example, that ABF was "gunning" for him, App. 96, and that "the higher echelon was after [him]," See also ABF Freight System, Inc., 304 N. L. R. B. 585, 592, 597 (1991). Within six weeks ABF discharged Manso for a second time on pretextual grounds ostensibly for failing to respond to a call to work made under a stringent verification procedure ABF had recently imposed upon preferential casuals.[2] Once again, a grievance panel ordered Manso reinstated. *320 Manso's third discharge came less than two months later. On August 11, 1989, Manso arrived four minutes late for the 5 a.m. shift. At the time, ABF had no policy regarding lateness. After Manso was late to work, however, ABF decided to discharge preferential casualsthough not other employeeswho were late twice without good cause. Six days later Manso triggered the policy's first application when he arrived at work nearly an hour late for the same shift. Manso telephoned at 5:25 a.m. to explain that he was having car trouble on the highway, and repeated that excuse when he arrived. ABF conducted a prompt investigation, ascertained that he was lying,[3] and fired him for tardiness under its new policy on lateness. Manso filed a second unfair labor practice charge. In the hearing before the ALJ, Manso repeated his story about the car trouble that preceded his third discharge. The ALJ credited most of his testimony about events surrounding his dismissals, but expressly concluded that Manso lied when he told ABF that car trouble made him late to work.
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Justice Stevens
| 1,994 | 16 |
majority
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ABF Freight System, Inc. v. NLRB
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112925/abf-freight-system-inc-v-nlrb/
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told ABF that car trouble made him late to work. Accordingly, although the ALJ decided that ABF had illegally discharged Manso the second time because he was a *321 party to the earlier union grievance,[4] the ALJ denied Manso relief for the third discharge based on his finding that ABF had dismissed Manso for cause. The Board affirmed the ALJ's finding that Manso's second discharge was unlawful, but reversed with respect to the third discharge. Acknowledging that Manso lied to his employer and that ABF presumably could have discharged him for that dishonesty, the Board nevertheless emphasized that ABF did not in fact discharge him for lying and that the ALJ's conclusion to the contrary was "a plainly erroneous factual statement of [ABF]'s asserted reasons."[5] Instead, Manso's lie "established only that he did not have a legitimate excuse for the August 17 lateness." The Board focused primarily on ABF's retroactive application of its lateness policy to include Manso's first time late to work, holding that ABF had "seized upon" Manso's tardiness "as a pretext to discharge him again and for the same unlawful reasons it discharged him on June 19."[6] In addition, though the Board deemed Manso's discharge unlawful even assuming the validity of ABF's general disciplinary treatment of preferential casuals, it observed that ABF's disciplinary approach and lack of uniform rules for all dockworkers "raise[d] more questions than they resolve[d]." The Board ordered ABF to reinstate Manso with backpay. *322 The Court of Appeals enforced the Board's order. Its review of the record revealed "abundant evidence of antiunion animus in ABF's conduct towards Manso," including "ample evidence" that Manso's third discharge was not for cause, The court regarded as important the testimony in the record confirming that Manso would not have been discharged under ABF's new tardiness policy had he provided a legitimate excuse. The court also rejected ABF's argument that awarding reinstatement and backpay to an employee who lied to his employer and to the ALJ violated public policy.[7] Noting that "Manso's original misrepresentation was made to his employer in an attempt to avoid being fired under a policy the application of which the Board found to be the result of antiunion animus," the court reasoned that the Board had wide discretion to ascertain what remedy best furthered the policies of the National Labor Relations Act (Act). II The question we granted certiorari to review is a narrow one.[8] We assume that the Board correctly found that ABF discharged Manso unlawfully in August 1989. We also assume, more importantly, that the Board did not abuse its discretion in
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Justice Stevens
| 1,994 | 16 |
majority
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ABF Freight System, Inc. v. NLRB
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112925/abf-freight-system-inc-v-nlrb/
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importantly, that the Board did not abuse its discretion in ordering reinstatement even though Manso *323 gave ABF a false reason for being late to work. We are concerned only with the ramifications of Manso's false testimony under oath in a formal proceeding before the ALJ. We recognize that the Board might have decided that such misconduct disqualified Manso from profiting from the proceeding, or it might even have adopted a flat rule precluding reinstatement when a former employee so testifies. As the case comes to us, however, the issue is not whether the Board might adopt such a rule, but whether it must do so. False testimony in a formal proceeding is intolerable. We must neither reward nor condone such a "flagrant affront" to the truth-seeking function of adversary proceedings. See United See also United ; ; ; ; United ; If knowingly exploited by a criminal prosecutor, such wrongdoing is so "inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of justice" that it can vitiate a judgment even after it has become final. In any proceeding, whether judicial or administrative, deliberate falsehoods "well may affect the dearest concerns of the parties before a tribunal," United and may put the factfinder and parties "to the disadvantage, hindrance, and delay of ultimately extracting the truth by cross examination, by extraneous investigation or other collateral means." Perjury should be severely sanctioned in appropriate cases. ABF submits that the false testimony of a former employee who was the victim of an unfair labor practice should always preclude him from winning reinstatement with backpay. That contention, though not inconsistent with our appraisal of his misconduct, raises countervailing concerns. Most important is Congress' decision to delegate to the *324 Board the primary responsibility for making remedial decisions that best effectuate the policies of the Act when it has substantiated an unfair labor practice. The Act expressly authorizes the Board "to take such affirmative action including reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of [the Act]." 29 U.S. C. 160(c). Only in cases of discharge for cause does the statute restrict the Board's authority to order reinstatement.[9] This is not such a case. When Congress expressly delegates to an administrative agency the authority to make specific policy determinations, courts must give the agency's decision controlling weight unless it is "arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute." Chevron U. S. A. Because this case involves that kind of express delegation, the Board's views merit the greatest deference. This has been our consistent appraisal of the Board's remedial authority throughout its long history
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Justice Stevens
| 1,994 | 16 |
majority
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ABF Freight System, Inc. v. NLRB
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112925/abf-freight-system-inc-v-nlrb/
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appraisal of the Board's remedial authority throughout its long history of administering the Act.[10] As we explained over a half century ago: "Because the relation of remedy to policy is peculiarly a matter for administrative competence, courts must not enter the allowable area of the Board's discretion and must guard against the danger of sliding unconsciously from the narrow confines of law into the more spacious domain of policy." Phelps Dodge *325 Notwithstanding our concern about the seriousness of Manso's ill-advised decision to repeat under oath his false excuse for tardiness, we cannot say that the Board's remedial order in this case was an abuse of its broad discretion or that it was obligated to adopt a rigid rule that would foreclose relief in all comparable cases. Nor can we fault the Board's conclusions that Manso's reason for being late to work was ultimately irrelevant to whether antiunion animus actually motivated his discharge and that ordering effective relief in a case of this character promotes a vital public interest. Notably, the ALJ refused to credit the testimony of several ABF witnesses, see, e. g., 304 N. L. R. B., at 598, and the Board affirmed those credibility findings, The unfairness of sanctioning Manso while indirectly rewarding those witnesses' lack of candor is obvious. Moreover, the rule ABF advocates might force the Board to divert its attention from its primary mission and devote unnecessary time and energy to resolving collateral disputes about credibility. Its decision to rely on "other civil and criminal remedies" for false testimony, cf. St. Mary's Honor rather than a categorical exception to the familiar remedy of reinstatement is well within its broad discretion. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. It is so ordered.
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Justice Powell
| 1,985 | 17 |
dissenting
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Dowling v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111502/dowling-v-united-states/
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The Court holds today that 18 U.S. C. 2314 does not apply to this case because the rights of a copyright holder are "different" from the rights of owners of other kinds of property. The Court does not explain, however, how the differences it identifies are relevant either under the language of 2314 or in terms of the purposes of the statute. Because I believe that the language of 2314 fairly covers the interstate transportation of goods containing unauthorized use of copyrighted material, I dissent. Section 2314 provides for criminal penalties against any person who "transports in interstate or foreign commerce any goods, wares, merchandise, securities or money, of the value of $5,000 or more, knowing the same to have been stolen, converted or taken by fraud." There is no dispute that the items Dowling transported in interstate commerce bootleg Elvis Presley records are goods, wares, or merchandise. Nor is there a dispute that the records contained copyrighted Elvis Presley performances that Dowling had no right to reproduce and distribute. The only issue here is whether the unauthorized use of a copyright may be "equate[d] with theft, conversion, or fraud" for purposes of 2314. Ante, at 217. Virtually every court that has considered the question has concluded that 2314 is broad *230 enough to cover activities such as Dowling's. See, e. g., United (CA11), cert. denied, ; United ; United ; United The only case cited by the Court that lends support to its holding is United[1] The Court's decision today is thus contrary to the clear weight of authority. The Court focuses on the fact that "[t]he copyright owner. holds no ordinary chattel." Ante, at 216. The Court quite correctly notes that a copyright is "comprise[d] of carefully defined and carefully delimited interests," ibid., and that the copyright owner does not enjoy " `complete control over all possible uses of his work,' " ante, at 217, quoting Sony But among the rights a copyright owner enjoys is the right to publish, copy, and distribute the copyrighted work. Indeed, these rights define virtually the entire scope of an owner's rights in intangible property such as a copyright. Interference with these rights may be "different" from the physical removal of tangible objects, but it is not clear why this difference matters under the terms of 2314. The statute makes no distinction between tangible and intangible property. The basic goal of the National Stolen Property Act, thwarting the interstate transportation of misappropriated goods, is not served by the judicial imposition of this distinction. Although the rights of copyright owners *231
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Justice Powell
| 1,985 | 17 |
dissenting
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Dowling v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111502/dowling-v-united-states/
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of this distinction. Although the rights of copyright owners *231 in their property may be more limited than those of owners of other kinds of property, they are surely "just as deserving of protection" United The Court concedes that 2314 has never been interpreted to require that the goods, wares, or merchandise stolen and transported in violation of the statute remain in unaltered form. Ante, at 216. See also United It likewise recognizes that the statute is applicable even when the misappropriated item "owes a major portion of its value to an intangible component." Ante, at 216. The difficulty the Court finds with the application of 2314 here is in finding a theft, conversion, or fraudulent taking, in light of the intangible nature of a copyright. But this difficulty, it seems to me, has more to do with its views on the relative evil of copyright infringement versus other kinds of thievery, than it does with interpretation of the statutory language. The statutory terms at issue here, i. e., "stolen, converted or taken by fraud," traditionally have been given broad scope by the courts. For example, in United this Court held that the term "stolen" included all felonious takings with intent to deprive the owner of the rights and benefits of ownership, regardless of whether the theft would constitute larceny at common law. Similarly, in the Court stated that conversion "may be consummated without any intent to keep and without any wrongful taking, where the initial possession by the converter was entirely lawful. Conversion may include misuse or abuse of property. It may reach use in an unauthorized manner or to an unauthorized extent of property placed in one's custody for limited use." Dowling's unauthorized duplication and commercial exploitation of the copyrighted performances were intended to gain for himself the rights and benefits lawfully reserved to the copyright owner. Under his acts should be *232 viewed as the theft of these performances. Likewise, Dowling's acts constitute the unauthorized use of another's property and are fairly cognizable as conversion under the Court's definition in Morissette. The Court invokes the familiar rule that a criminal statute is to be construed narrowly. This rule is intended to assure fair warning to the public, e. g., United ; and is applied when statutory language is ambiguous or inadequate to put persons on notice of what the legislature has made a crime. See, e. g., United ; I disagree not with these principles, but with their application to this statute. As I read 2314, it is not ambiguous, but simply very broad. The statute punishes
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Justice Powell
| 1,985 | 17 |
dissenting
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Dowling v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111502/dowling-v-united-states/
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is not ambiguous, but simply very broad. The statute punishes individuals who transport goods, wares, or merchandise worth $5,000 or more, knowing "the same to have been stolen, converted or taken by fraud." 18 U.S. C. 2314. As noted above, this Court has given the terms "stolen" and "converted" broad meaning in the past. The petitioner could not have had any doubt that he was committing a theft as well as defrauding the copyright owner.[2] The Court also emphasizes the fact that the copyright laws contain their own penalties for violation of their terms. But the fact that particular conduct may violate more than one federal law does not foreclose the Government from making a choice as to which of the statutes should be the basis for an indictment. "This Court has long recognized that when an act violates more than one criminal statute, the Government *233 may prosecute under either so long as it does not discriminate against any class of defendants." United Finally, Congress implicitly has approved the Government's use of 2314 to reach conduct like Dowling's. In adopting the Piracy and Counterfeiting Amendments Act of Stat. 91, Congress provided that the new penalties "shall be in addition to any other provisions of title 17 or any other law." 18 U.S. C. 2319(a) (emphasis added). The Senate Judiciary Committee specifically added the italicized language to clarify that the new provision "supplement[s] existing remedies contained in the copyright law or any other law." S. Rep. No. 97-4, p. 2 (emphasis added). Many courts had used 2314 to reach the shipment of goods containing unauthorized use of copyrighted material prior to the enactment of the Piracy and Counterfeiting Amendments Act. By choosing to make its new felony provisions supplemental, Congress implicitly consented to continued application of 2314 to these offenses. Dowling and his partners "could not have doubted the criminal nature of their conduct" United His claim that 2314 does not reach his clearly unlawful use of copyrighted performances evinces "the sort of sterile formality" properly rejected by the vast majority of courts that have considered the question. United (CA9 19), cert. denied, Accordingly, I dissent.
