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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
We review here the affirmance by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit of a 1971 order of the Federal Power Commission that established an area rate structure for interstate sales of natural gas produced in the Southern Louisiana area. The Southern Louisiana area is one of seven geographical areas defined by the Commission for the purpose of prescribing areawide price ceilings. This is the second area rate case to reach this Court. The first was the Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U. S. 747 (1968), in which the Court sustained the constitutional and statutory authority of the Commission to adopt a system of area regulation and to impose supplementary requirements in the discharge of its responsibilities under §§ 4 and 5 of the Natural Gas Act to determine whether producers’ rates are just and reasonable.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the 1971 order in its entirety as an appropriate exercise of administrative discretion supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. Placid Oil Co. v. PPC, 483 F. 2d 880 (1973). We granted the petitions for certiorari in these three cases to review the correctness of the Court of Appeals’ holding sustaining the 1971 order as in all respects within the Commission’s statutory powers, and to determine whether the Court of Appeals misapprehended or grossly misapplied the substantial-evidence standard. 414 U. S. 1142 (1974). We affirm.
I
The Commission first instituted proceedings to establish an area rate structure for the Southern Louisiana area on May 10, 1961. 25 F. P. C. 942. The area consists of the southern portion of the State of Louisiana and the federal and state areas of the Gulf of Mexico off the Louisiana coast. The area accounts for about one-third of the Nation’s domestic natural gas production and has been described as “the most important gas-producing area in the country.” Southern Louisiana Area Rate Cases, 428 F. 2d 407, 418 (CA5 1970) (hereafter SoLa I). Proceedings continued over seven years. On September 25, 1968, the Commission issued an order establishing an area rate structure, 40 F. P. C. 530, and, on March 20, 1969, a modified order on rehearing, 41 F. P. C. 301. Refunds under this structure for overcharges during the pendency of the proceeding amounted to some $375 million.
An appeal was taken to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. On March 19, 1970, the Court of Appeals affirmed the FPC orders but with "serious misgivings/’ SoLa I, supra, at 439. Noting that “[a] serious shortage, in fact, may already be unavoidable id., at 437, the Court of Appeals was critical of the Commission’s failure adequately to assess “supply and demand in either a semi-quantitative or qualitative way,” id., at 436. It was reinforced in this view by the evidence, including an FPC Staff Report, issued while the appeal was pending, that the Nation was faced with “a severe gas shortage, with disastrous effects on consumers and the economy alike.” Id., at 435 n. 87.
Therefore, although determining “that affirmance is the best course,” id., at 439, the Court of Appeals declared that the judgment was not in any wise to foreclose the Commission from making such changes in its orders, as to both past and future rates, as it found to be in the public interest. The court noticed the fact that, while the appeal was pending, the Commission, in March 1969, had instituted proceedings to reconsider rates for the offshore portion of Southern Louisiana, see 41 F. P. C. 378, and later that year expanded the procedure to include the entire area, 42 F. P. C. 1110. Thus, it stated:
“The mandate of this Court should not, however, be interpreted to interfere with Commission action that would change the rates we have approved here. We specifically and emphatically reject the contention advanced... that the Commission has no power to set aside rates once determined by it to be just and reasonable when it has reason to believe its determinations may have been erroneous. In fact, the existence of the new proceedings, which as we understand them will take into account many of the issues whose absence has concerned us here, has been one of the factors we have considered in deciding to affirm the Commission’s decisions.” 428 F. 2d, at 444-445.
Pending decision on petitions for rehearing, however, the Commission advised the Court of Appeals, in a letter requested by the court, that, unless that court otherwise directed, it did not believe that it had authority to modify, rescind, or set aside a rate order or moratorium affirmed by the court. The Court of Appeals answered in its opinion denying rehearing, 444 F. 2d 125, 126-127 (1970):
“We wish to make crystal clear the authority of the Commission in this case to reopen any part of its order that circumstances require be reopened. Under section 19 (b) of the Natural Gas Act, this Court has the broad remedial powers that inhere in a court of equity, and pursuant to our equitable powers we make it part of the remedy in this case that the authority of the Commission to reopen any part of its orders, including those affecting revenues from gas already delivered, is left intact. The Commission can make retrospective as well as prospective adjustments in this case if it finds that it is in the public interest to do so.
“At the same time, we emphasize that our judgment is an affirmance and not a remand. The appropriate place for originally considering what parts of the orders must be reopened in light of new evidence is before the Commission. It may be that the Commission will decide that the refunds it has ordered are just and reasonable or at least that their significance to the public interest is outweighed by the confusion and delay that would result from their reopening. In this event, the Commission will allow its refund orders to stand as they are. Or it may be that the refunds are too burdensome in light of new evidence to be in the public interest. In that case, it is our judgment that the Commission shall have the power and the duty to remedy the situation by changing its orders.”
The Commission thereupon formally reopened the 1961 proceeding and consolidated it with the new proceeding, 44 F. P. C. 1638 (1970). An extensive record of many thousands of pages of testimony and more than a hundred exhibits was compiled between April 1970 and March 1971. Pursuant to the instructions of the Court of Appeals, much of the evidence focused on the gas shortage, projected levels of demand, and estimates of new supply needed to alleviate the problem. Evidence was also adduced bearing upon rate levels needed to induce additional supply, the potential industry consequences of any new order, and new cost trends based on data unavailable at the time of the earlier proceedings.
Contemporaneously with the hearings, settlement conferences were instituted, on motion, by the Presiding Examiner, 46 F. P. C. 86, 103 (1971), and those conferences were attended by producers, pipelines, distributors, state commissions, municipally owned utilities, and the Commission staff. Eventually, a settlement proposal was submitted by one of the parties, and, after being placed on the record for comments, it was agreed to by a large majority of all interests. An intermediate decision of the Presiding Examiner was waived, and the Commission took up the case.
At the outset, the Commission stated that it believed that adoption of the settlement proposal was precluded unless the Commission found the terms to be in the public interest and supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the Commission evaluated the proposal in the light of the massive record that had been compiled in the decade since 1961, including the additional year of hearings directed in large part to the terms of the settlement proposal and the nature of the supply shortage. The Commission concluded that the terms of the proposed settlement were just and reasonable, and found them to be supported by substantial evidence in the record. The ceiling rates established in the 1968 orders, which because of Commission and court stays had never gone into effect, were held “now [to] perform no office,” 46 F. P. C., at 102.
The effective date of the 1971 order was August 1, 1971. By the terms of this order “flowing gas,” i. e., gas delivered after August 1, 1971, under contracts dated prior to October 1, 1968, receives treatment different from “new gas,” i. e., gas delivered after August 1, 1971, under contracts dated after October 1, 1968. The established flowing gas price ceilings are 22.2750 per thousand cubic feet (Mcf) for gas produced onshore and 21.3750 per Mcf for gas produced offshore. The established new gas price ceilings are 260 for both onshore and offshore gas.
Flowing gas ceilings automatically increased 0.50 per Mcf on October 1, 1973, and, as a further incentive for increasing the gas supply, the Commission also established increases up to 1.50 per Mcf, contingent upon the industry’s finding and dedicating new gas reserves. New gas rates automatically increase H per Mcf on October 1, 1974. A moratorium is imposed upon the filing of producer rate increases for flowing gas until October 1, 1976, and for new gas until October 1, 1977.
The Commission also established minimal pipeline rates to be charged producers by pipelines for the transportation of certain liquid and liquefiable hydrocarbons, and eliminated the price differential between casinghead gas (gas dissolved in or associated with the production of oil) and new gas-well gas that it had imposed in earlier cases. 46 F. P. C., at 144. See Permian Basin, 390 U. S., at 760-761.
The problem of refunds concerns deliveries of flowing gas prior to August 1, 1971. The rates established by the 1971 order were higher than those that would have been established under the 1968 order had they been put into effect. If refunds had been calculated on the basis of the 1968 order, they would have aggregated over $375 million. If they had been calculated upon the basis of the 1971 flowing gas ceiling rates, refunds would have aggregated less than $150 million. However, the proposed settlement stipulated a refund obligation of $150 million, with a proviso that this could be worked off by the commitment by a refund obligor of additional gas reserves to the interstate market. The Commission adopted this proposal as an integral part of the 1961-1971 rate structure and established a schedule aggregating $150 million of refunds from those that were owed but not yet paid by producers who had collected rates in excess of certain prescribed levels lower than the established flowing gas rates.
II
Before addressing petitioners’ arguments, we must consider briefly the situation in which the Commission has found itself in its attempts to regulate the natural gas market; the teachings of Permian Basin and other decisions of this Court as to the extent of the Commission’s statutory authority in this area; the limitations upon review by the Court of Appeals of the Commission’s order; and the limitations upon review by this Court of the Court of Appeals’ affirmance of the order.
The history of the Commission’s early experience with the Natural Gas Act, 15 U. S. C. § 717 et seq., >has been fully developed in our first area rate opinion, Permian Basin, supra, at 755-759, and may be merely summarized here. With the passage of the Act in 1938, 52 Stat. 821, Congress gave the Commission authority to determine and fix “just and reasonable rate[s],” § 5 (a), 15 U. S. C. § 717d (a), for the “sale in interstate commerce of natural gas for resale for ultimate public consumption for domestic, commercial, industrial, or any other use....” § 1 (b), 15 U. S. C. § 717 (b). The Act was patterned after earlier regulatory statutes that applied to traditional public utilities and transportation companies, and that provided for setting rates equal to such companies’ costs of service plus a reasonable rate of return.
Until 1954, the Commission construed its mandate as requiring that it regulate the chain of distribution of natural gas only from the point where an interstate pipeline acquired it. Because such pipelines were relatively few in number and fell within the transportation company model, the Commission was able to apply a traditional regulatory approach, using individualized costs of service as a basis for determining price.
In 1954, however, this Court ruled in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U. S. 672, that independent producers are “[n]atural-gas companies]” within the meaning of § 2 (6) of the Act, 15 U. S. C. § 717a (6). In response, the Commission at first attempted to extend to this new industry its old regulatory methods, including establishment of individual rates based on each producer’s costs of service. The effort foundered on the sheer size of the task — thousands of independent producers being engaged in jurisdictional sales of gas at that time.
In the early 1960's the Commission discontinued its attempts to deal with individual companies, and turned to the area rate method. The Commission established a number of discrete geographical areas within which it believed that costs and general operating conditions were reasonably similar, and set out to establish, by convening hearings and compiling massive records, uniform rate schedules that would govern all producers within each area. Upon the conclusion of the first of these undertakings, we reviewed the Commission's efforts and found no reversible error. Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U. S. 747 (1968). See Wisconsin v. FPC, 373 U. S. 294 (1963).
But, the Commission was soon confronted with indications, both from data available to it, and from criticism of its effort, that its cost emphasis in rate determination was being accompanied by a severe shortage in the supply of natural gas being dedicated to the interstate market. Since the Commission's subsequent area rate orders, including both its 1968 and 1971 orders, are adapted from the initial Permian Basin model and are governed by the same statutory provisions concerning ratemaking and judicial review, we will preface our discussion of the Commission’s response to these difficulties with a brief review of the Permian Basin order and the applicable rules laid down in our opinion sustaining that order.
Subsequent to its establishment of geographical areas in 1961, the Commission consolidated three of those areas to form the Permian Basin area. The rate structure devised for this area set two ceiling prices, the higher one for gas produced from gas wells and dedicated to interstate commerce after January 1, 1961, and the other for gas-well gas dedicated to interstate commerce before January 1, 1961, and all gas produced from oil wells (casinghead gas) either associated with the production of the oil or dissolved in it. The Commission derived the higher rate for the newer “vintage” gas-well gas from composite cost data obtained both from answers to producer questionnaires and from published data said to reflect the national costs of finding and producing gas-well gas in I960. It derived the lower rate from Permian Basin historical cost data for the older vintage gas-well gas, and applied that rate to both that and casinghead gas without distinction. To these composite costs, the Commission added a return of 12% on the producers’ average production investment, obtained by examining the cost data, imputing a rate base, and assuming that gas wells deplete at a constant rate beginning one year after investment and ending 20 years later. Finally, an adjustment up or down from the area ceiling rates was specified for gas of higher or lower quality and energy content than set by a selected standard. The resulting ceiling rates, including allowances for state taxes, were 14.50 per Mcf for first vintage and casinghead gas, and 16.50 for second vintage gas. For those producers who individually might suffer hardship under this fate schedule, the Commission indicated that it would on rare occasions provide special relief, but it declined to specify what circumstances would justify such action.
On review, the Court of Appeals refused to approve the Commission’s order, holding that certain determinations of the ultimate effects of the order had not been made as required by FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U. S. 591 (1944), that more precise delineation of the requirements for relief from the order must be set forth, and that the Commission could not require that producers refund excess charges during the pendency of the proceeding unless it concluded that aggregate actual area revenues exceeded aggregate permissible area revenues, and then apportioned only the excess among producers on an equitable basis. 375 F. 2d 6, 36 (1967).
On certiorari, this Court initially noted that judicial review of the Commission’s orders is extremely limited:
“Section 19 (b) of the Natural Gas Act provides without qualification that the ‘finding of the Commission as to the facts, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.’ More important, we have heretofore emphasized that Congress has entrusted the regulation of the natural gas industry to the informed judgment of the Commission, and not to the preferences of reviewing courts. A presumption of validity therefore attaches to each exercise of the Commission’s expertise, and those who would overturn the Commission’s judgment undertake ‘the heavy burden of making a convincing showing that it is invalid because it is unjust and unreasonable in its consequences.’ FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., supra, at 602. We are not obliged to examine each detail of the Commission’s decision; if the ‘total effect of the rate order cannot be said to be unjust and unreasonable, judicial inquiry under the Act is at an end.’ Ibid.
“Moreover, this Court has often acknowledged that the Commission is nqt required by the Constitution or the Natural Gas Act to adopt as just and reasonable any particular rate level; rather, courts are without authority to set aside any rate selected by the Commission which is within a ‘zone of reasonableness.’ FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U. S. 575, 585. No other rule would be consonant with the broad responsibilities given to the Commission by Congress; it must be free, within the limitations imposed by pertinent constitutional and statutory commands, to devise methods of regulation capable of equitably reconciling diverse and conflicting interests.” Permian Basin, 390 U. S., at 767.
Applying these limitations in the context of review of area rate regulation, Permian Basin defined the criteria governing the scope of judicial review as follows:
“First, [the reviewing court] must determine whether the Commission’s order, viewed in light of the relevant facts and of the Commission’s broad regulatory duties, abused or exceeded its authority. Second, the court must examine the manner in which the Commission has employed the methods of regulation which it has itself selected, and must decide whether each of the order’s essential elements is supported by substantial evidence. Third, the court must determine whether the order may reasonably be expected to maintain financial integrity, attract necessary capital, and fairly compensate investors for the risks they have assumed, and yet provide appropriate protection to the relevant public interests, both existing and foreseeable. The court’s responsibility is not to supplant the Commission’s balance of these interests with one more nearly to its liking, but instead to assure itself that the Commission has given reasoned consideration to each of the pertinent factors.” Id., at 791-792 (emphasis supplied).
Where application of these criteria discloses no infirmities in the Commission’s order, the order cannot be said to produce an “arbitrary result,” and must be sustained. FPC v. Hops Natural Gas Co., 320 U. S., at 602.
Applying these criteria, Permian reversed the Court of Appeals and sustained the Commission’s order, although noting that the Commission had not adhered rigidly to a cost-based determination of rates, much less to one that based each producer’s rates on his own costs. Each deviation from cost-based pricing was found not to be unreasonable and to be consistent with the Commission’s responsibility to consider not merely the interests of the producers in “maintain [ing] financial integrity, attracting] necessary capital, and fairly compensating] investors for the risks they have assumed,” but also “the relevant public interests, both existing and foreseeable.” 390 U. S., at 792. “The Commission’s responsibilities necessarily oblige it,” the Court said, “to give continuing attention to values that may be reflected only imperfectly by producers’ costs; a regulatory method that excluded as immaterial all but current or projected costs could not properly serve the consumer interests placed under the Commission’s protection.” Id., at 815.
Permian Basin teaches that application of the three criteria of judicial review of Commission orders is primarily the task of the courts of appeals. For “this [the Supreme] Court’s authority is essentially narrow and circumscribed.” Id., at 766. The'responsibility to assess the record to determine whether agency findings are supported by substantial evidence is not ours. Section 19 (b) of the Act provides that “[t]he judgment and decree of the [Court of Appeals] affirming, modifying, or setting aside, in whole or in part, any such order of the Commission, shall be final, subject to review by the Supreme Court... upon certiorari... We have held as to a like provision in the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. § 160 (e), that thus “[w]hether on the record as a whole there is substantial evidence to support agency findings is a question which Congress has placed in the keeping of the Courts of Appeals. This Court will intervene only in what ought to be the. rare instance when the standard appears to have been misapprehended or grossly misapplied.” Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U. S. 474, 491 (1951).
Ill
Before reviewing the Court of Appeals’ affirmance of the Commission’s 1971 order for compliance with Permian’s requirements, we address contentions that challenge the statutory authority of the Commission to adopt the order, rather than the terms of the order itself. The first of these challenges, made by New York and MDG, is that the Commission had no statutory authority to change rates and refund obligations fixed in the Commission’s 1968 order after that order was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in SoLa I. Brief for MDG 18; Brief for New York 15. The argument is that the affirmance was “unqualified” and therefore exhausted the Court of Appeals’ powers of review under § 19 (b), thus rendering its authorization to the Commission to reopen its 1968 orders without legal effect. But the affirmance of the 1968 order was not “unqualified.” Although the Commission could not have reopened the order on its own, see Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v. Northwestern Public Service Co., 341 U. S. 246, 254 (1951); FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U. S., at 618, the Court of Appeals’ opinion on rehearing made it “crystal clear” that, despite the form of the court’s judgment, the Commission was fully authorized to reopen any part of the 1968 order that seemed appropriate and necessary if evidence as to the future supply problem indicated that this should be done.
The Court of Appeals properly took this step in light of new information, unavailable at the time of the 1968 order, that suggested the possible inadequacy of the 1968 determination, although not necessarily an inadequacy that justified setting aside the order. See Baldwin v. Scott County Milling Co., 307 U. S. 478 (1939). Moreover, the 1968 order had not been made effective, being continuously stayed until withdrawn by the 1971 order. See 46 F. P. C., at 101. In these circumstances, we cannot say that the action of the Court of Appeals exceeded its powers under § 19 (b) “to affirm, modify, or set aside [an] order in whole or in part.”
This jurisdiction to review the orders of the Commission is vested in a court with equity powers, Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. FPC, 128 F. 2d 481 (CA7 1942), see Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 305 U. S. 364, 373 (1939), and we cannot say that the Court improperly exercised those powers in the circumstances. Dolcin Corp. v. FTC, 94 U. S. App. D. C. 247, 255-258, 219 F. 2d 742, 750-752 (1954). Indeed, § 19 (b) provides that the Court of Appeals may authorize the Commission in proper cases to take new evidence, upon which the Commission may modify its findings of fact and make recommendations, concerning the disposition of its original order. Under the Court of Appeals disposition, the 1968 order was therefore not final and thus it was within the power of the Commission to reconsider and change it. See United Gas Improvement Co. v. Callery Properties, 382 U. S. 223, 229 (1965).
Only New York presses the second challenge to the Commission’s statutory authority to adopt the 1971 order. New York contends that the Commission is without power to adopt as a rate order a settlement proposal that lacks unanimous agreement of the parties to the proceeding. That contention has no merit.
The Commission clearly had the power to admit the agreement into the record — indeed, it was obliged to consider it. That it was admitted for the record did not, of course, establish without more the justness and reasonableness of its terms. But the Commission did not treat it as such. As we have noted, the Commission weighed its terms by reference to the entire record in the Southern Louisiana area proceeding since 1961, and further supplemented that record with extensive testimony and exhibits directed at the proposal’s terms. We think that the Court of Appeals correctly analyzed the situation and stated the correct legal principles:
“No one seriously doubts the power — indeed, the duty — of FPC to consider the terms of a proposed settlement which fails to receive unanimous support as a decision on the merits. We agree with the D. C. Circuit that even 'assuming that under the Commission’s rules [a party’s] rejection of the settlement rendered the proposal ineffective as a settlement, it could not, and we believe should not, have precluded the Commission from considering the proposal on its merits.’ Michigan Consolidated Gas Co. v. FPC, 1960, 108 U. S. App. D. C. 409, 283 F. 2d 204, 224.....
“As it should FPC is employing its settlement power under the APA, 5 U. S. C. A. § 554 (c), and its own rules 18 C. F. R. § 1.18 (a), to further the resolution of area rate proceedings. If a proposal enjoys unanimous support from all of the immediate parties, it could certainly be adopted as a settlement agreement if approved in the general interest of the public. But even if there is a lack of unanimity, it may be adopted as a resolution on the merits, if FPC makes an independent finding supported by'substantial evidence on the record as a whole’ that the proposal will establish 'just and reasonable’ rates for the area.” 483 F. 2d, at 893. (Emphasis in original.)
The choice of an appropriate structure for the rate order is a matter of Commission discretion, to be tested by its effects. The choice is not the less appropriate because the Commission did not conceive of the structure independently.
New York presents a final argument against the Commission’s authority. It contends that the Court of Appeals’ opinion on rehearing in SoLa I authorized modification of the 1968 refund provisions only if the 1968 refunds “are too burdensome in light of new evidence to be in the public interest.” 444 F. 2d, at 127. It argues that this means the Commission was required first to find, based on substantial new evidence, that refunds “would substantially and adversely affect the producers’ ability to meet the continuing gas needs of the interstate market,” Brief for New York 18, and contends that the revision of the refund terms is therefore unauthorized because the Commission made no such finding. New York’s premise is unsupportable. The opinion on rehearing is explicit that the Commission was to have “great flexibility,” and could “make retrospective as well as prospective adjustments in this case if it finds that it is in the public interest to do so.” 444 F. 2d, at 126-127. Moreover, in the opinion under review, the Court of Appeals flatly rejected the argument New York has repeated in this Court. “[W]e categorically rejected [in SoLa I] the notion that the label 'affirmance’ could possibly impair FPC’s ability to alter or modify any of the provisions, particularly the refund provisions, of its SoLa I rate scheme if it believed that the exigencies of the gas industry required more effective remedial measures.” 483 F. 2d, at 904 (emphasis in original).
IV
We turn now to petitioners’ challenges to the rate order itself. We treat these contentions in three groups: challenges to the established price levels, challenges to the Commission’s allocation of gas and receipts among pipelines and producers through the refund credits and contingent escalations, and, finally, claims that certain specific provisions of the rate order lack substantial evidence.
A
Petitioner Mobil contends that the rates fixed for both flowing or first vintage gas and new or second vintage gas are too low. New York and MDG attack the rates for flowing gas as too high, but do not attack the new-gas rates. Each of the arguments is premised on a common error: that certain provisions of the order can be isolated and viewed without regard to the total effect the order is designed to achieve.
Mobil’s attack on the Commission’s evidence of costs is clearly frivolous. The Commission took extensive evidence of costs in its 1968-order hearings for flowing gas, and in both its 1968-order and 1971-order hearings for new gas. In response to the Commission’s rates, selected from the final cost “range” it found to be justifiable on the basis of the entire record, Mobil points to selected fragments of the record. We have examined the testimony cited and do not think that it sustains Mobil’s heavy burden of showing that the final Commission choice was outside what the Court of Appeals could have found to lie within the Commission’s authority. FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U. S. 575, 585 (1942).
Mobil further contends that the inclusion of refund workoff credits and contingent escalations in the Commission’s just and reasonable rates indicates that producers unable to gain part or all of their share of such payments will receive merely their “bare-bones” costs, which constitute illegally low prices. We do not question that such producers may receive less per unit of gas than will others. But that hardly invalidates the Commission’s order. See Permian Basin, 390 U. S., at 818-819. Mobil’s argument assumes that there is only one just and reasonable rate possible for each vintage of gas, and that this rate must be based entirely on some concept of cost plus a reasonable rate of return. We rejected this argument in Permian Basin and we reject it again here. The Commission explicitly based its additional “non-cost” incentives on the evidence of a need for increased supplies. Obviously a price sufficient to maintain a producer, while not itself necessarily required by the Act, may not be sufficient also to encourage an increase in production. As we said in Permian Basin, supra, at 796-798:
“The supply of gas-well gas is therefore relatively elastic, and its price can meaningfully be employed by the Commission to encourage exploration and production....
“... We have emphasized that courts are without authority to set aside any rate adopted by the Commission which is within a ‘zone of reasonableness.’... The Commission may, within this zone, employ price functionally in order to achieve relevant regulatory purposes; it may, in particular, take fully into account the probable consequences of a given price level for future programs of exploration and production. Nothing in the purposes or history of the Act forbids the Commission to require different prices for different sales, even if the distinctions are unrelated to quality, if these arrangements are ‘necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this Act.’... We hold that the statutory ‘just and reasonable’ standard permits the Commission to require differences in price for simultaneous sales of gas of identical quality, if it has permissibly found that such differences will effectively serve the regulatory purposes contemplated by Congress.”
Plainly the Court of Appeals did not err in deciding that it was well within Commission discretion and expertise to conclude that the refund workoff credits and contingent escalations could provide opportunity for increased prices that would help in generating capital funds and in meeting rising costs, while assuring that such increases would not be levied upon consumers unless accompanied by increased supplies of gas. It is true that the Commission concluded that it could not determine the precise amount of additional gas supply that would be found and dedicated to interstate sales as a result of this formula. But this was also true of any change it might have made in gas prices. The Commission took massive evidence on supply, demand, and the relation between the two. Its difficulties, while not minor, did not stem from any failure to seek answers. Rather, the Commission pointed out that the results of exploratory activity are by nature dependent to some extent on chance, and the level of exploratory activity in turn may be influenced by many other factors besides price, including, the Commission said, “monetary inflation, changes in real cost of input resources, availability of input resources, changes in alternative investment opportunities, development of new producing areas, size of prospective reservoirs, changes in business confidence, degree of directionality of exploratory effort [toward gas or oil], changes in industry technology, and other factors influencing business decisions.” We think the record sufficiently supports the Commission’s conclusion:
“Summarizing, there exists a positive relationship between gas contract price levels and exploratory effort; no reliable quantitative forecasts may be made by increments of additional gas supply resulting from specific increased gas prices; increases in ceiling prices which yield increases in producer revenues will result in expanded gas exploration activity; and the adequacy of expanded gas exploratory activity in terms of sufficiency of gas supply in relation to gas demands must be determined by continued Commission observation of the results of our decisions.” 46 F. P. C., at 124.
New York’s contention that the rates on flowing or first vintage gas are not supported by substantial evidence is also predicated on an erroneously limited view of the permissible range of the Commission’s authority to employ price to encourage exploration or production. Reduced to simplest form, New York’s contention is that the 1968 order set just and reasonable rates for first vintage gas, that no new evidence was introduced as to the cost of that gas, and that the 1971-order prices for that gas are consequently excessive. Again, as we said in Permian, the Commission is not so limited in its construction of rate formulae. Its justification here for increasing the price of flowing or first vintage gas was not that new evidence showed that the conditions of producing that gas differed from the conditions found in the 1968 opinion, but, as the Commission frankly acknowledged, new revenues were deemed necessary to expand future production. As between placing the burden of that expansion on new or second vintage gas alone or spreading it over both old and new gas, it judged the latter more equitable and more likely to lead to the immediately increased capital necessary in the face of a crisis. We see nothing in New York’s argument to suggest that the Commission could not — in view of its finding that increased revenues were necessary — place the burden of those payments on all users rather
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | H | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Clark
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Congress, in Article 2 (11) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, has provided that all persons “accompanying the armed forces without the continental limits of the United States” and certain named territories shall be subject to the Code if such jurisdiction is authorized under “any treaty or agreement to which the United States is or may be a party or to any accepted rule of international law.” 50 U. S. C. § 552. Pursuant to this article and a subsequent agreement between the United States and Japan, Mrs. Dorothy Krueger Smith was tried by a general court-martial in Tokyo, Japan, for the premeditated murder of her husband, a colonel in the United States Army. She was found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment. 10 C. M. R. 350. Her conviction was affirmed by the Board of Review, 17 C. M. R. 314, and the Court of Military Appeals, 5 U. S. C. M. A. 314, and she began serving her sentence in the Federal Reformatory for Women, Alderson, West Virginia.
Thereafter, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus was filed on Mrs. Smith’s behalf by her father, respondent herein. The petition alleged that the court-martial had no jurisdiction to try Mrs. Smith because Article 2 (11) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice violates both Art. Ill, § 2, and Amendment VI of the Federal Constitution, which guarantee the right to trial by jury to a civilian. The United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia issued a preliminary writ. After a hearing, which included the submission of briefs and unlimited oral argument, the writ was discharged and Mrs. Smith was remanded to the custody of the Warden. 137 F. Supp. 806. In order to expedite the determination of the case, the Government itself sought certiorari while an appeal was pending before the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. We granted review on March 12, 1956, 350 U. S. 986, because of the serious constitutional question presented and its far-reaching importance to our Armed Forces stationed in some sixty-three different countries throughout the world. We agree with the decision of the District Court.
In its entirety, Art. 2 (11), 50 U. S. C. § 552, provides that:
“The following persons are subject to this chapter:
“(11) Subject to the provisions of any treaty or agreement to which the United States is or may be a party or to any accepted rule of international law, all persons serving with, employed by, or accompanying the armed forces without the continental limits of the United States and without the following territories: That part of Alaska east of longitude one hundred and seventy-two degrees west, the Canal Zone, the main group of the Hawaiian Islands, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands . . . .”
Mrs. Smith comes squarely within the terms of this provision. As a military dependent, she had accompanied her husband beyond the continental limits of the United States. Prior to her husband’s death they lived together in Washington Heights, an American community in Tokyo composed exclusively of American servicemen and their dependents. Japan, at the time of the offense, had ceded to the United States “exclusive jurisdiction over all offenses which may be committed in Japan by members of the United States armed forces, the civilian component, and their dependents . . . Art. XVII, 3 UST (Part 3) 3354. Since Article 2 (11) concededly applies to this case if it was within the power of Congress to enact, the constitutionality of that provision is the sole question presented. Essentially, we are to determine only whether the civilian dependent of an American serviceman authorized to accompany him on foreign duty may constitutionally be tried by an American military court-martial in a foreign country for an offense committed in that country.
Trials by court-martial are governed by the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 64 Stat. 109, 50 U. S. C. § 551 et seq. The Code was carefully drawn by Congress to include the fundamental guarantees of due process, and in operation it has provided a fair and enlightened system of justice. However, courts-martial are not required to provide all the protections of constitutional courts; therefore, to try by court-martial a civilian entitled to trial in an Article III court is a violation of the Constitution. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U. S. 11. Accordingly, our first inquiry is directed to the question whether, as a matter of constitutional right, an American citizen outside of the continental limits of the United States and in a foreign country is entitled to trial before an Article III court for an offense committed in that country.
In making this determination, we are not faced with the question “whether the Constitution is operative, for that is self-evident, but whether the provision relied on is applicable.” Entirely aside from the power of Congress under Article III of the Constitution, it has been well-established since Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in American Insurance Co. v. Canter, 1 Pet. 511, that Congress may establish legislative courts outside the territorial limits of the United States proper. The procedure in such tribunals need not comply with the standards prescribed by the Constitution for Article III courts. In cases arising from Hawaii, the Philippines, and Puerto Rico, this Court has recognized the power of Congress to enact a system of laws which did not provide for trial by jury. By 1922 it was regarded as “clearly settled” that the jury provisions of Article III and the Sixth and Seventh Amendments “do not apply to territory belonging to the United States which has not been incorporated into the Union.” Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U. S. 298, 304-305.
In an earlier case, this Court had sustained the constitutionality of an Act of Congress which created consular courts to try, pursuant to treaties, American citizens for crimes committed in Japan, China, and other countries. In re Ross, 140 U. S. 453. Ross, an American seaman convicted of murder by a consular court in Yokohama, Japan, contended that he had been deprived of his constitutional right to both grand and petit juries. In rejecting this claim, the Court pointed out that these constitutional guarantees were not applicable to a consular court sitting outside the continental United States. 140 U. S., at 464. Recounting the long-established practice of governments to provide “for the exercise of judicial authority in other countries by [their] officers appointed to reside therein,” id., at 463, the Court noted that the requirement of a grand and petit jury in these circumstances “would defeat the main purpose of investing the consul with judicial authority.” 140 U. S., at 465. In 1929, citing Ross with approval in Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U. S. 438, 451, this Court reaffirmed the doctrine that “legislative courts . . . exercise their functions within particular districts in foreign territory and are invested with a large measure of jurisdiction over American citizens in those districts. The authority of Congress to create them and to clothe them with such jurisdiction has been upheld by this Court and is well recognized.” These cases establish beyond question that the Constitution does not require trial before an Article III court in a foreign country for offenses committed there by an American citizen and that Congress may establish legislative courts for this purpose.
Having determined that one in the circumstances of Mrs. Smith may be tried before a legislative court established by Congress, we have no need to examine the power of Congress “To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces” under Article I of the Constitution. If it is reasonable and consonant with due process for Congress to employ the existing system of courts-martial for this purpose, the enactment must be sustained.
In the present day, we, as a Nation, have found it necessary to the preservation of our security to maintain American forces in some sixty-three foreign countries. The practical necessity of allowing these men to be accompanied by their families where possible has been recognized by Congress as well as the services, and the result has been the creation of American communities of mixed civilian and military population at bases throughout the world. In all matters of substance, the lives of military and civilian personnel alike are geared to the local military organization which provides their living accommodations, medical facilities and transportation from and to the United States. We could not find it unreasonable for Congress to conclude that all should be governed by the same legal standard to the end that they receive equal treatment under law. The effect of a double standard might well create sufficient unrest and confusion to result in the destruction of effective law enforcement. By the enactment of Article 2 (11) of the Code, Congress has provided that all shall be subject to the same system of justice and that the military commander who bears full responsibility for the care and safety of those civilians attached to his command shall also have authority to regulate their conduct.
It was conceded before this Court that Congress could have established, or might yet establish, a system of territorial or consular courts to try offenses committed by civilian dependents abroad. While this would be within the power of Congress, In re Ross, supra, clearly nothing in the Constitution compels it. The power to create a territorial or consular court does not preclude, but must necessarily include, the power to provide for trial before a military tribunal unless that alternative is “so clearly arbitrary or capricious that legislators acting reasonably could not have believed it necessary or appropriate for the public welfare.” The choice among different types of legislative tribunals is peculiarly within the power of Congress, Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U. S. 438, 451, and we are concerned only with the constitutionality, not the wisdom, of this choice.
In selecting the Uniform Code of Military Justice, Congress might have sought to avoid needless and potentially harmful duplication of a legal system already extant in every foreign nation where our troops are stationed. On the other hand, Congress could well have determined that the Code was adequate to the purpose to be achieved and would afford more safeguards to an accused than any other available procedure. The Code is a uniform system of legal procedure, applicable beyond any constitutional question to all servicemen stationed abroad. It was adopted by Congress only after an exhaustive study of several years duration and the consultation of acknowledged authorities in the fields of constitutional and military law. In addition to the fundamentals of due process, it includes protections which this Court has not required a State to provide and some procedures which would compare favorably with the most advanced criminal codes. We find no constitutional defect in the fact that the Code does not provide for indictment by grand jury or trial by petit jury. In these respects it does not differ from the procedures specifically approved by this Court in other types of legislative courts established abroad by Congress. In re Ross, supra; Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U. S. 197; Dorr v. United States, 195 U. S. 138; Balzac v. Porto Rico, supra.
Furthermore, since under the principles of international law each nation has jurisdiction of the offenses committed within its own territory, Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 7 Cranch 116, 136, the essential choice involved here is between an American and a foreign trial. Foreign nations have relinquished jurisdiction to American military authorities only pursuant to carefully drawn agreements which presuppose prompt trial by existent authority. Absent the effective exercise of jurisdiction thus obtained, there is no reason to suppose that the nations involved would not exercise their sovereign right to try and punish for offenses committed within their borders. Under these circumstances, Congress may well have determined that trial before an American court-martial in which the fundamentals of due process are assured was preferable to leaving American servicemen and their dependents throughout the world subject to widely varying standards of justice unfamiliar to our people.
We note that this case presents no problem of the jurisdiction of a military court-martial sitting within the territorial limits of the United States or the power of Congress to provide for trial of Americans sojourning, touring, or temporarily residing abroad. No question of the legal relation between treaties and the Constitution is presented. On the question before us, we find no constitutional bar to the power of Congress to enact Article 2 (11) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
The judgment is
Affirmed.
Reservation of Mr. Justice Frankfurter.
The Court today sustains Mrs. Clarice B. Covert’s conviction by a general court-martial in England for the murder of her husband, a sergeant in the United States Air Force, and the conviction of Mrs. Dorothy Krueger Smith by a general court-martial in Japan for the murder of her husband, a colonel in the United States Army. The Court does so, although it announces that “we have no need to examine the power of Congress ‘To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces’ under Article I of the Constitution.” The plain inference from this is that the Court is not prepared to support the constitutional basis upon which the Covert and Smith courts-martial were instituted and the convictions were secured.
The Uniform Code of Military Justice which governed these proceedings, and the international arrangements with England and Japan whereby the United States was allowed to exercise jurisdiction over the alleged crimes, are concerned with, directed toward, and explicitly acknowledged as legal measures that had their source in, and were obviously to be an exercise of, the constitutional power of Congress “To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces.” As provided by the Uniform Code of Military Justice, Mrs. Smith and Mrs. Covert were tried as though they were members of the Armed Forces. In view of this Court’s opinion in Toth v. Quarles, 350 U. S. 11, and the fact that the Constitution “clearly distinguishes the military from the civil class as separate communities” and “recognizes no third class which is part civil and part military — military for a particular purpose or in a particular situation, and civil for all other purposes and in all other situations . . . ,” Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents (2d ed. 1896), 145, the Court’s failure to rest its decision upon the congressional power “To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces” is significant.
Having put out of consideration reliance on the immediately pertinent constitutional provision bearing on the difficulties raised by these cases, the Court sustains the convictions by two lines of argument that obviously have nothing whatever to do with the regulation of the Armed Forces of the United States. The Court relies on In re Ross, 140 U. S. 453, a case that represents, historically and juridically, an episode of the dead past about as unrelated to the world of today as the one-hoss shay is to the latest jet airplane. In complete disregard of the political and legal sources purporting to render women like Mrs. Smith and Mrs. Covert amenable to military courts-martial for crimes committed abroad, the Court draws on the system of capitulations whereby Western countries, including the United States, compelled powerless Eastern and Asiatic nations to surrender their authority over conduct within their confines by citizens of these Western nations to the rule of Western “consular courts.” The Eastern nations were made to yield because “of the barbarous and cruel punishments inflicted in those countries, and the frequent use of torture to enforce confession from parties accused . . . .” In re Ross, supra, at 463. I do not suppose that the arrangements by which Great Britain and Japan gave the United States jurisdiction over the murders with which Mrs. Smith and Mrs. Covert were charged are to be deemed concessions wrung by the United States as were the capitulations wrung, often by force, from the Ottoman Empire and other Eastern nations because they were deemed inferior by the West, long ago and far away.
The Court derives its second line of argument from the decisions of this Court which have evolved the power of Congress to deal with territory acquired by purchase or through war, beginning with the statute of 1822, which set up the government of Florida. See American Insurance Co. v. Canter, 1 Pet. 511. I must confess inability to appreciate the bearing of the series of complicated adjudications dealing with the difficult problems relating to “organized” and “unorganized” territories of the United States to legislation by Congress treating civilians accompanying members of the Armed Forces abroad as though they were part of the Armed Forces and therefore amenable to the Code of Military Justice.
Grave issues affecting the status of American civilians throughout the world are raised by these cases; they are made graver by the arguments on which the Court finds it necessary to rely in reaching its result. Doubtless because of the pressure under which the Court works during its closing weeks, these arguments have been merely adumbrated in its opinion. To deal adequately with them, however, demands of those to whom they are not persuasive more time than has been available to examine and to analyze in detail the historical underpinning and implication of the cases relied upon by the Court, as a preliminary to a searching critique of their relevance to the problems now before the Court. For the moment, it must suffice, by way of example, to indicate that by resorting to In re Ross the Court has torn from its historical context an institution — the consular court — that had a totally different source and a totally different purpose than the source and purpose of Art. 2 (11) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 64 Stat. 107, 109. A glimpse into the international environment and political assumptions out of which the consular court system derived and of which it was a part suffices to indicate the scope of the inquiry for which the Court’s opinion calls. Such a glimpse is afforded.by the justification for consular courts urged by the Government on this Court 65 years ago. Reliance was placed on this authoritative view of Secretary of State Hamilton Fish:
“A report made to Congress by my predecessor, Mr. Seward . . . shows that it has been the habit of this Department to regard the judicial power of our consular officers in Japan as resting upon the assent of the Government of that kingdom, whether expressed by formal convention or by tacit acquiescence in the notorious practice of the consular courts. In other words, they were esteemed somewhat in the same light as they would have been if they were constituted by the Mikado with American citizens as judges, and with all the authority with which a Japanese tribunal is invested in respect to the native subjects of Japan, to the extent that our Government will admit a jurisdiction understood to be extremely arbitrary. They were, so to speak, the agents of a depotism [sic], only restrained by such safeguards as our own Government may interpose for the protection of citizens who come within its sway.” Brief for the United States, p. 25, in In re Ross, 140 U. S. 453.
Time is required not only for the primary task of analyzing in detail the materials on which the Court relies. It is equally required for adequate reflection upon the meaning of these materials and their bearing on the issues now before the Court. Reflection is a slow process. Wisdom, like good wine, requires maturing.
Moreover, the judgments of this Court are collective judgments. They are neither solo performances nor debates between two sides, each of which has its mind quickly made up and then closed. The judgments of this Court presuppose full consideration and reconsideration by all of the reasoned views of each. Without adequate study there cannot be adequate reflection. Without adequate reflection there cannot be adequate deliberation and discussion. And without these, there cannot be that full interchange of minds which is indispensable to wise decision and its persuasive formulation.
The circumstances being what they are, I am forced, deeply as I regret it, to reserve for a later date an expression of my views.
Relevant portions of the administrative agreement are:
“Article IX
“1. The United States shall have the right to bring into Japan for purposes of this Agreement persons who are members of the United States armed forces, the civilian component, and their dependents.
“Article XVII
“1. Upon the coming into force with respect to the United States of the ‘Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the Status of their Forces’, signed at London on June 19, 1951, the United States will immediately conclude with Japan, at the option of Japan, an agreement on criminal jurisdiction similar to the corresponding provisions of that Agreement.
“2. Pending the coming into force with respect to the United States of the North Atlantic Treaty Agreement referred to in paragraph 1, the United States service courts and authorities shall have the right to exercise within Japan exclusive jurisdiction over all offenses which may be committed in Japan by members of the United States armed forces, the civilian component, and their dependents, excluding their dependents who have only Japanese nationality. Such jurisdiction may in any case be waived by the United States.
“4. The United States undertakes that the United States service courts and authorities shall be willing and able to try and, on conviction, to punish all offenses against the laws of Japan which members of the United States armed forces, civilian component, and their dependents may be alleged on sufficient evidence to have committed in Japan, and to investigate and deal appropriately with any alleged offense committed by members of the United States armed forces, the civilian component, and their dependents, which may be brought to their notice by Japanese authorities or which they may find to have taken place. The United States further undertakes to notify the Japanese authorities of the disposition made by United States service courts of all cases arising under this paragraph. The United States shall give sympathetic consideration to a request from Japanese authorities for a waiver of its jurisdiction in cases arising under this paragraph where the Japanese Government considers such waiver to be of particular importance. Upon such waiver, Japan may exercise its own jurisdiction.
“5. In the event the option referred to in paragraph 1 is not exercised by Japan, the jurisdiction provided for in paragraph 2 and the following paragraphs shall continue in effect. In the event the said North Atlantic Treaty Agreement has not come into effect within one year from the effective date of this Agreement, the United States will, at the request of the Japanese government, reconsider the subject of jurisdiction over offenses committed in Japan by members of the United States armed forces, the civilian component, and their dependents.” 3 UST (Part 3) 3346, 3353-3356.
Mr. Justice White concurring in Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 244, 292. See Dorr v. United States, 195 U. S. 138. “The Dorr Case shows that the opinion of Mr. Justice White of the majority, in Downes v. Bidwell, has become the settled law of the court.” Taft, C. J., in Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U. S. 298, 305.
Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U. S. 197.
Dorr v. United States, 195 U. S. 138.
Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U. S. 298.
In this respect this case is entirely different from Toth v. Quarles, supra, where the defendant, after discharge from military service and return to this country, was entitled to trial before an Article III court, and we found “no excuse for new expansion of court-martial jurisdiction at the expense of the normal and constitutionally preferable system of trial by jury.” 350 U. S., at 22-23. In Toth we found that Article 3 (a) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice “necessarily encroaches on the jurisdiction of federal courts set up under Article III of the Constitution.” 350 U. S., at 15. No like constitutional bar exists in the present case.
One need only consider the disruptive effect of establishing another type of legislative court to deal with the same offenses in the same territorial jurisdiction as the military tribunals. In cases of conspiracy or joint crime, parallel trials would have to be held in separate courts. Since the trials could not proceed at the same time, one would of necessity precede and influence the other, and results could understandably be disparate. Nor is the problem of insignificant proportions. Reliable figures show that our Armed Forces overseas are accompanied by approximately a quarter of a million dependents and civilian workers. Figures relating to the Army alone show that in the 6 fiscal years from July 1, 1949, to June 30, 1955, a total of 2,280 civilians were tried by courts-martial. While it is true that the vast majority of these prosecutions were for minor offenses, the volume alone shows the serious problem that would be presented by the administration of a dual system of courts.
Mr. Justice Brandéis dissenting in Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U. S. 504, 534.
See Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949).
E. g., self-incrimination, compare Art. 31 and T149b, and 172b, Manual for Courts-Martial, with Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46; former jeopardy, compare Arts. 44 and 63 with Palko v. Con necticut, 302 U. S. 319; use of illegally obtained evidence, compare ¶152, Manual for Courts-Martial, with Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25.
See note 1, supra, and Schwartz, International Law and the NATO Status of Forces Agreement, 53 Col. L. Rev. 1091; Re, The NATO Status of Forces Agreement and International Law, 50 N. W. U. L. Rev. 349.
It has been suggested that bringing American citizens to this country for trial for offenses committed abroad may be a preferable solution even if it is not required by the Constitution. Congress might well have concluded that this suggestion was completely impractical. First, a condition precedent to trial in this country would be the consent of the foreign nation concerned in each individual case. This consent could always be withheld and it is likely that foreign nations would refuse to cede jurisdiction over serious offenses when trial might be held many thousands of miles away. Even where jurisdiction was obtained, the deterrent effect of such prosecutions might well be vitiated by the distance and delay involved. Secondly, both the Government and the accused would face serious problems in the production of witnesses. Depositions for the Government are not permitted in criminal cases. See Rule 15, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Attendance of foreign witnesses could be only on a voluntary basis and the testimony of no foreign witness could be compelled if the witness or his government refused. The expense of transporting witnesses would be considerable for the Government and probably impossible for a defendant, whose successful defense may depend on the demeanor of one witness. In fairness, the Government would have to bear the expense of transporting the defendant's witnesses as well as its own, and the possibilities of abuse are obvious.
Finally, a breakdown of the figures on trial by courts-martial of civilians abroad from 1950-1955 shows that some 2,000 of the 2,280 cases tried involved offenses for which the maximum punishment was six months or less. The Government might be unwilling to undergo the heavy expense and inconvenience of trial here for such minor offenses. The alternatives would be either trial by the foreign country or no trial at all; the result must be the practical abdication of American judicial authority, precisely what Congress wished to avoid.
[Note: This reservation applies also to Reid v. Covert, post, p. 487.]
See the opinion, in 1855, of Attorney General Caleb Cushing: “The legal rationale of the treaty stipulations as to China, with which we are now chiefly concerned, and their relation to the legislative authority of the United States, are explained in a dispatch of the Minister who negotiated the treaty, as follows:
“ T entered China with the formed general conviction that the United States ought not to concede to any foreign state, under any circumstances, jurisdiction over the life and liberty of a citizen of the United States, unless that foreign state be of our own family of nations, — in a word, a Christian state. . . .”’ 7 Op. Atty. Gen. 495, 496-497.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | B | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
After entry of a judgment for the plaintiffs in a suit by two prisoners under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, the District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, ordered the defendants to pay the plaintiffs’ attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U. S. C. § 1988. There is no entitlement to attorney’s fees, however, unless the requesting party prevails; and by the time the District Court entered its judgment in the underlying suit one of the plaintiffs had died and the other was no longer in custody. In this posture, the plaintiffs were not prevailing parties under the rule we set forth in Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U. S. 755 (1987), and the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit erred in affirming the award of fees by the District Court.
I
On January 17, 1978, while in the custody of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, Albert Reese and Larry Stewart filed a complaint alleging violations of their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by officials who refused them permission to subscribe to a magazine. On April 2, 1981, the District Court issued an opinion and an order, later amended in respects no longer pertinent to the case. The court ruled that correctional officials had not applied the proper procedural and substantive standards in denying the inmates their request, and ordered compliance with those standards.
Two months later, the District Court entered an award of fees in favor of the attorneys for Reese and Stewart in the amount of $5,306.25. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. 703 F. 2d 566 (1982). We granted certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for further consideration in light of Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U. S. 424 (1983). Rhodes v. Stewart, 461 U. S. 952 (1983). On remand from the Court of Appeals, the District Court confirmed its earlier award.
None of the opinions or orders cited thus far made reference to, or showed awareness of, two salient facts: Reese died on February 18, 1979; and Stewart, the sole respondent now before us, was paroled on March 15, 1978, and given a final release from parole on January 17, 1980. In consequence, when the District Court issued its original order on April 2, 1981, neither plaintiff was in the State’s custody. For reasons that remain unexplained, petitioners here did not raise this matter until their appeal of the District Court’s order after remand.
A divided Court of Appeals upheld the award of fees, concluding that the mootness of the claim when the judgment was issued did not undermine respondent’s status as a prevailing party eligible for attorney’s fees. Affirmance order, 845 F. 2d 327 (1988). In an unpublished opinion, the majority characterized the relief plaintiffs had received as declaratory relief. The panel majority noted our recent holding in Hewitt v. Helms, supra, that a plaintiff must receive some relief on the merits of his claim before he can be said to have prevailed within the meaning of § 1988. It observed, however, that the plaintiff in Hewitt, unlike Stewart, had not won a declaratory judgment, and concluded that the declaratory judgment issued in this case justified the granting of attorney’s fees.
II
The Court of Appeals misapprehended our holding in Hewitt. Although the plaintiff in Hewitt had not won a declaratory judgment, nothing in our opinion suggested that the entry of such a judgment in a party’s favor automatically renders that party prevailing under § 1988. Indeed, we confirmed the contrary proposition:
“In all civil litigation, the judicial decree is not the end but the means. At the end of the rainbow lies not a judgment, but some action (or cessation of action) by the defendant that the judgment produces — the payment of damages, or some specific performance, or the termination of some conduct. Redress is sought through the court, but from the defendant. This is no less true of a declaratory judgment suit than of any other action. The real value of the judicial pronouncement — what makes it a proper judicial resolution of a ‘case or controversy’ rather than an advisory opinion — is in the settling of some dispute which affects the behavior of the defendant towards the plaintiff ” 482 U. S., at 761 (emphasis in original).
A declaratory judgment, in this respect, is no different from any other judgment. It will constitute relief, for purposes of § 1988, if, and only if, it affects the behavior of the defendant toward the plaintiff. In this case, there was no such result. The lawsuit was not brought as a class action, but by two plaintiffs. A modification of prison policies on magazine subscriptions could not in any way have benefited either plaintiff, one of whom was dead and the other released before the District Court entered its order. This case is thus controlled by our holding in Hewitt, where the fact that the respondent had “long since been released from prison” and “could not get redress” from any changes in prison policy caused by his lawsuit compelled the conclusion that he was ineligible for an award of fees. 482 U. S., at 763. The case was moot before judgment issued, and the judgment therefore afforded the plaintiffs no relief whatsoever. In the absence of relief, a party cannot meet the threshold requirement of § 1988 that he prevail, and in consequence he is not entitled to an award of attorney’s fees.
■ Certiorari is granted, and the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
It is so ordered.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | F | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Me. Justice Stewart
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Under § 33 of the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, an employer who pays compensation benefits to the representative of a deceased employee may be subrogated to the rights of the representative against third persons. The question presented by this case is whether a stevedoring contractor whose longshoreman employee was killed in the course of his employment is limited to this subrogation remedy in seeking reimbursement from a shipowner on whose vessel the longshoreman met his death. Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals held that statutory subrogation is the stevedoring contractor’s exclusive remedy against the shipowner, and we granted certiorari to consider this novel question under the Act.
I.
According to the stipulation of facts, the M/V Otter-burn, owned and operated by respondent Burnside Shipping Co., was under time charter to Federal Commerce and Navigation Co., a Canadian corporation affiliated with the petitioner, Federal Marine Terminals, Inc. Federal Commerce hired Marine Terminals to continue the operation, already commenced by the ship’s crew, of preparing the vessel to receive a cargo of grain. While the ship was docked in Detroit, the crew had commenced installation of “grain feeders” — walled-in structures erected in the ’tween deck hatches to the height of the main deck hatch. After Marine Terminals had been employed to continue the work of readying the ship for its cargo, the boatswain, acting on the instructions of the ship’s Chief Officer, “winged out” the deep tank lids — that is, pulled them outboard into the wings of the ’tween deck. No railing, wire, or guard of any kind was placed around the resulting deep tank openings.
Marine Terminals’ employees began working on the Otterburn after it had been removed to Chicago. On the morning of the third day of work, a group of Marine Terminals’ stevedores, supervised by Gordon McNeill, arrived at approximately 7 o’clock to continue with carpentry work in the ’tween deck as part of the last stages of completing a grain feeder in the area of the “winged out” deep tank lids. McNeill was last seen alive shortly after 8 a. m. At 8:45 a. m. his lifeless body was discovered lying at the bottom of one of the deep tanks. There were no witnesses to his 30-foot fall.
McNeill’s widow filed a claim for benefits under the Act for herself and three minor children, and the Department of Labor entered a compensation order for weekly payments of $36.75 to the widow and $33.25 to the children. The potential total liability of Marine Terminals for these payments is approximately $70,000. As administratrix of McNeill’s estate, his widow also filed a maritime wrongful death action against Burnside Shipping Co. in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Burnside answered the complaint, denying that McNeill’s death had been caused by its negligence or by its failure to furnish a seaworthy vessel.
Burnside also commenced a separate action in the same court against Marine Terminals seeking indemnification for any judgment it might be required to pay in the wrongful death action. The libel charged that, by virtue of the agreement with the time charterer to prepare the ship for its cargo, Marine Terminals “warranted that its services to the vessel would be performed in a safe, workmanlike and seamanlike manner.” That warranty was alleged to have been breached and the accident caused by Marine Terminals’ negligence, giving rise to an obligation to save Burnside harmless from all liability and expense occasioned by McNeill’s death.
Marine Terminals filed an answer denying most of the allegations of the libel, and also filed a counterclaim seeking damages from Burnside for “all sums which have been paid or will be paid” as compensation benefits to McNeill’s dependents. The counterclaim alleged that Burnside, as owner and operator in control of the Otter-burn, owed the stevedoring contractor “the duty of providing and maintaining a safe place to work so that injury to the employees... would be avoided.” Burnside had violated that duty, according to the counterclaim, by its negligence
“in failing to properly guard the deep tank opening, or make the passageway secure, or to cover up the said deep tank, and in failing to clear the passageways, and failing to provide adequate lighting in the area or to provide a safety railing around the deep tank opening, thereby causing, suffering and permitting the area and open deep tank to be a source of menace and danger.”
Burnside moved to dismiss the counterclaim for failure to state a cause of action. Each party then filed a motion for summary judgment on its claim and counterclaim.
The District Court, finding that material factual disputes existed concerning the conduct of both parties, denied Burnside’s motion for summary judgment on its complaint. But it did grant the motion to dismiss Marine Terminals’ counterclaim. The court noted Marine Terminals’ concession that its theory of a direct action against the shipowner was novel. Normally the stevedoring contractor is content with its remedy of subrogation to the rights of the deceased longshoreman’s representative against whatever third party may be liable for the death, usually the shipowner. In this case, however, the applicable Illinois Wrongful Death Act limited the amount recoverable by the decedent’s representative to $30,000, far short of Marine Terminals’ potential liability of $70,000. The court recognized that “[t]he existence of such a direct right over is well established in certain situations/’ but concluded that the employer’s rights provided by the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act are exclusive and “prevent him from maintaining an independent cause of action against the third party tortfeasor.”
The Court of Appeals affirmed, agreeing that Marine Terminals’ sole remedy is by subrogation under the Act. But while the District Court had implied that the steve-doring contractor would have had a direct action had it not been abrogated by the Act, the Court of Appeals appeared to assume that, in the absence of the statutory remedy, federal maritime law would permit no direct recovery from the shipowner:
“There is no common law direct action as the defendant argues. There is only the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act which creates an entire legal procedure in this part of admiralty law. We cannot search outside of the Act for common law remedies which do not exist. The Act is the source of all remedies.”
This case thus presents two questions. First, does § 33 of the Act exclude whatever other rights of action the stevedoring contractor might have against the shipowner for compensation payments to an employee or his representative? Second, if statutory subrogation is not an exclusive remedy, does the shipowner owe the stevedoring contractor any duty whose breach will give rise to a direct action? We consider these questions in order below.
II.
The Court of Appeals was clearly mistaken in its assertion that “[t]he statutory method provides that the [stevedoring contractor] can sue only as a subrogee.” Nothing on the face of § 33 of the Act purports to limit the employer’s remedy against third persons to subrogation to the rights of the deceased employee’s representative. The provision of § 33 that the employer's payment of compensation “shall operate as an assignment to the employer of all right of the legal representative of the deceased... to recover damages against such third person” contains no words of limitation. Congress thereby gave the employer, in return for his absolute liability to the employee’s representative, part of the latter’s rights against others. But the legislative grant of a new right does not ordinarily cut off or preclude other nonstatutory rights in the absence of clear language to that effect. When Congress imposed on the employer absolute liability for compensation, it explicitly made that liability exclusive. Yet in the same Act it attached no such exclusivity to the employer’s action against third persons as subrogee to the rights of the employee or his representative.
Nothing in the legislative history of the Act remotely supports the construction adopted by the courts below. And we can perceive no reason why Congress would have intended so to curtail the stevedoring contractor’s rights against the shipowner. The exclusivity of the statutory compensation remedy against the employer was designed to counterbalance the imposition of absolute liability; there is no comparable quid pro quo in the relationship between the employer and third persons. On the contrary, as we emphasized in Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S. S. Corp., 350 U. S. 124, the Act is concerned only with the rights and obligations as between the stevedoring contractor and the employee or his representative. It does not affect independent relationships between the stevedoring contractor and the shipowner. Neither this Court nor, before this case, any other court has held that statutory subrogation is the employer’s exclusive remedy against third party wrongdoers, and we decline to so hold today.
III.
We must also reject the implication of the Court of Appeals’ opinion that under federal maritime law the shipowner owed the stevedoring contractor no duties whose breach would give rise to a direct action for damages. As we held in Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U. S. 625, 632, “the owner of a ship in navigable waters owes to all who are on board for purposes not inimical to his legitimate interests the duty of exercising reasonable care under the circumstances of each case.” That duty of due care imposed by law extends to the stevedoring company as well as to others lawfully on the ship, and its breach gives rise to a cause of action for any damages proximately caused. It is not disputed, for example, that if the shipowner’s negligence caused damages to the stevedoring contractor’s equipment, those damages would be recoverable in a direct action sounding in tort. We can see no reason why the shipowner’s liability does not in like fashion extend to the foreseeable obligations of the stevedoring contractor for compensation payments to the representative of a longshoreman whose death was occasioned by the shipowner’s breach of his duty to the stevedoring contractor.
We do not, of course, hold that the shipowner’s duty to the employer is the same as to the employee. Nor do we disapprove the Court of Appeals’ holding that the shipowner does not owe to the stevedoring contractor the absolute duty of seaworthiness owed to individual longshoremen. But Marine Terminals’ counterclaim in this action did not rely on the unseaworthiness of the ship. Rather it charged that Burnside had been negligent in certain particular respects. And we have suggested before this that, while “the duties owing from [the shipowner] to [the longshoreman] were not identical with those from [the shipowner] to [the stevedoring contractor],” the shipowner can be negligent with respect to the stevedoring contractor as well as to the longshoreman. Weyerhaeuser S. S. Co. v. Nacirema Operating Co., 355 U. S. 563, 568. Neither court below reached the question whether the counterclaim sufficiently alleged a breach of the duties owed by Burnside to Marine Terminals, and relevant factual questions remain unresolved. With the case in its present posture, therefore, we express no opinion as to whether the conduct of Burnside’s employees amounted to a breach of the duty it owed to Marine Terminals. We hold only that federal maritime law does impose on the shipowner a duty to the stevedoring contractor of due care under the circumstances, and does recognize a direct action in tort against the shipowner to recover the amount of compensation payments occasioned by the latter’s negligence.
This holding is in no wise a departure from our decision in Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U. S. 282, 285, that we would not “fashion new judicial rules of contribution” between the shipowner and the stevedoring contractor as joint tortfeasors. Marine Terminals is not seeking contribution. It is not asking Burnside to share responsibility for their joint negligence with respect to McNeill. Rather the counterclaim seeks recovery of the full amount of Marine Terminals' liability under the Act to McNeill’s representative; and it is founded not on Burnside’s wrong to McNeill but on its independent wrong to Marine Terminals.
We further note that at this stage of the case it must be assumed that Marine Terminals was faultless vis-á-vis Burnside, for the claim that Marine Terminals breached its Ryan warranty of workmanlike service has not yet been adjudicated and is not before us. We decide nothing today with respect to the interaction between the shipowner’s breach of warranty claim and the steve-doring contractor’s tort claim. Marine Terminals has charged Burnside with negligence not as a defense to the latter’s Ryan claim but in a counterclaim for damages, and we have considered that claim without regard to the implications of the shipowner’s countervailing cause of action. Our holding is perforce limited to a rejection of Burnside’s argument that “a shipowner’s tortious conduct may be used as a shield, but not as a sword.”
IV.
In holding that the stevedoring contractor has a direct action in tort, we do not preclude the possibility of a direct action under some other theory. Marine Terminals argues in this case, for example, that just as a stevedoring contractor impliedly warrants to a shipowner under Ryan that it will perform the stevedoring services in a workmanlike manner, so also there are reciprocal contractual warranties running from the shipowner to the stevedoring contractor. Burnside counters with the observation that the stevedoring contract in this case is between Marine Terminals and its affiliate Federal Commerce, the time charterer, and that there is therefore no privity of contract between Marine Terminals and Burnside. Because the record before us contains neither the contract for stevedoring services nor the charter agreement, we cannot now assess these arguments. We do not know, for instance, whether any provisions of the time charter contain express or implied warranties which would inure to the benefit of Marine Terminals as stevedoring contractor.
Marine Terminals has also argued that, aside from any express or implied-in-fact contract, it has a quasi-contractual right of indemnity for the liability which it incurred under the Act on account of the shipowner’s wrong. This right, which was evidently recognized by the District Court, is said not to stem solely from the pre-existing contractual relationship between the parties, but to be conferred by law in order to place the liability where it justly belongs. As one court has described it,
“admiralty courts have recognized a right to indemnity, as distinguished from contribution, in a person who has responded in damages for a loss caused by the wrong of another. This right has been recognized in two general classes of cases: those in which the person seeking indemnification was without fault; and those in which such person was passively negligent, but the primary cause of the loss was the active negligence of another.”
Recovery can be based on this concept, Marine Terminals contends, because Burnside’s conduct was either solely or primarily responsible for McNeill’s death.
We express no opinion on the validity of this indemnity theory or its application to this case, but hold only that Marine Terminals is not foreclosed by any decision of this Court from raising it in the District Court. We have cautioned that “in the area of contractual indemnity an application of the theories of 'active’ or 'passive’ as well as 'primary’ or'secondary’ negligence is inappropriate,” Weyerhaeuser S. S. Co. v. Nacirema Operating Co., 355 U. S. 563, 569. But that proscription in terms applied only “in the area of contractual indemnity” under Ryan. In Ryan itself we specifically did “not meet the question of a noncontractual right of indemnity or of the relation of the Compensation Act to such a right.” 350 U. S., at 133. By leaving open the question of such an indemnity action by the shipowner against the stevedoring contractor, a fortiori we did not decide anything with respect to such an action by the steve-doring contractor against the shipowner.
Because, as we hold today, § 33 of the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act is not the exclusive source of the stevedoring contractor’s remedies against the shipowner, and the former may have a cause of action in tort for the compensation payments caused by the shipowner’s negligence, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Section 33, as amended in 1959, 73 Stat. 391, as set forth in 33 U. S. C. § 933, reads as follows:
“ (a) If on account of a disability or death for which compensation is payable under this chapter the person entitled to such compensation determines that some person other than the employer or a person or persons in his employ is liable in damages, he need not elect whether to receive such compensation or to recover damages against such third person.
“(b) Acceptance of such compensation under an award in a compensation order filed by the deputy commissioner shall operate as an assignment to the employer of all right of the person entitled to compensation to recover damages against such third person unless such person shall commence an action against such third person within six months after such award.
“(c) The payment [of such compensation into the fund established] in section 944 of this title shall operate as an assignment to the employer of all right of the legal representative of the deceased (hereinafter referred to as ‘representative’) to recover damages against such third person.
“(d) Such employer on account of such assignment may either institute proceedings for the recovery of such damages or may compromise with such third person either without or after instituting such proceeding.
“(e) Any amount recovered by such employer on account of such assignment, whether or not as the result of a compromise, shall be distributed as follows:
“(1) The employer shall retain an amount equal to—
“ (A) the expenses incurred by him in respect to such proceedings or compromise (including a reasonable attorney’s fee as determined by the deputy commissioner);
“(B) the cost of all benefits actually furnished by him to the employee under section 907 of this title;
“(C) all amounts paid as compensation;
“(D) the present value of all amounts thereafter payable as compensation, such present value to be computed in accordance with a schedule prepared by the Secretary, and the present value of the cost of all benefits thereafter to be furnished under section 907 of this title, to be estimated by the deputy commissioner, and the amounts so computed and estimated to be retained by the employer as a trust fund to pay such compensation and the cost of such benefits as they become due, and to pay any sum finally remaining in excess thereof to the person entitled to compensation or to the representative; and
“(2) The employer shall pay any excess to the person entitled to compensation or to the representative, less one-fifth of such excess which shall belong to the employer.
“(f) If the person entitled to compensation institutes proceedings within the period prescribed in subdivision (b) of this section the employer shall be required to pay as compensation under this chapter a sum equal to the excess of the amount which the Secretary determines is payable on account of such injury or death over the amount recovered against such third person.
“(g) If compromise with such third person is made by the person entitled to compensation or such representative of an amount less than the compensation to which such person or representative would be entitled to [sic] under this chapter, the employer shall be liable for compensation as determined in subdivision (f) of this section only if such compromise is made with his written approval.
“(h) Where the employer is insured and the insurance carrier has assumed the payment of the compensation, the insurance carrier shall be subrogated to all the rights of the employer under this section.
“(i) The right to compensation or benefits under this chapter shall be the exclusive remedy to an employee when he is injured, or to his eligible survivors or legal representatives if he is killed, by the negligence or wrong of any other person or persons in the same employ: Provided, That this provision shall not affect the liability of a person other than an officer or employee of the employer.”
If the representative decides to bring suit against the third person within six months of the award, as in this case, the employer’s liability for compensation is reduced by the amount recovered by the representative from the third person. See §33 (f), supra, n. 1.
284 F. Supp. 740.
392 F. 2d 918.
393 U. S. 820.
The District Court found that crucial factual issues existed regarding the longshoremen’s knowledge of the open hatch and the parties’ relative duties of inspection. McNeill had been present at the time the hatch lids were “winged out,” but the court noted that the factual question was posed whether McNeill could reasonably have assumed that the covers would be replaced and had merely entered the area to check it for safety.
The Illinois Wrongful Death Act was amended in 1967 to remove the ceiling on damages, but the amendment was made prospective only, and the Act still limits the recovery to $30,000 “where such death occurs on or after July 8, 1957 and prior to the effective date [August 18, 1967] of this amendatory Act of 1967... Ill. Rev. Stat., c. 70, § 2.
The District Court has reserved the question whether, suing as subrogee, the employer’s recovery would be limited by the Illinois statute:
“In our judgment, defendant’s theory of a direct action cannot be supported, and its counterclaim must be dismissed without prejudice to the filing of an amended counterclaim which alleges a cause of action derived from the persons entitled to compensation. If such an amendment is filed, we may then have occasion to consider whether as subrogee or assignee, the defendant’s possible recovery is limited by the damage ceiling of the Illinois Wrongful Death Act.” 284 F. Supp., at 744-745.
284 F. Supp., at 744. The District Court noted that the petitioner’s theory is summarized in § 96 of the Restatement of Restitution:
“A person who, without personal fault, has become subject to tort liability for the unauthorized and wrongful death of another, is entitled to indemnity from the other for expenditures properly made in the discharge of such liability.”
284 F. Supp., at 744.
392 F. 2d, at 920.
Ibid.
Section 5, 44 Stat. 1426, as set forth in 33 U. S. C. § 905, reads as follows:
"The liability of an employer prescribed in section 904 of this title shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability of such employer to the employee, his legal representative, husband or wife, parents, dependents, next of kin, and anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages from such employer at law or in admiralty on account of such injury or death, except that if an employer fails to secure payment of compensation as required by this chapter, an injured employee, or his legal representative in case death results from the injury, may elect to claim compensation under this chapter, or to maintain an action at law or in admiralty for damages on account of such injury or death. In such action the defendant may not plead as a defense that the injury was caused by the negligence of a fellow servant, nor that the employee assumed the risk of his employment, nor that the injury was due to the contributory negligence of the employee.”
Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals relied upon Doleman v. Levine, 295 U. S. 221, citing it for the proposition that the employer’s “rights are derived from the person entitled to compensation.” The decision, however, held only that, under the predecessor of § 33, the employer could not maintain a wrongful death action in his own name if he was subrogated to the rights of only one of the dependents entitled to bring the action. Not a word of the opinion in that case suggests that § 33 of the Act was the only source of the employer’s rights against third persons for liability to his employees.
The District Court rested on the following rationale of the District Court for the Southern District of California in California Casualty Indemnity Exchange v. United States, 74 F. Supp. 401, 404:
“The right of recoupment [under the federal Act] on the ground of third party liability is not a right created in the libelants by Statute as in the California Compensation Act.... The difference lies in the fact that the rights of the employer and its insurance carrier under the Longshoremen’s Act result solely by an assignment of the original rights of the injured person, which original rights are not created by the Statute. The act of the injured person, or representatives of decedent in seeking and accepting compensation under the Longshoremen’s Act operates as an assignment of those rights and creates no new right of action in the employer as is done in the California Law. The assignee has and can have no greater right than the assignor....”
It is clear even from the face of this passage, however, that the court in California Casualty was addressing itself to a different question from that presented by the instant case. The plaintiffs there had brought suit “as subrogee insurance carrier[s],” id., at 403, and the holding was only that when the employer or his insurance carrier sues as subrogee, his rights are derived from and therefore identical to those of the employee. The case did not hold that the employer’s remedy as subrogee is exclusive.
Nor did the District Court for the Northern District of Ohio so hold in Reiss S. S. Co. v. Cyr, 138 F. Supp. 834, aff’d, 229 F. 2d 849, another case relied on by the District Court below. Language in the Reiss opinion to the effect that § 33 “governs exclusively in instances of third party liability,” id., at 836, referred only to the relationship between employer and employee under the Act, not to the relationship between the employer and third parties.
See Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U. S. 85; Mahnich v. Southern S. S. Co., 321 U. S. 96.
See supra, at 409.
The context of this statement in Weyerhaeuser was our treatment of the stevedoring contractor’s contention that the shipowner’s conduct had been such as to preclude recovery for the stevedoring contractor’s breach of warranty. The statement that the shipowner owed the stevedoring contractor certain duties did not identify the source of those duties, but our discussion of the subject was in terms of obligations imposed by law:
“the duties owing from petitioner [the shipowner] to Connolly [the longshoreman] were not identical with those from petitioner to respondent [the stevedoring contractor]. While the jury found petitioner ‘guilty of some act of negligence,’ that ultimate finding might have been predicated, inter alia, on a failure of petitioner to remove the shelter when the ship left New York, or a failure to correct or warn respondent of a latent dangerous condition known to petitioner when respondent began the Boston unloading. Likewise, the finding might have been predicated on a failure of petitioner during the five days in Boston to inspect the shelter, detect and correct the unsafe condition. Although any of these possibilities could provide Connolly a basis of recovery, at least the latter would not, under Ryan, prevent recovery by petitioner in the third-party action.” 355 U. S., at 568.
The Federal District Court for the Southern District of California has held that the shipowner owes the stevedoring contractor at least the following obligations:
“(1) to exercise ordinary care under the circumstances to place the ship on which the stevedoring work is to be done, and the equipment and appliances aboard ship, in such condition that an expert and experienced stevedoring contractor, mindful of the dangers he should reasonably expect to encounter, arising from the hazards of the ship’s service or otherwise, will be able by the exercise of ordinary care under the circumstances to load or discharge the cargo, as the case may be, in a workmanlike manner and with reasonable safety to persons and property; and (2) to give the stevedoring contractor reasonable warning of the existence of any latent or hidden danger which has not been remedied and is not usually encountered or reasonably to be expected by an expert and experienced stevedoring company in the performance of the stevedoring work aboard the ship, if the shipowner actually knows or, in the exercise of ordinary care under the circumstances, should know of the existence of such danger, and the danger is one which the shipowner should reasonably expect a stevedoring contractor to encounter in the performance of the stevedoring contract.” Hugev v. Dampskisaktieselskabet International, 170 F. Supp. 601, 610-611, aif’d sub nom. Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v. Dampskisaktieselskabet International, 274 F. 2d 875, cert, denied, 363 U. S. 803.
While the court identified these obligations as implied in fact from the stevedoring contract, it indicated that they also constituted the “duty of ordinary care imposed by law toward ‘persons rightfully transacting business on ships/ ” 170 F. Supp., at 610.
In the case of Mickle v. The Henriette Wilhelmine Schulte, 188 F. Supp. 77, 80, the District Court for the Northern District of California, while rejecting the argument that such obligations were contractual, agreed that the occupier of a ship
“owes certain duties of care to a business invitee, especially to an independent contractor, such as a stevedore company, which comes onto the premises to perform services, 2 Harper & James, The Law of Torts, Section 27.12 (1956), including the duty not to cause injury by negligent activity, 2 Restatement of Torts, Section 341; the duty to warn of latent perils actually known to the occupier, Prosser on Torts, 453 (1955); and the duty to inspect the premises to discover dangerous conditions. 2 Restatement of Torts, Section 343. See generally Prosser, supra, 452-62.”
Such reciprocal contractual warranties were recognized in Ryan, Marine Terminals argues, by the Court’s statement that “the steve-doring contractor... has received a contractual quid pro quo from the shipowner for assuming responsibility for the proper performance of all of the latter’s stevedoring requirements....” 350 U. S., at 129, n. 3. (Emphasis in original.) Other courts have most often dealt with the shipowner’s duties only in the context of a stevedoring contractor’s defense to a shipowner’s claim for breach of Ryan warranties. See, e. g., D/S Ove Skou v. Hebert, 365 F. 2d 341; T. Smith & Son v. Skibs A/S Hassel, 362 F. 2d 745; Albanese v. N. V. Nederl. Amerik Stoomv. Maats., 346 F. 2d 481, rev’d on other grounds, 382 U. S. 283; Misurella v. Isthmian Lines, Inc., 328 F. 2d 40; Pettus v. Grace Line, Inc., 305 F. 2d 151; Drago v. A/S Inger, 305 F. 2d 139, cert. denied, 371 U. S. 925; Calmar S. S. Corp. v. Nacirema Operating Co., 266 F. 2d 79, cert. denied, 361 U. S. 816. They have on occasion, however, stated or intimated that the shipowner makes certain affirmative warranties to the stevedoring contractor whose breach would support an action for damages. See, e. g., The No. 34, 25 F. 2d 602; Pettus v. Grace Line, Inc., 305 F. 2d 151, 155 (dissenting opinion of Judge Clark); Cusumano v. Wilhelmsen, 267 F. Supp. 164; Ring v. Motor Vessel Cape Clear, 226 F. Supp. 709. See also Mowbray v. Merryweather, [1895] 2 Q. B. 640. See generally Proudfoot, “The Tar Baby”: Maritime Personal-Injury Indemnity Actions, 20 Stan. L. Rev. 423, 442-445 (1968).
The stevedoring contractor’s warranty of workmanlike service under Ryan extends to the shipowner even in the absence of contractual privity between the parties. Waterman S. S. Corp. v. Dugan & McNamara, Inc., 364 U. S. 421; Crumady v. The Joachim Hendrik Fisser, 358 U. S. 423. For the suggestion that the steve-doring contractor may be the beneficiary of certain of the shipowner’s obligations under the charter agreement, see Drago v. A/S Inger, 305 F. 2d 139, 143.
See supra, at 410-411.
This Court has recognized the objective under the Compensation Act of “placing the burden ultimately on the company whose default caused the injury.” Italia Societa per Azioni di Navigazione v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., 376 U. S. 315, 324. And see Reed v. The Yaka, 373 U. S. 410, 414.
Davis v. American President Lines, 106 F. Supp. 729, 730. For other decisions recognizing such a quasi-contractual right of indemnity under federal maritime law, see, e. g., Parenzan v. Iino Kaiun Kabushiki Kaisya, 251 F. 2d 928, cert. denied, sub nom. International Terminal Operating Co. v. Iino Kauin Kaisha, 356 U. S. 939; American President Lines, Ltd. v. Marine Terminals Corp., 234 F. 2d 753, cert. denied, 352 U. S. 926; Berti v. Compagnie de Navigation Cyprien Fabre, 213 F. 2d 397; States S. S. Co. v. Rothschild Int’l Stevedoring Co., 205 F. 2d 253; United States v. Rothschild Int’l Stevedoring Co., 183 F. 2d 181; Standard Oil Co. v. Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co., 32 F. 2d 182; McFall v. Compagnie Maritime Belge, 304 N. Y. 314, 107 N. E. 2d 463.
See also Italia Societa per Azioni di Navigazione v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., 376 U. S. 315, 320.
See also 350 U. S., at 132, n. 6. The Ryan opinion also recognized the difference between, and treated separately, the noncon-tractual right of indemnity and the claim for contribution from a joint tortfeasor. Id., at 133.
Some have thought that the exclusivity of the employer’s statutory liability to the employee would prevent the shipowner from asserting a right of indemnity against the stevedoring contractor based on the latter’s wrong to the employee. See, e. g., Ryan, supra, at 142 (Black,
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | H | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question here is whether a union which threatened and imposed fines, and brought suit for their collection, against members who crossed the union’s picket line and went to work during an authorized strike against their employer, committed the unfair labor practice under §8 (b)(1)(A) of the National Labor Relations Act of engaging in conduct “to restrain or coerce” employees in the exercise of their right guaranteed by § 7 to “refrain from” concerted activities.
Employees at the West Allis, and La Crosse, Wisconsin, plants of respondent Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Company were represented by locals of the United Automobile Workers. Lawful economic strikes were conducted at both plants in support of new contract demands. In compliance with the UAW constitution, the strikes were called with the approval of the International Union after at least two-thirds of the members of each local voted by secret ballot to strike. Some members of each local crossed the picket lines and worked during the strikes. After the strikes were over, the locals brought proceedings against these members charging them with violation of the International constitution and bylaws. The charges were heard by local trial committees in proceedings at which the charged members were represented by counsel. No claim of unfairness in the proceedings is made. The trials resulted in each charged member being found guilty of “conduct unbecoming a Union member” and being fined in a sum from $20 to $100. Some of the fined members did not pay the fines and one of the locals obtained a judgment in the amount of the fine against one of its members, Benjamin Natzke, in a test suit brought in the Milwaukee County Court. An appeal from the judgment is pending in the Wisconsin Supreme Court.
Allis-Chalmers filed unfair labor practice charges against the locals alleging violation of § 8 (b)(1)(A). A complaint issued and after hearing a trial examiner recommended its dismissal. The National Labor Relations Board sustained the examiner on the ground that, in the circumstances of this case, the actions of the locals, even if restraint or coercion prohibited by § 8 (b) (1) (A), constituted conduct excepted from the section's prohibitions by the proviso that such prohibitions “shall not impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein.” 149 N. L. R. B. 67. Upon Allis-Chalmers’ petition for review to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, a panel of that court upheld the Board's decision. Following a rehearing en bctnc, however, the court, three judges dissenting, withdrew the panel opinion, held that the locals’ conduct violated §8 (b)(1)(A), and remanded to the Board for appropriate proceedings. 358 F. 2d 656. We granted certiorari, 385 U. S. 810. We reverse.
I.
The panel and the majority en banc of the Court of Appeals thought that reversal of the NLRB order would be required under a literal reading of §§ 7 and 8(b)(1)(A); under that reading union members who cross their own picket lines would be regarded as exercising their rights under § 7 to refrain from engaging in a particular concerted activity, and union discipline in the form of fines for such activity would therefore “restrain or coerce” in violation of § 8 (b)(1)(A) if the section’s proviso is read to sanction no form of discipline other than expulsion from the union. The panel rejected that literal reading. The majority en banc adopted it, stating that the panel “mistakenly took the position that such a literal reading was unwarranted in the light of the history and purposes” of the sections, 358 F. 2d, at 659, and holding that “[t]he statutes in question present no ambiguities whatsoever, and therefore do not require recourse to legislative history for clarification.” Id,., at 660.
It is highly unrealistic to regard §8 (b)(1), and particularly its words “restrain or coerce,” as precisely and unambiguously covering the union conduct involved in this case. On its face court enforcement of fines imposed on members for violation of membership obligations is no more conduct to “restrain or coerce” satisfaction of such obligations than court enforcement of penalties imposed on citizens for violation of their obligations as citizens to pay income taxes, or court awards of damages against a contracting party for nonperformance of a contractual obligation voluntarily undertaken. But even if the inherent imprecision of the words “restrain or coerce” may be overlooked, recourse to legislative history to determine the sense in which Congress used the words is not foreclosed. We have only this Term again admonished that labor legislation is peculiarly the product of legislative compromise of strongly held views, Local 1976, Carpenters’ Union v. Labor Board, 357 U. S. 93, 99-100, and that legislative history may not be disregarded merely because it is arguable that a provision may unambiguously embrace conduct called in question. National Woodwork Mfrs. Assn. v. NLRB, 386 U. S. 612, 619-620. Indeed, we have applied that principle to the construction of §8(b)(1)(A) itself in holding that the section must be construed in light of the fact that it “is only one of many interwoven sections in a complex Act, mindful of the manifest purpose of the Congress to fashion a coherent national labor policy.” Labor Board v. Drivers Local Union, 362 U. S. 274, 292.
National labor policy has been built on the premise that by pooling their economic strength and acting through a labor organization freely chosen by the majority, the employees of an appropriate unit have the most effective means of bargaining for improvements in wages, hours, and working conditions. The policy therefore extinguishes the individual employee’s power to order his own relations with his employer and creates a power vested in the chosen representative to act in the interests of all employees. “Congress has seen fit to clothe the bargaining representative with powers comparable to those possessed by a legislative body both to create and restrict the rights of those whom it represents....” Steele v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 323 U. S. 192, 202. Thus only the union may contract the employee’s terms and conditions of employment, and provisions for processing his grievances; the union may even bargain away his right to strike during the contract term, and his right to refuse to cross a lawful picket line. The employee may disagree with many of the union decisions but is bound by them. “The majority-rule concept is today unquestionably at the center of our federal labor policy.” “The complete satisfaction of all who are represented is hardly to be expected. A wide range of reasonableness must be allowed a statutory bargaining representative in serving the unit it represents, subject always to complete good faith and honesty of purpose in the exercise of its discretion.” Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U. S. 330, 338.
It was because the national labor policy vested unions with power to order the relations of employees with their employer that this Court found it necessary to fashion the duty of fair representation. That duty “has stood as a bulwark to prevent arbitrary union conduct against individuals stripped of traditional forms of redress by the provisions of federal labor law.” Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U. S. 171, 182. For the same reason Congress in the 1959 Landrum-Griffin amendments, 73 Stat. 519, enacted a code of fairness to assure democratic conduct of union affairs by provisions guaranteeing free speech and assembly, equal rights to vote in elections, to attend meetings, and to participate in the deliberations and voting upon the business conducted at the meetings.
Integral to this federal labor policy has been the power in the chosen union to protect against erosion its status under that policy through reasonable discipline of members who violate rules and regulations governing membership. That power is particularly vital when the members engage in strikes. The economic strike against the employer is the ultimate weapon in labor’s arsenal for achieving agreement upon its terms, and “[t]he power to fine or expel strikebreakers is essential if the union is to be an effective bargaining agent....” Provisions in union constitutions and bylaws for fines and expulsion of recalcitrants, including strikebreakers, are therefore commonplace and were commonplace at the time of the Taft-Hartley amendments.
In addition, the judicial view current at the time §8 (b)(1)(A) was passed was that provisions defining punishable conduct and the procedures for trial and appeal constituted part of the contract between member and union and that “The courts’ role is but to enforce the contract.” In Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U. S. 617, 618, we recognized that “[t]his contractual conception of the relation between a member and his union widely prevails in this country....” Although state courts were reluctant to intervene in internal union affairs, a body of law establishing standards of fairness in the enforcement of union discipline grew up around this contract doctrine. See Parks v. Electrical Workers, 314 F. 2d 886, 902-903.
To say that Congress meant in 1947 by the § 7 amendments and § 8 (b) (1) (A) to strip unions of the power to fine members for strikebreaking, however lawful the strike vote, and however fair the disciplinary procedures and penalty, is to say that Congress preceded the Landrum-Griffin amendments with an even more pervasive regulation of the internal affairs of unions. It is also to attribute to Congress an intent at war with the understanding of the union-membership relation which has been at the heart of its effort “to fashion a coherent labor policy” and which has been a predicate underlying action by this Court and the state courts. More importantly, it is to say that Congress limited unions in the powers necessary to the discharge of their role as exclusive statutory bargaining agents by impairing the usefulness of labor’s cherished strike weapon. It is no answer that the proviso to § 8 (b)(1)(A) preserves to the union the power to expel the offending member. Where the union is strong and membership therefore valuable, to require expulsion of the member visits a far more severe penalty upon the member than a reasonable fine. Where the union is weak, and membership therefore of little value, the union faced with further depletion of its ranks may have no real choice except to condone the member’s disobedience. Yet it is just such weak unions for which the power to execute union decisions taken for the benefit of all employees is most critical to effective discharge of its statutory function.
Congressional meaning is of course ordinarily to be discerned in the words Congress uses. But when the literal application of the imprecise words “restrain or coerce” Congress employed in §8 (b)(1)(A) produces the extraordinary results we have mentioned we should determine whether this meaning is confirmed in the legislative history of the section.
II.
The explicit wording of § 8 (b)(2), which is concerned with union powers to affect a member’s employment, is in sharp contrast with the imprecise words of § 8 (b)(1) (A). Section 8(b)(2) limits union power to compel an employer to discharge a terminated member other than for “failure [of the employee] to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership.” It is significant that Congress expressly disclaimed in this connection any intention to interfere with union self-government or to regulate a union’s internal affairs. The Senate Report stated:
“The committee did not desire to limit the labor organization with respect to either its selection of membership or expulsion therefrom. But the committee did wish to protect the employee in his job if unreasonably expelled or denied membership. The tests provided by the amendment are based upon facts readily ascertainable and do not require the employer to inquire into the internal affairs of the union.” S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 20, I Legislative History of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (hereafter Leg. Hist.) 426. (Emphasis supplied.)
Senator Taft, in answer to protestations by Senator Pepper that § 8 (b) (2) would intervene in the union’s internal affairs and “deny it the right to protect itself against a man in the union who betrays the objectives of the union...,” stated:
“The pending measure does not propose any limitation with respect to the internal affairs of unions. They still will be able to fire any members they wish to fire, and they still will be able to try any of their members. All that they will not be able to do, after the enactment of this bill, is this: If they fire a member for some reason other than nonpayment of dues they cannot make his employer discharge him from his job and throw him out of work. That is the only result of the provision under discussion.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Section 8(b)(1)(A) was under consideration when Senator Taft said this. Congressional emphasis that § 8 (b) (2) insulated an employee’s membership from his job, but left internal union affairs to union self-government, is therefore significant evidence against reading § 8 (b)(1)(A) as contemplating regulation of internal discipline. This is borne out by the fact that provision was also made in the Taft-Hartley Act for a special committee to study, among other things, “the internal organization and administration of labor unions....” § 402 (3), 61 Stat. 160.
What legislative materials there are dealing with § 8 (b)(1)(A) contain not a single word referring to the application of its prohibitions to traditional internal union discipline in general, or disciplinary fines in particular. On the contrary there are a number of assurances by its sponsors that the section was not meant to regulate the internal affairs of unions.
The provision was not contained in the Senate or House bills reported out of committee, but was introduced as an amendment on the Senate floor by Senator Ball. The amendment was adopted in the Conference Committee, without significant enlightenment from the report of that committee. The first suggestion that restraint or coercion of employees in the exercise of § 7 rights should be an unfair labor practice appears in the Statement of Supplemental Views to the Senate Report, in which a minority of the Senate Committee, including Senators Ball, Taft, and Smith, concurred. The mischief against which the Statement inveighed was restraint and coercion by unions in organizational campaigns. “The committee heard many instances of union coercion of employees such as that brought about by threats of reprisal against employees and their families in the course of organizing campaigns; also direct interference by mass picketing and other violence.” S. Rep. No. 105, supra, at 50, I Leg. Hist. 456. Senator Ball proposed § 8 (b)(1)(A) as an amendment to the Senate bill, and stated, “The purpose of the amendment is simply to provide that where unions, in their organizational campaigns, indulge in practices which, if an employer indulged in them, would be unfair labor practices, such as making threats or false promises or false statements, the unions also shall be guilty of unfair labor practices.” 93 Cong. Rec. 4016, II Leg. Hist. 1018. Senator Ball gave numerous examples of the kind of union conduct the amendment was to cover. Each one related to union conduct during organizational campaigns. Senator Ball reiterated this purpose several times thereafter, including remarks added after passage of the amendment. The consistent thrust of his arguments was the necessity of controlling union conduct in organizational campaigns. Indeed, when Senator Holland introduced the proviso eliminating from the reach of §8 (b)(1)(A) “the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership...,” Senator Ball replied,
“I merely wish to state to the Senate that the amendment offered by the Senator from Florida is perfectly agreeable to me. It was never the intention of the sponsors of the pending amendment to interfere with the internal affairs or organization of unions.” (Emphasis supplied.)
After acceptance of the proviso, and on the same day as the vote on the amendment itself, Senator Ball said of the proviso: “That modification is designed to make it clear that we are not trying to interfere with the internal affairs of a union which is already organized. All we are trying to cover is the coercive and restraining acts of the union in its effort to organize unorganized employees.”
Another co-sponsor of the amendment, Senator Smith, echoed this purpose: “The pending measure is designed to protect employees in their freedom to decide whether or not they desire to join labor organizations, to prevent them from being restrained or coerced.”
Senatpr Taft also initially confined his comments on the amendment to examples of organizational tactics. However, in debate with Senator Pepper, he suggested a broader but still limited application:
“If there is anything clear in the development of labor union history in the past 10 years it is that more and more labor union employees have come to be subject to the orders of labor union leaders. The bill provides for the right to protest against arbitrary powers which have been exercised by some of the labor union leaders.” (Emphasis supplied.)
In reply to Senator Pepper’s protest that union members can protect themselves against such “tyranny,” Senator 'Taft stated, “I think it is fair to say that in the case of many of the unions, the employee has a good deal more of an opportunity to select his employer than he has to select his labor-union leader,” Senator Taft further observed that union leaders sometimes penalize those who vote against them. Senator Pepper then attempted to draw an analogy between union members and shareholders in a corporation, to which Senator Taft replied, “The Congress has gone much further in protecting the rights of minority stockholders in corporations than it has in protecting the rights of members of unions. Even in this bill we do not tell the unions how they shall vote or how they shall conduct their affairs... (Emphasis supplied.) Senator Pepper attempted twice to clarify the effect of the amendment on internal affairs, but Senator Taft answered only that the amendment applied to nonunion men as well.
It was one week after this debate between Senator Taft and Senator Pepper that §8(b)(l)(A) was adopted by the Senate as an amendment to the bill. There was no further reference in the debates to the applicability of the section to internal union affairs, by Senator Taft or anyone else, despite the repeated statements by Senator Ball that it bore no relationship to the conduct of such affairs. At one point, Senator Saltonstall asked Senator Taft to provide examples of the kind of union conduct covered by the section. Senator Taft responded with examples of threats of bodily harm, economic coercion, and mass picketing in organizational campaigns and coercion which prevented employees not involved in a labor dispute from going to work. But any inference that Senator Taft envisioned that § 8 (b)(1)(A) intruded into and regulated internal union affairs is negated by his categorical statements to the contrary in the contemporaneous debates on § 8 (b)(2).
It is true that there are references in the Senate debate on § 8 (b)(1)(A) to an intent to impose the same prohibitions on unions that applied to employers as regards restraint and coercion of employees in their exercise of § 7 rights. However apposite this parallel might be when applied to organizational tactics, it clearly is inapplicable to the relationship of a union member to his own union. Union membership allows the member a part in choosing the very course of action to which he refuses to adhere, but he has of course no role in employer conduct, and nonunion employees have no voice in the affairs of the union.
Cogent support for an interpretation of the body of §8 (b)(1) as not reaching the imposition of fines and attempts at court enforcement is the proviso to § 8 (b)(1). It states that nothing in the section shall “impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein....” Senator Holland offered the proviso during debate and Senator Ball immediately accepted it, stating that it was not the intent of the sponsors in any way to regulate the internal affairs of unions. At the very least it can be said that the proviso preserves the rights of unions to impose fines, as a lesser penalty than expulsion, and to impose fines which carry the explicit or implicit threat of expulsion for nonpayment. Therefore, under the proviso the rule in the UAW constitution governing fines is valid and the fines themselves and expulsion for nonpayment would not be an unfair labor practice. Assuming that the proviso cannot also be read to authorize court enforcement of fines, a question we need not reach, the fact remains that to interpret the body of §8 (b)(1) to apply to the imposition and collection of fines would be to impute to Congress a concern with the permissible means of enforcement of union fines and to attribute to Congress a narrow and discrete interest in banning court enforcement of such fines. Yet there is not one word in the legislative history evidencing any such congressional concern. And, as we have pointed out, a distinction between court enforcement and expulsion would have been anomalous for several reasons. First, Congress was operating within the context of the “contract theory” of the union-member relationship which widely prevailed at that time. The efficacy of a contract is precisely its legal enforceability. A lawsuit is and has been the ordinary way by which performance of private money obligations is compelled. Second, as we have noted, such a distinction would visit upon the member of a strong union a potentially more severe punishment than court enforcement of fines, while impairing the bargaining facility of the weak union by requiring it either to condone misconduct or deplete its ranks.
There may be concern that court enforcement may permit the collection of unreasonably large fines. However, even were there evidence that Congress shared this concern, this would not justify reading the Act also to bar court enforcement of reasonable fines.
The 1959 Landrum-Griffin amendments, thought to be the first comprehensive regulation by Congress of the conduct of internal union affairs, also negate the reach given §8 (b)(1)(A) by the majority en banc below. “To be sure, what Congress did in 1959 does not establish what it meant in 1947. However, as another major step in an evolving pattern of regulation of union conduct, the 1959 Act is a relevant consideration. Courts may properly take into account the later Act when asked to extend the reach of the earlier Act’s vague language to the limits which, read literally, the words might permit.” Labor Board v. Drivers Local Union, 362 U. S. 274, 291-292. In 1959 Congress did seek to protect union members in their relationship to the union by adopting measures to insure the provision of democratic processes in the conduct of union affairs and procedural due process to members subjected to discipline. Even then, some Senators emphasized that “in establishing and enforcing statutory standards great care should be taken not to undermine union self-government or weaken unions in their role as collective-bargaining agents.” S. Rep. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 7. The Eighty-sixth Congress was thus plainly of the view that union self-government was not regulated in 1947. Indeed, that Congress expressly recognized that a union member may be “fined, suspended, expelled, or otherwise disciplined,” and enacted only procedural requirements to be observed. 73 Stat. 523, 29 U. S. C. §411 (a)(5). Moreover, Congress added a proviso to the guarantee of freedom of speech and assembly disclaiming any intent “to impair the right of a labor organization to adopt and enforce reasonable rules as to the responsibility of every member toward the organization as an institution....” 29 U. S. C. §411 (a)(2).
The 1959 provisions are significant for still another reason. We have seen that the only indication in the debates over § 8 (b)(1)(A) of a reach beyond organizational tactics which restrain or coerce nonmembers was Senator Taft’s concern with arbitrary and undemocratic union leadership. The 1959 amendments are addressed to that concern. The kind of regulation of internal union affairs which Senator Taft said protected stockholders of a corporation, and made necessary a “right of protest against arbitrary powers which have been exercised by some of the labor union leaders,” is embodied in the 1959 Act. The requirements of adherence to democratic principles, fair procedures and freedom of speech apply to the election of union officials and extend into all aspects of union affairs. In the present case the procedures followed for calling the strikes and disciplining the recalcitrant members fully comported with these requirements, and were in every way fair and democratic. Whether §B(b)(l)(A) proscribes arbitrary imposition of fines, or punishment for disobedience of a fiat of a union leader, are matters not presented by this case, and upon which we express no view.
Thus this history of congressional action does not support a conclusion that the Taft-Hartley prohibitions against restraint or coercion of an employee to refrain from concerted activities included a prohibition against the imposition of fines on members who decline to honor an authorized strike and attempts to collect such fines. Rather, the contrary inference is more justified in light of the repeated refrain throughout the debates on § 8 (b) (1)(A) and other sections that Congress did not propose any limitations with respect to the internal affairs of unions, aside from barring enforcement of a union’s internal regulations to affect a member’s employment status.
III.
The collective bargaining agreements with the locals incorporate union security clauses. Full union membership is not compelled by the clauses: an employee is required only to become and remain “a member of the Union... to the extent of paying his monthly dues....” The majority en banc below nevertheless regarded full membership to be “the result not of individual voluntary choice but of the insertion of [this] union security provision in the contract under which a substantial minority of. the employees may have been forced into membership.” 358 F. 2d, at 660. But the relevant inquiry here is not what motivated a member’s full membership but whether the Taft-Hartley amendments prohibited disciplinary measures against a full member who crossed his union’s picket line. It is clear that the fined employees involved herein enjoyed full union membership. Each executed the pledge of allegiance to the UAW constitution and took the oath of full membership. Moreover, the record of the Milwaukee County Court case against Benjamin Natzke discloses that two disciplined employees testified that they had fully participated in the proceedings leading to the strike. They attended the meetings at which the secret strike vote and the renewed strike vote were taken. It was upon this and similar evidence that the Milwaukee County Court found that Natzke “had by his actions become a member of the union for all purposes....’’ Allis-Chalmers offered no evidence in this proceeding that any of the fined employees enjoyed other than full union membership. We will not presume the contrary. Cf. Machinists v. Street, 367 U. S. 740, 774. Indeed, it is and has been Allis-Chalmers’ position that the Taft-Hartley prohibitions apply whatever the nature of the membership. Whether those prohibitions would apply if the locals had imposed fines on members whose membership was in fact limited to the obligation of paying monthly dues is a question not before us and upon which we intimate no view.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Reversed.
The relevant provisions of §§ 7 and 8(b)(1)(A), 61 Stat. 140, 141, 29 U. S. C. §§157 and 158 (b)(1)(A), are
“Sec. 7. Employees shall have the right to... engage in... concerted activities..., and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities....”
“Sec. 8 (b). It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents—
“(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7: Provided, That this paragraph shall not impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein...”
Two locals were involved, Local 248 at the West Allis plant, and Local 401 at the La Crosse plant. Although Allis-Chalmers' charges of unfair labor practices mentioned threats of fines as well as imposition of fines, the only proof that fines were specifically threatened during a strike consisted of a letter to strikebreaking West Allis members of Local 248 in 1959. As to the 1962 strike at West Allis and both the 1959 and 1962 strikes at La Crosse, mention of fines first occurred after the strikes were over. The threat of court enforcement of the fines was first made in 1960 in letters sent to fined members of Local 248 who had not paid their fines; the letter informed them of the outcome of a Wisconsin Supreme Court opinion holding fines enforceable, UAW, Local 756 v. Woychik, 5 Wis. 2d 528, 93 N. W. 2d 336 (1958). Local 401’s test suit was brought after the 1962 strike.
See J. I. Case Co. v. Labor Board, 321 U. S. 332; Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. Labor Board, 321 U. S. 678; ILGWU v. Labor Board, 366 U. S. 731, 737.
See Mastro Plastics Corp. v. Labor Board, 350 U. S. 270, 280.
See Labor Board v. Rockaway News Co., 345 U. S. 71.
Wellington, Union Democracy and Fair Representation: Federal Responsibility in a Federal System, 67 Yale L. J. 1327, 1333 (1958).
See, e. g., Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 1049 (1951); Philip Taft, The Structure and Government of Labor Unions 117-180 (1954); Taylor, The Role of Unions in a Democratic Society, Selected Readings on Government Regulation of Internal Union Affairs Affecting the Rights of Members, prepared for the Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare 17 (Committee Print, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 1958) (hereafter Selected Readings); Kerr, Unions and Union Leaders of Their Own Choosing, Selected Readings, supra, at 106, 109.
Summers, supra, n. 7, at 1049.
“Strikebreaking is uniformly considered sufficient reason for expulsion whether or not there is an express prohibition, for it undercuts the union’s principal weapon and defeats the economic objective for which the union exists.” Summers, Disciplinary Powers of Unions, 3 Ind. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 483, 495 (1950).
National Industrial Conference Board, The Union, The Leader, and The Members, Selected Readings, at 40, 69-71; Summers, Disciplinary Powers of Unions, 3 Ind. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 483, 508-512 (1950); Disciplinary Powers and Procedures in Union Constitutions, U. S. Dept. of Labor Bulletin No. 1350, Bur. Lab. Statistics (1963).
It is suggested that while such provisions for fines and expulsion were a common element of union constitutions at the time of the enactment of §8 (b)(1), such background loses its cogency here because such provisions did not explicitly call for court enforcement. However the potentiality of resort to courts for enforcement is implicit in any binding obligation. Surely it cannot be said that the absence of a “court enforceability” clause in a contract of sale implies that the parties do not foresee resort to the courts as a possible means of enforcement. It is also suggested that court enforcement of fines is “a rather recent innovation.” Yet such enforcement was known as early as 1867. Master Stevedores’ Assn. v. Walsh, 2 Daly 1 (N. Y.).
Summers, The Law of Union Discipline: What the Courts Do in Fact, 70 Yale L. J. 175, 180 (1960).
See generally Chafee, The Internal Affairs of Associations Not for Profit, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 993 (1930); Note, Judicial Control of Actions of Private Associations, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 983 (1963); Cox, Internal Affairs of Labor Unions Under the Labor Reform Act of 1959, 58 Mich. L. Rev. 819, 835-836 (1960).
“Since the union’s effectiveness is based largely on the degree to which it controls the available labor, expulsions tend to weaken the union. If large numbers are expelled, they become a threat to union standards by undercutting union rates, and in case of a strike they may act as strikebreakers.... Therefore, expulsions must be limited to very small numbers unless the union is so strongly entrenched that it cannot be effectively challenged by the employer or another union.” Summers, Disciplinary Powers of Unions, 3 Ind. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 483, 487-488 (1950).
93 Cong. Rec. 4193, II Leg. Hist. 1097.
93 Cong. Rec. 4016-4017, II Leg. Hist. 1018-1021. Examples were given in debate of threats by unions to double the dues of employees who waited until later to join. It is suggested that this is no less within the ambit of internal union affairs than the fines imposed in the present case. But the significant distinction is that the cited examples necessarily concern threats against nonmembers designed to coerce them into joining, and are therefore further evidence of the primary concern of Congress with organizational tactics.
93 Cong. Rec. 4271, 4432, 4434, II Leg. Hist. 1139,1199,1203.
93 Cong. Rec. A-2252, II Leg. Hist. 1524-1525.
93 Cong. Rec. 4272, II Leg. Hist. 1141.
93 Cong. Rec. 4433, II Leg. Hist. 1200.
93 Cong. Rec. 4435, II Leg. Hist. 1204.
93 Cong. Rec. 4021-4022, II Leg. Hist. 1025-1027.
93 Cong. Rec. 4023, II Leg. Hist. 1028.
See Summers, Disciplinary Powers of Unions, 3 Ind. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 483: “It is significant that among the major changes made in the Wagner Act by the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 was the addition of sections purported to be aimed at protecting individual union members against undemocratic and corrupt leaders.”
93 Cong. Rec. 4023, II Leg. Hist. 1028.
93 Cong. Rec. 4024, II Leg. Hist. 1030. It was in the context of the quoted limiting statements that, in answer to Senator Ives’ suggestion that the matter of union coercion should be further investigated, Senator Taft made the broad remark that “[m]erely to require that unions be subject to the same rules that govern employers, and that they do not have the right to interfere with or coerce employees, either their own members or those outside their union, is such a clear matter, and seems to me so easy to determine, that I would hope we would all agree.” 93 Cong. Rec. 4025, II Leg. Hist. 1032.
93 Cong. Rec. 4023, 4024, II Leg. Hist. 1029, 1030. It is this colloquy to
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | G | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice O’Connor
announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which The Chief Justice, Justice White, and Justice Scalia join.
We are called upon in this case to determine whether a United States Postal Service regulation that prohibits “[sjoliciting alms and contributions” on postal premises violates the First Amendment. We hold the regulation valid as applied.
I
The respondents in this case, Marsha B. Kokinda and Kevin E. Pearl, were volunteers for the National Democratic Policy Committee, who set up a table on the sidewalk near the entrance of the Bowie, Maryland, Post Office to solicit contributions, sell books and subscriptions to the organization’s newspaper, and distribute literature addressing a variety of political issues. The postal sidewalk provides the sole means by which customers of the post office may travel from the parking lot to the post office building and lies entirely on Postal Service property. The District Court for the District of Maryland described the layout of the post office as follows:
“[T]he Bowie post office is a freestanding building, with its own sidewalk and parking lot. It is located on a major highway, Route 197. A sidewalk runs along the edge of the highway, separating the post office property from the street. To enter the post office, cars enter a driveway that traverses the public sidewalk and enter a parking lot that surrounds the post office building. Another sidewalk runs adjacent to the building itself, separating the parking lot from the building. Postal patrons must use the sidewalk to enter the post office. The sidewalk belongs to the post office and is used for no other purpose.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 24a.
During the several hours that respondents were at the post office, postal employees received between 40 and 50 complaints regarding their presence. The record does not indicate the substance of the complaints with one exception. One individual complained “because she knew the Girl Scouts were not allowed to sell cookies on federal property.” 866 F. 2d 699, 705 (CA4 1989). The Bowie postmaster asked respondents to leave, which they refused to do. Postal inspectors arrested respondents, seizing their table as well as their literature and other belongings.
Respondents were tried before a United States Magistrate in the District of Maryland and convicted of violating 39 CFR §232.1(h)(1) (1989), which provides in relevant part:
“Soliciting alms and contributions, campaigning for election to any public office, collecting private debts, commercial soliciting and vending, and displaying or distributing commercial advertising on postal premises are prohibited.”
Respondent Kokinda was fined $50 and sentenced to 10 days’ imprisonment; respondent Pearl was fined $100 and received a 30-day suspended sentence under that provision.
Respondents appealed their convictions to the District Court, asserting that application of §232.1(h)(1) violated the First Amendment. The District Court affirmed their convictions, holding that the postal sidewalk was not a public forum and that the Postal Service’s ban on solicitation is reasonable.
A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed. 866 F. 2d 699 (1989). The Court of Appeals held that the postal sidewalk is a traditional public forum and analyzed the regulation as a time, place, and manner regulation. The court determined that the Government has no significant interest in banning solicitation and that the regulation is not narrowly tailored to accomplish the asserted governmental interest.
The United States’ petition for rehearing and a suggestion for rehearing en banc were denied. Because the decision below conflicts with other decisions by the Courts of Appeals, see United States v. Belsky, 799 F. 2d 1485 (CA11 1986); United States v. Bjerke, 796 F. 2d 643 (CA3 1986), we granted certiorari. 493 U. S. 807 (1989).
I — I
Solicitation is a recognized form of speech protected by the First Amendment. See Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U. S. 620, 629 (1980); Riley v. National Federation of Blind of N. C., Inc., 487 U. S. 781, 788-789, (1988). Under our First Amendment jurisprudence, we must determine the level of scrutiny that applies to the regulation of protected speech at issue.
The Government’s ownership of property does not automatically open that property to the public. United States Postal Service v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Assns., 453 U. S. 114, 129 (1981). It is a long-settled principle that governmental actions are subject to a lower level of First Amendment scrutiny when “the governmental function operating . . . [is] not the power to regulate or license, as lawmaker, . . . but, rather, as proprietor, to manage [its] internal operations] . . . .” Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886, 896 (1961). That distinction was reflected in the plurality opinion in Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U. S. 298 (1974), which upheld a ban on political advertisements in city transit vehicles:
“Here, we have no open spaces, no meeting hall, park, street corner, or other public thoroughfare. Instead, the city is engaged in commerce. . . . The car card space, although incidental to the provision of public transportation, is a part of the commercial venture. In much the same way that a newspaper or periodical, or even a radio or television station, need not accept every proffer of advertising from the general public, a city transit system has discretion to develop and make reasonable choices concerning the type of advertising that may be displayed in its vehicles.” Id., at 303.
The Government, even when acting in its proprietary capacity, does not enjoy absolute freedom from First Amendment constraints, as does a private business, but its action is valid in these circumstances unless it i? unreasonable, or, as was said in Lehman, “arbitrary, capricious, or invidious.” Ibid. In Lehman, the plurality concluded that the ban on political advertisements (combined with the allowance of other advertisements) was permissible under this standard:
“Users [of the transit system] would be subjected to the blare of political propaganda. There could be lurking doubts about favoritism, and sticky administrative problems might arise in parceling out limited space to eager politicians. In these circumstances, the managerial decision to limit car card space to innocuous and less controversial commercial and service oriented advertising does not rise to the dignity of a First Amendment violation. Were we to hold to the contrary, display cases in public hospitals, libraries, office buildings, military compounds, and other public facilities immediately would become Hyde Parks open to every would-be pamphleteer and politician. This the Constitution does not require.” Id., at 304.
Since Lehman, “the Court has adopted a forum analysis as a means of determining when the Government’s interest in limiting the use of its property to its intended purpose outweighs the interest of those wishing to use the property for other purposes. Accordingly, the extent to which the Government can control access depends on the nature of the relevant forum.” Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc., 473 U. S. 788, 800 (1985). In Perry Education Assn. v. Perry Local Educators’ Assn., 460 U. S. 37 (1983), the Court announced a tripartite framework for determining how First Amendment interests are to be analyzed with respect to Government property. Regulation of speech activity on governmental property that has been traditionally open to the public for expressive activity, such as public streets and parks, is examined under strict scrutiny. Id., at 45. Regulation of speech on property that the Government has expressly dedicated to speech activity is also examined under strict scrutiny. Ibid. But regulation of speech activity where the Government has not dedicated its property to First Amendment activity is examined only for reasonableness. Id., at 46.
Respondents contend that although the sidewalk is on Postal Service property, because it is not distinguishable from the municipal sidewalk across the parking lot from the post office’s entrance, it must be a traditional public forum and therefore subject to strict scrutiny. This argument is unpersuasive. The mere physical characteristics of the property cannot dictate forum analysis. If they did, then Greer v. Spock, 424 U. S. 828 (1976), would have been decided differently. In that case, we held that even though a military base permitted free civilian access to certain unrestricted areas, the base was a nonpublic forum. The presence of sidewalks and streets within the base did not require a finding that it was a public forum. Id., at 835-837.
The postal sidewalk at issue does not have the characteristics of public sidewalks traditionally open to expressive activity. The municipal sidewalk that runs parallel to the road in this case is a public passageway. The Postal Service’s sidewalk is not such a thoroughfare. Rather, it leads only from the parking area to the front door of the post office. Unlike the public street described in Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U. S. 640 (1981), which was “continually open, often uncongested, and constitute[d] not only a necessary conduit in the daily affairs of a locality’s citizens, but also a place where people [could] enjoy the open air or the company of friends and neighbors in a relaxed environment,” id., at 651, the postal sidewalk was constructed solely to provide for the passage of individuals engaged in postal business. The sidewalk leading to the entry of the post office is not the traditional public forum sidewalk referred to in Peiry.
Nor is the right of access under consideration in this case the quintessential public sidewalk which we addressed in Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U. S. 474 (1988) (residential sidewalk). The postal sidewalk was constructed solely to assist postal patrons to negotiate the space between the parking lot and the front door of the post office, not to facilitate the daily commerce and life of the neighborhood or city. The dissent would designate all sidewalks open to the public as public fora. See post, at 745 (“[T]hat the walkway at issue is a sidewalk open and accessible to the general public is alone sufficient to identify it as a public forum”). That, however, is not our settled doctrine. In United States v. Grace, 461 U. S. 171 (1983), we did not merely identify the area of land covered by the regulation as a sidewalk open to the public and therefore conclude that it was a public forum:
“The sidewalks comprising the outer boundaries of the Court grounds are indistinguishable from any other sidewalks in Washington, D. C., and we can discern no reason why they should be treated any differently. Sidewalks, of course, are among those areas of public property that traditionally have been held open to the public for expressive activities and are clearly within those areas of public property that may be considered, generally without further inquiry, to be public forum property. In this respect, the present case differs from Greer v. Spock .... In Greer, the streets and sidewalks at issue were located within an enclosed military reservation, Fort Dix, N. J., and were thus separated from the streets and sidewalks of any municipality. That is not true of the sidewalks surrounding the Court. There is no separation, no fence, and no indication whatever to persons stepping from the street to the curb and sidewalks that serve as the perimeter of the Court grounds that they have entered some special type of enclave.” Id., at 179-180 (footnote omitted).
Grace instructs that the dissent is simply incorrect in asserting that every public sidewalk is a public forum. Post, at 745. As we recognized in Grace, the location and purpose of a publicly owned sidewalk is critical to determining whether such a sidewalk constitutes a public forum.
The dissent’s attempt to distinguish Greer is also unpersuasive. The dissent finds Greer “readily distinguishable” because the sidewalk in that case “was not truly ‘open’ to the public.” Post, at 748, n. 5. This assertion is surprising in light of Justice Brennan’s description of the public access permitted in Greer:
“No entrance to the Fort is manned by a sentry or blocked by any barrier. The reservation is crossed by 10 paved roads, including a major state highway. Civilians without any prior authorization are regular visitors to unrestricted areas of the Fort or regularly pass through it, either by foot or by auto, at all times of the day and night. Civilians are welcome to visit soldiers and are welcome to visit the Fort as tourists. They eat at the base and freely talk with recruits in unrestricted areas. Public service buses, carrying both civilian and military passengers, regularly serve the base. A 1970 traffic survey indicated that 66,000 civilian and military vehicles per day entered and exited the Fort. Indeed, the reservation is so open as to create a danger of muggings after payday and a problem with prostitution.” 424 U. S., at 851 (dissenting opinion).
In Greer we held that the power of the Fort’s commanding officer summarily to exclude civilians from the area of his command demonstrated that “[t]he notion that federal military reservations, like municipal streets and parks, have traditionally served as a place for free public assembly and communication of thoughts by private citizens is . . . historically and constitutionally false.” Id., at 838. It is the latter inquiry that has animated our traditional public forum analysis, and that we apply today. Postal entry ways, like the walkways at issue in Greer, may be open to the public, but that fact alone does not establish that such areas must be treated as traditional public fora under the First Amendment.
The Postal Service has not expressly dedicated its sidewalks to any expressive activity. Indeed, postal property is expressly dedicated to only one means of communication: the posting of public notices on designated bulletin boards. See 39 CFR § 232. l(o) (1989). No Postal Service regulation opens postal sidewalks to any First Amendment activity. To be sure, individuals or groups have been permitted to leaflet, speak, and picket on postal premises, see Reply Brief for United States 12; 43 Fed. Reg. 38824 (1978), but a regulation prohibiting disruption, 39 CFR §232(l)(e) (1989), and a practice of allowing some speech activities on postal property do not add up to the dedication of postal property to speech activities. We have held that “[t]he government does not create a public forum by . . . permitting limited discourse, but only by intentionally opening a nontraditional forum for public discourse.” Cornelius, 473 U. S., at 802 (emphasis added); see also Perry, 460 U. S., at 47 (“[Selective access does not transform government property into a public forum”). Even conceding that the forum here has been dedicated to some First Amendment uses, and thus is not a purely nonpublic forum, under Perry, regulation of the reserved nonpublic uses would still require' application of the reasonableness test. See Cornelius, supra, at 804-806.
Thus, the regulation at issue must be analyzed under the standards set forth for nonpublic fora: It must be reasonable and “not an effort to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker’s view.” Perry, supra, at 46. Indeed, “[c]ontrol over access to a nonpublic forum can be based on subject matter and speaker identity so long as the distinctions drawn are reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum and are viewpoint neutral.” Cornelius, supra, at 806. “The Government’s decision to restrict access to a nonpublic forum need only be reasonable; it need not be the most reasonable or the only reasonable limitation.” 473 U. S., at 808.
I-H I — I hH
The history of regulation of solicitation in post offices demonstrates the reasonableness of the provision here at issue. The Postal Service has been regulating solicitation at least since 1958. Before enactment of the 1970 Postal Reorganization Act, Pub. L. 91-375, 84 Stat. 720, 39 U. S. C. § 201 et seq., the Post Office Department’s internal guidelines “strictly prohibited” the “[s]oliciting [of] subscriptions, canvassing for the sale of any article, or making collections . . . in buildings operated by the Post Office Department, or on the grounds or sidewalks within the lot lines” of postal premises. Postal Service Manual, Facilities Transmittal Letter 8, Buildings Operation: Buildings Operated by the Post Office Department § 622.8 (July 1958). The Department prohibited all forms of solicitation until 1963, at which time it created an exception to its categorical ban on solicitation to enable certain “established national health, welfare, and veterans’ organizations” to conduct fund drives “at or within” postal premises with the local postmaster’s permission, and at his discretion. See Facilities Transmittal Letter 53, Buildings Operation: Buildings Operated by the Post Office Department §622.8 (July 1963). The general prohibition on solicitation was enlarged in 1972 to include “[sjoliciting alms and contributions or collecting private debts on postal premises.” 37 Fed. Reg. 24347 (1972), codified at 39 CFR §232.6(h)(1) (1973).'
Soon after the 1972 amendment to the regulation, the Service expanded the exemption to encompass “[n]ational organizations which are wholly nonprofit in nature and which are devoted to charitable or philanthropic purposes” and “[l]ocal charitable and other nonprofit organizations,” 39 CFR §§ 232.6(h)(2), (3) (1974), and to permit these organizations to “request use of lobby space for annual or special fund raising campaigns, providing they do not interfere with the transaction of postal business or require expenditures by the Postal Service or the use of its employees or equipment.” 38 Fed. Reg. 27824-27825 (1973), codified at 39 CFR § 232.16(h)(2) (1974). Finally, in 1978, the Service promulgated the regulation at issue here. After 15 years of providing various exceptions to its rule against solicitation, the Service concluded that a categorical ban on solicitation was necessary, because the “Postal Service lacks the resources to enforce such regulation in the tens of thousands of post offices throughout the nation. In addition, such regulation would be, of necessity, so restrictive as to be tantamount to prohibition, and so complex as to be unadministrable. ’’ 43 Fed. Reg. 38824 (1978).
“[CJonsideration of a forum’s special attributes is relevant to the constitutionality of a regulation since the significance of the governmental interest must be assessed in light of the characteristic nature and function of the particular forum involved.” Heffron, 452 U. S., at 650-651. The purpose of the forum in this case is to accomplish the most efficient and effective postal delivery system. See 39 U. S. C. §§ 403(a), 403(b)(1); H. R. Rep. No. 91-1104, pp. 1, 5, 11-12, 17, 19 (1970). Congress has made clear that “it wished the Postal Service to be run more like a business than had its predecessor, the Post Office Department.” Franchise Tax Board of California v. United States Postal Service, 467 U. S. 512, 519-520, and n. 13 (1984). Congress has directed the Service to become a self-sustaining service industry and to “seek out the needs and desires of its present and potential customers — the American public” and to provide services in a manner “responsive” to the “needs of the American people.” H. R. Rep. No. 91-1104, supra, at 19-20. The Postal Service has been entrusted with this mission at a time when the mail service market is becoming much more competitive. It is with this mission in mind that we must examine the regulation at issue.
The Government asserts that it is reasonable to restrict access of postal premises to solicitation, because solicitation is inherently disruptive of the Postal Service’s business. We agree. “Since the act of soliciting alms or contributions usually has as its objective an immediate act of charity, it has the potentiality for evoking highly personal and subjective reactions. Reflection usually is not encouraged, and the person solicited often must make a hasty decision whether to share his resources with an unfamiliar organization while under the eager gaze of the solicitor.” 43 Fed. Reg. 38824 (1978).
The dissent avoids determining whether the sidewalk is a public forum because it believes the regulation, 39 CFR §232.1(h) (1989), does not pass muster even under the reasonableness standard applicable to nonpublic fora. In concluding that §232.1(h) is unreasonable, the dissent relies heavily on the fact that the Service permits other types of potentially disruptive speech on a case-by-case basis. The dissent’s criticism in this regard seems to be that solicitation is not receiving the same treatment by the Postal Service that other forms of speech receive. See post, at 760 (criticizing “inconsistent treatment”). That claim, however, is more properly addressed under the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment. In any event, it is anomalous that the Service’s allowance of some avenues of speech would be relied upon as evidence that it is impermissibly suppressing other speech. If anything, the Service’s generous accommodation of some types of speech testifies to its willingness to provide as broad a forum as possible, consistent with its postal mission. The dissent would create, in the name of the First Amendment, a disincentive for the Government to dedicate its property to any speech activities at all. In the end, its approach permits it to sidestep the single issue before us: Is the Government’s prohibition of solicitation on postal sidewalks unreasonable?
Whether or not the Service permits other forms of speech, which may or may not be disruptive, it is not unreasonable to prohibit solicitation on the ground that it is unquestionably a particular form of speech that is disruptive of business. Solicitation impedes the normal flow of traffic. See Heffron, supra, at 653. Solicitation requires action by those who would respond: The individual solicited must decide whether or not to contribute (which itself might involve reading the solicitor’s literature or hearing his pitch), and then, having decided to do so, reach for a wallet, search it for money, write a check, or produce a credit card. See Record, Exh. 5 (credit card receipt); see also United States v. Belsky, 799 F. 2d 1485, 1489 (CA11 1986) (“Soliciting funds is an inherently more intrusive and complicated activity than is distributing literature”). As residents of metropolitan areas know from daily experience, confrontation by a person asking for money disrupts passage and is more intrusive and intimidating than an encounter with a person giving out information. One need not ponder the contents of a leaflet or pamphlet in order mechanically to take it out of someone’s hand, but one must listen, comprehend, decide, and act in order to respond to a solicitation. Solicitors can achieve their goal only by “stopping [passersby] momentarily or for longer periods as money is given or exchanged for literature” or other items. Heffron, supra, at 653 (upholding stringent restrictions on the location of sales and solicitation activity). Justice Blackmun noted this distinction in his opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part to Heffron:
“The distribution of literature does not require that the recipient stop in order to receive the message the speaker wishes to convey; instead, the recipient is free to read the message at a later time. . . . [SJales and the collection of solicited funds not only require the fairgoer to stop, but also ‘engender additional confusion . . . because they involve acts of exchanging articles for money, fumbling for and dropping money, making change, etc.’” 452 U. S., at 665 (citation omitted).
This description of the disruption and delay caused by solicitation rings of “common-sense,” ibid., which is sufficient in this Court to uphold a regulation under reasonableness review.
The Postal Service’s judgment is based on its long experience with solicitation. It has learned from this experience that because of a continual demand from a wide range of groups for permission to conduct fundraising or vending on postal premises, postal facility managers were distracted from their primary jobs by the need to expend considerable time and energy fielding competing demands for space and administering a program of permits and approvals. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 9 (“The Postal Service concluded after an experience with limited solicitation that there wasn’t enough room for everybody who wanted to solicit on postal property and further concluded that allowing limited solicitation carried with it more problems than it was worth”). Thus, the Service found that “even the limited activities permitted by [its] program . . . produced highly unsatisfactory results.” 42 Fed. Reg. 63911 (1977). It is on the basis of this real-world experience that the Postal Service enacted the regulation at issue in this case. The Service also enacted regulations barring deposit or display of written materials except on authorized bulletin boards “to regain space for the effective display of postal materials and the efficient transaction of postal business, eliminate safety hazards, reduce maintenance costs, and improve the appearance of exterior and public-use areas on postal premises.” 43 Fed. Reg. 38824 (1978); see 39 CFR §232.1(o) (1989). In short, the Postal Service has prohibited the use of its property and resources where the intrusion creates significant interference with Congress’ mandate to ensure the most effective and efficient distribution of the mails. This is hardly unreasonable.
The dissent concludes that the Service’s administrative concerns are unreasonable, largely because of the existence of less restrictive alternatives to the regulations at issue. See post, at 761-763. Even if more narrowly tailored regulations could be promulgated, however, the Postal Service is only required to adopt reasonable regulations, not “the most reasonable or the only reasonable” regulation possible. Cornelius, 473 U. S., at 808.
The dissent also would strike the regulation on the ground that the Postal Service enacted it because solicitation “would be likely to produce hostile reactions and to cause people to avoid post offices.” 43 Fed. Reg. 38824 (1978). The dissent reads into the Postal Service’s realistic concern with losing postal business because of the uncomfortable atmosphere created by aggressive solicitation an intent to suppress certain views. See post, at 754. But the Postal Service has never intimated that it intends to suppress the views of any “disfavored or unpopular political advocacy group.” Ibid. It is the inherent nature of solicitation itself, a content-neutral ground, that the Service justifiably relies upon when it concludes that solicitation is disruptive of its business. The regulation is premised on the Service’s long experience, on the fact that solicitation is inherently more disruptive than the other speech activities it permits, and on the Service’s empirically based conclusion that a case-by-case approach to regulation of solicitation is unworkable.
Clearly, the regulation does not discriminate on the basis of content or viewpoint. Indeed, “[njothing suggests the Postal Service intended to discourage one viewpoint and advance another. ... By excluding all. . . groups from engaging in [solicitation] the Postal Service is not granting to ‘one side of a debatable public question ... a monopoly in expressing its views.’” Monterey County Democratic Central Committee v. United States Postal Service, 812 F. 2d 1194, 1198-1199 (CA9 1987) (citation omitted). The Service’s concern about losing customers because of the potentially unpleasant situation created by solicitation per se does not reveal “an effort to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker’s view.” Perry, 460 U. S., at 45-46.
It is clear that this regulation passes constitutional muster under the Court’s usual test for reasonableness. See Lehman, 418 U. S., at 308; Cornelius, supra, at 808. Accordingly, we conclude, as have the Courts of Appeals for the Third and Eleventh Circuits, that the Postal Service’s regulation of solicitation is reasonable as applied. See United States v. Belsky, 799 F. 2d 1485 (CA11 1986); United States v. Bjerke, 796 F. 2d 643 (CA3 1986).
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Reversed.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | C | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Chief Justice Burger
delivered the opinion of of the Court.
The question presented in this case is whether the seizure of allegedly obscene material, contemporaneous with and as an incident to an arrest for the public exhibition of such material in a commercial theater may be accomplished without a warrant.
On September 29, 1970, the sheriff of Pulaski County, Kentucky, accompanied by the district prosecutor, purchased tickets to a local drive-in theater. There the sheriff observed, in its entirety, a film called “Cindy and Donna” and concluded that it was obscene and that its exhibition was in violation of a state statute. A substantial part of the film was also observed by a deputy sheriff from a vantage point on the road outside the theater. Since the petitioner conceded the obscenity of the film at trial, that issue is not before us for decision.
The sheriff, at the conclusion of the film, proceeded to the projection booth, where he arrested petitioner, the manager of the theater, on the charge of exhibiting an obscene film to the public contrary to Ky. Rev. Stat. § 436.101 (1973). Concurrent with the arrest, the sheriff seized one copy of the film for use as evidence. It is uncontested: (a) that the sheriff had no warrant when he made the arrest and seizure, (b) that there had been no prior determination by a judicial officer on the question of obscenity, and (c) that the arrest was based solely on the sheriff’s observing the exhibition of the film.
On September 30, 1970, the day following the arrest of petitioner and the seizure of the film, the Grand Jury of Pulaski County heard testimony concerning the scenes and content of the film and returned an indictment charging petitioner with exhibiting an obscene film in violation of Ky. Rev. Stat. § 436.101. On October 3, 1970, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty in the Pulaski Circuit Court, and the case was set for trial. On October 12, 1970, petitioner filed a motion to suppress the film as evidence and to dismiss the indictment. The motion was predicated upon the ground that the film was “improperly, unlawfully and illegally seized, contrary to . . . the laws of the land.” Four days later, on October 16, 1970, the Pulaski Circuit Court heard argument at an adversary hearing on petitioner’s motion. The motion was denied.
Petitioner’s trial began on October 20, 1970. The arresting sheriff and one of his deputies were the only witnesses for the prosecution. The sheriff testified that the film displayed nudity and “intimate love scenes.” The sheriff further testified that, upon viewing the film, he determined that it was obscene and that its exhibition violated state law. He therefore arrested petitioner. Together with the testimony of the sheriff, the film itself was introduced in evidence. Petitioner's motion to suppress the film was renewed, and again overruled. The sheriff’s deputy took the stand and testified that he had viewed the final 30 minutes of the film from a vantage point on a public road outside the theater. Following this testimony, the jury was permitted to see the film.
Petitioner testified in his own behalf. He stated that, to his knowledge, no juveniles had been admitted to see the film, and that he had received no complaints about the film until it was seized by the sheriff. At the close of his testimony, the jury found petitioner guilty as charged. The jury rendered both a general verdict of guilty and a special verdict that the film was obscene, as provided by Ky. Rev. Stat. §436.101 (8).
On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky affirmed petitioner’s conviction. The Court of Appeals first emphasized that “[i]t was conceded by [petitioner’s] counsel in closing argument to the jury that the film is obscene. No issue is presented on appeal as to the obscenity of the material.” 473 S. W. 2d 814, 815 (1971). The Court of Appeals then held that the film was properly seized incident to a lawful arrest, distinguishing the holdings of this Court in A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U. S. 205 (1964), and Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U. S. 717 (1961), on the ground that those decisions related to seizure of allegedly obscene materials “for destruction or suppression, not to seizures incident to an arrest for possessing, selling, or exhibiting a specific item.” 473 S. W. 2d, at 815. It also distinguished Lee Art Theatre v. Virginia, 392 U. S. 636 (1968), on the grounds that there film “had been seized pursuant to a [defective] search warrant, not incident to an arrest.” 473 S. W. 2d, at 816. The Court of Appeals relied on a decision of a federal three-judge court in Hosey v. City of Jackson, 309 F. Supp. 527 (SD Miss. 1970), which concluded that:
“[Sjeizure of an allegedly obscene film as an incident to lawful arrests for a crime committed in the presence of the arresting officers, i. e., the public showing of such film, does not exceed constitutional bounds in the absence of a prior judicial hearing on the question of its obscenity.” Id., at 533.
The Court of Appeals specifically declined to follow a decision by another federal three-judge court in Ledesma v. Perez, 304 F. Supp. 662 (ED La. 1969), which held unconstitutional the seizure of allegedly obscene material incident to an arrest, but without a warrant or a prior adversary hearing.
I
The Fourth Amendment proscription against “unreasonable . . . seizures,” applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, must not be read in a vacuum. A seizure reasonable as to one type of material in one setting may be unreasonable in a different setting or with respect to another kind of material. Cf. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 471-472 (1971); id., at 509-510 (Black, J., concurring and dissenting); id., at 512-513 (White, J., concurring and dissenting). The question to be resolved is whether the seizure of the film without a warrant was unreasonable under Fourth Amendment standards and, if so, whether the film was therefore inadmissible at-the trial. The seizure of instruments of a crime, such as a pistol or a knife, or “contraband or stolen goods or objects dangerous in themselves,” id., at 472, are to be distinguished from quantities of books and movie films when a court appraises the reasonableness of the seizure under Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment standards.
Marcus v. Search Warrant, supra, held that a warrant for the seizure of allegedly obscene books could not be issued on the conclusory opinion of a police officer that the books sought to be seized were obscene. Such a warrant lacked the safeguards demanded “to assure nonobscene material the constitutional protection to which it is entitled. . . . [T]he warrants issued on the strength of the conclusory assertions of a single police officer, without any scrutiny by the judge of any materials considered by the complainant to be obscene.” 367 U. S., at 731-732. There had been “no step in the procedure before seizure designed to focus searchingly on the question of obscenity.” Id., at 732.
The sense of this holding was reaffirmed in A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, supra, where the Court found unconstitutional a “massive seizure” of books from a commercial bookstore for the purpose of destroying the books as contraband. The result was premised on the lack of an adversary hearing prior to seizure, and the Court did not find it necessary to reach the claim that the seizure violated Fourth Amendment standards. 378 U. S., at 210 n. 2. However, the Court emphasized:
“It is no answer to say that obscene books are contraband, and that consequently the standards governing searches and seizures of allegedly obscene books should not differ from those applied with respect to narcotics, gambling paraphernalia and other contraband. We rejected that proposition in Marcus.” Id., at 211-212.
Lee Art Theatre v. Virginia, supra, was to the same effect with regard to seizure of a film from a commercial theater regularly open to the public. There a warrant for the seizure of the film was issued on the basis of a police officer’s affidavit giving the titles of the film and asserting in conclusory fashion that he had personally viewed the films and considered them obscene. The films were seized pursuant to the warrant and introduced into evidence in a criminal case against the exhibitor. Conviction ensued. On review, the Court held that “[t]he admission of the films in evidence requires reversal of petitioner’s conviction” because
“[t]he procedure under which the warrant issued solely upon the conclusory assertions of the police officer without any inquiry by the justice of the peace into the factual basis for the officer’s conclusions was not a procedure 'designed to focus searchingly on the question of obscenity,’ id., [Marcus v. Search Warrant, supra] at 732, and therefore fell short of constitutional requirements demanding necessary sensitivity to freedom of expression.” 392 U. S., at 637.
No mention was made in the brief per curiam Lee Art Theatre opinion as to whether or not the seizure was incident to an arrest. The Court relied on Marcus and A Quantity of Books.
The common thread of Marcus, A Quantity of Books, and Lee Art Theatre is to be found in the nature of the materials seized and the setting in which they were taken. See Stanford v. Texas, 379 U. S. 476, 486 (1965). In each case the material seized fell arguably within First Amendment protection, and the taking brought to an abrupt halt an orderly and presumptively legitimate distribution or exhibition. Seizing a film then being exhibited to the general public presents essentially the same restraint on expression as the seizure of all the books in a bookstore. Such precipitate action by a police officer, without the authority of a constitutionally sufficient warrant, is plainly a form of prior restraint and is, in those circumstances, unreasonable under Fourth Amendment standards. The seizure is unreasonable, not simply because it would have been easy to secure a warrant, but rather because prior restraint of the right of expression, whether by books or films, calls for a higher hurdle in the evaluation of reasonableness. The setting of the bookstore or the commercial theater, each presumptively under the protection of the First Amendment, invokes such Fourth Amendment warrant requirements because we examine what is “unreasonable” in the light of the values of freedom of expression. As we stated in Stanford v. Texas, supra:
“In short, . . . the constitutional requirement that warrants must particularly describe the ‘things to be seized’ is to be accorded the most scrupulous exactitude when the ‘things’ are books, and the basis for their seizure is the ideas which they contain. See Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U. S. 717; A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U. S. 205. No less a standard could be faithful to First Amendment freedoms. The constitutional impossibility of leaving the protection of those freedoms to the whim of the officers charged with executing the warrant is dramatically underscored by what the officers saw fit to seize under the warrant in this case.” 379 U. S., at 485 (footnotes omitted).
Moreover, ordinary human experience should teach that the seizure of a movie film from a commercial theater with regularly scheduled performances, where a film is being played and replayed to paid audiences, presents a very different situation from that in which contraband is changing hands or where a robbery or assault is being perpetrated. In the latter settings, the probable cause for an arrest might justify the seizure of weapons, or other evidence or instruments of crime, without a warrant. Cf. Chimel v. California, 395 U. S. 752, 764 (1969); id., at 773-774 (White, J., dissenting); Preston v. United States, 376 U. S. 364, 367 (1964). Where there are exigent circumstances in which police action literally must be “now or never” to preserve the evidence of the crime, it is reasonable to permit action without prior judicial evaluation. See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42, 47-51 (1970). Cf. Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132 (1925). The facts surrounding the “massive seizures” of books in Marcus and A Quantity of Books, or the seizure of the film in Lee Art Theatre, presented no such “now or never” circumstances.
II
The film seized in this case was being exhibited at a commercial theater showing regularly scheduled performances to the general public. The seizure proceeded solely on a police officer’s conclusions that the film was obscene; there was no warrant. Nothing prior to seizure afforded a magistrate an opportunity to “focus searchingly on the question of obscenity.” See Heller v. New York, ante, at 488-489; Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U. S., at 732. If, as Marcus and Lee Art Theatre held, a warrant for seizing allegedly obscene material may not issue on the mere conclusory allegations of an officer, a fortiori, the officer may not make such a seizure with no warrant at all. “The use by government of the power of search and seizure as an adjunct to a system for the suppression of objectionable publications is not new. . . . The Bill of Rights was fashioned against the background of knowledge that unrestricted power of search and seizure could also be an instrument for stifling liberty of expression.” Marcus v. Search Warrant, supra, at 724, 729. In this case, as in Lee Art Theatre, the admission of the film in evidence requires reversal of petitioner’s conviction. 392 U. S., at 637.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals of Kentucky is reversed and this case remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
[For dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas, see ante, p. 494.]
Petitioner’s lawyer made the following statement to the trial jury during the closing arguments:
“I would be good enough to tell you at the outset that, in behalf of Mr. Roaden, I am not going to get up here and defend the film observed yesterday nor the revolting scenes in it or try to argue or persuade you that those scenefs] were not obscene.” App. 37.
Kentucky Revised Statutes §436.101 (1973), reads in relevant part as follows:
“Obscene matter, distribution, penalties, destruction.
“(1) As used in this section:
“(a) 'Distribute' means to transfer possession of, whether with or without consideration.
“(b) ‘Matter’ means any book, magazine, newspaper, or other printed or written material or any picture, drawing, photograph, motion picture, or other pictorial representation or any statue or other figure, or any recording, transcription or mechanical, chemical or electrical reproduction or any other articles, equipment, machines or materials.
“(c) 'Obscene’ means that to the average person, applying contemporary standards, the predominant appeal of the matter, taken as a whole, is to prurient interest, a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion, which goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in description or representation of such matters.
“(d) 'Person’ means any individual, partnership, firm, association, corporation, or other legal entity.
“(2) Any person who, having knowledge of the obscenity thereof, sends or causes to be sent, or brings or causes to be brought, into this state for sale or distribution, or in this state prepares, publishes, prints, exhibits, distributes, or offers to distribute, or has in his possession with intent to distribute or to exhibit or offer to distribute, any obscene matter is punishable by fine of not more than $1,000 plus five dollars ($5.00) for each additional unit of material coming within the provisions of this chapter, which is involved in the offense, not to exceed ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than six (6) months plus one (1) day for each additional unit of material coming -within the provisions of this chapter, and which is involved in the offense, such basic maximum and additional days not to exceed 360 days in the county jail, or by both such fine and imprisonment. If such person has previously been convicted of a violation of this subsection, he is punishable by fine of not more than $2,000 plus five dollars ($5.00) for each additional unit of material coming within the provisions of this chapter, which is involved in the offense, not to exceed $25,000, or by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one (1) year, or by both such fine and such imprisonment. If a person has been twice convicted of a violation of this section, a violation of this subsection is punishable by imprisonment in the state penitentiary not exceeding five (5) years.
“(8) The jury, or the court, if a jury trial is waived, shall render a general verdict, and shall also render a special verdict as to whether the matter named in the charge is obscene. The special verdict or findings on the issue of obscenity may be: ‘We find the . . . (title or description of matter) to be obscene,’ or, ‘We find the . . . (title or description of matter) not to be obscene/ as they may find each item is or is not obscene.
“ (9) Upon the conviction of the accused, the court may, when the conviction becomes final, order any matter or advertisement, in respect whereof the accused stands convicted, and which remains in the possession or under the control of the attorney general, commonwealth’s attorney, county attorney, city attorney or their authorized assistants, or any law enforcement agency, to be destroyed, and the court may cause to be destroyed any such material in its possession or under its control.”
We vacated the judgment in Hosey v. City of Jackson, 309 F. Supp. 527 (SD Miss. 1970), on the grounds of the Court’s policy of noninterference in state prosecution; we did not reach the merits. Hosey v. City of Jackson, 401 U. S. 987 (1971). We also vacated the judgment in Ledesma v. Perez, 304 F. Supp. 662 (ED La. 1969), again on the grounds of noninterference with state criminal proceedings prior to adjudications by state courts. Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U. S. 82 (1971).
In Stanford v. Texas, supra, we acknowledged the difference between books and weapons, narcotics, or cases of whiskey.
This does not mean an adversary proceeding is needed before seizure, since a warrant may be issued ex parte. Heller v. New York, ante, p. 483.
Counsel for Kentucky, together with counsel for New York in Heller v. New York, ante, at 493, and counsel for California as amicus curiae in Heller, have emphasized that allegedly obscene films are particularly difficult evidence to preserve unless kept in custody. We again take judicial notice that films may be compact, may be easy to destroy or to remove to another jurisdiction, and may be subject to pretrial alterations by cutting out scenes and resplicing reels. See ibid. But, as the Heller case demonstrates, where films are scheduled for exhibition in a commercial theater open to the public, procuring a warrant based on a prior judicial determination of probable cause of obscenity need not risk loss of the evidence.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | C | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Chief Justice Warren
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this case we review for the first time a conviction under § 504 of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, which makes it a crime for a member of the Communist Party to serve as an officer or (except in clerical or custodial positions) as an employee of a labor union. Section 504, the purpose of which is to protect the national economy by minimizing the danger of political strikes, was enacted to replace § 9 (h) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended by the Taft-Hartley Act, which conditioned a union’s access to the National Labor Relations Board upon the filing of affidavits by all of the union’s officers attesting that they were not members of or affiliated with the Communist Party.
Respondent has been a working longshoreman on the San Francisco docks, and an open and avowed Communist, for more than a quarter of a century. He was elected to the Executive Board of Local 10 of the International Longshoremen’s and Warehousemen’s Union for consecutive one-year terms in 1959, 1960, and 1961. On May 24, 1961, respondent was charged in a one-count indictment returned in the Northern District of California with “knowingly and wilfully serv[ing] as a member of an executive board of a labor organization... while a member of the Communist Party, in wilful violation of Title 29, United States Code, Section 504.” It was neither charged nor proven that respondent at any time advocated or suggested illegal activity by the union, or proposed a political strike. The jury found respondent guilty, and he was sentenced to six months’ imprisonment. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed and remanded with instructions to set aside the conviction and dismiss the indictment, holding that § 504 violates the First and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution. 334 F. 2d 488. We granted certiorari, 379 U. S. 899.
Respondent urges — in addition to the grounds relied on by the court below — that the statute under which he was convicted is a bill of attainder, and therefore violates Art. I, § 9, of the Constitution. We agree that § 504 is void as a bill of attainder and affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals on that basis. We therefore find it unnecessary to consider the First and Fifth Amendment arguments.
I.
The provisions outlawing bills of attainder were adopted by the Constitutional Convention unanimously, and without debate.
“No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed [by the Congress].” Art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
“No State shall... pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts... Art. I, § 10.
A logical starting place for an inquiry into the meaning of the prohibition is its historical background. The bill of attainder, a parliamentary act sentencing to death one or more specific persons, was a device often resorted to in sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth century England for dealing with persons who had attempted, or threatened to attempt, to overthrow the government. In addition to the death sentence, attainder generally carried with it a “corruption of blood,” which meant that the attainted party’s heirs could not inherit his property. The “bill of pains and penalties” was identical to the bill of attainder, except that it prescribed a penalty short of death, e. g., banishment, deprivation of the right to vote, or exclusion of the designated party’s sons from Parliament. Most bills of attainder and bills of pains and penalties named the parties to whom they were to apply; a few, however, simply described them. While some left the designated parties a way of escaping the penalty, others did not. The use of bills of attainder and bills of pains and penalties was not limited to England. During the American Revolution, the legislatures of all thirteen States passed statutes directed against the Tories; among these statutes were a large number of bills of attainder and bills of pains and penalties.
While history thus provides some guidelines, the wide variation in form, purpose and effect of ante-Constitution bills of attainder indicates that the proper scope of the Bill of Attainder Clause, and its relevance to contemporary problems, must ultimately be sought by attempting to discern the reasons for its inclusion in the Constitution, and the evils it was' designed to eliminate. The best available evidence, the writings of the architects of our constitutional system, indicates that the Bill of Attainder Clause was intended not as a narrow, technical (and therefore soon to be outmoded) prohibition, but rather as an implementation of the separation of powers, a general safeguard against legislative exercise of the judicial function, or more simply — trial by legislature.
The Constitution divides the National Government into three branches — Legislative, Executive and Judicial. This “separation of powers” was obviously not instituted with the idea that it would promote governmental efficiency. It was, on the contrary, looked to as a bulwark against tyranny. For if governmental power is fraction-alized, if a given policy can be implemented only by a combination of legislative enactment, judicial application, and executive implementation, no man or group of men will be able to impose its unchecked will. James Madison wrote:
“The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”
The doctrine of separated powers is implemented by a number of constitutional provisions, some of which entrust certain jobs exclusively to certain branches, while others say that a given task is not to be performed by a given branch. For example, Article Ill’s grant of “the judicial Power of the United States” to federal courts has been interpreted both as a grant of exclusive authority over certain areas, Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, and as a limitation upon the judiciary, a declaration that certain tasks are not to be performed by courts, e. g., Muskrat v. United States, 219 U. S. 346. Compare Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579.
The authors of the Federalist Papers took the position that although under some systems of government (most notably the one from which the United States had just broken), the Executive Department is the branch most likely to forget the bounds of its authority, “in a representative republic... where the legislative power is exercised by an assembly... which is sufficiently numerous to feel all the passions which actuate a multitude; yet not so numerous as to be incapable of pursuing the objects of its passions...,” barriers had to be erected to ensure that the legislature would not overstep the bounds of its authority and perform the functions of the other departments. The Bill of Attainder Clause was regarded as such a barrier. Alexander Hamilton wrote:
“Nothing is more common than for a free people, in times of heat and violence, to gratify momentary passions, by letting into the government principles and precedents which afterwards prove fatal to themselves. Of this kind is the doctrine of disqualification, enfranchisement, and banishment by acts of the legislature. The dangerous consequences of this power are manifest. If the legislature can disfranchise any number of citizens at pleasure by general descriptions, it may soon confine all the votes to a small number of partisans, and establish an aristocracy or an oligarchy; if it may banish at discretion all those whom particular circumstances render obnoxious, without hearing or trial, no man can be safe, nor know when he may be the innocent victim of a prevailing faction. The name of liberty applied to such a government, would be a mockery of common sense.”
Thus the Bill of Attainder Clause not only was intended as one implementation of the general principle of frac-tionalized power, but also reflected the Framers’ belief that the Legislative Branch is not so well suited as politically independent judges and juries to the task of ruling upon the blameworthiness of, and levying appropriate punishment upon, specific persons.
“Every one must concede that a legislative body, from its numbers and organization, and from the very intimate dependence of its members upon the people, which renders them, liable to be peculiarly susceptible to popular clamor, is not properly constituted to try with coolness, caution, and impartiality a criminal charge, especially in those cases in which the popular feeling is strongly excited, — the very class of cases most likely to be prosecuted by this mode.”
By banning bills of attainder, the Framers of the Constitution sought to guard against such dangers by limiting legislatures to the task of rule-making. “It is the peculiar province of the legislature to prescribe general rules for the government of society; the application of those rules to individuals in society would seem to be the duty of other departments.” Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 136.
II.
It is in this spirit that the Bill of Attainder Clause was consistently interpreted by this Court — until the decision in American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382, which we shall consider hereafter. In 1810, Chief Justice Marshall, speaking for the Court in Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 138, stated that “[a] bill of attainder may affect the life of an individual, or may confiscate his property, or may do both.” This means, of course, that what were known at common law as bills of pains and penalties ar.e outlawed by the Bill of Attainder Clause. The Court’s pronouncement therefore served notice that the Bill of Attainder Clause was not to be given a narrow historical reading (which would exclude bills of pains and penalties), but was instead to be read in light of the evil the Framers had sought to bar: legislative punishment, of any form or severity, of specifically designated persons or groups. See also Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213, 286.
The approach which Chief Justice Marshall had suggested was followed in the twin post-Civil War cases of Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, and Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333. Cummings involved the constitutionality of amendments to the Missouri Constitution of 1865 which provided that no one could engage in a number of specified professions (Cummings was a priest) unless he first swore that he had taken no part in the rebellion against the Union. At issue in Garland was a federal statute which required attorneys to take a similar oath before they could practice in federal courts. This Court struck down both provisions as bills of attainder on the ground that they were legislative acts inflicting punishment on a specific group: clergymen and lawyers who had taken part in the rebellion and therefore could not truthfully take the oath. In reaching its result, the Court emphatically rejected the argument that the constitutional prohibition outlawed only a certain class of legislatively imposed penalties:
“The deprivation of any rights, civil or political, previously enjoyed, may be punishment, the circumstances attending and the causes of the deprivation determining this fact. Disqualification from office may be punishment, as in cases of conviction upon impeachment. Disqualification from the pursuits of a lawful avocation, or from positions of trust, or from the privilege of appearing in the courts, or acting as an executor, administrator, or guardian, may also, and often has been, imposed as punishment.” 4 Wall., at 320.
The next extended discussion of the Bill of Attainder Clause came in 1946, in United States v. Lovett, 328 U. S. 303, where the Court invalidated § 304 of the Urgent Deficiency Appropriation Act, 1943, 57 Stat. 431, 450, which prohibited payment of further salary to three named federal employees, as a bill of attainder.
“ [Legislative acts, no matter what their form, that apply either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial are bills of attainder prohibited by the Constitution.... This permanent proscription from any opportunity to serve the Government is punishment, and of a most severe type.... No one would think that Congress could have passed a valid law, stating that after investigation it had found Lovett, Dodd, and Watson 'guilty’ of the crime of engaging in'subversive activities,’ defined that term for the first time, and sentenced them to perpetual exclusion from any government employment. Section 304, while it does not use that language, accomplishes that result.” Id., at 315-316.
III.
Under the line of cases just outlined, § 504 of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act plainly constitutes a bill of attainder. Congress undoubtedly possesses power under the Commerce Clause to enact legislation designed to keep from positions affecting interstate commerce persons who may use such positions to bring about political strikes. In § 504, however, Congress has exceeded the authority granted it by the Constitution. The statute does not set forth a generally applicable rule decreeing that any person who commits certain acts or possesses certain characteristics (acts and characteristics which, in Congress’ view, make them likely to initiate political strikes) shall not hold union office, and leave to courts and juries the job of deciding what persons have committed the specified acts or possess the specified characteristics. Instead, it designates in no uncertain terms the persons who possess the feared characteristics and therefore cannot hold union office without incurring criminal liability — members of the Communist Party.
Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 U. S. 1, lends support to our conclusion. That case involved an appeal from an order by the Control Board ordering the Communist Party to register as a “Communist-action organization,” under the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 987, 50 U. S. C. § 781 et seg. (1958 ed.). The definition of “Communist-action organization” which the Board is to apply is set forth in § 3 of the Act:
“[A]ny organization in the United States... which (i) is substantially directed, dominated, or controlled by the foreign government or foreign organization controlling the world Communist movement referred to in section 2 of this title, and (ii) operates primarily to advance the objectives of such world Communist movement... 64 Stat. 989, 50 U. S. C. § 782 (1958 ed.).
A majority of the Court rejected the argument that the Act was a bill of attainder, reasoning that § 3 does not specify the persons or groups upon which the deprivations set forth in the Act are to be imposed, but instead sets forth a general definition. Although the Board had determined in 1953 that the Communist Party was a “Communist-action organization,” the Court found the statutory definition not to be so narrow as to insure that the Party would always come within it:
“In this proceeding the Board has found, and the Court of Appeals has sustained its conclusion, that the Communist Party, by virtue of the activities in which it now engages, comes within the terms of the Act. If the Party should at any time choose to abandon these activities, after it is once registered pursuant to § 7, the Act provides adequate means of relief.” 367 U. S., at 87.
The entire Court did not share the view of the majority that § 3’s definition constituted rule-making rather than specification. See also Garner v. Los Angeles Board, 341 U. S. 716, 723. However, language incorporated in the majority opinion indicates that there was agreement on one point: by focusing upon “the crucial constitutional significance of what Congress did when it rejected the approach of outlawing the Party by name and accepted instead a statutory program regulating not enumerated organizations but designated activities,” 367 U. S., at 84-85, the majority clearly implied that if the Act had applied to the Communist Party by name, it would have been a bill of attainder:
“The Act is not a bill of attainder. It attaches not to specified organizations but to described activities in which an organization may or may not engage.... The Subversive Activities Control Act... requires the registration only of organizations which, after the date of the Act, are found to be under the direction, domination, or control of certain foreign powers and to operate primarily to advance certain objectives. This finding must be made after full administrative hearing, subject to judicial review which opens the record for the reviewing court’s determination whether the administrative findings as to fact are supported by the preponderance of the evidence.” Id., at 86-87.
In this case no disagreement over whether the statute in question designates a particular organization can arise, for § 504 in terms inflicts its disqualification upon members of the Communist Party. The moment § 504 was enacted, respondent was given the choice of declining a leadership position in his union or incurring criminal liability.
The Solicitor General points out that in Board of Governors v. Agnew, 329 U. S. 441, this Court applied § 32 of the Banking Act of 1933, which provides:
“No officer, director, or employee of any corporation or unincorporated association, no partner or employee of any partnership, and no individual, primarily engaged in the issue, flotation, underwriting, public sale, or distribution, at wholesale or retail, or through syndicate participation, of stocks, bonds, or other similar securities, shall serve the same time as an officer, director, or employee of any member bank except in limited classes of cases in which the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System may allow such service by general regulations when in the judgment of the said Board it would not unduly influence the investment policies of such member bank or the advice it gives its customers regarding investments.”
He suggests that for purposes of the Bill of Attainder Clause, such conflict-of-interest laws are not meaningfully distinguishable from the statute before us. We find this argument without merit. First, we note that § 504, unlike § 32 of the Banking Act, inflicts its deprivation upon the members of a political group thought to present a threat to the national security. As we noted above, such groups were the targets of the overwhelming majority of English and early American bills of attainder. Second, § 32 incorporates no judgment censuring or condemning any man or group of men. In enacting it, Congress relied upon its general knowledge of human psychology, and concluded that the concurrent holding of the two designated positions would present a temptation to any man — not just certain men or members of a certain political party. Thus insofar as § 32 incorporates a condemnation, it condemns all men. Third, we cannot accept the suggestion that § 32 constitutes an exercise in specification rather than rule-making. It seems to us clear that § 32 establishes an objective standard of conduct. Congress determined that a person who both (a) held a position in a bank which could be used to influence the investment policies of the bank or its customers, and (b) was in a position to benefit financially from investment in the securities handled by a particular underwriting house, might well be tempted to “use his influence in the bank to involve it or its customers in securities which his underwriting house has in its portfolio or has committed itself to take.” 329 U. S., at 447. In designating bank officers, directors and employees as those persons in position (a), and officers, directors, partners and employees of underwriting houses as those persons in position (b), Congress merely expressed the characteristics it was trying to reach in an alternative, shorthand way. That Congress was legislating with respect to general characteristics rather than with respect to a specific group of men is well demonstratecfby the fact that § 32 provides that the prescribed disqualification should not obtain whenever the Board of Governors determined that “it would not unduly influence the investment policies of such member bank or the advice it gives its customers regarding investments.” We do not suggest that such an escape clause is essential to the constitutionality of § 32, but point to it only further to underscore the infirmity of the suggestion that § 32, like § 504, incorporates an empirical judgment of, and inflicts its deprivation upon, a particular group of men.
It is argued, however, that in § 504 Congress did no more than it did in enacting § 32: it promulgated a general rule to the effect that persons possessing characteristics which make them likely to incite political strikes should not hold union office, and simply inserted in place of a list of those characteristics an alternative, shorthand criterion — membership in the Communist Party. Again, we cannot agree. The designation of Communists as those persons likely to cause political strikes is not the substitution of a semantically equivalent phrase; on the contrary, it rests, as the Court in Douds explicitly recognized, 339 U. S., at 389, upon an empirical investigation by Congress of the acts, characteristics and propensities of Communist Party members. In a number of decisions, this Court has pointed out the fallacy of the suggestion that membership in the Communist Party, or any other political organization, can be regarded as an alternative, but equivalent, expression for a list of undesirable characteristics. For, as the Court noted in Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U. S. 118, 136, “under our traditions beliefs are personal and not a matter of mere association, and... men in adhering to a political party or other organization notoriously do not subscribe un-qualifiedly to all of its platforms or asserted principles.” Just last Term, in Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U. S. 500, we held § 6 of the Subversive Activities Control Act to violate the Constitution because it “too broadly and indiscriminately” restricted constitutionally protected freedoms. One of the factors which compelled us to reach this conclusion was that § 6 inflicted its deprivation upon all members of Communist organizations without regard to whether there existed any demonstrable relationship between the characteristics of the person involved and the evil Congress sought to eliminate. Id., at 509-511. These cases are relevant to the question before us. Even assuming that Congress had reason to conclude that some Communists would use union positions to bring about political strikes, “it cannot automatically be inferred that all members shar[e] their evil purposes or participate] in their illegal conduct.” Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U. S. 232, 246. In utilizing the term “members of the Communist Party” to designate those persons who are likely to incite political strikes, it plainly is not the case that Congress has merely substituted a convenient shorthand term for a list of the characteristics it was trying to reach.
IV.
The Solicitor General argues that § 504 is not a bill of attainder because the prohibition it imposes does not constitute “punishment.” In support of this conclusion, he urges that the statute was enacted for preventive rather than retributive reasons — that its aim is not to punish Communists for what they have done in the past, but rather to keep them from positions where they will in the future be able to bring about undesirable events. He relies on American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382, which upheld § 9 (h) of the National Labor Relations Act, the predecessor of the statute presently before us. In Douds the Court distinguished Cummings, Garland and Lovett on the ground that in those cases
“the individuals involved were in fact being punished for past actions; whereas in this case they are subject to possible loss of position only because there is substantial ground for the congressional judgment that their beliefs and loyalties will be transformed into future conduct.” Id., at 413.
This case is not necessarily controlled by Douds. For to prove its assertion that § 9 (h) was preventive rather than retributive in purpose, the Court in Douds focused on the fact that members of the Communist Party could escape from the class of persons specified by Congress simply by resigning from the Party:
“Here the intention is to forestall future dangerous acts; there is no one who may not, by a voluntary alteration of the loyalties which impel him to action, become eligible to sign the affidavit. We cannot conclude that this section is a bill of attainder.” Id., at 414.
Section 504, unlike § 9 (h), disqualifies from the holding of union office not only present members of the Communist Party, but also anyone who has within the past five years been a member of the Party. However, even if we make the assumption that the five-year provision was inserted not out of desire to visit retribution but purely out of a belief that failure to include it would lead to pro forma resignations from the Party which would not decrease the threat of political strikes, it still clearly appears that § 504 inflicts “punishment” within the meaning of the Bill of Attainder Clause. It would be archaic to limit the definition of “punishment” to “retribution.” Punishment serves several purposes: retributive, rehabilitative, deterrent — and preventive. One of the reasons society imprisons those convicted of crimes is to keep them from inflicting future harm, but that does not make imprisonment any the less punishment.
Historical considerations by no means compel restriction of the bill of attainder ban to instances of retribution. A number of English bills of attainder were enacted for preventive purposes — that is, the legislature made a judgment, undoubtedly based largely on past acts and associations (as § 504 is) that a given person or group was likely to cause trouble (usually, overthrow the government) and therefore inflicted deprivations upon that person or group in order to keep it from bringing about the feared event. It is also clear that many of the early American bills attainting the Tories were passed in order to impede their effectively resisting the Revolution.
“In the progress of the conflict, and particularly in its earliest periods, attainder and confiscation had been resorted to generally, throughout the continent, as a means of war. But it is a fact important to the history of the revolting colonies, that the acts prescribing penalties, usually offered to the persons against whom they were directed the option of avoiding them, by acknowledging their allegiance to the existing governments.
“It was a preventive, not a vindictive policy. In the same humane spirit, as the contest approached its close, and the necessity of these severities diminished, many of the states passed laws offering pardons to those who had been disfranchised, and restoring them to the enjoyment of their property....”
Thus Justice Iredell was on solid historical ground when he observed, in Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 399-400, that “attainders, on the principle of retaliation and proscription„ have marked all the vicissitudes of party triumph.” (Emphasis supplied.)
We think that the Court in Douds misread United States v. Lovett when it suggested, 339 U. S., at 413, that that case could be distinguished on the ground that the sanction there imposed was levied for purely retributive reasons. In Lovett the Court, after reviewing the legislative history of § 304 of the Urgent Deficiency Appropriation Act, 328 U. S., at 308-313, concluded that the statute was the product of a congressional drive to oust from government persons whose (congressionally determined) “subversive” tendencies made their continued employment dangerous to the national welfare: “the purpose of all who sponsored § 304... clearly was to ‘purge’ the then existing and all future lists of government employees of those whom Congress deemed guilty of ‘subversive activities’ and therefore ‘unfit’ to hold a federal job.” Id., at 314. Similarly, the purpose of the statute before us is to purge the governing boards of labor unions of' those whom Congress regards as guilty of subversive acts and associations and therefore unfit to fill positions which might affect interstate commerce.
The Solicitor General urges us to distinguish Lovett on the ground that the statute struck down there “singled out three identified individuals.” It is of course true that § 504 does not contain the words “Archie Brown,” and that-it inflicts its deprivation upon more than three people. However, the decisions of this Court, as well as the historical background of the Bill of Attainder Clause, make it crystal clear that these are distinctions without a difference. It was not uncommon for English acts of attainder to inflict their deprivations upon relatively large groups of people, sometimes by description rather than name. Moreover, the statutes voided in Cummings and Garland were of this nature. We cannot agree that the fact that § 504 inflicts its deprivation upon the membership of the Communist Party rather than upon a list of named individuals takes it out of the category of bills of attainder.
We do not hold today that Congress cannot weed dangerous persons out of the labor movement, any more than the Court held in Lovett that subversives must be permitted to hold sensitive government positions. Rather, we make again the point made in Lovett: that Congress must accomplish such results by rules of general applicability. It cannot specify the people upon whom the sanction it prescribes is to be levied. Under our Constitution, Congress possesses full legislative authority, but the task of adjudication must be left to other tribunals.
This Court is always reluctant to declare that an Act of Congress violates the Constitution, but in this case we have no alternative. As Alexander Hamilton observed:
“By a limited constitution, I understand one which contains certain specified exceptions to the legislative authority; such, for instance, as that it shall pass no bills of attainder, no ex post facto laws, and the like. Limitations of this kind can be preserved in practice no other way than through the medium of the courts of justice; whose duty it must be to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the constitution void. Without this, all the reservations of particular rights or privileges would amount to nothing.”
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
73 Stat. 536, 29 U. S. C. §504 (1958 ed., Supp. IV). The section, which took effect on September 14,1959, provides, in pertinent part:
“(a) No person who is or has been a member of the Communist Party... shall serve—
“(1) as an officer, director, trustee, member of any executive board or similar governing body, business agent, manager, organizer, or other employee (other than as an employee performing exclusively clerical or custodial duties) of any labor organization....
“during or for five years after the termination of his membership in the Communist Party....
“ (b) Any person who willfully violates this section shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.”
In American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382, 388, this Court found that “the purpose of § 9 (h) of the [National Labor Relations] Act [was] to remove... the so-called 'political strike’.” Section 504 was designed to accomplish the same purpose as § 9 (h), but in a more direct and effective way. H. R. Rep. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 33; H. R. Rep. No. 1147, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 36.
61 Stat. 146, amending the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 449. Section 9 (h) provided:
“No investigation shall be made by the Board of any question affecting commerce concerning the representation of employees, raised by a labor organization under subsection (c) of this section, no petition under section 9 (e)(1) shall be entertained, and no complaint shall be issued pursuant to a charge made by a labor organization under subsection (b) of section 10, unless there is on file with the Board an affidavit executed contemporaneously or within the preceding twelve-month period by each officer of such labor organization and the officers of any national or international labor organization of which it is an affiliate or constituent unit that he is not a member of the Communist Party or affiliated with such party, and that he does not believe in, and is not a member of or supports any organization that believes in or teaches, the overthrow of the United States Government by force or by any illegal or unconstitutional methods. The provisions of section 35 A of the Criminal Code shall be applicable in respect to such affidavits."
Section 9 (h) was repealed by § 201 (d) of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 Stat. 525.
Evidence that the executive board had never called a strike was, upon the motion of the Government, stricken from the record, and a defense oifer to prove that the union had not been involved in a strike since 1948 was rejected by the court.
Respondent first raised the bill of attainder argument in his motion to dismiss the indictment.
Madison, Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787, p. 449 (Hunt and Scott ed. 1920).
E. g., 3 Jac. 1, c. 2; 10 & 11 Will. 3, c. 13; 13 Will. 3, c. 3; 9 Geo. 1, c. 15.
3 Coke, First Institute (on Littleton), p. 565 (Thomas ed. 1818); Chafee, Three Human Rights in the Constitution of 1787, p. 96 (1956). Cf. U. S. Const., Art. Ill, § 3, cl. 2.
II Wooddeson, A Systematical View of the Laws of England, р. 638 (1792); II Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, p. 210 (4th ed. 1873); see, e. g., 13 Car. 2, Stat. I, с. 15; 9 Geo. 1, c. 15.
II Wooddeson, A Systematical View of the Laws of England, p. 638 (1792); see, e. g., 19 Car. 2, c. 10; Proceedings Against Hugh and Hugh Le Despencer, 1 State Trials 23 (1320).
E. g., 11 Geo. 3, c. 55.
21 Rich. 2, c.. 6.
E. g., 26 Hen. 8, c. 25 (priv.), 3 Statutes of the Realm, p. 529; 8 Will. 3, c. 5.
See note 32, infra.
Van Tyne, The Loyalists in the American Revolution, apps. B & C (1902); Thompson, Anti-Loyalist Legislation During the American Revolution, 3 Ill. L. Rev. 81, 147; Reppy, The Spectre of Attainder in New Yorlc, 23 St. John’s L. Rev. 1. See Respublica v. Gordon, 1 Dall. 233; Cooper v. Telfair, 4 Dall. 14.
The Federalist, No. 47, pp. 373-374 (Hamilton ed. 1880).
The Federalist, No. 48, pp. 383-384 (Hamilton ed. 1880) (Madison) ; see generally The Federalist, Nos. 47 (Madison), 48 (Madison), 49 (Hamilton), 51 (Hamilton) and 78 (Hamilton).
III (John C.) Hamilton, History of the Republic of the United States, p. 34 (1859), quoting Alexander Hamilton. James Madison expressed similar sentiments:
“Bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, and laws impairing the
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | C | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Thomas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether a front pay award is an element of compensatory damages under the Civil Rights Act of 1991. We eonelude that it is not.
I
Petitioner Sharon Pollard sued her former employer, E. 1 du Pont de Nemours and Company (DuPont), alleging that she had been subjected to a hostile work environment based on her sex, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,78 Stat. 253,42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq. After a trial, the District Court found that Pollard was subjected to coworker sexual harassment of which her supervisors were aware. The District Court further found that the harassment resulted in a medical leave of absence from her job for psychological assistance and her eventual dismissal for refusing to return to the same hostile work environment. The court awarded Pollard $107,364 in backpay and benefits, $252,997 in attorney’s fees, and, as relevant here, $300,000 in compensatory damages — the maximum permitted under the statutory cap for such damages in 42 U. S. C. § 1981a(b)(3). The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the record demonstrated that DuPont employees engaged in flagrant discrimination based on sex and that DuPont managers and supervisors did not take adequate steps to stop it. 213 F. 3d 933 (CA6 2000).
The issue presented for review here is whether front pay constitutes an element of "compensatory damages” under 42 U. S. C. § 1981a and thus is subject to the statutory damages cap imposed by that section. Although courts have defined "front pay” in numerous ways, front pay is simply money awarded for lost compensation during the period between judgment and reinstatement or in lieu of reinstatement. For instance, when an appropriate position for the plaintiff is not immediately available without displacing an incumbent employee, courts have ordered reinstatement upon the opening of such a position and have ordered front pay to be paid until reinstatement occurs. See, e. g., Walsdorf v. Board of Comm’rs, 857 F. 2d 1047, 1053-1054 (CA5 1988); King v. Staley, 849 F. 2d. 1143, 1145 (CA8 1988). In cases in which reinstatement is not viable because of continuing hostility between the plaintiff and the employer or its workers, or because of psychological injuries suffered by the plaintiff as a result of the discrimination, courts have ordered front pay as a substitute for reinstatement. See, e. g., Gotthardt v. National B. B. Passenger Corp., 191 F. 3d 1148, 1156 (CA9 1999); Fitzgerald v. Sirloin Stockade, Inc., 624 F. 2d 945, 957 (CA101980). For the purposes of this opinion, it is not necessary for us to explain when front pay is an appropriate remedy. The question before us is only whether front pay, if found to be appropriate, is an element of compensatory damages under the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and thus subject to the Act’s statutory cap on such damages.
Here, the District Court observed that "the $300,000.00 award is, in fact, insufficient to compensate plaintiff,” 16 F. Supp. 2d 913, 924, n. 19 (WD Tenn. 1998), but it stated that it was bound by the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Hudson v. Reno, 130 F. 3d 1193 (1997), which held that front pay was subject to the cap. On appeal, Pollard argued that Hudson was wrongly decided because front pay is not an element of compensatory damages, but rather a replacement for the remedy of reinstatement in situations in which reinstatement would be inappropriate. She also argued that § 1981a, by its very terms, explicitly excludes from the statutory cap remedies that traditionally were available under Title VII, which she argued included front pay. The Court of Appeals agreed with Pollard’s arguments but considered itself bound by Hudson. The Sixth Circuit declined to rehear the case en banc.
The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Hudson was one of the first appellate opinions to decide whether front pay is an element of compensatory damages subject to the statutory cap set forth in § 1981a(b)(3). Contrary to the Sixth Circuit’s resolution of this question, the other Courts of Appeals to address it have concluded that front pay is a remedy that is not subject to the limitations of § 1981a(b)(3). See, e. g., Pals v. Schepel Buick & GMC Truck, Inc., 220 F. 3d 495, 499-500 (CA7 2000); Kramer v. Logan County School Dist. No. R-1, 157 F. 3d 620,625-626 (CA8 1998); Gotthardt, supra, at 1153-1154; Medlock v. Ortho Biotech, Inc., 164 F. 3d 545, 556 (CA10 1999); EEOC v. W&O, Inc., 213 F. 3d 600, 619, n. 10 (CA11 2000); Martini v. Federal Nat. Mortgage Assn., 178 F. 3d 1336, 1348-1349 (CADC 1999). We granted certiorari to resolve this conflict. 531 U. S. 1069 (2001).
II
Plaintiffs who allege employment discrimination on the basis of sex traditionally have been entitled to such remedies as injunctions, reinstatement, backpay, lost benefits, and attorney’s fees under § 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42 U. S. C. § 2000 5(g)(1). In the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress expanded the remedies available to these plaintiffs by permitting, for the first time, the recovery of compensatory and punitive damages. 42 U. S. C. §1981a(a)(l) (“[T]he complaining party may recover compensatory and punitive damages as allowed in subsection (b) of this section, in addition to any relief authorized by section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964”). The amount of compensatory damages awarded under § 1981a for “future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other nonpeeu-niary losses,” and the amount of punitive damages awarded under § 1981a, however, may not exceed the statutory cap set forth in § 1981a(b)(3). The statutory cap is based on the number of people employed by the respondent. In this case, the cap is $300,000 because DuPont has more than 500 employees.
The Sixth Circuit has concluded that front pay constitutes compensatory damages awarded for future pecuniary losses and thus is subject to the statutory cap of § 1981a(b)(3). 213 F. 3d, at 945; Hudson, swpra, at 1203. For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that front pay is not an element of compensatory damages within the meaning of § 1981a, and, therefore, we hold that the statutory cap of § 1981a(b)(3) is inapplicable to front pay.
A
Under § 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as originally enacted, when a court found that an employer had intentionally engaged in an unlawful employment practice, the court was authorized to “enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay.” 42 U. S. C. §2000e-5(g)(1). This provision closely tracked the language of § 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 49 Stat. 454, 29 U. S. C. § 160(c), which similarly authorized orders requiring employers to take appropriate, remedial “affirmative action.” § 160(c) (authorizing the National Labor Relations Board to issue an order “requiring such person to cease and desist from such unfair labor practice, and to take such affirmative action including reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of this subehapter”). See also Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405, 419, n. 11 (1975). The meaning of this provision of the NLRA prior to enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, therefore, gives us guidance as to the proper meaning of the same language in § 706(g) of Title VII. In applying § 10(e) of the NLRA, the Board consistently had made awards of what it called “backpay” up to the date the employee was reinstated or returned to the position he should have been in had the violation of the NLRA not occurred, even if such event occurred after judgment. See, e. g., Natkanson v. NLRB, 344 U.S. 25, 29-30 (1952); NLRB v. Reeves Broadcasting & Development Corp., 336 F. 2d 590, 593-594 (CA4 1964); NLRB v. Hill & Hill Truck Line, Inc., 266 F. 2d 883, 887 (CA5 1959); Berger Polishing, Inc., 147 N. L. R. B. 21, 40 (1964); Lock Joint Pipe Co., 141 N. L. R. B. 943, 948 (1963). Consistent with the Board’s interpretation of this provision of the NLRA, courts finding unlawful intentional discrimination in Title VII actions awarded this same type of backpay under § 706(g). See, e. g., Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co., 442 F. 2d 1078, 1080 (CA5 1971); United States v. Georgia Power Co., 3 FEP Cases 767, 790 (ND Ga. 1971). In the Title VII context, this form of “backpay” occurring after the date of judgment is known today as “front pay.”
In 1972, Congress expanded § 706(g) to specify that a court could, in addition to awarding those remedies previously listed in the provision, award “any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.” After this amendment to § 706(g), courts endorsed a broad view of front pay. See, e. g., Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F. 2d 257, 269 (CA4 1976) (stating that where reinstatement is not immediately feasible, backpay “should be supplemented by an award equal to the estimated present value of lost earnings that are reasonably likely to occur between the date of judgment and the time when the employee can assume his new position”); EEOC v. Enterprise Assn. Steamfitters, 542 F. 2d 579, 590 (CA2 1976) (stating that backpay award would terminate on the date of actual remedying of discrimination); Bush v. Lone Star Steel Co., 373 F. Supp. 526, 538 (ED Tex. 1974) (ordering backpay from the date the employee would have been entitled to fill a vacancy but for racial discrimination to the date the employee would in all reasonable probability reach his rightful place). Courts recognized that reinstatement was not always a viable option, and that an award of front pay as a substitute for reinstatement in such cases was a necessary part of the “make whole” relief mandated by Congress and by this Court in Albemarle. See, e. g., Shore v. Federal Express Corp., 777 F. 2d 1155, 1158-1159 (CA6 1985) (“Front pay is . . . simply compensation for the post-judgment effects of past discrimination.” It is awarded “to effectuate fully the ‘make whole’ purposes of Title VII”); Brooks v. Woodline Motor Freight, Inc., 852 F. 2d 1061, 1066 (CA8 1988) (stating that front pay was appropriate given substantial animosity between parties where “the parties’ relationship was not likely to improve, and the nature of the business required a high degree of mutual trust and confidence”); Fitzgerald v. Sirloin Stockade, Inc., 624 F. 2d, at 957 (upholding award of front pay where continuing hostility existed between the parties); Cassino v. Reichhold Chems., Inc., 817 F. 2d 1338, 1347 (CA9 1987) (same). By 1991, virtually all of the courts of appeals had recognized that “front pay” was a remedy authorized under § 706(g). In fact, no court of appeals appears to have ever held to the contrary.
In 1991, without amending § 706(g), Congress further expanded the remedies available in cases of intentional employment discrimiñation to include compensatory and punitive damages. See 42 U. S. C. § 1981a(a)(l). At that time, Rev. Stat. § 1977, 42 U. S. C. § 1981, permitted the recovery of unlimited compensatory and punitive damages in cases of intentional race and ethnic discrimination, but no similar remedy existed in cases of intentional sex, religious, or disability discrimination. Thus, § 1981a brought all forms of intentional employment discrimination into alignment, at least with respect to the forms of relief available to successful plaintiffs. However, compensatory and punitive damages awarded under § 1981a may not exceed the statutory limitations set forth in § 1981a(b)(3), while such damages awarded under § 1981 are not limited by statute.
B
In the abstract, front pay could be considered compensation for "future pecuniary losses,” in which case it would be subject to the statutoiy cap. § 1981a(b)(3). The term “compensatory damages ... for future pecuniary losses” is not defined in the statute, and, out of context, its ordinary meaning could include all payments for monetary losses after the date of judgment. However, we must not analyze one term of § 1981a in isolation. See Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Assn., 505 U.S. 88, 99 (1992) C“[W]e must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law* ”). When § 1981a is read as a whole, the better interpretation is that front pay is not within the meaning of compensatory damages in § 1981a(b)(3), and thus front pay is excluded from the statutory cap.
In the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress determined that victims of employment discrimination were entitled to additional remedies. Congress expressly found that “additional remedies under Federal law are needed to deter unlawful harassment and intentional discrimination in the workplace,” without giving any indication that it wished to curtail previously available remedies. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, 105 Stat. 1071, §2. Congress therefore made clear through the plain language of the statute that the remedies newly authorized under § 1981a were in addition to the relief authorized by § 706(g). Section 1981a(a)(l) provides that, in intentional discrimination cases brought under Title VII, “the complaining party may recover compensatory and punitive damages as allowed in subjection (b) of [§ 1981a], in addition to any relief authorized by section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, from the respondent.” (Emphasis added.) And §1981a(b)(2) states that “[c]ompensatory damages awarded under [§ 1981a] shall not include back-pay, interest on backpay, or any other type of relief authorized under section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964” (Emphasis added.) According to these statutory provisions, if front pay was a type of relief authorized under § 706(g), it is excluded from the meaning of compensatory damages under § 1981a.
As discussed above, the original language of § 706(g) authorizing backpay awards was modeled after the same language in the NLRA. This provision in the NLRA had been construed to allow awards of backpay up to the date of reinstatement, even if reinstatement occurred after judgment. Accordingly, backpay awards made for the period between the date of judgment and the date of reinstatement, which today are called front pay awards under Title VII, were authorized under § 706(g).
As to front pay awards that are made in lieu of reinstatement, we construe § 706(g) as authorizing these awards as well. We see no logical difference between front pay awards made when there eventually is reinstatement and those made when there is not. Moreover, to distinguish between the two eases would lead to the strange result that employees could receive front pay when reinstatement eventually is available but not when reinstatement is not an option — whether because of continuing hostility between the plaintiff and the employer or its workers, or because of psychological injuries that the discrimination has caused the plaintiff. Thus, the most egregious offenders could be subject to the least sanctions. Had Congress drawn such a line in the statute and foreclosed front pay awards in lieu of reinstatement, we certainly would honor that line. But, as written, the text of the statute does not lend itself to such a distinction, and we will not create one. The statute authorizes courts to “ordo such affirmative action as may be appropriate.” 42 U. S. C. § 200Ge-5(g)(1). We conclude that front pay awards in lieu of reinstatement fit within this statutory term.
Because front pay is a remedy authorized under § 706(g), Congress did not limit the availability of such awards in § 1981a. Instead, Congress sought to expand the available remedies by permitting the recovery of compensatory and punitive damages in addition to previously available remedies, such as front pay.
* * *
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice O’Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this ease.
See, e. g., Barbano v. Madison Cty., 922 F. 2d 139,146-147 (CA21990); Blum v. Witco Chem. Corp., 829 F. 2d 367, 383 (CA3 1987); Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F. 2d 257, 269 (CA4 1976); Walsdorfv. Board of Comm’rs, 857 F. 2d 1047, 1054 (CA5 1988); Share v. Federal Express Corp., 777 F. 2d 1155, 1159-1160 (CA6 1985); Briseno v. Central Technical Community College Area, 739 F. 2d 344, 348 (CA8 1984); Thome v. El Segundo, 802 F. 2d 1181,1137 (CA9 1986); Fitzgerald v. Sirloin Stockade, Inc., 624 F. 2d 945,957 (CA101980); Nord v. United States Steel Corp., 758 F. 2d 1462,1473-1474 (CA111985); Thompson v. Sawyer, 678 F. 2d 257, 292 (CADC1982). See also McKnight v. General Motors Corp., 908 F. 2d 104, 116-117 (GA7 1990) (reserving question of availability of front pay under Title VII); Wildman v. Lerner Stores Corp., 771F. 2d 605,615-616 (CA1 1985) (holding that front pay is available under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, but relying on Title VTI case law).
The only two Courts of Appeals not to have addressed this issue prior to the Civil Rights Act of 1991 have since joined the other Circuits in holding that front pay is a remedy available under § 706(g). See Selgas v. American Airlines, Inc., 104 F. 3d 9, 12-13 (CAI 1997); Williams v. Pharmacia, Inc., 137 F. 3d 944, 951-952 (CA7 1998).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | B | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Burton
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case concerns the meaning of the word “stolen” in the following provision of the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act, commonly known as the Dyer Act:
“Whoever transports in interstate or foreign commerce a motor vehicle or aircraft, knowing the same to have been stolen, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.”
The issue before us is whether the meaning of the word “stolen,” as used in this provision, is limited to a taking which amounts to common-law larceny, or whether it includes an embezzlement or other felonious taking with intent to deprive the owner of the rights and benefits of ownership. For the reasons hereafter stated, we accept the broader interpretation.
In 1956, an information based on this section was filed against James Vernon Turley in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. It charged that Turley, in South Carolina, lawfully obtained possession of an automobile from its owner for the purpose of driving certain of their friends to the homes of the latter in South Carolina, but that, without permission of the owner and with intent to steal the automobile, Turley converted it to his own use and unlawfully transported it in interstate commerce to Baltimore, Maryland, where he sold it without permission of the owner. The information thus charged Turley with transporting the automobile in interstate commerce knowing it to have been obtained by embezzlement rather than by common-law larceny.
Counsel appointed for Turley moved to dismiss the information on the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute an offense against the United States. He contended that the word “stolen” as used in the Act referred only to takings which constitute common-law larceny and that the acts charged did not. The District Court agreed and dismissed the information. 141 F. Supp. 527. The United States concedes that the facts alleged in the information do not constitute common-law larceny, but disputes the holding that a motor vehicle obtained by embezzlement is not “stolen” within the meaning of the Act. The Government appealed directly to this Court under 18 U. S. C. § 3731 because the dismissal was based upon a construction of the statute upon which the information was founded. We noted probable jurisdiction. 352 U. S. 816.