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Justice Kennedy
| 2,015 | 4 |
majority
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Department of Transportation v. Association of American Railroads
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2784697/department-of-transportation-v-association-of-american-railroads/
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In 1970, Congress created the National Railroad Pas senger Corporation, most often known as Amtrak. Later, Congress granted Amtrak and the Federal Railroad Ad ministration (FRA) joint authority to issue “metrics and standards” that address the performance and scheduling of passenger railroad services. Alleging that the metrics and standards have substantial and adverse effects upon its members’ freight services, respondent—the Association of American Railroads—filed this suit to challenge their validity. The defendants below, petitioners here, are the Department of Transportation, the FRA, and two individ uals sued in their official capacity. Respondent alleges the metrics and standards must be invalidated on the ground that Amtrak is a private entity and it was therefore unconstitutional for Congress to allow and direct it to exercise joint authority in their issuance. This argument rests on the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause and the constitutional provisions regarding separa tion of powers. The District Court rejected both of re 2 DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION v. ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN RAILROADS Opinion of the Court spondent’s claims. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, finding that, for purposes of this dispute, Amtrak is a private entity and that Congress violated nondelegation principles in its grant of joint authority to Amtrak and the FRA. On that premise the Court of Appeals invalidated the metrics and standards. Having granted the petition for writ of certiorari, 573 U. S. (2014), this Court now holds that, for purposes of determining the validity of the metrics and standards, Amtrak is a governmental entity. Although Amtrak’s actions here were governmental, substantial questions respecting the lawfulness of the metrics and standards— including questions implicating the Constitution’s struc tural separation of powers and the Appointments Clause, U. S. Const., Art. II, cl. 2—may still remain in the case. As those matters have not yet been passed upon by the Court of Appeals, this case is remanded. I A Amtrak is a corporation established and authorized by a detailed federal statute enacted by Congress for no less a purpose than to preserve passenger services and routes on our Nation’s railroads. See ; National Railroad Passenger ; see also Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970, Congress recognized that Amtrak, of necessity, must rely for most of its operations on track systems owned by the freight rail roads. So, as a condition of relief from their common- carrier duties, Congress required freight railroads to allow Amtrak to use their tracks and facilities at rates agreed to by the parties—or in the event of disagreement to be set by the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC). See 45
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Justice Kennedy
| 2,015 | 4 |
majority
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Department of Transportation v. Association of American Railroads
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2784697/department-of-transportation-v-association-of-american-railroads/
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be set by the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC). See 45 U.S. C. 562 (1970 ed.). The Surface Transporta Cite as: 575 U. S. (2015) 3 Opinion of the Court tion Board (STB) now occupies the dispute-resolution role originally assigned to the ICC. See 49 U.S. C. ( ed.). Since 1973, Amtrak has received a statutory preference over freight transportation in using rail lines, junctions, and crossings. See The metrics and standards at issue here are the result of a further and more recent enactment. Concerned by poor service, unreliability, and delays resulting from freight traffic congestion, Congress passed the Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act (PRIIA) in 2008. See Section 207(a) of the PRIIA provides for the creation of the metrics and standards: “Within 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Federal Railroad Administration and Amtrak shall jointly, in consultation with the Surface Trans portation Board, rail carriers over whose rail lines Amtrak trains operate, States, Amtrak employees, nonprofit employee organizations representing Amtrak employees, and groups representing Amtrak passengers, as appropriate, develop new or improve existing metrics and minimum standards for measur ing the performance and service quality of intercity passenger train operations, including cost recovery, on-time performance and minutes of delay, ridership, on-board services, stations, facilities, equipment, and other services.” Section 207(d) of the PRIIA further provides: “If the development of the metrics and standards is not completed within the 180-day period required by subsection (a), any party involved in the development of those standards may petition the Surface Transpor tation Board to appoint an arbitrator to assist the parties in resolving their disputes through binding arbitration.” 4 DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION v. ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN RAILROADS Opinion of the Court The PRIIA specifies that the metrics and standards created under are to be used for a variety of pur poses. Section 207(b) requires the FRA to “publish a quarterly report on the performance and service quality of intercity passenger train operations” addressing the spe cific elements to be measured by the metrics and stand ards. –4917. Section 207(c) provides that, “[t]o the extent practicable, Amtrak and its host rail carriers shall incorporate the metrics and standards developed under subsection (a) into their access and service agree ments.” And obliges Amtrak, within one year after the metrics and standards are established, to “develop and implement a plan to improve on-board service pursuant to the metrics and standards for such service developed under [].” Under of the PRIIA, the metrics and standards also may play a role in prompting investigations by the STB and in subsequent enforcement
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Justice Kennedy
| 2,015 | 4 |
majority
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Department of Transportation v. Association of American Railroads
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2784697/department-of-transportation-v-association-of-american-railroads/
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in prompting investigations by the STB and in subsequent enforcement actions. For instance, “[i]f the on-time performance of any intercity passenger train averages less than 80 percent for any 2 consecutive calendar quarters,” the STB may initiate an investigation “to determine whether and to what extent delays are due to causes that could reasonably be addressed by Amtrak or other intercity passenger rail operators.” at 4925–4926. While conducting an investigation under the STB “has authority to review the accuracy of the train performance data and the extent to which sched uling and congestion contribute to delays” and shall “ob tain information from all parties involved and identify reasonable measures and make recommendations to im prove the service, quality, and on-time performance of the train.” Following an investigation, the STB may award damages if it “determines that delays or fail ures to achieve minimum standards are attributable to a rail carrier’s failure to provide preference to Amtrak over freight transportation.” The STB is further empow Cite as: 575 U. S. (2015) 5 Opinion of the Court ered to “order the host rail carrier to remit” damages “to Amtrak or to an entity for which Amtrak operates inter city passenger rail service.” B In March 2009, Amtrak and the FRA published a notice in the Federal Register inviting comments on a draft version of the metrics and standards. App. 75–76. The final version of the metrics and standards was issued jointly by Amtrak and the FRA in May 2010. at 129– 144. The metrics and standards address, among other matters, Amtrak’s financial performance, its scores on consumer satisfaction surveys, and the percentage of passenger-trips to and from underserved communities. Of most importance for this case, the metrics and stand ards also address Amtrak’s on-time performance and train delays caused by host railroads. The standards associated with the on-time performance metrics require on-time performance by Amtrak trains at least 80% to 95% of the time for each route, depending on the route and year. at 133–135. With respect to “host-responsible delays”— that is to say, delays attributed to the railroads along which Amtrak trains travel—the metrics and standards provide that “[d]elays must not be more than 900 minutes per 10,000 Train-Miles.” Amtrak conductors determine responsibility for particular delays. n. 23. In the District Court for the District of Columbia, re spondent alleged injury to its members from being re quired to modify their rail operations, which mostly in volve freight traffic, to satisfy the metrics and standards. Respondent claimed that “violates the nondelegation doctrine and the separation of powers principle by placing legislative
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Justice Kennedy
| 2,015 | 4 |
majority
|
Department of Transportation v. Association of American Railroads
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2784697/department-of-transportation-v-association-of-american-railroads/
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doctrine and the separation of powers principle by placing legislative and rulemaking authority in the hands of a private entity [Amtrak] that participates in the very in dustry it is supposed to regulate.” at 176–177, Com plaint ¶51. Respondent also asserted that violates 6 DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION v. ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN RAILROADS Opinion of the Court the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause by “[v]esting the coercive power of the government” in Amtrak, an “interested private part[y].” ¶¶53–54. In its prayer for relief respondent sought, among other reme dies, a declaration of ’s unconstitutionality and inval idation of the metrics and standards. The District Court granted summary judgment to peti tioners on both claims. See Without deciding whether Amtrak must be deemed pri vate or governmental, it rejected respondent’s nondelega tion argument on the ground that the FRA, the STB, and the political branches exercised sufficient control over promulgation and enforcement of the metrics and stand ards so that is constitutional. See The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir cuit reversed the judgment of the District Court as to the nondelegation and separation of powers claim, reasoning in central part that because “Amtrak is a private corpora tion with respect to Congress’s power to delegate au thority,” it cannot constitutionally be granted the “regula tory power prescribed in” The Court of Appeals did not reach respondent’s due process claim. See II In holding that Congress may not delegate to Amtrak the joint authority to issue the metrics and standards— authority it described as “regulatory power,” —the Court of Appeals concluded Amtrak is a private entity for purposes of determining its status when considering the constitutionality of its actions in the instant dispute. That court’s analysis treated as controlling Congress’ statutory command that Amtrak “ ‘is not a department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States Government.’ ” at 675 (quoting 49 U.S. C. The Court of Appeals also relied on Congress’ pronouncement that Cite as: 575 U. S. (2015) 7 Opinion of the Court Amtrak “ ‘shall be operated and managed as a for-profit corporation.’ ” (quoting see also at (“Though the federal government’s in volvement in Amtrak is considerable, Congress has both designated it a private corporation and instructed that it be managed so as to maximize profit. In deciding Amtrak’s status for purposes of congressional delegations, these declarations are dispositive”). Proceeding from this premise, the Court of Appeals concluded it was impermis sible for Congress to “delegate regulatory authority to a private entity.” ; see also prohibits any such delegation of authority). That premise, however, was
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Justice Kennedy
| 2,015 | 4 |
majority
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Department of Transportation v. Association of American Railroads
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2784697/department-of-transportation-v-association-of-american-railroads/
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prohibits any such delegation of authority). That premise, however, was erroneous. Congressional pronouncements, though instructive as to matters within Congress’ authority to address, see, e.g., United States ex rel. 491–492 (CADC 2004) (Roberts, J.), are not dispositive of Amtrak’s status as a governmental entity for purposes of separation of powers analysis under the Constitution. And an inde pendent inquiry into Amtrak’s status under the Constitu tion reveals the Court of Appeals’ premise was flawed. It is appropriate to begin the analysis with Amtrak’s ownership and corporate structure. The Secretary of Transportation holds all of Amtrak’s preferred stock and most of its common stock. Amtrak’s Board of Directors is composed of nine members, one of whom is the Secretary of Transportation. Seven other Board members are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. 49 U.S. C. These eight Board members, in turn, select Amtrak’s president. Amtrak’s Board members are subject to salary limits set by Congress, and the Executive Branch has concluded that all appointed Board members are removable by the President without cause, see 27 Op. Atty. Gen. 163 (2003). 8 DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION v. ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN RAILROADS Opinion of the Court Under further statutory provisions, Amtrak’s Board members must possess certain qualifications. Congress has directed that the President make appointments based on an individual’s prior experience in the transportation industry, and has provided that not more than five of the seven appointed Board members be from the same political party, In selecting Amtrak’s Board members, moreover, the President must consult with leaders of both parties in both Houses of Congress in order to “provide adequate and balanced representation of the major geographic regions of the United States served by Amtrak.” In addition to controlling Amtrak’s stock and Board of Directors the political branches exercise substantial, statutorily mandated supervision over Amtrak’s priorities and operations. Amtrak must submit numerous annual reports to Congress and the President, detailing such information as route-specific ridership and on-time per formance. The Freedom of Information Act ap plies to Amtrak in any year in which it receives a federal subsidy, 5 U.S. C. which thus far has been every year of its existence. Pursuant to its status under the Inspector General Act of 1978 as a “ ‘designated Federal entity,’ ” 5 U.S. C. App. p. 521, Amtrak must maintain an inspector general, much like governmental agencies such as the Federal Communications Commis sion and the Securities and Exchange Commission. Fur thermore, Congress conducts frequent oversight hearings into Amtrak’s budget, routes, and prices. See, e.g., Hear ing on Reviewing Alternatives to Amtrak’s Annual
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Justice Kennedy
| 2,015 | 4 |
majority
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Department of Transportation v. Association of American Railroads
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2784697/department-of-transportation-v-association-of-american-railroads/
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See, e.g., Hear ing on Reviewing Alternatives to Amtrak’s Annual Losses in Food and Beverage Service before the Subcommittee on Government Operations of the House Committee on Over sight and Government Reform, 113th Cong., 1st Sess., 5 (statement of Thomas J. Hall, chief of customer service, Amtrak); Hearing on Amtrak’s Fiscal Year 2014 Budget: The Starting Point for Reauthorization before the Cite as: 575 U. S. (2015) 9 Opinion of the Court Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials of the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, 113th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 6 (state ment of Joseph H. Boardman, president and chief execu tive officer, Amtrak). It is significant that, rather than advancing its own private economic interests, Amtrak is required to pursue numerous, additional goals defined by statute. To take a few examples: Amtrak must “provide efficient and effec tive intercity passenger rail mobility,” 49 U.S. C. “minimize Government subsidies,” provide reduced fares to the disabled and elderly, and ensure mobility in times of national disas ter, In addition to directing Amtrak to serve these broad public objectives, Congress has mandated certain aspects of Amtrak’s day-to-day operations. Amtrak must main tain a route between Louisiana and Florida. When making improvements to the Northeast corridor, Amtrak must apply seven considerations in a specified order of priority. And when Amtrak purchases materials worth more than $1 million, these materials must be mined or produced in the United States, or manu factured substantially from components that are mined, produced, or manufactured in the United States, unless the Secretary of Transportation grants an exemption. Finally, Amtrak is also dependent on federal financial support. In its first 43 years of operation, Amtrak has received more than $41 billion in federal subsidies. In recent years these subsidies have exceeded $1 billion annually. See Brief for Petitioners 5, and n. 2, 46. Given the combination of these unique features and its significant ties to the Government, Amtrak is not an autonomous private enterprise. Among other important considerations, its priorities, operations, and decisions are 10 DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION v. ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN RAILROADS Opinion of the Court extensively supervised and substantially funded by the political branches. A majority of its Board is appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate and is under stood by the Executive to be removable by the President at will. Amtrak was created by the Government, is con trolled by the Government, and operates for the Govern ment’s benefit. Thus, in its joint issuance of the metrics and standards with the FRA, Amtrak acted as a govern mental entity for purposes
|
Justice Kennedy
| 2,015 | 4 |
majority
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Department of Transportation v. Association of American Railroads
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2784697/department-of-transportation-v-association-of-american-railroads/
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FRA, Amtrak acted as a govern mental entity for purposes of the Constitution’s separation of powers provisions. And that exercise of governmental power must be consistent with the design and require ments of the Constitution, including those provisions relating to the separation of powers. Respondent urges that Amtrak cannot be deemed a governmental entity in this respect. Like the Court of Appeals, it relies principally on the statutory directives that Amtrak “shall be operated and managed as a for profit corporation” and “is not a department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States Government.” In light of that statutory language, respondent asserts, Amtrak cannot exercise the joint authority entrusted to it and the FRA by On that point this Court’s decision in provides necessary instruction. In Lebron, Amtrak prohibited an artist from installing a politically controversial display in New York City’s Penn Station. The artist sued Amtrak, alleging a violation of his First Amendment rights. In response Amtrak asserted that it was not a governmental entity, explaining that “its charter’s disclaimer of agency status prevent[ed] it from being considered a Government entity.” The Court rejected this contention, holding “it is not for Congress to make the final determi nation of Amtrak’s status as a Government entity for purposes of determining the constitutional rights of citi zens affected by its actions.” To hold otherwise Cite as: 575 U. S. (2015) 11 Opinion of the Court would allow the Government “to evade the most solemn obligations imposed in the Constitution by simply resort ing to the corporate form.” Noting that Amtrak “is established and organized under federal law for the very purpose of pursuing federal governmental objectives, under the direction and control of federal gov ernmental appointees,” and that the Govern ment exerts its control over Amtrak “not as a creditor but as a policymaker,” the Court held Amtrak “is an agency or instrumentality of the United States for the purpose of individual rights guaranteed against the Government by the Constitution.” Lebron teaches that, for purposes of Amtrak’s status as a federal actor or instrumentality under the Constitution, the practical reality of federal control and supervision prevails over Congress’ disclaimer of Amtrak’s governmen tal status. Lebron involved a First Amendment question, while in this case the challenge is to Amtrak’s joint au thority to issue the metrics and standards. But “[t]he structural principles secured by the separation of powers protect the individual as well.” Bond v. United States, 564 U. S. (2011) (slip op., at 10). Treating Amtrak as governmental for these purposes, moreover, is not an unbridled grant of authority to
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Justice Kennedy
| 2,015 | 4 |
majority
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Department of Transportation v. Association of American Railroads
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2784697/department-of-transportation-v-association-of-american-railroads/
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purposes, moreover, is not an unbridled grant of authority to an unaccountable actor. The political branches created Amtrak, control its Board, define its mission, specify many of its day-to-day opera tions, have imposed substantial transparency and ac countability mechanisms, and, for all practical purposes, set and supervise its annual budget. Accordingly, the Court holds that Amtrak is a governmental entity, not a private one, for purposes of determining the constitutional issues presented in this case. III Because the Court of Appeals’ decision was based on the flawed premise that Amtrak should be treated as a private 12 DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION v. ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN RAILROADS Opinion of the Court entity, that opinion is now vacated. On remand, the Court of Appeals, after identifying the issues that are properly preserved and before it, will then have the instruction of the analysis set forth here. Respondent argues that the selection of Amtrak’s president, who is appointed “not by the President but by the other eight Board Members,” “call[s] into question Amtrak’s structure under the Ap pointments Clause,” Brief for Respondent 42; that (d)’s arbitrator provision “is a plain violation of the nondelegation principle” and the Appointments Clause requiring invalidation of ; and that Con gress violated the Due Process Clause by “giv[ing] a feder ally chartered, nominally private, for-profit corporation regulatory authority over its own industry,” Petitioners, in turn, contend that “the metrics and stand ards do not reflect the exercise of ‘rulemaking’ authority or permit Amtrak to ‘regulate other private entities,’ ” and thus do not raise nondelegation concerns. Reply Brief 5 (internal citation omitted). Because “[o]urs is a court of final review and not first view,” Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U. S. (slip op., at 12) (internal quotation marks omitted), those issues—to the extent they are properly before the Court of Appeals—should be addressed in the first instance on remand. The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Cite as: 575 U. S. (2015) 1 ALITO, J., concurring SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 13–1080 DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.
|
Justice Souter
| 2,006 | 20 |
majority
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Will v. Hallock
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145689/will-v-hallock/
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The authority of the Courts of Appeals to review "all final decisions of the district courts," includes appellate jurisdiction over "a narrow class of decisions that do not terminate the litigation," but are sufficiently important and collateral to the merits that they should "nonetheless be treated as final," Digital The issue here is whether a refusal to apply the judgment bar of the Federal Tort Claims Act is open to collateral appeal. We hold it is not. I The complaint alleges that Susan Hallock owned a computer software business that she and her husband, Richard, operated from home. After information about Richard Hallock's credit card was stolen and used to pay the subscription fee for a child pornography Web site, agents of the United States Customs Service, investigating the Web site, traced *348 the payment to Richard Hallock's card and got a warrant to search the Hallocks' residence. With that authority, they seized the Hallocks' computer equipment, software, and disk drives. No criminal charges were ever brought, but the Government's actions produced a different disaster. When the computer equipment was returned, several of the disk drives were damaged, all of the stored data (including trade secrets and account files) were lost, and the Hallocks were forced out of business. In July 2002, Susan Hallock and her company brought an action against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, invoking the waiver of sovereign immunity, and alleging negligence by the customs agents in executing the search. The merits of the claim were never addressed, for the District Court granted the Government's motion to dismiss, holding that the agents' activities occurred in the course of detaining goods and thus fell within an exception to the Act's waiver of sovereign immunity, 2680(e). While the suit against the Government was still pending, Susan Hallock filed this action against the individual agents under alleging in her complaint that the agents had damaged her computers and thus deprived her of property including business income in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. After the District Court dismissed the first suit against the Government, the agents moved for judgment in the Bivens action, citing the judgment bar of the Tort Claims Act, that "the judgment in an action under [] 1346(b) of this title shall constitute a complete bar to any action by the claimant, by reason of the same subject matter, against the employee of the government whose act or omission gave rise to the claim." 2676. The District Court denied the motion, holding that dismissal of the action against the
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Justice Souter
| 2,006 | 20 |
majority
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Will v. Hallock
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145689/will-v-hallock/