Decisions involving the meaning of “stolen” as used in the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act did not arise frequently until comparatively recently. Two of the earlier cases interpreted “stolen” as meaning statutory larceny as defined by the State in which the taking occurred. The later decisions rejected that interpretation but divided on whether to give “stolen” a uniformly narrow meaning restricted to common-law larceny, or a uniformly broader meaning inclusive of embezzlement and other felonious takings with intent to deprive the owner of the rights and benefits of ownership. The Fifth, Eighth and Tenth Circuits favored the narrow definition, while the Fourth, Sixth and Ninth Circuits favored the broader one. We agree that in the absence of a plain indication of an intent to incorporate diverse state laws into a federal criminal statute, the meaning of the federal statute should not be dependent on state law. See Jerome v. United States, 318 U. S. 101, 104 (1943); United States v. Handler, 142 F. 2d 351, 354 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1944).
We recognize that where a federal criminal statute uses a common-law term of established meaning without otherwise defining it, the general practice is to give that term its common-law meaning. But “stolen” (or “stealing”) has no accepted common-law meaning. On this point the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently said:
“But while 'stolen’ is constantly identified with larceny, the term was never at common law equated or exclusively dedicated to larceny. 'Steal' (originally ‘stale’) at first denoted in general usage a taking through secrecy, as implied in ‘stealth,’ or through stratagem, according to the Oxford English Dictionary. Expanded through the years, it became the generic designation for dishonest acquisition, but it never lost its initial connotation. Nor in law is ‘steal’ or ‘stolen’ a word of art. Blackstone does not mention ‘steal’ in defining larceny — ‘the felonious taking and carrying away of the personal goods of another’ — or in expounding its several elements. IV Commentaries 229 et seq.” Boone v. United States, 235 F. 2d 939, 940 (C. A. 4th Cir. 1956).
Webster’s New International Dictionary (2d ed., 1953) likewise defines “stolen” as “Obtained or accomplished by theft, stealth, or craft . . . .” Black’s Law Dictionary (4th ed., 1951) states that “steal” “may denote the criminal taking of personal property either by larceny, embezzlement, or false pretenses.” Furthermore, “stolen” and “steal” have been used in federal criminal statutes, and the courts interpreting those words have declared that they do not have a necessary common-law meaning coterminous with larceny and exclusive of other theft crimes. Freed from a common-law meaning, we should give “stolen” the meaning consistent with the context in which it appears.
“That criminal statutes are to be construed strictly is a proposition which calls for the citation of no authority. But this does not mean that every criminal statute must be given the narrowest possible meaning in complete disregard of the purpose of the legislature.” United States v. Bramblett, 348 U. S. 503, 509-510 (1955); see also, United States v. Sullivan, 332 U. S. 689, 693-694 (1948).
It is, therefore, appropriate to consider the purpose of the Act and to gain what light we can from its legislative history.
By 1919, the law of most States against local theft had developed so as to include not only common-law larceny but embezzlement, false pretenses, larceny by trick, and other types of wrongful taking. The advent of the automobile, however, created a new problem with which the States found it difficult to deal. The automobile was uniquely suited to felonious taking whether by larceny, embezzlement or false pretenses. It was a valuable, salable article which itself supplied the means for speedy escape. “The automobile [became] the perfect chattel for modern large-scale theft.” This challenge could be best met through use of the Federal Government’s jurisdiction over interstate commerce. The need for federal action increased with the number, distribution and speed of the motor vehicles until, by 1919, it became a necessity. The result was the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act.
This background was reflected in the Committee Report on the bill presented by its author and sponsor, Representative Dyer. H. R. Rep. No. 312, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. This report, entitled “Theft of Automobiles,” pointed to the increasing number of automobile thefts, the resulting financial losses, and the increasing cost of automobile theft insurance. It asserted that state laws were inadequate to cope with the problem because the offenders evaded state officers by transporting the automobiles across state lines where associates received and sold them. Throughout the legislative history Congress used the word “stolen” as synonymous with “theft,” a term generally considered to be broader than “common-law larceny.” To be sure, the discussion referred to “larceny” but nothing was said about excluding other forms of “theft.” The report stated the object of the Act in broad terms, primarily emphasizing the need for the exercise of federal powers. No mention is made of a purpose to distinguish between different forms of theft, as would be expected if the distinction had been intended.
“Larceny” is also mentioned in Brooks v. United States, 267 U. S. 432 (1925). This reference, however, carries no necessary implication excluding the taking of automobiles by embezzlement or false pretenses. Public and private rights are violated to a comparable degree whatever label is attached to the felonious taking. A typical example of common-law larceny is the taking of an unattended automobile. But an automobile is no less “stolen” because it is rented, transported interstate, and sold without the permission of the owner (embezzlement). The same is true where an automobile is purchased with a worthless check, transported interstate, and sold (false pretenses). Professional thieves resort to innumerable forms of theft and Congress presumably sought to meet the need for federal action effectively rather than to leave loopholes for wholesale evasion.
We conclude that the Act requires an interpretation of “stolen” which does not limit it to situations which at common law would be considered larceny. The refinements of that crime are not related to the primary congressional purpose of eliminating the interstate traffic in unlawfully obtained motor vehicles. The Government’s interpretation is neither unclear nor vague. “Stolen” as used in 18 U. S. C. § 2312 includes all felonious takings of motor vehicles with intent to deprive the owner of the rights and benefits of ownership, regardless of whether or not the theft constitutes common-law larceny.
Reversed and remanded.
18 U. S. C. § 2312. The original Act, sponsored by Representative L. C. Dyer of Missouri, became law in 1919. 41 Stat. 324. It was amended, in 1945, to include aircraft, 59 Stat. 536, and was re-enacted, in 1948, as part of the Criminal Code, 62 Stat. 806.
As amended, the information charged that—
“On or about January 20, 1956, at Columbia, South Carolina,
James -VernoN Turley
did lawfully obtain a certain 1955 Ford automobile from its owner, Charles T. Shaver, with permission of said owner to use the automobile briefly on that day to transport certain of their friends to the homes of the latter in Columbia, South Carolina, and to return with them, but after so obtaining the automobile and transporting said persons to their homes, and before returning with them or delivering back the automobile to its owner, James Vernon Turley, without permission of the owner, and with intent in South Carolina to steal the 1955 Ford automobile, did convert the same to his own use and did unlawfully transport it in interstate commerce from Columbia, South Carolina, to Baltimore in the State and District of Maryland, knowing it to have been stolen, where he did on January 21, 1956, sell said 1955 Ford automobile without permission of the owner.”
Carpenter v. United States, 113 F. 2d 692 (C. A. 8th Cir. 1940); Abraham v. United States, 15 F. 2d 911 (C. A. 8th Cir. 1926). The Abraham case arose in Oklahoma, where larceny was defined by statute in the narrow common-law sense, and the conviction was reversed because the taking did not meet that test. The Carpenter case arose in Minnesota, where the statutory definition of larceny included embezzlement and other types of fraudulent taking, and the conviction was affirmed.
In this opinion felonious is used in the sense of having criminal intent rather than with reference to any distinction between felonies and misdemeanors.
Murphy v. United States, 206 F. 2d 571 (C. A. 5th Cir. 1953) (false pretenses); Ackerson v. United States, 185 F. 2d 485 (C. A. 8th Cir. 1950) (false pretenses); Hite v. United States, 168 F. 2d 973 (C. A. 10th Cir. 1948) (false pretenses). Cf. Hand v. United States, 227 F. 2d 794 (C. A. 10th Cir. 1955) (larceny by bailee); and Stewart v. United States, 151 F. 2d 386 (C. A. 8th Cir. 1945) (larceny by bailee). See also, United States v. Kratz, 97 F. Supp. 999 (D. C. Neb. 1951) (embezzlement); United States v. O’Carter, 91 F. Supp. 544 (D. C. S. D. Iowa 1949) (false pretenses); Ex parte Atkinson, 84 F. Supp. 300 (D. C. E. D. S. C. 1949) (false pretenses).
Boone v. United States, 235 F. 2d 939 (C. A. 4th Cir. 1956) (false pretenses); Smith v. United States, 233 F. 2d 744 (C. A. 9th Cir. 1956) (embezzlement); Breece v. United States, 218 F. 2d 819 (C. A. 6th Cir. 1954) (embezzlement); Wilson v. United States, 214 F. 2d 313 (C. A. 6th Cir. 1954) (embezzlement); Collier v. United States, 190 F. 2d 473 (C. A. 6th Cir. 1951) (embezzlement); Davilman v. United States, 180 F. 2d 284 (C. A. 6th Cir. 1950) (embezzlement). And see United States v. Sicurella, 187 F. 2d 533, 534 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1951) where the court said that “a narrow common law definition [of “stolen”] is not required under the Dyer Act.”
Most of these cases adopted the definition of “stolen” given by Judge Shackelford Miller, Jr., in United States v. Adcock, 49 F. Supp. 351, 353 (D. C. W. D. Ky. 1943) (embezzlement):
“. . . the word ‘stolen’ is used in the statute not in the technical sense of what constitutes larceny, but in its well known and accepted meaning of taking the personal property of another for one’s own use without right or law, and that such a taking can exist whenever the intent to do so comes into existence and is deliberately carried out regardless of how the party so taking the car may have originally come into possession of it.”
United States v. Carll, 105 U. S. 611 (1882); United States v. Smith, 5 Wheat. 153 (1820); United States v. Brandenburg, 144 F. 2d 656 (C. A. 3d Cir. 1944).
In defining “theft” Webster’s New International Dictionary (2d ed. 1953) says: “Stealing and theft, esp. in popular use, are broader terms than larceny, and may include swindling as well as embezzlement.”
“The term ‘theft,’ sometimes used as a synonym of larceny, is in reality a broader term, applying to all cases of depriving another of his property whether by removing or withholding it, and includes larceny, robbery, cheating, embezzlement, breach of trust, etc.” 13 Encyclopaedia Britannica, Larceny (1953), 720. And see 2 Bouvier’s Law Dictionary (3d rev. ed. 1914) 3267.
See, e. g., United States v. O’Connell, 165 F. 2d 697, 698 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1948) (“steal” or “unlawfully take by any fraudulent device, scheme, or game” from dining car moving in interstate commerce); United States v. De Normand, 149 F. 2d 622, 624 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1945) (interstate transportation of goods “stolen, feloniously converted, or taken feloniously by fraud or with intent to steal or purloin”); United States v. Handler, 142 F. 2d 351, 353 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1944) (same); Crabb v. Zerbst, 99 F. 2d 562, 565 (C. A. 5th Cir. 1938) (“embezzle, steal, or purloin” property of the United States); United States v. Trosper, 127 F. 476, 477 (D. C. S. D. Cal. 1904) (“steal” from the mails); United States v. Jolly, 37 F. 108 (D. C. W. D. Tenn. 1888) (“steal” from the mails); United States v. Stone, 8 F. 232 (C. C. W. D. Tenn. 1881) (“plunders, steals, or destroys” goods belonging to a vessel in distress).
Hall, Theft, Law and Society (2d ed. 1952), 235, and see 233-240; 58 Cong. Rec. 5470-5478.
In 1895, there were four automobiles in the United States and, in 1910, about 500,000. Hall, op. cit. 234 et seq. In 1919, there were nearly 6,500,000. H. R. Rep. No. 312, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3. Today, there are over 65,000,000 motor vehicle registrations. World Almanac (1957) 699.
See n. 8, supra.
The report began and ended as follows:
“The Congress of the United States can scarcely enact any law at this session that is more needed than the bill herein recommended, and that has for its purpose the providing of severe punishment of those guilty of the stealing of automobiles in interstate or foreign commerce. . . . State laws upon the subject have been inadequate to meet the evil. Thieves steal automobiles and take them from one State to another and oftthnes have associates in this crime who receive and sell the stolen machines. ...
“The purpose of the proposed law is to suppress crime in interstate commerce. Automobiles admittedly are tangible property, capable of being transmitted in interstate commerce. The larceny of automobiles is made a crime under the laws of all the States in the Union. No good reason exists why Congress, invested with the power to regulate commerce among the several States, should not provide that such commerce should not be polluted by the carrying of stolen property from one State to another. Congress is the only power competent to legislate upon this evil, and the purpose of this bill is to crush it, with the penalties attached.” Id., at 1, 4. See also, 58 Cong. Rec. 5470-5478_6433-6435.
In 1948, following the decision in Hite v. United States, 168 F. 2d 973 (C. A. 10th Cir.), holding that the word “stolen” was restricted to common-law larceny, the Department of Justice proposed various clarifying amendments to 18 U. S. C. § 2312. These amendments sought to clarify the application of the Act by adding the words “embezzled, feloniously converted, or taken feloniously by fraud,” or similar language. Such an amendment was adopted by one House of Congress in each of the 81st, 83d and 84th Congresses, but in each case it failed to come to a vote in the other House. Appellee seeks support for his interpretation of “stolen” in the failure of Congress to enact these proposals, but we think this failure is entitled to no significance. The proposed amendments are shown by their respective Committee Reports to be clarifying amendments. They included other proposed changes and were never voted down. See S. 1483, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (S. Rep. No. 358); S. 675, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (S. Rep. No. 2364); and H. R. 3702, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (H. R. Rep. No. 919).
In that case Chief Justice Taft, after referring to the purpose of Congress in passing the Act “to devise some method for defeating the success of these widely spread schemes of larceny,” did not further discuss larceny but said:
“The quick passage of the machines into another State helps to conceal the trail of the thieves, gets the stolen property into another police jurisdiction and facilitates the finding of a safer place in which to dispose of the booty at a good price. This is a gross misuse of interstate commerce. Congress may properly punish such interstate transportation by any one with knowledge of the theft, because of its harmful result and its defeat of the property rights of those whose machines against their will are taken into other jurisdictions.” Id., at 438-439.
See Smith v. United States, 233 F. 2d 744 (C. A. 9th Cir. 1956); Hand v. United States, 227 F. 2d 794 (C. A. 10th Cir. 1955); Stewart v. United States, 151 F. 2d 386 (C. A. 8th Cir. 1945); Clark and Marshall, Crimes (5th ed. 1952), 428-451, 482-503; Annotation, Distinction between larceny and embezzlement, 146 A. L. R. 532.
A car rental situation was involved in Davilman v. United States, 180 F. 2d 284 (C. A. 6th Cir. 1950). Kindred situations were involved in Breece v. United States, 218 F. 2d 819 (C. A. 6th Cir. 1954); Wilson v. United States, 214 F. 2d 313 (C. A. 6th Cir. 1954); and Collier v. United States, 190 F. 2d 473 (C. A. 6th Cir. 1951). Another embezzlement situation, the use of an employee to obtain automobiles feloniously, was involved in United States v. Bucur, 194 F. 2d 297 (C. A. 7th Cir. 1952).
See Boone v. United States, 235 F. 2d 939 (C. A. 4th Cir. 1956); Murphy v. United States, 206 F. 2d 571 (C. A. 5th Cir. 1953); Ackerson v. United States, 185 F. 2d 485 (C. A. 8th Cir. 1950); Hite v. United States, 168 F. 2d 973 (C. A. 10th Cir. 1948). In each of these cases the defendant obtained possession of a car by passing a bad check, falsely representing that it would be paid.
For examples of other automobile theft devices, see Hall, Theft, Law and Society (2d ed. 1952), 252-253. For a history of common-law larceny and the development of other theft crimes, see id., at 1-109, and Hall and Glueck, Criminal Law and Enforcement (1951), 165-171.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | A | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice White
delivered the opinion of the Court.
On March 3, 1974, the S.S. Atlantic Cognac, a container-ship owned by respondent, arrived at the Portsmouth Marine Terminal, Va. Petitioner, a longshoreman, was then employed by the Nacirema Operating Co., a stevedoring concern that the shipowner had engaged to unload cargo from the vessel. The longshoreman was injured in the course of that work, and he received benefits for that injury from his employer under the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act. 44 Stat. 1424, as amended, 33 U. S. C. § 901 et seg. In addition, the longshoreman brought this negligence action against the shipowner in Federal District Court.
A jury determined that the longshoreman had suffered total damages of $100,000, that he was responsible for 10% of the total negligence resulting in his injury, that the stevedore’s fault, through a co-employee’s negligence, contributed 70%, and that the shipowner was accountable for 20%. Following an established principle of maritime law, the District Court reduced the award to the longshoreman by the 10% attributed to his own negligence. But also in accordance with maritime law, and the common law as well, the court refused further to reduce the award against the shipowner in proportion to the fault of the employer.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, with two judges dissenting, reversed en banc, holding that the 1972 Amendments to the Act, 86 Stat. 1251, had altered the traditional admiralty rule by making the shipowner liable only for that share of the total damages equivalent to the ratio of its fault to the total fault. 577 F. 2d 1153, 1155-1156 (1978). Other Courts of Appeals have reached the contrary conclusion. We granted certiorari to resolve this conflict, 439 U. S. 952 (1978), and, once again, we have before us a question of the meaning of the 1972 Amendments.
I
Admiralty law is judge-made law to a great extent, United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U. S. 397, 409 (1975); Fitzgerald v. United States Lines Co., 374 U. S. 16, 20 (1963), and a longshoreman’s maritime tort action against a shipowner was recognized long before the 1972 Amendments, see Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U. S. 406, 413-414 (1953), as it has been since. As that law had evolved by 1972, a longshoreman’s award in a suit against a negligent shipowner would be reduced by that portion of the damages assignable to the longshoreman’s own negligence; but, as a matter of maritime tort law, the shipowner would be responsible to the longshoreman in full for the remainder, even if the stevedore’s negligence contributed to the injuries. This latter rule is in accord with the common law, which allows an injured party to sue a tortfeasor for the full amount of damages for an indivisible injury that the tortfeasor’s negligence was a substantial factor in causing, even if the concurrent negligence of others contributed to the incident.
The problem we face today, as was true of similar problems the Court has dealt with in the past, is complicated by the overlap of loss-allocating mechanisms that are guided by somewhat inconsistent principles. The liability of the ship to the longshoreman is determined by a combination of judge-made and statutory law and, in the present context, depends on a showing of negligence or some other culpability. The longshoreman-victim, however, and his stevedore-employer— also a tortfeasor in this case — are participants in a workers’ compensation scheme that affords benefits to the longshoreman regardless of the employer’s fault and provides that the stevedore’s only liability for the longshoreman’s injury is to the longshoreman in the amount specified in the statute. 33 U. S. C. § 905. We have more than once attempted to reconcile these systems.
We first held that the shipowner could not circumvent the exclusive-remedy provision by obtaining contribution from the concurrent tortfeasor employer. Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U. S. 282 (1952); Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, supra; see Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc., 417 U. S. 106, 111-113 (1974). As a matter of maritime law, we also held that a longshoreman working on a vessel was entitled to the warranty of seaworthiness, Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U. S. 85, 94 (1946), which amounted to liability without fault for most onboard injuries. However, we went on to hold, as a matter of contract law, that the shipowner could obtain from the stevedore an express or implied warranty of workmanlike service that might result in indemnification of the shipowner for its liability to the longshoreman. Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U. S. 124 (1956).
Against this background, Congress acted in 1972, among other things, to eliminate the shipowner’s liability to the longshoreman for unseaworthiness and the stevedore’s liability to the shipowner for unworkmanlike service resulting in injury to the longshoreman — in other words, to overrule Sieracki and Ryan. See Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U. S. 249, 260-261, and n. 18 (1977); Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc., supra, at 113 n. 6. Though admitting that nothing in either the statute or its history expressly indicates that Congress intended to modify as well the existing rules governing the longshoreman’s maritime negligence suit against the shipowner by diminishing damages recoverable from the latter on the basis of the proportionate fault of the nonparty stevedore, 577 F. 2d, at 1155, and n. 2, the en banc Court of Appeals found that such a result was necessary to reconcile two sentences added in 1972 as part of 33 U. S. C. § 905 (b). The two sentences state:
“In the event of injury to a person covered under this chapter caused by the negligence of a vessel, then such person, or anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages by reason thereof, may bring an action against such vessel as a third party in accordance with the provisions of section 933 of this title, and the employer shall not be liable to the vessel for such damages directly or indirectly and any agreements or warranties to the contrary shall be void. If such person was employed by the vessel to provide stevedoring services, no such action shall be permitted if the injury was caused by the negligence of persons engaged in providing stevedoring services to the vessel.” 33 U. S. C. §905 (b).
The Court of Appeals described the perceived conflict in this fashion:
“The first sentence says that if the injury is caused by the negligence of a vessel the longshoreman may recover, but the second sentence says he may not recover anything of the ship if his injury was caused by the negligence of a person providing stevedoring services. The sentences are irreconcilable if read to mean that any negligence on the part of the ship will warrant recovery while any negligence on the part of the stevedore will defeat it. They may be harmonized only if read in apportioned terms.” 577 F. 2d, at 1155.
For a number of reasons, we are unpersuaded that Congress intended to upset a “long-established and familiar principle]” of maritime law by imposing a proportionate-fault rule. Cf. Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U. S. 779, 783 (1952).
A
In the first place, the conflict seen by the Court of Appeals is largely one of its own creation. Both sides admit that each sentence may be read so as not to conflict with the other. The first sentence addresses the recurring situation, reflected by the facts in this case, where the party injured by the negligence of the vessel is a longshoreman employed by a steve-doring concern. In these circumstances, the longshoreman may sue the vessel as a third party, but his employer, the stevedore, is not to be liable directly or indirectly for any damages that may be recovered. This first sentence overrules Ryan and prevents the vessel from recouping from the stevedore any of the damages that the longshoreman may recover from the vessel. But the sentence neither expressly nor implicitly purports to overrule or modify the traditional rule that the longshoreman may recover the total amount of his damages from the vessel if the latter’s negligence is a contributing cause of his injury, even if the stevedore, whose limited liability is fixed by statute, is partly to blame.
The second sentence of the paragraph is expressly addressed to the different and less familiar arrangement where the injured longshoreman loading or unloading the ship is employed by the vessel itself, not by a separate stevedoring company— in short, to the situation where the ship is its own stevedore. In this situation, the second sentence places some limitations on suits against the vessel for injuries caused during its steve-doring operations. Whatever these limitations may be, there is no conflict between the two sentences, and one arises only if the second sentence is read, as the Court of Appeals read it, as applying to all injured longshoremen, whether employed by the ship or by an independent stevedore. Nothing in the legislative history advises this construction of the sentence, and we see no reason to depart from the language of the statute in this respect.
Respondent insists that, even though the two sentences may deal with different business arrangements, problems still arise. If under the first sentence a third-party suit against the vessel is authorized when any part of the negligence causing the injury is that of the vessel, it is argued that suit against the vessel under the second sentence should be barred when any part of the negligence causing the injury is that of a coworker also providing stevedoring services to the vessel. Under this interpretation, the employee of the independent stevedore could recover from the ship where the stevedore was responsible for 99% of the negligence, though a ship’s employee performing stevedoring services could not hold the vessel liable if his co-worker’s negligence was the slightest cause of the injury. This is said to be preposterous and contrary to the legislative intent to treat the vessel that provides its own stevedoring services just like other shipowners when and if it negligently causes injury in its capacity as a shipowner and just like other stevedores when it negligently injures in the course of providing its own loading or unloading services.
Aside from the fact that the problem suggested would arise only in the application of the second sentence, which is not involved in this case, the argument that the words “caused by the negligence of” in the two sentences must be given the same meaning and that they cannot have the meaning ascribed to them by petitioner’s construction of the first sentence, logically leads to the conclusion that the injured longshoreman should never be able to bring suit against the vessel unless it is the sole cause of the injury. This is a doubly absurd conclusion. It is supported by no one, and to avoid it, it is necessary only to construe the second sentence to permit a third-party suit against the vessel providing its own loading and unloading services when negligence in its nonstevedoring capacity contributes to the injury. The second sentence means no more than that all longshoremen are to be treated the same whether their employer is an independent stevedore or a shipowner-stevedore and that all stevedores are to be treated the same whether they are independent or an arm of the shipowner itself.
This leaves the question of the measure of recovery against a shipowner, whether or not it is doing its own stevedoring, when as shipowner it is only partially responsible for the negligence, but we are quite unable to distill from the face of the obviously awkward wording of the two sentences any indication that Congress intended to modify the pre-existing rule that a longshoreman who is injured by the concurrent negligence of the stevedore and the ship may recover for the entire amount of his injuries from the ship.
B
The legislative history strongly counsels against the Court of Appeals’ interpretation of the statute, which modifies the longshoreman’s pre-existing rights against the negligent vessel. The reports and debates leading up to the 1972 Amendments contain not a word of this concept. This silence is most eloquent, for such reticence while contemplating an important and controversial change in existing law is unlikely. Moreover, the general statements appearing in the legislative history concerning § 905 (b) are inconsistent with what respondent argues was in the back of the legislators’ minds about this specific issue. The Committees repeatedly refer to the refusal to limit the shipowner’s liability for negligence, which they felt left the vessel in the same position as a land-based third party whose negligence injures an employee. Because an employee generally may recover in full from a third-party concurrent tortfeasor, these statements are hardly indicative of an intent to modify the law in the respect found by the Court of Appeals. At the very least, one would expect some hint of a purpose to work such a change, but there was none.
The shipowner denies that the legislative history is so one-sided, relying upon statements that vessels “will not be chargeable with the negligence of the stevedore or [the] employees of the stevedore.” S. Rep. 11; see 577 F. 2d, at 1156 n. 2. But in context these declarations deal only with removal of the shipowner’s liability under the warranty of seaworthiness for acts of the stevedore — even nonnegligent ones.
C
Finally, we note that the proportionate-fault rule adopted by the Court of Appeals itself produces consequences that we doubt Congress intended. It may remove some inequities, but it creates others and appears to shift some burdens to the longshoreman.
As we have said, § 905 permits the injured longshoreman to sue the vessel and exempts the employer from any liability to the vessel for any damages that may be recovered. Congress clearly contemplated that the employee be free to sue the third-party vessel, to prove negligence and causation on the vessel’s part, and to have the total damages set by the court or jury without regard to the benefits he has received or to which he may be entitled under the Act. Furthermore, under the traditional rule, the employee may recover from the ship the entire amount of the damages so determined. If he recovers less than the statutory benefits, his employer is still liable for the statutory amount.
Under this arrangement, it is true that the ship will be liable for all of the damages found by the judge or jury; yet its negligence may have been only a minor cause of the injury. The stevedore-employer may have been predominantly responsible ; yet its liability is limited by the Act, and if it has lien rights on the longshoreman’s recovery it may be out-of-pocket even less.
Under the Court of Appeals’ proportionate-fault rule, however, there will be many circumstances where the longshoreman will not be able to recover in any way the full amount of the damages determined in his suit against the vessel. If, for example, his damages are at least twice the benefits paid or payable under the Act and the ship is less than 50% at fault, the total of his statutory benefits plus the reduced recovery from the ship will not equal his total damages. More generally, it would appear that if the stevedore’s proportionate fault is more than the proportion of compensation to actual damages, the longshoreman will always fall short of recovering the amount that the factfinder has determined is necessary to remedy his total injury, even though the diminution is due not to his fault, but to that of his employer.
But the impact of the proportionate-fault rule on the longshoreman does not stop there. Under § 933 (b), an administrative order for benefits operates as an assignment to the stevedore-employer of the longshoreman’s rights against the third party unless the longshoreman sues within six months. And a corresponding judicially created lien in the employer’s favor operates where the longshoreman himself sues. In the past, this lien has been for the benefits paid up to the amount of the recovery.' And under § 933 (c), which Congress left intact in 1972, where the stevedore-employer sues the vessel as statutory assignee it may retain from any recovery an amount equal in general to the expenses of the suit, the costs of medical services and supplies it provided the employee, all compensation benefits paid, the present value of benefits to be paid, plus one-fifth of whatever might remain. Under the Court of Appeals’ proportionate-fault system, the longshoreman would get very little, if any, of the diminished recovery obtained by his employer. Indeed, unless the vessel’s proportionate fault exceeded the ratio of compensation benefits to total damages, the longshoreman would receive nothing from the third-party action, and the negligent stevedore might recoup all the compensation benefits it had paid.
Some inequity appears inevitable in the present statutory scheme, but we find nothing to indicate and should not presume that Congress intended to place the burden of the inequity on the longshoreman whom the Act seeks to protect. Further, the 1972 Amendments make quite clear that “the employer shall not be liable to the vessel for such damages directly or indirectly,” 33 U. S. C. § 905 (b) (emphasis supplied), and that with the disappearance of the ship’s contribution and indemnity right against the stevedore the latter should no longer have to appear routinely in suits between longshoreman and shipowner. Consequently, as we have done before, we must reject a “theory that nowhere appears in the Act, that was never mentioned by Congress during the legislative process, that does not comport with Congress' intent, and that restricts... a remedial Act... Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U. S., at 278-279.
II
Of course, our conclusion that Congress did not intend to change the judicially created rule that the shipowner can be made to pay all the damages not due to the plaintiff’s own negligence does not decide whether we are free to and should change that role so as to make the vessel liable only for the damages in proportion to its own negligence. Indeed, some amici in support of respondent share the view that Congress did not change the rule but argue that this Court should do so. We disagree.
Though we recently acknowledged the sound arguments supporting division of damages between parties before the court on the basis of their comparative fault, see United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U. S. 397 (1975), we are mindful that here we deal with an interface of statutory and judge-made law. In 1972 Congress aligned the rights and liabilities of stevedores, shipowners, and longshoremen in light of the rules of maritime law that it chose not to change. “One of the most controversial and difficult issues which [Congress was] required to resolve... concern [ed] the liability of vessels, as third parties, to pay damages to longshoremen who are injured while engaged in stevedoring operations.” S. Rep. 8. By now changing what we have already established that Congress understood to be the law, and did not itself wish to modify, we might knock out of kilter this delicate balance. As our cases advise, we should stay our hand in these circumstances. Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc., 417 U. S., at 112; Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U. S., at 285-286. Once Congress has relied upon conditions that the courts have created, we are not as free as we would otherwise be to change them. A change in the conditions would effectively alter the statute by causing it to reach different results than Congress envisioned. Indeed, Congress might have intended to adopt the existing maritime rule even for third-party actions under the Act that are not within the admiralty jurisdiction, though we need not and do not reach that issue today.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment below and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
The District Court set aside a jury verdict for the longshoreman in an earlier trial because of errors in the jury instructions.
The plaintiff’s negligence is not an absolute bar to recovery under maritime law, which accepts the concept of comparative negligence of plaintiff and defendant. Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U. S. 406, 408-409 (1953); The Max Morris, 137 U. S. 1, 15 (1890); see n. 23, infra.
A panel of the Court of Appeals had earlier reached a similar conclusion. 558 F. 2d 186, 193-194 (1977); see n. 26, infra.
Zapico v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 579 F. 2d 714, 725 (CA2 1978); Samuels v. Empresa Lineas Maritimas Argentinas, 573 F. 2d 884, 887-889 (CA5 1978), cert. pending, No. 78-795; Dodge v. Mitsui Shintaku Ginko K. K. Tokyo, 528 F. 2d 669, 671-673 (CA9 1975), cert. denied, 425 U. S. 944 (1976); Shellman v. United States Lines, Inc., 528 F. 2d 675, 679-680 (CA9 1975), cert. denied, 425 U. S. 936 (1976). See also Cella v. Partenreederei MS Ravenna, 529 F. 2d 15, 20 (CA1 1975) (indicating agreement with Dodge, supra), cert. denied, 425 U. S. 975 (1976); Marant v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 550 F. 2d 142, 145-147 (CA3 1977) (discussing but reserving the issue); id., at 147-152 (Van Dusen, J., concurring) (expressing concern over validity of apportionment of damages).
See also Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U. S. 249 (1977); Director, Workers’ Compensation Programs v. Rasmussen, 440 U. S. 29 (1979); P. C. Pfeiffer Co. v. Diverson Ford, No. 78-425 (to be reargued October Term 1979).
Title 33 U. S. C. § 933 (a), which was unchanged in 1972, states that when a longshoreman “determines that some person other than the employer or a person or persons in his employ is liable in damages, he need not elect whether to receive... compensation or to recover damages against such third person.” Section 905 (b), which was added in 1972, states that the longshoreman “may bring an action against [the shipowner] as a third party in accordance with the provisions of section 933....”
See, e. g., Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc., 417 U. S. 106, 108, 113 (1974) (longshoreman could have recovered entire damages from shipowner responsible for 50% of the total fault); Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U. S. 282, 283 (1952) (shipowner responsible for 25% of negligence required to pay 100% of damages, and contribution unavailable from negligent shoreside contractor, an employer under the Act). See also The Atlas, 93 U. S. 302 (1876); The Juniata, 93 U. S. 337 (1876). We stated the common-law rale in The Atlas and adopted it as part of admiralty jurisprudence: “Nothing is more clear than the right of a plaintiff, having suffered such a loss, to sue in a common-law action all the wrong-doers, or any one of them, at his election; and it is equally clear, that, if he did not contribute to the disaster, he is entitled to judgment in either case for the full amount of his loss.” 93 U. S., at 315.
Restatement (Second) of Torts §§433A, 875, and 879 (1965 and 1979); T. Cooley, Law of Torts 142-144 (1879); W. Prosser, Law of Torts § 47, pp. 297-299, and § 52, pp. 314r-315 (4th ed. 1971); cf. Washington & Georgetown R. Co. v. Hickey, 166 U. S. 521, 527 (1897). A tortfeasor is not relieved of liability for the entire harm he caused just because another’s negligence was also a factor in effecting the injury. “Nor are the damages against him diminished.” Restatement, supra, § 879, Comment a. Likewise, under traditional tort law, a plaintiff obtaining a judgment against more than one concurrent tortfeasor may satisfy it against any one of them. Id., § 886. A concurrent tortfeasor generally may seek contribution from another, id., § 886A, but he is not relieved from liability for the entire damages even when the nondefendant tortfeasor is immune from liability. Id., § 880. These principles, of course, are inapplicable where the injury is divisible and the causation of each part can be separately assigned to each tortfeasor. Id., §§ 433A (1) and 881.
Generally, workers’ compensation benefits are not intended to compensate for an employee’s entire losses. 1 A. Larson, Law of Workmen’s Compensation § 2.50 (1978). The 1972 Amendments to the Act, however, make a determined effort to narrow the gap between the harm, suffered and the benefits payable.
See, e. g., Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U. S. 539, 549-550 (1960).
The Amendments also increased compensation benefits, expanded the Act’s geographic coverage, and instituted a new means of adjudicating compensation cases. Robertson, Jurisdiction, Shipowner Negligence and Stevedore Immunities under the 1972 Amendments to the Longshoremen’s Act, 28 Mercer L. Rev. 515, 516 (1977).
The first proposals in the legislative movement that produced the 1972 Amendments would have made all shipowners statutory employers, not just those also acting as stevedores, and thus cut off any tort action by the longshoreman. S. 525, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., § 1 (1971), Legislative History of the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act Amendments of 1972 (Committee Print compiled for the Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare), pp. 393-394 (1972). Congress ultimately decided to preserve the longshoremen’s tort action against shipowners acting as shipowners.
In Jackson v. Lykes Bros. S. S. Co., 386 U. S. 731 (1967), and Reed v. The Yaka, 373 U. S. 410 (1963), we upheld a longshoreman’s negligence or unseaworthiness action against the shipowner-stevedore.
See S. Rep. No. 92-1125, p. 11 (1972) (hereinafter S. Rep.) (“Accordingly, the bill provides in the case of a longshoreman who is employed directly by the vessel there will be no action for damages if the injury was caused by the negligence of persons engaged in performing longshoring services”) (emphasis supplied). The House Report, H. R. Rep. No. 92-1441 (1972), is identical to the Senate Report in all respects material to this case. Accordingly, further references will be only to the Senate Report.
In many cases, of course, the shipowner whose act or omission contributed only a very small percentage of the total negligence will avoid liability on the ground of lack of causation.
S. Rep. 11-12.
In the Senate hearings, a plaintiff's lawyer mentioned diminution of damages as a possible solution so long as the shipowner’s liability for unseaworthiness was retained. The only committee member present rejected this proposal, and Congress apparently never gave it serious consideration. See Hearings on S. 2318, S. 525, and S. 1547 before the Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 354-355 (1972).
Laborers’ International Union, Local No. 1057 v. NLRB, 186 U. S. App. D. C. 13, 20, 567 F. 2d 1006, 1013 (1977).
The debate over § 905 (b) involved the removal of the shipowner’s liability for unseaworthiness. That occurred as a concomitant of ending liability under the stevedore’s warranty of workmanlike service, which was a quid pro quo for increasing the compensation benefits. See S. Rep. 9-10. Some Congressmen objected to removing the vessel’s liability for unseaworthiness because that would deny millions of dollars of relief for longshoremen’s injuries. 118 Cong. Rec. 36382-36384 (1972) (Reps. Eckhardt, Dent, and Ashley). Indeed, the concern shared by some Congressmen over any modification of third-party actions “had political ramifications which... resulted in forestalling any improvements in the... Act for over twelve years.” S. Rep. 9. Those Congressmen likely would have assailed the diminution of the longshoreman’s recovery in proportion to the stevedore’s fault if they had any inkling that the Amendments did that.
Id., at 2, 5, 10.
Id., at 8 (“where a longshoreman or other worker covered under this Act is injured through the fault of the vessel, the vessel should be liable for damages as a third party, just as land-based third parties in non-maritime pursuits are liable for damages when, through their fault, a worker is injured”); accord, id., at 10 and 11.
See n. 8, supra; 2A Larson, supra n. 9, §75.22, at 14-263; Soule, Toward an Equitable and Rational Allocation of Employee Injury Losses in Cases with Third Party Liability, 1979 Ins. Counsel J. 201, 202-208.
S. Rep. 9-11.
E. g., Italia Societa per Azioni di Navigazione v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., 376 U. S. 315 (1964).
The shipowner also relies upon the Reports’ reference to “comparative negligence,” S. Rep. 12, but in context it is obvious that Congress alluded only, and not erroneously, see Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 Mich. L. Rev. 465 n. 2 (1953), to the comparative negligence of the plaintiff longshoreman and the defendant shipowner — a concept that, unlike the proposal before us today, was well established in admiralty. See S. Rep. 12; 33 U. S. C. §905 (a); n. 2, supra. It would be particularly curious for Congress to refer expressly to the established principle of comparative negligence, yet say not a word about adopting a new rule limiting the liability of the shipowner on the basis of the nonparty employer’s negligence.
See Zapico v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 579 F. 2d, at 725 (“one is still left to wonder why the longshoreman injured by the negligence of a third party should recover less when his employer has also been negligent than when the employer has been without fault”).
See The Etna, 138 E. 2d 37 (CA3 1943).
The original Fourth Circuit panel opinion would have made the shipowner liable for an amount equal not just to his proportionate fault, but also to the employer's lien. 558 F. 2d, at 194. The en banc court refused to make the vessel liable for the additional amount of the lien and declined to rule on any alteration of the lien since the employer was not party to the suit. 577 F. 2d, at 1156.
Cf. Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U. S., at 279.
“It is the Committee’s intention to prohibit such recovery under any theory including, without limitation, theories based on contract or tort.” S. Rep. 11; see Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U. S., at 412 (“reduction of [the shipowner’s] liability at the expense of [the employer] would be the substantial equivalent of contribution”); Dodge v. Mitsui Shintaku Ginko K. K. Tokyo, 528 E. 2d, at 673; Steinberg, The 1972 Amendments to the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act: Negligence Actions by Longshoremen against Shipowners — A Proposed Solution, 37 Ohio St. L. J. 767, 792-793 (1976).
See S. Rep. 9 (“much of the financial resources which could better be utilized to pay improved compensation benefits were now being spent to defray litigation costs” of stevedores in third-party actions).
As noted in n. 8, supra, the general rule is that a person whose negligence is a substantial factor in the plaintiff’s indivisible injury is entirely liable even if other factors concurred in causing the injury. Normally, the chosen tortfeasor may seek contribution from another concurrent tort-feasor. If both are already before the court — for example, when the plaintiff himself is the concurrent tortfeasor or when the two tortfeasors are suing each other as in a collision case like Reliable Transfer — a separate contribution action is unnecessary, and damages are simply allocated accordingly. But the stevedore is not a party and cannot be made a party here, so the Reliable Transfer contribution shortcut is inapplicable. Contribution remedies the unjust enrichment of the concurrent tortfeasor, see Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 81 U. Pa. L. Rev. 130, 136 (1932), and while it may sometimes limit the ultimate loss of the tortfeasor chosen by the plaintiff, it does not justify allocating more of the loss to the innocent employee, who was not unjustly enriched. See also EL Hart & A. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and Application of Law 525 (tent. ed. 1958). Our prior cases recognize that. Even before Reliable
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | H | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice O’Connor
announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, and III, and an opinion with respect to Parts IV and V, in which The Chief Justice, Justice Scalia, and Justice Kennedy join.
In Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U. S. 522 (1975), this Court held that the Sixth Amendment required that the jury venire be drawn from a fair cross section of the community. The Court stated, however, that “in holding that petit juries must be drawn from a source fairly representative of the community we impose no requirement that petit juries actually chosen must mirror the community and reflect the various distinctive groups in the population. Defendants are not entitled to a jury of any particular composition.” Id., at 538. The principal question presented in this case is whether the Sixth Amendment’s fair cross section requirement should now be extended to the petit jury. Because we adopt Justice Harlan’s approach to retroactivity for cases on collateral review, we leave the resolution of that question for another dav.
I
Petitioner, a black man, was convicted by an all-white Illinois jury of three counts of attempted murder, two counts of armed robbery, and one count of aggravated battery. During jury selection for petitioner’s trial, the prosecutor used all 10 of his peremptory challenges to exclude blacks. Petitioner’s counsel used one of his 10 peremptory challenges to exclude a black woman who was married to a police officer. After the prosecutor had struck six blacks, petitioner’s counsel moved for a mistrial. The trial court denied the motion. App. 2-3. When the prosecutor struck four more blacks, petitioner’s counsel again moved for a mistrial, arguing that petitioner was “entitled to a jury of his peers.” Id., at 3. The prosecutor defended the challenges by stating that he was trying to achieve a balance of men and women on the jury. The trial court denied the motion, reasoning' that the jury “appealed] to be a fair [one].” Id., at 4.
On appeal, petitioner argued that the prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges denied him the right to be tried by a jury that was representative of the community. The Illinois Appellate Court rejected petitioner’s fair cross section claim. People v. Teague, 108 Ill. App. 3d 891, 895-897, 439 N. E. 2d 1066, 1069-1071 (1982). The Illinois Supreme Court denied leave to appeal, and we denied certiorari. 464 U. S. 867 (1983).
Petitioner then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Petitioner repeated his fair cross section claim, and argued that the opinions of several Justices concurring in, or dissenting from, the denial of certiorari in McCray v. New York, 461 U. S. 961 (1983), had invited a reexamination of Swain v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 202 (1965), which prohibited States from purposefully and systematically denying blacks the opportunity to serve on juries. He also argued, for the first time, that under Swain a prosecutor could be questioned about his use of peremptory challenges once he volunteered an explanation. The District Court, though sympathetic to petitioner’s arguments, held that it was bound by Swain and Circuit precedent. App. 5-6.
On appeal, petitioner repeated his fair cross section claim and his McCray argument. A panel of the Court of Appeals agreed with petitioner that the Sixth Amendment’s fair cross section requirement applied to the petit jury and held that petitioner had made out a prima facie case of discrimination. A majority of the judges on the Court of Appeals voted to rehear the case en banc, and the panel opinion was vacated. United States ex rel. Teague v. Lane, 779 F. 2d 1332 (CA7 1985) (en banc) (Cudahy, J., dissenting). Rehearing was postponed until after our decision in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 (1986), which overruled a portion of Swain. After Batson was decided, the Court of Appeals held that petitioner could not benefit from the rule in that case because Allen v. Hardy, 478 U. S. 255 (1986) (per curiam), had held that Batson would not be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review. 820 F. 2d 832, 834, n. 4 (CA7 1987) (en banc). The Court of Appeals also held that petitioner’s Stvain claim was procedurally barred and in any event merit-less. Id., at 834, n. 6. The Court of Appeals rejected petitioner’s fair cross section claim, holding that the fair cross section requirement was limited to the jury venire. Id., at 834-843. Judge Cudahy dissented, arguing that the fair cross section requirement should be extended to the petit jury. Id., at 844.
II
Petitioner’s first contention is that he should receive the benefit of our decision in Batson even though his conviction became final before Batson was decided. Before addressing petitioner’s argument, we think it helpful to explain how Batson modified Swain. Swam held that a “State’s purposeful or deliberate denial” to blacks of an opportunity to serve as jurors solely on account of race violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 380 U. S., at 203-204. In order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under Swam, a defendant had to demonstrate that the peremptory challenge system had been “perverted.” A defendant could raise an inference of purposeful discrimination if he showed that the prosecutor in the county where the trial was held “in case after case, whatever the circumstances, whatever the crime and whoever the defendant or the victim may be,” has been responsible for the removal of qualified' blacks who had survived challenges for cause, with the result that no blacks ever served on petit juries. Id., at 223.
In Batson, the Court overruled that portion of Swain setting forth the evidentiary showing necessary to make out a prima facie case of racial discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause. The Court held that a defendant can establish a prima facie case by showing that he is a “member of a cognizable racial group,” that the prosecutor exercised “peremptory challenges to remove from the venire members of the defendant’s race,” and that those “facts and any other relevant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used that practice to exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on account of their race.” 476 U. S., at 96. Once the defendant makes out a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden shifts to the prosecutor “to come forward with a neutral explanation for challenging black jurors.” Id., at 97.
In Allen v. Hardy, the Court held that Batson constituted an “explicit and substantial break with prior precedent” because it overruled a portion of Swain. 478 U. S., at 258. Employing the retroactivity standard of Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618, 636 (1965), the Court concluded that the rule announced in Batson should not be applied retroactively on collateral review of convictions that became final before Batson was announced. The Court defined final to mean a case “‘where the judgment of conviction was rendered, the availability of appeal exhausted, and the time for petition for certiorari had elapsed before our decision in’ Batson....” 478 U. S., at 258, n. 1 (citation omitted).
Petitioner’s conviction became final 2/> years prior to Batson, thus depriving petitioner of any benefit from the rule announced in that case. Petitioner argues, however, that Batson should be applied retroactively to all cases pending on direct review at the time certiorari was denied in McCray because the opinions filed in McCray destroyed the preceden-tial effect of Swain. Brief for Petitioner 23. The issue in McCray and its companion cases was whether the Constitution prohibited the use of peremptory challenges to exclude members of a particular group from the jury, based on the prosecutor’s assumption that they would be biased in favor of other members of that same group. Justices Marshall and Brennan dissented from the denial of certiorari, expressing the views that Swain should be reexamined and that the conduct complained of violated a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to be tried by an impartial jury drawn from a fair cross section of the community. 461 U. S., at 964-970. Justices Stevens, Blackmun, and Powell concurred in the denial of certiorari. They agreed that the issue was an important one, but stated that it was a “sound exercise of discretion for the Court to allow the various States to serve as laboratories in which the issue receives further study before it is addressed.” Id., at 963.
We reject the basic premise of petitioner’s argument. As we have often stated, the “denial of a writ of certiorari imports no expression of opinion upon the merits of the case.” United States v. Carver, 260 U. S. 482, 490 (1923) (Holmes, J.). Accord, Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 409 U. S. 363, 366, n. 1 (1973); Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S. 443, 489-497 (1963). The “variety of considerations [that] underlie denials of the writ,” Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U. S. 912, 917 (1950) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.), counsels against according denials of certiorari any precedential value. Concomitantly, opinions accompanying the denial of certiorari cannot have the same effect as decisions on the merits. We find that Allen v. Hardy is dis-positive, and that petitioner cannot benefit from the rule announced in Batson.
I — H J-H
Petitioner s second contention is that he has established a violation of the Equal Protection Clause under Siva in. Recognizing that he has not shown any systematic exclusion of blacks from petit juries in case after case, petitioner contends that when the prosecutor volunteers an explanation for the use of his peremptory challenges, Swain does not preclude an examination of the stated reasons to determine the legitimacy of the prosecutor’s motive. Brief for Petitioner 35 (citing Batson, 476 U. S., at 101, n. (White, J., concurring)). See Weathersby v. Morris, 708 F. 2d 1493, 1495-1496 (CA9 1983) (supporting petitioner’s interpretation of Swain), cert. denied, 464 U. S. 1046 (1984).
Petitioner candidly admits that he did not raise the Swain claim at trial or on direct appeal. Brief for Petitioner 38-39. Because of this failure, petitioner has forfeited review of the claim in the Illinois courts. “It is well established that ‘where an appeal was taken from a conviction, the judgment of the reviewing court is res judicata as to all issues actually raised, and those that could have been presented but were not are deemed waived.’” People v. Gaines, 105 Ill. 2d 79, 87-88, 473 N. E. 2d 868, 873 (1984) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 471 U. S. 1131 (1985). The default prevents petitioner from raising the Swain claim in collateral proceedings under the Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act, Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, ¶ 122-1 et seq. (1987), unless fundamental fairness requires that the default be overlooked. People v. Brown, 52 Ill. 2d 227, 230, 287 N. E. 2d 663, 665 (1972).
The fundamental fairness exception is a narrow one, and has been applied in limited circumstances. Compare People v. Goerger, 52 Ill. 2d 403, 406, 288 N. E. 2d 416, 418 (1972) (improper instruction on reasonable doubt “does not constitute such fundamental unfairness as to obviate the res judicata and waiver doctrines”), with People v. Ikerd, 47 Ill. 2d 211, 212, 265 N. E. 2d 120, 121 (1970) (fundamental fairness exception applies “where the right relied on has been recognized for the first time after the direct appeal”), and People v. Hamby, 32 Ill. 2d 291, 294-295, 205 N. E. 2d 456, 458 (1965) (fundamental fairness exception applies to claims that defendant asked counsel to raise on direct appeal). It is clear that collateral relief would be unavailable to petitioner. See People v. Beamon, 31 Ill. App. 3d 145, 145-146, 333 N. E. 2d 575, 575-576 (1975) (abstract of decision) (not invoking fundamental fairness exception and holding that Swain claim not raised on direct appeal could not be raised for the first time in collateral proceedings). As a result, petitioner has exhausted his state remedies under 28 U. S. C. § 2254(b) with respect to the Swain claim. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107, 125-126, n. 28 (1982); United States ex rel. Williams v. Brantley, 502 F. 2d 1383, 1385-1386 (CA7 1974).
Under Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S. 72, 87-91 (1977), petitioner is barred from raising the Swain claim in a federal habeas corpus proceeding unless he can show cause for the default and prejudice resulting therefrom. See Engle v. Isaac, supra, at 113-114, 117, 124-135 (applying procedural default rule to claim that had never been raised in state court). Petitioner does not attempt to show cause for his default. Instead, he argues that the claim is not barred because it was addressed by the Illinois Appellate Court. Cf. Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U. S. 320, 327-328 (1985). We cannot agree with petitioner’s argument. The Illinois Appellate Court rejected petitioner’s Sixth Amendment fair cross section claim ivithout mentioning the Equal Protection Clause on which Swain was based or discussing whether Swain allows a prosecutor to be questioned about his use of peremptory challenges once he volunteers an explanation. See People v. Teague, 108 Ill. App. 3d, at 895-896, 439 N. E. 2d, at 1070. Accordingly, we hold that petitioner’s Swain claim is procedurally barred, and do not address its merits.
Our application of the procedural default rule here is consistent with Hands v. Reed, ante, at 263, which holds that a “procedural default does not bar consideration of a federal claim on either direct or habeas review unless the last state court rendering a judgment in the case ‘clearly and expressly’ states that its judgment rests on a state procedural bar” (citations and internal quotations omitted). The rule announced in Harris v. Reed assumes that a state court has had the opportunity to address a claim that is later raised in a federal habeas proceeding. It is simply inapplicable in a case such as this one, where the claim was never presented to the state courts. See ante, at 268-270 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
IV
Petitioner’s third and final contention is that the Sixth Amendment’s fair cross section requirement applies to the petit jury. As we noted at the outset, Taylor expressly stated that the fair cross section requirement does not apply to the petit jury. See 419 U. S., at 538. Petitioner nevertheless contends that the ratio decidendi of Taylor cannot be limited to the jury venire, and he urges adoption of a new rule. Because we hold that the rule urged by petitioner should not be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review, we decline to address petitioner’s contention.
A
In the past, the Court has, without discussion, often applied a new constitutional rule of criminal procedure to the defendant in the case announcing the new rule, and has confronted the question of retroactivity later when a different defendant sought the benefit of that rule. See, e. g., Brown v. Louisiana, 447 U. S. 323 (1980) (addressing retroactivity of Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U. S. 130 (1979)); Robinson v. Neil, 409 U. S. 505 (1973) (addressing retroactivity of Waller v. Florida, 397 U. S. 387 (1970)); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U. S. 293 (1967) (addressing retroactivity of United States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 218 (1967), and Gilbert v. California, 388 U. S. 263 (1967)); Tehan v. Shott, 382 U. S. 406 (1966) (addressing retroactivity of Griffin v. California, 380 U. S. 609 (1965)). In several cases, however, the Court has addressed the retroactivity question in the very case announcing the new rule. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 490 (1972); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U. S. 510, 523, n. 22 (1968). These two lines of cases do not have a unifying theme, and we think it is time to clarify how the question of retroactivity should be resolved for cases on collateral review.
The question of retroactivity with regard to petitioner’s fair cross section claim has been raised only in an amicus brief. See Brief for Criminal Justice Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae 22-24. Nevertheless, that question is not foreign to the parties, who have addressed retroactivity with respect to petitioner’s Batson claim. See Brief for Petitioner 21-32; Brief for Respondent 31-38. Moreover, our sua sponte consideration of retroactivity is far from novel. In Allen v. Hardy, we addressed the retroactivity of Batson even though that question had not been presented by the petition for certiorari or addressed by the lower courts. See 478 U. S., at 261-262 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, 646, n. 3 (1961) (applying exclusionary rule to the States even although such a course of action was urged only by amicus curiae).
In our view, the question “whether a decision [announcing a new rule should] be given prospective or retroactive effect should be faced at the time of [that] decision.” Mish-kin, Foreword: the High Court, the Great Writ, and the Due Process of Time and Law, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 56, 64 (1965). Cf. Bowen v. United States, 422 U. S. 916, 920 (1975) (when “issues of both retroactivity and application of constitutional doctrine are raised,” the retroactivity issue should be decided first). Retroactivity is properly treated as a threshold question, for, once a new rule is applied to the defendant in the case announcing the rule, evenhanded justice requires that it be applied retroactively to all who are similarly situated. Thus, before deciding whether the fair cross section requirement should be extended to the petit jury, we should ask whether such a rule would be applied retroactively to the case at issue. This retroactivity determination would normally entail application of the Linkletter standard, but we believe that our approach to retroactivity for cases on collateral review requires modification.
It is admittedly often difficult to determine when a case announces a new rule, and we do not attempt to define the spectrum of what may or may not constitute a new rule for retroactivity purposes. In general, however, a case announces a new rule when it breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government. See, e. g., Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U. S. 44, 62 (1987) (per se rule excluding all hypnotically refreshed testimony infringes impermissibly on a criminal defendant’s right to testify on his behalf); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U. S. 399, 410 (1986) (Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of prisoners who are insane). To put it differently, a case announces a new rule if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became final. See generally Truesdale v. Aiken, 480 U. S. 527, 528-529 (1987) (Powell, J., dissenting). Given the strong language in Taylor and our statement in Akins v. Texas, 325 U. S. 398, 403 (1945), that “[fjairness in [jury] selection has never been held to require proportional representation of races upon a jury,” application of the fair cross section requirement to the petit jury would be a new rule.
Not all new rules have been uniformly treated for retro-activity purposes. Nearly a quarter of a century ago, in Linkletter, the Court attempted to set some standards by which to determine the retroactivity of new rules. The question in Linkletter was whether Mapp v. Ohio, which made the exclusionary rule applicable to the States, should be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review. The Court determined that the retroactivity of Mapp should be determined by examining the purpose of the exclusionary rule, the reliance of the States on prior law, and the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the exclusionary rule. Using that standard, the Court held that Mapp would only apply to trials commencing after that case was decided. 381 U. S., at 636-640.
The Linkletter retroactivity standard has not led to consistent results. Instead, it has been used to limit application of certain new rules to cases on direct review, other new rules only to the defendants in the cases announcing such rules, and still other new rules to cases in which trials have not yet commenced. See Desist v. United States, 394 U. S. 244, 256-267 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citing examples). Not surprisingly, commentators have “had a veritable field day” with the Linkletter standard, with much of the discussion being “more than mildly negative.” Beytagh, Ten Years of Non-Retroactivity: A Critique and a Proposal, 61 Va. L. Rev. 1557, 1558, and n. 3 (1975) (citing sources).
Application of the Linkletter standard led to the disparate treatment of similarly situated defendants on direct review. For example, in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 467-473 (1966), the Court held that, absent other effective measures to protect the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, a person in custody must be warned prior to interrogation that he has certain rights, including the right to remain silent. The Court applied that new rule to the defendants in Miranda and its companion cases, and held that their convictions could not stand because they had been interrogated without the proper warnings. Id., at 491-499. In Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U. S. 719, 733-735 (1966), the Court held, under the Linkletter standard, that Miranda would only be applied to trials commencing after that decision had been announced. Because the defendant in Johnson, like the defendants in Miranda, was on direct review of his conviction, see 384 U. S., at 721, the Court’s refusal to give Miranda retroactive effect resulted in unequal treatment of those who were similarly situated. This inequity also generated vehement criticism. See, e. g., A. Bickel, The Supreme Court and the Idea of Progress 54-57 (1978) (decrying the “plain” injustice in Johnson and suggesting that the Court should have distinguished between direct and collateral review for purposes of retroactivity).
Dissatisfied with the Linkletter standard, Justice Harlan advocated a different approach to retroactivity. He argued that new rules should always be applied retroactively to cases on direct review, but that generally they should not be applied retroactively to criminal cases on collateral review. See Mackey v. United States, 401 U. S. 667, 675 (1971) (opinion concurring in judgments in part and dissenting in part); Desist, 394 U. S., at 256 (dissenting opinion).
In Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U. S. 314 (1987), we rejected as unprincipled and inequitable the Linkletter standard for cases pending on direct review at the time a new rule is announced, and adopted the first part of the retroactivity approach advocated by Justice Harlan. We agreed with Justice Harlan that “failure to apply a newly declared constitutional rule to criminal cases pending on direct review violates basic norms of constitutional adjudication.” 479 U. S., at 322. We gave two reasons for our decision. First, because we can only promulgate new rules in specific cases and cannot possibly decide all cases in which review is sought, “the integrity of judicial review” requires the application of the new rule to “all similar cases pending on direct review.” Id., at 323. We quoted approvingly from Justice Harlan’s separate opinion in Mackey, supra, at 679:
“ ‘If we do not resolve all cases before us on direct review in light of our best understanding of governing constitutional principles, it is difficult to see why we should so adjudicate any case at all.... In truth, the Court’s assertion of power to disregard current law in adjudicating cases before us that have not already run the full course of appellate review is quite simply an assertion that our constitutional function is not one of adjudication but in effect of legislation.’” 479 U. S., at 323.
Second, because “selective application of new rules violates the principle of treating similarly situated defendants the same,” we refused to continue to tolerate the inequity that resulted from not applying new rules retroactively to defendants whose cases had not yet become final. Id., at 323-324 (citing Desist, supra, at 258-259 (Harlan, J., dissenting)). Although new rules that constituted clear breaks with the past generally were not given retroactive effect under the Linkletter standard, we held that “a new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct review or not yet final, with no exception for cases in which the new rule constitutes a ‘clear break’ with the past.” 479 U. S., at 328.
The Linkletter standard also led to unfortunate disparity in the treatment of similarly situated defendants on collateral review. An example will best illustrate the point. In Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U. S. 477, 484-487 (1981), the Court held that once a person invokes his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be inferred from the fact that the person responded to police-initiated questioning. It was not until Solem v. Stumes, 465 U. S. 638 (1984), that the Court held, under the Linkletter standard, that Edwards was not to be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review. In the interim, several lower federal courts had come to the opposite conclusion and had applied Edwards to cases that had become final before that decision was announced. See Witt v. Wainwright, 714 F. 2d 1069, 1072-1074 (CA11 1983); Sockwell v. Maggio, 709 F. 2d 341, 343-344 (CA5 1983); McCree v. Housewright, 689 F. 2d 797, 800-802 (CA8 1982), cert. denied sub nom. McCree v. Lockhart, 460 U. S. 1088 (1983). Thus, some defendants on collateral review whose Edwards claims were adjudicated prior to Stumes received the benefit of Edwards, while those whose Edwards claims had not been addressed prior to Stumes did not. This disparity in treatment was a product of two factors: our failure to treat retroactivity as a threshold question and the Linkletter standard’s inability to account for the nature and function of collateral review. Having decided to rectify the first of those inadequacies, see supra, at 300-301, we now turn to the second.
B
Justice Harlan believed that new rules generally should not be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review. He argued that retroactivity for cases on collateral review could “be responsibly [determined] only by focusing, in the first instance, on the nature, function, and scope of the adjudicatory process in which such cases arise. The relevant frame of reference, in other words, is not the purpose of the new rule whose benefit the [defendant] seeks, but instead the purposes for which the writ of habeas corpus is made available.” Mackey, 401 U. S., at 682 (opinion concurring in judgments in part and dissenting in part). With regard to the nature of habeas corpus, Justice Harlan wrote:
“Habeas corpus always has been a collateral remedy, providing an avenue for upsetting judgments that have become otherwise final. It is not designed as a substitute for direct review. The interest in leaving concluded litigation in a state of repose, that is, reducing the controversy to a final judgment not subject to further judicial revision, may quite legitimately be found by those responsible for defining the scope of the writ to outweigh in some, many, or most instances the competing interest in readjudicating convictions according to all legal standards in effect when a habeas petition is filed.” Id. at 682-683.
Given the “broad scope of constitutional issues cognizable on habeas,” Justice Harlan argued that it is “sounder, in adjudicating habeas petitions, generally to apply the law prevailing at the time a conviction became final than it is to seek to dispose of [habeas] cases on the basis of intervening changes in constitutional interpretation.” Id., at 689. As he had explained in Desist, “the threat of habeas serves as a necessary additional incentive for trial and appellate courts throughout the land to conduct their proceedings in a manner consistent with established constitutional standards. In order to perform this deterrence function,... the habeas court need only apply the constitutional standards that prevailed at the time the original proceedings took place.” 394 U. S., at 262-263. See also Stumes, 465 U. S., at 653 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment) (“Review on habeas to determine that the conviction rests upon correct application of the law in effect at the time of the conviction is all that is required to ‘forc[e] trial and appellate courts... to toe the constitutional mark’ ”) (citation omitted).
Justice Harlan identified only two exceptions to his general rule of nonretroactivity for cases on collateral review. First, a new rule should be applied retroactively if it places “certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe.” Mackey, 401 U. S., at 692. Second, a new rule should be applied retroactively if it requires the observance of “those procedures that... are ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’” Id., at 698 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 819, 325 (1937) (Cardozo, J.)).
Last Term, in Yates v. Aiken, 484 U. S. 211 (1988), we were asked to decide whether the rule announced in Francis v. Franklin, 471 U. S. 307 (1985), should be applied to a de: fendant on collateral review at the time that case was decided. We held that Francis did not announce a new rule because it “was merely an application of the principle that governed our decision in Sandstrom v. Montana [,442 U. S. 510 (1979)], which had been decided before [the defendant’s] trial took place.” 484 U. S., at 216-217. We therefore found it unnecessary to adopt Justice Harlan’s view of retro-activity for cases on collateral review. We stated, however, that our recent decisions had noted, as had Justice Harlan, “the important distinction between direct review and collateral review.” Id., at 215. See also Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U. S. 551, 555 (1987) (distinguishing between direct and collateral review for purposes of Sixth Amendment right to counsel on appeal). Indeed, we have expressly reconciled some of our retroactivity decisions with Justice Harlan’s approach. See Shea v. Louisiana, 470 U. S. 51, 58, n. 4 (1985) (giving Edwards retroactive effect on direct, but not collateral, review “is fully congruent with both aspects of the approach to retroactivity propounded by Justice Harlan”).
We agree with Justice Harlan’s description of the function of habeas corpus. “[T]he Court never has defined the scope of the writ simply by reference to a perceived need to assure that an individual accused of crime is afforded a trial free of constitutional error.” Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U. S. 436, 447 (1986) (plurality opinion). Rather, we have recognized that interests of comity and finality must also be considered in determining the proper scope of habeas review. Thus, if a defendant fails to comply with state procedural rules and is barred from litigating a particular constitutional claim in state court, the claim can be considered on federal habeas only if the defendant shows cause for the default and actual prejudice resulting therefrom. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S., at 87-91. We have declined to make the application of the procedural default rule dependent on the magnitude of the constitutional claim at issue, see Engle v. Isaac, 466 U. S., at 129, or on the State’s interest in the enforcement of its procedural rule, see Murray v. Carrier, 477 U. S. 478, 493-496 (1986).
This Court has not “always followed an unwavering line in its conclusions as to the availability of the Great Writ. Our development of the law of federal habeas corpus has been attended, seemingly, with some backing and filling.” Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391, 411-412 (1963). See also Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 475-476 (1976). Nevertheless, it has long been established that a final civil judgment entered under a given rule of law may withstand subsequent judicial change in that rule. In Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U. S. 371 (1940), the
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | A | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
The petitioner is a disbarred attorney convicted of security fraud. At his trial the court appointed advisory counsel for him, finding that he qualified as an indigent. He was convieted. He later filed with a judge of the Court of Appeals a pro se request for extension of time in which to submit his brief on appeal. This was granted. But an accompanying inquiry concerning appointment of counsel to handle the appeal was ignored. His right to have appointed counsel here is clear. 18 U. S. C. § 3006A (c); cf. Douglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353 (1963). Subsequently the petitioner requested another extension of time and renewed his request for appointed counsel. The Government opposed both motions; they were denied and the appeal was dismissed. The petitioner, still acting pro se, then brought this application for habeas corpus to this Court.
In his response to the application the Solicitor General informed the Court that it appeared that the judge below was unaware of the petitioner’s initial request for counsel, and mistakenly believed that the petitioner had never filed a financial affidavit with the trial court. The Solicitor General therefore suggested that this Court should treat the application as a petition for certiorari, and grant certiorari and remand the case to the Court of Appeals for determination of whether the petitioner’s appeal had been improvidently dismissed.
On examination of the record, we follow the suggestion of the Solicitor General, grant certiorari, vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and remand the case to that court.
So ordered.
Mr. Justice Rehnquist dissents.
Section 3006A (c) reads in part as follows: “A person for whom counsel is appointed shall be represented at every stage of the proceedings from his initial appearance before the United States magistrate or the court through appeal.”
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | B | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Me. Justice Reed
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This appeal presents a problem as to the constitutionality of § 313 of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, as amended by § 304 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947. Section 313 of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act now reads as stated in the margin.
An indictment was returned at the January 1948 term in the District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia on two counts charging in count I the Congress of Industrial Organizations and in count II its President, Philip Murray, with violation of § 313 of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act because of the publication and distribution in the District of Columbia of an issue, Vol. 10, No. 28, under date of July 14,1947, of “The CIO News,” a weekly periodical owned and published by the CIO at the expense and from the funds of the CIO and with the consent of its President, Mr. Murray. The number of “The CIO News” in question carried upon its front page a statement by Mr. Murray as President of the CIO, urging all members of the CIO to vote for Judge Ed Gar-matz, then a candidate for Congress in Maryland at a special election to be held July 15, 1947. The statement said it was made despite § 313 in the belief that the section was unconstitutional because it abridged rights of free speech, free press and free assemblage, guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.
The defendants moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that § 313 as construed and applied and upon its face abridged as to the CIO and its members and Mr. Murray freedom of speech, press and assembly and the right to petition the Government for a redress of grievances in violation of the Constitution; that the classification of labor organizations was arbitrary and the provisions vague in contravention of the Bill of Rights; and that the terms of the section were an invasion of the rights of defendants, protected by the Ninth and Tenth Amendments. The District Court sustained the motion to dismiss on the ground that as “no clear and present danger to the public interest can be found in the circumstances surrounding the enactment of this legislation” the asserted abridgment of the freedoms of the First Amendment was unjustified. 77 F. Supp. 355. In the order granting the motion to dismiss, the District Court defined its ruling as follows:
“. . . that that portion of Section 313 of the Corrupt Practices Act, as amended by Section 304 of the Labor-Management' Relations Act, 1947, which prohibits expenditures by any labor organization in connection with any election at which Presidential and Vice Presidential electors or a Senator or Representative in, or a Delegate or Resident Commissioner to Congress are to be voted for, or in connection with any primary election or political convention or caucus held to select candidates for any of the foregoing offices, is unconstitutional.”
We accepted jurisdiction of the Government’s appeal under the Criminal Appeals Act. 18 U. S. C. § 682.
The briefs and arguments submitted to us support and attack the constitutionality of § 313 of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act on its face — at least so far as unconstitutionality is declared in the above order. We do not admit any duty in this Court to pass upon such a contention on an appeal under the Criminal Appeals Act except in cases of logical necessity. United States v. Petrillo, 332 U. S. 1. Although the case turned below on the constitutionality of the provision, the Criminal Appeals Act does not require us to pass upon the constitutionality of a federal statute where the indictment does not state an offense under its terms. United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U. S. 81, 88, 97. Compare United States v. Carbone, 327 U. S. 633. Our first obligation is to decide whether the indictment states an offense under § 313. As we hereafter conclude that this indictment does not charge acts embraced within its scope, this opinion is limited to that issue.
Indictment. — The presently essential parts of the indictment are set out in the margin. It will be noted that paragraph (3) does not allege the source of the CIO funds. The paragraph indicates on its face that “The CIO News” was a regularly published weekly periodical of which the challenged issue was Yol. 10, No. 28. The funds used may have been obtained from subscriptions of its readers or from portions of CIO membership dues, directly allocated by the members to pay for the “News,” or from other general or special receipts.
We do not read the indictment as charging an expenditure by the CIO in circulating free copies to nonsubscrib-ers, nonpurchasers or among citizens not entitled to receive copies of “The CIO News,” as members of the union. The indictment, count I, paragraph (3), charged the CIO with making expenditures from its funds for “the cost of distribution” of the paper, in paragraph (6) (a), with paying approximately $100 for postal charges for the challenged issue and “causing said article to be distributed in the Third Congressional District of the State of Maryland and elsewhere in connection with the special election held in that Congressional District on the fifteenth day of July 1947.” In paragraph (6) (b) there are allegations about certain extra copies. These are set out in the marginal note 3 supra. The extras we assume were published pursuant to the order of Mr. Murray in the article. We conclude that the indictment charges nothing more as to the extras than that extra copies of the “News” were published for distribution and were distributed in regular course to members or purchasers and that no allegation has been made of expenditures for “free” distribution of the paper to those not regularly entitled to receive it.
Scope of Section SIS.- — The construction of this section as applied to this indictment turns on the range of the word “expenditure,” added to the section by § 304 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, as indicated in note 1, supra. “Expenditure” as here used is not a word of art. It has no definitely defined meaning and the applicability of the word to prohibition of particular acts must be determined from the circumstances surrounding its employment. The reach of its meaning raised questions during congressional consideration of the bill when it contained the present text of the section. Did it cover comments upon political personages and events in a corporately owned newspaper? 93 Cong. Rec. 6438. Could unincorporated trade associations make expenditures? Id., 6439. Could a union-owned radio station give time for a political speech? Id., 6439. What of comments by a radio commentator? Id., 6439. Is it an expenditure only when A is running against B or is free, favorable publicity for prospective candidates illegal? Id., 6440. What of corporately owned religious papers supporting a candidate on moral grounds? The Anti-Saloon League? Id., 6440.
The purpose of Congress is a dominant factor in determining meaning. There is no better key to a difficult problem of statutory construction than the law from which the challenged statute emerged. Remedial laws are to be interpreted in the light of previous experience and prior enactments. Nor, where doubt exists, should we disregard informed congressional discussion.
Section 304 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 is not a section without a history. Its earliest legislative antecedent was the Act of January 26, 1907, which provided:
“That it shall be unlawful for any national bank, or any corporation organized by authority of any laws of Congress, to make a money contribution in connection with any election to any political office. It shall also be unlawful for any corporation whatever to make a money contribution in connection with any election at which Presidential and Vice-Presidential electors or a Representative in Congress is to be voted for or any election by any State legislature of a United States Senator. . . .” 34 Stat. 864r-65.
This legislation seems to have been motivated by two considerations. First, the necessity for destroying the influence over elections which corporations exercised through financial contribution. Second, the feeling that corporate officials had no moral right to use corporate funds for contribution to political parties without the consent of the stockholders.
The next important legislation was the Federal Corrupt Practices Act, 1925. This statute was the legislative response to the decision of this Court m Newberry v. United States, 256 U. S. 232. Cf. United States v. Classic, 313 U. S. 299. The Newberry case held that federal limitation upon expenditures by candidates was unconstitutional as applied to expenditures made in the course of a primary election for the Senate. While that case did not directly concern itself with the Act of 1907, it was widely construed to have invalidated all federal corrupt practices legislation relating to nominations. Therefore, the 1925 Act reenacted the earlier prohibitions against corporate contributions for political purposes with two significant changes. The phrase “money contribution” of 1907 was changed to read “contribution,” and primaries and conventions were expressly excluded from the scope of the legislation.
The statute immediately preceding § 304 in time was the War Labor Disputes Act of 1943. This Act extended, for- the duration of the war, the prohibitions of the Act of 1925 to labor organizations. Its legislative history indicates congressional belief that labor unions should then be put under the same restraints as had been imposed upon corporations. It was felt that the influence which labor unions exercised over elections through monetary expenditures should be minimized, and that it was unfair to individual union members to permit the union leadership to make contributions from general union funds to a political party which the individual member might oppose.
When Congress began to consider the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 it had as a guide the 1944 presidential election, an election which had been conducted under the above amendment to the Act of 1925. In analyzing the experience of that election, a serious defect was found in the wording of the Act of 1925. The difficulty was that the word “contribution” was read narrowly by various special congressional committees investigating the 1944 and 1946 campaigns. The concept of “contribution” was thought to be confined to direct gifts or direct payments. Since it was obvious that the statute as construed could easily be circumvented through indirect contributions, § 304 extended the prohibition of § 313 to “expenditures.”
The Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 was the subject of extensive debates in Congress. Embracing as it did a number of controversial issues, the discussion necessarily covered a wide range. It is not surprising, therefore, to find congressional explanation of the intended scope of the specific provision of § 304, in issue here, scanty and indecisive. We find, however, in the Senate debates definite indication that Congress did not intend to include within the coverage of the section as an expenditure the costs of the publication described in the indictment. As we have stated above, there are numerous suppositional instances of acts by corporations or unions that approach the border line of the expenditures that are declared unlawful by § 313 of the Corrupt Practices Act. As we are dealing on this appeal with the scope of § 313 as applied to an indictment that charges certain allegedly illegal acts, we propose to confine our examination of legislative history to the statements that tend to show whether the congressional purpose was to forbid the challenged publication. For example, Senator Taft, the Chairman of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, and one of the conferees for the Senate, answered inquiries as follows (93 Cong. Rec. 6437, 6438, 6440):
“Mr. Barkley. Suppose the particular publication referred to by the Senator from Florida is published and paid for by subscriptions paid to the publication by the membership of that railway labor organization?
“Mr. Taft. That will be perfectly lawful. That is the way it should be done.
“Mr. Barkley. And suppose it is not paid for by union funds collected from the various labor unions?
“Mr. Taft. That will be perfectly proper.
“Mr. Barkley. The Senator from Ohio referred to the law prohibiting the making of direct or indirect contributions by corporations as a justification for making the same provision in the case of labor unions. Let us consider the publication of a corporation which, day after day, takes a position against one candidate and in favor of another candidate, and does so in its editorials. The editorials occupy space in that newspaper or publication, and the space costs a certain amount of money. Is that a direct or an indirect contribution to a campaign; and if it is neither, what is it?
“Mr. Taft. I would say that is the operation of the newspaper itself.
“Mr. Barkley. That is true; it is the operation of the newspaper. But I gathered the impression that in referring to the present law prohibiting the making of contributions, directly or indirectly by corporations, the Senator inferred that if a corporation publishes a newspaper — as most of them do — and uses the editorials in that publication in advocacy of or opposition to any candidate, at least that is a direct contribution to the campaign. It could not be anything else.
“Mr. Taft. I do not think it is either a direct or an indirect contribution. I do not think it is an expenditure of the sort prohibited, because it seems to me it is simply the ordinary operation of the particular corporation's business.
“Mr. Barkley. Mr. President, let me ask the Senator this question: Let us suppose a labor organization publishes a newspaper for the information and benefit of its members, and let us suppose that it is published regularly, whether daily or weekly or monthly, and is paid for from a fund created by the payment of dues into the organization it represents. Let us assume that the newspaper is not sold on the streets, and let us assume further that a certain subscription by the month or by the year is not charged for the newspaper. Does the Senator from Ohio advise us that under this measure such a newspaper could not take an editorial position with respect to any candidate for public office, without violating this measure?
“Mr. Taft. If it is supported by union funds, I do not think it could. If the newspaper is prepared and distributed and circulated by means of the expenditure of union funds, then how could a line be drawn between that and political literature or pamphlets or publications of that nature? It is perfectly easy for a labor union to publish lawfully a bona fide newspaper and to charge subscriptions for that newspaper, either by itself or as a corporation.
“Mr. Ball. In the case of most union papers, as I understand, the subscriptions from the union members are collected along with the dues, but they are an earmarked portion of the dues which the union collects and remits to the paper in the form of subscriptions. I take it that would be in a different category from the case where the union makes a blanket subscription and an appropriation out of union dues.
“Mr. Taft. I think if the paper is, so to speak, a going concern, it can take whatever position it wants to.
“Mr. Magnuson. Teamsters’ unions publish newspapers dealing with matters in which such unions are interested. The same is true of many other unions. If the pending measure becomes a law, from now on such unions will be prohibited from advo-eating in their newspapers the support of any political candidates.
“Mr. Taft. That is correct, unless they sell the papers they publish to their members, if the members desire to buy them. In such a case there would be no expenditure for such a purpose of union funds.
“Mr. Magñuson. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield, let me ask him another question. All the funds of labor unions come from dues paid by their members. All the activities of the unions are based upon expenditure of funds provided by dues. That money is in the union’s treasury. If the pending bill should become law it would mean that all labor organs which are now in existence would, from now on, be prohibited from participating in a campaign, favoring a candidate, mentioning his name, or endorsing him for public office?
“Mr. Taft. No ; I do not think it means that. The union can issue a newspaper, and can charge the members for the newspaper, that is, the members who buy copies of the newspaper, and the union can put such matters in the newspaper if it wants to. The union can separate the payment of dues from the payment for a newspaper if its members are willing to do so, that is, if the members are willing to subscribe to that kind of a newspaper. I presume the members would be willing to do so. A union can publish such a newspaper, or unions can do as was done last year, organize something like the PAC, a political organization, and receive direct contributions, just so long as members of the union know what they are contributing to, and the dues which they pay into the union treasury are not used for such purpose.”
Senator Ellender, also one of the conferees, made this statement:
“May I say to the Senator from Florida it is only in the event that union funds are used for political contributions that a union becomes liable. Mr. Green can talk all he wants to, if he pays for his own time or if the members of the union desire to make individual contributions for such a purpose. For another thing, most unions operate and manage newspapers, and the most of them are maintained by advertisements or by subscriptions from members of the union and from other sources. The proceeds from such newspapers are not union funds. In such cases these newspapers can print anything they desire, and they will not violate the law, so long as union funds are not used to pay for the operation of those newspapers for political purposes.” 93 Cong. Rec. 6522.
Application. — With this summary of the development of and quotation of excerpts from discussion in Congress concerning § 313, we turn to its interpretation and a determination as to whether it covers the circumstances charged in the indictment. Some members of the Court, joining in this opinion, do not place the reliance upon legislative history that this opinion evidences, but reach the same conclusion without consideration of that history. From what we have previously noted, it is clear that Congress was keenly aware of the constitutional limitations on legislation and of the danger of the invalidation by the courts of any enactment that threatened abridgment of the freedoms of the First Amendment. It did not want to pass any legislation that would threaten interferences with the privileges of speech or press or that would undertake to supersede the Constitution. The obligation rests also upon this Court in construing congressional enactments to take care to interpret them so as to avoid a danger of unconstitutionality.
If § 313 were construed to prohibit the publication, by corporations and unions in the regular course of conducting their affairs, of periodicals advising their members, stockholders or customers of danger or advantage to their interests from the adoption of measures, or the election to office of men espousing such measures, the gravest doubt would arise in our minds as to its constitutionality. In so far as -some of the many statements made on the floor of Congress may indicate the thought, at the time, by certain members of Congress that the language of § 313 carried a restrictive meaning in conflict with that which we have adopted, we hold that the language itself, coupled with the dangers of unconstitutionality, supports the interpretation which we have placed upon it.
When Congress coupled the word “expenditure” with the word “contribution,” it did so because the practical operation of § 313 in previous elections showed the need to strengthen the bars against the misuse of aggregated funds gathered into the control of a single organization from many individual sources. Apparently “expenditure” was added to eradicate the doubt that had been raised as to the reach of “contribution,” not to extend greatly the coverage of the section. One can find indications in the exchanges between participants in the debates that informed proponents and opponents thought that § 313 went so far as to forbid periodicals in the regular course of publication from taking part in pending elections where there was not segregated subscription, advertising or sales moneys adequate for its support. Of course, a periodical financed by a corporation or labor union for the purpose of advocating legislation advantageous to the sponsor or supporting candidates whose views are believed to coincide generally with those deemed advantageous to such organization is on a different level from newspapers devoted solely to the dissemination of news but the line separating the two classes is not clear. In the absence of definite statutory demarcation, the location of that line must await the full development of facts in individual cases. It is one thing to say that trade or labor union periodicals published regularly for members, stockholders or purchasers are allowable under § 313 and quite another to say that in connection with an election occasional pamphlets or dodgers or free copies widely scattered are forbidden. Senator Taft stated on the Senate floor that funds voluntarily contributed for election purposes might be used without violating the section and papers supported by subscriptions and sales might likewise be published. Members of unions paying dues and stockholders of corporations know of the practice of their respective organizations in regularly publishing periodicals. It would require explicit words in an act to convince us that Congress intended to bar a trade journal, a house organ or a newspaper, published by a corporation, from expressing views on candidates or political proposals in the regular course of its publication. It is unduly stretching language to say that the members or stockholders are unwilling participants in such normal organizational activities, including the advocacy thereby of governmental policies affecting their interests, and the support thereby of candidates thought to be favorable to their interests.
It is our conclusion that this indictment charges only that the CIO and its president published with union funds a regular periodical for the furtherance of its aims, that President Murray authorized the use of those funds for distribution of this issue in regular course to those accustomed to receive copies of the periodical and that the issue with the statement described at the beginning of this opinion violated § 313 of the Corrupt Practices Act.
We are unwilling to say that Congress by its prohibition against corporations or labor organizations making an “expenditure in connection with any election” of candidates for federal office intended to outlaw such a publication. We do not think § 313 reaches such a use of corporate or labor organization funds. We express no opinion as to the scope of this section where different circumstances exist and none upon the constitutionality of the section.
Our conclusion leads us to affirm the order of dismissal upon the ground herein announced.
It is so ordered.
§ 304, Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. 159, enacted June 23, 1947:
" ‘Sec. 313. It is unlawful for any national bank, or any corporation organized by authority of any law of Congress, to make a contribution or expenditure in connection with any election to any political office, or in connection with any primary election or political convention or caucus held to select candidates for any political office, or for any corporation whatever, or any labor organization to make a contribution or expenditure in connection with any election at which Presidential and Vice Presidential electors or a Senator or Representative in, or a Delegate or Resident Commissioner to Congress are to be voted for, or in connection with any primary election or political convention or caucus held to select candidates for any of the foregoing offices, or for any candidate, political committee, or other person to accept or receive any contribution prohibited by this section. Every corporation or labor organization which makes any contribution or expenditure in violation of this section shall be fined not more than $5,000; and every officer or director of any corporation, or officer of any labor organization, who consents to any contribution or expenditure by the corporation or labor organization, as the case may be, in violation of this section shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both. For the purposes of this section “labor organization” means any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee representation committee or plan, in which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work.’ ”
The additions of 1947 are italicized.
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88; West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, and Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516, were cited.
“(3) That at all the times hereinafter mentioned, the said defendant CIO owned, composed, edited, and published a weekly periodical known as ‘The CIO News’, and the said defendant CIO paid all of the costs and made all of the expenditures necessary and incidental to the publication and distribution of said periodical, ‘The CIO News’, from the funds of the said defendant CIO, including the salaries of the editors and contributors and other writers of texts set forth in said periodical including also the cost of the printing of the said periodical and the cost of the distribution of the said periodical, and all such payments and expenditures, including those representing the cost and distribution of the issue of said ‘The CIO News’ under date of July 14, 1947, and designated as Volume 10, No. 28, were made by said defendant CIO at Washington, in the District of Columbia, and within the jurisdiction of this Court.”
(6) “(b) That the defendant CIO also caused one thousand copies of the issue of the publication, ‘The CIO News', dated July 14, 1947, and designated as the issue known as Volume 10, No. 28, to be specially moved and transported from Washington, District of Columbia, into the Third Congressional District of the State of Maryland, by mailing the said one thousand extra copies to the Regional CIO Director at Baltimore, Maryland, and caused the funds of the said defendant CIO to be expended in printing, packaging and transportation of said extra copies of the periodical, ‘The CIO News’, in connection with the aforesaid special election.”
The direction was in this form: “I therefore have directed and requested the editor of the CIO News to publish this statement, including the following paragraphs, and to give to this issue of the CIO News proper circulation among the members of CIO unions in the City of Baltimore and, particularly, within the Congressional District in which this election is scheduled to take place.”
United States v. Kirby, 7 Wall. 482, 486-87; Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U. S. 197, 211; Fort Smith & Western R. Co. v. Mills, 253 U. S. 206, 209; United States v. Katz, 271 U. S. 354, 359; United States v. Guaranty Trust Co., 280 U. S. 478, 485; Keifer & Keifer v. R. F. C., 306 U. S. 381, 391, n. 4; United States v. American Trucking Assns., 310 U. S. 534, 544.
Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U. S. 103, 108; Boston Sand Co. v. United States, 278 U. S. 41.
Harrison v. Northern Trust Co., 317 U. S. 476, 479.
See 40 Cong. Rec. 96; 41 Cong. Rec. 22.
See Hearings before the House Committee on the Election of the President, 59th Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1906); 40 Cong. Rec. 96.
In 1909 the Criminal Code of the United States, which codified, revised and amended the penal laws of the country, was passed. 35 Stat. 1088. The Act of 1907 was reenacted as § 83. 35 Stat. 1103.
36 Stat. 822, as amended by 37 Stat. 25.
43 Stat. 1074. “Contribution” was defined to include “a gift, subscription, loan, advance, or deposit, of money, or anything of value, and includes a contract, promise, or agreement, whether or not legally enforceable, to make a contribution.” 43 Stat. 1071.
43 Stat. 1070.
57 Stat. 167. “It is unlawful for any . . . labor organization to make a contribution in connection with any election at which Presidential and Vice Presidential electors or a Senator or Representative in, or a Delegate or Resident Commissioner to Congress are to be voted for, or for any candidate, political committee, or other person to accept or receive any contribution prohibited by this section.”
57 Stat. 168. “Except as to offenses committed prior to such date, the provisions of this Act and the amendments made by this Act shall cease to be effective at the end of six months following the termination of hostilities in the present war, as proclaimed by the President, or upon the date (prior to the date of such proclamation) of the passage of a concurrent resolution of the two Houses of Congress stating that such provisions and amendments shall cease to be effective.”
See Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Labor on H. R. 804, and H. R. 1483, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 4; S. Rep. No. 101, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 24.
See Hearings on H. R. 804 and H. R. 1483, supra, n. 15, 117-18, 133; 89 Cong. Rec. 5334, 5792; 93 Cong. Rec. 6440.
See H. R. Rep. No. 2093, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 11; S. Rep. No. 101, supra, n. 15, 57-59; H. R. Rep. No. 2739, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 39-40; S. Rep. No. 1, Part 2, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 37, 38-39.
See note 17, supra.
This point was repeatedly emphasized in the Senate debates. See 93 Cong. Rec. 6436-39.
United States v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U. S. 366, 407-408:
“It is elementary when the constitutionality of a statute is assailed, if the statute be reasonably susceptible of two interpretations, by one of which it would be unconstitutional and by the other valid, it is our plain duty to adopt that construction which will save the statute from constitutional infirmity. Knights Templars Indemnity Co. v. Jarman, 187 U. S. 197, 205. And unless this rule be considered as meaning that our duty is to first decide that a statute is unconstitutional and then proceed to hold that'such ruling was unnecessary because the statute is susceptible of a meaning, which causes it not to be repugnant to the Constitution, the rule plainly must mean that where a statute is susceptible of two constructions, by one of which grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the other of which such questions are avoided, our duty is to adopt the latter. Harriman v. Interstate Com. Comm., 211 U. S. 407.”
Federal Trade Comm’n v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U. S. 298, 307; Missouri P. R. Co. v. Boone, 270 U. S. 466, 471-72; cf. Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U. S. 142, 147.
Compare “Free discussion of the problems of society is a cardinal principle of Americanism — a principle which all are zealous to preserve.” Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U. S. 331, 346.
“The case confronts us again with the duty our system places on this Court to say where the individual's freedom ends and the State’s power begins. Choice on that border, now as always delicate, is perhaps more so where the usual presumption supporting legislation is balanced by the preferred place given in our scheme to the great, the indispensable democratic freedoms secured by the First Amendment.” Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516, 529-30.
“For the First Amendment does not speak equivocally. It prohibits any law 'abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.’ It must be taken as a command of the broadest scope that explicit language, read in the context of a liberty-loving society, will allow.” Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252, 263.
93 Cong. Rec. 6436, 6437, 6439.
See 93 Cong. Rec. 6437-40.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | H | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Black
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case here on appeal under 28 U. S. C. § 1257 raises questions concerning the constitutional power of a state to apply its anti-trade-restraint law to labor union activities, and to enjoin union members from peaceful picketing carried on as an essential and inseparable part of a course of conduct which is in violation of the state law. The picketing occurred in Kansas City, Missouri. The injunction was issued by a Missouri state court.
The appellants are members and officers of the Ice and Coal Drivers and Handlers Local Union No. 953, affiliated with the American Federation of Labor. Its membership includes about 160 of 200 retail ice peddlers who drive their own trucks in selling ice from door to door in Kansas City. The union began efforts to induce all the nonunion peddlers to join. One objective of the organizational drive was to better wage and working conditions of peddlers and their helpers. Most of the nonunion peddlers refused to join the union. To break down their resistance the union adopted a plan which was designed to make it impossible for nonunion peddlers to buy ice to supply their retail customers in Kansas City. Pursuant to the plan the union set about to obtain from all Kansas City wholesale ice distributors agreements that they would not sell ice to nonunion peddlers. Agreements were obtained from all distributors except the appellee, Empire Storage and Ice Company. Empire refused to agree. The union thereupon informed Empire that it would use other means at its disposal to force Empire to come around to the union view. Empire still refused to agree. Its place of business was promptly picketed by union members although the only complaint registered against Empire, as indicated by placards carried by the pickets, was its continued sale of ice to nonunion peddlers.
Thus the avowed immediate purpose of the picketing was to compel Empire to agree to stop selling ice to nonunion peddlers. Missouri statutes, set out in note 1, make such an agreement a crime punishable by a fine of not more than $5,000 and by imprisonment in the penitentiary for not more than five years. Furthermore, under § 8308 of the Missouri Revised Statutes Ann. (1939), had Empire made the agreement, the ice peddlers could have brought actions for triple damages for any injuries they sustained as a result of the agreement.
About 85% of the truck drivers working for Empire’s customers were members of labor unions. These union truck drivers refused to deliver goods to or from Empire’s place of business. Had any one of them crossed the picket line he would have been subject to fine or suspension by the union of which he was a member.
Because of the foregoing facts shown either by admissions, by undisputed evidence, or by unchallenged findings, the picketing had an instantaneous adverse effect on Empire’s business. It was reduced 85%. In this dilemma, Empire was faced with three alternatives: It could continue to sell ice to nonunion peddlers, in which event it would be compelled to wage a fight for survival against overwhelming odds; it could stop selling ice to nonunion peddlers thereby relieving itself from further conflict with the union, in which event it would be subject to prosecution for crime and suits for triple damages; it could invoke the protection of the law. The last alternative was adopted.
Empire’s complaint charged that the concerted efforts of union members to restrain Empire from selling to nonunion members was a violation of the anti-trade-restraint statute and that an agreement by Empire to refuse to make such sales would violate the same statute. It prayed for an injunction against the picketing. In answering, appellants asserted a constitutional right to picket Empire’s premises in order to force it to discontinue sale of ice to nonunion peddlers. They contended that their right to do so was “guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments” because there was “a labor dispute existing” between appellants and appellee, and because the picketers publicized only the truthful information that appellee was “selling ice to peddlers who are not members of the said defendants’ union.”
The trial court heard evidence, made findings and issued an injunction restraining the appellants from “placing pickets or picketing around or about the buildings” of Empire.
The State Supreme Court affirmed. 357 Mo. 671, 210 S. W. 2d 55. It agreed with the findings of the trial court that the conduct of appellants was pursuant to a local transportation combination used to compel Empire to stop selling ice to nonunion peddlers and that the purpose of the picketing was to force Empire to become a party to such combination. It held that such activities were unlawful because in violation of § 8301 of the Missouri statutes and further held that the injunction to prevent picketing for such unlawful purpose did not contravene the appellants’ right of free speech.
In this Court appellants do not raise problems similar to those discussed in Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, relating to censorship prior to publication as distinguished from sanctions to be imposed after publication, nor are their objections to the form, language, or scope of the injunction. See Milk Wagon Drivers v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U. S. 287, 297-298, also dissenting opinion, 299-303. Attacking the Missouri statute as construed and applied, appellants broadly challenge the power of the state to issue any injunction against their conduct since, they assert, the primary objective of their combination and picketing was to improve wage and working conditions. On this premise they argue that their right to combine, to picket, and to publish must be determined by focusing attention exclusively upon their lawful purpose to improve labor conditions, and that their violation of the state anti-trade-restraint laws must be dismissed as merely incidental to this lawful purpose.
First. That states have constitutional power to prohibit competing dealers and their aiders and abettors from combining to restrain freedom of trade is beyond question. Watson v. Buck, 313 U. S. 387, 403-404. In speaking of the Missouri statutory antecedent of the statute here challenged, this Court said: “The purpose of such statutes is to secure competition and preclude combinations which tend to defeat it. . . . There is nothing in the Constitution of the United States which precludes a State from adopting and enforcing such policy. To so decide would be stepping backwards.” International Harvester Co. v. Missouri, 234 U. S. 199, 209. Agreements and combinations not to sell to or buy goods from particular persons, or to dictate the terms under which transportation will be supplied, are well recognized trade restraint practices which both state and national legislation can and do prohibit. Grenada Lbr. Co. v. Mississippi, 217 U. S. 433, 440-441; Eastern States Lbr. Assn. v. United States, 234 U. S. 600, 612-614; Fashion Guild v. Trade Comm’n, 312 U. S. 457, 465; United States v. Freight Assn., 166 U. S. 290, 324-325.
Second. It is contended that though the Missouri statute can be applied validly to combinations of businessmen who agree not to sell to certain persons, it cannot be applied constitutionally to combinations of union workers who agree in their self-interest to use their' joint power to prevent sales to nonunion workers. This contention appears to be grounded on the guaranties of freedom of speech and press stemming from the Fourteenth and First Amendments. Aside from the element of disseminating information through peaceful picketers, later discussed, it is difficult to perceive how it could be thought that these constitutional guaranties afford labor union members a peculiar immunity from laws against trade restraint combinations, unless, as appellants contend, labor unions are given special constitutional protection denied all other people.
The objective of unions to improve wages and working conditions has sometimes commended itself to Congress and to state legislatures. To the extent that the states or Congress, for this or other reasons, have seen fit to exempt unions from antitrust laws, this Court has sustained legislative power to grant the exemptions. International Harvester Co. v. Missouri, 234 U. S. 199; Allen Bradley Co. v. Union, 325 U. S. 797, 810-811; United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U. S. 219, 232-234; and see Tigner v. Texas, 310 U. S. 141. On the other hand, where statutes have not granted exemptions, we have declared that violations of antitrust laws could not be defended on the ground that a particular accused combination would not injure but would actually help manufacturers, laborers, retailers, consumers, or the public in general. Fashion Guild v. Trade Comm’n, 312 U. S. 457, 467-468. More than thirty years ago this Court said (International Harvester Co. v. Missouri, supra, at 209): “It is too late in the day to assert against statutes which forbid combinations of competing companies that a particular combination was induced by good intentions . . . .” See also United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150, 220-221; Mandeville Farms v. Sugar Co., 334 U. S. 219, 242-243.
The foregoing holdings rest on the premise that legislative power to regulate trade and commerce includes the power to determine what groups, if any, shall be regulated, and whether certain regulations will help or injure businessmen, workers, and the public in general. In making this determination Missouri has decided to apply its law without exception to all persons who combine to restrain freedom of trade. We are without constitutional authority to modify or upset Missouri’s determination that it is in the public interest to make combinations of workers subject to laws designed to keep the channels of trade wholly free and open. To exalt all labor union conduct in restraint of trade above all state control would greatly reduce the traditional powers of states over their domestic economy and might conceivably make it impossible for them to enforce their anti-trade-restraint laws. See Allen Bradley Co. v. Union, 325 U. S. 797, 810. More than that, if for the reasons here contended states cannot subject union members to such anti-trade-restraint laws as Missouri’s, neither can Congress. The Constitution has not so greatly impaired the states’ or nation’s power to govern.
Third. It is contended that the injunction against picketing adjacent to Empire’s place of business is an unconstitutional abridgment of free speech because the picketers were attempting peacefully to publicize truthful facts about a labor dispute. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 102, and Allen Bradley Co. v. Union, 325 U. S. 797, 807, note 12. But the record here does not permit this publicizing to be treated in isolation. For according to the pleadings, the evidence, the findings, and the argument of the appellants, the sole immediate object of the publicizing adjacent to the premises of Empire, as well as the other activities of the appellants and their allies, was to compel Empire to agree to stop selling ice to nonunion peddlers. Thus all of appellants’ activities — their powerful transportation combination, their patrolling, their formation of a picket line warning union men not to cross at peril of their union membership, their publicizing — constituted a single and integrated course of conduct, which was in violation of Missouri’s valid law. In this situation, the injunction did no more than enjoin an offense against Missouri law, a felony.
It rarely has been suggested that the constitutional freedom for speech and press extends its immunity to speech or writing used as an integral part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute. We reject the contention now. Nothing that was said or decided in any of the cases relied on by appellants calls for a different holding.
Neither Thornhill v. Alabama, supra, nor Carlson v. California, 310 U. S. 106, both decided the same day, supports the contention that conduct otherwise unlawful is always immune from state regulation because an integral part of that conduct is carried on by display of placards by peaceful picketers. In both these cases this Court struck down statutes which banned all dissemination of information by people adjacent to certain premises, pointing out that the statutes were so broad that they could not only be utilized to punish conduct plainly illegal but could also be applied to ban all truthful publications of the facts of a labor controversy. But in the Thornhill opinion, at pp. 103-104, the Court was careful to point out that it was within the province of states “to set the limits of permissible contest open to industrial combatants.” See Lincoln Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U. S. 525, 536; Allen-Bradley Local v. Board, 315 U. S. 740, 748-751. Further emphasizing the power of a state “to set the limits of permissible contest open to industrial combatants” the Court cited with approval the opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis in Duplex Printing Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443, at 488. On that page the opinion stated:
“The conditions developed in industry may be such that those engaged in it cannot continue their struggle without danger to the community. But it is not for judges to determine whether such conditions exist, nor is it their function to set the limits of permissible contest and to declare the duties which the new situation demands. This is the function of the legislature which, while limiting individual and group rights of aggression and defense, may substitute processes of justice for the more primitive method of trial by combat.”
After emphasizing state power over industrial conflicts, the Court in the Thornhill opinion went on to say, at p. 104, that states may not “in dealing with the evils arising from industrial disputes . . . impair the effective exercise of the right to discuss freely industrial relations . . . .” This statement must be considered in its context. It was directed toward a sweeping state prohibition which this Court found to embrace “nearly every practicable, effective means whereby those interested— including the employees directly affected — -may enlighten the public on the nature and causes of a labor dispute.” That the general statement of the limitation of a state’s power to impair free speech was not intended to apply to the fact situation presented here is further indicated by the cases cited with approval in note 21 of the Thornhill opinion.
Appellants also rely on Carpenters Union v. Ritter’s Cafe, 315 U. S. 722, and Bakery Drivers Local v. Wohl, 315 U. S. 769, decided the same day. Neither lends support to the contention that peaceful picketing is beyond legislative control. The Court’s opinion in the Ritter case approvingly quoted a part of the Thornhill opinion which recognized broad state powers over industrial conflicts. In the Wohl case, the Court’s opinion at p. 775 found no “violence, force or coercion, or conduct otherwise unlawful or oppressive” and said that
“A state is not required to tolerate in all places . . . even peaceful picketing by an individual.” A concurring opinion in the Wohl case, at pp. 776-777, pointed out that picketing may include conduct other than speech, conduct which can be made the subject of restrictive legislation. No opinions relied on by petitioners assert a constitutional right in picketers to take advantage of speech or press to violate valid laws designed to protect important interests of society.
We think the circumstances here and the reasons advanced by the Missouri courts justify restraint of the picketing which was done in violation of Missouri’s valid law for the sole immediate purpose of continuing a violation of law. In holding this, we are mindful of the essential importance to our society of a vigilant protection of freedom of speech and press. Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252, 263. States cannot consistently with our Constitution abridge those freedoms to obviate slight inconveniences or annoyances. Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147, 162. But placards used as an essential and inseparable part of a grave offense against an important public law cannot immunize that unlawful conduct from state control. Virginia Electric Co. v. Board, 319 U. S. 533, 539; Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516, 536, 537, 538, 539-540. Nor can we say that the publication here should not have been restrained because of the possibility of separating the picketing conduct into illegal and legal parts. Thomas v. Collins, supra, at 547. For the placards were to effectuate the purposes of an unlawful combination, and their sole, unlawful immediate objective was to induce Empire to violate the Missouri law by acquiescing in unlawful demands to agree not to sell ice to nonunion peddlers. It is true that the agreements and course of conduct here were as in most instances brought about through speaking or writing. But it has never been deemed an abridgment of freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either spoken, written, or printed. See e. g., Fox v. Washington, 236 U. S. 273, 277; Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568. Such an expansive interpretation of the constitutional guaranties of speech and press would make it practically impossible ever to enforce laws against agreements in restraint of trade as well as many other agreements and conspiracies deemed injurious to society.
The interest of Missouri in enforcement of its antitrust laws cannot be classified as an effort to outlaw only a slight public inconvenience or annoyance. The Missouri policy against restraints of trade is of long standing and is in most respects the same as that which the Federal Government has followed for more than half a century. It is clearly drawn in an attempt to afford all persons an equal opportunity to buy goods. There was clear danger, imminent and immediate, that unless restrained, appellants would succeed in making that policy a dead letter insofar as purchases by nonunion men were concerned. Appellants’ power with that of their allies was irresistible. And it is clear that appellants were doing more than exercising a right of free speech or press. Bakery Drivers Local v. Wohl, 315 U. S. 769, 776-777. They were exercising their economic power together with that of their allies to compel Empire to abide by union rather than by state regulation of trade.
What we have said emphasizes that this is not a case in which it can be assumed that injury from appellants’ conduct would be limited to this single appellee. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 104-105. Missouri, acting within its power, has decided that such restraints of trade as petitioners sought are against the interests of the whole public. This decision is in accord with the general ideas underlying all anti-trade-restraint laws. It is not for us to overrule this clearly adopted state policy.
While the State of Missouri is not a party in this case, it is plain that the basic issue is whether Missouri or a labor union has paramount constitutional power to regulate and govern the manner in which certain trade practices shall be carried on in Kansas City, Missouri. Missouri has by statute regulated trade one way. The appellant union members have adopted a program to regulate it another way. The state has provided for enforcement of its statutory rule by imposing civil and criminal sanctions. The union has provided for enforcement of its rule by sanctions against union members who cross picket lines. See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U. S. 1, 19; Fashion Guild v. Trade Comm’n, supra, at 465; Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U. S. 211, 242. We hold that the state’s power to govern in this field is paramount, and that nothing in the constitutional guaranties of speech or press compels a state to apply or not to apply its anti-trade-restraint law to groups of workers, businessmen or others. Of course this Court does not pass on the wisdom of the Missouri statute. We hold only that as here construed and applied it does not violate the Federal Constitution.
Affirmed.
“Combinations in restraint of trade declared a conspiracy
“Any person who shall create, enter into, become a member of or participate in any pool, trust, agreement, combination, confederation or understanding with any person or persons in restraint of trade or competition in the importation, transportation, manufacture, purchase or sale of any product or commodity in this state, or any article or thing bought or sold whatsoever, shall be deemed and adjudged guilty of a conspiracy in restraint of trade, and shall be punished as provided in this article.” Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §8301 (1939).
And § 8305 provides that anyone violating § 8301 “shall be adjudged guilty of a felony, and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary not exceeding five years, or by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding one year, or by a fine of not less than five hundred dollars nor more than five thousand dollars, or by both such fine and imprisonment.” Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 8305 (1939).
Appellants say, after quoting from a concurring opinion in United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U. S. 219, 243, “We believe, therefore, that it is perfectly clear that a state may not apply either statutory or common law policies concerning restraint of trade to illegalize combinations among workingmen for the purpose of eliminating wage competition throughout a trade or industry.” And petitioners further argue that a state may not “make it unlawful for an employer to acquiesce in union demands that he refrain from supplying goods to nonunion peddlers . . . .”
In the International Harvester Co. case, 234 U. S. 199, the then Missouri statute was construed as inapplicable to combinations of purchasers and laborers. For this reason the statute was challenged as denying equal protection of the laws. Replying to the challenge, this Court said at p. 210: “Whether it would have been better policy to have made such comprehensive classification it is not our province to decide. In other words, whether a combination of wage earners or purchasers of commodities called for repression by law under the conditions in the State was for the legislature of the State to determine.”
Eastern States Lumber Dealers v. United States, 234 U. S. 600, was cited in note 21. In that case the lumber association was a combination of retail lumber dealers found by the court to have conspired to prevent wholesale dealers from selling directly to consumers of lumber. The sole basis for the injunction was the distribution and dissemination of truthful information by the association to its members in an official report. This Court sustained the decree which broadly enjoined the distribution of this truthful information.
The cases cited in note 21 of the Thornhill opinion include the following, strongly emphasizing states’ powers to regulate their internal industrial and economic affairs and rejecting contentions that challenged regulations violated the Federal Constitution. Senn v. Tile Layers Union, 301 U. S. 468; West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379; Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502; Dorchy v. Kansas, 272 U. S. 306; Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U. S. 194; Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366. Another case cited in note 21 of the Thornhill opinion was Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U. S. 436. It also involved a violation of the federal antitrust laws, and once again this Court sustained the power of the Government to enjoin trade practices deemed in violation - of those laws. The only other case cited in note 21, Labor Board v. Newport News Co., 308 U. S. 241, sustained an order against an employer which restrained it from using its influence over employees to interfere with their activities.
Both parties here rely on the Ritter case. Empire contends that this Court affirmed the action of the Texas courts on the basis of the state’s antitrust law. Appellants argue that this Court upheld the Texas injunction on the ground that the business picketed did not bear a sufficiently close relation to the labor dispute to justify picketing at that place. Since the Court relied on this ground, appellants contend that the Court impliedly rejected the contention that the injunction was justified because of an alleged violation of the antitrust laws. This Court’s opinion in the Ritter case, as well as the dissents, did emphasize questions other than the antitrust act contentions. The Court of Civil Appeals of Texas had not mentioned the Texas antitrust laws in its first or second opinion in the Ritter case. 138 S. W. 2d 223, 149 S. W. 2d 694. A third opinion, denying rehearing, did make reference for the first time to the state’s antitrust laws, but did not definitely point out in what way the picketers’ conduct violated any specific provision of these laws. 149 S. W. 2d 694, 699. Under these circumstances nothing that was said in the Ritter opinion stands for the principle that speech and writings, utilized as a part of conduct engaged in only to break a valid anti-trade-restraint law, render that course of conduct immune from state control.
“Picketing by an organized group is more than free speech, since it involves patrol of a particular locality and since the very presence of a picket line may induce action of one kind or another, quite irrespective of the nature of the ideas which are being disseminated. Hence those aspects of picketing make it the subject of restrictive regulation.” Bakery Drivers Local v. Wohl, supra, at 776-777.
The opinion in Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516, 537-538 stated: “. . . When to this persuasion other things are added which bring about coercion, or give it that character, the limit of the right has been passed. . . . But short of that limit the employer’s freedom cannot be impaired. The Constitution protects no less the employees’ converse right. Of- course espousal of the cause of labor is entitled to no higher constitutional protection than the espousal of any other lawful cause. It is entitled to the same protection.”
A concurring opinion in Thomas v. Collins, at 543-544, stated this: “But once he uses the economic power which he has over other men and their jobs to influence their action, he is doing more than exercising the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment. That is true whether he be an employer or an employee. But as long as he does no more than speak he has the same unfettered right, no matter what side of an issue he espouses.”
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | C | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice O’Connor
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner Joseph Libretti pleaded guilty to engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise, in violation of 84 Stat. 1265, 21 U. S. C. §848 (1988 ed. and Supp. V), and agreed to forfeit numerous items of his property to the Government. We must decide whether Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(f) requires the District Court to determine whether a factual basis exists for a stipulated asset forfeiture embodied in a plea agreement, and whether the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 31(e) right to a special jury verdict on forfeiture can only be waived following specific advice from the District Court as to the existence and scope of this right and an express, written waiver.
I
In May 1992, Joseph Libretti was charged in a multicount superseding indictment with violations of various federal drug, firearms, and money-laundering laws. Included in the indictment was a count alleging that Libretti engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise (CCE), in violation of 21 U. S. C. § 848, by operating a cocaine and marijuana distribution organization in Wyoming and Colorado from 1984 to 1992. Conviction under §848 subjects a defendant to, among other penalties, “the forfeiture prescribed in section 853.” 21 U. S. C. § 848(a). Accordingly, the indictment further alleged that the Government was entitled to forfeiture of property that was obtained from or used to facilitate Libretti’s drug offenses, including, but not limited to, various assets specified in the indictment. See Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 7(c)(2) (“No judgment of forfeiture may be entered in a criminal proceeding unless the indictment or the information shall allege the extent of the interest or property subject to forfeiture”).
Trial began in September 1992. The Government presented testimony from 18 witnesses, including several individuals who had purchased cocaine or marijuana from Li-bretti, to establish Libretti’s involvement in the possession and distribution of considerable amounts of narcotics. The testimony also reflected Libretti’s purchase of a home, an automobile, and dozens of automatic and semiautomatic weapons during a time when he had only modest sources of legitimate income. Finally, the testimony revealed that Libretti stored large amounts of money and drugs in safety deposit boxes and storage facilities away from his home.
Following four days of testimony, Libretti and the Government entered into a plea agreement, by the terms of which Libretti agreed to plead guilty to the CCE count of the indictment (count 6). The Government in return agreed not to pursue additional charges against Libretti and to recommend that he be sentenced to the mandatory minimum of 20 years’ imprisonment. Paragraph 10 of the plea agreement provided that Libretti would
“transfer his right, title, and interest in all of his assets to the Division of Criminal Investigation of the Wyoming Attorney General including, but not limited to: all real estate; all personal property, including guns, the computer, and every other item now in the possession of the United States; all bank accounts, investments, retirement accounts, cash, cashier’s checks, travelers checks and funds of any kind.”
Two other paragraphs of the plea agreement also made reference to the contemplated forfeiture. Paragraph 2 described the maximum statutory penalty for the offense to which Li-bretti agreed to plead guilty, which included “forfeiture of all known assets as prescribed in 21 U. S. C. §853 and assets which are discovered at any later time up to $1,500,000.” In paragraph 9, Libretti agreed to “identify all assets that were used to facilitate his criminal activity” and to “provide complete financial disclosure forms requiring the listing of assets and financial interests.” Finally, Libretti acknowledged in the agreement “that by pleading guilty to Count Six of the Indictment, he waive[d] various constitutional rights, including the right to a jury trial.” It is beyond dispute that Libretti received a favorable plea agreement. The Government recommended that Libretti receive the minimum sentence for conviction under §848, and agreed to drop all other counts in the indictment. One of those counts charged Libretti with use of a firearm equipped with a silencer during the commission of a drug offense, which mandates a 30-year sentence consecutive to the term of imprisonment on the underlying drug offense. 18 U. S. C. § 924(c)(1). Li-bretti also faced a potential fine of up to $2 million. 21 U. S. C. §§ 848(a), 853(a).
At the subsequent hearing on the plea agreement, the trial judge advised Libretti of his rights, including his right to a jury trial. The court also clarified the consequences of Libretti’s plea, including the facts that a plea of guilty would mean “the end of this trial,” that “the jury [would] not... decide whether [he’s] guilty or not,” and that “all the property that’s described in... Count 6 could be forfeited to the United States.” App. 87, 88. Libretti was then placed under oath. He admitted that his plea was voluntary and indicated that he had read and understood the significance of the indictment and the plea agreement, including the fact that “all of [his] property could be forfeited, the property that is owned by [him] by reason of any drug transaction.” Id., at 100. Libretti’s only question about the plea agreement pertained to paragraph 2, which provided for future forfeiture of assets up to $1,500,000. The District Court assured Libretti that future forfeiture would be limited to subsequently discovered drug-tainted assets, and that his future legitimate income would not be forfeited. Id., at 88-89. After a lengthy exchange, in which the court reviewed each subparagraph describing the violations that composed the CCE charge and Libretti acknowledged each factual allegation, the District Court found that the guilty plea was voluntary and factually based. Id., at 121.
Following preparation of a presentence report, the District Court held a sentencing hearing, at which Libretti was sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment, to be followed by 5 years of supervised release, and ordered to pay a $5,000 fine as well as a mandatory $50 assessment and to perform 500 hours of community service. The Government filed a motion for forfeiture of Libretti’s assets, in keeping with the plea agreement. Libretti’s counsel offered no objection at the sentencing hearing, declaring that the forfeiture statute was “a harsh law” and “a bitter pill dealt by Congress,” but conceding that it was “a pill we must swallow.” Id., at 149. At the conclusion of the hearing, however, Libretti stated on the record that he “would just like to object to what [he saw] as a failure to find any factual basis for the whole forfeiture.” Id., at 154. The District Judge noted the objection, but replied that “the evidence that I heard before me in the two [sic] days of trial I think is sufficient to warrant the granting of forfeiture. I think I have no alternative.” Ibid. On December 23, 1992, the District Court entered an order of forfeiture pursuant to 21 U. S. C. § 853. The order listed specific property to be forfeited, including a parcel of real property in Wyoming, two condominiums, two automobiles, a mobile home, a diamond ring, various firearms, cash, several bank accounts, and a number of cashier’s and traveler’s checks. App. 155-164. One check was forfeited as a substitute asset. Id., at 162. Libretti filed an appeal from the order of forfeiture.
While this appeal was pending, the District Court entertained third-party claims to some of the property ordered forfeited. See 21 U. S. C. § 853(n). Following a March 1993 hearing, the court amended its forfeiture order to return certain property to the third-party claimants. The court also modified its order with respect to Libretti, stating that “it may be unjust to enforce the specific forfeiture provisions in the plea agreement” and reasoning that Libretti’s concession to forfeiture in the plea agreement provided insufficient basis for the order of forfeiture. App. 309. The court ordered a Magistrate to conduct a hearing at which Libretti would be given the opportunity to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that any portion of his property was not subject to forfeiture. Upon motion by the Government, the District Court stayed the proceedings before the Magistrate Judge pending resolution of Libretti’s appeal.
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit rejected both of Libretti’s challenges to the forfeiture order. 38 F. 3d 523 (1994). The court ruled first that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to consider Libretti’s claims to the property ordered forfeited at the third-party hearing, because Libretti had filed a notice of appeal. After noting the divergence in the Courts of Appeals regarding the applicability of Rule 11(f) to forfeiture provisions in plea agreements, the court rejected Libretti’s contention that Rule 11(f) requires a district court to ascertain a factual basis for a stipulated forfeiture of assets. This conclusion, the Court of Appeals reasoned, follows from the fact that forfeiture “is a part of the sentence, not a part of the substantive offense.” Id., at 528. The Court of Appeals also determined that Libretti had waived his Rule 31(e) right to a jury determination of forfeit-ability, despite the fact that the District Court did not expressly advise Libretti of the existence and scope of that right during his plea colloquy. Id., at 530-531. We granted certiorari to resolve disagreement among the Circuits as to the applicability of Rule 11(f) to asset forfeiture provisions contained in plea agreements and the requisites for waiver of the right to a jury determination of forfeitability under Rule 31(e). 514 U. S. 1035 (1995).
II
Libretti insists that the District Court’s forfeiture order must be set aside (or at least modified), because the court neglected to establish a “factual basis” for forfeiture of the property covered by the order under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(f). Absent such a finding, Libretti argues, even his concession to forfeiture in the plea agreement cannot authorize the forfeiture.
A
Libretti’s first claim is that the Rule by its very terms applies to a forfeiture provision contained in a plea agreement. Accordingly, our analysis must begin with the text of Rule 11(f):
“Determining Accuracy of Plea. Notwithstanding the acceptance of a plea of guilty, the court should not enter a judgment upon such plea without making such inquiry as shall satisfy it that there is a factual basis for the plea.”
By its plain terms, the Rule applies only to a “plea of guilty.” Our precedent makes clear that this language refers to a defendant’s admission of guilt of a substantive criminal offense as charged in an indictment and his waiver of the right to a jury determination on that charge. See, e. g., United States v. Broce, 488 U. S. 563, 570 (1989) (“By entering a plea of guilty, the accused is not simply stating that he did the discrete acts described in the indictment; he is admitting guilt of a substantive crime”); North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U. S. 25, 32 (1970); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U. S. 238, 242 (1969); McCarthy v. United States, 394 U. S. 459, 466 (1969). With this definition in mind, we have held that a district judge satisfies the requirements of Rule 11(f) when he “determine[s] ‘that the conduct which the defendant admits constitutes the offense charged in the indictment or information or an offense included therein to which the defendant has pleaded guilty.’” Id., at 467 (quoting Advisory Committee’s Notes on Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 11, 18 U. S. C. App., p. 730).
A forfeiture provision embodied in a plea agreement is of an entirely different nature. Forfeiture is an element of the sentence imposed following conviction or, as here, a plea of guilty, and thus falls outside the scope of Rule 11(f). The text of the relevant statutory provisions makes clear that Congress conceived of forfeiture as punishment for the commission of various drug and racketeering crimes. A person convicted of engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise “shall be sentenced... to the forfeiture prescribed in section 853.” 21 U. S. C. § 848(a) (emphasis added). Forfeiture is imposed “in addition to any other sentence.” 21 U. S. C. § 853(a) (emphasis added). See also 18 U. S. C. § 1963 (forfeiture is imposed “in addition to any other sentence” for a violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)). The legislative history of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-473, Tit. II, 98 Stat. 1976, also characterizes criminal forfeiture as punishment. See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 98-225, p. 193 (1983) (criminal forfeiture “is imposed as a sanction against the defendant upon his conviction”). Congress plainly intended forfeiture of assets to operate as punishment for criminal conduct in violation of the federal drug and racketeering laws, not as a separate substantive offense.
Our precedents have likewise characterized criminal forfeiture as an aspect of punishment imposed following conviction of a substantive criminal offense. In Alexander v. United States, 509 U. S. 544 (1993), we observed that the criminal forfeiture authorized by the RICO forfeiture statute “is clearly a form of monetary punishment no different, for Eighth Amendment purposes, from a traditional ‘fine.’ ” Id., at 558. Similarly, in United States v. $8,850, 461 U. S. 555 (1983), we recognized that a “criminal proceeding... may often include forfeiture as part of the sentence.” Id., at 567. And in Austin v. United States, 509 U. S. 602 (1993), we concluded that even the in rem civil forfeiture authorized by 21 U. S. C. §§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7) is punitive in nature, so that forfeiture imposed under those subsections is subject to the limitations of the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause. 509 U. S., at 619-622. Libretti himself conceded below that criminal forfeiture “is a part of the sentence, not a part of the substantive offense.” 38 F. 3d, at 528.
It is true, as Libretti points out, that we said in Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U. S. 617 (1989), that “forfeiture is a substantive charge in the indictment against a defendant.” Id., at 628, n. 5. That statement responded to the defendant’s claim that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel “for his defense” could be transformed into a defense to a forfeiture count in the indictment. We intended only to suggest that a defendant cannot escape an otherwise appropriate forfeiture sanction by pointing to his need for counsel to represent him on the underlying charges. Elsewhere in that opinion we recognized that forfeiture is a “criminal sanction,” id., at 634, and is imposed as a sentence under § 853, id., at 620, n. 1.
Libretti nonetheless insists that the criminal forfeiture for which § 853 provides is not “simply” an aspect of sentencing, but is, in essence, a hybrid that shares elements of both a substantive charge and a punishment imposed for criminal activity. In support of this contention, Libretti points to three Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure that, according to him, treat forfeiture as a substantive criminal charge. Rule 7(c)(2) provides that “[n]o judgment of forfeiture may be entered in a criminal proceeding unless the indictment or the information shall allege the extent of the interest or property subject to forfeiture.” If the indictment or information alleges that a defendant’s property is subject to forfeiture, “a special verdict shall be returned as to the extent of the interest or property subject to forfeiture, if any.” Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 31(e). And a finding of forfeitability must be embodied in a judgment. Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 32(d)(2) (“When a verdict contains a finding of criminal forfeiture, the judgment must authorize the Attorney General to seize the interest or property subject to forfeiture on terms that the court considers proper”).
Although the procedural safeguards generated by these Rules are unique in the realm of sentencing, they do not change the fundamental nature of criminal forfeiture. The fact that the Rules attach heightened procedural protections to imposition of criminal forfeiture as punishment for certain types of criminal conduct cannot alter the simple fact that forfeiture is precisely that: punishment. The Advisory Committee’s “assumption” that “the amount of the interest or property subject to criminal forfeiture is an element of the offense to be alleged and proved,” Advisory Committee’s Notes on Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 31, 18 U. S. C. App., p. 786, does not persuade us otherwise. The Committee’s assumption runs counter to the weighty authority discussed above, all of which indicates that criminal forfeiture is an element of the sentence imposed for a violation of certain drug and racketeering laws. Moreover, even supposing that the Committee’s assumption is authoritative evidence with respect to the amendments to Rules 7, 31, and 32, it has no bearing on the proper construction of Rule 11. Tome v. United States, 513 U. S. 150 (1995), is not to the contrary. The Tome plurality treated the Advisory Committee’s Notes on Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B) as relevant evidence of the drafters’ intent as to the meaning of that Rule. 513 U. S., at 160-163. In contrast, Libretti seeks to use the Note appended to Rule 31 to elucidate the meaning of an entirely distinct Rule. We cannot agree that the Advisory Committee’s Notes on the 1972 amendment to Rule 31(e) shed any particular light on the meaning of the language of Rule 11(f), which was added by amendment to Rule 11 in 1966.
B
Libretti next advances three policy arguments for construing Rule 11(f) to reach asset forfeiture provisions of plea agreements. First, he claims, Rule ll(f)’s factual basis inquiry is essential to ensuring that a forfeiture agreement is knowing and voluntary. Next, Libretti declares that a Rule 11(f) inquiry will protect against Government overreaching. And lastly, Libretti insists that a factual basis inquiry is necessary to ensure that the rights of third-party claimants are fully protected. We consider these contentions in turn.
We are unpersuaded that the Rule 11(f) inquiry is necessary to guarantee that a forfeiture agreement is knowing and voluntary. Whether a stipulated asset forfeiture is “factually based” is a distinct inquiry from the question whether the defendant entered an agreement to forfeit assets knowingly and voluntarily. Libretti correctly points out that Rule 11(f) is intended to ensure that a defendant’s “plea of guilty” is knowing and voluntary. McCarthy, 894 U. S., at 472 (the Rule 11 inquiry is “designed to facilitate a more accurate determination of the voluntariness of [a] plea”); Advisory Committee’s Notes on Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 11,18 U. S. C. App., p. 730 (Rule 11(f) protects defendants who do not “realiz[e] that [their] conduct does not actually fall within the charge”). But a “plea of guilty” and a forfeiture provision contained in a plea agreement are different matters altogether. Forfeiture, as we have said, is a part of the sentence. If the voluntariness of a defendant’s concession to imposition of a particular sentence is questionable, the relevant inquiry is whether the sentencing stipulation was informed and uncoerced on the part of the defendant, not whether it is factually sound.
Libretti’s second argument — that a Rule 11(f) factual basis inquiry is necessary to prevent prosecutorial overreaching— proves equally unavailing. As Libretti properly observes, §853 limits forfeiture by establishing a factual nexus requirement: Only drug-tainted assets may be forfeited. Li-bretti suggests that failure to ensure, by means of a Rule 11(f) inquiry, that this factual nexus exists will open the door to voluntary forfeiture agreements that exceed the forfeiture authorized by statute, particularly in light of the Government’s direct financial interest in forfeiture as a source of revenue and the disparity in bargaining power between the Government and a defendant. We recognized in Caplin & Drysdale that the broad forfeiture provisions carry the potential for Government abuse and “can be devastating when used unjustly.” 491 U. S., at 634. Nonetheless, we concluded that “[c]ases involving particular abuses can be dealt with individually by the lower courts, when (and if) any such cases arise.” Id., at 635. However valid Libretti’s concern about prosecutorial overreaching may be, Rule 11(f) simply does not, on its face, address it.
We do not mean to suggest that a district court must simply accept a defendant’s agreement to forfeit property, particularly when that agreement is not accompanied by a stipulation of facts supporting forfeiture, or when the trial judge for other reasons finds the agreement problematic. In this regard, we note that the Department of Justice recently issued a Revised Policy Regarding Forfeiture by Settlement and Plea Bargaining in Civil and Criminal Actions, Directive 94-7 (Nov. 1994), to instruct that, among the procedures necessary to ensure a valid forfeiture agreement, “[t]he settlement to forfeit property must be in writing and the defendant must concede facts supporting the forfeiture.” Id., at 13. In this case, however, we need not determine the precise scope of a district court’s independent obligation, if any, to inquire into the propriety of a stipulated asset forfeiture embodied in a plea agreement. We note that the Sentencing Guidelines direct only that a district court “may” accept an agreement reached by the parties as to a specific, appropriate sentence, as long as the sentence is within the applicable guideline range or departs from that range “for justifiable reasons.” United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual §6B1.2(c)(2) (Nov. 1993). Libretti’s plea agreement correctly recognized that the District Court was not bound by the parties’ agreement as to the appropriate sentence: “[T]he sentencing judge is neither a party to nor bound by this plea agreement and is free to impose whatever sentence he feels is justified.” App. 81, ¶ 11.
Libretti finally argues that a Rule 11(f) factual basis inquiry is essential to preserving third-party claimants’ rights. A defendant who has no interest in particular assets, the argument goes, will have little if any incentive to resist forfeiture of those assets, even if there is no statutory basis for their forfeiture. Once the Government has secured a stipulation as to forfeitability, third-party claimants can establish their entitlement to return of the assets only by means of the hearing afforded under 21 U. S. C. § 853(n). This hearing, Libretti claims, is inadequate to safeguard third-party rights, since the entry of a forfeiture order deprives third-party claimants of the right to a jury trial and reverses the burden of proof. He concludes that insisting on a factual basis inquiry before entry of the forfeiture order will lessen the need for third-party hearings following a broad-ranging forfeiture agreement, and may even result in the conservation of scarce judicial resources. Whatever the merits of this argument as a matter of policy, Congress has determined that §853(n), rather than Rule 11(f), provides the means by which third-party rights must be vindicated. Third-party claimants are not party to Rule 11(f) proceedings, and Libretti’s assertion that their interests are best protected therein fits poorly within our adversary system of justice.
C
Contrary to the suggestion of the dissent, post, at 57, the District Court did not rest its forfeiture order on nothing more than Libretti’s stipulation that certain assets were for-feitable. In fact, there is ample evidence that the District Court both understood the statutory requisites for criminal forfeiture and concluded that they were satisfied on the facts of this case at the time the sentence was imposed. First, the District Judge correctly recognized the factual nexus requirement established by §853. App. 89 (change-of-plea hearing) (“[I]t has to be the product of a drug transaction to be forfeited”). Count 6 of the indictment specified numerous items of property alleged to be subject to forfeiture under that statute, including a parcel of real property in Wyoming; two automobiles; over $100,000 in cash proceeds from drug transactions; $12,000 in cash that Libretti had stored inside a paint can at his home; a diamond ring; “[a]ll United States currency and travelers checks” recovered from Libretti’s storage lockers, safes, home, and person; a mobile home; a computer system; four bank accounts; two GNMA investment certificates; bonds; three cashier’s checks; and the contents of two safe deposit boxes. Additional property was identified in a bill of particulars and a restraining order issued, and subsequently amended, by the District Court pursuant to 21 U. S. C. § 853(e) (“Upon application of the United States, the court may enter a restraining order... to preserve the availability of property described in subsection (a) of this section for forfeiture under this section”). After one week of trial, the parties submitted to the court an agreement which set out, in detail, specific items of property to be forfeited following Libretti’s plea of guilty, including “all real estate; all personal property, including guns, the computer, and every other item now in the possession of the United States; all bank accounts, investments, retirement accounts, cash, cashier’s checks, travelers checks and funds of any kind.” App. 81. The plea agreement also explained that the maximum penalty for the offense to which Libretti agreed to plead guilty included “forfeiture of all known assets as prescribed in 21 U. S. C. § 853 and assets which are discovered at any later time up to $1,500,000.” App. 79.
Before issuing the order of forfeiture, the trial judge listened to four days of testimony, in which Government witnesses detailed numerous drug transactions with Libretti. See, e. g., 2 Tr. 124-126, 137-139; 3 id., at 271-272; 4 id., at 495-501; 5 id., at 946-949. One witness recounted Libretti’s purchase of a home in 1985 with a $100,000 down payment, at a time during which he was earning an annual salary of approximately $20,000. 2 id., at 179-180, 210-216; App. 123 (Presentence Report, Prosecutor’s Statement ¶ 6); Presen-tence Report ¶ 37. Another told of Libretti’s purchase of a sports car with a check for $19,114. 5 Tr. 907-913. Other witnesses described Libretti’s possession, in his capacity as a federal firearms dealer, of numerous automatic and semiautomatic firearms, later determined to be worth at least $243,000. See, e. g., 2 id., at 140-141, 156-162; 5 id., at 844-853; App. 123 (Presentence Report, Prosecutor’s Statement ¶ 9). One witness testified that Libretti admitted having “quite a bit of money stashed away” in safe deposit boxes, 5 Tr. 834, and on at least one occasion had “a couple thousand” dollars in cash “sitting around,” id., at 835. Other witnesses established that Libretti often stored cash and drugs in safe deposit boxes and storage facilities away from his home. See, e. g., 2 id., at 155-156; 4 id., at 718-720, 738-743. One of Libretti’s drug customers testified that he broke into a storage facility at which Libretti had rented a storage locker and discovered a briefcase containing a large amount of cash (later estimated in the presentence report to be approximately $150,000), a large block of cocaine, and five large trash bags, at least one of which was filled with marijuana. Id., at 558-566, 588-589.
Prior to sentencing, the court received the presentence investigation report, which contained, among other things, a summary of Libretti’s legitimate income during the relevant time periods. During 1985 and 1986, Libretti worked as a restaurant and grocery store manager, earning approximately $20,000 per year. In early 1987, he was employed as a temporary stock broker and was paid on commission only. Later that year, he managed a Tenneco thrift store. In 1989, Libretti reported an income of approximately $50,000 from his firearms business. During 1988 and 1989, Libretti also owned a partnership interest in two condominiums; he reported that the rental income did not meet his expenses and thus he did not earn a profit. Between June 1989 and his arrest in December 1991, Libretti worked as a full-time accounting supervisor, earning a salary of approximately $40,000 per year. Presentence Report ¶¶ 35-37.
Included in the presentence report was a prosecutor’s statement detailing the amounts of cocaine and marijuana involved in Libretti’s drug operation and various sums of money Libretti earned from his drug dealing. App. 122-135. The statement described Libretti’s substantial expenditures, including the $100,000 cash deposit on a house in 1985 ($72,000 of which was derived from Libretti’s sale of drugs) and the purchase of a $20,000 mortgage in 1986 (again, allegedly with proceeds from his distribution of drugs). Id., at 123. Paragraph 12 reported that Libretti had opened a safe deposit box in 1987 in which he placed $48,000 in cash. On another occasion, Libretti placed approximately $10,000 into an account bearing his brother’s name. Id., at 124-125. The statement described Libretti’s practice of storing large amounts of cash and drugs in safes, storage lockers, and safe deposit boxes. Id., at 124, 129. Libretti also stored drugs, a weapon, and a cashier’s check for $65,000 in his personal locker at his place of employment. Id., at 129. The statement related Libretti’s investment of at least $243,000 in numerous firearms. Id., at 123-124. These funds again reportedly derived from Libretti’s drug distribution activities; the statement indicated that “Libretti’s gun business was used to launder drug proceeds” and served as a means by which Libretti could “justify his income since [he] was not working at times during the conspiracy and, when he was working, was not bringing in the money that would pay for the Lakewood house and other investments.” Id., at 127. Finally, the statement suggested that substantial sums of cash derived from Libretti’s drug activities were never recovered by law enforcement authorities. Id., at 134. Defense counsel conceded at the sentencing hearing that “the [presentence] report of Mr. Libretti’s background, education, financial circumstances are [sic] accurate.” Id., at 138. In light of these facts, defense counsel acknowledged that “the forfeiture is going to take regular money and illegal money under the substitute assets” provision of § 853. Id., at 149.
In view of the plea agreement, the indictment, and the amended restraining order, the trial judge issued an order forfeiting to the Government the Wyoming lot, both condominiums, both automobiles, $8,000 in cash proceeds of Libret-ti’s drug transactions, the diamond ring, the mobile home, all firearms, an IRA account, three bank accounts, bonds, two GNMA certificates, and several cashier’s and traveler’s checks. One check was ordered forfeited as a substitute asset “for assets dissipated and otherwise expended by Li-bretti.” Id., at 162.
It is not, as Libretti maintains, implausible that the court concluded on the record before it that the forfeiture order was appropriate. Following Libretti’s objection to the forfeiture order for lack of factual foundation, the trial judge replied that “the evidence that I heard before me in the two [sic] days of trial I think is sufficient to warrant the granting of forfeiture.” Id., at 154. We cannot say that the District Judge, despite his subsequent uncertainty, erred in issuing the forfeiture order on the facts before him.
Ill
Libretti also challenges the adequacy of his waiver of a jury determination as to the forfeitability of his property under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 31(e). The right, he argues, has both a constitutional and a statutory foundation,, and cannot be waived absent specific advice from the district court as to the nature and scope of this right and an express, written agreement to forgo the jury determination on forfeitability. We disagree.
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 31(e) provides that, “[i]f the indictment or the information alleges that an interest or property is subject to criminal forfeiture, a special verdict shall be returned as to the extent of the interest or property subject to forfeiture, if any.” Libretti would have us equate this statutory right to a jury determination of forfeitability with the familiar Sixth Amendment right to a jury determination of guilt or innocence. See, e. g., United States v. Gaudin, 515 U. S. 506, 511 (1995) (“The Constitution gives a criminal defendant the right to demand that a jury find him guilty of all the elements of the crime with which he is charged”). Without disparaging the importance of the right provided by Rule 31(e), our analysis of the nature of criminal forfeiture as an aspect of sentencing compels the conclusion that the right to a jury verdict on forfeitability does not fall within the Sixth Amendment’s constitutional protection. Our cases have made abundantly clear that a defendant does not enjoy a constitutional right to a jury determination as to the appropriate sentence to be imposed. See, e. g., McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U. S. 79, 93 (1986) (“[T]here is no Sixth Amendment right to jury sentencing, even where the sentence turns on specific findings of fact”); Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U. S. 376, 385 (1986) (“The decision whether a particular punishment... is, appropriate in any given case is not one that we have ever required to be made by a jury”); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U. S. 447, 459 (1984) (no right to a jury determination as to the imposition of the death penalty).
Given that the right to a jury determination of forfeitability is merely statutory in origin, we do not accept Libretti’s suggestion that the plea agreement must make specific reference to Rule 31(e). Nor must the district court specifically advise a defendant that a plea of guilty will result in waiver of the Rule 31(e) right. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c) details the information a district court must communicate to a defendant in order to ensure that a guilty plea is valid. Advisory Committee’s Notes
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | A | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Souter
delivered the opinion of the Court.
By administrative subpoena, the Office of Special Investigations of the Criminal Division of the United States Department of Justice (OSI) sought testimony from the respondent, Aloyzas Balsys, about his wartime activities between 1940 and 1944 and his immigration to the United States in 1961. Balsys declined to answer such questions, claiming the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, based on his fear of prosecution by a foreign nation. We hold that concern with foreign prosecution is beyond the scope of the Self-Incrimination Clause.
I
Respondent Aloyzas Balsys is a resident alien living in Woodhaven, New York, having obtained admission to this country in 1961 under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U. S. C. § 1201, on an immigrant visa and alien registration issued at the American Consulate in Liverpool. In his application, he said that he had served in the Lithuanian army between 1934 and 1940, and had lived in hiding in Plateliai, Lithuania, between 1940 and 1944. Balsys swore that the information was true, and signed a statement of understanding that if his application contained any false information or materially misleading statements, or concealed any material fact, he would be subject to criminal prosecution and deportation.
OSI, which was created to institute denaturalization and deportation proceedings against suspected Nazi war criminals, is now investigating whether, contrary to his representations, Balsys participated in Nazi persecution during World War II. Such activity would subject him to deportation for persecuting persons because of their race, religion, national origin, or political opinion under §§ 1182(a)(3)(E) and 1251(a)(4)(D), as well as for lying on his visa application under §§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(i) and 1251(a)(1)(A).
When OSI issued a subpoena requiring Balsys to testify at a deposition, he appeared and gave his name and address, but he refused to answer any other questions, such as those directed to his wartime activities in Europe between 1940-1945 and his immigration to the United States in 1961. In response to all such questions, Balsys invoked the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination, claiming that his answers could subject him to criminal prosecution. He did not contend that he would incriminate himself under domestic law, but claimed the privilege because his responses could subject him to criminal prosecution by Lithuania, Israel, and Germany.
OSI responded with a petition in Federal District Court to enforce the subpoena under § 1225(a). Although the District Court found that if Balsys were to provide the information requested, he would face a real and substantial danger of prosecution by Lithuania and Israel (but not by Germany), it granted OSI’s enforcement petition and ordered Balsys to testify, treating the Fifth Amendment as inapplicable to a claim of incrimination solely under foreign law. 918 F. Supp. 588 (EDNY 1996). Balsys appealed, and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated the Distinct Court’s order, holding that a witness with a real and substantial fear of prosecution by a foreign country may assert the Fifth Amendment privilege to avoid giving testimony in a domes-tie proceeding, even if the witness has no valid fear of a criminal prosecution in this country. 119 F. 3d 122 (1997). We granted certiorari, 522 U. S. 1072 (1998), to resolve a conflict among the Circuits on this issue and now reverse.
I — [ HH
The Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U. S. Const., Arndt. 5. Resident aliens such as Balsys are considered “persons” for purposes of the Fifth Amendment and are entitled to the same protections under the Clause as citizens. See Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U. S. 590, 596 (1953). The parties do not dispute that the Government seeks to “compel” testimony from Balsys that would make him “a witness against himself” The question is whether there is a risk that Balsys’s testimony will be used in a proceeding that is a “criminal ease.”
Balsys agrees that the risk that his testimony might subject him to deportation is not a sufficient ground for asserting the privilege, given the civil character of a deportation proceeding. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U. S. 1032, 1038-1039 (1984). If, however, Balsys could demonstrate that any testimony he might give in the deportation investigation could be used in a criminal proceeding against him brought by the Government of either the United States or one of the States, he would be entitled to invoke the privilege. It “can be asserted in any proceeding, civil or criminal, administrative or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory,” in which the witness reasonably believes that the information sought, or discoverable as a result of his testimony, could be used in a subsequent state or federal criminal proceeding. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U. S. 441, 444-445 (1972); see also McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U. S. 34, 40 (1924) (the privilege “applies alike to civil and criminal proceedings, wherever the answer might tend to subject to criminal responsibility him who gives it”). But Balsys makes no such claim, contending rather that his entitlement to invoke the privilege arises because of a real and substantial fear that his testimony could be used against him by Lithuania or Israel in a criminal prosecution. The reasonableness of his fear is not challenged by the Government, and we thus squarely face the question whether a criminal prosecution by a foreign government not subject to our constitutional guarantees presents a “criminal case” for purposes of the privilege against self-incrimination.
Ill
Balsys relies in the first instance on the textual contrast between the Sixth Amendment, which clearly applies only to domestic criminal proceedings, and the Compelled Self-Incrimination Clause, with its facially broader reference to “any criminal case.” The same point is developed by Balsys’s amici, who argue that “any criminal case” means exactly that, regardless of the prosecuting authority. According to the argument, the Framers' use of the adjective “any” precludes recognition of the distinction raised by the Government, between prosecution by a jurisdiction that is itself bound to recognize the privilege and prosecution by a foreign jurisdiction that is not. But the argument overlooks the cardinal rule to construe provisions in context. See King v. St. Vincent’s Hospital, 502 U. S. 215, 221 (1991). In the Fifth Amendment context, the Clause in question occurs in the company of guarantees of grand jury proceedings, defense against double jeopardy, due process, and compensation for property taking. Because none of these provisions is implicated except by action of the government that it binds, it would have been strange to choose such associates for a Clause meant to take a broader view, and it would be strange to find such a sweep in the Clause now. See Wharton v. Wise, 153 U. S. 155, 169-170 (1894) (noscitur a sociis); see also Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U. S. 561, 575 (1995) (same). The oddity of such a reading would be especially stark if the expansive language in question is open to another reasonable interpretation, as we think it is. Because the Fifth Amendment opens by requiring a grand jury indictment or presentment “for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,” the phrase beginning with “any” in the subsequent Self-Incrimination Clause may sensibly be read as making it clear that the privilege it provides is not so categorically limited. It is plausible to suppose the adjective was inserted only for that purpose, not as taking the further step of defining the relevant prosecutorial jurisdiction internationally. We therefore take this to be the fair reading of the adjective “any,” and we read the Clause contextually as apparently providing a witness with the right against compelled self-incrimination when reasonably fearing prosecution by the government whose power the Clause limits, but not otherwise. Since there is no helpful legislative history, and because there was no different common law practice at the time of the framing, see Part III-C, infra; cf. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547, 563-564 (1892) (listing a sample of cases, including preframing eases, in which the privilege was asserted, none of which involve fear of foreign prosecution), there is no reason to disregard the contextual reading. This Court’s precedent has indeed adopted that so-called same-sovereign interpretation.
A
The currently received understanding of the Bill of Rights as instituted “to curtail and restrict the general powers granted to the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Branches” of the National Government defined in the original constitutional articles, New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U. S. 713, 716 (1971) (per curiam) (Black, J., concurring) (emphasis deleted), was expressed early on in Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion for the Court in the leading ease of Barron ex rel. Tiernan v. Mayor of Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243, 247 (1833): the Constitution’s “limitations on power... are naturally, and, we think, necessarily applicable to the government created by the instrument,” and not to “distinct [state] governments, framed by different persons and for dif-fei’ent purposes.”
To be sure, it would have been logically possible to decide (as in Barron) that the “distinct [state] governments... framed... for different purposes” were beyond the ambit of the Fifth Amendment, and at the same time to hold that the self-incrimination privilege, good against the National Government, was implicated by fear of prosecution in another jurisdiction. But after Barron and before the era of Fourteenth Amendment incorporation, that would have been an unlikely doctrinal combination, and no such improbable development occurred.
The precursors of today’s case were those raising the question of the significance for the federal privilege of possible use of testimony in state prosecution. Only a handful of early eases even touched on the problem. In Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591 (1896), a witness raised the issue, claiming the privilege in a federal proceeding based on his fear of prosecution by a State, but we found that a statute under which immunity from federal prosecution had been conferred provided for immunity from state prosecution as well, obviating any need to reach the issue raised. Id., at, 606-608. In Jack v. Kansas, 199 U. S. 372 (1905), a Fourteenth Amendment case, we affirmed a sentence for contempt imposed on a witness in a state proceeding who had received immunity from state prosecution but refused to answer questions based on a fear that they would subject him to federal prosecution. Although there was no reasonable fear of a prosecution by the National Government in that ease, we addressed the question whether a self-incrimination privilege could be invoked in the one jurisdiction based on fear of prosecution by the other, saying that “[w]e think the legal immunity is in regard to a prosecution in the same jurisdiction, and when that is fully given it is enough.” Id., at 382. A year later, in the course of considering whether a federal witness, immunized from federal prosecution, could invoke the privilege based on fear of state prosecution, we adopted the general proposition that “the possibility that information given by the witness might be used” by the other government is, as a matter of law, “a danger so unsubstantial and remote” that it fails to trigger the right to invoke the privilege. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, 69 (1906).
“[I]f the argument were a sound one it might be carried still further and held to apply not only to state prosecutions within the same jurisdiction, but to prosecutions under the criminal laws of other States to which the witness might have subjected himself. The question has been folly considered in England, and the conclusion reached by the courts of that country [is] that the only danger to be considered is one arising within the same jurisdiction and under the same sovereignty. Queen v. Boyes, 1 B. & S. 311[, 121 Eng. Rep. 730]; King of the Two Sicilies v. Willcox, 7 State Trials (N. S.), 1049, 1068; State v. March, 1 Jones (N. Car.), 526; State v. Thomas, 98 N. Car. 599.” Ibid.
A holding to this effect came when United States v. Murdock, 284 U. S. 141 (1931), “definitely settled” the question whether in a federal proceeding the privilege applied on account of fear of state prosecution, concluding “that one under examination in a federal tribunal could not refose to answer on account of probable incrimination under state law.” United States v. Murdock, 290 U. S. 389, 396 (1933).
“The English rule of evidence against compulsory self-inerimination, on which historically that contained in the Fifth Amendment rests, does not protect witnesses against disclosing offenses in violation of the laws of another country. King of the Two Sicilies v. Willcox, 7 State Trials (N. S.) 1049, 1068. Queen v. Boyes, 1 B. & S., at 330[, 121 Eng. Rep., at 738]. This court has held that immunity against state prosecution is not essential to the validity of federal statutes declaring that a witness shall not be excused from giving evidence on the ground that it will incriminate him, and also that the lack of state power to give witnesses protection against federal prosecution does not defeat a state immunity statute. The principle established is that full and complete immunity against prosecution by the government compelling the witness to answer is equivalent to the protection furnished by the rule against compulsory self-incrimination. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547. Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591, 606. Jack v. Kansas, 199 U. S. 372, 381. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, 68. As appellee at the hearing did not invoke protection against federal prosecution, his.plea is without merit and the government’s demurrer should have been sustained.” Murdock, 284 U. S., at 149.
Murdock’s resolution of the question received a subsequent complement when we affirmed again that a State could compel a witness to give testimony that might incriminate him under federal law, see Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U. S. 371 (1958), overruled by Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n of N. Y. Harbor, 378 U. S. 52 (1964), testimony that we had previously held to be admissible into evidence in the federal courts, see Feldman v. United States, 322 U. S. 487 (1944), overruled by Murphy, supra, at 80.
B
It has been suggested here that our precedent addressing fear of prosecution by a government other than the compelling authority fails to reflect the Murdock rule uniformly. In 1927 (prior to our decision in Murdock), in a case involving a request for habeas relief from a deportation order, we declined to resolve whether “the Fifth Amendment guarantees immunity from self-incrimination under state statutes.” United States ex rel. Vajtauer v. Commissioner of Immigration, 273 U. S. 103, 113 (1927). Although we found that the witness had waived his claim to the privilege, our decision might be read to suggest that there was some tension between the reasoning of two of the eases discussed above, Hale v. Henkel and Brown v. Walker, and the analyses contained in two others, United States v. Saline Bank of Va., 1 Pet. 100 (1828), and Ballmann v. Fagin, 200 U. S. 186 (1906). 273 U. S., at 113. These last two eases have in fact been cited here for the claim that prior to due process incorporation, the privilege could be asserted in a federal proceeding based on fear of prosecution by a State. Saline Bank and Ballmann are not, however, inconsistent with Murdock.
In Saline Bank, we permitted the defendants to refuse discovery sought by the United States in federal court, where the defendants claimed that their responses would result in incrimination under the laws of 'Virginia. “The rule clearly is, that a party is not bound to make any discovery which would expose him to penalties, and this case falls within it.” 1 Pet., at 104. But, for all the sweep of this statement, the opinion makes no mention of the Fifth Amendment, and in Hale v. Henkel, we explained that “the prosecution [in Saline Bank] was under a state law which imposed the penalty, and... the Federal court was simply administering the state law.” 201 U. S., at 69. The state law, which addresses prosecutions brought by the State, suggested the rule that the Saline Bank Court applied to the case before it; the law provided that “no disclosure made by any party defendant to such suit in equity, and no books or papers exhibited by him in answer to the bill, or under the order of the Court, shall be used as evidence against him in any... prosecution under this law,” quoted in 1 Pet., at 104. Saline Bank, then, may have turned on a reading of state statutory law. Cf. MeNaughton, Self-Incrimination Under Foreign Law, 45 Va. L. Rev. 1299,1305-1306 (1959) (suggesting that Saline Bank represents “an application not of the privilege against self-incrimination... but of the principle that equity will not aid a forfeiture”). But see Ballmann, supra, at 195 (Holmes, J.) (suggesting that Saline Bank is a Fifth Amendment case, though this view was soon repudiated by the Court in Hale, as just noted).
Where Saline Bank is laconic, Ballmann is equivocal. While Ballmann specifically argued only the danger of incriminating himself under state law as his basis for invoking the privilege in a federal proceeding, and we upheld his claim of privilege, our opinion indicates that we concluded that Ballmann might have had a fear of incrimination under federal law as well as under state law. “While we did suggest, contrary to the Murdock rule, that Ballmann might have been able to invoke the privilege based on a fear of state prosecution, the opinion says only that “[o]ne way or the other [due to the risk of incrimination under federal or state law] we are of opinion that Ballmann could not be required to produce his cash book if he set up that it would tend to criminate him.” 200 U. S., at 195-196. At its equivocal worst, Ballmann reigned for only two months. Hale v. Henkel explained that “the only danger to be considered is one arising within the same jurisdiction and under the same sovereignty,” 201 U. S., at 69, and Ballmann and Saline Bank were later, of course, superseded by Murdock with its unequivocal holding that prosecution in a state jurisdiction not bound by the Clause is beyond the purview of the privilege.
C
In 1964, our precedent took a turn away from the unqualified proposition that fear of prosecution outside the jurisdiction seeking to compel testimony did not implicate a Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment privilege, as the case might be. In Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n of N. Y. Harbor, 378 U. S. 52 (1964), we reconsidered the converse of the situation in Murdock, whether a witness in a state proceeding who had been granted immunity from state prosecution could invoke the privilege based on fear of prosecution on federal charges. In the course of enquiring into a work stoppage at several New Jersey piers, the Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor subpoenaed the defendants, who were given immunity from prosecution under the laws of New Jersey and New York. When the witnesses persisted in refusing to testify based on their fear of federal prosecution, they were held in civil contempt, and the order was affirmed by New Jersey’s highest court. In re Application of the Waterfront Comm’n of N. Y. Harbor, 39 N. J. 436, 449, 189 A. 2d 36, 44 (1963). This Court held the defendants could be forced to testify not because fear of federal prosecution was irrelevant but because the Self-Incrimination Clause barred the National Government from using their state testimony or its fruits to obtain a federal conviction. We explained that “the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination protects a state witness against incrimination under federal as well as state law and a federal witness against incrimination under state as well as federal law.” 378 U. S., at 77-78.
Murphy is a case invested with two alternative rationales. Under the first, the result reached in Murphy was undoubtedly correct, given the decision rendered that very same day in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1 (1964), which applied the doctrine of Fourteenth Amendment due process incorporation to the Self-Incrimination Clause, so as to bind the States as well as the National Government to recognize the privilege. Id., at 3. Prior to Malloy, the Court had refused to impose the privilege against self-incrimination against the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, see Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78 (1908), thus leaving state-court witnesses seeking exemption from compulsion to testify to their rights under state law, as supplemented by the Fourteenth Amendment’s limitations on coerced confessions. Malloy, however, established that “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment secures against state invasion the same privilege that the Fifth Amendment guarantees against federal infringement — the right of a person to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will, and to suffer no penalty... for such silence.” 378 U. S., at 8.
As the Court immediately thereafter said in Murphy, Malloy “necessitate^] a reconsideration” of the unqualified Murdock rule that a witness subject to testimonial compulsion in one jurisdiction, state or federal, could not plead fear of prosecution in the other. 378 U. S., at 57. After Malloy, the Fifth Amendment limitation could no longer be seen as framed for one jurisdiction alone, each jurisdiction having instead become subject to the same claim of privilege flowing from the one limitation. Since fear of prosecution in the one jurisdiction bound by the Clause now implicated the very privilege binding upon the other, the Murphy opinion sensibly recognized that if a witness could not assert the privilege in such circumstances, the witness could be “whipsawed into incriminating himself under both state and federal law even though the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is applicable to each.” 378 U. S., at 55 (internal quotation marks omitted). The whipsawing was possible owing to a feature unique to the guarantee against self-incrimination among the several Fifth Amendment privileges. In the absence of waiver, the other such guarantees are purely and simply binding on the government. But under the Self-Incrimination Clause, the government has an option to exchange the stated privilege for an immunity to prosecutorial use of any compelled inculpatory testimony. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U. S., at 448-449. The only condition on the government when it decides to offer immunity in place of the privilege to stay silent is the requirement to provide an immunity as broad as the privilege itself. Id., at 449. After Malloy had held the privilege binding on the state jurisdictions as well as the National Government, it would therefore have been intolerable to allow a prosecutor in one or the other jurisdiction to eliminate the privilege by offering immunity less complete than the privilege’s dual jurisdictional reach. Murphy accordingly held that a federal court could not receive testimony compelled by a State in the absence of a statute effectively providing for federal immunity, and it did this by imposing an exclusionary rule prohibiting the National Government "from making any such use of compelled testimony and its fruits,” 378 U. S., at 79 (footnote omitted).
This view of Murphy as necessitated by Malloy was adopted in the subsequent case of Kastigar v. United States, supra, at 456, n. 42 (“Reconsideration of the rule that the Fifth Amendment privilege does not protect a witness in one jurisdiction against being compelled to give testimony that could be used to convict him in another jurisdiction was made necessary by the decision in Malloy v. Hogan”). Read this way, Murphy rests upon the same understanding of the Self-Incrimination Clause that Murdock recognized and to which the earlier eases had pointed. Although the Clause serves a variety of interests in one degree or another, see Part IV, infra, at its heart lies the principle that the courts of a government from which a witness may reasonably fear prosecution may not in fairness compel the witness to furnish testimonial evidence that may be used to prove his guilt. After Murphy, the immunity option open to the Executive Branch could be exercised only on the understanding that the state and federal jurisdictions were as one, with a federally mandated exclusionary rule filling the space between the limits of state immunity statutes and the scope of the privilege. As so understood, Murphy stands at odds with Balsys’s claim.
There is, however, a competing rationale in Murphy, investing the Clause with a more expansive promise. The Murphy majority opened the door to this view by rejecting this Court’s previous understanding of the English common-law evidentiary privilege against compelled self-incrimination, which could have informed the Framers’ understanding of the Fifth Amendment privilege. See, e. g., Murphy, 378 U. S., at 67 (rejecting Murdock’s analysis of the scope of the privilege under English common law). Having removed what it saw as an unjustified, historically derived limitation on the privilege, the Murphy Court expressed a comparatively ambitious conceptualization of personal privacy underlying the Clause, one capable of supporting, if not demanding, the scope of protection that Balsys claims. As the Court of Appeals recognized, if we take the Murphy opinion at face value, the expansive rationale can be claimed quite as legitimately as the Murdock-Malloy-Kastigar understanding of Murphy’s result, and Balsys’s claim accordingly requires us to decide whether Murphy’s innovative side is as sound as its traditional one. We conclude that it is not.
As support for the view that the Court had previously misunderstood the English rule, Murphy relied, first, on two preconstitutional English cases, East India Co. v. Campbell, 1 Ves. sen. 246, 27 Eng. Rep. 1010 (Ex. 1749), and Brownsword v. Edwards, 2 Ves. sen. 243, 28 Eng. Rep. 157 (Ch. 1750), for the proposition that a witness in an English court was permitted to invoke the privilege based on fear of prosecution in a foreign jurisdiction. See 378 U. S., at 58-59. Neither of these cases is on point as holding that proposition, however. In East India Co., a defendant before the Court of Exchequer, seeking to avoid giving an explanation for his possession of certain goods, claimed the privilege on the ground that his testimony might subject him to a fine or corporal punishment. The Court of Exchequer found that the defendant would be punishable in Calcutta, then an English Colony, and said it would “not oblige one to discover that, which, if he answers in the affirmative, will subject him to the punishment of a crime.” 1 Ves. sen., at 247, 27 Eng. Rep., at 1011. In Brownsword, a defendant before the Court of Chancery claimed the privilege on the ground that her testimony could render her liable to prosecution in an English ecclesiastical court. “The general rule,” the court said, “is that no one is bound to answer so as to subject himself to punishment, whether that punishment arises by the ecclesiastical law of the land.” 2 Ves. sen., at 245, 28 Eng. Rep., at 158. Although this statement, like its counterpart in East India Co., is unqualified, neither case is authority.for the proposition that fear of prosecution in foreign courts implicates the privilege. For in each of these cases, the judicial system to which the witness’s fears related was subject to the same legislative sovereignty that had created the courts in which the privilege was claimed. In fact, when these cases were decided, and for years after adoption of the Fifth Amendment, English authority was silent on whether fear of prosecution by a foreign nation implicated the privilege, and the 'Vice-Chancellor so stated in 1851. See King of the Two Sicilies v. Willcox, 1 Sim. (N. S.) 301, 331, 61 Eng. Rep, 116, 128 (Ch. 1851) (observing, in the course of an opinion that clearly involved a claim of privilege based on the fear of prosecution by another sovereign, that there is an “absence of all authority on the point”).
Murphy, in fact, went on to discuss the case last cited, as well as a subsequent one. The Murphy majority began by acknowledging that King of the Two Sicilies was not authority for attacking this Court’s prior view of English law. 378 U. S., at 60. In an opinion by Lord Cranworth, the Court of Chancery declined to allow defendants to assert the privilege based on their fear of prosecution in Sicily, for two reasons. 1 Sim. (N. S.), at 329, 61 Eng. Rep., at 128. The first was the court’s belief that the privilege speaks only to matters that might be criminal under the laws of England: “The rule relied on by the Defendants, is one which exists merely by virtue of our own municipal law, and must, I think, have reference, exclusively, to matters penal by that law: to matters as to which, if disclosed, the Judge would be able to say, as matter of law, whether it could or could not entail penal consequences.” For the second, the court relied on the unlikelihood that the defendants would ever leave England and be subject to Sicilian prosecution.
The Murphy majority nonetheless understood this rule to have been undermined by the subsequent case of United States of America v. McRae, 3 L. R. Ch. 79 (1867). See 378 U. S., at 61. In that suit brought by the United States against McRae in England to recover funds that he had collected there as a Confederate agent during the Civil War, the court recognized the privilege based on McRae’s claim that his testimony would incriminate him in the United States. The court distinguished the litigation then before it from King of the Two Sicilies, indicating that though it agreed with the general principles stated by Lord Cran-worth, see 3 L. R. Ch., at 84, he had not needed to lay down the broad proposition that invocation of the privilege was appropriate only with regard to matters penal under England’s own law, see id., at 85. The corut did not say that the privilege could be invoked in any ease involving fear of prosecution under foreign law, however. Instead it noted two distinctions from King of the Two Sicilies, the first being that the “presumed ignorance of the Judge as to foreign law” on which King of the Two Sicilies rested has been “completely removed by the admitted statements upon the pleadings,” 3 L. R. Ch., at 85; the second being that McRae presented the unusual circumstance that the party seeking to compel the testimony, the United States, was also the party that would prosecute any crime under its laws that might thereby be revealed, id., at 87. The court’s holding that the privilege could be invoked in such circumstances does not, however, support a general application of the privilege in any case in which a witness fears prosecution under foreign law by a party not before the court. Thus, Murphy went too far in saying that McRae overruled King of the Two Sicilies. See Murphy, 378 U. S., at 71. What is of more fundamental importance, however, is that even if McRae had announced a new development in English law going to the heart of King of the Two Sicilies, it would have been irrelevant to Fifth Amendment interpretation. The presumed influence of English law on the intentions of the Framers hardly invests the Framers with clairvoyance, and subsequent English developments are not attributable to the Framers by some rule of renvoi. Cf. Brown, 161 U. S., at 600 (citing Cathcart v. Robinson, 5 Pet. 264, 280 (1831)). Since McRae neither stated nor implied any disagreement with Lord Cranworth’s 1857 statement in King of the Two Sicilies that there was no clear prior authority on the question, the Murphy Court had no authority showing that Murdock rested on unsound historical assumptions contradicted by opinions of the English courts.
In sum, to the extent that the Murphy majority went beyond its response to Malloy and undercut Murdock’s rationale on historical grounds, its reasoning cannot be accepted now. Long before today, indeed, Murphy’s history was shown to be fatally flawed.
D
Although the Court and Justice Breyer’s dissent differ on details, including some considerations of policy addressed in Part IV, infra, our basic disagreement with that dissent turns on three points. First, we start with what we think is the most probable reading of the Clause in its Fifth Amendment context, as limiting its principle to concern with prosecution by a sovereign that is itself bound by the Clause; the dissent instead emphasizes the Clause’s facial breadth as consistent with a broader principle. Second, we rely on the force of our precedent, notably Murdock, as confirming this same-sovereign principle, as adapted to reflect the post-Malloy requirement of immunity effective against both sovereigns subject to the one privilege under the National Constitution; the dissent attributes less force to Murdock, giving weight to its tension with the Saline Bank language, among other things. Third, we reject Murphy’s restatement of the common-law background and read none of the common-law cases as authority inconsistent with our contextual reading of the Clause, later confirmed by precedent such as Murdock; the dissent finds support in the common-law eases for Murphy’s historical reexamination and the broader reading of the Clause. In the end, our contextual reading of the Clause, combined with the Murdock holding, places a burden on anyone who contests the basic same-sovereign principle, a burden that only clear, contrary, preframing common law might carry; since the dissent starts with a broader reading of the Clause and a less potent view of Murdock, it does not require Murphy and the common-law eases to satisfy such a burden before definitively finding that a more expansive principle underlies the Clause.
IV
There remains, at least on the face of the Murphy majority’s opinion, a further invitation to revise the principle of the Clause from what Murdock recognized. The Murphy majority opens its discussion with a catalog of “Policies of the Privilege,” 378 U. S., at 55 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted):
“It reflects many of our fundamental values and most noble aspirations: our unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt; our preference for an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system of
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | A | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Black
delivered the opinion of the Court.
After serving with the United States Air Force in Korea, Robert W. Toth was honorably discharged. He returned to his home in Pittsburgh and went to work in a steel plant. Five months later he was arrested by military authorities on charges of murder and conspiracy to commit murder while an airman in Korea. At the time of arrest he had no relationship of any kind with the military. He was taken to Korea to stand trial before a court-martial under authority of a 1950 Act of Congress. The Court of Appeals sustained the Act, rejecting the contention that civilian ex-servicemen like Toth could not constitutionally be subjected to trial by court-martial. 94 U. S. App. D. C. 28, 215 F. 2d 22. We granted cer-tiorari to pass upon this important constitutional question. 348 U. S. 809.
The 1950 Act cannot be sustained on the constitutional power of Congress “To raise and support Armies,” “To declare War,” or to punish “Offences against the Law of Nations.” And this assertion of military authority over civilians cannot rest on the President’s power as commander-in-chief, or on any theory of martial law. See Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, 124-127. The Government’s contention is that the Act is a valid exercise of the power granted Congress in Article I of the Constitution “To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces,” as supplemented by the Necessary and Proper Clause.
This Court has held that the Article I clause just quoted authorizes Congress to subject persons actually in the armed service to trial by court-martial for military and naval offenses. Later it was held that court-martial jurisdiction could be exerted over a dishonorably discharged soldier then a military prisoner serving a sentence imposed by a prior court-martial. It has never been intimated by this Court, however, that Article I military jurisdiction could be extended to civilian ex-soldiers who had severed all relationship with the military and its institutions. To allow this extension of military authority would require an extremely broad construction of the language used in the constitutional provision relied on. For given its natural meaning, the power granted Congress “To make Rules” to regulate “the land and naval Forces” would seem to restrict court-martial jurisdiction to persons who are actually members or part of the armed forces. There is a compelling reason for construing the clause this way: any expansion of court-martial jurisdiction like that in the 1950 Act necessarily encroaches on the jurisdiction of federal courts set up under Article III of the Constitution where persons on trial are surrounded with more constitutional safeguards than in military tribunals.
Article III provides for the establishment of a court system as one of the separate but coordinate branches of the National Government. It is the primary, indeed the sole business of these courts to try cases and controversies between individuals and between individuals and the Government. This includes trial of criminal cases. These courts are presided over by judges appointed for life, subject only to removal by impeachment. Their compensation cannot be diminished during their continuance in office. The provisions of Article III were designed to give judges maximum freedom from possible coercion or influence by the executive or legislative branches of the Government. But the Constitution and the Amendments in the Bill of Rights show that the Founders were not satisfied with leaving determination of guilt or innocence to judges, even though wholly independent. They further provided that no person should be held to answer in those courts for capital or other infamous crimes unless on the presentment or indictment of a grand jury drawn from the body of the people. Other safeguards designed to protect defendants against oppressive governmental practices were included. One of these was considered so important to liberty of the individual that it appears in two parts of the Constitution. Article III, § 2, commands that the “Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed.” And the Sixth Amendment provides that “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed . . . .” This right of trial by jury ranks very high in our catalogue of constitutional safeguards.
We find nothing in the history or constitutional treatment of military tribunals which entitles them to rank along with Article III courts as adjudicators of the guilt or innocence of people charged with offenses for which they can be deprived of their life, liberty or property. Unlike courts, it is the primary business of armies and navies to fight or be ready to fight wars should the occasion arise. But trial of soldiers to maintain discipline is merely incidental to an army’s primary fighting function. To the extent that those responsible for performance of this primary function are diverted from it by the necessity of trying cases, the basic fighting purpose of armies is not served. And conceding to military personnel that high degree of honesty and sense of justice which nearly all of them undoubtedly have, it still remains true that military tribunals have not been and probably never can be constituted in such way that they can have the same kind of qualifications that the Constitution has deemed essential to fair trials of civilians in federal courts. For instance, the Constitution does not provide life tenure for those performing judicial functions in military trials. They are appointed by military commanders and may be removed at will. Nor does the Constitution protect their salaries as it does judicial salaries. Strides have been made toward making courts-martial less subject to the will of the executive department which appoints, supervises and ultimately controls them. But from the very nature of things, courts have more independence in passing on the life and liberty of people than do military tribunals.
Moreover, there is a great difference between trial by jury and trial by selected members of the military forces. It is true that military personnel because of their training and experience may be especially competent to try soldiers for infractions of military rules. Such training is no doubt particularly important where an offense charged against a soldier is purely military, such as disobedience of an order, leaving post, etc. But whether right or wrong, the premise underlying the constitutional method for determining guilt or innocence in federal courts is that laymen are better than specialists to perform this task. This idea is inherent in the institution of trial by jury.
Juries fairly chosen from different walks of life bring into the jury box a variety of different experiences, feelings, intuitions and habits. Such juries may reach completely different conclusions than would be reached by specialists in any single field, including specialists in the military field. On many occasions, fully known to the Founders of this country, jurors — plain people — have manfully stood up in defense of liberty against the importunities of judges and despite prevailing hysteria and prejudices. The acquittal of William Penn is an illustrious example. Unfortunately, instances could also be cited where jurors have themselves betrayed the cause of justice by verdicts based on prejudice or pressures. In such circumstances independent trial judges and independent appellate judges have a most important place under our constitutional plan since they have power to set aside convictions.
The 1950 Act here considered deprives of jury trial and sweeps under military jurisdiction over 3,000,000 persons who have become veterans since the Act became effective. That number is bound to grow from year to year; there are now more than 3,000,000 men and women in uniform. These figures point up what would be the enormous scope of a holding that Congress could subject every ex-serviceman and woman in the land to trial by court-martial for any alleged offense committed while he or she had been a member of the armed forces. Every veteran discharged since passage of the 1950 Act is subject to military trial for any offense punishable by as much as five years’ imprisonment unless the offense is now punishable in a civilian court. And one need only glance at the Military Code to see what a vast number and variety of offenses are thus brought under military jurisdiction. Included within these are crimes such as murder, conspiracy, absence without leave, contempt toward officials, disrespect toward superior officers, willful or neglectful loss, damage, or destruction of government property, making false official statements, dueling, breach of the peace, forgery, fraud, assault, and many others. It is true that with reference to some of these offenses, very minor ones, veterans cannot now be tried because of a presidential order fixing the punishment for such offenses at less than five years. But that amelioration of the Military Code may be temporary, since punishment can be raised or lowered at the will of the President. It is also true that under the present law courts-martial have jurisdiction only if no civilian court does. But that might also be changed by Congress. Thus there is no justification for treating the Act as a mere minor increase of congressional power to expand military jurisdiction. It is a great change, both actually and potentially.
Fear has been expressed that if this law is not sustained discharged soldiers may escape punishment altogether for crimes they commit while in the service. But that fear is not warranted and was not shared by the Judge Advocate General of the Army who made a strong statement against passage of the law. He asked Congress to “confer jurisdiction upon Federal courts to try any person for an offense denounced by the [military] code if he is no longer subject thereto. This would be consistent with the fifth amendment of the Constitution.” The Judge Advocate General went on to tell Congress that “If you expressly confer jurisdiction on the Federal courts to try such cases, you preserve the constitutional separation of military and civil courts, you save the military from a lot of unmerited grief, and you provide for a clean, constitutional method for disposing of such cases.” It is conceded that it was wholly within the constitutional power of Congress to follow this suggestion and provide for federal district court trials of discharged soldiers accused of offenses committed while in the armed services. This concession is justified. U. S. Const., Art. III, § 2; and see, e. g., Jones v. United States, 137 U. S. 202, 211-212; United States v. Bowman, 260 U. S. 94, 97-98; Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U. S. 69, 73-74. There can be no valid argument, therefore, that civilian ex-servicemen must be tried by court-martial or not tried at all. If that is so it is only because Congress has not seen fit to subject them to trial in federal district courts.
None of the other reasons suggested by the Government are sufficient to justify a broad construction of the constitutional grant of power to Congress to regulate the armed forces. That provision itself does not empower Congress to deprive people of trials under Bill of Rights safeguards, and we are not willing to hold that power to circumvent those safeguards should be inferred through the Necessary and Proper Clause. It is impossible to think that the discipline of the Army is going to be disrupted, its morale impaired, or its orderly processes disturbed, by giving ex-servicemen the benefit of a civilian court trial when they are actually civilians. And we are not impressed by the fact that some other countries which do not have our Bill of Rights indulge in the practice of subjecting civilians who were once soldiers to trials by courts-martial instead of trials by civilian courts.
There are dangers lurking in military trials which were sought to be avoided by the Bill of Rights and Article III of our Constitution. Free countries of the world have tried to restrict military tribunals to the narrowest jurisdiction deemed absolutely essential to maintaining discipline among troops in active service. Even as late as the Seventeenth Century standing armies and courts-martial were not established institutions in England. Court-martial jurisdiction sprang from the belief that within the military ranks there is need for a prompt, ready-at-hand means of compelling obedience and order. But Army discipline will not be improved by court-mar-tialing rather than trying by jury some civilian ex-soldier who has been wholly separated from the service for months, years or perhaps decades. Consequently considerations of discipline provide no excuse for new expansion of court-martial jurisdiction at the expense of the normal and constitutionally preferable system of trial by jury.
Determining the scope of the constitutional power of Congress to authorize trial by court-martial presents another instance calling for limitation to “the least possible power adequate to the end proposed.” We hold that Congress cannot subject civilians like Toth to trial by court-martial. They, like other civilians, are entitled to have the benefit of safeguards afforded those tried in the regular courts authorized by Article III of the Constitution.
Reversed.
The charges were violations of Articles 118 and 81 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 64 Stat. 140, 134, 50 U. S. C. §§ 712 and 675.
Art. 3 (a), Uniform Code of Military Justice, 64 Stat. 109, 50 U. S. C. § 553, provides: “Subject to the provisions of article 43, any person charged with having committed, while in a status in which he was subject to this code, an offense against this code, punishable by confinement of five years or more and for which the person cannot be tried in the courts of the United States or any State or Territory thereof or of the District of Columbia, shall not be relieved from amenability to trial by courts-martial by reason of the termination of said status.”
This habeas corpus proceeding was brought in the District Court for the District of Columbia by Toth’s sister while he was held in Korea. Without passing on any constitutional question the District Court ordered Toth discharged on the ground that he should not have been carried to Korea for trial without a hearing, 113 F. Supp. 330, 114 F. Supp. 468.
See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U. S. 1; In re Yamashita, 327 U. S. 1.
The Fifth Amendment provides that "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger . . . .” This provision does not grant court-martial power to Congress; it merely makes clear that there need be no indictment for such military offenses as Congress can authorize military tribunals to try under its Article I power to make rules to govern the armed forces.
Dynes v. Hoover, 20 How. 65.
Kahn v. Anderson, 255 U. S. 1.
In 1863 Congress passed a statute authorizing trial of ex-soldiers for commission of fraud against the Government while in the service; this law also authorized court-martial trial of contractors not part of the military forces. 12 Stat. 696. The latter provision of the 1863 law' appears never to have been sustained by any court. Lower courts have disagreed as to the constitutional validity of the provision authorizing ex-soldiers to be tried. See, e. g., In re Bogart, 3 Fed. Cas. 796. Compare Ex parte Henderson, 11 Fed. Cas. 1067; United States ex rel. Flannery v. Commanding General, 69 F. Supp. 661, reversed by stipulation in unreported order of the Second Circuit, No. 20235, April 18, 1946. See United States ex rel. Hirshberg v. Cooke, 336 U. S. 210. A statute authorizing court-martial trial of inmates of the Soldiers’ Home has been ruled unconstitutional by the Judge Advocate General of the Army. Dig. Op. J. A. G. (1912), pp. 1010, 1012. It was declared that “such inmates are not a part of the Army of the United States, but are civilians.” Id., at 1012. Col. Winthrop, concededly a leading authority on military law, expressed the view that “this class of statutes, which in terms or inferentially subject persons formerly in the army, but become finally and legally separated from it, to trial by court-martial, are all necessarily and alike unconstitutional ....’’ 1 Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents (2d ed. 1896), 146. The War Department reprinted this classic volume for the guidance of the Army in 1920. Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents (2d ed., Reprint 1920).
A declaration of rights adopted by nine colonies in 1765 contained this statement: “That trial by jury, is the inherent and invaluable right of every British subject in these colonies.” Harvard Classics, Volume 43, p. 148. The Declaration of Independence stated as one of the grievances of the colonies that the King of Great Britain had deprived the colonists of the benefits of trial by jury in many cases and that he had “affected to render the Military independent of and superior to the Civil power.” Another charge was that he had transported colonials “beyond Seas to be tried for pretended offences.”
Chief Justice Cooley said: “The trial of criminal cases is by a jury of the country, and not by the court. The jurors, and they alone, are to judge of the facts, and weigh the evidence. The law has established this tribunal because it is believed that, from its numbers, the mode of their selection, and the fact that the jurors come from all classes of society, they are better calculated to judge of motives, weigh probabilities, and take what may be called a common sense view of a set of circumstances, involving both act and intent, than any single man, however pure, wise and eminent he may be. This is the theory of the law; and as applied to criminal accusations, it is eminently wise, and favorable alike to liberty and to justice.” People v. Garbutt, 17 Mich. 9,27.
“Juries undoubtedly may make mistakes: they may commit errors: they may commit gross ones. But changed as they constantly are, their errors and mistakes can never grow into a dangerous system. The native uprightness of their sentiments will not be bent under the weight of precedent and authority. The esprit du corps will not be introduced among them; nor will society experience from them those mischiefs, of which the esprit du corps, unchecked, is sometimes productive.” II Wilson’s Works (Andrews ed. 1896) 222.
An outstanding instance is the Dean of St. Asaph’s Case, 21 How. St. Tr. 847, discussed in Stryker, For the Defense, 119-136.
Penn and Mead’s Case, 6 How. St. Tr. 951. After trial the jurors were fined for acquitting Penn contrary to the court’s instructions. One was imprisoned for not paying the fine, but the Court of Common Pleas released him in a habeas corpus proceeding, upholding the freedom of the jury to decide the case. Bushell’s Case, 6 How. St. Tr. 999.
See II Wilson’s Works (Andrews ed. 1896) 222.
Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series P-25, No. 101 (U. S. Dept. Commerce 1954).
Arts. 77-134, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 64 Stat. 133-143, 50 U. S. C. §§ 671-728.
A particularly sweeping offense, punishable by death and not subject to any statute of limitations, is found in Article 94, which provides in part that anyone “(2) who with intent to cause the overthrow or destruction of lawful civil authority, creates, in concert with any other person or persons, revolt, violence, or other disturbance against such authority is guilty of sedition; (3) who fails to do his utmost to prevent and suppress an offense of mutiny or sedition being committed in his presence, or fails to take all reasonable means to inform his superior or commanding officer of an offense of mutiny or sedition which he knows or has reason to believe is taking place, is guilty of a failure to suppress or report a mutiny or sedition.” (Emphasis supplied.)
See Table of Maximum Punishments, 127c, MCM, 1951, 16 Fed. Reg. 1364-1368.
Hearings before Subcommittee of Senate Committee on Armed Services on S. 857 and H. R. 4080, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 256-257. The Assistant General Counsel of the Office of Secretary of Defense, who was chairman of a committee that helped draft the Uniform Code of Military Justice, expressed doubts as to the constitutionality of Article 3 (a). Hearings before Subcommittee of House Committee on Armed Services on H. R. 2498, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 881.
The historical background of this country’s preference for civilian over military trials was impressively presented in the arguments of counsel and opinion of this Court in Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, 121. And see Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U. S. 304.
3 Macaulay, History of England from the Accession of James the Second (London, 1855), 45.
Mr. Justice Sutherland writing for the Court in Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U. S. 474, 485-486, said, “The right of trial by jury is of ancient origin, characterized by Blackstone as ‘the glory of the English law’ and ‘the most transcendent privilege which any subject can enjoy’ (Bk. 3, p. 379); and, as Justice Story said (2 Story on the Constitution, § 1779), ‘. . . the Constitution would have been justly obnoxious to the most conclusive objection if it had not recognized and confirmed it in the most solemn terms.’ With, perhaps, some exceptions, trial by jury has always been, and still is, generally regarded as the normal and preferable mode of disposing of issues of fact in civil cases at law as well as in criminal cases. Maintenance of the jury as a fact-finding body is of such importance and occupies so firm a place in our history and jurisprudence that any seeming curtailment of the right to a jury trial should be scrutinized with the utmost care. Compare Patton v. United States, 281 U. S. 276, 312.”
Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204, 230-231.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | B | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Black
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The petitioner, Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Company, manufactures asphalt roofing products in Memphis, Tennessee, and sends them in trucks to customers in nearby states. Some of these trucks are driven by their owners who have allegedly leased them to the petitioner. Five of these driver-owners while carrying Fry’s interstate shipments on Arkansas highways were arrested for having failed to obtain a permit as required of all contract carriers by § 11 of the Arkansas Motor Act. Petitioner brought this action in an Arkansas state court to enjoin the state’s Public Service Commission from further molestation or prosecution of the drivers. The bill asserted both state and federal grounds for denying that the state law could be applied to require a permit. The state grounds alleged were: Neither petitioner Fry Roofing Company nor the truck drivers could be required to get a state permit, because the state law exempted “private” carriers from that duty, and petitioner was such a “private carrier” — that is, a commercial enterprise, carrying its own products exclusively in its own leased trucks operated by its own bona fide driver-employees. Since, petitioner claimed, the drivers were its bona fide employees, it necessarily followed that they need not get state permits as “contract carriers” because they were not in the business of transporting goods for hire. The federal ground asserted by petitioner to prevent application of the state statute was that requiring either Fry or the drivers to get state permits would unduly burden interstate commerce in violation of the United States Constitution and would invade a field of regulation pre-empted by the Federal Motor Carrier Act.
Answering the bill, the State Commission asked the court to dismiss it, strongly urging that petitioner’s alleged lease of trucks and operation of them by its own employees were mere pretenses, a subterfuge to enable petitioner and others to evade and escape the regulatory provisions of the Arkansas Motor Act. After lengthy hearings the trial court found that the arrested drivers were in fact bona fide employees of petitioner, that the truck leases were also bona fide, and that petitioner was therefore transporting its own goods as a private carrier exempt from the state Act. For this reason the court held that the Act did not require either petitioner or its drivers to get a permit. Accordingly the Commission was enjoined as prayed.’ Reviewing the facts for itself the State Supreme Court found that the arrested truck drivers were not petitioner’s employees, that the truck lease arrangements were shams, and that petitioner was therefore a shipper — not a carrier of any kind. In this situation the court found that the driver-owners were in reality transporting petitioner’s goods as “contract carriers” for hire, engaged in the very kind of business for which § 11 of the state Act required a permit. The court then dismissed the bill and denied a rehearing, thereby rejecting the federal questions raised. 219 Ark. 553, 244 S. W. 2d 147. Certiorari was granted because of the Commerce Clause and Federal Motor Carrier Act questions. 343 U. S. 962.
We are urged to set aside the findings of the State Supreme Court before passing upon the constitutional questions presented. Petitioner contends that these findings are without evidential support and that the subsidiary findings do not support the ultimate conclusion that the leases were shams. Whether rejection of these findings would place petitioner’s Commerce Clause contentions in a more favorable position, we need not consider. For there is much record evidence, both oral and written, some of which tends to support petitioner’s contention of good-faith arrangements and some the contrary. Some details of petitioner’s conduct resemble and some details differ from patterns of conduct found by courts in other cases to have been contrived to avoid legal regulation. See, e. g., United States v. La Tuff Transfer Service, 95 F. Supp. 375, and cases there cited. There are no exceptional circumstances of any kind that would justify us in rejecting the Supreme Court’s findings; they are not without factual foundation, and we accept them.
The finding that the arrested drivers own and operate the trucks for hire makes them contract carriers as defined in the State Act. Section 11 of that Act requires contract carriers to get a permit and outlines certain considerations the State Commission may weigh in granting or refusing the permit. Among these matters is the adequacy of transportation services already being performed by “any railroad, street railway or motor carrier.” Refusal of a state certificate based on such grounds was held to be an unconstitutional obstruction of interstate commerce in Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U. S. 307. To deny these interstate carriers an Arkansas permit for such reasons would conflict with the Buck holding.