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the motion, holding that dismissal of the action against the Government under the Tort *349 Claims Act was solely on a procedural ground, and thus failed to raise the judgment bar. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, after first finding jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine. We granted certiorari to consider the judgment bar, but now vacate for want of appellate jurisdiction on the part of the Court of Appeals. II The collateral order doctrine, identified with is "best understood not as an exception to the `final decision' rule laid down by Congress in 1291, but as a `practical construction' of it." Digital at (quoting ). Whereas "gives courts of appeals jurisdiction over `all final decisions' of district courts" that are not directly appealable to us, the collateral order doctrine accommodates a "small class" of rulings, not concluding the litigation, but conclusively resolving "claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action," The claims are "too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated." The requirements for collateral order appeal have been distilled down to three conditions: that an order "`[1] conclusively determine the disputed question, [2] resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and [3] be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.'" Puerto Rico and Sewer The conditions are "stringent," Digital *350 at 868 ), and unless they are kept so, the underlying doctrine will overpower the substantial finality interests 1291 is meant to further: judicial efficiency, for example, and the "sensible policy `of avoid[ing] the obstruction to just claims that would come from permitting the harassment and cost of a succession of separate appeals from the various rulings to which a litigation may give rise.'" Firestone Tire & Rubber Accordingly, we have not mentioned applying the collateral order doctrine recently without emphasizing its modest scope. See, e. g., Digital And we have meant what we have said; although the Court has been asked many times to expand the "small class" of collaterally appealable orders, we have instead kept it narrow and selective in its membership. A Prior cases mark the line between rulings within the class and those outside. On the immediately appealable side are orders rejecting absolute immunity, and qualified immunity, A State has the benefit of the doctrine to appeal a decision denying its claim to Eleventh Amendment immunity, Puerto Rico at -145, and a criminal defendant may collaterally appeal an adverse ruling on a
|
Justice Souter
| 2,006 | 20 |
majority
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Will v. Hallock
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145689/will-v-hallock/
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criminal defendant may collaterally appeal an adverse ruling on a defense of double jeopardy, The examples admittedly raise the lawyer's temptation to generalize. In each case, the collaterally appealing party was vindicating or claiming a right to avoid trial, in satisfaction of the third condition: unless the order to stand trial was *351 immediately appealable, the right would be effectively lost. Those seeking immediate appeal therefore naturally argue that any order denying a claim of right to prevail without trial satisfies the third condition. But this generalization is too easy to be sound and, if accepted, would leave the final order requirement of 1291 in tatters. We faced this prospect in Digital an appeal from an order rescinding a settlement agreement. Petitioner asserted a "`right not to stand trial' requiring protection by way of immediate appeal," analogizing the rescission to a denial of immunity. We said no, however, lest "every right that could be enforced appropriately by pretrial dismissal [be] loosely described as conferring a `right not to stand trial.'" Otherwise, "almost every pretrial or trial order might be called `effectively unreviewable' in the sense that relief from error can never extend to rewriting history." "Allowing immediate appeals to vindicate every such right would move 1291 aside for claims that the district court lacks personal jurisdiction, that the statute of limitations has run, that the movant has been denied his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial, that an action is barred on claim preclusion principles, that no material fact is in dispute and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, or merely that the complaint fails to state a claim. Such motions can be made in virtually every case." B Since only some orders denying an asserted right to avoid the burdens of trial qualify, then, as orders that cannot be reviewed "effectively" after a conventional final judgment, the cases have to be combed for some further characteristic that merits appealability under ; and as Digital explained, that something further boils down to "a judgment about the value of the interests that would be *352 lost through rigorous application of a final judgment requirement." -879 ). See also Lauro Lines ("The importance of the right asserted has always been a significant part of our collateral order doctrine"). Thus, in we stressed the "compelling public ends," "rooted in the separation of powers," that would be compromised by failing to allow immediate appeal of a denial of absolute Presidential immunity, In explaining collateral order treatment when a qualified immunity claim was at issue in we spoke
|
Justice Souter
| 2,006 | 20 |
majority
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Will v. Hallock
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145689/will-v-hallock/
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a qualified immunity claim was at issue in we spoke of the threatened disruption of governmental functions, and fear of inhibiting able people from exercising discretion in public service if a full trial were threatened whenever they acted reasonably in the face of law that is not "clearly established." Puerto Rico explained the immediate appealability of an order denying a claim of Eleventh Amendment immunity by adverting not only to the burdens of litigation but to the need to ensure vindication of a State's dignitary interests. And although the double jeopardy claim given treatment in did not implicate a right to be free of all proceedings whatsoever (since prior jeopardy is essential to the defense), we described the enormous prosecutorial power of the Government to subject an individual "to embarrassment, expense and ordeal compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety," ; the only way to alleviate these consequences of the Government's superior position was by collateral order appeal. In each case, some particular value of a high order was marshaled in support of the interest in avoiding trial: honoring the separation of powers, preserving the efficiency of government and the initiative of its officials, respecting a State's dignitary interests, and mitigating the government's *353 advantage over the individual. That is, it is not mere avoidance of a trial, but avoidance of a trial that would imperil a substantial public interest, that counts when asking whether an order is "effectively" unreviewable if review is to be left until later. Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S., at C Does the claim of the customs agents in this case serve such a weighty public objective that the judgment bar should be treated as an immunity demanding the protection of a collateral order appeal? One can argue, of course, that if the Bivens action goes to trial the efficiency of Government will be compromised and the officials burdened and distracted, as in the qualified immunity case: if qualified immunity gets treatment, so should the judgment bar to further litigation in the aftermath of the Government's success under the Tort Claims Act. But the cases are different. Qualified immunity is not the law simply to save trouble for the Government and its employees; it is recognized because the burden of trial is unjustified in the face of a colorable claim that the law on point was not clear when the official took action, and the action was reasonable in light of the law as it was. The nub of qualified immunity is the need to induce officials to show reasonable initiative when the
|
Justice Souter
| 2,006 | 20 |
majority
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Will v. Hallock
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145689/will-v-hallock/
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need to induce officials to show reasonable initiative when the relevant law is not "clearly established," ; cf. ; a quick resolution of a qualified immunity claim is essential. There is, however, no such public interest at stake simply because the judgment bar is said to be applicable. It is not the preservation of initiative but the avoidance of litigation for its own sake that supports the judgment bar, and if simply abbreviating litigation troublesome to Government employees were important enough for treatment, collateral order appeal would be a matter of right whenever the Government lost a motion to dismiss under the Tort *354 Claims Act, or a federal officer lost one on a Bivens action, or a state official was in that position in a case under 42 U.S.C. 1983, or Ex parte Young, In effect, would fade out whenever the Government or an official lost an early round that could have ended the fight. Another difference between qualified immunity and the judgment bar lies in the bar's essential procedural element. While a qualified immunity claim is timely from the moment an official is served with a complaint, the judgment bar can be raised only after a case under the Tort Claims Act has been resolved in the Government's favor. If a Bivens action alone is brought, there will be no possibility of a judgment bar, nor will there be so long as a Bivens action against officials and a Tort Claims Act against the Government are pending simultaneously (as they were for a time here). In the present case, if Susan Hallock had brought her Bivens action and no other, the agents could not possibly have invoked the judgment bar in claiming a right to be free of trial. The closer analogy to the judgment bar, then, is not immunity but the defense of claim preclusion, or res judicata. Although the statutory judgment bar is arguably broader than traditional res judicata, it functions in much the same way, with both rules depending on a prior judgment as a condition precedent[*] and neither reflecting a policy that a defendant should be scot free of any liability. The concern behind both rules is a different one, of avoiding duplicative litigation, "multiple suits on identical entitlements or obligations between the same parties." 18 C. Wright, A. Miller, & *355 E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure 4402, p. 9 (2d ed. 2002) But this rule of respecting a prior judgment by giving a defense against relitigation has not been thought to protect values so great that only immediate appeal can effectively vindicate
|
Justice Stevens
| 1,977 | 16 |
majority
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United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109593/united-states-steel-corp-v-fortner-enterprises-inc/
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In exchange for respondent's promise to purchase prefabricated houses to be erected on land near Louisville, Ky., petitioners agreed to finance the cost of acquiring and developing the land. Difficulties arose while the development was in progress, and respondent (Fortner) commenced this treble-damages action, claiming that the transaction was a tying arrangement forbidden by the Sherman Act. Fortner alleged that competition for prefabricated houses (the tied product) was restrained by petitioners' abuse of power over credit (the tying product). A summary judgment in favor of petitioners was reversed by this Court. Fortner (Fortner I). We held that the agreement affected a "not insubstantial" amount of commerce in the tied product and that Fortner was entitled to an opportunity to prove that petitioners possessed "appreciable *612 economic power" in the market for the tying product. The question now presented is whether the record supports the conclusion that petitioners had such power in the credit market.[1] The conclusion that a violation of 1 of the Sherman Act[2]*613 had been proved was only reached after two trials. At the first trial following our remand, the District Court directed a verdict in favor of Fortner on the issue of liability, and submitted only the issue of damages to the jury. The jury assessed damages, before trebling, of $93,200. The Court of Appeals reversed the directed verdict and remanded for a new trial on liability. cert. denied, Both courts held that the findings justified the conclusion that petitioners had sufficient economic power in the credit market to make the tying arrangement unlawful. Before explaining why we disagree with the ultimate conclusion of the courts below, we first describe the tying arrangement and then summarize the findings on the economic-power issue. I Only the essential features of the arrangement between the parties need be described. Fortner is a corporation which was activated by an experienced real estate developer for the purpose of buying and improving residential lots. One petitioner, United States Steel Corp., operates a "Home Division" which manufactures and assembles components of prefabricated houses; the second petitioner, the "Credit Corp.," is a wholly owned subsidiary, which provides financing to customers of the Home Division in order to promote sales. Although their common ownership and control make it appropriate to regard the two as a single seller, they sell two separate productsprefabricated houses and credit. The credit extended to Fortner was not merely for the price of the homes. Petitioners agreed to lend Fortner over $2,000,000 in exchange for Fortner's promise to purchase the components of 210 homes for about $689,000. The additional borrowed funds were
|
Justice Stevens
| 1,977 | 16 |
majority
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United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109593/united-states-steel-corp-v-fortner-enterprises-inc/
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210 homes for about $689,000. The additional borrowed funds were intended to cover Fortner's cost of acquiring and *614 developing the vacant real estate, and the cost of erecting the houses. The impact of the agreement on the market for the tied product (prefabricated houses) is not in dispute. On the one hand, there is no claimnor could there bethat the Home Division had any dominance in the prefabricated housing business. The record indicates that it was only moderately successful, and that its sales represented a small fraction of the industry total.[3] On the other hand, we have already held that the dollar value of the sales to respondent was sufficient to meet the "not insubstantial" test described in earlier cases. See -502. We therefore confine our attention to the source of the tying arrangement petitioners' "economic power" in the credit market. II The evidence supporting the conclusion that the Credit Corp. had appreciable economic power in the credit market relates to four propositions: (1) petitioner Credit Corp. and the Home Division were owned by one of the Nation's largest corporations; (2) petitioners entered into tying arrangements with a significant number of customers in addition to Fortner; (3) the Home Division charged respondent a noncompetitive price for its prefabricated homes; and (4) the financing provided to Fortner was "unique," primarily because it covered 100% of Fortner's acquisition and development costs. The Credit Corp. was established in 1954 to provide financing for customers of the Home Division. The United States Steel Corp. not only provided the equity capital, but also allowed the Credit Corp. to use its credit in order *615 to borrow money from banks at the prime rate. Thus, although the Credit Corp. itself was not a particularly large company, it was supported by a corporate parent with great financial strength. The Credit Corp.'s loan policies were primarily intended to help the Home Division sell its products.[4] It extended credit only to customers of the Home Division, and over two-thirds of the Home Division customers obtained such financing. With few exceptions, all the loan agreements contained a tying clause comparable to the one challenged in this case. Petitioner's home sales in 1960 amounted to $6,747,353. Since over $4,600,000 of these sales were tied to financing provided by the Credit Corp.,[5] it is apparent that the tying arrangement was used with a number of customers in addition to Fortner. The least expensive house package that Fortner purchased from the Home Division cost about $3,150. One witness testified that the Home Division's price was $455 higher than the price of comparable
|
Justice Stevens
| 1,977 | 16 |
majority
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United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109593/united-states-steel-corp-v-fortner-enterprises-inc/
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Division's price was $455 higher than the price of comparable components in a conventional home; another witness, to whom the District Court made no reference in its findings, testified that the Home Division's price was $443 higher than a comparable prefabricated product. Whether the price differential was as great as 15% is not entirely clear, but the record does support the conclusion that the contract required Fortner to pay a noncompetitive price for the Home Division's houses. The finding that the credit extended to Fortner was unique *616 was based on factors emphasized in the testimony of Fortner's expert witness, Dr. Masten, a professor with special knowledge of lending practices in the Kentucky area. Dr. Masten testified that mortgage loans equal to 100% of the acquisition and development cost of real estate were not otherwise available in the Kentucky area; that even though Fortner had a deficit of $16,000, its loan was not guaranteed by a shareholder, officer, or other person interested in its business; and that the interest rate of 6% represented a low rate under prevailing economic conditions.[6] Moreover, he explained that the stable price levels at the time made the risk to the lender somewhat higher than would have been the case in a period of rising prices. Dr. Masten concluded that the terms granted to respondent by the Credit Corp. were so unusual that it was almost inconceivable that the funds could have been acquired from any other source. It is a fair summary of his testimony, and of the District Court's findings, to say that the loan was unique because the lender accepted such a high risk and the borrower assumed such a low cost. The District Court also found that banks and federally insured savings and loan associations generally were prohibited by law from making 100% land acquisition and development loans, and "that other conventional lenders would not have made such loans at the time in question since they were not prudent loans due to the risk involved." App. 1596. Accordingly, the District Court concluded "that all of the required elements of an illegal tie-in agreement did exist since the tie-in itself was present, a not insubstantial amount of interstate commerce in the tied product was restrained and the Credit Corporation did possess sufficient economic power or leverage to effect such restraint." *617 III Without the finding that the financing provided to Fortner was "unique," it is clear that the District Court's findings would be insufficient to support the conclusion that the Credit Corp. possessed any significant economic power in the credit market. Although
|
Justice Stevens
| 1,977 | 16 |
majority
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United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109593/united-states-steel-corp-v-fortner-enterprises-inc/
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possessed any significant economic power in the credit market. Although the Credit Corp. is owned by one of the Nation's largest manufacturing corporations, there is nothing in the record to indicate that this enabled it to borrow funds on terms more favorable than those available to competing lenders, or that it was able to operate more efficiently than other lending institutions. In short, the affiliation between the petitioners does not appear to have given the Credit Corp. any cost advantage over its competitors in the credit market. Instead, the affiliation was significant only because the Credit Corp. provided a source of funds to customers of the Home Division. That fact tells us nothing about the extent of petitioners' economic power in the credit market. The same may be said about the fact that loans from the Credit Corp. were used to obtain house sales from Fortner and others. In some tying situations a disproportionately large volume of sales of the tied product resulting from only a few strategic sales of the tying product may reflect a form of economic "leverage" that is probative of power in the market for the tying product. If, as some economists have suggested, the purpose of a tie-in is often to facilitate price discrimination, such evidence would imply the existence of power that a free market would not tolerate.[7] But in this case Fortner was only required to purchase houses for the number of lots for which it received financing. The tying product produced no commitment from Fortner to purchase varying quantities of the tied product over an extended period of time. This record, therefore, does not describe *618 the kind of "leverage" found in some of the Court's prior decisions condemning tying arrangements.[8] The fact that Fortnerand presumably other Home Division customers as wellpaid a noncompetitive price for houses also lends insufficient support to the judgment of the lower court. Proof that Fortner paid a higher price for the tied product is consistent with the possibility that the financing was unusually inexpensive[9] and that the price for the entire package was equal to, or below, a competitive price. And this possibility is equally strong even though a number of Home Division customers made a package purchase of homes and financing.[10] *619 The most significant finding made by the District Court related to the unique character of the credit extended to Fortner. This finding is particularly important because the unique character of the tying product has provided critical support for the finding of illegality in prior cases. Thus, the statutory grant of a patent monopoly
|
Justice Stevens
| 1,977 | 16 |
majority
|
United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109593/united-states-steel-corp-v-fortner-enterprises-inc/
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prior cases. Thus, the statutory grant of a patent monopoly in International Salt ; the copyright monopolies in United and United ; and the extensive land holdings in Northern Pacific R.[11] represented tying products that the Court regarded as sufficiently unique to give rise to a presumption of economic power.[12] *620 As the Court plainly stated in its prior opinion in this case, these decisions do not require that the defendant have a monopoly or even a dominant position throughout the market for a tying product. See -503. They do, however, focus attention on the question whether the seller has the power, within the market for the tying product, to raise prices or to require purchasers to accept burdensome terms that could not be exacted in a completely competitive market.[13] In short, the question is whether the seller has some advantage not shared by his competitors in the market for the tying product. Without any such advantage differentiating his product from that of his competitors, the seller's product does not *621 have the kind of uniqueness considered relevant in prior tying-clause cases.[14] The Court made this point explicitly when it remanded this case for trial: "We do not mean to accept petitioner's apparent argument that market power can be inferred simply because the kind of financing terms offered by a lending company are `unique and unusual.' We do mean, however, that uniquely and unusually advantageous terms can reflect a creditor's unique economic advantages over his competitors." An accompanying footnote explained: "Uniqueness confers economic power only when other competitors are in some way prevented from offering the distinctive product themselves. Such barriers may be legal, as in the case of patented and copyrighted products, e. g., International Salt; Loew's, or physical, as when the product is land, e. g., Northern Pacific. It is true that the barriers may also be economic, as when competitors are simply unable to produce the distinctive product profitably, but the uniqueness test in such situations is somewhat confusing since the real source of economic power is not the product itself but rather the seller's cost advantage in producing it." at 505 n. 2. Quite clearly, if the evidence merely shows that credit terms are unique because the seller is willing to accept a lesser profitor to incur greater risksthan its competitors, *622 that kind of uniqueness will not give rise to any inference of economic power in the credit market. Yet this is, in substance, all that the record in this case indicates. The unusual credit bargain offered to Fortner proves nothing more than a willingness
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,982 | 11 |
majority
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Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110657/logan-v-zimmerman-brush-co/
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[] The issue in this case is whether a State may terminate a complainant's cause of action because a state official, for reasons beyond the complainant's control, failed to comply with a statutorily mandated procedure. I A The Illinois Fair Employment Practices Act (FEPA or Act), Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 48, ¶ 85 et seq. barred employment discrimination on the basis of "physical handicap unrelated to ability." ¶ 853(a). It also established a comprehensive scheme for adjudicating allegations of discrimination. To begin the process, a complainant had to bring a charge of unlawful conduct before the Illinois Fair Employment Practices Commission (Commission) within 80 days of the occurrence of the allegedly discriminatory act. ¶ 858(a). The statute in the provision directly at issue here then gave the Commission 20 days within which to convene a factfinding conference designed to obtain evidence, ascertain the positions of the parties, and explore the possibility of a negotiated settlement. ¶ 858(b). If the Commission found "substantial evidence" of illegal conduct, it was to attempt to "eliminate the effect thereof by means of *425 conference and conciliation," ¶ 858(c), and, if that proved impossible, to issue a formal complaint against the employer within 80 days after the expiration of the 20-day period. ¶ 858(d). A formal adversary hearing was then to be held before a commissioner or duly appointed adjudicator, who was to make findings and who was empowered to recommend reinstatement, backpay, and reasonable attorney's fees. ¶ 858.0. If the commissioner or adjudicator did not find substantial evidence of discrimination, he was to recommend dismissal of the charge. The findings and recommended order were to be filed with the Commission. A complainant was entitled to obtain review by the full Commission of any of the possible dispositions of his charge, including an initial determination that the evidence did not justify a complaint. The Commission was to file a written order and decision. ¶ 858.02; Illinois Fair Employment Practices Commission, Rules and Regulations, 4.5 If still not satisfied, the complainant could seek judicial review of any Commission order. ¶ 860.[] *426 B On November 9, 979, appellant Laverne L. Logan, a probationary employee hired one month previously, was discharged by appellee Zimmerman Brush Company, purportedly because Logan's short left leg made it impossible for him to perform his duties as a shipping clerk. Five days later, Logan, acting pro se, filed a charge with the Commission alleging that his employment had been unlawfully terminated because of his physical handicap. App. 3. This triggered the Commission's statutory obligation under ¶ 858(b) to convene a
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Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co.