Unlike the situation in the Buck case, Arkansas has not refused to grant a permit for interstate carriage of goods on state highways. It has asked these driver-owners to do nothing except apply for a permit as contract carriers are required to do by the State Act. And the State Commission here expressly disclaims any “discretionary right to refuse to grant a permit for contract carriage where that carriage is in interstate commerce.” The state asserts no power or purpose to require the drivers to do more than register with the appropriate agency. Such an identification is necessary, the Commission urges, in order that it may properly apply the state’s valid police, welfare, and safety regulations to motor carriers using its highways. Nor is there any showing whatever that the Commission has attempted or will attempt to attach any burdensome conditions to the grant of a permit, or conditions that would in any manner conflict with the National Motor Carrier Act or any Interstate Commerce Commission regulations issued thereunder. Moreover, the Arkansas Act imposes upon its Commission the duty of reconciling state regulation with that of the Interstate Commerce Commission, just as the Interstate Commerce Act requires federal officials to cooperate with the states and their duly authorized state officials. Here neither petitioner nor the drivers have obtained any kind of authority from the Interstate Commerce Commission. Indeed, petitioner’s whole case has been built on the premise that neither it nor the drivers must get a permit from the state or the national regulatory agency. In this situation our prior cases make clear that a state can regulate so long as no undue burden is imposed on interstate commerce, and that a mere requirement for a permit is not such a burden. It will be time enough to consider apprehended burdensome conditions when and if the state attempts to impose and enforce them. At present we hold only that Arkansas is not powerless to require interstate motor carriers to identify themselves as users of that state’s highways.
Affirmed.
“No person shall engage in the business of a contract carrier by motor vehicle over any public highway in this State unless there is in force with respect to such carrier a permit issued by the Commission, authorizing such persons to engage in such business. . . .” Ark. Acts 1941, No. 367, at 937, 947-948.
The State Act’s definition of a contract carrier is:
“The term 'contract carrier by motor vehicle’ means any person, not a common carrier included under Paragraph 7, Section 5 (a) of this Act, who or which, under individual contracts or agreements, and whether directly or indirectly or by a lease of equipment or franchise rights, or any other arrangement, transports passengers or property by motor vehicle for compensation.” Ark. Acts 1941, No. 367, § 5 (a) (8). Compare definition in the United States Motor Carrier Act, Part II of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U. S. C. § 303 (15).
49 Stat. 543, as amended, 54 Stat. 919, 49 U. S. C. §§ 301 et seq. The Federal Act contention was not specifically referred to in the original bill, but was urged in, considered and rejected by the State Supreme Court.
“It appeared that while the Act calls the certificate one of ‘public convenience and necessity,’ the Commission had recognized, before this suit was begun, that, ... it had no discretion where the carrier was engaged exclusively in interstate commerce, and was willing to grant to plaintiffs a certificate upon application and compliance with other provisions of the law.” Clark v. Poor, 274 U. S. 554, 556. In the Clark case this Court affirmed an order dismissing the bill. See Columbia Terminals Co. v. Lambert, 30 F. Supp. 28, 32, and 309 U. S. 620.
In Columbia Terminals Co. v. Lambert, 30 F. Supp. 28, the District Court upheld a Missouri statute reading: “It is hereby declared unlawful for any motor carrier ... to use any of the public highways of this state for the transportation of persons or property, or both, in interstate commerce without first having obtained from the commission a permit so to do. . . .” Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U. S. 307, was held not to require the statute’s invalidation, since Missouri had not refused to grant a permit on the ground that the state had power to say what interstate commerce would benefit the state and what would not. Agreeing with this constitutional holding, we ordered the complaint dismissed. 309 U. S. 620. See also Eichholz v. Public Service Comm’n, 306 U. S. 268, 273-274; H. P. Welch Co. v. New Hampshire, 306 U. S. 79, 84, 85; Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U. S. 598, affirming 336 Pa. 17, 7 A. 2d 466; McDonald v. Thompson, 305 U. S. 263, affirming 95 F. 2d 937; South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U. S. 177. Cf. Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U. S. 307, and Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U. S. 525, 538.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | H | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Marshall
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Under the basic federal mining statute, which derives from an 1872 law, “all valuable mineral deposits in lands belonging to the United States” are declared “free and open to exploration and purchase.” 30 U. S. C. § 22. The question presented is whether water is a "valuable mineral” as those words are used in the mining law.
I
A claim to federal land containing “valuable mineral deposits” may be “located” by complying with certain procedural requisites; one who locates a claim thereby gains the exclusive right to possession of the land, as well as the right to extract minerals from it. See generally 30 U. S. C. §§ 21-54; 1 American Law of Mining § 1.17 (1973). The claim at issue in this case, known as Claim 22, is one of a group of 23 claims near Las Vegas, Nev., that were located in 1942. In 1962, after respondent had purchased these claims, it discovered water on Claim 22 by drilling a well thereon. This water was used to prepare for commercial sale the sand and gravel removed from some of the 23 claims.
In 1965, the Secretary of the Interior filed a complaint with the Bureau of Land Management, seeking to have all of these claims declared invalid on the ground that the only minerals discovered on them were “common varieties” of sand and gravel, which had been expressly excluded from the definition of “valuable minerals” by a 1955 statute. § 3, 69 Stat. 368, 30 U. S. C. § 611. At the administrative hearing on the Secretary’s complaint, the principal issue was whether the sand and gravel deposits were “valuable” prior to the effective date of the 1955 legislation, in which case the claims would be valid. The Administrative Law Judge concluded after hearing the evidence that respondent had established pre-1955 value only as to Claim 10. On appeals taken by both respondent and the Government, the Interior Board of Land Appeals (IBLA) affirmed the Administrative Law Judge in all respects here relevant. 9 I. B. L. A. 94 (1973) ,
Respondent sought review in the United States District Court for the District of Nevada. The court concluded that the decisions of the Administrative Law Judge and the IBLA were not supported by the evidence and that “at least” Claims 1 through 16 were valid. App. to Pet. for Cert. 26a. The court further held “that access to Claim No. 22 must be permitted so that the water produced from the well on that claim may be made available to the operations on the valid claims.” Ibid. The IBLA’s decision was accordingly vacated, and the case remanded to the Department of the Interior.
On the Government’s appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. 553 F. 2d 1209 (1977). It agreed with the District Court as to Claims 1 through 16 and also agreed that respondent was entitled to access to the water on Claim 22. It grounded the latter conclusion, however, “upon a rationale other than that relied upon by the District Court,” id., at 1215, a rationale that had not been briefed or argued in either the District Court or the Court of Appeals. Noting that “[s]ince early times, water has been regarded as a mineral,” ibid., the appellate court stated that it could not assume “that Congress was not aware of the necessary glove of water for the hand of mining and [that] Congress impliedly intended to reserve water from those minerals allowed to be located and recovered,” id., at 1216. Since the water at Claim 22 “has an intrinsic value in the desert area” and has additional value at the particular site “as a washing agent for . . . sand and gravel,” the court ruled that respondent’s “claim for the extraction of [Claim 22’s] water is valid.” Ibid.
The difference between the District Court’s and the Court of Appeals’ rationales for allowing access to Claim 22 is a significant one. The District Court held only that respondent is entitled to use the water on the claim; the Court of Appeals, by contrast, held that the claim itself is valid. If the claim is indeed valid, respondent is not merely entitled to access to the water thereon, but also has exclusive possessory rights to the land and may keep others from making any use of it. By complying with certain procedures, moreover, respondent could secure a “patent” from the Government conveying fee simple title to the land. See 30 U. S. C. §§ 29, 37; 1 American Law of Mining § 1.23 (1973). See generally Union Oil Co. v. Smith, 249 U. S. 337, 348-349 (1919). In view of the significance of the determination that a mining claim to federal land is valid, the Government sought review here of the Court of Appeals’ sua sponte holding regarding Claim 22’s validity. The single question presented in the petition is “[w]hether water is a locatable mineral under the mining law of 1872.” Pet. for Cert. 2.
We granted certiorari, 434 U. S. 964 (1977), and we now reverse.
II
We may assume for purposes of this decision that the Court of Appeals was correct in concluding that water is a “mineral,” in the broadest sense of that word, and that it is “valuable.” Both of these facts are necessary to a holding that a claimant has located a “valuable mineral deposit” under the 1872 law, 30 U. S. C. § 22, but they are hardly sufficient.
This Court long ago recognized that the word “mineral,” when used in an Act of Congress, cannot be given its broadest definition. In construing an Act granting certain public lands, except “mineral lands,” to a railroad, the Court wrote:
“The word 'mineral’ is used in so many senses, dependent upon the context, that the ordinary definitions of the dictionary throw but little light upon its signification in a given case. Thus the scientific division of all matter into the animal, vegetable or mineral kingdom would be absurd as applied to a grant of lands, since all lands belong to the mineral kingdom .... Equally subversive of the grant would be the definition of minerals found in the Century Dictionary: as 'any constituent of the earth’s crust’ . . . .” Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Soderberg, 188 U. S. 526, 530 (1903).
In the context of the 1872 mining law, similar conclusions must be drawn. As one court observed, if the term “mineral” in the statute were construed to encompass all substances that are conceivably mineral, “there would be justification for making mine locations on virtually every part of the earth’s surface,” since “a very high proportion of the substances of the earth are in that sense 'mineral.' ” Rummell v. Bailey, 7 Utah 2d 137, 140, 320 P. 2d 653, 655 (1958). See also Robert L. Beery, 25 I. B. L. A. 287, 294-296 (1976) (noting that "common dirt,” while literally a mineral, cannot be considered locatable under the mining law); Holman v. Utah, 41 L. D. 314, 315 (1912); 1 American Law of Mining, supra, § 2.4, p. 168.
The fact that water may be valuable or marketable similarly is not enough to support a mining claim’s validity based on the presence of water. Many substances present on the land may be of value, and indeed it seems likely that land itself — especially land located just 15 miles from downtown Las Vegas, see 553 F. 2d, at 1211— has, in the Court of Appeals’ words, “an intrinsic value,” id., at 1216. Yet the federal mining law surely was not intended to be a general real estate law; as one commentator has written, “the Congressional mandate did not sanction the disposal of federal lands under the mining laws for purposes unrelated to mining.” 1 American Law of Mining, supra, § 1.18, p. 56; cf. Holman v. Utah, supra (distinguishing mining law from homestead and other agricultural entry laws). In order for a claim to be valid, the substance discovered must not only be a “valuable mineral” within the dictionary definition of those words, but must also be the type of valuable mineral that the 1872 Congress intended to make the basis of a valid claim.
Ill
The 1872 law incorporates two provisions involving water rights that derive from earlier mining Acts. See 17 Stat. 94-95. In 1866, in Congress’ first major effort to regulate mining on federal lands, it provided for the protection of the “vested rights” of “possessors and owners” “to the use of water for mining, agricultural, manufacturing or other purposes,” to the extent that these rights derive from “priority of possession” and “are recognized and acknowledged by the local customs, laws, and the decisions of courts.” 30 U. S. C. § 51. In 1870, Congress again emphasized its view that water rights derive from “local” law, not federal law, making “[a]ll patents granted . . . subject to any vested and accrued water rights ... as may have been acquired under or recognized by [the 1866 provision].” 30 U. S. C. § 52.
In discussing these mining law provisions on the subject of water rights, this Court has often taken note of the history of mining in the arid Western States. In 1879 Mr. Justice Field of California, writing for the Court, described in vivid terms the influx of miners that had shaped the water rights law of his State and its neighbors:
“The lands in which the precious metals were found belonged to the United States, and were unsurveyed Into these mountains the emigrants in vast numbers penetrated, occupying the ravines, gulches and canons, and probing the earth in all directions for the precious metals. . . . But the mines could not be worked without water. Without water the gold would remain for ever buried in the earth or rock. . . . The doctrines of the common law respecting the rights of riparian owners were not considered as applicable ... to the condition of miners in the mountains. . . . Numerous regulations were adopted, or assumed to exist, from their obvious justness, for the security of . . . ditches and flumes, and the protection of rights to water . . . .” Jennison v. Kirk, 98 U. S. 453, 457-458 (1879).
See also Basey v. Gallagher, 20 Wall. 670, 681-684 (1875) (Field, J.); Atchison v. Peterson, 20 Wall. 507, 510-515 (1874) (Field, J.). Over a half century later, Mr. Justice Sutherland set out this same history in California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U. S. 142, 154-155 (1935). He then explained that the water rights provisions of the 1866 and 1870 laws were intended to
“approve and confirm the policy of appropriation for a beneficial use, as recognized by local rules and customs, and the legislation and judicial decisions of the arid-land states, as the test and measure of private rights in and to the non-navigable waters on the public domain.” Id., at 155.
Our opinions thus recognize that, although mining law and water law developed together in the West prior to 1866, with respect to federal lands Congress chose to subject only mining to comprehensive federal regulation. When it passed the 1866 and 1870 mining laws, Congress clearly intended to preserve “pre-existing [water] right[s]." Broder v. Natoma Water & Mining Co., 101 U. S. 274, 276 (1879). Less than 15 years after passage of the 1872 law, the Secretary of the Interior in two decisions ruled that water is not a locatable mineral under the law and that private water rights on federal lands are instead “governed by local customs and laws,” pursuant to the 1866 and 1870 provisions. Charles Lennig, 5 L. D. 190, 191 (1886); see William A. Chessman, 2 L. D. 774, 775 (1883). The Interior Department, which is charged with principal responsibility for “regulating the acquisition of rights in the public lands,” Cameron v. United States, 252 U. S. 450, 460 (1920), has recently reaffirmed this interpretation. Robert L. Beery, 25 I. B. L. A. 287 (1976).
In ruling to the contrary, the Court of Appeals did not refer to 30 U. S. C. §§ 51 and 52, which embody the 1866 and 1870 provisions; to our opinions construing these provisions; or to the consistent course of administrative rulings on this question. Instead, without benefit of briefing, the court below decided that “it would be incongruous ... to hazard that Congress was not aware of the necessary glove of water for the hand of mining.” 553 F. 2d, at 1216. Congress was indeed aware of this, so much aware that it expressly provided a water rights policy in the mining laws. But the policy adopted is a “passive” one, 2 Waters and Water Rights § 102.1, p. 53 (R. Clark ed. 1967); Congress three times (in 1866, 1870, and 1872) affirmed the view that private water rights on federal lands were to be governed by state and local law and custom. It defies common sense to assume that Congress, when it adopted this policy, meant at the same time to establish a parallel federal system for acquiring private water rights, and that it did so sub silentio through laws designed to regulate mining. In light of the 1866 and 1870 provisions, the history out of which they arose, and the decisions construing them in the context of the 1872 law, the notion that water is a “valuable mineral” under that law is simply untenable.
IV
The conclusion that Congress did not intend water to be locatable under the federal mining law is reinforced by consideration of the practical consequences that could be expected to flow from a holding to the contrary.
A
Many problems would undoubtedly arise simply from the fact of having two overlapping systems for acquisition of private water rights. Under the appropriation doctrine prevailing in most of the Western States, the mere fact that a person controls land adjacent to a body of water means relatively little; instead, water rights belong to “[t]he first appropriator of water for a beneficial use,” but only “to the extent of his actual use,” California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., supra, at 154; see Jennison v. Kirk, supra, at 458; W. Hutchins, Selected Problems in the Law of Water Rights in the West 30-32, 389-403 (1942); McGowen, The Development of Political Institutions on the Public Domain, 11 Wyo. L. J. 1, 14 (1957). Failure to use the water to which one is entitled for a certain period of time generally causes one’s rights in that water to be deemed abandoned. See generally 2 W. Hutchins, Water Rights Laws in the Nineteen Western States 256-328 (1974).
With regard to minerals located under federal law, an entirely different theory prevails. The holder of a federal mining claim, by investing $100 annually in the claim, becomes entitled to possession of the land and may make any use, or no use, of the minerals involved. See 30 U. S. C. § 28. Once fee title by patent is obtained, see supra, at 609, even the $100 requirement is eliminated.
One can readily imagine the legal conflicts that might arise from these differing approaches if ordinary water were treated as a federally cognizable '“mineral.” A federal claimant could, for example, utilize all of the water extracted from a well like respondent’s, without regard for the settled prior appropriation rights of another user of the same water. Or he might not use the water at all and yet prevent another from using it, thereby defeating the necessary Western policy in favor of “actual use” of scarce water resources. California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U. S., at 154. As one respected commentator has written, allowing water to be the basis of a valid mining claim “could revive long abandoned common law rules of ground water ownership and capture, and . . . could raise horrendous problems of priority and extralateral rights.” We decline to effect so major an alteration in established legal relationships based on nothing more than an overly literal reading of a statute, without any regard for its context or history.
B
A final indication that water should not be held to be a locatable mineral derives from Congress’ 1955 decision to remove “common varieties” of certain minerals from the coverage of the mining law. 30 U. S. C. § 611; see supra, at 606-607, and n. 5. This decision was made in large part because of “abuses under the general mining laws by . . . persons who locate[d] mining claims on public lands for purposes other than that of legitimate mining activity.” H. R. Rep. No. 730, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 5 (1955); see S. Rep. No. 554, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 4-5 (1955). Apparently, locating a claim and obtaining a patent to federal land were so inexpensive that many “use[d] the guise of mining locations for nonmining purposes,” including the establishment of “filling stations, curio shops, cafes, . . . residencefs] [and] summer camp[s].” H. R. Rep. No. 730, p. 6; see S. Rep. No. 554, p. 5.
Water, of course, is among the most common of the earth’s elements. While it may not be as common in the federal lands subject to the mining law as it is elsewhere, it is nevertheless common enough to raise the possibility of abuse by those less interested in extracting mineral resources than in obtaining title to valuable land. See Robert L. Beery, 25 I. B. L. A., at 296-297. Given the unprecedented nature of the Court of Appeals’ decision, it is hardly surprising that the 1955 Congress did not include water on its list of “common varieties” of minerals that cannot confer validity on a mining claim. But the concerns that Congress addressed in the 1955 legislation indicate that water, like the listed minerals, should not be considered a locatable mineral under the 1872 mining law.
V
It has long been established that, when grants to federal land are at issue, any doubts “are resolved for the Government, not against it.” United States v. Union Pacific R. Co., 353 U. S. 112, 116 (1957). A fortiori, the Government must prevail in a case such as this, when the relevant statutory provisions, their historical context, consistent administrative and judicial decisions, and the practical problems with a contrary holding all weigh in its favor. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Reversed.
Act of May 10, 1872, 17 Stat. 91.
Title 30 U. S. C. § 22 provides in full:
“Except as otherwise provided, all valuable mineral deposits in lands belonging to the United States, both surveyed and unsurveyed, shall be free and open to exploration and purchase, and the lands in which they are found to occupation and purchase, by citizens of the United States and those who have declared their intention to become such, under regulations prescribed by law, and according to the local customs or rules of miners in the several mining districts, so far as the same are applicable and not inconsistent with the laws of the United States.”
Title 30 U. S. C. § 611 provides in pertinent part:
“No deposit of common varieties of sand, stone, gravel, pumice, pumicite, or cinders and no deposit of petrified wood shall be deemed a valuable mineral deposit within the meaning of the mining laws of the United States so as to give effective validity to any mining claim hereafter located under such mining laws: Provided, however, That nothing herein shall affect the validity of any mining location based upon discovery of some other mineral occurring in or in association with such a deposit. 'Common varieties’ as used in sections 601, 603, and 611 to 615 of this title does not include deposits of such materials which are valuable because the deposit has some property giving it distinct and special value . . .
The question of value has traditionally been resolved by application of “complement[ary]” tests relating to whether “‘a person of ordinary prudence’ ” would have expended “ 'his labor and means’ ” developing the claim at issue and whether the minerals thereon could have been “ ‘extracted, removed and marketed at a profit.’ ” United States v. Coleman, 390 U. S. 599, 600, 602 (1968), quoting decisions of the Secretary of the Interior in Coleman and in Castle v. Womble, 19 L. D. 455, 457 (1894).
The Administrative Law Judge, in addition to holding that Claim 10 was valid based on its pre-1955 value, held that Claim 9 was valid because it provided reserve material for Claim 10. The IBLA reversed as to Claim 9, holding it invalid. 9 I. B. L. A., at 108.
The Secretary’s complaint also named two other claims, numbered 12A and 13A, that were located by respondent in 1961. Since location occurred after the relevant 1955 date, the Administrative Law Judge held these claims invalid. His decision regarding Claims 12A and 13A was upheld by both the IBLA, 9 I. B. L. A., at 106, and the District Court, App. to Pet. for Cert. 25a, and was not contested in the Court of Appeals, see 553 F. 2d 1209, 1210 n. 1 (CA9 1977).
Although the question of the District Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction was not raised in this Court or apparently in either court below, we have an obligation to consider the question sua sponte. See, e. g., Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274, 278 (1977); Mansfield, Coldwater, & Lake Michigan R. Co. v. Swan, 111 U. S. 379, 382 (1884). Respondent’s complaint alleged jurisdiction based on the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U. S. C. § 701 et seq., and 28 U. S. C. §§ 1361, 1391 (e). App. 27A. Title 28 U. S. C. § 1391 (e) is a venue statute and cannot itself confer jurisdiction.
With regard to the APA, while it may have appeared to be a proper basis of jurisdiction in the Ninth Circuit at the time the complaint was filed in 1973, see Brandt v. Hickel, 427 F. 2d 63, 55 (CA9 1970), we have since held that “the APA does not afford an implied grant of subject-matter jurisdiction permitting federal judicial review of agency action,” Califano v. Sanders, 430 U. S. 99, 107 (1977). We need not decide whether jurisdiction would lie here under 28 U. S. C. § 1361, because jurisdiction in this action to review a decision of the Secretary of the Interior is clearly conferred by 28 U. S. C. § 1331 (a).
This general federal-question statute was amended in 1976 to eliminate the amount-in-controversy requirement with regard to actions “brought against the United States, any agency thereof, or any officer or employee thereof in his official capacity.” Pub. L. No. 94-574 § 2, 90 Stat. 2721. Hence the fact that in 1973 respondent in its complaint did not allege $10,000 in controversy is now of no moment. See Ralpho v. Bell, 186 U. S. App. D. C. 368, 376-377, n. 51, 569 F. 2d 607, 615-616, n. 51 (1977); Green v. Philbrook, 427 F. Supp. 834, 836 (Vt. 1977). Nor does it matter that the complaint does not in so many words assert § 1331 (a) as a basis of jurisdiction, since the facts alleged in it are sufficient to establish such jurisdiction and the complaint appeared jurisdictionally correct when filed. See Fort Sumter Tours, Inc. v. Andrus, 564 F. 2d 1119, 1123 n. 4 (CA4 1977); Harary v. Blumenthal, 555 F. 2d 1113, 1115 n. 1 (CA2 1977); Fitzgerald v. United States Civil Service Comm’n, 180 U. S. App. D. C. 327, 329 n. 1, 554 F. 2d 1186, 1188 n. 1 (1977).
In reaching this conclusion, the court correctly noted, 563 F. 2d, at 1216, that water is not listed among the “common varieties” of minerals withdrawn from location by 30 U. S. C. § 611. Hence the fact that respondent did not discover water on Claim 22 until after 1955 is irrelevant to the question of the validity of the claim. See supra, at 606-607, andn. 3. See also infra, at 617.
By referring to the intent of the 1872 Congress, we do not mean to imply that the only minerals locatable are those that were known to exist in 1872. But Congress’ general conception of what a “valuable mineral” was for purposes of mining claim location is of obvious relevance in construing the 1872 law.
Title 30 U. S. C. § 51 provides in full:
“Whenever, by priority of possession, rights to the use of water for mining, agricultural, manufacturing, or other purposes have vested and accrued, and the same are recognized and acknowledged by the local customs, laws, and the decisions of courts, the possessors and owners of such vested rights shall be maintained and protected in the same; and the right-of-way for the construction of ditches and canals for the purposes herein specified is acknowledged and confirmed; but .whenever any person, in the construction of any ditch or canal, injures or damages the possession of any settler on the public domain, the party committing such injury or damage shall be liable to the party injured for such injury or damage.”
Title 30 U. S. C. § 52 provides in full:
“All patents granted, or homesteads allowed, shall be subject to any vested and accrued water rights, or rights to ditches and reservoirs used in connection with such water rights, as may have been acquired under or recognized by section 51 of this title.”
The holder of a valid mining claim is generally understood to have an unlimited right to extract minerals from the claim, “even to exhaustion.” Union Oil Co. v. Smith, 249 U. S. 337, 349 (1919). Respondent suggests that this right could be limited in the context of a mining-law claim to water, if the law were construed to require the claimant to respect water rights previously vested under state law. Brief for Respondent 31 n. 8; see id., at 25-26.
Trelease, Federal-State Problems in Packaging Water Rights, in Water Acquisition for Mineral Development Institute Paper 9, pp. 9-17 n. 47 (Rocky Mt. Min. L. Fdn., 1978).
The Court of Appeals’ suggestion that a claim to water might be validated simply because of the “intrinsic value” of water “in the desert area,” 553 F. 2d, at 1216, makes abuse particularly likely, since the “intrinsic value” theory would substantially lessen a claimant’s burden of showing the “valuable” nature of his claim. See n. 4, supra.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | H | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Brennan
announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court as to Parts I and II and an opinion as to Part III in which Justice Marshall, Justice Blackmun, and Justice Kennedy join.
This case presents the issue whether a State may, consistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, categorically prohibit lawyers from soliciting legal business for pecuniary gain by sending truthful and nondeceptive letters to potential clients known to face particular legal problems.
hH
In 1985, petitioner, a member of Kentucky’s integrated Bar Association, see Ky. Sup. Ct. Rule 3.030 (1988), applied to the Kentucky Attorneys Advertising Commission for approval of a letter that he proposed to send “to potential clients who have had a foreclosure suit filed against them.” The proposed letter read as follows:
“It has come to my attention that your home is being foreclosed on. If this is true, you may be about to lose your home. Federal law may allow you to keep your home by ORDERING your creditor [sic] to STOP and give you more time to pay them.
“You may call my office anytime from 8:30 a. m. to 5:00 p. m. for FREE information on how you can keep your home.
“Call NOW, don’t wait. It may surprise you what I may be able to do for you. Just call and tell me that you got this letter. Remember it is FREE, there is NO charge for calling.”
The Commission did not find the letter false or misleading. Nevertheless, it declined to approve petitioner’s proposal on the ground that a then-existing Kentucky Supreme Court Rule prohibited the mailing or delivery of written advertisements “precipitated by a specific event or occurrence involving or relating to the addressee or addressees as distinct from the general public.” Ky. Sup. Ct. Rule 3.135(5)(b)(i). The Commission registered its view that Rule 3.135(5)(b)(i)’s ban on targeted, direct-mail advertising violated the First Amendment — specifically the principles enunciated in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U. S. 626 (1985) — and recommended that the Kentucky Supreme Court amend its Rules. See App. to Pet. for Cert. lla-15a. Pursuing the Commission’s suggestion, petitioner petitioned the Committee on Legal Ethics (Ethics Committee) of the Kentucky Bar Association for an advisory opinion as to the Rule’s validity. See Ky. Sup. Ct. Rule 3.530; n. 1, supra. Like the Commission, the Ethics Committee, in an opinion formally adopted by the Board of Governors of the Bar Association, did not find the proposed letter false or misleading, but nonetheless upheld Rule 3.135(5)(b) (i) on the ground that it was consistent with Rule 7.3 of the American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct (1984). App. to Pet. for Cert. 9a.
On review of the Ethics Committée’s advisory opinion, the Kentucky Supreme Court felt “compelled by the decision in Zauderer to order [Rule 3.135(5)(b)(i)] deleted,” 726 S. W. 2d 299, 300 (1987), and replaced it with the ABA’s Rule 7.3, which provides in its entirety:
‘“A lawyer may not solicit professional employment from a prospective client with whom the lawyer has no family or prior professional relationship, by mail, in-person or otherwise, when a significant motive for the lawyer’s doing so is the lawyer’s pecuniary gain. The term ‘solicit’ includes contact in person, by telephone or telegraph, by letter or other writing, or by other communication directed to a specific recipient, but does not include letters addressed or advertising circulars distributed generally to persons not known to need legal services of the kind provided by the lawyer in a particular matter, but who are so situated that they might in general find such services useful.’” 726 S. W. 2d, at 301 (quoting ABA, Model Rule of Professional Conduct 7.3 (1984)).
The court did not specify either the precise infirmity in Rule 3.135(5)(b)(i) or how Rule 7.3 cured it. Rule 7.3, like its predecessor, prohibits targeted, direct-mail solicitation by lawyers for pecuniary gain, without a particularized finding that the solicitation is false or misleading. We granted cer-tiorari to resolve whether such a blanket prohibition is consistent with the First Amendment, made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, 484 U. S. 814 (1987), and now reverse.
II
Lawyer advertising is in the category of constitutionally protected commercial speech. See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U. S. 350 (1977). The First Amendment principles governing state regulation of lawyer solicitations for pecuniary gain are by now familiar: “Commercial speech that is not false or deceptive and does not concern unlawful activities . . . may be restricted only in the service of a substantial governmental interest, and only through means that directly advance that interest.” Zauderer, supra, at 638 (citing Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm’n of New York, 447 U. S. 557, 566 (1980)). Since state regulation of commercial speech “may extend only as far as the interest it serves,” Central Hudson, supra, at 565, state rules that are designed to prevent the “potential for deception and confusion . . . may be no broader than reasonably necessary to prevent the” perceived evil. In re R. M. J., 455 U. S. 191, 203 (1982).
In Zauderer, application of these principles required that we strike an Ohio rule that categorically prohibited solicitation of legal employment for pecuniary gain through advertisements containing information or advice, even if truthful and nondeceptive, regarding a specific legal problem. We distinguished written advertisements containing such information or advice from in-person solicitation by lawyers for profit, which we held in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U. S. 447 (1978), a State may categorically ban. The “unique features of in-person solicitation by lawyers [that] justified a prophylactic rule prohibiting lawyers from engaging in such solicitation for pecuniary gain,” we observed, are “not present” in the context of written advertisements. Zauderer, supra, at 641-642.
Our lawyer advertising cases have never distinguished among various modes of written advertising to the general public. See, e. g., Bates, supra (newspaper advertising); id., at 372, n. 26 (equating advertising in telephone directory with newspaper advertising); In re R. M. J., supra (mailed announcement cards treated same as newspaper and telephone directory advertisements). Thus, Ohio could no more prevent Zauderer from mass-mailing to a general population his offer to represent women injured by the Daikon Shield than it could prohibit his publication of the advertisement in local newspapers. Similarly, if petitioner’s letter is neither false nor deceptive, Kentucky could not constitutionally prohibit him from sending at large an identical letter opening with the query, “Is your home being foreclosed on?,” rather than his observation to the targeted individuals that “It has come to my attention that your home is being foreclosed on.” The drafters of Rule 7.3 apparently appreciated as much, for the Rule exempts from the ban “letters addressed or advertising circulars distributed generally to persons . . . who are so situated that they might in general find such services useful.”
The court below disapproved petitioner’s proposed letter solely because it targeted only persons who were “known to need [the] legal services” offered in his letter, 726 S. W. 2d, at 301, rather than the broader group of persons “so situated that they might in general find such services useful.” Generally, unless the advertiser is inept, the latter group would include members of the former. The only reason to disseminate an advertisement of particular legal services among those persons who are “so situated that they might in general find such services useful” is to reach individuals who actually “need legal services of the kind provided [and advertised] by the lawyer.” But the First Amendment does not permit a ban on certain speech merely because it is more efficient; the State may not constitutionally ban a particular letter on the theory that to mail it only to those whom it would most interest is somehow inherently objectionable.
The court below did not rely on any such theory. See also Brief for Respondent 37 (conceding that “targeted direct mail advertising” — as distinguished from “solicitation” — “is constitutionally protected”) (emphasis in original). Rather, it concluded that the State’s blanket ban on all targeted, direct-mail solicitation was permissible because of the “serious potential for abuse inherent in direct solicitation by lawyers of potential clients known to need specific legal services.” 726 S. W. 2d, at 301. By analogy to Ohralik, the court observed:
“Such solicitation subjects the prospective client to pressure from a trained lawyer in a direct personal way. It is entirely possible that the potential client may feel overwhelmed by the basic situation which caused the need for the specific legal services and may have seriously impaired capacity for good judgment, sound reason and a natural protective self-interest. Such a condition is full of the possibility of undue influence, overreaching and intimidation.” 726 S. W. 2d, at 301.
Of course, a particular potential client will feel equally “overwhelmed” by his legal troubles and will have the same “impaired capacity for good judgment” regardless of whether a lawyer mails him an untargeted letter or exposes him to a newspaper advertisement — concededly constitutionally protected activities — or instead mails a targeted letter. The relevant inquiry is not whether there exist potential clients whose “condition” makes them susceptible to undue influence, but whether the mode of communication poses a serious danger that lawyers will exploit any such susceptibility. Cf. Ohralik, supra, at 470 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (“What is objectionable about Ohralik’s behavior here is not so much that he solicited business for himself, but rather the circumstances in which he performed that solicitation and the means by which he accomplished it”).
Thus, respondent’s facile suggestion that this case is merely “Ohralik in writing” misses the mark. Brief for Respondent 10. In assessing the potential for overreaching and undue influence, the mode of communication makes all the difference. Our decision in Ohralik that a State could categorically ban all in-person solicitation turned on two factors. First was our characterization of face-to-face solicitation as “a practice rife with possibilities for overreaching, invasion of privacy, the exercise of undue influence, and outright fraud.” Zauderer, 471 U. S., at 641. See Ohralik, 436 U. S., at 457-458, 464-465. Second, “unique . . . difficulties,” Zau-derer, supra, at 641, would frustrate any attempt at state regulation of in-person solicitation short of an absolute ban because such solicitation is “not visible or otherwise open to public scrutiny.” Ohralik, 436 U. S., at 466. See also ibid. (“[I]n-person solicitation would be virtually immune to effective oversight and regulation by the State or by the legal profession”) (footnote omitted). Targeted, direct-mail solicitation is distinguishable from the in-person solicitation in each respect.
Like print advertising, petitioner’s letter — and targeted, direct-mail solicitation generally — “poses much less risk of overreaching or undue influence” than does in-person solicitation, Zauderer, 471 U. S., at 642. Neither mode of written communication involves “the coercive force of the personal presence of a trained advocate” or the “pressure on the potential client for an immediate yes-or-no answer to the offer of representation.” Ibid. Unlike the potential client with a badgering advocate breathing down his neck, the recipient of a letter and the “reader of an advertisement. . . can ‘effectively avoid further bombardment of [his] sensibilities simply by averting [his] eyes,’” Ohralik, supra, at 465, n. 25 (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U. S. 15, 21 (1971)). A letter, like a printed advertisement (but unlike a lawyer), can readily be put in a drawer to be considered later, ignored, or discarded. In short, both types of written solicitation “con-ve[y] information about legal services [by means] that [are] more conducive to reflection and the exercise of choice on the part of the consumer than is personal solicitation by an attorney.” Zauderer, supra, at 642. Nor does a targeted letter invade the recipient’s privacy any more than does a substantively identical letter mailed at large. The invasion, if any, occurs when the lawyer discovers the recipient’s legal affairs, not when he confronts the recipient with the discovery.
Admittedly, a letter that is personalized (not merely targeted) to the recipient presents an increased risk of deception, intentional or inadvertent. It could, in certain circumstances, lead the recipient to overestimate the lawyer’s familiarity with the case or could implicitly suggest that the recipient’s legal problem is more dire than it really is. See Brief for ABA as Amicus Curiae 9. Similarly, an inaccurately targeted letter could lead the recipient to believe she has a legal problem that she does not actually have or, worse yet, could offer erroneous legal advice. See, e. g., Leoni v. State Bar of California, 39 Cal. 3d 609, 619-620, 704 P. 2d 183, 189 (1985), summarily dism’d, 475 U. S. 1001 (1986).
But merely because targeted, direct-mail solicitation presents lawyers with opportunities for isolated abuses or mistakes does not justify a total ban on that mode of protected commercial speech. See In re R. M. J., 455 U. S., at 203. The State can regulate such abuses and minimize mistakes through far less restrictive and more precise means, the most obvious of which is to require the lawyer to file any solicitation letter with a state agency, id., at 206, giving the State ample opportunity to supervise mailings and penalize actual abuses. The “regulatory difficulties” that are “unique” to in-person lawyer solicitation, Zauderer, supra, at 641 — solicitation that is “not visible or otherwise open to public scrutiny” and for which it is “difficult or impossible to obtain reliable proof of what actually took place,” Ohralik, supra, at 466-do not apply to written solicitations. The court below offered no basis for its “belie[f] [that] submission of a blank form letter to the Advertising Commission [does not] pro-vid[e] a suitable protection to the public from overreaching, intimidation or misleading private targeted mail solicitation.” 726 S. W. 2d, at 301. Its concerns were presumably those expressed by the ABA House of Delegates in its comment to Rule 7.3:
“State lawyer discipline agencies struggle for resources to investigate specific complaints, much less for those necessary to screen lawyers’ mail solicitation material. Even if they could examine such materials, agency staff members are unlikely to know anything about the lawyer or about the prospective client’s underlying problem. Without such knowledge they cannot determine whether the lawyer’s representations are misleading.” ABA, Model Rules of Professional Conduct, pp. 93-94 (1984).
The record before us furnishes no evidence that scrutiny of targeted solicitation letters will be appreciably more burdensome or less reliable than scrutiny of advertisements. See Bates, 433 U. S., at 379; id:, at 387 (Burger, C. J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (objecting to “enormous new regulatory burdens called for by” Bates). As a general matter, evaluating a targeted advertisement does not require specific information about the recipient’s identity and legal problems any more than evaluating a newspaper advertisement requires like information about all readers. If the targeted letter specifies facts that relate to particular recipients (e. g., “It has come to my attention that your home is being foreclosed on”), the reviewing agency has innumerable options to minimize mistakes. It might, for example, require the lawyer to prove the truth of the fact stated (by supplying copies of the court documents or material that led the lawyer to the fact); it could require the lawyer to explain briefly how he or she discovered the fact and verified its accuracy; or it could require the letter to bear a label identifying it as an advertisement, see id., at 384 (dictum); In re R. M. J., supra, at 206, n. 20, or directing the recipient how to report inaccurate or misleading letters. To be sure, a state agency or bar association that reviews solicitation letters might have more work than one that does not. But “[o]ur recent decisions involving commercial speech have been grounded in the faith that the free flow of commercial information is valuable enough to justify imposing on would-be regulators the costs of distinguishing the truthful from the false, the helpful from the misleading, and the harmless from the harmful.” Zauderer, 471 U. S., at 646.
Ill
The validity of Rule 7.3 does not turn on whether petitioner’s letter itself exhibited any of the evils at which Rule 7.3 was directed. See Ohralik, 436 U. S., at 463-464, 466. Since, however, the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine does not apply to professional advertising, see Bates, 433 U. S., at 379-381, we address respondent’s contentions that petitioner’s letter is particularly overreaching, and therefore unworthy of First Amendment protection. Id., at 381. In that regard, respondent identifies two features of the letter before us that, in its view, coalesce to convert the proposed letter into “high pressure solicitation, overbearing solicitation,” Brief for Respondent 20, which is not protected. First, respondent asserts that the letter’s liberal use of underscored, uppercase letters (e. g., “Call NOW, don’t wait”; “it is FREE, there is NO charge for calling”) “fairly shouts at the recipient . . . that he should employ Shapero.” Id., at 19. See also Brief in Opposition 11 (“Letters of solicitation which shout commands to the individual, targeted recipient in words in underscored capitals are of a different order from advertising and are subject to proscription”). Second, respondent objects that the letter contains assertions (e. g., “It may surprise you what I may be able to do for you”) that “statte] no affirmative or objective fact,” but constitute “pure salesman puffery, enticement for the unsophisticated, which commits Shapero to nothing.” Brief for Respondent 20.
The pitch or style of a letter’s type and its inclusion of subjective predictions of client satisfaction might catch the recipient’s attention more than would a bland statement of purely objective facts in small type. But a truthful and non-deceptive letter, no matter how big its type and how much it speculates can never “shou[t] at the recipient” or “gras[p] him by the lapels,” id., at 19, as can a lawyer engaging in face-to-face solicitation. The letter simply presents no comparable risk of overreaching. And so long as the First Amendment protects the right to solicit legal business, the State may claim no substantial interest in restricting truthful and nondeceptive lawyer solicitations to those least likely to be read by the recipient. Moreover, the First Amendment limits the State’s authority to dictate what information an attorney may convey in soliciting legal business. “[T]he States may not place an absolute prohibition on certain types of potentially misleading information ... if the information may also be presented in a way that is not deceptive,” unless the State “assert[s] a substantial interest” that such a restriction would directly advance. In re R. M. J., 455 U. S., at 203. Nor may a State impose a more particularized restriction without a similar showing. Aside from the interests that we have already rejected, respondent offers none.
To be sure, a letter may be misleading if it unduly emphasizes trivial or “relatively uninformative fact[s],” In re R. M. J., supra, at 205 (lawyer’s statement, “in large capital letters, that he was a member of the Bar of the Supreme Court of the United States”), or offers overblown assurances of client satisfaction, cf. In re Von Wiegen, 63 N. Y. 2d 163, 179, 470 N. E. 2d 838, 847 (1984) (solicitation letter to victims of massive disaster informs them that “it is [the lawyer’s] opinion that the liability of the defendants is clear”), cert. denied, 472 U. S. 1007 (1985); Bates, supra, at 383-384 (“[Advertising claims as to the quality of legal services . . . may be so likely to be misleading as to warrant restriction”). Respondent does not argue before us that petitioner’s letter was misleading in those respects. Nor does respondent contend that the letter is false or misleading in any other respect. Of course, respondent is free to raise, and the Kentucky courts are free to consider, any such argument on remand.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Kentucky is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
The Attorneys Advertising Commission is charged with the responsibility of “regulating attorney advertising as prescribed” in the Rules of the Kentucky Supreme Court. Ky. Sup. Ct. Rule 3.135(3) (1988). The Commission’s decisions are appealable to the Board of Governors of the Kentucky Bar Association, Rule 3.135(8)(a), and are ultimately reviewable by the Kentucky Supreme Court. Rule 3.135(8)(b). “Any attorney who is in doubt as to the propriety of any professional act contemplated by him” also has the option of seeking an advisory opinion from a committee of the Kentucky Bar Association, which, if formally adopted by the Board of Governors, is reviewable by the Kentucky Supreme Court. Rule 3.530.
Rule 3.135(5)(b)(i) provided in full:
“A written advertisement may be sent or delivered to an individual addressee only if that addressee is one of a class of persons, other than a family, to whómi R is also sent or delivered at or about the same time, and only if it is not prompted or precipitated by a specific event or occurrence involving or relating'to the addressee or addressees as distinct from the general public.”
We reject respondent’s request that we dismiss or affirm this case because “the Supreme Court of Kentucky granted Shapero precisely the relief which he requested.” Brief for Respondent 11. The court below did, as petitioner prayed, “declare . . . rule [3.135(5)(b)(i)] void,” Motion for Review of Advisory Opinion E-310, No. 86-SC-335 (Sup. Ct. Ky.). The court’s ultimate disposition, however, was to adopt a new Rule with the same defect that petitioner identified in the old ope and to “affirm the decision of the Ethics Committee to deny [petitioner’s] request” for approval of his letter. 726 S. W. 2d 299, 301 (1987). Petitioner surely cannot be said to have prevailed below.
Nor does the fact that petitioner never leveled his constitutional challenge specifically against Rule 7.3 mean that this case presents “federal constitutional issues [that were] raised here for the first time on review of [a] state court decisio[n],” Cardinale v. Louisiana, 394 U. S. 437, 438 (1969). The parties briefed and argued the constitutionality of a categorical ban on targeted, direct-mail advertising, and the court below plainly considered and rejected those arguments as it adopted Model Rule 7.3. See 726 S. W. 2d, at 300.
We also decline respondent’s invitation to dismiss this case in order to avoid interference with ongoing state judicial proceedings. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971). Once the court below rendered its final judgment in this case, there was no longer any pending state judicial proceeding.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | F | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Reed
delivered the opinion of the Court.
On September 13, 1950, petitioner pleaded guilty to a six-count indictment charging the theft of six separate letters from the mailboxes of the six addressees in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1708. Petitioner was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment on each count, the sentences to run concurrently. 193 F. 2d 720. After serving almost a year of his term, petitioner, on August 3, 1951, filed a motion under 28 U. S. C. § 2255 to vacate or correct sentence on the ground that the indictment did not allege that any of the letters stolen from the mailboxes had a value of more than $100, hence that the indictment charged misdemeanors under § 1708, the maximum penalty for each of which was one year, instead of felonies for which the maximum penalty was five years. The District Court denied petitioner’s motion and the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. Both of the courts below held that the misdemeanor provision of § 1708 applies only to thefts of “any article or thing” which in turn had been taken from a letter or package, and not to thefts of intact units of mail. As this result was in direct conflict with the position taken by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Armstrong v. United States, 187 F. 2d 954, we granted certiorari to resolve that conflict. 343 U. S. 976. The statute in question appears in the margin.
According to the view of the Government and that adopted by the courts below, the lesser penalty is limited to thefts from mail as opposed to thefts of mail for which the maximum punishment may be imposed. Under the Government’s construction, the phrase “article or thing” does not refer to mail or letters. Thus the one-year maximum sentence becomes appropriate only when mail is received in a manner not prohibited by the statute, and the contents thereof then illegally removed. We do not agree with this distinction.
As early as 1810 Congress prohibited and punished mail theft (2 Stat. 598). That statute provided a maximum of seven years’ imprisonment for the theft of letters containing “any article of value,” and a maximum punishment of a fine of $500 for the theft of letters “not containing any article of value or evidence thereof.” In 1825 the statute was amended to provide for increased penalties for the two offenses and the value distinction was retained (4 Stat. 109). Under an 1872 revision, however, the punishment distinction as to the value or the nature of the mail stolen was eliminated (17 Stat. 318). Under this revision the maximum sentence which could be imposed for mail theft was five years. This over-all maximum of five years was carried over in the 1909 Act (35 Stat. 1125) and in 18 U. S. C. § 317, the antecedent provision of 18 U. S. C. § 1708, enacted in 1948. In 1948 the entire federal criminal code received comprehensive revision. Among other changes not here pertinent, the 1948 revision added the phrase “but if the value or face value of any such article or thing does not exceed $100, he shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.” The Reviser’s Note on this addition which accompanied the bill and explained the changes to Congress states that “[t]he smaller penalty for an offense involving $100 or less was added.” (18 U. S. C. § 1708.) This note also called attention to similar adjustments of penalties in §§ 641 and 645, which relate to illegal abstractions of government records, vouchers and other things of value. Nothing was said of the distinction to which the Government would now have us accede.
As was pointed out in the Armstrong decision, “It would have been a simple matter for the reviser, or Congress, to have made clear, had such been the intent, that stealing ‘an article or thing’ from an item of mail, leaving the item of mail otherwise intact, is to be regarded as a less serious offense than stealing the item of mail itself. A highly technical distinction of this sort, which could easily have been spelled out, cannot be imposed on the general words ‘any such article or thing’ in the concluding proviso of Sec. 1708. Those words must be deemed to include any article or thing previously mentioned in Sec. 1708, whether it is described specifically as a ‘letter’ or generally as ‘an article or thing.’ ” 187 F. 2d 954, 956.
Following the Armstrong decision, the Postmaster General and the Attorney General asked Congress to eliminate the misdemeanor provision from § 1708 because the crime of theft of mail had been divided into “felonies and misdemeanors, with the value of the matter stolen as the determining factor.” S. Rep. No. 980, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 3-4; H. R. Rep. No. 1674, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 3-5. Subsequent to our granting certiorari, June 9, 1952, the proposal to eliminate the misdemeanor provision was approved, July 1,1952. 66 Stat. 314. Although Congress thus eliminated the conflict which led us to grant certiorari, the change in the statute can have no effect on a prior conviction such as petitioner’s. In our view, under the then wording of § 1708, and its purpose as shown by the Reviser’s Notes, petitioner was improperly convicted of a felony.
This Court has power to do justice as the case requires. 28 U. S. C. § 2106. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the cause is remanded to the District Court to correct the sentence.
It is so ordered.
“Whoever steals, takes, or abstracts, or by fraud or deception obtains, or attempts so to obtain, from or out of any mail, post office, or station thereof, letter box, mail receptacle, or any mail route or other authorized depository for mail matter, or from a letter or mail carrier, any letter, postal card, package, bag, or mail, or abstracts or removes from any such letter, package, bag, or mail, any article or thing contained therein, or secretes, embezzles, or destroys any such letter, postal card, package, bag, or mail, or any article or thing contained therein; or
“Whoever steals, takes, or abstracts, or by fraud or deception obtains any letter, postal card, package, bag, or mail, or any article or thing contained therein which has been left for collection upon or adjacent to a collection box or other authorized depository of mail matter; or
“Whoever buys, receives, or conceals, or unlawfully has in his possession, any letter, postal card, package, bag, or mail, or any article or thing contained therein, which has been so stolen, taken, embezzled, or abstracted, as herein described, knowing the same to have been stolen, taken, embezzled, or abstracted—
“Shall be fined not more than $2,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both; but if the value or face value of any such article or thing does not exceed $100, he shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.”
The Chief Reviser explained the purpose of such changes to the House Committee on Revision of the Laws as follows:
“changes in punishment
“Our work revealed many inconsistencies in punishments. Some appeared too lenient and others too harsh when compared with crimes of similar gravity. Our problem was twofold.
“First, we found that in spite of our exact definition of felonies and misdemeanors, 29 punishments were inaccurately labeled, resulting in conflicting court opinions. We solved this problem by omitting from each of the 29 punishments any description of the offense as a felony or misdemeanor, leaving the test as to the kind of crime, to our definitive section.
“Second, we discovered serious disparities in punishments when we considered the nature of various crimes. Before attempting to eliminate these differences we prepared a master table showing the nature of each offense and its punishment. In this way we eliminated many inequalities and brought uniformity out of the conflicts which time had developed.” Hearings on H. R. 5450, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 6.
Patterson v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 600, 607; Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U. S. 551, 555; Walling v. James V. Reuter, Inc., 321 U. S. 671, 676.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | A | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this limitation proceeding brought by the respondent under §§ 183-186 of the Limited Liability Act, R. S. §§ 4281-4289, as amended, 46 U. S. C. §§ 181-196, the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania denied the petitioner’s claim for damages filed on behalf of the widow and other dependents of a seaman who lost his life on respondent’s tug in a fire caused by the violation of a navigation rule. 141 F. Supp. 582. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed. 235 F. 2d 618, rehearing denied, 235 F. 2d 619. We granted certiorari. 352 U. S. 965.
The seaman lost his life on the tug Arthur N. Herron, which, on the night of November 18, 1952, while towing a scow on the Schuylkill River in Philadelphia, caught fire when an open-flame kerosene lamp on the deck of the scow ignited highly inflammable vapors lying above an extensive accumulation of petroleum products spread over the surface of the river. Several oil refineries and facilities for oil storage, and for loading and unloading petroleum products, are located along the banks of the Schuylkill River. The trial court found that the lamp was not more than three feet above the water. Maintaining the lamp at a height of less than eight feet violated a navigation rule promulgated by the Commandant of the United States Coast Guard. The trial court found that the vapor would not have been ignited if the lamp had been carried at the required height.
The District Court held that the violation of the rule, “whether . . . [it] be called negligence or be said to make the flotilla unseaworthy,” did not impose liability because “the Coast Guard regulation had to do solely with navigation and was intended for the prevention of collisions, and for no other purpose. In the present case there was no collision and no fault of navigation. True, the origin of the fire can be traced to the violation of the regulation, but the question is not causation but whether the violation of the regulation, of itself, imposes liability.” 141 F. Supp., at 585.
The petitioner urges first that the statutory violation made the flotilla unseaworthy, creating liability without regard to fault. But the remedy for unseaworthiness derives from the general maritime law, and that law recognizes no cause of action for wrongful death whether occasioned by unseaworthiness or by negligence. The Harrisburg, 119 U. S. 199; see Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U. S. 233, 240. Before the Jones Act, federal courts of admiralty resorted to the various state death acts to give a remedy for wrongful death. The Hamilton, 207 U. S. 398; The Transfer No. 4, 61 F. 364; see Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, supra, at 242; Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Kierejewski, 261 U. S. 479. The Jones Act created a federal right of action for the wrongful death of a seaman based on the statutory action under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act. In Lindgren v. United States, 281 U. S. 38, the Court held that the Jones Act remedy for wrongful death was exclusive and precluded any remedy for wrongful death within territorial waters, based on unseaworthiness, whether derived from federal or state law. The petitioner assumes that under today’s general maritime law the personal representative of a deceased seaman may elect, as the seaman himself may elect, between an action based on the FELA and an action, recognized in The Osceola, 189 U. S. 158, 175, based upon unseaworthiness. In view of the disposition we are making of this case, we need not consider the soundness of this assumption.
The petitioner also urges that, since the violation of the rule requiring the lights to be eight feet above the water resulted in a defect or insufficiency in the flotilla’s lighting equipment which in fact caused the seaman’s death, liability was created without regard to negligence under the line of decisions of this Court in actions under the FELA based upon violations of either the Safety Appliance Acts or the Boiler Inspection Act. That line of decisions interpreted the clause of § 1 of the FELA, 45 U. S. C. § 51, which imposes liability on the employer “by reason of any defect or insufficiency, due to its negligence, in its cars, engines, appliances, machinery, track, roadbed, works, boats, wharves, or other equipment.” The cases hold that under this clause, a defect resulting from a violation of either statute which causes the injury or death of an employee creates liability without regard to negligence. San Antonio & A. P. R. Co. v. Wagner, 241 U. S. 476, 484. Here the defect or insufficiency in the flotilla’s lighting equipment due to a violation of the statute resulted in the death of the seaman. The question for our decision is whether, in the absence of any showing of negligence, the Jones Act — which in terms incorporates the provisions of the FELA — permits recovery for the death of a seaman resulting from a violation of a statutory duty. We hold that it does.
In denying the claim the lower courts relied upon their views of general tort doctrine. It is true that at common law the liability of the master to his servant was founded wholly on tort rules of general applicability and the master was granted the effective defenses of assumption of risk and contributory negligence. This limited liability derived from a public policy, designed to give maximum freedom to infant industrial enterprises, “to insulate the employer as much as possible from bearing the 'human overhead’ which is an inevitable part of the cost — to someone — of the doing of industrialized business.” Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 318 U. S. 54, 59. But it came' to be recognized that, whatever the rights and duties among persons generally, the industrial employer had a special responsibility toward his workers, who were daily exposed to the risks of the business and who were largely helpless to provide adequately for their own safety. Therefore, as industry and commerce became sufficiently strong to bear the burden, the law, the reflection of an evolving public policy, came to favor compensation of employees and their dependents for the losses occasioned by the inevitable deaths and injuries of industrial employment, thus shifting to industry the “human overhead” of doing business. For most industries this change has been embodied in Workmen’s Compensation Acts. In the railroad and shipping industries, however, the FELA and Jones Act provide the framework for determining liability for industrial accidents. But instead of a detailed statute codifying common-law principles, Congress saw fit to enact a statute of the most general terms, thus leaving in large measure to the courts the duty of fashioning remedies for injured employees in a manner analogous to the development of tort remedies at common law. But it is clear that the general congressional intent was to provide liberal recovery for injured workers, Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 352 U. S. 500, 508-510, and it is also clear that Congress intended the creation of no static remedy, but one which would be developed and enlarged to meet changing conditions and changing concepts of industry’s duty toward its workers.
The FELA and the Jones Act impose upon the employer the duty of paying damages when injury to the worker is caused, in whole or in part, by the employer’s fault. This fault may consist of a breach of the duty of care, analogous but by no means identical to the general common-law duty, or of a breach of some statutory duty. The tort doctrine which the lower courts applied imposes liability for violation of a statutory duty only where the injury is one which the statute was designed to prevent. However, this Court has'repeatedly refused to apply such a limiting doctrine in FELA cases. In FELA cases based upon violations of the Safety Appli-anee Acts or the Boiler Inspection Act, the Court has held that a violation of either statute creates liability under FELA if the resulting defect or insufficiency in equipment contributes in fact to the death or injury in suit, without regard to whether the injury flowing from the breach was the injury the statute sought to prevent. Since it appears in this case that the defect or insufficiency of the flotilla’s lighting equipment resulting from the violation of 33 U. S. C. § 157 actually caused the seaman’s death, this principle governs and compels a result in favor of the petitioner’s claim.
In Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Layton, 243 U. S. 617, a railroad employee on one of five freight cars loaded with coal was thrown to the track and injured when an engine pushed a stock car into the last of the loaded cars and drove the five cars against a standing train. Neither the stock car nor the car which it struck was equipped with automatic couplers, as required by the Federal Safety Appliance Act. Had the cars been so equipped they would have coupled when they came together and the five cars would not have run against the standing train. The stated purpose of the automatic coupler requirement was to avoid “the necessity of men going between the ends of cars,” and the railroad contended that this showed that the Congress intended the requirement only for the benefit of employees injured when between cars for the purpose of coupling or uncoupling them. The Court rejected the argument and affirmed a judgment for the plaintiff.
In Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Gotschall, 244 U. S. 66, a brakeman walking along the tops of the cars of a moving train was thrown off and killed when the train separated because of the opening of a coupler which resulted in an automatic setting of the emergency brakes and a sudden jerk of the train. This Court sustained a judgment against the railroad although the injury was not one which the Safety Appliance Act aims to prevent.
In Davis v. Wolfe, 263 U. S. 239, the conductor of a moving train holding on to the grab iron directly over the sill-step on which he stood fell because the grab iron was loose and defective. It was contended that the grab iron was required to aid employees engaged in coupling or uncoupling cars or a service connected therewith, not to aid in the transportation of employees. The Court rejected this contention and held that the Layton and Gotschall cases had settled that the employee “. . . can recover if the failure to comply with the requirements of the [Safety Appliance] act is a proximate cause of the accident, resulting in injury to him while in the discharge of his duty, although not engaged in an operation in which the safety appliances are specifically designed to furnish him protection.” Id., at 243.
In Swinson v. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. R. Co., 294 U. S. 529, a freight brakeman was releasing a tightly set hand brake at the end of a tank car. Release of the hand brake required the application of considerable force to the brake wheel. The brakeman put his left foot on the running board and his right foot on the grab iron to set himself better to put pressure on the brake wheel. The foot pressure exerted on the grab iron caused the plank to which it was attached to split and one of the bolts securing the grab iron to be pulled through. As a result the brakeman lost his balance and was seriously injured in a fall in front of the moving car. The railroad contended, unsuccessfully, that it was not liable because the grab iron had been used by the brakeman for a purpose for which it was not intended, arguing that the duty to supply grab irons was intended by Congress in order to provide employees with an appliance to grasp with the hands, not to provide a foot brace or support to secure leverage in releasing a hand brake.
In Coray v. Southern Pacific Co., 335 U. S. 520, an employee of the railroad, riding a motor-driven track car behind a moving freight train, was killed in a crash of the track car into the freight train which stopped suddenly when its brakes locked because of a defect in its braking system. The Supreme Court of Utah affirmed the state trial court’s direction of verdict for the railroad upon the ground that, in so far as brakes were concerned, the object of the Safety Appliance Act was not to protect employees from standing trains, but from moving trains. The Utah Supreme Court also reasoned that the stopping of the train in consequence of the leak in the valve was precisely what, as a safety device, it was designed to do. This Court reversed and said, id., at 524:
“The language selected by Congress to fix liability in cases of this kind is simple and direct. Consideration of its meaning by the introduction of dialectical subtleties can serve no useful interpretative purpose. The statute declares that railroads shall be responsible for their employees’ deaths 'resulting in whole or in part’ from defective appliances such as were here maintained. 45 U. S. C. § 51. And to make its purpose crystal clear, Congress has also provided that 'no such employee . . . shall be held to have been guilty of contributory negligence in any case’ where a violation of the Safety Appliance Act, such as the one here, 'contributed to the . . . death of such employee.’ 45 U. S. C. § 53. Congress has thus for its own reasons imposed extraordinary safety obligations upon railroads and has commanded that if a breach of these obligations contributes in part to an employee’s death, the railroad must pay damages. These air-brakes were defective; for this reason alone the train suddenly and unexpectedly stopped; a motor track car following at about the same rate of speed and operated by an employee looking in another direction crashed into the train; all of these circumstances were inseparably related to one another in time and space. The jury could have found that decedent’s death resulted from any or all of the foregoing circumstances.”
Finally, in Urie v. Thompson, 337 U. S. 163, the Court considered a claim based upon an alleged violation of an Interstate Commerce Commission regulation promulgated under the Boiler Inspection Act. The regulation provided: “Locomotives shall be equipped with proper sanding apparatus, which shall be maintained in safe and suitable condition for service, and tested before each trip. Sand pipes must be securely fastened in line with the rails.” Id., at 195. The purpose of the requirement was to provide sand for traction. A fireman employed by the railroad for almost thirty years sued to recover damages for silicosis allegedly contracted from the inhalation of silicate dust emitted by allegedly broken or faultily adjusted sanders into the decks and cabs of the many locomotives on which he had worked. The railroad contended that the ICC rule was designed to ensure an adequate auxiliary braking system, not to protect employees against silicosis, and therefore the employee could not recover for an injury not of the kind the ICC rule sought to guard against. The Court rejected the argument as resting on general tort doctrine inapplicable to this case.
The decisive question in this case, then, is whether the principles developed in this line of FELA cases permit recovery for violation of this navigation statute or are limited, as the dissenting opinipn would have it, to cases involving the Safety Appliance and Boiler Inspection Acts. Our attention is directed to the provisions of § 4 of the FELA, which makes reference to “any statute enacted for the safety of employees . . . ,” and it is urged that this phrase, in some unexplained manner, creates a special relationship between the FELA and the Safety Appliance and Boiler Inspection Acts. Several answers may be given to this contention.
First, § 4 relates entirely to the defense of assumption of risk, abolishing this defense where the injury was caused by the employer’s negligence or by “violation . . . of any statute enacted for the safety of employees . . . .” It is § 1 of the FELA which creates the cause of action and this section, on its face, is barren of any suggestion that injuries caused by violation of any statute are to be treated specially. In formulating the rule that violation of the Safety Appliance and Boiler Inspection Acts creates liability for resulting injuries without proof of negligence, the Court relied on judicially evolved principles designed to carry out the general congressional purpose of providing appropriate remedies for injuries incurred by railroad employees. For Congress, in 1908, did not crystallize the application of the Act by enacting specific rules to guide the courts. Rather, by using generalized language, it created only a framework within which the courts were left to evolve, much in the manner of the common law, a system of principles providing compensation for injuries to employees consistent with the changing realities of employment in the railroad industry.
Second, it is argued that the Safety Appliance and Boiler Inspection Acts are special safety statutes and thus may easily be assimilated to the FELA under general common-law principles. But there is no magic in the word “safety.’' In the cases we have discussed it was regarded as irrelevant that the defects in the appliances did not disable them from performing their intended safety function. For instance, in Gotschall the coupling defect parting the cars resulted in the automatic setting of the emergency brakes as a safety measure. In Coray the train stopped due to the operation of the very safety mechanism required by the statute. In Urie the defect in the sanders which caused sand to come into the locomotive cabs in no wise impaired the designed safety function of the sanders — to provide sand for traction. We think that the irrelevance of the safety aspect in these cases demonstrates that the basis of liability is a violation of statutory duty without regard to whether the injury flowing from the violation was the injury the statute sought to guard against. It must therefore be concluded that the nature of the Acts violated is not a controlling consideration; the basis of liability is the FELA.
The courts, in developing the FELA with a view to adjusting equitably between the worker and his corporate employer the risks inherent in the railroad industry, have plainly rejected many of the refined distinctions necessary in common-law tort doctrine for the purpose of allocating risks between persons who are more nearly on an equal footing as to financial capacity and ability to avoid the hazards involved. Among the refinements developed by the common law for the purpose of limiting the risk of liability arising from wrongful conduct is the rule that violation of a statutory duty creates liability only when the statute was intended to protect those in the position of the plaintiff from the type of injury in fact incurred. This limiting approach has long been discarded from the FELA. Instead, the theory of the FELA is that where the employer’s conduct falls short of the high standard required of him by this Act, and his fault, in whole or in part, causes injury, liability ensues. And this result follows whether the fault is a violation of a statutory duty or the more general duty of acting with care, for the employer owes the employee, as much as the duty of acting with care, the duty of complying with his statutory obligations.
We find no difficulty in applying these principles, developed under the FELA, to the present action under the Jones Act, for the latter Act expressly provides for seamen the cause of action — and consequently the entire judicially developed doctrine of liability — granted to railroad workers by the .FELA. The deceased seaman here was in a position perfectly analogous to that of the railroad workers allowed recovery in the line of cases we have discussed, and the principles governing those cases clearly should apply here.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed with direction to remand to the District Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Reversed.
Memorandum of
Mr. Justice Frankfurter.
Since it has been my general-practice for on to a decade to refrain from participating in the substantive disposition of cases arising under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act and the Jones Act that have been brought here on writ of certiorari, a word explaining my participation today is in order.
After persistent protest against granting petitions for certiorari to review judgments in the state courts and the United States Courts of Appeals involving application of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, I deemed it necessary to register my conviction on the unjustifiability of granting such petitions by noting that the petitions were improviolently granted. See my opinion in Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 352 U. S. 500, 524. All these cases involved evaluation of evidence: evidence on what constitutes “negligence,” i. e., the common-law conception of negligence which Congress adopted, subject to qualifications regarding “causation” and withdrawal of common-law defenses, and which remains the statutory requisite for liability. It has become the practice for this Court to review evidence where trial courts have considered it their duty to take cases from juries or to set aside jury verdicts, or where appellate courts have reversed trial court decisions as to what are allowable verdicts by juries. This manifestly ceased to be the function of this Court after Congress, by the Act of September 6, 1916, 39 Stat. 726, abolished appeals to the Court in Federal Employers’ Liability Act cases and restricted review of lower court decisions in such cases to the confined scope of our general certiorari jurisdiction.
I am aware of the suggestion that these cases, at least those coming from the Courts of Appeals, involve a constitutional issue — namely, the application of the Seventh Amendment. That, I should suppose, would be equally true of every case in the federal courts in which the claim is made that a case should have been left to the jury, and equally, of course, such claims (in non-FELA cases, at any rate) are here denied, except in the most flagrant instances. This Court has said again and again, in other than FELA cases, that questions of fact — and that is essentially what these negligence cases involve — afford an inadmissible basis for review by this Court. And this for the conclusive reason that deliberate consideration and wise adjudication of the cases that concededly ought to be reviewed here make a demand greater than the resources of time and thought possessed by this Court, no matter how ably constituted, reasonably afford. See Ex parte Peru, 318 U. S. 578, 602-603 (dissenting opinion).
This case is different in kind from those in which I have felt it my duty to abstain from consideration on the merits. This is a case which involves a serious question of construction of a statute of nationwide importance. Such questions of construction are /among the most important issues for final determination by this Court. I therefore reach the merits, and on the merits I join the opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan.
33 CFR §80.16 (h). “Scows not otherwise provided for in this section on waters described in paragraph (a) of this section shall carry a white light at each end of each scow, except that when such scows are massed in tiers, two or more abreast, each of the outside scows shall carry a white light on its outer bow, and the outside scows in the last tier shall each carry, in addition, a white light on the outer part of the stern. The white light shall be carried not less than 8 feet above the surface of the water, and shall be so placed as to show an unbroken light all around the horizon, and shall be of such a character as to be visible on a dark night with a clear atmosphere at a distance of at least 5 miles.”
The Commandant is empowered by 30 Stat. 102, as amended, 33 U. S. C. § 157, to establish rules “as to the lights to be carried . . . as he . . . may deem necessary for safety . . . .” This section was contained in the Act of June 7, 1897, the purpose of which was to codify the rules governing navigation on inland waters and to conform them as nearly as practicable to the revised international rulesv for preventing collisions at sea adopted at the International Marine Conference in October 1889 . 30 Cong. Rec. 1394; H. R. Doc. No. 42, 55th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 1.
The Harrisburg disapproved lower federal court cases, among them a decision of Chief Justice Chase at Circuit, The Sea Gull, 21 Fed. Cas. 910, No. 12578a, which had given a right of action for wrongful death. Reliance was placed on the fact that English admiralty law did not recognize the cause of action although continental maritime law did. By statute, English admiralty courts now entertain a cause of action for wrongful death. 23 Halsbury’s Laws of England (2d ed. 1936) § 979.
“Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment may, at his election, maintain an action for damages at law, with the right of trial by jury, and in such action all statutes of the United States modifying or extending the common-law right or remedy in cases of personal injury to railway employees shall apply; and in case of the death of any seaman as a result of any such personal injury the personal representative of such seaman may maintain an action for damages at law with the right of trial by jury, and in such action all statutes of the United States conferring or regulating the right of action for death in the case of railway employees shall be applicable. [/. e., Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 35 Stat. 65, as amended, 45 U. S. C. §§ 51-60.] Jurisdiction in such actions shall be under the court of the district in which the defendant employer resides or in which his principal office is located.” 41 Stat. 1007, 46 U. S. C. § 688.
Where death occurs beyond a marine league from state shores, the Death on the High Seas Act, 41 Stat. 537, 46 U. S. C. §§ 761-768, provides a remedy for wrongful death. Presumably any claims, based on unseaworthiness, for damages accrued prior to the decedent’s death would survive, at least if a pertinent state statute is effective to bring about a survival of the seaman’s right. See Holland v. Steag, Inc., 143 F. Supp. 203; cf. Cox v. Roth, 348 U. S. 207; Just v. Chambers, 312 U. S. 383. Claims for maintenance and cure survive the death of the seaman. Sperbeck v. A. L. Burbank & Co., 190 F. 2d 449. For a discussion of the applicability of a state wrongful-death statute to an action for death of a nonseaman based upon a breach of the warranty of seaworthiness, see Skovgaard v. The Tungus, 252 F. 2d 14.
27 Stat. 531, as amended, 45 U. S. C. §§ 1-16.
36 Stat. 913, as amended, 45 U. S. C. §§ 22-34.
The trial court relied upon Restatement, Torts, § 286, Comment on Clause (c), h: “A statute or ordinance may be construed as intended to give protection against a particular form of harm to a particular interest. If so, the actor cannot be liable to another for a violation of the enactment unless the harm which the violation causes is that from which it was the purpose of the enactment to protect the other.”
The dissenters argue that the Safety Appliance and Boiler Inspection Acts were each prefaced by the statement: “An Act to promote the safety of employees and travelers . . . .” But we are not persuaded that liability under the FELA should depend on the title of the Acts whose violation is alleged. Were we to rely on such indicia we could point out that the statute here involved empowered the Commandant of the Coast Guard to establish rules “as to the lights to be carried . . . as he . . . may deem necessary for safety . . . 30 Stat. 102, 33 U. S. C. § 157. (Emphasis added.)
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | H | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Ginsburg
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In the latest chapter of this long-litigated original-jurisdiction ease, the Queehan Tribe (Tribe) and the United States on the Tribe’s behalf assert claims for increased rights to water from the Colorado River. These claims are based on the contention that the Fort Yuma (Queehan) Indian Reservation encompasses some 25,000 acres of disputed boundary lands not attributed to that reservation in earlier stages of the litigation. In this decision, we resolve a threshold question regarding these claims to additional water rights: Are the claims precluded by this Court’s prior decision in Arizona v. California, 873 U. S. 546 (1963) (Arizona I), or by a consent judgment entered by the United States Claims Court in 1983? The Special Master has prepared a report recommending that the Court reject the first ground for preclusion but accept the second. We reject both grounds for preclusion and remand the case to the Special Master for consideration of the claims for additional water rights appurtenant to the disputed boundary lands.
I
This litigation began in 1952 when Arizona invoked our original jurisdiction to settle a dispute with California over the extent of each State’s right to use water from the Colorado River system. Nevada intervened, seeking a determination of its water rights, and Utah and New Mexico were joined as defendants. The United States intervened and sought water rights on behalf of various federal establishments, including five Indian reservations: the Chemehuevi Indian Reservation, the Cocopah Indian Reservation, the Fort Yuma (Queehan) Indian Reservation, the Colorado River Indian Reservation, and the Fort Mojave Indian Reservation. The Court appointed Simon Rifkind as Special Master.
The first round of the litigation culminated in our opinion in Arizona L We agreed with Special Master Rifkind that the apportionment of Colorado River water was governed by the Boulder Canyon Project Act of 1928, 43 U. S. C. § 617 et seq., and by contracts entered into by the Secretary of the Interior pursuant to the Act. We further agreed that the United States had reserved water rights for the five reservations under the doctrine of Winters v. United States, 207 U. S. 564 (1908). See Arizona I, 373 U. S., at 565, 599-601. Because the Tribes’ water rights were effective as of the time each reservation was created, the rights were considered present perfected rights and given priority under the Act. Id., at 600. We also agreed with the Master that the reservations’ water rights should be based on the amount of practicably irrigable acreage on each reservation and sustained his findings as to the relevant acreage for each reservation. Ibid. Those findings were incorporated in our decree of March 9, 1964, which specified the quantities and priorities of the water entitlements for the States, the United States, and the Tribes. Arizona v. California, 376 U. S. 340. The Court rejected as premature, however, Master Rifkind’s recommendation to determine the disputed boundaries of the Fort Mojave and Colorado River Indian Reservations; we ordered, instead, that water rights for those two reservations “shall be subject to appropriate adjustment by agreement or decree of this Court in the event that the boundaries of the respective reservations are finally determined.” Id., at 345.
In 1978, the United States and the State parties jointly moved this Court to enter a supplemental decree identifying present perfected rights to the use of mainstream water in each State and their priority dates. The Tribes then filed motions to intervene, and the United States ultimately joined the Tribes in moving for additional water rights for the five reservations. Again, the Court deferred resolution of reservation boundary disputes and allied water rights claims. The supplemental decree we entered in 1979 set out the water rights and priority dates for the five reservations under the 1964 decree, but added that the rights for all five reservations (including the Fort Yuma Indian Reservation at issue here) “shall continue to be subject to appropriate adjustment by agreement or decree of this Court in the event that the boundaries of the respective reservations are finally determined.” Arizona v. California, 439 U. S. 419, 421 (per curiam). The Court then appointed Senior Circuit Judge Elbert P. Tuttle as Special Master and referred to him the Tribes’ motions to intervene and other pending matters.
Master Tuttle issued a report recommending that the Tribes be permitted to intervene, and concluding that various administrative actions taken by the Secretary of the Interior constituted “final determinations” of reservation boundaries for purposes of allocating water rights under the 1964 decree. (Those administrative actions included a 1978 Secretarial Order, discussed in greater detail infra, at 404-405, which recognized the Queehan Tribe’s entitlement to the disputed boundary lands of the Fort Yuma Reservation.) Master Tuttle also concluded that certain lands within the undisputed reservation boundaries but for which the United States had not sought water rights in Arizona / — the so-called “omitted lands” — had in fact been practicably irrigable at the time of Arizona I and were thus entitled to water. On these grounds, Master Tuttle recommended that the Court reopen the 1964 decree to award the Tribes additional water rights.
In Arizona v. California, 460 U. S. 605 (1988) (Arizona II), the Court permitted the Tribes to intervene, but otherwise rejected Master Tuttle’s recommendations. The Secretary’s determinations did not qualify as “final determinations” of reservation boundaries, we ruled, because the States, agencies, and private water users had not had an opportunity to obtain judicial review of those determinations. Id., at 636-637. In that regard, we noted that California state agencies had initiated an action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California chai-lenging the Secretary’s decisions, and that the United States had moved to dismiss that action on various grounds, including sovereign immunity. “There will be time enough,” the Court stated, “if any of these grounds for dismissal are sustained and not overturned on appellate review, to determine whether the boundary issues foreclosed by such action are nevertheless open for litigation in this Court.” Id., at 638. The Court also held that the United States was barred from seeking water rights for the lands omitted from presentation in the proceedings leading to Arizona I; “principles of res judicata,” we said, “advise against reopening the calculation of the amount of practicably irrigable acreage.” 466 U. S., at 626. In 1984, in another supplemental decree, the Court again declared that water rights for all five reservations “shall be subject to appropriate adjustments by agreement or decree of this Court in the event that the boundaries of the respective reservations are finally determined.” Arizona v. California, 466 U. S. 144, 145.
The District Court litigation proceeded with the participation of eight parties: the United States, the States of Arizona and California, the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California, the Coachella Valley Water District, and the Que-ehan, Fort Mojave, and Colorado River Indian Tribes. The District Court rejected the United States’ sovereign immunity defense; taking up the Fort Mojave Reservation matter first, the court voided the Secretary’s determination of that reservation’s boundaries. Metropolitan Water Dist. of S. Cal. v. United States, 628 F. Supp. 1018 (SD Cal. 1986). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, however, accepted the United States’ plea of sovereign immunity, and on that ground reversed and remanded with instructions to dismiss the entire case. Specifically, the Court of Appeals held that the Quiet Title Act, 28 U. S. C. § 2409a, preserved the United States’ sovereign immunity from suits challenging the United States’ title “to trust or restricted Indian lands,” § 2409a(a), and therefore blocked recourse to the Dis-triet Court by the States and state agencies. Metropolitan Water Dist. of S. Cal. v. United States, 830 F. 2d 139 (1987). We granted certiorari and affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s judgment by an equally divided Court. California v. United States, 490 U. S. 920 (1989) (per curiam).
The dismissal of the District Court action dispelled any expectation that a “final determination” of reservation boundaries would occur in that forum. The State parties then moved to reopen the 1964 decree, asking the Court to determine whether the Fort Yuma Indian Reservation and two other reservations were entitled to claim additional boundary lands and, if so, additional water rights. Neither the United States nor the Tribes objected to the reopening of the decree, and the Court granted the motion. Arizona v. California, 493 U. S. 886 (1989). After the death in 1990 of the third Special Master, Robert McKay, the Court appointed Frank J. McGarr as Special Master. Special Master McGarr has now filed a report and recommendation (McGarr Report), a full understanding of which requires a discussion of issues and events specific to the Fort Yuma Indian Reservation. We now turn to those issues and events.
H-f f — (
The specific dispute before us has its roots in an 1884 Executive Order signed by President Chester A. Arthur, designating approximately 72 square miles of land along the Colorado River in California as the Fort Yuma Indian Reservation (Reservation) for the benefit of the Quechan Tribe. The Tribe, which had traditionally engaged in farming, offered to cede its rights to a portion of the Reservation to the United States in exchange for allotments of irrigated land to individual Indians. In 1893, the Secretary of the Interior concluded an agreement with the Tribe (1893 Agreement), which Congress ratified in 1894. The 1893 Agreement provided for the Tribe’s cession of a 25,000-acre tract of boundary lands on the Reservation. Language in the agreement, however, could be read to condition the cession on the performance by the United States of certain obligations, including construction within three years of an irrigation canal, allotment of irrigated land to individual Indians, sale of certain lands to raise revenues for canal construction, and opening of certain lands to the public domain.
Doubts about the validity and effect of the 1893 Agreement arose as early as 1985. In that year the construction of the All-American Canal, which prompted the interstate dispute in Arizona I, see 373 U. S., at 554-555, also sparked a controversy concerning the Fort Yuma Reservation. When the Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Reclamation sought to route the canal through the Reservation, the Department’s Indian Office argued that the Bureau had to pay compensation to the Tribe for the right-of-way. The Secretary of the Interior submitted the matter to the Department’s Solicitor, Nathan Margold. In 1936, Solicitor Margold issued an opinion (Margold Opinion) stating that, under the 1893 Agreement, the Tribe had unconditionally eeded the lands in question to the United States. 1 Dept, of Interior, Opinions of the Solicitor Relating to Indian Affairs 596, 600 (No. M-28198, Jan. 8, 1936). The Margold Opinion remained the position of the Federal Government for 42 years.
In 1946, Congress enacted the Indian Claims Commission Act, 60 Stat. 1049, 25 U. S. C. § 70 et seq. (1976 ed.), establishing an Article I tribunal with power to decide claims of Indian tribes against the United States. See generally United States v. Dann, 470 U. S. 39 (1985). The Tribe filed an action before the Commission in 1951, challenging the validity and effect of the 1893 Agreement. In that action, referred to by the parties as Doeket No. 320, the Tribe relied principally on two mutually exclusive grounds for relief. First, the Tribe alleged that the 1893 Agreement was obtained through fraud, coercion, and/or inadequate consideration, rendering it “wholly nugatory.” Petition for Loss of Reservation in Docket No. 320 (Ind. Cl. Comm’n), ¶¶ 15-16, reprinted in Brief for United States in Support of Exception, pp. lla-27a. At the very least, contended the Tribe, the United States had failed to perform the obligations enumerated in the 1893 Agreement, rendering the cession void. Id., at ¶31. In either event, the Tribe claimed continuing title to the disputed lands and sought damages essentially for trespass. Alternatively, the Tribe alleged that the 1893 Agreement was contractually valid but constituted an uncompensated taking of tribal lands, an appropriation of lands for unconscionable consideration, and/or a violation of standards of fair and honorable dealing, for which §§ 2(3) — (5) of the Act authorized recovery. Id., at ¶¶ 19,22,25. According to this theory of recovery, the 1893 Agreement had indeed vested in the United States unconditional title to the disputed lands, and the Tribe sought damages as compensation for that taking. During the more than quarter-century of litigation in Docket No. 320, the Tribe vacillated between these two grounds for relief, sometimes emphasizing one and sometimes the other. See Quechan Tribe of Fort Yuma Reservation v. United States, 26 Ind. Cl. Comm’n 15 (1971), reprinted in Brief for United States in Support of Exception, at 29a-34a.
The Commission conducted a trial on liability, but stayed further proceedings in 1970 because legislation had been proposed in Congress that would have restored the disputed lands to the Tribe. The legislation was not enacted, and the Commission vacated the stay. In 1976, the Commission transferred the matter to the Court of Claims.
In the meantime, the Tribe had asked the Department of the Interior to reconsider its 1936 Margold Opinion regarding the 1893 Agreement. In 1977, Interior Solicitor Scott Austin concluded, in aeeord with the 1936 opinion, that the 1893 Agreement was valid and that the cession of the disputed lands had been unconditional. Opinion of the Solicitor, No. M-36886 (Jan. 18, 1977), 84 I. D. 1 (1977) (Austin Opinion). It soon became clear both to the Tribe and to interested Members of Congress, however, that the Austin Opinion had provoked controversy within the Department, and, after the election of President Carter, the Department revisited the issue and reversed course. In 1978, without notice to the parties, Solicitor Leo Krulitz issued an opinion concluding that the 1893 Agreement had provided for a conditional cession of the disputed lands, that the conditions had not been met by the United States, and that “[t]itle to the subject property is held by the United States in trust for the Quechan Tribe.” Opinion of the Solicitor, No. M-36908 (Jan. 2, 1979), 86 I. D. 3, 22 (1979) (Krulitz Opinion). On December 20, 1978, the Secretary of the Interior issued a Secretarial Order adopting the Krulitz Opinion and confirming the Tribe’s entitlement to the disputed lands, with the express exception of certain lands that the United States had acquired pursuant to Act of Congress or had conveyed to third parties.
The 1978 Secretarial Order caused the United States to change its position both in Docket No. 320, which was still pending in the Claims Court, and in the present litigation. Because the Secretarial Order amounted to an admission that the 1893 Agreement had been ineffective to transfer title and that the Tribe enjoyed beneficial ownership of the disputed boundary lands, the United States no longer opposed the Tribe’s claim for trespass in Docket No. 320. In the present litigation, the Secretarial Order both prompted the United States to file a water rights claim for the affected boundary lands and provided the basis for the Tribe’s intervention to assert a similar, albeit larger, water rights claim. See Arizona II, 460 U. S., at 632-633. Those water rights claims are the subject of the current proceedings.
In August 1983, a few months after this Court decided in Arizona II that the 1978 Secretarial Order did not constitute a final determination of reservation boundaries, see supra, at 399-400, the United States and the Tribe entered into a settlement of Docket No. 320, which the Court of Claims approved and entered as its final judgment. Under the terms of that settlement, the United States agreed to pay the Tribe $15 million in full satisfaction of “all rights, claims, or demands which plaintiff [i e., the Tribe] has asserted or could have asserted with respect to the claims in Docket 320.” Final Judgment, Docket No. 320 (Aug. 11,1983). The judgment further provided that “plaintiff shall be barred thereby from asserting any further rights, claims, or demands against the defendant and any future action on the claims encompassed on Docket 320.” Ibid. The United States and the Tribe also stipulated that the “final judgment is based on a compromise and settlement and shall not be construed as an admission by either party for the purposes of precedent or argument in any other case.” Ibid. Both the Tribe and the United States continue to recognize the Tribe’s entitlement to the disputed boundary lands.
HH
Master McGarr has issued a series of orders culminating in the report and recommendation now before the Court. He has recommended that the Court reject the claims of the United States and the Tribe seeking additional water rights for the Fort Yuma Indian Reservation. The Master rejected the State parties’ contention that this Court’s Arizona I decision precludes the United States and the Tribe from seeking water rights for the disputed boundary lands. He concluded, however, that the United States and the Tribe are precluded from pursuing those claims by operation of the 1983 Claims Court consent judgment. The State parties have filed an exception to the first of these preclusion recommendations, and the United States and the Tribe have filed exceptions to the second. In Part III-A, infra, we consider the exception filed by the State parties, and in Part III-B we address the exceptions filed by the United States and the Tribe. The Special Master has also recommended that the Court approve the parties’ proposed settlements respecting the Fort Mojave and Colorado River Indian Reservations. No party has filed an exception to those recommendations; we.address them in Part III-C, infra.
A
The States of Arizona and California, the Coachella Valley Water District, and the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California (State parties) argued before Special Master McGarr, and repeat before this Court, that the water rights claims associated with the disputed boundary lands of the Fort Yuma Reservation are precluded by the finality rationale this Court employed in dismissing the “omitted lands” claims in Arizona II. See supra, at 399-400. According to the State parties, the United States could have raised a boundary lands claim for the Fort Yuma Reservation in the Arizona I proceedings based on facts known at that time, just as it did for the Fort Mojave and Colorado River Reservations, but deliberately decided not to do so, just as it did with respect to the “omitted lands.” In Arizona II, this Court rejected the United States’ claim for water rights for the “omitted lands,” emphasizing that “[cjertainty of rights is particularly important with respect to water rights in the Western United States” and noting “the strong interest in finality in this case.” 460 U. S., at 620. Observing that the 1964 decree determined “the extent of irrigable acreage within the uneontested boundaries of the reservations,” id., at 621, n. 12, the Court refused to reconsider issues “fully and fairly litigated 20 years ago,” id., at 621. The Court concomitantly held that the Tribes were bound by the United States’ representation of them in Arizona I. 460 U. S., at 626-627.
The Special Master rejected the State parties’ preclusion argument. He brought out first the evident reason why the United States did not assert water rights claims for the Fort Yuma Reservation boundary lands in Arizona I. At that point in time, the United States was bound to follow the 1986 Margold Opinion, see supra, at 402, which maintained that the Tribe had no claim to those lands. “[I]t is clear,” the Master stated, “that the later Secretary of the Interior opinion arbitrarily changing [the Margold] decision was a circumstance not known in 1964, thus constituting an exception to the application of the rule of res adjudicata.” Special Master McGarr Memorandum Opinion and Order No. 4, pp. 6-7 (Sept. 6,1991). Characterizing the question as “close,” the Master went on to conclude that “the Tribe is not precluded from asserting water rights based on boundary land claims on [sicj this proceeding, because although the U. S. on behalf of the Tribe failed to assert such claims in the proceeding leading to the 1964 decree, a later and then unknown cireum-stance bars the application of the doctrine of res judicata to this issue.” Id., at 7.
While the Special Master correctly recognized the relevance of the Margold Opinion to the litigating stance of the United States, he ultimately relied on an improper ground in rejecting the State parties’ preclusion argument. The Department of the Interior’s 1978 Secretarial Order recognizing the Tribe’s beneficial ownership of the boundary lands, see supra, at 404-405, does not qualify as a “later and then unknown circumstance” that can overcome otherwise applicable preclusion principles. The 1978 Order did not change the underlying facts in dispute; it simply embodied one party’s changed view of the import of unchanged facts. * Moreover, the Tribe can hardly claim to have been surprised by the Government’s shift in assessment of the boundary lands ownership question, for the Tribe had been advocating just such a shift for decades.
The United States and the Tribe, however, urge other grounds on which to reject the State parties’ argument regarding the preclusive effect of Arizona I. The United States and the Tribe maintain that the preclusion rationale the Court applied to the “omitted lands” in Arizona II is not equally applicable to the disputed boundary lands, and that, in any event, the State parties have forfeited their preclusion defense. We agree that the State parties’ preclusion defense is inadmissible at this late date, and therefore we do not reach the merits of that plea. The State parties could have raised the defense in 1979 in response to the United States’ motion for a supplemental decree granting additional water rights for the Fort Yuma Reservation. The State parties did not do so then, nor did they raise the objection in 1982 when Arizona II was briefed and argued. Unaccountably, they raised the preclusion argument for the first time in 1989, when they initiated the current round of proceedings. See Exception and Brief for State Parties 16; Motion of State Parties to Reopen Decree in Arizona v. California, O. T. 1989, No. 8 Orig., p. 6, n. 2. The State parties had every opportunity, and every incentive, to press their current preclusion argument at earlier stages in the litigation, yet failed to do so.
“[W]hile the technical rules of preclusion are not strictly applicable [in the context of a single ongoing original action], the principles upon which these rules are founded should inform our decision.” Arizona II, 460 U. S., at 619. Those principles rank res judicata an affirmative defense ordinarily lost if not timely raised. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(c). Counsel for the State parties conceded at oral argument that “no preclusion argument was made with respect to boundary lands” in the proceedings leading up to Arizona II, and that “after this Court’s decision in Arizona II and after the Court’s later decision in [Nevada v. United States, 463 U. S. 110 (1983)], the light finally dawned on the State parties that there was a valid preclusion — or res judicata argument here with respect to Fort Yuma.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 46-47. We disapprove the notion that a party may wake up because a “light finally dawned,” years after the first opportunity to raise a defense, and effectively raise it so long as the party was (though no fault of anyone else) in the dark until its late awakening.
The State parties assert that our prior pronouncements in this case have expressly recognized the possibility that future boundary lands claims for the Fort Yuma Reservation might be precluded. If anything, the contrary is true. Nothing in the Arizona II decision hints that the Court believed the boundary lands issue might ultimately be held precluded. Rather, the Court expressly found it “necessary to decide whether any or all of these boundary disputes have been ‘finally determined’ within the meaning of Article 11(D)(5)... 460 U. S., at 631 (emphasis added). That Arizona II contains no discussion of preclusion with respect to the disputed lands is hardly surprising, given that the State parties neglected to raise that issue until six years later.
The Court did note in Arizona II that in the District Court proceedings the United States had asserted defenses based on “lack of standing, the absence of indispensable parties, sovereign immunity, and the applicable statute of limitations,” and added that “[t]here will be time enough, if any of these grounds for dismissal are sustained and not overturned on appellate review, to determine whether the boundary issues foreclosed by such [lower court] action are nevertheless open for litigation in this Court.” 460 U. S., at 638 (emphasis added). This passage, however, is most sensibly read to convey that the defenses just mentioned — standing, indispensable parties, sovereign immunity, and the statute of limitations — would not necessarily affect renewed litigation in this Court. The passage contains no acknowledgment, express or implied, of a lurking preclusion issue stemming from our Arizona I disposition.
Moreover, and of large significance, the 1979 and 1984 supplemental decrees anticipated that the disputed boundary issues for all five reservations, including the Fort Yuma Reservation, would be “finally determined” in some forum, not by preclusion but on the merits. See 1984 Supplemental Decree, Art. 11(D)(5), Arizona v. California, 466 U. S., at 145 (Water rights for all five reservations “shall be subject to appropriate adjustments by agreement or decree of this Court in the event that the boundaries of the respective reservations are finally determined.”); 1979 Supplemental Decree, Art. 11(D)(5), Arizona v. California, 439 U. S., at 421 (same).
The State parties themselves stipulated to the terms of the supplemental decree we entered in 1979. They also appear to have litigated the Arizona II proceedings on the understanding that the boundary disputes should be resolved on the merits. See 460 U. S., at 634 (“[The State parties] argued... that the boundary controversies were ripe for judicial review, and they urged the Special Master to receive evidence, hear legal arguments, and resolve each of the boundary disputes, but only for the limited purpose of establishing additional Indian water rights, if any.”); Report of Special Master Tuttle, O. T. 1981, No. 8 Orig., p. 57 (describing the State parties' contention “that the boundaries [of all five reservations] have not been finally determined and that I should make a de novo determination of the boundaries for recommendation to the Court”). As late as 1988, the State parties asked the Court to appoint a new Special Master and direct him “to conclude his review of the boundary issues as expeditiously as possible and to submit a recommended decision to the Court.” Brief for Petitioners in California v. United States, O. T. 1987, No. 87-1165, p. 49.
Finally, the State parties argue that even if they earlier failed to raise the preclusion defense, this Court should raise it now sua sponte. Judicial initiative of this sort might be appropriate in special circumstances. Most notably, “if a court is on notice that it has previously decided the issue presented, the court may dismiss the action sua sponte, even though the defense has not been raised. This result is fully consistent with the policies underlying res judicata: it is not based solely on the defendant's interest in avoiding the burdens of twice defending a suit, but is also based on the avoidance of unnecessary judicial waste.” United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U. S. 371, 432 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). That special circumstance is not present here: While the State parties contend that the Fort Yuma boundary dispute could have been decided in Arizona I, this Court plainly has not “previously decided the issue presented.” Therefore we do not face the prospect of redoing a matter once decided. Where no judicial resources have been spent on the resolution of a question, trial courts must be cautious about raising a preclusion bar sua sponte, thereby eroding the principle of party presentation so basic to our system of adjudication.
In view of the State parties’ failure to raise the preclusion argument earlier in the litigation, despite ample opportunity and cause to do so, we hold that the claims of the United States and the Tribe to increased water rights for the disputed boundary lands of the Fort Yuma Reservation are not foreclosed by our decision in Arizona I.
B
The State parties also assert that the instant water rights claims are precluded by the 1988 consent judgment in the Claims Court proceeding, Docket No. 320. Special Master McGarr agreed, noting the consent judgment’s declaration that the Tribe would “be barred thereby from asserting any further rights, claims or demands against the defendant and any future action encompassed on docket no. 320.” See Special Master McGarr Memorandum Opinion and Order No. 4, at 9-10. On reconsideration, the Special Master provided a fuller account of his recommendation. The settlement, he concluded, had extinguished the Tribe’s claim to title in the disputed boundary lands, vesting that title in the United States against all the world: “The only viable basis for a damage or trespass claim [in Docket No. 320] was that the 1893 taking was illegal and that title therefore remained with the Tribe. When the Tribe accepted money in settlement of this claim, it relinquished its claim to title.” Id., No. 7, at 5 (May 5,1992). See also id, No. 13, at 3 (Apr. 13, 1993) (“[T]he relinquishment of all future claims regarding the subject matter of Docket No. 320 in exchange for a sum of money extinguished the Tribe’s title in the subject lands....”). Because the settlement extinguished the Tribe’s title to the disputed boundary lands, the Master reasoned, the United States and the Tribe cannot now seek additional water rights based on the Tribe’s purported beneficial ownership of those lands.
Under standard preclusion doctrine, the Master’s recommendation cannot be sustained. As already noted, the express terms of the consent judgment in Docket No. 320 barred the Tribe and the United States from asserting against each other any claim or defense they raised or could have raised in that action. See supra, at 405. As between the parties to Docket No. 320, then, the settlement indeed had, and was intended to have, claim-preclusive effect — a matter the United States and the Tribe readily concede. Exception and Brief for United States 36; Exception and Brief for Queehan Indian Tribe 20. But settlements ordinarily occasion no issue preclusion (sometimes called collateral estoppel), unless it is clear, as it is not here, that the parties intend their agreement to have such an effect. “In most circumstances, it is recognized that consent agreements ordinarily are intended to preclude any further litigation on the claim presented but are not intended to preclude further litigation on any of the issues presented. Thus consent judgments ordinarily support claim preclusion but not issue preclusion.” 18 C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure §4443, pp. 384-385 (1981). This differentiation is grounded in basic res judicata doctrine. It is the general rule that issue preclusion attaches only “[w]hen an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment.” Restatement (Second) of Judgments. § 27, p. 250 (1982). “In the case of a judgment entered by confession, consent, or default, none of the issues is actually litigated. Therefore, the rule of this Section [describing issue preclusion’s domain] does not apply with respect to any issue in a subsequent action.” Id., comment e, at 257.
This Court’s decision in United States v. International Building Co., 345 U. S. 502 (1953), is illustrative. In 1942, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue assessed deficiencies against a taxpayer for the taxable years 1983,1938, and 1939, alleging that the taxpayer had claimed an excessive basis for depreciation. Id., at 503. After the taxpayer filed for bankruptcy, however, the Commissioner and the taxpayer filed stipulations in the pending Tax Court proceedings stating that there was no deficiency for the taxable years in question, and the Tax Court entered a formal decision to that effect. Id., at 503-504. In 1948, the Commissioner assessed deficiencies for the years 1943,1944, and 1945, and the taxpayer defended on the ground that the earlier Tax Court decision was preclusive on the issue of the correct basis for depreciation. We disagreed, holding that the Tax Court decision, entered pursuant to the parties’ stipulations, did not accomplish an “estoppel by judgment,” i. e., it had no issue-preclusive effect:
“We conclude that the decisions entered by the Tax Court for the years 1933, 1938, and 1939 were only a proforma acceptance by the Tax Court of an agreement between the parties to settle their controversy for reasons undisclosed.... Perhaps, as the Court of Appeals inferred, the parties did agree on the basis for depreciation. Perhaps the settlement was made for a different reason, for some exigency arising out of the bankruptcy proceeding. As the case reaches us, we are unable to tell whether the agreement of the parties was based on the merits or on some collateral consideration. Certainly the judgments entered are res judicata of the tax claims for the years 1933,1938, and 1939, whether or not the basis of the agreements on which they rest reached the merits.... Estoppel by judgment includes matters in a seeond proceeding which were actually presented and determined in an earlier suit. A judgment entered with the consent of the parties may involve a determination of questions of fact and law by the court. But unless a showing is made that that was the case, the judgment has no greater dignity, so far as collateral estoppel is concerned, than any judgment entered only as a compromise of the parties.” Id., at 505-506 (citations omitted).
The State parties, perhaps recognizing the infirmity of their argument as a matter of standard preclusion doctrine, assert that common-law principles of issue preclusion do not apply in the special context of Indian land claims. Instead, they argue, §22 of the Indian Claims Commission Act created a special regime of “statutory preclusion.” According to the State parties, the payment of a Commission judgment for claims to aboriginal or trust lands automatically and universally extinguishes title to the Indian lands upon which the claim is based and creates a statutory bar to further assertion of claims against either the United States or third parties based on the extinguished title. The State parties point to several decisions of the Ninth Circuit in support of this contention. See Reply Brief for State Parties 17 (citing United States v. Pend Oreille Pub. Util.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | B | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Scalia
announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which Justice Souter and Justice Ginsburg join, and in which Justice Thomas joins as to all but Part IV.
We consider whether the term “proceeds” in the federal money-laundering statute, 18 U. S. C. § 1956(a)(1), means “receipts” or “profits.”
I
From the 1970’s until 1994, respondent Santos operated a lottery in Indiana that was illegal under state law. See Ind. Code § 35-45-5-3 (West 2004). Santos employed a number of helpers to run the lottery. At bars and restaurants, Santos’s runners gathered bets from gamblers, kept a portion of the bets (between 15% and 25%) as their commissions, and delivered the rest to Santos’s collectors. Collectors, one of whom was respondent Diaz, then delivered the money to Santos, who used some of it to pay the salaries of collectors (including Diaz) and to pay the winners.
These payments to runners, collectors, and winners formed the basis of a 10-count indictment filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, naming Santos, Diaz, and 11 others. A jury found Santos guilty of one count of conspiracy to run an illegal gambling business (18 U. S. C. § 371), one count of running an illegal gambling business (§ 1955), one count of conspiracy to launder money (§ 1956(a)(l)(A)(i) and § 1956(h)), and two counts of money laundering (§ 1956(a)(l)(A)(i)). The court sentenced Santos to 60 months of imprisonment on the two gambling counts and to 210 months of imprisonment on the three money-laundering counts. Diaz pleaded guilty to conspiracy to launder money, and the District Court sentenced him to 108 months of imprisonment. The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions and sentences. United States v. Febus, 218 F. 3d 784 (CA7 2000). We declined to review the case. 531 U. S. 1021 (2000).
Thereafter, respondents filed motions under 28 U. S. C. § 2255, collaterally attacking their convictions and sentences. The District Court rejected all of their claims but one, a challenge to their money-laundering convictions based on the Seventh Circuit’s subsequent decision in United States v. Scialabba, 282 F. 3d 475 (2002), which held that the federal money-laundering statute’s prohibition of transactions involving criminal “proceeds” applies only to transactions involving criminal profits, not criminal receipts. Id., at 478. Applying that holding to respondents’ cases, the District Court found no evidence that the transactions on which the money-laundering convictions were based (Santos’s payments to runners, winners, and collectors and Diaz’s receipt of payment for his collection services) involved profits, as opposed to receipts, of the illegal lottery, and accordingly vacated the money-laundering convictions. The Court of Appeals affirmed, rejecting the Government’s contention that Scialabba was wrong and should be overruled. 461 F. 3d 886 (CA7 2006). We granted certiorari. 550 U. S. 902 (2007).
II
The federal money-laundering statute prohibits a number of activities involving criminal “proceeds.” Most relevant to this case is 18 U. S. C. § 1956(a)(l)(A)(i), which criminalizes transactions to promote criminal activity. This provision' uses the term “proceeds” in describing two elements of the offense: The Government must prove that a charged transaction “in fact involve[d] the proceeds of specified unlawful activity” (the proceeds element), and it also must prove that a defendant knew “that the property involved in” the charged transaction “representad] the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity” (the knowledge element). § 1956(a)(1).
The federal money-laundering statute does not define “proceeds.” When a term is undefined, we give it its ordinary meaning. Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U. S. 179, 187 (1995). “Proceeds” can mean either “receipts” or “profits.” Both meanings are accepted, and have long been accepted, in ordinary usage. See, e. g., 12 Oxford English Dictionary 544 (2d ed. 1989); Random House Dictionary of the English Language 1542 (2d ed. 1987); Webster’s New International Dictionary 1972 (2d ed. 1954) (hereinafter Webster’s 2d). The Government contends that dictionaries generally prefer the “receipts” definition over the “profits” definition, but any preference is too slight for us to conclude that “receipts” is the primary meaning of “proceeds.”
“Proceeds,” moreover, has not acquired a common meaning in the provisions of the Federal Criminal Code. Most leave the term undefined. See, e. g., 18 U. S. C. § 1963; 21 U. S. C. § 853. Recognizing the word’s inherent ambiguity, Congress has defined “proceeds” in various criminal provisions, but sometimes has defined it to mean “receipts” and sometimes “profits.” Compare 18 U. S. C. § 23390(e)(3) (2000 ed., Supp. V) (receipts), § 981(a)(2)(A) (2000 ed.) (same), with § 981(a)(2)(B) (profits).
Since context gives meaning, we cannot say the money-laundering statute is truly ambiguous until we consider “proceeds” not in isolation but as it is used in the federal money-laundering statute. See United Sav. Assn, of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd., 484 U. S. 365, 371 (1988). The word appears repeatedly throughout the statute, but all of those appearances leave the ambiguity intact. Section 1956(a)(1) itself, for instance, makes sense under either definition: One can engage in a financial transaction with either receipts or profits of a crime; one can intend to promote the carrying on of a crime with either its receipts or its profits; and one can try to conceal the nature, location, etc., of either receipts or profits. The same is true of all the other provisions of this legislation in which the term “proceeds” is used. They make sense under either definition. See, for example, § 1956(a)(2)(B), which speaks of “proceeds” represented by a “monetary instrument or funds.”
Section 1956(a)(1) reads as follows: “Whoever, knowing that the property involved in a financial transaction represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, conducts or attempts to conduct such a financial transaction which in fact involves the proceeds of specified unlawful activity... (A)(i) with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity . . . shall be sentenced to a fine of not more than $500,000 or twice the value of the property involved in the transaction, whichever is greater, or imprisonment for not more than twenty years, or both.” Respondents were also convicted of conspiring to launder money under § 1956(h). Because the Government has not argued that respondents’ conspiracy convictions could stand if “proceeds” meant “profits,” see 461F. 3d 886, 889 (CA7 2006), we do not address that possibility.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | A | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Chief Justice Vinson
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner was convicted of the offense of disorderly conduct, a misdemeanor under the New York penal laws, in the Court of Special Sessions of the City of Syracuse and was sentenced to thirty days in the county penitentiary. The conviction was affirmed by the Onondaga County Court and the New York Court of Appeals, 300 N. Y. 391, 91 N. E. 2d 316 (1950). The case is here on certiorari, 339 U. S. 962 (1950), petitioner having claimed that the conviction is in violation of his right of free speech under the Fourteenth Amendment.
In the review of state decisions where First Amendment rights are drawn in question, we of course make an examination of the evidence to ascertain independently whether the right has been violated. Here, the trial judge, who heard the case without a jury, rendered an oral decision at the end of the trial, setting forth his determination of the facts upon which he found the petitioner guilty. His decision indicated generally that he believed the state’s witnesses, and his summation of the testimony was used by the two New York courts on review in stating the facts. Our appraisal of the facts is, therefore, based upon the uncontroverted facts and, where controversy exists, upon that testimony which the trial judge did reasonably conclude to be true.
On the evening of March 8, 1949, petitioner Irving Feiner was addressing an open-air meeting at the corner of South McBride and Harrison Streets in the City of Syracuse. At approximately 6:30 p. m., the police received a telephone complaint concerning the meeting, and two officers were detailed to investigate. One of these officers went to the scene immediately, the other arriving some twelve minutes later. They found a crowd of about seventy-five or eighty people, both Negro and white, filling the sidewalk and spreading out into the street. Petitioner, standing on a large wooden box on the sidewalk, was addressing the crowd through a loud-speaker system attached to an automobile. Although the purpose of his speech was to urge his listeners to attend a meeting to be held that night in the Syracuse Hotel, in its course he was making derogatory remarks concerning President Truman, the American Legion, the Mayor of Syracuse, and other local political officials.
The police officers made no effort to interfere with petitioner’s speech, but were first concerned with the effect of the crowd on both pedestrian and vehicular traffic. They observed the situation from the opposite side of the street, noting that some pedestrians were forced to walk in the street to avoid the crowd. Since traffic was passing at the time, the officers attempted to get the people listening to petitioner back on the sidewalk. The crowd was restless and there was some pushing, shoving and milling around. One of the officers telephoned the police station from a nearby store, and then both policemen crossed the street and mingled with the crowd without any intention of arresting the speaker.
At this time, petitioner was speaking in a “loud, high-pitched voice.” He gave the impression that he was endeavoring to arouse the Negro people against the whites, urging that they rise up in arms and fight for equal rights. The statements before such a mixed audience “stirred up a little excitement.” Some of the onlookers made remarks to the police about their inability to handle the crowd and at least one threatened violence if the police did not act. There were others who appeared to be favoring petitioner’s arguments. Because of the feeling that existed in the crowd both for and against the speaker, the officers finally “stepped in to prevent it from resulting in a fight.” One of the officers approached the petitioner, not for the purpose of arresting him, but to get him to break up the crowd. He asked petitioner to get down off the box, but the latter refused to accede to his request and continued talking. The officer waited for a minute and then demanded that he cease talking. Although the officer had thus twice requested petitioner to stop over the course of several minutes, petitioner not only ignored him but continued talking. During all this time, the crowd was pressing closer around petitioner and the officer. Finally, the officer told petitioner he was under arrest and ordered him to get down from the box, reaching up to grab him. Petitioner stepped down, announcing over the microphone that “the law has arrived, and I suppose they will take over now.” In all, the officer had asked petitioner to get down off the box three times over a space of four or five minutes. Petitioner had been speaking for over a half hour.
On these facts, petitioner was specifically charged with violation of § 722 of the Penal Law of New York, the pertinent part of which is set out in the margin. The bill of particulars, demanded by petitioner and furnished by the State, gave in detail the facts upon which the prosecution relied to support the charge of disorderly conduct. Paragraph C is particularly pertinent here: “By ignoring and refusing to heed and obey reasonable police orders issued at the time and place mentioned in the Information to regulate and control said crowd and to prevent a breach or breaches of the peace and to prevent injury to pedestrians attempting to use said walk, and being forced into the highway adjacent to the place in question, and prevent injury to the public generally.”
We are not faced here with blind condonation by a state court of arbitrary police action. Petitioner was accorded a full, fair trial. The trial judge heard testimony supporting and contradicting the judgment of the police officers that a clear danger of disorder was threatened. After weighing this contradictory evidence, the trial judge reached the conclusion that the police officers were justified in taking action to prevent a breach of the peace. The exercise of the police officers’ proper discretionary power to prevent a breach of the peace was thus approved by the trial court and later by two courts on review. The courts below recognized petitioner’s right to hold a street meeting at this locality, to make use of loud-speaking equipment in giving his speech, and to make derogatory remarks concerning public officials and the American Legion. They found that the officers in making the arrest were motivated solely by a proper concern for the preservation of order and protection of the general welfare, and that there was no evidence which could lend color to a claim that the acts of the police were a cover for suppression of petitioner’s views and opinions. Petitioner was thus neither arrested nor convicted for the making or the content of his speech. Rather, it was the reaction which it actually engendered.
The language of Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940), is appropriate here. “The offense known as breach of the peace embraces a great variety of conduct destroying or menacing public order and tranquility. It includes not only violent acts but acts and words likely to produce violence in others. No one would have the hardihood to suggest that the principle of freedom of speech sanctions incitement to riot or that religious liberty connotes the privilege to exhort others to physical attack upon those belonging to another sect. When clear and present danger of riot, disorder, interference with traffic upon the public streets, or other immediate threat to public safety, peace, or order, appears, the power of the State to prevent or punish is obvious.” 310 U. S. at 308. The findings of the New York courts as to the condition of the crowd and the refusal of petitioner to obey the police requests, supported as they are by the record of this case, are persuasive that the conviction of petitioner for violation of public peace, order and authority does not exceed the bounds of proper state police action. This Court respects, as it must, the interest of the community in maintaining peace and order on its streets. Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147, 160 (1939); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77, 82 (1949). We cannot say that the preservation of that interest here encroaches on the constitutional rights of this petitioner.
We are well aware that the ordinary murmurings and objections of a hostile audience cannot be allowed to silence a speaker, and are also mindful of the possible danger of giving overzealous police officials complete discretion to break up otherwise lawful public meetings. “A State may not unduly suppress free communication of views, religious or other, under the guise of conserving desirable conditions.” Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra, at 308. But we are not faced here with such a situation. It is one thing to say that the police cannot be used as an instrument for the suppression of unpopular views, and another to say that, when as here the speaker passes the bounds of argument or persuasion and undertakes incitement to riot, they are powerless to prevent a breach of the peace. Nor in this case can we condemn the considered judgment of three New York courts approving the means which the police, faced with a crisis, used in the exercise of their power and duty to preserve peace and order. The findings of the state courts as to the existing situation and the imminence of greater disorder coupled with petitioner’s deliberate defiance of the police officers convince us that we should not reverse this conviction in the name of free speech.
Affirmed.
[For opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring in the result, see ante, p. 273.]
Section 722. “Any person who with intent to provoke a breach of the peace, or whereby a breach of the peace may be occasioned, commits any of the following acts shall be deemed to have committed the offense of disorderly conduct:
“1. Uses offensive, disorderly, threatening, abusive or insulting language, conduct or behavior;
“2. Acts in such a manner as to annoy, disturb, interfere with, obstruct, or be offensive to others;
“3. Congregates with others on a public street and refuses to move on when ordered by the police; . . .
The New York Court of Appeals said: “An imminent danger of a breach of the peace, of a disturbance of public order, perhaps even of riot, was threatened. . . . the defendant, as indicated above, disrupted pedestrian and vehicular traffic on the sidewalk and street, and, with intent to provoke a breach of the peace and with knowledge of the consequences, so inflamed and agitated a mixed audience of sympathizers and opponents that, in the judgment of the police officers present, a clear danger of disorder and violence was threatened. Defendant then deliberately refused to accede to the reasonable request of the officer, made within the lawful scope of his authority, that the defendant desist in the interest of public welfare and safety.” 300 N. Y. 391, 400, 402, 91 N. E. 2d 316, 319, 321.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | C | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Douglas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondents instituted a garnishment action against petitioner as defendant and Miller Harris Instrument Co., her employer, as garnishee. The complaint alleged a claim of $420 on a promissory note. The garnishee filed its answer stating it had wages of $63.18 under its control earned .by petitioner and unpaid, and that it would pay one-half to petitioner as a subsistence allowance and hold the other half subject to the order of the court.
Petitioner moved that the garnishment proceedings be dismissed for failure to satisfy the due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Wisconsin Supreme Court sustained the lower state court in approving the procedure. 37 Wis. 2d 163, 154 N. W. 2d 259. The case is here on a petition for a writ of certiorari. 393 U. S. 1078.
The Wisconsin statute gives a plaintiff 10 days in which to serve the summons and complaint on the defendant after service on the garnishee. In this case petitioner was served the same day as the garnishee. She nonetheless claims that the Wisconsin garnishment procedure violates that due process required by the Fourteenth Amendment, in that notice and an opportunity to be heard are not given before the in rem seizure of the wages. What happens in Wisconsin is that the clerk of the court issues the summons at the request of the creditor’s lawyer; and it is the latter who by serving the garnishee sets in motion the machinery whereby the wages are frozen. They may, it is true, be unfrozen if the trial of the main suit is ever had and the wage earner wins on the merits. But in the interim the wage earner is deprived of his enjoyment of earned wages without any opportunity to be heard and to tender any defense he may have, whether it be fraud or otherwise.
Such summary procedure may well meet the requirements of due process in extraordinary situations. Cf. Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U. S. 245, 253-254; Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U. S. 594, 598-600; Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U. S. 94, 110-112; Coffin Bros. v. Bennett, 277 U. S. 29, 31. But in the present case no situation requiring special protection to a state or creditor interest is presented by the facts; nor is the Wisconsin statute narrowly drawn to meet any such unusual condition. Petitioner was a resident of this Wisconsin community and in personam jurisdiction was readily obtainable.
The question is not whether the Wisconsin law is a wise law or unwise law. Our concern is not what philosophy Wisconsin should or should not embrace. See Green v. Frazier, 253 U. S. 233. We do not sit as a super-legislative body. In this case the sole question is whether there has been a taking of property without that procedural due process that is required by the Fourteenth Amendment. We have dealt over and over again with the question of what constitutes “the right to be heard” (Schroeder v. New York, 371 U. S. 208, 212) within the meaning of procedural due process. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U. S. 306, 314. In the latter case we said that the right to be heard “has little reality or worth unless one is informed that the matter is pending and can choose for himself whether to appear or default, acquiesce or contest.” 339 U. S., at 314. In the context of this case the question is whether the interim freezing of the wages without a chance to be heard violates procedural due process.
A procedural rule that may satisfy due process for attachments in general, see McKay v. McInnes, 279 U. S. 820, does not necessarily satisfy procedural due process in every case. The fact that a procedure would pass muster under a feudal regime does not mean it gives necessary protection to all property in its modern forms. We deal here with wages — a specialized type of property presenting distinct problems in our economic system. We turn then to the nature of that property and problems of procedural due process.
A prejudgment garnishment of the Wisconsin type is a taking which may impose tremendous hardship on wage earners with families to support. Until a recent Act of Congress, § 304 of which forbids discharge of employees on the ground that their wages have been garnished, garnishment often meant the loss of a job. Over and beyond that was the great drain on family income. As stated by Congressman Reuss:
“The idea of wage garnishment in advance of judgment, of trustee process, of wage attachment, or whatever it is called is a most inhuman doctrine. It compels the wage earner, trying to keep his family together, to be driven below the poverty level.”
Recent investigations of the problem have disclosed the grave injustices made possible by prejudgment garnishment whereby the sole opportunity to be heard comes after the taking. Congressman Sullivan, Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs who held extensive hearings on this and related problems stated:
“What we know from our study of this problem is that in a vast number of cases the debt is a fraudulent one, saddled on a poor ignorant person who is trapped in an easy credit nightmare, in which he is charged double for something he could not pay for even if the proper price was called for, and then hounded into giving up his pound of flesh, and being fired besides.” 114 Cong. Rec. 1832.
The leverage of the creditor on the wage earner is enormous. The creditor tenders not only the original debt but the “collection fees” incurred by his attorneys in the garnishment proceedings:
“The debtor whose wages are tied up by a writ of garnishment, and who is usually in need of money, is in no position to resist demands for collection fees. If the debt is small, the debtor will be under considerable pressure to pay the debt and collection charges in order to get his wages back. If the debt is large, he will often sign a new contract of ‘payment schedule’ which incorporates these additional charges.”
Apart from those collateral consequences, it appears that in Wisconsin the statutory exemption granted the wage earner is “generally insufficient to support the debtor for any one week.”
The result is that a prejudgment garnishment of the Wisconsin type may as a practical matter drive a wage-earning family to the wall. Where the taking of one’s property is so obvious, it needs no extended argument to conclude that absent notice and a prior hearing (cf. Coe v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 237 U. S. 413, 423) this prejudgment garnishment procedure violates the fundamental principles of due process.
Reversed.
Wis. Stat. § 267.18 (2) (a) provides:
“When wages or salary are the subject of garnishment action, the garnishee shall pay over to the principal defendant on the date when such wages or salary would normally be payable a subsistence allowance, out of the wages or salary then owing, in the sum of $25 in the case of an individual without dependents or $40 in the case of an individual with dependents; but in no event in excess of 50 per cent of the wages or salary owing. Said subsistence allowance shall be applied to the first wages or salary earned in the period subject to said garnishment action.”
Wis. Stat. §267.07 (1).
Wis. Stat. §267.04 (1).
82 Stat. 146, Act of May 29, 1968.
114 Cong. Rec. 1832.
Comment, Wage Garnishment in Washington — An Empirical Study, 43 Wash. L. Rev. 743, 753 (1968). And see Comment, Wage Garnishment as a Collection Device, 1967 Wis. L. Rev. 759.
See n. 1, supra.
Comment, Wage Garnishment as a Collection Device, 1967 Wis. L. Rev. 759, 767.
“For a poor man — and whoever heard of the wage of the affluent being attached? — to lose part of his salary often means his family will go without the essentials. No man sits by while his family goes hungry or without heat. He either files for consumer bankruptcy and tries to begin again, or just quits his job and goes on relief. Where is the equity, the common sense, in such a process?” Congressman Gonzales, 114 Cong. Eec. 1833. For the impact of garnishment on personal bankruptcies see H. R. Rep. No. 1040, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 20-21.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | B | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Blackmun
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The present phase of this prolonged litigation concerns the propriety of a federal court’s enjoining a municipality from permitting the use of public park recreational facilities by private segregated school groups and by other non-school groups that allegedly discriminate in their membership on the basis of race. We granted certiorari to consider this important issue. 414 U. S. 907 (1973).
I
Petitioners are Negro citizens of Montgomery, Alabama. In December 1958, now over 15 years ago, they instituted this class action to desegregate Montgomery’s public parks. The defendants are the city, its Board of Commissioners and the members thereof, the Parks and Recreation Board and its members, and the Superintendent of the Parks and Recreational Program.
By their original complaint, the petitioners specifically challenged, on Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection grounds, a Montgomery ordinance (No. 21-57, adopted June 4, 1957) which made it a misdemeanor, subject to fine and imprisonment, “for white and colored persons to enter upon, visit, use or in any way occupy public parks or other public houses or public places, swimming pools, wadding [sic] pools, beaches, lakes or ponds except those assigned to their respective races.” Both declaratory and injunctive relief were requested. On September 9, 1959, the District Court entered its judgment that the ordinance was unconstitutional and enjoined the defendants from enforcing the ordinance “or any custom, practice, policy or usage which may require plaintiffs, or any other Negroes similarly situated, to submit to enforced segregation solely because of race or color in their use of any public parks owned and operated by the City of Montgomery, Alabama.” The judgment was accompanied by a memorandum opinion. 176 F. Supp. 776 (MD Ala. 1959). On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed but ordered the judgment modified to provide that the District Court retain jurisdiction. 277 F. 2d 364, 368 (1960). The trial court, accordingly, ruled that it “will and does hereby retain jurisdiction of this cause until further order.”
In 1970, the petitioners sought to reopen the litigation. They filed a motion asking, among other relief, that the respondents be cited for contempt “for deliberately avoiding and violating this Court’s Judgment and Order in this case.” The motion contained allegations that some of the municipal parks had been reopened “in such a manner to avoid the total and full integration of said parks”; that the city had conspired with the Montgomery YMCA to segregate swimming and other recreational facilities and programs; that recreational facilities were unequally allocated as between white and Negro neighborhoods; and that the city discriminated in its employment of personnel in recreational programs. The basis for these claims arose from other, separate litigation initiated in 1969 and resulting in the granting of affirmative relief to the plaintiffs in that suit. See Smith v. Young Men’s Christian Assn., 316 F. Supp. 899 (MD Ala. 1970), aff’d as modified, 462 F. 2d 634 (CA5 1972). In that action the District Court found that the “coordinated effort” of the city and of the YMCA, 316 F. Supp., at 908, and an agreement between them, reached shortly before the closing of the city parks and the entry of the court’s 1959 decree, had effectuated “the perpetuation of segregated recreational facilities and programs in the City of Montgomery,” id., at 909, and that it was “unmistakably clear that its purpose was to circumvent the Supreme Court’s and this Court’s desegregation rulings in the area of public recreation.” Id., at 908. As summarized by the Court of Appeals, the District Court concluded:
“[T]he YMCA, as a result of the cooperative agreement, has been performing a statutorily declared 'public function’; the Montgomery Park and Recreation Board has, in effect, transferred some of its statutory authority and responsibility to the YMCA, thereby investing the YMCA with a municipal character; and therefore the YMCA has been serving as a municipal rather than a private agency in assisting the Park Board in providing recreational programs for the city.
“[T]he YMCA’s discriminatory conduct denied the plaintiffs their Fourteenth Amendment rights to Equal Protection of the law; under the facts of this case the plaintiffs’ showing of 'state action’ satisfies the requirement under Title 42; U. S. C. Section 1983 that the YMCA’s conduct be 'under color of law.’ ” 462 F. 2d, at 641-642.
The modification by the Court of Appeals related only to the disapproval of a provision in the District Court’s order directing a specific Negro-white ratio in the YMCA’s board and executive committee. No review was sought here.
The claims raised by the petitioners in their 1970 motion were settled by agreement dated January 29, 1971. On July 29, the respondents filed their first written progress report. On September 8, the petitioners filed a "Motion for Supplemental Relief.” App. 15. This motion forms the basis for the present phase of the litigation. The petitioners complained that the city was permitting racially segregated schools and other segregated private groups and clubs to use city parks and recreational facilities. They requested injunctive relief against “the use of City owned and operated recreational facilities by any private school group, club, or organization which is racially segregated or which has a racially discriminatory admissions policy.”
The District Court granted the petitioners the relief they requested. 337 F. Supp. 22 (MD Ala. 1972). The court reasoned that Montgomery officials were under an affirmative duty to bring about and to maintain a desegregated public school system. Providing recreational facilities to de jacto or de jure segregated private schools was inconsistent with that duty because such aid enhanced the attractiveness of those schools, generated capital savings that could be used to improve their private educational offerings, and provided means to raise other revenue to support the institutions, all to. the detriment of establishing the constitutionally mandated unitary public school system. The court, consequently, enjoined the city and its officials “from permitting or in any way sanctioning the use of city owned or operated recreational facilities by any private school, or private school affiliated group, if such school or group is racially segregated or if it has a racially discriminatory admissions policy.” Id., at 26. The court went on, however, with sparse findings and brief discussion, and similarly enjoined the city and its officials from permitting or sanctioning the use of city recreational facilities “by any private group, club or organization which is not affiliated with a private school and which has a racially discriminatory admissions policy.” Ibid
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed in part and remanded the case with directions. 473 F. 2d 832 (CA5 1973). It sustained that part of the injunction which restrained the use of city facilities by segregated private schools when that use was "exclusive” and not in common with other citizens. Id., at 837. The court ruled, however, that “nonexclusive enjoyment” of those facilities by private school children “was not proven to present a sufficient threat to desegregated public education to support an injunction restraining the clear personal right of the affected children to enjoy such usage in common with the rest of the public.” Ibid. With respect to that portion of the District Court’s order concerning other private nonschool groups, the Court of Appeals held that there was no “symbiotic relationship” of the kind present and condemned in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U. S. 715 (1961). Consequently, it held that under Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U. S. 163 (1972), that portion of the District Court’s order dealing with nonschool groups had to be reversed because the injunction impermissibly intruded upon the freedom of association of citizens who were members of private groups. The court, accordingly, ordered deletion of certain paragraphs of the injunctive order and the clarification of others. 473 F. 2d, at 839-840. The District Court complied with that mandate and, in particular, added the following paragraph to its injunctive order:
“The injunction issued by this Court does not prohibit the City of Montgomery from permitting non-exclusive access to public recreational facilities and general government services by private schools or school affiliated groups.”
The plaintiffs petitioned for certiorari; the defendants did not cross-petition.
II
The Equal 'Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not prohibit the “[individual invasion of individual rights.” Civil Bights Cases, 109 U. S. 3, 11 (1883). It does proscribe, however, state action “of every kind” that operates to deny any citizen the equal protection of the laws. Ibid. This proscription on state action applies de jacto as well as de jure because “[c] on-duct that is formally 'private’ may become so entwined with governmental policies or so impregnated with a governmental character as to become subject to the constitutional limitations placed upon state action.” Evans v. Newton, 382 U. S. 296, 299 (1966). In the present case we must determine whether the city of Montgomery engaged in discriminatory activity violative of the parks desegregation order. We must also decide whether the city’s involvement in the alleged discriminatory activity of segregated private schools and other private groups, through its providing recreational facilities, constitutes “state action” subject to constitutional limitation.
A
The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court insofar as the latter enjoined the “exclusive possession of public recreational facilities such as football stadiums, baseball diamonds, basketball courts, and tennis courts for official athletic contests and similar functions sponsored by racially segregated private schools.” 473 F. 2d, at 836-837. The boundaries of this “exclusive” use approach, however, are not self-evident. We find the concept helpful not so much as a controlling legal principle but as a description of a type of use and, in the context of this case, suggestive of a means of allocating public recreational facilities. The term “exclusive use” implies that an entire facility is exclusively, and completely, in the possession, control, and use of a private group. It also implies, without mandating, a decision-making role for the city in allocating such facilities among private and, for that matter, public groups.
Upon this understanding of the term, we agree with petitioners that the city’s policy of allocating facilities to segregated private schools, in the context of the 1959 parks desegregation order and subsequent history, created, in effect, “enclaves of segregation” and deprived petitioners of equal access to parks and recreational facilities. The city was under an affirmative constitutional duty to eliminate every “custom, practice, policy or usage” reflecting an “impermissible obeisance to the now thoroughly discredited doctrine of 'separate but equal.’ ” Watson v. Memphis, 373 U. S. 526, 538 (1963). This obviously meant that discriminatory practices in Montgomery parks and recreational facilities were to be eliminated “root and branch,” to use the phrase employed in Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, 391 U. S. 430, 438 (1968).
Instead of prompt and orderly compliance with the District Court’s mandate, however, the city of Montgomery engaged in an elaborate subterfuge to anticipate and circumvent the court’s order. Segregated recreational programs continued to be presented through the conveniently cooperating private agency of the local YMCA. All public swimming pools were closed allegedly to prevent the mixing of races. Facilities in Negro neighborhoods were not maintained equally with those in white neighborhoods. In light of these facts, made part of the record in this case, it was entirely appropriate for the District Court carefully to scrutinize any practice or policy that would tend to abandon to segregated private groups facilities normally open to members of all races on an equal basis. Here, the exclusive use and control of city recreational facilities, however temporary, by private segregated schools were little different from the city’s agreement with the YMCA to run a “coordinated” but, in effect, segregated recreational program. Such use and control carried the brand of “separate but equal” and, in the circumstances of this case, were properly terminated by the District Court.
Particularly important is the fact that the city’s policies operated directly to contravene an outstanding school desegregation order. See Carr v. Montgomery County Board of Education, 232 F. Supp. 705 (MD Ala. 1964); 253 F. Supp. 306 (1966); 289 F. Supp. 647 (1968), aff’d as modified, 400 F. 2d 1 and 402 F. 2d 782, 784, 787 (CA5 1968), rev’d and remanded sub nom. United States v. Montgomery County Board of Education, with directions to affirm the judgment of the District Court, 395 U. S. 225 (1969). Certainly, the city’s officials were aware of this order and were responsible for seeing that no actions on their part would significantly impede the progress of school desegregation in the city. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U. S. 1 (1958); Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, 391 U. S., at 437-438; Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education, 396 U. S. 19, 20 (1969). Any arrangement, implemented by state officials at any level, which significantly tends to perpetuate a dual school system, in whatever manner, is constitutionally impermissible. “[T]he constitutional rights of children not to be discriminated against . . . can neither be nullified openly and directly by state legislators or state executive or judicial officers, nor nullified indirectly by them through evasive schemes for segregation whether attempted ‘ingeniously or ingenuously.’ ” Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U. S., at 17. This means that any tangible state assistance, outside the generalized services government might provide to private segregated schools in common with other schools, and with all citizens, is constitutionally prohibited if it has “a significant tendency to facilitate, reinforce, and support private discrimination.” Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U. S. 455, 466 (1973). The constitutional obligation of the State “requires it to steer clear, not only of operating the old dual system of racially segregated schools, but also of giving significant aid to institutions that practice racial or other invidious discrimination.” Id., at 467.
Here, the city’s actions significantly enhanced the attractiveness of segregated private schools, formed in reaction against the federal court school order, by enabling them to offer complete athletic programs. The city’s provision of stadiums and recreational fields resulted in capital savings for those schools and enabled them to divert their own funds to other educational programs. It also provided the opportunity for the schools to operate concessions that generated revenue. We are persuaded, as were both the District Court and the Court of Appeals, that this assistance significantly tended to undermine the federal court order mandating the establishment and maintenance of a unitary school system in Montgomery. It therefore was wholly proper for the city to be enjoined from permitting exclusive access to public recreational facilities by segregated private schools and by groups affiliated with such schools.
B
Although the Court of Appeals ruled out the exclusive use of city facilities by private schools, it went on to modify the District Court order “to make clear that the City of Montgomery is not prohibited'from permitting nonexclusive access to public recreational facilities and general government services by private schools or school affiliated groups,” 473 F. 2d, at 840, or from permitting access to these facilities by private organizations that have a racially discriminatory admissions policy. Id., at 839. Upon this record, we are unable to draw a conclusion as to whether the use of zoos, museums, parks, and other recreational facilities by private school groups in common with others, and by private nonschool organizations, involves government so directly in the actions of those users as to warrant court intervention on constitutional grounds.
It would be improper to determine at this stage the appropriateness of further relief in all the many and varied situations where facilities are used in common by school groups or used exclusively or in common by private groups. It is possible that certain uses of city facilities will be judged to be in contravention of the parks desegregation order or the school desegregation order, or in some way to constitute impermissible “state action” ascribing to the city the discriminatory actions of the groups. The record before us does not contain sufficient facts upon which to predicate legal judgments of this kind. The questions to be resolved and the decisions to be made rest upon careful identification of the different types of city facilities that are available and the various uses to which they might be put by private groups.
The difficulties that confront us on this record are readily apparent. Under appropriate circumstances, the District Court might conclude, as it did in the instance of exclusive usé by private schools, that access in common to city facilities by private school groups would indeed contravene the school desegregation order. For example, all-white private school basketball teams might be invited to participate in a tournament conducted on public recreational facilities with desegregated private and public school teams. Because “discriminatory treatment exerts a pervasive influence on the entire educational process,” Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U. S., at 469, citing Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954), such assistance, although proffered in common with fully desegregated groups, might so directly impede the progress of court-ordered school desegregation within the city that it would be appropriate to fashion equitable relief “adjusting and reconciling public and private needs.” Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U. S. 294, 300 (1955). The essential finding justifying further relief would be a showing of direct impairment of an outstanding school desegregation order. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U. S., at 17; Bush v. Orleans Parish School Board, 364 U. S. 500 (1960); Brown v. South Carolina State Board of Education, 296 F. Supp. 199 (SC), aff’d, 393 U. S. 222 (1968); Poindexter v. Louisiana Financial Assistance Comm’n, 275 F. Supp. 833 (ED La. 1967), aff’d, 389 U. S. 571 (1968); Lee v. Macon County Board of Education, 267 F. Supp. 458 (MD Ala.), aff’d, sub nom. Wallace v. United States, 389 U. S. 215 (1967); Norwood v. Harrison, supra.
Relief would also be appropriate if a particular use constitutes a vestige of the type of state-sponsored racial segregation in public recreational facilities that was prohibited in the parks decree and likewise condemned in Watson v. Memphis, 373 U. S. 526 (1963). See also Dawson v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 220 F. 2d 386 (CA4), aff’d, 350 U. S. 877 (1955); Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Assn., 347 U. S. 971 (1954); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U. S. 879 (1955); New Orleans City Park Improvement Assn. v. Detiege, 358 U. S. 54 (1958). For example, the record contains indications that there are all-white private and all-Negro public Dixie Youth and Babe Ruth baseball leagues for children, all of which use city-provided ballfields and lighting, balls, bats, mitts, and other aid. Were the District Court to determine that this dual system came about as a means of evading the parks decree, or of serving to perpetuate the separate-but-equal use of city facilities on the basis of race, through the aid and assistance of the city, further relief would be appropriate.
The problem of private group use is much more complex. The Court of Appeals relied on Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U. S. 163 (1972), in concluding that the use of city facilities by private clubs did not reflect a “symbiotic relationship” between government and those groups so as to constitute state action. 473 F. 2d, at 838-839.
We feel that Moose Lodge is not fully applicable here. In that case, we generally followed the approach taken in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, supra, where it was stated:
“Owing to the very 'largeness’ of government, a multitude of relationships might appear to some to fall within the Amendment’s embrace, but that, it must be remembered, can be determined only in the framework of the peculiar facts or circumstances present.” 365 U. S., at 725-726.
In Moose Lodge the litigation was directly against a private organization, and it was alleged that the organization’s racially discriminatory policies constituted state action. We held that there was no state action in the mere fact that the fraternal organization’s beverage bar was licensed and regulated by the State. In contrast, here, as in Burton, the question of the existence of state action centers in the extent of the city’s involvement in discriminatory actions by private agencies using public facilities, and in whether that involvement makes the city “a joint participant in the challenged activity, which, on that account, cannot be considered to have been so ‘purely private’ as to fall without the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment.” 365 U. S., at 725. Because the city makes city property available for use by private entities, this case is more like Burton than Moose Lodge. The question then is whether there is significant state involvement in the private discrimination alleged. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U. S. 369 (1967); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, supra; Evans v. Newton, 382 U. S. 296 (1966); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, supra. “The Court has never held, of course, that discrimination by an otherwise private entity would be violative of the Equal Protection Clause if the private entity receives any sort of benefit or service at all from the State, or if it is subject to state regulation in any degree whatever.” 407 U. S., at 173. Traditional state monopolies, such as electricity, water, and police and fire protection — all generalized governmental services — do not by their mere provision constitute a showing of state involvement in invidious discrimination. Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U. S., at 465; Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U. S., at 173. The same is true of a broad spectrum of municipal recreational facilities: parks, playgrounds, athletic facilities, amphitheaters, museums, zoos, and the like. Cf. Evans v. Newton, 382 U. S., at 302. It follows, therefore, that the portion of the District Court’s order prohibiting the mere use of such facilities by any segregated “private group, club or organization” is invalid because it was not predicated upon a proper finding of state action.
If, however, the city or other governmental entity rations otherwise freely accessible recreational facilities, the case for state action will naturally be stronger than if the facilities are simply available to all comers without condition or reservation. Here, for example, petitioners allege that the city engages in scheduling softball games for an all-white church league and provides balls, equipment, fields, and lighting. The city’s role in that situation would be dangerously close to what was found to exist in Burton, where the city had “elected to place its power, property and prestige behind the admitted discrimination.” 365 U. S., at 725. We are reminded, however, that the Court has never attempted to formulate “an infallible test for determining whether the State . . . has become significantly involved in private discrimina^ tions” so as to constitute state action. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U. S., at 378. “ 'Only by sifting facts and weighing circumstances’ on a case-by-case basis can a ‘nonobvious involvement of the State in private conduct be attributed its true significance.’ ” Ibid., quoting Burton, 365 U. S., at 722. This is the task for the District Court on remand.
III
We close with this word of caution. It should be obvious that the exclusion of any person or group — all-Negro, all-Oriental, or all-white — -from public facilities infringes upon the freedom of the individual to associate as he chooses. Mr. Justice Douglas emphasized this in his dissent, joined by Mr. Justice Marshall, in Moose Lodge. He observed: “The associational rights which our system honors permit all white, all black, all brown, and all yellow clubs to be formed. They also permit all Catholic, all Jewish, or all agnostic clubs to be established. Government may not tell a man or woman who his or her associates must be. The individual can be as selective as he desires.” 407 U. S., at 179-180. The freedom to associate applies to the beliefs we share, and to those we consider reprehensible. It tends to produce the diversity of opinion that oils the machinery of democratic government and insures peaceful, orderly change. Because its exercise is largely dependent on the right to own or use property, Healy v. James, 408 U. S. 169, 181-183 (1972), any denial of access to public facilities must withstand close scrutiny and be carefully circumscribed. Certainly, a person’s mere membership in an organization which possesses a discriminatory admissions policy would not alone be ground for his exclusion from public facilities. Having said this, however, we must also be aware that the very exercise of the freedom to associate by some may serve to infringe that freedom for others. Invidious discrimination takes its own toll on the freedom to associate, and it is not subject to affirmative constitutional protection when it involves state action. Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U. S., at 470.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore reversed in part. The case is remanded to that court with directions to remand it in turn to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Prior to the institution of the suit, some of the plaintiffs had petitioned the city’s Parks and Recreation Board, and the plaintiffs and others had petitioned the city’s Board of Commissioners to provide access to the city parks for petitioners and all other Negro citizens similarly situated. The chairman of the Parks and Recreation Board replied that the Board “has no authority in this matter.” The Board of Commissioners responded, “The Commission will not operate integrated parks.” Exhibits attached to complaint filed Dec. 22, 1958, in Civil Action No. 1490-N, United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama, Northern Division.
Within days after petitioners filed their suit, the city authorities, by resolution effective January 1, 1959, closed all the city’s recreational parks, athletic fields, swimming facilities, and playgrounds, to all persons, white and black, and did not purport officially to reopen them until 1965. The city continued, however, to own and maintain them.
On April 22, 1964, after the case had lain dormant for four years, the District Court ordered the file closed “without prejudice to any party to this litigation petitioning this Court for a reinstatement.”
Petitioners’ motion, filed August 7, 1970, was styled as a “Motion to Cite Defendants for Contempt and for Relief.” On October 2, the District Court granted the further motion of the petitioners that the August 7 motion be treated as an amendment to the original complaint.
The record in that case revealed a deliberate attempt to thwart the desegregation order of the District Court. In 1958, the city and the YMCA formed a coordination committee. It was agreed that the YMCA would not offer any program that would duplicate or conflict with one offered by the city’s recreation department. The YMCA conducted football, basketball, and track programs for all the elementary school children of the city, but not for the junior high students. The responsibility for administering junior high programs was delegated to the Recreation Department. Each elementary school supposedly was assigned to the nearest YMCA branch. Yet the District Court found that “every predominantly white school in the city is assigned to one of the three all-white branches even though the school may be closer to the Cleveland Avenue [Negro] branch. Every predominantly Negro school is, regardless of its location, assigned to the Cleveland Avenue branch.” 316 F. Supp., at 905. The YMCA also was given free use of the city’s parks, playgrounds, and lighting equipment for its various athletic programs, and free water for its swimming pools. The city did not reopen its pools after it closed the parks in 1959. “In 1957, the YMCA operated one small branch in downtown Montgomery which had less than 1,000 members. By 1960, two years after the ‘Co-ordination Committee’ had been created, it operated five branches with five swimming pools. Today the YMCA operates six branches with eight swimming pools and has approximately 18,000 members.” Id., at 908.
The settlement agreement appears to have been aimed at providing equal recreational facilities for the Negro population of Montgomery. It specified the construction of new community centers and a new recreation center. Improvements were to be made to existing predominantly Negro facilities. The city agreed to maintain all community centers “on an equal basis and to the same manner and extent.”
The agreement was approved by the District Court on January 29, 1971. Jurisdiction, however, was “specifically retained,” and the defendants were.ordered to file a written progress report every six months.
The District Court's decretal provisions in full text, except for a paragraph relating to the taxation of costs, are:
“1. That the City of Montgomery, Alabama’s policy and practice of permitting the use of city owned or operated recreational facilities by any private school, or private school affiliated group, which school or group is racially segregated or which has a racially discriminatory admissions policy be and the same is hereby declared unconstitutional.
“2. That said City of Montgomery, Alabama, its officers, agents, servants, employees, and those acting in concert with it, be and each is hereby enjoined from permitting or in any way sanctioning the use of city owned or operated recreational facilities by any private school, or private school affiliated group, if such school or group is racially segregated or if it has a racially discriminatory admissions policy.
“3. That said City of Montgomery, Alabama’s policy and practice of permitting the use of city owned or operated recreational facilities by any private group, club or organization which has a racially discriminatory admissions policy be and the same is hereby declared unconstitutional.
“4. That said City of Montgomery, Alabama, its officers, agents, servants, employees and those acting in concert with it, be and each is hereby enjoined from permitting or in any way sanctioning the use of city owned or operated recreational facilities by any private group, club or organization which is not affiliated with a private school and which has a racially discriminatory admissions policy.” 337 F. Supp., at 26.
We understand the term “exclusive use” not to include the situation where only part of a facility may be allocated to or used by a group, even though that allocation or use results in the pro tanto exclusion of others. For example, the use of two of a total of 10 tennis courts by a private school group would not constitute an exclusive use; the use of all 10 courts would. This is not to say that the use of two by a private school group would be constitutionally permissible. See discussion, infra, at 570-571, n. 10.
Petitioners requested that the District Court take notice in this case of Smith v. Young Men’s Christian Assn., 316 F. Supp. 899 (1970), in which the same District Judge had presided. The trial court ruled from the bench that it would take judicial notice “of the evidence that was presented in the Y. M. C. A. case.” Excerpted transcript, testimony of William Chandler, Nov. 20, 1970, p. 7.
Petitioners also requested that the District Court in this case take notice of Carr v. Montgomery County Board of Education, supra. The trial court in its reported opinion, 337 F. Supp., at 24, referred to the duty of the State’s school boards to desegregate.
The Brethren in concurrence state that they would sustain the District Court insofar as any school-sponsored or school-directed uses of the city recreational facilities enable private segregated schools to duplicate public school operations at public expense. It hardly bears repetition that the District Court’s original injunction swept beyond these limits without the factfinding required for the prudent use of what would otherwise be the raw exercise of a court’s equitable power.
It is by no means apparent, as our Brother BreNNAN correctly notes, which uses of city facilities in common with others would have “a significant tendency to facilitate, reinforce, and support private discrimination.” Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U. S. 455, 466 (1973). Moreover, we are not prepared, at this juncture and on this record, to assume the standing of these plaintiffs to claim relief against certain nonexclusive uses by private school groups. The plaintiffs in Norwood were parties to a school desegregation order and the relief they sought was directly related to the concrete injury they suffered. Here, the plaintiffs were parties to an action desegregating the city parks and recreational facilities. Without a properly developed record, it is not clear that every nonexclusive use of city facilities by school groups, unlike their exclusive use, would result in cognizable injury to these plaintiffs. The District Court does not have carte blanche authority to administer city facilities simply because there is past or present discrimination. The usual prudential tenets limiting the exercise of judicial power must' be observed in this case as in any other.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | B | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Certiorari, 348 U. S. 808, to the Supreme Court of Indiana.
Per Curiam:
Affirmed on the authority of Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U. S. 249.
Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas dissent.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | H | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Chief Justice Rehnquist
delivered the opinion of the Court.
A Florida statute, with certain limited exceptions, prohibits a grand jury witness from ever disclosing testimony which he gave before that body. We hold that insofar as the Florida law prohibits a grand jury witness from disclosing his own testimony after the term of the grand jury has ended, it violates the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Respondent was a reporter for the Charlotte Herald-News in Charlotte County, Florida. While writing a series of newspaper articles, he obtained information relevant to alleged improprieties committed by the Charlotte County State Attorney’s Office and Sheriff’s Department. A special prosecutor appointed to investigate the allegations called respondent to testify before a special grand jury which had been convened as part of the investigation. At the time he testified, respondent was warned by the special prosecutor’s staff not to reveal his testimony in any manner, and that such revelation could result in a criminal prosecution for violating Fla. Stat. §905.27. Section 905.27 provides in pertinent part:
“(1) A grand juror ... or any other person appearing before the grand jury shall not disclose the testimony of a witness examined before the grand jury . . . except when required by a court to disclose the testimony for the purpose of:
“(a) Ascertaining whether it is consistent with the testimony given by the witness before the court;
“(b) Determining whether the witness is guilty of perjury; or
“(c) Furthering justice.
“(2) It is unlawful for any person knowingly to publish, broadcast, disclose, divulge, or communicate to any other person, or knowingly to cause or permit to be published, broadcast, disclosed, divulged, or communicated to any other person, in any manner whatsoever, any testimony of a witness examined before the grand jury, or the content, gist, or import thereof, except when such testimony is or has been disclosed in a court proceeding.” Fla. Stat. §905.27 (1989).
After the grand jury terminated its investigation, respondent set out to publish a news story — and perhaps a book— about the subject matter of the investigation, a publication which would include respondent’s testimony and experiences in dealing with the grand jury. He sued in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, seeking a declaration that §905.27 was an unconstitutional abridgment of speech, and an injunction preventing the State from prosecuting him. The District Court granted summary judgment to the State, holding that Florida was entitled to make the judgment that a permanent and total ban on the disclosure of witness testimony was necessary to the proper functioning of the grand jury, and that “this is the exceptional case where a severe infringement on rights under the First Amendment is permissible.” 678 F. Supp. 1552, 1561 (1988).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed. Recognizing that the “question presented by this appeal... is a narrow one,” the court held that “the provisions of section 905.27 prohibiting ‘any other person’ from disclosing the nature of grand jury testimony are unconstitutional to the extent that they apply to witnesses who speak about their own testimony after the grand jury investigation is terminated.” 866 F. 2d 1318, 1319, 1321 (1989). While acknowledging that “the freedom of speech afforded by the first amendment is not absolute,” the court concluded that the competing state interests were not sufficiently compelling to warrant the imposition of criminal sanctions on witnesses who revealed the content of their own grand jury testimony. Id., at 1319-1320. In reaching its determination, the court relied principally on our decision in Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U. S. 829 (1978), and the fact that the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure governing grand jury secrecy imposes no such obligation on grand jury witnesses. 866 F. 2d, at 1320. We granted certiorari, 493 U. S. 807 (1989), and now affirm.
Historically, the grand jury has served an important role in the administration of criminal justice. Although the English forerunner of the modern grand jury served primarily as a prosecutorial and investigative arm of the Crown and was designed to enhance the government’s authority, by the 17th century the grand jury had developed an equally important function — to safeguard citizens against an overreaching Crown and unfounded accusations. See 1 S. Beale & W. Bryson, Grand Jury Law and Practice § 1:02, pp. 5-8 (1986). The tradition of secrecy surrounding grand jury proceedings evolved, at least partially, as a means of implementing this latter function by ensuring the impartiality of that body. Douglas Oil Co. of California v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U. S. 211, 218-219, n. 9 (1979); Brown, The Witness and Grand Jury Secrecy, 11 Am. J. Crim. Law 169, 170 (1983). Today, grand jury secrecy remains important to safeguard a number of different interests.
‘We consistently have recognized that the proper functioning of our grand jury system depends upon the secrecy of the grand jury proceedings. See, e. g., United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., [356 U. S. 677 (1958)]. In particular, we have noted several distinct interests served by safeguarding the confidentiality of grand jury proceedings. First, if preindictment proceedings were made public, many prospective witnesses would be hesitant to come forward voluntarily, knowing that those against whom they testify would be aware of that testimony. Moreover, witnesses who appeared before the grand jury would be less likely to testify fully and frankly, as they would be open to retribution as well as to inducements. There also would be the risk that those about to be indicted would flee, or would try to influence individual grand jurors to vote against indictment. Finally, by preserving the secrecy of the proceedings, we assure that persons who are accused but exonerated by the grand jury will not be held up to public ridicule.” Douglas Oil Co., supra, at 218-219 (footnote omitted).
At the same time, we have recognized that the invocation of grand jury interests is not “some talisman that dissolves all constitutional protections.” United States v. Dionisio, 410 U. S. 1, 11 (1973). Indeed, we have noted that grand juries are expected to “operate within the limits of the First Amendment,” as well as the other provisions of the Constitution. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U. S. 665, 708 (1972). See also Wood v. Georgia, 370 U. S. 375 (1962). We must thus balance respondent’s asserted First Amendment rights against Florida’s interests in preserving the confidentiality of its grand jury proceedings. See Landmark Com munications, supra, at 838 (balancing State’s interest in preserving confidentiality of judicial review proceedings against rights of newspaper reporting on such proceedings); Branzburg, supra, at 690-691 (balancing interest in effective grand jury proceedings against burden on reporters’ news gathering from requiring disclosure of sources).
The Court examined the tension between First Amendment rights and government investigatory proceedings in Landmark Communications, supra. There, a Virginia statute made it a crime to divulge information regarding proceedings before the state judicial review commission. A newspaper publisher was convicted of violating the statute after publishing an article accurately reporting on a pending inquiry by the commission and identifying the state judge under investigation. This Court held that the conviction violated the United States Constitution, concluding “that the publication Virginia seeks to punish under its statute lies near the core of the First Amendment, and the Commonwealth’s interests advanced by the imposition of criminal sanctions are insufficient to justify the actual and potential encroachments on freedom of speech and of the press which follow therefrom.” Id., at 838. While assuming that the confidentiality of the judicial review proceedings served legitimate state interests, the Court observed that the State had “offered little more than assertion and conjecture to support its claim that without criminal sanctions the objectives of the statutory scheme would be seriously undermined.” Id., at 841. The Court also noted that over 40 States with similar judicial review procedures had found it unnecessary to criminalize the type of conduct at issue in order to preserve the integrity of their proceedings. Ibid.
Florida argues that our decision in Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U. S. 20 (1984), rather than Landmark, governs the validity of its prohibition. In Rhinehart we held that a protective order prohibiting a newspaper from publishing information which it had obtained through discovery procedures did not offend the First Amendment. Here, by contrast, we deal only with respondent’s right to divulge information of which he was in possession before he testified before the grand jury, and not information which he may have obtained as a result of his participation in the proceedings of the grand jury. In such cases, where a person “lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of public significance,” we have held that “state officials may not constitutionally punish publication of the information, absent a need to further a state interest of the highest order.” Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U. S. 97, 103 (1979); Florida Star v. B. J. F., 491 U. S. 524, 533 (1989).
Here Florida seeks to punish the publication of information relating to alleged governmental misconduct — speech which has traditionally been recognized as lying at the core of the First Amendment. See Landmark, 435 U. S., at 838; Wood, supra, at 388-389, 392. To justify such punishment, Florida relies on the interests in preserving grand jury secrecy acknowledged by the Court in Douglas Oil Co. of California v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U. S. 211 (1979). But we do not believe those interests warrant a permanent ban on the disclosure by a witness of his own testimony once a grand jury has been discharged. Some of these interests are not served at all by the Florida ban on disclosure, and those that are served are not sufficient to sustain the statute.
When an investigation ends, there is no longer a need to keep information from the targeted individual in order to prevent his escape — that individual presumably will have been exonerated, on the one hand, or arrested or otherwise informed of the charges against him, on the other. There is also no longer a need to prevent the importuning of grand jurors since their deliberations will be over. Similarly, the concern that some witnesses will be deterred from presenting testimony due to fears of retribution is, we think, not advanced by this prohibition; any witness is free not to divulge his own testimony, and that part of the Florida statute which prohibits the witness from disclosing the testimony of another witness remains enforceable under the ruling of the Court of Appeals.
Florida’s interest in preventing the subornation of grand jury witnesses who will later testify at trial is served by the prohibition in question to this extent: if the accused is of a mind to suborn potential witnesses against him, he will have an additional opportunity to learn of the existence of such a witness if that witness chooses to make his grand jury testimony public. But with present day criminal procedure generally requiring the disclosure of witnesses on the part of the State, see, e. g., Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 3.220(a), the names of these witnesses will be available to the accused sometime before trial in any event. Florida provides substantial criminal penalties for both perjury and tampering with witnesses, see Fla. Stat. §§837.02, 914.22 (1989), and its courts have subpoena and contempt powers available to bring recalcitrant witnesses to the stand. We think the additional effect of the ban here in question is marginal at best and insufficient to outweigh the First Amendment interest in speech involved.
Florida undoubtedly retains a substantial interest in seeing that “persons who are accused but exonerated by the grand jury will not be held up to public ridicule.” Douglas Oil Co., supra, at 219. And the ban in question does serve that interest to some extent, although it would have the opposite effect if applied to a witness who was himself a target of the grand jury probe and desired to publicize this testimony by way of exonerating himself. But even in those situations where the disclosure by the witness of his own testimony could have the effect of revealing the names of persons who had been targeted by the grand jury but exonerated, our decisions establish that absent exceptional circumstances, reputational interests alone cannot justify the proscription of truthful speech. See Landmark, supra, at 841-842 (“Our prior cases have firmly established . . . that injury to official reputation is an insufficient reason for repressing speech that would otherwise be free”) (quotation omitted); cf. Florida Star v. B. J. F., supra (First Amendment precluded State from imposing damages for publication of rape victim’s name); Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., supra (State could not constitutionally punish the publication of a juvenile offender’s name); Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. Oklahoma County District Court, 430 U. S. 308 (1977) (State could not constitutionally enjoin the publication of a juvenile offender’s name).
We also take note of the fact that neither the drafters of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, nor the drafters of similar rules in the majority of the States, found it necessary to impose an obligation of secrecy on grand jury witnesses with respect to their own testimony to protect reputational interests or any of the other interests asserted by Florida. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(2), governing grand jury secrecy, expressly prohibits certain individuals other than witnesses from disclosing “matters occurring before the grand jury,” and provides that “[n]o obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule.” The pertinent Advisory Committee Notes on Rule 6(e)(2), 18 U. S. C. App., p. 726, expressly exempt witnesses from the obligation of secrecy, stating that “[t]he seal of secrecy on witnesses seems an unnecessary hardship and may lead to injustice if a witness is not permitted to make a disclosure to counsel or to an associate.” Similarly, only 14 States have joined Florida in imposing an obligation of secrecy on grand jury witnesses. Of the remaining 35 States, 21 either explicitly or implicitly exempt witnesses from a general secrecy obligation, and 14 simply remain silent on the issue. See 2 Beale & Bryson, swpra, n. 3, §7.05, pp. 20-21, and nn. 18-21. While these practices are not conclusive as to the constitutionality of Florida’s rule, they are probative of the weight to be assigned Florida’s asserted interests and the extent to which the prohibition in question is necessary to further them.
Against the state interests which we have just evaluated must be placed the impact of Florida’s prohibition on respondent’s ability to make a truthful public statement. The effect is dramatic: before he is called to testify in front of the grand jury, respondent is possessed of information on matters of admitted public concern about which he was free to speak at will. After giving his testimony, respondent believes he is no longer free to communicate this information since it relates to the “content, gist, or import” of his testimony. The ban extends not merely to the life of the grand jury but into the indefinite future. The potential for abuse of the Florida prohibition, through its employment as a device to silence those who know of unlawful conduct or irregularities on the part of public officials, is apparent.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the interests advanced by the portion of the Florida statute struck down are not sufficient to overcome respondent’s First Amendment right to make a truthful statement of information he acquired on his own. Its judgment is therefore
Affirmed.
The entire text of § 905.27 provides as follows:
“905.27. Testimony not to be disclosed; exceptions.
“(1) A grand juror, state attorney, assistant state attorney, reporter, stenographer, interpreter, or any other person appearing before the grane jury shall not disclose the testimony of a witness examined before -the grand jury or other evidence received by it except when required by i court to disclose the testimony for the purpose of:
“(a) Ascertaining whether it is consistent with the testimony given bj the witness before the court;
“(b) Determining whether the witness is guilty of perjury; or “(c) Furthering justice.
“(2) It is unlawful for any person knowingly to publish, broadcast, dis close, divulge, or communicate to any other person, or knowingly to causi or permit to be published, broadcast, disclosed, divulged, or communicate! to any other person, in any manner whatsoever, any testimony of a witnes examined before the grand jury, or the content, gist, or import thereol except when such testimony is or has been disclosed in a court proceeding When a court orders the disclosure of such testimony pursuant to subsec tion (1) for use in a criminal case, it may be disclosed to the prosecutin attomey of the court in which such criminal case is pending, and by him to his assistants, legal associates, and employees, and to the defendant and his attorney, and by the latter to his legal associates and employees. When such disclosure is ordered by a court pursuant to subsection (1) for use in a civil case, it may be disclosed to all parties to the case and to their attorneys and by the latter to their legal associates and employees. However, the grand jury testimony afforded such persons by the court can only be used in the defense or prosecution of the civil or criminal case and for no other purpose whatsoever.
“(3) Nothing in this section shall affect the attorney-client relationship. A client shall have the right to communicate to his attorney any testimony given by the client to the grand jury, any matters involving the client discussed in the client’s presence before the grand jury, and any evidence involving the client received by or proffered to the grand jury in the client’s presence.
“(4) Persons convicted of violating this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.083, or by fine not exceeding $5,000, or both.
“(5) A violation of this section shall constitute criminal contempt of court.”
In his complaint, respondent also sought a declaration that he was entitled to divulge his “experience” before the grand jury. Whatever this term might encompass, it is clear that the Court of Appeals limited its holding to a witness’ “testimony” before the grand jury. Since respondent has not sought review of any portion of this ruling, we similarly limit our holding to the issue of a witness’ grand jury testimony.
In cases where an arrest is contemplated, there may be a lag time between the issuance of the indictment and the arrest. As a result, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and many States have provided a mechanism for the sealing of indictments pending the indictee’s arrest. See Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 6(e)(4); 1 S. Beale & W. Bryson, Grand Jury Law and Practice § 6.40, pp. 232-233, and nn. 2, 3 (1986). Other States, like Florida, have simply prohibited court officers or grand jurors from disclosing the fact that an indictment has been returned before an arrest is made. Id., § 6.40, p. 233, and n. 4. In such cases, there may be instances where the disclosure by a grand jury witness of his own testimony might lead the accused to infer that he had been indicted from the fact that the witness was asked about the accused’s conduct. This would seem to be a very speculative possibility, and it did not lead the drafters of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, nor the majority of States, to impose an obligation of secrecy on grand jury witnesses. See infra, at 634-635. We similarly conclude that Florida’s interest by reason of this hypothesis is not sufficient to justify the State’s postinvestigation ban on a witness’ disclosure of his own testimony.
Petitioners argue that the State’s interest in preventing a target’s flight remains valid in cases where the term of a grand jury expires and an investigation is continued with another grand jury. We are not confronted with this situation in the present case and, accordingly, express no opinion on whether a State could prohibit a witness from revealing his testimony under such circumstances.
But see Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 20.16 (Vernon 1977) (imposing obligation of secrecy where Beale & Bryson list as silent).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | C | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Whittaker
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondent brought this action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York to recover a claimed overpayment of federal income taxes for the year 1951. It keeps its books and files its returns on a calendar-year accrual basis. The case turns on the correct determination of the proper year of accrual and deduction of certain contested real estate taxes. Specifically, the question is whether the contested part of a real estate tax accrued (1) in the year it was assessed and, for the purpose — and as the only mode recognized by the local law — of avoiding seizure and sale of the property for the contested tax while the contest was pending, was “paid” by the taxpayer, or (2), in the year the contest was finally determined.
The District Court, following the holding of the Court of Claims in Consolidated Edison Co. v. United States, 133 Ct. Cl. 376, 135 F. Supp. 881, that such a “payment” of the tax “accrues the item even though payment is made under protest and even though litigation is started within the taxable year to obtain repayment,” 133 Ct. Cl., at 383-384, 135 F. Supp., at 885, held, without opinion, that the contested part of the tax accrued in the year of the “payment.” On appeal, the Court of Appeals, by a divided court, held that the contested part of the tax accrued in the year the contest was finally determined, and reversed the judgment. 279 F. 2d 152. It reasoned that inasmuch as respondent was “keeping its books on the accrual basis,” the contested part of the tax accrued “only when all events [had] occurred which determine [d] the fact and amount of the tax liability.” Id., at 155. To resolve the conflict between the decision below and Consolidated Edison Co. v. United States, supra, we granted certiorari. 364 U. S. 890.
During the years involved — 1946 through 1950— respondent owned numerous tracts of real estate in New York City which were subject to annual local property taxes. Under the' New York law, the City Council annually fixes the tax rate, and the City Tax Commission annually fixes the property valuations. Thus the amount of the tax on each tract is determined by multiplying the valuation by the tax rate. The tax rate is not contestable, but a timely application (commonly called a “protest”) may be made to the City Tax Commission to correct an erroneous valuation. Among other things, the protest must state the amount which the taxpayer “consider [s] was the full value of the property on January 25 [of the current] year” thus to establish the amount of the tax that is not contested. Upon exhaustion of this administrative procedure, a review of the Commission’s determination may be had by a judicial proceeding, commonly called a certiorari proceeding, in the State Supreme Court, which is the taxpayer’s sole and exclusive remedy. But the institution of such a suit does not stay or suspend the maturity of the tax bill, the accrual of 7% interest on it, nor the seizure and sale of the property to satisfy the tax lien. Thus, to obtain review, the taxpayer must either “pay” the tax or suffer the interest penalty and run the risk of seizure and sale of its property.
Though taxes for each of five years on hundreds of tracts are involved and the aggregate amount is very substantial, the parties very commendably stipulated in the District Court that the facts are sufficiently reflected, for the purposes of this suit, in the following simplified example:
In each of the years 1946 through 1950, respondent was notified of a tentative valuation which, at the established tax rate, would produce a tax of $100. Respondent then timely filed a bona fide protest (in respect of many, but not nearly all, of its tracts) stating a valuation which, at the established tax rate, would produce a tax of $85, and asking that the balance of the proposed valuation be stricken as excessive. After hearing, the Commission rejected the protest, and an assessment in the amount of $100 was made. Thereupon respondent, under protest and for the honestly stated purpose of avoiding the interest penalty and the seizure and sale of its property while it was contesting the Commission’s valuation by certiorari proceedings in the state court, remitted to the city cash in an amount equal to the tax of $100, and immediately thereafter commenced a certiorari proceeding in the proper court, in which it again admitted liability for a tax in the amount of $85, but denied all liability for any tax in excess of that amount. In December 1951, the court, upon the consent of the parties to the action, entered its order in (each of) the certiorari proceedings fixing respondent’s tax liability at $95, and thereupon the city forthwith returned $5 to respondent.
Although it was then engaged in a contest with the Commissioner in the Court of Claims over an identical question, namely, the proper income tax treatment to be accorded the $15 for each of the years 1938, 1939 and 1941 — which issue was decided by the Court of Claims in December 1955 in favor of the Government, Consolidated Edison Co. v. United States, supra—respondent, in terms of the illustrative example, accrued on its books and deducted on its federal income tax returns, for each of the years 1946 through 1950, the full $100; and in its return for the year 1951 — in which year the real estate tax liability was determined to be $95 — respondent failed to deduct the $10 from, and included the $5 in, its gross income for that year.
Believing that this treatment of the $15 in 1951 was erroneous and resulted in its paying a lesser amount of federal income taxes in each of the years 1946 through 1950, and more in the year 1951, than it should have paid, respondent filed in February 1955 its claim for refund of so much of its 1951 income taxes as resulted (1) from its failure to deduct the $10 of real estate tax that was determined, in that year, to be valid, and (2) from its inclusion in gross income of the $5 returned to it in that year. Upon rejection of that claim, respondent timely brought this action in the District Court to recover the refund claimed, and obtained the result already stated.
It is settled that each “taxable year” must be treated as a separate unit, and all items of gross income and deduction must be reflected in terms of their posture at the close of such year. Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U. S. 359; Heiner v. Mellon, 304 U. S. 271; Guaranty Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 303 U. S. 493; Security Mills Co. v. Commissioner, 321 U. S. 281. And the parties agree that, under the applicable federal statutes, neither the Government nor an accrual-basis taxpayer may cause an item to be deducted in a year other than the one in which it accrued. United States v. Anderson, 269 U. S. 422; Security Mills Co. v. Commissioner, supra; United States v. Olympic Radio & Television, 349 U. S. 232. They also agree that the “touchstone” for determining the year in which an item of deduction accrues is the “all events” test established by this Court in United States v. Anderson, supra, and since reaffirmed by this Court on numerous occasions, so that it is now a fundamental principle of tax accounting. See, e. g., Lucas v. American Code Co., 280 U. S. 445; Brown v. Helvering, 291 U. S. 193; Dixie Pine Co. v. Commissioner, 320 U. S. 516; Security Mills Co. v. Commissioner, supra. The parties also recognize that this Court amplified, or as the Government says “added a refinement to,” the “all events” test by its holding, in Dixie Pine Co. v. Commissioner, supra, that an accrual-basis taxpayer could not, while “contesting liability in the courts,” deduct “the amount of the tax, on the theory that the state’s exaction constituted a fixed and certain liability,” but “must, in the circumstances, await the event of the state court litigation and might claim a deduction only for the taxable year in which its liability for the tax was finally adjudicated.” 320 U. S., at 519. That principle was specifically reaffirmed in Security Mills Co. v. Commissioner, supra.
That $85 of the $100 assessment was admitted to be owing and was intended to be paid and satisfied by the remittance, and thus accrued in the year - of the remittance, is not in dispute. Respondent’s good faith, in contesting $15 of the assessment, is not in dispute, for the Government expressly “disavow [s] any suggestion that the respondent . . . filed its claims against the City of New York in bad faith, . . . ealculatingly inflated those claims, or . . . failed to prosecute them with diligence.” Nor is it questioned that accrual of such taxes in the proper year accords with “good accounting” principles.
But concordance of the views of the parties ends at this point. The Government contends that the remittance by respondent to the city, in each of the years in question, of cash in an amount equal to the whole of the assessed tax admitted liability for, and was intended to and did constitute “payment” and “satisfaction” of, both the disputed and undisputed parts of the assessment; and that when “the taxpayer pays the item and thereby discharges its liability, the expense has been incurred and there is no longer any contingency which would prevent its accrual.” Respondent, on the other hand, insists that its remittance to the city was not intended to and did not admit liability for, nor constitute “payment” and “satisfaction” of, the contested $15 of the assessment, but was, in effect, a mere deposit, in the nature of a cash bond, required of respondent, in a practical sense, by the local law as the only available mode of avoiding the risk of seizure and sale of the property for the contested tax while its validity was being diligently contested in the only way allowed by the laws of the State.
Thus the very narrow issue here is whether the remittance admitted liability for, and constituted “payment” and “satisfaction” of, the contested part of the assessment and thereby rendered it accruable in the year of the remittance. Like the Court of Appeals, we think the respondent is right in its contention, and that $10 of the contested $15 of the tax accrued when liability in that amount was finally determined by the New York court in 1951, and that the $5, for which respondent was by that judgment held not liable, and which was returned to it by the city, was not income to respondent in 1951.
Although the Government attempts to distinguish the Anderson, Dixie Pine and Security Mills cases on the ground that “payment” of the contested taxes had not been made in those cases, it primarily relies on the decisions of the Court of Claims in Chestnut Securities Co. v. United States, 104 Ct. Cl. 489, 62 F. Supp. 574, and Consolidated Edison Co. v. United States, 133 Ct. Cl. 376, 135 F. Supp. 881.
The Chestnut Securities case turned on the question whether certain judicially contested state income taxes (for the years 1936-1938) accrued when they were paid in 1940, as claimed by the accrual-basis taxpayer, or when the final judgment upholding their validity was rendered in 1942, as contended by the Government. Squarely contrary to its contention here, the Government, relying on Security Mills Co. v. Commissioner, supra, there contended that “since the [taxpayer’s] accounts were kept and its tax returns made on the accrual basis, it could not take its deduction for the taxes . . . paid to the State . . . until the year 1942, when its suit'for their return was finally decided adversely to it.” On the facts of that case, the Court of Claims held that “the Government [was] wrong” in that contention. Although, in full consonance with the Security Mills case, the Court of Claims said “[o]ne is not entitled to accrue a debt or other liability which is asserted against him but which he disputes and litigates, until the litigation is concluded,” it went on to say “[b]ut if a liability is asserted against him and he pays it, though under protest, and though he promptly begins litigation to get the money back, the status of the liability is that it has been discharged by payment. It is hardly conceivable that a liability asserted against him, which he has discharged by payment, has not yet ‘accrued’ within the meaning of the tax laws and the terminology of accounting. Accrual, from the debtor’s standpoint, precedes payment, and does not survive it.” 104 Ct. Cl., at 494-495, 62 F. Supp., at 576. And after pointing to this Court’s use of the phrase “and failed to pay” in its holding in the Security Mills case that “Since [the taxpayer] denied liability for, and failed to pay, the tax during the taxable year 1935, it was not in a position in its tax accounting to treat the Government’s claim as an accrued liability,” the Court of Claims concluded: “In the instant case the taxpayer denied liability, but paid. We think it thereby ‘accrued’ the taxes and interest, if accrual is requisite at all, in the case of the debtor, when actual payment has occurred.” 104 Ct. Cl., at 495, 62 F. Supp., at 576.
The Consolidated Edison case involved the same parties, facts and questions as the present case, though in respect to earlier tax years. Although recognizing that this Court’s opinions in Security Mills Co. v. Commissioner, supra, and Dixie Pine Co. v. Commissioner, supra, had “settled” the law to be “that a taxpayer may not accrue an expense when he is denying liability and refusing and contesting its payment,” the Court of Claims rejected, as “not necessarily true,” the taxpayer’s argument “that there must therefore be. an admission or absence of denial of liability before an item may be accrued and that the payment of the liability within the taxable year has no effect on its accrual since payment was made under protest and litigation was immediately started to obtain a repayment” (133 Ct. Cl., at 382, 135 F. Supp., at 884); and, purporting to follow, but seemingly departing from, its decision in the Chestnut Securities case, the Court concluded “that payment of an item which is otherwise accruable in the taxable year accrues the item even though payment is made under protest and even though litigation is started within the taxable year to obtain repayment.” 133 Ct. Cl., at 383-384, 135 F. Supp., at 885. (Emphasis added.) On that conclusion the Court rendered judgment for the Government.
Just what the Court meant by the phrase we have italicized was not explained, but it is evident that if the tax item was “otherwise accruable in the taxable year,” payment — whether of a character that would constitute an admission of the asserted liability or a mere deposit to enable contest of the liability — certainly would not render the item non-aceruable; and if, in the absence of payment, the item was “otherwise accruable in the taxable year,” payment would be immaterial, or at least unnecessary, to the question of accruability. It thus appears that the Court’s judgment was contrary to its rule in that case, for, although it regarded the remittance as “payment” of the asserted tax liability, admittedly the contested part of the tax was not “otherwise accruable in the' taxable year.”
Disagreeing with the conclusion of the Court of Claims in the Consolidated Edison case, the Court of Appeals concluded, we think correctly, that the question of accruability of the tax — apart from the issue respecting “payment” and “satisfaction” — was governed by the “all events” test established by this Court in United States v. Anderson, supra (see note 5), as amplified and affirmed in Dixie Pine Co. v. Commissioner, supra, and reaffirmed as amplified in Security Mills Co. v. Commissioner, supra. See notes 6 and 7.
As to whether respondent’s remittance of the full $100 to the city, in the circumstances of this case, constituted an admission of liability for, and a “payment” and “satisfaction” of, the contested $15 of the assessment, the Court of Appeals recognized that this Court’s opinions in the Anderson, Dixie Pine and Security Mills cases refer to the fact that “payment” of the taxes sought to be deducted in those cases had not been made by the taxpayers, but it thought, and we agree, that those references were made only for the sake of complete accuracy to an important but, so far as those cases were concerned, a collateral matter, and not to the determinative considerations of those cases, which were the “all events” test as they state it.
“Payment” is not a talismanic word. It may have many meanings depending on the sense and context in which it is used. As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, “A payment may constitute a capital expenditure, an exchange of assets, a prepaid expense, a deposit, or a current expense,” and “[w]hen the exact nature of the payment is not immediately ascertainable because it depends on some future event, such as the outcome of litigation, its treatment for income tax purposes must await that event.” 279 F. 2d, at 156. (Emphasis added.)
Of course, an unconditional “payment” made by a taxpayer in apparent “satisfaction” of an asserted matured tax liability is, without more, plain and persuasive evidence, at least against the taxpayer, that “all the events [have] occur [red] which fix the amount of the tax and determine the liability of the taxpayer to pay it,” United States v. Anderson, supra, at 441, and that the item so paid and satisfied has accrued.
But where, as stipulated by the parties in this case, the remittance or “payment” did not admit, but specifically denied, liability for, and was not intended to satisfy, the contested $15 of the assessment, but was, in effect, a mere deposit, “in the nature of a cash bond for the payment of [so much, if any, of the contested] taxes [as might] thereafter [be] found to be due” (Rosenman v. United States, 323 U. S. 658, 662, and see Lewyt Corp. v. Commissioner, 215 F. 2d 518, 523 (C. A. 2d Cir.)), and was made for the sole purpose of staying—there being no other way to stay—an otherwise possible seizure and sale of the property for the contested tax while its validity was being honestly and diligently contested in the only way allowed by the law of the State, it will not do to say that the taxpayer has made an unconditional “payment” in apparent “satisfaction” of the contested part of an asserted matured tax liability, and thereby rendered it immediately accruable.-
We therefore conclude that $10 of the contested $15 tax liability accrued not in the year of the remittance, but in 1951 when the New York court entered its final order determining that liability; and that the $5, for which respondent was held not liable by that judgment and which was returned to it by the city, was not income to respondent in 1951.
Affirmed.
The procedures allowed by the laws of New York for the contest of real property taxes are more fully set forth in Consolidated Edison Co. v. United States, 133 Ct. Cl. 376, 378, 135 F. Supp. 881, 882.
Respondent asserts that this treatment of the $15 in its 1951 federal income tax return was made under compulsion of the Commissioner's erroneous G. C. M. 25298, issued directly to it in 1947 (1947-2 Cum. Bull. 39), saying, “a contested tax liability accrues not later than time of payment, notwithstanding continuation of contest. The accrual basis of accounting relates to the deductibility of unpaid items,” and that the Commissioner insisted upon that treatment, despite his modification thereof in Mim. 6444 (1949-2 Cum. Bull. 11), saying in pertinent part, that “payment of [a] contested tax liability as a prerequisite for appeal is not deductible under G. C. M. 25298.”
The economic consequences to the parties arise from the fact that corporate income tax rates (normal plus surtax) were increased from 38% in 1946 to 50%% in 1951, and, in.this particular instance, more revenue would be produced by taking the deduction in 1946-1950 than in 1951. The taxpayer recognizes that, if its position be sustained, the Commissioner will have one year after entry of final judgment herein to reaudit the taxpayer's 1946-1950 returns and to assess deficiencies based upon deduction of the $15 in those years, in accordance with the provisions of §§ 1311-1315 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
The applicable statutes are §§23 (c), 41, 42, 43 and 48 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 (26 U. S. C. (1952 ed.), §§23 (c), 41, 42, 43, 48). These provisions are the same as their counterparts in prior Revenue Acts and in the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. Inasmuch as those statutes are not really in contest in this ease, it would serve no useful purpose even to abstract them here.
In the Anderson case, this Court declared the so-called “all events” test as follows: “In a technical legal sense it may be argued that a tax does not accrue until it has been assessed and becomes due; but it is also true that in advance of the assessment of a tax, all the events may occur which fix the amount of the tax and determine the liability of the taxpayer to pay it. In this respect, for purposes of accounting and of ascertaining true income for a given acccounting period, the munitions tax here in question did not stand on any different footing than other accrued expenses appearing on appellee’s books. In the economic and bookkeeping sense with which the statute and Treasury decision were concerned, the taxes had accrued.” 269 U. S., at 441.
In the Dixie Pine case, this Court reaffirmed the “all events” test as follows: “It has long been held that in order truly to reflect the income of a given year, all the events must occur in that year which fix the amount and the fact of the taxpayer’s liability for items of indebtedness deducted though not paid; and this cannot be the case where the liability is contingent apd is contested by the taxpayer.” 320 U. S., at 519.
In the Security Mills case, this Court reaffirmed that test as follows': “It is settled by many decisions that a taxpayer may not accrue an expense the amount of which is unsettled or the liability for which is contingent, and this principle is fully applicable to a tax, liability for which the taxpayer denies, and payment whereof he is contesting.” 321 U. S., at 284.
In the Security Mills case, after saying “that a taxpayer may not accrue an expense the amount of which is unsettled or the liability for which is contingent,” the Court concluded that “[s]ince [the taxpayer] denied liability for, and failed to pay, the tax during the taxable year 1935, it was not in a position in its tax accounting to treat the [tax] claim as an accrued liability.” 321 U. S., at 284.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | L | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Burton
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question before us is whether the accused, who is under a sentence of death, imposed by a Pennsylvania court and jury for murder committed during the course of an armed robbery, was tried under such prejudicial circumstances and improper influences that he was denied the due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The charges in this federal habeas corpus proceeding are that an atmosphere of hysteria and prejudice prevailed at the state trial, including the prejudicial conduct and frequent presence in the courtroom of another judge of the same court, who recently had presided over a trial of two associates of petitioner and which had resulted in a like conviction and sentence for the murder committed. For the reasons hereafter stated, we agree with the considered judgments of the state court, Pennsylvania ex rel. Darcy v. Claudy, 367 Pa. 130, 79 A. 2d 785; the Federal District Court, 130 F. Supp. 270; and the Court of Appeals, 224 F. 2d 504; holding that the accused was not denied due process of law.
Late on December 22, 1947, petitioner Darcy and three associates, Foster, Zeitz and Capone, armed with revolvers, held up a tavern in Feasterville, near Doyles-town, Bucks County, Pennsylvania. During the robbery two patrons of the tavern were shot and severely wounded. As petitioner and his companions left the scene, Zeitz fired at and killed a bystander, William Kelly. About a half hour later, petitioner and his companions committed another armed robbery in which shots also were fired but no one was injured. Before 2 a. m., they were arrested by Philadelphia police. While in that custody, they voluntarily admitted their participation not only in the above robberies but in seven others committed since November 30. In these a total of seven persons had been shot or otherwise injured.
On January 5,1948, petitioner and his three companions were brought to Bucks County, charged with the murder of William Kelly and committed, without bail, to await action by the grand jury. On February 10, all four being present and all but one being represented by counsel of his own choice, they were severally indicted for murder. The District Attorney moved for a continuance because Foster was without counsel, and because one prosecution witness was in a critical condition from the wound received at the time of the robbery. The continuance was granted. On March 1, counsel for petitioner and Capone moved for a severance and separate trials. Judge Keller of the nisi prius or trial court (Court of Oyer and Terminer and General Jail Delivery of Bucks County) suggested the advisability of a combination trial, but granted the motions when counsel insisted on their right to them. On March 3, Judge Boyer, of the same court, appointed two local attorneys to represent Foster.
In March, defense counsel were advised that the Foster-Zeitz case would be called first, petitioner’s case the following week, and then Capone’s case.
When it became apparent that the Foster-Zeitz trial, which began May 24, would continue into the week of June 1, the court directed the sheriff’s office to notify the prospective jurors who had been summoned for June 1 not to appear until June 7. They were so notified and, with one exception, did not appear for duty until the latter date. For the Foster-Zeitz and petitioner’s trials, the prospective jurors waited outside the main courtroom, were called in individually and were subjected to a searching examination on voir dire. While neither Foster, Zeitz nor petitioner exercised all of his peremptory challenges, two extra venires were called in order to complete the two juries. No jurors sat in both cases. Once accepted, the respective juries were kept together during each trial under the supervision of court officials. The jurors were not permitted to see newspapers, listen to radios, or see television programs, and were kept free from any outside influence or contact.
At no time during either the Foster-Zeitz trial or petitioner’s trial was the courtroom filled to capacity and at no time was there any need for the court to call for order. No outbursts, disturbances or untoward incidents occurred in the courtroom or elsewhere in the county. The proceedings were reported daily in the press and, on occasion, by radio. The reporting was factual, with some editorials. The news coverage diminished a few weeks after the robbery, increased and subsided again after the grand-jury proceedings, and increased just before the trials.
In Pennsylvania, the jury fixes the penalty for murder in the first degree. No question was raised as to identity or as to petitioner’s participation in the robbery. The strategy of the defense in both trials was to seek to keep the punishment down to life imprisonment. On Friday, June 4, the jury in the Foster-Zeitz trial returned a verdict of guilty and fixed the penalty at death. After receiving the verdict, the trial judge, Judge Boyer, was, on June 5, quoted in the local newspaper as having said to that jury:
“ T don’t see how you could, under the evidence, have reached any other verdict. Your verdict may have a very wholesome effect on other young men in all vicinities who may come to realize the seriousness of the folly in which so many young men indulge in these days. The only hope of stemming the tide of such crime by youth is to enforce the law which you have indicated by your decision.’ ” 130 F. Supp., at 291-292.
A few moments earlier, Judge Keller, in discharging the remainder of the May 24 panel, had, in the same courtroom, commended them for their satisfactory verdicts, the last one of which had been an acquittal on a charge of rape.
On Monday, June 7, petitioner’s trial began. The court opened at 10 a. m., with both Judge Boyer and Judge Keller presiding. As usual, miscellaneous business, unrelated to the impending trial, was first disposed of by the court. Petitioner was then arraigned. He pleaded not guilty and, upon Judge Keller’s direction, the selection of the jury was commenced. At various times during petitioner’s trial, although it was presided over by Judge Keller, Judge Boyer was in attendance, sitting either on the bench with Judge Keller or in the courtroom within the enclosure reserved for attorneys, the parties and the press. In this connection, the Federal District Court found that—
“By long established tradition in Bucks County, each morning and afternoon at the opening of court both judges take the bench to entertain motions and other miscellaneous matters in the Criminal, Common Pleas — law and equity — and Orphans Court. Once this work is completed, one of the judges, if engaged in a trial in that court room, remains on the bench; the other judge leaving to perform duties in another court room or in chambers. The practice used in many Pennsylvania courts . . . was continued daily no matter what court was in session or the nature of the trial [but] not on June 4 when Judge Boyer charged the jury [trying Foster and Zeitz]; and . . . not on June 8 and 10.
“The criminal docket ... a record of individual trials, shows both judges on the bench at 10:00 A. M. May 24 . . . 9:30 A. M. June 2 . . . 10:00 A. M. June 7 ... . The court reporter’s notes of testimony show only one instance of Judge Boyer taking any part whatsoever in the Darcy trial, i. e., during a sidebar discussion out of the hearing of the jury shortly after court convened on Saturday morning, June 12 ... . Under consideration was a difficult question of law on the admissibility of evidence of other offenses ... in view of the Act of July 3,1947, P. L. 1239, 19 P. S. Pa. § 711 note. Judge Boyer indicated his thinking on the matter. Upon objection by counsel the discussion ended; Judge Keller ruled; Judge Boyer left the bench shortly after and did not return during the remainder of the trial. It may be that during the Foster-Zeitz trial Judge Keller shortly after 9:30 A. M. June 2 . . . listened to but did not express any opinion during a similar discussion.