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the Commission's statutory obligation under ¶ 858(b) to convene a factfinding conference within 20 days; in Logan's case, this meant by March 3, Apparently through inadvertence, the Commission's representative scheduled the conference for March 8, five days after expiration of the statutory period. Notice of the meeting, which was mailed to both parties in January specified the hearing's date and location and declared that attendance was "required." It, however, did not allude to the FEPA's 20-day time limit. App. 5. The Commission also asked the company to complete a short questionnaire concerning its employment practices, and directed that it submit its answers by March 0. The company did this without objection. When the conference date arrived, the company moved that Logan's charge be dismissed because the Commission had failed to hold the conference within the statutorily mandated 20-day period. This request was rejected. The company thereupon petitioned the Supreme Court of Illinois for an original writ of prohibition. That court stayed proceedings on Logan's complaint pending decision on the request for a writ. Logan meanwhile obtained counsel, and because 80 days had not yet passed since the occurrence of the allegedly discriminatory act filed a second charge with the Commission. Before the Illinois Supreme Court, Logan argued that terminating his claim because of the Commission's failure to convene a timely conference a matter beyond Logan's, or indeed *427 the company's, control would violate his federal rights to due process and equal protection of the laws. But the court noted that the statutory provision at issue, ¶ 858(b), declared: "Within 20 days of the proper filing of a charge, the Commission shall convene a fact finding conference." (Emphasis added.) The Illinois court found this legislative language to be mandatory, and accordingly it held that failure to comply deprived the Commission of jurisdiction to consider Logan's charge. Zimmerman Brush The court found controlling its decision in Springfield-Sangamon County Regional Planning[2] where it had determined that ¶ 858(c)'s 80-day deadline for issuing a complaint was mandatory; since the state legislature wrote ¶ 858(b) after the Springfield-Sangamon decision, and used language similar to that employed in ¶ 858(c), it must have intended the 20-day time limit to be jurisdictional as well. This result, reasoned the court, comported with the statute's purposes by facilitating the "just and expeditious resolutions of employment disputes," while protecting employers " `from unfounded charges of discrimination,' " quoting ¶ 85. The Illinois Supreme Court summarily rejected Logan's argument that his due process and equal protection rights would be violated were the Commission's error allowed to extinguish
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would be violated were the Commission's error allowed to extinguish his cause of action. The state legislature had established the right to redress for discriminatory employment practices, it was said, and "[t]he legislature could establish reasonable procedures to be followed upon a charge" *428 The court then went on to rule that Logan could not file a second charge with the Commission based upon the same act of alleged discrimination, for to allow the second complaint to proceed would circumvent the design of the Act and frustrate the public interest in an expeditious resolution of disputes.[3] -09, -283. Logan appealed, bringing his federal claims to this Court. We noted probable jurisdiction. II A Justice Jackson, writing for the Court in observed: "Many controversies have raged about the cryptic and abstract words of the Due Process Clause but there can be no doubt that at a minimum they require that deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case." At the outset, then, we are faced with what has become a familiar two-part inquiry: we must determine whether Logan was deprived of a protected interest, and, if so, what process was his due. The first question, we believe, was affirmatively settled by the Mullane case itself, where the Court held that a cause of action is a species of property protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.[4] There, the Court confronted a challenge to a state law that provided for the settlement *429 of common trust fund accounts by fiduciaries, upon notice given through newspaper publication. The effect of the statute was to terminate "every right which beneficiaries would otherwise have against the trust company for improper management of the common trust fund." This, the Court concluded, worked to deprive the beneficiaries of property by, among other things, "cut[ting] off their rights to have the trustee answer for negligent or illegal impairments of their interests." Such a result was impermissible unless constitutionally adequate notice and hearing procedures were established before the settlement process went into effect. Despite appellee Zimmerman Brush Company's arguments to the contrary, we see no meaningful distinction between the cause of action at issue in Mullane and Logan's right to use the FEPA's adjudicatory procedures. This conclusion is hardly a novel one. The Court traditionally has held that the Due Process Clauses protect civil litigants who seek recourse in the courts, either as defendants hoping to protect their property or as plaintiffs attempting to redress grievances. In Societe for example where a
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to redress grievances. In Societe for example where a plaintiff's claim had been dismissed for failure to comply with a trial court's order the Court read the "property" component of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause to impose "constitutional limitations upon the power of courts, even in aid of their own valid processes, to dismiss an action without affording a party the opportunity for a hearing on the merits of his cause." See also Hammond Packing ; ; Cf. Similarly, the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause has been interpreted as preventing the States from denying potential litigants use of established adjudicatory procedures, when such *430 an action would be "the equivalent of denying them an opportunity to be heard upon their claimed right[s]."[5] In any event, the view that Logan's FEPA claim is a constitutionally protected one follows logically from the Court's more recent cases analyzing the nature of a property interest. The hallmark of property, the Court has emphasized, is an individual entitlement grounded in state law, which cannot be removed except "for cause." Memphis Light, Gas & Water ; ; Board of Once that characteristic is found, the types of interests protected as "property" are varied and, as often as not, intangible, relating "to the whole domain of social and economic fact." National Mutual Insurance ; ; Board of -572, 5-577. See, e. g., ; Memphis Light, Gas & Water ; ; ; ; ; The right to use the FEPA's adjudicatory procedures shares these characteristics. A claimant has more than an abstract desire or interest in redressing his grievance: his right to redress is guaranteed by the State, with the adequacy of his claim assessed under what is, in essence, a "for cause" standard, based upon the substantiality of the evidence. And an FEPA claim, which presumably can be surrendered for value, is at least as substantial as the right to an education labeled as property in[6] Certainly, it would require a remarkable reading of a "broad and majestic ter[m]," Board of to conclude that a horse trainer's license is a protected property interest under the Fourteenth Amendment, while a state-created right to redress discrimination is not. The Illinois Supreme Court nevertheless seemed to believe that no individual entitlement could come into being under the FEPA until the Commission took appropriate action within the statutory deadline. Because the entitlement arises from statute, the court reasoned, it was the legislature's *432 prerogative to establish the "procedures to be followed upon a charge." 82 Ill. 2d, This analysis, we believe, misunderstands the nature of the Constitution's due
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analysis, we believe, misunderstands the nature of the Constitution's due process guarantee. Each of our due process cases has recognized, either explicitly or implicitly, that because "minimum [procedural] requirements [are] a matter of federal law, they are not diminished by the fact that the State may have specified its own procedures that it may deem adequate for determining the preconditions to adverse official action." See 46 U. S., 6-67 ; Indeed, any other conclusion would allow the State to destroy at will virtually any state-created property interest. The Court has considered and rejected such an approach: " `While the legislature may elect not to confer a property interest, it may not constitutionally authorize the deprivation of such an interest, once conferred, without appropriate procedural safeguards. [T]he adequacy of statutory procedures for deprivation of a statutorily created property interest must be analyzed in constitutional terms.' " -, n. 6, quoting 46 U. S., 7 Of course, the State remains free to create substantive defenses or immunities for use in adjudication or to eliminate its statutorily created causes of action altogether just as it can amend or terminate its welfare or employment programs. The Court held as much in where it upheld a statute granting officials immunity from certain types of state tort claims. We acknowledged that the grant of immunity arguably did deprive the plaintiffs of a protected property interest. But they were not thereby deprived of property without due process, just as a welfare recipient is not deprived of due process when the legislature adjusts benefit levels. Cf. *433 U. S. Railroad Retirement ; ; ; Chase Securities In each case, the legislative determination provides all the process that is due, see Bi-Metallic Investment ; it "remain[s] true that the State's interest in fashioning its own rules of tort law is paramount to any discernible federal interest, except perhaps an interest in protecting the individual citizen from state action that is wholly arbitrary or irrational." Indeed, as was acknowledged in Martinez, it may well be that a substantive "immunity defense, like an element of the tort claim itself, is merely one aspect of the State's definition of that property interest." Cf. The 20-day limitation in the FEPA, ¶ 858(b), of course, involves no such thing. It is a procedural limitation on the claimant's ability to assert his rights, not a substantive element of the FEPA claim. Because the state scheme has deprived Logan of a property right, then, we turn to the determination of what process is due him. B As our decisions have emphasized time and again,
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him. B As our decisions have emphasized time and again, the Due Process Clause grants the aggrieved party the opportunity to present his case and have its merits fairly judged. Thus it has become a truism that "some form of hearing" is required before the owner is finally deprived of a protected property interest. Board of -57, n. 8 And that is why the Court has stressed that, when a "statutory scheme makes liability an important factor in the State's determination the State may not, consistent with due process, eliminate consideration of that factor in its prior hearing." 402 *. To put it as plainly as possible, the State may not finally destroy a property interest without first giving the putative owner an opportunity to present his claim of entitlement.[7] See On the other hand, the Court has acknowledged that the timing and nature of the required hearing[8] "will depend on appropriate accommodation of the competing interests involved." These include the importance of the private interest and the length or finality of the deprivation, see Memphis Light, Gas & Water and -335; the likelihood of governmental error, see ; and the magnitude of the governmental interests involved, see ib and -563. Each of these factors leads us to conclude that appellant Logan is entitled to have the Commission consider the merits of his charge, based upon the substantiality of the available evidence, before deciding whether to terminate his claim. Logan's interests in retaining his employment, in disproving his employer's charges of incompetence or inability, and more intangibly in redressing an instance of alleged discrimination, are all substantial. At the same time, the deprivation here is final; Logan, unlike a claimant whose charge is dismissed on the merits for lack of evidence, cannot obtain judicial review of the Commission action. A system or procedure that deprives persons of their claims in a random manner, as is apparently true of ¶ 858(b), necessarily *435 presents an unjustifiably high risk that meritorious claims will be terminated. And the State's interest in refusing Logan's procedural request is, on this record, insubstantial. There has been no suggestion that any great number of claimants are in Logan's position, or that directing the State to consider the merits of Logan's claim will be unduly burdensome. In any event, the State by statute has eliminated the mandatory hearing requirement, see n. demonstrating that it no longer has any appreciable interest in defending the procedure at issue. Despite appellee Zimmerman Brush Company's arguments, the recent decision in 45 U.S. 527 is not to the contrary. There, a
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45 U.S. 527 is not to the contrary. There, a state employee negligently lost a prisoner's hobby kit; while the Court concluded that the prisoner had suffered a deprivation of property within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, it held that all the process due was provided by the State's tort claims procedure. In such a situation, the Court observed, "[i]t is difficult to conceive of how the State could provide a meaningful hearing before the deprivation takes place." at 54. The company suggests that Logan is complaining of the same type of essentially negligent deprivation, and that he therefore should be remitted to the tort remedies provided by the Illinois Court of Claims Act, Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 37, ¶ 439. et seq. That statute allows an action "against the State for damages in cases sounding in tort, if a like cause of action would lie against a private person." ¶ 439.8(d).[9] This argument misses 's point. In the Court emphasized that it was dealing with "a tortious loss of. property as a result of a random and unauthorized act by *436 a state employee not a result of some established state procedure." 45 U.S., at 54. Here, in contrast, it is the state system itself that destroys a complainant's property interest, by operation of law, whenever the Commission fails to convene a timely conference whether the Commission's action is taken through negligence, maliciousness, or otherwise. was not designed to reach such a situation. See Unlike the complainant in Logan is challenging not the Commission's error, but the "established state procedure" that destroys his entitlement without according him proper procedural safeguards. In any event, the Court's decisions suggest that, absent "the necessity of quick action by the State or the impracticality of providing any predeprivation process," a postdeprivation hearing here would be constitutionally inadequate. 45 U. S., at 539. See Memphis Light, Gas & Water -20; Board of n. 7; 402 U. S., ; 40 U. S., at 379. Cf. -65 ; -347 That is particularly true where, as here, the State's only post-termination process comes in the form of an independent tort action.[0] Seeking redress through a *437 tort suit is apt to be a lengthy and speculative process, which in a situation such as this one will never make the complainant entirely whole: the Illinois Court of Claims Act does not provide for reinstatement as appellee Zimmerman Brush Company conceded at oral argument, Tr. of Oral Arg. 39 and even a successful suit will not vindicate entirely Logan's right to be free from discriminatory
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not vindicate entirely Logan's right to be free from discriminatory treatment. Obviously, nothing we have said entitles every civil litigant to a hearing on the merits in every case. The State may erect reasonable procedural requirements for triggering the right to an adjudication, be they statutes of limitations, cf. Chase Securities 325 U. S., at 34-36, or, in an appropriate case, filing fees. United (973). And the State certainly accords due process when it terminates a claim for failure to comply with a reasonable procedural or evidentiary rule. Hammond Packing 22 U. S., at 35; What the Fourteenth Amendment does require, however, "is `an opportunity granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner,' U.S. 545, (965) `for [a] hearing appropriate to the nature of the case,' Mullane v. Central Hanover Tr." 40 U. S., at 378. It is such an opportunity that Logan was denied. *438 III The judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois, accordingly, is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN, JUSTICE MARSHALL, and JUSTICE O'CONNOR join. The Court's opinion, ante, considers appellant Logan's due process claim and decides that issue in his favor. As has been noted, Logan also raised an equal protection claim and that issue has been argued and briefed here. Although the Court considered that it was unnecessary to discuss and dispose of the equal protection claim when the due process issue was being decided in Logan's favor, I regard the equal protection issue as sufficiently important to require comment on my part,[] particularly inasmuch as a majority of the Members of the Court are favorably inclined toward the claim, although, to be sure, that majority is not the one that constitutes the Court for the controlling opinion. On its face, Logan's equal protection claim is an unconventional one. The Act's ¶ 858(b) establishes no explicit classifications and does not expressly distinguish between claimants, and the company therefore argues that Logan has no more been deprived of equal protection than anyone would be who is injured by a random act of governmental misconduct. As the Illinois Supreme Court interpreted the statute, however, ¶ 858(b) unambiguously divides claims and thus, necessarily, claimants into two discrete groups that are accorded radically disparate treatment. Claims processed within 20 days are given full consideration on the merits, *439 and complainants bringing such charges are awarded the opportunity for full administrative and judicial review. In contrast, otherwise identical claims that do not receive a hearing within the
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identical claims that do not receive a hearing within the statutory period are unceremoniously, and finally, terminated. Because the Illinois court recognized, in so many words, that the FEPA establishes two categories of claims, one may proceed to determine whether the classification drawn by the statute is consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment. For over a century, the Court has engaged in a continuing and occasionally almost metaphysical effort to identify the precise nature of the Equal Protection Clause's guarantees.[2] At the minimum level, however, the Court "consistently has required that legislation classify the persons it affects in a manner rationally related to legitimate governmental objectives." 450 U.S. 22, This is not a difficult standard for a State to meet when it is attempting to act sensibly and in good faith. But the "rational-basis standard is `not a toothless one,' " quoting 50 ; the classificatory scheme must "rationally advanc[e] a reasonable and identifiable governmental objective." I see no need to explore the outer bounds of this test, for I find that the Illinois statute runs afoul of the lowest level of permissible equal protection scrutiny. The FEPA itself has two express purposes: eliminating employment discrimination, and protecting employers and other potential defendants "from unfounded charges of discrimination." ¶ 85. It is evident at a glance that neither of these objectives is advanced by ¶ 858(b)'s deadline provision. Terminating potentially meritorious claims in a random manner obviously cannot serve to redress instances of discrimination. *440 And it cannot protect employers from unfounded charges, for the frivolousness of a claim is entirely unrelated to the length of time the Commission takes to process that claim. So far as this purpose is concerned, ¶ 858(b) stands on precisely the same footing as the state statute invalidated in There, the Court struck down a provision requiring a tenant to post a double bond before appealing an adverse forcible entry judgment. "The claim that the double-bond requirement operates to screen out frivolous appeals is unpersuasive," the Court noted, "for it not only bars nonfrivolous appeals by those who are unable to post the bond but also allows meritless appeals by others who can afford the bond." Accord, 30 (966). Here, of course, the FEPA may operate to terminate meritorious claims without any hearing at all, while allowing frivolous complaints to proceed through the entire administrative and judicial review process. While it may well be true that "[n]o bright line divides the merely foolish from the arbitrary law," 450 U. S., 3 I have no doubt that ¶ 858(b) is patently irrational in the light of
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Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co.
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that ¶ 858(b) is patently irrational in the light of its stated purposes. In its opinion, however, the Illinois Supreme Court recognized a third rationale for ¶ 858(b): that provision, according to the court, was designed to further the "just and expeditious resolutio[n]" of employment disputes. Zimmerman Brush 07, Insofar as the court meant to suggest that a factfinding conference may help settle controversies and frame issues for a more efficient future resolution, it was undoubtedly correct. But I cannot agree that terminating a claim that the State itself has misscheduled is a rational way of expediting the resolution of disputes.[3] *44 Most important, the procedure at issue does not serve generally to hasten the processing or ultimate termination of employment controversies. Once the Commission has scheduled a factfinding conference and issued a complaint, there are no statutory time limits at all on the length of time it can take to resolve the claim. And ¶ 858(b) does not serve to protect employers from stale charges, because it does not function as a statute of limitation; Logan does not and could not quarrel with the requirement that complainants file their charges in a timely fashion. It is true, of course, that ¶ 858(b) serves to expedite the resolution of certain claims those not processed within 20 days in a most obvious way, and in that sense it furthers the purpose of terminating disputes expeditiously. But it is not enough, under the Equal Protection Clause, to say that the legislature sought to terminate certain claims and succeeded in doing so, for that is "a mere tautological recognition of the fact that [the legislature] did what it intended to do." U. S. Railroad Retirement 80 This Court still has an obligation to view the classificatory system, in an effort to determine whether the disparate treatment accorded the affected classes is arbitrary. Cf. U. S. Railroad Retirement 449 U. S., *442 Here, that inquiry yields an affirmative result. So far as the State's purpose is concerned, every FEPA claimant's charge, when filed with the Commission, stands on the same footing. Yet certain randomly selected claims, because processed too slowly by the State, are irrevocably terminated without review. In other words, the State converts similarly situated claims into dissimilarly situated ones, and then uses this distinction as the basis for its classification. This, I believe, is the very essence of arbitrary state action. "[T]he Equal Protection Clause `imposes a requirement of some rationality in the nature of the class singled out,' " 407 U.S. 28, 40 quoting -309, and that rationality is
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407 U.S. 28, 40 quoting -309, and that rationality is absent here. The Court faced an analogous situation in a case involving sex-based classifications, and its conclusion there is applicable to the case before us now: giving preference to a discrete class "merely to accomplish the elimination of hearings on the merits, is to make the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause" 404 U.S. 7, Finally, it is possible that the Illinois Supreme Court meant to suggest that the deadline contained in ¶ 858(b) can be justified as a means of thinning out the Commission's caseload, with the aim of encouraging the Commission to convene timely hearings. This rationale, however, suffers from the defect outlined above: it draws an arbitrary line between otherwise identical claims. In any event, the State's method of furthering this purpose if this was in fact the legislative end has so speculative and attenuated a connection to its goal as to amount to arbitrary action. The State's rationale must be something more than the exercise of a strained imagination; while the connection between means and ends need not be precise, it, at the least, must have some objective basis. That is not so here. I thus agree with appellant Logan that the Illinois scheme also deprives him of his Fourteenth Amendment right to the equal protection of the laws. *443 JUSTICE POWELL, with whom JUSTICE REHNQUIST joins, concurring in the judgment.
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Justice Powell
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dissenting
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Dougherty County Bd. of Ed. v. White
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109949/dougherty-county-bd-of-ed-v-white/
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Today the Court again expands the reach of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, ruling that a local board of education with no authority over any electoral system must obtain federal clearance of its personnel rule requiring employees to take leaves of absence while campaigning for political office. The Court's ruling is without support in the language or legislative history of the Act. Moreover, although prior decisions *48 of the Court have taken liberties with this language and history, today's decision is without precedent. I Standard, Practice, or Procedure Section 5 requires federal preclearance before a "political subdivision" of a State covered by 4 of the Act may enforce a change in "any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting" This provision marked a radical departure from traditional notions of constitutional federalism, a departure several Members of this Court have regarded as unconstitutional.[1] Indeed, the Court noted in the first case to come before it under the Act that 5 represents an "uncommon exercise of congressional power," South and the Justice Department has conceded in testimony before Congress that it is a "substantial departure from ordinary concepts of our federal system." Hearings on S. 407 et al. before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 94th Con, 1st Sess., 536 (1975) (testimony of Stanley Pottinger, Asst. Atty. Gen., Civil Rights Division). Congress tempered the intrusion of the Federal Government into state affairs, however, by limiting the Act's coverage to voting regulations. Indeed, the very title of the Act shows *49 that the Act's thrust is directed to the protection of voting rights. Section 2 forbids the States to use any "voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure" (emphasis added) to deny anyone the right to vote on account of race. Similarly, 4 sharply curtails the rights of certain States to use "tests or devices" as prerequisites to voting eligibility. "[T]est or device" is defined in 4 (c), 42 U.S. C. 1973b (c), as "any requirement that a person as a prerequisite for voting or registration for voting (1) demonstrate the ability to read, write, understand, or interpret any matter, (2) demonstrate any educational achievement or his knowledge of any particular subject, (3) possess good moral character, or (4) prove his qualifications by the voucher of registered voters or members of any other class." (Emphasis added.) Finally, 5 requires preclearance only of "any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting" (emphasis added).[2] The question under this
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Justice Powell
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dissenting
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Dougherty County Bd. of Ed. v. White
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109949/dougherty-county-bd-of-ed-v-white/
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with respect to voting" (emphasis added).[2] The question under this language, therefore, is whether Rule 58 of the Board pertains to votin Contrary to the suggestion of the Court's opinion, see ante, at 42-43, the answer to this question turns neither on the Board's possible discrimination against the appellee, nor on the potential of enactments such as Rule 58 for use as instruments of racial discrimination. Section 5 by its terms is not limited to enactments *50 that have a potential for discriminatory use; rather, it extends to all regulations with respect to voting, regardless of their purpose or potential uses. The affected party's race was conceded by counsel to be irrelevant in determining whether Rule 58 pertains to voting, see Tr. of Oral Ar 25-27; nor is the timing of the adoption of Rule 58 of any significance. Indeed, in stating his cause of action under the Act, the appellee does not allege any discrimination on the basis of race.[3] Yet the Court, in holding that Rule 58 is subject to the preclearance requirements of 5, relies on a perceived potential for discrimination. In so doing, the Court simply disregards the explicit scope of 5 and relies upon factors that the parties have conceded to be irrelevant.[4] *51 Separated from all mistaken references to racial discrimination, the Court's holding that Rule 58 is a "standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting" is difficult to understand. It tortures the language of the Act to conclude that this personnel regulation, having nothing to do with the conduct of elections as such, is state action "with respect to votin" No one is denied the right to vote; nor is anyone's exercise of the franchise impaired. To support its interpretation of 5, the Court has constructed a tenuous theory, reasoning that, because the right to vote includes the right to vote for whoever may wish to run for office, any discouragement given any potential candidate may deprive someone of the right to vote. In constructing this theory, ante, at 41, the Court relies upon ; ; and cases that involved explicit barriers to candidacy, such as the filing fees held to violate the Fourteenth Amendment in Bullock. The Court states that the "reality here is that Rule 58's impact on elections is no different from that of many of the candidate qualification changes for which we have previously required preclearance." Ante, at 41. But the notion that a State or locality imposes a "qualification" on candidates by refusing to support their campaigns with public funds is without support in reason or precedent.
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Justice Powell
| 1,978 | 17 |
dissenting
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Dougherty County Bd. of Ed. v. White
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109949/dougherty-county-bd-of-ed-v-white/
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with public funds is without support in reason or precedent. As no prior 5 decision arguably governs the resolution of this case, the Court draws upon broad dictum that, taken from *52 its context, is meaningless.[5] For example, in the Court suggested that 5 would require clearance of "any state enactment which alter[s] the election law of a covered State in even a minor way." Even if the language in Allen were viewed as necessary to the Court's holding in that case, it would not support today's decision. In Allen, as in each of the cases relied upon today,[6]*53 the Court was considering an enactment relating directly to the way in which elections are conducted: either by structuring the method of balloting, setting forth the qualifications for candidates, or determining who shall be permitted to vote. These enactments could be said to be "with respect to voting" in elections. Rule 58, on the other hand, effects no change in an election law or in a law regulating who may vote or when and where they may do so. It is a personnel rule directed to the resolution of a personnel problem: the expenditure of public funds to support the candidacy of an employee whose time and energies may be devoted to campaigning, rather than to counseling schoolchildren. After extending the scope of 5 beyond anything indicated in the statutory language or in precedent, the Court attempts to limit its holding by suggesting that Rule 58 somehow differs from a "neutral personnel practice governing all forms of absenteeism," as it "specifically addresses the electoral process." See ante, at 40. Thus, the Court intimates that it would not require Rule 58 to be precleared if the rule required Board employees to take unpaid leaves of absence whenever an extracurricular responsibility required them frequently to be absent from their dutieswhether that responsibility derived from candidacy for office, campaigning for a friend who is running for office, fulfilling civic duties, or entering into gainful employment with a second employer. The Court goes on, however, to give as the principal reason for extension of 5 to Rule 58 the effect of such rules on potential candidates for office. What the Court fails to note is that the effect on a potential candidate of a "neutral personnel practice governing all forms of absenteeism" is no less than the effect of Rule 58 as enacted by the Dougherty County School Board. Thus, under a general absenteeism provision the appellee would go without pay just as he did under Rule 58; the only difference would be that Board
|
Justice Powell
| 1,978 | 17 |
dissenting
|
Dougherty County Bd. of Ed. v. White
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109949/dougherty-county-bd-of-ed-v-white/
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under Rule 58; the only difference would be that Board employees absent for reasons other than their candidacy would join the appellee on leave. *54 Under the Court's rationale, therefore, even those enactments making no explicit reference to the electoral process would have to be cleared through the Attorney General or the District Court for the District of Columbia. Indeed, if the Court truly means that any incidental impact on elections is sufficient to trigger the preclearance requirement of 5, then it is difficult to imagine what sorts of state or local enactments would not fall within the scope of that section.[7] II Political Subdivision Section 5 requires federal preclearance only of those voting changes that are adopted either by a State covered under 4 or by a "political subdivision" of such a State. Although 14 (c) (2) of the Act restricts the term "political subdivision" to state institutions that "conduc[t] registration for voting," last Term the Court ruled that the preclearance requirement of 5 applied to the city of Sheffield, Ala., which is without authority to register voters. See United Sheffield had been given authority, however, to undertake a substantial restructuring of the method by which its government officials would be selected.[8] Thus, pursuant to a voter referendum, Sheffield had changed from a commission to a mayor-council form of government. Councilmen were to be elected at large, but would run for numbered seats corresponding to the two council seats given each of the city's four wards. The Court held that Sheffield was a political subdivision, in spite of its lack of authority to register voters. Today the Court states that appellants' "contention is squarely foreclosed by our decision last Term" in Sheffield. Ante, at 44. The contention that this local school board is not a political subdivision under the Act is foreclosed only because the Court now declares it to be so, as neither the holding nor the rationale of Sheffield applies to this case. The Sheffield decision was based on two grounds, neither of which is present here. First, the Sheffield Court relied upon "congressional intent" as derived from "the Act's structure," "the language of the Act," "the legislative history of enactment and re-enactments," and "the Attorney General's consistent interpretations of 5." -118. Second, the Court based its decision on the frustration of the Act's basic policy that would result if a State could circumvent the Act's provisions by simply withdrawing the power to register voters from all or selected cities, counties, parishes, or other political subdivisions.[9] *56 There is nothing in the language, structure, or legislative history
|
Justice Powell
| 1,978 | 17 |
dissenting
|
Dougherty County Bd. of Ed. v. White
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109949/dougherty-county-bd-of-ed-v-white/
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There is nothing in the language, structure, or legislative history of the Act that suggests it was Congress' intent that local entities such as the Board were to fall within the reach of 5; nor has the Court cited any "consistent interpretation" of 5 by the Attorney General that supports the Court's holdin[10] Looking to the structure of the Act, the Court argues that whether a subdivision has electoral responsibilities is of no consequence in determining whether 5 is applicable. Ante, at 45-46. Rather, it is said that this provision "directs attention to the impact of a change on the electoral process, not to the duties of the political subdivision that adopted it." Neither Sheffield nor any other decision of the Court suggests that 5 applies to the actions of every local entity however remote its powers may be with respect to elections and votin Indeed, the Court indicated the importance of direct power over elections in Sheffield when it repeatedly emphasized Sheffield's "power over the electoral process."[11]*57 See, e. 120, 122, 127. A rational application of Sheffield would require consideration of whether the entity enacting a change had a substantial measure of authority over the way in which elections were held or over the right to vote. The city of Sheffield had such authority; the Dougherty County School Board does not. Although professing to find support in the legislative history of the Act, the Court cites no committee report or statement by any supporter of the Act that suggests a congressional intention to require federal preclearance of actions by local entities that are powerless to exercise any control over elections or votin The Court does try to connect 5 to school boards by references to legislative history that are entirely irrelevant. The Court neglects to make clear that each of these references pertained to a school board enacting changes in the way its members were elected, something the Dougherty County School Board is without authority to do.[12] See 121 Con Rec. 23744 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Stennis) ("Any changes, so far as election officials were concerned, which were made in precincts, county districts, school districts, municipalities, or State legislatures had to be submitted"); Hearings on S. 407 et al. before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 94th Con, 1st Sess., 467-470 (1975) (school board enacting changes from ward to at-large elections for its members); S. Rep. No. 94-295, p. 27 (1975) (school boards in Texas adopting "[e]lection law changes" to avoid election of minority groups to school boards). *58 Furthermore, the Sheffield Court's
|
Justice Powell
| 1,978 | 17 |
dissenting
|
Dougherty County Bd. of Ed. v. White
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109949/dougherty-county-bd-of-ed-v-white/
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minority groups to school boards). *58 Furthermore, the Sheffield Court's concern over the possible circumvention of the Act is inapposite here, as the Board (unlike the city of Sheffield) has no authority to regulate the electoral process. There can be no danger, therefore, that substantial restructuring of the electoral system will take place in Dougherty County without the scrutiny of either the Attorney General or the District Court for the District of Columbia. Thus, none of the factors relied upon in Sheffield is present in this case: There is no relevant "language of the Act," nothing in the "Act's structure," nothing in its "legislative history," and no "consistent interpretation of 5" by the Attorney General to support the extension of 5 to the Board's enactments. Nor is it possible that a local school board that is without authority over the electoral process will be used to circumvent the Act's basic policy. There simply is no parallel in fact or governmental theory between a city like Sheffield and the Dougherty County School Board. Finding no support for its decision in the rationale of Sheffield, the Court falls back upon language in that opinion that "all entities having power over any aspect of the electoral process" are subject to 5language merely expressing a conclusion drawn from a consideration of the factors present in Sheffield, but absent here.[13] The Board has no "power over any aspect of the electoral process" in the normal sense of these words. It did not purport by Rule 58 to regulate the appellee's election to the Georgia House of Representatives; *59 it has been given no authority under Georgia law to do so. Rather, the Board merely has said to its employees that, if they choose to run for any elective office, the Board will not affirmatively support their campaign by paying their wages despite the neglect of their duties that inevitably will occur. Such neutral action designed to protect the public fisc hardly rises to the level of "power over the election process." In sum, I would reverse the judgment below on either or both of two grounds. The Dougherty County School Board is not a "political subdivision" within the meaning of the Act. Even if it were deemed to be such, the personnel rule at issue is not a standard, practice, or procedure "with respect to votin" As respectful as I am of my Brothers' opinions, I view the Court's decision as simply a judicial revision of the Act, unsupported by its purpose, statutory language, structure, or history.
|
Justice Brennan
| 1,970 | 13 |
majority
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Longshoremen v. Ariadne Shipping Co.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108091/longshoremen-v-ariadne-shipping-co/
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The question presented here is whether the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 29 U.S. C. 151 et seq., pre-empts state jurisdiction to enjoin peaceful picketing protesting substandard wages paid by vessels to American longshoremen working in American ports. The Florida courts held that there was no pre-emption, citing and Steamship We granted certiorari. We reverse. In 1966 the respondents, a Liberian corporation and a Panamanian corporation, operated cruise ships to the Caribbean from Port Everglades and Miami, Florida. Respondent Ariadne Shipping Company operated the S. S. Ariadne, of Liberian registry, with a crew subject to Liberian ship's articles. Respondent Evangeline Steamship Company operated S. S. Bahama Star, of Panamanian registry, with a crew subject to Panamanian ship's articles. The uncontradicted evidence showed that "[l]oading of the ship, stowage and loading of automobiles, loading cargo and ship stowage" occurred whenever either vessel berthed at Port Everglades or Miami, "[p]art of it [performed] by employees of the ship and some of it by outside labor." The petitioner is a labor organization representing longshoremen in the Miami area. Although none of those doing the longshore work for the ships belonged to the union, whenever either vessel docked at Port Everglades or Miami in May 1966, petitioner stationed a picket near the vessel to patrol with a placard protesting that the longshore *197 work was being done under substandard wage conditions.[1] Respondents obtained temporary injunctive relief against the picketing from the Circuit Court for Dade County.[2] That court rejected petitioner's contention that the subject matter was pre-empted, holding that under the picketing was beyond the reach of the regulatory power of the National Labor Relations Board, and hence could be enjoined, since it violated Florida law. The temporary injunction was affirmed by the District Court of Appeal for the Third District of Florida in a brief per curiam order citing and Thereafter the Circuit Court, without further hearing, made the injunction permanent. The District Court of Appeal again affirmed, although noting that the testimony "tended to show" that the picketing was carried on to protest against the substandard wages paid for the longshore work.[3] The Supreme Court of Florida denied review in an unreported order. and construed the National Labor Relations Act to preclude Board jurisdiction over labor disputes concerning certain maritime operations of vessels. Specifically, held that "maritime operations of ships employing alien seamen are not in `commerce' within the meaning of 2 (6) [of the Act]." See also This construction of the statute, however, was addressed to situations in which Board regulation of the labor relations in question would necessitate inquiry
|
Justice Brennan
| 1,970 | 13 |
majority
|
Longshoremen v. Ariadne Shipping Co.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108091/longshoremen-v-ariadne-shipping-co/
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regulation of the labor relations in question would necessitate inquiry into the "internal discipline and order" of a foreign vessel, an intervention thought likely to "raise considerable disturbance not only in the field of maritime law but in our international relations as well." In Benz a vessel temporarily in an American port was picketed by an American seamen's union, supporting the demands of a foreign crew for more favorable conditions than those in the ship's articles which they signed under foreign law, upon joining the vessel in a foreign port. In an American seamen's union petitioned for a representation election among the foreign crew members of a Honduran-flag vessel who were already represented by a Honduran union, certified under Honduran labor law. Again, in the picketing was by an American union formed "for the primary purpose of organizing foreign seamen on ships." -26. In these cases, we concluded that, since the Act primarily concerns strife between *199 American employers and employees, we could reasonably expect Congress to have stated expressly any intention to include within its coverage disputes between foreign ships and their foreign crews. Thus we could not find such an intention by implication, particularly since to do so would thrust the National Labor Relations Board into "a delicate field of international relations," Benz, Assertion of jurisdiction by the Board over labor relations already governed by foreign law might well provoke "vigorous protests from foreign governments and international problems for our Government," and "invite retaliatory action from other nations," Moreover, to construe the Act to embrace disputes involving the "internal discipline and order" of a foreign ship would be to impute to Congress the highly unlikely intention of departing from "the well-established rule of international law that the law of the flag state ordinarily governs the internal affairs of a ship," a principle frequently recognized in treaties with other countries. The considerations that informed the Court's construction of the statute in the cases above are clearly inapplicable to the situation presented here. The participation of some crew members in the longshore work does not obscure the fact that this dispute centered on the wages to be paid American residents, who were employed by each foreign ship not to serve as members of its crew but rather to do casual longshore work. There is no evidence that these occasional workers were involved in any internal affairs of either ship which would be governed by foreign law.[4] They were American residents, hired to work exclusively on American docks as longshoremen, *200 not as seamen on respondents' vessels. The critical inquiry then
|
Justice Brennan
| 1,970 | 13 |
majority
|
Longshoremen v. Ariadne Shipping Co.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108091/longshoremen-v-ariadne-shipping-co/
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not as seamen on respondents' vessels. The critical inquiry then is whether the longshore activities of such American residents were within the "maritime operations of ships" which and Benz found to be beyond the scope of the Act. We hold that their activities were not within these excluded operations. The American longshoremen's short-term, irregular and casual connection with the respective vessels plainly belied any involvement on their part with the ships' "internal discipline and order." Application of United States law to resolve a dispute over the wages paid the men for their longshore work, accordingly, would have threatened no interference in the internal affairs of ships likely to lead to conflict with foreign or international law. We therefore find that these longshore operations were in "commerce" within the meaning of 2 (6), and thus might have been subject to the regulatory power of the National Labor Relations Board.[5] The jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board is exclusive and pre-emptive as to activities that are "arguably subject" to regulation under 7 or 8 of the Act. San Diego Building Trades The activities of petitioner in this case met that test. The union's peaceful primary *201 picketing to protest wage rates below established area standards arguably constituted protected activity under 7. See ; Reversed. MR. JUSTICE WHITE, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR.