“Honorable Hiram H. Keller . . . who presided . . . throughout the trial, has certified . . . that after the miscellaneous business was completed, 'On several occasions . . . Judge Boyer remained for brief periods while evidence was presented . . and that with the exception of the incident [noted above], 'At no other time, during the course of the trial, did Judge Boyer assist, volunteer to assist, or make any suggestions to or otherwise aid the undersigned in the trial of this case.’
“The District Attorney . . . testified, and we find as a fact, that Judge Boyer did not at any time during the Darcy trial assist, attempt to assist, make any suggestion to or in any other manner aid the Commonwealth in the prosecution of the case against David Darcy; that Judge Boyer did not pass any note or message of any kind to the District Attorney in connection with the trial for the use of the District Attorney or Judge Keller.
“On several occasions during the Darcy trial — not on Friday evening or during the charge of the court on Monday, June 14 — Judge Boyer sat for brief intervals on a chair just inside the court room door from the judges’ chambers, apparently listening to the proceedings. . . .
“During the Darcy trial Judge Boyer did not at any time sit at or near the table reserved for the press; at or near the table reserved for the District Attorney; at no time did Judge Boyer sit on a chair next to or anywhere near a chair occupied by the District Attorney.
“Throughout the trial, the only chairs occupied by the District Attorney or his assistant were at the table reserved for that purpose, or in chairs immediately in front of the table reserved for the press.
“At no time other than that noted [above] did Judge Boyer take any part whatsoever in the proceedings of the Darcy trial.” 130 F. Supp., at 296-297.
On Monday, June 14, petitioner’s case went to the jury. It returned a verdict of guilty and fixed the penalty at death. The subsequent proceedings in this case, extending over eight years, are summarized in the margin. Those proceedings uniformly sustained the State, but we granted certiorari to review the charge now made by petitioner that he was denied due process. 350 U. S. 872.
Petitioner’s charge is that (a) the news coverage of the robbery and of the proceedings prior to his trial, including the Foster-Zeitz trial and Judge Boyer’s reported remarks to the jury in that case, created such an atmosphere of hysteria and prejudice that it prevented him from having a fair trial, (b) notwithstanding that he was granted a severance, he was forced to go to trial within one week of the trial of his companions, Foster and Zeitz, and (c) in the light of (a) and (b) above, Judge Boyer’s presence and participation in petitioner’s trial prevented him from being fairly tried since Judge Boyer, in effect, acted as an “overseer judge” and effectively guided and influenced petitioner’s jury.
Petitioner has been given ample opportunity to prove that he has been denied due process of law. While this Court stands ready to correct violations of constitutional rights, it also holds that “it is not asking too much that the burden of showing essential unfairness be sustained by him who claims such injustice and seeks to have the result set aside, and that it be sustained not as a matter of speculation but as a demonstrable reality.” Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U. S. 269, 281. See also, Buchalter v. New York, 319 U. S. 427, 431; Stroble v. California, 343 U. S. 181, 198. Justice Holmes, speaking for a unanimous Court in Holt v. United States, 218 U. S. 245, 251, cautioned that “If the mere opportunity for prejudice or corruption is to raise a presumption that they exist, it will be hard to maintain jury trial under the conditions of the present day.”
We have examined petitioner’s allegations, the testimony and documentary evidence in support thereof, and his arguments. We conclude that the most that has been shown is that, in certain respects, opportunity for prejudice existed. From this we are asked to infer that petitioner was prejudiced. The law recognizes that prejudice may infect any trial and provides protection against it. For example, provision is made for the voir dire examination and for challenges of jurors who indicate that they may be prejudiced. In addition, a substantial number of peremptory challenges is allowed. This gives to each party a large discretion to exclude jurors deemed objectionable for any reason or no reason. Another protection is available through the severance of the trials of the defendants and through continuances of the respective trials. Still another means of protection is that of a change of venue for proper cause.
In the instant case, notwithstanding the fact that competent counsel for petitioner did not use all of his peremptory challenges after a searching examination of prospective jurors on voir dire, and did not seek a continuance of the trial or a change of venue, petitioner asks this Court, in effect, to infer that the news coverage of the robbery and proceedings prior to petitioner’s trial, including the Foster-Zeitz trial, created such an atmosphere of prejudice and hysteria that it was impossible to draw a fair and impartial jury from the community or to hold a fair trial. The failure of petitioner’s counsel to exhaust the means provided to prevent the drawing of an unfair trial jury from a community allegedly infected with hysteria and prejudice against petitioner, while not dis-positive, is significant. Here, the issue was not raised until almost three years after the trial, yet we are asked to read the news reports and the testimony as to other incidents and to find, contrary to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania and two federal courts, that these reports and incidents did create such an atmosphere that it infected the jurors and deprived petitioner of a fair trial on the evidence presented to them. We see no justification in the record to warrant our so finding.
On the other hand, the Federal District Court, familiar with the local conditions, has found, on the evidence before it, that petitioner’s trial was conducted in a calm judicial manner, without any disturbances, and that the news coverage was “factual, with an occasional descriptive word or phrase, and, on occasion, words of compassion or commendation.” 130 F. Supp., at 286. It has found that counsel for petitioner conducted a thorough voir dire examination. In all, 49 persons were challenged for cause or excused — 14 for fixed opinion or bias. Petitioner used 10 of the 20 peremptory challenges allowed him, the Commonwealth only eight. The record shows that counsel for petitioner was informed almost three months before petitioner’s trial that petitioner would be tried immediately after Foster and Zeitz, but he made no motion for a continuance or for a change of venue. Of the prospective jurors called for service at petitioner’s trial, only one was found to have attended the Foster-Zeitz trial and that person was challenged for cause. There is nothing in the record to show, as a “demonstrable reality,” that petitioner was denied due process of law because of community hysteria and prejudice. The District Court’s findings, sustained by the Court of Appeals and supported by the record, dispose of this aspect of the case.
Nor do we conclude that petitioner was prevented from obtaining a fair jury trial by reason of Judge Boyer’s commendatory remarks to the Foster-Zeitz trial jury, reported in the local press two days before petitioner’s trial. At most, petitioner has shown that this created a possible opportunity for prejudice. There is no merit in petitioner’s claim that he was “forced” to trial immediately after the Foster-Zeitz trial or in his claim that the trial judge should have, sua sponte, changed the venue or continued the trial. See 130 F. Supp., at 292-295.
Petitioner’s remaining claim rests largely upon facts which the District Court has found against him. Petitioner alleges that, during the charge to the jury, Judge Boyer passed a note to the District Attorney, who immediately interposed an objection to Judge Keller’s charge, and the latter allegedly corrected himself. Petitioner argues that the testimony of the District Attorney and his assistant that they had no recollection of such an incident is insufficient to offset the direct testimony of petitioner’s witnesses that the incident did occur, that Judge Boyer did sit at the table reserved for the press, and that the District Attorney and his assistant sat immediately in front of Judge Boyer. The issue thus raised is largely one of credibility to be determined by the trier of the facts. Hawk v. Olson, 326 U. S. 271, 279. The District Court’s positive findings on this aspect of the case (at 458-460, supra) find support in the record. We are not justified in upsetting them.
We also are asked to find that the presence of Judge Boyer on the bench at the beginning of each session of the court, his remaining on the bench after the miscellaneous business was disposed of, and his presence thereafter in the courtroom created such a prejudicial effect upon the jury that it became impossible for it to return a fair verdict and penalty. Except for the one incident where Judge Boyer participated in a sidebar conference out of the hearing of the jury, the District Court found that he did not participate in petitioner’s trial. Petitioner’s counsel objected to Judge Boyer’s participation in the sidebar conference and he left the bench shortly thereafter.
Petitioner makes much of the fact that the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals states that Judge Boyer’s conduct showed a “striking manifestation of extraordinary interest in the proceedings,” and that the jury knew who he was and it was “very probable” they knew that he had just completed the Foster-Zeitz trial. 224 F. 2d, at 508. We agree with the Court of Appeals that petitioner attaches too much significance to Judge Boyer’s conduct. Judge Boyer’s presence on the bench, particularly in the light of the long-established practice for both judges to sit on the bench at the beginning of each session to dispose of miscellaneous business, did not amount to a denial of due process. Nor did his subsequent presence on the bench or in the courtroom make out a denial of due process. Under the cases cited earlier, petitioner must show that he was prejudiced in some way by the judge’s presence. Aside from the sidebar conference and the contested note-passing incident, petitioner relies upon Judge Boyer’s statement to the Foster-Zeitz jury and his subsequent remarks made on June 11, in another case, in sentencing another Philadelphia youth, to show that Judge Boyer was “hostile” to petitioner and that the jury recognized such hostility. But the remarks on June 11 could not have prejudiced petitioner’s jury since that jury had no access to any source of news that reported the incident. Petitioner, thus, is left with Judge Boyer’s commendatory remark to the Foster-Zeitz trial jury. This, read in its proper context and examined in the light of Judge Keller’s remarks made to the remainder of the jury panel, does not raise a substantial due process question. Petitioner seeks to have this Court speculate that the jurors knew that Judge Boyer had made this statement and that they were prejudiced by it or by Judge Boyer’s presence. We can no more speculate on this aspect of the case than on the others. Petitioner’s counsel must have been aware of Judge Boyer’s statement and of its possible effect, if any, on the jury, and the possible effect of Judge Boyer’s manifestation of interest. However, he took no action to prevent this possibility from infecting petitioner’s trial. Accordingly, we may as well speculate that he did not deem it necessary to take any such action because the possibility of prejudice was too remote to justify it. It is not necessary for this Court to enter into such speculations. Petitioner has not sustained the burden resting upon him to show that his trial was essentially unfair in a constitutional sense and that the several courts which have reviewed it are all in error. The judgment of the Court of Appeals, therefore, is
Affirmed.
This statement of facts and review of the relevant procedural steps in the case are taken largely from the opinion rendered in the instant case by the two judges constituting the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. 130 F. Supp. 270. They conducted a full hearing on the petition for habeas corpus. It lasted eight days. More than 30 witnesses testified and much documentary evidence was introduced.
130 F. Supp., at 283-285, n. 39-42.
130 F. Supp., at 285-289, n. 43-47.
Purdon’s Pa. Stat. Ann., 1945, Tit. 18, §4701.
Motion for new trial, denied; appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, conviction affirmed, 362 Pa. 259, 66 A. 2d 663; petition for habeas corpus to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, denied, without opinion; petition for certiorari to review those judgments, denied, 338 U. S. 862; applications to the Pennsylvania Board of Pardons for commutation of sentence, denied; second petition for habeas corpus to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court filed April 2, 1951, raising for the first time the constitutional questions now before us; on the same day, a similar petition for habeas corpus filed in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania; second petition for habeas corpus to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, denied, 367 Pa. 130, 79 A. 2d 785 (after passing on the merits of the petition); petition to the United States District Court, dismissed, 97 F. Supp. 930; petition for certiorari to review the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s denial of the writ of habeas corpus, denied, 342 U. S. 837; appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit from the District Court’s dismissal of the petition for habeas corpus, heard en banc, reversed by a divided court and remanded for hearing, 203 F. 2d 407; after rehearing denied by the Third Circuit, the State sought certiorari in this Court, denied, 346 U. S. 865; after hearing before Chief Judge Watson and District Judge Murphy, of the District Court, petition for habeas corpus denied, 130 F. Supp. 270; on appeal to the Third Circuit, heard en banc, the District Court’s judgment was affirmed, 4-3, 224 F. 2d 504. Throughout these proceedings, petitioner has been represented by competent counsel.
See Stroble v. California, 343 U. S. 181, 193-194.
Counsel for Capone sought and was granted a continuance on May 17, 1948, one week prior to the Foster-Zeitz trial.
The ruling made following this incident was in favor of petitioner, since the statements of prior offenses then before the court were admitted for a purpose more limited than the Pennsylvania Supreme Court approved on appeal. See Pennsylvania v. Darcy, 362 Pa. 259, 283, 66 A. 2d 663, 675.
The ground for this objection was that Judge Boyer had “disqualified himself from sitting in on this case, and it is prejudicial to the defendant [petitioner].” See 130 F. Supp., at 296, n. 54.
See cases cited at 462, supra.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | A | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Murphy
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case is here for the second time. In S. E. C. v. Chenery Corp., 318 U. S. 80, we held that an order of the Securities and Exchange Commission could not be sustained on the grounds upon which that agency acted. We therefore directed that the case be remanded to the Commission for such further proceedings as might be appropriate. On remand, the Commission reexamined the problem, recast its rationale and reached the same result. The issue now is whether the Commission’s action is proper in light of the principles established in our prior decision.
When the case was first here, we emphasized a simple but fundamental rule of administrative law. That rule is to the effect that a reviewing court, in dealing with a determination or judgment which an administrative agency alone is authorized to make, must judge the propriety of such action solely by the grounds invoked by the agency. If those grounds are inadequate or improper, the court is powerless to affirm the administrative action by substituting what it considers to be a more adequate or proper basis. To do so would propel the court into the domain which Congress has set aside exclusively for the administrative agency.
We also emphasized in our prior decision an important corollary of the foregoing rule. If the administrative action is to be tested by the basis upon which it purports to rest, that basis must be set forth with such clarity as to be understandable. It will not do for a court to be compelled to guess at the theory underlying the agency’s action; nor can a court be expected' to chisel that which must be precise from what the agency has left vague and indecisive. In other words, “We must know what a decision means before the duty becomes ours to say whether it is right or wrong.” United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P.R. Co., 294 U.S. 499, 511.
Applying this rule and its corollary, the Court was unable to sustain the Commission’s original action. The Commission had been dealing with the reorganization of the Federal Water Service Corporation (Federal), a holding company registered under the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 803. During the period when successive reorganization plans proposed by the management were before the Commission, the officers, directors and controlling stockholders of Federal purchased a substantial amount of Federal’s preferred stock on the over-the-counter market. Under the fourth reorganization plan, this preferred stock was to be converted into common stock of a new corporation; on the basis of the purchases of preferred stock, the management would have received more than 10% of this new common stock. It was frankly admitted that the management’s purpose in buying the preferred stock was to protect its interest in the new company. It was also plain that there was no fraud or lack of disclosure in making these purchases.
But the Commission would not approve the fourth plan so long as the preferred stock purchased by the management was to be treated on a parity with the other preferred stock. It felt that the officers and directors of a holding company in process of reorganization under the Act were fiduciaries and were under a duty not to trade in the securities of that company during the reorganization period. 8 S. E. C. 893, 915-921. And so the plan was amended to provide that the preferred stock acquired by the management, unlike that held by others, was not to be converted into the new common stock; instead, it was to be surrendered at cost plus dividends accumulated since the purchase dates. As amended, the plan was approved by the Commission over the management’s objections. 10 S. E. C. 200.
The Court interpreted the Commission’s order approving this amended plan as grounded solely upon judicial authority. The Commission appeared to have treated the preferred stock acquired by the management in accordance with what it thought were standards theretofore recognized by courts. If it intended to create new standards growing out of its experience in effectuating the legislative policy, it failed to express itself with sufficient clarity and precision to be so understood. Hence the order was judged by the only standards clearly invoked by the Commission. On that basis, the order could not stand. The opinion pointed out that courts do not impose upon officers and directors of a corporation any fiduciary duty to its stockholders which precludes them, merely because they are officers and directors, from buying and selling the corporation’s stock. Nor was it felt that the cases upon which the Commission relied established any principles of law or equity which in themselves would be sufficient to justify this order.
The opinion further noted that neither Congress nor the Commission had promulgated any general rule proscribing such action as the purchase of preferred stock by Federal’s management. And the only judge-made rule of equity which might have justified the Commission’s order related to fraud or mismanagement of the reorganization by the officers and directors, matters which were admittedly absent in this situation.
After the case was remanded to the Commission, Federal Water and Gas Corp. (Federal Water), the surviving corporation under the reorganization plan, made an application for approval of an amendment to the plan to provide for the issuance of new common stock of the reorganized company. This stock was to be distributed to the members of Federal’s management on the basis of the shares of the old preferred stock which they had acquired during the period of reorganization, thereby placing them in the same position as the public holders of the old preferred stock. The intervening members of Federal’s management joined in this request. The Commission denied the application in an order issued on February 8,1945. Holding Company Act Release No. 5584. That order was reversed by the Court of Appeals, 80 U. S. App. D. C. 365, 154 F. 2d 6, which felt that our prior decision precluded such action by the Commission.
The latest order of the Commission definitely avoids the fatal error of relying on judicial precedents which do not sustain it. This time, after a thorough reexamination of the problem in light of the purposes and standards of the Holding Company Act, the Commission has concluded that the proposed transaction is inconsistent with the standards of §§ 7 and 11 of the Act. It has drawn heavily upon its accumulated experience in dealing with utility reorganizations. And it has expressed its reasons with a clarity and thoroughness that admit of no doubt as to the underlying basis of its order.
The argument is pressed upon us, however, that the Commission was foreclosed from taking such a step following our prior decision. It is said that, in the absence of findings of conscious wrongdoing on the part of Federal’s management, the Commission could not determine by an order in this particular case that it was inconsistent with the statutory standards to permit Federal’s management to realize a profit through the reorganization purchases. All that it could do was to enter an order allowing an amendment to the plan so that the proposed transaction could be consummated. Under this view, the Commission would be free only to promulgate a general rule outlawing such profits in future utility reorganizations; but such a rule would have to be prospective in nature and have no retroactive effect upon the instant situation.
We reject this contention, for it grows out of a misapprehension of our prior decision and of the Commission’s statutory duties. We held no more and no less than that the Commission’s first order was unsupportable for the reasons supplied by that agency. But when the case left this Court, the problem whether Federal’s management should be treated equally with other preferred stockholders still lacked a final and complete answer. It was clear that the Commission could not give a negative answer by resort to prior judicial declarations. And it was also clear that the Commission was not bound by settled judicial precedents in a situation of this nature. 318 U. S. at 89. Still unsettled, however, was the answer the Commission might give were it to bring to bear on the facts the proper administrative and statutory considerations, a function which belongs exclusively to the Commission in the first instance. The administrative process had taken an erroneous rather than a final turn. Hence we carefully refrained from expressing any views as to the propriety of an order rooted in the proper and relevant considerations. See Siegel Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 327 U. S. 608, 613-614.
When the case was directed to be remanded to the Commission for such further proceedings as might be appropriate, it was with the thought that the Commission would give full effect to its duties in harmony with the views we had expressed. Ford Motor Co. v. Labor Board, 305 U. S. 364, 374; Federal Radio Commission v. Nelson Bros. Co., 289 U. S. 266, 278. This obviously meant something more than the entry of a perfunctory order giving parity treatment to the management holdings of preferred stock. The fact that the Commission had committed a legal error in its first disposition of the case certainly gave Federal’s management no vested right to receive the benefits of such an order. See Federal Communications Commission v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U. S. 134, 145. After the remand was made, therefore, the Commission was bound to deal with the problem afresh, performing the function delegated to it by Congress. It was again charged with the duty of measuring the proposed treatment of the management’s preferred stock holdings by relevant and proper standards. Only in that way could the legislative policies embodied in the Act be effectuated. Cf. Labor Board v. Donnelly Co., 330 U. S. 219, 227-228.
The absence of a general rule or regulation governing management trading during reorganization did not affect the Commission’s duties in relation to the particular proposal before it. The Commission was asked to grant or deny effectiveness to a proposed amendment to Federal’s reorganization plan whereby the management would be accorded parity treatment on its holdings. It could do that only in the form of an order, entered after a due consideration of the particular facts in light of the relevant and proper standards. That was true regardless of whether those standards previously had been spelled out in a general rule or regulation. Indeed, if the Commission rightly felt that the proposed amendment was inconsistent with those standards, an order giving effect to the amendment merely because there was no general rule or regulation covering the matter would be unjustified.
It is true that our prior decision explicitly recognized the possibility that the Commission might have promulgated a general rule dealing with this problem under its statutory rule-making powers, in which case the issue for our consideration would have been entirely different from that which did confront us. 318 U. S. 92-93. But we did not mean to imply thereby that the failure of the Commission to anticipate this problem and to promulgate a general rule withdrew all power from that agency to perform its statutory duty in this case. To hold that the Commission had no alternative in this proceeding but to approve the proposed transaction, while formulating any general rules it might desire for use in future cases of this nature, would be to stultify the administrative process. That we refuse to do.
Since the Commission, unlike a court, does have the ability to make new law prospectively through the exercise of its rule-making powers, it has less reason to rely upon ad hoc adjudication to formulate new standards of conduct within the framework of the Holding Company Act. The function of filling in the interstices of the Act should be performed, as much as possible, through this quasi-legislative promulgation of rules to be applied in the future. But any rigid requirement to that effect would make the administrative process inflexible and incapable of dealing with many of the specialized problems which arise. See Report of the Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative Procedure in Government Agencies, S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 29. Not every principle essential to the effective administration of a statute can or should be cast immediately into the mold of a general rule. Some principles must await their own development, while others must be adjusted to meet particular, unforeseeable situations. In performing its important functions in these respects, therefore, an administrative agency must be equipped to act either by general rule or by individual order. To insist upon one form of action to the exclusion of the other is to exalt form over necessity.
In other words, problems may arise in a case which the administrative agency could not reasonably foresee, problems which must be solved despite the absence of a relevant general rule. Or the agency may not have had sufficient experience with a particular problem to warrant rigidifying its tentative judgment into a hard and fast rule. Or the problem may be so specialized and varying in nature as to be impossible of capture within the boundaries of a general rule. In those situations, the agency must retain power to deal with the problems on a case-to-case basis if the administrative process is to be effective. There is thus a very definite place for the case-by-case evolution of statutory standards. And the choice made between proceeding by general rule or by individual, ad hoc litigation is one that lies primarily in the informed discretion of the administrative agency. See Columbia Broadcasting System v. United States, 316 U. S. 407, 421.
Hence we refuse to say that the Commission, which had not previously been confronted with the problem of management trading during reorganization, was forbidden from utilizing this particular proceeding for announcing and applying a new standard of conduct. Cf. Federal Trade Commission v. Keppel & Bro., 291 U. S. 304. That such action might have a retroactive effect was not necessarily fatal to its validity. Every case of first impression has a retroactive effect, whether the new principle is announced by a court or by an administrative agency. But such retroactivity must be balanced against the mischief of producing a result which is contrary to a statutory design or to legal and equitable" principles. If that mischief is greater than the ill effect of the retroactive application of a new standard, it is not the type of retroactivity which is condemned by law. See Addison v. Holly Hill Co., 322 U. S. 607, 620.
And so in this case, the fact that the Commission’s order might retroactively prevent Federal’s management from securing the profits and control which were the objects of the preferred stock purchases may well be outweighed by the dangers inherent in such purchases from the statutory standpoint. If that is true, the argument of retroactivity becomes nothing more than a claim that the Commission lacks power to enforce the standards of the Act in this proceeding. Such a claim deserves rejection.
The problem in this case thus resolves itself into a determination of whether the Commission’s action in denying effectiveness to the proposed amendment to the Federal reorganization plan can be justified on the basis upon which it clearly rests. As we have noted, the Commission avoided placing its sole reliance on inapplicable judicial precedents. Rather it has derived its conclusions from the particular facts in the case, its general experience in reorganization matters and its informed view of statutory requirements. It is those matters which are the guide for our review.
The Commission concluded that it could not find that the reorganization plan, if amended as proposed, would be “fair and equitable to the persons affected thereby” within the meaning of § 11 (e) of the Act, under which the reorganization was taking place. Its view was that the amended plan would involve the issuance of securities on terms “detrimental to the public interest or the interest of investors” contrary to §§ 7 (d) (6) and 7 (e), and would result in an “unfair or inequitable distribution of voting power” among the Federal security holders within the meaning of § 7 (e). It was led to this result “not by proof that the interveners [Federal’s management] committed acts of conscious wrongdoing but by the character of the conflicting interests created by the interveners’ program of stock purchases carried out while plans for reorganization were under consideration.”
The Commission noted that Federal’s management controlled a large multi-state utility system and that its influence permeated down to the lowest tier of operating companies. The financial, operational and accounting policies of the parent and its subsidiaries were therefore under the management’s strict control. The broad range of business judgments vested in Federal’s management multiplied opportunities for affecting the market price of Federal’s outstanding securities and made the exercise of judgment on any matter a subject of greatest significance to investors. Added to these normal managerial powers, the Commission pointed out that a holding company management obtains special powers in the course of a voluntary reorganization under § 11 (e) of the Holding Company Act. The management represents the stockholders in such a reorganization, initiates the proceeding, draws up and files the plan, and can file amendments thereto at any time. These additional powers may introduce conflicts between the management’s normal interests and its responsibilities to the various classes of stockholders which it represents in the reorganization. Moreover, because of its representative status, the management has special opportunities to obtain advance information of the attitude of the Commission.
Drawing upon its experience,-the Commission indicated that all these normal and special powers of the holding company management during the course of a § 11 (e) reorganization placed in the management’s command “a formidable battery of devices that would enable it, if it should choose to use them selfishly, to affect in material degree the ultimate allocation of new securities among the various existing classes, to influence the market for its own gain, and to manipulate or obstruct the reorganization required by the mandate of the statute.” In that setting, the Commission felt that a management program of stock purchase would give rise to the temptation and the opportunity to shape the reorganization proceeding so as to encourage public selling on the market at low prices. No management could engage in such a program without raising serious questions as to whether its personal interests had not opposed its duties “to exercise disinterested judgment in matters pertaining to subsidiaries’ accounting, budgetary and dividend policies, to present publicly an unprejudiced financial picture of the enterprise, and to effectuate a fair and feasible plan expeditiously.”
The Commission further felt that its answer should be the same even where proof of intentional wrongdoing on the management’s part is lacking. Assuming a conflict of interests, the Commission thought that the absence of actual misconduct is immaterial; injury to the public investors and to the corporation may result just as readily. “Questionable transactions may be explained away, and an abuse of investors and the administrative process may be perpetrated without evil intent, yet the injury will remain.” Moreover, the Commission was of the view that the delays and the difficulties involved in probing the mental processes and personal integrity of corporate officials do not warrant any distinction on the basis of evil intent, the plain fact being “that an absence of unfairness or detriment in cases of this sort would be practically impossible to establish by proof.”
Turning to the facts in this case, the Commission noted the salient fact that the primary object of Federal’s management in buying the preferred stock was admittedly to obtain the voting power that was accruing to that stock through the reorganization and to profit from the investment therein. That stock had been purchased in the market at prices that were depressed in relation to what the management anticipated would be, and what in fact was, the earning and asset value of its reorganization equivalent. The Commission admitted that the good faith and personal integrity of this management were not in question; but as to the management’s justification of its motives, the Commission concluded that it was merely trying to “deny that they made selfish use of their powers during the period when their conflict of interest, vis-a-vis public investors, was in existence owing to their purchase program.” Federal’s management had thus placed itself in a position where it was “peculiarly susceptible to temptation to conduct the reorganization for personal gain rather than the public good” and where its desire to make advantageous purchases of stock could have an important influence, even though subconsciously, upon many of the decisions to be made in the course of the reorganization. Accordingly, the Commission felt that all of its general considerations of the problem were applicable to this case.
The scope of our review of an administrative order wherein a new principle is announced and applied is no different from that which pertains to ordinary administrative action. The wisdom of the principle adopted is none of our concern. See Board of Trade v. United States, 314 U. S. 534, 548. Our duty is at an end when it becomes evident that the Commission’s action is based upon substantial evidence and is consistent with the authority granted by Congress. See National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U. S. 190, 224.
We are unable to say in this case that the Commission erred in reaching the result it did. The facts being undisputed, we are free to disturb the Commission’s conclusion only if it lacks any rational and statutory foundation. In that connection, the Commission has made a thorough examination of the problem, utilizing statutory standards and its own accumulated experience with reorganization matters. In essence, it has made what we indicated in our prior opinion would be an informed, expert judgment on the problem. It has taken into account “those more subtle factors in the marketing of utility company securities that gave rise to the very grave evils which the Public Utility Holding [Company] Act of 1935 was designed to correct” and has relied upon the fact that “Abuse of corporate position, influence, and access to information may raise questions so subtle that the law can deal with them effectively only by pfóhibitions not concerned with the fairness of a particular transaction.” 318 U. S. at 92.
Such factors may properly be considered by the Commission in determining whether to approve a plan of reorganization of a utility holding company, or an amendment to such a plan. The “fair and equitable” rule of § 11 (e) and the standard of what is “detrimental to the public interest or the interest of investors or consumers” under § 7 (d) (6) and § 7 (e) were inserted by the framers of the Act in order that the Commission might have broad powers to protect the various interests at stake. 318 U. S. at 90-91. The application of those criteria, whether in the form of a particular order or a general regulation, necessarily requires the use of informed discretion by the Commission. The very breadth of the statutory language precludes a reversal of the Commission’s judgment save where it has plainly abused its discretion in these matters. See United States v. Lowden, 308 U. S. 225; I. C. C. v. Railway Labor Assn., 315 U. S. 373. Such an abuse is not present in this case.
The purchase by a holding company management of that company’s securities during the course of a reorganization may well be thought to be so fraught with danger as to warrant a denial of the benefits and profits accruing to the management. The possibility that such a stock purchase program will result in detriment to the public investors is not a fanciful one. The influence that program may have upon the important decisions to be made by the management during reorganization is not inconsequential. Since the officers and directors occupy fiduciary positions during this period, their actions are to be held to a higher standard than that imposed upon the general investing public. There is thus a reasonable basis for a judgment that the benefits and profits accruing to the management from the stock purchases should be prohibited, regardless of the good faith involved. And it is a judgment that can justifiably be reached in terms of fairness and equitableness, to the end that the interests of the public, the investors and the consumers might be protected. But it is a judgment based upon public policy, a judgment which Congress has indicated is of the type for the Commission to make.
The Commission’s conclusion here rests squarely in that area where administrative judgments are entitled to the greatest amount of weight by appellate courts. It is the product of administrative experience, appreciation of the complexities of the problem, realization of the statutory policies, and responsible treatment of the uncontested facts. It is the type of judgment which administrative agencies are best equipped to make and which justifies the use of the administrative process. See Republic Aviation Corp. v. Labor Board, 324 U. S. 793, 800. Whether we agree or disagree with the result reached, it is an allowable judgment which we cannot disturb.
Reversed.
Mr. Justice Burton concurs in the result.
The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Douglas took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter and Mr. Justice Jackson dissent, but there is not now opportunity for a response adequate to the issues raised by the Court’s opinion. These concern the rule of law in its application to the administrative process and the function of this Court in reviewing administrative action. Accordingly, the detailed grounds for dissent will be filed in due course.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | H | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Blackmun
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case requires us once again to consider the so-called “automobile exception” to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment and its application to the search of a closed container in the trunk of a car.
I
On October 28, 1987, Officer Coleman of the Santa Ana, Cal., Police Department received a telephone call from a federal drug enforcement agent in Hawaii. The agent informed Coleman that he had seized a package containing marijuana which was to have been delivered to the Federal Express Office in Santa Ana and which was addressed to J. R. Daza at 805 West Stevens Avenue in that city. The agent arranged to send the package to Coleman instead. Coleman then was to take the package to the Federal Express office and arrest the person who arrived to claim it.
Coleman received the package on October 29, verified its contents, and took it to the Senior Operations Manager at the Federal Express office. At about 10:30 a.m. on October 30, a man, who identified himself as Jamie Daza, arrived to claim the package. He accepted it and drove to his apartment on West Stevens. He carried the package into the apartment.
At 11:45 a.m., officers observed Daza leave the apartment and drop the box and paper that had contained the marijuana into a trash bin. Coleman at that point left the scene to get a search warrant. About 12:05 p.m., the officers saw Richard St. George leave the apartment carrying a blue knapsack which appeared to be half full. The officers stopped him as he was driving off, searched the knapsack, and found 114 pounds of marijuana.
At 12:30 p.m., respondent Charles Steven Acevedo arrived. He entered Daza’s apartment, stayed for about 10 minutes, and reappeared carrying a brown paper bag that looked full. The officers noticed that the bag was the size of one of the wrapped marijuana packages sent from Hawaii. Acevedo walked to a silver Honda in the parking lot. He placed the bag in the trunk of the car and started to drive away. Fearing the loss of evidence, officers in a marked police car stopped him. They opened the trunk and the bag, and found marijuana.
Respondent was charged in state court with possession of marijuana for sale, in violation of Cal. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 11359 (West Supp. 1991). App. 2. He moved to suppress the marijuana found in the car. The motion was denied. He then pleaded guilty but appealed the denial of the suppression motion.
The California Court of Appeal, Fourth District, concluded that the marijuana found in the paper bag in the car’s trunk should have been suppressed. 216 Cal. App. 3d 586, 265 Cal. Rptr. 23 (1990). The court concluded that the officers had probable cause to believe that the paper bag contained drugs but lacked probable cause to suspect that Acevedo’s car, itself, otherwise contained contraband. Because the officers’ probable cause was directed specifically at the bag, the court held that the case was controlled by United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1 (1977), rather than by United States v. Ross, 456 U. S. 798 (1982). Although the court agreed that the officers could seize the paper bag, it held that, under Chadwick, they could not open the bag without first obtaining a warrant for that purpose. The court then recognized “the anomalous nature” of the dichotomy between the rule in Chadwick and the rule in Ross. 216 Cal. App. 3d, at 592, 265 Cal. Rptr., at 27. That dichotomy dictates that if there is probable cause to search a car, then the entire car—including any closed container found therein—may be searched without a warrant, but if there is probable cause only as to a container in the car, the container may be held but not searched until a warrant is obtained.
The Supreme Court of California denied the State’s petition for review. App. E to Pet. for Cert. 33. On May 14, 1990, Justice O’Connor stayed enforcement of the Court of Appeal’s judgment pending the disposition of the State’s petition for certiorari, and, if that petition were granted, the issuance of the mandate of this Court.
We granted certiorari, 498 U. S. 807 (1990), to reexamine the law applicable to a closed container in an automobile, a subject that has troubled courts and law enforcement officers since it was first considered in Chadwick.
h-i 1 — 1
The Fourth Amendment protects the “right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” Contemporaneously with the adoption of the Fourth Amendment, the First Congress, and, later, the Second and Fourth Congresses, distinguished between the need for a warrant to search for contraband concealed in “a dwelling house or similar place” and the need for a warrant to search for contraband concealed in a movable vessel. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 151 (1925). See also Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 623-624 (1886). In Carroll, this Court established an exception to the warrant requirement for moving vehicles, for it recognized
“a necessary difference between a search of a store, dwelling house or other structure in respect of which a proper official warrant readily may be obtained, and a search of a ship, motor boat, wagon or automobile, for contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.” 267 U. S., at 153.
It therefore held that a warrantless search of an automobile, based upon probable cause to believe that the vehicle contained evidence of crime in the light of an exigency arising out of the likely disappearance of the vehicle, did not contravene the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment. See id., at 158-159.
The Court refined the exigency requirement in Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42 (1970), when it held that the existence of exigent circumstances was to be determined at the time the automobile is seized. The car search at issue in Chambers took place at the police station, where the vehicle was immobilized, some time after the driver had been arrested. Given probable cause and exigent circumstances at the time the vehicle was first stopped, the Court held that the later warrantless search at the station passed constitutional muster. The validity of the later search derived from the ruling in Carroll that an immediate search without a warrant at the moment of seizure would have been permissible. See Chambers, 399 U. S., at 51. The Court reasoned in Chambers that the police could search later whenever they could have searched earlier, had they so chosen. Id., at 51-52. Following Chambers, if the police have probable cause to justify a warrantless seizure of an automobile on a public roadway, they may conduct either an immediate or a delayed search of the vehicle.
In United States v. Ross, 456 U. S. 798, decided in 1982, we held that a warrantless search of an automobile under the CaiToll doctrine could include a search of a container or package found inside the car when such a search was supported by probable cause. The warrantless search of Ross’ car occurred after an informant told the police that he had seen Ross complete a drug transaction using drugs stored in the trunk of his car. The police stopped the car, searched it, and discovered in the trunk a brown paper bag containing drugs. We decided that the search of Ross’ car was not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment: “The scope of a warrantless search based on probable cause is no narrower — and no broader — than the scope of a search authorized by a warrant supported by probable cause.” Id., at 823. Thus, “[i]f probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search.”' Id., at 825. In Ross, therefore, we clarified the scope of the Carroll doctrine as properly including a “probing search” of compartments and containers within the automobile so long as the search is supported by probable cause. Id., at 800.
In addition to this clarification, Ross distinguished the Carroll doctrine from the separate rule that governed the search of closed containers. See 456 U. S., at 817. The Court had announced this separate rule, unique to luggage and other closed packages, bags, and containers, in United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1 (1977). In Chadwick, federal narcotics agents had probable cause to believe that a 200-pound double-locked footlocker contained marijuana. The agents tracked the locker as the defendants removed it from a train and carried it through the station to a waiting car. As soon as the defendants lifted the locker into the trunk of the car, the agents arrested them, seized the locker, and searched it. In this Court, the United States did not contend that the locker’s brief contact with the automobile’s trunk sufficed to make the Carroll doctrine applicable. Rather, the United States urged that the search of movable luggage could be considered analogous to the search of an automobile. 433 U. S., at 11-12.
The Court rejected this argument because, it reasoned, a person expects more privacy in his luggage and personal effects than he does in his automobile. Id., at 13. Moreover, it concluded that as “may often not be the case when automobiles are seized,” secure storage facilities are usually available when the police seize luggage. Id., at 13, n. 7.
In Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U. S. 753 (1979), the Court extended Chadwick’s, rule to apply to a suitcase actually being transported in the trunk of a car. In Sanders, the police had probable cause to believe a suitcase contained marijuana. They watched as the defendant placed the suitcase in the trunk of a taxi and was driven away. The police pursued the taxi for several blocks, stopped it, found the suitcase in the trunk, and searched it. Although the Court had applied the Carroll doctrine to searches of integral parts of the automobile itself, (indeed, in Carroll, contraband whiskey was in the upholstery of the seats, see 267 U. S., at 136), it did not extend the doctrine to the warrantless search of personal luggage “merely because it was located in an automobile lawfully stopped by the police.” 442 U. S., at 765. Again, the Sanders majority stressed the heightened privacy expectation in personal luggage and concluded that the presence of luggage in an automobile did not diminish the owner’s expectation of privacy in his personal items. Id., at 764-765. Cf. California v. Carney, 471 U. S. 386 (1985).
In Ross, the Court endeavored to distinguish between Carroll, which governed the Ross automobile search, and Chad-tuick, which governed the Sanders automobile search. It held that the Carroll doctrine covered searches of automobiles when the police had probable cause to search an entire vehicle, but that the Chadwick doctrine governed searches of luggage when the officers had probable cause to search only a container within the vehicle. Thus, in a Ross situation, the police could conduct a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment without obtaining a warrant, whereas in a Sanders situation, the police had to obtain a warrant before they searched.
Justice Stevens is correct, of course, that Ross involved the scope of an automobile search. See post, at 592. Ross held that closed containers encountered by the police during a warrantless search of a car pursuant to the automobile exception could also be searched. Thus, this Court in Ross took the critical step of saying that closed containers in cars could be searched without a warrant because of their presence within the automobile. Despite the protection that Sanders purported to extend to closed containers, the privacy interest in those closed containers yielded to the broad scope of an automobile search.
h-i 1 — 1 I — l
The facts m this case closely resemble the facts m Ross. In Ross, the police had probable cause to believe that drugs were stored in the trunk of a particular car. See 456 U. S., at 800. Here, the California Court of Appeal concluded that the police had probable cause to believe that respondent was carrying marijuana in a bag in his car’s trunk. 216 Cal. App. 3d, at 590, 265 Cal. Rptr., at 25. Furthermore, for what it is worth, in Ross, as here, the drugs in the trunk were contained in a brown paper bag.
This Court in Ross rejected Chadwick’s distinction between containers and cars. It concluded that the expectation of privacy in one’s vehicle is equal to one’s expectation of privacy in the container, and noted that “the privacy interests in a car’s trunk or glove compartment may be no less than those in a movable container.” 456 U. S., at 823. It also recognized that it was arguable that the same exigent circumstances that permit a warrantless search of an automobile would justify the warrantless search of a movable container. Id., at 809. In deference to the rule of Chadwick and Sanders, however, the Court put that question to one side. Id., at 809-810. It concluded that the time and expense of the warrant process would be misdirected if the police could search every cubic inch of an automobile until they discovered a paper sack, at which point the Fourth Amendment required them to take the sack to a magistrate for permission to look inside. We now must decide the question deferred in Ross: whether the Fourth Amendment requires the police to obtain a warrant to open the sack in a movable vehicle simply because they lack probable cause to search the entire car. We conclude that it does not.
IV
Dissenters in Ross asked why the suitcase in Sanders was “more private, less difficult for police to seize and store, or in any other relevant respect more properly subject to the warrant requirement, than a container that police discover iñ a probable-cause search of an entire automobile?” Id., at 839-840. We now agree that a container found after a general search of the automobile and a container found in a car after a limited search for the container are equally easy for the police to store and for the suspect to hide or destroy. In fact, we see no principled distinction in terms of either the privacy expectation or the exigent circumstances between the paper bag found by the police in Ross and the paper bag found by the police here. Furthermore, by attempting to distinguish between a container for which the police are specifically searching and a container which they come across in a car, we have provided only minimal protection for privacy and have impeded effective law enforcement.
The line between probable cause to search a vehicle and probable cause to search a package in that vehicle is not always clear, and separate rules that govern the two objects to be searched may enable the police to broaden their power to make warrantless searches and disserve privacy interests. We noted this in Ross in the context of a search of an entire vehicle. Recognizing that under Carroll, the “entire vehicle itself . . . could be searched without a warrant,” we concluded that “prohibiting police from opening immediately a container in which the object of the search is most likely to be found and instead forcing them first to comb the entire vehicle would actually exacerbate the intrusion on privacy interests.” 456 U. S., at 821, n. 28. At the moment when officers stop an automobile, it may be less than clear whether they suspect with a high degree of certainty that the vehicle contains drugs in a bag or simply contains drugs. If the police know that they may open a bag only if they are actually searching the entire car, they may search more extensively than they otherwise would in order to establish the general probable cause required by Ross.
Such a situation is not farfetched. In United States v. Johns, 469 U. S. 478 (1985), Customs agents saw two trucks drive to a private airstrip and approach two small planes. The agents drew near the trucks, smelled marijuana, and then saw in the backs of the trucks packages wrapped in a manner that marijuana smugglers customarily employed. The agents took the trucks to headquarters and searched the packages without a warrant. Id., at 481. Relying on Chadwick, the defendants argued that the search was unlawful. Id., at 482. The defendants contended that Ross was inapplicable because the agents lacked probable cause to search anything but the packages themselves and supported this contention by noting that a search of the entire vehicle never occurred. Id., at 483. We rejected that argument and found Chadwick and Sanders inapposite because the agents had probable cause to search the entire body of each truck, although they had chosen not to do so. Id., at 482-483. We cannot see the benefit of a rule that requires law enforcement officers to conduct a more intrusive search in order to justify a less intrusive one.
To the extent that the Chadwick-Sanders rule protects privacy, its protection is minimal. Law enforcement officers may seize a container and hold it until they obtain a search warrant. Chadwick, 433 U. S., at 13. “Since the police, by hypothesis, have probable cause to seize the property, we can assume that a warrant will be routinely forthcoming in the overwhelming majority of cases. ” Sanders, 442 U. S., at 770 (dissenting opinion). And the police often will be able to search containers without a warrant, despite the Chadwick-Sanders rule, as a search incident to a lawful arrest. In New York v. Belton, 453 U. S. 454 (1981), the Court said:
“[W]e hold that when a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile.
“It follows from this conclusion that the police may also examine the contents of any containers found within the passenger compartment.” Id., at 460 (footnote omitted).
Under Belton, the same probable cause to believe that a container holds drugs will allow the police to arrest the person transporting the container and search it.
Finally, the search of a paper bag intrudes far less on individual privacy than does the incursion sanctioned long ago in Carroll. In that case, prohibition agents slashed the upholstery of the automobile. This Court nonetheless found their search to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. If destroying the interior of an automobile is not unreasonable, we cannot conclude that looking inside a closed container is. In light of the minimal protection to privacy afforded by the Chadwick-Sanders rule, and our serious doubt whether that rule substantially serves privacy interests, we now hold that the Fourth Amendment does not compel separate treatment for an automobile search that extends only to a container within the vehicle.
V
The Chadwick-Sanders rule not only has failed to protect privacy but also has confused courts and police officers and impeded effective law enforcement. The conflict between the Carroll doctrine cases and the Chadwick-Sanders line has been criticized in academic commentary. See, e. g., Gardner, Searches and Seizures of Automobiles and Their Contents: Fourth Amendment Considerations in a Post-Ross World, 62 Neb. L. Rev. 1 (1983); Latzer, Searching Cars and Their Contents: United States v. Ross, 18 Crim. L. Bull. 381 (1982); Kamisar, The “Automobile Search” Cases: The Court Does Little to Clarify the “Labyrinth” of Judicial Uncertainty, in 3 The Supreme Court: Trends and Developments 1980-1981, p. 69 (D. Opperman ed. 1982). One leading authority on the Fourth Amendment, after comparing Chadwick and Sanders with Carroll and its progeny, observed: “These two lines of authority cannot be completely reconciled, and thus how one comes out in the container-in-the-car situation depends upon which line of authority is used as a point of departure.” 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure 63 (2d ed. 1987).
The discrepancy between the two rules has led to confusion for law enforcement officers. For example, when an officer, who has developed probable cause to believe that a vehicle contains drugs, begins to search the vehicle and immediately discovers a closed container, which rule applies? The defendant will argue that the fact that the officer first chose to search the container indicates that his probable cause extended only to the container and that Chadtvick and Sanders therefore require a warrant. On the other hand, the fact that the officer first chose to search in the most obvious location should not restrict the propriety of the search. The Chadwick rule, as applied in Sanders, has devolved into an anomaly such that the more likely the police are to discover drugs in a container, the less authority they have to search it. We have noted the virtue of providing “‘“clear and unequivocal” guidelines to the law enforcement profession.’” Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U. S. 146, 151 (1990), quoting Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U. S. 676, 682 (1988). The Chadwick-Sanders rule is the antithesis of a “ ‘clear and unequivocal’ guideline.”
Justice Stevens argues that the decisions of this Court evince a lack of confusion about the automobile exception. See post, at 594. The first case cited by the dissent, United States v. Place, 462 U. S. 696 (1983), however, did not involve an automobile at all. We considered in Place the temporary detention of luggage in an airport. Not only was no automobile involved, but the defendant, Place, was waiting at the airport to board his plane rather than preparing to leave the airport in a car. Any similarity to Sanders, in which the defendant was leaving the airport in a car, is remote at best. Place had nothing to do with the automobile exception and is inapposite.
Nor does Justice Stevens’ citation of Oklahoma v. Castleberry, 471 U. S. 146 (1985), support his contention. Cas-tleberry presented the same question about the application of the automobile exception to the search of a closed container that we face here. In Castleberry, we affirmed by an equally divided court. That result illustrates this Court’s continued struggle with the scope of the automobile exception rather than the absence of confusion in applying it.
Justice Stevens also argues that law enforcement has not been impeded because the Court has decided 29 Fourth Amendment cases since Ross in favor of the government. See post, at 600. In each of these cases, the government appeared as the petitioner. The dissent fails to explain how the loss of 29 cases below, not to mention the many others which this Court did not hear, did not interfere with law enforcement. The fact that the state courts and the Federal Courts of Appeals have been reversed in their Fourth Amendment holdings 29 times since 1982 further demonstrates the extent to which our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has confused the courts.
Most important, with the exception of United States v. Johns, 469 U. S. 478 (1985), and Texas v. Brown, 460 U. S. 730 (1983), the Fourth Amendment cases cited by the dissent do not concern automobiles or the automobile exception. From Carroll through Ross, this Court has explained that automobile searches differ from other searches. The dissent fails to acknowledge this basic principle and so misconstrues and misapplies our Fourth Amendment case law.
The Chadwick dissenters predicted that the container rule would have “the perverse result of allowing fortuitous circumstances to control the outcome” of various searches. 433 U. S., at 22. The rule also was so confusing that within two years after Chadwick, this Court found it necessary to expound on the meaning of that decision and explain its application to luggage in general. Sanders, 442 U. S., at 761-764. Again, dissenters bemoaned the “inherent opaqueness” of the difference between the Carroll and Chadwick principles and noted “the confusion to be created for all concerned.” Id., at 771. See also Robbins v. California, 453 U. S. 420, 425-426 (1981) (listing cases decided by Federal Courts of Appeals since Chadwick had been announced). Three years after Sanders, we returned in Ross to “this troubled area,” 456 U. S., at 817, in order to assert that Sanders had not cut back on Carroll.
Although we have recognized firmly that the doctrine of stare decisis serves profoundly important purposes in our legal system, this Court has overruled a prior case on the comparatively rare occasion when it has bred confusion or been a derelict or led to anomalous results. See, e. g., Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U. S. 274, 288-289 (1977). Sanders was explicitly undermined in Ross, 456 U. S., at 824, and the existence of the dual regimes for automobile searches that uncover containers has proved as confusing as the Chadwick and Sanders dissenters predicted. We conclude that it is better to adopt one clear-cut rule to govern automobile searches and eliminate the warrant requirement for closed containers set forth in Sanders.
VI
The interpretation of the Carroll doctrine set forth m Ross now applies to all searches of containers found in an automobile. In other words, the police may search without a warrant if their search is supported by probable cause. The Court in Ross put it this way:
“The scope of a warrantless search of an automobile . . . is not defined by the nature of the container in which the contraband is secreted. Rather, it is defined by the object of the search and the places in which there is probable cause to believe that it may be found.” 456 U. S., at 824.
It went on to note: “Probable cause to believe that a container placed in the trunk of a taxi contains contraband or evidence does not justify a search of the entire cab.” Ibid. We reaffirm that principle. In the case before us, the police had probable cause to believe that the paper bag in the automobile’s trunk contained marijuana. That probable cause now allows a warrantless search of the paper bag. The facts in the record reveal that the police did not have probable cause to believe that contraband was hidden in any other part of the automobile and a search of the entire vehicle would have been without probable cause and unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
Our holding today neither extends the Carroll doctrine nor broadens the scope of the permissible automobile search delineated in Carroll, Chambers, and Ross. It remains a “cardinal principle that ‘searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment — subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.’” Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U. S. 385, 390 (1978), quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 357 (1967) (footnotes omitted). We held in Ross: “The exception recognized in Carroll is unquestionably one that is ‘specifically established and well delineated.’” 456 U. S., at 825.
Until today, this Court has drawn a curious line between the search of an automobile that coincidentally turns up a container and the search of a container that coincidentally turns up in an automobile. The protections of the Fourth Amendment must not turn on such coincidences. We therefore interpret Carroll as providing one rule to govern all automobile searches. The police may search an automobile and the containers within it where they have probable cause to believe contraband or evidence is contained.
The judgment of the California Court of Appeal is reversed, and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
When Officer Coleman returned with a warrant, the apartment was searched and bags of marijuana were found there. We are here concerned, of course, only with what was discovered in the automobile.
Although respondent now challenges this holding, we decline to second-guess the California courts, which have found probable cause. Respondent did not raise the probable-cause question in his Brief in Opposition nor did he cross-petition for resolution of the issue. He also did not raise the point in a cross-petition tó the Supreme Court of California. We therefore do not consider the issue here. See Lytle v. Household Mfg., Inc., 494 U. S. 545, 551, n. 3 (1990); Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U. S. 458, 468-469, n. 12 (1983).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | A | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Stewart
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The petitioner, a Nashville lawyer, was convicted in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee upon one count of an indictment under 18 U. S. C. § 1503, which charged him with endeavoring to bribe a member of the jury panel in a prospective federal criminal trial. The conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, 350 F. 2d 497. We granted certio-rari, 382 U. S. 1023, primarily to consider whether the conviction rests upon unconstitutionally acquired evidence, although the petitioner also presses other claims.
In late 1963, James R. Hoffa was awaiting trial upon a criminal charge in the federal court in Nashville, and the petitioner, as one of Hoffa’s attorneys, was engaged in preparing for that trial. In connection with these preparations the petitioner hired a man named Robert Vick to make background investigations of the people listed on the panel from which members of the jury for the Hoffa trial were to be drawn. Vick was a member of the Nashville police department whom the petitioner had employed for similar investigative work in connection with another criminal trial of the same defendant a year earlier. What the petitioner did not know was that Vick, before applying for the job with the petitioner in 1963, had met several times with federal agents and had agreed to report to them any “illegal activities” he might observe.
The conviction which we now review was upon the charge that the petitioner “during the period from on or about November 6, 1963, up to and including November 15, 1963, . . . did unlawfully, knowingly, wilfully and corruptly endeavor to influence, obstruct and impede the due administration of justice . . in that he “did request, counsel and direct Robert D. Vick to contact Ralph A. Elliott, who was, and was known by the said Osborn to be, a member of the petit jury panel from which the petit jury to hear the [Hoffa] trial was scheduled to be drawn, and to offer and promise to pay the said Ralph A. Elliott $10,000 to induce the said Elliott to vote for an acquittal, if the said Elliott should be selected to sit on the petit jury in the said trial.” The primary evidence against the petitioner on this charge consisted of Vick’s testimony, a tape recording of a conversation between the petitioner and Vick, and admissions which the petitioner had made during the course of federal disbarment proceedings.
Vick testified that during a discussion with the petitioner at the latter’s office on November 7, he mentioned that he knew some of the prospective jurors. At this, according to Vick, the petitioner “jumped up,” and said, “You do? Why didn’t you tell me?” The two then moved outside into the adjacent alley to continue the conversation. There, Vick testified, he told the petitioner that one of the prospective jurors, Ralph Elliott, was his cousin, and the petitioner told Vick to pay a visit to Elliott to see what arrangements could be made about the case. Vick also testified to meetings with the petitioner on November 8 and November 11, when he told the petitioner, falsely, that he had visited Elliott and found him “susceptible to money for hanging this jury,” to which the petitioner responded by offering $5,000 to Elliott if he became a member of the jury and an additional $5,000 “when he hung the jury, but he would have to go all the way, and to assure Mr. Elliott that he would not be alone, that there would be some other jurors in there.”
I.
No claim is made in this case that Vick’s testimony about the petitioner’s incriminating statements was inadmissible in evidence. Cf. Hoffa v. United States, ante, p. 293; Lewis v. United States, ante, p. 206. What is challenged is the introduction in evidence of a tape recording of one of the conversations about which Vick testified, specifically the conversation which took place in the petitioner’s office on November 11. The recording of this conversation was played for the jury, and a written transcript of it was introduced in evidence. We are asked to hold that the recording should have been excluded, either upon constitutional grounds, Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383, or in the exercise of our supervisory power over the federal courts. McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332.
There is no question of the accuracy of the recording. The petitioner testified that it was a “substantially correct” reproduction of what took place in his office on November 11. There can be no doubt, either, of the recording’s probative relevance. It provided strong corroboration of the truth of the charge against the petitioner. The recording was made by means of a device concealed upon Vick’s person during the November 11 meeting. We thus deal here not with surreptitious surveillance of a private conversation by an outsider, cf. Silverman v. United States, 365 U. S. 505, but, as in Lopez v. United States, 373 U. S. 427, with the use by one party of a device to make an accurate record of a conversation about which that party later testified. Unless Lopez v. United States is to be disregarded, therefore, the petitioner cannot prevail.
But we need not rest our decision here upon the broad foundation of the Court’s opinion in Lopez, because it is evident that the circumstances under which the tape recording was obtained in this case fall within the narrower compass of the Lopez concurring and dissenting opinions. Accordingly, it is appropriate to set out with some precision what these circumstances were.
Immediately after his November 7 meeting with the petitioner, at which, according to Vick, the possibility of approaching the juror Elliott was first discussed, Vick reported the conversation to an agent of the United States Department of Justice. Vick was then requested to put his report in the form of a written statement under oath, which he did. The following day this sworn statement was shown by government attorneys to the two judges of the Federal District Court, Chief Judge Miller and Judge Gray. After considering this affidavit, the judges agreed to authorize agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to conceal a recorder on Vick’s person in order to determine from recordings of further conversations between Vick and the petitioner whether the statements in Vick’s affidavit were true. It was this judicial authorization which ultimately led to the recording here in question.
The issue here, therefore, is not the permissibility of “indiscriminate use of such devices in law enforcement,” but the permissibility of using such a device under the most precise and discriminate circumstances, circumstances which fully met the “requirement of particu- / larity” which the dissenting opinion in Lopez found necessary.
The situation which faced the two judges of the District Court when they were presented with Vick’s affidavit on November 8, and the motivations which prompted their authorization of the recorder are re-fleeted in the words of Chief Judge Miller. As he put it, “The affidavit contained information which reflected seriously upon a member of the bar of this court, who had practiced in my court ever since I have been on the bench. I decided that some action had to be taken to determine whether this information was correct or whether it was false. It was the most serious problem that I have had to deal with since I have been on the bench. I could not sweep it under the rug.”
So it was that, in response to a detailed factual affidavit alleging the commission of a specific criminal offense directly and immediately affecting the administration of justice in the federal court, the judges of that court jointly authorized the use of a recording device for the narrow and particularized purpose of ascertaining the truth of the affidavit’s allegations. As the district judges recognized, it was imperative to determine whether the integrity of their court was being undermined, and highly undesirable that this determination should hinge on the inconclusive outcome of a testimonial contest between the only two people in the world' who knew the truth — one an informer, the other a lawyer of previous good repute. There could hardly be a clearer example of “ The procedure of antecedent justification before a magistrate that is central to the Fourth Amendment’ ” as “a precondition of lawful electronic surveillance.”
We hold on these facts that the use of the recording device was permissible, and consequently that the recording itself was properly admitted as evidence at the petitioner’s trial.
II.
The petitioner’s defense was one of entrapment, and he renews here the contention made in his motion for acquittal at the trial that entrapment was established as a matter of law. We cannot agree.
The validity of the entrapment defense depended upon what had transpired at the meetings between the petitioner and Vick which took place before the recorded conversation of November 11. According to the petitioner, Vick initiated the idea of making a corrupt approach to Elliott on October 28, and the petitioner at first resisted the suggestion and tried to discourage Vick from carrying it out. The petitioner conceded that he ultimately acquiesced in the scheme, out of “weakness” and because he was exhausted from overwork, but said that he never seriously intended actually to carry out the plan to bribe Elliott. But Vick’s version of what had happened was, as stated above, quite different, and the truth of the matter was for the jury to determine. Masciale v. United States, 356 U. S. 386. Surely it was not a “trap for the unwary innocent,” Sherman v. United States, 356 U. S. 369, 372, for Vick to tell the petitioner, truthfully, that he knew some of the members of the jury panel and that one of them was his cousin. And according to Vick he had said no more when the petitioner “jumped up,” went out into the alley with him, and initiated the effort to get Elliott “on our side.” At the most, Vick’s statement afforded the petitioner “opportunities or facilities” for the commission of a criminal offense, and that is a far cry from entrapment. Sherman v. United States, supra, at 372; Sorrells v. United States, 287 U. S. 435, 441.
III.
Finally, the argument is made that even if the admissibility and truth of all the evidence against the petitioner be accepted, this conviction must be set aside because his conduct did not constitute a violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1503. The basis for this argument is that since Vick never in fact approached Elliott and never intended to do so, any endeavor on the petitioner’s part was impossible of accomplishment.
We reject the argument. Whatever continuing validity the doctrine of “impossibility,” with all its subtleties, may continue to have in the law of criminal attempt, that body of law is inapplicable here. The statute under which the petitioner was convicted makes an offense of any proscribed “endeavor.” And almost 50 years ago this Court pointed out the significance of that word: “The word of the section is 'endeavor/ and by using it the section got rid of the technicalities which might be urged as besetting the word 'attempt/ and it describes any effort or essay to accomplish the evil purpose that the section was enacted to prevent. . . . The section ... is not directed at success in corrupting a juror but at the 'endeavor’ to do so. Experimental approaches to the corruption of a juror are the 'endeavor’ of the section.” United States v. Russell, 255 U. S. 138, 143.
If the evidence against the petitioner be accepted, there can be no question that he corruptly endeavored to impede the due administration of justice by instructing Robert Vick to offer a bribe to a prospective juror in a federal criminal case. , „ ,
, „ , Affirmed.
Mr. Justice White took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT.
Transcript of the recording of the Vick-Osborn conversation of November 11, 1963:
“Girl: You can go in now.
“Vick: O. K. honey. Hello, Mr. Osborn.
“Osborn: Hello Bob, close the door, my friend, and let's see what's up.
“Vick: How’re you doing?
“Osborn: No good. How're you doing?
“Vick: Oh, pretty good. You want to talk in here?
“Osborn: How far did you go?
“Vick: Well, pretty far.
“Osborn: Maybe we’d better . . .
“Vick: Whatever you say. Don’t make any difference to me.
“Osborn: [Inaudible whisper.]
“Vick: I’m comfortable, but er, this chair sits good, but we’ll take off if you want to, but
“Osborn: Did you talk to him?
“Vick: Huh?
“Osborn: Did you talk to him?
“Vick: Yeah. I went down to Springfield Saturday morning and talked to er.
“Osborn: Elliott?
“Vick: Elliott.
“Osborn: [Inaudible whisper.]
“Vick: Huh?
“Osborn: Is there any chance in the world that he would report you?
“Vick: That he will report me to the FBI? Why of course, there's always a chance, but I wouldn’t got into it if I thought it was very, very great.
“Osborn: [Laughed.]
“Vick: You understand that.
“Osborn: [Laughing.] Yeah, I do know. Old Bob first.
“Vick: That’s right. 'Don’t worry. I’m gonna take care of old Bob and I know, and of course I’m depending on you to take care of old Bob if anything, if anything goes wrong.
“Osborn: I am. I am. Why certainly.
“Vick: Er, we had coffee Saturday morning and now he had previously told you that it’s the son.
“Osborn: It is?
“Vick: Yes, and not the father.
“Osborn: That’s right.
“Vick: The son is Ralph Alden Elliott and the father is Ralph Donnal. Alden is er — Marie, that’s Ralph’s wife who killed herself. That was her maiden name, Alden, see? Anyway, we had coffee and he’s been on a hung jury up here this week, see?
“Osborn: I know that.
“Vick: Well, I didn’t know that but anyway, he brought that up so he got to talking about the last Hoffa case being hung, you know, and some guy refused $10,000 to hang it, see, and he said the guy was crazy, he should’ve took it, you know, and so we talked about and so just discreetly, you know, and course I’m really playing this thing slow, that’s the reason I asked you if you wanted a lawyer down there to handle it or you wanted me to handle it, cause I’m gonna play it easy.
“Osborn: The less people, the better.
“Vick: That’s right. Well, I’m gonna play it slow and easy myself and er, anyway, we talked about er, something about five thousand now and five thousand later, see, so he did, he brought up five thousand see, and talking about about [sic] how they pay it off you know and things like that. I don’t know whether he suspected why I was there or not cause I don’t just drop out of the blue to visit him socially, you know. We’re friends, close kin, cousins, but I don’t ordinarily just, we don’t fraternize, you know, and er, so he seemed very receptive for er, to hang the thing for five now and five later. Now, er, I thought I would report back to you and see what you say.
“Osborn: That’s fine! The thing to do is set it up for a point later so you won’t be running back and forth.
“Vick: Yeah.
“Osborn: Then tell him it’s a deal.
“Vick: It’s what?
“Osborn: That it’s a deal. What we’ll have to do— when it gets down to the trial date, when we know the date, tomorrow for example if the Supreme Court rules against us, well within a week we’ll know when the trial comes. Then he has to be certain that when he gets on, he’s got to know that he’ll just be talking to you and nobody else. -
“Vick: Social strictly.
“Osborn: Oh yeah.
“Vick: I’ve got my story all fixed on that.
“Osborn: Then he will have to know where to, he will have to know where to come.
“Vick: Well, er . . .
“Osborn: And, he’ll have to know when.
“Vick: Er, do you want to see him yourself? You want me to handle it or what?
“Osborn: Uh huh. You’re gonna handle it yourself.
“Vick: All right. You want to know it when he’s ready, when I think he’s ready for the five thousand. Is that right?
“Osborn: Well no, when he gets on the panel, once he gets on the jury. Provided he gets on the panel.
“Vick: Yeah. Oh yeah. That’s right. That’s right. Well now, he’s on the number one.
“Osborn: I know, but now . . .
“Vick: But you don’t know that would be the one.
“Osborn: Well, I know this, that if we go to trial before that jury he’ll be on it but suppose the government challenges him over being on another hung jury.
“Vick: Oh, I see.
“Osborn: Where are we then?
“Vick: Oh, I see. I see.
“Osborn: So we have to be certain that he makes it on the jury.
“Vick: Well now, here’s one thing, Tommy. He’s a member of the CWA, see, and the Teamsters, or
“Osborn: Well, they’ll knock him off.
“Vick: Naw, they won’t. They’ve had a fight with the CWA, see?
“Osborn: I think everything looks perfect.
“Vick: I think it’s in our favor, see. I think that’ll work to our favor.
“Osborn: That’s why I’m so anxious that they accept him.
“Vick: I think they would, too. I don’t think they would have a reason in the world to. I don’t think that I’m under any surveillance or suspicion or anything like that.
“Osborn: I don’t think so.
“Vick: I don’t know. I don’t frankly think, since last year and since I told them I was through with the thing, I don’t think I have been. Now Fred,
“Osborn: I don’t think you have either.
“Vick: You know Fred and I may not [pause], he may be too suspicious and I may not be suspicious enough. I don’t know.
“Osborn: I think you’ve got it sized up exactly right.
“Vick: Well, I think so.
“Osborn: Now, you know you promised that fella that you would have nothing more to do with that case.
“Vick: That’s right.
“Osborn: At that time you had already checked on some of the jury that went into Miller’s court. You went ahead and did that.
“Vick: Well, here’s another thing, Tommy.
“Osborn: - church affiliations, background, occupation and that sort of thing on those that went into Miller’s court. You didn’t even touch them. You didn’t even investigate the people that were in Judge Gray’s court.
“Vick: Well, here’s the thing about it, Tommy. Soon as this damn thing’s over, they’re gonna kick my . . . out anyway, so probably Fred’s too. So, I might as well get out of it what I can. The way I look at it. I might be wrong cause the Tennessean is not gonna have anything to do with anybody that’s had anything to do with the case now or in the past, you know that. Cause they’re too close to the Kennedy’s.
“Osborn: All right, so we’ll leave it to you. The only thing to do would be to tell him, in other words your next contact with him would be to tell him if he wants that deal, he’s got it.
“Vick: O. K.
“Osborn: The only thing it depends upon is him being accepted on the jury. If the government challenges him there will be no deal.
“Vick: All right. If he is seated.
“Osborn: If he’s seated.
“Vick: He can expect five thousand then and
“Osborn: Immediately.
“Vick: Immediately and then five thousand when it’s hung. Is that right?
“Osborn: All the way, now!
“Vick: Oh, he’s got to stay all the way?
“Osborn: All the way.
“Vick: No swing. You don’t want him to swing like we discussed once before. You want him
“Osborn: Of course, he could be guided by his own b — , but that always leaves a question. The thing to do is just stick with his crowd. That way we’ll look better and maybe they’ll have to go to another trial if we get a pretty good count.
“Vick: Oh. Now, I’m going to play it just like you told me previously, to reassure him and keep him from getting panicky, you know. I have reason to believe that he won’t be alone, you know.
“Osborn: You assure him of that. 100%.
“Vick: And to keep any fears down that he might have, see?
“Osborn: Tell him there will be at least two others with him.
“Vick: Now, another thing, I want to ask you does John know anything. You know, I originally told John about me knowing.
“Osborn: He does not know one thing.
“Vick: He doesn’t know. O. K.
“Osborn: He’ll come in and recommend this man- and I’ll say well just let it alone, you know.
“Vick: Yeah. So he doesn’t know anything about this at all?
“Osborn: Nothing.
“Vick: Now he hasn’t seen me. When I first came here he was in here, see.
“Osborn: -We’ll keep it secret. The way we keep it safe is that nobody knows about it but you and me-where could they ever go?
“Vick: Well that’s it, I reckon, or I’ll probably go down there. See, I’m off tonight. I’m off Sunday and Monday, see. That’s why I talked to you yesterday. I had a notion to go down there yesterday cause I was off last night and I’m off again tonight.
“Osborn: It will be a week at least until we know the trial date.
“Vick: 0. K. You want to hold up doing anything further till we know.
“Osborn: Unless he should happen to give you a call and - something like that, then you just tell him, whenever you happen to run into him.
“Vick: Well, he’s not apt to call, cause see
“Osborn: You were very circumspect.
“Vick: Yeah. We haven’t talked really definite and I think he clearly understands. Now, he might, it seemed to me that maybe he thought I was joking or, you know.
“Osborn: That’s a good way to leave it, he’s the one that brought it up.
“Vick: That’s right.
“Osborn: -
“Vick: Well, I knew he would before I went down there.
“Osborn: Well,-
“Vick: Huh?
“Osborn: I’ll be talking to you.
“Vick: I’ll wait a day or two.
“Osborn: Yeah. I would.
“Vick: Before I contact him. Don’t want to seem anxious and er
“Osborn: -
“Vick: O. K. See you later.”
18 U. S. C. § 1503 provides as follows:
"Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication, endeavors to influence, intimidate, or impede any witness, in any court of the United States or before any United States commissioner or other committing magistrate, or any grand or petit juror, or officer in or of any court of the United States, or officer who may be serving at any examination or other proceeding before any United States commissioner or other committing magistrate, in the discharge of his duty, or injures any party or witness in his person or property on account of his attending or having attended such court or examination before such officer, commissioner, or other committing magistrate, or on account of his testifying or having testified to any matter pending therein, or injures any such grand or petit juror in his person or property on account of any verdict or indictment assented to by him, or on account of his being or having been such juror, or injures any such officer, commissioner, or other committing magistrate in his person or property on account of the performance of his official duties, or corruptly or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication, influences, obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.”
The indictment contained two other counts charging similar offenses with respect to the earlier trial of the same defendant. The Government dismissed one of these counts, and the petitioner was acquitted on the other.
A transcript of the recording is reproduced as an Appendix to this opinion.
It is argued that in Lopez the petitioner knew that the person to whom he offered a bribe was a federal officer. But, even assuming there might otherwise be some force to this distinction, it is enough to point out that in the present case the petitioner also knew he was talking to a law enforcement officer — a member of the Nashville police department.
The relevant portion of this affidavit was as follows:
“On November 7, 1963, I was in Mr. Osborn’s office going over the results of my investigation. I was aware that the jury panel which I had been investigating was the panel assigned to Judge William E. Miller. Mr. Osbom and I got into a discussion of the jury panel assigned to Judge Frank Gray, Jr. This jury panel list had previously been shown to me by John Polk, an investigator for Mr. Osborn. Polk told me at that time that he was investigating the jury panel assigned to Judge Gray. At that time, I mentioned to Polk that I knew three of the people on the jury panel. In discussing the panel with Mr. Osborn, I again mentioned that I knew three of the people on the jury panel. Mr. Osbom said, ‘You do? Why didn’t you tell me?’ I told Mr. Osbom I had told John Polk and assumed that John Polk had told him. Mr. Osborn said that Polk had not told him and suggested that we discuss the matter further. We then left Mr. Osborn’s office and walked out onto the street to discuss the matter further. Mr. Osborn asked me how well I knew the three prospective jurors. I told him that I knew Mr. Ralph A. Elliott, Springfield, Tennessee, the best since he was my cousin. Mr. Osborn asked me whether I knew him well enough to talk to him about anything. I said that I thought I did. Mr. Osborn then said, ‘Go contact him right away. Sit down and talk to him and get him on our side. We want him on the jury.’ I told Mr. Osbom that I thought Mr. Elliott was not in very good financial position and Mr. Osbom said, ‘Good, go see him right away.’ ”
The recording device did not operate properly on the occasion of Vick’s visit to the petitioner’s office on November 8, and Vick made a written statement of what occurred during that meeting. The government lawyers reported these circumstances to District Judge Miller, who then authorized the use of the recorder on November 11, under the same conditions:
“I said on that second occasion the same as I did on the first occasion: that the tape recorder should be used under proper surveillance, supervision, to see that it was not faked in any way, and to take every precaution to determine that it was used in a fair manner, so that we could get at the bottom of it and determine what the truth was.”
“I also share the opinion of Mr. Justice BrennaN that the fantastic advances in the field of electronic communication constitute a great danger to the privacy of the individual; that indiscriminate use of such devices in law enforcement raises grave constitutional questions under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments; and that these considerations impose a heavier responsibility on this Court in its supervision of the fairness of procedures in the federal court system. However, I do not believe that, as a result, all uses of such devices should be proscribed either as unconstitutional or as unfair law enforcement methods.” Lopez v. United States, 373 U. S., at 441 (concurring opinion of The Chief Justice).
373 U. S., at 463.
“The requirements of the Fourth Amendment are not inflexible, or obtusely unyielding to the legitimate needs of law enforcement. It is at least clear that 'the procedure of antecedent justification before a magistrate that is central to the Fourth Amendment,’ Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U. S. 263, 272 (separate opinion) ; see McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451, 455; Abel v. United States, 362 U. S. 217, 251-252 (dissenting opinion), could be made a precondition of lawful electronic surveillance. . . .” Lopez v. United States, 373 U. S., at 464 (dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice BRENNAN).
The petitioner’s trial counsel explicitly conceded that the entrapment issue was for the jury to resolve.
The petitioner further argues, with respect to the entrapment defense, that the jury instructions were erroneous in two respects, and that government rebuttal evidence was improperly received.
It is urged that the trial judge committed error in failing to instruct the jury that if they acquitted the petitioner under Count 2 (charging an endeavor to bribe a juror at the 1962 Hoffa trial), they must not consider any evidence under that count in determining the petitioner’s guilt under Count 1. Such an instruction was not requested. Rule 30, Fed. Rules Crim. Proc. Moreover, it is settled that when the defense of entrapment is raised, evidence of prior conduct tending to show the defendant’s predisposition to commit the offense charged is admissible. See Sorrells v. United States, 287 U. S. 435, 451.
The petitioner further argues that the instructions on entrapment erroneously left to the jury the question of whether the tape recording had been obtained by lawful means. We do not so understand the trial judge’s language, and neither, apparently, did trial counsel, because no objection was made to the instructions as given. Rule 30, Fed. Rules Crim. Proc. Moreover, such an instruction would have been favorable to the petitioner, because the judge, in denying the earlier defense motion to suppress, had already ruled that the recording had been lawfully obtained.
Finally, objection is made to permitting the Government on rebuttal to introduce Vick’s November 8 affidavit and show the circumstances under which the tape recording had been authorized by the judges. But this evidence was a relevant response to the petitioner’s testimony that it was Vick who, at the instigation of the Government, had initiated the plan to approach Elliott as early as October 28.
See n. 1, supra.
Compare People v. Jaffe, 185 N. Y. 497, 78 N. E. 169, with People v. Gardner, 144 N. Y. 119, 38 N. E. 1003. See Wechsler, Jones & Korn, The Treatment of Inchoate Crimes in the Model Penal Code of the American Law Institute: Attempt, Solicitation, and Conspiracy, 61 Col. L. Rev. 571, 578-585 (1961).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | A | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Under the Landrum-Griffin Act amendments enacted in 1959, 73 Stat. 542, § 8 (b)(4)(A) of the National Labor Relations Act, 61 Stat. 141, became § 8 (b) (4) (B) and § 8 (e) was added. The questions here are whether, in the circumstances of these cases, the Metropolitan District Council of Philadelphia and Vicinity of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO (hereafter the Union), committed the unfair labor practices prohibited by §§8(e) and 8(b)(4)(B).
Frouge Corporation, a Bridgeport, Connecticut, concern, was the general contractor on a housing project in Philadelphia. Frouge had a collective bargaining agreement with the Carpenters’ International Union under which Frouge agreed to be bound by the rules and regulations agreed upon by local unions with' contractors in areas in which Frouge had jobs. Frouge was therefore subject to the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement between the Union and an organization of Phila-' delphia contractors, the General Building Contractors Association, Inc. A sentence in a provision of that agreement entitled Rule 17 provides that “... No member of this District Council will handle... any doors... which have been fitted prior to being furnished on the job....” Frouge’s Philadelphia project called for 3,600 doors. Customarily, before the doors could be hung on such projects, “blank” or “blind” doors would be mortised for the knob, routed for the hinges, and beveled to make them fit between jambs. These are tasks traditionally performed' in the Philadelphia area by the carpenters employed on the jobsite. However, precut and prefitted doors ready to hang may be purchased from door manufacturers. Although Frouge’s contract and job specifications did not call for premachined doors, and “blank” or “blind” doors could have been ordered, Frouge contracted for the purchase of premachined doors from, a Pennsylvania door manufacturer which is a member of the National Woodwork Manufacturers Association, petitioner in No. 110 and respondent in No. 111. The Union ordered its carpenter members not to hang the doors when they arrived at the jobsite; Frouge thereupon withdrew the prefabricated doors and substituted “blank” doors which were fitted and cut by its carpenters on the jobsite.
The National Woodwork Manufacturers Association and another filed charges with the National Labor Relations Board against the Union alleging that by including the “will not handle” sentence of Rule 17 in the collective bargaining agreement the Union committed the unfair labor practice under § 8 (e) of entering into an “agreement... whereby [the] employer... agrees to cease or refrain from handling... any of the products of any other employer. '..,” and alleging further that in enforcing the sentence against Frouge, the Union committed the unfair labor practice under § 8 (b) (4) (B) of “forcing or requiring any person to cease using.., the products of any other... manufacturer....” The National Labor Relations Board dismissed the charges, 149 N. L. R. B. 646. The Board adopted the findings of the Trial Examiner that the “will not handle" sen- ■ tence in Rule 17 was language used by the parties to protect and preserve cutting out and fitting as unit work to be performed by the jobsite carpenters. The Board also adopted the holding of the Trial Examiner that both the sentence of Rule 17 itself and its maintenance against Frouge were therefore “primary” activity outside the prohibitions of §§ 8 (e) and 8 (b)(4)(B). The following statement of the Trial Examiner was adopted by the Board:
“I am convinced and find that, the tasks of cutting out and fitting millwork, including doors, has, at least customarily, been performed by the carpenters employed -on the jobsite. ■ Certainly, this provision of rule 17 is not concerned with the nature of the employer with whom the contractor does business nor with the employment conditions of other employers or employees, nor does it attempt to control such other employers or employees. The provision guards against encroachments on the cutting out and fitting work of the contract unit employees who have performed that work in the past. Its purpose is plainly to regulate the relations between the general contractor and his Qwn employees and to protect a legitimate economic interest of the employees by preserving their unit work. Merely because it incidentally also affects other parties is no basis for invalidating this provision.
“I find that,.. [the provision] is a lawful work-protection or work-preservation provision and that Respondents have not violated Section 8 (e) of the Act by entering into agreements containing this provision and by thereafter maintaining and enforcing this provision.” 149 N. L. R. B., at 657.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the Board in this respect. 354 F. 2d 594, 599. The court held that the “will not handle” agreement violated § 8 (e) without regard to any “primary” or “secondary” objective, and remanded to the Board with instructions to enter an order accordingly. In the court’s view, the sentence was designed to effect a product boycott like the one condemned in Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, 325 U. S. 797, and Congress meant, in enacting § 8 (e) and §8 (b)(4)(B), to prohibit such agreements and conduct forcing employers to enter into them.
The Court of Appeals sustained, however, the dismissal of the- § 8 (b)(4)(B)* charge. The court agreed with the Board that the Union’s conduct as to Frouge involved only a primary dispute with it and held that the conduct was therefore not prohibited by that section but expressly protected by the proviso “ft]hat nothing contained in this clause (B) shall be construed to make unlawful, where not otherwise unlawful, any primary strike or primary picketing....” 354 F. 2d, at 597.
We granted certiorari on the petition of the Woodwork Manufacturers Association in No. 110 and on the petition of the Board in No. 111. 384 U. S. 968. We affirm in No. 110 and reverse in No. 111.
I.
Even on the doubtful premise that the words of § 8 (e) unambiguously embrace the sentence of Rule 17, this does not end inquiry into Congress’ purpose in enacting the section. It is a “familiar rule, that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers.” Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U. S. 457, 459. That principle has particular application in the construction of labor legislation which is “to a marked degree, the result of conflict and compromise between strong contending forces and deeply held views on the role of organized labor in the free economic life of the Nation and the appropriate balance to be struck between the uncontrolled power of management and labor to further their respective interests.” Local 1976, United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. Labor Board (Sand Door), 357 U. S. 93, 99-100. See, e. g., Labor Board v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers, 377 U. S. 58; Labor Board v. Servette, Inc., 377 U. S. 46; Labor Board v. Drivers Local Union, 362 U. S. 274; Mastro Plastics Corp. v. Labor Board, 350 U. S. 270; Labor Board v. Lion Oil Co., 352 U. S. 282; Labor Board v. International Rice Milling Co., 341 U. S. 665; Local 761, Electrical Workers v. Labor Board, 366 U. S. 667.
Strongly held opposing views have invariably marked controversy over labor's use of the boycott to further its aims by involving an employer in disputes not his own. But congressional action to deal with such conduct has.stopped short of proscribing identical activity having the object of pressuring the employer for agreements regulat- ■ ing relations between him and his own employees. That Congress meant §§ 8 (e) and 8(b)(4)(B) to prohibit only “secondary” objectives clearly appears from an examination of the history of congressional action on the subject; we may, by such an examination, “recon.-'stitute the gamut of values current at the time when the words were uttered.”
The history begins with judicial application of the Sherman Act (26 Stat. 209) to labor activities. Federal court injunctions freely issued against all manner of strikes and boycotts under rulings that condemned virtually every collective activity of labor as an unlawful restraint of trade. The first congressional response to vehement labor protests came with § 20 of the Clayton Act in 1914. That section purported drastically to limit the injunction power of federal courts in controversies “involving, or growing out of, a dispute concerning terms.or conditions of employment.” In terms, it prohibited restraining any person from “ceasing to perform any work or labor” or “from ceasing to patronize or to employ any party to such dispute, or from recommending, advising, or persuading others by peaceful and lawful means so to do.” 38 Stat. 738. Labor hailed the law as a charter immunizing its activities from the antitrust laws. This expectation was disappointed when Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443, and Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters’ Assn., 274 U. S. 37, held that § 20 immunized only trade union activities directed against an employer by his own employees. In Duplex, the union carried on an elaborate scheme to coerce and restrain neutral customers of the complainant manufacturer from dealing with it, with the object of using these customers as an economic lever to bring the nonunion manufacturer to terms. The Court there stated:
“The substance of the matters here complained of is an interference with complainant’s interstate trade, intended to have coercive effect upon complainant, and produced by what is commonly known as a ‘secondary boycott,’ that is, a combination not merely to refrain from dealing with complainant, or to advise, or by peaceful means persuade complainant’s customers to refrain (‘primary boycott’), but to exercise coercive pressure upon such customers, actual or prospective, in order to cause them to withhold or withdraw patronage from complainant through fear of loss or damage to themselves should they deal with it.” Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Peering, supra, at 466.
Thus “primary” but" not “secondary” pressures were excepted from the antitrust laws. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, 330, defined “secondary boycott” as one “where many combine to injure one in his business by coercing third persons against their will to cease patronizing him by threats of similar injury.'... The question in such cases is whether the moral - coercion exercised over a stranger to the original controversy by steps in themselves legal becomes a legal wrong.” See 1 Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining § 1.45 (1940). Commentators of the day, while noting the ambiguity which lurked in the definition, discerned its core concept: union pressure directed at a neutral employer the object of which was to induce or coerce him to cease doing business with an employer with whom the union was engaged in a labor dispute.
In 1932 Congress enacted the Norris-LaGuardia Act and tipped the scales the other way. Its provisions “established that the allowable area of union activity was not to be restricted, as it had been in the Duplex case, to an immediate employer-employee relation.” United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U. S. 219, 231. Congress abolished, for purposes of labor immunity, the distinction ■ between primary activity between the “immediate disputants” and secondary activity in which the employer disputants and the members of the union do not stand “in the proximate relation of employer and employee....” H. R. Rep. No. 669, 72d Cong., 1st Sess., 8 (1932). Thus, in Hutcheson, supra, the Court held that the Norris--LaGuardia Act immunized a jurisdictional strike trapping a neutral employer in the middle of an “internecine struggle between two unions seeking the favor of the same employer,” supra, at 232. Commentators of the post-Norris-LaGuardia era, as those before, while continuing to deplore the chameleon-like qualities of the term “secondary boycott,” agreed upon its central aspect: pressure tactically directed toward a neutral employer in a labor dispute not his own.
Labor abuses of the broad immunity granted by the Norris-LaGuardia Act resulted in the Taft-Hartley Act prohibitions against secondary activities enacted in §8 (b)(4)(A), which, as amended in 1969, is now § 8 (b)(4)(B). As will appear, the basic thrust of the accommodation there effected by Congress was not expanded by the Landrum-Griitin amendments. The congressional design in enacting. § 8 (b)(4)(A) is therefore crucial to the determination of the scope of §§ 8 (e) and 8 (b)(4)(B). Senator Taft said of its purpose:
“This provision- makes it unlawful to resort to a secondary boycott to injure the business of a third ;person who is wholly unconcerned in the disagreement between an employer and his employees-.... [UJnder the provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, it became impossible to stop a secondary boycott or any other kind of a strike, no matter how unlawful it may have been at common law. All this provision of the bill does is to reverse the effect of the law as to secondary boycotts.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Senator Taft and others frequently sounded this note that § 8 (b)(4)(A) was designed to eliminate the “secondary boycott,” and its proponents uniformly cited examples of union conduct which evidenced labor efforts to draw in neutral employers through pressure calculated to induce them to cease doing business with the primary employer. And the Senate Committee Report carefully characterized the conduct prohibited by §8 (b)(4) (A) in the same terms:
“Thus, it would not be lawful for a union to engage in a strike against employer A for the purpose of forcing that employer to cease doing business with employer B; nor would it be lawful for a union to boycott employer A because employer A uses or otherwise deals in the goods of or does business with, employer B (with whom the union has a dispute).” S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 22,1 1947 Leg. Hist. 428.
The other subsections of § 8 (b) (4) of the Act were similarly limited to protecting employers in the position' of neutrals between contending parties. The prohibition of subsection (B) against a noncertified union’s forcing recognition from an employer was designed to protect the employer trapped between the union and his employees, a majority of whom may not desire to choose the union as their representative. The prohibition of subsection (C) against a demand for recognition when another union has been certified protects the employer trapped between the noncertified and the certified unions. The prohibition of subsection (D) against coercion to force an employer to assign certain work to one of two unions contesting for it protects the employer trapped between the two claims. The central theme pervading these provisions of protection for the neutral employer confirms the assurances of those sponsoring the section that in subsection (A) Congress likewise meant to protect the employer only from union pressures designed to involve him in disputes not his own.
Judicial decisions interpreting the broad language of § 8 (b)(4)(A) of the Act uniformly limited its’application to such “secondary” situations. This limitation was in “conformity with the dual congressional objectives of preserving the right of labor organizations to bring pressure to bear on offending employers in primary labor disputes and of shielding unoffending employers and others from pressures in controversies not their Own.” Labor Board v. Denver Bldg. Trades Council, 341 U. S. 675, 692. This Court accordingly refused to read? 8 (b) (4) (A) to ban traditional primary strikes and picketing having an impact on neutral employers even though the activity fell within its sweeping terms; Labor Board v. International Rice Milling Co., 341 U. S. 665; see Local 761, Electrical Workers v. Labor Board, 366 U. S. 667. Thus, however severe the impact of primary activity on neutral employers; it was not thereby transformed into activity with a secondary objective.
The literal terms.of § 8 (b)(4)(A) also were not applied in the so-calléd “ally doctrine” cases, in which'the union’s pressure was aimed toward employers performing the work.of the primary employer’s striking employees. The rationale, again, was the inapplicability of the provision’s central theme, the protection of neutrals against secondary pressure, where the secondary employer against whom the union’s pressure is directed has entangled himself in the vortex of the primary dispute. “[T]he union was not extending its activity to a front remote from the immediate dispute but to one intimately’ añd indeed inextricably united to it.” Douds v. Metropolitan Federation of Architects, 75 F. Supp. 672, 677 (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1948); see Labor Board v. Business Machine & Office Appliance Mechanics, 228 F. 2d 553 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1955). We summarized our reading of §8 (b)(4)(A) just a year before enactment'of § 8 (e):
“It aimed to restrict the area of industrial conflict. insofar as this could be achieved by prohibiting the most obvious, widespread, and, as Congress evidently judged, dangerous practice' of unions to widen that conflict: the coercion of neutral employers, themselves not concerned with a primary labor dispute, through the inducement of their employees to engage in strikes or concerted refusals to handle goods.” Local 1976, United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. Labor Board (Sand Door), 357 U. S. 93, 100.
Despite this virtually overwhelming support for the limited reading of § 8 (b)(4)(A), the Woodwork Manufacturers Association relies on Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, 325 U. S. 797, as requiring that the successor section, § 8 (b)(4)(B), be read-as proscribing the District Council’s conduct in enforcing the “will not handle” sentence of Rule 17 against Frouge. The Association points to the references to Allen Bradley in the legislative debates leading to the enactment of the predecessor § 8 (b) (4) (A). We think that this is an erroneous reading of the legislative history. Allen Bradley held violative of the antitrust laws a combination between Local 3 of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers and both electrical contractors and manufacturers of electrical fixtures in New York City to restrain the bringing in of such equipment from outside the city. The contractors obligated themselves to confine their purchases to local manufacturers, who in turn obligated themselves to confine their New York City sales to contractors employing members of the local, and this scheme was supported by threat of boycott by the contractors’ employees. While recognizing that the union might have had an immunity for its contribution to-the trade boycott had it acted alone, citing Hutcheson, supra, the Court held immunity was not intended by the. Clayton or Norris-LaGuardia Acts in cases in which the union’s activity was part of a larger conspiracy to abet contractors and manufacturers to create a monopoly.
The argument that the references to Allen Bradley in the debates over § 8 (b)(4)(A) have broader significance in the determination of the reach of that section is that there was no intent on Local 3’s part to influence the internal labor policies of the boycotted out-of-state manufacturers of electrical equipment. There are three answers to this argument: First, the boycott 6f out-of-state electrical equipment by the electrical contractors’ employees was not in pursuance of any objective relating to pressuring their employers in the matter of their wages, hours, and working conditions; there was no work preservation or other primary objective rjelated to. the union employees’ relations with their contractor employers. On the contrary, the object of the boycott was to secure benefits for the New York City electrical manufacturers and their employees. “This is a secondary object because the cessation of business was being used tactically, with an eye to its effect on conditions elsewhere.”. Second, and of even greater significance on the question of the inferences to be drawn from the references to Allen Bradley, Senator Taft regarded the Local 3 boycott as in effect saying, “We will not permit any material made by any other union or. by any nonunion workers to come into New York City and be put into- any building in New York City.” 93 Cong. Rec. 4199, II 1947 Leg. Hist. 1107. This clearly shows that the Senator viewed the pressures applied by Local 3 on the employers of its members as having solely a secondary objective. The Senate Committee Report échoes the same view:
'“[It is] an unfair labor practice for. a union to engage in the type of secondary boycott that has been conducted in New York City by local No. 3 of the IBEW, whereby electricians have refused to install electrical products of manufacturers employing electricians who are members of some labor organization other than local No. 8.” S. Rep. No.'105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 22, I 1947 Leg. Hist. 428. (Emphasis supplied.)
Other statements on the floor of Congress repeat the same refrain. Third, even on the • premise that Congress meant to prohibit boycotts such as that in Allen Bradley without regard to whether they were carried on to affect labor conditions elsewhere, the fact is that the boycott in Allen Bradley was carried on, not as a shield to preserve the jobs of Local 3 members, traditionally a primary labor activity, but as a sword, to reach out and monopolize all the manufacturing job tasks for Local 3 members. It is arguable that Congress may have viewed the use of the boycott as a sword as different from labor’s traditional concerns with wages, hours, and working conditions. But the boycott in the present cases was not used as a sword; it was a shield carried solely to preserve the members’ jobs. We therefore have no occasion today to decide the questions which might arise where the workers carry on a boycott to reach out to monopolize jobs or acquire new job tasks when their own jobs are not threatened by the boycotted product.
It is true that the House bill proposed to amend the Clayton Act to narrow labor’s immunity from the antitrust laws. H. R. 3020, § 301 (b), I 1947 Leg. Hist. 220. This was omitted from the Conference agreement. It is suggested that this history evidences that Congress meant § 8 (b) (4) (A) to reach all product boycotts with work preservation motives. The argument is premised on a statement by the House Managers in the House Conference Report that “[sjincethe matters dealt with in this section have to a large measure been effectuated through the use of boycotts, and since the conference agreement contains effective provisions directly dealing with boycotts themselves, this provision is omitted from the conference agreement.” H. R. Conf. Rep, No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 65, I 1947 Leg. Hist. 569. The statement is hardly probative that § 8 (b) (4) (A) enacted a broad prohibition in face of the overwhelming evidence that' its Senate sponsors intended the narrower reach. Actually the statement at best reflects that the House may have receded from a broader position and accepted that of the Senate. For §8 (b)(4)(A) constituted the “effective provisions” referred to and the House Managers’, understanding of and agreement with the reach of the section as intended by its Senate sponsors is expressed at page 43 of-the same Report, I 1947 Leg. Hist. 547:
“Under clause (A) strikes or boycotts, or attempts to induce or encourage such action, were made unfair. labor practices if the purpose was to force an employer or other person to cease using,. selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of another, or to cease doing business with any other person. Thus it was made an unfair labor practice for a union to engage in a strike against employer A for the purpose of forcing that employer to cease doing business with employer B. Similarly it would not be lawful for a union to boycott employer A because employer A uses or otherwise deals in the goods of, or does business with, employer B.”
In effect Congress, in enacting §8 (b)(4) (A) of the Act, returned to the regime of Duplex Printing Press Co. and Bedford Cut Stone Co., supra, and barred as a secondary boycott union activity directed against a neutral employer, including the immediate employer when in fact the activity directed against him was carried on for its effect elsewhere.
Indeed, Congress in rewriting §8 (b)(4) (A) as §8 (b)(4)(B) took pains to confirm the limited application of the section to such “secondary” conduct. The word “concerted” in former §8 (b)(4) was deleted to reach secondary conduct directed to only one individual. This was in response to the Court’s holding in Labor Board v. International Rice Milling Co,, 341 U. S. 665, that “concerted” required proof, of inducement of two or more employees. But to make clear that the deletion was not. to be read; as ^supporting a construction of the statute as prohibiting the incidental effects of traditional primary activity, Congress added the proviso that nothing in the amended section “shall be construed to make unlawful, where not otherwise unlawful, any primary strike or primary picketing.” Many statements and examples proffered in the 1959 debates confirm this congressional acceptance of the distinction between primary and secondary activity.
II.
The Landrum-Griffin Act amendments in 1959 were adopted only to close various loopholes in the application of § 8 (b)(4)(A) which had been exposed in Board and court decisions. We discussed some of these loopholes, and the particular amendments adopted to close them, in Labor Board v. Servette, Inc., 377 U. S. 46, 51-54. We need not repeat that discussion, here, except to emphasize, as we there said, that “these changes did not expand the type of conduct which §.8 (b)(4)(A) condemned, that is, union pressures calculated to induce the employees of a secondary employer to withhold their services in order to force their employer to cease dealing with the primary employer.” Id., at 52-53.
. Section 8 (e) simply closed still another loophole. In Local 1976, United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. Labor Board (Sand Door), 357 U. S. 93, the Court held that it was no defense to an unfair labor practice.charge under § 8 (b) (4) (A) that the struck employer had agreed, in a contract with the union, not to handle nonunion material.' However, the Court emphasized that the mere execution of such a contract provision (known as a “hot cargo” clause because of its prevalence in Teamsters Union contracts), or its voluntary observance by the employer, was not unlawful under- § 8 (b)(4).(A). Section 8 (e) was designed to plug this gap in the legislation by making the “hot cargo” clause itself unlawful. The Sand Door decision was believed by Congress not only to create the possibility of damage actions against employers for breaches of “hot cargo” clauses, but also'to create a situation in which such clauses might be employed to exert subtle pressures upon employers to engage in “voluntary” boycotts. Hearings in late 1958 before the Senate Select Committee explored seven cases of “hot cargo” clauses in Teamsters Union contracts, the use of which the Committee found conscripted neutral employers in Teamsters organizational campaigns.
This loophole-closing measure likewise did not expand the type of conduct which §8 (b)(4) (A) condemned. Although the language of § 8 (e) is sweeping, it closely tracks that of § 8 (b)(4)(A), and just as the latter and its successor §8 (b)(4)(B) did not reach employees’ activity to pressure their employer to preserve for themselves work traditionally done by them, § 8 (e) does not prohibit agreements made and maintained for that purpose.
The legislative history of § 8 (e) confirms this con-clúsion. The Kennedy-Ervin bill as originally reported proposed no remedy for abuses of the “hot cargo” clauses revealed at the hearings of the Select Committee. Senators Goldwater and Dirksen filed a minority report urging that a prohibition against “hot cargo” clauses should be enacted to close that loophole. Their statement expressly acknowledged their acceptance of the reading of §8 (b)(4) (A) as applicable only “to protect genuinely neutral employers and their employees, not themselves involved in a labor dispute, against economic coercion designed to give a labor union victory in a dispute with some other' employer.” They argued that a prohibition against “hot cargo” clauses was necessary to further that objective. They were joined by Senator McClellan, Chairman of the Select Committee, in their proposal to add such a provision. Their statements in support consistently defined the evil to be prevented in terms of agreements which obligated neutral employers not to do business with other employers involved in labor disputes with the union. Senator Gore initially proposed, and the Senate first passed, a “hot cargo” amendment to the Kenn'edy-Ervin bill which outlawed such agreements only for “common carriers subject to Part II of the Interstate Commerce Act.” This reflected the testimony at the Select Committee hearings which, attributed abuses of such clauses primarily to the Teamsters Union. Significantly, such alleged abuses by the Teamsters invariably involved uses of the clause, to pressure neutral trucking employers not to handle goods of other employers involved in disputes with the Teamsters Union.
The House Labor Committee first reported out a bill containing a provision substantially identical to the Gore amendment. The House Report expressly noted that since that proposal tracked the language of § 8 (b) (4) (A) “it preserved the established distinction between primary activities and secondary boycotts.” The substitute Landrum-Griffin bill, however, expanded the proposal to cover all industry and not common carriers alone. H. R. 8400, § 705 (b)(1) in I 1959 Leg. Hist. 683. Representative Landrum stated, “I submit if such contracts are bad in one segment of our economy, they are undesirable in all segments.” 105 Cong. Rec. 14343, II 1959 Leg. Hist. 1518. In describing the substitute bill, Representative Landrum pointedly spoke of the situation “where the union, in a dispute with one employer, puts pressure upon another employer or his employees, in order to force the second employer or his employees, to- stop doing business with the first employer, and ‘bend his knee to' the union’s will.’ ” Ibid. An analysis of the shbstitute bill submitted by Representative Griffin referred to the need to plug the various loopholes in the “secondary boycott” provisions, one of which is the “hot cargo” agreement. In Conference Committee, the Landrum-Griffin application to all industry, and not just to common carriers, was adopted.
However, provisos were added to § 8 (e) to preserve the status quo in the construction industry, and exempt the garment industry from the prohibitions of §§ 8 (e) and 8 (bX4)(B). This action of the Congress is strong confirmation that Congress meant that, both.§§ 8 (e) and 8 (b)(4)(B) reach only secondary pressures. If the body of § 8 (e) applies only to secondary activity, the garment industry proviso, is a justifiable exception which allows what the legislative history shows it was designed to allow, secondary pressures to counteract the effects of' sweatshop conditions in an industry with a highly integrated process of production between jobbers, manufacturers, contractors and subcontractor^. First, this motivation for the proviso sheds light on the central theme of the body of § 8 (e), to which the proviso is an exception. Second, if the body of that provision and § 8 (b) (4) (B) were construed to prohibit primary agreements and their maintenance, such as those concerning work preservation, the proviso would have the highly unlikely effect, unjustified in any of the statute’s history, of" permitting garmient workers, but garment workers only, to preserve their jobs against subcontracting or prefabrication by such agreements and by strikes and boycotts to.enforce them. Similarly, the construction industry proviso, which permits “hot cargo” agreements only for jobsite work, would have the curious and unsupported result of allowing the construction worker to make agreements preserving his traditional tasks against jobsite prefabrication and subcontracting, but not against nonjobsite prefabrication and subcontracting. On the other hand, if the heart of § 8 (e) is construed to be directed only to secondary activities, the construction proviso becomes; as it was intended to be, a measure designed to allow agreements pertaining to certain- secondary activities on the construction site because of the close community of interests there, but to ban secondary-objective agreements concerning nonjob-site work, in which respect the construction industry is no different from any other. The provisos are therefore substantial probative support that primary work preservation agreements were not to be within the ban of § 8 (e).
The only mention of a broader reach for § 8 (e) appears in isolated statements by opponents of that provision, expressing fears that work preservation agreements would be banned. These statements have scant probative value against the backdrop of the strong evidence to the contrary. Too, “we have often cautioned against the danger, when interpreting a statute, of reliance upon the views of its legislative opponents. In their zeal to defeat a bill, they understandably tend to overstate its reach.” Labor Board v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers, 377 U. S. 58, 66. “It is the sponsors that we 'look to when the meaning, of the statutory words is in doubt.” Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U. S. 384, 394-395. See Mastro Plastics Corp. v. Labor Board, 350 U. S. 270, 288.
In addition to all else, “[t]he silence of the sponsors of [the] amendments is pregnant with significance....” Labor Board v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers, supra, at 66. Before we may say that Congress meant to strike from workers'.hands the economic weapons traditionally used against their employers’ efforts to abolish their jobs, that meaning should plainly appear. • “[I]n this era of automation and onrushing technological change; no problems in the domestic economy are of greater concern, than those involving job security and employment stability. ■ Because of the potentially cruel impact upon the lives and fortunes of the working men and women of the
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | G | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Clark
announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion in which The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Fortas join.
This is a companion case to No. 412, Shillitani v. United States, and No. 442, Pappadio v. United States, ante, p. 364. Unlike those cases, this is a criminal contempt proceeding.
Upon petition of the Federal Trade Commission, Cheff was charged, along with Holland Furnace Company and 10 other of its officers, with criminal contempt of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The alleged contemnors were tried before a panel of three judges of the Court of Appeals without a jury. The corporation and three of its officers, including Cheff, were found guilty of violating a previous order of that court. Cheff, a former president and chairman of the board of Hollánd, was sentenced to six months’ imprisonment; the other two officers were fined $500 each; and the corporation was fined $100,000. The remaining eight individuals were acquitted. 341 F. 2d 548. Cheff and Holland petitioned for certiorari. We denied Holland’s petition, 381 U. S. 924, and granted Cheff’s, limited to a review of the question whether, after a denial of a demand for a jury, a sentence of imprisonment of six months is constitutionally permissible under Article III and the Sixth Amendment. 382 U. S. 917. We hold that Cheff was not entitled to a jury trial and affirm the judgment.
I.
The case had its inception in proceedings before the Federal Trade Commission where, in 1954, complaints were issued against Holland charging it with unfair methods of competition and deceptive trade practices in connection with the sale of its products. After extensive hearings, the Commission issued a cease-and-desist order against Holland “and its officers, agents, representatives and employees” prohibiting the continuance of practices the Commission found illegal. In the Matter of Holland Furnace Co., 55 F. T. C. 55 (1958).
Holland petitioned the Court of Appeals to review and set aside the order of the Commission. Soon thereafter the Commission, claiming that Holland was continuing to violate its order, moved the Court of Appeals for a pendente lite order requiring compliance. On August 5, 1959, the court issued an order commanding Holland to “obey and comply with the order to cease and desist . . . unless and until said order shall be set aside upon review by this Court or by the Supreme Court of the United States . . . .” This order forms the basis of this criminal contempt proceeding. Meanwhile, Holland’s petition for review was decided adversely to the corporation. In separate opinions, the Court of Appeals upheld the jurisdiction of the Commission, to enter its cease-and-desist order, 269 F. 2d 203 (1959), and affirmed on the merits, 295 F. 2d 302 (1961).
In March 1962 the Commission petitioned the Court of Appeals to enter a show cause order against Holland for contempt of its pendente lite order. A rule was issued and attorneys appointed to prosecute on behalf of the court. Thereafter, in April 1963, rules were issued against Cheff and the other officers, as individuals, to show cause why they should not be held in criminal contempt “by reason of having knowingly, wilfully and intentionally caused, and aided and abetted in causing, respondent Holland Furnace Company to violate and disobey, and fail and refuse to comply with” the order of August 5, 1959. Cheff demanded a jury trial, which was denied, and following A full hearing extending over a 10-day period the court found him guilty. As we have stated, a sentence of six months was imposed. In accordance with the limited grant of certiorari, there is no issue here as to the sufficiency of the hearing, excepting the absence of a jury.
II.
Cheff first contends that contempt proceedings in the Court of Appeals which stem from administrative law enforcement proceedings are civil, rather than criminal, in nature. This may be true where the purpose of the proceeding is remedial. Cf. Shillitani v. United States, ante, p. 364. Within the context of the question before us, however, the contention is irrelevant, for a jury trial is not required in civil contempt proceedings, as we specifically reaffirm in Shillitani, supra. In any event, the contention is without merit. The purpose of the proceedings against Cheff could not have been remedial for he had severed all connections with Holland in 1962, long before the contempt proceedings were instituted against him. He had no control whatever over the corporation and could no longer require any compliance with the order of the Commission. Moreover, as Cheff himself points out, the corporation “had completely withdrawn from the business of replacement of furnaces, which is the area in which the violation is alleged.” There was, therefore, an “absence of any necessity of assuring future compliance” which made the six-month sentence “entirely punitive.” Brief for Petitioner, p. 16.
There can be no doubt that the courts of appeals have the power to punish for contempt. 18 U. S. C. §401 (1964 ed.). See, e. g., cases cited in United States v. Barnett, 376 U. S. 681, 694, n. 12 (1964). And it matters not that the contempt arises indirectly from proceedings of an administrative agency. Cheff was found in contempt of the Court of Appeals, not of the Commission. The sole ground for the contempt proceedings is stated in the initial order served on Cheff and the other parties to show cause why they should not be adjudged in criminal contempt of that court, for violations of that court’s pendente lite order. Indeed, Cheff’s answer itself verified that he had not violated, disobeyed, and failed and refused to comply with “an order of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit entered on August 5, 1959 . . . (Italics added.) In addition, the Court of Appeals itself was quite specific in limiting the contempt charges to “cover the period from August 5, 1959 to the entry of the final judgment [in October 1961] by this court.” 341 F. 2d, at 550. As the court clearly had the authority to enter its interlocutory order, Federal Trade Commission Act, § 5, 38 Stat. 719, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 45 (c) (1964 ed.), it follows that the court has the power to punish for contempt any disobedience of that order.
Cheff’s next and chief contention is that criminal contempt proceedings are criminal actions falling within the requirements of Article III and the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution. Only two Terms ago we held to the contrary in United States v. Barnett, supra; however, some members of the Court were of the view there that, without regard to the seriousness of the offense, punishment by summary trial without a jury would be constitutionally limited to that penalty provided for petty offenses. 376 U. S., at 694, n. 12. Cheff, however, would have us hold that the right to jury trial attaches in all criminal contempts and not merely in those which are outside the category of “petty offenses.”
Cheff’s argument is unavailing, for we are constrained to view the proceedings here as equivalent to a procedure to prosecute a petty offense, which under our decisions does not require a jury trial. Over 75 years ago in Callan v. Wilson, 127 U. S. 540, 557 (1888), this Court stated that “in that class or grade of offences called petty offences, which, according to the common law, may be proceeded against summarily in any tribunal legally constituted for that purpose,” a jury trial is not required. And as late as 1937 the Court reiterated in District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U. S. 617, 624, that: “It is settled by the decisions of this Court . . . that the right of trial by jury . . . does not extend to every criminal proceeding. At the time of the adoption of the Constitution there were numerous offenses, commonly described as 'petty,’ which were tried summarily without a jury . . . .” See also Natal v. Louisiana, 139 U. S. 621 (1891); Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133, 141-142 (1894); Schick v. United States, 195 U. S. 65, 68-72 (1904); District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U. S. 63, 72-73 (1930). Indeed, Mr. Justice Goldberg, joined by The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Douglas, took the position in his dissenting opinion in United States v. Barnett, supra, at 751, that “at the time of the Constitution all types of 'petty’ offenses punishable by trivial penalties were generally triable without a jury. This history justifies the imposition without trial by jury of no more than trivial penalties for criminal contempts.”
According to 18 U. S. C. § 1 (1964 ed.), “[a]ny misdemeanor, the penalty for which does not exceed imprisonment for a period of six months” is a “petty offense.” Since Cheff received a sentence of six months’ imprisonment (see District of Columbia v. Clawans, supra, at 627-628), and since the nature of criminal contempt, an offense sui generis, does not, of itself, warrant treatment otherwise (cf. District of Columbia v. Colts, supra), Cheff’s offense can be treated only as “petty” in the eyes of the statute and our prior decisions. We conclude therefore that Cheff was properly convicted without a jury. At the same time, we recognize that by limiting our opinion to those cases where a sentence not exceeding six months is imposed we leave the federal courts at sea in instances involving greater sentences. Effective administration compels us to express a view on that point. Therefore, in the exercise of the Court’s supervisory power and under the peculiar power of the federal courts to revise sentences in contempt cases, we rule further that sentences exceeding six months for criminal contempt may not be imposed by federal courts absent a jury trial or waiver thereof. Nothing we have said, however, restricts the power of a reviewing court, in appropriate circumstances, to revise sentences in contempt cases tried with or without juries.
The judgment in this case is
Affirmed.
Mr. Justice Stewart, joining Part I of Mr. Justice Harlan’s separate opinion, concurs in the result.
Mr. Justice White took no part in the decision of this case.
Mr. Justice Harlan, concurring in the result in No. 67 and dissenting in Nos. 412 and 442.
By the opinions in these cases, two new limitations on the use of the federal contempt power are inaugurated. In Cheff, it is announced that prison sentences for criminal contempt in a federal court must be limited to six months unless the defendant is afforded a trial by jury. In Shillitani and Pappadio, an automatic “purge” clause and related indicia are found to convert a criminal sentence into a civil sanction which cannot survive the grand jury’s expiration. I believe these limitations are erroneous in reasoning and result alike.
I.
The decision to extend the right to jury trial to criminal contempts ending in sentences greater than six months is the product of the views of four Justices who rest that conclusion on the Court’s supervisory power and those of two others who believe that jury trials are constitutionally required in all but “petty” criminal contempts. The four Justices who rely on the supervisory power also find the constitutional question a “difficult” one. Ante, at 365. However, as recently as 1958, this Court in Green v. United States, 356 U. S. 165, unequivocally declared that the prosecution of criminal contempts was not subject to the grand and petit jury requirements of Art. Ill, § 2, of the Constitution and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. This doctrine, which was accepted by federal judges in the early days of the Republic and has been steadfastly adhered to in case after case in this Court, should be recognized now as a definitive answer to petitioners’ constitutional claims in each of the cases before us.
The prevailing opinion’s new supervisory-power rule seems to me equally infirm. The few sentences devoted to this dictum give no reason why a six-month limitation is desirable. Nor is there anything about the sentences actually imposed in these instances that warrants reappraisal of the present practice in contempt sentencing. In Cheff itself the sentence was for six months. Shillitani and Pappadio involved two-year sentences but each was moderated by a purge clause and seemingly in neither case were there disputed facts suitable for a jury. Among the prominent shortcomings of the new rule, which are simply disregarded, is the difficulty it may generate for federal courts seeking to implement locally unpopular decrees. Another problem is in administration: to decide whether to proffer a jury trial, the judge must now look ahead to the sentence, which itself depends on the precise facts the trial is to reveal.
In my view, before this Court improvises a rule necessarily based on pure policy that largely shrugs off history, a far more persuasive showing can properly be expected.
II.
No less remarkable is the Court’s upsetting of the sentences in Shillitani and Pappadio on the ground that the jailings were really for civil contempt which cannot endure beyond the grand jury’s term. It can hardly be suggested that the lower courts did not intend to invoke the criminal contempt power to keep the petitioners in jail after the grand jury expired; the contrary is demonstrated by the entire record. Instead, the Court attempts to characterize the proceedings by a supposed primary or essential “purpose” and then lops off so much of the sentences as do not conform to that purpose. What the Court fails to do is to give any reason in policy, precedent, statute law, or the Constitution for its unspoken premise that a sentencing judge cannot combine two purposes into a single sentence of the type here imposed.
Without arguing about which purpose was primary, obviously a fixed sentence with a purge clause can be said to embody elements of both criminal and civil contempt. However, so far as the safeguards of criminal contempt proceedings may be superior to civil, the petitioners have not been disadvantaged in this regard, nor do they claim otherwise. Adding a purge clause to a fixed sentence is a benefit for the petitioners, not a reason for complaint. Similarly the public interest is served by exerting strong pressure to obtain answers while tailoring the length of imprisonment so that it may punish the defendant only for his period of recalcitrance and no more. I see no reason why a fixed sentence with an automatic purge clause should be deemed impermissible.
For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the judgments in all three cases on the basis of Green and leave the authority of that case unimpaired.
The relevant portions of these provisions declare:
“The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury . . . .” Art. Ill, § 2.
“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury . . . .” Sixth Amendment.
E. g., Ex parte Burr, 4 Fed. Cas. 791, 797 (No. 2,186) (C. C. D. C. 1823) (Cranch, C. J.):
“[C]ases of contempt of court have never been considered as crimes within the meaning and intention of the second section of the third article of the constitution of the United States; nor have attachments for contempt ever been considered as criminal prosecutions within the sixth amendment. . . . Many members of the [constitutional] convention were members of the first congress, and it cannot be believed that they would have silently acquiesced in so palpable a violation of the then recent constitution, as would have been contained in the seventeenth section of the judiciary act of 1789 (1 Stat. 73), — which authorizes all the courts of the United States ‘to punish by fine and imprisonment, at the discretion of the said courts, all contempts of authority in any cause or hearing before the same,’ — if their construction of the constitution had been that which has, in this case, been contended for at the bar.”
See Ex parte Terry, 128 U. S. 289, 313 (1888) (Harlan, J.); Savin, Petitioner, 131 U. S. 267, 278 (1889) (Harlan, J.); Eilenbecker v. Plymouth County, 134 U. S. 31, 36 (1890) (Miller, J.); Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Brimson, 154 U. S. 447, 489 (1894) (Harlan, J.); Bessette v. W. B. Conkey Co., 194 U. S. 324, 336-337 (1904) (Brewer, J.); Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U. S. 418, 450 (1911) (Lamar, J.); Gompers v. United States, 233 U. S. 604, 610-611 (1914) (Holmes, J.); Ex parte Hudgings, 249 U. S. 378, 383 (1919) (White, C. J.); Myers v. United States, 264 U. S. 95, 104-105 (1924) (McReynolds, J.); Michaelson v. United States, 266 U. S. 42, 67 (1924) (Sutherland, J. ); Ex parte Grossman, 267 U. S. 87, 117-118 (1925) (Taft, C. J.); Fisher v. Pace, 336 U. S. 155, 159-160 (1949) (Reed, J.); Offutt v. United States, 348 U. S. 11, 14 (1954) (Frankfurter, J.).
This question was never raised in Pappadio nor encompassed by the limited grant of certiorari in that case, see 382 U. S. 916; in Shillitani, where the issue is properly before the Court, petitioner filed a certiorari petition discussing the point but tendered no brief on the merits on any phase of the case.
For example, in each case the Judgment and Commitment states that “the defendant is guilty of criminal contempt” and orders him committed “for a period of Two (2) Years, or until further order of this Court,” should the questions be answered within that period before the grand jury expires.
The two-year sentences imposed on Shillitani and Pappadio do not call for the exercise of this Court’s corrective power over contempt sentences, see Green, 356 U. S., at 187-189; as has been noted, both sentences carried purge clauses.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | A | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
MR. Chief Justice Burger
delivered the opinion of the Court.
We granted certiorari in this case to decide whether a search warrant is required before federal agents may open a locked footlocker which they have lawfully seized at the time of the arrest of its owners, when there is probable cause to believe the footlocker contains contraband.
(1)
On May 8, 1973, Amtrak railroad officials in San Diego observed respondents Gregory Machado and Bridget Leary load a brown footlocker onto a train bound for Boston. Their suspicions were aroused when they noticed that the trunk was unusually heavy for its size, and that it was leaking talcum powder, a substance often used to mask the odor of marihuana or hashish. Because Machado matched a profile used to spot drug traffickers, the railroad officials reported these circumstances to federal agents in San Diego, who in turn relayed the information, together with detailed descriptions of Machado and the footlocker, to their counterparts in Boston.
When the train arrived in Boston two days later, federal narcotics agents were on hand. Though the officers had not obtained an arrest or search warrant, they had with them a police dog trained to detect marihuana. The agents identified Machado and Leary and kept them under surveillance as they claimed their suitcases and the footlocker, which had been transported by baggage cart from the train to the departure area. Machado and Leary lifted the footlocker from the baggage cart, placed it on the floor and sat down on it.
The agents then released the dog near the footlocker. Without alerting respondents, the dog signaled the presence of a controlled substance inside. Respondent Chadwick then joined Machado and Leary, and they engaged an attendant to move the footlocker outside to Chadwick’s waiting automobile. Machado, Chadwick, and the attendant together lifted the 200-pound footlocker into the trunk of the car, while Leary waited in'the front seat. At that point, while the trunk of the car was still open and before the car engine had been started, the officers arrested all three. A search disclosed no weapons, but the keys to the footlocker were apparently taken from Machado.
Respondents were taken to the Federal Building in Boston; the agents followed with Chadwick’s car and the footlocker. As the Government concedes, from the moment of respondents’ arrests at about 9 p. m., the footlocker remained under the exclusive control of law enforcement officers at all times. The footlocker and luggage were placed in the Federal Building, where, as one of the agents later testified, “there was no risk that whatever was contained in the footlocker trunk would be removed by the defendants or their associates.” App. 44. The agents had no reason to believe that the footlocker contained explosives or other inherently dangerous items, or that it contained evidence which would lose its value unless the footlocker were opened at once. Facilities were readily available in which the footlocker could have been stored securely; it is not contended that there was any exigency calling for an immediate search.
At the Federal Building an hour and a half after the arrests, the agents opened the footlocker and luggage. They did not obtain respondents’ consent; they did not secure a search warrant. The footlocker was locked with a padlock and a regular trunk lock. It is unclear whether it was opened with the keys taken from respondent Machado, or by other means. Large amounts of marihuana were found in the footlocker.
Respondents were indicted for possession of marihuana with intent to distribute it, in violation of 21 U. S. C. § 841 (a) (1), and for conspiracy, in violation of 21 U. S. C. § 846. Before trial, they moved to suppress the marihuana obtained from the footlocker. In the District Court, the Government sought to justify its failure to secure a search warrant under the “automobile exception” of Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42 (1970), and as a search incident to the arrests. Holding that “ [warrantless searches are per se unreasonable, subject to a few carefully delineated and limited exceptions,” the District Court rejected both justifications. 393 F. Supp. 763, 771 (Mass. 1975). The court saw the relationship between the footlocker and Chadwick’s automobile as merely coincidental, and held that the double-locked, 200-pound footlocker was not part of “the area from within which [respondents] might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.” Chimel v. California, 395 U. S. 752, 763 (1969).
A divided Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the suppression of the seized marihuana. The court held that the footlocker had been properly taken into federal custody after respondents’ lawful arrest; it also agreed that the agents had probable cause to believe that the footlocker contained a controlled substance when they opened it. But probable cause alone was held not enough to sustain the warrantless search. On the premise that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable unless they fall within some established exception to the warrant requirement, the Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court that the footlocker search was not justified either under the “automobile exception” or as a search incident to a lawful arrest.
The Court of Appeals then responded to an argument, suggested by the Government for the first time on appeal, that movable personalty lawfully seized in a public place should be subject to search without a warrant if there exists probable cause to believe it contains evidence of a crime. Conceding that such personalty shares some characteristics of mobility which support warrantless automobile searches, the court nevertheless concluded that a rule permitting a search of personalty on probable cause alone had not yet “received sufficient recognition by the Supreme Court outside the automobile area, or generally, for us to recognize it as a valid exception to the fourth amendment warrant requirement.” 532 F. 2d 773, 781 (1976). We granted certiorari, 429 U. S. 814 (1976). We affirm.
(2)
In this Court the Government again contends that the Fourth Amendment Warrant Clause protects only interests traditionally identified with the home. Recalling the colonial writs of assistance, which were often executed in searches of private dwellings, the Government claims that the Warrant Clause was adopted primarily, if not exclusively, in response to unjustified intrusions into private homes on the authority of general warrants. The Government argues there is no evidence that the Framers of the Fourth Amendment intended to disturb the established practice of permitting warrantless searches outside the home, or to modify the initial clause of the Fourth Amendment by making warrantless searches supported by probable cause per se unreasonable.
Drawing on its reading of history, the Government argues that only homes, offices, and private communications implicate interests which lie at the core of the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, it is only in these contexts that the determination whether a search or seizure is reasonable should turn on whether a warrant has been obtained. In all other situations, the Government contends, less significant privacy values are at stake, and the reasonableness of a government intrusion should depend solely on whether there is probable cause to believe evidence of criminal conduct is present. Where personal effects are lawfully seized outside the home on probable cause, the Government would thus regard searches without a warranty not “unreasonable.”
We do not agree that the Warrant Clause protects only dwellings and other specifically designated locales. As we have noted before, the Fourth Amendment “protects people, not places,” Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 351 (1967); more particularly, it protects people from unreasonable government intrusions into their legitimate expectations of privacy. In this case, the Warrant Clause makes a significant contribution to that protection. The question, then, is whether a warrantless search in these circumstances was unreasonable.
(3)
It cannot be doubted that the Fourth Amendment’s commands grew in large measure out of the colonists’ experience with the writs of assistance and their memories of the general warrants formerly in use in England. These writs, which were issued on executive rather than judicial authority, granted sweeping power to customs officials and other agents of the King to search at large for smuggled goods. Though the authority to search granted by the writs was not limited to the home, searches conducted pursuant to them often were carried out in private residences. See generally Stanford v. Texas, 379 U. S. 476, 481-485 (1965); Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U. S. 717, 724-729 (1961); Frank v. Maryland, 359 U. S. 360 (1959).
Although the searches and seizures which deeply concerned the colonists, and which were foremost in the minds of the Framers, were those involving invasions of the home, it would be a mistake to conclude, as the Government contends, that the Warrant Clause was therefore intended to guard only against intrusions into the home. First, the Warrant Clause does not in terms distinguish between searches conducted in private homes and other searches. There is also a strong historical connection between the Warrant Clause and the initial clause of the Fourth Amendment, which draws no distinctions among “persons, houses, papers, and effects” in safeguarding against unreasonable searches and seizures. See United States v. Rabinowits, 339 U. S. 56, 68 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
Moreover, if there is little evidence that the Framers intended the Warrant Clause to operate outside the home, there is no evidence at all that they intended to exclude from protection of the Clause all searches occurring outside the home. The absence of a contemporary outcry against war-rantless searches in public places was because, aside from searches incident to arrest, such warrantless searches were not a large issue in colonial America. Thus, silence in the historical record tells us little about the Framers' attitude toward application of the Warrant Clause to the search of respondents’ footlocker. What we do know is that the Framers were men who focused on the wrongs of that day but who intended the Fourth Amendment to safeguard fundamental values which would far outlast the specific abuses which gave it birth.
Moreover, in this area we do not write on a clean slate. Our fundamental inquiry in considering Fourth Amendment issues is whether or not a search or seizure is reasonable under all the circumstances. Cooper v. California, 386 U. S. 58 (1967). The judicial warrant has a significant role to play in that it provides the detached scrutiny of a neutral magistrate, which is a more reliable safeguard against improper searches than the hurried judgment of a law enforcement officer “engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.” Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 14 (1948). Once a lawful search has begun, it is also far more likely that it will not exceed proper bounds when it is done pursuant to a judicial authorization “particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.” Further, a warrant assures the individual whose property is searched or seized of the lawful authority of the executing officer, his need to search, and the limits of his power to search. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 532 (1967).
Just as the Fourth Amendment “protects people, not places,” the protections a judicial warrant offers against erroneous governmental intrusions are effective whether applied in or out of the home. Accordingly, we have held warrantless searches unreasonable, and therefore unconstitutional, in a variety of settings. A century ago, Mr. Justice Field, speaking for the Court, included within the reach of the Warrant Clause printed matter traveling through the mails within the United States:
“Letters and sealed packages of this kind in the mail are as fully guarded from examination and inspection, except as to their outward form and weight, as if they were retained by the parties forwarding them in their own domiciles. The constitutional guaranty of the right of the people to be secure in their papers against unreasonable searches and seizures extends to their papers, thus closed against inspection, wherever they may be. Whilst in the mail, they can only be opened and examined under like warrant, issued upon similar oath or affirmation, particularly describing the thing to be seized, as is required when papers are subjected to search in one’s own household.” Ex parte Jackson, 96 U. S. 727, 733 (1878).
We reaffirmed Jackson in United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U. S. 249 (1970), where a search warrant was obtained to open two packages which, on mailing, the sender had declared contained only coins. Judicial warrants have been required for other searches conducted outside the home. E. g., Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967) (electronic interception of conversation in public telephone booth); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 (1971) (automobile on private premises); Preston v. United States, 376 U. S. 364 (1964) (automobile in custody); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U. S. 48 (1961) (hotel room); G. M. Leasing Corp, v. United States, 429 U. S. 338 (1977) (office); Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U. S. 364 (1968) (office). These cases illustrate the applicability of the Warrant Clause beyond the narrow limits suggested by the Government. They also reflect the settled constitutional principle, discussed earlier, that a fundamental purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to safeguard individuals from unreasonable government invasions of legitimate privacy interests, and not simply those interests found inside the four walls of the home. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 27 (1949).
In this case, important Fourth Amendment privacy interests were at stake. By placing personal effects inside a double-locked footlocker, respondents manifested an expectation that the contents would remain free from public examination. No less than one who locks the doors of his home against intruders, one who safeguards his personal possessions in this manner is due the protection of the Fourth Amendment Warrant Clause. There being no exigency, it was unreasonable for the Government to conduct this search without the safeguards a judicial warrant provides.
(4)
The Government does not contend that the footlocker’s brief contact with Chadwick’s car makes this an automobile search, but it is argued that the rationale of our automobile search cases demonstrates the reasonableness of permitting warrantless searches of luggage; the Government views such luggage as analogous to motor vehicles for Fourth Amendment purposes. It is true that, like the footlocker in issue here, automobiles are “effects” under the Fourth Amendment, and searches and seizures of automobiles are therefore subject to the constitutional standard of reasonableness. But this Court has recognized significant differences between motor vehicles and other property which permit warrantless searches of automobiles in circumstances in which warrantless searches would not be reasonable in other contexts. Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132 (1925); Preston v. United States, supra, at 366-367; Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42 (1970). See also South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U. S. 364, 367 (1976).
Our treatment of automobiles has been based in part on their inherent mobility, which often makes obtaining a judicial warrant impracticable. Nevertheless, we have also sustained “warrantless searches of vehicles ... in cases in which the possibilities of the vehicle’s being removed or evidence in it destroyed were remote, if not nonexistent.” . Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U. S. 433, 441-442 (1973); accord, South Dakota v. Opperman, supra, at 367; see Texas v. White, 423 U. S. 67 (1975); Chambers v. Maroney, supra; Cooper v. California, 386 U. S. 58 (1967).
The answer lies in the diminished expectation of privacy which surrounds the automobile:
“One has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle because its function is transportation and it seldom serves as one’s residence or as the repository of personal effects. ... It travels public thoroughfares where both its occupants and its contents are in plain view.” Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U. S. 583, 590 (1974) (plurality opinion).
Other factors reduce automobile privacy. “All States require vehicles to be registered and operators to be licensed. States and localities have enacted extensive and detailed codes regulating the condition and manner in which motor vehicles may be operated on public streets and highways.” Cady v. Dombrowski, supra, at 441. Automobiles periodically undergo official inspection, and they are often taken into police custody in the interests of public safety. South Dakota v. Opperman, supra, at 368.
The factors which diminish the privacy aspects of an automobile do not apply to respondents’ footlocker. Luggage contents are not open to public view, except as a condition to a border entry or common carrier travel; nor is luggage subject to regular inspections and official • scrutiny on a continuing basis. Unlike an automobile, whose primary function is transportation, luggage is intended as a repository of personal effects. In sum, a person’s expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile.
Nor does the footlocker’s mobility justify dispensing with the added protections of the Warrant Clause. Once the federal agents had seized it at the railroad station and had safely transferred it to the Boston Federal Building under their exclusive control, there was not the slightest danger that the footlocker or its contents could have been removed before a valid search warrant could be obtained. The initial seizure and detention of the footlocker, the validity of which respondents do not contest, were sufficient to guard against any risk that evidence might be lost. With the footlocker safely immobilized, it was unreasonable to undertake the additional and greater intrusion of a search without a warrant.
Finally, the Government urges that the Constitution permits the warrantless search- of any property in the possession of a person arrested in public, so long as there is probable cause to believe that the property contains contraband or evidence of crime. Although recognizing that the footlocker was not within respondents’ immediate control, the Government insists that the search was reasonable because the footlocker was seized contemporaneously with respondents' arrests and was searched as soon thereafter as was practicable. The reasons justifying search in a custodial arrest are quite different. When a custodial arrest is made, there is always some danger that the person arrested may seek to use a weapon, or that evidence may be concealed or destroyed. To safeguard himself and others, and to prevent the loss of evidence, it has been held reasonable for the arresting officer to conduct a prompt, warrantless “search of the arrestee’s person and the area ‘within his immediate control’ — construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.” Chimel v. California, 395 U. S., at 763. See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968).
Such searches may be conducted without a warrant, and they may also be made whether or not there is probable cause to believe that the person arrested may have a weapon or is about to destroy evidence. The potential dangers lurking in all custodial arrests make warrantless searches of items within the “immediate control” area reasonable without requiring the arresting officer to calculate the probability that weapons or destructible evidence may be involved. United States v. Robinson, 414 U. S. 218 (1973); Terry v. Ohio, supra. However, warrantless searches of luggage or other property seized at the time of an arrest cannot be justified as incident to that arrest either if the “search is remote in time or place from the arrest,” Preston v. United States, 376 U. S., at 367, or no exigency exists. Once law enforcement officers have reduced luggage or other personal property not immediately associated with the person of the arrestee to their exclusive control, and there is no longer any danger that the arrestee might gain access to the property to seize a weapon or destroy evidence, a search of that property is no longer an incident of the arrest.
Here the search was conducted more than an hour after federal agents had gained exclusive control of the footlocker and long after respondents were securely in custody; the search therefore cannot be viewed as incidental to the arrest or as justified by any other exigency. Even though on this record the issuance of a warrant by a judicial officer was reasonably predictable, a line must be drawn. In our view, when no exigency is shown to support the need for an immediate search, the Warrant Clause places the line at the point where the property to be searched comes under the exclusive dominion of police authority. Respondents were therefore entitled to the protection of the Warrant Clause with the evaluation of a neutral magistrate, before their privacy-interests in the contents of the footlocker were invaded.
Accordingly, the judgment is
Affirmed.
Marihuana was also found in the suitcases. The Court of Appeals found no adequate justification for the warrantless suitcase search, and suppressed this evidence. Incriminating statements made by respondent Chadwick during the arrest procedure were also suppressed, on the theory that there had not been probable cause to arrest him and that his statements were therefore tainted as the product of an illegal arrest. However, the petition for certiorari draws into question only the footlocker search; consequently, we need not pass on the legality of Chadwick’s arrest or the search of the suitcases.
The Fourth Amendment provides:
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papersj and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”
In this Court the Government has limited the question presented to “[w]hether a search warrant is required before federal agents may open a locked footlocker that is properly in their possession and that they have probable cause to believe contains contraband.” Accordingly, this case presents no issue of the application of the exclusionary rule.
The Government’s historical analysis is further undercut by its own arguments. The Government acknowledges that the core values the Fourth Amendment protects are privacy interests. In its view, those privacy interests which should receive the “maximum protection from governmental search or seizure” provided by the Warrant Clause include private oral and electronic communication, “[i]n addition to the home and other structures such as an office or hotel room . . . .” Brief for United States 30. It is not readily apparent how the Government’s contention that the Warrant Clause applies to high privacy areas, both within and without the home, can be reconciled with its earlier contention that judicial warrants are appropriate only for searches conducted within private dwellings.
In circumstances involving noncriminal inventory searches, where probable cause to search is irrelevant, we have recognized "that search warrants are not required, linked as the warrant requirement textually is to the probable-cause concept.” South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U. S. 364, 370 n. 5 (1976). This is so because the salutary functions of a warrant simply have no application in that context; the constitutional reasonableness of inventory searches must be determined on other bases.
This has been settled law in this Court for over 90 years. At least since Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616 (1886), we have known that “[i]t is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offence; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and private property . . . .” Id., at 630.
This is not to say that the Fourth Amendment translates precisely into a constitutional privacy right. See Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 350-351 (1967).
This may often not be the case when automobiles are seized, Absolutely secure storage facilities may not be available, see South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U. S. 364 (1976); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U. S. 433 (1973), and the size and inherent mobility of a vehicle malee it susceptible to theft or intrusion by vandals.
Respondents’ principal privacy interest in the footlocker was, of course, not in the container itself, which was exposed to public view, but in its contents. A search of the interior was therefore a far greater intrusion into Fourth Amendment values than the impoundment of the footlocker. Though surely a substantial infringement of’respondents’ use and possession, the seizure did not diminish respondents’ legitimate expectation that the footlocker’s contents would remain private.
It was the greatly reduced expectation of privacy in the automobile, coupled with the transportation function of the vehicle, which made the Court in Chambers unwilling to decide whether an immediate search of an automobile, or its seizure and indefinite immobilization, constituted a greater interference with the rights of the owner. This is clearly not the case with locked luggage.
Of course, there may be other justifications for a warrantless search of luggage taken from a suspect at the time of his arrest; for example, if officers have reason to believe that luggage contains some immediately dangerous instrumentality, such as explosives, it would be foolhardy to transport it to the station house without opening the luggage and dis>arming the weapon. See, e. g., United States v. Johnson, 467 F. 2d 630, 639 (CA2 1972).
TMike searches of the person, United States v. Robinson, 414 U. S. 218 (1973); United States v. Edwards, 415 U. S. 800 (1974), searches of possessions within an arrestee’s immediate control cannot be justified by any reduced expectations of privacy caused by the arrest. Respondents’ privacy interest in the contents of the footlocker was not eliminated simply because they were under arrest.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | A | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Kennedy
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The central question before us is whether a judicial hearing is required before the State may treat a mentally ill prisoner with antipsychotic drugs against his will. Resolution of the case requires us to discuss the protections afforded the prisoner under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
I
Respondent Walter Harper was sentenced to prison in 1976 for robbery. From 1976 to 1980, he was incarcerated at the Washington State Penitentiary. Most of that time, respondent was housed in the prison’s mental health unit, where he consented to the administration of antipsychotic drugs. Antipsychotic drugs, sometimes called “neuroleptics” or “psychotropic drugs,” are medications commonly used in treating mental disorders such as schizophrenia. Brief for American Psychiatric Association et al. as Amici Curiae 2-3, n. 1. As found by the trial court, the effect of these and similar drugs is to alter the chemical balance in the brain, the desired result being that the medication will assist the patient in organizing his or her thought procésses and regaining a rational state of mind. See App. to Pet. for Cert. B-7.
Respondent was paroled in 1980 on the condition that he participate in psychiatric treatment. While on parole, he continued to receive treatment at the psychiatric ward at Harborview Medical Center in Seattle, Washington, and was later sent to Western State Hospital pursuant to a civil commitment order. In December 1981, the State revoked respondent’s parole after he assaulted two nurses at a hospital in Seattle.
Upon his return to prison, respondent was sent to the Special Offender Center (SOC or Center), a 144-bed correctional institute established by the Washington Department of Corrections to diagnose and treat convicted felons with serious mental disorders. At the Center, psychiatrists first diagnosed respondent as suffering from a manic-depressive disorder. At first, respondent gave voluntary consent to treatment, including the administration of antipsychotic medications. In November 1982, he refused to continue taking the prescribed medications. The treating physician then sought to medicate respondent over his objections, pursuant to SOC Policy 600.30.,
Policy 600.30 was developed in partial response to this Court’s decision in Vitek v. Jones, 445 U. S. 480 (1980). The Policy has several substantive and procedural components. First, if a psychiatrist determines that an inmate should be treated with antipsychotic drugs but the inmate does not consent, the inmate may be subjected to involuntary treatment with the drugs only if he (1) suffers from a “mental disorder” and (2) is “gravely disabled” or poses a “likelihood of serious harm” to himself, others, or their property. Only a psychiatrist may order or approve the medication. Second, an inmate who refuses to take the medication voluntarily is entitled to a hearing before a special committee consisting of a psychiatrist, a psychologist, and the Associate Superintendent of the Center, none of whom may be, at the time of the hearing, involved in the inmate’s treatment or diagnosis. If the committee determines by a majority vote that the inmate suffers from a mental disorder and is gravely disabled or dangerous, the inmate may be medicated against his will, provided the psychiatrist is in the majority.
Third, the inmate has certain procedural rights before, during, and after the hearing. He must be given at least 24 hours’ notice of the Center’s intent to convene an involuntary medication hearing, during which time he may not be medicated. In addition, he must receive notice of the tentative diagnosis, the factual basis for the diagnosis, and why the staff believes medication is necessary. At the hearing, the inmate has the right to attend; to present evidence, including witnesses; to cross-examine staff witnesses; and to the assistance of a lay adviser who has not been involved in his case and who understands the psychiatric issues involved. Minutes of the hearing must be kept, and a copy provided to the inmate. The inmate has the right to appeal the committee’s decision to the Superintendent of the Center within 24 hours, and the Superintendent must decide the appeal within 24 hours after its receipt. See App. to Pet. for Cert. B-3. The inmate may seek judicial review of a committee decision in state court by means of a personal restraint petition or extraordinary writ. See Wash. Rules App. Proc. 16.3 to 16.17; App. to Pet. for Cert. B-8.
Fourth, after the initial hearing, involuntary medication can continue only with periodic review. When respondent first refused medication, a committee, again composed of a nontreating psychiatrist, a psychologist, and the Center’s Associate Superintendent, was required to review an inmate’s case after the first seven days of treatment. If the committee reapproved the treatment, the treating psychiatrist was required to review the case and prepare a report for the Department of Corrections medical director every 14 days while treatment continued.
In this case, respondent was absent when members of the Center staff met with the committee before the hearing. The committee then conducted the hearing in accordance with the Policy, with respondent being present and assisted by a nurse practitioner from another institution. The committee found that respondent was a danger to others as a result of a mental disease or disorder, and approved the involuntary administration of antipsychotic drugs. On appeal, the Superintendent upheld the committee’s findings. Beginning on November 23, 1982, respondent was involuntarily medicated for about one year. Periodic review occurred in accordance with the Policy.
In November 1983, respondent was transferred from the Center to the Washington State Reformatory. While there, he took no medication, and as a result, his condition deteriorated. He was retransferred to the Center after only one month. Respondent was the subject of another committee hearing in accordance with Policy 600.30, and the committee again approved medication against his will. Respondent continued to receive antipsychotic drugs, subject to the required periodic reviews, until he was transferred to the Washington State Penitentiary in June 1986.
In February 1985, respondent filed suit in state court under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 (1982 ed.) against various individual defendants and the State, claiming that the failure to provide a judicial hearing before the involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication violated the Due Process, Equal Protection, and Free Speech Clauses of both the Federal and State Constitutions, as well as state tort law. He sought both damages and declaratory and injunctive relief. After a bench trial in March 1987, the court held that, although respondent had a liberty interest in not being subjected to the involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication, the procedures contained in the Policy met the requirements of due process as stated in Vitek.
On appeal, the Washington Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to the trial court. 110 Wash. 2d 873, 759 P. 2d 358 (1988). Agreeing with the trial court that respondent had a liberty interest in refusing antipsychotic medications, the court concluded that the “highly intrusive nature” of treatment with antipsychotic medications warranted greater procedural protections than those necessary to protect the liberty interests at stake in Vitek. 110 Wash. 2d, at 880-881, 759 P. 2d, at 363. It held that, under the Due Process Clause, the State could administer antipsychotic medication to a competent, nonconsenting inmate only if, in a judicial hearing at which the inmate had the full panoply of adversarial procedural protections, the State proved by “clear, cogent, and convincing” evidence that the administration of antipsychotic medication was both necessary and effective for furthering a compelling state interest. Id., at 883-884, 759 P. 2d, at 364-365.
We granted certiorari, 489 U. S. 1064 (1989), and we reverse.
II
Respondent contends that because the State has ceased administering antipsychotic drugs to him against his will, the case is moot. We disagree.
Even if we confine our attention to those facts found in the record, a live case or controversy between the parties remains. There is no evidence that respondent has recovered from his mental illness. Since being sentenced to prison in 1976, he has been diagnosed and treated for a serious mental disorder. Even while on parole, respondent continued to receive treatment, at one point under a civil commitment order, at state mental hospitals. At the time of trial, after his transfer from the Center for a second time, respondent was still diagnosed as suffering from schizophrenia.
Respondent continues to serve his sentence in the Washington state prison system, and is subject to transfer to the Center at any time. Given his medical history, and the fact that he has been transferred not once but twice to the Center from other state penal institutions during the period 1982-1986, it is reasonable to conclude that there is a strong likelihood that respondent may again be transferred to the Center. Once there, given his medical history, it is likely that, absent the holding of the Washington Supreme Court, Center officials would seek to administer antipsychotic medications pursuant to Policy 600.30.
On the record before us, the case is not moot. The alleged injury likely would recur but for the decision of the Washington Supreme Court. This sufficiently overcomes the claim of mootness in the circumstances of the case and under our precedents. See Vitek, 445 U. S., at 486-487.
Ill
The Washington Supreme Court gave its primary attention to the procedural component of the Due Process Clause. It phrased the issue before it as whether “a prisoner [is] entitled to a judicial hearing before antipsychotic drugs can be administered against his will.” 110 Wash. 2d, at 874, 759 P. 2d, at 360. The court, however, did more than establish judicial procedures for making the factual determinations called for by Policy 600.30. It required that a different set of determinations than those set forth in the Policy be made as a precondition to medication without the inmate’s consent. Instead of having to prove, pursuant to the Policy, only that the mentally ill inmate is “gravely disabled” or that he presents a “serious likelihood of harm” to himself or others, the court required the State to prove that it has a compelling interest in administering the medication and that the administration of the drugs is necessary and effective to further that interest. The decisionmaker was required further to consider and make written findings regarding either the inmate’s desires or a “substituted judgment” for the inmate analogous to the medical treatment decision for an incompetent person. Id., at 883-884, 759 P. 2d, at 365.
The Washington Supreme Court’s decision, as a result, has both substantive and procedural aspects. It is axiomatic that procedural protections must be examined in terms of the substantive rights at stake. But identifying the contours of the substantive right remains a task distinct from deciding what procedural protections are necessary to protect that right. “[T]he substantive issue involves a definition of th[e] protected constitutional interest, as well as identification of the conditions under which competing state interests might outweigh it. The procedural issue concerns the minimum procedures required by the Constitution for determining that the individual’s liberty interest actually is outweighed in a particular instance.” Mills v. Rogers, 457 U. S. 291, 299 (1982) (citations omitted).
Restated in the terms of this case, the substantive issue is what factual circumstances must exist before the State may administer antipsychotic drugs to the prisoner against his will; the procedural issue is whether the State’s nonjudicial mechanisms used to determine the facts in a particular case are sufficient. The Washington Supreme Court in effect ruled upon the substance of the inmate’s right, as well as the procedural guarantees, and both are encompassed by our grant of certiorari. We address these questions beginning with the substantive one.
As a matter of state law, the Policy itself undoubtedly confers upon respondent a right to be free from the arbitrary administration of antipsychotic medication. In Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U. S. 460 (1983), we held that Pennsylvania had created a protected liberty interest on the part of prison inmates to avoid administrative segregation by enacting regulations that “used language of an unmistakably mandatory character, requiring that certain procedures ‘shall,’ ‘will,’ or ‘must’ be employed, and that administrative segregation will not occur absent specified substantive predicates — viz., ‘the need for control,’ or ‘the threat of a serious disturbance.’” Id., at 471-472 (citations omitted). Policy 600.30 is similarly mandatory in character. By permitting a psychiatrist to treat an inmate with antipsychotic drugs against his wishes only if he is found to be (1) mentally ill and (2) gravely disabled or dangerous, the Policy creates a justifiable expectation on the part of the inmate that the drugs will not be administered unless those conditions exist. See also Vitek, 445 U. S., at 488-491.
We have no doubt that, in addition to the liberty interest created by the State’s Policy, respondent possesses a significant liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id., at 491-494; Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U. S. 307, 316 (1982); Parham v. J. R., 442 U. S. 584, 600-601 (1979). Upon full consideration of the state administrative scheme, however, we find that the Due Process Clause confers upon respondent no greater right than that recognized under state law.
Respondent contends that the State, under the mandate of the Due Process Clause, may not override his choice to refuse antipsychotic drugs unless he has been found to be incompetent, and then only if the factfinder makes a substituted judgment that he, if competent, would consent to drug treatment. We disagree. The extent of a prisoner’s right under the Clause to avoid the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs must be defined in the context of the inmate’s confinement. The Policy under review requires the State to establish, by a medical finding, that a mental disorder exists which is likely to cause harm if not treated. Moreover, the fact that the medication must first be prescribed by a psychiatrist, and then approved by a reviewing psychiatrist, ensures that the treatment in question will be ordered only if it is in the prisoner’s medical interests, given the legitimate needs of his institutional confinement. These standards, which recognize both the prisoner’s medical interests and the State’s interests, meet the demands of the Due Process Clause.
The legitimacy, and the necessity, of considering the State’s interests in prison safety and security are well established by our cases. In Turner v. Safley, 482 U. S. 78 (1987), and O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U. S. 342 (1987), we held that the proper standard for determining the validity of a prison regulation claimed to infringe on an inmate’s constitutional rights is to ask whether the regulation is “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Turner, supra, at 89. This is true even when the constitutional right claimed to have been infringed is fundamental, and the State under other circumstances would have been required to satisfy a more rigorous standard of review. Estate of Shabazz, supra, at 349. The Washington Supreme Court declined to apply this standard of review to the Center’s Policy, reasoning that the liberty interest present here was distinguishable from the First Amendment rights at issue in both Turner and Estate of Shabazz. 110 Wash. 2d, at 883, n. 9, 759 P. 2d, at 364, n. 9. The court erred in refusing to apply the standard of reasonableness.
Our earlier determination to adopt this standard of review was based upon the need to reconcile our longstanding adherence to the principle that inmates retain at least some constitutional rights despite incarceration with the recognition that prison authorities are best equipped to make difficult decisions regarding prison administration. Turner, supra, at 84-85; Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U. S. 119, 128 (1977). These two principles apply in all cases in which a prisoner asserts that a prison regulation violates the Constitution, not just those in which the prisoner invokes the First Amendment. We made quite clear that the standard of review we adopted in Turner applies to all circumstances in which the needs of prison administration implicate constitutional rights. See Turner, 482 U. S., at 85 (“Our task... is to formulate a standard of review for prisoners’ constitutional claims that is responsive both to the ‘policy of judicial restraint regarding prisoner complaints and [to] the need to protect constitutional rights’”) (citation omitted); id., at 89 (“If Pell, Jones, and Bell have not already resolved the question posed in [Procunier v.] Martinez, [416 U. S. 396 (1974),] we resolve it now: when a prison regulation impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests”); Estate of Shabazz, supra, at 349 (“To ensure that courts afford appropriate deference to prison officials, we have determined that prison regulations alleged to infringe constitutional rights are judged under a ‘reasonableness’ test less restrictive than that ordinarily applied to alleged infringements of fundamental constitutional rights”). In Turner itself we applied the reasonableness standard to a prison regulation that imposed severe restrictions on the inmate’s right to marry, a right protected by the Due Process Clause. See Turner, supra, at 95-96 (citing Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U. S. 374 (1978), and Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1 (1967)). Our precedents require application of the standard here.
In Turner, we considered various factors to determine the reasonableness of a challenged prison regulation. Three are relevant here. “First, there must be a ‘valid, rational connection’ between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it.” 482 U. S., at 89 (quoting Block v. Rutherford, 468 U. S. 576, 586 (1984)). Second, a court must consider “the impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources generally.” 482 U. S., at 90. Third, “the absence of ready alternatives is evidence of the reasonableness of a prison regulation,” but this does not mean that prison officials “have to set up and then shoot down every conceivable alternative method of accommodating the claimant’s constitutional complaint.” Id., at 90-91; see also Estate of Shabazz, supra, at 350.
Applying these factors to the regulation before us, we conclude that the Policy comports with constitutional requirements. There can be little doubt as to both the legitimacy and the importance of the governmental interest presented here. There are few cases in which the State’s interest in combating the danger posed by a person to both himself and others is greater than in a prison environment, which, “by definition,” is made up of persons with “a demonstrated proclivity for antisocial criminal, and often violent, conduct.” Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U. S. 517, 526 (1984); Jones, supra, at 132; Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539, 561-562 (1974). We confront here the State’s obligations, not just its interests. The State has undertaken the obligation to provide prisoners with medical treatment consistent not only with their own medical interests, but also with the needs of the institution. Prison administrators have not only an interest in ensuring the safety of prison staffs and administrative personnel, see Hewitt, 459 U. S., at 473, but also the duty to take reasonable measures for the prisoners’ own safety. See Hudson, supra, at 526-527. These concerns have added weight when a penal institution, like the SOC, is restricted to inmates with mental illnesses. Where an inmate’s mental disability is the root cause of the threat he poses to the inmate population, the State’s interest in decreasing the danger to others necessarily encompasses an interest in providing him with medical treatment for his illness.
SOC Policy 600.30 is a rational means of furthering the State’s legitimate objectives. Its exclusive application is to inmates who are mentally ill and who, as a result of their illness, are gravely disabled or represent a significant danger to themselves or others. The drugs may be administered for no purpose other than treatment, and only under the direction of a licensed psychiatrist. There is considerable debate over the potential side effects of antipsychotic medications, but there is little dispute in the psychiatric profession that proper use of the drugs is one of the most effective means of treating and controlling a mental illness likely to cause violent behavior.
The alternative means proffered by respondent for accommodating his interest in rejecting the forced administration of antipsychotic drugs do not demonstrate the invalidity of the State’s policy. Respondent’s main contention is that, as a precondition to antipsychotic drug treatment, the State must find him incompetent, and then obtain court approval of the treatment using a “substituted judgment” standard. The suggested rule takes no account of the legitimate governmental interest in treating him where medically appropriate for the purpose of reducing the danger he poses. A rule that is in no way responsive to the State’s legitimate interests is not a proper accommodation, and can be rejected out of hand. Nor are physical restraints or seclusion “alternative[s] that fully accommodat[e] the prisoner’s rights at de minimis cost to valid penological interests.” Turner, supra, at 91. Physical restraints are effective only in the short term, and can have serious physical side effects when used on a resisting inmate, see Brief for American Psychiatric Association et al. as Amici Curiae 12, as well as leaving the staff at risk of injury while putting the restraints on or tending to the inmate who is in them. Furthermore, respondent has failed to demonstrate that physical restraints or seclusion are acceptable substitutes for antipsychotic drugs, in terms of either their medical effectiveness or their toll on limited prison resources.
We hold that, given the requirements of the prison environment, the Due Process Clause permits the State to treat a prison inmate who has a serious mental illness with antipsychotic drugs against his will, if the inmate is dangerous to himself or others and the treatment is in the inmate’s medical interest. Policy 600.30 comports with these requirements; we therefore reject respondent’s contention that its substantive standards are deficient under the Constitution.
iv
Having determined that state law recognizes a liberty interest, also protected by the Due Process Clause, which permits refusal of antipsychotic drugs unless certain preconditions are met, we address next what procedural protections are necessary to ensure that the decision to medicate an inmate against his will is neither arbitrary nor erroneous under the standards we have discussed above. The Washington Supreme Court held that a full judicial hearing, with the inmate being represented by counsel, was required by the Due Process Clause before the State could administer antipsychotic drugs to him against his will. In addition, the court held that the State must justify the authorization of involuntary administration of antipsychotic drugs by “clear, cogent, and convincing” evidence. We hold that the administrative hearing procedures set by the SOC Policy do comport with procedural due process, and conclude that the Washington Supreme Court erred in requiring a judicial hearing as a prerequisite for the involuntary treatment of prison inmates.
A
The primary point of disagreement between the parties is whether due process requires a judicial decisionmaker. As written, the Policy requires that the decision whether to medicate an inmate against his will be made by a hearing committee composed of a psychiatrist, a psychologist, and the Center’s Associate Superintendent. None of the committee members may be involved, at the time of the hearing, in the inmate’s treatment or diagnosis; members are not disqualified from sitting on the committee, however, if they have treated or diagnosed the inmate in the past. The committee’s decision is subject to review by the Superintendent; if the inmate so desires, he may seek judicial review of the decision in a state court. See supra, at 216. Respondent contends that only a court should make the decision to medicate an inmate against his will.
The procedural protections required by the Due Process Clause must be determined with reference to the rights and interests at stake in the particular case. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 481 (1972); Hewitt, 459 U. S., at 472; Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U. S. 1, 12 (1979). The factors that guide us are well established. “Under Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 335 (1976), we consider the private interests at stake in a governmental decision, the governmental interests involved, and the value of procedural requirements in determining what process is due under the Fourteenth Amendment.” Hewitt, supra, at 473.
Respondent’s interest in avoiding the unwarranted administration of antipsychotic drugs is not insubstantial. The forcible injection of medication into a nonconsenting person’s body represents a substantial interference with that person’s liberty. Cf. Winston v. Lee, 470 U. S. 753 (1985); Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757, 772 (1966). The purpose of the drugs is to alter the chemical balance in a patient’s brain, leading to changes, intended to be beneficial, in his or her cognitive processes. See n. 1, supra. While the therapeutic benefits of antipsychotic drugs are well documented, it is also true that the drugs can have serious, even fatal, side effects. One such side effect identified by the trial court is acute dystonia, a severe involuntary spasm of the upper body, tongue, throat, or eyes. The trial court found that it may be treated and reversed within a few minutes through use of the medication Cogentin. Other side effects include akathesia (motor restlessness, often characterized by an inability to sit still); neuroleptic malignant syndrome (a relatively rare condition which can lead to death from cardiac dysfunction); and tardive dyskinesia, perhaps the most discussed side effect of antipsychotic drugs. See Finding of Fact 9, App. to Pet. for Cert. B-7; Brief for American Psychological Association as Amicus Curiae 6-9. Tardive dyskinesia is a neurological disorder, irreversible in some cases, that is characterized by involuntary, uncontrollable movements of various muscles, especially around the face. See Mills, 457 U. S., at 293, n. 1. The State, respondent, and amici sharply disagree about the frequency with which tar-dive dyskinesia occurs, its severity, and the medical profession’s ability to treat, arrest, or reverse the condition. A fair reading of the evidence, however, suggests that the proportion of patients treated with antipsychotic drugs who exhibit the symptoms of tardive dyskinesia ranges from 10% to 25%. According to the American Psychiatric Association, studies of the condition indicate that 60% of tardive dyskinesia is mild or minimal in effect, and about 10% may be characterized as severe. Brief for American Psychiatric Association et al. as Amici Curiae 14-16, and n. 12; see also Brief for American Psychological Association as Amicus Curiae 8.
Notwithstanding the risks that are involved, we conclude that an inmate’s interests are adequately protected, and perhaps better served, by allowing the decision to medicate to be made by medical professionals rather than a judge. The Due Process Clause “has never been thought to require that the neutral and detached trier of fact be law trained or a judicial or administrative officer.” Parham, 442 U. S., at 607. Though it cannot be doubted that the decision to medicate has societal and legal implications, the Constitution does not prohibit the State from permitting medical personnel to make the decision under fair procedural mechanisms. See id., at 607-609; cf. Youngberg, 457 U. S., at 322-323. Particularly where the patient is mentally disturbed, his own intentions will be difficult to assess and will be changeable in any event. Schwartz, Vingiano, & Perez, Autonomy and the Right to Refuse Treatment: Patients’ Attitudes After Involuntary Medication, 39 Hospital & Community Psychiatry 1049 (1988). Respondent’s own history of accepting and then refusing drug treatment illustrates the point. We cannot make the facile assumption that the patient’s intentions, or a substituted judgment approximating those intentions, can be determined in a single judicial hearing apart from the realities of frequent and ongoing clinical observation by medical professionals. Our holding in Parham that a judicial hearing was not required prior to the voluntary commitment of a child to a mental hospital was based on similar observations:
“... [D]ue process is not violated by use of informal, traditional medical investigative techniques.... The mode and procedure of medical diagnostic procedures is not the business of judges....
“Although we acknowledge the fallibility of medical and psychiatric diagnosis, see O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U. S. 563, 584 (1975) (concurring opinion), we do not accept the notion that the shortcomings of specialists can always be avoided by shifting the decision from a trained specialist using the traditional tools of medical science to an untrained judge or administrative hearing officer after a judicial-type hearing. Even after a hearing, the nonspecialist decisionmaker must make a medical-psychiatric decision. Common human experience and scholarly opinions suggest that the supposed protections of an adversary proceeding to determine the appropriateness of medical decisions for the commitment and treatment of mental and emotional illness may well be more illusory than real.” Parham, 442 U. S., at 607-609.
Nor can we ignore the fact that requiring judicial hearings will divert scarce prison resources, both money and the staff’s time, from the care and treatment of mentally ill inmates. See id., at 605-606.
Under Policy 600.30, the decisionmaker is asked to review a medical treatment decision made by a medical professional. That review requires two medical inquiries: first, whether the inmate suffers from a “mental disorder”; and second, whether, as a result of that disorder, he is dangerous to himself, others, or their property. Under the Policy, the hearing committee reviews on a regular basis the staff’s choice of both the type and dosage of drug to be administered, and can order appropriate changes. 110 Wash. 2d, at 875, 759 P. 2d, at 360. The risks associated with antipsychotic drugs are for the most part medical ones, best assessed by medical professionals. A State may conclude with good reason that a judicial hearing will not be as effective, as continuous, or as probing as administrative review using medical decisionmakers. We hold that due process requires no more.
A State’s attempt to set a high standard for determining when involuntary medication with antipsychotic drugs is permitted cannot withstand challenge if there are no procedural safeguards to ensure the prisoner’s interests are taken into account. Adequate procedures exist here. In particular, independence of the decisionmaker is addressed to our satisfaction by these procedures. None of the hearing committee members may be involved in the inmate’s current treatment or diagnosis. The record before us, moreover, is limited to the hearings given to respondent. There is no indication that any institutional biases affected or altered the decision to medicate respondent against his will. The trial court made specific findings that respondent has a history of assaultive behavior which his doctors attribute to his mental disease, and that all of the Policy’s requirements were met. See App. to Pet. for Cert. B-4 to B-5, B-8. The court found also that the medical treatment provided to respondent, including the administration of antipsychotic drugs, was at' all times consistent “with the degree of care, skill, and learning expected of a reasonably prudent psychiatrist in the State of Washington, acting in the same or similar circumstances.” Id., at B-8. In the absence of record evidence to the contrary, we are not willing to presume that members of the staff lack the necessary independence to provide an inmate with a full and fair hearing in accordance with the Policy. In previous cases involving medical decisions implicating similar liberty interests, we have approved use of similar internal decisionmakers. See Vitek, 445 U. S., at 496; Parham, supra, at 613-616. Cf. Wolff, 418 U. S., at 570-571 (prison officials sufficiently impartial to conduct prison disciplinary hearings). As we reasoned in Vitek, it is only by permitting persons connected with the institution to make these decisions that courts are able to avoid “unnecessary intrusion into either medical or correctional judgments.” Vitek, supra, at 496; see Turner, 482 U. S., at 84-85, 89..
B
The procedures established by the Center are sufficient to meet the requirements of due process in all other respects, and we reject respondent’s arguments to the contrary. The Policy provides for notice, the right to be present at an adversary hearing, and the right to present and cross-examine witnesses. See Vitek, supra, at 494-496. The procedural protections are not vitiated by meetings between the committee members and staff before the hearing. Absent evidence of resulting bias, or evidence that the actual decision is made before the hearing, allowing respondent to contest the staff’s position at the hearing satisfies the requirement that the opportunity to be heard “must be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U. S. 545, 552 (1965). We reject also respondent’s contention that the hearing must be conducted in accordance with the rules of evidence or that a “clear, cogent, and convincing” standard of proof is necessary. This standard is neither required nor helpful when medical personnel are making the judgment required by the regulations here. See Vitek, supra, at 494-495. Cf. Youngberg, 457 U. S., at 321-323. Finally, we note that under state law an inmate may obtain judicial review of the hearing committee’s decision by way of a personal restraint petition or petition for an extraordinary writ, and that the trial court found that the record compiled under the Policy was adequate to allow such review. See App. to Pet. for Cert. B-8.
Respondent contends that the Policy is nonetheless deficient because it does not allow him to be represented by counsel. We disagree. “[I]t is less than crystal clear why lawyers must be available to identify possible errors in medical judgment.” Walters v. National Association of Radiation Survivors, 473 U. S. 305, 330 (1985) (emphasis in original). Given the nature of the decision to be made, we conclude that the provision of an independent lay adviser who understands the psychiatric issues involved is sufficient protection. See Vitek, supra, at 499-500 (Powell, J., concurring).
V
In sum, we hold that the regulation before us is permissible under the Constitution. It is an accommodation between an inmate’s liberty interest in avoiding the forced administration of antipsychotic drugs and the State’s interests in providing appropriate medical treatment to reduce the danger that an inmate suffering from a serious mental disorder represents to himself or others. The Due Process Clause does require certain essential procedural protections, all of which are provided by the regulation before us. The judgment of the Washington Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
The drugs administered to respondent included Trialafon, Haldol,
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | D | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Scalia
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented in this case is whether § 27A(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, to the extent that it requires federal courts to reopen final judgments in private civil actions under § 10(b) of the Act, contravenes the Constitution’s separation of powers or the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
I
In 1987, petitioners brought a civil action against respondents in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky. The complaint alleged that in 1983 and 1984 respondents had committed fraud and deceit in the sale of stock in violation of § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities and Exchange Commission. The case was mired in pretrial proceedings in the District Court until June 20, 1991, when we decided Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U. S. 350. Lampf held that “[litigation instituted pursuant to § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5... must be commenced within one year after the discovery of the facts constituting the violation and within three years after such violation.” Id., at 364. We applied that holding to the plaintiff-respondents in Lampf itself, found their suit untimely, and reinstated a summary judgment previously entered in favor of the defendant-petitioners. Ibid. On the same day we decided James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U. S. 529 (1991), in which a majority of the Court held, albeit in different opinions, that a new rule of federal law that is applied to the parties in the case announcing the rule must be applied as well to all cases pending on direct review. See Harper v. Virginia Dept. of Taxation, 509 U. S. 86, 92 (1993). The joint effect of Lampf and Beam was to mandate application of the l-year/3-year limitations period to petitioners’ suit. The District Court, finding that petitioners’ claims were untimely under the Lampf rule, dismissed their action with prejudice on August 13, 1991. Petitioners filed no appeal; the judgment accordingly became final 30 days later. See 28 U. S. C. § 2107(a) (1988 ed., Supp. V); Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U. S. 314, 321, n. 6 (1987).
On December 19, 1991, the President signed the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, 105 Stat. 2236. Section 476 of the Act — a section that had nothing to do with FDIC improvements — became §27A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and was later codified as 15 U. S. C. § 78aa-1 (1988 ed., Supp. V). It provides:
“(a) Effect on pending causes of action
“The limitation period for any private civil action implied under section 78j(b) of this title [§ 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934] that was commenced on or before June 19, 1991, shall be the limitation period provided by the laws applicable in the jurisdiction, including principles of retroactivity, as such laws existed on June 19,1991.
“(b) Effect on dismissed causes of action
“Any private civil action implied under section 78j(b) of this title that was commenced on or before June 19, 1991—
“(1) which was dismissed as time barred subsequent to June 19,1991, and
“(2) which would have been timely filed under the limitation period provided by the laws applicable in the jurisdiction, including principles of retroactivity, as such laws existed on June 19,1991,
“shall be reinstated on motion by the plaintiff not later than 60 days after December 19, 1991.”
On February 11, 1992, petitioners returned to the District Court and filed a motion to reinstate the action previously dismissed with prejudice. The District Court found that the conditions set out in §§27A(b)(l) and (2) were met, so that petitioners’ motion was required to be granted by the terms of the statute. It nonetheless denied the motion, agreeing with respondents that §27A(b) is unconstitutional. Memorandum Opinion and Order, Civ. Action No. 87-438 (ED Ky., Apr. 13, 1992). The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. 1 F. 3d 1487 (1993). We granted certiorari. 511 U. S. 1141 (1994).
II
Respondents bravely contend that §27A(b) does not require federal courts to reopen final judgments, arguing first that the reference to “the laws applicable in the jurisdiction... as such laws existed on June 19, 1991” (the day before Lamp† was decided) may reasonably be construed to refer precisely to the limitations period provided in Lampf itself, in which case petitioners’ action was time barred even under § 27A. It is true that “[a] judicial construction of a statute is an authoritative statement of what the statute meant before as well as after the decision of the case giving rise to that construction.” Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U. S. 298, 312-313 (1994); see also id., at 313, n. 12. But respondents’ argument confuses the question of what the law in fact was on June 19, 1991, with the distinct question of what § 27A means by its reference to what the law was. We think it entirely clear that it does not mean the law enunciated in Lampf, for two independent reasons. First, Lampf provides a uniform, national statute of limitations (instead of using the applicable state limitations period, as lower federal courts had previously done. See Lampf, 501 U. S., at 354, and n. 1). If the statute referred to that law, its reference to the “laws applicable in the jurisdiction” (emphasis added) would be quite inexplicable. Second, if the statute refers to the law enunciated in Lampf, it is utterly without effect, a result to be, avoided if possible. American Nat. Red Cross v. S. G., 505 U. S. 247, 263-264 (1992); see 2A N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction § 46.06 (Sands rev. 4th ed. 1984). It would say, in subsection (a), that the limitations period is what the Supreme Court has held to be the limitations period; and in subsection (b), that suits dismissed as untimely under Lampf which were timely under Lampf (a null set) shall be reinstated. To avoid a constitutional question by holding that Congress enacted, and the President approved, a blank sheet of paper would indeed constitute “disingenuous evasion.” George Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose, 289 U. S. 373, 379 (1933).
As an alternative reason why § 27A(b) does not require the reopening of final judgments, respondents suggest that the subsection applies only to cases still pending in the federal courts when §27A was enacted. This has only half the defect of the first argument, for it makes only half of §27A purposeless — §27A(b). There is no need to “reinstate” actions that are still pending; § 27A(a) (the new statute of limitations) could and would be applied by the courts of appeals. On respondents’ reading, the only consequence of §27A(b) would be the negligible one of permitting the plaintiff in the pending appeal from a statute-of-limitations dismissal to return immediately to the district court, instead of waiting for the court of appeals’ reversal. To enable § 27A(b) to achieve such an insignificant consequence, one must disregard the language of the provision, which refers generally to suits “dismissed as time barred.” It is perhaps arguable that this does not include suits that are not yet finally dismissed, i. e., suits still pending on appeal; but there is no basis for the contention that it includes only those. In short, there is no reasonable construction on which §27A(b) does not require federal courts to reopen final judgments in suits dismissed with prejudice by virtue of Lampf.
Ill
Respondents submit that § 27A(b) violates both the separation of powers and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Because the latter submission, if correct, might dictate a similar result in a challenge to state legislation under the Fourteenth Amendment, the former is the narrower ground for adjudication of the constitutional questions in the case, and we therefore consider it first. Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandéis, J., concurring). We conclude that in § 27A(b) Congress has exceeded its authority by requiring the federal courts to exercise. “[t]he judicial Power of the United States,” U. S. Const., Art. III, §1, in a manner repugnant to the text, structure, and traditions of Article III.
Our decisions to date have identified two types of legislation that require federal courts to exercise the judicial power in a manner that Article III forbids. The first appears in United States v. Klein, 13 Wall. 128 (1872), where we refused to give effect to a statute that was said “[to] prescribe rules of decision to the Judicial Department of the government in cases pending before it.” Id., at 146. Whatever the precise scope of Klein, however, later decisions have made clear that its prohibition does not take hold when Congress “amend[s] applicable law.” Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc., 503 U. S. 429, 441 (1992). Section 27A(b) indisputably does set out substantive legal standards for the Judiciary to apply, and in that sense changes the law (even if solely retroactively). The second type of unconstitutional restriction upon the exercise of judicial power identified by past cases is exemplified by Hayburn’s Case, 2 Dall. 409 (1792), which stands for the principle that Congress cannot vest review of the decisions of Article III courts in officials of the Executive Branch. See, e. g., Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S. S. Corp., 333 U. S. 103 (1948). Yet under any application of §27A(b) only courts are involved; no officials of other departments sit in direct review of their decisions. Section 27A(b) therefore offends neither of these previously established prohibitions.
We think, however, that § 27A(b) offends a postulate of Article III just as deeply rooted in our law as those we have mentioned. Article III establishes a “judicial department” with the “province and duty... to say what the law is” in particular cases and controversies. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803). The record of history shows that the Framers crafted this charter of the judicial department with an expressed understanding that it gives the Federal Judiciary the power, not merely to rule on cases, but to de tide them, subject to review only by superior courts in the Article III hierarchy — with an understanding, in short, that “a judgment conclusively resolves the case” because “a ‘judicial Power’ is one to render dispositive judgments.” Easter-brook, Presidential Review, 40 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 905, 926 (1990). By retroactively commanding the federal courts to reopen final judgments, Congress has violated this fundamental principle.
A
The Framers of our Constitution lived among the ruins of a system of intermingled legislative and judicial powers, which had been prevalent in the colonies long before the Revolution, and which after the Revolution had produced factional strife and partisan oppression. In the 17th and 18th centuries colonial assemblies and legislatures functioned as courts of equity of last resort, hearing original actions or providing appellate review of judicial judgments. G. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic 1776-1787, pp. 154-155 (1969). Often, however, they chose to correct the judicial process through special bills or other enacted legislation. It was common for such legislation not to prescribe a resolution of the dispute, but rather simply to set aside the judgment and order a new trial or appeal. M. Clarke, Parliamentary Privilege in the American Colonies 49-51 (1943). See, e.g., Judicial Action by the Provincial Legislature of Massachusetts, 15 Harv. L. Rev. 208 (1902) (collecting documents from 1708-1709); 5 Laws of New Hampshire, Including Public and Private Acts, Resolves, Votes, Etc., 1784-1792 (Metcalf ed. 1916). Thus, as described in our discussion of Hayburn’s Case, supra, at 218, such legislation bears not on the problem of interbranch review but on the problem of finality of judicial judgments.
The vigorous, indeed often radical, populism of the revolutionary legislatures and assemblies increased the frequency of legislative correction of judgments. Wood, supra, at 155-156, 407-408. See also INS v. Chadha, 462 U. S. 919, 961 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring). “The period 1780-1787... was a period of ‘constitutional reaction’ ” to these developments, “which... leaped suddenly to its climax in the Philadelphia Convention.” E. Corwin, The Doctrine of Judicial Review 37 (1914). Voices from many quarters, official as well as private, decried the increasing legislative interference with the private-law judgments of the courts. In 1786, the Vermont Council of Censors issued an “Address of the Council of Censors to the Freemen of the State of Vermont” to fulfill the council’s duty, under the State Constitution of 1784, to report to the people “ ‘whether the legislative and executive branches of government have assumed to themselves, or exercised, other or greater powers than they are entitled to by the Constitution.’” Vermont State Papers 1779-1786, pp. 531, 533 (Slade ed. 1823). A principal method of usurpation identified by the censors was “[t]he instances... of judgments being vacated by legislative acts.” Id., at 540. The council delivered an opinion
“that the General Assembly, in all the instances where they have vacated judgments, recovered in due course of law, (except where the particular circumstances of the case evidently made it necessary to grant a new trial) have exercised a power not delegated, or intended to be delegated, to them, by the Constitution.... It super-cedes the necessity of any other law than the pleasure of the Assembly, and of any other court than themselves: for it is an imposition on the suitor, to give him the trouble of obtaining, after several expensive trials, a final judgment agreeably to the known established laws of the land; if the Legislature, by a sovereign act, can interfere, reverse the judgment, and decree in such manner, as they, unfettered by rules, shall think proper.” Ibid.
So too, the famous report of the Pennsylvania Council of Censors in 1784 detailed the abuses of legislative interference with the courts at the behest of private interests and factions. As the General Assembly had (they wrote) made a custom of “extending their deliberations to the cases of individuals,” the people had “been taught to consider an application to the legislature, as a shorter and more certain mode of obtaining relief from hardships and losses, than the usual process of law.” The censors noted that because “favour and partiality have, from the nature of public bodies of men, predominated in the distribution of this relief... [t]hese dangerous procedures have been too often recurred to, since the revolution.” Report of the Committee of the Council of Censors 6 (Bailey ed. 1784).
This sense of a sharp necessity to separate the legislative from the judicial power, prompted by the crescendo of legislative interference with private judgments of the courts, triumphed among the Framers of the new Federal Constitution. See Corwin, The Progress of Constitutional Theory Between the Declaration of Independence and the Meeting of the Philadelphia Convention, 30 Am. Hist. Rev. 511, 514-517 (1925). The Convention made the critical decision to establish a judicial department independent of the Legislative Branch by providing that “the judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.” Before and during the debates on ratification, Madison, Jefferson, and Hamilton each wrote of the factional disorders and disarray that the system of legislative equity had produced in the years before the framing; and each thought that the separation of the legislative from the judicial power in the new Constitution would cure them. Madison’s Federalist No. 48, the famous description of the process by which “[tjhe legislative department is every where extending the sphere of its activity, and drawing all power into its impetuous vortex,” referred to the report of the Pennsylvania Council of Censors to show that in that State “cases belonging to the judiciary department [had been] frequently drawn within legislative cognizance and determination.” The Federalist No. 48, pp. 333, 337 (J. Cooke ed. 1961). Madison relied as well on Jefferson’s Notes on the State of Virginia, which mentioned, as one example of the dangerous concentration of governmental powers into the hands of the legislature, that “the Legislature... in many instances decided rights which should have been left to judiciary controversy.” Id., at 336 (emphasis deleted).
If the need for separation of legislative from judicial power was plain, the principal effect to be accomplished by that separation was even plainer. As Hamilton wrote in his exegesis of Article III, § 1, in The Federalist No. 81:
“It is not true... that the parliament of Great Britain, or the legislatures of the particular states, can rectify the exceptionable decisions of their respective courts, in any other sense than might be done by a future legislature of the United States. The theory neither of the British, nor the state constitutions, authorises the revisal of a judicial sentence, by a legislative act.... A legislature without exceeding its province cannot reverse a determination once made, in a particular case; though it may prescribe a new rule for future cases.” The Federalist No. 81, p. 545 (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
The essential balance created by this allocation of authority was a simple one. The Legislature would be possessed of power to “prescribe] the rules by which the duties and rights of every citizen are to be regulated,” but the power of “[t]he interpretation of the laws” would be “the proper and peculiar province of the courts.” Id., No. 78, at 523, 525. See also Corwin, The Doctrine of Judicial Review, at 42. The Judiciary would be, “from the nature of its functions,... the [department] least dangerous to the political rights of the constitution,” not because its acts were subject to legislative correction, but because the binding effect of its acts was limited to particular cases and controversies. Thus, “though individual oppression may now and then proceed from the courts of justice, the general liberty of the people can never be endangered from that quarter:... so long as the judiciary remains truly distinct from both the legislative and executive.” The Federalist No. 78, at 522, 523.
Judicial decisions in the period immediately after ratification of the Constitution confirm the understanding that it forbade interference with the final judgments of courts. In Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386 (1798), the Legislature of Connecticut had enacted a statute that set aside the final judgment of a state court in a civil case. Although the issue before this Court was the construction of the Ex Post Facto Clause, Art. I, §10, Justice Iredell (a leading Federalist who had guided the Constitution to ratification in North Carolina) noted that
“the Legislature of [Connecticut] has been in the uniform, uninterrupted, habit of exercising a general superintending power over its courts of law, by granting new trials. It may, indeed, appear strange to some of us, that in any form, there should exist a power to grant, with respect to suits depending or adjudged, new rights of trial, new privileges of proceeding, not previously recognized and regulated by positive institutions____ The power... is judicial in its nature; and whenever it is exercised, as in the present instance, it is an exercise of judicial, not of legislative, authority.” Id., at 398.
The state courts of the era showed a similar understanding of the separation of powers, in decisions that drew little distinction between the federal and state constitutions. To choose one representative example from a multitude: In Bates v. Kimball, 2 Chipman 77 (Vt. 1824), a special Act of the Vermont Legislature authorized a party to appeal from the judgment of a court even though, under the general law, the time for appeal had expired. The court, noting that the unappealed judgment had become final, set itself the question “Have the Legislature power to vacate or annul an existing judgment between party and party?” Id., at 83. The answer was emphatic: “The necessity of a distinct and separate existence of the three great departments of government... had been proclaimed and enforced by... Blackstone, Jefferson and Madison,” and had been “sanctioned by the people of the United States, by being adopted in terms more or less explicit, into all their written constitutions.” Id., at 84. The power to annul a final judgment, the court held (citing Hayburn’s Case, 2 Dall., at 410), was “an assumption of Judicial power,” and therefore forbidden. Bates v. Kimball, supra, at 90. For other examples, see Merrill v. Sherburne, 1 N. H. 199 (1818) (legislature may not vacate a final judgment and grant a new trial); Lewis v. Webb, 3 Greenleaf 299 (Me. 1825) (same); T. Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 95-96 (1868) (collecting cases); J. Sutherland, Statutory Construction 18-19 (J. Lewis ed. 1904) (same).
By the middle of the 19th century, the constitutional equilibrium created by the separation of the legislative power to make general law from the judicial power to apply that law in particular cases was so well understood and accepted that it could survive even Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393 (1857). In his First Inaugural Address, President Lincoln explained why the political branches could not, and need not, interfere with even that infamous judgment:
“I do not forget the position assumed by some, that constitutional questions are to be decided by the Supreme Court; nor do I deny that such decisions must be binding in any case, upon the parties to a suit, as to the object of that suit.... And while it is obviously possible that such decision may be erroneous in any given case, still the evil effect following it, being limited to that particular case, with the chance that it may be over-ruled, and never become a precedent for other cases, can better be borne than could the evils of a different practice.” 4 R. Basler, The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln 268 (1953) (First Inaugural Address 1861).
And the great constitutional scholar Thomas Cooley addressed precisely the question before us in his 1868 treatise:
“If the legislature cannot thus indirectly control the action of the courts, by requiring of them a construction of the law according to its own views, it is very plain it cannot do so directly, by setting aside their judgments, compelling them to grant new trials, ordering the discharge of offenders, or directing what particular steps shall be taken in the progress of a judicial inquiry.” Cooley, supra, at 94-95.
B
Section 27A(b) effects a clear violation of the separation-of-powers principle we have just discussed. It is, of course, retroactive legislation, that is, legislation that prescribes what the law was at an earlier time, when the act whose effect is controlled by the legislation occurred — in this case, the filing of the initial Rule 10b-5 action in the District Court. When retroactive legislation requires its own application in a case already finally adjudicated, it does no more and no less than “reverse a determination once made, in a particular case.” The Federalist No. 81, at 545. Our decisions stemming from Hayburn’s Case — although their precise holdings are not strictly applicable here, see supra, at 218 — have uniformly provided fair warning that such an act exceeds the powers of Congress. See, e.g., Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc., 333 U. S., at 113 (“Judgments within the powers vested in courts by the Judiciary Article of the Constitution may not lawfully be revised, overturned or refused faith and credit by another Department of Government”); United States v. O’Grady, 22 Wall. 641, 647-648 (1875) (“Judicial jurisdiction implies the power to hear and determine a cause, and... Congress cannot subject the judgments of the Supreme Court to the re-examination and revision of any other tribunal”); Gordon v. United States, 117 U. S. Appx. 697, 700-704 (1864) (opinion of Taney, C. J.), (judgments of Article III courts are “final and conclusive upon the rights of the parties”); Hayburn’s Case, 2 Dall., at 411 (opinion of Wilson and Blair, JJ., and Peters, D. J.) (“[RJevision and control” of Article III judgments is “radically inconsistent with the independence of that judicial power which is vested in the courts”); id., at 413 (opinion of Iredell, J., and Sitgreaves, D. J.) (“[N]o decision of any court of the United States can, under any circumstances,... be liable to a revision, or even suspension, by the [legislature itself, in whom no judicial power of any kind appears to be vested”). See also Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 18 How. 421, 431 (1856) (“[I]t is urged, that the act of congress cannot have the effect and operation to annul the judgment of the court already rendered, or the rights determined thereby.... This, as a general proposition, is certainly not to be denied, especially as it respects adjudication upon the private rights of parties. When they have passed into judgment the right becomes absolute, and it is the duty of the court to enforce it”). Today those clear statements must either be honored, or else proved false.
It is true, as petitioners contend, that Congress can always revise the judgments of Article III courts in one sense: When a new law makes clear that it is retroactive, an appellate court must apply that law in reviewing judgments still on appeal that were rendered before the law was enacted, and must alter the outcome accordingly. See United States v. Schooner Peggy, 1 Cranch 103 (1801); Landgraf v. US I Film Products, 511 U. S. 244, 273-280 (1994). Since that is so, petitioners argue, federal courts must apply the “new” law created by §27A(b) in finally adjudicated cases as well; for the line that separates lower court judgments that are pending on appeal (or may still be appealed), from lower court judgments that are final, is determined by statute, see, e. g., 28 U. S. C. § 2107(a) (30-day time limit for appeal to federal court of appeals), and so cannot possibly be a constitutional line. But a distinction between judgments from which all appeals have been forgone or completed, and judgments that remain on appeal (or subject to being appealed), is implicit in what Article III creates: not a batch of unconnected courts, but a judicial department composed of “inferior Courts” and “one supreme Court.” Within that hierarchy, the decision of an inferior court is not (unless the time for appeal has expired) the final word of the department as a whole. It is the obligation of the last court in the hierarchy that rules on the case to give effect to Congress’s latest enactment, even when that has the effect of overturning the judgment of an inferior court, since each court, at every level, must “decide according to existing laws.” Schooner Peggy, supra, at 109. Having achieved finality, however, a judicial decision becomes the last word of the judicial department with regard to a particular case or controversy, and Congress may not declare by retroactive legislation that the law applicable to that very case was something other than what the courts said it was. Finality of a legal judgment is determined by statute, just as entitlement to a government benefit is a statutory creation; but that no more deprives the former of its constitutional significance for separation-of-powers analysis than it deprives the latter of its significance for due process purposes. See, e. g., Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. Loudermill, 470 U. S. 532 (1985); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U. S. 215 (1976).
To be sure, § 27A(b) reopens (or directs the reopening of) final judgments in a whole class of cases rather than in a particular suit. We do not see how that makes any difference. The separation-of-powers violation here, if there is any, consists of depriving judicial judgments of the conclusive effect that they had when they were announced, not of acting in a manner — viz., with particular rather than general effect — that is unusual (though, we must note, not impossible) for a legislature. To be sure, a general statute such as this one may reduce the perception that legislative interference with judicial judgments was prompted by individual favoritism; but it is legislative interference with judicial judgments nonetheless. Not favoritism, nor even corruption, but power is the object of the separation-of-powers prohibition. The prohibition is violated when an individual final judgment is legislatively rescinded for even the very best of reasons, such as the legislature’s genuine conviction (supported by all the law professors in the land) that the judgment was wrong; and it is violated 40 times over when 40 final judgments are legislatively dissolved.