|
Justice Rehnquist
| 1,972 | 19 |
second_dissenting
|
Brooks v. Tennessee
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108551/brooks-v-tennessee/
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The Court's invalidation of the Tennessee statute challenged here is based upon both its stated repugnance to the privilege against self-incrimination and its infringement of counsel's right to plan the presentation of his case. While it is possible that this statute regulating the order of proof in criminal trials might in another case raise issues bearing on the privilege against self-incrimination, its application in this case certainly has not done so. Petitioner Brooks never took the stand, and it is therefore difficult to see how his right to remain silent was in any way infringed by the State. Whatever may be the operation of the statute in other situations, petitioner cannot assert that it infringed his privilege against self-incriminationa privilege which he retained inviolate throughout the trial. The Court's alternative holding that the Tennessee statute infringes the right of petitioner's counsel to plan the presentation of his case creates a far more dominant role for defense counsel than that indicated by the language of the Constitution. While cases such as establish the fundamental nature of the constitutional right to the assistance of counsel, no case previously decided by this Court elevates defense counsel to the role of impresario with respect to decisions as to the order in which witnesses shall testify at the trial. *618 This Court and other courts have repeatedly held that the control of the order of proof at trial is a matter primarily entrusted to the discretion of the trial court. See, e. g., ; cert. denied, ; ; The notion that the Sixth Amendment allows defense counsel to overrule the trial judge as to the order in which witnesses shall be called stands on its head the traditional understanding of the defendant's right to counsel. Defense counsel sits at the side of the accused, not to take over the conduct of the trial, but to advise the accused as to various choices available to him within the limits of existing state practice and procedure. I could understand, though I would not agree with, a holding that under these circumstances the Fourteenth Amendment conferred a right upon the defendant, counseled or not, to decide at what point during the presentation of his case to take the stand. But to cast the constitutional issue in terms of violation of the defendant's right to counsel suggests that defense counsel has an authority of constitutional dimension to determine the order of proof at trial. It is inconceivable to me that the Court would permit every preference of defense counsel as to the order in which defense witnesses were to
|
Justice Rehnquist
| 1,972 | 19 |
second_dissenting
|
Brooks v. Tennessee
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108551/brooks-v-tennessee/
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as to the order in which defense witnesses were to be called to prevail over a contrary ruling of the trial judge in the exercise of his traditional discretion to control the order of proof at trial. The crucial fact here is not that counsel wishes to have a witness take the stand at a particular time, but that the defendant whether advised by counsel or otherwisewishes to determine at what point during the presentation of his case he desires to take the stand. Logically the benefit of today's ruling should be available to a defendant conducting *619 his own defense who has waived the right of counsel, but since the Court insists on putting the issue in terms of the advice of counsel, rather than in terms of defense control over the timing of defendant's appearance, the application of today's holding to that situation is by no means clear. The Tennessee statute in question is, as the Court notes in its opinion, based upon an accommodation between the traditional policy of sequestering prospective witnesses before they testify and the right of the criminal defendant to be present during his trial. Since the defendant may not be sequestered against his will while other witnesses are testifying, the State has placed a more limited restriction on the presentation of his testimony. The defendant is required to testify, if he chooses to do so, as the first witness for the defense. The State applies the same rule evenhandedly to the prosecuting witness, if there be one; he, too, must testify first. While it is perfectly true that the prosecution is given no constitutional right to remain silent, this fact does not detract from the evident fairness of Tennessee's effort to accommodate the two conflicting policies. The state rule responds to the fear that interested parties, if allowed to present their own testimony after other disinterested witnesses have testified, may well shape their version of events in a way inconsistent with their oath as witnesses. This fear is not groundless, nor is its importance denigrated by vague generalities such as the statement that "our adversary system reposes judgment of the credibility of all witnesses in the jury." Ante, at 611. Assuredly the traditional common-law charge to the jury confides to that body the determination as to the truth or falsity of the testimony of each witness. But the fact that the jury is instructed to make such a determination in reaching its verdict has never been thought to militate against *620 the desirability, to say nothing of the constitutionality, of additional inhibitions against
|
Justice Thomas
| 2,017 | 1 |
majority
|
Manrique v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4384110/manrique-v-united-states/
|
Sentencing courts are required to impose restitution as part of the sentence for specified crimes. But the amount to be imposed is not always known at the time of sentenc- ing. When that is the case, the court may enter an initial judgment imposing certain aspects of a defendant’s sen- tence, such as a term of imprisonment, while deferring a determination of the amount of restitution until entry of a later, amended judgment. We must decide whether a single notice of appeal, filed between the initial judgment and the amended judgment, is sufficient to invoke appellate review of the later- determined restitution amount. We hold that it is not, at least where, as here, the Government objects to the de- fendant’s failure to file a notice of appeal following the amended judgment. I fter federal agents found more than 300 files contain- ing child pornography on his computer, petitioner Marcelo Manrique pleaded guilty to possessing a visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct, in viola- MNRIQUE v. UNITED STTES Opinion of the Court tion of 18 U.S. C. and (b)(). Under the Mandatory Victims Restitution ct of 1996 (MVR), the District Court was required to order petitioner to “make restitution to the victim of the offense.” see (b)() ccordingly, the judgment expressly deferred “determination of restitu- tion” and noted that an “mended Judgment w[ould] be entered after such determination.” pp. 39. On July 8, petitioner filed a notice of appeal “from the final judgment and sentence entered in this action on the 4th day of June, 014.” The District Court held a restitution hearing on Sep- tember 17, 014. Only one of the victims sought restitu- tion. The court ordered petitioner to pay $4,500 in restitu- tion to her and entered an amended judgment the next day imposing that sentence. Petitioner did not file a second notice of appeal from the court’s order imposing restitution or from the amended judgment. Notwithstanding his failure to file a second notice of appeal, petitioner challenged the restitution amount before the Eleventh Circuit, arguing in his brief that the Government had not shown he was the proximate cause of the victim’s injuries and that the restitution amount bore no rational relationship to the damages she claimed. The Government countered that petitioner had forfeited his right to challenge the restitution amount by failing to file Cite as: 1 U. S. (017) 3 Opinion of the Court a second notice of appeal. The Court of ppeals agreed that petitioner could not challenge the restitution amount and declined to consider his challenge. We granted
|
Justice Thomas
| 2,017 | 1 |
majority
|
Manrique v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4384110/manrique-v-united-states/
|
restitution amount and declined to consider his challenge. We granted certiorari, 578 U. S. (016), and now affirm. II To secure appellate review of a judgment or order, a party must file a notice of appeal from that judgment or order. Filing a notice of appeal transfers adjudicatory authority from the district court to the court of appeals. The statute that governs appeals of criminal sentences, 18 U.S. C. provides that a “defendant may file a notice of appeal in the district court for review of an oth- erwise final sentence” in certain specified circumstances. See United nd Federal Rule of ppellate Procedure 3(a)(1) specifies that “[a]n appeal permitted by law as of right may be taken only by filing a notice of appeal with the district clerk within the time allowed by Rule 4.” (Emphasis added.) Both and Rule 4 contemplate that the defend- ant will file the notice of appeal after the district court has decided the issue sought to be appealed. Section 374(a)(1) permits the defendant to file a notice of appeal of a sentence that “was imposed in violation of law.” (Emphasis added.) nd Rule 4(b)(1)()(i) provides gener- ally that, “[i]n a criminal case, a defendant’s notice of appeal must be filed in the district court within 14 days after the entry of either the judgment or the order being appealed.” (Emphasis added.) Petitioner filed only one notice of appeal, which preceded by many months the sentence and judgment imposing restitution. His notice of appeal could not have been “for 4 MNRIQUE v. UNITED STTES Opinion of the Court review” of the restitution order, and it was not filed within the timeframe allowed by Rule 4. He thus failed to properly appeal under the statute and the Rules the amended judgment imposing restitution. The Government contends that filing a notice of appeal from the judgment imposing restitution is a jurisdictional prerequisite to securing appellate review of the restitution amount. See, e.g., Brief for United States 8–31. This position follows, according to the Government, from many of our cases emphasizing the “jurisdictional significance” of a notice of appeal. E.g., Be- cause the notice of appeal is jurisdictional, the Govern- ment explains, the Court of ppeals was required to dis- miss petitioner’s appeal regardless of whether the Government raised the issue. We do not need to decide in this case whether the Gov- ernment is correct. The requirement that a defendant file a timely notice of appeal from an amended judgment imposing restitution is at least a mandatory claim- processing rule. See Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S.
|
Justice Thomas
| 2,017 | 1 |
majority
|
Manrique v. United States
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4384110/manrique-v-united-states/
|
claim- processing rule. See Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 37, 5–53 (008); see also Rule 3(a)() (“n appellant’s failure to take any step other than the timely filing of a notice of appeal does not affect the validity of the appeal, but is ground only for the court of appeals to act as it considers appropriate, including dismissing the appeal” (emphasis added)). Mandatory claim-processing rules “seek to promote the orderly progress of litigation by requiring that the parties take certain procedural steps at certain specified times.” Henderson v. Shinseki, 56 U.S. 48, 435 (011). Unlike jurisdictional rules, mandatory claim-processing rules may be forfeited “if the party as- serting the rule waits too long to raise the point.” Eber- (internal quotation marks omitted). If a party “properly raise[s] them,” however, they are “unalterable.” at Cite as: 1 U. S. (017) 5 Opinion of the Court 19. The Government timely raised petitioner’s failure to file a notice of appeal from the amended judgment imposing restitution before the Court of ppeals. See Brief for United States in No. 14–1309 (C11), pp. –5 (arguing that petitioner “waived his right to appeal the district court’s order of restitution by failing to file a notice of appeal from that order” (capitalization omitted)). ccord- ingly, “the court’s duty to dismiss the appeal was manda- tory.” B Petitioner disputes this conclusion, arguing that his single notice of appeal sufficed under the Rules to appeal both the initial judgment and the amended judgment imposing restitution. s we understand it, his argument depends on two premises: First, in a deferred restitution case, there is only one “judgment,” as that term is used in Rules 4(b)(1) and (b)(); and second, so long as a notice of appeal is filed after the initial judgment, it “springs for- ward” under Rule 4(b)() to appeal the amended judgment imposing restitution. We reject each of these premises. 1 Petitioner argues that the initial judgment deferring restitution and the amended judgment imposing a specific restitution amount merge to become “the judgment” refer- enced in the Federal Rules. See Rule 4(b)(1)()(i) (notice of appeal must be filed within 14 days after “the entry of the judgment being appealed”); Rule 4(b)() (“Filing Before Entry of Judgment”). He argues that his notice of appeal, which was filed within 14 days of the initial judg- ment, was therefore sufficient to invoke appellate review of the merged judgment. Petitioner’s approach is inconsistent with our reasoning in Dolan, The petitioner in that case ar- 6 MNRIQUE v. UNITED STTES Opinion of the Court gued that the amended judgment imposing restitution is
|
Justice Thomas
| 2,017 | 1 |
majority
|
Manrique v. United States
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4384110/manrique-v-united-states/
|
the Court gued that the amended judgment imposing restitution is the only final, appealable judgment in a deferred restitu- tion case. See lthough we did not decide “whether or when a party can, or must, appeal”—the question presented here—we were not persuaded by the argument that “a sentencing judgment is not ‘final’ until it contains a definitive determination of the amount of resti- tution.” at 617–618. To the contrary, we recognized “strong arguments” supporting the proposition that both the “initial judgment [that] imposed a sentence of impris- onment and supervised release” and the subsequent “ ‘sen- tence that impose[d] an order of restitution’ ” were each immediately appealable final judgments. (citing 18 U.S. C. §§3(b) (imprisonment), 33(a) (supervised release), and 3664(o) (restitution)). Consequently, we were not surprised “to find instances where a defendant ha[d] appealed from the entry of a judgment containing an initial sentence that includes a term of imprisonment” and “subsequently appealed from a later order setting forth the final amount of restitution.” Our analysis in Dolan thus makes clear that deferred restitu- tion cases involve two appealable judgments, not one.* Petitioner’s reliance on Rule 4(b)() is also misplaced. That Rule provides that a “notice of appeal filed after the court announces a decision, sentence, or order—but before the entry of the judgment or order—is treated as filed on the date of and after the entry.” prematurely filed notice of appeal will become effective under the Rule to challenge a later-entered judgment in some circumstances. s this Court explained in construing Rule 4(a)()’s paral- —————— * We do not intend to call into question this Court’s decision in Corey v. United States, (holding that a defendant may challenge his conviction after a single notice of appeal filed from a final sentence imposed under Cite as: 1 U. S. (017) 7 Opinion of the Court lel provision for civil cases, the Rule “was intended to protect the unskilled litigant who files a notice of appeal from a decision that he reasonably but mistakenly believes to be a final judgment, while failing to file a notice of appeal from the actual final judgment.” FirsTier Mortgage (1991). By its own terms, however, Rule 4(b)() applies only to a notice of appeal filed after a sentence has been “an- nounce[d]” and before the judgment imposing the sentence is entered on the docket. See Rule 4(b)(6) (“ judgment or order is entered for purposes of this Rule 4(b) when it is entered on the criminal docket”). If the court has not yet decided the issue that the appellant seeks to appeal, then the
|
Justice Thomas
| 2,017 | 1 |
majority
|
Manrique v. United States
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4384110/manrique-v-united-states/
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the issue that the appellant seeks to appeal, then the Rule does not come into play. ccordingly, it does not apply where a district court enters an initial judgment deferring restitution and subsequently amends the judg- ment to include the sentence of restitution. By deferring restitution, the court is declining to announce a sentence. When petitioner filed his notice of appeal in this case, the District Court had observed only that restitution was “mandatory.” pp. 7. The court did not announce the restitution amount (or even hold a hearing on the issue) until months later. Even if describing restitution as man- datory could qualify as a “sentence” that the District Court “announced” under Rule 4(b)(), petitioner has never disputed that restitution is mandatory for his offense. Rather, he argued on appeal that the amount of the resti- tution imposed—an issue the court did not consider until months later—is unlawful. Because petitioner’s notice of appeal was filed well before the District Court announced the sentence imposing $4,500 in restitution, the notice of appeal did not “spring forward” to become effective on the date the court entered its amended judgment imposing that sentence. 8 MNRIQUE v. UNITED STTES Opinion of the Court C Finally, petitioner argues in the alternative that any defect in his notice of appeal should be overlooked as harmless error, citing Lemke v. United States, 346 U.S. 35 (1953) (per curiam). In that case, the petitioner filed a notice of appeal the day after his sentence was announced but three days before the judgment was entered. at 36. His notice of appeal was dismissed as premature under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(a)(), which then governed notices of appeal in criminal cases. This Court reversed on the ground that the premature filing was harmless error under Rule 5(a). The Court’s holding in Lemke does not apply to petitioner’s failure to file a notice of appeal from the amended judg- ment. Lemke has been superseded by the Federal Rules of ppellate Procedure in two ways. First, the Lemke peti- tioner’s notice of appeal would now be timely under Rule 4(b)(). s discussed in Part II–B–, petitioner here cannot take advantage of that rule. Second, Rule 3(a)() now provides the consequences for litigant errors associated with filing a notice of appeal. The court of appeals may, in its discretion, overlook defects in a notice of appeal other than the failure to timely file a notice. It may not overlook the failure to file a notice of appeal at all. The filing of a notice of appeal from an amended judgment imposing
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Justice Thomas
| 2,017 | 1 |
majority
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Manrique v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4384110/manrique-v-united-states/
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of a notice of appeal from an amended judgment imposing restitution is at least a mandatory claim-processing rule, Part II–, meaning that the requirement to file such a notice is unalterable, so long as the opposing party raises the issue. By definition, manda- tory claim-processing rules, although subject to forfeiture, are not subject to harmless-error analysis. Petitioner in this case did not file a defective notice of appeal from the amended judgment imposing restitution, but rather failed altogether to file a notice of appeal from the amended judgment. Courts do not have discretion to overlook such an error, at least where it is called to their Cite as: 1 U. S. (017) 9 Opinion of the Court attention. * * * We hold that a defendant who wishes to appeal an order imposing restitution in a deferred restitution case must file a notice of appeal from that order. Because petitioner failed to do so, and the Government objected, the Court of ppeals properly declined to consider his challenge to the amount of restitution imposed. The judgment of the Court of ppeals, accordingly, is affirmed. It is so ordered. JUSTICE GORSUCH took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Cite as: 1 U. S. (017) 1 GINSBURG, J., dissenting SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STTES No. –750 MRCELO MNRIQUE, PETITIONER v.