It is irrelevant as well that the final judgments reopened by § 27A(b) rested on the bar of a statute of limitations. The rules of finality, both statutory and judge made, treat a dismissal on statute-of-limitations grounds the same way they treat a dismissal for failure to state a claim, for failure to prove substantive liability, or for failure to prosecute: as a judgment on the merits. See, e.g., Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 41(b); United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U. S. 85, 87-88 (1916). Petitioners suggest, directly or by implication, two reasons why a merits judgment based on this particular ground may be uniquely subject to congressional nullification. First, there is the fact that the length and indeed even the very existence of a statute of limitations upon a federal cause of action is entirely subject to congressional control. But virtually all of the reasons why a final judgment on the merits is rendered on a federal claim are subject to congressional control. Congress can eliminate, for example, a particular element of a cause of action that plaintiffs have found it difficult to establish; or an evidentiary rule that has often excluded essential testimony; or a rule of offsetting wrong (such as contributory negligence) that has often prevented recovery. To distinguish statutes of limitations on the ground that they are mere creatures of Congress is to distinguish them not at all. The second supposedly distinguishing characteristic of a statute of limitations is that it can be extended, without violating the Due Process Clause, after the cause of the action arose and even after the statute itself has expired. See, e. g., Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U. S. 304 (1945). But that also does not set statutes of limitations apart. To mention only one other broad category of judgment-producing legal rule: Rules of pleading and proof can similarly be altered after the cause of action arises, Landgraf v. USI Film Products, supra, at 275, and n. 29, and even, if the statute clearly so requires, after they have been applied in a case but before final judgment has been entered. Petitioners’ principle would therefore lead to the conclusion that final judgments rendered on the basis of a stringent (or, alternatively, liberal) rule of pleading or proof may be set aside for retrial under a new liberal (or, alternatively, stringent) rule of pleading or proof. This alone provides massive scope for undoing final judgments and would substantially subvert the doctrine of separation of powers.
The central theme of the dissent is a variant on these arguments. The dissent maintains that Lampf “announced” a new statute of limitations, post, at 246, in an act of “judicial... lawmaking,” post, at 247, that “changed the law,” post, at 250. That statement, even if relevant, would be wrong. The point decided in Lampf had never before been addressed by this Court, and was therefore an open question, no matter what the lower courts had held at the time. But the more important point is that Lampf as such is irrelevant to this case. The dissent itself perceives that “[w]e would have the same issue to decide had Congress enacted the Lampf rule,” and that the Lampf rule’s genesis. in judicial lawmaking rather than, shall we say, legislative lawmaking, “should not affect the separation-of-powers analysis.” Post, at 247. Just so. The issue here is not the validity or even the source of the legal rule that produced the Article III judgments, but rather the immunity from legislative abrogation of those judgments themselves. The separation-of-powers question before us has nothing to do with Lanvpf, and the dissent’s attack on Lampf has nothing to do with the question before us.
C
Apart from the statute we review today, we know of no instance in which Congress has attempted to set aside the final judgment of an Article III court by retroactive legislation. That prolonged reticence would be amazing if such interference were not understood to be constitutionally proscribed. The closest analogue that the Government has been able to put forward is the statute at issue in United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U. S. 371 (1980). That law required the Court of Claims, “ ‘[notwithstanding any other provision of law... [to] review on the merits, without regard to the defense of res judicata or collateral estoppel,’ ” a Sioux claim for just compensation from the United States— even though the Court of Claims had previously heard and rejected that very claim. We considered and rejected separation-of-powers objections to the statute based upon Hayburn’s Case and United States v. Klein. See 448 U. S., at 391-392. The basis for our rejection was a line of precedent (starting with Cherokee Nation v. United States, 270 U. S. 476 (1926)) that stood, we said, for the proposition that “Congress has the power to waive
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | M | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice White
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case centers around the respondent union’s peaceful handbilling of the businesses operating in a shopping mall in Tampa, Florida, owned by petitioner, the Edward J. DeBartolo Corporation (DeBartolo). The union’s primary labor dispute was with H. J. High Construction Company (High) over alleged substandard wages and fringe benefits. High was retained by the H. J. Wilson Company (Wilson) to construct a department store in the mall, and neither DeBartolo nor any of the other 85 or so mall tenants had any contractual right to influence the selection of contractors.
The union, however, sought to obtain their influence upon Wilson and High by distributing handbills asking mall customers not to shop at any of the stores in the mall “until the Mall’s owner publicly promises that all construction at the Mall will be done using contractors who pay their employees fair wages and fringe benefits.” The handbills’ message was that “[t]he payment of substandard wages not only diminishes the working person’s ability to purchase with earned, rather than borrowed, dollars, but it also undercuts the wage standard of the entire community.” The handbills made clear that the union was seeking only a consumer boycott against the other mall tenants, not a secondary strike by their employees. At all four entrances to the mall for about three weeks in December 1979, the union peacefully distributed the handbills without any accompanying picketing or patrolling.
After DeBartolo failed to convince the union to alter the language of the handbills to state that its dispute did not involve DeBartolo or the mall lessees other than Wilson and to limit its distribution to the immediate vicinity of Wilson’s construction site, it filed a complaint with the National Labor Relations Board (Board), charging the union with engaging in unfair labor practices under § 8(b)(4) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 61 Stat. 141, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 158(b)(4). The Board’s General Counsel issued a complaint, but the Board eventually dismissed it, concluding that the handbilling was protected by the publicity proviso of § 8(b)(4). Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Coun cil, 252 N. L. R. B. 702 (1980). The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the Board, 662 F. 2d 264 (1981), but this Court reversed in Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. NLRB, 463 U. S. 147 (1983). There, we concluded that the handbilling did not fall within the proviso’s limited scope of exempting “publicity intended to inform the public that the primary employer’s product is ‘distributed by’ the secondary employer” because DeBartolo and the other tenants, as opposed to Wilson, did not distribute products of High. Id., at 155-157. Since there had not been a determination below whether the union’s handbilling fell within the prohibition of § 8(b)(4), and, if so, whether it was protected by the First Amendment, we remanded the case.
On remand, the Board held that the union’s handbilling was proscribed by § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). 273 N. L. R. B. 1431 (1985). It stated that under its prior cases “handbilling and other activity urging a consumer boycott constituted coercion.” Id., at 1432. The Board reasoned that “[appealing to the public not to patronize secondary employers is an attempt to inflict economic harm on the secondary employers by causing them to lose business,” and “such appeals constitute ‘economic retaliation’ and are therefore a form of coercion.” Id., at 1432, n. 6. It viewed the object of the hand-billing as attempting “to force the mall tenants to cease doing business with DeBartolo in order to force DeBartolo and/or Wilson’s not to do business with High.” Id., at 1432. The Board observed that it need not inquire whether the prohibition of this handbilling raised serious questions under the First Amendment, for “the statute’s literal language and the applicable case law require[d]” a finding of a violation. Ibid. Finally, it reiterated its longstanding position that “as a congressionally created administrative agency, we will presume the constitutionality of the Act we administer.” Ibid.
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit denied enforcement of the Board’s order. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. NLRB, 796 F. 2d 1328, 1346 (1986). Because there would be serious doubts about whether § 8(b)(4) could constitutionally ban peaceful hand-billing not involving nonspeech elements, such as patrolling, the court applied our decision in NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U. S. 490 (1979), to determine if there was a clear congressional intent to proscribe such handbilling. The language of the section, the court held, revealed no such intent, and the legislative history indicated that Congress, by using the phrase “threaten, coerce, or restrain,” was concerned with secondary picketing and strikes rather than appeals to consumers not involving picketing. 796 F. 2d, at 1336-1340. The court also concluded that the publicity proviso did not manifest congressional intent to ban all speech not coming within its terms because it was “drafted as an interpretive, explanatory section” and not as an exception to an otherwise all-encompassing prohibition on publicity in § 8(b)(4). Id., at 1344. The court went on to construe the section as not prohibiting consumer publicity; DeBartolo petitioned for certiorari. Because this case presents important questions of federal constitutional and labor law, we granted the petition, 482 U. S. 913 (1987), and now affirm.
The Board, the agency entrusted by Congress with the authority to administer the NLRA, has the “special function of applying the general provisions of the Act to the complexities of industrial life.” NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U. S. 221, 236 (1963); see Pattern Makers v. NLRB, 473 U. S. 95, 114 (1985); NLRB v. Steelworkers, 357 U. S. 357, 362-363 (1958). Here, the Board has construed § 8(b)(4) of the Act to cover handbilling at a mall entrance urging potential customers not to trade with any retailers in the mall, in order to exert pressure on the proprietor of the mall to influence a particular mall tenant not to do business with a nonunion construction contractor. That statutory interpretation by the Board would normally be entitled to deference unless that construction were clearly contrary to the intent of Congress. Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 842-843, and n. 9 (1984).
Another rule of statutory construction, however, is pertinent here: where an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress. Catholic Bishop, supra, at 499-501, 504. This cardinal principle has its roots in Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion for the Court in Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch 64, 118 (1804), and has for so long been applied by this Court that it is beyond debate. E. g., Catholic Bishop, supra, at 500-501; Machinists v. Street, 367 U. S. 740, 749-750 (1961); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 62 (1932); Lucas v. Alexander, 279 U. S. 573, 577 (1929); Panama R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U. S. 375, 390 (1924); United States ex rel. Attorney General v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U. S. 366, 407-408 (1909); Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Pet. 433, 448-449 (1830) (Story, J.). As was stated in Hooper v. California, 155 U. S. 648, 657 (1895), “[t]he elementary rule is that every reasonable construction must be resorted to, in order to save a statute from unconstitutionality.” This approach not only reflects the prudential concern that constitutional issues not be needlessly confronted, but also recognizes that Congress, like this Court, is bound by and swears an oath to uphold the Constitution. The courts will therefore not lightly assume that Congress intended to infringe constitutionally protected liberties or usurp power constitutionally forbidden it. See Grenada County Supervisors v. Brogden, 112 U. S. 261, 269 (1884).
We agree with the Court of Appeals and respondents that this case calls for the invocation of the Catholic Bishop rule, for the Board’s construction of the statute, as applied in this case, poses serious questions of the validity of § 8(b)(4) under the First Amendment. The handbills involved here truthfully revealed the existence of a labor dispute and urged potential customers of the mall to follow a wholly legal course of action, namely, not to patronize the retailers doing business in the mall. The handbilling was peaceful. No picketing or patrolling was involved. On its face, this was expressive activity arguing that substandard wages should be opposed by abstaining from shopping in a mall where such wages were paid. Had the union simply been leafletting the public generally, including those entering every shopping mall in town, pursuant to an annual educational effort against substandard pay, there is little doubt that legislative proscription of such leaflets would pose a substantial issue of validity under the First Amendment. The same may well be true in this case, although here the handbills called attention to a specific situation in the mall allegedly involving the payment of unacceptably low wages by a construction contractor.
That a labor union is the leafletter and that a labor dispute was involved does not foreclose this analysis. We do not suggest that communications by labor unions are never of the commercial speech variety and thereby entitled to a lesser degree of constitutional protection. The handbills involved here, however, do not appear to be typical commercial speech such as advertising the price of a product or arguing its merits, for they pressed the benefits of unionism to the community and the dangers of inadequate wages to the economy and the standard of living of the populace. Of course, commercial speech itself is protected by the First Amendment, Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U. S. 748, 762 (1976), and however these handbills are to be classified, the Court of Appeals was plainly correct in holding that the Board’s construction would require deciding serious constitutional issues. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm’n of N. Y., 447 U. S. 530, 534-535, 537 (1980); Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U. S. 97, 102-103 (1979); Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U. S. 415, 419-420 (1971).
The Board was urged to construe the statute in light of the asserted constitutional considerations, but thought that it was constrained by its own prior authority and cases in the Courts of Appeals, as well' as by the express language of the Act, to hold that § 8(b)(4) must be construed to forbid the handbilling involved here. Even if this construction of the Act were thought to be a permissible one, we are quite sure that in light of the traditional rule followed in Catholic Bishop, we must independently inquire whether there is another interpretation, not raising these serious constitutional concerns, that may fairly be ascribed to § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). This the Court has done in several cases.
In NLRB v. Drivers, 362 U. S. 274, 284 (1960), for example, the Court rejected the Board’s interpretation of the phrase “restrain or coerce” to include peaceful recognitional picketing and stated:
“In the sensitive area of peaceful picketing Congress has dealt explicitly with isolated evils which experience has established flow from such picketing. Therefore, unless there is the clearest indication in the legislative history of § 8(b)(1)(A) supporting the Board’s claim of power under that section, we cannot sustain the Board’s order here. We now turn to an examination of the legislative history.”
That examination of the legislative history failed to yield the requisite “clearest indication.” Similarly, in NLRB v. Fruit Packers, 377 U. S. 58, 63 (1964) (Tree Fruits), we disagreed with the Board’s determination that § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) prohibited all consumer picketing at a secondary establishment, no matter the economic consequences of that picketing, because our examination of the legislative history led us to “conclude that it does not reflect with the requisite clarity a congressional plan to proscribe all peaceful consumer picketing at secondary sites, and, particularly, any concern with peaceful picketing when it is limited, as here, to persuading” customers not to purchase a specific product of the secondary establishment. We once more looked for the “isolated evils” that Congress had focused on because “[b]oth the congressional policy and our adherence to this principle of interpretation reflect concern that a broad ban against peaceful picketing might collide with the guarantees of the First Amendment.” Id., at 62-63; see id., at 67, 71. Because there was not the required “clearest indication in the legislative history,” we rejected the Board’s interpretation that limited expressive activities. Again, in Catholic Bishop, we independently determined whether the Board’s jurisdiction extended to parochial schools in the face of a substantial First Amendment challenge, although the Board itself had previously considered the First Amendment challenge and presumably interpreted the statute cognizable of those limits. 440 U. S., at 497-499.
We follow this course here and conclude, as did the Court of Appeals, that the section is open to a construction that obviates deciding whether a congressional prohibition of handbilling on the facts of this case would violate the First Amendment.
The case turns on whether handbilling such as involved here must be held to “threaten, coerce, or restrain any person” to cease doing business with another, within the meaning of § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). We note first that “inducting] or encouragting]” employees of the secondary employer to strike is proscribed by § 8(b)(4)(i). But more than mere persuasion is necessary to prove a violation of § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B): that section requires a showing of threats, coercion, or restraints. Those words, we have said, are “nonspecific, indeed vague,” and should be interpreted with “caution” and not given a “broad sweep,” Drivers, supra, at 290; and in applying § 8(b)(1)(A) they were not to be construed to reach peaceful recognitional picketing. Neither is there any necessity to construe such language to reach the handbills involved in this case. There is no suggestion that the leaflets had any coercive effect on customers of the mall. There was no violence, picketing, or patrolling and only an attempt to persuade customers not to shop in the mall.
The Board nevertheless found that the handbilling “coerced” mall tenants and explained in a footnote that “[a]p-pealing to the public not to patronize secondary employers is an attempt to inflict economic harm on the secondary employers by causing them to lose business. As the case law makes clear, such appeals constitute ‘economic retaliation’ and are therefore a form of coercion.” 273 N. L. R. B., at 1432, n. 6. Our decision in Tree Fruits, however, makes untenable the notion that any kind of handbilling, picketing, or other appeals to a secondary employer to cease doing business with the employer involved in the labor dispute is “coercion” within the meaning of § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) if it has some economic impact on the neutral. In that case, the union picketed a secondary employer, a retailer, asking the public not to buy a product produced by the primary employer. We held that the impact of this picketing was not coercion within the meaning of § 8(b)(4) even though, if the appeal succeeded, the retailer would lose revenue.
NLRB v. Retail Store Employees, 447 U. S. 607 (1980) (Safeco), in turn, held that consumer picketing urging a general boycott of a secondary employer aimed at causing him to sever relations with the union’s real antagonist was coercive and forbidden by § 8(b)(4). It is urged that Safeco rules this case because the union sought a general boycott of all tenants in the mall. But “picketing is qualitatively ‘different from other modes of communication,'” Babbitt v. Farm, Workers, 442 U. S. 289, 311, n. 17 (1979) (quoting Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U. S. 460, 465 (1950)), and Safeco noted that the picketing there actually threatened the neutral with ruin or substantial loss. As Justice Stevens pointed out in his concurrence in Safeco, 447 U. S., at 619, picketing is “a mixture of conduct and communication” and the conduct element “often provides the most persuasive deterrent to third persons about to enter a business establishment.” Handbills containing the same message, he observed, are “much less effective than labor picketing” because they “depend entirely on the persuasive force of the idea.” Ibid. Similarly, the Court stated in Hughes v. Superior Court, supra, at 465:
“Publication in a newspaper, or by distribution of circulars, may convey the same information or make the same charge as do those patrolling a picket line. But the very purpose of a picket line is to exert influences, and it produces consequences, different from other modes of communication.”
In Tree Fruits, we could not discern with the “requisite clarity” that Congress intended to proscribe all peaceful consumer picketing at secondary sites. There is even less reason to find in the language of § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B), standing alone, any clear indication that handbilling, without picketing, “coerces” secondary employers. The loss of customers because they read a handbill urging them not to patronize a business, and not because they are intimidated by a line of picketers, is the result of mere persuasion, and the neutral who reacts is doing no more than what its customers honestly want it to do.
The Board argues that our first DeBartolo case goes far to dispose of this case because there we said that the only non-picketing publicity “exempted from the prohibition is publicity intended to inform the public that the primary employer’s product is ‘distributed by’ the secondary employer.”. 463 U. S., at 155. We also indicated that if the handbilling were protected by the proviso, the distribution requirement would be without substantial practical effect. Id., at 157. But we obviously did not there conclude or indicate that the handbills were covered by § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B), for we remanded the case on this very issue. Id., at 157-158.
It is nevertheless argued that the second proviso to § 8(b)(4) makes clear that that section, as amended in 1959, was intended to proscribe nonpicketing appeals such as hand-billing urging a consumer boycott of a neutral employer. That proviso reads as follows:
“Provided further, That for the purposes of this paragraph (4) only, nothing contained in such paragraph shall be construed to prohibit publicity, other than picketing, for the purpose of truthfully advising the public, including consumers and members of a labor organization, that a product or products are produced by an employer with whom the labor organization has a primary dispute and are distributed by another employer, as long as such publicity does not have an effect of inducing any individual employed by any person other than the primary employer in the course of his employment to refuse to pick up, deliver, or transport any goods, or not to perform any services, at the establishment of the employer engaged in such distribution.”
By its terms, the proviso protects nonpicketing communications directed at customers of a distributor of goods produced by an employer with whom the union has a labor dispute. Because handbilling and other consumer appeals not involving such a distributor are not within the proviso, the argument goes, those appeals must be considered coercive within the meaning of § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). Otherwise, it is said, the proviso is meaningless, for if handbilling and like communications are never coercive and within the reach of the section, there would have been no need whatsoever for the proviso.
This approach treats the proviso as establishing an exception to a prohibition that would otherwise reach the conduct excepted. But this proviso has a different ring to it. It states that § 8(b)(4) “shall not be construed” to forbid certain described nonpicketing publicity. That language need not be read as an exception. It may indicate only that without the proviso, the particular nonpicketing communication the proviso protects might have been considered to be coercive, even if other forms of publicity would not be. Section 8(b)(4), with its proviso, may thus be read as not covering nonpicketing publicity, including appeals to customers of a retailer as they approach the store, urging a complete boycott of the retailer because he handles products produced by nonunion shops.
The Board’s reading of § 8(b)(4) would make an unfair labor practice out of any kind of publicity or communication to the public urging a consumer boycott of employers other than those the proviso specifically deals with. On the facts of this case, newspaper, radio, and television appeals not to patronize the mall would be prohibited; and it would be an unfair labor practice for unions in their own meetings to urge their members not to shop in the mall. Nor could a union’s handbills simply urge not shopping at a department store because it is using a nonunion contractor, although the union could safely ask the store’s customers not to buy there because it is selling mattresses not carrying the union label. It is difficult, to say the least, to fathom why Congress would consider appeals urging a boycott of a distributor of a nonunion product to be more deserving of protection than non-picketing persuasion of customers of other neutral employers such as that involved in this case.
Neither do we find any clear indication in the relevant legislative history that Congress intended § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) to proscribe peaceful handbilling, unaccompanied by picketing, urging a consumer boycott of a neutral employer. That section was one of several amendments to the NLRA enacted in 1959 and aimed at closing what were thought to be loopholes in the protections to which secondary employers were entitled. We recounted the legislative history in Tree Fruits and NLRB v. Servette, Inc., 377 U. S. 46 (1964), and the Court of Appeals carefully reexamined, it in this case and found “no affirmative intention of Congress clearly expressed to prohibit nonpicketing labor publicity.” 796 F. 2d, at 1346. For the following reasons, for the most part expressed by the Court of Appeals, we agree with that conclusion.
First, among the concerns of the proponents of the provision barring threats, coercion, or restraints aimed at secondary employers was consumer boycotts of neutral employers carried out by picketing. At no time did they suggest that merely handbilling the customers of the neutral employer was one of the evils at which their proposals were aimed. Had they wanted to bar any and all nonpicketing appeals, through newspapers, radio, television, handbills, or otherwise, the debates and discussions would surely have reflected this intention. Instead, when asked, Congressman Griffin, cosponsor of the bill that passed the House, stated that the bill covered boycotts carried out by picketing neutrals but would not interfere with the constitutional right of free speech. 105 Cong. Rec. 15673, 2 Leg. Hist. 1615.
Second, the only suggestions that the ban against coercing secondary employers would forbid peaceful persuasion of customers by means other than picketing came from the opponents of any proposals to close the perceived loopholes in § 8(b)(4). Among their arguments in both the House and the Senate was that picketing and handbilling a neutral employer to force him to cease dealing in the products of an employer engaged in labor disputes, appeals which were then said to be legal, would be forbidden by the proposal that became § 8(b) (4)(ii)(B). The prohibition, it was said, “reaches not only picketing but leaflets, radio broadcasts, and newspaper advertisements, thereby interfering -with freedom of speech.” 105 Cong. Rec. 15540, 2 Leg. Hist. 1576. The views of opponents of a bill with respect to its meaning, however, are not persuasive:
“[W]e have often cautioned against the danger, when interpreting a statute, of reliance upon the views of its legislative opponents. In their zeal to defeat a bill, they understandably tend to overstate its reach. 'The fears and doubts of the opposition are no authoritative guide to the construction of legislation. It is the sponsors that we look to when the meaning of the statutory words is-in doubt.’” Tree Fruits, 377 U. S., at 66 (quoting Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U. S. 384, 394-395 (1951)).
Without more, the interpretation put on the words “threaten, coerce, or restrain” by those opposed to the amendment hardly settles the matter.
Third, § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) was one of the amendments agreed upon by a House-Senate Conference on the House’s LandrumGriffin bill and the Senate’s Kennedy-Ervin bill. An analysis of the Conference bill was presented in the House by Representative Griffin and in the Senate by Senator Goldwater. With respect to appeals to consumers, the summary said that the House provision prohibiting secondary consumer picketing was adopted but “with clarification that other forms of publicity are not prohibited.” 105 Cong. Rec. 18706, Leg. Hist. 1454 (Sen. Goldwater); 105 Cong. Rec. 18022, Leg. Hist. 1712 (Rep. Griffin). The clarification referred to was the second proviso to § 8(b)(4). See supra, at 581-582. The Court of Appeals held that although the proviso was itself confined to advising the customers of an employer that the latter was distributing a product of another employer with whom the union had a labor dispute, the legislative history did not foreclose understanding the proviso as a clarification of the meaning of § 8(b)(4) rather than an exception to a general ban on consumer publicity. We agree with this view.
In addition to the summary presented by Senator Goldwater and Representative Griffin, Senator Kennedy, the Chairman of the Conference Committee, in presenting the Conference Report on the Senate floor, 105 Cong. Rec. 17898-17899, 2 Leg. Hist. 1431-1432, stated that under the amendments as reported by the Conference Committee, a “union can hand out handbills at the shop, can place advertisements in newspapers, can make announcements over the radio, and can carry on all publicity short of having ambulatory picketing in front of a secondary site.” And he assured Senator Goldwater that union buy-American campaigns — that is, publicity requesting that consumers not buy foreign-made products, even though there is no ongoing labor dispute with the actual producer — would not be prohibited by the section.
Senator Kennedy included in his statement, however, the following:
“Under the Landrum-Griffin Bill it would have been impossible for a union to inform the customers of a secondary employer that that employer or store was selling goods which were made under racket conditions or sweatshop conditions, or in a plant where an economic strike was in progress. We were not able to persuade the House conferees to permit picketing in front of that secondary shop, but we were able to persuade them to agree that the union shall be free to conduct informational activity short of picketing.” 105 Cong. Rec. 17898-17899, 2 Leg. Hist. 1432.
The Board relies on this part of the Senator’s exposition as an authoritative interpretation of the words “threaten, coerce, or restrain” and argues that except as saved by the express language of the proviso, informational appeals to customers not to deal with secondary employers are unfair labor practices. The Senator’s remarks about the meaning of §8(b)(4)(ii) echoed his views, and that of others, expressed in opposing and defeating in the Senate any attempts to give more protection to secondary employers from consumer boycotts, whether carried out by picketing or non-picketing means. See n. 8, supra, and accompanying text. And if the proviso added in conference were an exception rather than a clarification, it surely would not follow, as the Senator said, that under the Conference bill, unions would be free to “conduct informational activity short of picketing” and could handbill, advertise in newspapers, and carry out all publicity short of ambulatory picketing in front of a secondary site. Nor would buy-American appeals be permissible, for they do not fall within the proviso’s terms. At the very least, the Kennedy-Goldwater colloquy falls far short of revealing a clear intent that all nonpicketing appeals to customers urging a secondary boycott were unfair practices unless protected by the express words of the proviso. Nor does that exchange together with the other bits of legislative history relied on by the Board rise to that level.
In our view, interpreting § 8(b)(4) as not reaching the hand-billing involved in this case is not foreclosed either by the language of the section or its legislative history. That construction makes unnecessary passing on the serious constitutional questions that would be raised by the Board’s understanding of the statute. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
Justice O’Connor and Justice Scalia concur in the judgment.
Justice Kennedy took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
The Handbill read:
“PLEASE DON’T SHOP AT EAST LAKE SQUARE MALL PLEASE
“The FLA. GULF COAST BUILDING TRADES COUNCIL, AFL-CIO, is requesting that you do not shop at the stores in the East Lake Square Mall because of The Mall ownership’s contribution to substandard wages.
“The Wilson’s Department Store under construction on these premises is being built by contractors who pay substandard wages and fringe benefits. In the past, the Mall’s owner, The Edward J. DeBartolo Corporation, has supported labor and our local economy by insuring that the Mall and its stores be built by contractors who pay fair wages and fringe benefits. Now, however, and for no apparent reason, the Mall owners have taken a giant step backwards by permitting our standards to be torn down. The payment of substandard wages not only diminishes the working person’s ability to purchase with earned, rather than borrowed, dollars, but it also undercuts the wage standard of the entire community. Since low construction wages at this time of inflation means decreased purchasing power, do the owners of East Lake Mall intend to compensate for the decreased purchasing power of workers of the community by encouraging the stores in East Lake Mall to cut their prices and lower their profits?
“CUT-RATE WAGES ARE NOT FAIR UNLESS MERCHANDISE PRICES ARE ALSO CUT-RATE.
‘We ask for your support in our protest against substandard wages. Please do not patronize the stores in the East Lake Square Mall until the Mall’s owner publicly promises that all construction at the Mall will be done using contractors who pay their employees fair wages and fringe benefits.
“IF YOU MUST ENTER THE MALL TO DO BUSINESS, please express to the store managers your concern over substandard wages and your support of our efforts.
We are appealing only to the public — the consumer. We are not seeking to induce any person to cease work or to refuse to make deliveries.”
That section provides in pertinent part:
Ҥ 158. Unfair labor practices
“(b) Unfair labor practices by labor organization
“It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents —
“(4)(i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to engage in, a strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services; or (ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, where in either case an object thereof is —
“(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person, or forcing or requiring any other employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the representative of his employees unless such labor organization has been certified as the representative of such employees under the provisions of section 159 of this title: Provided, That nothing contained in this clause (B) shall be construed to make unlawful, where not otherwise unlawful, any primary strike or primary picketing;
“... Provided further, That for the purposes of this paragraph (4) only, nothing contained in such paragraph shall be construed to prohibit publicity, other than picketing, for the purpose of truthfully advising the public, including consumers and members of a labor organization, that a product or products are produced by an employer with whom the labor organization has a primary dispute and are distributed by another employer, as long as such publicity does not have an effect of inducing any individual employed by any person other than the primary employer in the course of his employment to refuse to pick up, deliver, or transport any goods, or not to perform any services, at the establishment of the employer engaged in such distribution.”
The Board cited two of its decisions that had been enforced by the Courts of Appeals as authority for its construction of § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). The court in Honolulu Typographical Union No. 37 v. NLRB, 131 U. S. App. D. C. 1, 6, 401 F. 2d 952, 957 (1968), enf’g 167 N. L. R. B. 1030 (1967), upheld the Board’s determination that the handbilling there violated § 8(b) (4)(ii)(B), but that handbilling was part and parcel of a consumer picketing campaign in which the handbills were distributed at the edge of a line of picketers who were patrolling the entrance to the mall. The absence of picketing in the present case distinguishes it from Honolulu Typographical. In Great Western Broadcasting Corp. v. NLRB, 356 F. 2d 434, 436 (CA9), enf’g 150 N. L. R. B. 467 (1964), cert. denied, 384 U. S. 1002 (1966), the court upheld the Board’s determination that the handbilling there fell within the publicity proviso and thus was not unlawful, but it stated in dictum that §
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | G | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Florida Supreme Court held that the Florida District Court of Appeal erred in refusing to issue a writ of prohibition to restrain the Circuit Court for Duval County from exercising its jurisdiction over a suit within the purview of § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA). The suit sought to enjoin respondent unions' breach of a no-strike clause contained in a collective-bargaining agreement, which breach arguably is also an unfair labor practice under the Act. The State Supreme Court stated: “It is unquestionable that state courts do have jurisdiction to enforce a collective-bargaining agreement and to enjoin a strike in violation of a ‘no-strike’ clause contained therein, but not when the strike is also arguably an unfair labor practice prohibited by federal law.” 279 So. 2d 300, 302 (1973). We granted certiorari to decide whether the holding of the Florida Supreme Court was consistent with decisions of this Court, including Teamsters Local v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U. S. 95 (1962), and Smith v. Evening News Assn., 371 U. S. 195 (1962). 414 U. S. 1063 (1973). We reverse.
Article VI of a collective-bargaining agreement between petitioner, William E. Arnold Co., and respondents, Carpenters District Council of Jacksonville and Vicinity and its affiliate, Local 627 (Carpenters), provides:
“There shall be no work stoppage, slowdown, work cessation or strike because of a Jurisdictional Dispute. A mutually agreeable settlement, or joint decision of the International Unions involved, or decision or interpretation of the National Joint Board for the Settlement of Jurisdictional Disputes (or Hearing Panel) shall be binding and all parties agree to accept such decision or interpretation.”
In 1971, during the construction of the Jacksonville General Hospital, one of Arnold’s subcontractors assigned work claimed by the Carpenters to the Wood, Wire and Metal Lathers International Union, AFL-CIO, Local 59. The Carpenters struck Arnold to force reassignment of the work to their members. Arnold thereupon brought this suit in the Circuit Court of Duval County to enjoin the Carpenters from violating the provisions of Art. VI and obtained a temporary restraining order prohibiting the strike. The Carpenters then sought a writ of prohibition from a Florida District Court of Appeal, contending that the Circuit Court lacked jurisdiction to order injunctive relief because the alleged breach of the no-strike clause was also arguably an unfair labor practice under § 8 (b) (4) (i) (D) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U. S. C. § 158 (b)(4) (i)(D), and therefore fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board (Board). The District Court of Appeal denied the writ of prohibition and, as previously mentioned, the Supreme Court of Florida reversed.
When an activity is either arguably protected by § 7 or arguably prohibited by § 8 of the NLRA, the preemption doctrine developed in San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U. S. 236 (1959), and its progeny, teaches that ordinarily “the States as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations Board if the danger of state interference with national policy is to be averted.” Id., at 245. When, however, the activity in question also constitutes a breach of a collective-bargaining agreement, the Board’s authority “is not exclusive and does not destroy the jurisdiction of the courts in suits under § 301.” Smith v. Evening News Assn., 371 U. S., at 197. This exception was explicitly reaffirmed in Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U. S. 274, 297-298 (1971). It was fashioned because the history of § 301 reveals that “Congress deliberately chose to leave the enforcement of collective agreements 'to the usual processes of the law,’” Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U. S. 502, 513 (1962). Thus, we have said that the Garmon doctrine is “not relevant” to actions within the purview of § 301, Teamsters Local v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U. S., at 101 n. 9, which may be brought in either state .or federal courts, Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, supra, at 506.
Indeed, Board policy is to refrain from exercising jurisdiction in respect of disputed conduct arguably both an unfair labor practice and a contract violation when, as in this case, the parties have voluntarily established by contract a binding settlement procedure. See, e. g., The Associated Press, 199 N. L. R. B. 1110 (1972); Eastman Broadcasting Co., 199 N. L. R. B. 434 (1972); Laborers Local 423, 199 N. L. R. B. 450 (1972); Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N. L. R. B. 837 (1971). The Board said in Collyer, “an industrial relations dispute may involve conduct which, at least arguably, may contravene both the collective agreement and our statute. When the parties have contractually committed themselves to mutually agreeable procedures for resolving their disputes during the period of the contract, we are of the view that those procedures should be afforded full opportunity to function. . . . We believe it to be consistent with the fundamental objectives of Federal law to require the parties ... to honor their contractual obligations rather than, by casting [their] dispute in statutory terms, to ignore their agreed-upon procedures.” Id., at 842-843. The Board’s position harmonizes with Congress’ articulated concern that, “[f]inal adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is . . . the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the application or interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining agreement. ...” § 203 (d) of the LMRA, 29 U. S. C. § 173 (d).
Furthermore, when the particular contract violation also involves an arguable violation of § 8 (b) (4) (i) (D) of the NLRA concerning jurisdictional disputes, as in this case, the Board has recognized added policy justifications for deferring to the contractual dispute settlement mechanism agreed upon by the parties. Section 10 (k) of the NLRA, 29 U. S. C. § 160 (k), establishes a special procedure for the Board’s resolution of charges involving jurisdictional disputes:
“Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in an'unfair labor practice within the meaning of paragraph (4)(D) of section 158 (b) of this title, the Board is empowered and directed to hear and determine the dispute out of which such unfair labor practice shall have arisen, unless, within ten days after notice that such charge has been filed, the parties to such dispute submit to the Board satisfactory evidence that they have adjusted, or agreed upon methods for the voluntary adjustment of, the dispute. Upon compliance by the parties to the dispute with the decision of the Board or upon such voluntary adjustment of the dispute, such charge shall be dismissed.” (Emphasis added.)
Thus, § 10 (k) “not only tolerates but actively encourages voluntary settlements of work assignment controversies between unions . . . Carey v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 375 U. S. 261, 266 (1964). Recognizing Congress’ preference for voluntary settlement of jurisdictional disputes, the Board has declined jurisdiction in § 10 (k) cases, commenting that, “[i]f we retained jurisdiction . . . , the statutory purpose to encourage the voluntary settlement of jurisdictional disputes would be frustrated in that a party receiving an adverse decision from the agreed-upon tribunal for settling its jurisdictional dispute would be encouraged to ignore such decision, lapse into noncompliance, and then come before this Board for a more favorable resolution of the dispute.” Laborers Local 423, 199 N. L. R. B., at 451.
The Board’s practice and policy of declining to exercise its concurrent jurisdiction over arguably unfair labor practices which also violate provisions of collective-bargaining agreements for voluntary adjustment of disputes highlight the congressional purpose that § 301 suits in state and federal courts should be the primary means for “promoting collective bargaining that [ends] with agreements not to strike.” Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U. S. 448, 453 (1957). The assurance of swift and effective judicial relief provides incentive to eschew economic weapons in favor of binding grievance procedures and no-strike clauses.
The Carpenters contend, however, that state court jurisdiction over collective-bargaining disputes should be limited to claims for damages, rather than injunctive relief. See Brief for Respondents 7-9. We disagree. To be sure, Lucas, Smith, and Lockridge, all supra, involved only damages claims, but nothing in the opinions in those cases remotely suggests that state court jurisdiction should turn upon the particular type of relief sought. Indeed, Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge 735, 390 U. S. 557, 561 (1968), disposes of the argument. We there said: “The nature of the relief available after jurisdiction attaches is, of course, different from the question whether there is jurisdiction to adjudicate the controversy. . . . Any error in granting or designing relief ‘does not go to the jurisdiction of the court.’ Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 311, 331.” Moreover, the policy reasons against extension of the Garmon doctrine to suits within the scope of § 301 are particularly compelling when the relief sought is specific performance of a no-strike obligation, rather than damages. What we said in Boys Markets v. Clerks Union, 398 U. S. 235, 248 (1970), is pertinent here:
“[A] no-strike obligation, express or implied, is the quid pro quo for an undertaking by the employer to submit grievance disputes to the process of arbitration. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, supra, at 455. Any incentive for employers to enter into such an arrangement is necessarily dissipated if the principal and most expeditious method by which the no-strike obligation can be enforced is eliminated. While it is of course true, as respondent contends, that other avenues of redress, such as an action for damages, would remain open to an aggrieved employer, an award of damages after a dispute has been settled is no substitute for an immediate halt to an illegal strike. Furthermore, an action for damages prosecuted during or after a labor dispute would only tend to aggravate industrial strife and delay an early resolution of the difficulties between employer and union.” (Footnotes omitted.)
See also Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U. S. 368, 382 (1973).
Therefore, we reject the argument of Carpenters that the availability of effective equitable relief should be limited to the federal courts. We have previously expressed our agreement with Chief Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court that “whether or not Congress could deprive state courts of the power to give such [injunctive] remedies when enforcing collective-bargaining agreements, it has not attempted to do so either in the Norris-La Guardia Act or section 301,” McCarroll v. Los Angeles County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 49 Cal. 2d 45, 63, 315 P. 2d 322, 332 (1957). See Boys Markets v. Clerks Union, supra, at 247. Rather, the jurisdiction given federal courts under § 301 was “not to displace, but to supplement, the thoroughly considered jurisdiction of the courts of the various States over contracts made by labor organizations,” Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U. S., at 511.
We do not, of course, pass upon the propriety of the injunctive relief sought in the present case. That is a question to be resolved on remand. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Florida is reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
“Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.” 61 Stat. 156, 29 U. S. C. §185 (a).
Section 8 (b) (4) makes it an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents:
“(i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to engage in, a strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise, handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services; or (ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, where in either case an object thereof is—
“(D) forcing or requiring any employer to assign particular work to employees in a particular labor organization or in a particular trade, craft, or class rather than to employees in another labor organization or in another trade, craft, or class, unless such employer is failing to conform to an order or certification of the Board determining the bargaining representative for employees performing such work . .. .”
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | J | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
In this companion case to NLRB v. Boeing Go., ante, p. 67, we must decide whether our decision in NLRB v. Textile Workers, 409 U. S. 213, authorizes the Board to find that a union commits an unfair labor practice in seeking court enforcement of fines imposed for strikebreaking activities by employees who have resigned from the union, even though the union constitution expressly prohibits members from strikebreaking. We hold that it does.
On September 16, 1965, the day after the expiration of the collective-bargaining agreement between Booster Lodge No. 405, International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO (the Union), and the Boeing Co. (the Company), the Union called a lawful strike and picketed the Company’s Michoud, Louisiana, plant to further its demands for a new contract. The strike continued for 18 days, during which time 143 of the 1,900 production and maintenance employees represented by the Union crossed the picket line to work. All of these employees had been members of the Union before the strike, but 61 resigned their membership prior to returning to work and another 58 resigned after they returned to work. These resignations were tendered in registered or certified letters to the Union. Neither its constitution nor its bylaws contained any provision expressly permitting or forbidding such resignations.
The strike ended on October 4, 1965, after ratification of a new collective-bargaining agreement by the Union membership. During late October and early November, the Union notified all employees who had crossed the picket line to work during the strike that charges had been preferred against them under the Union constitution for “Improper Conduct of a Member” because of their having “accept[ed] employment ... in an establishment where a strike or lockout exist [ed].” They were advised of the dates of their Union trials, which were to be held even in their absence, and of their right to be represented by any counsel who was a member of the International Union. Fines were imposed on all employees who had worked during the strike without regard to whether or not such employees had resigned or had remained members. None of the disciplined employees processed intra-union appeals. To the extent that fines were not paid, the Union sent written notices to the offending employees stating that the matter had been referred to an attorney for collection. Suits were initiated in state court against nine employees for the purpose of collecting the fines plus attorneys’ fees and interest. None of these suits has been resolved.
The Company filed an unfair labor practice charge with the National Labor Relations Board alleging that the Union had violated §8 (b)(1)(A) of the National Labor Relations Act, 61 Stat. 141, 29 U. S. C. § 158 (b) (1)(A). The General Counsel issued a complaint, and the Board held that the Union violated § 8(b)(1) (A), by fining those employees who had resigned from the Union before returning to work during the strike, and by fining those who had resigned after returning to work to the extent that such fines were based on post-resignation work. No violation was found in the Union’s fining members for crossing the picket line to work during the strike or in its fining those employees who resigned after they returned to work for work performed prior to resignation. The Board ordered the Union to cease and desist from fining employees who had resigned from the Union for their post-resignation work during the strike and from seeking court enforcement of such fines. It further ordered reimbursement to employees who had already paid fines for any amount imposed because of post-resignation work. The Court of Appeals sustained these holdings, 148 U. S. App. D. C. 119, 459 F. 2d 1143 (1972), and, on the Union’s petition for review, we granted certiorari. 409 U. S. 1074.
In NLRB v. Textile Workers, 409 U. S., at 217, we held that “[w]here a member lawfully resigns from a union and thereafter engages in conduct which the union rule proscribes, the union commits an unfair labor practice when it seeks enforcement of fines for that conduct.” Since in that case there was no provision in the Union’s constitution or bylaws limiting the circumstances in which a member could resign, we concluded that the members were free to resign at will and that § 7 of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 157, protected that right to return to work during a strike which had been commenced while they were union members. The Union’s imposition of court-collectible fines against the former members for such work was, therefore, held to violate § 8 (b)(1)(A).
Here, as in Textile Workers, the Union’s constitution and bylaws are silent on the subject of voluntary resignation from the Union. And here, as there, we leave open the question of the extent to which contractual restriction on a member’s right to resign may be limited by the Act. Since there is no evidence that the employees here either knew of or had consented to any limitation on their right to resign, we need “only to apply the law which normally is reflected in our free institutions — the right of the individual to join or to resign from associations, as he sees fit ‘subject of course to any financial obligations due and owing’ the group with which he was associated.” Textile Workers, supra, at 216.
The Union contends, however, that a result different from Textile Workers is warranted in this case because, even though its constitution does not expressly restrict the right to resign during a strike, it does impose on members an obligation to refrain from strikebreaking. The Union asserts that this provision has been consistently interpreted to bind a member, notwithstanding his resignation, to abstain from strikebreaking for the duration of an existing strike. It urges that this provision may be enforced as a matter of contract law against one whose membership has ceased, because it was an obligation he undertook while a member.
The provision in the Union’s constitution which proscribes strikebreaking by its terms purports only to define “misconduct of a member.” Nothing in the record indicates that Union members were informed, prior to the bringing of the charges that were the basis of this action, that the provision was interpreted as imposing any obligation on a resignee. Thus, in order to sustain the Union’s position, we would first have to find, contrary to the determination of the Board and of the Court of Appeals, that the Union constitution by implication extended its sanctions to nonmembers, and then further conclude that such sanctions were consistent with the Act. But we are no more disposed to find an implied post-resignation commitment from the strikebreaking proscription in the Union’s constitution here than we were to find it from the employees’ participation in the strike vote and ratification of penalties in Textile Workers. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals sustaining the Board’s finding of an unfair labor practice on the part of petitioner Union is
Affirmed.
The expired collective agreement contained a maintenance-of-membership provision that required new employees, as a condition of continued employment, to become members of the Union unless they notified both the Union and the Company within 40 days of accepting employment that they did not wish to join. Further, Union members were required to maintain their membership during the life of the contract.
The remaining employees who returned to work during the strike did not resign from the Union.
A standard fine of $450 was imposed on each of the disciplined employees. The amount was reduced, however, for those few members who appeared at their hearings, apologized for their actions, and pledged loyalty to the Union.
None of the $450 fines has been paid, but reduced fines have been paid in a few instances.
Section 8 (b)(1)(A) of the Act provides, in relevant part:
“It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents—
“(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7: Provided, That this paragraph shall not impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein . . . .”
Section 7 of the Act provides, in relevant part:
“Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities . . .
It was stipulated in that case that all 31 of the employees who resigned from the Union during the strike and returned to work participated in the strike vote, and voted in favor of the strike. NLRB v. Textile Workers, 409 U. S. 213, 219 n. 2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Since the collective-bargaining agreement expired prior to the times of the resignations, the maintenance-of-membership clause therein was no impediment to resigning.
The Union points out in its brief that at the 1972 International Union convention its interpretation of the strikebreaking proscription was made explicit. This constitutional amendment, made seven years after the strike here, is persuasive evidence that it was not there before, or at a minimum, that the proscription then existing did not apprise the employees of their asserted obligations to the Union.
In its reply brief, the Union argues that in Textile Workers there was no limiting rule on post-resignation return to work during the course of the strike, but that in this case, the Union constitution proscribed such conduct. In Textile Workers, however, there was a duly enacted rule prohibiting any member from aiding and abetting the employer during the strike and subjecting violators to a $2,000 fine. On its face, the constitutional proscription here advanced is no broader than that rule.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | G | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Ginsburg
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case concerns the authority of the federal courts to adjudicate controversies. Jurisdiction to resolve cases on the merits requires both authority over the category of claim in suit (subject-matter jurisdiction) and authority over the parties (personal jurisdiction), so that the court’s decision will bind them. In Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U. S. 83 (1998), this Court adhered to the rule that a federal court may not hypothesize subject-matter jurisdiction for the purpose of deciding the merits. Steel Co. rejected a doctrine, once approved by several Courts of Appeals, that allowed federal tribunals to pretermit jurisdictional objections “where (1) the merits question is more readily resolved, and (2) the prevailing party on the merits would be the same as the prevailing party were jurisdiction denied.” Id., at 93. Recalling “a long and venerable line of our eases,” id., at 94, Steel Co. reiterated: “The requirement that jurisdiction be established as a threshold matter . . . is ‘inflexible and without exception,’ ” id., at 94-95 (quoting Mansfield, C. & L. M. R. Co. v. Swan, 111 U. S. 379, 382 (1884)); for “[¿jurisdiction is power to declare the law,” and “‘[wjithout jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause,’ ” 523 U. S., at 94 (quoting Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506, 514 (1869)). The Court, in Steel Co., acknowledged that “the absolute purity” of the jurisdiction-first rule had been diluted in a few extraordinary eases, 523 U. S., at 101, and Justice O’Connor, joined by Justice Kennedy, joined the majority on the understanding that the Court’s opinion did not catalog “an exhaustive list of circumstances” in which exceptions to the solid rule were appropriate, id., at 110.
Steel Co. is the backdrop for the issue now before us: If, as Steel Co. held, jurisdiction generally must precede merits in dispositional order, must subject-matter jurisdiction precede personal jurisdiction on the decisional line? Or, do federal district courts have discretion to avoid a difficult question of subject-matter jurisdiction when the absence of personal jurisdiction is the surer ground? The particular civil action we confront was commenced in state court and removed to federal court. The specific question on which we granted certiorari asks “[wjhether a federal district court is absolutely barred in all circumstances from dismissing a removed case for lack of personal jurisdiction without first deciding its subject-matter jurisdiction.” Pet. for Cert. i.
We hold that in cases court, as in cases originating in federal court, there is no unyielding jurisdictional hierarchy. Customarily, a federal court first resolves doubts about its jurisdiction over the subject matter, but there are circumstances in which a district court appropriately accords priority to a personal jurisdiction inquiry. The proceeding before us is such a ease.
I
The underlying controversy stems from a venture to produce gas in the Heimdal Field of the Norwegian North Sea. In 1976, respondents Marathon Oil Company and Marathon International Oil Company acquired Marathon Petroleum Company (Norway) (MPCN) and respondent Marathon Petroleum Norge (Norge). See App. 26. Before the acquisition, Norge held a license to produce gas in the Heimdal Field; following the transaction, Norge assigned the license to MPCN. See Record, Exhs. 61 and 62 to Document 64. In 1981, MPCN contracted to sell 70% of its share of the Heimdal gas production to a group of European buyers, including petitioner Ruhrgas AG. See Record, Exh. 1 to Document 63, pp. 90, 280. The parties’ agreement was incorporated into the Heimdal Gas Sales Agreement (Heimdal Agreement), which is “governed by and construed in accordance with Norwegian Law,” Record, Exh. B, Tab 1 to Pet. for Removal, Heimdal Agreement, p. 102; disputes thereunder are to be “exclusively and finally ... settled by arbitration in Stockholm, Sweden, in accordance with” International Ghamber of Commerce rules, id., at 100.
h — I h — i
Marathon Oil Company, Marathon International Oil Company, and Norge (collectively, Marathon) filed this lawsuit against Ruhrgas in Texas state court on July 6, 1995, asserting state-law claims of fraud, tortious interference with prospective business relations, participation in breach of fiduciary duty, and civil conspiracy. See App. 38-40. Marathon Oil Company and Marathon International Oil Company alleged that Ruhrgas and the other European buyers induced them with false promises of “premium prices” and guaranteed pipeline tariffs to invest over $300 million in MPGN for the development of the Heimdal Field and the erection of a pipeline to Ruhrgas’ plant in Germany. See id., at 26-28; Brief for Respondents 1-2. Norge alleged that Ruhrgas’ effective monopolization of the Heimdal gas diminished the value of the license Norge had assigned to MPCN. See App. 31, 33, 357; Brief for Respondents 2. Marathon asserted that Ruhrgas had furthered its plans at three meetings in Houston, Texas, and through a stream of correspondence directed to Marathon in Texas. See App. 229, 233.
Southern District of Texas. See 145 F. 3d 211, 214 (CA5 1998). In its notice of removal, Ruhrgas asserted three bases for federal jurisdiction: diversity of citizenship, see 28 U. S. C. § 1332 (1994 ed. and Supp. Ill), on the theory that Norge, the only nondiverse plaintiff, had been fraudulently joined; federal question, see §1331, because Marathon’s claims “raise[dj substantial questions of foreign and international relations, which are incorporated into and form part of the federal common law,” App. 274; and 9 U. S. C. §205, which authorizes removal of cases “relating] to” international arbitration agreements. See 145 F. 3d, at 214-215; 115 F. 3d 315, 319-321 (CA5), vacated and rehearing en banc granted, 129 F. 3d 746 (1997). Ruhrgas moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. Marathon moved to remand the case to the state court for lack of federal subject-matter jurisdiction. See 145 F. 3d, at 215.
After permitting Court dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction. See App. 455. In so ruling, the District Court relied on Fifth Circuit precedent allowing district courts to adjudicate personal jurisdiction without first establishing subject-matter jurisdiction. See id., at 445. Texas’ long-arm statute, see Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 17.042 (1997), authorizes personal jurisdiction to the extent allowed by the Due Process Clause of the Federal Constitution. See App. 446; Kawasaki Steel Corp. v. Middleton, 699 S. W. 2d 199, 200 (Tex. 1985). The District Court addressed the constitutional question and concluded that Ruhrgas’ contacts with Texas were insufficient to support personal jurisdiction. See App. 445-454. Finding “no evidence that Ruhrgas engaged in any tortious conduct in Texas,” id., at 450, the court determined that Marathon’s complaint did not present circumstances adequately affiliating Ruhrgas with Texas, see id., at 448.
A panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded that “respec[t]” for “the proper balance of federalism” impelled it to turn first to “the formidable subject matter jurisdiction issue presented.” 115 F. 3d, at 318. After examining and rejecting each of Ruhrgas’ asserted bases of federal jurisdiction, see id., at 319-321, the Court of Appeals vacated the judgment of the District Court and ordered the case remanded to the state court, see id., at 321. This Court denied Ruhrgas’ petition for a writ of certiorari, which was limited to the question whether subject-matter jurisdiction existed under 9 U. S. C. § 205. See 522 U. S. 967 (1997).
The Fifth Circuit, on its own motion, granted rehearing en banc, thereby vacating the panel decision. See 129 F. 3d 746 (1997). In a 9-to-7 decision, the en banc court held that, in removed cases, district courts must decide issues of subject-matter jurisdiction first, reaching issues of personal jurisdiction “only if subject-matter jurisdiction is found to exist.” 145 F. 3d, at 214. Noting Steel Co.’s instruction that subject-matter jurisdiction must be “‘established as a threshold matter,’ ” 145 F. 3d, at 217 (quoting 523 U. S., at 94), the Court of Appeals derived from that decision “counsel against” recognition of judicial discretion to proceed directly to personal jurisdiction. 145 F. 3d, at 218. The court limited its holding to removed eases; it perceived in those cases the most grave threat that federal courts would “usur[p]... state courts’ residual jurisdiction.” Id., at 219.
Writing for the seven dissenters, Judge Higginbotham agreed that subject-matter jurisdiction ordinarily should be considered first. See id., at 231. If the challenge to personal jurisdiction involves no complex state-law questions, however, and is more readily resolved than the challenge to subject-matter jurisdiction, the District Court, in the dissenters’ view, should take the easier route. See ibid. Judge Higginbotham regarded the District Court’s decision dismissing Marathon’s case as illustrative and appropriate: While Ruhrgas’ argument under 9 U. S. C. § 205 presented a difficult issue of first impression, its personal jurisdiction challenge raised “[n]o substantial questions of purely state law,” and “could be resolved relatively easily in [Ruhrgas’] favor.” 145 F. 3d, at 232-233.
We granted certiorari, 525 U. S. 1039 (1998), to resolve a conflict between the Circuits and now reverse.
HH HH HH
Steel Co. held that Article III generally requires a federal court to satisfy itself of its jurisdiction over the subject matter before it considers the merits of a ease. “For a court to pronounce upon [the merits] when it has no jurisdiction to do so,” Steel Co. declared, “is ... for a court to act ultra vires.” 523 U. S., at 101-102. The Fifth Circuit incorrectly read Steel Co. to teach that subject-matter jurisdiction must be found to exist, not only before a federal court reaches the merits, but also before personal jurisdiction is addressed. See 145 F. 3d, at 218.
A
The Court of Appeals accorded priority to the requirement of subject-matter jurisdiction because it is nonwaivable and delimits federal-court power, while restrictions on a court’s jurisdiction over the person are waivable and protect individual rights. See id., at 217-218. The character of the two jurisdictional bedrocks unquestionably differs. Subject-matter limitations on federal jurisdiction serve institutional interests. They keep the federal courts within the bounds the Constitution and Congress have prescribed. Accordingly, subject-matter delineations must be policed by the courts on their own initiative even at the highest level. See Steel Co., 523 U. S., at 94-95; Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 12(h)(3) (“Whenever it appears . .. that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action.”); 28 U. S. C. § 1447(c) (1994 ed., Supp. Ill) (“If at any time before final judgment [in a removed case] it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.”).
Personal jurisdiction, on the other striction on judicial power ... as a matter of individual liberty.” Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U. S. 694, 702 (1982). Therefore, a party may insist that the limitation be observed, or he may forgo that right, effectively consenting to the court’s exercise of adjudicatory authority. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 12(h)(1) (defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person waivable); Insurance Corp. of Ireland, 456 U. S., at 703 (same).
These distinctions do not mean that diction is ever and always the more “fundamental.” Personal jurisdiction, too, is “an essential element of the jurisdiction of a district . . . court,” without which the court is “powerless to proceed to an adjudication.” Employers Reinsurance Corp. v. Bryant, 299 U. S. 374, 382 (1937). In this case, indeed, the impediment to subject-matter jurisdiction on which Marathon relies — lack of complete diversity — rests on statutory interpretation, not constitutional command. Marathon joined an alien plaintiff (Norge) as well as an alien defendant (Ruhrgas). If the joinder of Norge is legitimate, the complete diversity required by 28 U. S. C. § 1332 (1994 ed. and Supp. Ill), but not by Article III, see State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tashire, 386 U. S. 523, 530-531 (1967), is absent. In contrast, Ruhrgas relies on the constitutional safeguard of due process to stop the court from proceeding to the merits of the case. See Insurance Corp. of Ireland, 456 U. S., at 702 (“The requirement that a court have personal jurisdiction flows ... from the Due Process Clause.”).
While Steel Co. reasoned that subjeet-matter necessarily precedes a ruling on the merits, the same principle does not dictate a sequencing of jurisdictional issues. “[A] court that dismisses on . . . non-merits grounds such as . . . personal jurisdiction, before finding subject-matter jurisdiction, makes no assumption of law-declaring power that violates the separation of powers principles underlying Mansfield and Steel Company.” In re Papandreou, 139 F. 3d 247, 255 (CADC 1998). It is hardly novel for a federal court to choose among threshold grounds for denying audience to a case on the merits. Thus, as the Court observed in Steel Co., district courts do not overstep Article III limits when they decline jurisdiction of state-law claims on discretionary grounds without determining whether those claims fall within their pendent jurisdiction, see Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U. S. 693, 715-716 (1973), or abstain under Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971), without deciding whether the parties present a case or controversy, see Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U. S. 426, 433-434 (1975). See Steel Co., 523 U. S., at 100-101, n. 3; cf. Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U. S. 43, 66-67 (1997) (pretermitting challenge to appellants’ standing and dismissing on mootness grounds).
B
Maintaining that subject-matter jurisdiction must be decided first even when the litigation originates in federal court, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 21; Brief for Respondents 13, Marathon sees removal as the more offensive case, on the ground that the dignity of state courts is immediately at stake. If a federal court dismisses a removed case for want of personal jurisdiction, that determination may preclude the parties from relitigating the very same personal jurisdiction issue in state court. See Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men’s Assn., 283 U. S. 522, 524-527 (1931) (personal jurisdiction ruling has issue-preclusive effect).
in subsequent state-court litigation, however, may also attend a federal court’s subject-matter determination. Ruhrgas hypothesizes, for example, a defendant who removes on diversity grounds a state-court suit seeking $50,000 in compensatory and $1 million in punitive damages for breach of contract. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 10-11. If the district court determines that state law does not allow punitive damages for breach of contract and therefore remands the removed action for failure to satisfy the amount in controversy, see 28 U. S. C. § 1332(a) (1994 ed., Supp. III) ($75,000), the federal court’s conclusion will travel back with the ease. Assuming a fair airing of the issue in federal court, that court’s ruling on permissible state-law damages may bind the parties in state court, although it will set no precedent otherwise governing state-court adjudications. See Chicot County Drainage Dist v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U. S. 371, 376 (1940) (“[Federal courts’] determinations of [whether they have jurisdiction to entertain a ease] may not be assailed collaterally.”); Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 12, p. 115 (1980) (“When a court has rendered a judgment in a contested action, the judgment [ordinarily] precludes the parties from litigating the question of the court’s subject matter jurisdiction in subsequent litigation.”). Similarly, as Judge Higginbotham observed, our “dualistic . . . system of federal and state courts” allows federal courts to make issue-preclusive rulings about state law in the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1367. 145 F. 3d, at 231, and n. 7.
Most essentially, federal tary systems for administering justice in our Nation. Cooperation and comity, not competition and conflict, are essential to the federal design. A State’s dignitary interest bears consideration when a district court exercises discretion in a case cf this order. If personal jurisdiction raises “difficult questions of [state] law,” and subject-matter jurisdiction is resolved “as eas[ily]” as personal jurisdiction, a district court will ordinarily conclude that “federalism concerns tip the scales in favor of initially ruling on the motion to remand.” Allen v. Ferguson, 791 F. 2d 611, 616 (CA7 1986). In other cases, however, the district court may find that concerns of judicial economy and restraint are overriding. See, e.g., Asociacion Nacional de Pescadores v. Dow Quimica, 988 F. 2d 559, 566-567 (CA5 1993) (if removal is nonfrivolous and personal jurisdiction turns on federal constitutional issues, “federal intrusion into state courts’ authority ... is minimized”). The federal design allows leeway for sensitive judgments of this sort. “'Our Federalism’”
“does not mean blind deference to 'States’ Rights’ any more than it means centralization of control over every important issue in our National Government and its courts. The Framers rejected both these courses. What the concept does represent is a system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State and National Governments.” Younger, 401 U. S., at 44.
The Fifth Gircuit and Marathon posit that state-court defendants will abuse the federal system with opportunistic removals. A discretionary rule, they suggest, will encourage manufactured, convoluted federal subject-matter theories designed to wrench eases from state court. See 145 F. 3d, at 219; Brief for Respondents 28-29. This specter of unwarranted removal, we have recently observed, “rests on an assumption we do not indulge — that district courts generally will not comprehend, or will balk at applying, the rules on removal Congress has prescribed. . . . The well-advised defendant. .. will foresee the likely outcome of an unwarranted removal — a swift and nonreviewable remand order, see 28 U. S. C. §§ 1447(c), (d), attended by the displeasure of a district court whose authority has been improperly invoked.” Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U. S. 61, 77-78 (1996).
G
In accord with Judge Higginbotham, we recognize that in most instances subject-matter jurisdiction will involve no arduous inquiry. See 145 F. 3d, at 229 (“engag[ing]” subject-matter jurisdiction “at the outset of a ease ... [is] often ... the most efficient way of going”). In sueh cases, both expedition and sensitivity to state courts’ coequal stature should impel the federal court to dispose of that issue first. See Cantor Fitzgerald, L. P. v. Peaslee, 88 F. 3d 152, 155 (CA2 1996) (a court disposing of a case on personal jurisdiction grounds “should be convinced that the challenge to the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction is not easily resolved”). Where, as here, however, a district court has before it a straightforward personal jurisdiction issue presenting no complex question of state law, and the alleged defect in subject-matter jurisdiction raises a difficult and novel question, the court does not abuse its discretion by turning directly to personal jurisdiction.
* * *
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Ruhrgas is a German corporation; Norge is a Norwegian corporation. See App. 21,22. Marathon Oil Company, an Ohio corporation, and Marathon International Oil Company, a Delaware corporation, moved their principal places of business from Ohio to Texas while the venture underlying this case was in formation. See id., at 21, 239, and n. 11.
A suit between “citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state” lies within federal diversity jurisdiction. 28 U. S. C. § 1332(a)(2). Section 1332 has been interpreted to require “complete diversity.” See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 3 Cranch 267 (1806); R. Fallon, D. Meltzer, & D. Shapiro, Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal System 1528-1531 (4th ed. 1996). The foreign citizenship of defendant Ruhrgas, a German corporation, and plaintiff Norge, a Norwegian corporation, rendered diversity incomplete.
Title 9 U. S. C. §205 allows removal "[wjhere the subject matter of an action or proceeding pending in a State court relates to an arbitration agreement or award falling under the Convention [on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of June 10,1958].”
Respecting the three meetings Ruhrgas attended in Houston, Texas, see supra, at 579, the District Court concluded that Marathon had not shown that Ruhrgas pursued the alleged pattern of fraud and misrepresentation during the Houston meetings. See App. 449. The court further found that Ruhrgas attended those meetings “due to the [Heimdal Agreement] with MPCN.” Id., at 450. As the Heimdal Agreement provides for arbitration in Sweden, the court reasoned, “Ruhrgas could not have expected to be haled into Texas courts based on these meetings.” Ibid. The court also determined that Ruhrgas did not have “systematic and continuous contacts with Texas” of the kind that would “subject it to general jurisdiction in Texas.” Id., at 453 (citing Helicópteros Nocionales de Colombia, S. A v. Hall, 466 U. S. 408 (1984)).
The Court of Appeals concluded that whether Norge had a legal interest in the Heimdal license notwithstanding its assignment to MPCN likely turned on difficult questions of Norwegian law; Ruhrgas therefore could not show, at the outset, that Norge had been fraudulently joined as a plaintiff to defeat diversity. See 115 F. 3d 315, 319-320 (CA5), vacated and rehearing en banc granted, 129 F. 3d 746 (1997). The appeals court also determined that Marathon’s claims did not “strike at the sovereignty of a foreign nation,” so as to raise a federal question on that account. 115 F. 3d, at 320. Finally, the court concluded that Marathon asserted claims independent of the Heimdal Agreement and that the case therefore did not “relat[e] to” an international arbitration agreement under 9 U. S. C. § 205. See 115 F. 3d, at 320-321.
The Fifth Circuit remanded the case to the District Court for it to consider the “nove[l]” subject-matter jurisdiction issues presented. 145 F. 3d 211, 225 (CA5 1998). The appeals court “expressed] no opinion” on the vacated panel decision which had held that the District Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. Id., at 225, n. 23.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has concluded that district courts have discretion to dismiss a removed case for want of personal jurisdiction without reaching the issue of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Cantor Fitzgerald, L. P. v. Peaslee, 88 F. 3d 152, 155 (1996).
Ruhrgas suggests that it would be appropriate simply to affirm the District Court's holding that it lacked personal jurisdiction over Ruhrgas. See Brief for Petitioner 38-39, and n. 20. That issue is not within the question presented and is properly considered by the Fifth Circuit on remand.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | I | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
PER CURIAM.
In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed a denial of federal habeas relief, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, on the ground that the state court had unreasonably rejected respondent's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court of Appeals' decision ignored well-established principles. It did not consider reasonable grounds that could have supported the state court's summary decision, and it analyzed respondent's arguments without any meaningful deference to the state court. Accordingly, the petition for certiorari is granted, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
I
Respondent Nicholas Beaudreaux shot and killed Wayne Drummond during a late-night argument in 2006. Dayo Esho and Brandon Crowder were both witnesses to the shooting. The next day, Crowder told the police that he knew the shooter from middle school, but did not know the shooter's name. Esho described the shooter, but also did not know his name. Seventeen months later, Crowder was arrested for an unrelated crime. While Crowder was in custody, police showed him a middle-school yearbook with Beaudreaux's picture, as well as a photo lineup including Beaudreaux. Crowder identified Beaudreaux as the shooter in the Drummond murder.
Officers interviewed Esho the next day. They first spoke with him during his lunch break. They showed him a display that included a recent picture of Beaudreaux and pictures of five other men. Esho tentatively identified Beaudreaux as the shooter, saying his picture "was 'closest' to the gunman." App. to Pet. for Cert. 4a. Later that day, one of the officers found another photograph of Beaudreaux that was taken "closer to the date" of the shooting. Record ER 263. Beaudreaux looked different in the two photographs. In the first, " 'his face [was] a little wider and his head [was] a little higher.' " Id., at ER 262. Between four and six hours after the first interview, the officers returned to show Esho a second six-man photo lineup, which contained the older picture of Beaudreaux. Beaudreaux's photo was in a different position in the lineup than it had been in the first one. Esho again identified Beaudreaux as the shooter, telling the officers that the second picture was " 'very close.' " Id., at ER 263-ER 264. But he again declined to positively state that Beaudreaux was the shooter. Esho was hesitant because there were "a few things" he remembered about the shooter that would require seeing him in person. Id., at ER 283-ER 284. At a preliminary hearing, Esho identified Beaudreaux as the shooter. At trial, Esho explained that it "clicked" when he saw Beaudreaux in person based on "the way that he walked." Id., at ER 285. After seeing him in person, Esho was "sure" that Beaudreaux was the shooter. Ibid. At no time did any investigator or prosecutor suggest to Esho that Beaudreaux was the one who shot Drummond. Ibid.
Beaudreaux was tried in 2009 for first-degree murder and attempted second-degree robbery. Esho and Crowder both testified against Beaudreaux and both identified him as Drummond's shooter. The jury found Beaudreaux guilty, and the trial court sentenced him to a term of 50 years to life. Beaudreaux's conviction was affirmed on direct appeal, and his first state habeas petition was denied.
In 2013, Beaudreaux filed a second state habeas petition. He claimed, among other things, that his trial attorney was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress Esho's identification testimony. The California Court of Appeal summarily denied the petition, and the California Supreme Court denied review. Petitioner then filed a federal habeas petition, which the District Court denied.
A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed. The panel majority spent most of its opinion conducting a de novo analysis of the merits of the would-be suppression motion-relying in part on arguments and theories that Beaudreaux had not presented to the state court in his second state habeas petition. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 1a-7a; Record ER 153-ER 154. It first determined that counsel's failure to file the suppression motion constituted deficient performance. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 3a. The circumstances surrounding Esho's pretrial identification were "unduly suggestive," according to the Ninth Circuit, because only Beaudreaux's picture was in both photo lineups. Id., at 4a. And, relying on Ninth Circuit precedent, the panel majority found that the preliminary hearing was unduly suggestive as well. Ibid. (quoting Johnson v. Sublett, 63 F.3d 926, 929 (C.A.9 1995) ). The panel majority next concluded that, under the totality of the circumstances, Esho's identification was not reliable enough to overcome the suggestiveness of the procedures. App. to Pet. for Cert. 5a. The panel majority then determined that counsel's failure to file the suppression motion prejudiced Beaudreaux, given the weakness of the State's case. Id., at 5a-6a. After conducting this de novo analysis of Beaudreaux's ineffectiveness claim, the panel majority asserted that the state court's denial of this claim was not just wrong, but objectively unreasonable under § 2254(d). See id., at 6a-7a. Judge Gould dissented. He argued that the state court could have reasonably concluded that Beaudreaux had failed to prove prejudice. Id., at 8a.
The State of California petitioned for certiorari.
II
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), a federal court cannot grant habeas relief "with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim ... resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by" this Court, or "a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." § 2254(d). When, as here, there is no reasoned state-court decision on the merits, the federal court "must determine what arguments or theories ... could have supported the state court's decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of this Court." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102, 131 S.Ct. 770, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011). If such disagreement is possible, then the petitioner's claim must be denied. Ibid. We have often emphasized that "this standard is difficult to meet" "because it was meant to be." Ibid. ; e.g., Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 20, 134 S.Ct. 10, 187 L.Ed.2d 348 (2013). The Ninth Circuit failed to properly apply this standard.
A
To prove ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must demonstrate both deficient performance and prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). The state court's denial of relief in this case was not an unreasonable application of Strickland . A fairminded jurist could conclude that counsel's performance was not deficient because counsel reasonably could have determined that the motion to suppress would have failed. See Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115, 124, 131 S.Ct. 733, 178 L.Ed.2d 649 (2011).
This Court has previously described "the approach appropriately used to determine whether the Due Process Clause requires suppression of an eyewitness identification tainted by police arrangement." Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228, 238, 132 S.Ct. 716, 181 L.Ed.2d 694 (2012). In particular, the Court has said that "due process concerns arise only when law enforcement officers use[d] an identification procedure that is both suggestive and unnecessary." Id., at 238-239, 132 S.Ct. 716 (citing Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 107, 109, 97 S.Ct. 2243, 53 L.Ed.2d 140 (1977), and Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972) ; emphasis added). To be " 'impermissibly suggestive,' " the procedure must " 'give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.' " Id., at 197, 93 S.Ct. 375 (quoting Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384, 88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968) ). It is not enough that the procedure "may have in some respects fallen short of the ideal." Id., at 385-386, 88 S.Ct. 967. Even when an unnecessarily suggestive procedure was used, "suppression of the resulting identification is not the inevitable consequence." Perry, 565 U.S., at 239, 132 S.Ct. 716. Instead, "the Due Process Clause requires courts to assess, on a case-by-case basis, whether improper police conduct created a 'substantial likelihood of misidentification.' " Ibid. (quoting Biggers, supra, at 201, 93 S.Ct. 375 ). "[R]eliability [of the eyewitness identification] is the linchpin' of that evaluation." Perry, supra, at 239, 132 S.Ct. 716 (quoting Manson, 432 U.S., at 114, 97 S.Ct. 2243 ; alterations in original). The factors affecting reliability include "the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness' degree of attention, the accuracy of his prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated at the confrontation, and the time between the crime and the confrontation." Id ., at 114, 97 S.Ct. 2243. This Court has held that pretrial identification procedures violated the Due Process Clause only once, in Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440, 89 S.Ct. 1127, 22 L.Ed.2d 402 (1969). There, the police used two highly suggestive lineups and "a one-to-one confrontation," which "made it all but inevitable that [the witness] would identify [the defendant]." Id., at 443, 89 S.Ct. 1127.
In this case, there is at least one theory that could have led a fairminded jurist to conclude that the suppression motion would have failed. See Richter, supra, at 102, 131 S.Ct. 770. The state court could have reasonably concluded that Beaudreaux failed to prove that, "under the 'totality of the circumstances,' " the identification was not "reliable." Biggers, supra, at 199, 93 S.Ct. 375. Beaudreaux's claim was facially deficient because his state habeas petition failed to even address this requirement. See Record ER 153-ER 154. And the state court could have reasonably concluded that the totality of the circumstances tipped against Beaudreaux. True, Esho gave a vague initial description of the shooter, see Manson, supra, at 115, 97 S.Ct. 2243 (noting the detailed physical description the witness gave "minutes after"), and there was a 17-month delay between the shooting and the identification, see Biggers, supra, at 201, 93 S.Ct. 375 (determining that "a lapse of seven months ... would be a seriously negative factor in most cases"). But, as the District Court found, Esho had a good opportunity to view the shooter, having talked to Beaudreaux immediately after the shooting. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 66a. He also was paying attention during the crime and even remembered Beaudreaux's distinctive walk. See id., at 64a, 66a. Esho demonstrated a high overall level of certainty in his identification. He chose Beaudreaux's picture in both photo lineups, and he was "sure" about his identification once he saw Beaudreaux in person. Record ER 285; App. to Pet. for Cert. 63a-64a, 66a. There also was "little pressure" on Esho to make a particular identification. Manson, supra, at 116, 97 S.Ct. 2243. It would not have been " ' "objectively unreasonable" ' " to weigh the totality of these circumstances against Beaudreaux. White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. 415, 419, 134 S.Ct. 1697, 188 L.Ed.2d 698 (2014).
B
The Ninth Circuit's opinion was not just wrong. It also committed fundamental errors that this Court has repeatedly admonished courts to avoid.
First, the Ninth Circuit effectively inverted the rule established in Richter . Instead of considering the "arguments or theories [that] could have supported" the state court's summary decision, 562 U.S., at 102, 131 S.Ct. 770 the Ninth Circuit considered arguments against the state court's decision that Beaudreaux never even made in his state habeas petition.
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit failed to assess Beaudreaux's ineffectiveness claim with the appropriate amount of deference. The Ninth Circuit essentially evaluated the merits de novo, only tacking on a perfunctory statement at the end of its analysis asserting that the state court's decision was unreasonable. But deference to the state court should have been near its apex in this case, which involves a Strickland claim based on a motion that turns on general, fact-driven standards such as suggestiveness and reliability. The Ninth Circuit's analysis did not follow this Court's repeated holding that, " '[t]he more general the rule ... the more leeway [state] courts have.' " Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 776, 130 S.Ct. 1855, 176 L.Ed.2d 678 (2010) (brackets in original). Nor did it follow this Court's precedents stating that, "because the Strickland standard is a general standard, a state court has even more latitude to reasonably determine that a defendant has not satisfied that standard." Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123, 129 S.Ct. 1411, 173 L.Ed.2d 251 (2009). The Ninth Circuit's essentially de novo analysis disregarded this deferential standard.
* * *
The petition for a writ of certiorari and respondent's motion to proceed in forma pauperis are granted. The judgment of the United States Courts of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice BREYER dissents.
Judge Gould found that the state court could have reasonably concluded that Beaudreaux failed to prove prejudice because the weight of the evidence against him-even without Esho's identification-would have been sufficient to ensure his conviction. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 8a. We need not reach that issue.
In the first lineup, the suspect was nearly six inches taller than the other two men in the lineup, and was the only one wearing a leather jacket like the one the witness described the robber as wearing. Foster, 394 U.S., at 441, 443, 89 S.Ct. 1127. Police then arranged a "one-to-one confrontation" in which the witness sat in the same room as the suspect and spoke to him. Id., at 441, 89 S.Ct. 1127. And in the second lineup, the suspect was the only one in the five man lineup who had been in the original lineup. Id., at 441-442, 89 S.Ct. 1127.
Because our decision merely applies 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), it takes no position on the underlying merits and does not decide any other issue. See Kernan v. Cuero, 583 U.S. ----, ----, 138 S.Ct. 4, 8-9, 199 L.Ed.2d 236 (2017) (per curiam ); Marshall v. Rodgers, 569 U.S. 58, 64, 133 S.Ct. 1446, 185 L.Ed.2d 540 (2013) (per curiam ).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | A | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Chief Justice Rehnquist
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Section 236(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 66 Stat. 200, as amended, 110 Stat. 3009-585, 8 U. S. C. § 1226(c), provides that “[t]he Attorney General shall take into custody any alien who” is removable from this country because he has been convicted of one of a specified set of crimes. Respondent is a citizen of the Republic of South Korea. He entered the United States in 1984, at the age of six, and became a lawful permanent resident of the United States two years later. In July 1996, he was convicted of first-degree burglary in state court in California and, in April 1997, he was convicted of a second crime, “petty theft with priors.” The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) charged respondent with being deportable from the United States in light of these convictions, and detained him pending his removal hearing. We hold that Congress, justifiably concerned that deportable criminal aliens who are not detained continue to engage in crime and fail to appear for their removal hearings in large numbers, may require that persons such as respondent be detained for the brief period necessary for their removal proceedings.
Respondent does not dispute the validity of his prior convictions, which were obtained following the full procedural protections our criminal justice system offers. Respondent also did not dispute the INS’ conclusion that he is subject to mandatory detention under § 1226(c). See Brief in Opposition 1-2; App. 8-9. In conceding that he was deportable, respondent forwent a hearing at which he would have been entitled to raise any nonfrivolous argument available to demonstrate that he was not properly included in a mandatory detention category. See 8 CFR § 3.19(h)(2)(h) (2002); Matter of Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. 799 (BIA 1999). Respondent instead filed a habeas corpus action pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2241 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California challenging the constitutionality of § 1226(c) itself. App. to Pet. for Cert. 2a. He argued that his detention under § 1226(e) violated due process because the INS had made no determination that he posed either a danger to society or a flight risk. Id., at 31a, 33a.
The District Court agreed with respondent that § 1226(c)’s requirement of mandatory detention for certain criminal aliens was unconstitutional. Kim v. Schiltgen, No. C 99-2257 SI (Aug. 11, 1999), App. to Pet. for Cert. 31a-51a. The District Court therefore granted respondent’s petition subject to the INS’ prompt undertaking of an individualized bond hearing to determine whether respondent posed either a flight risk or a danger to the community. Id., at 50a. Following that decision, the District Director of the INS released respondent on $5,000 bond.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Kim v. Ziglar, 276 F. 3d 523 (2002). That court held that § 1226(c) violates substantive due process as applied to respondent because he is a permanent resident alien. Id., at 528. It noted that permanent resident aliens constitute the most favored category of aliens and that they have the right to reside permanently in the United States, to work here, and to apply for citizenship. Ibid. The court recognized and rejected the Government’s two principal justifications for mandatory detention under § 1226(c): (1) ensuring the presence of criminal aliens at their removal proceedings; and (2) protecting the public from dangerous criminal aliens. The Court of Appeals discounted the first justification because it found that not all aliens detained pursuant to § 1226(c) would ultimately be deported. Id., at 531-532. And it discounted the second justification on the grounds that the aggravated felony classification triggering respondent’s detention included crimes that the court did not consider “egregious” or otherwise sufficiently dangerous to the public to necessitate mandatory detention. Id., at 532-533. Respondent’s crimes of first-degree burglary (burglary of an inhabited dwelling) and petty theft, for instance, the Ninth Circuit dismissed as “rather ordinary crimes.” Id., at 538. Relying upon our recent decision in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U. S. 678 (2001), the Court of Appeals concluded that the INS had not provided a justification “for no-bail civil detention sufficient to overcome a lawful permanent resident alien’s liberty interest.” 276 F. 3d, at 535.
Three other Courts of Appeals have reached the same conclusion. See Patel v. Zemski, 275 F. 3d 299 (CA3 2001); Welch v. Ashcroft, 293 F. 3d 213 (CA4 2002); Hoang v. Comfort, 282 F. 3d 1247 (CA10 2002). The Seventh Circuit, however, rejected a constitutional challenge to § 1226(c) by a permanent resident alien. Parra v. Perryman, 172 F. 3d 954 (1999). We granted certiorari to resolve this conflict, see 536 U. S. 956 (2002), and now reverse.
r — 1
We address first the argument that 8 U. S. C. § 1226(e) deprives us of jurisdiction to hear this case. See Florida v. Thomas, 532 U. S. 774, 777 (2001) (“Although the parties did not raise the issue in their briefs on the merits, we must first consider whether we have jurisdiction to decide this case”). An amicus argues, and the concurring opinion agrees, that § 1226(e) deprives the federal courts of jurisdiction to grant habeas relief to aliens challenging their detention under § 1226(c). See Brief for Washington Legal Foundation et al. as Amici Curiae. Section 1226(e) states:
“(e) Judicial review
“The Attorney General’s discretionary judgment regarding the application of this section shall not be subject to review. No court may set aside any action or decision by the Attorney General under this section regarding the detention or release of any alien or the grant, revocation, or denial of bond or parole.”
The amicus argues that respondent is contesting a “decision by the Attorney General” to detain him under § 1226(c), and that, accordingly, no court may set aside that action. Brief for Washington Legal Foundation et al. as Amici Curiae 7-8.
But respondent does not challenge a “discretionary judgment” by the Attorney General or a “decision” that the Attorney General has made regarding his detention or release. Rather, respondent challenges the statutory framework that permits his detention without bail. Parra v. Perryman, supra, at 957 (“Section 1226(e) likewise deals with challenges to operational decisions, rather than to the legislation establishing the framework for those decisions”).
This Court has held that “where Congress intends to preclude judicial review of constitutional claims its intent to do so must be clear.” Webster v. Doe, 486 U. S. 592, 603 (1988); see also Johnson v. Robison, 415 U. S. 361, 367 (1974) (holding that provision barring review of “ ‘decisions of the Administrator on any question of law or fact under any law administered by the Veterans’ Administration providing benefits for veterans’ ” did not bar constitutional challenge (emphasis deleted)). And, where a provision precluding review is claimed to bar habeas review, the Court has required a particularly clear statement that such is Congress’ intent. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U. S. 289, 308-309 (2001) (holding that title of provision, “Elimination of Custody Review by Habeas Corpus,” along with broad statement of intent to preclude review, was not sufficient to bar review of habeas corpus petitions); see also id., at 298 (citing cases refusing to find bar to habeas review where there was no specific mention of the Court’s authority to hear habeas petitions); id., at 327 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that opinion established “a superclear statement, ‘magic words’ requirement for the congressional expression of” an intent to preclude ha-beas review).
Section 1226(e) contains no explicit provision barring ha-beas review, and we think that its clear text does not bar respondent’s constitutional challenge to the legislation authorizing his detention without bail.
II
Having determined that the federal courts have jurisdiction to review a constitutional challenge to § 1226(c), we proceed to review respondent’s claim. Section 1226(c) mandates detention during removal proceedings for a limited class of deportable aliens — including those convicted of an aggravated felony. Congress adopted this provision against a backdrop of wholesale failure by the INS to deal with increasing rates of criminal activity by aliens. See, e.g., Criminal Aliens in the United States: Hearings before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); S. Rep. No. 104-48, p. 1 (1995) (hereinafter S. Rep. 104-48) (confinement of criminal aliens alone cost $724 million in 1990). Criminal aliens were the fastest growing segment of the federal prison population, already constituting roughly 25% of all federal prisoners, and they formed a rapidly rising share of state prison populations as well. Id., at 6-9. Congress’ investigations showed, however, that the INS could not even identify most deportable aliens, much less locate them and remove them from the country. Id., at 1. One study showed that, at the then-current rate of deportation, it would take 23 years to remove every criminal alien already subject to deportation. Id., at 5. Making matters worse, criminal aliens who were deported swiftly reentered the country illegally in great numbers. Id., at 3.
The INS’ near-total inability to remove deportable criminal aliens imposed more than a monetary cost on the Nation. First, as Congress explained, “[a]liens who enter or remain in the United States in violation of our law are effectively taking immigration opportunities that might otherwise be extended to others.” S. Rep. No. 104-249, p. 7 (1996). Second, deportable criminal aliens who remained in the United States often committed more crimes before being removed. One 1986 study showed that, after criminal aliens were identified as deportable, 77% were arrested at least once more and 45% — nearly half — were arrested multiple times before their deportation proceedings even began. Hearing on H. R. 3333 before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 54, 52 (1989) (hereinafter 1989 House Hearing); see also Zadvydas, 533 U. S., at 713-714 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (discussing high rates of recidivism for released criminal aliens).
Congress also had before it evidence that one of the major causes of the INS’ failure to remove deportable criminal aliens was the agency’s failure to detain those aliens during their deportation proceedings. See Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Deportation of Aliens After Final Orders Have Been Issued, Rep. No. 1-96-03 (Mar. 1996), App. 46 (hereinafter Inspection Report) (“Detention is key to effective deportation”); see also H. R. Rep. No. 104-469, p. 123 (1995). The Attorney General at the time had broad discretion to conduct individualized bond hearings and to release criminal aliens from custody during their removal proceedings when those aliens were determined not to present an excessive flight risk or threat to society. See 8 U. S. C. § 1252(a) (1982 ed.). Despite this discretion to conduct bond hearings, however, in practice the INS faced severe limitations on funding and detention space, which considerations affected its release determinations. S. Rep. 104-48, at 23 (“[Rjelease determinations are made by the INS in large part, according to the number of beds available in a particular region”); see also Reply Brief for Petitioners 9.
Once released, more than 20% of deportable criminal aliens failed to appear for their removal hearings. See S. Rep. 104-48, at 2; see also Brief for Petitioners 19. The dissent disputes that statistic, post, at 562-564 (opinion of Souter, J.), but goes on to praise a subsequent study conducted by the Vera Institute of Justice that more than confirms it. Post, at 565-566. As the dissent explains, the Vera study found that “77% of those [deportable criminal aliens] released on bond” showed up for their removal proceedings. Post, at 565. This finding — that one out of four criminal aliens released on bond absconded prior to the completion of his removal proceedings — is even more striking than the one-in-five flight rate reflected in the evidence before Congress when it adopted § 1226(c). The Vera Institute study strongly supports Congress’ concern that, even with individualized screening, releasing deportable criminal aliens on bond would lead to an unacceptable rate of flight.
Congress amended the immigration laws several times toward the end of the 1980’s. In 1988, Congress limited the Attorney General’s discretion over custody determinations with respect to deportable aliens who had been convicted of aggravated felonies. See Pub. L. 100-690, Tit. VII, § 7343(a), 102 Stat. 4470. Then, in 1990, Congress broadened the definition of “aggravated felony,” subjecting more criminal aliens to mandatory detention. See Pub. L. 101-649, Tit. V, § 501(a), 104 Stat. 5048. At the same time, however, Congress added a new provision, 8 U. S. C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) (1988 ed., Supp. II), authorizing the Attorney General to release permanent resident aliens during their deportation proceedings where such aliens were found not to constitute a flight risk or threat to the community. See Pub. L. 101-649, Tit. V, § 504(a)(5), 104 Stat. 5049.
During the same period in which Congress was making incremental changes to the immigration laws, it was also considering wholesale reform of those laws. Some studies presented to Congress suggested that detention of criminal aliens during their removal proceedings might be the best way to ensure their successful removal from this country. See, e. g., 1989 House Hearing 75; Inspection Report, App. 46; S. Rep. 104-48, at 32 (“Congress should consider requiring that all aggravated felons be detained pending deportation. Such a step may be necessary because of the high rate of no-shows for those criminal aliens released on bond”). It was following those Reports that Congress enacted 8 U. S. C. § 1226, requiring the Attorney General to detain a subset of deportable criminal aliens pending a determination of their removability.
“In the exercise of its broad power over naturalization and immigration, Congress regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens.” Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U. S. 67, 79-80 (1976). The dissent seeks to avoid this fundamental premise of immigration law by repeatedly referring to it as “dictum.” Post, at 547-549, n. 9 (opinion of Souter, J.). The Court in Mathews, however, made the statement the dissent now seeks to avoid in reliance on clear precedent establishing that “‘any policy toward aliens is vitally and intricately interwoven with contemporaneous policies in regard to the conduct of foreign relations, the war power, and the maintenance of a republican form of government.’ ” 426 U. S., at 81, n. 17 (quoting Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U. S. 680, 588-589 (1952)). And, since Mathews, this Court has firmly and repeatedly endorsed the proposition that Congress may make rules as to aliens that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens. See, e.g., Zadvydas, 533 U. S., at 718 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“The liberty rights of the aliens before us here are subject to limitations and conditions not applicable to citizens”); Reno v. Flores, 507 U. S. 292, 305-306 (1993) (“Thus, ‘in the exercise of its broad power over immigration and naturalization, “Congress regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens” ’ ” (quoting Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U. S. 787, 792 (1977), in turn quoting Mathews, supra, at 79-80)); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U. S. 259, 273 (1990).
In his habeas corpus challenge, respondent did not contest Congress’ general authority to remove criminal aliens from the United States. Nor did he argue that he himself was not “deportable” within the meaning of § 1226(c). Rather, respondent argued that the Government may not, consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, detain him for the brief period necessary for his removal proceedings. The dissent, after an initial detour on the issue of respondent’s concession, see post, at 541-543 (opinion of Sou-ter, J.), ultimately acknowledges the real issue in this case. Post, at 555-556, n. 11; see also Brief in Opposition 1-2 (explaining that respondent’s “challenge is solely to Section 1226(c)’s absolute prohibition on his release from detention”).
“It is well established that the Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings.” Flores, supra, at 306. At the same time, however, this Court has recognized detention during deportation proceedings as a constitutionally valid aspect of the deportation process. As we said more than a century ago, deportation proceedings “would be vain if those accused could not be held in custody pending the inquiry into their true character.” Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U. S. 228, 235 (1896); see also Flores, supra, at 305-306; Zadvydas, 533 U. S., at 697 (distinguishing constitutionally questioned detention there at issue from “detention pending a determination of removability”); id., at 711 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“Congress’ power to detain aliens in connection with removal or exclusion... is part of the Legislature’s considerable authority over immigration matters”).
In Carlson v. Landon, 342 U. S. 524 (1952), the Court considered a challenge to the detention of aliens who were deportable because of their participation in Communist activities. The detained aliens did not deny that they were members of the Communist Party or that they were therefore deportable. Id., at 530. Instead, like respondent in the present case, they challenged their detention on the grounds that there had been no finding that they were unlikely to appear for their deportation proceedings when ordered to do so. Id., at 531-532; see also Brief for Petitioner in Carlson v. Landon, O. T. 1951, No. 35, p. 12 (arguing that legislative determinations could not justify “depriving [an alien] of his liberty without facts personal to the individual”). Although the Attorney General ostensibly had discretion to release detained Communist aliens on bond, the INS had adopted a policy of refusing to grant bail to those aliens in light of what Justice Frankfurter viewed as the mistaken “conception that Congress had made [alien Communists] in effect unbailable.” 342 U. S., at 559, 568 (dissenting opinion).
The Court rejected the aliens’ claims that they were entitled to be released from detention if they did not pose a flight risk, explaining “[detention is necessarily a part of this deportation procedure.” Id., at 538; see also id., at 535. The Court noted that Congress had chosen to make such aliens deportable based on its “understanding of [Communists’] attitude toward the use of force and violence... to accomplish their political aims.” Id., at 541. And it concluded that the INS could deny bail to the detainees “by reference to the legislative scheme” even without any finding of flight risk. Id., at 543; see also id., at 550 (Black, J., dissenting) (“Denial [of bail] was not on the ground that if released [the aliens] might try to evade obedience to possible deportation orders”); id., at 551, and n. 6.
The dissent argues that, even though the aliens in Carlson were not flight risks, “individualized findings of dangerousness were made” as to each of the aliens. Post, at 573 (opinion of Souter, J.). The dissent, again, is mistaken. The aliens in Carlson had not been found individually dangerous. The only evidence against them was their membership in the Communist Party and “a degree... of participation in Communist activities.” 342 U. S., at 541. There was no “individualized findin[g]” of likely future dangerousness as to any of the aliens and, in at least one case, there was a specific finding of nondangerousness. The Court nonetheless concluded that the denial of bail was permissible “by reference to the legislative scheme to eradicate the evils of Communist activity.” Id., at 543.
In Reno v. Flores, 507 U. S. 292 (1993), the Court considered another due process challenge to detention during deportation proceedings. The due process challenge there was brought by a class of alien juveniles. The INS had arrested them and was holding them in custody pending their deportation hearings. The aliens challenged the INS’ policy of releasing detained alien juveniles only into the care of their parents, legal guardians, or certain other adult relatives. See, e. g., id., at 297 (citing Detention and Release of Juveniles, 53 Fed. Reg. 17449 (1988) (codified as to deportation at 8 CFR § 242.24 (1992))). The aliens argued that the policy improperly relied “upon a ‘blanket’ presumption of the unsuitability of custodians other than parents, close relatives, and guardians” to care for the detained juvenile aliens. 507 U. S., at 313. In rejecting this argument, the Court emphasized that “reasonable presumptions and generic rules,” even when made by the INS rather than Congress, are not necessarily impermissible exercises of Congress’ traditional power to legislate with respect to aliens. Ibid.; see also id., at 313-314 (“In the case of each detained alien juvenile, the INS makes those determinations that are specific to the individual and necessary to accurate application of the regulation.... The particularization and individuation need go no further than this”). Thus, as with the prior challenges to detention during deportation proceedings, the Court in Flores rejected the due process challenge and upheld the constitutionality of the detention.
Despite this Court’s longstanding view that the Government may constitutionally detain deportable aliens during the limited period necessary for their removal proceedings, respondent argues that the narrow detention policy reflected in 8 U. S. C. § 1226(c) violates due process. Respondent, like the four Courts of Appeals that have held § 1226(c) to be unconstitutional, relies heavily upon our recent opinion in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U. S. 678 (2001).
In Zadvydas, the Court considered a due process challenge to detention of aliens under 8 U. S. C. § 1231 (1994 ed., Supp. V), which governs detention following a final order of removal. Section 1231(a)(6) provides, among other things, that when an alien who has been ordered removed is not in fact removed during the 90-day statutory “removal period,” that alien “may be detained beyond the removal period” in the discretion of the Attorney General. The Court in Zadvydas read § 1231 to authorize continued detention of an alien following the 90-day removal period for only such time as is reasonably necessary to secure the alien’s removal. 533 U. S., at 699.
But Zadvydas is materially different from the present case in two respects.
First, in Zadvydas, the aliens challenging their detention following final orders of deportation were ones for whom removal was “no longer practically attainable.” Id., at 690. The Court thus held that the detention there did not serve its purported immigration purpose. Ibid. In so holding, the Court rejected the Government’s claim that, by detaining the aliens involved, it could prevent them from fleeing prior to their removal. The Court observed that where, as there, “detention’s goal is no longer practically attainable, detention no longer bears a reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual was committed.” Ibid, (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
In the present ease, the statutory provision at issue governs detention of deportable criminal aliens pending their removal proceedings. Such detention necessarily serves the purpose of preventing deportable criminal aliens from fleeing prior to or during their removal proceedings, thus increasing the chance that, if ordered removed, the aliens will be successfully removed. Respondent disagrees, arguing that there is no evidence that mandatory detention is necessary because the Government has never shown that individualized bond hearings would be ineffective. See Brief for Respondent 14. But as discussed above, see supra, at 519-520, in adopting § 1226(c), Congress had before it evidence suggesting that permitting discretionary release of aliens pending their removal hearings would lead to large numbers of deportable criminal aliens skipping their hearings and remaining at large in the United States unlawfully.
Respondent argues that these statistics are irrelevant and do not demonstrate that individualized bond hearings “are ineffective or burdensome.” Brief for Respondent 33-40. It is of course true that when Congress enacted § 1226, individualized bail determinations had not been tested under optimal conditions, or tested in all their possible permutations. But when the Government deals with deportable aliens, the Due Process Clause does not require it to employ the least burdensome means to accomplish its goal. The evidence Congress had before it certainly supports the approach it selected even if other, hypothetical studies might have suggested different courses of action. Cf., e. g., Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U. S. 425, 436-437 (2002); Flores, supra, at 315 (“It may well be that other policies would be even better, but ‘we are [not] a legislature charged with formulating public policy’” (quoting Schall v. Martin, 467 U. S. 253, 281 (1984))).
Zadvydas is materially different from the present case in a second respect as well. While the period of detention at issue in Zadvydas was “indefinite” and “potentially permanent,” 533 U. S., at 690-691, the detention here is of a much shorter duration.
Zadvydas distinguished the statutory provision it was there considering from § 1226 on these very grounds, noting that “post-removal-period detention, unlike detention pending a determination of removability..., has no obvious termination point.” Id., at 697 (emphasis added). Under §1226(c), not only does detention have a definite termination point, in the majority of cases it lasts for less than the 90 days we considered presumptively valid in Zadvydas. The Executive Office for Immigration Review has calculated that, in 85% of the cases in which aliens are detained pursuant to § 1226(c), removal proceedings are completed in an average time of 47 days and a median of 30 days. Brief for Petitioners 39-40. In the remaining 15% of cases, in which the alien appeals the decision of the immigration judge to the Board of Immigration Appeals, appeal takes an average of four months, with a median time that is slightly shorter. Id., at 40.
These statistics do not include the many cases in which removal proceedings are completed while the alien is still serving time for the underlying conviction. Id., at 40, n. 17. In those cases, the aliens involved are never subjected to mandatory detention at all. In sum, the detention at stake under § 1226(c) lasts roughly a month and a half in the vast majority of cases in which it is invoked, and about five months in the minority of cases in which the alien chooses to appeal. Respondent was detained for somewhat longer than the average — spending six months in INS custody prior to the District Court’s order granting habeas relief, but respondent himself had requested a continuance of his removal hearing.
For the reasons set forth above, respondent’s claim must fail. Detention during removal proceedings is a constitutionally permissible part of that process. See, e. g., Wong Wing, 163 U. S., at 235 (“We think it clear that detention, or temporary confinement, as part of the means necessary to give effect to the provisions for the exclusion or expulsion of aliens would be valid”); Carlson v. London, 342 U. S. 524 (1952); Reno v. Flores, 507 U. S. 292 (1993). The INS detention of respondent, a criminal alien who has conceded that he is deportable, for the limited period of his removal proceedings, is governed by these cases. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Reversed.
App. to Pet. for Cert. 32a; see 8 U. S. C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(G), 1227(a)(2) (A)(iii). Section 1226(c) authorizes detention of aliens who have committed certain crimes including, inter alia, any “aggravated felony,” §§ 1226(c)(1)(B), 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), and any two “crimes involving moral turpitude,” §§ 1226(c)(1)(B), 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii). Although the INS initially included only respondent’s 1997 conviction in the charging document, it subsequently amended the immigration charges against him to include his 1996 conviction for first-degree burglary as another basis for mandatory detention and deportation. Brief for Petitioners 3, n. 2 (alleging that respondent’s convictions reflected two ‘“crimes involving moral turpitude’”).
As respondent explained: “The statute requires the [INS] to take into custody any alien who ‘is deportable’ from the United States based on having been convicted of any of a wide range of crimes.... [Respondent] does not challenge INS’s authority to take him into custody after he finished serving his criminal sentence. His challenge is solely to Section 1226(c)’s absolute prohibition on his release from detention, even where, as here, the INS never asserted that he posed a danger or significant flight risk.” Brief in Opposition 1-2.
This “Joseph hearing” is immediately provided to a detainee who claims that he is not covered by § 1226(c). Tr. of Oral Arg. 22. At the hearing, the detainee may avoid mandatory detention by demonstrating that he is not an alien, was not convicted of the predicate crime, or that the INS is otherwise substantially unlikely to establish that he is in fact subject to mandatory detention. See 8 CFR §3.19(h)(2)(ii) (2002); Matter of Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. 799 (BIA 1999). Because respondent conceded that he was deportable because of a conviction that triggers § 1226(c) and thus sought no Joseph hearing, we have no occasion to review the adequacy of Joseph hearings generally in screening out those who are improperly detained pursuant to § 1226(c). Such individualized review is available, however, and Justice Souter is mistaken if he means to suggest otherwise. See post, at 555-556, 558 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part) (hereinafter dissent).
Although the Attorney General had authority to release these aliens on bond, it is not clear that all of the aliens released were in fact given individualized bond hearings. See Brief for Petitioners 19 (“[M]ore than 20% of criminal aliens who were released on bond or otherwise not kept in custody throughout their deportation proceedings failed to appear for those proceedings” (emphasis added)), citing S. Rep. 104-48, at 2. The evidence does suggest, however, that many deportable criminal aliens in this “released criminal aliens” sample received such determinations. See Brief for Petitioners 19 (noting that, for aliens not evaluated for flight risk at a bond hearing, the prehearing skip rate doubled to 40%).
The dissent also claims that the study demonstrated that “92% of criminal aliens... who were released under supervisory conditions attended all of their hearings.” Post, at 565 (opinion of SOUTEK, J.). The study did manage to raise the appearance rate for criminal aliens through a supervision program known as the Appearance Assistance Program (AAP). But the AAP study is of limited value. First, the study included only 16 aliens who, like respondent, were released from prison and charged with being deportable on the basis of an aggravated felony. 1 Vera Institute of Justice, Testing Community Supervision for the INS: An Evaluation of the Appearance Assistance Program, pp. 33-34, 36 (Aug. 1, 2000). In addition, all 127 aliens in the AAP study were admitted into the study group only after being screened for “strength of family and community ties, appearance rates in prior legal proceedings, and eligibility to apply for a legal remedy.” Id., at 13; see also id., at 37. Following this selection process, “supervision staff were in frequent, ongoing communication with participants,” id., at 14, through, among other things, required reporting sessions, periodic home visits, and assistance in retaining legal representation, id., at 41-42. And, in any event, respondent seeks an individualized bond hearing, not “community supervision.” The dissent’s claim that criminal aliens released under supervisory conditions are likely to attend their hearings, post, at 565, therefore, is totally beside the point.
Respondent’s concession on this score is relevant for two reasons: First, because of the concession, respondent by his own choice did not receive one of the procedural protections otherwise provided to aliens detained under § 1226(c). And, second, because of the concession we do not reach a contrary argument raised by respondent for the first time in his brief on the merits in this Court. Specifically, in his brief on the merits, respondent suggests that he might not be subject to detention under § 1226(c) after all because his 1997 conviction for petty theft with priors might not qualify as an aggravated felony under recent Ninth Circuit precedent. Respondent now states that he intends to argue at his next removal hearing that “his 1997 conviction does not constitute an aggravated felony... and his 1996 conviction [for first-degree burglary] does not constitute either an aggravated felony or a crime involving moral turpitude.” Brief for Respondent. 11
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | B | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Scalia
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented in this case is what a defendant must show in order to demonstrate a Sixth Amendment violation where the trial court fails to inquire into a potential conflict of interest about which it knew or reasonably should have known.
I
In 1993, a Virginia jury convicted petitioner Mickens of the premeditated murder of Timothy Hall during or following the commission of an attempted forcible sodomy. Finding the murder outrageously and wantonly vile, it sentenced petitioner to death. In June 1998, Mickens filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, see 28 U. S. C. § 2254 (1994 ed. and Supp. V), in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, alleging, inter alia, that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because one of his court-appointed attorneys had a conflict of interest at trial. Federal habeas counsel had discovered that petitioner’s lead trial attorney, Bryan Saunders, was representing Hall (the victim) on assault and concealed-weapons charges at the time of the murder. Saunders had been appointed to represent Hall, a juvenile, on March 20, 1992, and had met with him once for 15 to 30 minutes some time the following week. Hall’s body was discovered on March 30,1992, and four days later a juvenile court judge dismissed the charges against him, noting on the docket sheet that Hall was deceased. The one-page docket sheet also listed Saunders as Hall’s counsel. On April 6, 1992, the same judge appointed Saunders to represent petitioner. Saunders did not disclose to the court, his co-counsel, or petitioner that he had previously represented Hall. Under Virginia law, juvenile case files are confidential and may not generally be disclosed without a court order, see Va. Code Ann. § 16.1-305 (1999), but petitioner learned about Saunders’ prior representation when a clerk mistakenly produced Hall’s file to federal habeas counsel.
The District Court held an evidentiary hearing and denied petitioner’s habeas petition. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, 227 F. 3d 203 (2000), and the Court of Appeals granted rehearing en banc, 240 F. 3d 348 (2001). As an initial matter, the 7-to-3 en banc majority determined that petitioner’s failure to raise his conflict-of-interest claim in state court did not preclude review, concluding that petitioner had established cause and that the “inquiry as to prejudice for purposes of excusing [petitioner’s] default... incorporates the test for evaluating his underlying conflict of interest claim.” Id., at 356-357. On the merits, the Court of Appeals assumed that the juvenile court judge had neglected a duty to inquire into a potential conflict, but rejected petitioner’s argument that this failure either mandated automatic reversal of his conviction or relieved him of the burden of showing that a conflict of interest adversely affected his representation. Relying on Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U. S. 335 (1980), the court held that a defendant must show “both an actual conflict of interest and an adverse effect even if the trial court failed to inquire into a potential conflict about which it reasonably should have known,” 240 F. 3d, at 355-356. Concluding that petitioner had not demonstrated adverse effect, id., at 360, it affirmed the District Court’s denial of habeas relief. We granted a stay of execution of petitioner’s sentence and granted certiorari. 532 U. S. 970 (2001).
II
The Sixth Amendment provides that a criminal defendant shall have the right to “the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” This right has been accorded, we have said, “not for its own sake, but because of the effect it has on the ability of the accused to receive a fair trial.” United States v. Cronic, 466 U. S. 648, 658 (1984). It follows from this that assistance which is ineffective in preserving fairness does not meet the constitutional mandate, see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 685-686 (1984); and it also follows that defects in assistance that have no probable effect upon the trial’s outcome do not establish a constitutional violation. As a general matter, a defendant alleging a Sixth Amendment violation must demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id., at 694.
There is an exception to this general rule. We have spared the defendant the need of showing probable effect upon the outcome, and have simply presumed such effect, where assistance of counsel has been denied entirely or during a critical stage of the proceeding. When that has occurred, the likelihood that the verdict is unreliable is so high that a case-by-case inquiry is unnecessary. See Cronic, supra, at 658-659; see also Geders v. United States, 425 U. S. 80, 91 (1976); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335, 344-345 (1963). But only in “circumstances of that magnitude” do we forgo individual inquiry into whether counsel’s inadequate performance undermined the reliability of the verdict. Cronic, supra, at 659, n. 26.
We have held in several cases that “circumstances of that magnitude” may also arise when the defendant’s attorney actively represented conflicting interests. The nub of the question before us is whether the principle established by these cases provides an exception to the general rule of Strickland under the circumstances of the present case. To answer that question, we must examine those cases in some detail.
In Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U. S. 475 (1978), defense counsel had objected that he could not adequately represent the divergent interests of three codefendants. Id., at 478-480. Without inquiry, the trial court had denied counsel’s motions for the appointment of separate counsel and had refused to allow counsel to cross-examine any of the defendants on behalf of the other two. The Holloway Court deferred to the judgment of counsel regarding the existence of a disabling conflict, recognizing that a defense attorney is in the best position to determine when a conflict exists, that he has an ethical obligation to advise the court of any problem, and that his declarations to the court are “virtually made under oath.” Id., at 485-486 (internal quotation marks omitted). Holloway presumed, moreover, that the conflict, “which [the defendant] and his counsel tried to avoid by timely objections to the joint representation,” id., at 490, undermined the adversarial process. The presumption was justified because joint representation of conflicting interests is inherently suspect, and because counsel’s conflicting obligations to multiple defendants “effectively sea[l] his lips on crucial matters” and make it difficult to measure the precise harm arising from counsel’s errors. Id., at 489-490. Holloway thus creates an automatic reversal rule only where defense counsel is forced to represent codefendants over his timely objection, unless the trial court has determined that there is no conflict. Id., at 488 (“[W]henever a trial court improperly requires joint representation over timely objection reversal is automatic”).
In Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U. S. 335 (1980), the respondent was one of three defendants accused of murder who were tried separately, represented by the same counsel. Neither counsel nor anyone else objected to the multiple representation, and counsel’s opening argument at Sullivan’s trial suggested that the interests of the defendants were aligned. Id., at 347-348. We declined to extend Holloway’s automatic reversal rule to this situation and held that, absent objection, a defendant must demonstrate that “a conflict of interest actually affected the adequacy of his representation.” 446 U. S., at 348-349. In addition to describing the defendant’s burden of proof, Sullivan addressed separately a trial court’s duty to inquire into the propriety of a multiple representation, construing Holloway to require inquiry only when “the trial court knows or reasonably should know that a particular conflict exists,” 446 U. S., at 347 — which is not to be confused with when the trial court is aware of a vague, unspecified possibility of conflict, such as that which “inheres in almost every instance of multiple representation,” id., at 348. In Sullivan, no “special circumstances” triggered the trial court’s duty to inquire. Id., at 346.
Finally, in Wood v. Georgia, 450 U. S. 261 (1981), three indigent defendants convicted of distributing obscene materials had their probation revoked for failure to make the requisite $500 monthly payments on their $5,000 fines. We granted certiorari to consider whether this violated the Equal Protection Clause, but during the course of our consideration certain disturbing circumstances came to our attention: At the probation-revocation hearing (as at all times since their arrest) the defendants had been represented by the lawyer for their employer (the owner of the business that purveyed the obscenity), and their employer paid the attorney’s fees. The employer had promised his employees he would pay their fines, and had generally kept that promise but had not done so in these defendants’ case. This record suggested that the employer’s interest in establishing a favorable equal-protection precedent (reducing the fines he would have to pay for his indigent employees in the future) diverged from the defendants’ interest in obtaining leniency or paying lesser fines to avoid imprisonment. Moreover, the possibility that counsel was actively representing the conflicting interests of employer and defendants “was sufficiently apparent at the time of the revocation hearing to impose upon the court a duty to inquire further.” Id., at 272. Because “[o]n the record before us, we [could not] be sure whether counsel was influenced in his basic strategic decisions by the interests of the employer who hired him,” ibid., we remanded for the trial court “to determine whether the conflict of interest that this record strongly suggests actually existed,” id., at 273.
Petitioner argues that the remand instruction in Wood established an “unambiguous rule” that where the trial judge neglects a duty to inquire into a potential conflict, the defendant, to obtain reversal of the judgment, need only show that his lawyer was subject to a conflict of interest, and need not show that the conflict adversely affected counsel’s performance. Brief for Petitioner 21. He relies upon the language in the remand instruction directing the trial court to grant a new revocation hearing if it determines that “an actual conflict of interest existed,” Wood, supra, at 273, without requiring a further determination that the conflict adversely affected counsel’s performance. As used in the remand instruction, however, we think “an actual conflict of interest” meant precisely a conflict that affected counsel’s performance — as opposed to a mere theoretical division of loyalties. It was shorthand for the statement in Sullivan that “a defendant who shows that a conflict of interest actually affected the adequacy of his representation need not demonstrate prejudice in order to obtain relief.” 446 U. S., at 349-350 (emphasis added). This is the only interpretation consistent with the Wood Court’s earlier description of why it could not decide the case without a remand: “On the record before us, we cannot be sure whether counsel was influenced in his basic strategic decisions by the interests of the employer who hired him. If this was the case, the due process rights of petitioners were not respected . . . .” 450 U. S., at 272 (emphasis added). The notion that Wood created a new rule sub silentio — and in a case where certio-rari had been granted on an entirely different question, and the parties had neither briefed nor argued the conflict-of-interest issue — is implausible.
Petitioner’s proposed rule of automatic reversal when there existed a conflict that did not affect counsel’s performance, but the trial judge failed to make the Sullivan-mandated inquiry, makes little policy sense. As discussed, the rule applied when the trial judge is not aware of the conflict (and thus not obligated to inquire) is that prejudice will be presumed only if the conflict has significantly affected counsel’s performance — thereby rendering the verdict unreliable, even though Strickland prejudice cannot be shown. See Sullivan, supra, at 348-349. The trial court’s awareness of a potential conflict neither renders it more likely that counsel’s performance was significantly affected nor in any other way renders the verdict unreliable. Cf. United States v. Cronic, 466 U. S., at 662, n. 31. Nor does the trial judge’s failure to make the Sullivan-mandated inquiry often make it harder for reviewing courts to determine conflict and effect, particularly since those courts may rely on evidence and testimony whose importance only becomes established at the trial.
Nor, finally, is automatic reversal simply an appropriate means of enforcing Sullivan’s mandate of inquiry. Despite Justice Souter’s belief that there must be a threat of sanction (to wit, the risk of conferring a windfall upon the defendant) in order to induce “resolutely obdurate” trial judges to follow the law, post, at 208, we do not presume that judges are as careless or as partial as those police officers who need the incentive of the exclusionary rule, see United States v. Leon, 468 U. S. 897, 916-917 (1984). And in any event, the Sullivan standard, which requires proof of effect upon representation but (once such effect is shown) presumes prejudice, already creates an “incentive” to inquire into a potential conflict. In those cases where the potential conflict is in fact an actual one, only inquiry will enable the judge to avoid all possibility of reversal by either seeking waiver or replacing a conflicted attorney. We doubt that the deterrence of “judicial dereliction” that would be achieved by an automatic reversal rule is significantly greater.
Since this was not a case in which (as in Holloway) counsel protested his inability simultaneously to represent multiple defendants; and since the trial court’s failure to make the Sullivan-mandated inquiry does not reduce the petitioner’s burden of proof; it was at least necessary, to void the conviction, for petitioner to establish that the conflict of interest adversely affected his counsel’s performance. The Court of Appeals having found no such effect, see 240 F. 3d, at 360, the denial of habeas relief must be affirmed.
Ill
Lest today’s holding be misconstrued, we note that the only question presented was the effect of a trial court’s failure to inquire into a potential conflict upon the Sullivan rule that deficient performance of counsel must be shown. The case was presented and argued on the assumption that (absent some exception for failure to inquire) Sullivan would be applicable — requiring a showing of defective performance, but not requiring in addition (as Strickland does in other ineffectiveness-of-counsel cases), a showing of probable effect upon the outcome of trial. That assumption was not unreasonable in light of the holdings of Courts of Appeals, which have applied Sullivan “unblinkingly” to “all kinds of alleged attorney ethical conflicts,” Beets v. Scott, 65 F. 3d 1258, 1266 (CA5 1995) (en banc). They have invoked the Sullivan standard not only when (as here) there is a conflict rooted in counsel’s obligations to former clients, see, e. g., Perillo v. Johnson, 205 F. 3d 775, 797-799 (CA5 2000); Freund v. Butterworth, 165 F. 3d 839, 858-860 (CA11 1999); Mannhalt v. Reed, 847 F. 2d 576, 580 (CA9 1988); United States v. Young, 644 F. 2d 1008, 1013 (CA4 1981), but even when representation of the defendant somehow implicates counsel’s personal or financial interests, including a book deal, United States v. Hearst, 638 F. 2d 1190, 1193 (CA9 1980), a job with the prosecutor’s office, Garcia v. Bunnell, 33 F. 3d 1193, 1194-1195, 1198, n. 4 (CA9 1994), the teaching of classes to Internal Revenue Service agents, United States v. Michaud, 925 F. 2d 37, 40-42 (CA1 1991), a romantic “entanglement” with the prosecutor, Summerlin v. Stewart, 267 F. 3d 926, 935-941 (CA9 2001), or fear of antagonizing the trial judge, United States v. Sayan, 968 F. 2d 55, 64-65 (CADC 1992).
It must be said, however, that the language of Sullivan itself does not clearly establish, or indeed even support, such expansive application. “[Ujntil,” it said, “a defendant shows that his counsel actively represented conflicting interests, he has not established the constitutional predicate for his claim of ineffective assistance.” 446 U. S., at 350 (emphasis added). Both Sullivan itself, see id., at 348-349, and Holloway, see 435 U. S., at 490-491, stressed the high probability of prejudice arising from multiple concurrent representation, and the difficulty of proving that prejudice. See also Geer, Representation of Multiple Criminal Defendants: Conflicts of Interest and the Professional Responsibilities of the Defense Attorney, 62 Minn. L. Rev. 119,125-140 (1978); Lowenthal, Joint Representation in Criminal Cases: A Critical Appraisal, 64 Va. L. Rev. 939,941-950 (1978). Not all attorney conflicts present comparable difficulties. Thus, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure treat concurrent representation and prior representation differently, requiring a trial court to inquire into the likelihood of conflict whenever jointly charged defendants are represented by a single attorney (Rule 44(c)), but not when counsel previously represented another defendant in a substantially related matter, even where the trial court is aware of the prior representation. See Sullivan, supra, at 346, n. 10 (citing the Rule).
This is not to suggest that one ethical duty is more or less important than another. The purpose of our Holloway and Sullivan exceptions from the ordinary requirements of Strickland, however, is not to enforce the Canons of Legal Ethics, but to apply needed prophylaxis in situations where Strickland itself is evidently inadequate to assure vindication of the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel. See Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U. S. 157, 165 (1986) (“[B]reach of an ethical standard does not necessarily make out a denial of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of assistance of counsel”). In resolving this case on the grounds on which it was presented to us, we do not rule upon the need for the Sullivan prophylaxis in cases of successive representation. Whether Sullivan should be extended to such cases remains, as far as the jurisprudence of this Court is concerned, an open question.
* * *
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
Justice Breyer rejects Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U. S. 475 (1978), Guyler v. Sullivan, 446 U. S. 335 (1980), and Wood v. Georgia, 450 U. S. 261 (1981), as “a sensible [and] coherent framework for dealing with” this case, post, at 209 (dissenting opinion), and proposes instead the “categorical rule,” post, at 211, that when a “breakdown in the criminal justice system creates . . . the appearance that the proceeding will not reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt and innocence, and the resulting criminal punishment will not be regarded as fundamentally fair,” ibid, (internal quotation marks omitted), reversal must be decreed without proof of prejudice. This seems to us less a categorical rule of decision than a restatement of the issue to be decided. Holloway, Sullivan, and Wood establish the framework that they do precisely because that framework is thought to identify the situations in which the conviction will reasonably not be regarded as fundamentally fair. We believe it eminently performs that function in the case at hand, and that Justice Breyer is mistaken to think otherwise. But if he does think otherwise, a proper regard for the judicial function — and especially for the function of this Court, which must lay down rules that can be followed in the innumerable cases we are unable to review — would counsel that he propose some other “sensible [and] coherent framework,” rather than merely saying that prior representation of the victim, plus the capital nature of the case, plus judicial appointment of the counsel, see post, at 210, strikes him as producing a result that will not be regarded as fundamentally fair. This is not a rule of law but expression of an ad hoc “fairness” judgment (with which we disagree).
In order to circumvent Sullivan’s clear language, Justice Stevens suggests that a trial court must scrutinize representation by appointed counsel more closely than representation by retained counsel. Post, at 184 (dissenting opinion). But we have already rejected the notion that the Sixth Amendment draws such a distinction. “A proper respect for the Sixth Amendment disarms [the] contention that defendants who retain their own lawyers are entitled to less protection than defendants for whom the State appoints counsel.... The vital guarantee of the Sixth Amendment would stand for little if the often uninformed decision to retain a particular lawyer could reduce or forfeit the defendant’s entitlement to constitutional protection.” Sullivan, supra, at 344.
Petitioner no longer argues, as he did below and as Justice Souter does now, post, at 202 (dissenting opinion), that the Sixth Amendment requires reversal of his conviction without further inquiry into whether the potential conflict that the judge should have investigated was real. Compare 240 F. 3d 348, 357 (CA4 2001) (en banc), with Tr. of Oral Arg. 23-25. Some Courts of Appeals have read a footnote in Wood v. Georgia, 450 U. S., at 272, n. 18, as establishing that outright reversal is mandated when the trial court neglects a duty to inquire into a potential conflict of interest. See, e. g., Campbell v. Rice, 265 F. 3d 878, 884-885, 888 (CA9 2001); Ciak v. United States, 59 F. 3d 296,302 (CA2 1995). But see Brien v. United States, 695 F. 2d 10, 15, n. 10 (CA1 1982). The Wood footnote says that Sullivan does not preclude “raising ... a conflict-of-interest problem that is apparent in the record” and that “Sullivan mandates a reversal when the trial court has failed to make [the requisite] inquiry.” Wood, supra, at 272, n. 18. These statements were made in response to the dissent’s contention that the majority opinion had “gone beyond” Cuyler v. Sullivan, see 450 U. S., at 272, n. 18, in reaching a conflict-of-interest due process claim that had been raised neither in the petition for certiorari nor before the state courts, see id., at 280 (White, J., dissenting). To the extent the “mandates a reversal” statement goes beyond the assertion of mere jurisdiction to reverse, it is dictum — and dictum inconsistent with the disposition in Wood, which was not to reverse but to vacate and remand for the trial court to conduct the inquiry it had omitted.
Justice Souter labors to suggest that the Wood remand order is part of “a coherent scheme,” post, at 194, in which automatic reversal is required when the trial judge fails to inquire into a potential conflict that was apparent before the proceeding was “held or completed,” but a defendant must demonstrate adverse effect when the judge fails to inquire into a conflict that was not apparent before the end of the proceeding, post, at 202. The problem with this carefully concealed “coherent scheme” (no case has ever mentioned it) is that in Wood itself the court did not decree automatic reversal, '^ven though it found that “the possibility of a conflict of interest was sufficiently apparent at the time of the revocation hearing to impose upon the court a duty to inquire further.” 450 U. S., at 272 (second emphasis added). Indeed, the State had actually notified the judge of a potential conflict of interest “‘[d]uring the probation revocation hearing.’ ” Id., at 272, and n. 20. Justice Souter’s statement that “the signs that a conflict may have occurred were clear to the judge at the close of the probation revocation proceeding,” post, at 201 — when it became apparent that counsel had neglected the “strategy more obviously in the defendants’ interest, of requesting the court to reduce the fines or defer their collection,” post, at 198 — would more accurately be phrased “the effect of the conflict upon counsel’s performance was clear to the judge at the close of the probation revocation proceeding.”
Justice Stevens asserts that this reading (and presumably Justice Souter’s reading as well, post, at 201), is wrong, post, at 186-187; that Wood only requires petitioner to show that a real conflict existed, not that it affected counsel's performance, post, at 187. This is so because we “unambiguously stated” that a conviction must be reversed whenever the trial court fails to investigate a potential conflict, post, at 186-187 (citing Wood, footnote). As we have explained earlier, n. 3, supra, this dictum simply contradicts the remand order in Wood.
We have used “actual conflict of interest" elsewhere to mean what was required to be shown in Sullivan. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U. S. 648, 662, n. 31 (1984) (“[W]e have presumed prejudice when counsel labors under an actual conflict of interest____ See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U. S. 335 (1980)”). And we have used “conflict of interest” to mean a division of loyalties that affected counsel’s performance. In Holloway, 435 U. S., at 482, we described our earlier opinion in Glasser v. United States, 315 U. S. 60 (1942), as follows:
“The record disclosed that Stewart failed to cross-examine a Government witness whose testimony linked Glasser with the conspiracy and failed to object to the admission of arguably inadmissible evidence. This failure was viewed by the Court as a result of Stewart’s desire to protect Kretske’s interests, and was thus ‘indicative of Stewart’s struggle to serve two masters . . . .’ [315 U. S.], at 75. After identifying this conflict of interests, the Court declined to inquire whether the prejudice flowing from it was harmless and instead ordered Glasser’s conviction reversed.” (Emphasis added.)
Thus, the Sullivan standard is not properly read as requiring inquiry into actual conflict as something separate and apart from adverse effect. An “actual conflict,” for Sixth Amendment purposes, is a conflict of interest that adversely affects counsel’s performance.
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 44(c) provides:
“Whenever two or more defendants have been jointly charged pursuant to Rule 8(b) or have been joined for trial pursuant to Rule 13, and are represented by the same retained or assigned counsel or by retained or assigned counsel who are associated in the practice of law, the court shall promptly inquire with respect to such joint representation and shall personally advise each defendant of the right to the effective assistance of counsel, including separate representation. Unless it appears that there is good cause to believe no conflict of interest is likely to arise, the court shall take such measures as may be appropriate to protect each defendant’s right to counsel.”
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | A | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Black
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Article 37 of the Declaration of Rights of the Maryland Constitution provides:
“[N]o religious test ought ever to be required as a qualification for any office of profit or trust in this State, other than a declaration of belief in the existence of God . . .
The appellant Torcaso was appointed to the office of Notary Public by the Governor of Maryland but was refused a commission to serve because he would not declare his belief in God. He then brought this action in a Maryland Circuit Court to compel issuance of his commission, charging that the State’s requirement that he declare this belief violated “the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States . ...” The Circuit Court rejected these federal constitutional contentions, and the highest court of the State, the Court of Appeals, affirmed, holding that the state constitutional provision is self-executing and requires declaration of belief in God as a qualification for office without need for implementing legislation. The case is therefore properly here on appeal under 28 U. S. C. § 1257 (2).
There is, and can be, no dispute about the purpose or effect of the Maryland Declaration of Rights requirement before us — it sets up a religious test which was designed to and, if valid, does bar every person who refuses to declare a belief in God from holding a public “office of profit or trust” in Maryland. The power and authority of the State of Maryland thus is put on the side of one particular sort of believers — those who are willing to say they believe in “the existence of God.” It is true that there is much historical precedent for such laws. Indeed, it was largely to escape religious test oaths and declarations that a great many of the early colonists left Europe and came here hoping to worship in their own way. It soon developed, however, that many of those who had fled to escape religious test oaths turned out to be perfectly willing, when they had the power to do so, to force dissenters from their faith to take test oaths in conformity with that faith. This brought on a host of laws in the new Colonies imposing burdens and disabilities of various kinds upon varied beliefs depending largely upon what group happened to be politically strong enough to legislate in favor of its own beliefs. The effect of all this was the formal or practical “establishment” of particular religious faiths in most of the Colonies, with consequent burdens imposed on the free exercise of the faiths of nonfavored believers.
There were, however, wise and far-seeing men in the Colonies — too many to mention — who spoke out against test oaths and all the philosophy of intolerance behind them. One of these, it so happens, was George Calvert (the first Lord Baltimore), who took a most important part -in the original establishment of the Colony of Maryland. He was a Catholic and had, for this reason, felt compelled by his conscience to refuse to take the Oath of Supremacy in England at the cost of resigning from high governmental office. He again refused to take that oath when it was demanded by the Council of the Colony of
Virginia, and as a result he was denied settlement in that Colony. A recent historian of the early period of Maryland’s life has said that it was Calvert’s hope and purpose to establish in Maryland a colonial government free from the religious persecutions he had known — one “securely beyond the reach of oaths . ...”
When our Constitution was adopted, the desire to put the people “securely beyond the reach” of religious test oaths brought about the inclusion in Article VI of that document of a provision that “no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.” Article VI supports the accuracy of our observation in Girouard v. United States, 328 U. S. 61, 69, that “[t]he test oath is abhorrent to our tradition.” Not satisfied, however, with Article VI and other guarantees in the original Constitution, the First Congress proposed and the States very shortly thereafter adopted our Bill of Rights, including the First Amendment. That Amendment broke new constitutional ground in the protection it sought to afford to freedom of religion, speech, press, petition and assembly. Since prior cases in this Court have thoroughly explored and documented the history behind the First Amendment, the reasons for it, and the scope of the religious freedom it protects, we need not cover that ground again. What was said in our prior cases we think controls our decision here.
In Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 303-304, we said:
“The First Amendment declares that Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The Fourteenth Amendment has rendered the legislatures of the states as incompetent as Congress to enact such laws. . . . Thus the Amendment embraces two concepts, — freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be.”
Later we decided Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1, and said this at pages 15 and 16:-
“The 'establishment of religion’ clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect 'a wall of separation between church and State.’ ”
While there were strong dissents in the Everson case, they did not challenge the Court’s interpretation of the First Amendment’s coverage as being too broad, but thought the Court was applying that interpretation too narrowly to the facts of that case. Not long afterward, in Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U. S. 203, we were urged to repudiate as dicta the above-quoted Everson interpretation of the scope of the First Amendment’s coverage. We declined to do this, but instead strongly reaffirmed what had been said in Everson, calling attention to the fact that both the majority and the minority in Everson had agreed on the principles declared in this part of the Everson opinion. And a concurring opinion in McCollum, written by Mr. Justice Frankfurter and joined by the other Everson dissenters, said this:
“We are all agreed that the First and Fourteenth Amendments have a secular reach far more penetrating in the conduct of Government than merely to forbid an 'established church.’. . . We renew our conviction that ‘we have staked the very existence of our country on the faith that complete separation between the state and religion is best for the state and best for religion.’ ”
The Maryland Court of Appeals thought, and it is argued here, that this Court’s later holding and opinion in Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U. S. 306, had in part repudiated the statement in the Everson opinion quoted above and previously reaffirmed in McCollum. But the Court’s opinion in Zorach specifically stated: “We follow the McCollum case.” 343 U. S., at 315. Nothing decided or written in Zorach lends support to the idea that the Court there intended to open up the way for government, state or federal, to restore the historically and constitutionally discredited policy of probing religious beliefs by test oaths or limiting public offices to persons who have, or perhaps more properly profess to have, a belief in some particular kind of religious concept.
We repeat and again reaffirm that neither a State nor the Federal Government can constitutionally force a person “to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion.” Neither can constitutionally pass laws or impose requirements which aid all religions as against non-believers, and neither can aid those religions based on a belief in the existence of God as against those religions founded on different beliefs.
In upholding the State’s religious test for public office the highest court of Maryland said:
“The petitioner is not compelled to believe or disbelieve, under threat of punishment or other compulsion. True, unless he makes the declaration of belief he cannot hold public office in Maryland, but he is not compelled to hold office.”
The fact, however, that a person is not compelled to hold public office cannot possibly be an excuse for barring him from office by state-imposed criteria forbidden by the Constitution. This was settled by our holding in Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183. We there pointed out that whether or not “an abstract right to public employment exists,” Congress could not pass a law providing “. . that no federal employee shall attend Mass or take any active part in missionary work.’ ”
This Maryland religious test for public office unconstitutionally invades the appellant’s freedom of belief and religion and therefore cannot be enforced against him.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals of Maryland is accordingly reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter and Mr. Justice Harlan concur in the result.
Appellant also claimed that the State’s test oath requirement violates the provision of Art. VI of the Federal Constitution that “no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.” Because we are reversing the judgment on other grounds, we find it unnecessary to consider appellant’s contention that this provision applies to state as well as federal offices.
223 Md. 49, 162 A. 2d 438. Appellant’s alternative contention that this test violates the Maryland Constitution also was rejected by the state courts.
See, e. g., I Stokes, Church and State in the United States, 358-446. See also cases cited, note 7, infra.
The letter from the Virginia Council to the King’s Privy Council is quoted in Hanley, Their Rights and Liberties (Newman Press 1959), 65, as follows:
“According to the instructions from your Lordship and the usual course held in this place, we tendered the oaths of supremacy and allegiance to his Lordship[;] [Baltimore] and some of his followers, who making profession of the Romish Religion, utterly refused to take the same. . . . His Lordship then offered to take this oath, a copy whereof is included . . . but we could not imagine that so much latitude was left for us to decline from the prescribed form, so strictly exacted and so well justified and defended by the pen of our late sovereign, Lord King James of happy memory. . . . Among the many blessings and favors for which we are bound to bless God . . . there is none whereby it hath been made more happy than in the freedom of our Religion . . . and that no papists have been suffered to settle their abode amongst us. . .
Of course this was long before Madison’s great Memorial and Remonstrance and the enactment of the famous Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty, discussed in our opinion in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1, 11-13.
Hanley, op. cit., supra, p. 65.
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”
See, e. g., the opinions of the Court and also the concurring and dissenting opinions in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145; Davis v. Beason, 133 U. S. 333; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296; West Virginia State Bd. of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624; Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U. S. 67; Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1; Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U. S. 203; McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420.
333 U. S., at 213, 232. Later, in Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U. S. 306, 322, Mr. Justice FraNícfurter stated in dissent that “[t]he result in the McCollum case . . . was based on principles that received unanimous acceptance by this Court, barring only a single vote.”
In one of his famous letters of “a Landholder,” published in December 1787, Oliver Ellsworth, a member of the Federal Constitutional Convention and later Chief Justice of this Court, included among his strong arguments against religious test oaths the following statement:
“In short, test-laws are utterly ineffectual: they are no security at all; because men of loose principles will, by an external compliance, evade them. If they exclude any persons, it will be honest men, men of principle, who will rather suffer an injury, than act contrary to the dictates of their consciences. . . .” Quoted in Ford, Essays on the Constitution of the United States, 170. See also 4 Elliot, Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution, 193.
In discussing Article VI in the debate of the North Carolina Convention on the adoption of the Federal Constitution, James Iredell, later a Justice of this Court, said:
“. . . [I]t is objected that the people of America may, perhaps, choose representatives who have no religion at all, and that pagans and Mahometans may be admitted into offices. But how is it possible to exclude any set of men, without taking away that principle of religious freedom which we ourselves so warmly contend for?”
And another delegate pointed out that Article VI “leaves religion on the solid foundation of its own inherent validity, without any connection with temporal authority; and no kind of oppression can take place.” 4 Elliot, op. cit., supra, at 194, 200.
Among religions in this country which do not teach what would generally be considered a belief in the existence of God are Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture, Secular Humanism and others. See Washington Ethical Society v. District of Columbia, 101 U. S. App. D. C. 371, 249 F. 2d 127; Fellowship of Humanity v. County of Alameda, 153 Cal. App. 2d 673, 315 P. 2d 394; II Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences 293; 4 Encyclopaedia Britannica (1957 ed.) 325-327; 21 id., at 797; Archer, Faiths Men Live By (2d ed. revised by Purinton), 120-138, 254-313; 1961 World Almanac 695, 712; Year Book of American Churches for 1961, at 29, 47.
344 U. S., at 191-192, quoting from United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 ü. S. 75, 100.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | C | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Minton
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The petitioner brought suit against the United States under the Suits in Admiralty Act, 46 U. S. C. § 741 et seq., to recover damages for negligence in creating conditions aboard ship whereby he contracted polio and for negligence in the treatment thereof. The District Court, sitting without a jury, made findings of fact and stated its conclusions of law thereon (Admiralty Rules, No. 46%) in which it found the respondent not guilty of negligence in the treatment of the petitioner after he became ill, but found it guilty of negligence in permitting conditions to exist on board ship which were conducive to the transmission of polio whereby the petitioner was unduly exposed and thereby contracted the disease. Judgment for damages was entered against respondent, and on appeal the Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that no proximate cause was shown between the negligence and the contraction of polio. 207 F. 2d 952. We granted certiorari. 347 U. S. 932.
The first question presented is whether the Court of Appeals in reviewing the District Court’s findings applied proper standards. In reviewing a judgment of a trial court, sitting without a jury in admiralty, the Court of Appeals may not set aside the judgment below unless it is clearly erroneous. No greater scope of review is exercised by the appellate tribunals in admiralty cases than they exercise under Rule 52 (a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Boston Ins. Co. v. Dehydrating Process Co., 204 F. 2d 441, 444 (C. A. 1st Cir.); C. J. Dick Towing Co. v. The Leo, 202 F. 2d 850, 854 (C. A. 5th Cir.); Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. United States, 200 F. 2d 908, 910 (C. A. 2d Cir.); Koehler v. United States, 187 F. 2d 933, 936 (C. A. 7th Cir.); Walter G. Hougland, Inc. v. Muscovalley, 184 F. 2d 530, 531 (C. A. 6th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U. S. 935; Petterson Lighterage & Towing Corp. v. New York Central R. Co., 126 F. 2d 992, 994-995 (C. A. 2d Cir.). A finding is clearly erroneous when “although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed,” United States v. Oregon Medical Society, 343 U. S. 326, 339; United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U. S. 364, 395. We do not find that the Court of Appeals departed from this standard, although we do disagree with the result reached under the application of the standard. In relation to the District Court’s findings we stand in review-in the same position as the Court of Appeals. The question, therefore, is whether the findings of the District Court are clearly erroneous.
The petitioner was second assistant engineer on board the S. S. Edward B. Haines which was in Chinese waters from September 13, 1945, to December 3, 1945. During this time the master of the ship was informed that polio and other contagious diseases were prevalent in Shanghai, and a bulletin was posted on ship warning the crew thereof and directing them while ashore to exercise care in eating and drinking and to avoid association with the inhabitants ashore. So concerned was the master about this condition that he mustered the members of the crew on several occasions and warned them to the same effect. The District Court found that the petitioner obeyed these warnings, and there was no evidence in the record to the contrary. While the ship was in port at Shanghai, November 11, 1945, the record does not show that the petitioner went ashore. The last time he was ashore was November 1. On November 11, a number of Chinese stevedores came aboard to do some work, and there were also taken aboard at that time forty or fifty Chinese soldiers and fifty truck drivers and mechanics to be transported to Tsingtao. These soldiers, truck drivers and mechanics, fresh from Shanghai, the area infested by polio, were permitted wide use of the ship, including toilet facilities and the only drinking fountain, which was located on deck. To supplement the toilet facilities an open wooden trough was laid along the deck and discharged over the side of the ship. A hose was provided for flushing the trough, and on several occasions the petitioner had to go on deck to turn the water on to flush it. There was expert testimony by doctors that polio derives from a virus usually spread by people who are carriers of the disease to healthy persons who are susceptible. The virus is carried by human beings who have the organism in their intestinal tract or in their nose and throat. It enters the respiratory or the intestinal tract of the susceptible person and is carried to the central nervous system where the disease produces injury.
The petitioner first reported his symptoms on November 24, 1945. The usual period of incubation for the virus causing polio is believed to be about two weeks, with a maximum of two and one-half weeks. There was expert testimony that the producing cause of polio in the petitioner was contact with the Chinese stevedores, soldiers, truck drivers and mechanics who came aboard the ship. According to the expert testimony, polio usually does not occur unless there have been previous cases of the disease or contact with persons who have it. The petitioner had an uneventful trip of months before reaching the Orient with individuals who had no polio; then suddenly he is thrown in contact with Chinese from the Shanghai area where polio is prevalent, and thereafter, within the normal period of incubation, he comes down with the disease.
On evidence showing these facts, including the opinion of the experts, we think there was substantial evidence from which the District Court could and did find that respondent was negligent in permitting these Chinese, from the infested area of Shanghai, to have the run of the ship and use of its facilities, and in furnishing the crude and exposed latrine provided on the deck of the ship, by reason whereof the petitioner contracted polio.
Of course no one can say with certainty that the Chinese were the carriers of the polio virus and that they communicated it to the petitioner. But upon balance of the probabilities it seems a reasonable inference for the District Court to make from the facts proved, supported as they were by the best judgment medical experts have upon the subject today, that petitioner was contaminated by the Chinese who came aboard the ship November 11, 1945, at Shanghai. Certainly we cannot say on review that a judgment based upon such evidence is clearly erroneous. Myers v. Reading Co., 331 U. S. 477, 485-486; Tennant v. Peoria & P. U. R. Co., 321 U. S. 29. We think it was an allowable judgment of the District Court, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Reversed.
Mr. Justice Reed would affirm on the grounds stated by the Court of Appeals.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter.
The petition on the basis of which a writ of certiorari was sought in this case presented two questions of law claimed to have general importance. The course of the argument at the bar left no doubt that these were not the questions which were involved in the decision of the Court of Appeals under review. Neither is the question which this Court is now deciding. Both counsel and this Court have viewed the case as no more than an ordinary action for negligence, giving rise, as is frequently the case, to conflict in evaluation of the evidence. In short, the Court of Appeals read the evidence one way and this Court another. If there is any class of cases which plainly falls outside the professed considerations by which this Court exercises its discretionary jurisdiction, it is cases involving only interpretation of facts bearing on the issue of causation or negligence. The standards of judgment in this type of litigation are well settled. The significance of facts becomes the bone of contention. And the facts stir differences that derive from the very elusiveness of the meaning of the myriad unique sets of circumstances in negligence cases. One’s deep sympathy is of course aroused by a victim of the hazards of negligence litigation in situations like the one before us. But the remedy for an obsolete and uncivilized system of compensation for loss of life or limb of crews on ships and trains is not intermittent disregard of the considerations which led Congress to entrust this Court with the discretion of certiorari jurisdiction. The remedy is an adequate and effective system of workmen’s compensation.
The present case is one of those instances when a full appreciation before the writ was granted of what the argument developed should have led to a denial of the writ. If this Court is to entertain a negligence case solely because we stand in review in the same position as the Court of Appeals with relation to the District Court and disagree with the result which the Court of Appeals reached in the application of the right standards, the opportunity that is afforded in this case for a review of the Court of Appeals is an opportunity that should generally be afforded when the Court of Appeals reverses a District Court. (Incidentally, this Court is not reviewing the District Court. It reviews the Court of Appeals’ review of the District Court.)
Again and again and again has it been authoritatively announced that controversies such as this are not for this Court. Nor does it follow that because the case in fact was brought here and has been argued, the merits should be decided. The short answer is that to entertain this kind of a case inevitably will encourage petitions for cer-tiorari in other like cases tendering an issue of more general importance which close examination proves wanting. Thus will again begin demands on the Court which it wisely cannot discharge and for which legislative relief had to come, or a feeling of discrimination will be engendered in taking some cases that ought not to be taken and rejecting others.
These controlling considerations were thus put by Mr. Chief Justice Taft on behalf of the entire Court:
“If it be suggested that as much effort and time as we have given to the consideration of the alleged conflict would have enabled us to dispose of the case before us on the merits, the answer is that it is very important that we be consistent in not granting the writ of certiorari except in cases involving principles the settlement of which is of importance to the public as distinguished from that of the parties, and in cases where there is a real and embarrassing conflict of opinion and authority between the circuit courts of appeal. The present case certainly comes under neither head.” Layne & Bowler Corp. v. Western Well Works, Inc., 261 U. S. 387, 393.
With due regard to the Court’s jurisdiction on writ of certiorari (Revised Rules of the Supreme Court, No. 19) and to the effective adjudication of those cases, inevitably abundant, for which the Court sits, the Court has again and again dismissed the writ as improviden'tly granted after a preliminary and necessarily tentative consideration of the petition. United States v. Rimer, 220 U. S. 547; Furness, Withy & Co. v. Yang-Tsze Ins. Assn., 242 U. S. 430; Tyrrell v. District of Columbia, 243 U. S. 1; Layne & Bowler Corp. v. Western Well Works, Inc., 261 U. S. 387; Southern Power Co. v. North Carolina Pub. Serv. Co., 263 U. S. 508; Keller v. Adams-Campbell Co., 264 U. S. 314; Wisconsin Electric Co. v. Dumore Co., 282 U. S. 813; Sanchez v. Borras, 283 U. S. 798; Franklin-American Trust Co. v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 286 U. S. 533; Moor v. Texas & N. O. R. Co., 297 U. S. 101; Texas & New Orleans R. Co. v. Neill, 302 U. S. 645; Goodman v. United States, 305 U. S. 578; Goins v. United States, 306 U. S. 622; McCullough v. Kammerer Corp., 323 U. S. 327; McCarthy v. Bruner, 323 U. S. 673.
I would dismiss the writ as improvidently granted.
See Labor Board v. Pittsburgh S. S. Co., 340 U. S. 498, 503: “This is not the place to review a conflict of evidence nor to reverse a Court of Appeals because were we in its place we would find the record tilting one way rather than the other, though fair-minded judges could find it tilting either way.”
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | H | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice SOTOMAYORdelivered the opinion of the Court.
In Atkins v. Virginia,536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002), this Court recognized that the execution of the intellectually disabled contravenes the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. After Atkinswas decided, petitioner, a Louisiana death-row inmate, requested an opportunity to prove he was intellectually disabled in state court. Without affording him an evidentiary hearing or granting him time or funding to secure expert evidence, the state court rejected petitioner's claim. That decision, we hold, was "based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Petitioner was therefore entitled to have his Atkinsclaim considered on the merits in federal court.
I
Petitioner Kevan Brumfield was sentenced to death for the 1993 murder of off-duty Baton Rouge police officer Betty Smothers. Brumfield, accompanied by another individual, shot and killed Officer Smothers while she was escorting the manager of a grocery store to the bank.
At the time of Brumfield's trial, this Court's precedent permitted the imposition of the death penalty on intellectually disabled persons. See Penry v. Lynaugh,492 U.S. 302, 340, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989)(opinion of O'Connor, J.). But in Atkins,this Court subsequently held that "in light of... 'evolving standards of decency,' " the Eighth Amendment " 'places a substantive restriction on the State's power to take the life' of a mentally retarded offender." 536 U.S., at 321, 122 S.Ct. 2242(quoting Ford v. Wainwright,477 U.S. 399, 405, 106 S.Ct. 2595, 91 L.Ed.2d 335 (1986)).Acknowledging the "disagreement" regarding how to "determin[e] which offenders are in fact" intellectually disabled, the Court left "to the State[s] the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon [their] execution of sentences." 536 U.S., at 317, 122 S.Ct. 2242(internal quotation marks omitted; some alterations in original).
The Louisiana Supreme Court took up the charge of implementing Atkins' mandate in State v. Williams,2001-1650 (La.11/1/02), 831 So.2d 835. The court held that "a diagnosis of mental retardationhas three distinct components: (1) subaverage intelligence, as measured by objective standardized IQ tests; (2) significant impairment in several areas of adaptive skills; and (3) manifestations of this neuro-psychological disorder in the developmental stage." Id.,at 854(relying on, inter alia,American Association of Mental Retardation, Mental Retardation: Definition, Classification, and Systems of Supports (10th ed. 2002) (AAMR), and American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (rev. 4th ed. 2000) (DSM-IV)); see also La.Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 905.5.1(H)(1)(West Cum. Supp. 2015) (subsequently enacted statute governing Atkinsclaims adopting the three Williamscriteria). The Williamscourt also clarified that "not everyone faced with a death penalty sentence" would "automatically be entitled to a post-Atkinshearing"; rather, it would "be an individual defendant's burden to provide objective factors that will put at issue the fact of mental retardation." 831 So.2d, at 857. Borrowing from the state statutory standard for determining when a pretrial competency inquiry is necessary, the court held that an Atkinsevidentiary hearing is required when an inmate has put forward sufficient evidence to raise a "'reasonable ground' " to believe him to be intellectually disabled. See id.,at 861; see also id.,at 858, n. 33(characterizing the requisite showing as one raising a "'reasonable doubt' ").
Shortly after the Williamsdecision, Brumfield amended his pending state postconviction petition to raise an Atkinsclaim. He sought an evidentiary hearing on the issue, asserting that his case was "accompanied by a host of objective facts which raise the issue of mental retardation." App. 203a.
In support, Brumfield pointed to mitigation evidence introduced at the sentencing phase of his trial. He focused on the testimony of three witnesses in particular: his mother; Dr. Cecile Guin, a social worker who had compiled a history of Brumfield by consulting available records and conducting interviews with family members and teachers; and Dr. John Bolter, a clinical neuropsychologist who had performed a number of cognitive tests on Brumfield. A psychologist, Dr. Brian Jordan, had also examined Brumfield and prepared a report, but did not testify at trial. Brumfield contended that this evidence showed, among other things, that he had registered an IQ score of 75, had a fourth-grade reading level, had been prescribed numerous medications and treated at psychiatric hospitals as a child, had been identified as having some form of learning disability, and had been placed in special education classes. See id.,at 203a-204a. Brumfield further requested "all the resources necessary to the proper presentation of his case," asserting that until he was able to "retain the services of various experts," it would be "premature for [the court] to address [his] claims." Id.,at 207a.
Without holding an evidentiary hearing or granting funds to conduct additional investigation, the state trial court dismissed Brumfield's petition. With respect to the request for an Atkinshearing, the court stated:
"I've looked at the application, the response, the record, portions of the transcript on that issue, and the evidence presented, including Dr. Bolter's testimony, Dr. Guinn's [sic] testimony, which refers to and discusses Dr. Jordan's report, and based on those, since this issue-there was a lot of testimony by all of those in Dr. Jordan's report.
"Dr. Bolter in particular found he had an IQ of over-or 75. Dr. Jordan actually came up with a little bit higher IQ. I do not think that the defendant has demonstrated impairment based on the record in adaptive skills. The doctor testified that he did have an anti-social personality or sociopath, and explained it as someone with no conscience, and the defendant hadn't carried his burden placing the claim of mental retardation at issue. Therefore, I find he is not entitled to that hearing based on all of those things that I just set out." App. to Pet. for Cert. 171a-172a.
After the Louisiana Supreme Court summarily denied his application for a supervisory writ to review the trial court's ruling, Brumfield v. State,2004-0081 (La.10/29/04), 885 So.2d 580, Brumfield filed a petition for habeas corpus in federal court, again pressing his Atkinsclaim. Pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Brumfield could secure relief only if the state court's rejection of his claim was either "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," or was "based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(1), (2).
The District Court found that both of these requirements had been met. 854 F.Supp.2d 366, 383-384 (M.D.La.2012). First, the District Court held that denying Brumfield an evidentiary hearing without first granting him funding to develop his Atkinsclaim "represented an unreasonable application of then-existing due process law," thus satisfying § 2254(d)(1). Id.,at 379. Second, and in the alternative, the District Court found that the state court's decision denying Brumfield a hearing "suffered from an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state habeas proceeding in violation of § 2254(d)(2)." Ibid.
The District Court further determined Brumfield to be intellectually disabled based on the extensive evidence it received during an evidentiary hearing. Id.,at 406;
see Cullen v. Pinholster,563 U.S. 170, ----, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1401, 179 L.Ed.2d 557 (2011)(recognizing that federal habeas courts may "take new evidence in an evidentiary hearing" when § 2254(d)does not bar relief). This evidence included the results of various IQ tests-which, when adjusted to account for measurement errors, indicated that Brumfield had an IQ score between 65 and 70, 854 F.Supp.2d, at 392-testimony and expert reports regarding Brumfield's adaptive behavior and "significantly limited conceptual skills," id.,at 401, and proof that these deficits in intellectual functioning had exhibited themselves before Brumfield reached adulthood, id.,at 405. Thus, the District Court held, Brumfield had "demonstrated he is mentally retarded as defined by Louisiana law" and was "ineligible for execution." Id.,at 406.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed. 744 F.3d 918, 927 (2014). It held that Brumfield's federal habeas petition failed to satisfy either of § 2254(d)'s requirements. With respect to the District Court's conclusion that the state court had unreasonably applied clearly established federal law, the Fifth Circuit rejected the notion that any of this Court's precedents required a state court to grant an Atkinsclaimant the funds necessary to make a threshold showing of intellectual disability. See 744 F.3d, at 925-926. As for the District Court's holding that the state court's decision rested on an unreasonable determination of the facts, the Fifth Circuit declared that its "review of the record persuad[ed it] that the state court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Brumfield an evidentiary hearing." Id.,at 926. Having found that Brumfield's petition failed to clear § 2254(d)'s hurdle, the Fifth Circuit did not review the District Court's conclusion that Brumfield is, in fact, intellectually disabled. See id.,at 927, and n. 8.
We granted certiorari on both aspects of the Fifth Circuit's § 2254(d)analysis, 574 U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 752, 190 L.Ed.2d 474 (2014), and now vacate its decision and remand for further proceedings.
II
Before this Court, Brumfield advances both of the rationales on which the District Court relied in holding § 2254(d)to be satisfied. Because we agree that the state court's rejection of Brumfield's request for an Atkinshearing was premised on an "unreasonable determination of the facts" within the meaning of § 2254(d)(2), we need not address whether its refusal to grant him expert funding, or at least the opportunity to seek pro bonoexpert assistance to further his threshold showing, reflected an "unreasonable application of... clearly established Federal law," § 2254(d)(1).
In conducting the § 2254(d)(2)inquiry, we, like the courts below, "look through" the Louisiana Supreme Court's summary denial of Brumfield's petition for review and evaluate the state trial court's reasoned decision refusing to grant Brumfield an Atkinsevidentiary hearing. See Johnson v. Williams,568 U.S. ----, ----, n. 1, 133 S.Ct. 1088, 1094, n. 1, 185 L.Ed.2d 105 (2013); Ylst v. Nunnemaker,501 U.S. 797, 806, 111 S.Ct. 2590, 115 L.Ed.2d 706 (1991). Like Brumfield, we do not question the propriety of the legal standard the trial court applied, and presume that a rule according an evidentiary hearing only to those capital defendants who raise a "reasonable doubt" as to their intellectual disability is consistent with our decision in Atkins. Instead, we train our attention on the two underlying factual determinations on which the trial court's decision was premised-that Brumfield's IQ score was inconsistent with a diagnosis of intellectual disability and that he had presented no evidence of adaptive impairment. App. to Pet. for Cert. 171a-172a.
We may not characterize these state-court factual determinations as unreasonable "merely because [we] would have reached a different conclusion in the first instance." Wood v. Allen,558 U.S. 290, 301, 130 S.Ct. 841, 175 L.Ed.2d 738 (2010). Instead, § 2254(d)(2)requires that we accord the state trial court substantial deference. If " '[r]easonable minds reviewing the record might disagree' about the finding in question, 'on habeas review that does not suffice to supersede the trial court's... determination.' " Ibid.(quoting Rice v. Collins,546 U.S. 333, 341-342, 126 S.Ct. 969, 163 L.Ed.2d 824 (2006)). As we have also observed, however, "[e]ven in the context of federal habeas, deference does not imply abandonment or abdication of judicial review," and "does not by definition preclude relief." Miller-El v. Cockrell,537 U.S. 322, 340, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). Here, our examination of the record before the state court compels us to conclude that both of its critical factual determinations were unreasonable.
A
The state trial court's rejection of Brumfield's request for an Atkinshearing rested, first, on Dr. Bolter's testimony that Brumfield scored 75 on an IQ test and may have scored higher on another test. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 171a. These scores, the state court apparently believed, belied the claim that Brumfield was intellectually disabled because they necessarily precluded any possibility that he possessed subaverage intelligence-the first of the three criteria necessary for a finding of intellectual disability. But in fact, this evidence was entirely consistent with intellectual disability.
To qualify as "significantly subaverage in general intellectual functioning" in Louisiana, "one must be more than two standard deviations below the mean for the test of intellectual functioning." Williams,831 So.2d, at 853(internal quotation marks omitted). On the Wechsler scalefor IQ-the scale employed by Dr. Bolter-that would equate to a score of 70 or less. See id.,at 853-854, n. 26.
As the Louisiana Supreme Court cautioned in Williams,however, an IQ test result cannot be assessed in a vacuum. In accord with sound statistical methods, the court explained: "[T]he assessment of intellectual functioning through the primary reliance on IQ tests must be tempered with attention to possible errors in measurement."
Ibid.Thus, Williamsheld, "[a]lthough Louisiana's definition of significantly subaverage intellectual functioning does not specifically use the word 'approximately,' because of the SEM [ (standard error of measurement) ], any IQ test score has a margin of error and is only a factor in assessing mental retardation." Id.,at 855, n. 29.
Accounting for this margin of error, Brumfield's reported IQ test result of 75 was squarely in the range of potential intellectual disability. The sources on which Williamsrelied in defining subaverage intelligence both describe a score of 75 as being consistent with such a diagnosis. See AAMR, at 59; DSM-IV, at 41-42; see also State v. Dunn,2001-1635 (La.5/11/10), 41 So.3d 454, 470("The ranges associated with the two scores of 75 brush the threshold score for a mental retardation diagnosis").Relying on similar authorities, this Court observed in Atkinsthat "an IQ between 70 and 75 or lower... is typically considered the cutoff IQ score for the intellectual function prong of the mental retardation definition." 536 U.S., at 309, n. 5, 122 S.Ct. 2242. Indeed, in adopting these definitions, the Louisiana Supreme Court anticipated our holding in Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. ----, 134 S.Ct. 1986, 188 L.Ed.2d 1007 (2014), that it is unconstitutional to foreclose "all further exploration of intellectual disability" simply because a capital defendant is deemed to have an IQ above 70. Id., at ----, 134 S.Ct., at 1990; see also id.,at ----, 134 S.Ct., at 1996("For professionals to diagnose-and for the law then to determine-whether an intellectual disability exists once the SEM applies and the individual's IQ score is 75 or below the inquiry would consider factors indicating whether the person had deficits in adaptive functioning"). To conclude, as the state trial court did, that Brumfield's reported IQ score of 75 somehow demonstrated that he could not possess subaverage intelligence therefore reflected an unreasonable determination of the facts.
Nor was there evidence of any higher IQ test score that could render the state court's determination reasonable. The state court claimed that Dr. Jordan, who examined Brumfield but never testified at trial, "came up with a little bit higher IQ." App. to Pet. for Cert. 171a. At trial, the existence of such a test score was mentioned only during the cross-examination of Dr. Bolter, who had simply acknowledged the following: "Dr. Jordan rated his intelligence just a little higher than I did. But Dr. Jordan also only did a screening test and I gave a standardized measure of intellectual functioning." App. 133a. And in fact, Dr. Jordan's written report provides no IQ score. See id.,at 429a.The state court therefore could not reasonably infer from this evidence that any examination Dr. Jordan had performed was sufficiently rigorous to preclude definitively the possibility that Brumfield possessed subaverage intelligence. See State v. Dunn,2001-1635 (La.11/1/02), 831 So.2d 862, 886, n. 9(ordering Atkinsevidentiary hearing even though "prison records indicate[d]" the defendant had an " 'estimated IQ of 76,' " emphasizing testimony that prison officials "did not do the formal IQ testing").
B
The state court's refusal to grant Brumfield's request for an Atkinsevidentiary hearing rested, next, on its conclusion that the record failed to raise any question as to Brumfield's "impairment... in adaptive skills." App. to Pet. for Cert. 171a. That determination was also unreasonable.
The adaptive impairment prong of an intellectual disability diagnosis requires an evaluation of the individual's ability to function across a variety of dimensions. The Louisiana Supreme Court in Williamsdescribed three separate sets of criteria that may be utilized in making this assessment. See 831 So.2d, at 852-854. Although Louisiana courts appear to utilize all three of these tests in evaluating adaptive impairment, see Dunn,41 So.3d, at 458-459, 463, for the sake of simplicity we will assume that the third of these tests, derived from Louisiana statutory law, governed here, as it appears to be the most favorable to the State.Under that standard, an individual may be intellectually disabled if he has "substantial functional limitations in three or more of the following areas of major life activity: (i) Self-care. (ii) Understanding and use of language. (iii) Learning. (iv) Mobility. (v) Self-direction. (vi) Capacity for independent living." Williams,831 So.2d, at 854(quoting then La.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 28:381(12)(repealed 2005)).
The record before the state court contained sufficient evidence to raise a question as to whether Brumfield met these criteria. During the sentencing hearing, Brumfield's mother testified that Brumfield had been born prematurely at a very low birth weight. App. 28a. She also recounted that he had been taken out of school in the fifth grade and hospitalized due to his behavior, and recalled an incident in which he suffered a seizure. Id.,at 34a-38a, 41a, 47a.
Social worker Dr. Guin elaborated on this testimony, explaining that Brumfield's low birth weight indicated "that something ha[d] gone wrong during the pregnancy," that medical records suggested Brumfield had "slower responses than normal babies," and that "they knew that something was wrong at that point." Id.,at 75a-76a. Dr. Guin also confirmed that, beginning in fifth grade, Brumfield had been placed in special classes in school and in multiple mental health facilities, and had been prescribed antipsychotics and sedatives. Id.,at 89a, 93a-94a.Moreover, one report Dr. Guin reviewed from a facility that treated Brumfield as a child "questioned his intellectual functions," and opined that "he probably had a learning disability related to some type of slowness in motor development, some type of physiological [problem]." Id.,at 89a. Dr. Guin herself reached a similar conclusion, stating that Brumfield "obviously did have a physiologically linked learning disability that he was born with," and that his "basic problem was that he... could not process information." Id.,at 90a, 98a.
Finally, Dr. Bolter, who had performed "a comprehensive battery of tests," confirmed that Brumfield had a "borderline general level of intelligence." Id.,at 127a-128a. His low intellect manifested itself in a fourth-grade reading level-and he reached that level, Dr. Bolter elaborated, only with respect to "simple word recognition," and "not even comprehension." Id.,at 128a; see also id.,at 134a. In a written report submitted to the state court, Dr. Bolter further noted that Brumfield had deficiencies "frequently seen in individuals with a history of learning disabilities," and "clearly" had "learning characteristics that make it more difficult for him to acquire new information." Id.,at 418a, 420a. Dr. Bolter also testified that Brumfield's low birth weight had "place[d] him [at] a risk of some form of potential neurological trauma," and affirmed that the medications administered to Brumfield as a child were generally reserved for "severe cases." Id.,at 130a, 132a.
All told, then, the evidence in the state-court record provided substantial grounds to question Brumfield's adaptive functioning. An individual, like Brumfield, who was placed in special education classes at an early age, was suspected of having a learning disability, and can barely read at a fourth-grade level, certainly would seem to be deficient in both "[u]nderstanding and use of language" and "[l]earning"-two of the six "areas of major life activity" identified in Williams, 831 So.2d, at 854. And the evidence of his low birth weight, of his commitment to mental health facilities at a young age, and of officials' administration of antipsychotic and sedative drugs to him at that time, all indicate that Brumfield may well have had significant deficits in at least one of the remaining four areas. See ibid.
In advancing its contrary view of the record, the state court noted that Dr. Bolter had described Brumfield as someone with "an antisocial personality." App. 127a; see App. to Pet. for Cert. 171a. The relevance of this diagnosis is, however, unclear, as an antisocial personality is not inconsistent with any of the above-mentioned areas of adaptive impairment, or with intellectual disability more generally. The DSM-IV-one of the sources on which the Williamscourt relied in defining intellectual disability-provides: "The diagnostic criteria for Mental Retardationdo not include an exclusion criterion; therefore, the diagnosis should be made... regardless of and in addition to the presence of another disorder." DSM-IV, at 47; see also AAMR, at 172 (noting that individuals with intellectual disability also tend to have a number of other mental health disorders, including personality disorders).
To be sure, as the dissent emphasizes, post,at 2289 - 2290, 2292 - 2293, other evidence in the record before the state court may have cut against Brumfield's claim of intellectual disability. Perhaps most significant, in his written report Dr. Bolter stated that Brumfield "appears to be normal from a neurocognitive perspective," with a "normal capacity to learn and acquire information when given the opportunity for repetition," and "problem solving and reasoning skills" that were "adequate." App. 421a. Likewise, the underlying facts of Brumfield's crime might arguably provide reason to think that Brumfield possessed certain adaptive skills, as the murder for which he was convicted required a degree of advanced planning and involved the acquisition of a car and guns. But cf. AAMR, at 8 (intellectually disabled persons may have "strengths in social or physical capabilities, strengths in some adaptive skill areas, or strengths in one aspect of an adaptive skill in which they otherwise show an overall limitation").
It is critical to remember, however, that in seeking an evidentiary hearing, Brumfield was not obligated to show that he was intellectually disabled, or even that he would likely be able to prove as much. Rather, Brumfield needed only to raise a "reasonable doubt" as to his intellectual disability to be entitled to an evidentiary hearing. See Williams,831 So.2d, at 858, n. 33. The Louisiana Supreme Court's decision in Williamsillustrated how low the threshold for an evidentiary hearing was intended to be: There, the court held that the defendant was entitled to a hearing on his Atkinsclaim notwithstanding the fact that "the defense's own expert testified unequivocally, at both the guilt and penalty phases of trial, that [the] defendant is not mentally retarded," an assessment "based on the fact that [the] defendant [was] not deficient in adaptive functioning." 831 So.2d, at 855; see also Dunn,831 So.2d, at 885, 887(ordering hearing despite expert testimony that the defendant "had never been identified as a child who was a slow learner," and had "received college credit for courses completed during his incarceration"). Similarly, in light of the evidence of Brumfield's deficiencies, none of the countervailing evidence could be said to foreclose all reasonable doubt. An individual who points to evidence that he was at risk of "neurological trauma" at birth, was diagnosed with a learning disability and placed in special education classes, was committed to mental health facilities and given powerful medication, reads at a fourth-grade level, and simply cannot "process information," has raised substantial reason to believe that he suffers from adaptive impairments.
That these facts were alone sufficient to raise a doubt as to Brumfield's adaptive impairments is all the more apparent given that Brumfield had not yet had the opportunity to develop the record for the purpose of proving an intellectual disability claim. At his pre-Atkinstrial, Brumfield had little reason to investigate or present evidence relating to intellectual disability. In fact, had he done so at the penalty phase, he ran the risk that it would "enhance the likelihood... future dangerousness [would] be found by the jury." Atkins,536 U.S., at 321, 122 S.Ct. 2242. Thus, given that the evidence from trial provided good reason to think Brumfield suffered from an intellectual disability, there was even greater cause to believe he might prove such a claim in a full evidentiary hearing. Indeed, the Louisiana Supreme Court had made clear that a capital defendant in Brumfield's position should be accorded this additional benefit of the doubt when it defined the standard for assessing whether a hearing is required. Echoing Atkins' observation that penalty-phase evidence of intellectual disability can be a "two-edged sword," ibid.,Williamsnoted that where a trial "was conducted prior to Atkins," the defense's "trial strategy may have been to shift the focus away from any diagnosis of mental retardation."
831 So.2d, at 856, n. 31. For that reason, the Williamscourt considered the fact that the defendant "ha[d] not had the issue of mental retardation put before the fact finder in light of the Atkinsrestriction on the death penalty" as a factor supporting the requisite threshold showing that "entitled [him] to an evidentiary hearing." Id.,at 857; accord, Dunn,831 So.2d, at 886. Here, the state trial court should have taken into account that the evidence before it was sought and introduced at a time when Brumfield's intellectual disability was not at issue. The court's failure to do so resulted in an unreasonable determination of the facts.
III
A
Urging affirmance of the decision below, the State advances two additional arguments that we need discuss only briefly.
First, the State suggests that rather than being evaluated pursuant to § 2254(d)(2)'s "unreasonable determination of the facts" standard, Brumfield's attack on the state trial court's decision should instead be "'reviewed under the arguably more deferential standard set out in § 2254(e)(1).' " Brief for Respondent 30 (quoting Wood,558 U.S., at 301, 130 S.Ct. 841).We have not yet "defined the precise relationship between § 2254(d)(2)and § 2254(e)(1)," Burt v. Titlow,571 U.S. ----, ----, 134 S.Ct. 10, 15, 187 L.Ed.2d 348 (2013), and we need not do so here. The State did not press below the theory that § 2254(e)(1)supplies the governing standard when a court evaluates whether a habeas petitioner has satisfied § 2254(d)(2)'s requirements, the Fifth Circuit did not address that possibility, and the State in its brief in opposition to certiorari failed to advance any specific argument that the decision below could be supported by invocation of that statutory provision. See Brief in Opposition 60-64. The argument is therefore "properly 'deemed waived.' " Granite Rock Co. v. Teamsters,561 U.S. 287, 306, 130 S.Ct. 2847, 177 L.Ed.2d 567 (2010)(quoting this Court's Rule 15.2).
Second, the State contends that Brumfield's request for an Atkinshearing was properly rejected because the record evidence failed to show that Brumfield's intellectual deficiencies manifested while he was in the "developmental stage"-that is, before he reached adulthood. Williams,831 So.2d, at 854. But the state trial court never made any finding that Brumfield had failed to produce evidence suggesting he could meet this age-of-onset requirement. There is thus no determination on that point to which a federal court must defer in assessing whether Brumfield satisfied § 2254(d). See Panetti v. Quarterman,551 U.S. 930, 953-954, 127 S.Ct. 2842, 168 L.Ed.2d 662 (2007); compare, e.g.,Wiggins v. Smith,539 U.S. 510, 534, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003)(reviewing de novothe question whether petitioner had suffered prejudice where state court's reasoned decision rejecting claim under Strickland v. Washington,466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), was premised solely on conclusion that attorney's performance had not been constitutionally deficient), with Harrington v. Richter,562 U.S. 86, 98, 131 S.Ct. 770, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011)(requiring federal habeas court to defer to hypothetical reasons state court might have given for rejecting federal claim where there is no "opinion explaining the reasons relief has been denied"). In any event, the state-court record contained ample evidence creating a reasonable doubt as to whether Brumfield's disability manifested before adulthood: Both Dr. Guin and Dr. Bolter testified at length about Brumfield's intellectual shortcomings as a child and their possible connection to his low birth weight. If Brumfield presented sufficient evidence to suggest that he was intellectually limited, as we have made clear he did, there is little question that he also established good reason to think that he had been so since he was a child.
B
Finally, we offer a few additional words in response to Justice THOMAS' dissent. We do not deny that Brumfield's crimes were terrible, causing untold pain for the victims and their families. But we are called upon today to resolve a different issue. There has already been one death that society rightly condemns. The question here is whether Brumfield cleared AEDPA's procedural hurdles, and was thus entitled to a hearing to show that he so lacked the capacity for self-determination that it would violate the Eighth Amendment to permit the State to impose the "law's most severe sentence," Hall,572 U.S., at ----, 134 S.Ct., at 1993, and take his life as well. That question, and that question alone, we answer in the affirmative.
* * *
We hold that Brumfield has satisfied the requirements of § 2254(d). The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is therefore vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice THOMAS, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, Justice SCALIA, and Justice ALITO join as to all but Part I-C, dissenting.
Federal collateral review of state convictions interrupts the enforcement of state criminal laws and undermines the finality of state-court judgments. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) addresses that interference by constraining the ability of federal courts to grant relief to state prisoners. Today, the Court oversteps those limits in a decision that fails to respect the Louisiana state courts and our precedents. I respectfully dissent.
I
This case is a study in contrasts. On the one hand, we have Kevan Brumfield, a man who murdered Louisiana police officer Betty Smothers and who has spent the last 20 years claiming that his actions were the product of circumstances beyond his control. On the other hand, we have Warrick Dunn, the eldest son of Corporal Smothers, who responded to circumstances beyond his control by caring for his family, building a professional football career, and turning his success on the field into charitable work off the field.
A
Given that the majority devotes a single sentence to a description of the crime for which a Louisiana jury sentenced Brumfield to death
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | A | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Blackmun
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, as amended, 20 U. S. C. § 241a et seq., provides for federal funding of special programs for educationally deprived children in both public and private schools.
This suit was instituted on behalf of parochial school students who were eligible for Title I benefits and who claimed that the public school authorities in their area, in violation of the Act, failed to provide adequate Title I programs for private school children as compared with those programs provided for public school children. The defendants answered that the extensive aid sought by the plaintiffs exceeded the requirements of Title I and contravened the State's Constitution and state law and public policy. First Amendment rights were also raised by the parties. The District Court, concluding that the State had fulfilled its Title I obligations, denied relief. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, by a divided vote, reversed. 475 F. 2d 1338 (1973). We granted certiorari to examine serious questions that appeared to be present as to the scope and constitutionality of Title I. 414 U. S. 908 (1973).
I
Title I is the first federal-aid-to-education program authorizing assistance for private school children as well as for public school children. The Congress, by its statutory declaration of policy, and otherwise, recognized that all children from educationally deprived areas do not necessarily attend the public schools, and that, since the legislative aim was to provide needed assistance to educationally deprived children rather than to specific schools, it was necessary to include eligible private school children among the beneficiaries of the Act.
Since the Act was designed to be administered by local public education officials, a number of problems naturally arise in the delivery of services to eligible private school pupils. Under the administrative structure envisioned by the Act, the priihary responsibility for designing and effectuating a Title I program rests with what the Act and the implementing regulations describe as the “local educational agency.” This local agency submits to the “State educational agency” a proposed program designed to meet the special educational needs of educationally deprived children in school attendance areas with high concentrations of children from low-income families. The state agency then must approve the local plan and, in turn, forward the approved proposal to the United States Commissioner of Education, who has the ultimate responsibility for' administering the program and dispensing the appropriated and allocated funds. In order to receive state approval, the proposed plan, among other requirements, must be designed to provide the eligible private school students services that are “comparable in quality, scope, and opportunity for participation to those provided for public school children with needs of equally high priority.” United States Office of Education (USOE) Program Guide No. 44, ¶4.5 (1968), reproduced in Title I ESEA, Participation of Private School Children — A Handbook for State and Local School Officials, U. S. Dept, of Health, Education, and Welfare, Publication No. (OE) 72-62, p.. 41 (1971) (hereinafter referred to as the Handbook).
The questions that arise in this case concern the scope of the State’s duty to insure that a program submitted by a local agency under Title I provides “comparable” services for eligible private school children.
II
Plaintiff-respondents are parents of minor children attending elementary and secondary nonpublic schools in the inner city area of Kansas City, Missouri. They instituted this class action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri on behalf of themselves and their children, and others similarly situated, alleging that the defendant-petitioners, the then State Commissioner of Education and the members of the Missouri Board of Education, arbitrarily and illegally were approving Title I programs that deprived eligible nonpublic school children of services comparable to those offered eligible public school children. The complaint sought an injunction restraining continued violations of the Act and an accounting and restoration of some $13,000,000 in Title I funds allegedly misapplied from 1966 to 1969.
The District Court initially dismissed the complaint on the alternative grounds of failure to exhaust state remedies and abstention. The Court of Appeals reversed this dismissal and remanded the case for trial. 441 F. 2d 795 (CA8 1971). It observed: “[W]e indicate no opinion on the merits of the alleged noncompliance by the state officials.” Id., at 801.
On remand, the District Court found that while most of the Title I funds allocated to public schools in Missouri were used “to employ teachers to instruct in remedial subjects,” the petitioners had refused “to approve any applications allocating money for teachers in parochial schools during regular school hours.” Pet. for Cert. A40. The court did find that petitioners in some instances had approved the use of Title I money “to provide mobile educational services and equipment, visual aids, and educational radio and television in parochial schools. Teachers for after-school classes, weekend classes, and summer school classes, all open to parochial school pupils, have all been approved.” Id., at A40-A41.
In what perhaps may be described as something less than full cooperation by both sides, the possibility of providing “comparable” services was apparently frustrated by the fact that many parochial schools would accept only services in the form of assignment of federally funded Title I teachers to teach in those schools during regular school hours. At the same time, the petitioners refused to approve any program providing for on-the-premises instruction on the grounds that it was forbidden under both Missouri law and the First Amendment and, furthermore, that Title I did not require it. Since the larger portion (over 65%) of Title! funds allocated to Missouri has been used to provide personnel for remedial instruction, the effect of this stalemate is that substantially less money per pupil has been expended for eligible students in private schools, and that the services provided in those schools in no sense can be considered “comparable.”
Faced with this situation, the District Court recognized that “[t]his head-on conflict... has resulted in an undoubtedly inequitable expenditure of Title I funds between educationally deprived children in public and nonpublic schools in some local school districts in the state.” Id., at A41.
Nonetheless, the District Court denied relief. It reasoned that since the petitioners were under no statutory obligation to provide on-the-premises nonpublic school instruction, the failure to provide that instruction could not violate the Act. The court further reasoned that since the petitioners apparently had approved all programs “except those requesting salaried teachers in the nonpublic schools,” id., at A43, they had fulfilled their commitment. The court did not directly consider whether programs in effect without on-the-premises private school instruction complied with the comparability requirement despite gross disparity in the services delivered.
The Court of Appeals reversed. It traced the legislative history of Title I, examined the language of the statute and the regulations, and noted “that the Act and the regulations require a program for educationally deprived non-public school children that is comparable in quality, scope and opportunity, which may or may not necessarily be equal in dollar expenditures to that provided in the public schools.” 475 F. 2d, at 1344. The court then observed that the Act does not mandate that services take any particular form and that, within the confines of the comparability requirement, the Act left to the state and local agencies the task of designing a program best suited to meet the particularized needs of both the public school children and the nonpublic school children in the area. After reviewing the unique situation existing in Missouri, where funds were grossly malapportioned due to the refusal to employ either dual enrollment or Title I teachers on private school premises, the court concluded that the petitioners were in violation of the comparability requirement:
“Thus, we find that when the need of educationally disadvantaged children requires it, Title I authorizes special teaching services, as contemplated within the Act and regulations, to be furnished by the public agency on private as well as public school premises. In other words, we think it clear that the Act demands that if such special services are furnished public school children, then comparable programs, if needed, must be provided the disadvantaged private school child.” Id., at 1353.
In response to petitioners’ argument that Missouri law forbids sending public school teachers into private schools, the court held that the state constitutional provision barring use of “public” school funds in private schools had no application to Title I funds. The court reasoned that although the Act was generally to be accommodated to state law, the question whether Title I funds were “public,” within the meaning of the Missouri Constitution, must necessarily be decided by federal law. Id., at 1351— 1353. Finally, the court refused to pass on petitioners’ claim that the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment would be violated if Title I, in fact, does require or permit service by public school teachers on private school premises. The reason stated for the court’s refusal was that since no plan had yet been implemented, the court “must refrain from passing upon important constitutional questions on an abstract or hypothetical basis.” Id., at 1354.
The dissent argued that although Title I permits the assignment of Title I teachers to nonpublic schools, it does not mandate that assignment, and that if the Act is to be read as embracing such a mandate, it would present substantial First Amendment problems that could not be avoided. Id., at 1358-1359.
III
In this Court the parties are at odds over two issues: First, whether on this record Title I requires the assignment of publicly employed teachers to provide remedial instruction during regular school hours on the premises of private schools attended by Title I eligible students, and, second, whether that requirement, if it exists, contravenes the First Amendment. We conclude that we cannot reach and decide either issue at this stage of the proceedings.
A. Title I requirements. As the case was presented to the District Court, petitioners clearly had failed to meet their statutory commitment to provide comparable services to children in nonpublic schools. The services provided to the class of children represented by respondents were plainly inferior, both qualitatively and quantitatively, and the Court of Appeals was correct in ruling that the District Court erred in refusing to order relief. But the opinion of the Court of Appeals is not to be read to the effect that petitioners must submit and approve plans that employ the use of Title I teachers on private school premises during regular school hours.
The legislative history, the language of the Act, and the regulations clearly reveal the intent of Congress to place plenary responsibility in local and state agencies for the formulation of suitable programs under the Act. There was a pronounced aversion in Congress to “federalization” of local educational decisions.
“It is the intention of the proposed legislation not to prescribe the specific types of programs or projects that will be required in school districts. Rather, such matters are left to the discretion and judgment of the local public educational agencies since educational needs and requirements for strengthening educational opportunities for educationally deprived elementary and secondary school pupils will vary from State to State and district to district.” H. R. Rep. No. 143, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 5 (1965); S. Rep. No. 146, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 9 (1965).
And 20 U. S. C. § 1232a provides, inter alia:
“No provision of... the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965... shall be construed to authorize any department, agency, officer, or employee of the United States to exercise any direction, supervision, or control over the curriculum, program of instruction, administration, or personnel of any educational institution, school, or school system....”
Although this concern was directed primarily at the possibility of HEW’s assuming the role of a national school board, it has equal application to the possibility of a federal court’s playing an overly active role in supervising the manner of Title I expenditures.
At the outset, we believe that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that federal law governed the question whether on-the-premises private school instruction is permissible under Missouri law. Whatever the case might be if there were no expression of specific congressional intent, Title I evinces a clear intention that state constitutional spending proscriptions not be pre-empted as a condition of accepting federal funds. The key issue, namely, whether federal aid is money “donated to any state fund for public school purposes,” within the meaning of the Missouri Constitution, Art. 9, § 5, is purely a question of state and not federal law. By characterizing the problem as one involving “federal” and not “state” funds, and then concluding that federal law governs, the Court of Appeals, we feel, in effect nullified the Act’s policy of accommodating state law. The correct rule is that the “federal law” under Title I is to the effect that state law should not be disturbed. If it is determined, ultimately, that the petitioners’ position is a correct exposition of Missouri law, Title I requires, not that that law be preempted, but, rather, that it be accommodated by the use of services not proscribed under state law. The question whether Missouri law prohibits the use of Title I funds for on-the-premises private school instruction is still unresolved. See n. 9, supra.
Furthermore, in the present posture of this case, it was unnecessary for the federal court even to reach the issue whether on-the-premises parochial school instruction is permissible under state law. The state-law question appeared in the case by way of petitioners’ defense that it could not provide on-the-premises services because it was prohibited by the State’s Constitution. But, as is discussed more fully below, the State is not obligated by Title I to provide on-the-premises instruction. The mandate is to provide “comparable” services. Assuming, arguendo, that state law does prohibit on-the-premises instruction, this would not provide a defense to respondents’ complaint that comparable services are not being provided. The choice of programs is left to the State with the proviso that comparable (not identical) programs are also made available to eligible private school children. If one form of services to parochial school children is rendered unavailable because of state constitutional proscriptions, the solution is to employ an acceptable alternative form. In short, since the illegality under state law of on-the-premises instruction would not provide a defense to respondents’ charge of noncompliance with Title I, there was no reason for the Court of Appeals to reach this issue. By deciding that on-the-premises instruction was not barred by state law, the court in effect issued an advisory opinion. Even apart from traditional policies of abstention and comity, it was unnecessary to decide this question in the current posture of the case.
The Court of Appeals properly recognized, as we have noted, that petitioners failed to meet their broad obligation and commitment under the Act to provide comparable programs. “Comparable,” however, does not mean “identical,” and, contrary to the assertions of both sides, we do not read the Court of Appeals’ opinion or, for that matter, the Act itself, as ever requiring that identical services be provided in nonpublic schools. Congress recognized that the needs of educationally deprived children attending nonpublic schools might be different from those of similar children in public schools; it was also recognized that in some States certain programs for private and parochial schools would be legally impossible because of state constitutional restrictions, most notably in the church-state area. See n. 9, supra. Title I was not intended to override these individualized state restrictions. Rather, there was a clear intention that the assistance programs be designed on local levels so as to accommodate the restrictions.
Inasmuch as comparable, and not identical, services are required, the mere fact that public school children are provided on-the-premises Title I instruction does not necessarily create an obligation to make identical provision for private school children. Congress expressly-recognized that different and unique problems and needs might make it appropriate to utilize different programs in the private schools. A requirement of identity would run directly counter to this recognition. It was anticipated, to be sure, that one of the options open to the local agency in designing a suitable program for private school children was the provision of on-the-premises instruction, and on remand this is an option open to these petitioners and the local agency. If, however, petitioners choose not to pursue this method, or if it turns out that state law prevents its use, three broad options still remain:
First, the State may approve plans that do not utilize on-the-premises private school Title I instruction but, nonetheless, still measure up to the requirement of comparability. Respondents appear to be arguing here that it is impossible to provide “comparable” services if the public schools receive on-the-premises Title I instruction while private school children are reached in an alternative method. In support of their position, respondents argue: “The most effective type of services is that provided by a teacher or other specialist during regular school hours. There is nothing comparable to the services of personnel except the services of personnel.” Brief for Respondents 49. In essence, respondents are asking this Court to hold, as a matter of federal law, that one mode of delivering remedial Title I services is superior to others. To place on this Court, or on any federal court, the responsibility of ruling on the relative merits of various possible Title I programs seriously misreads the clear intent of Congress to leave decisions of that kind to the local and state agencies. It is unthinkable, both in terms of the legislative history and the basic structure of the federal judiciary, that the courts be given the function of measuring the comparative desirability of various pedagogical methods contemplated by the Act.
In light of the uncontested statutory proscription in Missouri against dual enrollment, it may well be a significant challenge to these petitioners and the local agencies in their State to devise plans that utilize on-the-premises public school instruction and, at the same time, forgo on-the-premises private school instruction. We cannot say, however, that this is an impossibility; by relying upon “the initiative of school administrators to develop a program that would meet the Federal [comparability] requirements,” Handbook 20, it may well be possible to develop and submit an acceptable plan under Title I.
Of course, the cooperation and assistance of the officials of the private school are obviously expected and required in order to design a program that is suitable for the private school. It is clear, however, that the Act places ultimate responsibility and control with the public agency, and the overall program is not to be defeated simply because the private school refuses to participate unless the aid is offered in the particular form it requests. The private school may refuse to participate if the local program does not meet with its approval. But the result of this would then be that the private school’s eligible children, the direct and intended beneficiaries of the Act, would lose. The Act, however, does not give the private school a veto power over the program selected by the local agency.