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Justice Marshall
| 1,986 | 15 |
majority
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Fisher v. Berkeley
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111607/fisher-v-berkeley/
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The question presented here is whether a rent control ordinance enacted by a municipality pursuant to popular initiative is unconstitutional because pre-empted by the Sherman Act. I In June 1980, the electorate of the city of Berkeley, California, enacted an initiative entitled "Ordinance 5261-N. S., Rent Stabilization and Eviction for Good Cause Ordinance" *262 (hereafter Ordinance). Section 3 of the Ordinance stated the measure's purposes:[1] "The purposes of this Ordinance are to regulate residential rent increases in the City of Berkeley and to protect tenants from unwarranted rent increases and arbitrary, discriminatory, or retaliatory evictions, in order to help maintain the diversity of the Berkeley community and to ensure compliance with legal obligations relating to the rental of housing. This legislation is designed to address the City of Berkeley's housing crisis, preserve the public peace, health and safety, and advance the housing policies of the City with regard to low and fixed income persons, minorities, students, handicapped, and the aged." App. to Juris. Statement A-111. To accomplish these goals, the Ordinance places strict rent controls on all real property that "is being rented or is available for rent for residential use in whole or in part," 5, at A-113. Excepted are government-owned units, transient units, cooperatives, hospitals, certain small owner-occupied buildings, and all newly constructed buildings. For the remaining units, numbering approximately 23,000, the Ordinance establishes a base rent ceiling reflecting the rents in effect at the end of May 1980. A landlord may raise his rents from these levels only pursuant to an annual general adjustment of rent ceilings by a Rent Stabilization Board of appointed commissioners or after he is successful in petitioning the Board for an individual adjustment. A landlord who fails to register with the Board units covered by the Ordinance or who fails to adhere *263 to the maximum allowable rent set under the Ordinance may be fined by the Board, sued by his tenants, or have rent legally withheld from him. If his violations are willful, he may face criminal penalties. Shortly after the passage of the initiative, appellants, a group of landlords owning rental property in Berkeley, brought this suit in California Superior Court, claiming, inter alia, that the Ordinance violates their rights under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The Superior Court upheld the Ordinance on its face, but was reversed by the Court of Appeal. While that appeal was pending, however, this Court's decision in Community Communications led certain amici to raise the question whether the Ordinance was unconstitutional because
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Justice Marshall
| 1,986 | 15 |
majority
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Fisher v. Berkeley
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111607/fisher-v-berkeley/
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to raise the question whether the Ordinance was unconstitutional because pre-empted by the federal antitrust laws. When the California Supreme Court heard the appeal from the Court of Appeal's decision, it therefore chose to consider plaintiffs' pre-emption claim along with their Fourteenth Amendment challenge. Although fully briefed on the question whether the Berkeley Ordinance constitutes state action exempt from antitrust scrutiny under the standard established in the California Supreme Court noted that consideration of this issue would become necessary only were there to be " `truly a conflict between the Sherman Act and the challenged regulatory scheme,' " 693 P. 2d, at 275 cert. denied, ). Such a conflict would exist, the Supreme Court concluded, only if the Ordinance on its face mandated conduct prohibited by either 1 or 2 of the Sherman Act. See After reviewing the two "traditional standards" that have consistently been used to determine whether conduct violates 1 of the Sherman Act the per se rules and the rule of reason, see *264 National Society of Professional the court concluded that both standards, with their exclusive focus on competition and concern for the selfish motives of private actors, failed to give due deference to a municipality's legitimate interest in promoting public health, safety, and -673, 693 P. 2d, at 280-285. The Supreme Court therefore found both standards inappropriate and proceeded to apply a standard of its own devising, based upon this Court's Commerce Clause cases. Applying this test, the court found no conflict between the Ordinance and either 1 or 2 of the Sherman Act. We noted probable jurisdiction limited to the antitrust pre-emption question, and now affirm, although on grounds different from those relied on by the California Supreme Court. While that court was correct in noting that consideration of state action is not necessary unless an actual conflict with the antitrust laws is established, we find traditional antitrust analysis adequate to resolve the issue presented here. II We begin by noting that appellants make no claim under either 4 or 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S. C. 15 and 26, that the process by which the Rent Stabilization Ordinance was passed renders the Ordinance the product of an illegal "contract, combination or conspiracy." Appellants instead claim that, regardless of the manner of its enactment, the regulatory scheme established by the Ordinance, on its face, conflicts with the Sherman Act and therefore is pre-empted. Recognizing that the function of government may often be to tamper with free markets, correcting their failures and aiding their victims, this Court noted in that a "state
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Justice Marshall
| 1,986 | 15 |
majority
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Fisher v. Berkeley
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111607/fisher-v-berkeley/
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aiding their victims, this Court noted in that a "state statute is not pre-empted by the federal antitrust laws simply because the state scheme may have an anticompetitive effect," See Exxon *265 We have therefore held that a state statute should be struck down on pre-emption grounds "only if it mandates or authorizes conduct that necessarily constitutes a violation of the antitrust laws in all cases, or if it places irresistible pressure on a private party to violate the antitrust laws in order to comply with the statute." 458 U.S., at While involved a state statute rather than a municipal ordinance, the rule it established does not distinguish between the two. As in other pre-emption cases, the analysis is the same for the acts of both levels of government. See, e. g., Only where legislation is found to conflict "irreconcilably" with the antitrust laws, does the level of government responsible for its enactment become important. Legislation that would otherwise be pre-empted under may nonetheless survive if it is found to be state action immune from antitrust scrutiny under The ultimate source of that immunity can be only the State, not its subdivisions. See Community Communications ; Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light A Appellants argue that Berkeley's Ordinance is pre-empted under because it imposes rent ceilings across the entire rental market for residential units. Such a regime, they contend, clearly falls within the per se rule against price fixing, a rule that has been one of the settled points of antitrust enforcement since the earliest days of the Sherman Act, see ; United v. Socony-Vacuum Oil That the prices set here are ceilings rather than floors and that the public interest has been invoked to justify this stabilization should not, appellants *266 argue, save Berkeley's regulatory scheme from condemnation under the per se rule. Certainly there is this much truth to appellants' argument: Had the owners of residential rental property in Berkeley voluntarily banded together to stabilize rents in the city, their activities would not be saved from antitrust attack by claims that they had set reasonable prices out of solicitude for the welfare of their tenants. See National Society of Professional ; United v. Trans-Missouri Freight Assn., Moreover, it cannot be denied that Berkeley's Ordinance will affect the residential housing rental market in much the same way as would the philanthropic activities of this hypothetical trade association. What distinguishes the operation of Berkeley's Ordinance from the activities of a benevolent landlords' cartel is not that the Ordinance will necessarily have a different economic effect, but that the rent ceilings
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Justice Marshall
| 1,986 | 15 |
majority
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Fisher v. Berkeley
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111607/fisher-v-berkeley/
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have a different economic effect, but that the rent ceilings imposed by the Ordinance and maintained by the Rent Stabilization Board have been unilaterally imposed by government upon landlords to the exclusion of private control. The distinction between unilateral and concerted action is critical here. Adhering to the language of 1, this Court has always limited the reach of that provision to "unreasonable restraints of trade effected by a `contract, combination or conspiracy' between separate entities." Copperweld We have therefore deemed it "of considerable importance" that independent activity by a single entity be distinguished from a concerted effort by more than one entity to fix prices or otherwise restrain trade, v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., Even where a single firm's restraints directly affect prices and have the same economic effect as concerted action might have, there can be no liability under 1 in the absence of agreement. ; United v. Parke, Davis *267 & Thus, if the Berkeley Ordinance stabilizes rents without this element of concerted action, the program it establishes cannot run afoul of 1. Recognizing this concerted-action requirement, appellants argue that the Ordinance "forms a combination between [the city of Berkeley and its officials], on the one hand, and the property owners on the other. It also creates a horizontal combination among the landlords." Reply Brief for Appellants 10, n. 7. In so arguing, appellants misconstrue the concerted-action requirement of 1. A restraint imposed unilaterally by government does not become concerted action within the meaning of the statute simply because it has a coercive effect upon parties who must obey the law. The ordinary relationship between the government and those who must obey its regulatory commands whether they wish to or not is not enough to establish a conspiracy. Similarly, the mere fact that all competing property owners must comply with the same provisions of the Ordinance is not enough to establish a conspiracy among landlords. Under Berkeley's Ordinance, control over the maximum rent levels of every affected residential unit has been unilaterally removed from the owners of those properties and given to the Rent Stabilization Board. While the Board may choose to respond to an individual landlord's petition for a special adjustment of a particular rent ceiling, it may decide not to. There is no meeting of the minds here. See American Tobacco v. United quoted in The owners of residential property in Berkeley have no more freedom to resist the city's rent controls than they do to violate any other local ordinance enforced by substantial sanctions. B Not all restraints imposed upon private actors by government units
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Justice Marshall
| 1,986 | 15 |
majority
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Fisher v. Berkeley
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111607/fisher-v-berkeley/
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Not all restraints imposed upon private actors by government units necessarily constitute unilateral action outside the purview of 1. Certain restraints may be characterized as *268 "hybrid," in that nonmarket mechanisms merely enforce private marketing decisions. See Where private actors are thus granted "a degree of private regulatory power," the regulatory scheme may be attacked under 1. Indeed, this Court has twice found such hybrid restraints to violate the Sherman Act. See Schwegmann ; California Retail Liquor Dealers 5 U.S. 97 In Schwegmann, a Louisiana statute authorized a distributor to enforce agreements fixing minimum retail prices not only against parties to such contracts, but also against retailers who sold the distributor's products without having agreed to the price restrictions. After finding that the statute went far beyond the now-repealed Miller-Tydings Act, which offered a limited antitrust exemption to certain " `contracts or agreements prescribing minimum prices for the resale' " of specified commodities, the Court held that two liquor distributors had violated 1 when they attempted to hold a retailer to the price-fixing terms of a contract it had refused to sign. In so holding, the Court noted that "when a state compels retailers to follow a parallel price policy, it demands private conduct which the Sherman Act forbids." 341 U. S, at 389. However, under the Louisiana statute, both the selection of minimum price levels and the exclusive power to enforce those levels were left to the discretion of distributors. While the petitioner-retailer in that case may have been legally required to adhere to the levels so selected, the involvement of his suppliers in setting those prices made it impossible to characterize the regulation as unilateral action by the State of Louisiana. The trade restraint condemned in entailed a similar degree of free participation by private economic actors. That case presented an antitrust challenge to California's requirement that all wine producers, wholesalers, and rectifiers *269 file fair trade contracts or price schedules with the State. If a wine producer did not set prices, wholesalers had to post a resale price schedule for that producer's brands. No state-licensed wine merchant could sell wine to a retailer at other than those 5 U.S., at 99. The Court found: "California's system for wine pricing plainly constitutes resale price maintainance in violation of the Sherman Act The wine producer holds the power to prevent price competition by dictating the prices charged by wholesalers." Here again, the mere existence of legal compulsion did not turn California's scheme into unilateral action by the State. The Court noted: "The State has no direct control over wine
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Justice Marshall
| 1,986 | 15 |
majority
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Fisher v. Berkeley
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111607/fisher-v-berkeley/
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Court noted: "The State has no direct control over wine prices, and it does not review the reasonableness of the prices set by wine dealers." The hybrid restraints condemned in Schwegmann and were thus quite different from the pure regulatory scheme imposed by Berkeley's Ordinance. While the Ordinance does give tenants certainly a group of interested private parties some power to trigger the enforcement of its provisions, it places complete control over maximum rent levels exclusively in the hands of the Rent Stabilization Board. Not just the controls themselves but also the rent ceilings they mandate have been unilaterally imposed on the landlords by the city. C There may be cases in which what appears to be a state- or municipality-administered price stabilization scheme is really a private price-fixing conspiracy, concealed under a "gauzy cloak of state involvement," This might occur even where prices are ostensibly under the absolute control of government officials. However, we have been given no indication that such corruption has tainted the rent controls imposed by Berkeley's Ordinance. Adopted by popular initiative, the Ordinance can hardly be viewed as a cloak for any conspiracy among landlords or between the landlords and the municipality. Berkeley's landlords have *270 simply been deprived of the power freely to raise their rents. That is why they are here. And that is why their role in the stabilization program does not alter the restraint's unilateral nature.[2] III Because under settled principles of antitrust law, the rent controls established by Berkeley's Ordinance lack the element of concerted action needed before they can be characterized as a per se violation of 1 of the Sherman Act, we cannot say that the Ordinance is facially inconsistent with the federal antitrust laws. See at We therefore need not address whether, even if the controls were to mandate 1 violations, they would be exempt under the state-action doctrine from antitrust scrutiny. See The judgment of the California Supreme Court is Affirmed. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in the judgment.
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Justice Scalia
| 2,016 | 9 |
dissenting
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Montgomery v. Louisiana
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3171724/montgomery-v-louisiana/
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The Court has no jurisdiction to decide this case, and the decision it arrives at is wrong. I respectfully dissent. I. Jurisdiction Louisiana postconviction courts willingly entertain Eighth Amendment claims but, with limited exceptions, apply the law as it existed when the state prisoner was convicted and sentenced. Shortly after this Court an- nounced the Louisi- ana Supreme Court adopted Teague’s framework to govern the provision of postconviction remedies available to state prisoners in its state courts as a matter of state law. Tay- In doing so, the court stated that it was “not bound” to adopt that federal framework. One would think, then, that it is none of our business that a -year-old Louisiana prison- er’s state-law motion to be resentenced according to v. Alabama, 567 U. S. (2012), a case announced almost half a century after his sentence was final, was met with a firm rejection on state-law grounds by the Louisiana Supreme Court. But a majority of this Court, eager to reach the merits of this case, resolves the question of our jurisdiction by deciding that the Constitution requires state postconviction courts to adopt Teague’s exception for 2 MONTGOMERY v. LOUISIANA SCALIA, J., dissenting so-called “substantive” new rules and to provide state-law remedies for the violations of those rules to prisoners whose sentences long ago became This conscription into federal service of state postconviction courts is noth- ing short of astonishing. A Teague announced that federal courts could not grant habeas corpus to overturn state convictions on the basis of a “new rule” of constitutional law—meaning one an- nounced after the convictions became final—unless that new rule was a “substantive rule” or a “watershed rul[e] of criminal procedure.” The Teague pre- scription followed from Justice Harlan’s view of the “retro- activity problem” detailed in his separate opinion in v. United States, (dissenting opinion), and later in v. United States, 01 U.S. 667, 675 (opinion concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). Placing the rule’s first exception in context requires more analysis than the majority has applied. The Court in the mid-20th century was confounded by what Justice Harlan called the “swift pace of constitu- tional change,” (1963) as it vacated and remanded many cases in the wake of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Justice Harlan called upon the Court to engage in “informed and deliberate consideration” of “whether the States are constitutionally required to apply [Gideon’s] new rule retrospectively, which may well re- quire the reopening of cases long since finally adjudicated in accordance with then applicable decisions of this Court.” The Court
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Justice Scalia
| 2,016 | 9 |
dissenting
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Montgomery v. Louisiana
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3171724/montgomery-v-louisiana/
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accordance with then applicable decisions of this Court.” The Court answered that call in Linkletter began with the premise “that we are neither required to apply, nor prohibited from applying, a decision Cite as: 577 U. S. (2016) 3 SCALIA, J., dissenting retrospectively” and went on to adopt an equitable rule-by- rule approach to retroactivity, considering “the prior his- tory of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation.” The Linkletter framework proved unworkable when the Court began applying the rule-by-rule approach not only to cases on collateral review but also to cases on direct review, rejecting any distinction “between convictions now final” and “convictions at various stages of trial and direct review.” It was this rejection that drew Justice Harlan’s reproach in and later in He urged that “all ‘new’ rules of constitutional law must, at a minimum, be applied to all those cases which are still subject to direct review by this Court at the time the ‘new’ decision is handed down.” “Simply fishing one case from the stream of appellate review, using it as a vehicle for pronouncing new constitutional standards, and then permitting a stream of similar cases subsequently to flow by unaffected by that new rule constitute an indefen- sible departure from th[e] model of judicial review.” The decision in 79 U.S. 31 (1987), heeded this constitutional concern. The Court jettisoned the Linkletter test for cases pending on direct review and adopted for them Justice Harlan’s rule of redressability: “[F]ailure to apply a newly declared consti- tutional rule to criminal cases pending on direct review violates basic norms of constitutional adjudication.” 79 U.S., 22 We established in that this Court must play by our own “old rules”—rules we have settled before the defendant’s conviction and sen- tence become final, even those that are a “clear break from existing precedent”—for cases pending before us on direct appeal. 23. Since the rule is constitution- MONTGOMERY v. LOUISIANA SCALIA, J., dissenting ally compelled, we instructed the lower state and federal courts to comply with it as well. When Teague followed on ’s heels two years later, the opinion contained no discussion of “basic norms of constitutional adjudication,” 22, nor any discussion of the obligations of state courts. Doing away with Linkletter for good, the Court adopted Justice Harlan’s solution to “the retroactivity problem” for cases pending on collateral review—which he described not as a constitutional problem but as “a problem as to the scope of the habeas writ.” at 68 Teague held that federal habeas courts could no
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Justice Scalia
| 2,016 | 9 |
dissenting
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Montgomery v. Louisiana
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3171724/montgomery-v-louisiana/
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at 68 Teague held that federal habeas courts could no longer upset state-court convictions for violations of so-called “new rules,” not yet announced when the conviction be- came 89 U.S., 10. But it allowed for the previ- ously mentioned exceptions to this rule of nonredressabil- ity: substantive rules placing “certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the crimi- nal law-making authority to proscribe” and “watershed rules of criminal procedure.” 11. Then in Penry v. Lynaugh, 92 U.S. 302 the Court expanded this first exception for substantive rules to embrace new rules “prohibiting a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or offense.” 30. Neither Teague nor its exceptions are constitutionally compelled. Unlike today’s majority, the Teague-era Court understood that cases on collateral review are fundamen- tally different from those pending on direct review because of “considerations of finality in the judicial process.” Shea v. Louisiana, 70 U.S. 51, That line of finality demarcating the constitutionally required rule in from the habeas rule in Teague supplies the an- swer to the not-so-difficult question whether a state post- conviction court must remedy the violation of a new sub- stantive rule: No. A state court need only apply the law as it existed at the time a defendant’s conviction and sen- Cite as: 577 U. S. (2016) 5 SCALIA, J., dissenting tence became See 22. And once final, “a new rule cannot reopen a door already closed.” James B. Beam Distilling 51 (1991) (opinion of Souter, J.). Any relief a prisoner might receive in a state court after finality is a matter of grace, not constitutional prescription. B The majority can marshal no case support for its con- trary position. It creates a constitutional rule where none had been before: “Teague’s conclusion establishing the retroactivity of new substantive rules is best understood as resting upon constitutional premises” binding in both federal and state courts. Ante, at 8. “Best understood.” Because of what? Surely not because of its history and derivation. Because of the Supremacy Clause, says the majority. Ante, at 12. But the Supremacy Clause cannot possibly answer the question before us here. It only elicits another question: What federal law is supreme? Old or new? The majority’s champion, Justice Harlan, said the old rules apply for federal habeas review of a state-court conviction: “[T]he habeas court need only apply the constitutional standards that prevailed at the time the original proceed- ings took place,” 39 U.S., at 263 (dissenting opin- ion), for a state court cannot “toe the constitutional mark” that does not
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Justice Scalia
| 2,016 | 9 |
dissenting
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Montgomery v. Louisiana
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3171724/montgomery-v-louisiana/