In sum, although it may be difficult, it is not impossible under the Act to devise and implement a legal local Title I program with comparable services despite the use of on-the-premises instruction in the public schools but not in the private schools. On the facts of this case, petitioners have been approving plans that do not meet this requirement, and certainly, if public school children continue to receive on-the-premises Title I instruction, petitioners should not approve plans that fail to make a genuine effort to employ comparable alternative programs that make up for the lack of on-the-premises instruction for the nonpublic school children. A program which provides instruction and equipment to the public school children and the same equipment but no instruction to the private school children cannot, on its face, be comparable. In order to equalize the level and quality of services offered, something must be substituted for the private school children. The alternatives are numerous. Providing nothing to fill the gap, however, is not among the acceptable alternatives.
Second, if the State is unwilling or unable to develop a plan which is comparable, while using Title I teachers in public but not in private schools, it may develop and submit an acceptable plan which eliminates the use of on-the-premises instruction in the public schools and, instead, resorts to other means, such as neutral sites or summer programs that are less likely to give rise to the gross disparity present in this case.
Third, and undoubtedly least attractive for the educationally deprived children, is nonparticipation in the program. Indeed, under the Act, the Commissioner, subject to judicial review, 20 U. S. C. § 241k, may refuse to provide funds if the State does not make a bona fide effort to formulate programs with comparable services. 20 U. S. C. § 241 j.
B. First Amendment. The second major issue is whether the Establishment Clause of the Pirst Amendment prohibits Missouri from sending public school teachers paid with Title I funds into parochial schools to teach remedial courses. The Court of Appeals declined to pass on this significant issue, noting that since no order had been entered requiring on-the-premises parochial school instruction, the matter was not ripe for review. We agree. As has been pointed out above, it is possible for the petitioners to comply with Title I without utilizing on-the-premises parochial school instruction. Moreover, even if, on remand, the state and local agencies do exercise their discretion in favor of such instruction, the range of possibilities is a broad one and the First Amendment implications -may vary according to the precise contours of the plan that is formulated. For example, a program whereby a former parochial school teacher is paid with Title I funds to teach full time in a parochial school undoubtedly would present quite different problems than if a public school teacher, solely under public control, is sent into a parochial school to teach special remedial courses a few hours a week. At this time we intimate no view as to the Establishment Clause effect of any particular program.
The task of deciding when the Establishment Clause is implicated in the context of parochial school aid has proved to be a delicate one for the Court. Usually it requires a careful evaluation of the facts of the particular case. See, e. g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1971), and Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 672 (1971). It would be wholly inappropriate for us to attempt to render an opinion on the First Amendment issue when no specific plan is before us. A federal court does not sit to render a decision on hypothetical facts, and the Court of Appeals was correct in so concluding.
The Court of Appeals disposed of the case as follows:
“The case is remanded to the district court with directions to enjoin the defendants from further violation of Title I of ESEA, and it is further ordered that the court retain continuing jurisdiction of the litigation for the purpose of requiring, within reasonable time limits, the imposition and application of guidelines which will comport with Title I and its regulations. Such guidelines must provide the lawful means and machinery for effectively assuring educationally disadvantaged non-public school children in Missouri participation in a meaningful program as contemplated within the Act which is comparable in size, scope and opportunity to that provided eligible public school children. Such guidelines shall be incorporated into an appropriate injunctive decree by the district court.” 475 F. 2d, at 1355-1356 (footnotes omitted).
We affirm this disposition with the understanding that petitioners will be given the opportunity to submit guidelines insuring that only those projects that comply with the Act’s requirements and this opinion will be approved and submitted to the Commission. It is also to be understood that the District Court’s function is not to decide which method is best, or to order that a specific form of service be provided. Rather, the District Court is simply to assure that the state and local agencies fulfill their part of the Title I contract if they choose to accept Title I funds. Cf. Lau v. Nichols, 414 U. S. 563 (1974). The comparability mandate is a broad one, and in order to implement the overriding concern with localized control of Title I programs, the District Court should make every effort to defer to the judgment of the petitioners and of the local agency. Under the Act, respondents are entitled to comparable services, and they are, therefore, entitled to relief. As we have stated repeatedly herein, they are not entitled to any particular form of service, and it is the role of the state and local agencies, and not of the federal courts, at least at this stage, to formulate a suitable plan.
On this basis, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
T..,, It is so ordered.
Mr. Justice Marshall concurs in the result.
"In recognition of the special educational needs of children of low-income families and the impact that concentrations of low-income families have on the ability of local educational agencies to support adequate educational programs, the Congress hereby declares it to be the policy of the United States to provide financial assistance (as set forth in the following parts of this subchapter) to local educational agencies serving areas with concentrations of children from low-income families to expand and improve their educational programs by various means (including preschool programs) which contribute particularly to meeting the special educational needs of educationally deprived children.” 20 U. S. C. §241a.
The implementing regulations, 45 CFR § 116.1, set forth a number of definitions, some in common with, and others in addition to, the definitions contained in the Act itself, 20 U. S. C. § 244. They draw no distinction between public and nonpublic school children. Specifically:
“ ‘Educationally deprived children’ means those children who have need for special educational assistance in order that their level of educational attainment may be raised to that appropriate for children of their age. The term includes children who are handicapped or whose needs for such special educational assistance result from poverty, neglect, delinquency, or cultural or linguistic isolation from the community at large.” 45 CFR § 116.1 (i).
In order for a local Title I proposal to be approved and a grant received, the local agency must give
“satisfactory assurance that the control of funds provided under this subchapter, and title to property derived therefrom, shall be in a public agency for the uses and purposes provided in this subchapter, and that a public agency will administer such funds and property.” 20 U. S. C. § 241e (a)(3).
“[T]he term 'local educational agency’ means a public board of education or other public authority legally constituted within a State for either administrative control or direction of, or to perform a service function for, public elementary or secondary schools in a city, county, township, school district, or other political subdivision of a State, or such combination of school districts or counties as are recognized in a State as an administrative agency for its public elementary or secondary schools. Such term includes any other public institution or agency having administrative control and direction of a public elementary or secondary school....” 20 U. S. C. § 244 (6) (B). See also 45 CFR § 116.1 (r).
“The term ‘State educational agency’ means the officer or agency primarily responsible for the State supervision of public elementary and secondary schools.” 20 U. S. C. § 244 (7). See also 45 CFR §116.1 (aa).
The regulations state:
“Each local education agency shall provide special educational services designed to meet the special educational needs of educationally deprived children residing in its district who are enrolled in private schools. Such educationally deprived children shall be provided genuine opportunities to participate therein consistent with the number of such educationally deprived children and the nature and extent of their educational deprivation.” 45 CFR § 116.19 (a).
“The needs of educationally deprived children enrolled in private schools, the number of such children who will participate in the program and the types of special educational services to be provided for them, shall be determined, after consultation with persons knowledgeable of the needs of these private school children, on a basis comparable to that used in providing for the participation in the program by educationally deprived children enrolled in public schools.” 45 CFR § 116.19 (b).
The Court of Appeals noted:
"The practice in Missouri as a whole in prior years has been to give comparable equipment, materials and supplies to eligible private school children, but to exclude any sharing whatsoever of personnel services. Most Title I public school programs in Missouri involve remedial reading, speech therapy and special mathematics classes, thus the largest proportion of the cost of these projects involves salaries for teachers and teacher aids. After the first two years of Title I, expenditures in Missouri for instructional personnel have run from 65 per cent to 70 per cent of the total grant. The remaining funds are used for equipment and materials, health and counseling services, transportation, and plant maintenance. One difficulty with providing only equipment and materials is that even minimal sharing of expenses for equipment and materials soon reaches a saturation point; in fact, the state guidelines permit only 15 per cent of any appropriation to be spent on equipment and instructional materials. The result of this plan for the deprived private school child has been to create a disparity in expenditures in many school districts ranging from approximately $10 to $85 approved for the educationally disadvantaged private school child to approximately $210 to $275 allocated for the deprived public school child.” 475 F. 2d 1338, 1345.
An informal survey conducted by the United States Office of Education revealed that Missouri was the only State which did not use either dual enrollment or on-the-premises private school instruction as a means of providing Title I services. Brief for Respondents 93-95.
The Missouri Constitution, Art. 9, § 5, provides:
“The proceeds of all certificates of indebtedness due the state school fund, and all moneys, bonds, lands, and other property belonging to or donated to any state fund for public school purposes, and the net proceeds of all sales of lands and other property and effects that may accrue to the state by escheat, shall be paid into the state treasury, and securely invested under the supervision of the state board of education, and sacredly preserved as a public school fund the annual income of which shall he faithfully appropriated for establishing and maintaining free public schools, and for no other uses or purposes whatsoever." (Emphasis supplied.)
The Constitution, Art. 9, §8, also provides:
“Neither the general assembly, nor any county, city, town, township, school district or other municipal corporation, shall ever make an appropriation or pay from any public fund whatever, anything in aid of any religious creed, church or sectarian purpose, or to help to support or sustain any private or public school, academy, seminary, college, university, or other institution of learning controlled by any religious creed, church or sectarian denomination whatever; nor shall any grant or donation of personal property or real estate ever be made by the state, or any county, city, town, or other municipal corporation, for any religious creed, church, or sectarian purpose whatever.”
Finally, the Constitution's Bill of Rights, Art. 1, §7, provides:
“That no money shall ever be taken from the public treasury, directly or indirectly, in aid of any church, sect or denomination of religion, or in aid of any priest, preacher, minister or teacher thereof, as such; and that no preference shall be given to nor any discrimination made against any church, sect or creed of religion, or any form of religious faith or worship.”
In Special District v. Wheeler, 408 S. W. 2d 60, 63 (1966), the Supreme Court of Missouri held that “the use of public school moneys to send speech teachers... into the parochial schools for speech therapy” was not a use “for the purpose of maintaining free public schools,” within the meaning of Art. 9, § 5, of the State’s Constitution, and therefore was a practice “unlawful and invalid.” That case did not involve federal funds.
The question in the present ease is whether Title I grants to the State are “donated... for public school purposes” and therefore subject to the proscription held to exist in Special District. After' that case was decided by the Missouri court, the State Board of Education promulgated a regulation governing the use of Title I funds in Missouri. It provides:
“ 'Special educational services and arrangements, including broadened instructional offerings made available to children in private schools, shall be provided at public facilities. Public school personnel shall not be made available in private facilities. This does not prevent the inclusion in a project of special educational arrangements to provide educational radio and television to students at private schools.’ ” See 475 F. 2d, at 1350.
In a formal opinion the Attorney General of Missouri has taken the opposing view, stating: “We do not believe that an appropriation of this type [Title I] converts federal aid into state aid, thereby making it subject to the Missouri constitutional provisions.” The opinion concludes:
“It is the opinion of this office that the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 provides that, under certain circumstances and to the extent necessary, public school personnel, paid with federal funds pursuant to this program, may be made available on the premises of private schools to provide certain special services to eligible children and that Missouri law would not prevent public school personnel, paid with federal funds, from providing these services on the premises of a private school.” Op. Atty. Gen. No. 26 (1970).
This rather fundamental intrastate legal rift apparently has resulted in the Missouri Attorney General’s nonappearance for the petitioners in the present litigation.
There is no Missouri case in point. Cf. State ex rel. School District of Hartington v. Nebraska State Board of Education, 188 Neb. 1, 195 N. W. 2d 161, cert. denied, 409 U. S. 921 (1972).
On remand from the Court of Appeals the District Court on May 9, 1973, entered an “Injunction and Judgment Issued in Compliance with Mandate” requiring use of Title I personnel on private school premises during regular school hours if such personnel are also used in public schools during regular school hours. Pet. for Cert. A45-A47. Petitioners appealed from that judgment, but the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal as moot after we granted certiorari. Our grant of certiorari was to review the judgment of the Court of Appeals entered pursuant to the opinion reported at 475 F. 2d 1338. The judgment of the District Court on remand is not presently before us.
The Act itself does not mention “comparability.” It requires only that the state agency, in approving a plan, must determine “that, to the extent consistent with the number of educationally deprived children in the school district of the local educational agency who are enrolled in private elementary and secondary schools, such agency has made provision for including special educational services and arrangements (such as dual enrollment, educational radio and television, and mobile educational services and equipment) in which such children can participate.” 20 U. S. C. § 241e (a) (2).
The regulations, 45 CFR §§116.19 (a) and (b), are the source of the comparability requirement. See n. 6, supra.
The ease from this Court primarily cited by the Court of Appeals for the proposition that federal, not state, law should govern, is United States v. 93.970 Acres of Land, 360 U. S. 328 (1959). There, however, this Court said:
“We have often held that where essential interests of the Federal Government are concerned, federal law rules unless Congress chooses to make state laws applicable. It is apparent that no such choice has been made here.” Id., at 332-333 (footnotes omitted).
In the present case, Congress, in fact, has made this choice, see n. 13, infra, and thus the cited ease is not controlling.
During the debates in the House, it was generally understood that state constitutional limitations were to be accommodated. For example, at one point Congressman Goodell raised the possibility that state law would preclude certain forms of services to nonpublic schools. The response
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | C | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Appellant sought to challenge the constitutionality of the Maryland motion picture censorship statute, Md. Ann. Code, 1957, Art. 66A, and exhibited the film “Revenge at Daybreak” at his Baltimore theatre without first submitting the picture to the State Board of Censors as required by § 2 thereof. The State concedes that the picture does not violate the statutory standards and would have received a license if properly submitted, but the appellant was convicted of a § 2 violation despite his contention that the statute in its entirety unconstitutionally impaired freedom of expression. The Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed, 233 Md. 498, 197 A. 2d 232, and we noted probable jurisdiction, 377 U. S. 987. We reverse.
I.
In Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U. S. 43, we considered and upheld a requirement of submission of motion pictures in advance of exhibition. The Court of Appeals held, on the authority of that decision, that “the Maryland censorship law must be held to be not void on its face as violative of the freedoms protected against State action by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.” 233 Md., at 505, 197 A. 2d, at 235. This reliance on Times Film was misplaced. The only question tendered for decision in that case was “whether a prior restraint was necessarily unconstitutional under all circumstances.” Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U. S. 58, 70, n. 10 (emphasis in original). The exhibitor’s argument that the requirement of submission without more amounted to a constitutionally prohibited prior restraint was interpreted by the Court in Times Film as a contention that the “constitutional protection includes complete and absolute freedom to exhibit, at least once, any and every kind of motion picture . . . even if this film contains the basest type of pornography, or incitement to riot, or forceful overthrow of orderly government . . . .” 365 U. S., at 46, 47. The Court held that on this “narrow” question, id., at 46, the argument stated the principle against prior restraints too broadly; citing a number of our decisions, the Court quoted the statement from Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, 716, that “the protection even as to previous restraint is not absolutely unlimited.” In rejecting the proffered proposition in Times Film the Court emphasized, however, .that “[i]t is that question alone which we decide,” 365 U. S., at 46, and it would therefore be inaccurate to say that Times Film upheld the specific features of the Chicago censorship ordinance.
Unlike the petitioner in Times Film, appellant does not argue that § 2 is unconstitutional simply because it may prevent even the first showing of a film whose exhibition may legitimately be the subject of an obscenity prosecution. He presents a question quite distinct from that passed on in Times Film; accepting the rule in Times Film, he argues that § 2 constitutes an invalid prior restraint because, in the context of the remainder of the statute, it presents a danger of unduly suppressing protected expression. He focuses particularly on the procedure for an initial decision by the censorship board, which, without any judicial participation, effectively bars exhibition of any disapproved film, unless and until the exhibitor undertakes a time-consuming appeal to the Maryland courts and succeeds in having the Board’s decision reversed. Under the statute, the exhibitor is required to submit the film to the Board for examination, but no time limit is imposed for completion of Board action, § 17. If the film is disapproved, or any elimination ordered, § 19 provides that
“the person submitting such film or view for examination will receive immediate notice of such elimination or disapproval, and if appealed from, such film or view will be promptly re-examined, in the presence of such person, by two or more members of the Board, and the same finally approved or disapproved promptly after such re-examination, with the right of appeal from the decision of the Board to the Baltimore City Court of Baltimore City. There shall be a further right of appeal from the decision of the Baltimore City Court to the Court of Appeals of Maryland, subject generally to the time and manner provided for taking appeal to the Court of Appeals.”
Thus there is no statutory provision for judicial participation in the procedure which bars a film, nor even assurance of prompt judicial review. Risk of delay is built into the Maryland procedure, as is borne out by experience; in the only reported case indicating the length of time required to complete an appeal, the initial judicial determination has taken four months and final vindication of the film on appellate review, six months. United Artists Corp. v. Maryland State Board of Censors, 210 Md. 586, 124 A. 2d 292.
In the light of the difference between the issues presented here and in Times Film, the Court of Appeals erred in saying that, since appellant’s refusal to submit the film to the Board was a violation only of § 2, “he has restricted himself to an attack on that section alone, and lacks standing to challenge any of the other provisions (or alleged shortcomings) of the statute.” 233 Md., at 505, 197 A. 2d, at 236. Appellant has not challenged the submission requirement in a vacuum but in a concrete statutory context. His contention is that § 2 effects an invalid prior restraint because the structure of the other provisions of the statute contributes to the infirmity of § 2; he does not assert that the other provisions are independently invalid.
In the area of freedom of expression it is well established that one has standing to challenge a statute on the ground that it delegates overly broad licensing discretion to an administrative office, whether or not his conduct could be proscribed by a properly drawn statute, and whether or not he applied for a license. “One who might have had a license for the asking may . . . call into question the whole scheme of licensing when he is prosecuted for failure to procure it.” Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 97; see Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U. S. 313, 319; Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558; Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516; Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S. 496; Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U. S. 444, 452-453. Standing is recognized in such cases because of the “. . . danger of tolerating, in the area of First Amendment freedoms, the existence of a penal statute susceptible of sweeping and improper application.” NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 433; see also Amsterdam, Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 67, 75-76, 80-81, 96-104 (1960). Although we have no occasion to decide whether the vice of overbroadness infects the Maryland statute, we think that appellant’s assertion of a similar danger in the Maryland apparatus of censorship — one always fraught with danger and viewed with suspicion— gives him standing to make that challenge. In substance his argument is that, because the apparatus operates in a statutory context in which judicial review may be too little and too late, the Maryland statute lacks sufficient safeguards for confining the censor’s action to judicially determined constitutional limits, and therefore contains the same vice as a statute delegating excessive administrative discretion.
II.
Although the Court has said that motion pictures are not “necessarily subject to the precise rules governing any other particular method of expression,” Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U. S. 495, 503, it is as true here as of other forms of expression that “[a]ny system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.” Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, supra, at 70. “. . . [U]nder the Fourteenth Amendment, a State is not free to adopt whatever procedures it pleases for dealing with obscenity . . . without regard to the possible consequences for constitutionally protected speech.” Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U. S. 717, 731. The administration of a censorship system for motion pictures presents peculiar dangers to constitutionally protected speech. Unlike a prosecution for obscenity, a censorship proceeding puts the initial burden on the exhibitor or distributor. Because the censor’s business is to censor, there inheres the danger that he may well be less responsive than a court— part of an independent branch of government — to the constitutionally protected interests in free expression. And if it is made unduly onerous, by reason of delay or otherwise, to seek judicial review, the censor’s determination may in practice be final.
Applying the settled rule of our cases, we hold that a noncriminal process which requires the prior submission of a film to a censor avoids constitutional infirmity only if it takes place under procedural safeguards designed to obviate the dangers of a censorship system. First, the burden of proving that the film is unprotected expression must rest on the censor. As we said in Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513, 526, “Where the transcendent value of speech is involved, due process certainly requires . . . that the State bear the burden of persuasion to show that the appellants engaged in criminal speech.” Second, while the State may require advance submission of all films, in order to proceed effectively to bar all showings of unprotected films, the requirement cannot be administered in a manner which would lend an effect of finality to the censor’s determination whether a film constitutes protected expression. The teaching of our cases is that, because only a judicial determination in an adversary proceeding ensures the necessary sensitivity to freedom of expression, only a procedure requiring a judicial determination suffices to impose a valid final restraint. See Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, supra; A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U. S. 205; Marcus v. Search Warrant, supra; Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U. S. 478, 518-519. To this end, the exhibitor must be assured, by statute or authoritative judicial construction, that the censor will, within a specified brief period, either issue a license or go to court to restrain showing the film. Any restraint imposed in advance of a final judicial determination on the merits must similarly be limited to preservation of the status quo for the shortest fixed period compatible with sound judicial resolution. Moreover, we are well aware that, even after expiration of a temporary restraint, an administrative refusal to license, signifying the censor’s view that the film is unprotected, may have a discouraging effect on the exhibitor. See Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, supra. Therefore, the procedure must also assure a prompt final judicial decision, to minimize the deterrent effect of an interim and possibly erroneous denial of a license.
Without these safeguards, it may prove too burdensome to seek review of the censor’s determination. Particularly in the case of motion pictures, it may take very little to deter exhibition in a given locality. The exhibitor’s stake in any one picture may be insufficient to warrant a protracted and onerous course of litigation. The distributor, on the other hand, may be equally unwilling to accept the burdens and delays of litigation in a particular area when, without such difficulties, he can freely exhibit his film in most of the rest of the country; for we are told that only four States and a handful of municipalities have active censorship laws.
It is readily apparent that the Maryland procedural scheme does not satisfy these criteria. First, once the censor disapproves the film, the exhibitor must assume the burden of instituting judicial proceedings and of persuading the courts that the film is protected expression. Second, once the Board has acted against a film, exhibition is prohibited pending judicial review, however protracted. Under the statute, appellant could have been convicted if he had shown the film after unsuccessfully seeking a license, even though no court had evér ruled on the obscenity of the film. Third, it is abundantly clear that the Maryland statute provides no assurance of prompt judicial determination. We hold, therefore, that appellant’s conviction must be reversed. The Maryland scheme fails to provide adequate safeguards against undue inhibition of protected expression, and this renders the § 2 requirement of prior submission of films to the Board an invalid previous restraint.
III.
How or whether Maryland is to incorporate the required procedural safeguards in the statutory scheme is, of course, for the State to decide. But a model is not lacking: In Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U. S. 436, we upheld a New York injunctive procedure designed to prevent the sale of obscene books. That procedure postpones any restraint against sale until a judicial determination of obscenity following notice and an adversary hearing. The statute provides for a hearing one day after joinder of issue; the judge must hand down his decision within two days after termination of the hearing. The New York procedure operates without prior submission to a censor, but the chilling effect of a censorship order, even one which requires judicial action for its enforcement, suggests all the more reason for expeditious determination of the question whether a particular film is constitutionally protected.
The requirement of prior submission to a censor sustained in Times Film is consistent with our recognition that films differ from other forms of expression. Similarly, we think that the nature of the motion picture industry may suggest different time limits for a judicial determination. It is common knowledge that films are scheduled well before actual exhibition, and the requirement of advance submission in § 2 recognizes this. One possible scheme would be to allow the exhibitor or distributor to submit his film early enough to ensure an orderly final disposition of the case before the scheduled exhibition date — far enough in advance so that the exhibitor could safely advertise the opening on a normal basis. Failing such a scheme or sufficiently early submission under such a scheme, the statute would have to require adjudication considerably more prompt than has been the case under the Maryland statute. Otherwise, litigation might be unduly expensive and protracted, or the victorious exhibitor might find the most propitious opportunity for exhibition past. We do not mean to lay down rigid time limits or procedures, but to suggest considerations in drafting legislation to accord with local exhibition practices, and in doing so to avoid the potentially chilling effect of the Maryland statute on protected expression.
D Reversed.
Md. Ann. Code, 1957, Art. 66A, §2:
“It shall be unlawful to sell, lease, lend, exhibit or use any motion picture film or view in the State of Maryland unless the said film or view has been submitted by the exchange, owner or lessee of the film or view and duly approved and licensed by the Maryland State Board of Censors, hereinafter in this article called the Board.”
Md. Ann. Code, 1957, Art. 66A, § 6:
“(a) Board to examine, approve or disapprove films — -The Board shall examine or supervise the examination of all films or views to be exhibited or used in the State of Maryland and shall approve and license such films or views which are moral and proper, and shall disapprove such as are obscene, or such as tend, in the judgment of the Board, to debase or corrupt morals or incite to crimes. All films exclusively portraying current events or pictorial news of the day, commonly called news reels, may be exhibited without examination and no license or fees shall be required therefor.
“(b) What films considered obscene. — For the purposes of this article, a motion picture film or view shall be considered to be obscene if, when considered as a whole, its calculated purpose or dominant effect is substantially to arouse sexual desires, and if the probability of this effect is so great as to outweigh whatever other merits the film may possess.
“(c) What films tend to debase or corrupt morals.- — For the purposes of this article, a motion picture film or view shall be considered to be of such a character that its exhibition would tend to debase or corrupt morals if its dominant purpose or effect is erotic or pornographic; or if it portrays acts of sexual immorality, lust or lewdness, or if it expressly or impliedly presents such acts as desirable, acceptable or proper patterns of behavior.
“(d) What films tend to incite to crime. — For the purposes of this article, a motion picture film or view shall be considered of such a character that its exhibition would tend to incite to crime if the theme or the manner of its presentation presents the commission of criminal acts or contempt for law as constituting profitable, desirable, acceptable, respectable or commonly accepted behavior, or if it advocates or teaches the use of, or the methods of use of, narcotics or habit-forming drugs.”
Appellant also challenges the constitutionality of § 6, establishing standards, as invalid for vagueness under the Due Process Clause; § 11, imposing fees for the inspection and licensing of a film, as constituting an invalid tax upon the exercise of freedom of speech; and § 23, allowing exemptions to various classes of exhibitors, as denying him the equal protection of the laws. In view of our result, we express no views upon these claims.
See Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 Law & Con-temp. Prob. 648, 666-659 (1955). This is well illustrated by the fact that the Maryland Court of Appeals has reversed the Board’s disapproval in every reported case. United Artists Corp. v. Maryland State Board of Censors, supra; Maryland State Board of Censors v. Times Film Corp., 212 Md. 454, 129 A. 2d 833; Fanfare Films, Inc. v. Motion Picture Censor Board, 234 Md. 10, 197 A. 2d 839.
An appendix to the brief amici curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union and its Maryland Branch lists New York, Virginia and Kansas as the three States having statutes similar to the Maryland statute, and the cities of Chicago, Detroit, Fort Worth and Providence as having similar ordinances. Twenty-eight of the remaining 39 municipal ordinances and codes are listed as “inactive.”
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | C | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Scalia
delivered the opinion of the Court.
We consider whether a disabled inmate in a state prison may sue the State for money damages under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA or Act), 104 Stat. 337, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 12131 et seq. (2000 ed. and Supp. II).
I
A
Title II of the ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” § 12132 (2000 ed.). A “‘qualified individual with a disability’” is defined as “an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the removal of architectural, communication, or transportation barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids and services, meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity.” §12131(2). The Act defines “‘public entity’” to include “any State or local government” and “any department, agency, ... or other instrumentality of a State,” §12131(1). We have previously held that this term includes state prisons. See Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U. S. 206, 210 (1998). Title II authorizes suits by private citizens for money damages against public entities that violate § 12132. See 42 U. S. C. § 12133 (incorporating by reference 29 U. S. C. § 794a).
In enacting the ADA, Congress “invoke[d] the sweep of congressional authority, including the power to enforce the fourteenth amendment . . . .” 42 U. S. C. § 12101(b)(4). Moreover, the Act provides that “[a] State shall not be immune under the eleventh amendment to the Constitution of the United States from an action in [a] Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction for a violation of this chapter.” § 12202. We have accepted this latter statement as an unequivocal expression of Congress’s intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity. See Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U. S. 356, 363-364 (2001).
B
Petitioner in No. 04-1236, Tony Goodman, is a paraplegic inmate in the Georgia prison system who, at all relevant times, was housed at the Georgia State Prison in Reidsville. After filing numerous administrative grievances in the state prison system, Goodman filed a pro se complaint in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia challenging the conditions of his confinement. He named as defendants the State of Georgia and the Georgia Department of Corrections (state defendants) and several individual prison officials. He brought claims under Rev. Stat. § 1979,42 U S. C. § 1983, Title II of the ADA, and other provisions not relevant here, seeking both injunctive relief and money damages against all defendants.
Goodman’s pro se complaint and subsequent filings in the District Court included many allegations, both grave and trivial, regarding the conditions of his confinement in the Reidsville prison. Among his more serious allegations, he claimed that he was confined for 23-to-24 hours per day in a 12-by-3-foot cell in which he could not turn his wheelchair around. He alleged that the lack of accessible facilities rendered him unable to use the toilet and shower without assistance, which was often denied. On multiple occasions, he asserted, he had injured himself in attempting to transfer from his wheelchair to the shower or toilet on his own, and, on several other occasions, he had been forced to sit in his own feces and urine while prison officials refused to assist him in cleaning up the waste. He also claimed that he had been denied physical therapy and medical treatment, and denied access to virtually all prison programs and services on account of his disability.
The District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation that the allegations in the complaint were vague and constituted insufficient notice pleading as to Goodman’s §1983 claims. It therefore dismissed the §1983 claims against all defendants without providing Goodman an opportunity to amend his complaint. The District Court also dismissed his Title II claims against all individual defendants. Later, after our decision in Garrett, the District Court granted summary judgment to the state defendants on Goodman’s Title II claims for money damages, holding that those claims were barred by state sovereign immunity.
Goodman appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. The United States, petitioner in No. 04-1203, intervened to defend the constitutionality of Title II’s abrogation of state sovereign immunity. The Eleventh Circuit determined that the District Court had erred in dismissing all of Goodman’s § 1983 claims, because Goodman’s multiple pro se filings in the District Court alleged facts sufficient to support “a limited number of Eighth-Amendment claims under § 1983” against certain individual defendants. App. A to Pet. for Cert, in No. 04-1236, p. 17a, judgt. order reported at 120 Fed. Appx. 785 (2004). The Court of Appeals held that the District Court should have given Goodman leave to amend his complaint to develop three Eighth Amendment claims relating to his conditions of confinement:
“First, Goodman alleges that he is not able to move his wheelchair in his cell. If Goodman is to be believed, this effectively amounts to some form of total restraint twenty-three to twenty-four hours-a-day without penal justification. Second, Goodman has alleged several instances in which he was forced to sit in his own bodily waste because prison officials refused to provide assistance. Third, Goodman has alleged sufficient conduct to proceed with a § 1983 claim based on the prison staff’s supposed ‘deliberate indifference’ to his serious medical condition of being partially paraplegic ....” App. A to Pet. for Cert, in No. 04-1236, pp. 18a-19a (citation and footnote omitted).
The court remanded the suit to the District Court to permit Goodman to amend his complaint, while cautioning Goodman not to reassert all the §1983 claims included in his initial complaint, “some of which [we]re obviously frivolous.” Id., at 18a.
The Eleventh Circuit did not address the sufficiency of Goodman’s allegations under Title II. Instead, relying on its prior decision in Miller v. King, 384 F. 3d 1248 (2004), the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s holding that Goodman’s Title II claims for money damages against the State were barred by sovereign immunity. We granted certiorari to consider whether Title II of the ADA validly abrogates state sovereign immunity with respect to the claims at issue here. 544 U. S. 1031 (2005).
II
In reversing the dismissal of Goodman’s § 1983 claims, the Eleventh Circuit held that Goodman had alleged actual violations of the Eighth Amendment by state agents on the grounds set forth above. See App. A to Pet. for Cert, in No. 04-1236, pp. 18a-19a. The State does not contest this holding, see Brief for Respondents 41-44, and we did not grant certiorari to consider the merits of Goodman’s Eighth Amendment claims; we assume without deciding, therefore, that the Eleventh Circuit’s treatment of these claims was correct. Moreover, Goodman urges, and the State does not dispute, that this same conduct that violated the Eighth Amendment also violated Title II of the ADA. See Brief for Petitioner in No. 04-1236, p. 46; Brief for Respondents 41-44. In fact, it is quite plausible that the alleged deliberate refusal of prison officials to accommodate Goodman’s disability-related needs in such fundamentals as mobility, hygiene, medical care, and virtually all other prison programs constituted “exclusion] from participation in or . . . deni[al of] the benefits of” the prison’s “services, programs, or activities.” 42 U. S. C. § 12132; see also Yeskey, 524 U. S., at 210 (noting that the phrase “services, programs, or activities” in § 12132 includes recreational, medical, educational, and vocational prison programs). Therefore, Goodman’s claims for money damages against the State under Title II were evidently based, at least in large part, on conduct that independently violated the provisions of § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U. S. 459, 463 (1947) (plurality opinion) (the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Eighth Amendment’s guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment). In this respect, Goodman differs from the claimants in our other cases addressing Congress’s ability to abrogate sovereign immunity pursuant to its § 5 powers. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U. S. 509, 543, n. 4 (2004) (Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting) (respondents were not actually denied constitutional rights); Nevada Dept, of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U. S. 721, 752, 755 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (Nevada provided family leave “on a gender-neutral basis”— “a practice which no one contends suffers from a constitutional infirmity”); Garrett, 531 U. S., at 362, 367-368 (failure to make the special accommodations requested by disabled respondents was not unconstitutional); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U. S. 62, 69-70, 83-84 (2000) (most petitioners raised nonconstitutional disparate-impact challenges to the State’s age-related policies); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank, 527 U. S. 627, 643-644, and n. 9 (1999) (Florida satisfied due process by providing remedies for patent infringement by state actors); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U. S. 507, 512 (1997) (church building permit denied under neutral law of general applicability).
While the Members of this Court have disagreed regarding the scope of Congress’s “prophylactic” enforcement powers under §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, see, e. g., Lane, 541 U. S., at 513 (majority opinion of Stevens, J.); id., at 538 (Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting); id., at 554 (Scalia, J., dissenting), no one doubts that §5 grants Congress the power to “enforce ... the provisions” of the Amendment by creating private remedies against the States for actual violations of those provisions. “Section 5 authorizes Congress to create a cause of action through which the citizen may vindicate his Fourteenth Amendment rights.” Id., at 559-560 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing the Ku Klux Klan Act of April 20, 1871, 17 Stat. 13); see also Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445, 456 (1976) (“In [§ 5] Congress is expressly granted authority to enforce . . . the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment” by providing actions for money damages against the States (emphasis added)); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339, 346 (1880) (“The prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment are directed to the States .... It is these which Congress is empowered to enforce . . . ”). This enforcement power includes the power to abrogate state sovereign immunity by authorizing private suits for damages against the States. See Fitzpatrick, supra, at 456. Thus, insofar as Title II creates a private cause of action for damages against the States for conduct that actually violates the Fourteenth Amendment, Title II validly abrogates state sovereign immunity. The Eleventh Circuit erred in dismissing those of Goodman’s Title II claims that were based on such unconstitutional conduct.
From the many allegations in Goodman’s pro se complaint and his subsequent filings in the District Court, it is not clear precisely what conduct he intended to allege in support of his Title II claims. Because the Eleventh Circuit did not address the issue, it is likewise unclear to what extent the conduct underlying Goodman’s constitutional claims also violated Title II. Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit ordered that the suit be remanded to the District Court to permit Goodman to amend his complaint, but instructed him to revise his factual allegations to exclude his “frivolous” claims — some of which are quite far afield from actual constitutional violations (under either the Eighth Amendment or some other constitutional provision), or even from Title II violations. See, e. g., App. 50 (demanding a “steam table” for Goodman’s housing unit). It is therefore unclear whether Goodman’s amended complaint will assert Title II claims premised on conduct that does not independently violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Once Goodman’s complaint is amended, the lower courts will be best situated to determine in the first instance, on a claim-by-elaim basis, (1) which aspects of the State’s alleged conduct violated Title II; (2) to what extent such misconduct also violated the Fourteenth Amendment; and (3) insofar as such misconduct violated Title II but did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, whether Congress’s purported abrogation of sovereign immunity as to that class of conduct is nevertheless valid.
* * *
The judgment of the Eleventh Circuit is reversed, and the suit is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | J | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mb. Justice Harlan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U. S. 236 (1959), established the general principle that the National Labor Relations Act pre-empts state and federal court jurisdiction to remedy conduct that is arguably protected or prohibited by the Act. That decision represents the watershed in this Court’s continuing effort to mark the extent to which the maintenance of a general federal law of labor relations combined with a centralized administrative agency to implement its provisions necessarily supplants the operation of the more traditional legal processes in this field. We granted certiorari in this case, 397 U. S. 1006 (1970), because the divided decision of the Idaho Supreme Court demonstrated the need for this Court to provide a fuller explication of the premises upon which Garmon rests and to consider the extent to which that decision must be taken to have modified or superseded' this Court’s earlier efforts to treat with the knotty pre-emption problem.
I
Respondent, Wilson P. Lockridge, has obtained in the Idaho courts a judgment for $32,678.56 against peti-. tioners, Northwest Division 1055 of the Amalgamated Association of Street, Electric Railway and Motor Coach Employees of America and its parent international association, on the grounds that, in procuring Lockridge’s discharge from employment, pursuant to a valid union security clause in the applicable collective-bargaining agreement, the Union breached a contractual obligation embodied in the Union’s constitution and bylaws.
From May 1943 until November 2, 1959, Lockridge was a member of petitioner Union and employed within the State of Idaho as a bus driver for Western Greyhound Lines, or its predecessor. At the time of Lockridge’s dismissal from the Union, § 3 (a) of the collective-bargaining agreement in effect between the Union and Greyhound provided:
“All present employees covered by this contract shall become members of the ASSOCIATION [Union] not later than thirty (30) days following its effective date and shall remain members as a condition precedent to continued employment. This section shall apply to newly hired employees thirty (30) days from the date of their employment with the COMPANY.” App. 88.
In addition, § 91 of the Union’s Constitution and General Laws provided, in pertinent part, that:
“All dues... of the members of this Association are due and-payable on the first day of each month for that month.... They must be paid by the fifteenth of the month in order to continue the member in good standing.... A member in arrears for his dues... after the fifteenth day of the month is not in good standing... and where a member allows his arrearage... to run into the second month before paying the same, he shall be debarred from benefits for one month after payment. Where a member allows his arrearage... to run over the last day of the second month without payment, he does thereby suspend himself from membership in this Association. Where agreements with employing companies provide that members must be in continuous good financial standing, the member in arrears one month may be suspended from membership and removed from employment, in compliance with the terms of the agreement.” App. 91-92.
Prior to September 1959, Lockridge’s dues had been deducted from his paycheck, by Greyhound, pursuant to a checkoff arrangement. During that year, however, Lockridge and a few other employees were released at their request from the checkoff, and thereby became obligated to pay their dues directly to the Union’s office in Portland, Oregon. On November 2, 1959, C. A. Bank-head, the treasurer and financial secretary of the union local, suspénded Lockridge from membership on the sole ground that since respondent had not yet paid his October dues he was therefore in arrears contrary to § 91. Bank-head simultaneously notified Greyhound of this determination and requested that Lockridge be removed from employment. Greyhound promptly complied. Lock-ridge’s wife received notice, of the suspension from membership in early November, while her husband was on vacation, and on November 10, 1959, tendered Bankhead a check to cover respondent’s dues for October and November, which Bankhead refused to accept.
This chain of events, combined with the disparity between the above-quoted terms of the collective-bargaining agreement and the union constitution and general laws, generated this lawsuit. Lockridge has contended, and the Idaho courts have so held, that because he was less than two months behind in his payment of dues, respondent had not yet “suspended himself from membership” within the meaning of the Union’s rules, but instead had merely ceased to be a “member in good standing.” And, because the collective-bargaining agreement required only that employees “remain members,” those courts held that neither that agreement nor the final sentence of § 91 justified the Union’s action in procuring Lockridge’s discharge. Therefore, the Idaho courts have held, Lockridge’s dismissal violated a promise, implied in law, that the Union would not seek termination of his employment unless he was sufficiently derelict in his dues payments to subject him to loss of his job under the terms of the applicable collective-bargaining agreement.
Although the trial court made no formal findings of fact on this score, it appears likely that the Union procured Lockridge’s dismissal in the mistaken belief that the applicable union security agreement with Greyhound did, in fact, require employees to remain members in good standing and that the Union insisted on what it thought was a technically valid position because it was piqued by Lockridge’s obtaining his release from the checkoff. The trial court did find specifically that “almost without, exception” it had been the past practice of this local division of the Union merely to suspend delinquent members from service, rather than to strip them of membership, and to put them back to work without loss, of seniority when their dues were paid.
Lockridge initially made some efforts, with Bankhead’s assistance, to obtain reinstatement in the Union but these proved unsuccessful.. No charges were filed before the National Labor Relations Board. Instead, Lockridge filed suit in September 1960 in the Idaho State District Court against the Union and Greyhound, which was later dropped as a party. That court, on the Union’s motion, dismissed the complaint in April 1961 on the grounds that it charged the Union with the commission of an unfair labor practice and consequently fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB. A year later, the Idaho Supreme Court reversed, holding that the state courts had jurisdiction under this Court’s decision in Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U. S. 617 (1958), and remanded for trial' on the merits. Lockridge v. Amalgamated Assn. of St., El. Ry. & M. C. Emp., 84 Idaho 201, 369 P. 2d 1006 (1962).
In 1965 Lockridge filed a second amended complaint which has since served as the basis for this lawsuit. Its first count alleged that
“in suspending plaintiff from membership in the [Union] which resulted in plaintiff’s loss of employment, the [Union]... acted wantonly, wilfully and wrongfully and without just cause, and... deprived plaintiff of his... employment with Greyhound Corporation that accrued to him and would accrue to him by reason of his employment, seniority and experience, and plaintiff has been harassed and subject to mental anguish....” App. 46-47.
Count Two, sounding squarely in contract, alleged that
“in wrongfully suspending plaintiff from membership in the [Union], which resulted in plaintiff’s discharge from employment with the Greyhound Corporation, the [Union]... acted wrongfully, wantonly, wilfully and maliciously and without just cause and violated the constitution and general laws of the [Union] which constituted a contract between the plaintiff as a member thereof and the [Union], and as a result of said breach of contract plaintiff has been deprived of his... employment with.. ; Greyhound Corporation... and plaintiff has been embarrassed and subjected to mental anguish....” App. 48.
The complaint sought damages in the amount of $212,000 “and such other and further relief as to the court may appear meet and equitable in the premises.” Ibid.
After trial, the Idaho District Court found the facts as stated above and held that they did, indeed, amount to a breach of contract. The court felt itself bound by the prior determination of the Idaho Supreme Court to consider that it might properly exercise jurisdiction.over the controversy and to “decide [the] case on the theories of” Machinists v. Gonzales, supra. Consequently, the trial judge concluded that Lockridge was entitled to a decree restoring him to membership in the Union, “although plaintiff has never sought such remedy.” Lock-ridge was also awarded $32,678.56 as compensation for wages actually lost due to his dismissal from Greyhound’s employ, but his requests for future damages arising from continued loss of employment, compensation for loss of. seniority or fringe benefits, and punitive damages were all denied. On appeal the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed, over one dissenting vote, except that it also ordered restoration of respondent’s seniority rights. 93 Idaho 294, 460 P. 2d 719 (1969). Having granted certiorari for the reasons stated at the outset of this opinion, we now reverse.
II
A.
On the surface, this might appear to be a routine and simple case. Section 8 (b) (2) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 61 Stat. 141, 29 U. S. C. § 158 (b)(2), makes it an unfair labor practice for a union
“to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee in violation of subsection (a)(3)... or to discriminate against an employee with respect to wThom membership in such organization has been denied or terminated on some ground other than his failure to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly r'equired as a' condition, of acquiring or retaining'membership.”
Section 8 (b)(1)(A), 29 U. S. C. § 158 (b)(1)(A), makes it an unfair labor practice for a union “to restrain or.qoerce... employees in the exercise of the rights-guar-anteed in. section 7,” which includes the right not only* “to form, join, or assist labor organizations” but also “the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 8 (a) (3).” 61 Stat. 140, 29 U. S. C. § 157. Section 8 (a) (3) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer
“by discrimination in regard.to hire or tenure of employment... to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization: Provided, That nothing in this Act... shall preclude an employer from making an agreement with a labor organization... to require as a condition of employment membership therein on or after the thirtieth day following the beginning of such employment or the effective date-of such agreement, whichever is the later... : Provided further, That no employer shall justify any discrimination against an employee for nonmémbership in a labor organization... if he has reasonable grounds for believing that membership was denied or terminated for reasons other than the failure of the employee to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership....” 29 U. S. C. § 158 (a)(3).
Further, in San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U. S., at 245, we held that the National Labor Relations Act pre-empts the jurisdiction of state and federal courts to regulate conduct “arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the Act.” On their face, the above-quoted provisions of the Act at least arguably either permit or forbid' the.union conduct dealt with by the judgment below. For the evident thrust of this aspect of the federal statutory scheme is to permit the enforcement of union security clauses, by dismissal from employment, only for failure to pay dues. Whatever other sanctions may be employed to exact compliance with those internal union rules unrelated to dues payment, the Act seems generally to exclude dismissal from employment. See Radio Officers’ Union v. NLRB, 347 U. S. 17 (1954). Indeed, in the course of rejecting petitioner’s pre-emption argument, the Idaho Supreme Court stated that, in its opinion, the Union “did most certainly -violate 8 (b)(1)(A), did most certainly violate 8 (b) (2)... and probably caused the employer to violate 8 (a) (3).” 93 Idaho, at 299, 460 P. 2d, at 724. Thus, given the broad pre-emption principle enunciated in Garmon, the want of state court power to resolve Lockridge’s complaint might well seem to follow as a matter of course.
The Idaho Supreme Court, however, concluded that it nevertheless possessed jurisdiction in these eimumstances: That determination, as we understand it, rested upon three separate propositions, all of which are urged here by respondent. The first is that the Union’s conduct was not only, an unfair labor practice, but a breach of its contract with Lockridge as well. “Pre-emption is not established simply by showing that the same-facts will sustain two different legal wrongs.” 93 Idaho, at 300, 460 P. 2d, at 725. In other words Garmon, the state court and respondent assert, states a principle applicable only where the state law invoked is designed specifically to regulate labor relations; it has no force where the State applies its general common law of contracts to resolve disputes between a union and its members. Secondly, it is urged that the facts that might be shown to vindicate Lockridge’s claim in the Idaho state courts differ from those relevant to proceedings governed by the National Labor Relations Act. It is said that the conduct regulated by the Act is union and employer discrimination; general contract law takes into account only the correctness of competing interpretations of the language embodied in agreements. 93 Idaho, at 303-304, 460 P. 2d, at 728-729. Finally, there recurs throughout, the state court opinion, and the arguments-of respondent here, the theme that the facts of the instant case render it virtually indistinguishable from Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U. S. 617 (1958), where this Court upheld the exercise of state court jurisdiction in an opinion written only one Term prior to Garmon, by the author of Garmon and which was approvingly cited in the Garmon opinion itself.
We do not believe that any of these arguments suffice to overcome the plain purport of Garmon as applied to the facts of this case. However, we have determined to treat these considerations at some length because of the understandable confusion, perhaps in a measure attributable to the previous opinions of this Court, they reflect over the jurisprudential bases upon which the Garmon doctrine rests.
B
The constitutional principles of pre-emption, in whatever particular field of law they operate, are designed with a common end in view: to avoid conflicting regulation of conduct by various official- bodies which might have some authority over the subject matter. A full understanding of the particular pre-emption rule set forth in Garmon especially requires, we think, appreciation of the precise nature and extent of the potential for injurious conflict that would inhere in a system unaffected by- such a doctrine, and also the setting in which the general problem of accommodating conflicting claims of competence to resolve disputes touching upon labor relations has been presented to this Court.
The course of events that eventuated in the enactment of a comprehensive national labor law, entrusted for its administration and development to a centralized, expert agency, as well as the very fact of that enactment itself, reveals that a primary factor in this development was the perceived incapacity of common-law courts and state legislatures, acting alone, to provide an informed and coherent basis for ■ stabilizing labor relations conflict and for equitably and delicately structuring the balance of power among competing forces so as to further the common good. The principle of pre-emption that informs our general national labor law was born of this Court’s efforts, without the aid of explicit congressional guidance, to delimit state and federal judicial authority over labor disputes in order to preclude, so far as reasonably possible, conflict between the exertion of judicial and administrative power in the attainment of the multifaceted policies underlying the federal scheme.
As it appears to us, nothing could serve more fully to defeat the congressional goals underlying the Act than to subject,-without, limitation, the relationships it seeks to create to the concurrent jurisdiction of state and fed-'eral courts free to apply the general local law. Nor would an approach suffice that sought merely to avoid disparity in the content, of proscriptive behavioral rules. As the Court observed in Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U. S. 485, 490-491 (1953), Congress in establishing overriding federal supervision of labor law
“did not merely lay down a substantive rulé of law.to be enforced by any tribunal competent to apply law generally to the parties. It went on to confide primary interpretation and application of its rules to a specific and specially constituted tribunal and prescribed a particular procedure for investigation, complaint and notice, and hearing and decision.... Congress evidently considered that centralized administration of specially designed procedures was necessary to obtain uniform application of its substantive rules and to avoid these diversities and conflicts likely to result from a variety of local procedures and attitudes toward labor controversies.... A multiplicity of tribunals and a diversity of procedures are quite as apt to produce incompatible or conflicting adjudications as are different rules of substantive law.”
Conflict in technique can be fully as disruptive to the system Congress erected as conflict in overt policy. As the passage from Garner indicates, in matters of dispute concerning labor relations a simple recitation of the formally prescribed rights and duties of the parties constitutes an inadequate description of the actual process for setfclément Congress has provided. The technique of administration and the range and nature of those remedies that are and are not available is a fundamental part and parcel of the operative legal system established by the National Labor Relations Act. “Administration is more than a means of regulation; administration is regulation. We have been concerned with conflict in its broadest sense; conflict with a complex and interrelated federal scheme of law, remedy, and administration.” Garmon, 359 U. S., at 243.
The rationale for pre-emption, then, rests in large measure upon our determination that when it set down a federal labor policy Congress plainly meant to do more than simply to alter the then-prevailing substantive law. It sought as well to restructure fundamentally the processes for effectuating that policy, deliberately placing the responsibility for applying and'developing this comprehensive legal system in the hands of an expert administrative body rather than the federalized judicial system. Thus, that a local court, while adjudicating a labor dispute also within the jurisdiction of the NLRB, may purport to apply legal rules identical to those prescribed in the federal Act or may eschew the authority to define or apply principles specifically developed to regulate labor relations does not mean that all relevant potential for debilitating conflict is absent.
A second factor that has played an important role in our shaping of the pre-emption doctrine has been the necessity to act without specific congressional direction. The precise extent to which state law must be displaced to achieve those unifying ends sought by the national legislature has never been determined by the Congress. This has, quite frankly, left the Court with few available options. We cannot declare pre-empted all local regulation that touches or concerns in any way the complex interrelationships between employees, employers, and unions; obviously, much of this is left to the States. Nor can we proceed on a case-by-case basis to determine whether each particular final judicial pronouncement does, or might reasonably be thought to, conflict in some relevant manner with federal labor policy. This Court is ill-equipped to play such a role and the federal system dictates that this problem be solved with a rule capable of relatively easy application, so that lower courts may largely police' themselves in this regard. Equally important, such a principle would fail to take account of the fact, as discussed above, that simple congruity of legal rules does not, in this area, prove the absence of untenable conflict. Further, it is surely not possible for this Court to treat the National Labor Relations Act section by section, committing enforcement of some of its provisions wholly to the NLRB and others to the concurrent domain of local law. Nothing in the language or underlying purposes of the Act suggests any basis for such distinctions. Finally, treating differently judicial power to deal with conduct protected by the Act from that prohibited by it would likewise be unsatisfactory. Both areas equally involve conduct whose legality is governed by federal law, the application of which Congress committed to the Board, not courts.
This is not to say, however, that these inherent limitations on this Court’s ability to state a workable rule that comports reasonably with apparent congressional objectives are necessarily self-evident. In fact, varying approaches were taken by the Court in initially grappling with this pre-emption problem. Thus, for example, some early cases suggested the true distinction lay between judicial application of general common law, which was permissible, as opposed to state rules specifically designed to regulate labor relations, which were pre-empted. See, e. g., Automobile Workers v. Russell, 356 U. S. 634, 645 (1958). Others made pre-emption turn on whether the States purported to apply a remedy not provided for by the federal scheme, e. g., Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U. S. 468, 479-480 (1955), while in still others the Court undertook a thorough scrutiny of the federal Act to ascertain whether the state courts had, in fact, arrived at conclusions inconsistent with its provisions, e. g., Automobile Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U. S. 245 (1949). For the reasons outlined above none of these approaches proved satisfactory, however, and each was ultimately abandoned. It was, in short, experience — not pure logic — which initially taught that each of these methods sacrificed important federal interests in a uniform law of' labor relations centrally administered by an expert.agency without yielding anything in return by way of predictability or ease of judicial application.
The failure of alternative analyses and the interplay of the foregoing policy considerations, then, led this Court to hold in Garmon, 359 U. S., at 244:
“When it is clear or may fairly be assumed that the activities which a State purports to regulate are protected by § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, or constitute an unfair labor practice under § 8, due regard for the federal enactment requires that state jurisdiction.must yield. To leave the States free to regulate conduct so plainly within the central aim of federal regulation involves too great a danger of conflict between power asserted by Congress and requirements imposed by state law.” '
C
Upon these premises, we think that Garmon rather clearly. dictates reversal of the judgment below. None of the propositions asserted to support that judgment can withstand an application, in light of those factors that compelled its promulgation, of the Garmon rule.
Assuredly the proposition that Lockridge’s complaint was not subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB because, it charged a breach of contract rather than an unfair labor practice is not tenable. Pre-emption, as shown above, is designed to shield the system from conflicting regulation of conduct. It is the conduct being regulated, not the formal description of governing legal standards, that is the proper focus of concern. Indeed, the notion that a relevant distinction exists for such purposes between particularized and generalized labor law was explicitly rejected in Garmon itself. 359 U. S., at 244.
The second argument, closely related to the first, is that the state courts, in resolving this controversy, did deal with different conduct, i. e., interpretation of contractual terms, than would the NLRB which would be required to decide whether the Union discriminated against Lockridge. At bottom, of course, the Union’s action in procuring Lockridge’s dismissal from employment is the conduct which Idaho courts have sought to regulate. Thus, this second point demonstrates at best that Idaho defines differently what sorts of such union conduct may permissibly be proscribed. This is to say either that the regulatory schemes, state and federal, conflict (in which case pre-emption is clearly called for) or that Idaho is dealing with conduct to which the federal Act does not speak. If the latter assertion was intended, it is not accurate.. As pointed out in Part II-A, supra, the relevant portions of the Act operate to prohibit a union from causing or attempting to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee because his membership in the union has been terminated “on some ground other than” his failure to pay those dues requisite to membership. This has led the Board routinely and frequently to inquire into the proper construction of union regulations in order to ascertain whether the union properly found an employee to have been derelict in his dues-paying responsibilities, where his discharge was procured on the asserted grounds of nonmembership in the union. See, e. g., NLRB v. Allied Independent Union, 238 F. 2d 120 (CA7 1956); NLRB v. Leece-Neville Co., 330 F. 2d 242 (CA6 1964); Communications Workers v. NLRB, 215 F. 2d 835 (CA2 1954); NLRB v. Spector Freight System, Inc., 273 F. 2d 272 (CA8 1960). See generally 3 CCH Lab. L. Rep. ¶ 4525 (Labor Relations). That a union may in good faith have misconstrued its own rules has not been treated by the Board as a defense to a claimed violation of § 8 (b)(2). In the Board's view, it is the fact of misapplication by a union of its rules, not the motivation for that discrimination, that constitutes an unfair labor practice. See, in addition to the authorities cited above, Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers v. NLRB, 113 U. S. App. D. C. 342, 347, 307 F. 2d 679, 684 (1962), and Teamsters Local v. NLRB, 365 U. S. 667, 681 (1961) (concurring opinion).
From the foregoing, then, it would seem that this case indeed represents one of the clearest instances where the Garmon principle, properly understood, should operate to oust state court jurisdiction. There being no doubt that the conduct here involved was arguably protected by § 7 or prohibited by § 8 of the Act, the full range of very substantial interests the pre-emption doctrine seeks to protect is directly implicated here.
However, a final strand of analysis underlies the opinion of the Idaho Supreme Court, and the position of respondent, in this case. Our decision in Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U. S. 617 (1958), it is argued, fully survived the subsequent reorientation of pre-emption doctrine effected by the Garmon decision, providing, in effect, an express exception for the exercise of judicial jurisdiction in cases such as this.
The fact situation in Gonzales does resemble in some relevant regards that of the instant case. There the California courts had entertained a complaint by an individual union member claiming he had been expelled from his union in violation of rights conferred upon him by the union’s constitution and bylaws, which allegedly constituted a contract between him and his union. Gonzales prevailed on his breach-of-contract theory and was awarded damages for wages lost due to the revocation of membership as well as a decree providing for his reinstatement in the union. This Court confirmed the California courts’ power to award the monetary damages, the only aspect of the action below challenged in this Court. The primary rationale for the result reached was that California should be competent to “fill out,” 356 U. S., at 620, the reinstatement remedy by utilizing “the comprehensive relief of equity,” id., at 621, which the Board did not fully possess. Secondarily, it was said that the lawsuit “did not purport to remedy or regulate union conduct on the ground that it was designed to bring about employer discrimination against an employee, the evil the Board is concerned to strike at as an unfair labor practice under §8 (b)(2).” Id., at 622.
Although it was decided only one Term subsequent to Gonzales, Garmon clearly did not fully embrace the technique of the prior case. It was precisely the realization that disparities in remedies and administration could produce substantial conflict, in the practical sense of the term, between the relevant state and federal regulatory schemes and that this Court could not effectively and responsibly superintend on a case-by-case basis the exertion of state power over matters arguably governed by the National Labor Relations Act that impelled the somewhat broader formulation of the pre-emption doctrine in Garmon. It seems evident that the full-blown rationale of Gonzales could not survive the rule of Garmon. Nevertheless, Garmon did not cast doubt upon the result reached in Gonzales, but cited it approvingly as an example of the fact that state court jurisdiction is not preempted “where the activity regulated was a merely peripheral concern of the... Act.” 359 U. S., at 243.
Against this background, we attempted to define more precisely the reach of Gonzales within the more comprehensive framework Garmon provided in the companion cases of Plumbers’ Union v. Borden, 373 U. S. 690 (1963), and Iron Workers v. Perko, 373 U. S. 701 (1963).
Borden had sued his union in state courts, alleging that the union had arbitrarily refused to refer him to a particular job which he had lined up.- He recovered damages, based on lost wages, on the grounds that this conduct constituted both tortious interference with his right to contract for employment and a breach of promise, implicit in his membership arrangement with the union, not to discriminate unfairly against any member or deny him the right to work. Perko had obtained a large money judgment in the Ohio courts on proof that the union had conspired, without cause, to deprive him of employment as a foreman by demanding his discharge from one such position he had held and representing to others that his foreman’s rights had been suspended. We held both Perko’s and Borden’s judgments inconsistent with the Garmon rule essentially for the same reasons we have concluded that Lockridge could not, consistently with the Garmon decision, maintain his lawsuit in the state courts. We further held there was no necessity to “consider the present vitality of [the Gonzales] rationale in the light of more recent decisions,” because in those cases, unlike Gonzales, “the crux of the action [s]... concerned alleged interference with the plaintiff’s existing or prospective employment relations and was not directed to internal union matters.” Because no specific claim for restoration of membership rights had been advanced, “there was no permissible state remedy to which the award of consequential damages for loss of earnings might be subordinated.” Perko, 373 U. S., at 705. See also Borden, 373 U. S., at 697.
In sum, what distinguished Gonzales from Borden and Perko was that the former lawsuit “was focused on purely internal union matters,” Borden, supra, at 697, a subject the National Labor Relations Act leaves principally to other processes of law. The possibility that, in defining the scope of the union’s duty to Gonzales, the state courts would directly and consciously implicate principles of federal law was at best tangential and remote. In the instant case, however,- this possibility was real and immediate. To assess the legality of his union’s conduct toward Gonzales the California courts needed only to focus upon the union’s constitution and by-laws. Here, however, Lockridge’s entire case turned upon the construction of the applicable union security clause, a matter as to which, as shown above, federal concern is pervasive and its regulation complex. The reasons for Gonzales’ deprivation of union membership had nothing to do with matters of employment, while Lockridge’s cause of action and claim for damages were based solely upon the procurement of his discharge from employment. It cannot plausibly be argued, in any meaningful sense, that Lock-ridge’s lawsuit “was focused on purely internal union matters.” Although nothing said in Garmon necessarily-suggests that States cannot regulate the general conditions which unions may impose on their membership, it surely makes crystal clear that Gonzales does not stand for the proposition that resolution of any union-member conflict is within state competence so long as one of the remedies provided is restoration of union membership. This much was settled by Borden and Perko, and it is only upon such an unwarrantably broad interpretation of Gonzales that the judgment below could be sustained.
Ill
The pre-emption doctrine we apply today is, like any other purposefully administered legal principle, not without exception. Those same considerations that underlie Garmon, have led this Court to permit the exercise- of judicial power over conduct arguably protected or prohibited by the Act where Congress has affirmatively indicated that such power should exist, Smith v. Evening News Assn., 371 U. S. 195 (1962); Teamsters Union v. Morton, 377 U. S. 252 (1964), where this Court cannot, in spite of the force of the policies Garmon seeks to promote, conscientiously presume that Congress meant to intrude so deeply into areas traditionally left to local' law, e. g., Linn v. Plant Guard Workers, 383 U. S. 53 (1966); Automobile Workers v. Russell, 356 U. S. 634 (1958), and where the particular rule of law sought to be invoked before another tribunal is so structured and administered that, in virtually all instances, it is safe to presume that judicial supervision will not disserve the. interests promoted by the federal labor statutes; Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U. S. 171 (1967).
In his brief before this Court, respondent has argued for the first time since this lawsuit was started that two of these exceptions to the Garmon principle independently justify the Idaho courts’ exercise of jurisdiction over this controversy. First, Lockridge contends that his action, properly viewed, is one to enforce a collective-bargaining agreement. Alternatively, he asserts the suit, in essence, was one to redress petitioner’s breach of its duty of fair representation. As will be seen, these contentions are somewhat intertwined.
In- § 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act, 61 Stat. 156, Congress authorized federal courts to exercise jurisdiction over suits brought to enforce collective-bargaining agree-. ments. We have held that such actions are judicially cognizable, even where the conduct alleged was arguably protected or prohibited by the National Labor Relations Act because the history of the enactment of § 301 reveals that “Congress deliberately chose to leave the' enforcement of collective agreements 'to the usual processes of the law.’ ” Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U. S. 502, 513 (1962). It is firmly established, further, that state courts retain concurrent jurisdiction to adjudicate such claims, Charles Dowd Box Co., supra, and that individual employees have standing to protect rights conferred upon them by such agreements, Smith v. Evening News, supra; Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U. S. 335 (1964).
Our cases also clearly establish that individual union members may sue their employers under § 301 for breach'of a promise embedded in the collective-bargaining agreement that was intended to confer a benefit upon the individual. Smith v. Evening News, supra. Plainly, however, this is not such a lawsuit. Lock
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | G | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice KENNEDYdelivered the opinion of the Court.
The underlying dispute in this case concerns where housing for low-income persons should be constructed in Dallas, Texas-that is, whether the housing should be built in the inner city or in the suburbs. This dispute comes to the Court on a disparate-impact theory of liability. In contrast to a disparate-treatment case, where a "plaintiff must establish that the defendant had a discriminatory intent or motive," a plaintiff bringing a disparate-impact claim challenges practices that have a "disproportionately adverse effect on minorities" and are otherwise unjustified by a legitimate rationale. Ricci v. DeStefano,557 U.S. 557, 577, 129 S.Ct. 2658, 174 L.Ed.2d 490 (2009)(internal quotation marks omitted). The question presented for the Court's determination is whether disparate-impact claims are cognizable under the Fair Housing Act (or FHA), 82 Stat. 81, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq.
I
A
Before turning to the question presented, it is necessary to discuss a different federal statute that gives rise to this dispute. The Federal Government provides low-income housing tax credits that are distributed to developers through designated state agencies. 26 U.S.C. § 42. Congress has directed States to develop plans identifying selection criteria for distributing the credits. § 42(m)(1). Those plans must include certain criteria, such as public housing waiting lists, § 42(m)(1)(C), as well as certain preferences, including that low-income housing units "contribut[e] to a concerted community revitalization plan" and be built in census tracts populated predominantly by low-income residents. §§ 42(m)(1)(B)(ii)(III), 42(d)(5)(ii)(I). Federal law thus favors the distribution of these tax credits for the development of housing units in low-income areas.
In the State of Texas these federal credits are distributed by the Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs (Department). Under Texas law, a developer's application for the tax credits is scored under a point system that gives priority to statutory criteria, such as the financial feasibility of the development project and the income level of tenants.
Tex. Govt.Code Ann. §§ 2306.6710(a)-(b)(West 2008). The Texas Attorney General has interpreted state law to permit the consideration of additional criteria, such as whether the housing units will be built in a neighborhood with good schools. Those criteria cannot be awarded more points than statutorily mandated criteria. Tex. Op. Atty. Gen. No. GA-0208, pp. 2-6 (2004), 2004 WL 1434796, *4-*6.
The Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. (ICP), is a Texas-based nonprofit corporation that assists low-income families in obtaining affordable housing. In 2008, the ICP brought this suit against the Department and its officers in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. As relevant here, it brought a disparate-impact claim under §§ 804(a) and 805(a) of the FHA. The ICP alleged the Department has caused continued segregated housing patterns by its disproportionate allocation of the tax credits, granting too many credits for housing in predominantly black inner-city areas and too few in predominantly white suburban neighborhoods. The ICP contended that the Department must modify its selection criteria in order to encourage the construction of low-income housing in suburban communities.
The District Court concluded that the ICP had established a prima facie case of disparate impact. It relied on two pieces of statistical evidence. First, it found "from 1999-2008, [the Department] approved tax credits for 49.7% of proposed non-elderly units in 0% to 9.9% Caucasian areas, but only approved 37.4% of proposed non-elderly units in 90% to 100% Caucasian areas." 749 F.Supp.2d 486, 499 (N.D.Tex.2010)(footnote omitted). Second, it found "92.29% of [low-income housing tax credit] units in the city of Dallas were located in census tracts with less than 50% Caucasian residents." Ibid.
The District Court then placed the burden on the Department to rebut the ICP's prima facie showing of disparate impact. 860 F.Supp.2d 312, 322-323 (2012). After assuming the Department's proffered interests were legitimate, id.,at 326, the District Court held that a defendant-here the Department-must prove "that there are no other less discriminatory alternatives to advancing their proffered interests," ibid.Because, in its view, the Department "failed to meet [its] burden of proving that there are no less discriminatory alternatives," the District Court ruled for the ICP. Id.,at 331.
The District Court's remedial order required the addition of new selection criteria for the tax credits. For instance, it awarded points for units built in neighborhoods with good schools and disqualified sites that are located adjacent to or near hazardous conditions, such as high crime areas or landfills. See 2012 WL 3201401 (Aug. 7, 2012). The remedial order contained no explicit racial targets or quotas.
While the Department's appeal was pending, the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) issued a regulation interpreting the FHA to encompass disparate-impact liability. See Implementation of the Fair Housing Act's Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed.Reg. 11460 (2013). The regulation also established a burden-shifting framework for adjudicating disparate-impact claims. Under the regulation, a plaintiff first must make a prima facie showing of disparate impact. That is, the plaintiff "has the burden of proving that a challenged practice caused or predictably will cause a discriminatory effect." 24 CFR § 100.500(c)(1) (2014). If a statistical discrepancy is caused by factors other than the defendant's policy, a plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case, and there is no liability. After a plaintiff does establish a prima facie showing of disparate impact, the burden shifts to the defendant to "prov[e] that the challenged practice is necessary to achieve one or more substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests." § 100.500(c)(2). HUD has clarified that this step of the analysis "is analogous to the Title VII requirement that an employer's interest in an employment practice with a disparate impact be job related." 78 Fed.Reg. 11470. Once a defendant has satisfied its burden at step two, a plaintiff may "prevail upon proving that the substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests supporting the challenged practice could be served by another practice that has a less discriminatory effect." § 100.500(c)(3).
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held, consistent with its precedent, that disparate-impact claims are cognizable under the FHA. 747 F.3d 275, 280 (2014). On the merits, however, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded. Relying on HUD's regulation, the Court of Appeals held that it was improper for the District Court to have placed the burden on the Department to prove there were no less discriminatory alternatives for allocating low-income housing tax credits. Id., at 282-283. In a concurring opinion, Judge Jones stated that on remand the District Court should reexamine whether the ICP had made out a prima facie case of disparate impact. She suggested the District Court incorrectly relied on bare statistical evidence without engaging in any analysis about causation. She further observed that, if the federal law providing for the distribution of low-income housing tax credits ties the Department's hands to such an extent that it lacks a meaningful choice, then there is no disparate-impact liability. See id.,at 283-284(specially concurring opinion).
The Department filed a petition for a writ of certiorari on the question whether disparate-impact claims are cognizable under the FHA. The question was one of first impression, see Huntington v. Huntington Branch, NAACP,488 U.S. 15, 109 S.Ct. 276, 102 L.Ed.2d 180 (1988)(per curiam), and certiorari followed, 573 U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 46, 189 L.Ed.2d 896 (2014). It is now appropriate to provide a brief history of the FHA's enactment and its later amendment.
B
De jureresidential segregation by race was declared unconstitutional almost a century ago, Buchanan v. Warley,245 U.S. 60, 38 S.Ct. 16, 62 L.Ed. 149 (1917), but its vestiges remain today, intertwined with the country's economic and social life. Some segregated housing patterns can be traced to conditions that arose in the mid-20th century. Rapid urbanization, concomitant with the rise of suburban developments accessible by car, led many white families to leave the inner cities. This often left minority families concentrated in the center of the Nation's cities. During this time, various practices were followed, sometimes with governmental support, to encourage and maintain the separation of the races: Racially restrictive covenants prevented the conveyance of property to minorities, see Shelley v. Kraemer,334 U.S. 1, 68 S.Ct. 836, 92 L.Ed. 1161 (1948); steering by real-estate agents led potential buyers to consider homes in racially homogenous areas; and discriminatory lending practices, often referred to as redlining, precluded minority families from purchasing homes in affluent areas. See, e.g., M. Klarman, Unfinished Business: Racial Equality in American History 140-141 (2007); Brief for Housing Scholars as Amici Curiae22-23. By the 1960's, these policies, practices, and prejudices had created many predominantly black inner cities surrounded by mostly white suburbs.
See K. Clark, Dark Ghetto: Dilemmas of Social Power 11, 21-26 (1965).
The mid-1960's was a period of considerable social unrest; and, in response, President Lyndon Johnson established the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, commonly known as the Kerner Commission. Exec. Order No. 11365, 3 CFR 674 (1966-1970 Comp.). After extensive factfinding the Commission identified residential segregation and unequal housing and economic conditions in the inner cities as significant, underlying causes of the social unrest. See Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders 91 (1968) (Kerner Commission Report). The Commission found that "[n]early two-thirds of all nonwhite families living in the central cities today live in neighborhoods marked by substandard housing and general urban blight." Id.,at 13. The Commission further found that both open and covert racial discrimination prevented black families from obtaining better housing and moving to integrated communities. Ibid.The Commission concluded that "[o]ur Nation is moving toward two societies, one black, one white-separate and unequal." Id.,at 1. To reverse "[t]his deepening racial division," ibid.,it recommended enactment of "a comprehensive and enforceable open-occupancy law making it an offense to discriminate in the sale or rental of any housing... on the basis of race, creed, color, or national origin." Id.,at 263.
In April 1968, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., was assassinated in Memphis, Tennessee, and the Nation faced a new urgency to resolve the social unrest in the inner cities. Congress responded by adopting the Kerner Commission's recommendation and passing the Fair Housing Act. The statute addressed the denial of housing opportunities on the basis of "race, color, religion, or national origin." Civil Rights Act of 1968, § 804, 82 Stat. 83. Then, in 1988, Congress amended the FHA. Among other provisions, it created certain exemptions from liability and added "familial status" as a protected characteristic. See Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 102 Stat. 1619.
II
The issue here is whether, under a proper interpretation of the FHA, housing decisions with a disparate impact are prohibited. Before turning to the FHA, however, it is necessary to consider two other antidiscrimination statutes that preceded it.
The first relevant statute is § 703(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 255. The Court addressed the concept of disparate impact under this statute in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,401 U.S. 424, 91 S.Ct. 849, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971). There, the employer had a policy requiring its manual laborers to possess a high school diploma and to obtain satisfactory scores on two intelligence tests. The Court of Appeals held the employer had not adopted these job requirements for a racially discriminatory purpose, and the plaintiffs did not challenge that holding in this Court. Instead, the plaintiffs argued § 703(a)(2) covers the discriminatory effect of a practice as well as the motivation behind the practice. Section 703(a), as amended, provides as follows:
"It shall be an unlawful employer practice for an employer-
"(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
"(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
The Court did not quote or cite the full statute, but rather relied solely on § 703(a)(2). Griggs,401 U.S., at 426, n. 1, 91 S.Ct. 849.
In interpreting § 703(a)(2), the Court reasoned that disparate-impact liability furthered the purpose and design of the statute. The Court explained that, in § 703(a)(2), Congress "proscribe[d] not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation." Id.,at 431, 91 S.Ct. 849. For that reason, as the Court noted, "Congress directed the thrust of [§ 703(a)(2) ] to the consequences of employment practices, not simply the motivation." Id.,at 432, 91 S.Ct. 849. In light of the statute's goal of achieving "equality of employment opportunities and remov[ing] barriers that have operated in the past" to favor some races over others, the Court held § 703(a)(2) of Title VII must be interpreted to allow disparate-impact claims. Id.,at 429-430, 91 S.Ct. 849.
The Court put important limits on its holding: namely, not all employment practices causing a disparate impact impose liability under § 703(a)(2). In this respect, the Court held that "business necessity" constitutes a defense to disparate-impact claims. Id.,at 431, 91 S.Ct. 849. This rule provides, for example, that in a disparate-impact case, § 703(a)(2) does not prohibit hiring criteria with a "manifest relationship" to job performance. Id.,at 432, 91 S.Ct. 849; see also Ricci,557 U.S., at 587-589, 129 S.Ct. 2658(emphasizing the importance of the business necessity defense to disparate-impact liability). On the facts before it, the Court in Griggsfound a violation of Title VII because the employer could not establish that high school diplomas and general intelligence tests were related to the job performance of its manual laborers. See 401 U.S., at 431-432, 91 S.Ct. 849.
The second relevant statute that bears on the proper interpretation of the FHA is the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 81 Stat. 602 et seq.,as amended. Section 4(a) of the ADEA provides:
"It shall be unlawful for an employer-
"(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age;
"(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's age; or
"(3) to reduce the wage rate of any employee in order to comply with this chapter." 29 U.S.C. § 623(a).
The Court first addressed whether this provision allows disparate-impact claims in Smith v. City of Jackson,544 U.S. 228, 125 S.Ct. 1536, 161 L.Ed.2d 410 (2005). There, a group of older employees challenged their employer's decision to give proportionately greater raises to employees with less than five years of experience.
Explaining that Griggs"represented the better reading of [Title VII's] statutory text," 544 U.S., at 235, 125 S.Ct. 1536a plurality of the Court concluded that the same reasoning pertained to § 4(a)(2) of the ADEA. The Smithplurality emphasized that both § 703(a)(2) of Title VII and § 4(a)(2) of the ADEA contain language "prohibit[ing] such actions that 'deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affecthis status as an employee, because of such individual's' race or age." 544 U.S., at 235, 125 S.Ct. 1536. As the plurality observed, the text of these provisions "focuses on the effectsof the action on the employee rather than the motivation for the action of the employer" and therefore compels recognition of disparate-impact liability. Id.,at 236, 125 S.Ct. 1536. In a separate opinion, Justice SCALIA found the ADEA's text ambiguous and thus deferred under Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984), to an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission regulation interpreting the ADEA to impose disparate-impact liability, see 544 U.S., at 243-247, 125 S.Ct. 1536(opinion concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
Together, Griggsholds and the plurality in Smithinstructs that antidiscrimination laws must be construed to encompass disparate-impact claims when their text refers to the consequences of actions and not just to the mindset of actors, and where that interpretation is consistent with statutory purpose. These cases also teach that disparate-impact liability must be limited so employers and other regulated entities are able to make the practical business choices and profit-related decisions that sustain a vibrant and dynamic free-enterprise system. And before rejecting a business justification-or, in the case of a governmental entity, an analogous public interest-a court must determine that a plaintiff has shown that there is "an available alternative... practice that has less disparate impact and serves the [entity's] legitimate needs." Ricci, supra,at 578, 129 S.Ct. 2658. The cases interpreting Title VII and the ADEA provide essential background and instruction in the case now before the Court.
Turning to the FHA, the ICP relies on two provisions. Section 804(a) provides that it shall be unlawful:
"To refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a).
Here, the phrase "otherwise make unavailable" is of central importance to the analysis that follows.
Section 805(a), in turn, provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any person or other entity whose business includes engaging in real estate-related transactions to discriminate against any person in making available such a transaction, or in the terms or conditions of such a transaction, because of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin." § 3605(a).
Applied here, the logic of Griggsand Smithprovides strong support for the conclusion that the FHA encompasses disparate-impact claims. Congress' use of the phrase "otherwise make unavailable" refers to the consequences of an action rather than the actor's intent. See United States v. Giles,300 U.S. 41, 48, 57 S.Ct. 340, 81 L.Ed. 493 (1937)(explaining that the "word'make' has many meanings, among them '[t]o cause to exist, appear or occur' " (quoting Webster's New International Dictionary 1485 (2d ed. 1934))). This results-oriented language counsels in favor of recognizing disparate-impact liability. See Smith, supra,at 236, 125 S.Ct. 1536. The Court has construed statutory language similar to § 805(a) to include disparate-impact liability. See, e.g.,Board of Ed. of City School Dist. of New York v.
Harris,444 U.S. 130, 140-141, 100 S.Ct. 363, 62 L.Ed.2d 275 (1979)(holding the term "discriminat[e]" encompassed disparate-impact liability in the context of a statute's text, history, purpose, and structure).
A comparison to the antidiscrimination statutes examined in Griggsand Smithis useful. Title VII's and the ADEA's "otherwise adversely affect" language is equivalent in function and purpose to the FHA's "otherwise make unavailable" language. In these three statutes the operative text looks to results. The relevant statutory phrases, moreover, play an identical role in the structure common to all three statutes: Located at the end of lengthy sentences that begin with prohibitions on disparate treatment, they serve as catchall phrases looking to consequences, not intent. And all three statutes use the word "otherwise" to introduce the results-oriented phrase. "Otherwise" means "in a different way or manner," thus signaling a shift in emphasis from an actor's intent to the consequences of his actions. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1598 (1971). This similarity in text and structure is all the more compelling given that Congress passed the FHA in 1968-only four years after passing Title VII and only four months after enacting the ADEA.
It is true that Congress did not reiterate Title VII's exact language in the FHA, but that is because to do so would have made the relevant sentence awkward and unclear. A provision making it unlawful to "refuse to sell [,]... or otherwise [adversely affect], a dwelling to any person" because of a protected trait would be grammatically obtuse, difficult to interpret, and far more expansive in scope than Congress likely intended. Congress thus chose words that serve the same purpose and bear the same basic meaning but are consistent with the structure and objectives of the FHA.
Emphasizing that the FHA uses the phrase "because of race," the Department argues this language forecloses disparate-impact liability since "[a]n action is not taken 'because of race' unless race is a reasonfor the action." Brief for Petitioners 26. Griggsand Smith,however, dispose of this argument. Both Title VII and the ADEA contain identical "because of" language, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2); 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2), and the Court nonetheless held those statutes impose disparate-impact liability.
In addition, it is of crucial importance that the existence of disparate-impact liability is supported by amendments to the FHA that Congress enacted in 1988. By that time, all nine Courts of Appeals to have addressed the question had concluded the Fair Housing Act encompassed disparate-impact claims. See Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Huntington,844 F.2d 926, 935-936 (C.A.2 1988); Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo,564 F.2d 126, 146 (C.A.3 1977); Smith v. Clarkton,682 F.2d 1055, 1065 (C.A.4 1982); Hanson v. Veterans Administration,800 F.2d 1381, 1386 (C.A.5 1986); Arthur v. Toledo,782 F.2d 565, 574-575 (C.A.6 1986); Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. v. Arlington Heights,558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (C.A.7 1977); United States v. Black Jack,508 F.2d 1179, 1184-1185 (C.A.8 1974); Halet v. Wend Investment Co.,672 F.2d 1305, 1311 (C.A.9 1982); United States v. Marengo Cty. Comm'n,731 F.2d 1546, 1559, n. 20 (C.A.11 1984).
When it amended the FHA, Congress was aware of this unanimous precedent. And with that understanding, it made a considered judgment to retain the relevant statutory text. See H.R.Rep. No. 100-711, p. 21, n. 52(1988), 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173 (H.R. Rep.) (discussing suits premised on disparate-impact claims and related judicial precedent); 134 Cong. Rec. 23711 (1988) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (noting unanimity of Federal Courts of Appeals concerning disparate impact); Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1987: Hearings on S. 558 before the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 529 (1987) (testimony of Professor Robert Schwemm) (describing consensus judicial view that the FHA imposed disparate-impact liability). Indeed, Congress rejected a proposed amendment that would have eliminated disparate-impact liability for certain zoning decisions. See H.R. Rep., at 89-93.
Against this background understanding in the legal and regulatory system, Congress' decision in 1988 to amend the FHA while still adhering to the operative language in §§ 804(a) and 805(a) is convincing support for the conclusion that Congress accepted and ratified the unanimous holdings of the Courts of Appeals finding disparate-impact liability. "If a word or phrase has been... given a uniform interpretation by inferior courts..., a later version of that act perpetuating the wording is presumed to carry forward that interpretation." A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 322 (2012); see also Forest Grove School Dist. v. T.A.,557 U.S. 230, 244, n. 11, 129 S.Ct. 2484, 174 L.Ed.2d 168 (2009)("When Congress amended [the Act] without altering the text of [the relevant provision], it implicitly adopted [this Court's] construction of the statute"); Manhattan Properties, Inc. v. Irving Trust Co.,291 U.S. 320, 336, 54 S.Ct. 385, 78 L.Ed. 824 (1934)(explaining, where the Courts of Appeals had reached a consensus interpretation of the Bankruptcy Act and Congress had amended the Act without changing the relevant provision, "[t]his is persuasive that the construction adopted by the [lower federal] courts has been acceptable to the legislative arm of the government").
Further and convincing confirmation of Congress' understanding that disparate-impact liability exists under the FHA is revealed by the substance of the 1988 amendments. The amendments included three exemptions from liability that assume the existence of disparate-impact claims. The most logical conclusion is that the three amendments were deemed necessary because Congress presupposed disparate impact under the FHA as it had been enacted in 1968.
The relevant 1988 amendments were as follows. First, Congress added a clarifying provision: "Nothing in [the FHA] prohibits a person engaged in the business of furnishing appraisals of real property to take into consideration factors other than race, color, religion, national origin, sex, handicap, or familial status." 42 U.S.C. § 3605(c). Second, Congress provided: "Nothing in [the FHA] prohibits conduct against a person because such person has been convicted by any court of competent jurisdiction of the illegal manufacture or distribution of a controlled substance." § 3607(b)(4). And finally, Congress specified: "Nothing in [the FHA] limits the applicability of any reasonable... restrictions regarding the maximum number of occupants permitted to occupy a dwelling." § 3607(b)(1).
The exemptions embodied in these amendments would be superfluous if Congress had assumed that disparate-impact liability did not exist under the FHA. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co.,513 U.S. 561, 574, 115 S.Ct. 1061, 131 L.Ed.2d 1 (1995)("[T]he Court will avoid a reading which renders some words altogether redundant"). Indeed, none of these amendments would make sense if the FHA encompassed only disparate-treatment claims. If that were the sole ground for liability, the amendments merely restate black-letter law. If an actor makes a decision based on reasons other than a protected category, there is no disparate-treatment liability. See, e.g., Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine,450 U.S. 248, 254, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). But the amendments do constrain disparate-impact liability. For instance, certain criminal convictions are correlated with sex and race. See, e.g., Kimbrough v. United States,552 U.S. 85, 98, 128 S.Ct. 558, 169 L.Ed.2d 481 (2007)(discussing the racial disparity in convictions for crack cocaine offenses). By adding an exemption from liability for exclusionary practices aimed at individuals with drug convictions, Congress ensured disparate-impact liability would not lie if a landlord excluded tenants with such convictions. The same is true of the provision allowing for reasonable restrictions on occupancy. And the exemption from liability for real-estate appraisers is in the same section as § 805(a)'s prohibition of discriminatory practices in real-estate transactions, thus indicating Congress' recognition that disparate-impact liability arose under § 805(a). In short, the 1988 amendments signal that Congress ratified disparate-impact liability.
A comparison to Smith's discussion of the ADEA further demonstrates why the Department's interpretation would render the 1988 amendments superfluous. Under the ADEA's reasonable-factor-other-than-age (RFOA) provision, an employer is permitted to take an otherwise prohibited action where "the differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than age." 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1). In other words, if an employer makes a decision based on a reasonable factor other than age, it cannot be said to have made a decision on the basis of an employee's age. According to the Smithplurality, the RFOA provision "plays its principal role" "in cases involving disparate-impact claims" "by precluding liability if the adverse impact was attributable to a nonage factor that was'reasonable.' " 544 U.S., at 239, 125 S.Ct. 1536. The plurality thus reasoned that the RFOA provision would be "simply unnecessary to avoid liability under the ADEA" if liability were limited to disparate-treatment claims. Id.,at 238, 125 S.Ct. 1536.
A similar logic applies here. If a real-estate appraiser took into account a neighborhood's schools, one could not say the appraiser acted because of race. And by embedding 42 U.S.C. § 3605(c)'s exemption in the statutory text, Congress ensured that disparate-impact liability would not be allowed either. Indeed, the inference of disparate-impact liability is even stronger here than it was in Smith. As originally enacted, the ADEA included the RFOA provision, see § 4(f)(1), 81 Stat. 603, whereas here Congress added the relevant exemptions in the 1988 amendments against the backdrop of the uniform view of the Courts of Appeals that the FHA imposed disparate-impact liability.
Recognition of disparate-impact claims is consistent with the FHA's central purpose. See Smith, supra,at 235, 125 S.Ct. 1536(plurality opinion); Griggs,401 U.S., at 432, 91 S.Ct. 849. The FHA, like Title VII and the ADEA, was enacted to eradicate discriminatory practices within a sector of our Nation's economy. See 42 U.S.C. § 3601("It is the policy of the United States to provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the United States"); H.R. Rep., at 15 (explaining the FHA "provides a clear national policy against discrimination in housing").
These unlawful practices include zoning laws and other housing restrictions that function unfairly to exclude minorities from certain neighborhoods without any sufficient justification. Suits targeting such practices reside at the heartland of disparate-impact liability. See, e.g., Huntington,488 U.S., at 16-18, 109 S.Ct. 276(invalidating zoning law preventing construction of multifamily rental units); Black Jack,508 F.2d, at 1182-1188(invalidating ordinance prohibiting construction of new multifamily dwellings); Greater New Orleans Fair Housing Action Center v. St. Bernard Parish,641 F.Supp.2d 563, 569, 577-578 (E.D.La.2009)(invalidating post-Hurricane Katrina ordinance restricting the rental of housing units to only " 'blood relative[s]' " in an area of the city that was 88.3% white and 7.6% black); see also Tr. of Oral Arg. 52-53 (discussing these cases). The availability of disparate-impact liability, furthermore, has allowed private developers to vindicate the FHA's objectives and to protect their property rights by stopping municipalities from enforcing arbitrary and, in practice, discriminatory ordinances barring the construction of certain types of housing units. See, e.g.,Huntington, supra,at 18, 109 S.Ct. 276. Recognition of disparate-impact liability under the FHA also plays a role in uncovering discriminatory intent: It permits plaintiffs to counteract unconscious prejudices and disguised animus that escape easy classification as disparate treatment. In this way disparate-impact liability may prevent segregated housing patterns that might otherwise result from covert and illicit stereotyping.
But disparate-impact liability has always been properly limited in key respects that avoid the serious constitutional questions that might arise under the FHA, for instance, if such liability were imposed based solely on a showing of a statistical disparity. Disparate-impact liability mandates the "removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers," not the displacement of valid governmental policies. Griggs, supra,at 431, 91 S.Ct. 849. The FHA is not an instrument to force housing authorities to reorder their priorities. Rather, the FHA aims to ensure that those priorities can be achieved without arbitrarily creating discriminatory effects or perpetuating segregation.
Unlike the heartland of disparate-impact suits targeting artificial barriers to housing, the underlying dispute in this case involves a novel theory of liability. See Seicshnaydre, Is
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | B | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Tennessee is reversed. Redrup v. New York, 386 U. S. 767.
The Chief Justice would affirm.
Mr. Justice Harlan
would affirm for the reasons set forth in his separate opinion in Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, 496, 500-503, and in his dissenting opinion in Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U. S. 413, 455.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | C | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
A Federal District Court entered a final order denying the petitioner habeas corpus relief. Under federal law the petitioner had a statutory right to appellate review of that decision. 28 U. S. C. § 2253. Because it appears that effective appellate review may not have been accorded in this case, the writ of certiorari is granted, and the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
The petitioner pleaded guilty to narcotics and firearms violations in the Criminal Court, of Baltimore City and was sentenced to a term of 20 years in the Maryland state penitentiary. In 1975, after exhausting state post-conviction remedies, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, alleging that several specific constitutional violations had occurred in the state prosecution. The District Court dismissed the petition without an evidentiary hearing. The petitioner, pro se, took an appeal to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the order of the District Court in the following language:
“PER CURIAM:
“A review of the record and of the district court's opinion discloses that this appeal from the order of the district court denying relief under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 is without merit. Accordingly, the order is affirmed for the reasons stated by the district court. Blizzard v. Mahan, C/A No. 76-0117-CRT (E. D. N. C., Sept. 13, 1976).
“AFFIRMED.”
Clearly, this per curiam order has nothing whatsoever to do with the petitioner’s case. He had filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, not a civil rights action under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. He had sought relief in a federal court in Maryland, not one in North Carolina. The case of Blizzard v. Mahan, in short, is wholly unrelated to the petitioner’s case.
It may be that the petitioner’s contentions are wholly frivolous. But it is not enough that a just result may have been reached. “[T]o perform its high function in the best way 'justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.’ Offutt v. United States, 348 U. S. 11, 14.” In re Murchison, 349 U. S. 133, 136 (1955); cf. In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1, 26 (1967). Accordingly, in the exercise of our power to' “require such further proceedings to be had as may be just under the circumstances,” 28 U. S. C. § 2106, we grant the motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for certiorari, vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and remand this case to it for further consideration.
It is so ordered.
The petition for certiorari in No. 77-939, Blizzard v. Mahan (denied, post, p. 951), shows that the Court of Appeals’ per curiam order in that case (filed on the same day as the order in the present case) is identical to the one quoted in the text above.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | I | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Powell
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The plaintiff in this lawsuit seeks relief in civil damages from a former President of the United States. The claim rests on actions allegedly taken in the former President’s official capacity during his tenure in office. The issue before us is the scope of the immunity possessed by the President of the United States.
I
In January 1970 the respondent A. Ernest Fitzgerald lost his job as a management analyst with the Department of the Air Force. Fitzgerald’s dismissal occurred in the context of a departmental reorganization and reduction in force, in which his job was eliminated. In announcing the reorganization, the Air Force characterized the action as taken to promote economy and efficiency in the Armed Forces.
Respondent’s discharge attracted unusual attention in Congress and in the press. Fitzgerald had attained national prominence approximately one year earlier, during the waning months of the Presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson. On November 13,1968, Fitzgerald appeared before the Subcommittee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Committee of the United States Congress. To the evident embarrassment of his superiors in the Department of Defense, Fitzgerald testified that cost-overruns on the C-5A transport plane could approximate $2 billion. He also revealed that unexpected technical difficulties had arisen during the development of the aircraft.
Concerned that Fitzgerald might have suffered retaliation for his congressional testimony, the Subcommittee on Economy in Government convened public hearings on Fitzgerald’s dismissal. The press reported those hearings prominently, as it had the earlier announcement that his job was being eliminated by the Department of Defense. At a news conference on December 8, 1969, President Richard Nixon was queried about Fitzgerald’s impending separation from Government service. The President responded by promising to look into the matter. Shortly after the news conference the petitioner asked White House Chief of Staff H. R. Halde-man to arrange for Fitzgerald’s assignment to another job within the administration. It also appears that the President suggested to Budget Director Robert Mayo that Fitzgerald might be offered a position in the Bureau of the Budget.
Fitzgerald’s proposed reassignment encountered resistance within the administration. In an internal memorandum of January 20, 1970, White House aide Alexander Butterfield reported to Haldeman that “‘Fitzgerald is no doubt a top-notch cost expert, but he must be given very low marks in loyalty; and after all, loyalty is the name of the game.’” Butterfield therefore recommended that “‘[w]e should let him bleed, for a while at least.’ ” There is no evidence of White House efforts to reemploy Fitzgerald subsequent to the Butterfield memorandum.
Absent any offer of alternative federal employment, Fitzgerald complained to the Civil Service Commission. In a letter of January 20, 1970, he alleged that his separation represented unlawful retaliation for his truthful testimony before a congressional Committee. The Commission convened a closed hearing on Fitzgerald’s allegations on May 4, 1971. Fitzgerald, however, preferred to present his grievances in public. After he had brought suit and won an injunction, Fitzgerald v. Hampton, 152 U. S. App. D. C. 1, 467 F. 2d 755 (1972), public hearings commenced on January 26, 1973. The hearings again generated publicity, much of it devoted to the testimony of Air Force Secretary Robert Seamans. Although he denied that Fitzgerald had lost his position in retaliation for congressional testimony, Seamans testified that he had received “some advice” from the White House before Fitzgerald’s job was abolished. But the Secretary declined to be more specific. He responded to several questions by invoking “executive privilege.”
At a news conference on January 31, 1973, the President was asked about Mr. Seamans’ testimony. Mr. Nixon took the opportunity to assume personal responsibility for Fitzgerald’s dismissal:
“I was totally aware that Mr. Fitzgerald would be fired or discharged or asked to resign. I approved it and Mr. Seamans must have been talking to someone who had discussed the matter with me. No, this was not a case of some person down the line deciding he should go. It was a decision that was submitted to me. I made it and I stick by it.”
A day later, however, the White House press office issued a retraction of the President’s statement. According to a press spokesman, the President had confused Fitzgerald with another former executive employee. On behalf of the President, the spokesman asserted that Mr. Nixon had not had “put before him the decision regarding Mr. Fitzgerald.”
After hearing over 4,000 pages of testimony, the Chief Examiner for the Civil Service Commission issued his decision in the Fitzgerald case on September 18, 1973. Decision on the Appeal of A. Ernest Fitzgerald, as reprinted in App. 60a. The Examiner held that Fitzgerald’s dismissal had offended applicable civil service regulations. Id., at 86a-87a. The Examiner based this conclusion on a finding that the departmental reorganization in which Fitzgerald lost his job, though purportedly implemented as an economy measure, was in fact motivated by “reasons purely personal to” respondent. Id., at 86a. As this was an impermissible basis for a reduction in force, the Examiner recommended Fitzgerald’s reappointment to his old position or to a job of comparable authority. The Examiner, however, explicitly distinguished this narrow conclusion from a suggested finding that Fitzgerald had suffered retaliation for his testimony to Congress. As found by the Commission, “the evidence of record does not support [Fitzgerald’s] allegation that his position was abolished and that he was separated... in retaliation for his having revealed the C-5A cost overrun in testimony before the Prox-mire Committee on November 13, 1968.” Id., at 81a.
Following the Commission’s decision, Fitzgerald filed a suit for damages in the United States District Court. In it he raised essentially the same claims presented to the Civil Service Commission. As defendants he named eight officials of the Defense Department, White House aide Alexander Butterfield, and “one or More” unnamed “White House Aides” styled only as “John Does.”
The District Court dismissed the action under the District of Columbia’s 3-year statute of limitations, Fitzgerald v. Seamans, 384 F. Supp. 688 (DC 1974), and the Court of Appeals affirmed as to all but one defendant, White House aide Alexander Butterfield, Fitzgerald v. Seamans, 180 U. S. App. D. C. 75, 553 F. 2d 220 (1977). The Court of Appeals reasoned that Fitzgerald had no reason to suspect White House involvement in his dismissal at least until 1973. In that year, reasonable grounds for suspicion had arisen, most notably through publication of the internal White House memorandum in which Butterfield had recommended that Fitzgerald at least should be made to “bleed for a while” before being offered another job in the administration. Id., at 80, 84, 553 F. 2d, at 225, 229. Holding that concealment of illegal activity would toll the statute of limitations, the Court of Appeals remanded the action against Butterfield for further proceedings in the District Court.
Following the remand and extensive discovery thereafter, Fitzgerald filed a second amended complaint in the District Court on July 5, 1978. It was in this amended complaint— more than eight years after he had complained of his discharge to the Civil Service Commission — that Fitzgerald first named the petitioner Nixon as a party defendant. Also included as defendants were White House aide Bryce Harlow and other officials of the Nixon administration. Additional discovery ensued. By March 1980, only three defendants remained: the petitioner Richard Nixon and White House aides Harlow and Butterfield. Denying a motion for summary judgment, the District Court ruled that the action must proceed to trial. Its order of March 26 held that Fitzgerald had stated triable causes of action under two federal statutes and the First Amendment to the Constitution. The court also ruled that petitioner was not entitled to claim absolute Presidential immunity.
Petitioner took a collateral appeal of the immunity decision to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The Court of Appeals dismissed summarily. It apparently did so on the ground that its recent decision in Halperin v. Kissinger, 196 U. S. App. D. C. 285, 606 F. 2d 1192 (1979), aff’d in pertinent part by an equally divided Court, 452 U. S. 713 (1981), had rejected this claimed immunity defense.
As this Court has not ruled on the scope of immunity available to a President of the United States, we granted certio-rari to decide this important issue. 452 U. S. 959 (1981).
II
Before addressing the merits of this case, we must consider two challenges to our jurisdiction. In his opposition to the petition for certiorari, respondent argued that this Court is without jurisdiction to review the nonfinal order in which the District Court rejected petitioner’s claim to absolute immunity. We also must consider an argument that an agreement between the parties has mooted the controversy.
A
Petitioner invokes the jurisdiction of this Court under 28 U. S. C. § 1254, a statute that invests us with authority to review “[cjases in” the courts of appeals. When the petitioner in this case sought review of an interlocutory order denying his claim to absolute immunity, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Emphasizing the “jurisdictional” basis for the Court of Appeals’ decision, respondent argued that the District Court’s order was not an appealable “case” properly “in” the Court of Appeals within the meaning of § 1254. We do not agree.
Under the “collateral order” doctrine of Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541 (1949), a small class of interlocutory orders are immediately appealable to the courts of appeals. As defined by Cohen, this class embraces orders that “conclusively determine the disputed question, resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and [are] effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U. S. 463, 468 (1978); see Cohen, supra, at 546-547. As an additional requirement, Cohen established that a collateral appeal of an interlocutory order must “presen[t] a serious and unsettled question.” 337 U. S., at 547. At least twice before this Court has held that orders denying claims of absolute immunity are appealable under the Cohen criteria. See Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U. S. 500 (1979) (claim of immunity under the Speech and Debate Clause); Abney v. United States, 431 U. S. 651 (1977) (claim of immunity under Double Jeopardy Clause). In previous cases the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit also has treated orders denying absolute immunity as appealable under Cohen. See Briggs v. Goodwin, 186 U. S. App. D. C. 179, 227-229, 569 F. 2d 10, 58-60 (1977) (Wilkey, J., dissenting on the appealability issue); McSurely v. McClellan, 172 U. S. App. D. C. 364, 372, 521 F. 2d 1024, 1032 (1975), aff’d in pertinent part en banc, 180 U. S. App. D. C. 101, 107-108, n. 18, 553 F. 2d 1277, 1283-1284, n. 18 (1976), cert. dism’d sub nom. McAdams v. McSurely, 438 U. S. 189 (1978).
In “dismissing” the appeal in this case, the Court of Appeals appears to have reasoned that petitioner’s appeal lay outside the Cohen doctrine because it raised no “serious and unsettled question” of law. This argument was pressed by the respondent, who asked the Court of Appeals to dismiss on the basis of that court’s “controlling” decision in Halperin v. Kissinger, supra.
Under the circumstances of this case, we cannot agree that petitioner’s interlocutory appeal failed to raise a “serious and unsettled” question. Although the Court of Appeals had ruled in Halperin v. Kissinger that the President was not entitled to absolute immunity, this Court never had so held. And a petition for certiorari in Halperin was pending in this Court at the time petitioner’s appeal was dismissed. In light of the special solicitude due to claims alleging a threatened breach of essential Presidential prerogatives under the separation of powers, see United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 691-692 (1974), we conclude that petitioner did present a “serious and unsettled” and therefore appealable question to the Court of Appeals. It follows that the case was “in” the Court of Appeals under § 1254 and properly within our certio-rari jurisdiction.
B
Shortly after petitioner had filed his petition for certiorari in this Court and respondent had entered his opposition, the parties reached an agreement to liquidate damages. Under its terms the petitioner Nixon paid the respondent Fitzgerald a sum of $142,000. In consideration, Fitzgerald agreed to accept liquidated damages of $28,000 in the event of a ruling by this Court that petitioner was not entitled to absolute immunity. In case of a decision upholding petitioner’s immunity claim, no further payments would be made.
The limited agreement between the parties left both petitioner and respondent with a considerable financial stake in the resolution of the question presented in this Court. As we recently concluded in a case involving a similar contract: “Given respondents’ continued active pursuit of monetary relief, this case remains ‘definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests.’” Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U. S. 368, 371 (1982), quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S. 227, 240-241 (1937).
Ill
A
This Court consistently has recognized that government officials are entitled to some form of immunity from suits for civil damages. In Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U. S. 483 (1896), the Court considered the immunity available to the Postmaster General in a suit for damages based upon his official acts. Drawing upon principles of immunity developed in English cases at common law, the Court concluded that “[t]he interests of the people” required a grant of absolute immunity to public officers. Id., at 498. In the absence of immunity, the Court reasoned, executive officials would hesitate to exercise their discretion in a way “injuriously affect[ing] the claims of particular individuals,” id., at 499, even when the public interest required bold and unhesitating action. Considerations of “public policy and convenience” therefore compelled a judicial recognition of immunity from suits arising from official acts.
“In exercising the functions of his office, the head of an Executive Department, keeping within the limits of his authority, should not be under an apprehension that the motives that control his official conduct may, at any time, become the subject of inquiry in a civil suit for damages. It would seriously cripple the proper and effective administration of public affairs as entrusted to the executive branch of the government, if he were subjected to any such restraint.” Id., at 498.
Decisions subsequent to Spalding have extended the defense of immunity to actions besides those at common law. In Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367 (1951), the Court considered whether the passage of 42 U. S. C. § 1983, which made no express provision for immunity for any official, had abrogated the privilege accorded to state legislators at common law. Tenney held that it had not. Examining § 1983 in light of the “presuppositions of our political history” and our heritage of legislative freedom, the Court found it incredible “that Congress... would impinge on a tradition so well grounded in history and reason” without some indication of intent more explicit than the general language of the statute. Id., at 376. Similarly, the decision in Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547 (1967), involving a § 1983 suit against a state judge, recognized the continued validity of the absolute immunity of judges for acts within the judicial role. This was a doctrine “‘not for the protection or benefit of a malicious or corrupt judge, but for the benefit of the public, whose interest it is that the judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions with independence and without fear of consequences.’ ” Id., at 554, quoting Scott v. Stansfield, L. R. 3 Ex. 220, 223 (1868). See Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335 (1872). The Court in Pierson also held that police officers are entitled to a qualified immunity protecting them from suit when their official acts are performed in "good faith.” 386 U. S., at 557.
In Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232 (1974), the Court considered the immunity available to state executive officials in a § 1983 suit alleging the violation of constitutional rights. In that case we rejected the officials’ claim to absolute immunity under the doctrine of Spalding v. Vilas, finding instead that state executive officials possessed a “good faith” immunity from § 1983 suits alleging constitutional violations. Balancing the purposes of § 1983 against the imperatives of public policy, the Court held that “in varying scope, a qualified immunity is available to officers of the executive branch of government, the variation being dependent upon the scope of discretion and responsibilities of the office and all the circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time of the action on which liability is sought to be based.” 416 U. S., at 247.
As construed by subsequent cases, Scheuer established a two-tiered division of immunity defenses in § 1983 suits. To most executive officers Scheuer accorded qualified immunity. For them the scope of the defense varied in proportion to the nature of their official functions and the range of decisions that conceivably might be taken in “good faith.” This “functional” approach also defined a second tier, however, at which the especially sensitive duties of certain officials— notably judges and prosecutors — required the continued recognition of absolute immunity. See, e. g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409 (1976) (state prosecutors possess absolute immunity with respect to the initiation and pursuit of prosecutions); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U. S. 349 (1978) (state judge possesses absolute immunity for all judicial acts).
This approach was reviewed in detail in Butz v. Econo mou, 438 U. S. 478 (1978), when we considered for the first time the kind of immunity possessed by federal executive officials who are sued for constitutional violations. In Butz the Court rejected an argument, based on decisions involving federal officials charged with common-law torts, that all high federal officials have a right to absolute immunity from constitutional damages actions. Concluding that a blanket recognition of absolute immunity would be anomalous in light of the qualified immunity standard applied to state executive officials, id., at 504, we held that federal officials generally have the same qualified immunity possessed by state officials in cases under § 1983. In so doing we reaffirmed our holdings that some officials, notably judges and prosecutors, “because of the special nature of their responsibilities,” id., at 511, “require a full exemption from liability.” Id., at 508. In Butz itself we upheld a claim of absolute immunity for administrative officials engaged in functions analogous to those of judges and prosecutors. Ibid. We also left open the question whether other federal officials could show that “public policy requires an exemption of that scope.” Id., at 506.
B
Our decisions concerning the immunity of government officials from civil damages liability have been guided by the Constitution, federal statutes, and history. Additionally, at least in the absence of explicit constitutional or congressional guidance, our immunity decisions have been informed by the common law. See Butz v. Economou, supra, at 508; Imbler v. Pachtman, supra, at 421. This Court necessarily also has weighed concerns of public policy, especially as illuminated by our history and the structure of our government. See, e. g., Butz v. Economou, supra, at 508; Imbler v. Pachtman, supra, at 421; Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U. S., at 498.
This case now presents the claim that the President of the United States is shielded by absolute immunity from civil damages liability. In the case of the President the inquiries into history and policy, though mandated independently by our cases, tend to converge. Because the Presidency did not exist through most of the development of common law, any historical analysis must draw its evidence primarily from our constitutional heritage and structure. Historical inquiry thus merges almost at its inception with the kind of “public policy” analysis appropriately undertaken by a federal court. This inquiry involves policies and principles that may be considered implicit in the nature of the President’s office in a system structured to achieve effective government under a constitutionally mandated separation of powers.
<
Here a former President asserts his immunity from civil damages claims of two kinds. He stands named as a defendant in a direct action under the Constitution and in two statutory actions under federal laws of general applicability. In neither case has Congress taken express legislative action to subject the President to civil liability for his official acts.
Applying the principles of our cases to claims of this kind, we hold that petitioner, as a former President of the United States, is entitled to absolute immunity from damages liability predicated on his official acts. We consider this immunity a functionally mandated incident of the President’s unique office, rooted in the constitutional tradition of the separation of powers and supported by our history. Justice Story’s analysis remains persuasive:
“There are... incidental powers, belonging to the executive department, which are necessarily implied from the nature of the functions, which are confided to it. Among these, must necessarily be included the power to perform them.... The president cannot, therefore, be liable to arrest, imprisonment, or detention, while he is in the discharge of the duties of his office; and for this purpose his person must be deemed, in civil cases at least, to possess an official inviolability.” 3 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 1563, pp. 418-419 (1st ed. 1833).
A
The President occupies a unique position in the constitutional scheme. Article II, § 1, of the Constitution provides that “[t]he executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States....” This grant of authority establishes the President as the chief constitutional officer of the Executive Branch, entrusted with supervisory and policy responsibilities of utmost discretion and sensitivity. These include the enforcement of federal law — it is the President who is charged constitutionally to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully' executed”; the conduct of foreign affairs — a realm in which the Court has recognized that “[i]t would be intolerable that courts, without the relevant information, should review and perhaps nullify actions of the Executive taken on information properly held secret”; and management of the Executive Branch — a task for which “imperative reasons re-quir[e] an unrestricted power [in the President] to remove the most important of his subordinates in their most important duties.”
In arguing that the President is entitled only to qualified immunity, the respondent relies on cases in which we have recognized immunity of this scope for governors and cabinet officers. E. g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S. 478 (1978); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232 (1974). We find these cases to be inapposite. The President’s unique status under the Constitution distinguishes him from other executive officials.
Because of the singular importance of the President’s duties, diversion of his energies by concern with private lawsuits would raise unique risks to the effective functioning of government. As is the case with prosecutors and judges— for whom absolute immunity now is established — a President must concern himself with matters likely to “arouse the most intense feelings.” Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S., at 654. Yet, as our decisions have recognized, it is in precisely such cases that there exists the greatest public interest in providing an official “the maximum ability to deal fearlessly and impartially with” the duties of his office. Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U. S. 193, 203 (1979). This concern is compelling where the officeholder must make the most sensitive and far-reaching decisions entrusted to any official under our constitutional system. Nor can the sheer prominence of the President’s office be ignored. In view of the visibility of his office and the effect of his actions on countless people, the President would be an easily identifiable target for suits for civil damages. Cognizance of this personal vulnerability frequently could distract a President from his public duties, to the detriment of not only the President and his office but also the Nation that the Presidency was designed to serve.
B
Courts traditionally have recognized the President’s constitutional responsibilities and status as factors counseling judicial deference and restraint. For example, while courts generally have looked to the common law to determine the scope of an official’s evidentiary privilege, we have recognized that the Presidential privilege is “rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution.” United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S., at 708. It is settled law that the separation-of-powers doctrine does not bar every exercise of jurisdiction over the President of the United States. See, e. g., United States v. Nixon, supra; United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187, 191, 196 (No. 14,694) (CC Va. 1807); cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579 (1952). But our cases also have established that a court, before exercising jurisdiction, must balance the constitutional weight of the interest to be served against the dangers of intrusion on the authority and functions of the Executive Branch. See Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U. S. 425, 443 (1977); United States v. Nixon, supra, at 703-713. When judicial action is needed to serve broad public interests — as when the Court acts, not in derogation of the separation of powers, but to maintain their proper balance, cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, supra, or to vindicate the public interest in an ongoing criminal prosecution, see United States v. Nixon, supra — the exercise of jurisdiction has been held warranted. In the case of this merely private suit for damages based on a President’s official acts, we hold it is not.
c
In defining the scope of an official’s absolute privilege, this Court has recognized that the sphere of protected action must be related closely to the immunity’s justifying purposes. Frequently our decisions have held that an official’s absolute immunity should extend only to acts in performance of particular functions of his office. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S., at 508-517; cf. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S., at 430-431. But the Court also has refused to draw functional lines finer than history and reason would support. See, e. g., Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U. S., at 498 (privilege extends to all matters “committed by law to [an official’s] control or supervision”); Barr v. Matteo, 360 U. S. 564, 575 (1959) (fact “that the action here taken was within the outer perimeter of petitioner’s line of duty is enough to render the privilege applicable.. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U. S., at 363, and n. 12 (judicial privilege applies even to acts occurring outside “the normal attributes of a judicial proceeding”). In view of the special nature of the President’s constitutional office and functions, we think it appropriate to recognize absolute Presidential immunity from damages liability for acts within the “outer perimeter” of his official responsibility.
Under the Constitution and laws of the United States the President has discretionary responsibilities in a broad variety of areas, many of them highly sensitive. In many cases it would be difficult to determine which of the President’s innumerable “functions” encompassed a particular action. In this case, for example, respondent argues that he was dismissed in retaliation for his testimony to Congress — a violation of 5 U. S. C. §7211 (1976 ed., Supp. IV) and 18 U. S. C. § 1505. The Air Force, however, has claimed that the underlying reorganization was undertaken to promote efficiency. Assuming that petitioner Nixon ordered the reorganization in which respondent lost his job, an inquiry into the President’s motives could not be avoided under the kind of “functional” theory asserted both by respondent and the dissent. Inquiries of this kind could be highly intrusive.
Here respondent argues that petitioner Nixon would have acted outside the outer perimeter of his duties by ordering the discharge of an employee who was lawfully entitled to retain his job in the absence of “ ‘such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service.’ ” Brief for Respondent 39, citing 5 U. S. C. § 7512(a). Because Congress has granted this legislative protection, respondent argues, no federal official could, within the outer perimeter of his duties of office, cause Fitzgerald to be dismissed without satisfying this standard in prescribed statutory proceedings.
This construction would subject the President to trial on virtually every allegation that an action was unlawful, or was taken for a forbidden purpose. Adoption of this construction thus would deprive absolute immunity of its intended effect. It clearly is within the President’s constitutional and statutory authority to prescribe the manner in which the Secretary will conduct the business of the Air Force. See 10 U. S. C. § 8012(b). Because this mandate of office must include the authority to prescribe reorganizations and reductions in force, we conclude that petitioner’s alleged wrongful acts lay well within the outer perimeter of his authority.
V
A rule of absolute immunity for the President will not leave the Nation without sufficient protection against misconduct on the part of the Chief Executive. There remains the constitutional remedy of impeachment. In addition, there are formal and informal checks on Presidential action that do not apply with equal force to other executive officials. The President is subjected to constant scrutiny by the press. Vigilant oversight by Congress also may serve to deter Presidential abuses of office, as well as to make credible the threat of impeachment. Other incentives to avoid misconduct may include a desire to earn reelection, the need to maintain prestige as an element of Presidential influence, and a President’s traditional concern for his historical stature.
The existence of alternative remedies and deterrents establishes that absolute immunity will not place the President “above the law.” For the President, as for judges and prosecutors, absolute immunity merely precludes a particular private remedy for alleged misconduct in order to advance compelling public ends.
VI
For the reasons stated in this opinion, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for action consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
See Economies of Military Procurement: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Committee, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. I, pp. 199-201 (1968-1969). It is not disputed that officials in the Department of Defense were both embarrassed and angered by Fitzgerald’s testimony. Within less than two months of respondent’s congressional appearance, staff had prepared a memorandum for the outgoing Secretary of the Air Force, Harold Brown, listing three ways in which Fitzgerald might be removed from his position. See App. 209a-211a (memorandum of John Lang to Harold Brown, Jan. 6, 1969). Among these was a “reduction in force” — the means by which Fitzgerald ultimately was removed by Brown’s successor in office under the new Nixon administration. The reduction in force was announced publicly on November 4, 1969, and Fitzgerald accordingly was separated from the Air Force upon the elimination of his job on January 5, 1970.
See The Dismissal of A. Ernest Fitzgerald by the Department of Defense: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Committee, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). Some 60 Members of Congress also signed a letter to the President protesting the “firing of this dedicated public servant” as a “punitive action.” Id., at 115-116.
A briefing memorandum on the Fitzgerald matter had been prepared by White House staff in anticipation of a possible inquiry at the forthcoming press conference. Authored by aide Patrick Buchanan, it advanced the view that the Air Force was “firing... a good public servant.” App. 269a (memorandum of Patrick Buchanan to Richard Nixon, Dec. 5, 1969). The memorandum suggested that the President order Fitzgerald's retention by the Defense Department.
Id., at 228a.
See id., at 109a-112a (deposition of H. R. Haldeman); id., at 137a-141a (deposition of petitioner Richard Nixon). Haldeman’s deposed testimony was based on his handwritten notes of December 12, 1969. Id., at 275a.
See id., at 126a (deposition of Robert Mayo); id., at 141a (deposition of Richard Nixon).
Both Mayo and his deputy, James Schlesinger, appear to have resisted at least partly due to a suspicion that Fitzgerald lacked institutional loyalty to executive policies and that he spoke too freely in communications with friends on Capitol Hill. Both also stated that high-level positions were presently unavailable within the Bureau of the Budget. See id., at 126a (deposition of Robert Mayo); id., at 146a-147a (deposition of James Schlesinger).
Quoted in Decision on the Appeal of A. Ernest Fitzgerald (Sept. 18, 1973) (CSC Decision), reprinted in App. 60a, 84a. (Page citations to the CSC Decision refer to the cited page in the Joint Appendix.)
Id., at 85a. The memorandum added that “‘[w]e owe “first choice on Fitzgerald” to [Senator] Proxmire and others who tried so hard to make him a hero [for exposing the cost overruns].’ ” Suspicion of Fitzgerald’s assumed loyalty toward Senator Proxmire was widely shared in the White House and in the Defense Department. According to the CSC Decision, supra:
“While Mr. Fitzgerald has denied that he was ‘Senator Proxmier’s [sic] boy in the Air Force’, and he may honestly believe it, we find this statement difficult to accept. It is evident that the top officials in the Air Force, without specifically saying so, considered him to be just that.... We also note that upon leaving the Air Force Mr. Fitzgerald was employed as a consultant by the Proxmire Committee and that Senator Proxmire appeared at the Commission hearing as a character witness for [Fitzgerald].” App. 83a.
Id., at 61a.
See id., at 83a-84a.
See ibid.
Id., at 185a. A few hours after the press conference, Mr. Nixon repeated privately to Presidential aide Charles Colson that he had ordered Fitzgerald’s firing. Id., at 214a-215a (recorded conversation of Jan. 31, 1973).
Id., at 196a (transcription of statement of White House press secretary Ronald Ziegler, Feb. 1, 1973). In a conversation with aide John Ehrliehman, following his conversation with Charles
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | H | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Ginsburg
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether an appellate court, reviewing a judgment according public officials qualified immunity from a damages suit charging violation of a federal right, must disregard relevant legal authority not presented to, or considered by, the court of first instance. We hold that appellate review of qualified immunity dispositions is to be conducted in light of all relevant precedents, not simply those cited to, or discovered by, the district court.
I
In April 1987, police officers in Idaho learned that Charles Elder was wanted by Florida authorities. They set out to arrest Elder, but did not obtain an Idaho arrest warrant. The officers planned to apprehend Elder at his workplace, in a public area where a warrant is not required. See United States v. Watson, 423 U. S. 411, 418, n. 6 (1976). Finding that Elder had already left his jobsite, the officers surrounded the house in which he resided and ordered him to come out. Elder suffered epileptic seizures during the episode, and an officer instructed him to crawl out of the house to avoid injury from falling. Elder, instead, walked through the doorway, immediately suffered another seizure, and fell on the concrete walk in front of the house. He sustained serious brain trauma and remains partially paralyzed.
II
Alleging that the warrantless arrest violated his Fourth Amendment right to be secure against unreasonable seizure, Elder sued the arresting officers for damages under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. The doctrine of qualified immunity shields public officials like respondents from damages actions unless their conduct was unreasonable in light of clearly established law. The District Court analyzed Elder’s case in three steps. Had the arrest occurred inside the house, that court recognized, clear law would come into play: absent exigent circumstances, an arrest warrant would have been required. See 751 F. Supp. 858, 860 (Idaho 1990) (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573 (1980)). If the same clear law governed Elder’s arrest as it in fact transpired, the District Court said, then the matter of exigent circumstances would present a triable issue. 751 F. Supp., at 865. But, the District Court concluded, it was not clear that the warrant requirement applied when officers surrounded a house and requested an individual inside to come out and surrender. For that scenario, the one presented here, the District Court “found no controlling Idaho or Ninth Circuit case law.” Id., at 866. The District Court accordingly granted summary judgment for the officers on qualified immunity grounds. See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800, 818 (1982) (officials “are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known”).
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit noticed precedent in point missed in the District Court: United States v. Al-Azzawy, 784 F. 2d 890 (CA9 1985), cert. denied, 476 U. S. 1144 (1986). Al-Azzawy, the Court of Appeals observed, involved a suspect seized outside his surrounded home. The Al-Azzawy decision, published over a year before Elder’s arrest, “might have alerted a reasonable officer to the constitutional implications of putting a suspect under arrest after he had come outside his house pursuant to an order to exit.” 975 F. 2d 1388, 1391-1392 (1991). Indeed, Al-Azzawy explicitly “reaffirmed the rule that ‘it is the location of the arrested person, and not the arresting agents, that determines whether an arrest occurs within a home.’ [Al-Azzawy, 784 F. 2d, at 893] (quoting United States v. Johnson, 626 F. 2d 753, 757 (9th Cir. 1980), aff'd on other grounds, 457 U. S. 537 .. . (1982)).” 975 F. 2d, at 1391.
Elder could not benefit from the rule reaffirmed in AlAzzawy, the Court of Appeals believed, because that precedent had been unearthed too late. For the conclusion that cases unmentioned in the District Court could not control on appeal, the Court of Appeals relied on Davis v. Scherer, 468 U. S. 183 (1984), in particular, on this statement from Davis: “A plaintiff who seeks damages for violation of constitutional or statutory rights may overcome the defendant official’s qualified immunity only by showing that those rights were clearly established at the time of the conduct at issue.” Id., at 197 (emphasis added).
Although typing the qualified immunity inquiry “a ‘pure questiofn] of law,’” 975 F. 2d, at 1392 (quoting Romero v. Kitsap County, 931 F. 2d 624, 627-628 (CA9 1991)), the Court of Appeals read Davis to require plaintiffs to put into the district court record, as “legal facts,” the cases showing that the right asserted was “clearly established.” 975 F. 2d, at 1394. Just as appellants forfeit facts not presented to the court of first instance, the Ninth Circuit reasoned, so, in the peculiar context of civil rights qualified immunity litigation, a plaintiff may not benefit on appeal from precedent neither he nor the district court itself mentioned in the first instance: “[T]he plaintiff’s burden in responding to a request for judgment based on qualified immunity is to identify the universe of statutory or decisional law from which the [district] court can determine whether the right allegedly violated was clearly established.” Id., at 1392. We granted certiorari, 509 U. S. 921 (1993).
Ill
The central purpose of affording public officials qualified immunity from suit is to protect them “from undue interference with their duties and from potentially disabling threats of liability.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S., at 806. The rule announced by the Ninth Circuit does not aid this objective because its operation is unpredictable in advance of the district court’s adjudication. Nor does the rule further the interests on the other side of the balance: deterring public officials’ unlawful actions and compensating victims of such conduct. Instead, it simply releases defendants because of shortages in counsel’s or the court’s legal research or briefing.
In thinking its rule compelled by this Court’s instruction, the Ninth Circuit misconstrued Davis v. Scherer. The Court held in Davis that an official’s clear violation of a state administrative regulation does not allow a § 1983 plaintiff to overcome the official’s qualified immunity. Only in this context is the Court’s statement comprehensible: “A plaintiff who seeks damages for violation of constitutional or statutory rights may overcome the defendant official’s qualified immunity only by showing that those rights were clearly established____” Davis v. Scherer, 468 U. S., at 197 (emphasis added). Davis, in short, concerned not the authorities a court may consider in determining qualified immunity, but this entirely discrete question: Is qualified immunity defeated where a defendant violates any clearly established duty, including one under state law, or must the clearly established right be the federal right on which the claim for relief is based? The Court held the latter. Id., at 193-196, and n. 14; see 984 F. 2d 991, 995 (CA9 1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of reh’g en banc).
Whether an asserted federal right was clearly established at a particular time, so that a public official who allegedly violated the right has no qualified immunity from suit, presents a question of law, not one of “legal facts.” See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U. S. 511, 528 (1985); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S., at 818. That question of law, like the generality of such questions, must be resolved de novo on appeal. See, e. g., Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U. S. 552, 558 (1988). A court engaging in review of a qualified immunity judgment should therefore use its “full knowledge of its own [and other relevant] precedents.” See Davis, 468 U. S., at 192, n. 9.
We leave it to the Court of Appeals to consider, in light of all relevant authority, including Al-Azzawy, whether the respondent officers are entitled to prevail on their qualified immunity defense. We express no opinion on that ultimate issue, nor do we consider whether the officers’ alternate plea of exigent circumstances is tenable.
* * *
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
According to depositions before the District Court, Elder had access to guns in the house, a consideration that might support an exigent circumstances plea. On the other hand, the police started to plan for the arrest five days before it occurred, a factor that might tug against a finding of exigency.
Elder’s brief in the Court of Appeals did cite Al-Azzawy, albeit without elaboration. Brief for Appellant in No. 91-35146 (CA9), p. 9. There was cause for Elder’s caution: The ultimate holding of Al-Azzawy was that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless arrest. Cf. n. 1, supra.
The Ninth Circuit’s rule could have a number of untoward effects. It could occasion appellate affirmation of incorrect legal results, see 984 F. 2d 991, 998-999 (CA9 1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of reh’g en banc), and it could place defense counsel in a trying situation. See ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.3(a) (1989 ed.) (“A lawyer shall not knowingly: ... (3) fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel.”).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | I | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Stewart
delivered the opinion of the Court.
A New York law confers upon every judge in a non-jury criminal trial the power to deny counsel any opportunity to make a summation of the evidence before the rendition of judgment. N. Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 320.20 (3) (c) (1971). In the case before us we are called upon to assess the constitutional validity of that law.
I
The appellant was brought to trial in the Supreme Court of Richmond County, N. Y., upon charges of attempted robbery in the first and third degrees and possession of a dangerous instrument. He waived a jury.
The trial began on a Thursday, and, after certain preliminaries, the balance of that day and most of Friday were spent on the case for the prosecution. The complaining witness, Allen Braxton, testified that the appellant had approached him outside his home in a Staten Island housing project at about six o’clock on the evening of September 15, 1971, and asked for money. He said that when he refused this demand, the appellant had swung a knife at him. On cross-examination, the appellant’s lawyer attempted to impeach the credibility of this evidence by demonstrating inconsistencies between Braxton’s testimony and other sworn statements that Braxton had previously made. The only other witness for the prosecution was the police officer who had arrested the appellant upon the complaint of Braxton. The officer testified that Braxton had reported the alleged incident to him, and that the appellant, when confronted by the officer later in the evening, had denied Braxton’s story and said that he had been working for a Mr. Taylor at the time of the alleged offense. The officer testified that he had then arrested the appellant and found a small knife in his pocket.
At the close of the case for the prosecution, the court granted a defense motion to dismiss the charge of possession of a dangerous instrument on the ground that the knife in evidence was too small to qualify as a dangerous instrument under state law. The trial was then adjourned for the two-day weekend.
Proceedings did not actually resume until the following Monday afternoon. The first witness for the defense was Donald Taylor, who was the appellant’s employer. He testified that he recalled seeing the appellant on the job premises at about 5:30 p. m. on the day of the alleged offense. The appellant then took the stand and denied Braxton’s story. He said that he had been working on a refrigerator at his place of employment during the time of the alleged offense, and further testified that Braxton, a former neighbor, had threatened on several occasions to “fix” him for refusing to give Braxton money for wine and drugs.
At the conclusion of the case for the defense, counsel made a motion to dismiss the robbery charges. This motion was denied. The appellant’s lawyer then requested to “be heard somewhat on the facts.” The trial judge replied: “Under the new statute, summation is discretionary, and I choose not to hear summations.” The judge thereupon found the appellant guilty of attempted robbery in the third degree, and subsequently sentenced him to serve an indeterminate term of imprisonment with a maximum of four years. The conviction was affirmed without opinion by an intermediate appellate court. Leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals was denied. An appeal was then brought here, and we noted probable jurisdiction. 419 U. S. 893.
II
The Sixth Amendment guarantees to the accused in all criminal prosecutions the rights to a “speedy and public trial,” to an “impartial jury,” to notice of the “nature and cause of the accusation,” to be “confronted” with opposing witnesses, to “compulsory process” for defense witnesses, and to the “Assistance of Counsel.” These fundamental rights are extended to a defendant in a state criminal prosecution through the Fourteenth Amendment.
The decisions of this Court have not given to these constitutional provisions a narrowly literalistic construction. More specifically, the right to the assistance of counsel has been understood to mean that there can be no restrictions upon the function of counsel in defending a criminal prosecution in accord with the traditions of the adversary factfinding process that has been constitutionalized in the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. For example, in Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U. S. 570, the Court held constitutionally invalid a state statute that, while permitting the defendant to make an unsworn statement to the court and jury, prevented defense counsel from eliciting the defendant’s testimony through direct examination. Similarly, in Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U. S. 605, the Court found unconstitutional a state law that restricted the right of counsel to decide “whether, and when in the course of presenting his defense, the accused should take the stand.” Id., at 613. The right to the assistance of counsel has thus been given a meaning that ensures to the defense in a criminal trial the opportunity to participate fully and fairly in the adversary factfinding process.
There can be no doubt that closing argument for the defense is a basic element of the adversary factfinding process in a criminal trial. Accordingly, it has universally been held that counsel for the defense has a right to make a closing summation to the jury, no matter how strong the case for the prosecution may appear to the presiding judge. The issue has been considered less often in the context of a so-called bench trial. But the overwhelming weight of authority, in both federal and state courts, holds that a total denial of the opportunity for final argument in a non jury criminal trial is a denial of the basic right of the accused to make his' defense.
One of many cases so holding was Yopps v. State, 228 Md. 204, 178 A. 2d 879 (1962). The defendant in that case, indicted for burglary, was tried by the court without a jury. The defendant in his testimony admitted being in the vicinity of the offense, but denied any involvement in the crime. At the conclusion of the testimony, the trial judge announced a judgment of guilty. Defense counsel objected, stating that he wished to present argument on the facts. But the trial judge refused to hear any argument on the ground that only a question of credibility was involved, and that therefore counsel’s argument would not change his mind. The Maryland Court of Appeals held that the trial court’s refusal to permit defense counsel to make a final summation violated the defendant’s right to the assistance of counsel under the State and Federal Constitutions:
“The Constitutional right of a defendant to be heard through counsel necessarily includes his right to have his counsel make a proper argument on the evidence and the applicable law in his favor, however simple, clear, unimpeached, and conclusive the evidence may seem, unless he has waived his right to such argument, or unless the argument is not within the issues in the case, and the trial court has no discretion to deny the accused such right.” Id., at 207, 178 A. 2d, at 881.
The widespread recognition of the right of the defense to make a closing summary of the evidence to the trier of the facts, whether judge or jury, finds solid support in history. In the 16th and 17th centuries, when notions of compulsory process, confrontation, and counsel were in their infancy, the essence of the English criminal trial was argument between the defendant and counsel for the Crown. Whatever other procedural protections may have been lacking, there was no absence of debate on the factual and legal issues raised in a criminal case. As the rights to compulsory process, to confrontation, and to counsel developed, the adversary system’s commitment to argument was neither discarded nor diluted. Rather, the reform in procedure had the effect of shifting the primary function of argument to summation of the evidence at the close of trial, in contrast to the “fragmented” factual argument that had been typical of the earlier common law.
It can hardly be questioned that closing argument serves to sharpen and clarify the issues for resolution by the trier of fact in a criminal case. For it is only after all the evidence is in that counsel for the parties are in a position to present their respective versions of the case as a whole. Only then can they argue the inferences to be drawn from all the testimony, and point out the weaknesses of their adversaries’ positions. And for the defense, closing argument is the last clear chance to persuade the trier of fact that there may be reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt. See In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358.
The very premise of our adversary system of criminal justice is that partisan advocacy on both sides of a case will best promote the ultimate objective that the guilty be convicted and the innocent go free. In a criminal trial, which is in the end basically a factfinding process, no aspect of such advocacy could be more important than the opportunity finally to marshal the evidence for each side before submission of the case to judgment.
This is not to say that closing arguments in a criminal case must be uncontrolled or even unrestrained. The presiding judge must be and is given great latitude in controlling the duration and limiting the scope of closing summations. He may limit counsel to a reasonable time and may terminate argument when continuation would be repetitive or redundant. He may ensure that argument does not stray unduly from the mark, or otherwise impede the fair and orderly conduct of the trial. In all these respects he must have broad discretion. See generally 5 R. Anderson, Wharton’s Criminal Law and Procedure §2077 (1957). Cf. American Bar Association Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, The Prosecution Function § 5.8, pp. 126-129, and the Defense Function § 7.8, pp. 277-282 (App. Draft 1971).
But there can be no justification for a statute that empowers a trial judge to deny absolutely the opportunity for any closing summation at all. The only conceivable interest served by such a statute is expediency. Yet the difference in any case between total denial of final argument and a concise but persuasive summation could spell the difference, for the defendant, between liberty and unjust imprisonment.
Some cases may appear to the trial judge to be simple — open and shut — at the close of the evidence. And surely in many such cases a closing argument will, in the words of Mr. Justice Jackson, be “likely to leave [a] judge just where it found him.” But just as surely, there will be cases where closing argument may correct a premature misjudgment and avoid an otherwise erroneous verdict. And there is no certain way for a trial judge to identify accurately which cases these will be, until the judge has heard the closing summation of counsel.
The present case is illustrative. This three-day trial was interrupted by an interval of more than two days— a period during which the judge's memory may well have dimmed, however conscientious a note-taker he may have been. At the conclusion of the evidence on the trial's final day, the appellant's lawyer might usefully have pointed to the direct conflict in the trial testimony of the only two prosecution witnesses concerning how. and when the appellant was found on the evening of the alleged offense. He might also have stressed the many inconsistencies, elicited on cross-examination, between the trial testimony of the complaining witness and his earlier sworn statements. He might reasonably have argued that the testimony of the appellant’s employer was entitled to greater credibility than that of the complaining witness, who, according to the appellant, had threatened to “fix” him because of personal differences in the past. There is no way to know whether these or any other appropriate arguments in summation might have affected the ultimate judgment in this case. The credibility assessment was solely for the trier of fact. But before that determination was made, the appellant, through counsel, had a right to be heard in summation of the evidence from the point of view most favorable to him.
In denying the appellant this right under the authority of its statute, New York denied him the assistance of counsel that the Constitution guarantees. Accordingly, the judgment before us is vacated and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is.so ordered.
Section 320.20 (3) (c) provides:
“The court may in its discretion permit the parties to deliver summations. If the court grants permission to one party, it must grant it to the other also. If both parties deliver summations, the defendant’s summation must be delivered first.”
By contrast, New York law explicitly grants a right to make a “closing statement” in every civil case. N. Y. Civ. Prac. Rule 4016 (1963).
N. Y. Penal Law §§ 110.00/160.15, 110.00/160.05, 265.05 (1975).
On cross-examination of Braxton, the appellant’s lawyer demonstrated the following inconsistencies: First, Braxton testified at trial that, after running into his house to evade the appellant, he did not look back outside to see where the appellant had gone; but before the grand jury, Braxton had said that, after entering his house, he had looked outside and the appellant was gone. Second, Braxton testified at trial that the knifeblade was shiny; but in his grand jury testimony he had said that he could not remember if it was shiny or not. Third, Braxton testified at trial that the appellant had asked him for money in a “soft” voice; but before the grand jury he had stated that the request for money was “kind of loud.” Fourth, Braxton testified at trial that the appellant had swung a blade at him once; but in the felony complaint filed the day after the alleged crime, he had stated that the appellant had swung a knife at him “a couple of times.”
There was a major inconsistency between the police officer’s testimony and that of Braxton. Braxton testified that he was walking down the street with the officer at about 6:45 p. m. when they came across the appellant. But the officer testified that he had searched for the appellant with Braxton until only about 6:30 p. m., when they had separated, and that about an hour later he had seen the appellant and Braxton on opposite sides of Broadway. Thus Braxton testified that he and the officer were together when they found the appellant about 6:45 p. m., while the officer’s testimony was that he had separated from Braxton about 6:30 p. m., and that he next saw Braxton and the appellant on opposite sides of a street at about 7:30 p. m.
The court subsequently certified that in affirming the judgment, it had rejected the appellant’s constitutional claims:
“Upon the appeal herein, there was presented and passed upon the following constitutional question, namely, whether relator’s rights under the Fourth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments were denied by the trial court’s application of paragraph (c) of subdivision 3 of CPL 320.20 to refuse appellant permission to deliver a summation. This court considered appellant’s said conviction and determined that none of his constitutional rights were violated.”
The Sixth Amendment provides:
“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury ...[,] to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”
See Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U. S. 213 (speedy trial); In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257 (public trial); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U, S. 145 (jury trial); Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U. S. 196 (notice of nature and cause of accusation); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U. S. 400 (confrontation); Washington v. Texas, 388 U. S. 14 (compulsory process); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335, and Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U. S. 25 (assistance of counsel).
See, e. g., Jackson v. State, 239 Ala. 38, 193 So. 417 (1940); Yeldell v. State, 100 Ala. 26, 14 So. 570 (1894); People v. Green, 99 Cal. 564, 34 P. 231 (1893); State v. Hoyt, 47 Conn. 518 (1880); Hall v. State, 119 Fla. 38, 160 So. 511 (1935); Williams v. State, 60 Ga. 367 (1878); Porter v. State, 6 Ga. App. 770, 65 S. E. 814 (1909); State v. Gilbert, 65 Idaho 210, 142 P. 2d 584 (1943); People v. McMullen, 300 Ill. 383, 133 N. E. 328 (1921); Lynch v. State, 9 Ind. 541 (1857); State v. Verry, 36 Kan. 416, 13 P. 838 (1887); Sizemore v. Commonwealth, 240 Ky. 279, 42 S. W. 2d 328 (1931); State v. Cancienne, 50 La. Ann. 1324, 24 So. 321 (1898); Wingo v. State, 62 Miss. 311 (1884); State v. Page, 21 Mo. 257 (1855); State v. Tighe, 27 Mont. 327, 71 P. 3 (1903); State v. Shedoudy, 45 N. M. 516, 118 P. 2d 280 (1941); People v. Marcelin, 23 App. Div. 2d 368, 260 N. Y. S. 2d 560 (1965); State v. Hardy, 189 N. C. 799, 128 S. E. 152 (1925); Weaver v. State, 24 Ohio St. 584 (1874); State v. Bogoway, 45 Ore. 601, 78 P. 987 (1904), rehearing, 45 Ore. 611, 81 P. 234 (1905); Stewart v. Commonwealth, 117 Pa. 378, 11 A. 370 (1887); State v. Ballenger, 202 S. C. 155, 24 S. E. 2d 175 (1943); Word v. Commonwealth, 30 Va. 743 (1831); State v. Mayo, 42 Wash. 540, 85 P. 251 (1906); Seattle v. Erickson, 55 Wash. 675, 104 P. 1128 (1909).
One treatise states the general rule as follows: “The presentation of his defense by argument to the jury, by himself or his counsel, is a constitutional right of the defendant which may not be denied him, however clear the evidence may seem to the trial court.” 5 R. Anderson, Wharton’s Criminal Law and Procedure § 2077 (1957).
See United States v. Walls, 443 F. 2d 1220 (CA6 1971); Thomas v. District of Columbia, 67 App. D. C. 179, 90 F. 2d 424 (1937) ; United States ex rel. Spears v. Johnson, 327 F. Supp. 1021 (ED Pa. 1971), rev’d on other grounds, 463 F. 2d 1024 (CA3 1972); United States ex rel. Wilcox v. Pennsylvania, 273 F. Supp. 923 (ED Pa. 1967); Floyd v. State, 90 So. 2d 105 (Fla. 1956); Olds v. Commonwealth, 10 Ky. 465 (1821); Yopps v. State, 228 Md. 204, 178 A. 2d 879 (1962); People v. Thomas, 390 Mich. 93, 210 N. W. 2d 776 (1973); Decker v. State, 113 Ohio St. 512, 150 N. E. 74 (1925); Commonwealth v. McNair, 208 Pa. Super. 369, 222 A. 2d 599 (1966); Commonwealth v. Gambrell, 450 Pa. 290, 301 A. 2d 596 (1973); Anselin v. State, 72 Tex. Cr. R. 17, 160 S. W. 713 (1913); Walker v. State, 133 Tex. Cr. R. 300, 110 S. W. 2d 578 (1937); Ferguson v. State, 133 Tex. Cr. R. 250, 110 S. W. 2d 61 (1937). Cf. Collingsworth v. Mayo, 173 F. 2d 695, 697 (CA5 1949) ; State v. Hollingsworth, 160 La. 26, 106 So. 662 (1925). But see People v. Manske, 399 Ill. 176, 77 N. E. 2d 164 (1948). Cf. People v. Berger, 288 Ill. 47, 119 N. E. 975 (1918); Casterlow v. State, 256 Ind. 214, 267 N. E. 2d 552 (1971); Reed v. State, 232 Ind. 68, 111 N. E. 2d 661 (1953); Lewis v. State, 11 Ga. App. 14, 74 S. E. 442 (1912),
Stephen has described the trial procedure in this period as a “long argument between the prisoner and the counsel for the Crown.” 1 J. Stephen, History of the Criminal Law of England 326 (1883). For a fuller description of the trial process in that period, see id,., at 325-326, 350.
See 7 Will. 3, c. 3, § 1 (1695); 1 Anne, Stat. 2, c. 9, § 3 (1701) ; 6&7 Will. 4, c. 114, § 1 (1836).
Cf. Stephen, supra, n. 10, at 349.
In the Colonies, where a similar reform in criminal defendants’ rights occurred, common practice, if not right, apparently gave to the accused the opportunity to sum up his case in closing argument. For example, Zephaniah Swift, in an early colonial treatise on the law in Connecticut, wrote:
“When the exhibition of evidence is closed, the attorney for the state opens the argument, the counsel for the prisoner follow[s], the attorney for the state then closes the argument, and the chief justice then sums up the evidence in his charge delivered to the jury, in which he states in the most candid and impartial manner, the evidence and the law, and the arguments of the counsel for the state, as well as the prisoner. ...” 2 Z. Swift, A System of the Laws of the State of Connecticut 401 (1796).
With a lesser degree of certainty, a modern scholar concludes that in the trial of capital offenses in colonial Virginia, it was likely, but not certain, that the accused would be given an opportunity to make a dosing argument in summation at the end of the trial. See H. Rankin, Criminal Trial Proceedings in the General Court of Colonial Virginia 101 (1965).
In England, in 1865, the right of the defendant in a criminal trial to make a closing argument, either by himself or by counsel if he was represented, was given express statutory recognition: “[U]pon every Trial . . . whether the Prisoners ... or any of them, shall be defended by Counsel or not . . . such Prisoner . . . shall be entitled . . . when all the Evidence is concluded to sum up the Evidence respectively.” Criminal Procedure Act of 1865, 28 Viet., c. 18, § 2. This remains the rule in England. 10 Halsbury’s Laws of England § 777, pp. 422-423 (3d ed. 1955). See also T. Butler & M. Garsia, Archibold’s Pleading, Evidence and Practice in Criminal Cases, § 558 (37th ed. 1969). Cf. R. v. Wainwright, 13 Cox Cr. Cas. 171 (1875); R. v. Wickham, 55 Cr. App. R. 199 (1971) (noted at 1971 Crim. L. Rev. 233).
We deal in this case only with final argument or summation at the conclusion of the evidence in a criminal trial. Nothing said in this opinion is to be understood as implying the existence of a constitutional right to oral argument at any other stage of the trial or appellate process.
R. Jackson, The Struggle for Judicial Supremacy 301 (1941).
The contention has been made that, while a right to make closing argument should be recognized in a jury trial, there is insufficient justification for such a right in the context of a bench trial. This view rests on the premise that a judge, with legal training and experience, will be likely to see the case clearly, rendering argument superfluous, or to recognize that further illumination of the issues would be helpful, in which ease he would permit closing argument.
We find this contention unpersuasive. Judicial training and expertise, however it may enhance judgment, does not render memory or reasoning infallible. Moreover, in one important respect, closing argument may be even more important in a bench trial than in a trial by jury. As Mr. Justice Powell has observed, the “collective judgment” of the jury "tends to compensate for individual shortcomings and furnishes some assurance of a reliable decision.” Powell, Jury Trial of Crimes, 23 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1, 4 (1966). In contrast, the judge who tries a case presumably will reach his verdict with deliberation and contemplation, but must reach it without the stimulation of opposing viewpoints inherent in the collegial decision-making process of a jury.
See n. 4, supra.
See n. 3, supra.
A defendant who has exercised the right to conduct his own defense has, of course, the same right to make a closing argument. See Faretta v. California, ante, p. 806.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | A | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Scalia
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondents are a group of organizations dedicated to protecting the environment. (We will refer to them collectively as “Earth Island.”) They Seek to prevent the United States Forest Service from enforcing regulations that exempt small fire-rehabilitation and timber-salvage projects from the notice, comment, and appeal process used by the Forest Service for more significant land management decisions. We must determine whether respondents have standing to challenge the regulations in the absence of a live dispute over a concrete application of those regulations.
I
In 1992, Congress enacted the Forest Service Decision-making and Appeals Reform Act (Appeals Reform Act or Act), Pub. L. 102-381, Tit. Ill, §322, 106 Stat. 1419, note following 16 U. S. C. § 1612. Among other things, this required the Forest Service to establish a notice, comment, and appeal process for “proposed actions of the Forest Service concerning projects and activities implementing land and resource management plans developed under the Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act of 1974.” Ibid.
The Forest Service’s regulations implementing the Act provided that certain of its procedures would not be applied to projects that the Service considered categorically excluded from the requirement to file an environmental impact statement (EIS) or environmental assessment (EA). 36 CFR §§ 215.4(a) (notice and comment), 215.12(f) (appeal) (2008). Later amendments to the Forest Service’s manual of implementing procedures, adopted by rule after notice and comment, provided that fire-rehabilitation activities on areas of less than 4,200 acres, and salvage-timber sales of 250 acres or less, did not cause a significant environmental impact and thus would be categorically exempt from the requirement to file an EIS or EA. 68 Fed. Reg. 33824 (2003) (Forest Service Handbook (FSH) 1909.15, ch. 30, §31.2(11)); 68 Fed. Reg. 44607 (FSH 1909.15, ch. 30, §31.2(13)). This had the effect of excluding these projects from the notice, comment, and appeal process.
In the summer of 2002, fire burned a significant area of the Sequoia National Forest. In September 2003, the Service issued a decision memo approving the Burnt Ridge Project, a salvage sale of timber on 238 acres damaged by that fire. Pursuant to its categorical exclusion of salvage sales of less than 250 acres, the Forest Service did not provide notice in a form consistent with the Appeals Reform Act, did not provide a period of public comment, and did not make an appeal process available.
In December 2003, respondents filed a complaint in the Eastern District of California, challenging the failure of the Forest Service to apply to the Burnt Ridge Project § 215.4(a) of its regulations implementing the Appeals Reform Act (requiring prior notice and comment), and §215.12(f) of the regulations (setting forth an appeal procedure). The complaint also challenged six other Forest Service regulations implementing the Act that were not applied to the Burnt Ridge Project. They are irrelevant to this appeal.
The District Court granted a preliminary injunction against the Burnt Ridge salvage-timber sale. Soon thereafter, the parties settled their dispute over the Burnt Ridge Project and the District Court concluded that “the Burnt Ridge timber sale is not at issue in this case.” Earth Island Inst. v. Pengilly, 376 F. Supp. 2d 994, 999 (ED Cal. 2005). The Government argued that, with the Burnt Ridge dispute settled, and with no other project before the court in which respondents were threatened with injury in fact, respondents lacked standing to challenge the regulations; and that absent a concrete dispute over a particular project a challenge to the regulations would not be ripe. The District Court proceeded, however, to adjudicate the merits of Earth Island’s challenges. It invalidated five of the regulations (including §§ 215.4(a) and 215.12(f)), id., at 1011, and entered a nationwide injunction against their application, Earth Island Inst. v. Ruthenbeck, No. CIV F-03-6386 JKS, 2005 WL 5280466, *2 (Sept. 20, 2005).
The Ninth Circuit held that Earth Island’s challenges to regulations not at issue in the Burnt Ridge Project were not ripe for adjudication because there was “not a sufficient ‘case or controversy’” before the court to sustain a facial challenge. Earth Island Inst. v. Ruthenbeck, 490 F. 3d 687, 696 (2007) (amended opinion). It affirmed, however, the District Court’s determination that §§ 215.4(a) and 215.12(f), which were applicable to the Burnt Ridge Project, were contrary to law, and upheld the nationwide injunction against their application.
The Government sought review of the question whether Earth Island could challenge the regulations at issue in the Burnt Ridge Project, and if so whether a nationwide injunction was appropriate relief. We granted certiorari, 552 U. S. 1162 (2008).
II
In limiting the judicial power to “Cases” and “Controversies,” Article III of the Constitution restricts it to the traditional role of Anglo-American courts, which is to redress or prevent actual or imminently threatened injury to persons caused by private or official violation of law. Except when necessary in the execution of that function, courts have no charter to review and revise legislative and executive action. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 559-560 (1992); Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U. S. 95, 111-112 (1983). This limitation “is founded in concern about the proper — and properly limited — role of the courts in a democratic society.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 498 (1975). See United States v. Richardson, 418 U. S. 166, 179 (1974).
The doctrine of standing is one of several doctrines that reflect this fundamental limitation. It requires federal courts to satisfy themselves that “the plaintiff has ‘alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy’ as to warrant his invocation of federal-court jurisdiction.” Warth, supra, at 498-499. He bears the burden of showing that he has standing for each type of relief sought. See Lyons, supra, at 105. To seek injunctive relief, a plaintiff must show that he is under threat of suffering “injury in fact” that is concrete and particularized; the threat must be actual and imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; it must be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and it must be likely that a favorable judicial decision will prevent or redress the injury. Friends of Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U. S. 167, 180-181 (2000). This requirement assures that “there is a real need to exercise the power of judicial review in order to protect the interests of the complaining party,” Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U. S. 208, 221 (1974). Where that need does not exist, allowing courts to oversee legislative or executive action “would significantly alter the allocation of power . . . away from a democratic form of government,” Richardson, supra, at 188 (Powell, J., concurring).
The regulations under challenge here neither require nor forbid any action on the part of respondents. The standards and procedures that they prescribe for Forest Service appeals govern only the conduct of Forest Service officials engaged in project planning. “[Wjhen the plaintiff is not himself the object of the government action or inaction he challenges, standing is not precluded, but it is ordinarily ‘substantially more difficult’ to establish.” Defenders of Wildlife, supra, at 562. Here, respondents can demonstrate standing only if application of the regulations by the Government will affect them in the manner described above.
It is common ground that the respondent organizations can assert the standing of their members. To establish the concrete and particularized injury that standing requires, respondents point to their members’ recreational interests in the national forests. While generalized harm to the forest or the environment will not alone support standing, if that harm in fact affects the recreational or even the mere esthetic interests of the plaintiff, that will suffice. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S. 727, 734-736 (1972).
Affidavits submitted to the District Court alleged that organization member Ara Marderosian had repeatedly visited the Burnt Ridge site, that he had imminent plans to do so again, and that his interests in viewing the flora and fauna of the area would be harmed if the Burnt Ridge Project went forward without incorporation of the ideas he would have suggested if the Forest Service had provided him an opportunity to comment. The Government concedes this was sufficient to establish Article III standing with respect to Burnt Ridge. Brief for Petitioners 28. Marderosian’s threatened injury with regard to that project was originally one of the bases for the present suit. After the District Court had issued a preliminary injunction, however, the parties settled their differences on that score. Marderosian’s injury in fact with regard to that project has been remedied, and it is, as the District Court pronounced, “not at issue in this case.” 376 F. Supp. 2d, at 999. We know of no precedent for the proposition that when a plaintiff has sued to challenge the lawfulness of certain action or threatened action but has settled that suit, he retains standing to challenge the basis for that action (here, the regulation in the abstract), apart from any concrete application that threatens imminent harm to his interests. Such a holding would fly in the face of Article Ill’s injury-in-fact requirement. See Lyons, supra, at 111.
Respondents have identified no other application of the invalidated regulations that threatens imminent and concrete harm to the interests of their members. The only other affidavit relied on was that of Jim Bensman. He asserted, first, that he had suffered injury in the past from development on Forest Service land. That does not suffice for several reasons: because it was not tied to application of the challenged regulations, because it does not identify any particular site, and because it relates to past injury rather than imminent future injury that is sought to be enjoined.
Bensman’s affidavit further asserts that he has visited many national forests and plans to visit several unnamed national forests in the future. Respondents describe this as a mere failure to “provide the name of each timber sale that affected [Bensman’s] interests,” Brief for Respondents 44. It is much more (or much less) than that. It is a failure to allege that any particular timber sale or other project claimed to be unlawfully subject to the regulations will impede a specific and concrete plan of Bensman’s to enjoy the national forests. The national forests occupy more than 190 million acres, an area larger than Texas. See Meet the Forest Service, http://www.fs.fed.us/aboutus/meetfs.shtml (as visited Feb. 27, 2009, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file). There may be a chance, but is hardly a likelihood, that Bensman’s wanderings will bring him to a parcel about to be affected by a project unlawfully subject to the regulations. Indeed, without further specification it is impossible to tell which projects are (in respondents’ view) unlawfully subject to the regulations. The allegations here present a weaker likelihood of concrete harm than that which we found insufficient in Lyons, 461 U. S. 95, where a plaintiff who alleged that he had been injured by an improper police chokehold sought injunctive relief barring use of the hold in the future. We said it was “no more than conjecture” that Lyons would be subjected to that chokehold upon a later encounter. Id., at 108. Here we are asked to assume not only that Bensman will stumble across a project tract unlawfully subject to the regulations, but also that the tract is about to be developed by the Forest Service in a way that harms his recreational interests, and that he would have commented on the project but for the regulation. Accepting an intention to visit the national forests as adequate to confer standing to challenge any Government action affecting any portion of those forests would be tantamount to eliminating the requirement of concrete, particularized injury in fact.
The Bensman affidavit does refer specifically to a series of projects in the Allegheny National Forest that are subject to the challenged regulations. It does not assert, however, any firm intention to visit their locations, saying only that Bensman “ Vant[s] to’” go there. Brief for Petitioners 6. This vague desire to return is insufficient to satisfy the requirement of imminent injury: “Such ‘some day’ intentions— without any description of concrete plans, or indeed even any specification of when the some day will be — do not support a finding of the ‘actual or imminent’ injury that our cases require.” Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S., at 564.
Respondents argue that they have standing to bring their challenge because they have suffered procedural injury, namely, that they have been denied the ability to file comments on some Forest Service actions and will continue to be so denied. But deprivation of a procedural right without some concrete interest that is affected by the deprivation— a procedural right in vacuo — is insufficient to create Article III standing. Only a “person who has been accorded a procedural right to protect his concrete interests can assert that right without meeting all the normal standards for redress-ability and immediacy.” Id., at 572, n. 7 (emphasis added). Respondents alleged such injury in their challenge to the Burnt Ridge Project, claiming that but for the allegedly unlawful abridged procedures they would have been able to oppose the project that threatened to impinge on their concrete plans to observe nature in that specific area. But Burnt Ridge is now off the table.
It makes no difference that the procedural right has been accorded by Congress. That can loosen the strictures of the redressability prong of our standing inquiry — so that standing existed with regard to the Burnt Ridge Project, for example, despite the possibility that Earth Island’s allegedly guaranteed right to comment would not be successful in persuading the Forest Service to avoid impairment of Earth Island’s concrete interests. See ibid. Unlike redressability, however, the requirement of injury in fact is a hard floor of Article III jurisdiction that cannot be removed by statute.
“[I]t would exceed [Article Ill’s] limitations if, at the behest of Congress and in the absence of any showing of concrete injury, we were to entertain citizen suits to vindicate the public’s nonconcrete interest in the proper administration of the laws.... [T]he party bringing suit must show that the action injures him in a concrete and personal way.” Id., at 580-581 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
Ill
The dissent proposes a hitherto unheard-of test for organizational standing: whether, accepting the organization’s self-description of the activities of its members, there is a statistical probability that some of those members are threatened with concrete injury. Since, for example, the Sierra Club asserts in its pleadings that it has more than “ ‘700,000 members nationwide, including thousands of members in California’ who ‘use and enjoy the Sequoia National Forest,’ ” post, at 502 (opinion of Breyer, J.), it is probable (according to the dissent) that some (unidentified) members have planned to visit some (unidentified) small parcels affected by the Forest Service’s procedures and will suffer (unidentified) concrete harm as a result. This novel approach to the law of organizational standing would make a mockery of our prior cases, which have required plaintiff-organizations to make specific allegations establishing that at least one identified member had suffered or would suffer harm. In Defenders of Wildlife, supra, at 563, we held that the organization lacked standing because it failed to “submit affidavits . . . showing, through specific facts . . . that one or more of [its] members would ... be ‘directly’ affected” by the allegedly illegal activity. Morton, 405 U. S. 727, involved the same Sierra Club that is a party in the present case, and a project in the Sequoia National Forest. The principal difference from the present case is that the challenged project was truly massive, involving the construction of motels, restaurants, swimming pools, parking lots, and other structures on 80 acres of the Forest, plus ski lifts, ski trails, and a 20-mile access highway. We did not engage in an assessment of statistical probabilities that one of the Sierra Club’s members would be adversely affected, but held that the Sierra Club lacked standing. We said:
“The Sierra Club failed to allege that it or its members would be affected in any of their activities or pastimes by the Disney development. Nowhere in the pleadings or affidavits did the Club state that its members use Mineral King for any purpose, much less that they use it in any way that would be significantly affected by the proposed actions of the respondents.” Id., at 735.
And in FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U. S. 215, 235 (1990), we noted that the affidavit provided by the city to establish standing would be insufficient because it did not name the individuals who were harmed by the challenged license-revocation program. This requirement of naming the affected members has never been dispensed with in light of statistical probabilities, but only where all the members of the organization are affected by the challenged activity. See, e. g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U. S. 449, 459 (1958) (all organization members affected by release of membership lists).
A major problem with the dissent’s approach is that it accepts the organizations’ self-descriptions of their membership, on the simple ground that “no one denies” them, post, at 506. But it is well established that the court has an independent obligation to assure that standing exists, regardless of whether it is challenged by any of the parties. Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 475 U. S. 534, 541 (1986). Without individual affidavits, how is the court to assure itself that the Sierra Club, for example, has “ ‘thousands of members’ ” who “ ‘use and enjoy the Sequoia National Forest’ ”? And, because to establish standing plaintiffs must show that they “use the area affected by the challenged activity and not an area roughly in the vicinity of” a project site, Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S., at 566 (internal quotation marks omitted), how is the court to assure itself that some of these members plan to make use of the specific sites upon which projects may take place? Or that these same individuals will find their recreation burdened by the Forest Service’s use of the challenged procedures? While it is certainly possible — perhaps even likely — that one individual will meet all of these criteria, that speculation does not suffice. “Standing,” we have said, “is not ‘an ingenious academic exercise in the conceivable’ . . . [but] requires ... a factual showing of perceptible harm.” Ibid. In part because of the difficulty of verifying the facts upon which such probabilistic standing depends, the Court has required plaintiffs claiming an organizational standing to identify members who have suffered the requisite harm — surely not a difficult task here, when so many thousands are alleged to have been harmed.
The dissent would have us replace the requirement of “ ‘imminent’ ” harm, which it acknowledges our cases establish, see post, at 505, with the requirement of “ ‘a realistic threat’ that reoccurrence of the challenged activity would cause [the plaintiff] harm ‘in the reasonably near future,’” ibid. That language is taken, of course, from an opinion that did not find standing, so the seeming expansiveness of the test made not a bit of difference. The problem for the dissent is that the timely affidavits no more meet that requirement than they meet the usual formulation. They fail to establish that the affiants’ members will ever visit one of the small parcels at issue.
The dissent insists, however, that we should also have considered the late-filed affidavits. It invokes Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(d) (West 2008 rev. ed.), which says that “[t]he court may permit supplementation even though the original pleading is defective in stating a claim or defense.” So also does Rule 21 permit joinder of parties “at any time.” But the latter no more permits joinder of parties, than the former permits the supplementation of the record, in the circumstances here: after the trial is over, judgment has been entered, and a notice of appeal has been filed. The dissent cites no instance in which “supplementation” has been permitted to resurrect and alter the outcome in a case that has gone to judgment, and indeed after notice of appeal had been filed. If Rule 15(b) allows additional facts to be inserted into the record after appeal has been filed, we are at the threshold of a brave new world of trial practice in which Rule 60 has been swallowed whole by Rule 15(b).
* * *
Since we have resolved this case on the ground of standing, we need not reach the Government’s contention that plaintiffs have not demonstrated that the regulations are ripe for review under the Administrative Procedure Act. We likewise do not reach the question whether, if respondents prevailed, a nationwide injunction would be appropriate. And we do not disturb the dismissal of respondents’ challenge to the remaining regulations, which has not been appealed.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed in part and affirmed in part.
It is so ordered.
After the District Court had entered judgment, and after the Government had filed its notice of appeal, respondents submitted additional affidavits to the District Court. We do not consider these. If respondents had not met the challenge to their standing at the time of judgment, they could not remedy the defect retroactively.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | I | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
OPINION OF THE COURT
[562 U.S. 280]
Justice Kagan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 restricts the ability of state and local governments to levy discriminatory taxes on rail carriers. We consider here whether a railroad may invoke this statute to challenge sales and use taxes that apply to rail carriers (among others), but exempt their competitors in the transportation industry. We conclude that the railroad may do so.
I
A
Congress enacted the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 (Act or 4-R Act) to “restore the financial stability of the railway system of the United States,” among other purposes. § 101(a), 90 Stat. 33. To help achieve this goal, Congress targeted state and local taxation schemes that discriminate against rail carriers. Burlington Northern R. Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm’n, 481 U.S. 454, 457, 107 S. Ct. 1855, 95 L. Ed. 2d 404 (1987). The provision of the Act at issue here, now codified at 49 U.S.C. § 11501, bars States and localities from engaging in four forms of discriminatory taxation. 90 Stat. 54.
Section 11501(b) describes the prohibited practices. It begins with three provisions addressed specifically to property
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taxes; it concludes with a catch-all provision concerning other taxes. According to § 11501(b), States (or their subdivisions) “may not”:
“(1) Assess rail transportation property at a value that has a higher ratio to the true market value of the rail transportation property than the ratio that the assessed value of other commercial and industrial property in the same assessment jurisdiction has to the true market value of the other commercial and industrial property.
“(2) Levy or collect a tax on an assessment that may not be made under paragraph (1) of this subsection.
“(3) Levy or collect an ad valorem property tax on rail transportation property at a tax rate that exceeds the tax rate applicable to commercial and industrial property in the same assessment jurisdiction.
“(4) Impose another tax that discriminates against a rail carrier.”
The following subsection confers jurisdiction on federal courts to “prevent a violation” of § 11501(b) notwithstanding the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341, which ordinarily prohibits federal courts from enjoining the collection of state taxes when a remedy is available in state court. § 11501(c).
B
Petitioner CSX Transportation, Inc. (CSX) is an interstate rail carrier that operates in Alabama and pays taxes there.
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Alabama imposes a sales tax of 4% on the gross receipts of retail businesses, Ala. Code § 40-23-2(1) (2010 Cum. Supp.), and a use tax of 4% on the storage, use, or consumption of tangible personal property, § 40-23-61(a) (2003). Railroads pay these taxes when they purchase or consume diesel fuel. But railroads’ main competitors—interstate motor and water carriers—are generally exempt from paying sales and use taxes on their fuel (although fuel for motor carriers is subject to a separate excise tax).
Alleging that Alabama’s tax scheme discriminates against railroads in violation of § 11501(b)(4) of the 4-R Act, CSX sued respondents, the Alabama Department of Revenue and its Commissioner (Alabama or State), in Federal District Court. In particular, CSX complained that the State could not impose sales and use taxes on railroads’ purchase and consumption of diesel fuel while exempting motor and water carriers from those taxes. App. 22 (Complaint ¶26).
The District Court dismissed CSX’s suit as not cognizable under the 4-R Act, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed in a brief per curiam decision. 350 Fed. Appx. 318 (2009). The Eleventh Circuit rested on its earlier decision in Norfolk Southern R. Co. v. Alabama Dept. of Revenue, 550 F.3d 1306 (2008), which involved a nearly identical challenge to the application of Alabama’s sales and use taxes.
In Norfolk Southern, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the plaintiff railroad’s challenge, principally in reliance on this Court’s decision in Department of Revenue of Ore. v. ACF
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Industries, Inc., 510 U.S. 332, 114 S. Ct. 843, 127 L. Ed. 2d 165 (1994). In that case, we held that a railroad could not invoke § 11501(b)(4) to challenge a generally applicable property tax on the basis that certain non-railroad property was exempt from the tax. Id., at 335, 114 S. Ct. 843, 127 L. Ed. 2d 165. The Eleventh Circuit recognized that the case before it involved sales and use taxes—not property taxes, which the statutory scheme separately addresses. Norfolk Southern, 550 F.3d, at 1314. The court concluded, however, that this difference was immaterial, and accordingly held that a railroad could not object to Alabama’s sales and use taxes simply because the State provides exemptions from them. Id., at 1316.
CSX petitioned for a writ of certio-rari, arguing that the Eleventh Circuit had misunderstood ACF Industries and noting a split of authority concerning whether railroads may bring a challenge under § 11501(b)(4) to non-property taxes from which their competitors are exempt. We granted certiorari, 560 U.S. 964, 130 S. Ct. 3409, 177 L. Ed. 2d 323 (2010), and now reverse.
II
We begin, as in any case of statutory interpretation, with the language of the statute. Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 251, 130 S. Ct. 2149, 176 L. Ed. 2d 998 (2010). Section 11501(b)(4) provides that a State may not “[i] in-pose another tax that discriminates against a rail carrier.” CSX wishes to bring an action under this provision because rail carriers, but not motor or water carriers, must pay Alabama’s sales and use taxes on diesel fuel. To determine whether this suit may go
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forward, we must therefore answer two questions. Is CSX challenging “another tax” within the meaning of the statute? And, if so, might that tax “discriminate” against rail carriers by exempting their competitors?
An excise tax, like Alabama’s sales and use tax, is “another tax” under subsection (b)(4). The 4-R Act does not define “tax”; nor does the statute otherwise place any matters within, or exclude any matters from, the term’s ambit. In these circumstances, we look to the word’s ordinary definition, Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 187, 115 S. Ct. 788, 130 L. Ed. 2d 682 (1995), and we note what taxpayers have long since discovered—that the meaning of “tax” is expansive. A State (or other
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governmental entity) seeking to raise revenue may choose among multiple forms of taxation on property, income, transactions, or activities. “[AJnother tax,” as used in subsection (b)(4), is best understood to refer to all of these—more precisely, to encompass any form of tax a State might impose, on any asset or transaction, except the taxes on property previously addressed in subsections (b)(l)-(3). See Burlington Northern R. Co. v. Superior, 932 F.2d 1185, 1186 (CA7 1991) (Subsection (b)(4) includes “an income tax, a gross-receipts tax, a use tax, an occupation tax... —whatever”). The phrase “another tax” is a catch-all.
In particular, we see no reason to interpret subsection (b)(4) as applying only to the gross-receipts taxes— known as “in lieu” taxes—that some States imposed instead of property taxes at the time of the Act’s passage. See Brief for Respondents 53-55; Brief for State of Washington et al. as Amici Curiae 20-22. The argument in favor of this construction relies on the House Report concerning the bill, which described subsection (b)(4) as prohibiting “the imposition of... the so-called ‘in lieu tax.’ ” H. R. Rep. No. 94-725, p. 77 (1975). But the Conference Report on the final bill abandoned the House Report’s narrowing language and described the subsection as it was written—as prohibiting, without limitation, “the imposition of any other tax which results in the discriminatory treatment of any” railroad. S. Conf. Rep. No. 94-595, pp. 165-166 (1976); accord, S. Rep. No. 94-499, p. 65 (1975). And the statutory language is the real crux of the matter: Subsection (b)(4) speaks both clearly and broadly, and a legislative report misdescribing the provision cannot succeed in altering it.
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Nor do we agree with the Eleventh Circuit’s apparent view that CSX does not challenge “another tax” because its complaint relies on the exemptions the State has given. See Norfolk Southern, 550 F.3d, at 1315 (“The language of section (b)(4) prohibits a discriminatory ‘tax’ not a discriminatory tax exemption”); Brief for American Trucking Associations, Inc., as Amicus Curiae 9. What the complaint protests is Alabama’s imposition of taxes on the fuel CSX uses; what the complaint requests is that Alabama cease to collect those taxes from CSX. App. 23. The exemptions, no doubt, play a central role in CSX’s argument: They demonstrate, in CSX’s view, that the State’s sales and use taxes discriminate against railroads. See id., at 22, ¶¶24-26. But the essential subject of the complaint remains the taxes Alabama levies on CSX.
The key question thus becomes whether a tax might be said to “discriminate” against a railroad under subsection (b)(4) because the State has granted exemptions from the tax to other entities (here, the railroad’s competitors). The statute does not define “discriminates,” and so we again look to the ordinary meaning of the word. See supra, at 284, 179 L. Ed. 2d, at 47. “Discrimination” is the “failure to treat all persons equally when no reasonable distinction can be found between those favored and those not favored.” Black’s Law Dictionary 534 (9th ed. 2009); accord, id., at 420 (5th ed. 1979); see also Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 648 (1976) (“discriminates” means “to make a difference in treatment or
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favor on a class or categorical basis in disregard of individual merit”). To charge one group of taxpayers a 2% rate and another group a 4% rate, if the groups are the same in all relevant respects, is to discriminate against the latter. That discrimination continues (indeed, it increases) if the State takes the favored group’s rate down to 0%. And that is all an exemption is. See West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 210-211, 114 S. Ct. 2205, 129 L. Ed. 2d 157 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (noting that an “ ‘exemption’ from... a ‘neutral’ tax” for favored persons “is no different in principle” than “a discriminatory tax... imposing a higher liability” on disfavored persons). To say that such a tax (with such an exemption) does not “discriminate”—assuming the groups are similarly situated and there is no justification for the difference in treatment—is to adopt a definition of the term at odds with its natural meaning.
In line with this understanding, our decisions have repeatedly recognized that tax schemes with exemptions may be discriminatory. In Davis v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 109 S. Ct. 1500, 103 L. Ed. 2d 891 (1989), for example, we reviewed a state income tax provision that exempted retirement benefits given by the State, but not those paid by the Federal Government. We held that the tax “discriminate [d]” against federal employees under 4 U.S.C. § 111, which serves to protect those employees from discriminatory state taxation. Similarly, our dormant Commerce Clause cases have often held that tax exemptions given to local businesses discriminate against interstate actors. See, e.g., Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 268-269, 104 S. Ct. 3049, 82 L. Ed. 2d 200 (1984) (holding that a state excise tax on alcohol “discriminate [d] ” against interstate businesses because of exemptions granted to local producers); Camps Newfound / Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 588-589, 117 S. Ct. 1590, 137 L. Ed. 2d 852 (1997) (invalidating as “discriminatory” a state property tax that exempted organizations operating for the benefit of residents, but not organizations aimed at nonresidents). And even our decision in ACF Industries, on which
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the Eleventh Circuit relied in dismissing CSX’s suit, made clear that tax exemptions “could be a variant of tax discrimination.” 510 U.S., at 343, 114 S. Ct. 843, 127 L. Ed. 2d 165.
Nor does the 4-R Act limit the prohibited discrimination to state tax schemes that unjustifiably exempt local actors, as opposed to interstate entities. Alabama argues for this result, claiming that § 11501(b) is designed “to protect interstate carriers against discrimination vis-a-vis local businesses.” Brief for Respondents 29. But the text of § 11501(b) tells a different story. Consistent with the Act’s purpose of restoring the financial stability of railroads (not of interstate carriers generally), supra, at 280, 179 L. Ed. 2d, at 44-45, each of subsection (b)’s provisions proscribes taxes that specially burden a rail carrier’s property or otherwise discriminate against a rail carrier. And not a single provision of the Act (including the references in subsections (b)(1)-(3) to “commercial and industrial property”) distinguishes between local and non-local taxpayers who receive favorable tax treatment. The distinctions drawn in § 11501(b) are not between interstate and local actors, as the State contends, but rather between railroads and other actors, whether interstate or local. Accordingly, a state excise tax that applies to railroads but exempts their interstate competitors is subject to challenge under subsection (b)(4) as a “tax that discriminates against a rail carrier.”
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III
As against the plain language of subsection (b)(4), Alabama offers two arguments based on our decision in ACF Industries. The first claim, which the Eleventh Circuit accepted, rests on the reasoning we adopted in ACF Industries: We concluded there that railroads could not challenge property tax exemptions under subsection (b)(4), and Alabama asserts that the same analysis applies to excise (and other non-property) tax exemptions. The second contention focuses on alleged problems that would emerge in the application of § 11501(b) if the rule of ACF Industries did not govern all tax exemptions. On this view, even if ACF Industries’ reasoning is irrelevant to cases involving excise taxes, its holding must extend to those cases to prevent inconsistent or
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anomalous results. We reject each of these arguments. We stand foursquare behind our decision in ACF Industries, but we will not extend it in the way the State wishes.
A
In ACF Industries, we considered whether a railroad could sue a State under subsection (b)(4) for taxing railroad property while exempting certain other commercial property. We held that the railroad could not do so. We noted that the language of subsection (b)(4), when viewed in isolation, could be read to allow such a challenge. But we reasoned that the structure of § 11501 required the opposite result. 510 U.S., at 343, 114 S. Ct. 843, 127 L. Ed. 2d 165. The Eleventh Circuit considered ACF Industries “determinative” of the question here, Norfolk Southern, 550 F.3d, at 1313, and Alabama agrees, Brief for Respondents 18. We think they misread that decision.
We began our analysis in ACF Industries by explaining that railroads could not challenge property tax exemptions under subsections (b)(1)-(3)—the provisions of § 11501 specifically addressing property taxes. As noted earlier, subsections (b)( 1)—(3) prohibit a State from imposing higher property tax rates or assessment ratios on “rail transportation property” than on “other commercial and industrial property.” The statute defines “commercial and industrial property” as including only “property... subject to a property tax levy.” § 11501(a)(4). We interpreted that phrase to mean “property that is taxed,” rather than property that is potentially taxable. 510 U.S., at 341-342, 114 S. Ct. 843, 127 L. Ed. 2d 165. As a result, we determined that exempt (i.e., non-taxed) property fell outside the category of “other commercial and industrial property” against which the taxation of railroad property is measured. Ibid. The conclusion followed: Subsections (b)( 1)—(3) permitted States to impose property taxes on railroads while exempting other entities. Ibid.
And because that was so, we stated, still another conclusion followed: Subsection (b)(4)’s prohibition on discrimination
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likewise could not encompass property tax exemptions. Id., at 343, 114 S. Ct. 843, 127 L. Ed. 2d 165. We viewed this holding as a matter of simple deduction: “It would be illogical to conclude that Congress, having allowed the States to grant property tax exemptions in subsections (b)(1)-(3), would turn around and nullify its own choice in subsection (b)(4).” Ibid. Or stated otherwise: “[RJeading subsection (b)(4) to prohibit what” other parts of the statute were “designed to allow” would “subvert the statutory plan” and “contravene the ‘elementary canon of construction that a statute should be interpreted so as not to render one part inoperative.’ ” Id., at 340, 114 S. Ct. 843, 127 L. Ed. 2d 165. The structure of § 11501 thus compelled our conclusion that property tax exemptions—even if “a variant of tax discrimination,” id., at 343, 114 S. Ct. 843, 127 L. Ed. 2d 165—fell outside subsection (b)(4)’s reach.
But this structural analysis—the core of ACF Industries—has no bearing on the question here. Subsections (b)( 1)—(3) specifically address— and allow—property tax exemptions. But neither those subsections nor any other provision of the 4-R Act speaks to non-property tax exemptions like those at issue in this case. Congress has expressed no intent to “allo[w] the States to grant” these exemptions. Ibid. Reading subsection (b)(4) as written—to encompass non-property tax exemptions—therefore poses no danger of “nullify[ing]” a congressional policy choice or otherwise “subvert[ing] the statutory plan.” Id., at 340, 343, 114 S. Ct. 843, 127 L. Ed. 2d 165. To the contrary: Giving subsection (b)(4) something other than its ordinary meaning, absent any structural reason to do so, would itself contravene the expressed will of Congress.
Implicitly acknowledging that ACF Industries’ central theory is irrelevant here, Alabama focuses on what that decision called “[o]ther considerations reinforc[ing]” its structural analysis. Id., at 343, 114 S. Ct. 843, 127 L. Ed. 2d 165. Most notably, Alabama underscores the following sentence from ACF Industries: “Given the prevalence of property tax exemptions when Congress enacted the 4-R Act, [§ 11501’s] silence on the subject—in light of the explicit prohibition of tax rate and assessment
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ratio discrimination—reflects a determination to permit the States to leave their exemptions in place.” Id., at 344, 114 S. Ct. 843, 127 L. Ed. 2d 165. Alabama asserts that this statement “holds just as true” for sales and use taxes. Brief for Respondents 41.
That claim rings hollow. To be sure, ACF Industries noted that Congress had declined to speak “with any degree of particularity to” the permissibility of property tax exemptions, even though States often granted them. 510 U.S., at 343, 114 S. Ct. 843, 127 L. Ed. 2d 165. But we thought that fact relevant only because Congress had spoken with particularity in proscribing other forms of discriminatory property taxes. The very sentence Alabama highlights makes our reasoning clear: Congress’s silence as to the practice of granting property tax exemptions reflected its acquiescence in that practice “in light of the explicit prohibition [in subsections (b)( 1)—(3)] of [property] tax rate and assessment ratio discrimination.” Id., at 344, 114 S. Ct. 843, 127 L. Ed. 2d 165 (emphasis added). If that explicit prohibition had not existed—if § 11501(b) had consisted only of subsection (b)(4)’s broad ban on tax discrimination—we could not have gleaned what we did from congressional silence. After all, the very purpose of a catch-all provision like subsection (b)(4) is to avoid the necessity of listing each matter (here, each kind of tax discrimination) falling within it. And with respect to non-property taxes (like Alabama’s sales and use taxes), subsection (b)(4) is all there is. So here again, our analysis in ACF Industries does not apply because it rested on subsections (b)(1)-(3)—that is, on the highly reticulated scheme in the 4-R Act relating solely to property taxes.
Alabama also emphasizes our statement in ACF Industries that “ ‘ [principles of federalism’ ” supported our holding, Brief for Respondents 41-43 (quoting 510 U.S., at 345, 114 S. Ct. 843, 127 L. Ed. 2d 165), but this final effort to borrow from that decision’s analysis similarly fails. We indeed recognized in ACF Industries that the 4-R Act limits the traditional taxing power of the States. Because that is so, we expressed “hesitan[ce] to extend the statute beyond its evident scope.” 510 U.S., at 345, 114 S. Ct. 843, 127 L. Ed. 2d 165.
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But here, for all the reasons already noted, we are not “extend [ing] the statute”; we are merely giving effect to its clear meaning. To reiterate: The 4-R Act distinguishes between property taxes and other taxes. Congress expressed its intent to insulate property tax exemptions from challenge; against that background, ACF Industries stated that permitting such suits would intrude on the States’ rightful authority. By contrast, Congress drafted § 11501 to enable railroads to contest all other tax exemptions; and when Congress speaks in such preemptive terms, its decision must govern. Principles of federalism cannot narrow § 11501’s clear scope. See, e.g., CSX Transp., Inc. v. Georgia State Bd. of Equalization, 552 U.S. 9, 20, 128 S. Ct. 467, 169 L. Ed. 2d 418 (2007) (rejecting the idea that federalism principles preclude challenges to state valuation methodologies when § 11501 “clearly authorized” such actions). Nothing in ACF Industries suggested otherwise.
B
Alabama additionally makes a subtler argument involving ACF Industries. Given that decision, Alabama contends, a ruling in CSX’s favor here would create troubling inconsistencies. Alabama claims that subsection (b)(4)’s singular prohibition on “dis-criminat[ion]” would then mean one thing for property taxes (according to ACF Industries) and another for non-property taxes, even though nothing in the statute supports “morphing definitions.” Brief for Respondents 32. And still worse than the difference in meaning would be the difference in result: A ruling for CSX, Alabama argues, would give railroads more protection against non-property taxes than against property taxes, even though no good reason exists for this distinction.
Alabama’s one-word-two-meanings argument collapses because it again rests on a misunderstanding of ACF Industries. That decision did not define “discriminat[e]” or say that a tax exemption could not fall within that term. Quite to the contrary: As noted earlier, ACF Industries frankly
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acknowledged that tax exemptions, including property tax exemptions, “could be a variant of tax discrimination.” 510 U.S., at 343, 114 S. Ct. 843, 127 L. Ed. 2d 165; supra, at 287-288, 179 L. Ed. 2d, at 49. We held that property tax exemptions were immune from challenge under subsection (b)(4) for structural, rather than linguistic, reasons. Even assuming these exemptions “discriminate [d],” they did so in a way that the specific provisions of §§ 11501(b)(l)-(3) allow, and accordingly § 11501(b)(4)’s prohibition could not include them. That reasoning, once more, does not apply here, because subsections (b)( 1)—(3) do not permit—indeed, in no way address—non-property tax exemptions. We therefore do not adopt a new definition of “discriminate” in this case; in the context of the 4-R Act, that word has, and has always had, just one meaning.
What remains is Alabama’s complaint that a ruling in CSX’s favor, when combined with our decision in ACF Industries, will result in divergent treatment of property and non-property taxes. At times, Alabama dresses up this objection in Latin: It contends that the canon of ejusdem generis, which “limits general terms [that] follow specific ones to matters similar to those specified,” Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124, 128, 56 S. Ct. 395, 80 L. Ed. 522 (1936), has a role to play in interpreting § 11501(b). More particularly, Alabama contends that this canon supports reading into § 11501(b)(4) every limitation contained in §§ 1150l(b)(1)—(3), including the exclusion of tax exemptions from the class of state actions subject to challenge. See Brief for Respondents 26-27. That interpretive move, Alabama rightly notes, would ensure equal treatment of property tax and non-property tax exemptions.
But we think ejusdem generis is not relevant here. As an initial matter, subsection (b)(4), “[a]lthough something of a catchall,... is not a general or collective term following a list of specific items to which a particular statutory command is applicable (e.g., ‘fishing rods, nets, hooks, bobbers, sinkers, and other equipment’).” United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 615, 115 S. Ct. 2357, 132 L. Ed. 2d 520 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting
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in part). Rather, that subsection is “one of... several distinct and independent prohibitions.” Ibid. Related to this structural point is a functional one. We typically use ejusdem generis to ensure that a general word will not render specific words meaningless. E.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 114-115, 121 S. Ct. 1302, 149 L. Ed. 2d 234 (2001); see 2A N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutes and Statutory Construction §47:17 (7th ed. 2007). But that concern is absent here. Reading subsection (b)(4) to cover non-property tax exemptions will not deprive subsections (b)( 1)—(3) of effect, because those subsections are addressed only to property taxes. A canon meaning literally “of the same kind” has no application to provisions directed toward dissimilar subject matter.
The better version of Alabama’s claim reads entirely in English; it is simply that distinguishing between property tax exemptions and other tax exemptions makes not a whit of sense. We are not much inclined to disagree. Neither CSX nor the United States as amicus curiae has offered a satisfying reason for why Congress drew this line—why in §§ 11501(b)(l)-(3) it barred challenges based on property tax exemptions, but then turned around in § 11501(b)(4) to allow challenges based on, say, excise tax exemptions. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 4-5, 24-25. CSX, for example, has not presented any evidence that different tax exemptions posed different levels of threat to railroads’ financial stability. So even if Congress had a good reason for distinguishing between property and non-property tax exemptions, we acknowledge that it eludes us.
But this admission does not take us far in Alabama’s direction. Even if the 4-R Act were ambiguous, we doubt we would interpret subsection (b)(4) to replicate each facet of subsections (b)( 1)—(3). Treating property tax exemptions and other tax exemptions equivalently might make sense, as Alabama argues. But so too might allowing railroads to challenge ah taxes (property or non-property) that contain exemptions. After ah, as we noted earlier, tax exemptions
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are an obvious form of tax discrimination. See supra, at 287-288, 179 L. Ed. 2d, at 48-49. It is hardly self-evident why Congress would prohibit a State from charging a railroad a 4% tax and a competitor a 2% tax, but allow the State to charge the railroad a 4% tax and the competitor nothing. The latter situation would frustrate the purposes of the Act even more than the former. In ACF Industries, we accepted that anomaly because the terms and structure of the Act demanded that we do so. But we could say no more in favor of the result than that it was “not so bizarre that Congress could not have intended it.” 510 U.S., at 347, 114 S. Ct. 843, 127 L. Ed. 2d 165 (internal quotation marks omitted). That was not a glowing recommendation, and we see no reason today to view the matter differently. Accordingly, even assuming that statutory ambiguity permitted us to do so, we would hesitate to extend the distinction between tax exemptions and differential tax rates in order to avoid a distinction between property and non-property taxes. That would seem a poor trade of statutory anomalies.
In any event, and more importantly, the choice is not ours to make. Congress wrote the statute it wrote, and that statute draws a sharp line between property taxes and other taxes. Congress drafted §§ 11501(b)(l)-(3) to exclude tax exemptions from the sphere of prohibited property tax discrimination. But it drafted § 11501(b)(4) more broadly, without any of the prior subsections’ limitations, to proscribe other “tax[es] that discriminat[e],” including through the use of exemptions. That congressional election settles this case. Alabama’s preference for symmetry cannot trump an asymmetrical statute. And its preference for the greatest possible latitude to levy taxes cannot trump Congress’s decision to restrict discriminatory taxation of rail carriers.
IV
Our decision in this case is limited. We hold that CSX may challenge Alabama’s sales and use taxes as “tax[es] that discriminate] against... rail carrier[s]” under § 11501(b)(4).
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We do not address whether CSX should prevail in that challenge—whether, that is, Alabama’s taxes in fact discriminate against railroads by exempting interstate motor and water carriers. Alabama argues, in support of barring CSX’s challenge at the outset, that this inquiry into discrimination may pose difficulties. Brief for Respondents 35-37. We cannot deny that assertion, but neither can we respond to it by precluding CSX’s claim. Discrimination cases sometimes do raise knotty questions about whether and when dissimilar treatment is adequately justified. In the context of the 4-R Act, those hard calls can arise when States charge different tax rates to different entities in a practice the statute specifically subjects to challenge. See § 11501(b)(3). So too, difficult issues can emerge when, as here, States provide certain entities with tax exemptions. In either case, Congress has directed the federal courts to review a railroad’s challenge; and in either case, we would flout the congressional command were we to declare the matter beyond us.
For the reasons stated, we reverse the judgment of the Eleventh Circuit and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
. This provision was originally codified at 49 U.S.C. § 26c (1976 ed.). In 1978, Congress recodified it at § 11503 (1976 ed., Supp. II), with slightly altered language but “without substantive change,’’ § 3(a), 92 Stat. 1466. In 1995, Congress again recodified the section without substantive change, this time at 49 U.S.C. § 11501. This opinion refers to the statute’s current text.
. The first sentence of subsection (c) provides: “Notwithstanding section 1341 of title 28... a district court of the United States has jurisdiction... to prevent a violation of subsection (b) of this section.’’ The next sentence concerns the relief available for violations of §§ 11501(b)(1) and (2): “Relief may be granted under this subsection only if the ratio of assessed value to true market value of rail transportation property exceeds by at least 5 percent the ratio of assessed value to true market value of other commercial and industrial property in the same assessment jurisdiction.’’
. State law provides that motor carriers need not pay sales or use
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | H | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Chief Justice ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court.
Four criminal defendants objected to being bound by full restraints during pretrial proceedings in their cases, but the District Court denied relief. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the use of such restraints was unconstitutional, even though each of the four criminal cases had ended prior to its decision. The question presented is whether the appeals were saved from mootness either because the defendants sought "class-like relief" in a "functional class action," or because the challenged practice was "capable of repetition, yet evading review."
I
It is the responsibility of the United States Marshals Service to "provide for the security ... of the United States District Courts." 28 U.S.C. § 566(a). To fulfill that duty, the United States Marshal for the Southern District of California requested that the judges of that district permit the use of full restraints on all in-custody defendants during nonjury proceedings. When "full restraints" are applied, "a defendant's hands are closely handcuffed together, these handcuffs are connected by chain to another chain running around the defendant's waist, and the defendant's feet are shackled and chained together." 859 F.3d 649, 653 (C.A.9 2017) (en banc). In support of his proposal, the Marshal cited safety concerns arising from understaffing, past incidents of violence, and the high volume of in-custody defendants produced in the Southern District. The judges agreed to the Marshal's request, with modifications providing that a district or magistrate judge may require a defendant to be produced without restraints, and that a defendant can request that this be done. See App. 78-79.
Respondents Jasmin Morales, Rene Sanchez-Gomez, Moises Patricio-Guzman, and Mark Ring were among the defendants produced by the Marshals Service for pretrial proceedings in full restraints. They raised constitutional objections to the use of such restraints in their respective cases, and to the restraint policy as a whole. They noted that the policy had resulted in the imposition of full restraints on, for example, a woman with a fractured wrist, a man with a severe leg injury, a blind man, and a wheelchair-bound woman. The District Court denied their challenges.
Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, but before the court could issue a decision, their underlying criminal cases came to an end. Morales, Sanchez-Gomez, and Patricio-Guzman each pled guilty to the offense for which they were charged: Morales, to felony importation of a controlled substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952 and 960 ; Sanchez-Gomez, to felony misuse of a passport, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1544 ; and Patricio-Guzman, to misdemeanor illegal entry into the United States, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1325. The charges against Ring-for making an interstate threat in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) -were dismissed pursuant to a deferred-prosecution agreement.
A panel of the Court of Appeals nonetheless concluded that respondents' claims were not moot, and went on to strike down the restraint policy as violating the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 798 F.3d 1204 (C.A.9 2015). Those rulings were reaffirmed on rehearing en banc. 859 F.3d 649. The en banc court understood the "main dispute" before it to be a challenge to the policy itself, not just to the application of that policy to respondents. Id., at 655. The court then construed respondents' notices of appeal as petitions for mandamus, which invoked the court's supervisory authority over the Southern District. Id., at 657. The case was, in the court's view, a "functional class action" involving "class-like claims" seeking "class-like relief." Id., at 655, 657-658. In light of that understanding, the Court of Appeals held that this Court's civil class action precedents kept the case alive, even though respondents were no longer subject to the restraint policy. Id., at 657-659 (citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 110-111, n. 11, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975) ). On the merits, the Court of Appeals concluded that the restraint policy violated the Constitution. 859 F.3d, at 666.
Judge Ikuta, writing in dissent for herself and four colleagues, rejected the majority's application of class action precedents to the individual criminal cases before the court and would have held the case moot. Id., at 675. She also disagreed with the majority on the merits, concluding that the restraint policy did not violate the Constitution. Id., at 683.
We granted certiorari. 583 U.S. ----, ---- S.Ct. ----, --- L.Ed.2d ---- (2017).
II
To invoke federal jurisdiction, a plaintiff must show a "personal stake" in the outcome of the action. Genesis HealthCare Corp. v. Symczyk, 569 U.S. 66, 71, 133 S.Ct. 1523, 185 L.Ed.2d 636 (2013). "This requirement ensures that the Federal Judiciary confines itself to its constitutionally limited role of adjudicating actual and concrete disputes, the resolutions of which have direct consequences on the parties involved." Ibid. Such a dispute "must be extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed." Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401, 95 S.Ct. 2330, 45 L.Ed.2d 272 (1975). A case that becomes moot at any point during the proceedings is "no longer a 'Case' or 'Controversy' for purposes of Article III," and is outside the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85, 91, 133 S.Ct. 721, 184 L.Ed.2d 553 (2013).
A
In concluding that this case was not moot, the Court of Appeals relied upon our class action precedents, most prominently Gerstein v. Pugh . That reliance was misplaced.
Gerstein, a class action brought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, involved a certified class of detainees raising claims concerning their pretrial detention. 420 U.S., at 106-107, 95 S.Ct. 854. By the time this Court heard the case, the named representatives' claims were moot, and the record suggested that their interest might have lapsed even before the District Court certified the class. See id., at 110-111, n. 11, 95 S.Ct. 854. Normally a class action would be moot if no named class representative with an unexpired claim remained at the time of class certification. See ibid. (citing Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 402, n. 11, 95 S.Ct. 553, 42 L.Ed.2d 532 (1975) ). The Court nevertheless held that the case remained live. As we explained, pretrial custody was inherently temporary and of uncertain length, such that we could not determine "that any given individual, named as plaintiff, would be in pretrial custody long enough for a district judge to certify the class." Gerstein, 420 U.S., at 110-111, n. 11, 95 S.Ct. 854. At the same time, it was certain that there would always be some group of detainees subject to the challenged practice. Ibid. Given these circumstances, the Court determined that the class action could proceed. Ibid. ; see Swisher v. Brady, 438 U.S. 204, 213-214, n. 11, 98 S.Ct. 2699, 57 L.Ed.2d 705 (1978) (employing same analysis in a class action challenging juvenile court procedures).
The Court of Appeals interpreted Gerstein to cover all "cases sufficiently similar to class actions" in which, "because of the inherently transitory nature of the claims," the claimant's "interests would expire before litigation could be completed." 859 F.3d, at 658. Gerstein was an action brought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, but the Court of Appeals decided that such "a procedural mechanism to aggregate the claims" was not a "necessary prerequisite" for application of the Gerstein rule. 859 F.3d, at 659 (alteration omitted). Respondents, the court noted, sought "relief [from the restraint policy] not merely for themselves, but for all in-custody defendants in the district." Id., at 655. Those "class-like claims" seeking "class-like relief" were sufficient to trigger the application of Gerstein and save the case from mootness, despite the termination of respondents' criminal cases. 859 F.3d, at 655.
We reject the notion that Gerstein supports a freestanding exception to mootness outside the class action context. The class action is a creature of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See generally 7A C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1751 et seq. (3d ed. 2005). It is an "exception to the usual rule that litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the individual named parties only," and "provides a procedure by which the court may exercise ... jurisdiction over the various individual claims in a single proceeding." Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700-701, 99 S.Ct. 2545, 61 L.Ed.2d 176 (1979). "The certification of a suit as a class action has important consequences for the unnamed members of the class." Sosna, 419 U.S., at 399, n. 8, 95 S.Ct. 553. Those class members may be "bound by the judgment" and are considered parties to the litigation in many important respects. Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 7, 9-10, 122 S.Ct. 2005, 153 L.Ed.2d 27 (2002). A certified class thus "acquires a legal status separate from the interest asserted by the named plaintiff." Genesis HealthCare, 569 U.S., at 74, 133 S.Ct. 1523 (quoting Sosna, 419 U.S., at 399, 95 S.Ct. 553 ; alterations omitted).
Gerstein belongs to a line of cases that we have described as turning on the particular traits of civil class actions. The first case in this line, Sosna v. Iowa, held that when the claim of the named plaintiff becomes moot after class certification, a "live controversy may continue to exist" based on the ongoing interests of the remaining unnamed class members. Genesis HealthCare, 569 U.S., at 74, 133 S.Ct. 1523 (citing Sosna, 419 U.S., at 399-402, 95 S.Ct. 553 ); see Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 755-756, 96 S.Ct. 1251, 47 L.Ed.2d 444 (1976). The "fact that a putative class acquires an independent legal status once it is certified" was, we later explained, "essential to our decision[ ] in Sosna ." Genesis HealthCare, 569 U.S., at 75, 133 S.Ct. 1523 ; see Kremens v. Bartley, 431 U.S. 119, 131-133, 97 S.Ct. 1709, 52 L.Ed.2d 184 (1977) (explaining that, under Sosna 's rule, "only a 'properly certified' class ... may succeed to the adversary position of a named representative whose claim becomes moot"); Alvarez v. Smith, 558 U.S. 87, 92-93, 130 S.Ct. 576, 175 L.Ed.2d 447 (2009) (same).
Gerstein, announced one month after Sosna, provides a limited exception to Sosna 's requirement that a named plaintiff with a live claim exist at the time of class certification. The exception applies when the pace of litigation and the inherently transitory nature of the claims at issue conspire to make that requirement difficult to fulfill. See Sosna, 419 U.S., at 402, n. 11, 95 S.Ct. 553 (anticipating the Gerstein rule as an exception); Gerstein, 420 U.S., at 110-111, n. 11, 95 S.Ct. 854 (describing its holding as "a suitable exception" to Sosna ). We have repeatedly tied Gerstein ' s rule to the class action setting from which it emerged. See, e.g., Genesis HealthCare, 569 U.S., at 71, n. 2, 133 S.Ct. 1523 (describing Gerstein 's rule as "developed in the context of class actions under Rule 23 to address the circumstance in which a named plaintiff's claim becomes moot prior to certification of the class"); United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 397-399, 100 S.Ct. 1202, 63 L.Ed.2d 479 (1980) (highlighting Gerstein as an example of the Court "consider[ing] the application of the 'personal stake' requirement in the class-action context").
In concluding that Gerstein reaches further, the Court of Appeals looked to our recent decision in Genesis HealthCare Corp. v. Symczyk. But in that case the Court refused to extend Gerstein beyond the class action context, even with respect to a procedural device bearing many features similar to a class action. Genesis HealthCare addressed whether a "collective action" brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) by a plaintiff on behalf of herself "and other 'similarly situated' employees" remained "justiciable when the lone plaintiff's individual claim bec[ame] moot." 569 U.S., at 69, 133 S.Ct. 1523. In an effort to continue her case on behalf of others, the plaintiff turned to Sosna and its progeny, including Gerstein . But those cases, we explained, were "inapposite," not least because " Rule 23 actions are fundamentally different from collective actions under the FLSA." Genesis HealthCare, 569 U.S., at 74, 133 S.Ct. 1523. Such collective actions, we stressed, do not "produce a class with an independent legal status, or join additional parties to the action." Id., at 75, 133 S.Ct. 1523.
This case, which does not involve any formal mechanism for aggregating claims, is even further removed from Rule 23 and Gerstein . The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure establish for criminal cases no vehicle comparable to the FLSA collective action, much less the class action. And we have never permitted criminal defendants to band together to seek prospective relief in their individual criminal cases on behalf of a class. As we said when declining to apply nonparty preclusion outside the formal class action context, courts may not "recognize ... a common-law kind of class action" or "create de facto class actions at will." Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 901, 128 S.Ct. 2161, 171 L.Ed.2d 155 (2008) (alterations omitted); see Smith v. Bayer Corp., 564 U.S. 299, 315-316, 131 S.Ct. 2368, 180 L.Ed.2d 341 (2011) (same); Pasadena City Bd. of Ed. v.
Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 430, 96 S.Ct. 2697, 49 L.Ed.2d 599 (1976) (rejecting in mootness context the idea that "the failure to obtain the class certification required under Rule 23 is merely the absence of a meaningless 'verbal recital' ").
The court below designated respondents' case a "functional class action" because respondents were pursuing relief "not merely for themselves, but for all in-custody defendants in the district." 859 F.3d, at 655, 657-658. But as explained in Genesis HealthCare, the "mere presence of ... allegations" that might, if resolved in respondents' favor, benefit other similarly situated individuals cannot "save [respondents'] suit from mootness once the[ir] individual claim[s]" have dissipated. 569 U.S., at 73, 133 S.Ct. 1523.
Our conclusion is unaffected by the decision of the court below to recast respondents' appeals as petitions for "supervisory mandamus." See 859 F.3d, at 659 (viewing such a petition, like the civil class action, as a procedural vehicle to which the Gerstein rule applies). Supervisory mandamus refers to the authority of the Courts of Appeals to exercise "supervisory control of the District Courts" through their "discretionary power to issue writs of mandamus." La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 259-260, 77 S.Ct. 309, 1 L.Ed.2d 290 (1957). There is no sign in our scant supervisory mandamus precedents that such cases are exempt from the normal mootness rules. See generally Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 88 S.Ct. 269, 19 L.Ed.2d 305 (1967) ; Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 85 S.Ct. 234, 13 L.Ed.2d 152 (1964) ; La Buy, 352 U.S. 249, 77 S.Ct. 309, 1 L.Ed.2d 290. Indeed, as the court below acknowledged, "[s]upervisory mandamus cases require live controversies." 859 F.3d, at 657.
B
Respondents do not defend the reasoning of the Court of Appeals. See Brief for Respondents 58 (arguing that this Court need not reach the functional class action issue and should "discard[ ]" that label); Tr. of Oral Arg. 43 (respondents' counsel agreeing that they "have not made any effort to defend" the functional class action approach). In respondents' view, functional class actions and Gerstein 's rule are beside the point because two respondents-Sanchez-Gomez and Patricio-Guzman-retain a personal stake in the outcome of their appeals.
Sanchez-Gomez and Patricio-Guzman are no longer in pretrial custody. Their criminal cases, arising from their illegal entry into the United States, ended in guilty pleas well before the Court of Appeals issued its decision. Respondents contend, however, that the claims brought by Sanchez-Gomez and Patricio-Guzman fall within the "exception to the mootness doctrine for a controversy that is capable of repetition, yet evading review." Kingdomware Technologies, Inc. v. United States, 579 U.S. ----, ----, 136 S.Ct. 1969, 1976, 195 L.Ed.2d 334 (2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). A dispute qualifies for that exception only "if (1) the challenged action is in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will be subjected to the same action again." Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 439-440, 131 S.Ct. 2507, 180 L.Ed.2d 452 (2011) (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). The parties do not contest that the claims at issue satisfy the first prong of that test, but they sharply disagree as to the second.
Respondents argue that Sanchez-Gomez and Patricio-Guzman meet the second prong because they will again violate the law, be apprehended, and be returned to pretrial custody. But we have consistently refused to "conclude that the case-or-controversy requirement is satisfied by" the possibility that a party "will be prosecuted for violating valid criminal laws." O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 497, 94 S.Ct. 669, 38 L.Ed.2d 674 (1974). We have instead "assume[d] that [litigants] will conduct their activities within the law and so avoid prosecution and conviction as well as exposure to the challenged course of conduct." Ibid. ; see, e.g., Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 15, 118 S.Ct. 978, 140 L.Ed.2d 43 (1998) (reasoning that a claim regarding a parole revocation order was moot following release from custody because any continuing consequences of the order were "contingent upon [the claimant] violating the law, getting caught, and being convicted"); Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 320, 108 S.Ct. 592, 98 L.Ed.2d 686 (1988) ("[W]e generally have been unwilling to assume that the party seeking relief will repeat the type of misconduct that would once again place him or her at risk of that injury."); Lane v. Williams, 455 U.S. 624, 632-633, n. 13, 102 S.Ct. 1322, 71 L.Ed.2d 508 (1982) (concluding that case was moot where the challenged parole revocation could not "affect a subsequent parole determination unless respondents again violate state law, are returned to prison, and become eligible for parole").
Respondents argue that this usual refusal to assume future criminal conduct is unwarranted here given the particular circumstances of Sanchez-Gomez's and Patricio-Guzman's offenses. They cite two civil cases-Honig v. Doe and Turner v. Rogers -in which this Court concluded that the expectation that a litigant would repeat the misconduct that gave rise to his claims rendered those claims capable of repetition. Neither case, however, supports a departure from the settled rule.
Honig involved a disabled student's challenge to his suspension from school for disruptive behavior. We found that given his "inability to conform his conduct to socially acceptable norms" or "govern his aggressive, impulsive behavior," it was "reasonable to expect that [the student would] again engage in the type of misconduct that precipitated this suit" and "be subjected to the same unilateral school action for which he initially sought relief." 484 U.S., at 320-321, 108 S.Ct. 592. In Turner, we determined that an indigent person repeatedly held in civil contempt for failing to make child support payments, who was at the time over $13,000 in arrears, and whose next hearing was only five months away, was destined to find himself in civil contempt proceedings again. The challenged denial of appointed counsel at his contempt hearing was thus capable of repetition. See 564 U.S., at 440, 131 S.Ct. 2507.
Respondents contend that Sanchez-Gomez and Patricio-Guzman, like the challengers in Honig and Turner, are likely to find themselves right back where they started if we dismiss their case as moot. Respondents cite a Sentencing Commission report finding that in 2013 thirty-eight percent of those convicted and sentenced for an illegal entry or illegal reentry offense "were deported and subsequently illegally reentered at least one time." United States Sentencing Commission, Illegal Reentry Offenses 15 (2015) (cited by Brief for Respondents 51). Respondents emphasize the economic and familial pressures that often compel individuals such as Sanchez-Gomez and Patricio-Guzman to repeatedly attempt to enter the United States. And respondents note that both men, after their release, actually did cross the border into the United States, were apprehended again, and were charged with new illegal entry offenses. All this, respondents say, adds up to a sufficient showing that Sanchez-Gomez and Patricio-Guzman satisfy the "capable of repetition" requirement. Because the Court of Appeals was not aware that Sanchez-Gomez and Patricio-Guzman had subsequently reentered the United States illegally, respondents invite us to remand this case for further proceedings.
We decline to do so because Honig and Turner are inapposite. Our decisions in those civil cases rested on the litigants' inability, for reasons beyond their control, to prevent themselves from transgressing and avoid recurrence of the challenged conduct. In Honig, such incapacity was the very reason the school sought to expel the student. And in Turner, the indigent individual's large outstanding debt made him effectively incapable of satisfying his imminent support obligations. Sanchez-Gomez and Patricio-Guzman, in contrast, are "able-and indeed required by law"-to refrain from further criminal conduct. Lane, 455 U.S., at 633, n. 13, 102 S.Ct. 1322. Their personal incentives to return to the United States, plus the elevated rate of recidivism associated with illegal entry offenses, do not amount to an inability to obey the law. We have consistently refused to find the case or controversy requirement satisfied where, as here, the litigants simply "anticipate violating lawful criminal statutes." O'Shea, 414 U.S., at 496, 94 S.Ct. 669.
III
None of this is to say that those who wish to challenge the use of full physical restraints in the Southern District lack any avenue for relief. In the course of this litigation the parties have touched upon several possible options. See, e.g., Tr. of Oral Arg. 12 (indicating circumstances under which detainees could bring a civil suit). Because we hold this case moot, we take no position on the question.
* * *
We vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and remand the case to that court with instructions to dismiss as moot.
It is so ordered.
Shortly after the panel decision in this case, the Southern District altered its policy to eliminate the routine use of full restraints in pretrial proceedings. The Government represents, however, that the Southern District intends to reinstate its policy once it is no longer bound by the decision of the Court of Appeals. Tr. of Oral Arg. 29. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the rescission of the policy does not render this case moot. A party "cannot automatically moot a case simply by ending its unlawful conduct once sued," else it "could engage in unlawful conduct, stop when sued to have the case declared moot, then pick up where [it] left off, repeating this cycle until [it] achieves all [its] unlawful ends." Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85, 91, 133 S.Ct. 721, 184 L.Ed.2d 553 (2013).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | I | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
CHIEF Justice Rehnquist
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The federal Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) establishes a 1-year statute of limitations for filing a federal habeas corpus petition. 28 U. S. C. § 2244(d)(1). That limitations period is tolled, however, while “a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending.” § 2244(d)(2). This case requires us to decide whether a state postconviction petition rejected by the state court as untimely nonetheless is “properly filed” within the meaning of § 2244(d)(2). We conclude that it is not, and hold that petitioner John Pace’s federal petition is time barred.
In February 1986, petitioner pleaded guilty to second-degree murder and possession of an instrument of crime in a Pennsylvania state court. He was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. Petitioner did not file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, and he did not file a direct appeal. In August 1986, he filed a petition under the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Hearing Act (PCHA), 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §9541 et seq. (1988) (amended and renamed by Act No. 1988-47, §§ 3, 6,1988 Pa. Laws pp. 337-342). These proceedings concluded in September 1992, when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied petitioner’s untimely request for discretionary review.
Over four years later, on November 27, 1996, petitioner filed another state postconviction petition, this time under the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §9541 et seq. (1998). The PCRA had replaced the PCHA in 1988 and was amended in 1995 to include, for the first time, a statute of limitations for state postconviction petitions, with three exceptions. Although petitioner’s PCRA petition was filed after the date upon which the new time limits became effective, the petition said nothing about timeliness.
After reviewing petitioner’s PCRA petition, appointed counsel submitted a “no-merit” letter. On July 23,1997, the Court of Common Pleas dismissed the petition, without calling for a response from the Commonwealth. The court noted that petitioner’s claims previously had been litigated and were meritless. Petitioner appealed. On May 6, 1998, the Commonwealth filed a brief in response, asserting that petitioner’s PCRA petition was untimely under the PCRA’s time bar, § 9545(b), and citing as support Commonwealth v. Alcorn, 703 A. 2d 1054 (Pa. Super. 1997). On May 28, 1998, petitioner responded by arguing that the time limit was inapplicable to him. The Superior Court dismissed his petition as untimely on December 3, 1998. The Superior Court reasoned that petitioner’s PCRA petition did not come within the statutory note following § 9545(b), see ibid., and that petitioner had “neither alleged nor proven” that he fell within any statutory exception, see §§ 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). App. 316-317. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied review on July 29, 1999. Id., at 372.
On December 24, 1999, petitioner filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U. S. C. § 2254 in the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The Magistrate Judge recommended dismissal of the petition under AEDPA’s statute of limitations, § 2244(d)(1), but the District Court rejected that recommendation, App. 447-466 (June 7, 2001, memorandum and order), 503-533 (Mar. 29, 2002, memorandum and order). The District Court recognized that, without tolling, petitioner’s petition was time barred. But it held that petitioner was entitled to both statutory and equitable tolling for the time during which his PCRA petition was pending — November 27, 1996 to July 29, 1999. Beginning with statutory tolling, the District Court held that, even though the state court rejected his PCRA petition as untimely, that did not prevent the petition from being “properly filed” within the meaning of § 2244(d)(2). It reasoned that because the PCRA set up judicially reviewable exceptions to the time limit, the PCRA time limit was not a “condition to filing” but a “condition to obtaining relief” as we described those distinct concepts in Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U. S. 4,11 (2000). The District Court alternatively found extraordinary circumstances justifying equitable tolling.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed. Pace v. Vaughn, 71 Fed. Appx. 127 (2003) (not precedential). With regard to statutory tolling, it relied on a line of Third Circuit cases to conclude that the PCRA time limit constitutes a “condition to filing” and that, when a state court deems a petition untimely, it is not “properly filed.” Id., at 128. With regard to equitable tolling, it held that there were not extraordinary circumstances justifying that remedy. Id., at 129. Because Circuits have divided over whether a state postconviction petition that the state court has rejected as untimely nonetheless may be “properly filed,” we granted certiorari. 542 U. S. 965 (2004). We now affirm.
In Artuz v. Bennett, supra, we held that time limits on postconviction petitions are “condition[s] to filing,” such that an untimely petition would not be deemed “properly filed.” Id., at 8, 11 (“[A]n application is ‘properly filed’ when its delivery and acceptance are in compliance with the applicable laws and rules governing filings” including “time limits upon its delivery”). However, we reserved the question we face here: “whether the existence of certain exceptions to a timely filing requirement can prevent a late application from being considered improperly filed.” Id., at 8, n. 2. Having now considered the question, we see no grounds for treating the two differently.
As in Artuz, we are guided by the “common usage” and “commo[n] understanding]” of the phrase “properly filed.” Id., at 8, 9. In common understanding, a petition filed after a time limit, and which does not fit within any exceptions to that limit, is no more “properly filed” than a petition filed after a time limit that permits no exception. The purpose of AEDPA’s statute of limitations confirms this commonsense reading. On petitioner’s theory, a state prisoner could toll the statute of limitations at will simply by filing untimely state postconviction petitions. This would turn § 2244(d)(2) into a de facto extension mechanism, quite contrary to the purpose of AEDPA, and open the door to abusive delay.
Carey v. Saffold, 536 U. S. 214 (2002), points to the same conclusion. In Saffold, we considered whether § 2244(d)(2) required tolling during the months between the California appellate court’s denial of Saffold’s postconviction petition and his further petition in the California Supreme Court. The California Supreme Court denied the petition “on the merits and for lack of diligence,” which raised the question whether that court had dismissed for lack of merit, for untimeliness, or for both. Id., at 225 (internal quotation marks omitted). Although we ultimately remanded, we explained that, “[i]f the California Supreme Court had clearly ruled that Saffold’s 4V&-month delay was ‘unreasonable,’” i. e., untimely, “that would be the end of the matter, regardless of whether it also addressed the merits of the claim, or whether its timeliness ruling was ‘entangled’ with the merits.” Id., at 226 (emphasis added); see also id., at 236 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“If the California court held that all of [Saffold’s] state habeas petitions were years overdue, then they were not ‘properly filed’ at all, and there would be no tolling of the federal limitations period”). What we intimated in Saffold we now hold: When a postconviction petition is untimely under state law, “that [is] the end of the matter” for purposes of § 2244(d)(2).
Petitioner makes three principal arguments against this reading. First, he asserts that “condition[s] to filing” are merely those conditions necessary to get a clerk to accept the petition, as opposed to conditions that require some judicial consideration. Respondent David DiGuglielmo (hereinafter respondent) characterizes petitioner’s position, which the dissent also appears to embrace, see post, at 426, as a juridical game of “hot potato,” in which a petition will be “properly filed” so long as a petitioner is able to hand it to the clerk without the clerk tossing it back. Brief for Respondent 16. Be that as it may, petitioner’s theory is inconsistent with Artuz, where we explained that jurisdictional matters and fee payments, both of which often necessitate judicial scrutiny, are “condition[s] to filing.” See 531 U. S., at 9. We fail to see how timeliness is any less a “filing” requirement than the mechanical rules that are enforceable by clerks, if such rules exist. For example, Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 901 (2005), which is entitled “Initiation of Post-Conviction Collateral Proceedings,” lists two mandatory conditions: (A) the petition “shall” be filed within the time limit, and (B) the proceedings “shall be initiated by filing” a verified petition and “3 copies with the clerk of the court in which the defendant was convicted and sentenced.” The natural reading is that (A) is every bit as much of a “condition to filing” as (B).
Petitioner also argues that, because § 2244(d)(2) refers to a “properly filed application,” then any condition that must be applied on a claim-by-claim basis, such as Pennsylvania’s time limit, cannot be a “condition to filing.” (Emphasis added.) Section 2244, however, refutes this position. Section 2244(b)(3)(C), for example, states that the court of appeals “may authorize the filing of a second or successive application only if it determines that the application makes a prima facie showing that the application satisfies the requirements of this subsection.” (Emphases added.) Yet the “requirements” of the subsection are not applicable to the application as a whole; instead, they require inquiry into specific “claim[s].” See § 2244(b)(2)(A) (“claim” relies on a new rule made retroactive); § 2244(b)(2)(B) (“claim” with new factual predicate). In fact, petitioner’s argument is inconsistent with § 2244(d)(2) itself, which refers not just to a “properly filed application,” but to a “properly filed application . . . with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim.” (Emphasis added.)
Finally, petitioner challenges the fairness of our interpretation. He claims that a “petitioner trying in good faith to exhaust state remedies may litigate in state court for years only to find out at the end that he was never ‘properly filed,’ ” ánd thus that his federal habeas petition is time barred. Brief for Petitioner 30. A prisoner seeking state postcon-vietion relief might avoid this predicament, however, by filing a “protective” petition in federal court and asking the federal court to stay and abey the federal habeas proceedings until state remedies are exhausted. See Rhines v. Weber, ante, at 278. A petitioner’s reasonable confusion about whether a state filing would be timely will ordinarily constitute “good cause” for him to file in federal court. Ibid. (“[I]f the petitioner had good cause for his failure to exhaust, his unexhausted claims are potentially meritorious, and there is no indication that the petitioner engaged in intentionally dilatory tactics,” then the district court likely “should stay, rather than dismiss, the mixed petition”).
The dissent suggests that our conclusion in Artuz, that state procedural bars “prescribing] a rule of decision for a court” confronted with certain claims previously adjudicated or not properly presented are not “filing” conditions, requires the conclusion that the time limit at issue here also is not a “filing” condition. Post, at 425-426; see Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U. S., at 10-11 (discussing N. Y. Crim. Proc. Law §§440.10(2)(a) and (c) (McKinney 1994)). The dissent ignores the fact that Artuz itself distinguished between time limits and procedural bars. 531 U. S., at 8-10. For purposes of determining what are “filing” conditions, there is an obvious distinction between time limits, which go to the very initiation of a petition and a court’s ability to consider that petition, and the type of “rule of decision” procedural bars at issue in Artuz, which go to the ability to obtain relief. Far from requiring “verbal gymnastics,” it must be the case that a petition that cannot even be initiated or considered due to the failure to include a timely claim is not “properly filed.” Id., at 10.
For these reasons, we hold that time limits, no matter their form, are “filing” conditions. Because the state court rejected petitioner’s PCRA petition as untimely, it was not “properly filed,” and he is not entitled to statutory tolling under § 2244(d)(2).
We now turn to petitioner’s argument that he is entitled to equitable tolling for the time during which his untimely PCRA petition was pending in the state courts. Generally, a litigant seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of establishing two elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way. See, e. g., Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U. S. 89, 96 (1990). Petitioner argues that he has satisfied the extraordinary circumstance test. He reasons that Third Circuit law at the time he sought relief required him to exhaust his state remedies and thus seek PCRA relief, even if it was unlikely the state court would reach the merits of his claims, and that state law made it appear as though he might gain relief, despite the petition’s untimeliness. Thus, he claims, “state law and Third Circuit exhaustion law created a trap” on which he detrimentally relied as his federal time limit slipped away. Brief for Petitioner 34. Even if we were to accept petitioner’s theory, he would not be entitled to relief because he has not established the requisite diligence.
Petitioner’s PCRA petition set forth three claims: that his sentence was “illegal”; that his plea was invalid because he did not understand his life sentence was without the possibility of parole; and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at “all levels of representation.” App. 202, 220. The first two of these claims were available to petitioner as early as 1986. Indeed, petitioner asserted a version of his invalid plea claim in his August 21, 1986, PCHA petition. See id., at 144. The third claim — ineffective assistance of counsel — related only to events occurring in or before 1991. See id., at 191.
Yet petitioner waited years, without any valid justification, to assert these claims in his November 27,1996, PCRA petition. Had petitioner advanced his claims within a reasonable time of their availability, he would not now be facing any time problem, state or federal. And not only did petitioner sit on his rights for years before he filed his PCRA petition, but he also sat on them for five more months after his PCRA proceedings became final before deciding to seek relief in federal court. See id., at 372, 373. Under long-established principles, petitioner’s lack of diligence precludes equity’s operation. See Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, supra, at 96; McQuiddy v. Ware, 20 Wall. 14, 19 (1874) (“Equity always refuses to interfere where there has been gross laches in the prosecution of rights”).
Because petitioner filed his federal habeas petition beyond the deadline, and because he was not entitled to statutory or equitable tolling for any of that period, his federal petition is barred by the statute of limitations. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
The amended statute states that “[a]ny” posteonviction petition, “including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year” from the date the petitioner’s conviction becomes final. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9545(b)(1) (1998). However, three exceptions are provided: if governmental interference prevented filing; if a new constitutional rule is made retroactive; or if new facts arise that could not have been discovered through due diligence. §§ 9545(b)(l)(i) — (iii). A statutory note provides that the 1995 amendments “shall apply to petitions filed after [January 16, 1996]; however, a petitioner whose judgment has become final on or before [January 16, 1996] shall be deemed to have filed a timely petition ... if the petitioner’s first petition is filed within one year of [January 16,1996].” Statutory Note on § 9545(b).
The District Court noted that, under Third Circuit precedent, “petitioners whose convictions became final before the enactment of AEDPA’s statute of limitations on April 24,1996 have until one year from the enactment of the habeas statute of limitations to file their petitions.” App. 453, 503. Without tolling, therefore, petitioner’s federal habeas petition was filed well after the April 1997 deadline.
Compare, e.g., Dictado v. Ducharme, 244 F. 3d 724, 726-728 (CA9 2001), with Merritt v. Blaine, 326 F. 3d 157, 162-168 (CA3 2003).
With regard to jurisdiction, see, e. g., Commonwealth v. Judge, 568 Pa. 877, 387-389, 797 A. 2d 250, 257 (2002) (Pennsylvania court had jurisdiction over PCRA petition, despite the fact the petitioner was not in Pennsylvania custody). With regard to filing fees, see, e. g., Pa. Rule Crim. Proe. 904(F) (2005) (“When a defendant satisfies the judge that the defendant is unable to pay the costs of the post-conviction collateral proceedings, the judge shall order that the defendant be permitted to proceed in forma pauperis”).
Perhaps not unintentionally, petitioner fails to provide us any guidance on exactly which Pennsylvania Rules are subject to a clerk’s striking for noncompliance. We doubt there are many such rules, both because few truly mechanical rules exist and because the role of the clerk in refusing petitions in most courts is quite limited. See, e. g., Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 5(e) (“The clerk shall not refuse to accept for filing any paper presented for that purpose solely because it is not presented in proper form as required by these rules or any local rules or practices”); 28 U. S. C. § 2254 Rule 3(b) (2000 ed., Supp. IV) (“The clerk must file the petition and enter it on the docket”); see also Advisory Committee’s Note on Habeas Corpus Rule 3(b), 28 U. S. C., p. 42 (2000 ed., Supp. IV) (“Rule 3(b) requires the clerk to file a petition, even though it may otherwise fail to comply with Rule 2. This rule ... is not limited to those instances where the petition is defective only in form; the clerk would also be required, for example, to file the petition even though it lacked the requisite filing fee or an informa pauperis form”). Indeed, not even filing in the right court would be a “condition to filing” under petitioner’s limited theory. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5103(a) (2004) (instructing that, when a petition is filed in the wrong court, it is not to be stricken but transferred to the proper court). Under this theory, “filing” conditions may be an empty set.
Similarly, § 2244(d)(1) provides that a “1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus.” (Emphasis added.) The subsection then provides one means of calculating the limitation with regard to the “application” as a whole, § 2244(d)(1)(A) (date of final judgment), but three others that require claim-by-elaim consideration, § 2244(d)(1)(B) (governmental interference); § 2244(d)(1)(C) (new right made retroactive); § 2244(d)(1)(D) (new factual predicate).
Compare, e. g., Pa. Rule Crim. Proe. 901(A) (2005) (titled “Initiation of Post-Conviction Collateral Proceedings” and listing compliance with the time limit as one mandatory condition); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9545(b) (2002) (titled “Jurisdiction and proceedings” and listing the time limit); Commonwealth v. Fahy, 558 Pa. 313, 328, 737 A. 2d 214, 222 (1999) (describing the time limit as “jurisdictional”); 2 Ala. Rule Crim. Proc. 32.2(c) (2004-2005) (stating that a court “shall not entertain” a time-barred petition), with 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9543(a) (2002) (titled “Eligibility for relief” and listing procedural bars, like those at issue in Artuz)', 2 Ala. Rule Crim. Proc. 32.2(a) (2004-2005) (stating that a “petitioner will not be given relief” if certain procedural bars, like those at issue in Artuz, axe present).
We have never squarely addressed the question whether equitable tolling is applicable to AEDPA’s statute of limitations. Cf. Pliler v. Ford, 542 U. S. 225 (2004). Because respondent assumes that equitable tolling applies and because petitioner is' not entitled to equitable tolling under any standard, we assume without deciding its application for purposes of this case.
Petitioner’s PCRA petition did cite allegedly “new” evidence to support his claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his plea was invalid because he did not understand his life sentence was without the possibility of parole. However, this new evidence was not new at all: It consisted of affidavits from petitioner’s parents and brother regarding a meeting they attended with petitioner’s counsel and petitioner in 1985 or 1986. App. 195-199.
As noted previously, the PCRA time limit only came into effect in January 1996, see n. 1, supra, and petitioner’s federal habeas petition was due in April 1997, see n. 2, supra.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | I | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Douglas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Missouri has a statute, Mo. Rev. Stat., 1949, § 129.060, first enacted in 1897, which was designed to end the coercion of employees by employers in the exercise of the franchise. It provides that an employee may absent himself from his employment for four hours between the opening and closing of the polls without penalty, and that any employer who among other things deducts wages for that absence is guilty of a misdemeanor.
Appellant is a Missouri corporation doing business in St. Louis. November 5, 1946, was a day for general elections in Missouri, the polls being open from 6 A. M. to 7 P. M. One Grotemeyer, an employee of appellant, was on a shift that worked from 8 A. M. to 4:30 P. M. each day, with thirty minutes for lunch. His rate of pay was $1.60 an hour. He requested four hours from the scheduled work day to vote on November 5, 1946. That request was refused; but Grotemeyer and all other employees on his shift were allowed to leave at 3 P. M. that day, which gave them four consecutive hours to vote before the polls closed.
Grotemeyer left his work at 3 P. M. in order to vote and did not return to work that day. He was not paid for the hour and a half between 3 P. M. and 4:30 P. M. Appellant was found guilty and fined for penalizing Grotemeyer in violation of the statute. The judgment was affirmed by the Missouri Supreme Court, 362 Mo. 299, 240 S. W. 2d 886, over the objection that the statute violated the Due Process and the Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Contract Clause of Art. I, § 10.
The liberty of contract argument pressed on us is reminiscent of the philosophy of Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45, which invalidated a New York law prescribing maximum hours for work in bakeries; Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U. S. 1, which struck down a Kansas statute outlawing “yellow dog” contracts; Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U. S. 525, which held unconstitutional a federal statuté fixing minimum wage standards for women in the District of Columbia, and others of that vintage. Our recent decisions make plain that we do not sit as a super-legislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation nor to decide whether the policy which it expresses offends the public welfare. The legislative power has limits, as Tot v. United States, 319 U. S. 463, holds. But the state legislatures have constitutional authority to experiment with new techniques; they are entitled to their own standard of the public welfare; they may within extremely broad limits control practices in the business-labor field, so long as specific constitutional prohibitions are not violated and so long as conflicts with valid and controlling federal laws are avoided. That is the essence of West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379; Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502; Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U. S. 236; Lincoln Union v. Northwestern Co., 335 U. S. 525; and California Auto. Assn. v. Maloney, 341 U. S. 105.
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, supra, overruling Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, supra, held constitutional a state law fixing minimum wages for women. The present statute contains in form a minimum wage requirement. There is a difference in the purpose of the legislation.. Here it is not the protection of the health and morals of the citizen. Missouri by this legislation has sought to safeguard the right of suffrage by taking from employers the incentive and power to use their leverage over employees to influence the vote. But the police power is not confined to a narrow category; it extends, as stated in Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104, 111, to all the great public needs. The protection of the right of suffrage under our scheme of things is basic and fundamental.
The only semblance of substance in the constitutional objection to Missouri’s law is that the employer must pay wages for a period in which the employee performs no services. Of course many forms of regulation reduce the net return of the enterprise; yet that gives rise to no constitutional infirmity. See Queenside Hills Co. v. Saxl, 328 U. S. 80; California Auto. Assn. v. Maloney, supra. Most regulations of business necessarily impose financial burdens on the enterprise for which no compensation is paid. Those are part of the costs of our civilization. Extreme cases are conjured up where an employer is required to pay wages for a period that has no relation to the legitimate end. Those cases can await decision as and when they arise. The present law has no such infirmity. Jt is designed to eliminate any penalty for exercising the right of suffrage and to remove a practical obstacle to getting out the vote. The public welfare is a broad and inclusive concept. The moral, social, economic, and physical well-being of the community is one part of it; the political well-being, - another. The police power which is adequate to fix the financial burden for one is adequate for the other. The judgment of the legislature that time out for voting should cost the employee nothing may be a debatable one. It is indeed conceded by the opposition to be such. But if our recent cases mean anything, they leave debatable issues as respects business, economic, and social affairs to legislative decision. We could strike down this law only if we returned to the philosophy of the Lochner, Coppage, and Adkins cases.
The classification of voters so as to free employees from the domination of employers is an attempt to deal with an evil to which the one group has been exposed. The need for that classification is a matter for legislative judgment (American Federation of Labor v. American Sash Co., 335 U. S. 538), and does not amount to a denial of equal protection under the laws.
Affirmed.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter concurs in the result.
“Any person entitled to vote at any election in this state shall, on the day of such election, be entitled to absent himself from any services or employment in which he is then engaged or employed, for a period of four hours between the times of opening and closing the polls; and such voter shall not, because of so absenting himself, be liable to any penalty; provided, however, that his employer may specify the hours during which such employee may absent himself as aforesaid. Any person or corporation who shall refuse to any employee the privilege hereby conferred, or shall discharge or threaten to discharge any employee for absenting himself from his work for the purpose of said election, or shall cause any employee to suffer any penalty or deduction of wages because of the exercise of such privilege, or who shall, directly or indirectly, violate the provisions of this section, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction thereof be fined in any sum not exceeding five hundred dollars.”
Decisions contrary to that of the Missouri Supreme Court in this case have been rendered by the Court of Appeals of Kentucky in Illinois Central R. Co. v. Commonwealth, 305 Ky. 632, 204 S. W. 2d 973, and by the Supreme Court of Illinois in People v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 306 Ill. 486, 138 N. E. 155. But cf. Zelney v. Murphy, 387 Ill. 492, 56 N. E. 2d 754. The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York in People v. Ford Motor Co., 271 App. Div. 141, 63 N. Y. S. 2d 697, and the Appellate Department of the Superior Court of California in Ballarini v. Schlage Lock Co., 100 Cal. App. 2d 859, 226 P. 2d 771, held in accord with Missouri. For a review of legislation in this field, see 47 Col. L. Rev. 135.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | B | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Douglas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner seeks in this suit maintenance and cure from the United States, as owner of S. S. Anna Howard Shaw. Petitioner was a messman who went ashore on leave while the vessel was at Naples in 1944. He and two other members of the crew first did some sightseeing. Then the three of them drank one bottle of wine and went to a dance hall, where they stayed an hour and a half, dancing. There was a room adjoining the dance hall that overlooked the ocean. French doors opened onto an unprotected ledge which extended out from the building a few feet. Petitioner stepped to within 6 inches of the edge and leaned over to take a look. As he did so, he took hold of an iron rod which seemed to be attached to the building. The rod came off and petitioner lost his balance and fell, breaking a leg.
The District Court awarded maintenance. 75 F. Supp. 210, 76 F. Supp. 735. The Court of Appeals disallowed it. 179 F. 2d 919. The case is here on certiorari.
The Shipowners’ Liability Convention, proclaimed by the President Sept. 29, 1939, 54 Stat. 1693, provides in Art. 2:
“1. The shipowner shall be liable in respect of— “(a) sickness and injury occurring between the date specified in the articles of agreement for reporting for duty and the termination of the engagement;
“(b) death, resulting from such sickness or injury.
“2. Provided that national laws or regulations may make exceptions in respect of:
“(a) injury incurred otherwise than in the service of the ship;
“(b) injury or sickness due to the wilful act, default or misbehaviour of the sick, injured or deceased person;
“(c) sickness or infirmity intentionally concealed when the engagement is entered into.”
Petitioner’s argument is twofold. He maintains first that under paragraph 1 a shipowner’s duty to provide maintenance and cure is absolute and that the exceptions specified in paragraph 2 are not operative until a statute is enacted which puts them in force. He argues in the second place that, even if paragraph 2 is operative without an Act of Congress, his conduct was not due to a “wilful act, default or misbehaviour” within the meaning of that paragraph. An amicus curiae argues that the injury was not received “in the service of the ship” within the meaning of Paragraph 2 (a) of Art. 2.
There is support for petitioner’s first point in the concurring opinion of Chief Justice Stone in Waterman Steamship Corp. v. Jones, 318 U. S. 724, 738. But we think the preferred view is opposed. Our conclusion is that the exceptions permitted by paragraph 2 are operative by virtue of the general maritime law and that no Act of Congress is necessary to give them force.
The language of paragraph 2, in its ordinary range of meaning, easily permits that construction. It is “national laws or regulations” which may make exceptions. The term law in our jurisprudence usually includes the rules of court decisions as well as legislative acts. That was held in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, to be true of the phrase “the laws of the several states” as used in the first Judiciary Act. 1 Stat. 73, § 34. No reason is apparent why a more restricted meaning should be given “national laws or regulations.” The purpose of the Convention would not be served by the narrow meaning. This Convention was a product of the International Labor Organization. Its purpose was to provide an international system of regulation of the shipowner’s liability. That international system was aimed at providing a reasonable average which could be applied in any country. We find no suggestion that it was designed to adopt a more strict standard of liability than that which our maritime law provides. The aim indeed was not to change materially American standards but to equalize operating costs by raising the standards of member nations to the American level. If the Convention was designed to make absolute the liability of the shipping industry until and unless each member nation by legislative act reduced it, we can hardly believe some plain indication of the purpose would not have been made. Much of this body of maritime law had developed through the centuries in judicial decisions. To reject that body of law and start anew with a complete code would be a novel and drastic step. Under our construction the Convention provides a reasonable average for international application. The definition of the exceptions itself helps provide the average, leaving the creation of the exceptions to any source of law which the member nations recognize. That view serves the purpose of the Convention and conforms to the normal meaning of the words used. Our conclusion is that both paragraph 1 and paragraph 2 of Art. 2 state the standard of liability which legislative and decisional law define in particularity.
The District Court held that petitioner’s degree of fault did not bar a recovery for maintenance and cure. The Court of Appeals thought otherwise. The question is whether the injury was “due to the wilful act, default or misbehaviour” of petitioner within the meaning of Art. 2, paragraph 2 (b) of the Convention. The standard prescribed is not negligence but wilful misbehavior. In the maritime law it has long been held that while fault of the seaman will forfeit the right to maintenance and cure, it must be “some positively vicious conduct — such as gross negligence or willful disobedience of orders.” The Chandos, 6 Sawy. 544, 549-550; The City of Carlisle, 39 F. 807, 813; The Ben Flint, 1 Biss. 562, 566. And see Reed v. Canfield, 1 Sumn. 195, 206. In Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U. S. 724, 731, we stated the rule as follows : “Conceptions of contributory negligence, the fellow-servant doctrine, and assumption of risk have no place in the liability or defense against it. Only some wilful misbehavior or deliberate act of indiscretion suffices to deprive the seaman of his protection.”
The exception which some cases have made for injuries resulting from intoxication (see Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., supra, p. 731, notes 11 and 12) has no place in this case. As the District Judge ruled, the amount of wine consumed hardly permits a finding of intoxication. Petitioner was plainly negligent. Yet we would have to strain to find the element of wilfulness or its equivalent. He sought to use some care when he looked down from the small balcony, as evidenced by his seizure of the iron bar for a handhold. His conduct did not measure up to a standard of due care under the circumstances. But we agree with the District Court that it was not wilful misbehavior within the meaning of the Convention.
Finally it is suggested that the injury did not occur “in the service of the ship,” as that term is used in paragraph 2 (a) of Art. 2 of the Convention. We held in Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., supra, that maintenance and cure extends to injuries occurring while the seaman is departing on or returning from shore leave though he has at the time no duty to perform for the ship. It is contended that the doctrine of that case should not be extended to injuries received during the diversions of the seaman after he has reached the shore. Mr. Justice Rutledge, speaking for the Court in the Aguilar case, stated the reasons for extending maintenance and cure to shore leave cases as follows (pp. 733-734):
“To relieve the shipowner of his obligation in the case of injuries incurred on shore leave would cast upon the seaman hazards encountered only by reason of the voyage. The assumption is hardly sound that the normal uses and purposes of shore leave are 'exclusively personal' and have no relation to the vessel’s business. Men cannot live for long cooped up aboard ship, without substantial impairment of their efficiency, if not also serious danger to discipline. Relaxation beyond the confines of the ship is necessary if the work is to go on, more so that it may move smoothly. No master would take a crew to sea if he could not grant shore leave, and no crew would be taken if it could never obtain it. . . . In short, shore leave is an elemental necessity in the sailing of ships, a part of the business as old as the art, not merely a personal diversion.
“The voyage creates not only the need for relaxation ashore, but the necessity that it be satisfied in distant and unfamiliar ports. If, in those surroundings, the seaman, without disqualifying misconduct, contracts disease or incurs injury, it is because of the voyage, the shipowner’s business. That business has separated him from his usual places of association. By adding this separation to the restrictions of living as well as working aboard, it forges dual and unique compulsions for seeking relief wherever it may be found. In sum, it is the ship’s business which subjects the seaman to the risks attending hours of relaxation in strange surroundings. Accordingly, it is but reasonable that the business extend the same protections against injury from them as it gives for other risks of the employment.”
This reasoning is as applicable to injuries received during the period of relaxation while on shore as it is to' those received while reaching it. To restrict the liability along the lines suggested would be to whittle it down “by restrictive and artificial distinctions” as attempted in the Aguilar case. We repeat what we said there, “If leeway is to be given in either direction, all the considerations which brought the liability into being dictate it should be in the sailor’s behalf.” 318 U. S. at 735.
Reversed.
Petitioner sued the United States as owner and American South African Line, Inc. as the general agent and operator. The District Court dismissed the libel as to the United States and held the general agent liable under Hust v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 328 U. S. 707. During the pendency of the appeal by the general agent and the cross-appeal by petitioner, Fink v. Shepard S. S. Co., 337 U. S. 810, was decided. Accordingly the decree against the general agent was reversed and the Court of Appeals considered the case on the merits against the United States.
Chief Justice Stone relied on the report of the Secretary of State to the President on the need for legislation implementing the Convention. The Secretary said in part: “Many of the provisions of the convention are considered to be self-executing, and there would appear to be no need to repeat verbatim the language of the convention in a statute to make it effective. Some of the articles of the convention, however, after stating the general rule, provide that nation^ .laws may make specified exceptions thereto. If this Government is to be excepted from certain obligations of the convention or alterations in our present practice, it is necessary to do so affirmatively by statute.” H. R. Rep. No. 1328, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 6.
The Secretary had the following to say about Article 2: “Section 4 follows the exceptions in article 2 of the convention which sets forth the risks covered in the entire convention. . . . Paragraph 1 of article 2 of the convention was not incorporated in the bill because of the belief (1) that it is self-executing in that it establishes liability, although no definite amount is provided; and (2) that it will not be held by the courts to conflict with present law in this country.” Id., p. 6.
The implementing legislation was passed by the House, 84 Cong. Rec. 10540, but not by the Senate. See Hearings, Subcommittee of the Committee on Commerce, U. S. Senate, on H. R. 6881, 76th Cong., 3d Sess.; S. Doc. 113, 77th Cong., 1st Sess.; 87 Cong. Rec. 7434.
See Fried, Relations Between the United Nations and the International Labor Organization, 41 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 963; Dillon, International Labor Conventions (1942); Shotwell, The Origins of the International Labor Organization (1934).
The United States became a member of the International Labor Organization on August 20, 1934. See U. S. Treaties, Treaty Series, No. 874.
See International Labor Conference, Proceedings, Thirteenth Sess. (1929), 131.
The report of the Secretary of State recommending ratification of the Convention emphasized that the treaty (1) would not materially change American legal standards and (2) would raise standards of member nations to the American level and thus equalize operating costs. S. Exec. Rep. 8, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 3.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | H | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Thomas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question before us in this case is whether a plaintiff must present direct evidence of discrimination in order to obtain a mixed-motive instruction under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (1991 Act). We hold that direct evidence is not required.
I
A
Since 1964, Title VII has made it an “unlawful employment practice for an employer... to discriminate against any individual. . . , because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 78 Stat. 255, 42 U. S. C. §2000e-2(a)(1) (emphasis added). In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U. S. 228 (1989), the Court considered whether an employment decision is made “because of” sex in a “mixed-motive” case, i. e., where both legitimate and illegitimate reasons motivated the decision. The Court concluded that, under §2000e-2(a)(l), an employer could “avoid a finding of liability ... by proving that it would have made the same decision even if it had not allowed gender to play such a role.” Id., at 244; see id., at 261, n. (White, J., concurring in judgment); id., at 261 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment). The Court was divided, however, over the predicate question of when the burden of proof may be shifted to an employer to prove the affirmative defense.
Justice Brennan, writing for a plurality of four Justices, would have held that “when a plaintiff . . . proves that her gender played a motivating part in an employment decision, the defendant may avoid a finding of liability only by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same decision even if it had not taken the plaintiff’s gender into account.” Id., at 258 (emphasis added). The plurality did not, however, “suggest a limitation on the possible ways of proving that [gender] stereotyping played a motivating role in an employment decision.” Id., at 251-252.
Justice White and Justice O’Connor both concurred in the judgment. Justice White would have held that the case was governed by Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274 (1977), and would have shifted the burden to the employer only when a plaintiff “show[ed] that the unlawful motive was a substantial factor in the adverse employment action.” Price Waterhouse, supra, at 259. Justice O’Con-nor, like Justice White, would have required the plaintiff to show that an illegitimate consideration was a “substantial factor” in the employment decision. 490 U. S., at 276. But, under Justice O’Connor’s view, “the burden on the issue of causation” would shift to the employer only where “a disparate treatment plaintiff [could] show by direct evidence that an illegitimate criterion was a substantial factor in the decision.” Ibid. (emphasis added).
Two years after Price Waterhouse, Congress passed the 1991 Act “in large part [as] a response to a series of decisions of this Court interpreting the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1964.” Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U. S. 244, 250 (1994). In particular, § 107 of the 1991 Act, which is at issue in this case, “responded]” to Price Waterhouse by “setting forth standards applicable in ‘mixed motive’ cases” in two new statutory provisions. 511 U. S., at 251. The first establishes an alternative for proving that an “unlawful employment practice” has occurred:
“Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, an unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.” 42 U. S. C. §2000e-2(m).
The second provides that, with respect to “a claim in which an individual proves a violation under section 2000e-2(m),” the employer has a limited affirmative defense that does not absolve it of liability, but restricts the remedies available to a plaintiff. The available remedies include only declaratory relief, certain types of injunctive relief, and attorney’s fees and costs. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). In order to avail itself of the affirmative defense, the employer must “demonstrate] that [it] would have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor.” Ibid.
Since the passage of the 1991 Act, the Courts of Appeals have divided over whether a plaintiff must prove by direct evidence that an impermissible consideration was a “motivating factor” in an adverse employment action. See 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2(m). Relying primarily on Justice O’Con-nor’s concurrence in Price Waterhouse, a number of courts have held that direct evidence is required to establish liability under § 20Q0e-2(m). See, e. g., Mohr v. Dustrol, Inc., 306 F. 3d 636, 640-641 (CA8 2002); Fernandes v. Costa Bros. Masonry, Inc., 199 F. 3d 572, 580 (CA1 1999); Trotter v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ala., 91 F. 3d 1449, 1453-1454 (CA11 1996); Fuller v. Phipps, 67 F. 3d 1137, 1142 (CA4 1995). In the decision below, however, the Ninth Circuit concluded otherwise. See infra, at 97-98.
B
Petitioner Desert Palace, Inc., dba Caesar’s Palace Hotel & Casino of Las Vegas, Nevada, employed respondent Catha-rina Costa as a warehouse worker and heavy equipment operator. Respondent was the only woman in this job and in her local Teamsters bargaining unit.
Respondent experienced a number of problems with management and her co-workers that led to an escalating series of disciplinary sanctions, including informal rebukes, a denial of privileges, and suspension. Petitioner finally terminated respondent after she was involved in a physical altercation in a warehouse elevator with fellow Teamsters member Herbert Gerber. Petitioner disciplined both employees because the facts surrounding the incident were in dispute, but Gerber, who had a clean disciplinary record, received only a 5-day suspension.
Respondent subsequently' filed this lawsuit against petitioner in the United States- District Court for the District of Nevada, asserting claims of sex discrimination and sexual harassment under Title VII. The District Court dismissed the sexual harassment claim, but allowed the claim for sex discrimination to go to the jury. At trial, respondent presented evidence that (1) she was singled out for “intense ‘stalking’ ” by one- of her supervisors, (2) she received harsher discipline than men for the same conduct, (3) she was treated less favorably than men in the assignment of overtime, and (4) supervisors repeatedly “stack[ed]” her disciplinary record and “frequently used or tolerated” sex-based slurs against her. 299 F. 3d 838, 845-846 (CA9 2002).
Based on this evidence, the District Court denied petitioner’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, and submitted the case to the jury with instructions, two of which are relevant here. First, without objection from petitioner, the District Court instructed the jury that “ ‘[t]he plaintiff has the burden of proving ... by a preponderance of the evidence’ ” that she “‘suffered adverse work conditions’” and that her sex “ ‘was a motivating factor in any such work conditions imposed upon her.’ ” Id., at 858.
Second, the District Court gave the jury the following mixed-motive instruction:
“‘You have heard evidence that the defendant’s treatment of the plaintiff was motivated by the plaintiff’s sex and also by other lawful reasons. If you find that the plaintiff’s sex was a motivating factor in the defendant’s treatment of the plaintiff, the plaintiff is entitled to your verdict, even if you find that the defendant’s conduct was also motivated by a lawful reason.
“ ‘However, if you find that the defendant’s treatment of the plaintiff was motivated by both gender and lawful reasons, you must decide whether the plaintiff is entitled to damages. The plaintiff is entitled to damages unless the defendant proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant would have treated plaintiff similarly even if the plaintiff’s gender had played no role in the employment decision.’ ” Ibid.
Petitioner unsuccessfully objected to this instruction, claiming that respondent had failed to adduce “direct evidence” that sex was a motivating factor in her dismissal or in any of the other adverse employment actions taken against her. The jury rendered a verdict for respondent, awarding back-pay, compensatory damages, and punitive damages. The District Court denied petitioner’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law.
The Court of Appeals initially vacated and remanded, holding that the District Court had erred in giving the mixed-motive instruction because respondent had failed to present “substantial evidence of conduct or statements by the employer directly reflecting discriminatory animus.” 268 F. 3d 882, 884 (CA9 2001). In addition, the panel concluded that petitioner was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the termination claim because the evidence was insufficient to prove that respondent was “terminated because she was a woman.” Id., at 890.
The Court of Appeals reinstated the District Court’s judgment after rehearing the case en banc. 299 F. 3d 838 (CA9 2002). The en banc court saw no need to decide whether Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Price Waterhouse controlled because it concluded that Justice O’Connor’s references to “direct evidence” had been “wholly abrogated” by the 1991 Act. 299 F. 3d, at 850. And, turning “to the language” of §2000e-2(m), the court observed that the statute “imposes no special [evidentiary] requirement and does not reference ‘direct evidence.’” Id., at 853. Accordingly, the court concluded that a “plaintiff... may establish a violation through a preponderance of evidence (whether direct or circumstantial) that a protected characteristic played ‘a motivating factor.’ ” Id., at 853-854 (footnote omitted). Based on that standard, the Court of Appeals held that respondent’s evidence was sufficient to warrant a mixed-motive instruction and that a reasonable jury could have found that respondent’s sex was a “motivating factor in her treatment.” Id., at 859. Four judges of the en banc panel dissented, relying in large part on “the reasoning of the prior opinion of the three-judge panel.” Id., at 866.
We granted certiorari. 537 U. S. 1099 (2003).
II
This case provides us with the first opportunity to consider the effects of the 1991 Act on jury instructions in mixed-motive cases. Specifically, we must decide whether a plaintiff must present direct evidence of discrimination in order to obtain a mixed-motive instruction under 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2(m). Petitioner’s argument on this point proceeds in three steps: (1) Justice O’Connor’s opinion is the holding of Price Waterhouse; (2) Justice O’Connor’s Price Water-house opinion requires direct evidence of discrimination before a mixed-motive instruction can be given; and (3) the 1991 Act does nothing to abrogate that holding. Like the Court of Appeals, we see no need to address which of the opinions in Price Waterhouse is controlling: the third step of petitioner’s argument is flawed, primarily because it is inconsistent with the text of § 2000e-2(m).
Our precedents make clear that the starting point for our analysis is the statutory text. See Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U. S. 249, 253-254 (1992). And where, as here, the words of the statute are unambiguous, the “ ‘judicial inquiry is complete.’” Id., at 254 (quoting Rubin v. United States, 449 U. S. 424, 430 (1981)). Section 2000e-2(m) unambiguously states that a plaintiff need only “demonstrate]” that an employer used a forbidden consideration with respect to “any employment practice.” On its face, the statute does not mention, much less require, that a plaintiff make a heightened showing through direct evidence. Indeed, petitioner concedes as much. Tr. of Oral Arg. 9.
Moreover, Congress explicitly defined the term “demonstrates” in the 1991 Act, leaving little doubt that no special evidentiary showing is required. Title VII defines the term “ ‘demonstrates' ” as to “mee[t] the burdens of production and persuasion.” §2000e(m). If Congress intended the term “ ‘demonstrates' " to require that the “burdens of production and persuasion” be met by direct evidence or some other heightened showing, it could have made that intent clear by including language to that effect in §2000e(m). Its failure to do so is significant, for Congress has been unequivocal when imposing heightened proof requirements in other circumstances, including in other provisions of Title 42. See, e. g., 8 U. S. C. § 1158(a)(2)(B) (stating that an asylum application may not be filed unless an alien “demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence” that the application was filed within one year of the alien’s arrival in the United States); 42 U. S. C. § 5851(b)(8)(D) (providing that “[r]elief may not be ordered” against an employer in retaliation cases involving whistleblowers under the Atomic Energy Act where the employer is able to “demonstrate] by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the same unfavorable personnel action in the absence of such behavior” (emphasis added)); cf. Price Waterhouse, 490 U. S., at 253 (plurality opinion) (“Only rarely have we required clear and convincing proof where the action defended against seeks only conventional relief”).
In addition, Title VII’s silence with respect to the type of evidence required in mixed-motive cases also suggests that we should not depart from the “[c]onventional rul[e] of civil litigation [that] generally applies] in Title VII cases.” Ibid. That rule requires a plaintiff to prove his case “by a preponderance of the evidence,” ibid., using “direct or circumstantial evidence,” Postal Service Bd. of Governors v. Athens, 460 U. S. 711, 714, n. 3 (1983). We have often acknowledged the utility of circumstantial evidence in discrimination cases. For instance, in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U. S. 133 (2000), we recognized that evidence that a defendant’s explanation for an employment practice is “unworthy of credence” is “one form of circumstantial evidence that is probative of intentional discrimination.” Id., at 147 (emphasis added). The reason for treating circumstantial and direct evidence alike is both clear and deep rooted: “Circumstantial evidence is not only sufficient, but may also be more certain, satisfying and persuasive than direct evidence.” Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 352 U. S. 500, 508, n. 17 (1957).
The adequacy of circumstantial evidence also extends beyond civil cases; we have never questioned the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence in support of a criminal conviction, even though proof beyond a reasonable doubt is required. See Holland v. United States, 348 U. S. 121, 140 (1954) (observing that, in criminal cases, circumstantial evidence is “intrinsically no different from testimonial evidence”). And juries are routinely instructed that “[t]he law makes no distinction between the weight or value to be given to either direct or circumstantial evidence.” 1A K. O’Malley, J. Grenig, & W. Lee, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions, Criminal § 12.04 (5th ed. 2000); see also 4 L. Sand, J. Siffert, W. Loughlin, S. Reiss, & N. Batterman, Modern Federal Jury Instructions ¶ 74.01 (2002) (model instruction 74-2). It is not surprising, therefore, that neither petitioner nor its amici curiae can point to any other circumstance in which we have restricted a litigant to the presentation of direct evidence absent some affirmative directive in a statute. Tr. of Oral Arg. 13.
Finally, the use of the term “demonstrates” in other provisions of Title VII tends to show further that §2000e-2(m) does not incorporate a direct evidence requirement. See, e. g., 42 U. S. C. §§ 2000e-2(k)(l)(A)(i), 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). For instance, § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) requires an employer to “demon-stratfe] that [it] would have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor” in order to take advantage of the partial affirmative defense. Due to the similarity in structure between that provision and §2000e-2(m), it would be logical to assume that the term “demonstrates” would carry the same meaning with respect to both provisions. But when pressed at oral argument about whether direct evidence is required before the partial affirmative defense can be invoked, petitioner did not “agree that ... the defendant or the employer has any heightened standard” to satisfy. Tr. of Oral Arg. 7. Absent some congressional indication to the contrary, we decline to give the same term in the same Act a different meaning depending on whether the rights of the plaintiff or the defendant are at issue. See Commissioner v. Lundy, 516 U. S. 235, 250 (1996) (“The interrelationship and close proximity of these provisions of the statute ‘presents a classic case for application of the “normal rule of statutory construction that identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning”’” (quoting Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U. S. 478, 484 (1990))).
For the reasons stated above, we agree with the Court of Appeals that no heightened showing is required under § 2000e-2(m).
* * *
In order to obtain an instruction under §2000e-2(m), a plaintiff need only present sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude, by a preponderance of the evidence, that “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice.” Because direct evidence of discrimination is not required in mixed-motive cases, the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in giving a mixed-motive instruction to the jury. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
This case does not require us to decide when, if ever, § 107 applies outside of the mixed-motive context.
Title 42 U. S. C. §2000e-5(g)(2)(B) provides in full:
“On a claim in which an individual proves a violation under section 2000e-2(m) of this title and a respondent demonstrates that the respondent would have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor, the court—
“(i) may grant declaratory relief, injunctive relief (except as provided in clause (ii)), and attorney’s fees and costs demonstrated to be directly attributable only to the pursuit of a claim under section 2000e-2(m) of this title; and
“(ii) shall not award damages or issue an order requiring any admission, reinstatement, hiring, promotion, or payment, described in subparagraph (A).”
Of course, in light of our conclusion that direct evidence is not required under §2000e-2(m), we need not address the second question on which we granted certiorari: “What are the appropriate standards for lower courts to follow in making a direct evidence determination in ‘mixed-motive’ cases under Title VII?” Pet. for Cert. i.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | B | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Kagan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
A federal employee subjected to an adverse personnel action such as a discharge or demotion may appeal her agency’s decision to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB or Board). See 5 U. S. C. §§ 7512, 7701. In that challenge, the employee may claim, among other things, that the agency discriminated against her in violation of a federal statute. See § 7702(a)(1). The question presented in this case arises when the MSPB dismisses an appeal alleging discrimination not on the merits, but on procedural grounds. Should an employee seeking judicial review then file a petition in the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, or instead bring a suit in district court under the applicable antidiscrimination law? We hold she should go to district court.
I
A
The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA), 5 U. S. C. § 1101 et seq., establishes a framework for evaluating personnel actions taken against federal employees. That statutory framework provides graduated procedural protections depending on an action’s severity. If (but only if) the action is particularly serious—involving, for example, a removal from employment or a reduction in grade or pay—the affected employee has a right to appeal the agency’s decision to the MSPB, an independent adjudicator of federal employment disputes. See §§1204, 7512, 7701. Such an appeal may' merely allege that the agency had insufficient cause for taking the action under the CSRA; but the appeal may also or instead charge the agency with discrimination prohibited by another federal statute, such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U. S. C. §2000e et seq., or the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,29 U. S. C. § 621 et seq. See 5 U. S. C. § 7702(a)(1). When an employee complains of a personnel action serious enough to appeal to the MSPB and alleges that the action was based on discrimination, she is said (by pertinent regulation) to have brought a “mixed case.” See 29 CFR § 1614.302 (2012). The CSRA and regulations of the MSPB and Equal Employment Opportunity-Commission (EEOC) set out special procedures to govern such a case—different from those used when the employee either challenges a serious personnel action under the CSRA alone or attacks a less serious action as discriminatory. See 5 U. S. C. §§7702, 7703(b)(2) (2006 ed. and Supp. V); 5 CFR pt. 1201, subpt. E (2012); 29 CFR pt. 1614, subpt. C.
A federal employee bringing a mixed case may proceed in a variety of ways. She may first file a discrimination complaint with the agency itself, much as an employee challenging a personnel practice not appealable to the MSPB could do. See 5 CFR § 1201.154(a); 29 CFR § 1614.302(b). If the agency decides against her, the employee may then either take the matter to the MSPB or bypass further administrative review by suing the agency in district court. See 5 CFR § 1201.154(b); 29 CFR § 1614.302(d)(l)(i). Alternatively, the employee may initiate the process by bringing her case directly to the MSPB, forgoing the agency’s own system for evaluating discrimination charges. See 5 CFR § 1201.154(a); 29 CFR § 1614.302(b). If the MSPB upholds the personnel action (whether in the first instance or after the agency has done so), the employee again has a choice: She may request additional administrative process, this time with the EEOC, or else she may seek judicial review. See 5 U.S.C. §§7702(a)(3), (b); 5 CFR §1201.161; 29 CFR §1614.303. The question in this case concerns where that judicial review should take place.
Section 7703 of the CSRA governs judicial review of the MSPB’s decisions. Section 7703(b)(1) gives the basic rule: “Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, a petition to review a . . . final decision of the Board shall be filed in the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.” Section 7703(b)(2) then spells out the exception:
“Cases of discrimination subject to the provisions of section 7702 of this title shall be filed under [the enforcement sections of the Civil Rights Act, Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and Fair Labor Standards Act], as applicable. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any such case filed under any such section must be filed within 30 days after the date the individual filing the case received notice of the judicially reviewable action under such section 7702.”
The enforcement provisions of the antidiscrimination statutes listed in this exception all authorize suit in federal district court. See 42 U. S. C. §§2000e-16(c), 2000e-5(f); 29 U. S. C. § 633a(c); § 216(b); see also Elgin v. Department of Treasury, 567 U. S. 1, 13 (2012).
Section 7702 describes and provides for the “cases of discrimination” referenced in § 7703(b)(2)’s exception. In relevant part, § 7702(a)(1) states:
“[I]n the case of any employee . . . who—
“(A) has been affected by an action which the employee .. . may appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board, and
“(B) alleges that a basis for the action was discrimination prohibited by [specified antidiscrimination statutes],
“the Board shall, within 120 days of the filing of the appeal, decide both the issue of discrimination and the appealable action in accordance with the Board’s appellate procedures.”
The “cases of discrimination” in § 7703(b)(2)’s exception, in other words, are mixed cases, in which an employee challenges as discriminatory a personnel action appealable to the MSPB.
The parties here dispute whether, in light of these interwoven statutory provisions, an employee should go to the Federal Circuit (pursuant to the general rule of § 7703(b)(1)), or instead to a district court (pursuant to the exception in § 7703(b)(2)), when the MSPB has dismissed her mixed case on procedural grounds.
B
Petitioner Carolyn Kloeckner used to work at the Department of Labor (DOL or agency). In June 2005, while still an employee, she filed a complaint with the agency’s civil rights office, alleging that DOL had engaged in unlawful sex and age discrimination by subjecting her to a hostile work environment. At that point, Kloeckner’s case was not ap-pealable to the MSPB because she had not suffered a sufficiently serious personnel action (e. g., a removal or demotion). See supra, at 44. Her claim thus went forward not under the special procedures for mixed cases, but under the EEOC’s regulations for all other charges of discrimination. See 29 CFR pt. 1614, subpts. A, D. In line with those rules, the agency completed an internal investigation and report in June 2006, and Kloeckner requested a hearing before an EEOC administrative judge.
The next month, DOL fired Kloeckner. A removal from employment is appealable to the MSPB, see supra, at 44, and Kloeckner believed the agency’s action was discriminatory; she therefore now had a mixed case. As permitted by regulation, see supra, at 45, she initially elected to file that case with the MSPB. Her claim of discriminatory removal, however, raised issues similar to those in her hostile work environment case, now pending before an EEOC judge; as a result, she became concerned that she would incur duplica-tive discovery expenses. To address that problem, she sought leave to amend her EEOC complaint to include her claim of discriminatory removal, and she asked the MSPB to dismiss her case without prejudice for four months to allow the EEOC process to go forward. See App. 13, 50-51. Both of those motions were granted. The EEOC judge accepted the amendment, and on September 18, 2006, the MSPB dismissed her appeal “without prejudice to [her] right to refile . . . either (A) within 30 days after a decision is rendered in her EEOC case; or (B) by January 18, 2007— whichever occurs first.” Id., at 5.
Discovery continued in the EEOC proceeding well past the MSPB’s January 18 deadline. In April, the EEOC judge found that Kloeckner had engaged in bad-faith conduct in connection with discovery. As a sanction, the judge terminated the EEOC proceeding and returned Kloeckner’s case to DOL for a final decision. Six months later, in October 2007, DOL issued a ruling rejecting all of Kloeckner’s claims. See id., at 10-49.
Kloeckner appealed DOL’s decision to the Board in November 2007. That appeal was filed within 30 days, the usual window for seeking MSPB review of an agency’s determination of a mixed case. See 5 CFR § 1201.154(a); 29 CFR § 1614.302(d)(l)(ii). But the MSPB declined to treat Kloeck-ner’s filing as an ordinary appeal of such an agency decision. Instead, the Board viewed it as an effort to reopen her old MSPB case—many months after the January 18 deadline for doing so had expired. The Board therefore dismissed Kloeckner’s appeal as untimely. See App. 53-57.
Kloeckner then brought this action against DOL in Federal District Court, alleging unlawful discrimination. The District Court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. See Kloeckner v. Solis, Civ. Action No. 4:09CV804 (ED Mo., Feb. 18, 2010). Relying on the Eighth Circuit’s ruling in Brumley v. Levinson, 991 F. 2d 801 (1993) (per curiam), the court held that because the MSPB had dismissed Kloeckner’s claims on procedural grounds, she should have sought review in the Federal Circuit under § 7703(b)(1); in the court’s view, the only discrimination cases that could go to district court pursuant to § 7703(b)(2) were those the MSPB had decided on the merits. The Eighth Circuit affirmed on the same reasoning. See 639 F. 3d 834 (2011).
We granted certiorari, 565 U. S. 1152 (2012), to resolve a • Circuit split on whether an employee seeking judicial review should proceed in the Federal Circuit or in a district court when the MSPB has dismissed her mixed case on procedural grounds. We now reverse the Eighth Circuit’s decision.
H—Í i—i
As the above account reveals, the intersection of federal civil rights statutes and civil service law has produced a complicated, at times confusing, process for resolving claims of discrimination in the federal workplace. But even within the most intricate and complex systems, some things are plain. So it is in this case, where two sections of the CSRA, read naturally, direct employees like Kloeckner to district court.
Begin with §7703, which governs judicial review of the MSPB’s rulings. As already noted, see supra, at 45-46, § 7703(b)(1) provides that petitions to review the Board’s final decisions should be filed in the Federal Circuit—“[e]x-cept as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection.” Paragraph (2), i. e,, § 7703(b)(2), then sets out a different rule for one category of cases—“[clases of discrimination subject to the provisions of section 7702 of this title.” Such a case, paragraph (2) instructs, “shall be filed under” the enforcement provision of an enumerated antidiscrimination statute. And each of those enforcement provisions authorizes an action in federal district court. See supra, at 46. So “[c]ases of discrimination subject to the provisions of section 7702” shall be filed in district court.
Turn next to § 7702, which identifies the cases “subject to [its] provisions.” As also stated earlier, §7702(a)(1) describes cases in which a federal employee “(A) has been affected by an action which [she] may appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board, and (B) alleges that a basis for the action was discrimination prohibited by” a listed federal statute. The subsection thus describes what we (adopting the lingo of the applicable regulations) have called “mixed eases.” See 29 CFR §1614.302. Those are the “eases of discrimination subject to” the rest of §7702⅛ provisions.
Now just put §7703 and §7702 together—say, in the form of a syllogism, to make the point obvious. Under § 7703(b)(2), “cases of discrimination subject to [§ 7702]” shall be filed in district court. Under § 7702(a)(1), the “cases of discrimination subject to [§7702]” are mixed cases—those appealable to the MSPB and alleging discrimination. Ergo, mixed cases shall be filed in district court.
And so that is where Kloeckner’s case should have been filed (as indeed it was). No one here contests that Kloeck-ner brought a mixed case—that she was affected by an action (i. e., removal) appealable to the MSPB and that she alleged discrimination prohibited by an enumerated federal law. And under the CSRA's terms, that is all that matters. Regardless whether the MSPB dismissed her claim on the merits or instead threw it out as untimely, Kloeekner brought the kind of case that the CSRA routes, in crystalline fashion, to district court.
Ill
The Government offers an alternative view (as did the Eighth Circuit)—that the CSRA directs the MSPB’s merits decisions to district court, while channeling its procedural rulings to the Federal Circuit. According to the Government, that bifurcated scheme, though not prescribed in the CSRA in so many words, lies hidden in the statute’s timing requirements. But we return from the Government’s maze-like tour of the CSRA persuaded only that the merits-procedure distinction is a contrivance, found nowhere in the statute’s provisions on judicial review.
The Government’s argument has two necessary steps. First, the Government claims that § 7703(b)(2)’s exception to Federal Circuit jurisdiction applies only when the MSPB’s decision in a mixed case is a “judicially reviewable action” under §7702. Second, the Government asserts that the Board’s dismissal of a mixed case on procedural grounds does not qualify as such a “judicially reviewable action.” We describe in turn the way the Government arrives at each of these conclusions.
The first step of the Government’s argument derives from § 7703(b)(2)’s second sentence. Right after stating that “cases of discrimination subject to [§7702]” shall be filed under specified antidiscrimination statutes (i. e., shall be filed in district court), § 7703(b)(2) provides: “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any such case filed under any such [statute] must be filed within 30 days after the date the individual filing the case received notice of the judicially reviewable action under section 7702.” The Government reads that sentence to establish an additional prerequisite for taking a case to district court, instead of to the Federal Circuit. To fall within the § 7703(b)(2) exception, the Government says, it is not enough that a case qualify as a “case of discrimination subject to [§ 7702]”; in addition, the MSPB’s decision must count as a “judicially reviewable action.” See Brief for Respondent 20-21. If the MSPB’s decision is not a “judicially reviewable action”—a phrase the Government characterizes as a “term of art in this context,” Tr. of Oral Arg. 28—the ruling still may be subject to judicial review (i. e., “judicially reviewable” in the ordinary sense), but only in the Federal Circuit.
The Government’s second step—that the Board’s procedural rulings are not “judicially reviewable actions”—begins with the language of § 7702(a)(3). That provision, the Government states, “defines for the most part which MSPB decisions qualify as ‘judicially reviewable aetionsfs]’ ” by “providing that ‘[a]ny decision of the Board under paragraph (1) of this subsection shall be a judicially reviewable action as of’ the date of the decision.” Brief for Respondent 21 (quoting § 7702(a)(3); emphasis and brackets added by Government). From there, the Government moves on to the cross-referenced paragraph—§ 7702(a)(1)—which states, among other things, that the Board “shall, within 120 days of [the employee’s filing], decide both the issue of discrimination and the appealable action in accordance with the Board’s appellate procedures.” According to the Government, the Board only “decide[s] . . . the issue of discrimination” when it rules on the merits, rather than on procedural grounds. On that view, a procedural decision is not in fact a “decision of the Board under paragraph (1),” which means that it also is not a “judicially reviewable action” under § 7702(a)(3). See Brief for Respondent 21-22. And so (returning now to the first step of the Government’s argument), judicial review of a procedural decision can occur only in the Federal Circuit, and not in district court.
If you need to take a deep breath after all that, you’re not alone. It would be hard to dream up a more roundabout way of bifurcating judicial review of the MSPB’s rulings in mixed cases. If Congress had wanted to send merits decisions to district court and procedural dismissals to the Federal Circuit, it could just have said so. The Government has offered no reason for Congress to have constructed such an obscure path to such a simple result.
And taking the Government’s analysis one step at a time makes it no more plausible than as a gestalt. The Government’s initial move is to read § 7703(b)(2)’s second sentence as adding a requirement for a case to fall within the exception to Federal Circuit jurisdiction. But that sentence does no such thing; it is nothing more than a filing deadline. Consider each sentence of § 7703(b)(2) in turn. The first sentence defines which cases should be brought in district court, rather than in the Federal Circuit; here, the full description is “[cjases of discrimination subject to the provisions of section 7702”—to wit, mixed cases. The second sentence then states when those cases should be brought: “[A]ny such case . . . must be filed within 30 days” of the date the employee “received notice of the judicially reviewable action.” The reference to a “judicially reviewable action” in that sentence does important work: It sets the clock running for when a case that belongs in district court must be filed there. What it does not do is to further define which timely-brought cases belong in district court instead of in the Federal Circuit. Describing those cases is the first sentence’s role.
Proof positive that the Government misreads § 7703(b)(2) comes from considering what the phrase “judicially reviewable action” would mean under its theory. In normal legal parlance, to say that an agency action is not “judicially reviewable” is to say simply that it is not subject to judicial review—that, for one or another reason, it cannot be taken to a court. But that ordinary understanding will not work for the Government here, because it wants to use the phrase to help determine which of two courts should review a decision, rather than whether judicial review is available at all. In the Government’s alternate universe, then, to say that an agency action is not “judicially reviewable” is to say that it is subject to judicial review in the Federal Circuit (even though not in district court). Small wonder that the Government must call the phrase “judicially reviewable action” a “term of art,” supra, at 51: On a natural reading, the phrase defines cases amenable to judicial review, rather than routes those cases as between two courts.
And even were we to indulge the Government that far, we could not accept the second step of its analysis. At that stage, remember, the Government contends that under § 7702 only decisions on the merits qualify as “judicially reviewable actions.” The language on which the Government principally relies, stated again, is as follows: “[T]he Board shall, within 120 days of [the employee’s filing], decide both the issue of discrimination and the appealable action.” But that provision, too, is only a timing requirement; it is designed to ensure that the Board act promptly on employees’ complaints. We see no reason to think that embedded within that directive is a limitation on the class of “judicially reviewable actions.” Nor (even were we to indulge the Government on that point as well) can we find the particular restriction the Government urges. According to the Government, the MSPB does not “decide ... the issue of discrimination” when it dismisses a mixed case on procedural grounds. But that phrase cannot bear the weight the Government places on it. All the phrase signifies is that the Board should dispose of the issue in some way, whether by actually adjudicating it or by holding that it was not properly raised. Indeed, were the Government right, §7702(a)’s statement that the Board “shall” decide the issue of discrimination would appear to bar procedural dismissals, requiring the Board to resolve on the merits even untimely complaints. No one (least of all the Government, which here is defending a procedural ruling) thinks that a plausible congressional command.
Another section of the statute—§ 7702(e)(1)(B)—puts the final nail in the coffin bearing the Government’s argument. That section states: “[I]f at any time after .. . the 120th day following [an employee’s filing] with the Board . . ., there is no judicially reviewable action[,] ... an employee shall be entitled to file a civil action” in district court under a listed antidiscrimination statute. That provision, as the Government notes, is designed “to save employees from being held in perpetual uncertainty by Board inaction.” Brief for Respondent 28. But if, as the Government insists, a procedural ruling is not a “judicially reviewable action,” then the provision would have another, surprising effect—essentially blowing up the Government’s argument from the inside. In that event, an employee whose suit the Board had dismissed on procedural grounds could bring suit in district court under § 7702(e)(1)(B) (so long as 120 days had elapsed from her Board filing), because she would have received “no judicially reviewable action.” And what’s more, she could do so even .many years later, because the statute’s usual 30-day filing deadline begins to run only upon “notice of [a] judicially reviewable action.” § 7703(b)(2). So an argument intended to keep employees like Kloeckner out of district court would paradoxically, and nonsensically, result in giving them all the time in the world to file suit there.
Responding to this unwelcome outcome, the Government offers us an exit route: We should avoid “absurd results,” the Government urges, by applying § 7702(e)(1)(B) only to “cases over which the Board continues to exert jurisdiction.” Brief for Respondent 27, 28, n. 4. But as the Government admits, that “gloss on the statute is not found in the text,” Tr. of Oral Arg. 50; the Government’s remedy requires our reading new words into the statute. We think a better option lies at hand. If we reject the Government’s odd view of “judicially reviewable actions,” then no absurdity arises in the first place: § 7702(e)(1)(B) would have no bearing on any case the MSPB dismissed within 120 days, whatever the grounds. It is the Government’s own misreading that creates the need to “fix” § 7702(e)(1)(B); take that away and the provision serves, as it was intended, only as a remedy for Board inaction.
l—I <í
A federal employee who claims that an agency action ap-pealable to the MSPB violates an antidiscrimination statute listed in § 7702(a)(1) should seek judicial review in district court, not in the Federal Circuit. That is so whether the MSPB decided her case on procedural grounds or instead on the merits. Kloeckner therefore brought her suit in the right place. We reverse the contrary judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
The actions entitling an employee to appeal a case to the MSPB include “(1) a removal; (2) a suspension for more than 14 days; (3) a reduction in grade; (4) a reduction in pay; and (5) a furlough.” 5 U. S. C. §7512.
Neither the CSRA nor any regulation explicitly authorizes an EEOC judge to consider the legality of a removal or other serious personnel action before the Board has done so. See supra, at 44-45. Nonetheless, the EEOC has approved that approach when the issues the personnel action raises are “firmly enmeshed” in an ongoing EEOC proceeding in order to avoid “delay[ing] justice and creating] unnecessary procedural complications.” Burton v. Espy, Appeal No. 01932449, 1994 WL 748214, *12 (EEOC, Oct. 28, 1994); see also Myvett v. Poteat, Appeal No. 0120103671, 2011 WL 6122516, *2 (EEOC, Nov. 21, 2011). We express no view on the propriety of this practice.
Compare 639 F. 3d 834 (CA8 2011) (case below) (Federal Circuit); Ballentine v. MSPB, 738 F. 2d 1244 (CA Fed. 1984) (same), with Harms v. IRS, 321 F. 3d 1001 (CA10 2003) (district court); Downey v. Runyon, 160 F. 3d 139 (CA2 1998) (same).
The Government supplements its tortuous reading of the CSRA’s text with an appeal to one of the statute’s purposes—in its words, “ensuring that the Federal Circuit would develop a uniform body of case law governing federal personnel issues.” Brief for Respondent 32. We have previously recognized that Congress, through the CSRA, sought to avoid “unnecessary layer[s] of judicial review in lower federal courts, and en-courag[e] more consistent judicial decisions.” United States v. Fausto, 484 U. S. 439, 449 (1988) (internal quotation marks and some bracketing omitted). But in this case, the Government’s argument about the neces sity of Federal Circuit review runs into an inconvenient fact: When Congress passed the CSRA, the Federal Circuit did not exist, and § 7703(b)(1) thus provided, as the general rule, that a federal employee should appeal a Board decision to 1 of the 12 Courts of Appeals or the Court of Claims. See Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 1143. Moreover, the Government’s own approach would leave many eases involving federal employment issues in district court. If the MSPB rejects on the merits a complaint alleging that an agency violated the CSRA as well as an antidiscrimination law, the suit will come to district court for a decision on both questions. See Williams v. Department of Army, 715 F. 2d 1485, 1491 (CA Fed. 1983) (en banc). In any event, even the most formidable argument concerning the statute’s purposes could not overcome the clarity we find in the statute’s text.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | B | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
The writ of certiorari is dismissed as improvidently granted.
It is so ordered.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | I | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Black
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented in these cases is whether the Federal Maritime Commission properly disapproved two provisions of several shipping conference agreements. One of the provisions under attack, the so-called tying rule, prohibits travel agents who book passage on ships participating in the conferences from selling passage on competing, nonconference lines. The second provision, known as the unanimity rule, requires unanimous action by conference members before the maximum rate of commissions payable to travel agents may be changed.
The Commission’s authority in this area stems from the Shipping Act, 1916. Section 15 of this Act, as amended, requires common carriers by water to submit most of their cooperative agreements to the Commission and directs it to:
“disapprove, cancel or modify any agreement, or any modification or cancellation thereof, whether or not previously approved by it, that it finds to be unjustly discriminatory or unfair as between carriers, shippers, exporters, importers, or ports, or between exporters from the United States and their foreign competitors, or to operate to the detriment of the commerce of the United States, or to be contrary to the public interest, or to be in violation of this chapter . . . .”
In 1959 proceedings were initiated before the Federal Maritime Board, predecessor agency to the present Federal Maritime Commission, on the complaint of the American Society of Travel Agents, petitioner in No. 258. The Society challenged a number of the practices of two conferences composed of steamship lines that furnish passenger service across the Atlantic. After extensive investigation and hearings before a Commission Examiner, the Commission disapproved both the tying and unanimity rules and ordered them eliminated. 7 F. M. C. 737 (1964). The Court of Appeals, however, set aside the order and remanded the case to the Commission for more detailed findings and explanations. 122 U. S. App. D. C. 59, 351 F. 2d 756 (1965). On remand the Commission again disapproved both rules. The tying rule was found detrimental to the commerce of the United States, unjustly discriminatory as between carriers, and contrary to the public interest. The unanimity rule was found detrimental to the commerce of the United States and contrary to the public interest. -F. M. C. - (1966). On appeal, the Court of Appeals again set aside the order, holding that the Commission’s new opinion had not remedied the defects noted in the prior decision on appeal, 125 U. S. App. D. C. 359, 372 F. 2d 932 (1967), and we granted certiorari, 389 U. S. 816 (1967). We hold that the Commission’s order was supported in all respects by adequate findings and analysis. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and approve the order of the Commission.
I.
An understanding of the issues in these cases will be facilitated by a very brief discussion of the purposes of these shipping conferences and the federal statutes enacted to regulate them. Major American and foreign steamship lines which compete for trafile along the same routes have long joined together in conferences to fix rates and other charges, allocate traffic, and in other ways moderate the rigors of competition. Despite traditional hostility to anticompetitive arrangements of this kind, however, Congress found after extensive investigation that the cooperative activity of these conferences was to some extent in the public interest. The House Committee that conducted the primary inquiry reported that the conferences promoted:
“regularity and frequency of service, stability and uniformity of rates, economy in the cost of service, better distribution of sailings, maintenance of American and European rates to foreign markets on a parity, and equal treatment of shippers through the elimination of secret arrangements and underhanded methods of discrimination.” H. R. Doc. No. 805, 63d Cong., 2d Sess., 416.
These advantages, the Committee concluded, could probably not be preserved in the face of unrestricted competition, and accordingly it recommended that the industry be granted some exemption from the antitrust laws. On the other hand, the Committee stressed that an unqualified exemption would be undesirable. The conferences had abused their power in the past and might do so in the future unless they were subjected to some form of effective governmental supervision. In response to these findings Congress enacted the Shipping Act, 1916. The statute not only outlawed a number of specific abuses but set up the United States Shipping Board, a predecessor of the present Federal Maritime Commission, with permanent authority under § 15 of the Act to modify or disapprove conference agreements. The antitrust immunity conferred was, as the House Committee had recommended, a limited one — only agreements receiving the approval of the Board were exempted. Originally the Board could disapprove an agreement on only three grounds: unjust discrimination, detriment to commerce, or illegality under one of the specific provisions of the Act. In 1959, however, Congress began an extensive review of regulation under the Shipping Act, and amendments passed in 1961 in response to these studies included a provision granting considerably broader authority by permitting disapproval under § 15 of any agreement found to be “contrary to the public interest.” The scheme of regulation adopted thus permits the conferences to continue operation but insures that their immunity from the antitrust laws will be subject to careful control.
II.
A crucial issue in these cases is respondents’ challenge to the Commission’s reliance on antitrust policy as a basis for disapproving these rules. Since the contention is equally relevant to analysis of the tying and unanimity rules, we consider it at the outset.
The Commission has formulated a principle that conference restraints which interfere with the policies of antitrust laws will be approved only if the conferences can “bring forth such facts as would demonstrate that the . . . rule was required by a serious transportation need, necessary to secure important public benefits or in furtherance of a valid regulatory purpose of the Shipping Act.” See - F. M. C., at -. In the present cases, but for the partial immunity granted by the Act, both the tying and unanimity rules undoubtedly would be held illegal under the antitrust laws, and respondents failed to satisfy the Commission that the rules were necessary to further some legitimate interest. The Commission found this sufficient reason to disapprove the rules, but the Court of Appeals disagreed. Emphasizing that “[t]he statutory language authorizes disapproval only when the Commission finds as a fact that the agreement operates in one of the four ways set out in the section by Congress,” the court held, “We do not read the statute as authorizing disapproval of an agreement on the ground that it runs counter to antitrust principles . . . .” 122 TJ. S. App. D. C., at 64; 351 F. 2d, at 761 (opinion on first appeal).
Insofar as this holding rests on the absence of an explicit antitrust test among the “four ways set out in the section,” we think the Court of Appeals was excessively formalistic in its approach to the Commission’s findings. By its very nature an illegal restraint of trade is in some ways “contrary to the public interest,” and the Commission’s antitrust standard, involving an assessment of the necessity for this restraint in terms of legitimate commercial objectives, simply gives understandable content to the broad statutory concept of “the public interest.” Certainly any reservations the Court of Appeals may have had on this point should have been dispelled by the Commission’s careful explanation on remand of the connection between its antitrust standard and the public interest requirement. See-F. M. C., at-. As long as the Commission indicates which of the statutory standards is the ultimate authority for its disapproval, we can see no objection to the Commission’s casting its primary analysis in terms of the requirements of its antitrust test.
Respondents argue more broadly, however, that the antitrust test is not a permissible elaboration of the statutory standards. They contend that the whole purpose of the statutory scheme would be defeated if incompatibility with the antitrust laws can be a sufficient reason for denying immunity from these laws. Congress, it is argued, has already decided that there is a justification for intrusions on our antitrust policy by the conference system, and accordingly the Commission cannot require further justifications from the shipping lines but must itself demonstrate the way in which the statutory requirements are violated.
Respondents’ arguments, however, are not even superficially persuasive. Congress has, it is true, decided to confer antitrust immunity unless the agreement is found to violate certain statutory standards, but as already indicated, antitrust concepts are intimately involved in the standards Congress chose. The Commission’s approach does not make the promise of antitrust immunity meaningless because a restraint that would violate the antitrust laws will still be approved whenever a sufficient justification for it exists. Nor does the Commission’s test, by requiring the conference to come forward with a justification for the restraint, improperly shift the burden of proof. The Commission must of course adduce substantial evidence to support a finding under one of the four standards of § 15, but once an antitrust violation is established, this alone will normally constitute substantial evidence that the agreement is “contrary to the public interest,” unless other evidence in the record fairly detracts from the weight of this factor. It is not unreasonable to require that a conference adopting a particular rule to govern its own affairs, for reasons best known to the conference itself, must come forward and explain to the Commission what those reasons are. We therefore hold that the antitrust test formulated by the Commission is an appropriate refinement of the statutory “public interest” standard.
III.
We turn then to the Commission’s analysis of the specific impact of the unanimity rule. The rule is embodied in the basic agreement of the carriers in the Atlantic Passenger Steamship Conference, an association of the major lines serving passenger traffic between Europe and the United States and Canada. Article 6 (a) of this agreement provides that the rate of commission which member lines may pay to their agents must be established by unanimous agreement of the member lines. In addition, Article 3 (d) of the agreement permits the subcommittee with primary responsibility for suggesting commission rates to make recommendations to the full conference only when subcommittee members are in unanimous accord.
The Commission noted that at the time of its hearings, the commission paid by conference members to travel agents was substantially lower than that paid by the airlines. By the time the Commission wrote its opinion on remand, the conference had raised its commission to the level offered by the airlines, but the effective commission earned by travel agents remained lower on ocean travel because booking passage by sea requires three to four times as much of a travel agent’s time as is required to book air travel. The Commission found that the unanimity rule was responsible for the existing disparity between effective commissions on air and sea travel and for the delays in conference action to rectify the situation. On three specific occasions, lack of unanimity prevented the conference subcommittee from recommending an increase, even though a majority was recorded as being in favor of the proposals. The Commission also referred to several other occasions on which the conference and its subcommittee failed to take action. Because minutes apparently were not taken for these meetings, the Commission was unable to determine with certainty whether the unanimity rule had frustrated the will of a majority on these occasions.
The Commission then found that as a result of the relatively advantageous commission on sales of air travel, there was a definite tendency for travel agents to encourage their customers to travel by air rather than by sea. This situation in turn not only injured the majority of the shipping lines by diverting business to the airlines, but also injured the undecided traveler, who lost the opportunity to deal with an agent whose recommendations would not be influenced by his own economic interest. The Commission also found that respondents had failed to establish any important public interest served by the unanimity rule. Under these circumstances the Commission concluded that the rule was detrimental to commerce by fostering a decline in travel by sea, and contrary to the public interest in the maintenance of a sound and independent merchant marine. The Commission also found the rule contrary to the public interest in that it invaded the principles of the antitrust laws more than was necessary to further any valid regulatory purpose.
We find the Commission’s analysis sound and the evidence in support of its conclusions more than ample. Respondents attack the initial finding that the unanimity-rule has blocked the desires of the majority to raise the commission rate, but the argument reduces to an insistence that the Commission establish this point by conclusive proof. It is true that there is no specific evidence in the record revealing that at any of the conference meetings where no action was taken, a majority favored an immediate increase. But the Maritime Commission faces no such rigorous standard of proof. The issue to be decided was a purely factual one, and the Commission was entitled to draw inferences as to the wishes of the majority from the record as a whole. The record showed beyond doubt that in several instances a majority of the subcommittee favored an increase, and faced with the lack of proof one way or the other as to the wishes of the majority of the full conference, the Commission acted reasonably in assuming that the views of the subcommittee were not diametrically opposed to that of the entire membership. In addition, it is undisputed that the rule on several occasions operated to prevent a majority of the subcommittee from presenting its recommendations to the full conference, and the Commission could reasonably conclude that this impact on the subcommittee served in itself to delay or prevent action by the full conference. Although any conclusion as to the commission rate that would have prevailed under a different voting procedure must to some extent rest on “conjecture,” the court below misconceived its reviewing function when it found this a sufficient basis for setting the Commission’s finding aside. Having correctly noted that positive proof on various aspects of the case was simply not available one way or the other, the Commission was fully entitled to draw inferences on these points from the incomplete evidence that was available. “Conjecture” of this kind, when based on inferences that are reasonable in light of human experience generally or when based on the Commission’s special familiarity with the shipping industry, is fully within the competence of this administrative agency and should be respected by the reviewing courts.
Respondents’ attack on the finding that the commission disparity affected the recommendations of travel agents suffers from this same misconception of the Commission’s task. It is true that no agent testified that he had ever persuaded a customer to travel by air over the customer’s preference to travel by sea. Agents heavily dependent on conference business could hardly be expected to make such an admission, but one agent did go so far as to concede that under some circumstances, there was a “definite tendency” to encourage a customer to choose air travel because “it is easier to sell” and “you make more money.” This amply supports the Commission’s conclusion.
The final problem is respondents’ claim that the rule is justified because none of the member lines, the American-flag minority in particular, wishes to surrender control over basic financial decisions to a majority of its competitors. This is a bewildering contention, to say the least. The rule may enable a single line to protect itself from a majority decision, but the rule in no way guarantees that line control over its own financial decisions. Lack of unanimity under this particular rule does not leave the lines free to make independent decisions, but simply freezes the existing situation. In this way control over the basic financial decisions of all lines is “surrendered” not to the majority but to any single line that happens to oppose change. We therefore find that the Commission’s conclusions with respect to the unanimity rule were supported by substantial evidence and should have been upheld by the Court of Appeals.
IV.
The tying rule is imposed by the second conference involved in these cases, the Trans-Atlantic Passenger Steamship Conference. This conference is composed of the major lines providing passenger service between America and Europe, and it has substantially the same membership as the conference which is formally responsible for the unanimity rule already considered. The tying rule prohibits all travel agents authorized to book passage for the member lines “from selling passage tickets for any steamer not connected with the fleets of the member Lines.” The rule does not prohibit these agents from arranging air travel.
As the Commission correctly noted, this rule seriously interferes with the purposes of the antitrust laws. Under the Sherman Act, any agreement by a group of competitors to boycott a particular buyer or group of buyers is illegal per se. United States v. General Motors, 384 U. S. 127, 146-147 (1966); Klor’s v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U. S. 207 (1959). And the conference’s tying rule specifically injures three distinct sets of interests. It denies passengers the advantages of being able to deal with a travel agent who can sell any means of travel. It denies agents the ability to serve passengers who wish to travel on nonconference lines. Most important, it denies nonconference lines the opportunity to reach effectively the 80% of all transatlantic steamship passengers who book their travel through conference-appointed agents.
Given these effects of the rule, which are not seriously disputed, it was incumbent upon the conference to establish a justification for the rule in terms of some legitimate objective. One of the possible purposes of the rule is to eliminate the competition of the noncon-ference lines, but this is not a permissible objective under the Shipping Act, see Federal Maritime Board v. Isbrandtsen Co., 356 U. S. 481, 491-493 (1958), and respondents quite properly do not press it. Respondents do contend, however, that the rule is justified as a means of preserving the stability of the conference. By choosing and supervising responsible agents who will book steamship passage only for its members, the conference creates an incentive for members to remain in the conference and for other lines to join. The Commission found no indication, however, that elimination of the rule would in fact jeopardize the stability of the conference. Although no evidence in the record actually tends to refute respondents’ theory, it is also clear that respondents failed to come forward with any evidence to support their claim. The theory was therefore insufficient to justify the undeniable injury to interests ordinarily protected by the antitrust laws.
Equally insubstantial is the second justification presented by respondents, that the conference members bear the expense of selecting and supervising qualified agents and that other lines who wish to take advantage of these efforts should pay their fair share by joining the conference. The Commission found that most of the expenses incurred by the conference were in fact reimbursed by the agents themselves through annual fees. Many of the promotional activities were paid for by individual lines, and in addition these arrangements often required matching contributions by the agents. In light of these factors the Commission properly concluded that although the conference’s efforts might entitle it to exercise some control over the agents’ activities, there was no justification for completely prohibiting the agents from dealing with nonconference lines.
These circumstances taken together provide substantial support for all three of the Commission’s findings — that the rule is detrimental to the commerce of the United States by injuring passengers, agents, and nonconference lines, that the rule is unjustly discriminatory as between conference and nonconference carriers, and that the rule is contrary to the public interest by unnecessarily invading the policies of the antitrust laws.
Y.
For the reasons indicated the Commission properly disapproved the tying and unanimity rules involved in these cases. These proceedings were commenced more than eight years ago, and this is the second time the controversy has been appealed to the reviewing courts. On the second appeal to the Court of Appeals, that court took the extraordinary course of simply reversing, without remanding to the Commission for further action. Since we have found that the Commission’s findings and order are supported by substantial evidence, and since there are no other meritorious contentions raised by the respondents, we think it is time for a final disposition of the proceedings. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the cases are remanded with directions to affirm the order of the Commission.
It is so ordered.
Me. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases.
39 Stat. 728, as amended, 46 U. S. C. § 801 et seq.
See Hearings before Antitrust Subcommittee of House Committee on the Judiciary, on Monopoly Problems in Regulated Industries: Ocean. Freight Industry, 86th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess., ser. 14, Pt. 1, Vols. I-V, and Pt. 2, Vols. I-II (1959-1960), 87th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 10, Pt. 3, Vols: I-II (1961); Hearings before Special Subcommittee on Steamship Conferences of House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, Steamship Conference Study, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., Pts. 1-3 (1959); H. R. Rep. No. 1419, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962).
75 Stat. 762.
For this reason the Commission’s antitrust standard is entirely consistent with respondents’ evidence of a congressional recognition at the time the “contrary to the public interest” test was added in 1961, that “our traditional antitrust concepts cannot be fully applied to this aspect of international commerce.” S. Rep. No. 860, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1961) (emphasis added). And for the same reason respondents’ reliance on Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. United States, 382 U. S. 154 (1965), and Minneapolis St. Louis R. Co. v. United States, 361 U. S. 173 (1959), is misplaced. The antitrust standard formulated here is in full accord with the kind of accommodation between antitrust and regulatory objectives approved by this Court in those cases. Indeed we have stressed that such an accommodation does not authorize the agency in question to ignore the antitrust laws. E. g., McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U. S. 67, 79-80 (1944).
Respondents correctly point out that there is no support for the Commission’s finding that the majority of the members were unable to act at the meeting of February-March 1956 because of a veto exercised by one line. It does appear that at the meeting of May 3, 1960, a majority favored an increase, but the memorandum disclosing this does not indicate clearly whether the majority preferred to put the increase into effect immediately, or favored the actual decision to defer consideration.
Compare IATA Traffic Conference Resolution, 6 C. A. B. 639, 645 (1946). These airline conferences leave the individual members free to initiate their own rates when unanimous agreement cannot be reached.
The Commission's reference to the fact that the Caribbean cruise trade operates without a tying rule does not seem to meet respondents’ contention. Since the Caribbean cruise trade operates without a conference at all, the lack of a tying rule would in no way indicate the extent to which such a rule tends to strengthen membership in conferences.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | I | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted and the judgment of the Court of Appeals of New York is reversed. Redrup v. New York, 386 U. S. 767.
The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Clark, and Mr. Justice Brennan would affirm.
Mr. Justice Harlan adheres to the views expressed in his separate opinions in Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, 496, and Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U. S. 413, 455, and on the basis of the reasoning set forth therein would affirm.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | C | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Blackmun
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents an issue of the appropriateness of an extension of the judicially created exclusionary rule: Is evidence seized by a state criminal law enforcement officer in good faith, but nonetheless unconstitutionally, inadmissible in a civil proceeding by or against the United States?
I
In November 1968 the Los Angeles police obtained a warrant directing a search for bookmaking paraphernalia at two specified apartment locations in the city and, as well, on the respective persons of Morris Aaron Levine and respondent Max Janis. The warrant was issued by a judge of the Municipal Court of the Los Angeles Judicial District. It was based upon the affidavit of Officer Leonard Weissman. After the search, made pursuant to the warrant, both the respondent and Levine were arrested and the police seized from respondent property consisting of $4,940 in cash and certain wagering records.
Soon thereafter, Officer Weissman telephoned an agent of the United States Internal Revenue Service and informed the agent that Janis had been arrested for bookmaking activity. With the assistance of Weissman, who was familiar with bookmakers’ codes, the revenue agent analyzed the wagering records that had been seized and determined from them the gross volume of respondent’s gambling activity for the five days immediately preceding the seizure. Weissman informed the agent that he had conducted a surveillance of respondent’s activities that indicated that respondent had been engaged in bookmaking during the 77-day period from September 14 through November 30, 1968, the day of the arrest.
Respondent had not filed any federal wagering tax return pertaining to bookmaking activities for that 77-day period. Based exclusively upon its examination of the evidence so obtained by the Los Angeles police, the Internal Revenue Service made an assessment jointly against respondent and Levine for wagering taxes, under § 4401 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U. S. C. § 4401, in the amount of $89,026.09, plus interest. The amount of the assessment was computed by first determining respondent’s average daily gross proceeds for the five-day period covered by the seized material and analyzed by the agent, and then multiplying the resulting figure by 77, the period of the police surveillance of respondent’s activities. The assessment having been made, the Internal Revenue Service exercised its statutory authority, under 26 U. S. C. § 6331, to levy upon the $4,940 in cash in partial satisfaction of the assessment against respondent.
Charges were filed in due course against respondent and Levine in Los Angeles Municipal Court for violation of the local gambling laws. They moved to quash the search warrant. A suppression hearing was held by the same judge who had issued the warrant. The defendants pressed upon the court the case of Spinelli v. United States, 393 U. S. 410 (1969), which had been decided just three weeks earlier and after the search warrant had been issued. They urged that the Weissman affidavit did not set forth, in sufficient detail, the underlying circumstances to enable the issuing magistrate to determine in-dependency the reliability of the information supplied by the informants. The judge granted the motion to quash the warrant. He then ordered that all items seized pursuant to it be returned except the cash that had been levied upon by the Internal Revenue Service. App. 78-80.
In June 1969 respondent filed a claim for refund of the $4,940. The claim was not honored, and 18 months later, in December 1970, respondent filed suit for that amount in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. The Government answered and counterclaimed for the substantial unpaid balance of the assessment. In pretrial proceedings, it was agreed that the “sole basis of the computation of the civil tax assessment... was... the items obtained pursuant to the search warrant... and the information furnished to [the revenue agent] by Officer Weissman with respect to the duration of [respondent’s] alleged wagering activities.” Id., at 18. Respondent then moved to suppress the evidence seized, and all copies thereof in the possession of the Service, and to quash the assessment. Id., at 23-24.
At the outset of the hearing on the motion, the District Court observed that it was “reluctantly holding that the affidavit supporting the search warrant is insufficient under the Spinelli and Aguilar [v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108 (1964)] doctrines.” Id., at 47. It then concluded that “[a] 11 of the evidence utilized as the basis” of the assessment “was obtained directly or indirectly as a result of the search pursuant to the defective search warrant,” and that, consequently, the assessment “was based in substantial part, if not completely, on illegally procured evidence... in violation of [respondent's] Fourth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.” 73-1 USTC ¶ 16,083, p. 81,392 (1973). The court concluded that Janis was entitled to a refund of the $4,940, together with interest thereon, “for the reason that substantially all, if not all, of the evidence utilized by the defendants herein in making their assessment... was illegally obtained, and, as such, the assessment was invalid.” Ibid. Further, where, as here, “illegally obtained evidence constitutes the basis of a federal tax assessment,” the respondent was “not required to prove the extent of the refund to which he claims he is entitled.” Id., at 81,393. Instead, it was sufficient if he prove “that substantially all, if not all, of the evidence upon which the assessment was based was the result of illegally obtained evidence.” Accordingly, the court ordered that the civil tax assessment made by the Internal Revenue Service “against all the property and assets of... Janis be quashed,” and entered judgment for the respondent. Ibid. The Government's counterclaim was dismissed with prejudice. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, by unpublished memorandum without opinion, affirmed on the basis of the District Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law. Pet. for Cert. 12A.
Because of the obvious importance of the question, we granted certiorari. 421 U. S. 1010 (1975).
II
Some initial observations about the procedural posture of the case in the District Court are indicated. If there is to be no limit to the burden of proof the respondent, as “taxpayer,” must carry, then, even though he were to obtain a favorable decision on the inadmissibility-of-evidence issue, the respondent on this record could not possibly defeat the Government’s counterclaim. The Government notes, properly we think, that the litigation is composed of two separate elements: the refund suit instituted by the respondent, and the collection suit instituted by the United States through its counterclaim. In a refund suit the taxpayer bears the burden of proving the amount he is entitled to recover. Lewis v. Reynolds, 284 U. S. 281 (1932). It is not enough for him to demonstrate that the assessment of the tax for which refund is sought was erroneous in some respects.
This Court has not spoken with respect to the burden of proof in a tax collection suit. The Government argues here that the presumption of correctness that attaches to the assessment in a refund suit must also apply in a civil collection suit instituted by the United States under the authority granted by §§ 7401 and 7403 of the Code, 26 U. S. C. §§ 7401 and 7403. Thus, it is said, the defendant in a collection suit has the same burden of proving that he paid the correct amount of his tax liability.
The policy behind the presumption of correctness and the burden of proof, see Bull v. United States, 295 U. S. 247, 259-260 (1935), would appear to be applicable in each situation. It accords, furthermore, with the burden-of-proof rule which prevails in the usual preassessment proceeding in the United States Tax Court. Lucas v. Structural Steel Co., 281 U. S. 264, 271 (1930); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U. S. 111, 115 (1933); Rule 142(a) of the Rules of Practice and Procedure of the United States Tax Court (1973). In any event, for purposes of this case, we assume that this is so and that the burden of proof may be said technically to rest with respondent Janis.
Respondent, however, submitted no evidence tending either to demonstrate that the assessment was incorrect or to show the correct amount of wagering tax liability, if any, on his part. In the usual situation one might well argue, as the Government does, that the District Court then could not properly grant judgment for the respondent on either aspect of the suit. But the present case may well not be the usual situation. What we have is a “naked” assessment without any foundation whatsoever if what was seized by the Los Angeles police cannot be used in the formulation of the assessment. The determination of tax due then may be one “without rational foundation and excessive,” and not properly subject to the usual rule with respect to the burden of proof in tax cases. Helvering v. Taylor, 293 U. S. 507, 514-515 (1935). See 9 J. Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation § 50.65 (1971).
There appears, indeed, to be some debate among the Federal Courts of Appeals, in different factual contexts, as to the effect upon the burden of proof in a tax case when there is positive evidence that an assessment is incorrect. Some courts indicate that the burden of showing the amount of the deficiency then shifts to the Commissioner. Others hold that the burden of showing the correct amount of the tax remains with the taxpayer. However that may be, the debate does not extend to the situation where the assessment is shown to be naked and without any foundation. The courts then appear to apply the rule of the Taylor case. See United States v. Rexach, 482 F. 2d 10, 16-17, n. 3 (CA1), cert. denied, 414 U. S. 1039 (1973); Pizzarello v. United States, 408 F. 2d 579 (CA2), cert. denied, 396 U. S. 986 (1969); Suarez v. Commisioner, 58 T. C. 792, 814-815 (1972). But cf. Compton v. United States, 334 F. 2d 212, 216 (CA4 1964).
Certainly, proof that an assessment is utterly without foundation is proof that it is arbitrary and erroneous. For purposes of this case, we need not go so far as to accept the Government’s argument that the exclusion of the evidence in issue here is insufficient to require judgment for the respondent or even to shift the burden to the Government. We are willing to assume that if the District Court was correct in ruling that the evidence seized by the Los Angeles police may not be used in formulating the assessment (on which both the levy and the counterclaim were based), then the District Court was also correct in granting judgment for Janis in both aspects of the present suit. This assumption takes us, then, to the primary issue.
Ill
This Court early pronounced a rule that the Fifth Amendment’s command that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself” renders evidence falling within the Amendment’s prohibition inadmissible. Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616 (1886). It was not until 1914, however, that the Court held that the Fourth Amendment alone may be the basis for excluding from a federal criminal trial evidence seized by a federal officer in violation solely of that Amendment. Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383. This comparatively late judicial creation of a Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule is not particularly surprising. In contrast to the Fifth Amendment’s direct command against the admission of compelled testimony, the issue of admissibility of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is determined after, and apart from, the violation. In Weeks it was held, however, that the Fourth Amendment did not apply to state officers, and, therefore, that material seized unconstitutionally by a state officer could be admitted in a federal criminal proceeding. This was the “silver platter” doctrine.
In Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25 (1949), the Court determined that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment reflected the Fourth Amendment to the extent of providing those protections against intrusions that are “ 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’ ” Id., at 27. Nonetheless, the Court, in not applying the Weeks doctrine in a state trial to the product of a state search, held:
“Granting that in practice the exclusion of evidence may be an effective way of deterring unreasonable searches, it is not for this Court to condemn as falling below the minimal standards assured by the Due Process Clause a State’s reliance upon other methods which, if consistently enforced, would be equally effective.” 338 U. S., at 31.
Not long thereafter, the Court ruled that means used by a State to procure evidence could be sufficiently offensive to the concept of ordered liberty as to make admission of the evidence so procured a violation of the Due Process Clause, Rochin v. California, 342 U. S. 165 (1952), but that such a violation would exist only in the most extreme case, Irvine v. California, 347 U. S. 128 (1954).
Thus, as matters then stood, the Fourth Amendment was applicable to the States, but a State could allow an official to engage in a violation thereof with no judicial sanction except in the most extreme case. In addition, federal authorities, if they happened upon a State so inclined, could profit from the State’s action by receiving on a silver platter evidence unconstitutionally obtained. The federal authorities, profiting thereby, had no judicially created reason to discourage unconstitutional searches by a State, and the States, having no judicially mandated controls, were free to engage in such searches.
Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206, was decided in 1960. Invoking its “supervisory power over the administration of criminal justice in the federal courts,” id., at 216, the Court held that
“evidence obtained by state officers during a search which, if conducted by federal officers, would have violated the defendant’s immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment is inadmissible over the defendant’s timely objection in a federal criminal trial.” Id., at 223.
The rule thus announced apparently served two purposes. First, it assured that a State, which could admit the evidence in its own proceedings if it so chose, nevertheless would suffer some deterrence in that its federal counterparts would be unable to use the evidence in federal criminal proceedings. Second, the rule discouraged federal authorities from using a state official to circumvent the restrictions of Weeks.
Only one year later, however, the exclusionary rule was made applicable to state criminal trials. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961). The Court ruled:
“Since the Fourth Amendment’s right of privacy has been declared enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by the same sanction of exclusion as is used against the Federal Government.” Id., at 655.
The debate within the Court on the exclusionary rule has always been a warm one. It has been unaided, unhappily, by any convincing empirical evidence on the effects of the rule. The Court, however, has established that the “prime purpose” of the rule, if not the sole one, “is to deter future unlawful police conduct.” United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 347 (1974). See United States v. Peltier, 422 U. S. 531, 536-539 (1975). Thus,
“[i]n sum, the rule is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved.” United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S., at 348.
And
“[a]s with any remedial device, the application of the rule has been restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served.” Ibid.
In the complex and turbulent history of the rule, the Court never has applied it to exclude evidence from a civil proceeding, federal or state.
IV
In the present case we are asked to create judicially a deterrent sanction by holding that evidence obtained by a state criminal law enforcement officer in good-faith reliance on a warrant that later proved to be defective shall be inadmissible in a federal civil tax proceeding. Clearly, the enforcement of admittedly valid laws would be hampered by so extending the exclusionary rule, and, as is nearly always the case with the rule, con-cededly relevant and reliable evidence would be rendered unavailable.
In evaluating the need for a deterrent sanction, one must first identify those who are to be deterred. In this case it is the state officer who is the primary object of the sanction. It is his conduct that is to be controlled. Two factors suggest that a sanction in addition to those that presently exist is unnecessary. First, the local law enforcement official is already “punished” by the exclusion of the evidence in the state criminal trial. That, necessarily, is of substantial concern to him. Second, the evidence is also excludable in the federal criminal trial, Elkins v. United States, supra, so that the entire criminal enforcement process, which is the concern and duty of these officers, is frustrated.
Jurists and scholars uniformly have recognized that the exclusionary rule imposes a substantial cost on the societal interest in law enforcement by its proscription of what concededly is relevant evidence. See, e. g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388, 411 (1971) (Burger, C. J., dissenting); Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 Minn. L. Rev. 349, 429 (1974). And alternatives that would be less costly to societal interests have been the subject of extensive discussion and exploration.
Equally important, although scholars have attempted to determine whether the exclusionary rule in fact does have any deterrent effect, each empirical study on the subject, in its own way, appears to be flawed. It would not be appropriate to fault those who have attempted empirical studies for their lack of convincing data. The number of variables is substantial, and many cannot be measured or subjected to effective controls. Record-keeping before Mapp was spotty at best, a fact which thus severely hampers before-and-after studies. Since Mapp, of course, all possibility of broad-scale controlled or even semi-controlled comparison studies has been eliminated. “Response” studies are hampered by the presence of the respondents’ interests. And extrapolation studies are rendered highly inconclusive by the changes in legal doctrines and police-citizen relationships that have taken place in the 15 years since Mapp was decided.
We find ourselves, therefore, in no better position than the Court was in 1960 when it said:
“Empirical statistics are not available to show that the inhabitants of states which follow the exclusionary rule suffer less from lawless searches and seizures than do those of states which admit evidence unlawfully obtained. Since as a practical matter it is never easy to prove a negative, it is hardly likely that conclusive factual data could ever be assembled. For much the same reason, it cannot positively be demonstrated that enforcement of the criminal law is either more or less effective under either rule.” Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S., at 218.
If the exclusionary rule is the “strong medicine” that its proponents claim it to be, then its use in the situations in which it is now applied (resulting, for example, in this case in frustration of the Los Angeles police officers’ good-faith duties as enforcers of the criminal laws) must be assumed to be a substantial and efficient deterrent. Assuming this efficacy, the additional marginal deterrence provided by forbidding a different sovereign from using the evidence in a civil proceeding surely does not outweigh the cost to society of extending the rule to that situation. If, on the other hand, the exclusionary rule does not result in appreciable deterrence, then, clearly, its use in the instant situation is unwarranted. Under either assumption, therefore, the extension of the rule is unjustified.
In short, we conclude that exclusion from federal civil proceedings of evidence unlawfully seized by a state criminal enforcement officer has not been shown to have a sufficient likelihood of deterring the conduct of the state police so that it outweighs the societal costs imposed by the exclusion. This Court, therefore, is not justified in so extending the exclusionary rule.
Respondent argues, however, that the application of the exclusionary rule to civil proceedings long has been recognized in the federal courts. He cites a number of cases. But respondent does not critically distinguish between those cases in which the officer committing the unconstitutional search or seizure was an agent of the sovereign that sought to use the evidence, on the one hand, and those cases, such as the present one, on the other hand, where the officer has no responsibility or duty to, or agreement with, the sovereign seeking to use the evidence.
The seminal cases that apply the exclusionary rule to a civil proceeding involve “intrasovereign” violations, a situation we need not consider here. In some cases the courts have refused to create an exclusionary rule for either intersovereign or intrasovereign violations in proceedings other than strictly criminal prosecutions. See United States ex rel. Sperling v. Fitzpatrick, 426 F. 2d 1161 (CA2 1970) (intrasovereign/parole revocation); United States v. Schipani, 435 F. 2d 26 (CA2 1970), cert. denied, 401 U. S. 983 (1971) (intersovereign/sentenc-ing). And in Compton v. United States, 334 F. 2d 212, 215-216 (1964), a case remarkably like this one, the Fourth Circuit held that the presumption of correctness given a tax assessment was not affected by the fact that the assessment was based upon evidence unconstitutionally seized by state criminal law enforcement officers. Only one case cited by the respondent squarely holds that there must be an exclusionary rule barring use in a civil proceeding by one sovereign of material seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment by an officer of another sovereign. In Suarez v. Commissioner, 58 T. C. 792 (1972) (reviewed by the court, with two judges dissenting), the Tax Court determined that the exclusionary rule should be applied in a situation similar to the one that confronts us here. The court concluded that
“any competing consideration based upon the need for effective enforcement of civil tax liabilities (compare Elkins v. United States...) must give way to the higher goal of protection of the individual and the necessity for preserving confidence in, rather than encouraging contempt for, the processes of Government.” Id., at 805.
No appeal was taken.
We disagree with the broad implications of this statement of the Tax Court for two reasons. To the extent that the court did not focus on the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule, the law has since been clarified. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338 (1974); United States v. Peltier, 422 U. S. 531 (1975). Moreover, the court did not distinguish between intersover-eign and intrasovereign uses of unconstitutionally seized material. Working, as we must, with the absence of convincing empirical data, common sense dictates that the deterrent effect of the exclusion of relevant evidence is highly attenuated when the “punishment” imposed upon the offending criminal enforcement officer is the removal of that evidence from a civil suit by or against a different sovereign. In Elkins the Court indicated that the assumed interest of criminal law enforcement officers in the criminal proceedings of another sovereign counterbalanced this attenuation sufficiently to justify an exclusionary rule. Here, however, the attenuation is further augmented by the fact that the proceeding is one to enforce only the civil law of the other sovereign.
This attenuation, coupled with the existing deterrence effected by the denial of use of the evidence by either sovereign in the criminal trials with which the searching officer is concerned, creates a situation in which the imposition of the exclusionary rule sought in this case is unlikely to provide significant, much less substantial, additional deterrence. It falls outside the offending officer’s zone of primary interest. The extension of the exclusionary rule, in our view, would be an unjustifiably drastic action by the courts in the pursuit of what is an undesired and undesirable supervisory role over police officers. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U. S. 362 (1976).
In the past this Court has opted for exclusion in the anticipation that law enforcement officers would be deterred from violating Fourth Amendment rights. Then, as now, the Court acted in the absence of convincing empirical evidence and relied, instead, on its own assumptions of human nature and the interrelationship of the various components of the law enforcement system. In the situation before us, we do not find sufficient justification for the drastic measure of an exclusionary rule. There comes a point at which courts, consistent with their duty to administer the law, cannot continue to create barriers to law enforcement in the pursuit of a supervisory role that is properly the duty of the Executive and Legislative Branches. We find ourselves at that point in this case. We therefore hold that the judicially created exclusionary rule should not be extended to forbid the use in the civil proceeding of one sovereign of evidence seized by a criminal law enforcement agent of another sovereign.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. R fi0 or<W-
Me. Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Officer Weissman’s affidavit, App. 69-74, stated: He and Sergeant Briggs of the Los Angeles Police Department each had received information from an informant concerning respondent Janis and Levine and concerning telephone numbers the two men used for bookmaking. Police investigation disclosed that Janis had two telephones with unpublished numbers, including the number given by Weissman’s informant, and that there was a third published number at the same address in the name of Nancy L. Janis. The unpublished numbers given by Weissman’s informant as being used by Levine were found to be maintained by Levine at a different address, and that address was the one given by Briggs’ informant as being Levine’s base of operations. Both informants stated that Levine and Janis were working in concert. Each officer regarded his informant as reliable; the informant had given information in the past that led to arrests for bookmaking and, in the case of Briggs’ informant, to convictions as well. Preliminary hearings and trials were pending for persons arrested with the aid of Weissman’s informant. Each officer and his informant believed that it was necessary for the informant’s safety, and his future usefulness to law enforcement officers, that his identity be kept secret.
Weissman further stated:
“Prom the nature and context of the information supplied by the informant to this affiant, and from the nature and context of the information which was supplied to Sgt. Briggs, as told to this affiant, it is believed that the informants... at all times mentioned in this affidavit, unless otherwise specified, were speaking with personal knowledge.” Id., at 73.
The affidavit, taken in its entirety, bears some similarity to the affidavit the Court later considered in Spinelli v. United States, 393 U. S. 410, 420-422 (1969). Spinelli was a 5-3 decision handed down two months after the Los Angeles warrant in the present case had been issued. Mr. Justice White joined the opinion in Spinelli, id., at 423-429, but, in doing so, referred, id., at 427, to the “tension between Draper [v. United States, 358 U. S. 307 (1959)],” on the one hand, and Nathanson v. United States, 290 U. S. 41 (1933), and Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108 (1964), on the other, and, “[p] ending full-scale reconsideration” of Draper “or of the Nathanson-Aguilar cases,” joined “the opinion of the Court and the judgment of reversal, especially since a vote to affirm would produce an equally divided Court.” 393 U. S., at 429.
The Internal Revenue Service’s Certificate of Assessments and Payments, App. 81, shows a credit of $5,097, the amount actually seized by the police and subjected to the Service’s subsequent levy. The Government acknowledges, however, that $157 of this amount was money belonging to Levine. It was applied upon the joint assessment made against both Janis and Levine. Levine has not sought a refund of the $157. Brief for United States 5 n. 1. The present case, therefore, concerns only the $4,940 taken from respondent Janis.
Officer Weissman testified that there was no departmental policy to call the Internal Revenue Service in a situation of this kind. He did it “as a matter of police procedure.” He would not do it, he said, on what he “would consider a small-size book, but I considered this one a major-size book. So, I, therefore, did it.” App. 42. He further stated that some of his fellow officers had acted similarly, but that he did not think “that they all have done it.” Ibid. The District Court did not rest its conclusion on any federal involvement in, or encouragement of, the search. We therefore must assume, for purposes of this opinion, that there was no federal involvement. See n. 31, infra.
The wagering excise tax at the time was 10% of the amount of the wagers. § 4401 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U. S. C. §4401 (a). The rate was reduced to 2%, effective December 1, 1974, by Pub. L. 93-499, §3 (a), 88 Stat. 1550.
The Government advises us that, in order to avoid multiple litigation, its policy is to counterclaim in. a refund suit, just as it did here, where there is an outstanding unpaid assessment and the refund suit and the counterclaim involve the same facts. Brief for United States 17 n. 4.
The Certificate of Assessments and Payments was stipulated "to be admissible without objection.” App. 20. The Government did not seek to introduce the wagering records obtained by the Los Angeles police.
The Government has not asserted that, absent the seized materials, it would have had grounds for an assessment against respondent and Levine.
The situation may be described as having some resemblance to that for which the Court has developed an exception to the Anti-Injunction Act, § 7421 (a) of the Code, 26 U. S. C. § 7421 (a). See Enochs v. Williams Packing Co., 370 U. S. 1 (1962); Bob Jones University v. Simon, 416 U. S. 725 (1974); Commissioner v. “Americans United” Inc., 416 U. S. 752 (1974); Laing v. United States, 423 U. S. 161 (1976); Commissioner v. Shapiro, 424 U. S. 614 (1976).
Taylor, although decided more than 40 years ago, has never been cited by this Court on the burden-of-proof issue. The Courts of Appeals, the Court of Claims, the Tax Court, and the Federal District Courts, however, frequently have referred to that aspect of the case.
E. g., Foster v. Commissioner, 391 F. 2d 727, 735 (CA4 1968); Herbert v. Commissioner, 377 F. 2d 65, 69 (CA9 1967). See Bar L Ranch, Inc. v. Phinney, 426 F. 2d 995, 999 (CA5 1970).
E. g., United States v. Rexach, 482 F. 2d 10, 15-17 (CA1), cert. denied, 414 U. S. 1039 (1973); Psaty v. United States, 442 F. 2d 1154, 1158-1161 (CA3 1971); Ehlers v. Vinal, 382 F. 2d 58, 65-66 (CA8 1967). See Bar L Ranch, Inc. v. Phinney, 426 F. 2d, at 998.
Although the present case presents only the issue whether such evidence may be used in the formulation of the assessment, there appears to be no difference between that question and the issue whether the evidence is to be excluded in the refund or collection suit itself. We perceive no principled distinction to be made between the use of the evidence as the basis of an assessment and its use in the case in chief.
“[T]he raptured privacy of the victims’ homes and effects cannot be restored. Reparation comes too late.” Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618, 637 (1965). “The rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair. Its purpose is to deter — to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way — by removing the incentive to disregard it.” Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206, 217 (1960). See United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 347-348 (1974); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, 656 (1961); Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U. S. 406, 413 (1966); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29 (1968).
In Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S., at 207 n. 1, the Court noted that the appellation stems from Mr. Justice Frankfurter’s plurality opinion in Lustig v. United States, 338 U. S. 74 (1949):
“The crux of that doctrine is that a search is a search by a federal official if he had a hand in it; it is not a search by a federal official if evidence secured by state authorities is turned over to the federal authorities on a silver platter.” Id., at 78-79.
The absence of this Court’s imposition of controls did not mean, of course, that the States were running unchecked in their pursuit of evidence. Not only were there tort remedies and internal disciplinary sanctions available, but, as the Court noted in Elkins: “Not more than half the states continue totally to adhere to the rule that evidence is freely admissible no matter how it was obtained. Most of the others have adopted the exclusionary rule in its entirety; the rest have adopted it in part.” 364 U. S., at 219 (footnote omitted).
See also id., at 224r-225 (Appendix to opinion).
Except for the unanimous decision written by Mr. Justice Day in Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 (1914), the evolution of the exclusionary rule has been marked by sharp divisions in the Court. Indeed, Wolf, Lustig, Bochin, Irvine, Elkins, Mapp, and Calandra produced a combined total of 27 separate signed opinions or statements.
Thus, the Court has held that the exclusionary
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | A | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Stevens
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Inorganic chemical manufacturing plants operated by the eight petitioners in Nos. 75-978 and 75-1473 discharge various pollutants into the Nation’s waters and therefore are “point sources” within the meaning of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Act), as added and amended by § 2 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 816, 33 U. S. C. § 1251 et seq. (1970 ed., Supp. V). The Environmental Protection Agency has promulgated industrywide regulations imposing three sets of precise limitations on petitioners’ discharges. The first two impose progressively higher levels of pollution control on existing point sources after July 1, 1977, and after July 1, 1983, respectively. The third set imposes limits on “new sources” that may be constructed in the future.
These cases present three important questions of statutory construction: (1) whether EPA has the authority under § 301 of the Act to issue industrywide regulations limiting discharges by existing plants; (2) whether the Court of Appeals, which admittedly is authorized to review the standards for new sources, also has jurisdiction under § 509 to review the regulations concerning existing plants; and (3) whether the new-source standards issued under § 306 must allow variances for individual plants.
As a preface to our discussion of these three questions, we summarize relevant portions of the statute and then describe the procedure which EPA followed in promulgating the challenged regulations.
The Statute
The statute, enacted on October 18, 1972, authorized a series of steps to be taken to achieve the goal of eliminating all discharges of pollutants into the Nation’s waters by 1985, § 101 (a)(1).
The first steps required by the Act are described in § 304, which directs the Administrator to develop and publish various kinds of technical data to provide guidance in carrying out responsibilities imposed by other sections of the Act. Thus, within 60 days, 120 days, and 180 days after the date of enactment, the Administrator was to promulgate a series of guidelines to assist the States in developing and carrying out permit programs pursuant to § 402. §§ 304 (h), (f), (g). Within 270 days, he was to develop the information to be used in formulating standards for new plants pursuant to § 306. § 304 (c). And within one year he was to publish regulations providing guidance for effluent limitations on existing point sources. Section 304 (b) goes into great detail concerning the contents of these regulations. They must identify the degree of effluent reduction attainable through use of the best practicable or best available technology for a class of plants. The guidelines must also “specify factors to be taken into account” in determining the control measures applicable to point sources within these classes. A list of factors to be considered then follows. The Administrator was also directed to develop and publish, within one year, elaborate criteria for water quality accurately reflecting the most current scientific knowledge, and also technical information on factors necessary to restore and maintain water quality. § 304 (a). The title of § 304 describes it as the “information and guidelines" portion of the statute.
Section 301 is captioned “effluent limitations.” Section 301 (a) makes the discharge of any pollutant unlawful unless the discharge is in compliance with certain enumerated sections of the Act. The enumerated sections which are relevant to this case are § 301 itself, § 306, and § 402. A brief word about each of these sections is necessary.
Section 402 authorizes the Administrator to issue permits for individual point sources, and also authorizes him to review and approve the plan of any State desiring to administer its own permit program. These permits serve “to transform generally applicable effluent limitations... into the obligations (including a timetable for compliance) of the individual discharger[s]...." EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Board, 426 U. S. 200, 205. Petitioner chemical companies’ position in this litigation is that § 402 provides the only statutory authority for the issuance of enforceable limitations on the discharge of pollutants by existing plants. It is noteworthy, however, that although this section authorizes the imposition of limitations in individual permits, the section itself does not mandate either the Administrator or the States to use permits as the method of prescribing effluent limitations.
Section 306 directs the Administrator to publish within 90 days a list of categories of sources discharging pollutants and, within one year thereafter, to publish regulations establishing national standards of performance for new sources within each category. Section 306 contains no provision for exceptions from the standards for individual plants; on the contrary, subsection (e) expressly makes it unlawful to operate a new source in violation of the applicable standard of performance after its effective date. The statute provides that the new-source standards shall reflect the greatest degree of effluent reduction achievable through application of the best available demonstrated control technology.
Section 301 (b) defines the effluent limitations that shall be achieved by existing point sources in two stages. By July 1, 1977, the effluent limitations shall require the application of the best practicable control technology currently available; by July 1, 1983, the limitations shall require application of the best available technology economically achievable. The statute expressly provides that the limitations which are to become effective in 1983 are applicable to “categories and classes of point sources”; this phrase is omitted from the description of the 1977 limitations. While § 301 states that these limitations “shall be achieved,” it fails to state who will establish the limitations.
Section 301 (c) authorizes the Administrator to grant variances from the 1983 limitations. Section 301 (e) states that effluent limitations established pursuant to § 301 shall be applied to all point sources.
To summarize, § 301 (b) requires the achievement of effluent limitations requiring use of the “best practicable” or “best available” technology. It refers to § 304 for a definition of these terms. Section 304 requires the publication of “regulations, providing guidelines for effluent limitations.” Finally, permits issued under § 402 must require compliance with § 301 effluent limitations. Nowhere are we told who sets the § 301 effluent limitations, or precisely how they relate to § 304 guidelines and § 402 permits.
The Regulations
The various deadlines imposed on the Administrator were too ambitious for him to meet. For that reason, the procedure which he followed in adopting the regulations applicable to the inorganic chemical industry and to other classes of point sources is somewhat different from that apparently contemplated by the statute. Specifically, as will appear, he did not adopt guidelines pursuant to § 304 before defining the effluent limitations for existing sources described in § 301 (b) or the national standards for new sources described in § 306. This case illustrates the approach the Administrator followed in implementing the Act.
EPA began by engaging a private contractor to prepare a Development Document. This document provided a detailed technical study of pollution control in the industry. The study first divided the industry into categories. For each category, present levels of pollution were measured and plants with exemplary pollution control were investigated. Based on this information, other technical data, and economic studies, a determination was made of the degree of pollution control which could be achieved by the various levels of technology mandated by the statute. The study was made available to the public and circulated to interested persons. It formed the basis of “effluent limitation guideline” regulations issued by EPA after receiving public comment on proposed regulations. These regulations divide the industry into 22 subcategories. Within each subcategory, precise numerical limits are set for various pollutants. The regulations for each subcategory contain a variance clause, applicable only to the 1977 limitations.
Eight chemical companies filed petitions in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit for review of these regulations. The Court of Appeals rejected their challenge to EPA’s authority to issue precise, single-number limitations for discharges of pollutants from existing sources. It held, however, that these limitations and the new plant standards were only “presumptively applicable” to individual plants. We granted the chemical companies’ petitions for certiorari in order to consider the scope of EPA’s authority to issue existing-source regulations. 425 U. S. 933; 426 U. S. 947. We also granted the Government’s cross-petition for review of the ruling that new-source standards are only presumptively applicable. Ibid. For convenience, we will refer to the chemical companies as the “petitioners.”
The Issues
The broad outlines of the parties’ respective theories may be stated briefly. EPA contends that § 301 (b) authorizes it to issue regulations establishing effluent limitations for classes of plants. The permits granted under § 402, in EPA’s view, simply incorporate these across-the-board limitations, except for the limited variances allowed by the regulations themselves and by § 301 (c). The § 304 (b) guidelines, according to EPA, were intended to guide it in later establishing § 301 effluent-limitation regulations. Because the process proved more time consuming than Congress assumed when it established this two-stage process, EPA condensed the two stages into a single regulation.
In contrast, petitioners contend that § 301 is not an independent source of authority for setting effluent limitations by regulation. Instead, § 301 is seen as merely a description of the effluent limitations which are set for each plant on an individual basis during the permit-issuance process. Under the industry view, the § 304 guidelines serve the function of guiding the permit issuer in setting the effluent limitations.
The jurisdictional issue is subsidiary to the critical question whether EPA has the power to issue effluent limitations by regulation. Section 509 (b)(1), 86 Stat. 892, 33 U. S. C. 1369 (b)(1), provides that “[r]eview of the Administrator’s action... (E) in approving or promulgating any effluent limitation... under section 301” may be had in the courts of appeals. On the other hand, the Act does not provide for judicial review of § 304 guidelines. If EPA is correct that its regulations are “effluent limitation[s] under section 301,” the regulations are directly reviewable in the Court of Appeals. If industry is correct that the regulations can only be considered § 304 guidelines, suit to review the regulations could probably be brought only in the District Court, if anywhere. Thus, the issue of jurisdiction to review the regulations is intertwined with the issue of EPA’s power to issue the regulations.
I
We think § 301 itself is the key to the problem. The statutory language concerning the 1983 limitations, in particular, leaves no doubt that these limitations are to be set by regulation. Subsection (b)(2)(A) of § 301 states that by 1983 “effluent limitations for categories and classes of point sources” are to be achieved which will require “application of the best available technology economically achievable for such category or class.” (Emphasis added.) These effluent limitations are to require elimination of all discharges if “such elimination is technologically and economically achievable for a category or class of point sources.” (Emphasis added.) This is “language difficult to reconcile with the view that individual effluent limitations are to be set when each permit is issued.” American Meat Institute v. EPA, 526 F. 2d 442, 450 (CA7 1975). The statute thus focuses expressly on the characteristics of the “category or class” rather than the characteristics of individual point sources. Normally, such classwide determinations would be made by regulation, not in the course of issuing a permit to one member of the class.
Thus, we find that § 301 unambiguously provides for the use of regulations to establish the 1983 effluent limitations. Different language is used in § 301 with respect to the 1977 limitations. Here, the statute speaks of “effluent limitations for point sources,” rather than “effluent limitations for categories and classes of point sources.” Nothing elsewhere in the Act, however, suggests any radical difference in the mechanism used to impose limitations for the 1977 and 1983 deadlines. See American Iron & Steel Institute v. EPA, 526 F. 2d 1027, 1042 n. 32 (CA3 1975). For instance, there is no indication in either § 301 or § 304 that the § 304 guidelines play a different role in setting 1977 limitations. Moreover, it would be highly anomalous if the 1983 regulations and the new-source standards were directly reviewable in the Court of Appeals, while the 1977 regulations based on the same administrative record were reviewable only in the District Court. The magnitude and highly technical character of the administrative record involved with these regulations makes it almost inconceivable that Congress would have required duplicate review in the first instance by different courts. We conclude that the statute authorizes the 1977 limitations as well as the 1983 limitations to be set by regulation, so long as some allowance is made for variations in individual plants, as EPA has done by including a variance clause in its 1977 limitations.
The question of the form of § 301 limitations is tied to the question whether the Act requires the Administrator or the permit issuer to establish the limitations. Section 301 does not itself answer this question, for it speaks only in the passive voice of the achievement and establishment of the limitations. But other parts of the statute leave little doubt on this score. Section 304 (b) states that “[f]or the purpose of adopting or revising effluent limitations... the Administrator shall” issue guideline regulations; while the judicial-review section, § 509 (b)(1), speaks of “the Administrator’s action... in approving or promulgating any effluent limitation or other limitation under section 301....” See infra, at 136-137. And § 101 (d) requires us to resolve any ambiguity on this score in favor of the Administrator. It provides that “[e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency... shall administer this Act.” (Emphasis added.) In sum, the language of the statute supports the view that § 301 limitations are to be adopted by the Administrator, that they are to be based primarily on classes and categories, and that they are to take the form of regulations.
The legislative history supports this reading of § 301. The Senate Report states that “pursuant to subsection 301 (b)(1)(A), and Section 304 (b)” the Administrator is to set a base level for all plants in a given category, and “[i]n no case... should any plant be allowed to discharge more pollutants per unit of production than is defined by that base level.” S. Rep. No. 92-414, p. 50 (1971), Leg. Hist. 1468. The Conference Report on § 301 states that “the determination of the economic impact of an effluent limitation [will be made] on the basis of classes and categories of point sources, as distinguished from a plant by plant determination.” Sen. Conf. Rep. No. 92-1236, p. 121 (1972), Leg. Hist. 304. In presenting the Conference Report to the Senate, Senator Muskie, perhaps the Act’s primary author, emphasized the importance of uniformity in setting § 301 limitations. He explained that this goal of uniformity required that EPA focus on classes or categories of sources in formulating effluent limitations. Regarding the requirement contained in § 301 that plants use the “best practicable control technology” by 1977, he stated:
“The modification of subsection 304 (b)(1) is intended to clarify what is meant by the term ‘practicable.’ The balancing test between total cost and effluent reduction benefits is intended to limit the application of technology only where the additional degree of effluent reduction is wholly out of proportion to the costs of achieving such marginal level of reduction for any class or category of sources.
“The Conferees agreed upon this limited cost-benefit analysis in order to maintain uniformity within a class and category of point sources subject to effluent limitations, and to avoid imposing on the Administrator any requirement to consider the location of sources within a category or to ascertain water quality impact of effluent controls, or to determine the economic impact of controls on any individual plant in a single community.” 118 Cong. Rec. 33696 (1972), Leg. Hist. 170 (emphasis added).
He added that:
“The Conferees intend that the factors described in section 304 (b) be considered only within classes or categories of point sources and that such factors not be considered at the time of the application of an effluent limitation to an individual point source within such a category or class.” 118 Cong. Rec. 33697 (1972), Leg. Hist. 172.
This legislative history supports our reading of § 301 and makes it clear that the § 304 guidelines are not merely aimed at guiding the discretion of permit issuers in setting limitations for individual plants.
What, then, is the function of the § 304 (b) guidelines? As we noted earlier, § 304 (b) requires EPA to identify the amount of effluent reduction attainable through use of the best practicable or available technology and to “specify factors to be taken into account” in determining the pollution control methods “to be applicable to point sources... within such categories or classes.” These guidelines are to be issued “[f]or the purpose of adopting or revising effluent limitations under this Act.” As we read it, § 304 requires that the guidelines survey the practicable or available pollution-control technology for an industry and assess its effectiveness. The guidelines are then to describe the methodology EPA intends to use in the § 301 regulations to determine the effluent limitations for particular plants. If the technical complexity of the task had not prevented EPA from issuing the guidelines within the statutory deadline, they could have provided valuable guidance to permit issuers, industry, and the public, prior to the issuance of the § 301 regulations.
Our construction of the Act is supported by § 501 (a), which gives EPA the power to make “such regulations as are necessary to carry out” its functions, and by § 101 (d), which charges the agency with the duty of administering the Act. In construing this grant of authority, as Mr. Justice Harlan wrote in connection with a somewhat similar problem:
“ ‘[C]onsiderations of feasibility and practicality are certainly germane’ to the issues before us. Bowles v. Willingham, [321 U. S. 503,] 517. We cannot, in these circumstances, conclude that Congress has given authority inadequate to achieve with reasonable effectiveness the purposes for which it has acted.” Permian Basin Area Bate Cases, 390 U. S. 747, 777.
The petitioners’ view of the Act would place an impossible burden on EPA. It would require EPA to give individual consideration to the circumstances of each of the more than 42,000 dischargers who have applied for permits, Brief for Respondents in No. 75-978, p. 30 n. 22, and to issue or approve all these permits well in advance of the 1977 deadline in order to give industry time to install the necessary pollution-control equipment. We do not believe that Congress would have failed so conspicuously to provide EPA with the authority needed to achieve the statutory goals.
Both EPA and petitioners refer to numerous other provisions of the Act and fragments of legislative history in support of their positions. We do not find these conclusive, and little point would be served by discussing them in detail. We are satisfied that our reading of § 301 is consistent with the rest of the legislative scheme.
Language we recently employed in another case involving the validity of EPA regulations applies equally to this case:
“We therefore conclude that the Agency's interpretation... was 'correct,' to the extent that it can be said with complete assurance that any particular interpretation of a complex statute such as this is the 'correct' one. Given this conclusion, as well as the facts that the Agency is charged with administration of the Act, and that there has undoubtedly been reliance upon its interpretation by the States and other parties affected by the Act, we have no doubt whatever that its construction was sufficiently reasonable to preclude the Court of Appeals from substituting its judgment for that of the Agency.” Train v. Natural Resources Def. Council, 421 U. S. 60, 87.
When, as in this litigation, the Agency’s interpretation is also supported by thorough, scholarly opinions written by some of our finest judges, and has received the overwhelming support of the Courts of Appeals, we would be reluctant indeed to upset the Agency’s judgment. Here, on the contrary, our independent examination confirms the correctness of the Agency’s construction of the statute.
Consequently, we hold that EPA has the authority to issue regulations setting forth uniform effluent limitations for categories of plants.
II
Our holding that § 301 does authorize the Administrator to promulgate effluent limitations for classes and categories of existing point sources necessarily resolves the jurisdictional issue as well. For, as we have already pointed out, § 509 (b)(1) provides that “[r]eview of the Administrator’s action... in approving or promulgating any effluent limitation or other limitation under section 301, 302, or 306,... may be had by any interested person in the Circuit Court of Appeals of the United States for the Federal judicial district in which such person resides or transacts such business....”
Petitioners have argued that the reference to § 301 was intended only to provide for review of the grant or denial of an individual variance pursuant to § 301 (c). We find this argument unpersuasive for two reasons in addition to those discussed in Part I of this opinion. First, in other portions of § 509, Congress referred to specific subsections of the Act and presumably would have specifically mentioned § 301 (c) if only action pursuant to that subsection were intended to be reviewable in the court of appeals. More importantly, petitioners’ construction would produce the truly perverse situation in which the court of appeals would review numerous individual actions issuing or denying permits pursuant to § 402 but would have no power of direct review of the basic regulations governing those individual actions. See American Meat Institute v. EPA, 526 F. 2d, at 452.
We regard §509 (b)(1)(E) as unambiguously authorizing court of appeals review of EPA action promulgating an effluent limitation for existing point sources under § 301. Since those limitations are typically promulgated in the same proceeding as the new-source standards under § 306, we have no doubt that Congress intended review of the two sets of regulations to be had in the same forum.
III
The remaining issue in this case concerns new plants. Under § 306, EPA is to promulgate “regulations establishing Federal standards of performance for new sources..." § 306 (b)(1)(B). A “standard of performance” is a “standard for the control of the discharge of pollutants which reflects the greatest degree of effluent reduction which the Administrator determines to be achievable through application of the best available demonstrated control technology,... including, where practicable, a standard permitting no discharge of pollutants.” § 306 (a)(1). In setting the standard, “[t]he Administrator may distinguish among classes, types, and sizes within categories of new sources... and shall consider the type of process employed (including whether batch or continuous).” § 306 (b)(2). As the House Report states, the standard must reflect the best technology for “that category of sources, and for class, types, and sizes within categories.” H. R. Rep. No. 92-911, p. 111 (1972), Leg. Hist. 798.
The Court of Appeals held:
“Neither the Act nor the regulations contain any variance provision for new sources. The rule of presumptive applicability applies to new sources as well as existing sources. On remand EPA should come forward with some limited escape mechanism for new sources.” Du Pont II, 541 F. 2d, at 1028.
The court’s rationale was that “[p]rovisions for variances, modifications, and exceptions are appropriate to the regulatory process.” Ibid.
The question, however, is not what a court thinks is generally appropriate to the regulatory process; it is what Congress intended for these regulations. It is clear that Congress intended these regulations to be absolute prohibitions. The use of the word “standards” implies as much. So does the description of the preferred standard as one “permitting no discharge of pollutants.” (Emphasis added.) It is “unlawful for any owner or operator of any new source to operate such source in violation of any standard of performance applicable to such source.” § 306 (e) (emphasis added). In striking contrast to § 301 (c), there is no statutory provision for variances, and a variance provision would be inappropriate in a standard that was intended to insure national uniformity and “maximum feasible control of new sources.” S. Rep. No. 92-414, p. 58 (1971), Leg. Hist. 1476.
That portion of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in 541 F.2d 1018 requiring EPA to provide a variance procedure for new sources is reversed. In all other aspects, the judgments of the Court of Appeals are affirmed.
It is so ordered.
Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases.
A “point source” is “any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance,... from which pollutants are or may be discharged.” § 502 (14), 33 U. S. C. § 1362 (14) (1970 ed., Supp. V).
Throughout this opinion we will refer interchangeably to the Administrator of the EPA and to the Agency itself.
The reasons for the statutory scheme have been described as follows: “Such direct restrictions on discharges facilitate enforcement by marking it unnecessary to work backward from an overpolluted body of water to determine which point sources are responsible and which must be abated. In addition, a discharger’s performance is now measured against strict technology-based effluent limitations—specified levels of treatment—to which it must conform, rather than against limitations derived from water quality standards to which it and other polluters must collectively conform.” EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Board, 426 U. S. 200, 204-205 (footnotes omitted).
Section 304 (b) provides:
“(b) For the purpose of adopting or revising effluent limitations under this Act the Administrator shall, after consultation with appropriate Federal and State agencies and other interested persons, publish within one year of enactment of this title, regulations, providing guidelines for effluent limitations, and, at least annually thereafter, revise, if appropriate, such regulations. Such regulations shall—
“(1)(A) identify, in terms of amounts of constituents and chemical, physical, and biological characteristics of pollutants, the degree of effluent reduction attainable through the application of the best practicable control technology currently available for classes and categories of point sources (other than publicly owned treatment works); and
“(B) specify factors to be taken into account in determining the control measures and practices to be applicable to point sources (other than publicly owned treatment works) within such categories or classes. Factors relating to the assessment of best practicable control technology currently available to comply with subsection (b)(1) of section 301 of this Act shall include consideration of the total cost of application of technology in relation to the effluent reduction benefits to be achieved from such application, and shall also take into account the age of equipment and facilities involved, the process employed, the engineering aspects of the application of various types of control techniques, process changes, non-water quality environmental impact (including energy requirements), and such other factors as the Administrator deems appropriate;
“(2) (A) identify, in terms of amounts of constituents and chemical, physical, and biological characteristics of pollutants, the degree of effluent reduction attainable through the application of the best control measures and practices achievable including treatment techniques, process and procedure innovations, operating methods, and other alternatives for classes and categories of point sources (other than publicly owned treatment works); and
“(B) specify factors to be taken into account in determining the best measures and practices available to comply with subsection (b)(2) of section 301 of this Act to be applicable to any point source (other than publicly owned treatment works) within such categories or classes. Factors relating to the assessment of best available technology shall take into account the age of equipment and facilities involved, the process employed, the engineering aspects of the application of various types of control techniques, process changes, the cost of achieving such effluent reduction, non-water quality environmental impact (including energy requirements), and such other factors as the Administrator deems appropriate; and
“(3) identify control measures and practices available to eliminate the discharge of pollutants from categories and classes of point sources, taking into account the cost of achieving such elimination of the discharge of pollutants.” 86 Stat. 851, 33 U. S. C. § 1314 (b) (1970 ed., Supp. V).
Section 301 provides in pertinent part:
“Sec. 301. (a) Except as in compliance with this section and sections 302, 306, 307, 318, 402, and 404 of this Act, the discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be unlawful.
“(b) In order to carry out the objective of this Act there shall be achieved—
“(1)(A) not later than July 1, 1977, effluent limitations for point sources, other than publicly owned treatment works, (i) which shall require the application of the best practicable control technology currently available as defined by the Administrator pursuant to section 304 (b) of this Act....
“(2)(A) not later than July 1, 1983, effluent limitations for categories and classes of point sources, other than publicly owned treatment works, which (i) shall require application of the best available technology economically achievable for such category or class, which will result in reasonable further progress toward the national goal of eliminating the discharge of all pollutants, as determined in accordance with regulations issued by the Administrator pursuant to section 304 (b) (2) of this Act, which such effluent limitations shall require the elimination of discharges of all pollutants if the Administrator finds, on the basis of information available to him (including information developed pursuant to section 315), that such elimination is technologically and economically achievable for a category or class of point sources as determined in accordance with regulations issued by the Administrator pursuant to section 304 (b)(2) of this Act....
“(c) The Administrator may modify the requirements of subsection (b)(2)(A) of this section with respect to any point source for which a permit application is filed after July 1, 1977, upon a showing by the owner or operator of such point source satisfactory to the Administrator that such modified requirements (1) will represent the maximum use of technology within the economic capability of the owner or operator; and (2) will result in reasonable further progress toward the elimination of the discharge of pollutants.
“(d) Any effluent limitation required by paragraph (2) of subsection (b) of this section shall be reviewed at least every five years and, if appropriate, revised pursuant to the procedure established under such paragraph.
“(e) Effluent limitations established pursuant to this section or section 302 of this Act shall be applied to all point sources of discharge of pollutants in accordance with the provisions of this Act.” 86 Stat. 844, 33 U. S. C. § 1311 (1970 ed., Supp. V).
There is no provision for compliance with § 304, the guideline section.
Section 402 (a) (1) provides:
“Except as provided in sections 318 and 404 of this Act, the Administrator may, after opportunity for public hearing, issue a permit for the discharge of any pollutant, or combination of pollutants, notwithstanding section 301 (a), upon condition that such discharge will meet either all applicable requirements under sections 301, 302, 306, 307, 308, and 403 of this Act, or prior to the talking of necessary implementing actions relating to all such requirements, such conditions as the Administrator determines are necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act.” 86 Stat. 880, 33 U. S. C. § 1342 (a) (1) (1970 ed., Supp. V).
Under § 402 (b), the Administrator may delegate this authority to the States, but retains the power to withdraw approval of the state program, §402 (c)(3), and to veto individual state permits, §402 (d). Finally, under § 402 (k), compliance with the permit is generally deemed compliance with § 301. Twenty-seven States now administer their own permit programs.
The pertinent provisions of § 306, 86 Stat. 854, 33 U. S. C. § 1316 (1970 ed., Supp. V), are as follows:
“(a) For purposes of this section:
“(1) The term'standard of performance' means a standard for the control of the discharge of pollutants which reflects the greatest degree of effluent reduction which the Administrator determines to be achievable through application of the best available demonstrated control technology, processes, operating methods, or other alternatives, including, where practicable, a standard permitting no discharge of pollutants.
“(b)(1)...
“(B) As soon as practicable, but in no case more than one year, after a category of sources is included in a list under subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, the Administrator shall propose and publish regulations establishing Federal standards of performance for new sources within such category....
“(2) The Administrator may distinguish among classes, types, and sizes within categories of new sources for the purpose of establishing such standards and shall consider the type of process employed (including whether batch or continuous).
“(3) The provisions of this section shall apply to any new source owned or operated by the United States.
“(e) After the effective date of standards of performance promulgated under this section, it shall be unlawful for any owner or operator of any new source to operate such source in violation of any standard of performance applicable to such source.”
Some subcategories are required to eliminate all discharges by 1977. E. g., 40 CFR §§ 415.70-415.76 (1976). Other subcategories are subject to less stringent restrictions. For instance, by 1977 plants producing titanium dioxide by the chloride process must reduce average daily discharges of dissolved iron to 0.72 pounds per thousand pounds of product. This limit is cut in half for existing plants in 1983 and for all new plants. 40 CFR §§415.220-415.225 (1976).
These limitations may be made “either more or less stringent” to the extent that “factors relating to the equipment or facilities involved, the process applied, or other such factors related to such discharger are fundamentally different from the factors considered” in establishing the limitations. See, e. g., for the two subcategories discussed in n. 9, supra, 40 CFR §§ 415.72 and 415.222 (1976), respectively.
Because EPA’s authority to issue the regulations is closely tied to the question whether the regulations are directly reviewable in the Court of Appeals, see infra, at 124-125, some of the companies also filed suit in District Court challenging the regulations. The District Court held that EPA had the authority to issue the regulations and that exclusive jurisdiction was therefore in the Court of Appeals. 383 F. Supp. 1244 (WD Va. 1974), aff’d, 528 F. 2d 1136 (CA4 1975) (Du Pont I).
The Court of Appeals issued two separate opinions. In Du Pont I, supra, the court held that it
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | H | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Kennedy
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Single transactions, it is well known, may be susceptible to different, and inconsistent, theories of taxation. In the case before us, the taxpayer treated moneys derived from her deceased employer’s estate as a gift and paid gift tax on the transfer. Some years later, the Government contended that the money the taxpayer had received from the transaction was income. The taxpayer disagreed, and the Government’s assertion of an income tax deficiency was the subject of proceedings in the United States Tax Court. The question presented is whether, the statute of limitations long since having run, the doctrine of equitable recoupment supports a separate suit for refund of the earlier paid gift tax after the taxpayer settled the Tax Court deficiency proceeding and agreed to pay income tax on the transaction. We hold that it does Hot.
I
• The taxpayer, Frances Dalm, is the respondent here. Dalm was appointed administratrix of the estate of Harold Schrier in May 1975, at the request of Schrier’s surviving brother, Clarence. It appears Dalm had been the decedent’s loyal secretary for many years and that Clarence wanted her to take charge of the affairs of the estate and receive some of the moneys that otherwise would belong to him.
Dalm received fees from the estate, approved by the probate court, of $30,000 in 1976 and $7,000 in 1977. She also received from Clarence two payments, $180,000 in 1976 and $133,813 in 1977. Clarence and his wife filed a gift tax return in December 1976 reporting the $180,000 payment as a gift to Dalm, and in that same month Dalm paid the gift tax of $18,675. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) later assessed an additional $1,587 in penalties and interest with respect to the transfer. The Schriers paid the penalties and interest in 1977, and were reimbursed by Dalm. But no gift tax return was filed with respect to the 1977 payment of $133,813.
After auditing Dalm’s 1976 and 1977 income tax returns, the IRS determined that the payments from Clarence represented additional fees for Dalm’s services as administratix of the estate and should have been reported as income. The IRS asserted deficiencies in her income tax of $91,471 in 1976, and $70,639 in 1977, along with additions to the taxes under § 6653(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (IRC), 26 U. S. C. § 6653(a) (1982 ed.).
Dalm petitioned the Tax Court for a redetermination of the asserted deficiencies, as was her right under § 6213(a). In her petition, she argued that the 1976 and 1977 payments from Clarence were gifts to carry out the wish of the decedent that she share in the estate. After two days of trial, Dalm and the IRS settled the case, with the parties agreeing to a stipulated decision that respondent owed income tax deficiencies of $10,416 for 1976 and $70,639 for 1977. No claim for a credit or recoupment of the gift tax paid by Dalm was raised in the Tax Court proceedings, although there is some dispute whether the gift tax was one of the factors considered in arriving at the terms of the settlement. See n. 2, infra.
Immediately after agreeing to the settlement, Dalm filed an administrative claim for refund of the $20,262 in gift tax, interest, and penalties paid with respect to the $180,000 transfer in 1976. The claim was filed in November 1984, even though the IRC required Dalm to file any claim for a refund of the gift tax by December 1979. See § 6511(a). When the IRS failed to act upon her claim within six months, Dalm filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan, seeking what in her complaint she denominated a refund of “overpaid gift tax.” Her complaint alleged that the District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1346(a)(1) (1982 ed.).
The Government moved to dismiss the suit for lack of jurisdiction and for summary judgment, arguing that the suit was untimely under the applicable statute of limitations. The District Court granted the Government’s motions, rejecting Dalm’s contention that her suit was timely under the doctrine of equitable recoupment as set forth in our opinion in Bull v. United States, 295 U. S. 247 (1935), a case we shall discuss. The court held that equitable recoupment did not authorize it to exercise jurisdiction over “an independent lawsuit, such as this suit,... maintained for a refund for a year in which the statute of limitations has expired.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 19a.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed. 867 F. 2d 305 (1989). The court found Dalm’s claim satisfied all of the requirements for equitable recoupment expressed in our cases. It rejected the District Court’s characterization of Dalm’s action as an independent lawsuit barred by the statute of limitations, reasoning that she could maintain an otherwise barred action for refund of gift tax because the Government had made a timely claim of a deficiency in her income tax based upon an inconsistent legal theory. Id., at 311-312 (citing Kolom v. United States, 791 F. 2d 762 (CA9 1986)).
Because the approach taken by the Sixth and Ninth Circuits is in conflict with that adopted by Seventh Circuit, see O’Brien v. United States, 766 F. 2d 1038 (1985), we granted certiorari, 493 U. S. 807 (1989), and now reverse.
II
The ultimate question in the case is whether the District Court had jurisdiction over Dalm’s suit seeking a refund of the gift tax, interest, and penalties paid on the 1976 transfer. We hold that it did not.
A
In her complaint, Dalm invoked 28 U. S. C. § 1346(a)(1) (1982 ed.), under which a district court has jurisdiction over a “civil action against the United States for the recovery of any internal-revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority or any sum alleged to have been excessive or in any manner wrongfully collected under the internal-revenue laws.” Despite its spacious terms, § 1346(a)(1) must be read in conformity with other statutory provisions which qualify a taxpayer’s right to bring a refund suit upon compliance with certain conditions. The first is § 7422(a), which, tracking the language of § 1346(a)(1), limits a taxpayer’s right to bring a refund suit by providing that
“[n]o suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of any internal revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or of any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority, or of any sum alleged to have been excessive or in any manner wrongfully collected, until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with the Secretary, according to the provisions of law in that regard, and the regulations of the Secretary established in pursuance thereof.”
Second, § 6511(a) provides that if a taxpayer is required to file a return with respect to a tax, such as the gift tax, the taxpayer must file any claim for refund within three years from the time the return was filed or two years from the time the tax was paid, whichever period expires later. Read together, the import of these sections is clear: unless a claim for refund of a tax has been filed within the time limits imposed by § 6511(a), a suit for refund, regardless of whether the tax is alleged to have been “erroneously,” “illegally,” or “wrongfully collected,” §§ 1346(a)(1), 7422(a), may not be maintained in any court. See United States v. Kales, 314 U. S. 186, 193 (1941).
There is no doubt that Dalm failed to comply with these statutory requirements. The Schriers filed their gift tax return and Dalm paid the gift tax on the 1976 transfer in December 1976. She paid the penalties and interest on that tax in March 1977. Dalm did not file her claim for refund of the gift tax until November 1984, long after the limitations period expired. Under the plain language of §§ 6511(a) and 7422(a), the District Court was barred from entertaining her suit for a refund of the tax.
B
The Court of Appeals did not contest this analysis; indeed, it recognized that “[tjhere is no statutory basis for permitting the recovery of a tax overpayment after the statute of limitations has expired.” 867 F. 2d, at 308. Despite the lack of a statutory basis for recovery, the court concluded that the doctrine of equitable recoupment permits Dalm to maintain an action to recover the overpaid gift tax. We disagree.
The doctrine of equitable recoupment was first addressed by us in our opinion in Bull v. United States, supra. There, the dispute centered on whether partnership distributions received by a decedent’s estate after his death were subject to estate tax or income tax. After an audit, the executor of the estate included the sums in the estate tax return and paid the estate tax in 1920 and 1921. In 1925, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue notified the estate of a deficiency in the estate’s income tax for the 1920 tax year, contending that the same distributions upon which estate tax had been paid should have been treated as income. The Commissioner, however, did not give credit for the estate tax earlier paid on the value of the distributions.
That same year, the estate petitioned to the Board of Tax Appeals for a redetermination of the deficiency. After the Board sustained the Commissioner’s deficiency determination, the estate paid the additional income tax and filed a claim for refund of the income tax paid. The Commissioner rejected the claim, and, in September 1930, the executor sued in the Court of Claims for a refund of the income tax. In his petition to the Court of Claims, the executor argued (1) that the amount taxed was not income, so that the estate was entitled to a refund of the entire amount of income tax paid; and (2) alternatively, if the amount taxed was income, the Government should credit against the income tax due the overpayment of estate tax, plus interest, attributable to the inclusion of the amount in the taxable estate. The Court of Claims rejected both arguments.
We reversed, holding that the executor was entitled to a credit against the income tax deficiency in the amount of the overpayment of estate tax, with interest. 295 U. S., at 263. We began by acknowledging that the executor had not filed a claim for refund of the estate tax within the limitations period, and that any action for refund of the tax was now barred. Id., at 259, 260-261. “If nothing further had occurred Congressional action would have been the sole avenue of redress.” Id., at 261.
What did occur, however, was that after the limitations period on the estate tax had run, the Government assessed a deficiency in the estate’s income tax based upon the same taxable event, and the deficiency became the subject of litigation between the estate and the Government. We reasoned that a tax assessment is in essence an assertion by the sovereign that the taxpayer owes a debt to it; but that, because “taxes are the life-blood of government,” it was necessary for the tax assessed to be collected prior to adjudication of whether the assessment was erroneous or unlawful. As a result,
“the usual procedure for the recovery of debts is reversed in the field of taxation. Payment precedes defense, and the burden of proof, normally on the claimant, is shifted to the taxpayer.... But these reversals of the normal process of collecting a claim cannot obscure the fact that after all what is being accomplished is the recovery of a just debt owed the sovereign.” Id., at 260.
Under our reasoning, the proceeding between the executor and the Government was in substance an attempt by the Government to recover a debt from the estate. The debt was the income tax that was owed, even though in fact it already had been paid. Had the Government followed the “usual procedure” of recovering debts by instituting an action at law for the income tax owed, the executor would have been able to defend against the suit by “demanding recoupment of the amount mistakenly collected as estate tax and wrongfully retained.” Id., at 261 (citing United States v. State Bank, 96 U. S. 30 (1878)).
“If the claim for income tax deficiency had been the subject of a suit, any counter demand for recoupment of the overpayment of estate tax could have been asserted by way of defense and credit obtained notwithstanding the statute of limitations had barred an independent suit against the Government therefor. This is because recoupment is in the nature of a defense arising out of some feature of the transaction upon which the plaintiff’s action is grounded. Such a defense is never barred by the statute of limitations so long as the main action itself is timely.” 295 U. S., at 262.
We found it immaterial that, rather than the Government having to sue to collect the income tax, the executor was required first to pay it and then seek a refund. “This procedural requirement does not obliterate his substantial right to rely on his cross-demand for credit of the amount which if the United States had sued him for income tax he could have recouped against his liability on that score.” Id., at 263.
Dalm contends that the only distinction between her case and Bull is the “meaningless procedural distinction” that her claim of equitable recoupment is raised in a separate suit for refund of gift tax, after she had litigated the income tax deficiency, while in Bull the claim of equitable recoupment of the estate tax was litigated as part of a suit for refund of that tax alleged to be inconsistent with the estate tax. A distinction that has jurisdiction as its central concept is not meaningless. In Bull, the executor sought equitable recoupment of the estate tax in an action for refund of income tax, over which it was undisputed that the Court of Claims had jurisdiction. See n. 4, supra. All that was at issue was whether the Court of Claims, in the interests of equity, could adjust the income tax owed to the Government to take account of an estate tax paid in error but which the executor could not recover in a separate refund action. Here, Dalm does not seek to invoke equitable recoupment in determining her income tax liability; she has already litigated that liability without raising a claim of equitable recoupment and is foreclosed from relitigating it now. See § 6512(a). She seeks to invoke equitable recoupment only in a separate action for refund of gift tax, an action for which there is no statutory authorization by reason of the bar of the limitations statute.
It is instructive to consider what the facts in Bull would have to be if Dalm’s contention is correct that her case is identical to Bull in all material respects. The executor in Bull would have litigated the income tax liability, without raising a claim of equitable recoupment, in the Board of Tax Appeals and/or in the Court of Claims, with' the Government winning in each forum. Then, having exhausted his avenues of litigating the income tax liability and paid the tax, the executor would have filed a claim for refund of the estate tax with the Commissioner, asserting equitable recoupment as the basis for the refund, with the Commissioner rejecting it as untimely. At that point, the executor would have brought suit for refund of the estate tax in the Court of Claims after the statute of limitations had run. Had the case come to us with those facts, we would have faced the issue presented here: whether the court in which the taxpayer was seeking a refund was barred from entertaining the suit. We can say with assurance that we were not presented with this issue in Bull and did not consider it. Even had the issue been raised, Bull itself suggests that we would have rejected Dalm’s argument out of hand. See Bull, 295 U. S., at 259 (“The fact that the petitioner relied on the Commissioner’s assessment for estate tax, and believed the inconsistent claim of deficiency of income tax was of no force, cannot avail to toll the statute of limitations, which forbade the bringing of any action in 1930 for refund of estate tax payments made in 1921”).
The only other decision in which we have upheld a claim or defense premised upon the doctrine of equitable recoupment is consistent with our analysis today. In Stone v. White, 301 U. S. 532 (1937), a trust had paid the income it received from the corpus to its sole beneficiary and also paid the tax due on the income. After the statute of limitations governing the Government’s right to collect the income tax from the beneficiary had run, the trust filed a timely suit seeking a refund of the income tax paid on the theory thát the beneficiary, not the trust, was liable for the tax. We held that, given the identity of interest between the beneficiary and the trust, the Government could invoke equitable recoupment to assert its now-barred claim against the beneficiary as a defense to the trust’s timely claim for a refund. Id., at 537-539. As in Bull, there was no dispute that the court in which we allowed the doctrine of equitable recoupment to be raised had jurisdiction over the underlying action: the trust’s timely action for a refund of income tax.
In sum, our decisions in Bull and Stone stand only for the proposition that a party litigating a tax claim in a timely proceeding may, in that proceeding, seek recoupment of a related, and inconsistent, but now time-barred tax claim relating to the same transaction. In both cases, there was no question but that the courts in which the refund actions were brought had jurisdiction. To date, we have not allowed equitable recoupment to be the sole basis for jurisdiction.
C
Under settled principles of sovereign immunity, “the United States, as sovereign, ‘is immune from suit, save as it consents to be sued... and the terms of its consent to be sued in any court define that court’s jurisdiction to entertain the suit.’” United States v. Testan, 424 U. S. 392, 399 (1976) (quoting United States v. Sherwood, 312 U. S. 584, 586 (1941)). A statute of limitations requiring that a suit against the Government be brought within a certain time period is one of those terms. See United States v. Mottaz, 476 U. S. 834, 841 (1986); Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Bd. of Univ. and School Lands, 461 U. S. 273, 287 (1983). “[Although we should not construe such a time-bar provision unduly restrictively, we must be careful not to interpret it in a manner that would ‘extend the waiver beyond that which Congress intended.’” Ibid. (quoting United States v. Kubrick, 444 U. S. 111, 117-118 (1979)); Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U. S. 310, 318 (1986); United States v. King, 395 U. S. 1, 4 (1969) (waivers of sovereign immunity by Congress “cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed”).
As we have determined, our previous equitable recoupment cases have not suspended rules of jurisdiction and so have not deviated from these principles. We likewise refuse Dalm’s invitation to do so here. She seeks a refund not of income tax but of gift tax on which the return was filed and the tax paid in December 1976. For the District Court to have jurisdiction over her suit for refund, Dalm was required to file a claim for refund of the tax within three years of the time the gift tax return was filed or two years of the time the tax was paid, whichever period expires later. See §§ 6511 (a), 7422(a). There is no question but that she failed to do so. Having failed to comply with the statutory requirements for seeking a refund, she asks us to go beyond the authority Congress has given us in permitting suits against the Government. If any principle is central to our understanding of sovereign immunity, it is that the power to consent to such suits is reserved to Congress.
Our conclusion is reinforced by the fact that Congress has legislated a set of exceptions to the limitations period prescribed by §§ 7422 and 6511(a). In 1938, Congress adopted what are known as the mitigation provisions, now codified at §§1311-1314. These statutes, in specified circumstances, permit a taxpayer who has been required to pay inconsistent taxes to seek a refund of a tax the recovery of which is otherwise barred by §§ 7422(a) and 6511(a). It is undisputed that Dalm’s action does not come within these provisions; were we to allow her to maintain a suit for refund on the basis of equitable recoupment, we would be doing little more than overriding Congress’ judgment as to when equity requires that there be an exception to the limitations bar.
Our holding today does not leave taxpayers in Dalm’s position powerless to invoke the doctrine of equitable recoupment. Both the Secretary, at the administrative level, see Rev. Rui. 71-56, 1971-1 Cum. Bull. 404 (revoking Rev. Rul. 55-226, 1955-1 Cum. Bull. 469), and a court which has jurisdiction over a timely suit for refund may consider an equitable recoupment claim for an earlier tax paid under an inconsistent theory on the same transaction.
Ill
The Court of Appeals reasoned that recoupment should be permitted because it effected, with respect to a single transaction, the recovery of a tax based upon a theory inconsistent with the theory upon which a later tax was paid. But to permit an independent action for recoupment because there is but one transaction is to mistake the threshold requirement for its rationale. It is true that our precedents allowing recoupment pertain to cases where a single transaction is subjected to inconsistent taxation, but the reason the statute of limitations is not a bar in those cases is that the court has uncontested jurisdiction to adjudicate one of the taxes in question. In such cases, a court has the equitable power to examine and consider the entire transaction:
“The essence of the doctrine of recoupment is stated in the Bull case: ‘recoupment is in the nature of a defense arising out of some feature of the transaction upon which the plaintiff’s action is grounded.’ 295 U. S. 247, 262. It has never been thought to allow one transaction to be offset against another, but only to permit a transaction which is made the subject of suit by plaintiff to be examined in all its aspects, and judgment to be rendered that does justice in view of the one transaction as a whole.” Rothensies v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 329 U. S. 296, 299 (1946).
Here the Government asserted an income tax deficiency on a theory inconsistent with the theory upon which Dalm relied in paying gift tax. She chose to litigate the deficiency in the Tax Court, where she did not attempt to raise a recoupment claim. She cannot choose this avenue to adjudicate the income tax consequences of the transaction, and then seek to reopen the matter and override the statute of limitations for the sole purpose of seeking recoupment. The controlling jurisdictional statutes do not permit her to do so.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore reversed.
It is so ordered.
Justice Stevens,
with whom Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall join, dissenting.
This is not a decision that will be much celebrated or often cited. New cases are affected, and not a single brief amicus curiae was filed. The Court reserves in a footnote an issue that would render obsolete its holding. The case casts a shadow on the Executive — and on this Court — but otherwise has no apparent importance.
Indeed, the Court’s opinion is remarkable not at all for what it says but rather for what it leaves unsaid. The majority’s parsing of sovereign immunity and jurisdiction masks what is the ultimate question before us: whether a statute of limitations otherwise barring a refund of federal income tax is tolled by Government conduct that this Court has censured as “immoral” and tantamount to “a fraud on the taxpayer’s rights.” See Bull v. United States, 295 U. S. 247, 261 (1935). The Court today offers a jurisdictional apology when it could — and should — follow the just rule of the Bull case.
I
This case is remarkably similar to its 55-year-old precursor. The Bull case involved an attempt by the Government to collect income tax on partnership distributions received by the estate of a deceased partner. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue had already collected an estate tax on the distributions on the assumption that they constituted part of the estate corpus. The Commissioner contended, first, that the same transactions could constitute both corpus and income and thus be subject to both an estate tax and an income tax, and, second, that, in any event, the statute of limitations barred a recovery of the estate tax. This Court rejected the Commissioner’s first argument, and characterized as follows his claim that the Government could retain the estate tax while collecting a second tax on the same transaction pursuant to an inconsistent theory:
“The United States, we have held, cannot, as against the claim of an innocent party, hold his money which has gone into its treasury by means of the fraud of its agent. United States v. State Bank, 96 U. S. 30. While here the money was taken through mistake without any element of fraud, the unjust retention is immoral and amounts in law to a fraud on the taxpayer’s rights.” 295 U. S., at 261.
This case involves an equally unjust retention of a previously paid tax. The Government has collected an income tax on a transfer of $180,000 to respondent while retaining the gift tax previously paid on the same transfer. The Court’s decision assumes, as the summary judgment record requires, that when the Government compromised its claim for an income tax deficiency, it allowed respondent no credit for the gift tax that had previously been paid. Thus, the critical fact that made the Government’s position in Bull immoral is present here: a single taxable event has been subjected to two taxes on mutually inconsistent theories.
II
Even with the parallel between Bull and this case clearly in mind, most readers of the majority’s opinion must wonder how this case ever came before our Court, and why the majority must recite so much law to decide it. According to the majority, respondent chose to litigate in the Tax Court the deficiency assessed against her, and, having made this choice, cannot “then seek to reopen the matter and override the statute of limitations for the sole purpose of seeking recoupment.” Ante, at 611. This may seem fair enough, but also plain enough: A legal claim that might have been settled in an earlier proceeding is usually barred by rules of claim preclusion. If the claim is not barred by the settlement agreement in this case, then surely the Government can— without any help from this Court — avoid such problems in the future by drafting its settlement agreements more carefully. There is accordingly no justification for the Court’s exercise of certiorari jurisdiction in this case, a discretionary act which has done nothing more useful than deprive the twice-taxed respondent in this case of a remedy for a wrong done by the Government.
Two facts explain why the Government does not rely on principles of claim preclusion as a defense in this case. The first is this: It is undisputed by the parties to this case that the Tax Court lacked jurisdiction to consider recoupment of the gift tax payment against the income tax deficiency. According to the Government, respondent cannot, and for that reason did not, raise her equitable recoupment claim in the Tax Court: “respondent’s choice of the Tax Court forum precluded her from claiming equitable recoupment against the income tax deficiency.” Reply Brief for United States 6. The Government acknowledges that respondent may have had a sound claim for recoupment, but insists that to pursue this claim she should have “paid the 1976 and 1977 income tax deficiencies and then brought a timely refund suit in district court or the Claims Court.” Id., at 3-4.
The second fact is this.: an affluent taxpayer, but not a less fortunate one, can pay a deficiency assessment and file suit for a refund. It is undisputed that if respondent had the means to do so, she could have recovered the gift tax that had been paid in 1976 by a refund action filed after she received the notice of income tax deficiency in 1983, even though the statute of limitations had long since run. One might infer from the posture of this case — as respondent’s counsel represented to the Court — that respondent’s limited means foreclosed this avenue of relief for her. She therefore challenged the deficiency in the Tax Court.
These two facts explain what the majority does not: why we are not addressing a simple case of res judicata. It is clear that the basis for respondent’s equitable recoupment claim did not exist until it was determined that the payment made in 1976 was taxable as income. Thus, respondent could apparently obtain a forum to hear her equitable recoupment claim only by seeking a refund of the previously paid gift tax — an action which all agree was barred by limitations when respondent received the notice of deficiency in 1983.
When that determination was made — that is to say, when the income tax case was settled — respondent promptly asserted her recoupment claim in the only forum available. Indeed, she filed her claim for a gift tax refund even before the settlement agreement was consummated. In view of the fact that the character of the 1976 transaction remained in dispute until the claim was filed, none of the policy reasons that normally support the application of a statute of limitations is implicated by this case.