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state court cannot “toe the constitutional mark” that does not yet exist, 01 U.S., at 687 (opinion of Harlan, J.). Following his analysis, we have clarified time and again—recently in Greene v. Fisher, 565 U. S. – (slip op., at –5)—that federal habeas courts are to review state-court decisions against the law and factual record that existed at the time the decisions were made. “Section 225(d)(1) [of the federal habeas statute] refers, in the past tense, to a state-court adjudica- tion that ‘resulted in’ a decision that was contrary to, or ‘involved’ an unreasonable application of, established law. 6 MONTGOMERY v. LOUISIANA SCALIA, J., dissenting This backward-looking language requires an examination of the state-court decision at the time it was made.” Cul- How can it possibly be, then, that the Constitution requires a state court’s review of its own convictions to be governed by “new rules” rather than (what suffices when federal courts review state courts) “old rules”? The majority relies on the statement in United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 01 U.S. 715 that “ ‘[n]o circumstances call more for the invocation of a rule of complete retroactivity’ ” than when “ ‘the conduct being penalized is constitutionally immune from punishment.’ ” Ante, at 9–10 ( 01 U.S., at 72). The majority neglects to mention that this statement was addressing the “circumstances” of a conviction that “had not become final,” at 72, n. 13 when the “rule of complete retroactivity” was invoked. Coin & Currency, an opinion written by (guess whom?) Justice Harlan, merely foreshadowed the rule announced in that all cases pending on direct review receive the benefit of newly announced rules—better termed “old rules” for such rules were announced before finality. The majority also misappropriates v. Aiken, 8 U.S. 211 (1988), which reviewed a state habeas petition- er’s Fourteenth Amendment claim that the jury instruc- tions at his trial lessened the State’s burden to prove every element of his offense beyond a reasonable doubt. That case at least did involve a conviction that was But the majority is oblivious to the critical fact that ’s claim depended upon an old rule, settled at the time of his trial. This Court reversed the state habeas court for its refusal to consider that the jury instructions violated that old rule. The majority places great weight upon the dictum in that the South Carolina habeas court “ ‘ha[d] a duty to grant the relief that federal law requires.’ ” Ante, at 13 ( ). Cite as: 577 U. S. (2016) 7 SCALIA, J., dissenting It is simply wrong
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Justice Scalia
| 2,016 | 9 |
dissenting
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Montgomery v. Louisiana
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3171724/montgomery-v-louisiana/
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S. (2016) 7 SCALIA, J., dissenting It is simply wrong to divorce that dictum from the facts it addressed. In that context, merely reinforces the line drawn by : when state courts provide a forum for postconviction relief, they need to play by the “old rules” announced before the date on which a defendant’s conviction and sentence became The other sleight of hand performed by the majority is its emphasis on Ex parte Siebold, That case considered a petition for a federal writ of habeas corpus following a federal conviction, and the initial issue it confronted was its jurisdiction. A federal court has no inherent habeas corpus power, Ex parte Bollman, Cranch 75, 9 (1807), but only that which is conferred (and limited) by statute, see, e.g., Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 66 (1996). As Siebold stated, it was forbidden to use the federal habeas writ “as a mere writ of error.” 100 U.S., 75. “The only ground on which this court, or any court, without some special statute authorizing it, [could] give relief on habeas corpus to a prisoner under conviction and sentence of another court is the want of jurisdiction in such court over the person or the cause, or some other matter rendering its proceedings void.” Turning to the facts before it, the Court decided it was within its power to hear Siebold’s claim, which did not merely protest that the conviction and sentence were “erroneous” but contended that the statute he was con- victed of violating was unconstitutional and the conviction therefore void: “[I]f the laws are unconstitutional and void, the Circuit Court acquired no jurisdiction of the causes.” 76–377. Siebold is thus a decision that expands the limits of this Court’s power to issue a federal habeas writ for a federal prisoner. The majority, however, divines from Siebold “a general principle” that “a court has no authority to leave in place a conviction or sentence that violates a substantive rule, regardless of whether the conviction or sentence became 8 MONTGOMERY v. LOUISIANA SCALIA, J., dissenting final before the rule was announced.” Ante, at 11. That is utterly impossible. No “general principle” can rationally be derived from Siebold about constitutionally required remedies in state courts; indeed, the opinion does not even speak to constitutionally required remedies in federal courts. It is a decision about this Court’s statutory power to grant the Original Writ, not about its constitutional obligation to do so. Nowhere in Siebold did this Court intimate that relief was constitutionally required—or as the majority puts it, that a court would have had “no
|
Justice Scalia
| 2,016 | 9 |
dissenting
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Montgomery v. Louisiana
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3171724/montgomery-v-louisiana/
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majority puts it, that a court would have had “no authority” to leave in place Siebold’s conviction, ante, at 11. The majority’s sorry acknowledgment that “Siebold and the other cases discussed in this opinion, of course, do not directly control the question the Court now answers for the first time,” ib is not nearly enough of a disclaimer. It is not just that they “do not directly control,” but that the dicta cherry picked from those cases are irrelevant; they addressed circumstances fundamentally different from those to which the majority now applies them. In- deed, we know for sure that the author of some of those dicta, Justice Harlan, held views that flatly contradict the majority. The majority’s maxim that “state collateral review courts have no greater power than federal habeas courts to mandate that a prisoner continue to suffer punishment barred by the Constitution,” ante, at 12–13, begs the ques- tion rather than contributes to its solution. Until today, no federal court was constitutionally obliged to grant relief for the past violation of a newly announced substantive rule. Until today, it was Congress’s prerogative to do away with Teague’s exceptions altogether. Indeed, we had left unresolved the question whether Congress had al- ready done that when it amended a section of the habeas corpus statute to add backward-looking language govern- ing the review of state-court decisions. See Antiterrorism Cite as: 577 U. S. (2016) 9 SCALIA, J., dissenting and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, §10, 110 Stat. 1219, codified at 28 U.S. C. §225(d)(1); Greene, 565 U. S, at n. (slip op., at 5, n.). A maxim shown to be more relevant to this case, by the analysis that the majority omitted, is this: The Supremacy Clause does not impose upon state courts a constitutional obligation it fails to impose upon federal courts. C All that remains to support the majority’s conclusion is that all-purpose Latin canon: ipse dixit. The majority opines that because a substantive rule eliminates a State’s power to proscribe certain conduct or impose a certain punishment, it has “the automatic consequence of invali- dating a defendant’s conviction or sentence.” Ante, at 9. What provision of the Constitution could conceivably produce such a result? The Due Process Clause? It surely cannot be a denial of due process for a court to pronounce a final judgment which, though fully in accord with federal constitutional law at the time, fails to anticipate a change to be made by this Court half a century into the future. The Equal Protection Clause? Both statutory and (in- creasingly) constitutional laws
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Justice Scalia
| 2,016 | 9 |
dissenting
|
Montgomery v. Louisiana
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3171724/montgomery-v-louisiana/
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Equal Protection Clause? Both statutory and (in- creasingly) constitutional laws change. If it were a denial of equal protection to hold an earlier defendant to a law more stringent than what exists today, it would also be a denial of equal protection to hold a later defendant to a law more stringent than what existed 50 years ago. No principle of equal protection requires the criminal law of all ages to be the same. The majority grandly asserts that “[t]here is no grandfa- ther clause that permits States to enforce punishments the Constitution forbids.” Ante, at 12 Of course the italicized phrase begs the question. There most certainly is a grandfather clause—one we have called finality—which says that the Constitution does not re- quire States to revise punishments that were lawful when 10 MONTGOMERY v. LOUISIANA SCALIA, J., dissenting they were imposed. Once a conviction has become final, whether new rules or old ones will be applied to revisit the conviction is a matter entirely within the State’s control; the Constitution has nothing to say about that choice. The majority says that there is no “possibility of a valid result” when a new substantive rule is not applied retroactively. Ante, at 9. But the whole controversy here arises because many think there is a valid result when a defendant has been convicted under the law that existed when his convic- tion became And the States are unquestionably entitled to take that view of things. The majority’s imposition of Teague’s first exception upon the States is all the worse because it does not adhere to that exception as initially conceived by Justice Harlan— an exception for rules that “place, as a matter of constitu- tional interpretation, certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law- making authority to proscribe.” 01 U.S., at 2 Rather, it endorses the exception as expanded by Penry, to include “rules prohibiting a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or offense.” 92 U.S., 30. That expan- sion empowered and obligated federal (and after today state) habeas courts to invoke this Court’s Eighth Amendment “evolving standards of decency” jurisprudence to upset punishments that were constitutional when im- posed but are “cruel and unusual,” U. S. Const., Amdt. 8, in our newly enlightened society. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). The “evolving standards” test con- cedes that in 19 the State had the power to punish Henry Montgomery as it did. Indeed, Montgomery could at that time have been sentenced to death by our
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Justice Scalia
| 2,016 | 9 |
dissenting
|
Montgomery v. Louisiana
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3171724/montgomery-v-louisiana/
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at that time have been sentenced to death by our yet unevolved society. Even 20 years later, this Court reaf- firmed that the Constitution posed no bar to death sen- tences for juveniles. 92 U.S. 361 Not until our People’s “standards of decency” Cite as: 577 U. S. (2016) 11 SCALIA, J., dissenting evolved a mere 10 years ago—nearly 0 years after Mont- gomery’s sentence was imposed—did this Court declare the death penalty unconstitutional for juveniles. Roper v. Simmons, 53 U.S. 551 Even then, the Court reassured States that “the punishment of life imprison- ment without the possibility of parole is itself a severe sanction,” implicitly still available for juveniles. at 572. And again five years ago this Court left in place this severe sanction for juvenile homicide offenders. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 8, So for the five decades Montgomery has spent in prison, not one of this Court’s precedents called into question the legality of his sen- tence—until the People’s “standards of decency,” as per- ceived by five Justices, “evolved” yet again in Teague’s central purpose was to do away with the old regime’s tendency to “continually force the States to mar- shal resources in order to keep in prison defendants whose trials and appeals conformed to then-existing constitu- tional standards.” 89 U.S., 10. Today’s holding thwarts that purpose with a vengeance. Our ever-evolving Constitution changes the rules of “cruel and unusual punishments” every few years. In the passage from that the majority’s opinion quotes, ante, at 13, Justice Harlan noted the diminishing force of finality (and hence the equitable propriety—not the constitutional requirement—of disregarding it) when the law punishes nonpunishable conduct, see 01 U.S., at 3. But one cannot imagine a clearer frustration of the sensible policy of Teague when the ever-moving target of impermissible punishments is at issue. Today’s holding not only fore- closes Congress from eliminating this expansion of Teague in federal courts, but also foists this distortion upon the States. II. The Retroactivity of Having created jurisdiction by ripping Teague’s first 12 MONTGOMERY v. LOUISIANA SCALIA, J., dissenting exception from its moorings, converting an equitable rule governing federal habeas relief to a constitutional com- mand governing state courts as well, the majority proceeds to the merits. And here it confronts a second obstacle to its desired outcome. the opinion it wishes to im- pose upon state postconviction courts, simply does not decree what the first part of the majority’s opinion says Teague’s first exception requires to be given retroactive effect: a rule “set[ting] forth categorical constitutional guarantees that place certain criminal laws and punish-
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Justice Scalia
| 2,016 | 9 |
dissenting
|
Montgomery v. Louisiana
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3171724/montgomery-v-louisiana/
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categorical constitutional guarantees that place certain criminal laws and punish- ments altogether beyond the State’s power to impose.” Ante, at 9 No problem. Having distorted Teague, the majority simply proceeds to rewrite The majority asserts that “rendered life without parole an unconstitutional penalty for ‘a class of defend- ants because of their status’—that is, juvenile offenders whose crimes reflect the transient immaturity of youth.” Ante, at 17. It insists that barred life-without- parole sentences “for all but the rarest of juvenile offend- ers, those whose crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility. For that reason, is no less substantive than are Roper and Graham.” Ante, at 17–18. The problem is that stated, quite clearly, precisely the opposite: “Our decision does not categorically bar a penalty for a class of offenders or type of crime—as, for example, we did in Roper or Graham. Instead, it mandates only that a sen- tencer follow a certain process—considering an offender’s youth and attendant characteristics—before imposing a particular penalty.” 567 U. S., at (slip op., at 20) To contradict that clear statement, the majority opinion quotes passages from that assert such things as “mandatory life-without-parole sentences for children ‘pos[e] too great a risk of disproportionate punishment’ ” and “ ‘appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible penalty will be uncommon.’ ” Ante, at 16 Cite as: 577 U. S. (2016) 13 SCALIA, J., dissenting ( at (slip op., at 17)). But to say that a punishment might be inappropriate and dispropor- tionate for certain juvenile offenders is not to say that it is unconstitutionally void. All of the statements relied on by the majority do nothing more than express the reason why the new, youth-protective procedure prescribed by is desirable: to deter life sentences for certain juvenile of- fenders. On the issue of whether rendered life- without-parole penalties unconstitutional, it is impossible to get past ’s unambiguous statement that “[o]ur decision does not categorically bar a penalty for a class of offenders” and “mandates only that a sentencer follow a certain process before imposing a particular penalty.” 567 U. S., at (slip op., at 20). It is plain as day that the majority is not applying but rewriting it.1 And the rewriting has consequences beyond merely making ’s procedural guarantee retroactive. If, indeed, a State is categorically prohibited from imposing life without parole on juvenile offenders whose crimes do not “reflect permanent incorrigibility,” then even when the procedures that demands are provided the constitu- tional requirement is not necessarily satisfied. It remains available for the defendant sentenced to life without pa- role to argue that his
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Justice Scalia
| 2,016 | 9 |
dissenting
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Montgomery v. Louisiana
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3171724/montgomery-v-louisiana/
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sentenced to life without pa- role to argue that his crimes did not in fact “reflect per- manent incorrigibility.” Or as the majority’s opinion puts it: “That did not impose a formal factfinding re- quirement does not leave States free to sentence a child[2] —————— 1 It is amusing that the majority’s initial description of is the same as our own: “[T]he Court held that a juvenile convicted of a homicide offense could not be sentenced to life in prison without parole absent consideration of the juvenile’s special circumstances in light of the principles and purposes of juvenile sentencing.” Ante, at 1. Only 15 pages later, after softening the reader with 3 pages of obfuscating analysis, does the majority dare to attribute to that which explicitly denies. 2 The majority presumably regards any person one day short of voting age as a “child.” 1 MONTGOMERY v. LOUISIANA SCALIA, J., dissenting whose crime reflects transient immaturity to life without parole. To the contrary, established that this pun- ishment is disproportionate under the Eighth Amend- ment.” Ante, at 20. How wonderful. Federal and (like it or not) state judges are henceforth to resolve the knotty “legal” question: whether a 17-year-old who murdered an innocent sheriff ’s deputy half a century ago was at the time of his trial “incorrigible.” Under bear in mind, the inquiry is whether the inmate was seen to be incorrigible when he was sentenced—not whether he has proven corrigible and so can safely be paroled today. What silliness. (And how impossible in practice, see Brief for National District Attorneys Assn. et al. as Amici Curiae 9–17.) When in 38 U.S. 586, the Court im- posed the thitherto unheard-of requirement that the sen- tencer in capital cases must consider and weigh all “rele- vant mitigating factors,” it at least did not impose the substantive (and hence judicially reviewable) requirement that the aggravators must outweigh the mitigators; it would suffice that the sentencer thought so. And, fairly read, did the same. Not so with the “incorrigibility” requirement that the Court imposes today to make retroactive. But have no fear. The majority does not seriously ex- pect state and federal collateral-review tribunals to en- gage in this silliness, probing the evidence of “incorrigibil- ity” that existed decades ago when defendants were sentenced. What the majority expects (and intends) to happen is set forth in the following not-so-subtle invita- tion: “A State may remedy a violation by permitting juvenile homicide offenders to be considered for parole, rather than by resentencing them.” Ante, at 21. Of course. This whole exercise, this whole distortion
|
Justice Scalia
| 2,016 | 9 |
dissenting
|
Montgomery v. Louisiana
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3171724/montgomery-v-louisiana/
|
at 21. Of course. This whole exercise, this whole distortion of Mil- ler, is just a devious way of eliminating life without parole for juvenile offenders. The Court might have done that Cite as: 577 U. S. (2016) 15 SCALIA, J., dissenting expressly (as we know, the Court can decree anything), but that would have been something of an embarrassment. After all, one of the justifications the Court gave for de- creeing an end to the death penalty for murders (no mat- ter how many) committed by a juvenile was that life with- out parole was a severe enough punishment. See Roper, 53 U.S., at 572. How could the majority—in an opinion written by the very author of Roper—now say that pun- ishment is also unconstitutional? The Court expressly refused to say so in 567 U. S., at (slip op., at 17). So the Court refuses again today, but merely makes imposition of that severe sanction a practical impossibil- ity. And then, in Godfather fashion, the majority makes state legislatures an offer they can’t refuse: Avoid all the utterly impossible nonsense we have prescribed by simply “permitting juvenile homicide offenders to be considered for parole.” Ante, at 21. Mission accomplished. Cite as: 577 U. S. (2016) 1 THOMAS, J., dissenting SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 1–280 HENRY MONTGOMERY, PETITIONER v.
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,989 | 11 |
second_dissenting
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DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Servs.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112202/deshaney-v-winnebago-county-dept-of-social-servs/
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Today, the Court purports to be the dispassionate oracle of the law, unmoved by "natural sympathy." Ante, at 202. But, in this pretense, the Court itself retreats into a sterile formalism which prevents it from recognizing either the facts of the case before it or the legal norms that should apply to those facts. As JUSTICE BRENNAN demonstrates, the facts here involve not mere passivity, but active state intervention in the life of Joshua DeShaney intervention that triggered a fundamental duty to aid the boy once the State learned of the severe danger to which he was exposed. The Court fails to recognize this duty because it attempts to draw a sharp and rigid line between action and inaction. But such formalistic reasoning has no place in the interpretation of the broad and stirring Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Indeed, I submit that these Clauses were designed, at least in part, to undo the formalistic legal reasoning that infected antebellum jurisprudence, which the late Professor Robert Cover analyzed so effectively in his significant work entitled Justice Accused (1975). Like the antebellum judges who denied relief to fugitive slaves, see the Court today claims that its decision, however harsh, is compelled by existing legal doctrine. On the contrary, the question presented by this case *213 is an open one, and our Fourteenth Amendment precedents may be read more broadly or narrowly depending upon how one chooses to read them. Faced with the choice, I would adopt a "sympathetic" reading, one which comports with dictates of fundamental justice and recognizes that compassion need not be exiled from the province of judging. Cf. A. Stone, Law, Psychiatry, and Morality 262 (1984) ("We will make mistakes if we go forward, but doing nothing can be the worst mistake. What is required of us is moral ambition. Until our composite sketch becomes a true portrait of humanity we must live with our uncertainty; we will grope, we will struggle, and our compassion may be our only guide and comfort"). Poor Joshua! Victim of repeated attacks by an irresponsible, bullying, cowardly, and intemperate father, and abandoned by respondents who placed him in a dangerous predicament and who knew or learned what was going on, and yet did essentially nothing except, as the Court revealingly observes, ante, at 193, "dutifully recorded these incidents in [their] files." It is a sad commentary upon American life, and constitutional principles so full of late of patriotic fervor and proud proclamations about "liberty and justice for all" that this child, Joshua DeShaney, now is assigned to live out
|
Justice Rehnquist
| 1,981 | 19 |
majority
|
United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Mitchell
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110459/united-parcel-service-inc-v-mitchell/
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We are called upon in this case to determine which state statute of limitations period should be borrowed and applied to an employee's action against his employer under 301 (a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 29 U.S. C. 185 (a), and I Petitioner United Parcel Service, (UPS), employed respondent Mitchell (respondent) as a car washer at its facility on Staten Island, N. Y. On January 13, 1977, respondent was discharged for dishonest acts, including falsifying his timecards and claiming payment for hours which he did not work. Respondent denied the charges against him and requested his union, Department Store and Wholesale Drivers, Warehousemen and Helpers, Local Union No. 177 (the Union), to file a grievance on his behalf contesting the discharge. UPS and the Union were parties to a collective-bargaining agreement which provided a grievance and arbitration procedure for the resolution of disputes covered by the agreement. App. 57-67. Pursuant to the agreement respondent's grievance was submitted to a panel of the Atlantic Area Parcel Grievance Committee, composed of three union and three company representatives (the Joint Panel). Cf. The Joint Panel conducted a hearing, at which respondent was represented by the Union, and on February 16, 1977, it announced its decision that the discharge be upheld. App. 103-104. Under the collective-bargaining agreement this decision was "binding on all parties." ; see Seventeen months later, on July 20, 1978, respondent filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern *59 District of New York against the Union and UPS under 301 (a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S. C. 185 (a). See He alleged that the Union had breached its duty of fair representation and that UPS discharged him not for the stated reasons, which it knew to be false, but to achieve savings by replacing full-time employees with part-time employees. App. 7-13. Both UPS and the Union moved for summary judgment on the ground that the action was barred by New York's 90-day statute of limitations for actions to vacate arbitration awards. Section 7511 (a) of the N. Y. Civ. Prac. Law (McKinney 1963) provides that "[a]n application to vacate or modify an [arbitration] award may be made by a party within ninety days after its delivery to him." The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of UPS and the Union, ruling that respondent's action was properly characterized as one to vacate the arbitration award entered against him. The court reasoned: "The relief sought was expressly denied in an arbitration award issued as a result of a full-scale arbitration proceeding. The
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