Ill
The Court nevertheless denies respondent the relief devised by the Bull Court. Ignoring both the policies underlying the statute of limitations and the principles of just conduct underlying Bull, the Court confronts respondent with the majestic voices of “jurisdiction” and “sovereign immunity” — voices that seem to have a haunting charm for this Court’s current majority.
The Court that decided the Bull case reasoned not in obeisance to these siren-like voices but rather under the reliable guidance of a bright star in our jurisprudence: the presumption that for every right there should be a remedy. See Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 162-163 (1803). Without any sacrifice of technical propriety, the Bull Court could have found that the lapse of time had divested the Court of Claims of jurisdiction to allow the taxpayer credit for the previously paid estate tax. It easily avoided that unjust result, however, by relying on the special features of the tax collection procedures that impose burdens on the taxpayer unlike those imposed on ordinary litigants. The net effect of its analysis was to hold that in a refund action based on the multiple and inconsistent taxation of a single transaction, the taxpayer is to be treated as though she were the defendant even though she is actually the plaintiff.
I would adopt the same course in this case. By initiating a proceeding to recover income tax based on the 1976 payment, the Government waived the time bar that would otherwise have precluded a claim for refund of the gift tax. Had respondent paid the deficiency and asserted the claim for a gift tax refund as a second count in one action, even this Court would agree that the claim was timely. If we adopt the Court’s reasoning in Bull, it is proper to treat the second count of the refund action as timely even when the income tax issues are litigated before the Tax Court, because the deficiency assessment was sufficient to put in issue the right to recoupment and to justify treating the taxpayer as a defendant, rather than a plaintiff. If it was not too late for the Government to litigate' the tax consequences, of the 1976 payment, it should not be too late for the taxpayer to do so. “A different result here [is] a reproach to our jurisprudence.” United States v. State Bank, 96 U. S. 30, 36 (1878).
IV
It may reasonably be said that the disposition in Bull involved an unusually flexible treatment of legal categories. The rights of a plaintiff are construed by reference to the status of a defendant so as to permit, in effect, the equitable tolling of a limitations period. A doctrinal innovation that appears imaginative may, however, be nothing more than the necessary expression of an exception to a generally appropriate definition. This particular exception deserves the status of a legal rule by virtue of our decision in Bull. There is no reason to retreat from the direction of that precedent today.
There is, moreover, nothing especially sober or unflinching about the majority’s disposition of this case. Quite the contrary is true. The majority’s approach depends upon showing that this Court is constrained by tightly drawn jurisdictional boundaries, but, as the majority concedes, the relevant jurisdictional statute speaks in “spacious terms.” Ante, at 601. Indeed, the statute confers jurisdiction not only over any “civil action against the United States for the recovery of any internal-revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected,” but also over any such action to recover “any sum alleged to have been excessive or in any manner wrongfully collected under the internal revenue laws.” 28 U. S. C. § 1346(a)(1) (1982 ed.).
The majority correctly recognizes that this blanket waiver of immunity can be converted into a jurisdictional straitjacket only by recourse to limitations spelled out elsewhere. The majority would find these limitations in § 7422 and § 6511(a) of the Internal Revenue Code. The first of these provisions stipulates that no tax refund suit “shall be maintained... until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with the Secretary, according to the provisions of law in that regard, and the regulations of the Secretary established in pursuance thereof.” 26 U. S. C. §7422(a) (1982 ed.). The second provision establishes a statute of limitations applicable to actions for refund of taxes paid by filing a return or by means of a stamp. 26 U. S. C. § 6511(a) (1982 ed.). It is the latter of these two provisions which gives the majority the shackles it seeks: the statute of limitations in § 6511(a) is a provision of law that, under § 7422(a), restricts the capacity of taxpayers to maintain suits. Denominating respondent’s suit an action for refund of overpaid gift tax, the majority declares there can be “no doubt” that the combined operation of § 7422(a) and § 6511(a) strips the federal courts of the jurisdiction otherwise accorded by 28 U. S. C. § 1346(a)(1) (1982 ed.) over the recoupment suit.
I have no doubt that § 6511 prescribes the statute of limitations applicable to actions for the refund of overpaid gift tax, and that, if this were such an action, the section would at least support the majority’s argument. This suit is not, however, technically a suit for the refund of overpaid gift tax within the meaning of § 6511(a). The gravamen of respondent’s claim is not that the gift tax was overpaid, but that it was unjustly retained. According to the Bull Court, “[wjhile here the money was taken through mistake without any element of fraud, the unjust retention is immoral and amounts in law to a fraud on the taxpayer’s rights.” 295 U. S., at 261. In my opinion, a sum fraudulently retained under the
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | L | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for writ of certiorari are granted. The judgment is vacated.and the case is remanded to the United States District' Court for the Western District of Texas for further consideration in light of Sanders v. United States, ante, p. 1.
Mr. Justice Clark and Mr. Justice Harlan would deny certiorari on the basis of their dissent in Sanders v. United States, ante, p. 23:
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | A | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Blackmun
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the issue of the constitutionality, under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, of those provisions of the Social Security Act that condition the eligibility of certain illegitimate children for a surviving child’s insurance benefits upon a showing that the deceased wage earner was the claimant child’s parent and, at the time of his death, was living with the child or was contributing to his support.
I
Robert Cuffee, now deceased, lived with Belmira Lucas during the years 1948 through 1966, but they were never married. Two children were born to them during these years: Ruby M. Lucas, in 1953, and Darin E. Lucas, in 1960. In 1966 Cuffee and Lucas separated. Cuffee died in Providence, R. I., his home, in 1968. He died without ever having acknowledged in writing his paternity of either Ruby or Darin, and it was never determined in any judicial proceeding during his lifetime that he was the father of either child. After Cuffee’s death, Mrs. Lucas filed an application on behalf of Ruby and Darin for surviving children’s benefits under i 202 (d)(1) of the Social Security Act, 70 Stat. 807, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 402 (d)(1) (1970 ed. and Supp. IV), based upon Cuffee’s earnings record.
II
In operative terms, the Act provides that an unmarried son or daughter of an individual, who died fully or currently insured under the Act, may apply for and be entitled to a survivor’s benefit, if the applicant is under 18 years of age at the time of application (or is a full-time student and under 22 years of age) and was dependent, within the meaning of the statute, at the time of the parent’s death. A child is' considered dependent for this purpose if the insured father was living with or contributing to the child’s support at the time of death. Certain children, however, are relieved of the burden of such individualized proof of dependency. Unless the child has been adopted by some other individual, a child who is legitimate, or a child who would be entitled to inherit personal property from the insured parent’s estate under the applicable state intestacy law, is considered to have been dependent at the time of the parent’s death. Even lacking this relationship under state law, a child, unless adopted by some other individual, is entitled to a presumption of dependency if the decedent, before death, (a) had gone through a marriage ceremony with the other parent, resulting in a purported marriage between them which, but for a nonobvious legal defect, would have been valid, or (b) in writing had acknowledged the child to be his, or (c) had been decreed by a court to be the child’s father, or (d) had been ordered by a court to support the child because the child was his.
An. Examiner of the Social Security Administration, after hearings, determined that while Cuffee’s paternity was established, the children had failed to demonstrate their dependency by proof that Cuffee either lived with them or was contributing to their support at the time of his death, or by any of the statutory presumptions of dependency, and thus that they were not entitled to sur-vivorship benefits under the Act. The Appeals Council of the Social Security Administration affirmed these rulings, and they became the final decision of the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare. Lucas then timely filed this action, pursuant to § 205 (g) of the Act, 42 U. S. C. §405 (g), in the United States District Court for-the District of Rhode Island on behalf of the two children (hereinafter sometimes called the appellees) for review of the Secretary's decision.
The District Court ultimately affirmed each of the factual findings of the administrative agency: that Robert Cuffee was the children’s father; that he never acknowledged his paternity in writing; that his paternity or support obligations had not been the subject of a judicial proceeding during his lifetime; that no common-law marriage had ever been contracted between Cuffee and Lucas, so that the children could not inherit Cuffee’s personal property under the intestacy law of Rhode Island; and that, at the time of his death, he was neither living with the children nor contributing to their support. 390 F. Supp. 1310, 1312-1314 (1975). None of these factual matters is at issue here.
A motion for summary judgment, filed by the appel-lees, relied on Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U. S. 628 (1974). It was urged that denial of benefits in this case, where paternity was clear, violated the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, as that provision comprehends the principle of equal protection of the laws, because other children, including all legitimate children, are statutorily entitled, as the Lucas children are not, to survivorship benefits regardless of actual dependency. Addressing this issue, the District Court ruled that the statutory classifications were constitutionally impermissible. 390 F. Supp., at 1314-1321. Recognizing that the web of statutory provisions regarding presumptive dependency was overinclusive because it entitled some children, who were not actually dependent, to survivorship benefits under the Act — although not underinclusive, since no otherwise eligible child who could establish actual dependency at the time of death was denied such benefits — the court concluded that the Act was not intended merely to replace actual support that a child lost through the death of the insured parent. Id., at 1319-1320. Rather, the court characterized the statute as one designed to replace obligations of support or potential support lost through death, where the obligation was perceived by Congress, on the basis of the responsibility of the relation between the child’s parents, to be a valid one. Thus, the court concluded:
“[The Act] conditions eligibility on the basis of Congress’ views as to who is entitled to support and reflects society’s view that legitimate and ‘legitimated’ children are more entitled to support by or through a parent than are illegitimate children. But this is not a legitimate governmental interest, and thus cannot support the challenged classification. Gomez v. Perez, [409 U. S. 535 (1973)].” Id., at 1320. (Emphasis in original.)
With this conclusion, the District Court reversed the administrative decision and ordered the Secretary to pay benefits for both children. Jurisdictional Statement 28a.
The Secretary appealed directly to this Court. 28 U. S. C. § 1252. We noted probable jurisdiction and set the case for argument with Norton v. Mathews, post, p. 524. 423 U.S. 819 (1975).
Ill
The Secretary does not disagree that the Lucas children and others similarly circumstanced are treated differently, as a class, from those children — legitimate and illegitimate — who are relieved by statutory presumption of any requirement of proving actual dependency at the time of death through cohabitation or contribution: for children in the advantaged classes may be statutorily entitled to benefits even if they have never been dependent upon the father through whom they claim. Statutory classifications, of course, are not per se unconstitutional; the matter depends upon the character of the discrimination and its relation to legitimate legislative aims. “The essential inquiry... is... inevitably a dual one: What legitimate [governmental] interest does the classification promote? What fundamental personal rights might the classification endanger?” Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U. S. 164, 173 (1972).
Although the District Court concluded that close judicial scrutiny of the statute's classifications was not necessary to its conclusion invalidating those classifications, it also concluded that legislation treating legitimate and illegitimate offspring differently is constitutionally suspect, 390 F. Supp., at 1318-1319, and requires the judicial scrutiny traditionally devoted to cases involving discrimination along lines of race or national origin. Appellees echo this approach. We disagree.
It is true, of course, that the legal status of illegitimacy, however defined, is, like race or national origin, a characteristic determined by causes not within the control of the illegitimate individual, and it bears no relation to the individual’s ability to participate in and contribute to society. The Court recognized in Weber that visiting condemnation upon the child in order to express society’s disapproval of the parents’ liaisons
“is illogical and unjust. Moreover, imposing disabilities on the illegitimate child is contrary to the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing. Obviously, no child is responsible for his birth and penalizing the illegitimate child is an ineffectual — as well as an unjust — way of deterring the parent.” 406 U. S., at 175. (Footnote omitted.)
But where the law is arbitrary in such a way, we have had no difficulty in finding the discrimination impermissible on less demanding standards than those advocated here. New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U. S. 619 (1973); Richardson v. Davis, 409 U. S. 1069 (1972); Richardson v. Griffin, 409 U. S. 1069 (1972); Weber, supra; Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 68 (1968). And such irrationality in some classifications does not in itself demonstrate that other, possibly rational, distinctions made in part on the basis of legitimacy are inherently untenable. Moreover, while the law has long placed the illegitimate child in an inferior position relative to the legitimate in certain circumstances, particularly in regard to obligations of support or other aspects of family law, see generally, e. g., H. Krause, Illegitimacy: Law and Social Policy 21-A2 (1971); Gray & Rudovsky, The Court Acknowledges the Illegitimate: Levy v. Louisiana and Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co., 118 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 19-38 (1969), perhaps in part because the roots of the discrimination rest in the conduct of the parents rather than the child, and perhaps in part because illegitimacy does not carry an obvious badge, as race or sex do, this discrimination against illegitimates has never approached the severity or pervasiveness of the historic legal and political discrimination against women and Negroes. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U. S. 677, 684-686 (1973) (plurality opinion).
We therefore adhere to our earlier view, see Labine v. Vincent, 401 U. S. 532 (1971), that the Act’s discrimination between individuals on the basis of their legitimacy does not “command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process,” San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 28 (1973), which our most exacting scrutiny would entail. See Jimenez, 417 U. S., at 631-634, 636; Weber, 406 U. S., at 173, 175-176.
IV
Relying on Weber, the Court, in Gomez v. Perez, 409 U. S. 535, 538 (1973), held that “once a State posits a judicially enforceable right on behalf of children to needed support from their natural fathers there is no constitutionally sufficient justification for denying such an essential right to a child simply because its natural father has not married its mother.” The same principle, which we adhere to now, applies when the judicially enforceable right to needed support lies against the Government rather than a natural father. See New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, supra.
Consistent with our decisions, the Secretary explains the design of the statutory scheme assailed here as a program to provide for all children of deceased insureds who can demonstrate their “need” in terms of dependency at the times of the insureds’ deaths. Cf. Jimenez, 417 U. S., at 634. He authenticates this description by reference to the explicit language of the Act specifying that the applicant child’s classification as legitimate, or acknowledged, etc., is ultimately relevant only to the determination of dependency, and by reference to legislative history indicating that the statute was not a general welfare provision for legitimate or otherwise “approved” children of deceased insureds, but was intended just “to replace the support lost by a child when his father... dies....” S. Rep. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 110 (1965).
Taking this explanation at face value, we think it clear that conditioning entitlement upon dependency at the time of death is not impermissibly discriminatory in providing only for those children for whom the loss of the parent is an immediate source of the need. Cf. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U. S. 484, 492-497 (1974); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U. S. 535 (1972); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U. S. 78 (1971). See also Weber, 406 U. S., at 174-175.
But appellees contend that the actual design of the statute belies the Secretary’s description, and that the statute was intended to provide support for insured decedents’ children generally, if they had a “legitimate” claim to support, without regard to actual dependency at death; in any case, they assert, the statute’s matrix of classifications bears no adequate relationship to actual dependency at death. Since such dependency does not justify the statute’s discriminations, appellees argue, those classifications must fall under Gomez v. Perez, supra. These assertions are in effect one and the same. The basis for appellees’ argument is the obvious fact that each, of the presumptions of dependency renders the class of benefit-recipients incrementally overinclusive, in the sense that some children within each class of presumptive dependents are automatically entitled to benefits under the statute although they could not in fact prove their economic dependence upon insured wage earners at the time of death. We conclude that the statutory classifications are permissible, however, because they are reasonably related to the likelihood of dependency at death.
A
Congress’ purpose in adopting the statutory presumptions of dependency was obviously to serve administrative convenience. While Congress was unwilling to assume that every child of a deceased insured was dependent at the time of death, by presuming dependency on the basis of relatively readily documented facts, such as legitimate birth, or existence of a support order or paternity decree, which could be relied upon to indicate the likelihood of continued actual dependency, Congress was able to avoid the burden and expense of specific case-by-case determination in the large number of cases where dependency is objectively probable. Such presumptions in aid of administrative functions, though they may approximate, rather than precisely mirror, the results that case-by-case adjudication would show, are permissible under the Fifth Amendment, so long as that lack of precise equivalence does not exceed the bounds of substan-tiality tolerated by the applicable level of scrutiny. See Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749, 772 (1975).
In cases of strictest scrutiny, such approximations must be supported at least by a showing that the Govem-merit’s dollar “lost” to overincluded benefit recipients is returned by a dollar “saved” in administrative expense avoided. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U. S., at 689 (plurality opinion). Under the standard of review appropriate here, however, the materiality of the relation between the statutory classifications and the likelihood of dependency they assertedly reflect need not be “'scientifically substantiated.’ ” James v. Strange, 407 U. S. 128, 133 (1972), quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, 501 (1957) (opinion of Harlan, J.). Nor, in any case, do we believe that Congress is required in this realm of less than strictest scrutiny to weigh the burdens of administrative inquiry solely in terms of dollars ultimately “spent,” ignoring the relative amounts devoted to administrative rather than welfare uses. Cf. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S., at 784. Finally, while the scrutiny by which their showing is to be judged is not a toothless one, e. g., Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U. S. 628 (1974); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U. S., at 691 (Stewaet, J., concurring in judgment, Powell, J., concurring in judgment); Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S. 71 (1971), the burden remains upon the appellees to demonstrate the insubstantiality of that relation. See Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61, 78-79 (1911); cf. United States v. Gainey, 380 U. S. 63, 67 (1965).
B
Applying these principles, we think that the statutory classifications challenged here are justified as reasonable empirical judgments that are consistent with a design to qualify entitlement to benefits upon a child’s dependency at the time of the parent’s death. To begin with, we note that the statutory scheme is significantly different from the provisions confronted in cases in which the Court has invalidated legislative discriminations among children on the basis of legitimacy. See Gomez v. Perez, 409 U. S. 535 (1973); New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U. S. 619 (1973); Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U. S. 164 (1972); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 68 (1968). These differences render those cases of little assistance to appellees. It could not have been fairly argued, with respect to any of the statutes struck down in those cases, that the legitimacy of the child was simply taken as an indication of dependency, or of some other valid ground of qualification. Under all but one of the statutes, not only was the legitimate child automatically entitled to benefits, but an illegitimate child was denied benefits solely and finally on the basis of illegitimacy, and regardless of any demonstration of dependency or other legitimate factor. See also Griffin v. Richardson, 346 F. Supp. 1226 (Md.), summarily aff’d, 409 U. S. 1069 (1972); Davis v. Richardson, 342 F. Supp. 588 (Conn.), summarily aff’d, 409 U. S. 1069 (1972). In Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., supra, the sole partial exception, the statutory scheme provided for a child’s equal recovery under a workmen’s compensation plan in the event of the death of the father, not only if the child was dependent, but also only if the dependent child was legitimate. 406 U. S., at 173-174, and n. 12. Jimenez v. Weinberger, supra, invalidating discrimination among afterbom illegitimate children as to entitlement to a child’s disability benefits under the Social Security Act, is similarly distinguishable. Under the somewhat related statutory matrix considered there, legitimate children and those capable of inheriting personal property under state intestacy law, and those illegitimate solely on account of a nonobvious defect in their parents’ marriage, were eligible for benefits, even if they were born after the onset of the father’s disability. Other (illegitimate) afterborn children were conclusively denied any benefits, regardless of any showing of dependency. The Court held the discrimination among illegitimate afterborn children impermissible, rejecting the Secretary’s claim that the classification was based upon considerations regarding trustworthy proof of dependency, because it could not accept the assertion:
“[T]he blanket and conclusive exclusion of appellants’ subclass of illegitimates is reasonably related to the prevention of spurious claims [of dependency]. Assuming that the appellants are in fact dependent on the claimant [father], it would not serve the purposes of the Act to conclusively deny them an opportunity to establish their dependency and their right to insurance benefits.” 417 U. S., at 636.
Hence, it was held that
“to conclusively deny one subclass benefits presumptively available to the other denies the former the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the due process provision of the Fifth Amendment.” Id., at 637.
See also Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U. S. 636, 645 (1975); cf. Labine v. Vincent, 401 U. S., at 539. But this conclusiveness in denying benefits to some classes of afterborn illegitimate children, which belied the asserted legislative reliance on dependency in Jimenez, is absent here, for, as we have noted, any otherwise eligible child may qualify for survivorship benefits by showing contribution to support, or cohabitation, at the time of death. Cf. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U. S. 441, 452-453, n. 9 (1973), distinguishing Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234 (Minn. 1970), summarily aff’d, 401 U. S. 985 (1971).
It is, of course, not enough simply that any child of a deceased insured is eligible for benefits upon some showing of dependency. In Frontiero v. Richardson, supra, we found it impermissible to qualify the entitlement to dependent’s benefits of a married woman in the uniformed services upon an individualized showing of her husband’s actual dependence upon her for more than half his income, when no such showing of actual dependency was required of a married man in the uniformed services to obtain dependent’s benefits on account of his wife. The invalidity of that gender-based discrimination rested upon the “overbroad” assumption, Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U. S. 498, 508 (1975), underlying the discrimination “that male workers’ earnings are vital to the support of their families, while the earnings of female wage earners do not significantly contribute to their families’ support.” Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U. S., at 643; see Frontiero, 411 U. S., at 689 n. 23. Here, by contrast, the statute does not broadly discriminate between legitimates and illegitimates without more, but is carefully tuned to alternative considerations. The presumption of dependency is withheld only in the absence of any significant indication of the likelihood of actual dependency. Moreover, we cannot say that the factors that give rise to a presumption of dependency lack any substantial relation to the likelihood of actual dependency. Rather, we agree with the assessment of the three-judge court as it originally ruled in Norton v. Weinberger, 364 F. Supp. 1117, 1128 (Md. 1973):
“[I]t is clearly rational to presume the overwhelming number of legitimate children are actually dependent upon their parents for support. Likewise... the children of an invalid marriage... would typically live in the wage earner's home or be supported by him.... When an order of support is entered by a court, it is reasonable to assume compliance occurred. A paternity decree, while not necessarily ordering support, would almost as strongly suggest support was subsequently obtained. Conceding that a written acknowledgment lacks the imprimatur of a judicial proceeding, it too establishes the basis for a rational presumption. Men do not customarily affirm in writing their responsibility for an illegitimate child unless the child is theirs and a man who has acknowledged a child is more likely to provide it support than one who does not.”
Similarly, we think, where state intestacy law provides that a child may take personal property from a father’s estate, it may reasonably be thought that the child will more likely be dependent during the parent’s life and at his death. For in its embodiment of the popular view within the jurisdiction of how a parent would have his property devolve among his children in the event of death, without specific directions, such legislation also reflects to some degree the popular conception within the jurisdiction of the felt parental obligation to such an “illegitimate” child in other circumstances, and thus something of the likelihood of actual parental support during, as well as after, life. Accord, Watts v. Veneman, 155 U. S. App. D. C. 84, 88, 476 F. 2d 529, 533 (1973).
To be sure, none of these statutory criteria compels the extension of a presumption of dependency. But the constitutional question is not whether such a presumption is required, but whether it is permitted. Nor, in ratifying these statutory classifications, is our role to hypothesize independently on the desirability or feasibility of any possible alternative basis for presumption. These matters of practical judgment and empirical calculation are for Congress. Drawing upon its own practical experience, Congress has tailored statutory classifications in accord with its calculations of the likelihood of actual support suggested by a narrow set of objective and apparently reasonable indicators. Our role is simply to determine whether Congress’ assumptions are so inconsistent or insubstantial as not to be reasonably supportive of its conclusions that individualized factual inquiry in order to isolate each nondependent child in a given class of cases is unwarranted as an administrative exercise. In the end, the precise accuracy of Congress’ calculations is not a matter of specialized judicial competence; and we have no basis to question their detail beyond the evident consistency and substan-tiality. Cf. United States v. Gainey, 380 U. S., at 67. We cannot say that these expectations are unfounded, or so indiscriminate as to render the statute’s classifications baseless. We conclude, in short, that, in failing to extend any presumption of dependency to appellees and others like them, the Act does not imper-missibly discriminate against them as compared with legitimate children or those illegitimate children who are statutorily deemed dependent.
Reversed.
Section 202 (d)(1) of the Act, as set forth in 42 U. S. C. § 402 (d) (1), provides in pertinent part:
“Every child (as defined in section 416 (e) of this title)... of an individual who dies a fully or currently insured individual, if such child—
“ (A) has filed application for child’s insurance benefits,
“(B) at the time such application was filed was unmarried and (i) either had not attained the age of 18 or was a full-time student and had not attained the age of 22... and
“(C) was dependent upon such individual—
“(ii) if such individual has died, at the time of such death,...
“shall be entitled to a child’s insurance benefit for each month, beginning with the first month after August 1950 in which such child becomes so entitled to such insurance benefits....”
Section 216 (e), 42 U. S. C. §416 (e), includes, under the definition of child, inter alia, “the child... of an individual,” certain legally adopted children, certain stepchildren, and certain grandchildren and stepgrandehildren. Additionally, § 216 (h) (2) (A) of the Act, 42 U. S. C. § 416 (h) (2) (A), provides:
“In determining whether an applicant is the child... of a fully or currently insured individual for purposes of this subchapter, the Secretary shall apply such law as would be applied in determining the devolution of intestate personal property... by the courts of the State in which [such insured individual] was domiciled at the time of his death.... Applicants who according to such law would have the same status relative to talcing intestate personal property as a child... shall be deemed such.”
Section 202 (d)(3) of the Act, 42 U. S. C. §402 (d)(3), provides in pertinent part:
“A child shall be deemed dependent upon his father or adopting father or his mother or adopting mother at the time specified in paragraph (1) (C) of this subsection unless, at such time, such individual was not living with or contributing to the support of such child and—
“(A) such child is neither the legitimate nor adopted child of such individual, or
“(B) such child has been adopted by some other individual.”
Additionally, any child who qualifies under §216 (h)(2)(A), see n. 1, supra, is considered legitimate for § 202 (d) (3) purposes, and thus dependent.
Section 202 (d)(3), as set forth in 42 U. S. C. §402 (d)(3), provides in pertinent part that “a child deemed to be a child of a fully or currently insured individual pursuant to section 416 (h) (2) (B) or section 416 (h) (3)... shall be deemed to be the legitimate child of such individual,” and therefore presumptively dependent. Section 216 (h) (2) (B), as set forth in 42 U. S. C. §416 (h)(2)(B), provides:
“If an applicant is a son or daughter of a fully or currently insured individual but is not (and is not deemed to be) the child of such insured individual under subparagraph (A), such applicant shall nevertheless be deemed to be the child of such insured individual if such insured individual and the mother or father, as the case maybe, of such applicant went through a marriage ceremony resulting in a purported marriage between them which, but for a legal impediment described in the last sentence of paragraph (1)(B), would have been a valid marriage.”
The specified last sentence of §216 (h)(1)(B), 42 U. S. C. §416 (h)(1) (B), in turn, refers only to
"an impediment (i) resulting from the lack of dissolution of a previous marriage or otherwise arising out of such previous marriage or its dissolution, or (ii) resulting from a defect in the procedure followed in connection with such purported marriage.”
Section 216(h)(3), as set forth in 42 U. S. C. §416 (h)(3), provides:
"An applicant who is the son or daughter of a fully or currently insured individual, but who is not (and is not deemed to be) the child of such insured individual under paragraph (2) of this subsection, shall nevertheless be deemed to be the child of such insured individual if:
“(C) In the case of a deceased individual—
"(i) such insured individual—
“(I) had acknowledged in writing that the applicant is his son or daughter,
“(II) had been decreed by a court to be the father of the applicant, or
“(III) had been ordered by a court to contribute to the support of the applicant because the applicant was his son or daughter, “and such acknowledgment, court decree, or court order was made before the death of such individual, or
“(ii) such insured individual is shown by evidence satisfactory to the Secretary to have been the father of the applicant, and such insured individual was living with or contributing to the support of the applicant at the time such insured individual died.”
Upon the original petition for review under §205 (g), the District Court affirmed the administrative findings that had then been made, but remanded the case to the Secretary for him to determine the common-law status of the relationship between the children’s parents, a question left unconsidered in the first administrative proceeding. After an adverse determination on this point and an unsuccessful administrative appeal, Lucas, on behalf of the children, again timely sought review in the District Court, presenting the common-law marriage question and asserting a constitutional challenge to the Act. The District Court affirmed the administrative conclusion of no common-law marriage, and then turned to the constitutional questions that are the subject of this appeal.
See, e. g., Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U. S., at 637; United States Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U. S. 528, 533 n. 5 (1973); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U. S. 677, 680 n. 5 (1973) (plurality opinion).
The District Court affirmed the Secretary’s factual findings in a “Memorandum and Order” entered August 30, 1974, Viewing the constitutional claim as one requiring the convention of a three-judge district court under 28 U. S. C. §§ 2282 and 2284, the single District Judge did not reach that issue. A three-judge District Court was convened, but disbanded when appellees’ renewed motion for summary judgment omitted their earlier request for in-junctive relief. The constitutional claim thus was correctly determined by a single District Judge.
It adds nothing to say that the illegitimate child is also saddled with the procedural burden of proving entitlement on the basis of facts the legitimate child need not prove. The legitimate child is required, like the illegitimate, to prove the facts upon which his statutory entitlement rests.
Appellees do not suggest, nor could they successfully, that strict judicial scrutiny of the statutory classifications is required here because, in regulating entitlement to survivorship benefits, the statute discriminatorily interferes with interests of constitutional fundamentally. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749, 768-770 (1975); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471 (1970).
The Court, of course, has found the privacy of familial relationships to be entitled to procedural due process protections from disruption by the State, whether or not those relationships were legitimized by marriage under state law. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U. S. 645 (1972). But the concerns relevant to that context are only tangential to the analysis here, since the statutory scheme does not interfere in any way with familial relations.
See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1, 11 (1967); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497 (1954).
See Oyama v. California, 332 U. S. 633, 644-646 (1948); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U. S. 214, 216 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S. 81, 100 (1943).
That the statutory classifications challenged here discriminate among illegitimate children does not mean, of course, that they are not also properly described as discriminating between legitimate and illegitimate children. See Frontiero v. Richardson, supra; cf. Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U. S. 164, 169, 172 (1972). In view of our conclusion regarding the applicable standard of judicial scrutiny, we need not consider how the classes of legitimate and illegitimate children would be constitutionally defined under appellees’ approach.
The significance of this consideration would seem to be suggested by provisions enabling the parents to legitimatize children born illegitimate. Compare Weber, 406 U. S., at 170-171, with Labine v. Vincent, 401 U. S. 532, 539 (1971). Of course, the status of “dependency” as recognized by the statute here is wholly within the control of the parent.
In Rodriguez the Court identified a “suspect class” entitled to the protections of strict judicial scrutiny as one “saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process.” 411 U. S., at 28.
We are not bound to agree with the Secretary’s description of the legislative design if the legislative history and the structure of the provisions themselves
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | B | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
On March 27, 1989, we denied pro se petitioner Curtis Wrenn’s request to proceed in forma pauperis under this Court’s Rule 46.1 in filing petitions for certiorari in Wrenn v. Benson and Wrenn v. Ohio Dept. of Mental Health, 489 U. S. 1095. Since October Term 1986, petitioner has filed 22 petitions for certiorari with the Court. We denied him leave to proceed informa pauperis with respect to 19 of those petitions, and he paid the docketing fee required by this Court’s Rule 45(a) on one occasion. He also filed one petition for rehearing.
This Court’s Rule 46.1 requires that “[a] party desiring to proceed in this Court informa pauperis shall file a motion for leave to so proceed, together with his affidavit in the form prescribed in Fed. Rules App. Proc., Form 4 . . . setting forth with particularity facts showing that he comes within the statutory requirements.” Our decision to deny a petitioner leave to proceed in forma pauperis is based on our review of the information contained in the supporting affidavit of indigency. In petitioner’s case, a review of the affidavits he has filed with his last nine petitions for certiorari indicates that his financial condition has remained substantially unchanged. The Court denied him leave to proceed informa pauperis with respect to each petition. Petitioner has nonetheless continued to file for leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
In In re McDonald, 489 U. S. 180, 184 (1989), we said: “Every paper filed with the Clerk of this Court, no matter how repetitious or frivolous, requires some portion of the institution’s limited resources. A part of the Court’s responsibility is to see that these resources are allocated in a way that promotes the interests of justice. ” We do not think that justice is served if the Court continues to process petitioner’s requests to proceed informa pauperis when his financial condition has not changed from that reflected in a previous filing in which he was denied leave to proceed informa pauperis.
We direct the Clerk of the Court not to accept any further filings from petitioner in which he seeks leave to proceed informa pauperis under this Court’s Rule 46.1, unless the affidavit submitted with the filing indicates that petitioner’s financial condition has substantially changed from that reflected in the affidavits submitted by him in Wrenn v. Benson and Wrenn v. Ohio Dept. of Mental Health, 489 U. S. 1095 (1989).
It is so ordered.
See Wrenn v. Benson and Wrenn v. Ohio Dept. of Mental Health, 489 U. S. 1095 (1989) (IFP status denied); Wrenn v. New York City Health & Hospitals Corporation and Wrenn v. United States District Court, 489 U. S. 1008 (1989) (same); Wrenn v. Thornburgh, 488 U. S. 1039 (1989) (same); Wrenn v. Bowen, 488 U. S. 1028 (1989) (same); Wrenn v. Commissioner, 486 U. S. 1041 (1988) (same); Wrenn v. Gould, 484 U. S. 1067 (1988) (same; paid docketing fee required by this Court’s Rule 45(a) and submitted petition in compliance with Rule 33); Wrenn v. Gould, 484 U. S. 961 (1987) (IFP status denied); Wrenn v. Board of Directors, Whitney M. Young, Jr., Health Center, Inc., and Wrenn v. Bowen, 484 U. S. 894 (1987) (same); Wrenn v. Capstone Medical Center, 483 U. S. 1003 (1987) (same); Wrenn v. Weinberger, 481 U. S. 1047 (1987) (same); Wrenn v. Christian Hospital NE-NW, 479 U. S. 1081 (1987) (same); Wrenn v. McFadden, 479 U. S. 1028 (1987) (same); Wrenn v. Ohio Dept. of Mental Health, 479 U. S. 1016 (1986) (same); Wrenn v. Ohio Dept. of Mental Health, 479 U. S. 981 (1986) (same); Wrenn v. Missouri, 479 U. S. 981 (1986) (same); Wrenn v. Ohio Dept. of Mental Health, 479 U. S. 928 (1986) (same); Wrenn v. Ohio Dept. of Mental Health, 479 U. S. 809 (1986) (same); Wrenn v. St. Charles Hospital, 477 U. S. 907 (1986); Wrenn v. Walters, 475 U. S. 1128 (1986).
Wrenn v. Gould, 485 U. S. 1015 (1988).
The Clerk of the Court provides the following Form 4 affidavit to those who seek assistance in drafting in forma pauperis papers:
“I, [John Doe], being first duly sworn, depose and say that I am the petitioner in the above-entitled case; that in support of my motion to proceed without being required to prepay fees, costs, or give security therefor, I state that because of my poverty I am unable to pay the costs of this case or to give security therefor; and that I believe I am entitled to redress.
“I further swear that the responses which I have made to the questions and instructions below relating to my ability to pay the cost of proceeding in this Court are true.
“1. Are you presently employed?
“a. If the answer is yes, state the amount of your salary or wages per month and give the name and address of your employer.
“b. If the answer is no, state the date of your last employment and the amount of salary or wages per month which you received.
“2. Have you received within the past twelve months any income from a business, profession or other form of self-employment, or in the form of rent payments, interest, dividends, or other sources?
“a. If the answer is yes, describe each source of income and state the amount received from each during the last twelve months.
“3. Do you own any cash or checking or savings account?
“a. If the answer is yes, state the total value of the items owned.
“4. Do you own any real estate, stocks, bonds, notes, automobiles, or other valuable property (excluding ordinary household furnishings and clothing)?
“a. If the answer is yes, describe the property and state its approximate value.
“5. List the persons who are dependent upon you for support and state your relationship to those persons.
“I understand that a false statement or answer to any question in this affidavit will subject me to penalties for perjury.”
See Wrenn v. Benson and Wrenn v. Ohio Dept. of Mental Health, 489 U. S. 1095 (1989) ($2,309.67 per month in salary; $46 in cash; $72,000 home; $250 savings bond; 4 dependents); Wrenn v. United States District Court and Wrenn v. New York City Health & Hospitals Corporation, 489 U. S. 1008 (1989) ($1,390.20 per month in salary; $72 in cash; $72,000 home; $250 savings bond; 4 dependents); Wrenn v. Thornburgh, 488 U. S. 1039 (1989) ($1,390.20 per month in salary; $72 in cash; $72,000 home; $250 savings bond; 4 dependents); Wrenn v. Bowen, 488 U. S. 1028 (1989) ($2,309.67 per month in salary; $46 in cash; $72,000 home; $250 savings bond; 4 dependents); Wrenn v. Commissioner, 486 U. S. 1041 (1988) ($1,073 per month in salary; $14,496 per year in retirement benefits; $42 in cash; $72,000 home; 4 dependents); Wrenn v. Gould, 484 U. S. 961 (1987) ($1,073 per month in salary; $8,400 per year in retirement benefits; $61 in cash; $72,000 home; 4 dependents); Wrenn v. Bowen, 484 U. S. 894 (1987) ($1,073 per month in salary; $8,400 per year in retirement benefits; $61 in cash; $72,000 home; 4 dependents).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | B | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
MR. Justice Stewart
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented in this case is whether a common carrier which has exercised reasonable care and has complied with the instructions of the shipper, is nonetheless liable to the shipper for spoilage in transit of an interstate shipment of perishable commodities, when the carrier fails to prove that the cause of the spoilage was the natural tendency of the commodities to deteriorate. The petitioner is a common carrier and the respondent is a fruit shipper. The respondent sued the petitioner in a Texas court to recover for damage to a carload of honeydew melons shipped from Rio Grande City, Texas, to Chicago, Illinois.
In accordance with Texas practice, special issues were submitted to the jury at the close of the evidence. The jury affirmatively found that the melons were in good condition at the time they were turned over to the carrier in Rio Grande City, but that they arrived in damaged condition at their destination in Chicago. The jury also affirmatively found that the petitioner and its connecting carriers performed all required transportation services without negligence. The jury were instructed that “inherent vice” means “any existing defects, diseases, decay or the inherent nature of the commodity which will cause it to deteriorate with a lapse of time.” They answered “No” to a special issue asking whether they found from a preponderance of the evidence that the condition of the melons on arrival in Chicago was due solely to an inherent vice, as so defined, “at the time the melons were received by the carrier at Rio Grande City, Texas, for transportation.”
On the basis of these special findings, the trial judge entered judgment for damages against the carrier. The judgment was affirmed by the Texas Court of Civil Appeals, 360 S. W. 2d 839, and by the Texas Supreme Court, upon the ground that, as a matter of federal law, “the carrier may not exonerate itself by showing that all transportation services were performed without negligence but must go further and establish that the loss or damage was caused by one of the four excepted perils recognized at common law.” 368 S. W. 2d 99, 100. The court concluded, in view of the jury’s findings, that, although “[a] common carrier is not responsible for spoilage or decay which is shown to be due entirely to the inherent nature of the goods, . . . petitioner has not established that the damage in this case was caused solely by natural deterioration.” Id., at 103. We granted certiorari, 375 U. S. 811, because of a conflict with an almost contemporaneous decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit holding that “in the case of perishable goods the burden upon the carrier is not to prove that the damage resulted from the inherent vice of the goods, but to prove its own compliance with the rules of the tariff and the shipper’s instructions.” For the reasons which follow, we affirm the judgment before us.
The parties agree that the liability of a carrier for damage to an interstate shipment is a matter of federal law controlled by federal statutes and decisions. The Carmack Amendment of 1906, § 20 (11) of the Interstate Commerce Act, makes carriers liable “for the full actual loss, damage, or injury . . . caused by” them to property they transport, and declares unlawful and void any contract, regulation, tariff, or other attempted means of limiting this liability. It is settled that this statute has two undisputed effects crucial to the issue in this case: First, the statute codifies the common-law rule that a carrier, though not an absolute insurer, is liable for damage to goods transported by it unless it can show that the damage was caused by “(a) the act of God; (b) the public enemy; (c) the act of the shipper himself; (d) public authority; (e) or the inherent vice or nature of the goods.” Bills of Lading, 52 I. C. C. 671, 679; Chesapeake & O. R. Co. v. Thompson Mfg. Co., 270 U. S. 416, 421-423; Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U. S. 491, 509; Hall & Long v. Railroad Companies, 13 Wall. 367, 372. Second, the statute declares unlawful and void any “rule, regulation, or other limitation of any character whatsoever” purporting to limit this liability. See Cincinnati & Texas Pac. R. Co. v. Rankin, 241 U. S. 319, 326; Boston & M. R. Co. v. Piper, 246 U. S. 439, 445. Accordingly, under federal law, in an action to recover from a carrier for damage to a shipment, the shipper establishes his prima facie case when he shows delivery in good condition, arrival in damaged condition, and the amount of damages. Thereupon, the burden of proof is upon the carrier to show both that it was free from negligence and that the damage to the cargo was due to one of the excepted causes relieving the carrier of liability. Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Wallace, 223 U. S. 481, 492; Chicago & E. I. R. Co. v. Collins Co., 249 U. S. 186, 191; Chesapeake & O. R. Co. v. Thompson Mfg. Co., 270 U. S. 416, 420-423; Thompson v. James McCarrick Co., 205 F. 2d 897, 900.
The disposition of this case in the Texas courts was in accordance with these established principles. It is apparent that the jury were unable to determine the cause of the damage to the melons. “[T]he decay of a perishable cargo is not a cause; it is an effect. It may be the result of a number of causes, for some of which, such as the inherent defects of the cargo . . . the carrier is not liable.” But the jury refused to find that the carrier had borne its burden of establishing that the damaged condition of the melons was due solely to “inherent vice/’ as defined in the instruction of the trial judge — including “the inherent nature of the commodity which will cause it to deteriorate with a lapse of time.” The petitioner does not challenge the accuracy of the trial judge’s instruction or the jury’s finding. Its position is simply that if goods are perishable, and the nature of the damage is spoilage, and the jury affirmatively find that the carrier was free from negligence and performed the transportation services as required by the shipper, then the law presumes that the cause of the spoilage was the natural tendency of perishables to deteriorate even though the damage might, in fact, have resulted from other causes, such as the acts of third parties, for which no exception from carrier liability is provided. Consequently, it is argued, the question of “inherent vice” should not have been submitted to the jury, since the carrier in such a case does not bear the affirmative burden of establishing that the damage was caused by the inherent vice exception of the common law.
The petitioner appears to recognize that, except in the case of loss arising from injury to livestock in transit— a well-established exception to the general common-law rule based on the peculiar propensity of animals to injure themselves and each other — no distinction was made in the earlier federal cases between perishables and non-perishables. It is said, however, that the “large-scale development, in relatively recent years, of long distance transportation of fresh fruit and vegetables in interstate commerce has led to the evolution” of a new federal rule governing the carrier’s liability for spoilage and decay of perishables, similar to the “livestock rule,” which absolves the carrier from liability upon proof that the carrier has exercised reasonable care, and has complied with the shipper’s instructions.
We are aware of no such new rule of federal law. As recently as 1956, in Secretary of Agriculture v. United States, 350 U. S. 162, this Court gave no intimation that the general rule placing on the carrier the affirmative burden of bringing the cause of the damage within one of the specified exceptions no longer applied to cases involving perishable commodities.
Nor do Rules 130 and 135 of the Perishable Protective Tariff, relied upon by petitioner, reflect any such change in the federal law, when read in the light of the history underlying their adoption in 1920 by the Interstate Commerce Commission. Rule 130, declaring that a carrier does not “undertake to overcome the inherent tendency of perishable goods to deteriorate or decay,” merely restates the common-law rule that a carrier shall not be held liable in the absence of negligence for damage resulting solely from an inherent vice or defect in the goods. And Rule 135, declaring that the carrier shall not be “liable for any loss or damage that may occur because of the acts of the shipper or because the directions of the shipper were incomplete, inadequate or ill-conceived,” merely reiterates the common-law and bill-of-lading rule that the carrier shall not be liable, in the absence of negligence, for the “act or default of the shipper or owner.” Neither of these rules refers to the presumptions or burdens of proof imposed by the common law, and it is clear that it was not the intention of the Commission in approving these rules to modify or reduce the common-law liability of a carrier. Indeed, the Commission stated at the time these rules were adopted in 1920 that “such declarations can have no controlling effect, for the carrier’s liability for loss or damage is determined by the law. Nothing can be added to or subtracted from the law by limitations or definitions stated in tariffs .... There is the constant risk, therefore, if such declarations are included, of misstating the law and misleading the parties to no good purpose.” Perishable Freight Investigation, 56 I. C. C. 449, 482. Although the Commission concluded for this reason that this type of rule was generally objectionable, id., at 483, it recognized the desirability of giving “some warning to shippers” that a carrier was not liable for the inherent tendency of perishable goods to deteriorate or decay, or for the shipper’s failure to give proper transportation instructions. Ibid. The rules themselves reflect nothing more than this objective.
That this was the limited purpose of Rules 130 and 135 is confirmed by the Commission’s action in rejecting an additional proposal made by the carriers at the time these Rules were approved in 1920. The carriers sought to include a provision to be known as Item 20 (d), reading:
“Nothing in this tariff shall be construed as relieving carriers from such liability as may rest upon them for loss or damage when same is the result of carriers’ negligence.” See 56 I. C. C., at 481.
The Commission emphatically rejected the provision on the express ground that
“a carrier may be liable under the common law for loss or damage which is not the result of its negligence, and this item implies that there may be something in the tariff which seeks to limit such liability.” Id., at 483. (Emphasis supplied.)
Finally, all else failing, it is argued that as a matter of public policy, the burden ought not to be placed upon the carrier to explain the cause of spoilage, because where perishables are involved, the shipper is peculiarly knowledgeable about the commodity’s condition at and prior to the time of shipment, and is therefore in the best position to explain the cause of the damage. Since this argument amounts to a suggestion that we now carve out an exception to an unquestioned rule of long standing upon which both shippers and carriers rely, and which is reflected in the freight rates set by the carrier, the petitioner must sustain a heavy burden of persuasion. The general rule of carrier liability is based upon the sound premise that the carrier has peculiarly within its knowledge “[a] 11 the facts and circumstances upon which [it] may rely to relieve [it] of [its] duty .... In consequence, the law casts upon [it] the burden of the loss which [it] cannot explain or, explaining, bring within the exceptional case in which [it] is relieved from liability.” Schnell v. The Vallescura, 293 U. S. 296, 304. We are not persuaded that the carrier lacks adequate means to inform itself of the condition of goods at the time it receives them from the shipper, and it cannot be doubted that while the carrier has possession, it is the only one in a position to acquire the knowledge of what actually damaged a shipment entrusted to its care.
Affirmed.
The complaint contained four independent counts, each stating a separate claim for damage to a different shipment of perishables. The shipment involved here is solely that covered by Count 1, which related to the shipment of 640 crates of honeydew melons in Car ART 35042 from Rio Grande City to Chicago.
The jury also refused to find that the damage was caused by acts or omissions of the shipper in the shipping instructions:
“Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the worsened condition . . . was caused solely by carrying out the instructions for handling this shipment given by the shipper to the carrier, although these instructions, together with the obligations of the defendant uhder the bill of lading and in the performance of all other matters not covered by the bill of lading and the instructions were carried out in a reasonably prudent manner, if you have so found?
“Answer ‘yes’ or ‘no-’
“We, the jury, answer: No.”
Larry’s Sandwiches, Inc., v. Pacific Electric R. Co., 318 F. 2d 690, 692-693. Cf. Trautmann Bros. Co. v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 312 F. 2d 102; United States v. Reading Co., 289 F. 2d 7; Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Georgia Packing Co., 164 F. 2d 1.
34 Stat. 595.
See 24 Stat. 386, as amended; 49 U. S. C. §20 (11).
The meaning of § 20 (11) was reaffirmed by the Cummins Amendment of 1915. 38 Stat. 1196. Clearly recognizing that the phrase “caused by” did not limit the carrier’s liability to cases of negligence, but covered liability without fault except where the specific common-law exceptions could be established, the Cummins Amendment permitted the carrier to require the shipper to file a timely notice of his claim prior to filing a lawsuit in cases where the carrier was without fault but forbade such a condition where the loss resulted from the carrier’s negligence. See Chesapeake & O. R. Co. v. Thompson Mfg. Co., 270 U. S. 416, 422. The proviso forbidding the notice requirement in cases of negligence was repealed in 1930 (46 Stat. 251).
Schnell v. The Vallescura, 293 U. S. 296, 305-306.
The petitioner does appear to argue, however, that the rule applied by the Texas courts required it to show some specific peculiar defect in this particular shipment of perishables. We find no intimation of such a requirement either in the trial court’s instructions or in the Texas Supreme Court’s opinion. The Texas courts merely placed upon the petitioner the affirmative burden of satisfying the jury that the cause of the spoilage was the natural tendency of perishables to deteriorate over time.
“[T]he carrier is responsible without regard to the exercise of due care, even though the damage or loss be occasioned by the independent act of third persons.” Commodity Credit Corp. v. Norton, 167 F. 2d 161, 164-165.
See, e. g., North Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Commercial Bank, 123 U. S. 727, 734.
With respect to wholly intrastate shipments, this is the rule in a number of States. See, e. g., Southern Pacific Co. v. Itule, 51 Ariz. 25, 74 P. 2d 38.
The Court noted that it was “conceded” that §20 (11) of the Interstate Commerce Act codified “the common-law rule making a carrier liable, without proof of negligence, for all damage to the goods transported by it, unless it affirmatively shows that the damage was occasioned by the shipper, acts of God, the public enemy, public authority, or the inherent vice or nature of the commodity.” 350 U. S., at 165-166 n. 9.
“RULE 130 — CONDITION OF PERISHABLE GOODS NOT GUARANTEED BY CARRIERS.—
“Carriers furnishing protective service as provided herein do not undertake to overcome the inherent tendency of perishable goods to deteriorate or decay, but merely to retard such deterioration or decay insofar as may be accomplished by reasonable protective service, of the kind and extent requested by the shipper, performed without negligence.” General Rules and Regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission, Perishable Protective Tariff No. 17, I. C. C. No. 34, W. T. Jamison, Agent.
“RULE 135 — LIABILITY OF CARRIERS.—
“Property accepted for shipment under the terms and conditions of this tariff will be received and transported subject to such directions, only, and to such election by the shipper respecting the character and incidents of the protective service as are provided for herein. The duty of the carrier is to furnish without negligence reasonable protective service of the kind and extent so directed or elected by the shipper and carriers are not liable for any loss or damage that may occur because of the acts of the shipper or because the directions of the shipper were incomplete, inadequate or ill-conceived.” Ibid.
The suggestion is made that because the shipper elected to ship under the terms and conditions of the Uniform Domestic Straight Bill of Lading, the carrier’s liability is limited to negligence. But insofar as damage to merchandise in transit is concerned, the bill provides for full “common-law liability.” Section 1 (a) of the bill provides that “[t]he carrier or party in possession of any of the property herein described shall be liable as at common law for any. loss thereof or damage thereto, except as hereinafter provided.” Section 1 (b) provides, in pertinent part, that a carrier shall not be liable for damage “resulting from a defect or vice in the property.” Nothing in the language of this contract even remotely suggests that the carrier does not bear the affirmative burden of proving that the damage was caused by a defect or vice in the property. Indeed, we think it significant that the identical bill of lading is used for the shipment of both perishable and nonperishable commodities, while a quite different contract, the Uniform Live Stock Contract, is employed in the shipment of livestock. See Uniform Freight Classification No. 4, p. 204.
Limitations on liability contained in other sections of the bill of lading apply to circumstances not covered by the Carmack Amendment. It could not lawfully be otherwise, for the Amendment codified the common-law liability for damage to goods in transit, and its legal' effect was “to bar the Interstate Commerce Commission from legalizing tariffs limiting the common-law liability of a carrier for such damage. The common law, in imposing liability, dispensed with proof by a shipper of a carrier’s negligence in causing the damage.” Secretary of Agriculture v. United States, 350 U. S. 162, 173 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | H | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Me. Justice Blackmun
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case concerns the validity of 45 CFR § 233.100 (a) (1) (1976), a regulation promulgated by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) pursuant to a delegation of rulemaking authority in § 407 (a) of the Social Security Act, 42 U. S. C. § 607 (a). The issue is whether the regulation is a proper exercise of the Secretary’s statutory authority.
I
The statute is contained in the Social Security Act’s Title IV, which has to do primarily with Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). The AFDC program was established by the Act in 1935 to provide welfare payments where children are needy because of the death, absence, or incapacity of a parent. 42 IT. S. C. § 606 (a). The original conception of AFDC was to allow widows and divorced mothers to care for their children at home without having to go to work, thus eliminating the practice of removing needy children in situations of that kind to institutions. See Burns v. Alcala, 420 U. S. 575, 581-582 (1975). AFDC was not originally designed to assist children who are needy simply because the family breadwinner is unable to find work; it was contemplated that other programs would alleviate that problem by attacking unemployment directly. See Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U. S. 598, 603 (1972); King v. Smith, 392 U. S. 309, 313, 327-329 (1968). Other parts of the Act encouraged the establishment of state unemployment compensation programs, primarily through tax incentives, but the federal role in these programs is not so great as in AFDC. See Ohio Bureau of Employment Services v. Hodory, 431 U. S. 471 (1977).
Title IY was amended in 1961 to add § 407. Pub. L. 87-31, § 1, 75 Stat. 75. This section established an experimental program (AFDC-UF) to provide assistance in some cases where the unemployment of a parent causes dependent children to be needy. The States were given broad power to define “unemployment” for purposes of the program and to determine the relationship of this new program to existing state unemployment compensation plans. In 1968 the AFDC-UF program was made permanent, 81 Stat. 882, but the eligibility criteria were modified to withdraw some of the definitional authority delegated to the States. The statute now requires a participating State to provide assistance where a needy child “has been deprived of parental support or care by reason of the unemployment (as determined in accordance with standards prescribed by the Secretary) of his father.” 42 U. S. C. § 607 (a). See Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U. S. 707, 709-711 (1975).
Both AFDC and AFDC-UF are cooperative ventures of the Federal Government and the States. States that elect to participate in these programs administer them under federal standards and HEW supervision. Funding is provided from state and federal revenues on a matching basis. See, e. g., Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U. S. 251, 253 (1974); King v. Smith, 392 U. S., at 316. Although every. State currently participates in AFDC, only about half the States participate in the AFDC-UF program. Dept. of HEW, Public Assistance Statistics, Oct. 1976, table 5, p. 9 (1977).
II
The instant case originated in 1971 as a challenge to Rule 200.X. (A) (2) of the Maryland Department of Employment and Social Services. That Rule denies AFDC-UF benefits to families where the father is out of work for reasons that disqualify him for state unemployment insurance compensation. The original plaintiffs represented two classes of families with dependent children who were thereby ineligible for AFDC-UF benefits: one where the father had been discharged for misconduct (excessive absenteeism), and the other where the father was out of work because of a strike. The defendants were Maryland officials having responsibility for the administration of public assistance grants in the State. A three-judge United States District Court was convened to consider the claim that Rule 200.X.(A)(2) violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court sustained the constitutionality of the state regulation but went on to hold it invalid because it was contrary to the federal regulation prescribing standards for the determination of unemployment under the AFDC-UF program. Francis v. Davidson, 340 F. Supp. 351 (Md.), summarily aff’d, 409 U. S. 904 (1972) (Francis I). Although HEW did not agree that its regulation was inconsistent with Rule 200.X.(A) (2), the Solicitor General, in his memorandum for the United States as amicus curiae, filed in Francis I at this Court’s invitation, 408 U. S. 920 (1972), suggested a summary affirmance in that case in light of the then-forthcoming revision of the HEW regulation.
The HEW regulation, as amended, expressly authorizes some state discretion in defining unemployment. Generally, it requires the States to consider a person to be unemployed for AFDC-UF purposes if he works less than 100 hours a month, except for intermittent employment, and “except that, at the option of the State, such definition need not include a father whose unemployment results from participation in a labor dispute or who is unemployed by reason of conduct or circumstances which result or would result in disqualification for unemployment compensation under the State’s unemployment compensation law.” 45 CFR § 233.100 (a) (1) (1976). The Secretary had stated that the purpose of this amendment was to nullify the effect of Francis I by making explicit the HEW policy of allowing the States to exclude AFDC-UF participants based on the particular reason that the father was out of work.
After the amended HEW regulation became effective, the defendant Maryland officials moved that the District Court dissolve its earlier injunction issued March 16, 1972, after Francis I had been decided, against enforcement of Rule 200.X.(A) (2). That court recognized that “[t]he conflict between the federal and the Maryland regulation ended after the former was amended,” but nevertheless it denied the motion and continued the injunction on the ground that the amended federal regulation now was in conflict with the federal statute. Francis v. Davidson, 379 F. Supp. 78, 81 (Md. 1974) (Francis II). First, with regard to the class of fathers discharged for misconduct, the District Court stated that these people are necessarily “unemployed,” within the meaning of the statute, and that any contrary regulation is invalid. Second, the court recognized that it is not clear whether the statutory term “unemployed” includes persons involved in a labor dispute. The court held, however, that the HEW regulation was invalid in this regard because it delegated the question of coverage to the States without providing a uniform national standard. Id., at 81-82.
After this Court dismissed a direct appeal in Francis II for want of jurisdiction, 419 U. S. 1042 (1974), appeals were taken by the state defendants and by the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, as intervenor, to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. There the case was consolidated with an appeal in a similar case, Bethea v. Mason, 384 F. Supp. 1274 (Md. 1974), where a single District Judge had followed Francis II in holding the same HEW regulation invalid insofar as it authorized the State to deny AFDC-UF benefits to fathers who had voluntarily quit their previous jobs.
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the three appeals in an unpublished per curiam adopting the respective opinions of the two District Judges. See 529 F. 2d 514 and 515 (1975). The state defendants petitioned for certiorari, contending that the current HEW regulation is authorized by the federal statute and that the injunction against the state regulation therefore should be dissolved. The Solicitor General, at the invitation of the Court, 425 U. S. 969 (1976), filed a memorandum for the United States as amicus curiae, supporting the state defendants’ position. We granted certiorari. 429 U. S. 939 (1976).
Ill
The ultimate question in this case is whether the statutory term “unemployment” may be interpreted to allow the State to exclude the three classes" of respondents from receiving AFDC-UF benefits. There can be no doubt that 45 CFR § 233.100 (a)(1) (1976) embodies that interpretation. Thus, the actual issue we must decide is not how the statutory term should be interpreted, but whether the Secretary’s regulation is proper.
Ordinarily, administrative interpretations of statutory terms are given important but not controlling significance. This was the Court’s approach, for example, when it had under consideration the question whether the term “wages” in Title II of the Social Security Act included a backpay award. Social Security Board v. Nierotko, 327 U. S. 358, 369 (1946).
Unlike the statutory term in Title II, however, Congress in § 407 (a) expressly delegated to the Secretary the power to prescribe standards for determining what constitutes “unemployment” for purposes of AFDC-UF eligibility. In a situation of this kind, Congress entrusts to the Secretary, rather than to the courts, the primary responsibility for interpreting the statutory term. In exercising that responsibility, the Secretary adopts regulations with legislative effect. A reviewing court is not free to set aside those regulations simply because it would have interpreted the statute in a different, manner. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. United States, 299 U. S. 232, 235-237 (1936).
The regulation at issue in this ease is therefore entitled to more than mere deference or weight. It can be set aside only if the Secretary exceeded his statutory authority or if the regulation is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U. S. C. §§ 706 (2) (A), (C).
IV
We turn now to the grounds on which the District Courts and the Court of Appeals held the regulation invalid, keeping in mind the narrow scope of review that is indicated in this situation.
These courts held that the Secretary exceeded his statutory authority to prescribe standards, in the first place, because he permitted the determination of eligibility to turn in part on the reason for the father’s unemployment. The language of § 407 (a) was thought to make the only relevant consideration that of whether, not why, the father was out of work:
“ ‘A man out of work because he was discharged for cause by his employer is unemployed. There can be no two ways about that conclusion’.... [N]o combination of federal and state regulations may provide that a father who is unemployed is not unemployed.” Francis II, 379 F. Supp., at 81, quoting Francis I, 340 F. Supp., at 366.
And in Bethea the court by like reasoning held that a person who voluntarily quit his job is to be considered unemployed within the meaning of the statute. 384 F. Supp., at 1280-1281.
We do not agree that the statutory language is so unambiguous. The term “unemployment” is often used in a specialized context where its meaning is other than simply not having a job. For example, the concept of unemployment is frequently limited to persons who have some connection with the work force, that is, individuals who desire to work and are capable of working, and who, usually but not always, have held- jobs in the past. In addition, the feature of involuntariness is often linked with unemployment. Limitations of this nature are found in the definitions used by the Department of Labor in compiling unemployment statistics. State unemployment compensation programs generally confine their benefits in this manner. Indeed, the other provisions of § 407 impose similar limitations, indicating that the AFDC-UF program was not intended to provide assistance without regard to the reason a person is out of work.
Thus, we conclude that the statutory term is capable of more than the tautological definition imposed by the District Judges and the Court of Appeals. Congress- itself must have appreciated that the meaning of the statutory term was not self-evident, or it would not have given the Secretary the power to prescribe standards.
Respondents argue, however, that Congress intended that the Secretary prescribe an “hours-worked” standard for determining unemployment but did not intend any further additions to the eligibility criteria specified in other provisions of the statute. In fact, a minimum hours-worked standard is part of the regulation at issue in this case, but there is no indication in the statutory language or legislative history that Congress intended to foreclose other factors in the determination of what constitutes unemployment for purposes of the AFDC-TJF program.
Of course, the Secretary’s statutory authority to prescribe standards is not unlimited. He could not, for example, adopt a regulation that bears no relationship to any recognized concept of unemployment or that would defeat the purpose of the AFDC-UF program. But the regulation here at issue does not even approach these limits of the delegated authority. By allowing the States to exclude persons who would be disqualified under the State’s unemployment compensation law, the Secretary has incorporated a well-known and widely applied standard for “unemployment.” Exclusion of individuals who are out of work as a result of their own conduct and thus disqualified from state unemployment compensation is consistent with the goal of AFDC-UF, namely, to aid the families of the involuntarily unemployed. On the other hand, state unemployment benefits are ordinarily available only after a waiting period and only for a limited number of weeks or months. By providing benefits during the periods before and after state unemployment compensation is available, AFDC-UF fills a significant gap in social insurance coverage. Thus we cannot say that the Secretary’s regulation defeats the purpose of the AFDC-UF program.
We therefore hold that the HEW regulation, to the extent it allows the States to determine that persons disqualified under unemployment compensation laws are not "unemployed” under §407 (a), is within the statutory authority delegated to the Secretary, and is reasonable.
V
The second stated reason for the District Judges’ and Court of Appeals’ holding that the Secretary’s regulation was invalid was that it permitted the States the option of denying unemployment compensation benefits to participants in a labor dispute. Although the holding is not entirely clear to us, it appears that what was regarded as fatal was the Secretary’s failure to impose sufficient standards to control the States’ decisions under this optional feature. Presumably, the same rationale would provide an alternative basis for holding the regulation invalid to the extent it allows States the uncontrolled option of denying benefits to persons who were discharged for cause or had voluntarily quit their jobs.
It is clear that a major purpose of the 1968 amendment was to retract some of the authority previously delegated to the States under § 407 (a). Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U. S., at 710. We, however, do not think this shift of authority from the States to the Secretary required the Secretary to adopt a regulation that precludes any recognition of local policies. If Congress had intended such a result, it might have changed the statutory language from “unemployment (as defined by the State)” to “unemployment (as defined by the Secretary).” Instead, § 407 (a) now reads “unemployment (as determined in accordance with standards prescribed by the Secretary).” The power to “determine” unemployment remains with the States, and we conclude that the power to prescribe “standards” gives the Secretary sufficient flexibility to recognize some local options in determining AFDC-TJF eligibility.
The legislative history, we acknowledge, is at some variance with the statutory language. The effect of the 1968 amendment is described as to “provide for a -uniform definition of unemployment throughout the United States,” and as to “authorize a Federal definition of unemployment by the Secretary.” S. Rep. No. 744, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 3-4,160 (1967). See H. R. Rep. No. 544, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 3, 17, 108 (1967); 113 Cong. Rec. 32592 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Long). We do not understand these comments to mean, however, that the Secretary is prohibited from allowing the States any options in determining whether or not a person is “unemployed” for purposes of the AFDC-UF program. First, the legislative history cannot be read literally in its claim that the amended statute itself provides a federal definition of unemployment; at best the statute delegates to the Secretary the power to- prescribe such a definition. Second, we have no quarrel with the statements in the legislative history that the Secretary is authorized to adopt such a uniform definition; we simply hold that he is not required to do so.
Certainly, the congressional purpose was to promote greater uniformity in the applicability of the AFDC-UF program. But the goal of greater uniformity can be met without imposing identical standards on each State. In one case, for example, a State was permitted to adopt a somewhat more liberal hours-worked test than the minimum required by the Secretary. Macias v. Finch, 324 F. Supp. 1252 (ND Cal.), summarily aff’d, 400 U. S. 913 (1970). We conclude, therefore, that the Secretary’s approach in the present case is not contrary to the purpose of the statute.
Our conclusion is reinforced by our understanding of the AFDC-UF program as involving the concept of cooperative federalism. The States are free not to participate in the program, and, as we have noted, only about half of them in fact do so. The congressional purpose is not served at all in those States where AFDC-UF is totally unavailable. Accordingly, we should not lightly infer a congressional intention to preclude the Secretary from recognizing legitimate local policies in determining eligibility. See New York Dept. of Soc. Services v. Dublino, 413 U. S. 405, 413-414, 421-422 (1973).
We therefore hold that 45 CFR § 233.100 (a) (1) (1976) adequately promotes the statutory goal of reducing interstate variations in the AFDC-UF program. In this respect, the regulation is both reasonable and within the authority delegated to the Secretary.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
It is so ordered.
Ҥ 233.100 Dependent children of unemployed fathers.
“(a) Requirements for State Plans. If a State wishes to provide AFDC for children of unemployed fathers, the State plan under Title IV — Part A of the Social Security Act must, except as specified in paragraph (b) of this section:
“(1) Include a definition of an unemployed father which shall apply only to families determined to be needy in accordance with the provisions in § 233.20 of this chapter. Such definition must include any father who:
“ (i) Is employed less than 100 hours a month; or
“ (ii) Exceeds that standard for a particular month, if his work is intermittent and the excess is of a temporary nature as evidenced by the fact that he was under the 100-hour standard for the prior 2 months and is expected to be under the standard during the next month;
“except that, at the option of the State, such definition need not include a father whose unemployment results from participation in a labor dispute or who is unemployed by reason of conduct or circumstances which result or would result in disqualification for unemployment compensation under the State’s unemployment compensation law.”
Ҥ 607. Dependent children of unemployed fathers; definition.
“(a) The term ‘dependent child’ shall, notwithstanding section 606 (a) of this title, include a needy child who meets the requirements of section 606 (a) (2) of this title who has been deprived of parental support or care by reason of the unemployment (as determined in accordance with standards prescribed by the Secretary) of his father, and who is living with any of the relatives specified in section 606 (a)(1) of this title in a place of residence maintained by one or more of such relatives as his (or their) own home.”
The program originally was to expire June 30, 1962. It was extended, however, first for five years, 76 Stat. 193, and then to June 30, 1968, 81 Stat. 94.
Before the 1968 amendments, § 407 (a) referred to “unemployment (as defined by the State).” 75 Stat. 75. Under the original statute the States were also free to decide to what extent receipt of unemployment compensation would affect eligibility for AFDC-UF benefits. Section 407 (b) (2) (C) (ii) was added and amended in 1968 to require participating States to deny AFDC-UF benefits “with respect to any week for which such child's father receives unemployment compensation under an unemployment compensation law of a State or of the United States.” § 302, 82 Stat. 273.
In Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U. S., at 710 n. 6, 719, the Court observed that a purpose of the 1968 amendments was to eliminate variations in AFDC-UF coverage among the States. Accordingly, § 407 (b) (2) (C) (ii) was held to establish a nationwide test of eligibility under which only the actual “receipt” of unemployment compensation would preclude AFDC-UF benefits. Thus the States were required to allow persons eligible for both programs to refuse unemployment compensation and receive AFDC-UF benefits instead. 421 U. S., at 713-719.
The effect of the Court’s decision in Phübrook was counteracted the following year when Congress again amended § 407 (b) (2) (C) (ii) to require denial of AFDC-UF benefits where a father is qualified for unemployment compensation but refuses to apply for or accept it. Pub. L. 94^566, § 502, 90 Stat. 2688.
This Rule, which has since been redesignated COMAR 07.02.09.10 (A) (2) (1975), provides that AFDC-UF benefits' may not be paid “[t]o meet need due to being disqualified for unemployment insurance.” Maryland’s Unemployment Insurance Law specifies various grounds that disqualify otherwise eligible individuals from receiving benefits. These grounds include, among others, voluntarily leaving work without good cause, gross misconduct, discharge or suspension as a disciplinary measure (temporary disqualification for not less than one week and for not more than nine weeks), and certain work stoppages due to labor disputes other than lockouts. Md. Ann. Code, art. 95A, §§6 (a), (b), (c), and (e) (1969).
The notice of rulemaking read:
“Dependent Children of Unemployed Fathers
“Notice is hereby given that the regulation set forth in tentative, alternative form below is proposed by the Administrator, Social and Rehabilitation Service, with the approval of the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare. Both alternatives would amend § 233.100 (a) (1), which provides a Federal definition of unemployed father under the AFDC program in terms of hours of work.
“In applying the existing regulation, the Department policy has been to permit a State, at its option, to use a definition of unemployed father which imposes additional conditions relating to the reason for the unemployment, e. g., the State definition might exclude a father whose unemployment results from participation in a labor dispute or who is unemployed by reason of conduct or circumstances which result or would result in disqualification for unemployment compensation under the State’s unemployment compensation law. In Davidson v. Francis, the U. S. Supreme Court on October 16, summarily affirmed the judgment of the district court which held, in effect, that while the Secretary has broad authority to define an unemployed father for purposes of section 407 of the Social Security Act, the existing Federal regulation provides only an hours-of-work test, and thus prohibits a State from excluding fathers who meet this test but are disqualified for unemployment compensation.
“Accordingly, the proposed alternative A below would amend the regulation to make the prior Department policy explicit, by stating the options which are permitted to the States in defining an unemployed father. Alternative B, on the other hand, would amend the regulation to make clear that the hours-of-work test is intended as the exclusive definition of unemployed father, so that States may not have definitions which impose added conditions. This would be a change in Department policy, but would be consistent with the way that the existing regulation has been interpreted by the courts.” 38 Fed. Reg. 49 (1973).
“Alternative A” was eventually adopted. Id., at 18549.
The Chamber of Commerce of the United States, as intervenor in Francis II, also filed a petition for certiorari, No. 75-1182, arguing that federal labor policy prohibits the payment of welfare benefits to persons involved in labor disputes. Although we did not act on its petition, the Chamber filed a brief as respondent-intervenor in the present case. In light of today’s decision, the petition for certiorari in No. 75-1182 is denied.
The Court there explained:
“Administration, when it interprets a statute so as to make it apply to particular circumstances, acts as a delegate to the legislative power. Congress might have declared that 'back pay’ awards under the Labor Act should or should not be treated as wages. Congress might have delegated to the Social Security Board to determine what compensation paid by employers to employees should be treated as wages. Except as such interpretive power may be included in the agencies’ administrative functions, Congress did neither. An agency may not finally decide the limits of its statutory power. That is a judicial function. Congress used a well understood word — 'wages’—to indicate the receipts which were to govern taxes and benefits under the Social Security Act. There may be borderline payments to employees on which courts would follow administrative determination as to whether such payments were or were not wages under the act.
“We conclude, however, that the Board’s interpretation of this statute to exclude back pay goes beyond the boundaries of administrative routine and the statutory limits.” 327 U. S., at 369 (footnote omitted).
Legislative, or substantive, regulations are “issued by an agency pursuant to statutory authority and . . . implement the statute, as, for example, the proxy rules issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission .... Such rules have the force and effect of law.” U. S. Dept. of Justice, Attorney' General’s Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act 30 n. 3 (1947). See United States v. Mersky, 361 U. S. 431, 437-438 (1960); Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Scarlett, 300 U. S. 471, 474 (1937).
By way of contrast, a court is not required to give effect to an interpretative regulation. Varying degrees of deference are accorded to administrative interpretations, based on such factors as the timing and consistency of the agency’s position, and the nature of its expertise. See General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U. S. 125, 141-145 (1976); Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U. S. 199, 231-237 (1974); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134, 140 (1944).
See generally K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 5.03 (1958 and Supps. 1970, 1976); L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 564r-565 (1965).
The other kinds of review provided by the Administrative Procedure Act are not involved in this case. The constitutionality and procedural aspects of the regulation, 5 U. S. C. §§ 706 (2) (B), (D), are not at issue at this time. Neither substantial-evidence review nor trial de novo, §§706 (2)(E), (F), was available in this case. See Camp v. Pitts, 411 U. S. 138, 140-142 (1973); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U. S. 402, 413-416 (1971).
“Employed persons are (1) those who worked for pay any time during the week which includes the 12th day of the month or who worked unpaid for 15 hours or more in a family-operated enterprise and (2) those who were temporarily absent from their regular jobs because of illness, vacation, industrial dispute, or similar reasons. . . .
“Unemployed persons are those who did not work during the survey week, but were available for work except for temporary illness and had looked for jobs within the preceding 4 weeks. Persons who were available for work but did not work because they were on layoff or waiting to start new jobs within the next 30 days are also counted among the unemployed. . . .
"... Persons not in the labor force are those not classified as employed or unemployed; this group includes persons retired, those engaged in their own housework, those not working while attending school, those unable to work because of long-term illness, those discouraged from seeking work because of personal or job market factors and those who are voluntarily idle. . . .” U. S. Dept, of Labor, Monthly Labor Review 91 (Apr. 1977).
“Unemployment insurance programs are designed to provide cash benefits to regularly employed members of the labor force who become involuntarily unemployed and who are able and willing to accept suitable jobs.” Dept. of HEW, Social Security Programs in the United States 54 (1971). See also Ohio Bureau of Employment Services v. Hodory, 431 U. S., at 482, and 487 n. 15.
Among the conditions imposed by § 407 (b) are requirements that the unemployed father have a substantial connection with the work force and that he actively seek employment. See Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U. S. 707, 710 n. 6 (1975).
In describing the bill on the floor of the House, a cosponsor stated that the concern was with the “involuntarily unemployed and I put the emphasis on the word 'involuntarily.’ ” 107 Cong. Rec. 3767 (1961) (remarks of Cong. Byrnes).
When President Kennedy proposed the adoption of the AFDC-UF program in 1961, the only example he gave of the sort of person that would be covered was one “who has exhausted unemployment benefits and is not receiving adequate local assistance. . . Message from the President on Economic Recovery and Growth, 107 Cong. Rec. 1679 (1961).
Although 45 CFR § 233.100 (a) (1) (1976) contains a separate option for States to exclude labor-dispute participants from AFDC-UF, Maryland has incorporated its labor-dispute rule as a disqualification for unemployment compensation. The labor-dispute provision of the federal regulation, therefore, is not directly at issue in this case. We attach no significance to the approach followed by Maryland in this case.
The Francis I court initially held that the Secretary could have left the decision on whether strikers are unemployed up to each State, but that he had failed to do so in the regulation then in effect. 340 F. Supp., at 367-368. After the regulation was so amended, however, the same court held it invalid, 379 F. Supp., at 81-82, because the Secretary failed to establish “national standards within which the regulations of each of the states were to be channelized and confined.” Id., at 82. The extent to which any significant options in coverage would be tolerated under this approach is not clear. The court, however, stopped short of repudiating its previous conclusion that § 407 (a) does not require the Secretary to adopt a “national definition” of unemployment. 379 F. Supp., at 82.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | B | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
On February 13, 1973, the United Steelworkers of America (USWA) held district officer elections in its several districts. Respondent Bachowski (hereinafter respondent) was defeated by the incumbent in the election for that office in District 20. After exhausting his remedies within USWA, respondent filed a timely complaint with petitioner, the Secretary of Labor, alleging violations of § 401 of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA), 73 Stat. 532, 29 U. S. C. §481, thus invoking 29 U. S. C. §§ 482 (a), (b), which require that the Secretary investigate the complaint and decide whether to bring a civil action to set aside the election. Similar complaints were filed respecting five other district elections. After completing his investigations, the Secretary filed civil actions to set aside the elections in only two districts. With respect to the election in District 20, he advised respondent by letter dated November 7, 1973, that “[b]ased on the investigative findings, it has been determined . . . that civil action to set aside the challenged election is not warranted.”
On November 7, 1973, respondent filed this action against the Secretary and USWA in the District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. The complaint asked that, among other relief, “the Court declare the actions of the Defendant Secretary to be arbitrary and capricious and order him to file suit to set aside the aforesaid election.” The District Court conducted a hearing on November 8, and after argument on the question of reviewability of the Secretary’s decision, concluded that the court lacked “authority” to find that the action was capricious and to order him to file suit. Civil Action No. 73-0954, WD Pa., Doc. 9, p. 27. The hearing was followed by an order dated November 12, dismissing the suit. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, 502 F. 2d 79 (1974).
The Court of Appeals held, first, that the District Court had jurisdiction of respondent’s suit under 28 U. S. C. § 1337 as a case arising under an Act of Congress regulating commerce, the LMRDA, 502 F. 2d, at 82-83; second, that the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. §§ 702 and 704, subjected the Secretary’s decision to judicial review as “final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court,” § 704, and that his decision was not, as the Secretary maintained, agency action pursuant to “(1) statutes [that] preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action [that] is committed to agency discretion by law,” excepted by § 701 (a) from judicial review, 502 F. 2d, at 83-88; and, third, that the scope of judicial review — governed by §706 (2) (A), “to ensure that the Secretary’s actions are not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion,” 502 F. 2d, at 90 — entitled respondent, who sought “to challenge the factual basis for [the Secretary’s] conclusion either that no violations occurred or that they did not affect the outcome of the election,” id., at 89, “to a sufficiently specific statement of the factors upon which the Secretary relied in reaching his decision ... so that [respondent] may have information concerning the allegations contained in his complaint.” Id., at 90. We granted certiorari sub nom. Brennan v. Bachowski, 419 U. S. 1068 (1974).
We agree that 28 U. S. C. § 1337 confers jurisdiction upon the District Court to entertain respondent’s suit, and that the Secretary’s decision not to sue is not excepted from judicial review by 5 U. S. C. § 701 (a); rather, §§ 702 and 704 subject the Secretary’s decision to judicial review under the standard specified in § 706 (2) (A). We hold, however, that the Court of Appeals erred insofar as its opinion construes § 706 (2) (A) to authorize a trial-type inquiry into the factual bases of the Secretary’s conclusion that no violations occurred affecting the outcome of the election. We accordingly reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals insofar as it directs further proceedings on remand consistent with the opinion of that court, and direct the entry of a new judgment ordering that the proceedings on remand be consistent with this opinion of this Court.
I
The LMRDA contains no provision that explicitly prohibits judicial review of the decision of the Secretary not to bring a civil action against the union to set aside an allegedly invalid election. There is no such prohibition in 29 U. S. C. §483. That section states that “[t]he remedy provided by this subchapter for challenging an election already conducted shall be exclusive.” Certain LMRDA provisions concerning pre-election conduct, 29 U. S. C. §§ 411-413 and 481 (c), are enforceable in suits brought by individual union members. Provisions concerning the conduct of the election itself, however, may be enforced only according to the post-election procedures specified in 29 U. S. C. §482. Section 483 is thus not a prohibition against judicial review but simply underscores the exclusivity of the § 482 procedures in post-election cases.
In the absence of an express prohibition in the LMRDA. the Secretary, therefore, bears the heavy burden of overcoming the strong presumption that Congress did not mean to prohibit all judicial review of his decision. “The question is phrased in terms of ‘prohibition’ rather than ‘authorization’ because a survey of our cases shows that, judicial review of a final agency action by an aggrieved person will not be cut off unless there is persuasive reason to believe that such was the purpose of Congress.” Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136, 140 (1967). “[O]nly upon a showing of ‘clear and convincing evidence’ of a contrary legislative intent should the courts restrict access to judicial review.” Id., at 141. See also Rusk v. Cort, 369 U. S. 367, 379-380 (1962) ; Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U. S. 402, 410 (1971).
The Secretary urges that the structure of the statutory scheme, its objectives, its legislative history, the nature of the administrative action involved, and the conditions spelled out with respect thereto, combine to evince a congressional meaning to prohibit judicial review of his decision. We have examined the materials the Secretary relies upon. They do not reveal to us any congressional purpose to prohibit judicial review. Indeed, there is not even the slightest intimation that Congress gave thought to the matter of the preclusion of judicial review. “The only reasonable inference is that the possibility did not occur to the Congress.” Wirtz v. Bottle Blowers Assn., 389 U. S. 463, 468 (1968).
We therefore reject the Secretary’s argument as without merit. He has failed to make a showing of “clear and convincing evidence” that Congress meant to prohibit all judicial review of his decision. In that circumstance, courts “are necessarily [not] without power or jurisdiction ... if it should clearly appear that the Secretary has acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner by ignoring the mandatory duty he owes plaintiffs under the powers granted by the Congress. Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U. S. 184 . . . (1958).” DeVito v. Shultz, 300 F. Supp. 381, 382 (DC 1969) (DeVito I). But see Ravaschieri v. Shultz, 75 L. R. R. M. 2272 (SDNY 1970); McArthy v. Wirtz, 65 L. R. R. M. 2411 (ED Mo. 1967); Katrinic v. Wirtz, 62 L. R. R. M. 2557 (DC 1966). Our examination of the relevant materials persuades us, however, that although no purpose to prohibit all judicial review is shown, a congressional purpose narrowly to limit the scope of judicial review of the Secretary’s decision can, and should, be inferred in order to carry out congressional objectives in enacting the LMRDA.
II
Four prior decisions of the Court construing the LMRDA identify the congressional objectives and thus put the scope of permissible judicial review in perspective. Congress “decided to utilize the special knowledge and discretion of the Secretary of Labor in order best to serve the public interest . . . [and] decided not to permit individuals to block or delay union elections by filing federal-court suits . ...” Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U. S. 134, 140 (1964). Congress’ concern was “to settle as quickly as practicable the cloud on the incumbents’ titles to office,” Wirtz v. Bottle Blowers Assn., supra, at 468 n. 7, and in "deliberately [giving] exclusive enforcement authority to the Secretary . . . emphatically asserted a vital public interest in assuring free and democratic union elections that transcends the narrower interest of the complaining union member. . . .” Id., at 473-475. “[I]t is most improbable that Congress deliberately settled exclusive enforcement jurisdiction on the Secretary and granted him broad investigative powers to discharge his responsibilities, yet intended the shape of the enforcement action to be immutably fixed by the artfulness of a layman’s complaint .... The expertise and resources of the Labor Department were surely meant to have a broader play. . . .” Wirtz v. Laborers’ Union, 389 U. S. 477, 482 (1968). “. . . Congress made suit by the Secretary the exclusive post-election remedy for two principal reasons: (1) to protect unions from frivolous litigation and unnecessary judicial interference with their elections, and (2) to centralize in a single proceeding such litigation as might be warranted . . . .” Trbovich v. Mine Workers, 404 U. S. 528, 532 (1972). “. . . Congress intended to prevent members from pressing claims not thought meritorious by the Secretary, and from litigating in forums or at times different from those chosen by the Secretary.” Id., at 536. “[T]he statute gives the individual union members certain rights against their union, and ‘the Secretary of Labor in effect becomes the union member’s lawyer’ for purposes of enforcing those rights ....” Id., at 538-539.
Bottle Blowers Assn, reveals two more considerations pertinent to determination of the scope of judicial review. Section 482 (b) leaves to the Secretary, in terms, only the question whether he has probable cause to believe that a violation has occurred, and not the question whether the outcome of the election was probably affected by the violation. Bottle Blowers construed § 482 (b), however, as conferring upon the Secretary discretion to determine both the probable violation and the probable effect. “[T]he Secretary may not initiate an action until his own investigation confirms that a violation . . . probably infected the challenged election.” 389 U. S., at 472. See also Schonfeld v. Wirtz, 258 F. Supp. 705, 707-708 (SDNY 1966).
In addition, in rejecting the argument that the unlawfulness infecting a challenged election could be washed away by an intervening unsupervised union election, the Court stated, 389 U. S., at 474:
“. . . Congress’ evident conclusion that only a supervised election could offer assurance that the officers who achieved office as beneficiaries of violations of the Act would not by some means perpetuate their unlawful control in the succeeding election . . . was reached in light of the abuses surfaced by the extensive congressional inquiry showing how incumbents’ use of their inherent advantage over potential rank and file challengers established and perpetuated dynastic control of some unions. . . . These abuses were among the ‘number of instances of breach of trust . . . [and] disregard of the rights of individual employees . . .’ upon which Congress rested its decision that the legislation was required in the public interest.”
Two conclusions follow from this survey of our decisions: (1) since the statute relies upon the special knowledge and discretion of the Secretary for the determination of both the probable violation and the probable effect, clearly the reviewing court is not authorized to substitute its judgment for the decision of the Secretary not to bring suit; (2) therefore, to enable the reviewing court intelligently to review the Secretary’s determination, the Secretary must provide the court and the complaining witness with copies of a statement of reasons supporting his determination. “[W]hen action is taken by [the Secretary] it must be such as to enable a reviewing Court to determine with some measure of confidence whether or not the discretion, which still remains in the Secretary, has been exercised in a manner that is neither arbitrary nor capricious. ... [I]t is necessary for [him] to delineate and make explicit the basis upon which discretionary action is taken, particularly in a case such as this where the decision taken consists of a failure to act after the finding of union election irregularities.” DeVito I, 300 F. Supp., at 383; see also Valenta v. Brennan, No. C 74-11 (ND Ohio 1974).
Moreover, a statement of reasons serves purposes other than judicial review. Since the Secretary’s role as lawyer for the complaining union member does not include the duty to indulge a client’s usual prerogative to direct his lawyer to file suit, we may reasonably infer that Congress intended that the Secretary supply the member with a reasoned statement why he determined not to proceed. “[A]s a matter of law ... the Secretary is not required to sue to set aside the election whenever the proofs before him suggest the suit might be successful. There remains in him a degree of discretion to select cases and it is his subjective judgment as to the probable outcome of the litigation that must control.” DeVito v. Shultz, 72 L. R. R. M. 2682, 2683 (DC 1969) (DeVito II) (emphasis added). But “[sjurely Congress must have intended that courts would intercede sufficiently to determine that the provisions of Title IV have been carried out in harmony with the implementation of other provisions of [the LMRDAj.” . DeVito I, supra, at 383. Finally, a “reasons” requirement promotes thought by the Secretary and compels him to cover the relevant points and eschew irrelevancies, and as noted by the Court of Appeals in this case, the need to assure careful administrative consideration “would be relevant even if the Secretary’s decision were unreviewable.” 502 F. 2d, at 88-89, n. 14.
The necessity that the reviewing court refrain from substitution of its judgment for that of the Secretary thus helps define the permissible scope of review. Except in what must be the rare case, the court’s review should be confined to examination of the “reasons” statement, and the determination whether the statement, without more, evinces that the Secretary’s decision is so irrational as to constitute the decision arbitrary and capricious. Thus, review may not extend to cognizance or trial of a complaining member’s challenges to the factual bases for the Secretary’s conclusion either that no violations occurred or that they did not affect the outcome of the election. The full trappings of adversary trial-type hearings would be defiant of congressional objectives not to permit individuals to block or delay resolution of post-election disputes, but rather “to settle as quickly as practicable the cloud on the incumbents’ titles to office”; and “to protect unions from frivolous litigation and unnecessary interference with their elections.” “If . . . the Court concludes . . . there is a rational and defensible basis [stated in the reasons statement] for [the Secretary’s] determination, then that should be an end of this matter, for it is not the function of the Court to determine whether or not the case should be brought or what its outcome would be.” DeVito II, supra, at 2683.
Thus, the Secretary’s letter of November 7, 1973, may have sufficed as a “brief statement of the grounds for denial” for the purposes of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. § 555 (e), but plainly it did not suffice as a statement of reasons required by the LMRDA. For a statement of reasons must be adequate to enable the court to determine whether the Secretary’s decision was reached for an impermissible reason or for no reason at all. For this essential purpose, although detailed findings of fact are not required, the statement of reasons should inform the court and the complaining union member of both the grounds of decision and the essential facts upon which the Secretary’s inferences are based.
The Secretary himself suggests that the rare case that might justify review beyond the confines of the reasons statement might arise, for example, “if the Secretary were to declare that he no longer would enforce Title IV, or otherwise completely abrogate his enforcement responsibilities ... [or] if the Secretary prosecuted complaints in a constitutionally discriminatory manner ....” Brief for Petitioner 9 n. 3. Other cases might be imagined where the Secretary’s decision would be “plainly beyond the bounds of the Act [or] clearly defiant of the Act.” DeVito II, 72 L. R. R. M., at 2682. Since it inevitably would be a matter of grave public concern were a case to arise where the complaining member’s proofs sufficed to require judicial inquiry into allegations of that kind, we may hope that such cases would be rare indeed.
There remains the question of remedy. When the district court determines that the Secretary’s statement of reasons adequately demonstrates that his decision not to sue is not contrary to law, the complaining union member’s suit fails and should be dismissed. Howard v. Hodgson, 490 F. 2d 1194 (CA8 1974). Where the statement inadequately discloses his reasons, the Secretary may be afforded opportunity to supplement his statement. DeVito I, 300 F. Supp., at 384; Valenta v. Brennan, supra. The court must be mindful, however, that endless litigation concerning the sufficiency of the written statement is inconsistent with the statute’s goal of expeditious resolution of post-election disputes.
The district court may, however, ultimately come to the conclusion that the Secretary’s statement of reasons on its face renders necessary the conclusion that his decision not to sue is so irrational as to constitute the decision arbitrary and capricious. There would then be presented the question whether the district court is empowered to order the Secretary to bring a civil suit against the union to set aside the election. We have no occasion to address that question at this time. It obviously presents some difficulty in light of the strong evidence that Congress deliberately gave exclusive enforcement authority to the Secretary. See Passenger Corp v. Passengers Assn., 414 U. S. 453, 465 (1974) (Brennan, J., concurring); Nader v. Saxbe, 162 U. S. App. D. C. 89, 92-93, n. 19, 497 F. 2d 676, 679-680, n. 19 (1974). We prefer therefore at this time to assume that the Secretary would proceed appropriately without the coercion of a court order when finally advised by the courts that his decision was in law arbitrary and capricious.
Ill
The opinion of the Court of Appeals authorized review beyond the permissible limits defined in this opinion. After first stating that “judicial review of the Secretary’s decision not to bring suit should extend at the very least to an inquiry into his reasons, for that decision . . . ,” 502 F. 2d, at 88-89, the court noted: “The relief requested by the complaint . . . however, goes beyond such an inquiry. . . . [P] lain tiff seeks an opportunity to challenge the factual basis for [the Secretary’s] conclusion either that no violations occurred or that they did not affect the outcome of the election.” Id., at 89. The court concluded that in that circumstance “plaintiff is entitled to a sufficiently specific statement of the factors upon which the Secretary relied in reaching his decision not to file suit so that plaintiff may have information concerning the allegations contained in his complaint.” Id., at 90.
But the key allegation of plaintiff’s verified complaint is paragraph 18 which alleges: “Notwithstanding the fact that the Defendant Secretary’s investigation has substantiated the plaintiff’s allegations and notwithstanding the fact that the irregularities charged affected the outcome of the election the Defendant Secretary refuses to file suit to set aside the election.” Thus the Court of Appeals’ opinion impermissibly authorizes the District Court to allow respondent the full trappings of an adversary trial of his challenge to the factual basis for the Secretary’s decision.
IV
The District Court, pursuant to the Court of Appeals’ order of remand, ordered the Secretary to furnish a statement of reasons. The petitioner did not cross-petition from the order, and petitioner and USWA conceded that the order was proper in this case. Tr. of Oral Arg. 23-24, 52. The Secretary furnished the statement and it is attached as an Appendix to this opinion. Its adequacy to support a conclusion whether the Secretary’s decision was rationally based or was arbitrary and capricious, is a matter of initial determination by the District Court.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed insofar as it directs further proceedings consistent with the opinion of the Court of Appeals, and that court is directed to enter a new order that the proceedings on remand be consistent with this opinion of this Court.
iSo ordered.
The result of the election was as follows:
Kay Kluz (incumbent) 10,558
Walter Bachowski (respondent) 9,651
Morros Brummett 3,566
Title 29 U. S. C. §482 provides:
“(a) Filing of complaint; presumption of validity of challenged election.
“A member of a labor organization—
"(1) who has exhausted the remedies available under the constitution and bylaws of such organization and of any parent body, or
“(2) who has invoked such available remedies without obtaining a final decision within three calendar months after their invocation, “may file a complaint with the Secretary within one calendar month thereafter alleging the violation of any provision of section 481 of this title . . . . The challenged election shall be presumed valid pending a final decision thereon . . . and in the interim the affairs of the organization shall be conducted by the officers elected or in such other manner as its constitution and bylaws may provide. “(b) Investigation of complaint; commencement of civil action by Secretary; jurisdiction; preservation of assets.
“The Secretary shall investigate such complaint and, if he finds probable cause to believe that a violation of this subchapter has occurred and has not been remedied, he shall, within sixty days after the filing of such complaint, bring a civil action against the labor organization as an entity in the district court of the United States in which such labor organization maintains its principal office to set aside the invalid election, if any, and to direct the conduct of an election or hearing and vote upon the removal of officers under the supervision of the Secretary . . . .”
The complaint was filed on the date, November 7, 1973, of the letter quoted in the text. The complaint alleges that on November 5, respondent “received a phone call from the Pittsburgh office of the Defendant Secretary advising him that the Defendant Secretary had decided not to file suit to set aside the contested election in District 20 USWA.”
The Order of November 12 recites that “it is determined that this Court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of this Complaint.” In view of our result, it is immaterial whether the dismissal was on the ground of lack of jurisdiction or of nonreviewability, or on both grounds.
Section 606 of the LMRDA, 29 U. S. C. §526, provides:
“The provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act shall be applicable to . . . any adjudication, authorized or required pursuant to the provisions of this chapter.”
The pertinent provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. §§ 701-706, provide:
"§701. Application; definitions.
"(a) This chapter applies . . . except to the extent that—
“(1) statutes preclude judicial review; or
"(2) agency action is committed to agency discretion by law. . . .” “§ 702. Right of review.
“A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action . . . is entitled to judicial review thereof.”
Ҥ 704. Actions reviewable.
“Agency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review. . . .”
"§ 706. Scope of review.
“. . . The reviewing court shall—
“(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action . . . found to be—
“(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law . . . .”
The closing sentence of the opinion as originally filed on July 26, 1974, required' the District Court to permit respondent “to examine the data and reports” upon which the Secretary relied. The present version was substituted by order dated September 3, 1974, which also added n. 17, reciting the Court of Appeals’ recognition that certain data in the Secretary’s files may be privileged and confidential.
We agree with the Court of Appeals, for the reasons stated in its opinion, 502 F. 2d 79, 86-88 (CA3 1974), that there is no merit in the Secretary’s contention that his decision is an unreviewable exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
See S. Rep. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 7 (1959) :
“In acting on this bill [S. 1555] the committee followed three principles:
“1. The committee recognized the desirability of minimum interference by Government in the internal affairs of any private organization. ... [I]n establishing and enforcing statutory standards great care should be taken not to undermine union self-government or weaken unions in their role as collective-bargaining agents.
“2. Given the maintenance of minimum democratic safeguards and detailed essential information about the union, the individual members are fully competent to regulate union aifairs. . . .
“3. Remedies for the abuses should be direct. . . . [T]he legislation should provide an administrative or judicial remedy appropriate for each specific problem.”
See also ibid.:
“The bill reported by the committee, while it carries out all the major recommendations of the [McClellan] committee, does so within a general philosophy of legislative restraint.”
Respondent referred at oral argument to the following statement in the Brief for United Mine Workers of America as Amicus Curiae 3: “The struggle by UMWA members to overturn tyranny in their Union was a lonely and difficult one in part because of apathy and indifference, if not outright prejudice against them, by the officials within the United States Department of Labor, purportedly the guardians of union members’ rights under LMRDA. Too often, union reformers have found the Department of Labor allied with union incumbents against their interests.”
No issue of this nature is raised by respondent’s complaint in this case.
Title 5 U. S. C. § 555 (e) provides:
“Prompt notice shall be given of the denial in whole or in part of a written application, petition, or other request of an interested person made in connection with any agency proceedings. Except in affirming a prior denial or when the denial is self-explanatory, the notice shall be accompanied by a brief statement of the grounds for denial.”
Judge Gesell of the District Court for the District of Columbia fashioned an acceptable procedure in DeVito I, 300 F. Supp. 381 (1969). Aggrieved union members complained of irregularities in the election of regular officers of the International Union. They also complained of irregularities in the election of an International President Emeritus. The office of the Secretary of Labor refused to bring suit to set aside either election, supplying separate statements of reasons in the cases. Judge Gesell determined that the statement respecting the regular election of officers was inadequate, but that the statement respecting the election of a President Emeritus was sufficient. He therefore ordered the Secretary to reopen consideration of the former complaint and to submit "a fuller statement of reasons and explanation,” if on reconsideration the Secretary remained determined not to bring suit. The Secretary’s motion to dismiss and for summary judgment was denied without prejudice to a further submission of reasons on that aspect of the case but was granted as respects the election of the President Emeritus. Later, following the Secretary’s reconsideration of the election of the regular officers, and his adherence to his determination not to file suit, Judge Gesell conducted another hearing. DeVito 17, 72 L. R. R. M. 2682 (DC 1969). Judge Gesell concluded on this occasion that the Secretary “satisfied the Court that there is a rational basis for his not proceeding” and granted the Secretary’s motion to dismiss.
USWA argues that Arts. II and III of the Constitution “do not countenance a court order requiring the executive branch, against its wishes, to institute a lawsuit in federal court.” “[A] judicial direction that such an action be brought would violate the separation of powers . . . [and] because the Secretary agrees with the union that Title IV does not require a new election, the lawsuit would be one lacking the requisite adversity of interest to constitute a 'case’ or 'controversy’ as required by Article III.” Since we do not consider at this time the question of the court’s power to order the Secretary to file suit, we need not address those contentions.
The Secretary concedes that, because the District Court dismissed respondent’s complaint for want of “jurisdiction,” all of the factual allegations of this paragraph must be accepted as true. Brief for Petitioner 4 n. 2. The allegation recites, however, only that the “Secretary’s investigation has substantiated the plaintiff’s allegations,” and not also that the Secretary has found that the irregularities charged affected the outcome of the election. On the contrary, the reasons statement attached as the Appendix to this opinion discloses that the Secretary found that the irregularities did not affect the conduct of the election.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | I | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
The operative facts herein are substantially identical to those in United States v. Morrison, ante, p. 1, and United States v. Rose, ante, p. 5. Respondent’s car was stopped by Border Patrol agents; a search disclosed marihuana. Respondent lost a motion to suppress and was found guilty after a bench trial. Following this trial, but before sentencing, the District Court, relying upon our decision in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U. S. 266 (1973), dismissed the indictment. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, as it did in Morrison and Rose, found the Government’s appeal barred by double jeopardy.
In United States v. Wilson, 420 U. S. 332 (1975), we held that double jeopardy would not bar a Government appeal if success on that appeal would result in the reinstatement of a verdict of guilty. The fact that the dismissal of the indictment here occurred after a general finding of guilt rendered- by the court in a bench trial, rather than after a return of a verdict of guilty by a jury, is immaterial. Morrison, supra. Double jeopardy therefore does not bar an appeal by the Government.
We grant the petition for certiorari, vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and remand to that court for proceedings consistent herewith.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | A | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice O’Connor
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Brookfield, Wisconsin, has adopted an ordinance that completely bans picketing “before or about” any residence. This case presents a facial First Amendment challenge to that ordinance.
I
Brookfield, Wisconsin, is a residential suburb of Milwaukee with a population of approximately 4,300. The appellees, Sandra C. Schultz and Robert C. Braun, are individuals strongly opposed to abortion and wish to express their views on the subject by picketing on a public street outside the Brookfield residence of a doctor who apparently performs abortions at two clinics in neighboring towns. Appellees and others engaged in precisely that activity, assembling outside the doctor’s home on at least six occasions between April 20, 1985, and May 20, 1985, for periods ranging from one to one and a half hours. The size of the group varied from 11 to more than 40. The picketing was generally orderly and peaceful; the town never had occasion to invoke any of its various ordinances prohibiting obstruction of the streets, loud and unnecessary noises, or disorderly conduct. Nonetheless, the picketing generated substantial controversy and numerous complaints.
The Town Board therefore resolved to enact an ordinance to restrict the picketing. On May 7, 1985, the town passed an ordinance that prohibited all picketing in residential neighborhoods except for labor picketing. But after reviewing this Court’s decision in Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S. 455 (1980), which invalidated a similar ordinance as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, the town attorney instructed the police not to enforce the new ordinance and advised the Town Board that the ordinance’s labor picketing exception likely rendered it unconstitutional. This ordinance was repealed on May 15, 1985, and replaced with the following flat ban on all residential picketing:
“It is unlawful for any person to engage in picketing before or about the residence or dwelling of any individual in the Town of Brookfield.” App. to Juris. Statement A-28.
The ordinance itself recites the primary purpose of this ban: “the protection and preservation of the home” through assurance “that members of the community enjoy in their homes and dwellings a feeling of well-being, tranquility, and privacy.” Id., at A-26. The Town Board believed that a ban was necessary because it determined that “the practice of picketing before or about residences and dwellings causes emotional disturbance and distress to the occupants . . . [and] has as its object the harassing of such occupants.” Id., at A-26 — A-27. The ordinance also evinces a concern for public safety, noting that picketing obstructs and interferes with “the free use of public sidewalks and public ways of travel.” Id., at A-27.
On May 18, 1985, appellees were informed by the town attorney that enforcement of the new, revised ordinance would begin on May 21, 1985. Faced with this threat of arrest and prosecution, appellees ceased picketing in Brookfield and filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. The complaint was brought under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 and sought declaratory as well as preliminary and permanent injunctive relief on the grounds that the ordinance violated the First Amendment. Ap-pellees named appellants — the three members of the Town Board, the Chief of Police, the town attorney, and the town itself — as defendants.
The District Court granted appellees’ motion for a preliminary injunction. The court concluded that the ordinance was not narrowly tailored enough to restrict protected speech in a public forum. 619 F. Supp. 792, 797 (1985). The District Court’s order specified that unless the appellants requested a trial on the merits within 60 days or appealed, the preliminary injunction would become permanent. Appellants requested a trial and also appealed the District Court’s entry of a preliminary injunction.
A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. 807 F. 2d 1339 (1986). The Court of Appeals subsequently vacated this decision, however, and ordered a rehearing en banc. 818 F. 2d 1284 (1987). After rehearing, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the District Court by an equally divided vote. 822 F. 2d 642 (1987). Contending that the Court of Appeals had rendered a final judgment holding the ordinance “to be invalid as repugnant to the Constitution,” 28 U. S. C. § 1254 (2), appellants attempted to invoke our mandatory appellate jurisdiction. App. to Juris. Statement A-25 (citing § 1254 (2)). We postponed further consideration of our appellate jurisdiction until the hearing on the merits. 484 U. S. 1003 (1988).
Appellees argue that there is no jurisdiction under § 1254 (2) due to the lack of finality. They point out that the District Court entered only a preliminary injunction and that appellants requested a trial on the merits, which has yet to be conducted. These considerations certainly suggest a lack of finality. Yet despite the formally tentative nature of its order, the District Court appeared ready to enter a final judgment since it indicated that unless a trial was requested a permanent injunction would issue. In addition, while appellants initially requested a trial, they no longer adhere to this position and now say that they would have no additional arguments to offer at such a trial. Tr. of Oral Arg. 7. In the context of this case, however, there is no need to decide whether jurisdiction is proper under § 1254(2). Because the question presented is of substantial importance, and because further proceedings below would not likely aid our consideration of it, we choose to avoid the finality issue simply by granting certiorari. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal and, treating the jurisdictional statement as a petition for certiorari, now grant the petition. See 28 U. S. C. § 2103. Cf. Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, ante, at 369, n. 10. For convenience, however, we shall continue to refer to the parties as appellants and appel-lees, as we have in previous cases. See ibid.; Peralta v. Heights Medical Center, Inc., 485 U. S. 80, 84, n. 4 (1988).
II
The antipicketing ordinance operates at the core of the First Amendment by prohibiting appellees from engaging in picketing on an issue of public concern. Because of the importance of “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open” debate on public issues, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 270 (1964), we have traditionally subjected restrictions on public issue picketing to careful scrutiny. See, e. g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U. S. 312, 318 (1988); United States v. Grace, 461 U. S. 171 (1983); Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S. 455 (1980). Of course, “[e]ven protected speech is not equally permissible in all places and at all times.” Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc., 473 U. S. 788, 799 (1985).
To ascertain what limits, if any, may be placed on protected speech, we have often focused on the “place” of that speech, considering the nature of the forum the speaker seeks to employ. Our cases have recognized that the standards by which limitations on speech must be evaluated “differ depending on the character of the property at issue.” Perry Education Assn. v. Perry Local Educators’ Assn., 460 U. S. 37, 44 (1983). Specifically, we have identified three types of fora: “the traditional public forum, the public forum created by government designation, and the nonpublic forum.” Cornelius, supra, at 802.
The relevant forum here may be easily identified: appellees wish to picket on the public streets of Brookfield. Ordinarily, a determination of the nature of the forum would follow automatically from this identification; we have repeatedly referred to public streets as the archetype of a traditional public forum. See, e. g., Boos v. Barry, supra, at 318; Cornelius, supra, at 802; Perry, 460 U. S., at 45. “[T]ime out of mind” public streets and sidewalks have been used for public assembly and debate, the hallmarks of a traditional public forum. See ibid.; Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S. 496, 515 (1939) (Roberts, J.). Appellants, however, urge us to disregard these “clichés.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 16. They argue that the streets of Brookfield should be considered a nonpublic forum. Pointing to the physical narrowness of Brookfield’s streets as well as to their residential character, appellants contend that such streets have not by tradition or designation been held open for public communication. See Brief for Appellants 23 (citing Perry, supra, at 46).
We reject this suggestion. Our prior holdings make clear that a public street does not lose its status as a traditional public forum simply because it runs through a residential neighborhood. In Carey v. Brown — which considered a statute similar to the one at issue here, ultimately striking it down as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause because it included an exception for labor picketing — we expressly recognized that “public streets and sidewalks in residential neighborhoods,” were “public for[a].” 447 U. S., at 460-461. This rather ready identification virtually forecloses appellants’ argument. See also Perry, supra, at 54-55 (noting that the “key” to Carey “was the presence of a public forum”).
In short, our decisions identifying public streets and sidewalks as traditional public fora are not accidental invocations of a “cliché,” but recognition that “[w]herever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public.” Hague v. CIO, supra, at 515 (Roberts, J.). No particularized inquiry into the precise nature of a specific street is necessary; all public streets are held in the public trust and are properly considered traditional public fora. Accordingly, the streets of Brookfield are traditional public fora. The residential character of those streets may well inform the application of the relevant test, but it does not lead to á different test; the anti-picketing ordinance must be judged against the stringent standards we have established for restrictions on speech in traditional public fora:
“In these quintessential public for[a], the government may not prohibit all communicative activity. For the State to enforce a content-based exclusion it must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end. . . . The State may also enforce regulations of the time, place, and manner of expression which are content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication.” Penny, supra, at 45 (citations omitted).
As Perry makes clear, the appropriate level of scrutiny is initially tied to whether the statute distinguishes between prohibited and permitted speech on the basis of content. Appellees argue that despite its facial content-neutrality, the Brookfield ordinance must be read as containing an implied exception for labor picketing. See Brief for Appellees 20-26. The basis for appellees’ argument is their belief that an express protection of peaceful labor picketing in state law, see Wis. Stat. §103.53(1) (1985-1986), must take precedence over Brookfield’s contrary efforts. The District Court, however, rejected this suggested interpretation of state law, 619 F. Supp., at 796, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, albeit ultimately by an equally divided court. 822 F. 2d 642 (1987). See also 807 F. 2d, at 1347 (original panel opinion declining to reconsider District Court’s construction of state law). Following our normal practice, “we defer to the construction of a state statute given it by the lower federal courts . . . to reflect our belief that district courts and courts of appeals are better schooled in and more able to interpret the laws of their respective States.” Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U. S. 491, 499-500 (1985). See Virginia v. American Booksellers Assn., 484 U. S. 383, 395 (1988) (“This Court rarely reviews a construction of state law agreed upon by the two lower federal courts”). Thus, we accept the lower courts’ conclusion that the Brookfield ordinance is content neutral. Accordingly, we turn to consider whether the ordinance is “narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest” and whether it “leave[s] open ample alternative channels of communication.” Perry, 460 U. S., at 45.
Because the last question is so easily answered, we address it first. Of course, before we are able to assess the available alternatives, we must consider more carefully the reach of the ordinance. The precise scope of the ban is not further described within the text of the ordinance, but in our view the ordinance is readily subject to a narrowing construction that avoids constitutional difficulties. Specifically, the use of the singular form of the words “residence!’, and “dwelling” suggests that the ordinance is intended to prohibit only picketing focused on, and taking place in front of, a particular residence. As Justice White’s concurrence recounts, the lower courts described the ordinance as banning “all picketing in residential areas.” Post, at 490. But these general descriptions do not address the exact scope of the ordinance and are in no way inconsistent with our reading of its text. “Picketing,” after all, is defined as posting at a particular place, see Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1710 (1981), a characterization in line with viewing the ordinance as limited to activity focused on a single residence. Moreover, while we ordinarily defer to lower court constructions of state statutes, see supra, at 482, we do not invariably do so, see Virginia v. American Booksellers Assn., supra, at 395. We are particularly reluctant to defer when the lower courts have fallen into plain error, see Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., supra, at 500, n. 9, which is precisely the situation presented here. To the extent they endorsed a broad reading of the ordinance, the lower courts ran afoul of the well-established principle that statutes will be interpreted to avoid constitutional difficulties. See, e. g., Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U. S. 205, 216 (1975); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S. 601, 613 (1973). Cf. Edward J. De-Bartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Construction Trades Council, 485 U. S. 568, 575 (1988). Thus, unlike the lower courts’ judgment that the ordinance does not contain an implied exception for labor picketing, we are unable to accept their potentially broader view of the ordinance’s scope. We instead construe the ordinance more narrowly. This narrow reading is supported by the representations of counsel for the town at oral argument, which indicate that the town takes, and will enforce, a limited view of the “picketing” proscribed by the ordinance. Thus, generally speaking, “picketing would be having the picket proceed on a definite course or route in front of a home.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 8. The picket need not be carrying a sign, id., at 14, but in order to fall within the scope of the ordinance the picketing must be directed at a single residence, id., at 9. General marching through residential neighborhoods, or even walking a route in front of an entire block of houses, is not prohibited by this ordinance. Id., at 15. Accordingly, we construe the ban to be a limited one; only focused picketing taking place solely in front of a particular residence is prohibited.
So narrowed, the ordinance permits the more general dissemination of a message. As appellants explain, the limited nature of the prohibition makes it virtually self-evident that ample alternatives remain:
“Protestors have not been barred from the residential neighborhoods; They may enter such neighborhoods, alone or in groups, even marching. . . . They may go door-to-door to proselytize their views. They may distribute literature in this manner ... or through the mails. They may contact residents by telephone, short of harassment.” Brief for Appellants 41-42 (citations omitted).
We readily agree that the ordinance preserves ample alternative channels of communication and thus move on to inquire whether the ordinance serves a significant government interest. We find that such an interest is identified within the text of the ordinance itself: the protection of residential privacy. See App. to Juris. Statement A-26.
“The State’s interest in protecting the well-being, tranquility, and privacy of the home is certainly of the highest order in a free and civilized society.” Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S., at 471. Our prior decisions have often remarked on the unique nature of the home, “the last citadel of the tired, the weary, and the sick,” Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U. S. 111, 125 (1969) (Black, J., concurring), and have recognized that “[preserving the sanctity of the home, the one retreat to which men and women can repair to escape from the tribulations of their daily pursuits, is surely an important value.” Carey, supra, at 471.
One important aspect of residential privacy is protection of the unwilling listener. Although in many locations, we expect individuals simply to avoid speech they do not want to hear, cf. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, supra, at 210-211; Cohen v. California, 403 U. S. 15, 21-22 (1971), the home is different. “That we are often ‘captives’ outside the sanctuary of the home and subject to objectionable speech ... does not mean we must be captives everywhere.” Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397 U. S. 728, 738 (1970). Instead, a special benefit of the privacy all citizens enjoy within their own walls, which the State may legislate to protect, is an ability to avoid intrusions. Thus, we have repeatedly held that individuals are not required to welcome unwanted speech into their own homes and that the government may protect this freedom. See, e. g., FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U. S. 726, 748-749 (1978) (offensive radio broadcasts); id., at 759-760 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (same); Rowan, supra (offensive mailings); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77, 86-87 (1949) (sound trucks).
This principle is reflected even in prior decisions in which we have invalidated complete bans on expressive activity, including bans operating in residential areas. See, e. g., Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147, 162-163 (1939) (hand-billing); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U. S. 141 (1943) (door-to-door solicitation). In all such cases, we have been careful to acknowledge that unwilling listeners may be protected when within their own homes. In Schneider, for example, in striking- down a complete ban on handbilling, we spoke of a right to distribute literature only “to one willing to receive it.” Similarly, when we invalidated a ban on door-to-door solicitation in Martin, we did so on the basis that the “home owner could protect himself from such intrusion by an appropriate sign ‘that he is unwilling to be disturbed.’” Kovacs, 336 U. S., at 86. We have “never intimated that the visitor could insert a foot in the door and insist on a hearing.” Ibid. There simply is no right to force speech into the home of an unwilling listener.
It remains to be considered, however, whether the Brook-field ordinance is narrowly tailored to protect only unwilling recipients of the communications. A statute is narrowly tailored if it targets and eliminates no more than the exact source of the “evil” it seeks to remedy. City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U. S. 789, 808-810 (1984). A complete ban can be narrowly tailored, but only if each activity within the proscription’s scope is an appropriately targeted evil. For example; in Taxpayers for Vincent we upheld an ordinance that banned all signs on public property because the interest supporting the regulation, an esthetic interest in avoiding visual clutter and blight, rendered each sign an evil. Complete prohibition was necessary because “the substantive evil — visual blight — [was] not merely a possible byproduct of the activity, but [was] created by the medium of expression itself.” Id., at 810.
The same is true here. The type of focused picketing prohibited by the Brookfield ordinance is fundamentally different from more generally directed means of communication that may not be completely banned in residential areas. See, e. g., Schneider, supra, at 162-163 (handbilling); Martin, supra (solicitation); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105 (1943) (solicitation). See also Gregory v. Chicago, supra (marching). Cf. Perry, 460 U. S., at 45 (in traditional public forum, “the government may not prohibit all communicative activity”). In such cases “the flow of information [is not] into . . . household[s], but to the public.” Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U. S. 415, 420 (1971). Here, in contrast, the picketing is narrowly directed at the household, not the public. The type of picketers banned by the Brookfield ordinance generally do not seek to disseminate a message to the general public, but to intrude upon the targeted resident, and to do so in an especially offensive way. Moreover, even if some such picketers have a broader communicative purpose, their activity nonetheless inherently and offensively intrudes on residential privacy. The devastating effect of targeted picketing on the quiet enjoyment of the home is beyond doubt:
“‘To those inside . . . the home becomes something less than a home when and while the picketing . . . continue^]. . . . [The] tensions and pressures may be psychological, not physical, but they are not, for that reason, less inimical to family privacy and truly domestic tranquility.’” Carey, supra, at 478 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Wauwatosa v. King, 49 Wis. 2d 398, 411-412, 182 N. W. 2d 530, 537 (1971)).
In this case, for example, appellees subjected the doctor and his family to the presence of a relatively large group of protesters on their doorstep in an attempt to force the doctor to cease performing abortions. But the actual size of the group is irrelevant; even a solitary picket can invade residential privacy. See Carey, 447 U. S., at 478-479 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“Whether. . . alone or accompanied by others . . . there are few of us that would feel comfortable knowing that a stranger lurks outside our home”). The offensive and disturbing nature of the form of the communication banned by the Brookfield ordinance thus can scarcely be questioned. Cf. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U. S. 60, 83-84 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) (as opposed to regulation of communications due to the ideas expressed, which “strikes at the core of First Amendment values,” “regulations of form and context may strike a constitutionally appropriate balance between the advocate’s right to convey a message and the recipient’s interest in the quality of his environment”).
The First Amendment permits the government to prohibit offensive speech as intrusive when the “captive” audience cannot avoid the objectionable speech. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm’n of New York, 447 U. S. 530, 542 (1980). Cf. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., supra, at 72. The target of the focused picketing banned by the Brookfield ordinance is just such a “captive.” The resident is figuratively, and perhaps literally, trapped within the home, and because of the unique and subtle impact of such picketing is left with no ready means of avoiding the unwanted speech. Cf. Cohen v. California, 403 U. S., at 21-22 (noting ease of avoiding unwanted speech in other circumstances). Thus, the “evil” of targeted residential picketing, “the very presence of an unwelcome visitor at the home,” Carey, supra, at 478 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), is “created by the medium of expression itself.” See Taxpayers for Vincent, supra, at 810. Accordingly, the Brookfield ordinance’s complete ban of that particular medium of expression is narrowly tailored.
Of course, this case presents only a facial challenge to the ordinance. Particular hypothetical applications of the ordinance — to, for example, a particular resident’s use of his or her home as a place of business or public meeting, or to picketers present at a particular home by invitation of the resident-may present somewhat different questions. Initially, the ordinance by its own terms may not apply in such circumstances, since the ordinance’s goal is the protection of residential privacy, App. to Juris. Statement A-26, and since it speaks only of a “residence or dwelling,” not a place of business, id., at A-28. Cf. Carey, supra, at 457 (quoting an antipicketing ordinance expressly rendered inapplicable by use of home as a place of business or to hold a public meeting). Moreover, since our First Amendment analysis is grounded in protection of the unwilling residential listener, the constitutionality of applying the ordinance to such hypothetical remains open to question. These are, however, questions we need not address today in order to dispose of appellees’ facial challenge.
Because the picketing prohibited by the Brookfield ordinance is speech directed primarily at those who are presumptively unwilling to receive it, the State has a substantial and justifiable interest in banning it. The nature and scope of this interest make the ban narrowly tailored. The ordinance also leaves open ample alternative channels of communication and is content neutral. Thus, largely because of its narrow scope, the facial challenge to the ordinance must fail. The contrary judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Reversed.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | C | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Chief Justice Rehnquist
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this case the California Court of Appeal held that a landowner who claims that his property has been “taken” by a land-use regulation may not recover damages for the time before it is finally determined that the regulation constitutes a “taking” of his property. We disagree, and conclude that in these circumstances the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution would require compensation for that period.
In 1957, appellant First English Evangelical Lutheran Church purchased a 21-acre parcel of land in a canyon along the banks of the Middle Fork of Mill Creek in the Angeles National Forest. The Middle Fork is the natural drainage channel for a watershed area owned by the National Forest Service. Twelve of the acres owned by the church are flat land, and contained a dining hall, two bunkhouses, a caretaker’s lodge, an outdoor chapel, and a footbridge across the creek. The church operated on the site a campground, known as “Lutherglen,” as a retreat center and a recreational area for handicapped children.
In July 1977, a forest fire denuded the hills upstream from Lutherglen, destroying approximately 3,860 acres of the watershed area and creating a serious flood hazard. Such flooding occurred on February 9 and 10, 1978, when a storm dropped 11 inches of rain in the watershed. The runoff from the storm overflowed the banks of the Mill Creek, flooding Lutherglen and destroying its buildings.
In response to the flooding of the canyon, appellee County of Los Angeles adopted Interim Ordinance No. 11,855 in January 1979. The ordinance provided that “[a] person shall not construct, reconstruct, place or enlarge any building or structure, any portion of which is, or will be, located within the outer boundary lines of the interim flood protection area located in Mill Creek Canyon '. . . .” App. to Juris. Statement A31. The ordinance was effective immediately because the county determined that it was “required for the immediate preservation of the public health and safety . . . .” Id., at A32. The interim flood protection area described by the ordinance included the flat areas on either side of Mill Creek on which Lutherglen had stood.
The church filed a complaint in the Superior Court of California a little more than a month after the ordinance was adopted. As subsequently amended, the complaint alleged two claims against the county and the Los Angeles County Flood Control District. The first alleged that the defendants were liable under Cal. Govt. Code Ann. § 835 (West 1980) for dangerous conditions on their upstream properties that contributed to the flooding of Lutherglen. As a part of this claim, appellant also alleged that “Ordinance No. 11,855 denies [appellant] all use of Lutherglen.” App. 12, 49. The second claim sought to recover from the Flood Control District in inverse condemnation and in tort for engaging in cloud seeding during the storm that flooded Lutherglen. Appellant sought damages under each count for loss of use of Lutherglen. The defendants moved to strike the portions of the complaint alleging that the county’s ordinance denied all use of Lutherglen, on the view that the California Supreme Court’s decision in Agins v. Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P. 2d 25 (1979), aff’d on other grounds, 447 U. S. 255 (1980), rendered the allegation “entirely immaterial and irrelevant^ with] no bearing upon any conceivable cause of action herein.” App. 22. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code Ann. § 436(a) (West Supp. 1987) (“The court may. . . [s]trike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading”).
In Agins v. Tiburon, supra, the California Supreme Court decided that a landowner may not maintain an inverse condemnation suit in the courts of that State based upon a “regulatory” taking. 24 Cal. 3d, at 275-277, 598 P. 2d, at 29-31. In the court’s view, maintenance of such a suit would allow a landowner to force the legislature to exercise its power of eminent domain. Under this decision, then, compensation is not required until the challenged regulation or ordinance has been held excessive in an action for declaratory relief or a writ of mandamus and the government has nevertheless decided to continue the regulation in effect. Based on this decision, the trial court in the present case granted the motion to strike the allegation that the church had been denied all use of Lutherglen. It explained that “a careful rereading of the Agins case persuades the Court that when an ordinance, even a non-zoning ordinance, deprives a person of the total use of his lands, his challenge to the ordinance is by way of declaratory relief or possibly mandamus.” App. 26. Because the appellant alleged a regulatory taking and sought only damages, the allegation that the ordinance denied all use of Lutherglen was deemed irrelevant.
On appeal, the California Court of Appeal read the complaint as one seeking “damages for the uncompensated taking of all use of Lutherglen by County Ordinance No. 11,855 . . . .” App. to Juris. Statement A13-A14. It too relied on the California Supreme Court’s decision in Agins in rejecting the cause of action, declining appellant’s invitation to reevaluate Agins in light of this Court’s opinions in San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. San Diego, 450 U. S. 621 (1981). The court found itself obligated to follow Agins “because the United States Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the question of whether a state may constitutionally limit the remedy for a taking to nonmonetary relief . . . .” App. to Juris. Statement A16. It accordingly affirmed the trial court’s decision to strike the allegations concerning appellee’s ordinance. The California Supreme Court denied review.
This appeal followed, and we noted probable jurisdiction. 478 U. S. 1003 (1986). Appellant asks us to hold that the California Supreme Court erred in Agins v. Tiburón in determining that the Fifth Amendment, as made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, does not require compensation as a remedy for “temporary” regulatory takings — those regulatory takings which are ultimately invalidated by the courts. Four times this decade, we have considered similar claims and have found ourselves for one reason or another unable to consider the merits of the Agins rule. See MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U. S. 340 (1986); Williamson County Regional Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U. S. 172 (1985); San Diego Gas & Electric Co., supra; Agins v. Tiburon, supra. For the reasons explained below, however, we find the constitutional claim properly presented in this case, and hold that on these facts the California courts have decided the compensation question inconsistently with the requirements of the Fifth Amendment.
I
Concerns with finality left us unable to reach the remedial question in the earlier cases where we have been asked to consider the rule of Agins. See MacDonald, Sommer & Frates, supra, at 351 (summarizing cases). In each of these cases, we concluded either that regulations considered to be in issue by the state court did not effect a taking, Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U. S., at 263, or that the factual disputes yet to be resolved by state authorities might still lead to the conclu-ion that no taking had occurred. MacDonald, Sommer & Frates, supra, at 351-353; Williamson County, supra, at 188-194; San Diego Gas & Electric Co., supra, at 631-632. Consideration of the remedial question in those circumstances, we concluded, would be premature.
The posture of the present case is quite different. Appellant’s complaint alleged that “Ordinance No. 11,855 denies [it] all use of Lutherglen,” and sought damages for this deprivation. App. 12, 49. In affirming the decision to strike this allegation, the Court of Appeal assumed that the complaint sought “damages for the uncompensated taking of all use of Lutherglen by County Ordinance No. 11,855.” App. to Juris. Statement A13-A14 (emphasis added). It relied on the California Supreme Court’s Agins decision for the conclusion that “the remedy for a taking [is limited] to nonmonetary relief . . . .” App. to Juris. Statement A16 (emphasis added). The disposition of the case on these grounds isolates the remedial question for our consideration. The rejection of appellant’s allegations did not rest on the view that they were false. Cf. MacDonald, Sommer & Frates, supra, at 352-353, n. 8 (California court rejected allegation in the complaint that appellant was deprived of all beneficial use of its property); Agins v. Tiburon, supra, at 259, n. 6 (same). Nor did the court rely on the theory that regulatory measures such as Ordinance No. 11,855 may never constitute a taking in the constitutional sense. Instead, the claims were deemed irrelevant solely because of the California Supreme Court’s decision in Agins that damages are unavailable to redress a “temporary” regulatory taking. The California Court of Appeal has thus held that, regardless of the correctness of appellant’s claim that the challenged ordinance denies it “all use of Lutherglen,” appellant may not recover damages until the ordinance is finally declared unconstitutional, and then only for any period after that declaration for which the county seeks to enforce it. The constitutional question pretermitted in our earlier cases is therefore squarely presented here.
We reject appellee’s suggestion that, regardless of the state court’s treatment of the question, we must independently evaluate the adequacy of the complaint and resolve the takings claim on the merits before we can reach the remedial question. However “cryptic” — to use appellee’s description — the allegations with respect to the taking were, the California courts deemed them sufficient to present the issue. We accordingly have no occasion to decide whether the ordinance at issue actually denied appellant all use of its property or whether the county might avoid the conclusion that a compensable taking had occurred by establishing that the denial of all use was insulated as a part of the State’s authority to enact safety regulations. See, e. g., Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U. S. 590 (1962); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U. S. 394 (1915); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623 (1887). These questions, of course, remain open for decision on the remand we direct today. We now turn to the question whether the Just Compensation Clause requires the government to pay for “temporary” regulatory takings.
I — I I — I
Consideration of the compensation question must begin with direct reference to the language of the Fifth Amendment, which provides in relevant part that “private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation.” As its language indicates, and as the Court has frequently noted, this provision does not prohibit the taking of private property, but instead places a condition on the exercise of that power. See Williamson County, 473 U. S., at 194; Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U. S. 264, 297, n. 40 (1981); Hurley v. Kincaid, 285 U. S. 95, 104 (1932); Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U. S. 312, 336 (1893); United States v. Jones, 109 U. S. 513, 518 (1883). This basic understanding of the Amendment makes clear that it is designed not to limit the governmental interference with property rights per se, but rather to secure compensation in the event of otherwise proper interference amounting to a taking. Thus, government action that works a taking of property rights necessarily implicates the “constitutional obligation to pay just compensation.” Armstrong v. United States, 364 U. S. 40, 49 (1960).
We have recognized that a landowner is entitled to bring an action in inverse condemnation as a result of ‘“the self-executing character of the constitutional provision with respect to compensation . . . United States v. Clarke, 445 U. S. 253, 257 (1980), quoting 6 P. Nichols, Eminent Domain §25.41 (3d rev. ed. 1972). As noted in Justice Brennan’s dissent in San Diego Gas & Electric Co., 450 U. S., at 654-655, it has been established at least since Jacobs v. United States, 290 U. S. 13 (1933), that claims for just compensation are grounded in the Constitution itself:
“The suits were based on the right to recover just compensation for property taken by the United States for public use in the exercise of its power of eminent domain. That right was guaranteed by the Constitution. The fact that condemnation proceedings were not instituted and that the right was asserted in suits by the owners did not change the essential nature of the claim. The form of the remedy did not qualify the right. It rested upon the Fifth Amendment. Statutory recognition was not necessary. A promise to pay was not necessary. Such a promise was implied because of the duty to pay imposed by the Amendment. The suits were thus founded upon the Constitution of the United States.” Id., at 16. (Emphasis added.)
Jacobs, moreover, does not stand alone, for the Court has frequently repeated the view that, in the event of a taking, the compensation remedy is required by the Constitution. See, e. g., Kirby Forest Industries, Inc. v. United States, 467 U. S. 1, 5 (1984); United States v. Causby, 328 U. S. 256, 267 (1946); Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. United States, 261 U. S. 299, 304-306 (1923); Monongahela Navigation, supra, at 327.
It has also been established doctrine at least since Justice Holmes’ opinion for the Court in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S. 393 (1922), that “[t]he general rule at least is, that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.” Id., at 415. While the typical taking occurs when the government acts to condemn property in the exercise of its power of eminent domain, the entire doctrine of inverse condemnation is predicated on the proposition that a taking may occur without such formal proceedings. In Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 13 Wall. 166, 177-178 (1872), construing a provision in the Wisconsin Constitution identical to the Just Compensation Clause, this Court said:
“It would be a very curious and unsatisfactory result, if ... it shall be held that if the government refrains from the absolute conversion of real property to the uses of the public it can destroy its value entirely, can inflict irreparable and permanent injury to any extent, can, in effect, subject it to total destruction without making any compensation, because, in the narrowest sense of that word, it is not taken for the public use.”
Later cases have unhesitatingly applied this principle. See, e. g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U. S. 164 (1979); United States v. Dickinson, 331 U. S. 745, 750 (1947); United States v. Causby, supra.
While the California Supreme Court may not have actually disavowed this general rule in Agins, we believe that it has truncated the rule by disallowing damages that occurred prior to the ultimate invalidation of the challenged regulation. The California Supreme Court justified its conclusion at length in the Agins opinion, concluding that:
“In combination, the need for preserving a degree of freedom in the land-use planning function, and the inhibiting financial force which inheres in the inverse condemnation remedy, persuade us that on balance mandamus or declaratory relief rather than inverse condemnation is the appropriate relief under the circumstances.” 24 Cal. 3d, at 276-277, 598 P. 2d, at 31.
We, of course, are not unmindful of these considerations, but they must be evaluated in the light of the command of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Court has recognized in more than one case that the government may elect to abandon its intrusion or discontinue regulations. See, e. g., Kirby Forest Industries, Inc. v. United States, supra; United States v. Dow, 357 U. S. 17, 26 (1958). Similarly, a governmental body may acquiesce in a judicial declaration that one of its ordinances has effected an unconstitutional taking of property; the landowner has no right under the Just Compensation Clause to insist that a “temporary” taking be deemed a permanent taking. But we have not resolved whether abandonment by the government requires payment of compensation for the period of time during which regulations deny a landowner all use of his land.
In considering this question, we find substantial guidance in cases where the government has only temporarily exercised its right to use private property. In United States v. Dow, supra, at 26, though rejecting a claim that the Government may not abandon condemnation proceedings, the Court observed that abandonment “results in an alteration in the property interest taken — from [one of] full ownership to one of temporary use and occupation. ... In such cases compensation would be measured by the principles normally governing the taking of a right to use property temporarily. See Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U. S. 1 [1949]; United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U. S. 372 [1946]; United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U. S. 373 [1945].” Each of the cases cited by the Dow Court involved appropriation of private property by the United States for use during World War II. Though the takings were in fact “temporary,” see United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U. S. 372, 375 (1946), there was no question that compensation would be required for the Government’s interference with the use of the property; the Court was concerned in each case with determining the proper measure of the monetary relief to which the property holders were entitled. See Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U. S. 1, 4-21 (1949); Petty Motor Co., supra, at 377-381; United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U. S. 373, 379-384 (1945).
These cases reflect the fact that “temporary” takings which, as here, deny a landowner all use of his property, are not different in kind from permanent takings, for which the Constitution clearly requires compensation. Cf. San Diego Gas & Electric Co., 450 U. S., at 657 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Nothing in the Just Compensation Clause suggests that ‘takings’ must be permanent and irrevocable”). It is axiomatic that the Fifth Amendment’s just compensation provision is “designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.” Armstrong v. United States, 364 U. S., at 49. See also Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U. S. 104, 123-125 (1978); Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U. S., at 325. In the present case the interim ordinance was adopted by the County of Los Angeles in January 1979, and became effective immediately. Appellant filed suit within a month after the effective date of the ordinance and yet when the California Supreme Court denied a hearing in the case on October 17, 1985, the merits of appellant’s claim had yet to be determined. The United States has been required to pay compensation for leasehold interests of shorter duration than this. The value of a leasehold interest in property for a period of years may be substantial, and the burden on the property owner in extinguishing such an interest for a period of years may be great indeed. See, e. g., United States v. General Motors, supra. Where this burden results from governmental action that amounted to a taking, the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires that the government pay the landowner for the value of the use of the land during this period. Cf. United States v. Causby, 328 U. S., at 261 (“It is the owner’s loss, not the taker’s gain, which is the measure of the value of the property taken”). Invalidation of the ordinance or its successor ordinance after this period of time, though converting the taking into a “temporary” one, is not a sufficient remedy to meet the demands of the Just Compensation Clause.
Appellee argues that requiring compensation for denial of all use of land prior to invalidation is inconsistent with this Court’s decisions in Danforth v. United States, 308 U. S. 271 (1939), and Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U. S. 255 (1980). In Danforth, the landowner contended that the “taking” of his property had occurred prior to the institution of condemnation proceedings, by reason of the enactment of the Flood Control Act itself. He claimed that the passage of that Act had diminished the value of his property because the plan embodied in the Act required condemnation of a flowage easement across his property. The Court held that in the context of condemnation proceedings a taking does not occur until compensation is determined and paid, and went on to say that “[a] reduction or increase in the value of property may occur by reason of legislation for or the beginning or completion of a project,” but “[s]uch changes in value are incidents of ownership. They cannot be considered as a ‘taking’ in the constitutional sense.” Danforth, supra, at 285. Agins likewise rejected a claim that the city’s preliminary activities constituted a taking, saying that “[m]ere fluctuations in value during the process of governmental decisionmaking, absent extraordinary delay, are ‘incidents of ownership.’” See 447 U. S., at 263, n. 9.
But these cases merely stand for the unexceptional proposition that the valuation of property which has been taken must be calculated as of the time of the taking, and that depreciation in value of the property by reason of preliminary activity is not chargeable to the government. Thus, in Agins, we concluded that the preliminary activity did not work a taking. It would require a considerable extension of these decisions to say that no compensable regulatory taking may occur until a challenged ordinance has ultimately been held invalid.
Nothing we say today is intended to abrogate the principle that the decision to exercise the power of eminent domain is a legislative function “‘for Congress and Congress alone to determine.’ ” Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U. S. 229, 240 (1984), quoting Berman v. Parker, 348 U. S. 26, 33 (1954). Once a court determines that a taking has occurred, the government retains the whole range of options already available — amendment of the regulation, withdrawal of the invalidated regulation, or exercise of eminent domain. Thus we do not, as the Solicitor General suggests, “permit a court, at the behest of a private person, to require the . . . Government to exercise the power of eminent domain . . . .” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 22. We merely hold that where the government’s activities have already worked a taking of all use of property, no subsequent action by the government can relieve it of the duty to provide compensation for the period during which the taking was effective.
We also point out that the allegation of the complaint which we treat as true for purposes of our decision was that the ordinance in question denied appellant all use of its property. We limit our holding to the facts presented, and of course do not deal with the quite different questions that would arise in the case of normal delays in obtaining building permits, changes in zoning ordinances, variances, and the like which are not before us. We realize that even our present holding will undoubtedly lessen to some extent the freedom and flexibility of land-use planners and governing bodies of municipal corporations when enacting land-use regulations. But such consequences necessarily flow from any decision upholding a claim of constitutional right; many of the provisions of the Constitution are designed to limit the flexibility and freedom of governmental authorities, and the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment is one of them. As Justice Holmes aptly noted more than 50 years ago, “a strong public desire to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change.” Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S., at 416.
Here we must assume that the Los Angeles County ordinance has denied appellant all use of its property for a considerable period of years, and we hold that invalidation of the ordinance without payment of fair value for the use of the property during this period of time would be a constitutionally insufficient remedy. The judgment of the California Court of Appeal is therefore reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Section 835 of the California Government Code establishes conditions under which a public entity may be liable “for injury caused by a dangerous condition of its property. ...”
The trial court also granted defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings on the second cause of action, based on cloud seeding. It limited trial on the first cause of action for damages under Cal. Govt. Code Ann. § 835 (West 1980), rejecting the inverse condemnation claim. At the close of plaintiff’s evidence, the trial court granted a nonsuit on behalf of defendants, dismissing the entire complaint.
The California Court of Appeal also affirmed the lower court’s orders limiting the issues for trial on the first cause of action, granting a nonsuit on the issues that proceeded to trial, and dismissing the second cause of action — based on cloud seeding — to the extent it was founded on a theory of strict liability in tort. The court reversed the trial court’s ruling that the second cause of action could not be maintained against the Flood Control District under the theory of inverse condemnation. The case was remanded for further proceedings on this claim.
These circumstances alone, apart from the more particular issues presented in takings cases and discussed in the text, require us to consider whether the pending resolution of further liability questions deprives us of jurisdiction because we are not presented with a “final judgmen[t] or de-crete]” within the meaning of 28 U. S. C. § 1257. We think that this case is fairly characterized as one “in which the federal issue, finally decided by the highest court in the State [in which a decision could be had], will survive and require decision regardless of the outcome of future state-court proceedings.” Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469, 480 (1975). As we explain infra, at 311-313, the California Court of Appeal rejected appellant’s federal claim that it was entitled to just compensation from the county for the taking of its property; this distinct issue of federal law will survive and require decision no matter how further proceedings resolve the issues concerning the liability of the Flood Control District for its cloud seeding operation.
The Fifth Amendment provides “nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation,” and applies to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226 (1897).
It has been urged that the California Supreme Court’s discussion of the compensation question in Agins v. Tiburon was dictum, because the court had already decided that the regulations could not work a taking. See Martino v. Santa Clara Valley Water District, 703 F. 2d 1141, 1147 (CA9 1983) (“extended dictum”). The Court of Appeal in this ease considered and rejected the possibility that the compensation discussion in Agins was dictum. See App. to Juris. Statement A14-A15, quoting Aptos Seascape Corp. v. County of Santa Cruz, 138 Cal. App. 3d 484, 493, 188 Cal. Rptr. 191, 195 (1982) (“[I]t is apparent that the Supreme Court itself did not intend its discussion [of inverse condemnation as a remedy for a taking] to be considered dictum . . . and it has not been treated as such in subsequent Court of Appeal cases”). Whether treating the claim as a takings claim is inconsistent with the first holding of Agins is not a matter for our concern. It is enough that the court did so for us to reach the remedial question.
Our eases have also required that one seeking compensation must “seek compensation through the procedures the State has provided for doing so” before the claim is ripe for review. Williamson County Regional Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U. S. 172, 194 (1985). It is clear that appellant met this requirement. Having assumed that a taking occurred, the California court’s dismissal of the action establishes that “the inverse condemnation procedure is unavailable . . . .” Id., at 197. The compensation claim is accordingly ripe for our consideration.
Because the issue was not raised in the complaint or considered relevant by the California courts in their assumption that a taking had occurred, we also do not consider the effect of the county’s permanent ordinance on the conclusions of the courts below. That ordinance, adopted in 1981 and reproduced at App. to Juris. Statement A32-A33, provides that “[a] person shall not use, erect, construct, move onto, or. . . alter, modify, enlarge or reconstruct any building or structure within the boundaries of a flood protection district except . . . [accessory buildings and structures that will not substantially impede the flow of water, including sewer, gas, electrical, and water 'systems, approved by the county engineer . . . ; [a]utomobile parking facilities incidental to a lawfully established use; [and] [f]lood-eontrol structures approved by the chief engineer of the Los Ange-les County Flood Control District.” County Code §22.44.220.
In addition to challenging the finality of the takings decision below, appellee raises two other challenges to our jurisdiction. First, going to both the appellate and certiorari jurisdiction of this Court under 28 U. S. C. § 1257, appellee alleges that appellant has failed to preserve for review any claim under federal law. Though the complaint in this case invoked only the California Constitution, appellant argued in the Court of Appeal that “recent Federal decisions . . . show the Federal Constitutional error in . . . Agins[ v. Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P. 2d 25 (1979)].” App. to Appellant’s Opposition to Appellee’s Second Motion to Dismiss A13. The Court of Appeal, by applying the state rule of Agins to dismiss appellant’s action, rejected on the merits the claim that the rule violated the United States Constitution. This disposition makes irrelevant for our purposes any deficiencies in the complaint as to federal issues. Where the state court has considered and decided the constitutional claim, we need not consider how or when the question was raised. Manhattan Life Ins. Co. v. Cohen, 234 U. S. 123, 134 (1914). Having succeeded in bringing the federal issue into the ease, appellant preserved this question on appeal to the California Supreme Court, see App. to Appellant’s Opposition to Ap-pellee’s Second Motion to Dismiss A14-A22, which declined to review its Agins decision. Accordingly, we find that the issue urged here was both raised and passed upon below.
Second, appellee challenges our appellate jurisdiction on the grounds that the ease below did not draw “in question the validity of a statute of any state ....’’ 28 U. S. C. § 1257(2). There is, of course, no doubt that the ordinance at issue in this case is “a statute of [a] state” for purposes of § 1257. See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U. S. 205, 207, n. 3 (1975). As construed by the state courts, the complaint in this case alleged that the ordinance, by denying all use of the property, worked a taking without providing for just compensation. We have frequently treated such challenges to zoning ordinances as challenges to their validity under the Federal Constitution, and see no reason to revise that approach here. See, e. g., MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U. S. 340 (1986); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U. S. 419 (1982); Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U. S. 255 (1980); Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U. S. 104 (1978). By holding that the failure to provide compensation was not unconstitutional, moreover, the California courts upheld the validity of the ordinance against the particular federal constitutional question at issue here — just compensation — and the case is therefore within the terms of § 1257(2).
The Solicitor General urges that the prohibitory nature of the Fifth Amendment, see supra, at 314, combined with principles of sovereign immunity, establishes that the Amendment itself is only a limitation on the power of the Government to act, not a remedial provision. The eases cited in the text, we think, refute the argument of the United States that “the Constitution does not, of its own force, furnish a basis for a court to award money damages against the government.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 14. Though arising in various factual and jurisdictional settings, these cases make clear that it is the Constitution that dictates the remedy for interference with property rights amounting to a taking. See San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. San Diego, 450 U. S. 621, 655, n. 21 (1981) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting), quoting United States v. Dickinson, 331 U. S. 745, 748 (1947).
Williamson County Regional Planning Comm’n, is not to the contrary. There, we noted that “no constitutional violation occurs until just compensation has been denied.” 473 U. S., at 194, n. 13. This statement, however, was addressed to the issue whether the constitutional claim was ripe for review and did not establish that compensation is unavailable for government activity occurring before compensation is actually denied. Though, as a matter of law, an illegitimate taking might not occur until the government refuses to pay, the interference that effects a taking might begin much earlier, and compensation is measured from that time. See Kirby Forest Industries, Inc. v. United States, 467 U. S. 1, 5 (1984) (Where Government physically occupies land without condemnation proceedings, “the owner has a right to bring an ‘inverse condemnation’ suit to recover the value of the land on the date of the intrusion by the Government”). (Emphasis added.)
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | D | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice White
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The petition for certiorari, which we granted, 396 U. S. 813 (1969), seeks reversal of three separate judgments of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ordering hearings on petitions for habeas corpus filed by the respondents in this case. The principal issue before us is whether and to what extent an otherwise valid guilty plea may be impeached in collateral proceedings by assertions or proof that the plea was motivated by a prior coerced confession. We find ourselves in substantial disagreement with the Court of Appeals.
I
The three respondents now before us are Dash, Richardson, and Williams. We first state the essential facts involved as to each.
Dash: In February 1959, respondent Dash was charged with first-degree robbery which, because Dash had previously been convicted of a felony, was punishable by up to 60 years’ imprisonment. After pleading guilty to robbery in the second degree in April, he was sentenced to a term of eight to 12 years as a second-felony offender. His petition for collateral relief in the state courts in 1963 was denied without a hearing. Relief was then sought in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York where his petition for habeas corpus alleged that his guilty plea was the illegal product of a coerced confession and of the trial judge’s threat to impose a 60-year sentence if he was convicted after a plea of not guilty. His petition asserted that he had been beaten, refused counsel, and threatened with false charges prior to his confession and that the trial judge’s threat was made during an off-the-record colloquy in one of Dash’s appearances in court prior to the date of his plea of guilty. Dash also asserted that his court-appointed attorney had advised pleading guilty since Dash did not “stand a chance due to the alleged confession signed” by him. The District Court denied the petition without a hearing because “a voluntary plea of guilty entered on advice of counsel constitutes a waiver of all nonjurisdictional defects in any prior stage of the proceedings against the defendant,” citing United States ex rel. Glenn v. McMann, 349 F. 2d 1018 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U. S. 915 (1966), and other cases. The allegation of coercion by the trial judge did not call for a hearing since the prosecutor had filed an affidavit in the state court categorically denying that the trial judge ever threatened the defendant. Dash then appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
Richardson: Respondent Richardson was indicted in April 1963 for murder in the first degree. Two attorneys were assigned to represent Richardson. He initially pleaded not guilty but in July withdrew his plea and pleaded guilty to murder in the second degree, specifically admitting at the time that he struck the victim with a knife. He was convicted and sentenced to a term of 30 years to life. Following the denial without a hearing of his application for collateral relief in the state courts, Richardson filed his petition for habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York, alleging in conclusory fashion that his plea of guilty was induced by a coerced confession and by ineffective court-appointed counsel. His petition was denied without a hearing, and he appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, including with his appellate brief a supplemental affidavit in which he alleged that he was beaten into confessing the crime, that his assigned attorney conferred with him only 10 minutes prior to the day the plea of guilty was taken, that he advised his attorney that he did not want to plead guilty to something he did not do, and that his attorney advised him to plead guilty to avoid the electric chair, saying that “this was not the proper time to bring up the confession” and that Richardson “could later explain by a writ of habeas corpus how my confession had been beaten out of me.”
Williams: In February 1956, respondent Williams was indicted for five felonies, including rape and robbery. He pleaded guilty to robbery in the second degree in March and was sentenced in April to a term of 7y2 to 15 years. After unsuccessful applications for collateral relief in the state courts, he petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, asserting that his plea was the consequence of a coerced confession and was made without an understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea. In his petition and in documents supporting it, allegations were made that he had been handcuffed to a desk while being interrogated, that he was threatened with a pistol and physically abused, and that his attorney, in advising him to plead guilty, ignored his alibi defense and represented that his plea would be to a misdemeanor charge rather than to a felony charge. The petition was denied without a hearing and Williams appealed.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed in each case, sitting en banc and dividing six to three in Dash's case and disposing of Richardson's and Williams' cases in decisions by three-judge panels. In each case it was directed that a hearing be held on the petition for habeas corpus. It was the Court of Appeals’ view that a plea of guilty is an effective waiver of pretrial irregularities only if the plea is voluntary and that a plea is not voluntary if it is the consequence of an involuntary confession. That the petitioner was represented by counsel and denied the existence of coercion or promises when tendering his plea does not foreclose a hearing on his petition for habeas corpus alleging matters outside the state court record. Although conclusory allegations would in no case suffice, the allegations in each of these cases concerning the manner in which the confession was coerced and the connection between the confession and the plea were deemed sufficient to require a hearing. The law required this much, the Court of Appeals thought, at least in New York, where prior to Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368 (1964), constitutionally acceptable procedures were unavailable to a defendant to test the voluntariness of his confession. The Court of Appeals also ordered a hearing in each case for reasons other than that the plea was claimed to rest on a coerced confession which the defendant had no adequate opportunity to test in the state courts. In the Dash case, the additional issue to be considered was whether the trial judge coerced the guilty plea by threats as to the probable sentence after trial and conviction on a plea of not guilty; in Richardson, the additional issue was the inadequacy of counsel allegedly arising from the short period of consultation and counsel’s advice to the effect that the confession issue could be raised after a plea of guilty; and in Williams, the additional question was the alleged failure of counsel to consider Williams’ alibi defense and to make it clear that he was pleading to a felony rather than to a misdemeanor.
II
The core of the Court of Appeals’ holding is the proposition that if in a collateral proceeding a guilty plea is shown to have been triggered by a coerced confession— if there would have been no plea had there been no confession — the plea is vulnerable at least in cases coming from New York where the guilty plea was taken prior to Jackson v. Denno, supra. We are unable to agree with the Court of Appeals on this proposition.
A conviction after a plea of guilty normally rests on the defendant’s own admission in open court that he committed the acts with which he is charged. Brady v. United States, ante, at 748; McCarthy v. United States, 394 U. S. 459, 466 (1969). That admission may not be compelled, and since the plea is also a waiver of trial— and unless the applicable law otherwise provides, a waiver of the right to contest the admissibility of any evidence the State might have offered against the defendant- — it must be an intelligent act “done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” Brady v. United States, ante, at 748.
For present purposes, we put aside those cases where the defendant has his own reasons for pleading guilty wholly aside from the strength of the case against him as well as those cases where the defendant, although he would have gone to trial had he thought the State could not prove its case, is motivated by evidence against him independent of the confession. In these cases, as the Court of Appeals recognized, the confession, even if coerced, is not a sufficient factor in the plea to justify relief. Neither do we have before us the uncounseled defendant, see Pennsylvania ex rel. Herman v. Claudy, 350 U. S. 116 (1956), nor the situation where the circumstances that coerced the confession have abiding impact and also taint the plea. Cf. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U. S. 227 (1940). It is not disputed that in such cases a guilty plea is properly open to challenge.
The issue on which we differ with the Court of Appeals arises in those situations involving the counseled defendant who allegedly would put the State to its proof if there was a substantial enough chance of acquittal, who would do so except for a prior confession that might be offered against him, and who because of the confession decides to plead guilty to save himself the expense and agony of a trial and perhaps also to minimize the penalty that might be imposed. After conviction on such a plea, is a defendant entitled to a hearing, and to relief if his factual claims are accepted, when his petition for habeas corpus alleges that his confession was in fact coerced and that it motivated his plea? We think not if he alleges and proves no more than this.
Ill
Since we are dealing with a defendant who deems his confession crucial to the State’s case against him and who would go to trial if he thought his chances of acquittal were good, his decision to plead guilty or not turns on whether he thinks the law will allow his confession to be used against him. For the defendant who considers his confession involuntary and hence unusable against him at a trial, tendering a plea of guilty would seem a most improbable alternative. The sensible course would be to contest his guilt, prevail on his confession claim at trial, on appeal, or, if necessary, in a collateral proceeding, and win acquittal, however guilty he might be. The books are full of cases in New York and elsewhere, where the defendant has made this choice and has prevailed. If he nevertheless pleads guilty the plea can hardly be blamed on the confession which in his view was inadmissible evidence and no proper part of the State’s case. Since by hypothesis the evidence aside from the confession is weak and the defendant has no reasons of his own to plead, a guilty plea in such circumstances is nothing less than a refusal to present his federal claims to the state court in the first instance— a choice by the defendant to take the benefits, if any, of a plea of guilty and then to pursue his coerced-confession claim in collateral proceedings. Surely later allegations that the confession rendered his plea involuntary would appear incredible, and whether his plain bypass of state remedies was an intelligent act depends on whether he was so incompetently advised by counsel concerning the forum in which he should first present his federal claim that the Constitution will afford him another chance to plead.
A more credible explanation for a plea of guilty by a defendant who would go to trial except for his prior confession is his prediction that the law will permit his admissions to be used against him by the trier of fact. At least the probability of the State’s being permitted to use the confession as evidence is sufficient to convince him that the State’s case is too strong to contest and that a plea of guilty is the most advantageous course. Nothing in this train of events suggests that the defendant’s plea, as distinguished from his confession, is an involuntary act. His later petition for collateral relief asserting that a coerced confession induced his plea is at most a claim that the admissibility of his confession was mistakenly assessed and that since he was erroneously advised, either under the then applicable law or under the law later announced, his plea was an unintelligent and voidable act. The Constitution, however, does not render pleas of guilty so vulnerable.
As we said in Brady v. United States, ante, at 766-757, the decision to plead guilty before the evidence is in frequently involves the making of difficult judgments. All the pertinent facts normally cannot be known unless witnesses are examined and cross-examined in court. Even then the truth will often be in dispute. In the face of unavoidable uncertainty, the defendant and his counsel must make their best judgment as to the weight of the State’s case. Counsel must predict how the facts, as he understands them, would be viewed by a court. If proved, would those facts convince a judge or jury of the defendant’s guilt? On those facts would evidence seized without a warrant be admissible? Would the trier of fact on those facts find a confession voluntary and admissible? Questions like these cannot be answered with certitude; yet a decision to plead guilty must necessarily rest upon counsel’s answers, uncertain as they may be. Waiving trial entails the inherent risk that the good-faith evaluations of a reasonably competent attorney will turn out to be mistaken either as to the facts or as to what a court’s judgment might be on given facts.
That a guilty plea must be intelligently made is not a requirement that all advice offered by the defendant’s lawyer withstand retrospective examination in a post-conviction hearing. Courts continue to have serious differences among themselves on the admissibility of evidence, both with respect to the proper standard by which the facts are to be judged and with respect to the application of that standard to particular facts. That this Court might hold a defendant’s confession inadmissible in evidence, possibly by a divided vote, hardly justifies a conclusion that the defendant’s attorney was incompetent or ineffective when he thought the admissibility of the confession sufficiently probable to advise a plea of guilty.
In our view a defendant’s plea of guilty based on reasonably competent advice is an intelligent plea not open to attack on the ground that counsel may have misjudged the admissibility of the defendant’s confession. Whether a plea of guilty is unintelligent and therefore vulnerable when motivated by a confession erroneously thought admissible in evidence depends as an initial matter, not on whether a court would retrospectively consider counsel’s advice to be right or wrong, but on whether that advice was ¿within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal casesTJ On the one hand, uncertainty is inherent in predicting court decisions; but on the other hand defendants facing felony charges are entitled to the effective assistance of competent counsel. Beyond this we think the matter, for the most part, should be left to the good sense and discretion of the trial courts with the admonition that if the right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution is to serve its purpose, defendants cannot be left to the mercies of incompetent counsel, and that judges should strive to maintain proper standards of performance by attorneys who are representing defendants in criminal cases in their courts.
IY
We hold, therefore, that a defendant who alleges that he pleaded guilty because of a prior coerced confession is not, without more, entitled to a hearing on his petition for habeas corpus. Nor do we deem the situation substantially different where the defendant’s plea was entered prior to Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368 (1964). At issue in that case was the constitutionality of the New York procedure for determining the voluntariness of a confession offered in evidence at a jury trial. This procedure, which would have been applicable to the respondents if they had gone to trial, required the trial judge, when the confession was offered and a prima facie case of voluntariness established, to submit the issue to the jury without himself finally resolving disputed issues of fact and determining whether or not the confession was voluntary. The Court held this procedure unconstitutional because it did not “afford a reliable determination of the voluntariness of the confession offered in evidence at the trial, did not adequately protect Jackson’s right to be free of a conviction based upon a coerced confession and therefore cannot withstand constitutional attack under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” 378 U. S., at 377. In reaching that conclusion, the Court overruled Stein v. New York, 346 U. S. 156 (1953), which had approved the New York practice.
Whether- a guilty plea was entered before or after Jackson v. Denno, the question of the validity of the plea remains the same: was the plea a voluntary and intelligent act of the defendant? As we have previously set out, a plea of guilty in a state court is not subject to collateral attack in a federal court on the ground that it was motivated by a coerced confession unless the defendant was incompetently advised by his attorney. For the respondents successfully to claim relief based on Jackson v. Denno, each must demonstrate gross error on the part of counsel when he recommended that the defendant plead guilty instead of going to trial and challenging the New York procedures for determining the admissibility of confessions. Such showing cannot be made, for precisely this challenge was presented to the New York courts and to this Court in Stein v. New York, supra, and in 1953 this Court found no constitutional infirmity in the New York procedures for dealing with coerced-confession claims. Counsel for these respondents cannot be faulted for not anticipating Jackson v. Denno or for considering the New York procedures to be as valid as the four dissenters in that case thought them to be.
We are unimpressed with the argument that because the decision in Jackson has been applied retroactively to defendants who had previously gone to trial, the defendant whose confession allegedly caused him to plead guilty prior to Jackson is also entitled to a hearing on the voluntariness of his confession and to a trial if his admissions are held to have been coerced. A conviction after trial in which a coerced confession is introduced rests in part on the coerced confession, a constitutionally unacceptable basis for conviction. It is that conviction and the confession on which it rests that the defendant later attacks in collateral proceedings. The defendant who pleads guilty is in a different posture. He is convicted on his counseled admission in open court that he committed the crime charged against him. The prior confession is not the basis for the judgment, has never been offered in evidence at a trial, and may never be offered in evidence. Whether or not the advice the defendant received in the pre-Jackson era would have been different had Jackson then been the law has no bearing on the accuracy of the defendant’s admission that he committed the crime.
What is at stake in this phase of the case is not the integrity of the state convictions obtained on guilty pleas, but whether, years later, defendants must be permitted to withdraw their pléas, which were perfectly valid when made, and be given another choice between admitting their guilt and putting the State to its proof. It might be suggested that if Jackson had been the law when the pleas in the cases below were made — if the judge had been required to rule on the voluntariness of challenged confessions at a trial — there would have been a better chance of keeping the confessions from the jury and there would have been no guilty pleas. But because of inherent uncertainty in guilty-plea advice, this is a highly speculative matter in any particular case and not an issue promising a meaningful and productive evi-dentiary hearing long after entry of the guilty plea. The alternative would be a per se constitutional rule invalidating all New York guilty pleas that were motivated by confessions and that were entered prior to Jackson. This would be an improvident invasion of the State’s interests in maintaining the finality of guilty-plea convictions that were valid under constitutional standards applicable at the time. It is no denigration of the right to trial to hold that when the defendant waives his state court remedies and admits his guilt, he does so under the law then existing; further, he assumes the risk of ordinary error in either his or his attorney’s assessment of the law and facts. Although he might have pleaded differently had later decided cases then been the law, he is bound by his plea and his conviction unless he can allege and prove serious derelictions on the part of counsel sufficient to show that his plea was not, after all, a knowing and intelligent act.
Y
As we have previously indicated, in each case below the Court of Appeals ruled that a hearing was required to consider claims other than the claim that the plea of guilty rested on a coerced confession and was entered prior to Jackson v. Denno, supra. With respect to these other claims, we now express no disagreement with the judgments of the Court of Appeals; but since our holding will require reassessment of the petitions for habeas corpus in the light of the standards expressed herein, the judgments of the Court of Appeals are vacated and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Mb. Justice Black, while still adhering to his separate opinion in Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368, 401-423, concurs in the Court’s opinion and judgment in this case.
Our grant of certiorari also included a fourth respondent, another petitioner for habeas corpus, Wilbert Ross. See n. 7, infra. However, upon consideration of a subsequent suggestion of mootness by reason of Ross’ death, we vacated the Court of Appeals’ judgment and remanded to the District Court for the Eastern District of New York with directions to dismiss the petition for habeas corpus as moot. 396 U. S. 118 (1969).
N. Y. Penal Law § 2125, then in effect, provided that first-degree robbery was punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term the minimum of which was to be not less than 10 years and the maximum of which was to be not more than 30 years. Under N. Y. Penal Law § 1941, subd. 1, then in effect, conviction for a second felony was punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term with the minimum one-half the maximum set for a first conviction and the maximum twice the maximum set for a first conviction.
In addition to the first-degree robbery charge, Dash was also charged with grand larceny and assault.
Waterman and Devine, two men accused of taking part in the robbery along with Dash, did not plead guilty; after a jury trial they were convicted of first-degree robbery, second-degree grand larceny, and second-degree assault and were sentenced to 15 to 20 years’ imprisonment. On appeal these convictions were reversed because of the State’s use of post-indictment confessions given by one of the defendants in the absence of counsel. People v. Waterman, 12 App. Div. 2d 84, 208 N. Y. S. 2d 596 (1960), aff’d, 9 N. Y. 2d 561, 175 N. E. 2d 445 (1961). Waterman and Devine then pleaded guilty to assault in the second degree and were sentenced to imprisonment for 2% to 3 years.
The denial of relief was affirmed h}*- the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court, People v. Dash, 21 App. Div. 2d 978, 252 N. Y. S. 2d 1016 (1964), aff’d mem., 16 N. Y. 2d 493, 208 N.E. 2d 171 (1965).
The denial of relief was affirmed without opinion, by the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court, People v. Richardson, 23 App. Div. 2d 969, 260 N. Y. S. 2d 586 (1965).
The denial of relief on the claims later presented in the Federal District Court was affirmed without opinion by the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court, People v. Williams, 25 App. Div. 2d 620, 268 N. Y. S. 2d 958 (1966).
United States ex rel. Ross v. McMann, 409 F. 2d 1016 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1969). The Court of Appeals’ opinion dealt also with the appeal of Wilbert Ross from a denial of habeas corpus without a hearing by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. Ross in his habeas petition alleged that his 1955 plea of guilty to second-degree murder was induced by the State’s possession of an unconstitutionally obtained confession. The Court of Appeals held that, like Dash, Ross was entitled to a hearing on his claims. Along with the three respondents dealt with in this opinion, we granted certiorari as to Ross but the matter was subsequently remanded for dismissal as moot after the death of Ross. See n. 1, supra.
United States ex rel. Richardson v. McMann, 408 F. 2d 48 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1969); United States ex rel. Williams v. Follette, 408 F. 2d 658 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1969).
The same day that the Court of Appeals ordered hearings in the Dash and Richardson cases, the court, en banc and without dissent, held that a hearing was not required in the case of a petitioner for habeas corpus who had pleaded guilty after a trial judge ruled that his confession was admissible in evidence — the Court of Appeals found that the petition for habeas corpus did not allege with sufficient specificity that the plea of guilty was infected by the allegedly coerced confession. United States ex rel. Rosen v. Follette, 409 F. 2d 1042 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1969).
The majority and concurring opinions in the Dash case relied on decisions in several other circuits: United States ex rel. Collins v. Maroney, 382 F. 2d 547 (C. A. 3d Cir. 1967); Jones v. Cunningham, 297 F. 2d 851 (C. A. 4th Cir. 1962); Smith v. Wainwright, 373 F. 2d 506 (C. A. 5th Cir. 1967); Carpenter v. Wainwright, 372 F. 2d 940 (C. A. 5th Cir. 1967); Bell v. Alabama, 367 F. 2d 243 (C. A. 5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U. S. 916 (1967); Reed v. Henderson, 385 F. 2d 995 (C. A. 6th Cir. 1967); Smiley v. Wilson, 378 F. 2d 144 (C. A. 9th Cir. 1967); Doran v. Wilson, 369 F. 2d 505 (C. A. 9th Cir. 1966).
New York law now permits a defendant to. challenge the admissibility of a confession in a pretrial hearing and to appeal from an adverse ruling on the admissibility of the confession even if the conviction is based on a plea, of guilty. N. Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 813-g (Supp. 1969) (effective July 16, 1965). A similar provision permits a defendant to appeal an adverse ruling on a Fourth Amendment claim after a plea of guilty. N. Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 813-c (Supp. 1969) (effective April 29, 1962).
Pennsylvania ex rel. Herman v. Claudy, 350 U. S. 116 (1956), involved a plea of guilty made by a defendant without assistance of counsel. Herman did not hold that a plea of guilty, offered by a defendant assisted by competent counsel, is invalid whenever induced by the prosecution’s possession of a coerced confession. Likewise, Chambers v. Florida, 309 U. S. 227 (1940), does not support the position taken by the Court of Appeals in these cases. In Chambers the voluntariness of the confessions was properly considered by this Court both because the alleged coercion producing the confessions appeared to carry over to taint the guilty pleas and because the convictions were based on the confessions as well as the guilty pleas. See Chambers v. State, 136 Fla. 568, 187 So. 156 (1939), rev’d, 309 U. S. 227 (1940).
We do not here consider whether a conviction, based on a plea of guilty entered in a State permitting the defendant pleading guilty to challenge on appeal the admissibility of his confession (as in New York after July 16, 1965, see n. 11, supra), would be open to attack in federal habeas corpus proceedings on the grounds that the confession was coerced. Cf. United States ex rel. Rogers v. Warden, 381 F. 2d 209 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1967).
Since Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963), it has been clear that a defendant pleading guilty to a felony charge has a federal right to the assistance of counsel. See White v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 59 (1963); Arsenault v. Massachusetts, 393 U. S. 5 (1968). It has long been recognized that the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel. See Reece v. Georgia, 350 U. S. 85, 90 (1955); Glasser v. United States, 315 U. S. 60, 69-70 (1942); Avery v. Alabama, 308 U. S. 444, 446 (1940); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, 57 (1932).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | A | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
These cases require us to decide whether 28 U. S. C. §2342(4) and 42 U. S. C. §2239 grant the federal courts of appeals exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction initially to review decisions of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to deny citizen petitions requesting that the Commission “institute a proceeding ... to modify, suspend or revoke a license_” 10 CFR § 2.206(a) (1984).
Respondent Joette Lorion, on behalf of the Center for Nuclear Responsibility, wrote the Nuclear Regulatory Commission on September 11, 1981, to express fears about potential safety threats at petitioner Florida Power and Light Company’s Turkey Point nuclear reactor near her home outside Miami, Florida. Her detailed letter urged the Commission to suspend Turkey Point’s operating license and specified several reasons for such action. The Commission treated Lorion’s letter as a citizen petition for enforcement action pursuant to the authority of § 2.206 of the Commission’s rules of practice. This rule provides:
“Any person may file a request for the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation ... to institute a proceeding pursuant to [10 CFR] §2.202 to modify, suspend or revoke a license, or for such other action as may be proper. . . . The requests shall specify the action requested and set forth the facts that constitute the basis for the request.” 10 CFR § 2.206(a) (1984).
This rule also requires the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, within a reasonable time after receiving such a request, either to institute the requested proceeding, or to provide a written explanation of the decision to deny the request. § 2.206(b). The Commission interprets §2.206 as requiring issuance of an order to show cause when a citizen petition raises “substantial health or safety issues.” Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, 2 N. R. C. 173, 174 (1975).
In these cases, the Director decided not to take the action Lorion had requested. His written explanation — based on a 547-page record compiled primarily from existing Commission materials — responded to each of Lorion’s points. See In re Florida Power & Light Co. (Turkey Point Plant, Unit 4), 14 N. R. C. 1078 (1981). Lorion unsuccessfully sought review by the Commission of the Director’s denial of the §2.206 request and then petitioned the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for review. Before that court, Lorion argued that the Director’s denial of the §2.206 request was arbitrary and capricious pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U. S. C. §706(2)(A). Lorion also claimed that the Commission improperly denied her the statutory right to a full public hearing on the § 2.206 request. The Commission defended the substantive integrity of its decision and argued that Lorion had no right to a hearing.
Declining to reach the merits of this dispute, the Court of Appeals decided sua sponte that it lacked initial subject-matter jurisdiction over Lorion’s challenge to the denial of the §2.206 petition. This result was based on the court’s reading of the three statutory provisions that define the initial jurisdiction of the federal courts of appeals over Commission decisions. Under 28 U. S. C. §2342(4), a provision of the Administrative Orders Review Act (commonly known and referred to herein as the Hobbs Act) the courts of appeals have exclusive jurisdiction over petitions seeking review of “all final orders of the Atomic Energy Commission [now the Nuclear Regulatory Commission] made reviewable by section 2239 of title 42.” Title 42 U. S. C. § 2239(b) provides that the Hobbs Act governs review of “[a]ny final order entered in any proceeding of the kind specified in subsection (a) [of section 2239].” Subsection (a) proceedings are those “for the granting, suspending, revoking, or amending of any license.” 42 U. S. C. §2239(a)(1). The Court of Appeals concluded that the Commission’s denial of Lorion’s §2.206 petition was not an order entered in a “proceeding for the granting, suspending, revoking, or amending of any license” within the meaning of 42 U. S. C. § 2239(a) and therefore dismissed Lorion’s petition for review for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. 229 U. S. App. D. C. 440, 712 F. 2d 1472 (1983).
The court’s decision turned on its interpretation of the interrelation between the review and hearing provisions of § 2239. Section 2239(a)(1) provides that “[i]n any proceeding under this chapter, for the granting, suspending, revoking, or amending of any license . . . the Commission shall grant a hearing upon the request of any person whose interest may be affected by the proceeding.” On the basis of this statu-
tory hearing requirement, the court reasoned that Commission action was a § 2239(a)(1) “proceeding” only if an interested person could obtain a hearing. Because the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit had earlier held that a § 2.206 petitioner had no right to a hearing, see Porter County Chapter of the Izaak Walton League of America, Inc. v. NRC, 196 U. S. App. D. C. 456, 462, and n. 16, 606 F. 2d 1363, 1369, and n. 16 (1979), and because the Commission urged in its brief that “ ‘[u]nless and until granted [Lorion’s §2.206 request] is not a “proceeding” where the requester has any right to present evidence,’” 229 U. S. App. D. C., at 446, 712 F. 2d, at 1478 (citation omitted), the Court of Appeals held that the denial of Lorion’s § 2.206 request was not an order entered in a “proceeding” within the meaning of § 2239(a). Section 2239(b) was therefore found not to authorize initial court of appeals review of the order, and the court declined to hear the case. This holding arguably departed from precedent within the Circuit, and in any event created a direct conflict with the holdings of two other Circuits. We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict. 466 U. S. 903 (1984). We reverse.
II
The issue before us is whether the Commission’s denial of a §2.206 request should be considered a final order initially reviewable exclusively in the court of appeals pursuant to 42 U. S. C. § 2239(b) and 28 U. S. C. §2342(4). This issue requires us to decide whether such an order is issued in a “proceeding ... for the granting, suspending, revoking, or amending of any license.” 42 U. S. C. § 2239(a)(1). Enacting § 2239 in 1954, Congress did not focus specifically on this question; the Commission did not establish the §2.206 citizen petition procedure until 20 years later. See 39 Fed. Reg. 12353 (1974). Our task therefore is to decide whether Commission denials of §2.206 petitions are final orders of the kind Congress intended to be reviewed initially in the court of appeals pursuant to § 2239(b).
A
We begin, as did the Court of Appeals, with the language of the statute. See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U. S. 330, 337 (1979). The crucial statutory language in subsection (b) of § 2239 is: “Any final order entered in any proceeding of the kind specified in subsection (a) of this section shall be subject to judicial review in the manner prescribed in [the Hobbs Act, 28 U. S. C. §2341 et seq.].” Though subsection (b) would seem generally to locate review of licensing proceedings in the courts of appeals pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §2342(4), the cross-reference to “proceeding^] of the kind specified in subsection (a)” is problematic. In a vexing semantic conjunction, the sentence in subsection (a) to which subsection (b) refers sets forth both the scope of Commission licensing proceedings and the hearing requirement for such proceedings. See 42 U. S. C. § 2239(a)(1) (“In any proceeding under this chapter, for the granting, suspending, revoking, or amending of any license . . . the Commission shall grant a hearing to any person whose interest may be affected by the proceeding”).
The Court of Appeals found this statutory language “clear-cut.” 229 U. S. App. D. C., at 445, 712 F. 2d, at 1477. We do not find it so. Though the linkage in § 2239 of the definition of proceeding and hearing could be read as the Court of Appeals read it, see supra, at 733-734, § 2239 could as easily be read as reflecting two independent congressional purposes: (1) to provide for hearings in licensing proceedings if requested by certain individuals (those “whose interest may be affected”); and (2) to place judicial review of final orders in all licensing proceedings in the courts of appeals pursuant to the Hobbs Act irrespective of whether a hearing before the agency occurred or was requested. On this alternative reading, the cross-reference in subsection (b) to “proceeding^] of the kind specified in subsection (a),” 42 U. S. C. § 2239(b), was meant only to refer to the language “any proceeding under this chapter, for the granting, suspending, revoking, or amending of any license,” § 2239(a)(1). If read this way, subsection (b) reflects no congressional intent to limit initial court of appeals review to Commission actions in which a hearing took place.
To discern the correct interpretation of this statute we must therefore decide whether Congress intended to authorize initial court of appeals review by reference to the procedures accompanying agency action (%. e., by reference to whether a hearing was held) or by reference to the subject matter of the agency action (i. e., by reference to whether the order was issued in a licensing proceeding). Adopting the former interpretation, the Court of Appeals relied solely on what it took to be the plain meaning of § 2239. Yet plain meaning, like beauty, is sometimes in the eye of the beholder. The court below inferred “plain meaning” from the conjunction of the hearing requirement and the description of the scope of licensing proceeedings in subsection (a) without consulting indicia of congressional intent in the legislative history or general principles respecting the proper forum for judicial review of agency action. Because we find the statute ambiguous on its face, we seek guidance in the statutory structure, relevant legislative history, congressional purposes expressed in the choice of Hobbs Act review, and general principles respecting the proper allocation of judicial authority to review agency orders. We conclude that these sources indicate that Congress intended to provide for initial court of appeals review of all final orders in licensing proceedings whether or not a hearing before the Commission occurred or could have occurred.
B
Relevant evidence of congressional intent in the legislative history, though fragmentary, supports this interpretation. The legislative metamorphoses of the various bills that eventually became the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 strongly suggest that Congress intended to define the scope of initial court of appeals review according to the subject matter of the Commission action and not according to whether the Commission held a hearing. As originally introduced in both the House and the Senate, the provision governing judicial review (§ 189 of the proposed Act) provided that “[a]ny proceeding to enjoin, set aside, annul or suspend any order of the Commission shall be brought as provided by [the Hobbs Act, 28 U. S. C. §2341 et seq.V H. R. 8862, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., § 189 (1954); S. 3323, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., § 189 (1954). After hearings by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, the judicial review provision was amended to provide for initial court of appeals review of “[a]ny final order granting, denying, suspending, revoking, modifying, or rescinding any license_” Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., § 189 (Comm. Print of May 21, 1954). Though this change was unexplained, it appears to have been intended to limit the scope of judicial review to final orders entered in licensing proceedings; the earlier version had more broadly authorized review of “any order of the Commission.” Soon after the bill incorporating this provision was submitted to the full Congress, a shortcoming in the proposed scope of review became apparent. Judicial review would not extend to final orders in proceedings that terminated short of a suspension, revocation, or amendment of a license; those seeking to challenge Commission decisions not to suspend, revoke, or amend could not obtain initial court of appeals review. Remedying this deficiency, Senator Hickenlooper proposed an amendment to expand the authorization for review to final orders issued in “any 'proceeding under this act, for the granting, suspending, revoking, or amending of any license . . . .” Amendment to S. 3690, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., § 189 (July 16, 1954) (emphasis added).
The hearing requirement under the Act developed independently of the review provisions until the last step of the legislative process. As introduced in the House and the Senate, the original bills did not provide for a hearing in licensing determinations. See H. R. 8862, supra; S. 3323, supra. The lack of a hearing requirement prompted expressions of concern at Committee hearings, S. 3323 and H. R. 8862, To Amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1946: Hearings on S. 3323 and H. R. 8862 before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 65, 113-114, 152-153, 226-227, 328-329, 352-353, 400-401, 416-417 (1954), and led to an amendment to § 181 of the proposed Act providing for a hearing in “any agency action.” H. R. 9757, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., §181 (1954). This provision was soon recognized as too broad a response to the perceived need, see 100 Cong. Rec. 10686 (1954) (remarks of Sen. Pastore) (“That wording was thought to be too broad, broader than it was intended to make it”), and the hearing requirement was tailored to the scope of proceedings authorized under the licensing Sub-chapter. Senator Hickenlooper accomplished this narrowing with the same amendment he used to broaden the scope of reviewable licensing determinations. He simply proposed to add the hearing requirement to §189, which until then had governed only judicial review; in this way the hearing authorization was limited to licensing proceedings. Amendment to S. 3690, supra, § 189. The proposed amendment was accepted and the current §2239 reflects its precise wording.
The evolution of the judicial review provision reveals a congressional intent to provide for initial court of appeals review of all final orders in licensing proceedings. When Congress decided on the scope of judicial review, it did so solely by reference to the subject matter of the Commission action and not by reference to the procedural particulars of the Commission action. That the hearing provision evolved independently reinforces the conclusion that Congress had no intention to limit initial court of appeals review to cases in which a hearing occurred or could have occurred. The only possible evidence of congressional intent to limit court of appeals review by reference to the procedures used is the last-minute marriage of the hearing and review provisions in the Hickenlooper Amendment. Nothing in the legislative history affirmatively suggests that Congress intended this conjunction of the hearing and review provisions to limit initial court of appeals review to final orders resulting from proceedings in which a hearing occurred. To the contrary, this semantic conjunction indicates no more than a congressional intent to provide for a hearing in the types of proceedings in which initial court of appeals review would take place — that is, licensing proceedings. See 100 Cong. Rec. 10686 (1954) (remarks of Sen. Pastore) (“The amendment limits the provision to hearings on licenses in which a review shall take place”).
C
Whether subject-matter jurisdiction over denials of §2.206 petitions properly lies in the district courts or the courts of appeals must also be considered in light of the basic congressional choice of Hobbs Act review in 42 U. S. C. § 2239(b). The Hobbs Act specifically contemplated initial court of appeals review of agency orders resulting from proceedings in which no hearing took place. See 28 U. S. C. § 2347(b) (“When the agency has not held a hearing . . . the court of appeals shall. . . pass on the issues presented, when a hearing is not required by law and ... no genuine issue of material fact is presented”). One purpose of the Hobbs Act was to avoid the duplication of effort involved in creation of a separate record before the agency and before the district court. See H. R. Rep. No. 2122, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 4 (1950) (“[T]he submission of the cases upon the records made before the administrative agencies will avoid the making of two records, one before the agency and one before the court, and thus going over the same ground twice”). Cf. Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc., 446 U. S. 578, 593 (1980) (“The most obvious advantage of direct review by a court of appeals is the time saved compared to review by a district court, followed by a second review on appeal”).
Given the choice of the Hobbs Act as the primary method of review of licensing orders, we have no reason to think Congress in the Atomic Energy Act would have intended to preclude initial court of appeals review of licensing proceedings in which a Commission hearing did not occur when the Hobbs Act specifically provides for such review and the consequence of precluding it would be unnecessary duplication of effort.
D
The legislative history and the basic congressional choice of Hobbs Act review lead us to conclude that Congress intended to vest in the courts of appeals initial subject-matter jurisdiction over challenges to Commission denials of § 2.206 petitions. An examination of the consequences that would follow upon adoption of the contrary rule proposed by the Court of Appeals in these cases confirms the soundness of this conclusion. The Court of Appeals did not specify whether it thought § 2239 vested the courts of appeals with initial jurisdiction over only proceedings in which a hearing actually occurred or over proceedings in which a hearing could have occurred had one been requested. Either approach results in consequences that cannot be squared with general principles respecting judicial review of agency action.
If initial review in the court of appeals hinged on whether a hearing before the agency actually occurred, then some licensing proceedings will be reviewed in the courts of appeals while others will not depending on whether a hearing is requested. It is clear that § 2239 contemplates the possibility of proceedings without hearings. Absent a request from a person whose interest may be affected by the proceeding no hearing is required. 42 U. S. C. § 2239(a)(1) (“In any proceeding under this chapter . . . the Commission shall grant a hearing upon the request of any person whose interest may be affected by the proceeding”). Thus if no one requests a hearing or if the only request comes from a person whose interest cannot be affected by the issues before the Commission in the proceeding, no hearing will be held. See, e. g., Bellotti v. NRC, 233 U. S. App. D. C. 274, 725 F. 2d 1380 (1983). The locus of judicial review would thus depend on the “fortuitous circumstance” of whether an interested person requested a hearing, see Crown Simpson Pulp Co. v. Costle, 445 U. S. 193, 196-197 (1980). This sorting process would result in some final orders in licensing proceedings receiving two layers of judicial review and some receiving only one. “Absent a far clearer expression of congressional intent, we are unwilling to read the Act as creating such a seemingly irrational bifurcated system.” Id., at 197.
If initial review in the court of appeals hinged on whether a hearing could have taken place had an interested person requested one, different but equally irrational consequences follow. All final orders in full-blown Commission licensing proceedings in which the issue is the granting, suspending, revoking, or amending of a license would be reviewed initially in the court of appeals irrespective of whether a hearing occurred before the agency. But final orders in summary proceedings and informal Commission rulemaking authorized in § 2239(a) would be reviewed initially in the district court because the Commission does not currently provide for a hearing in such situations.
At least two implausible results would flow from excluding orders in such situations from initial review in the court of appeals. First, the resulting duplication of judicial review in the district court and court of appeals, with its attendant delays, would defeat the very purpose of summary or informal procedures before the agency — saving time and effort in cases not worth detailed formal consideration or not requiring a hearing on the record. See Investment Company Institute v. Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System, 179 U. S. App. D. C. 311, 317-318, 551F. 2d 1270, 1276-1277 (1977); Verkuil, Judicial Review of Informal Rulemaking, 60 Va. L. Rev. 185, 204 (1974). Second, such an approach would cause bifurcation of review of orders issued in the same proceeding. While the final order in the licensing proceeding would be reviewed initially in the court of appeals, numerous ancillary or preliminary orders denying requests for intervention or a hearing by persons who purport to be affected by the issues in the proceeding would be reviewed initially in the district court. In the absence of specific evidence of contrary congressional intent, however, we have held that review of orders resolving issues preliminary or ancillary to the core issue in a proceeding should be reviewed in the same forum as the final order resolving the core issue. Foti v. INS, 375 U. S. 217, 227, 232 (1963); see L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 422 (1965); Currie & Goodman, Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action: Quest for the Optimum Forum, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 60 (1975).
Perhaps the only plausible justification for linking initial review in the court of appeals to the occurrence of a hearing before the agency would be that, absent a hearing, the reviewing court would lack an adequate agency-compiled factual basis to evaluate the agency action and a district court with factfinding powers could make up that deficiency. Such a justification cannot, however, be squared with fundamental principles of judicial review of agency action. “[T]he focal point for judicial review should be the administrative record already in existence, not some new record made initially in the reviewing court.” Camp v. Pitts, 411 U. S. 138, 142 (1973). The task of the reviewing court is to apply the appropriate APA standard of review, 5 U. S. C. § 706, to the agency decision based on the record the agency presents to the reviewing court. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U. S. 402 (1971).
If the record before the agency does not support the agency action, if the agency has not considered all relevant factors, or if the reviewing court simply cannot evaluate the challenged agency action on the basis of the record before it, the proper course, except in rare circumstances, is to remand to the agency for additional investigation or explanation. The reviewing court is not generally empowered to conduct a de novo inquiry into the matter being reviewed and to reach its own conclusions based on such an inquiry. We made precisely this point last Term in a case involving review under the Hobbs Act. FCC v. ITT World Communications, Inc., 466 U. S. 463, 468-469 (1984); see also Camp v. Pitts, supra. Moreover, a formal hearing before the agency is in no way necessary to the compilation of an agency record. As the actions of the Commission in compiling a 547-page record in this case demonstrate, agencies typically compile records in the course of informal agency action. The APA specifically contemplates judicial review on the basis of the agency record compiled in the course of informal agency action in which a hearing has not occurred. See 5 U. S. C. §§ 551(13), 704, 706.
The factfinding capacity of the district court is thus typically unnecessary to judicial review of agency decisionmak-ing. Placing initial review in the district court does have the negative effect, however, of requiring duplication of the identical task in the district court and in the court of appeals; both courts are to decide, on the basis of the record the agency provides, whether the action passes muster under the appropriate APA standard of review. One crucial purpose of the Hobbs Act and other jurisdictional provisions that place initial review in the courts of appeals is to avoid the waste attendant upon this duplication of effort. Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc., 446 U. S., at 593; Investment Company Institute, supra, at 317, 551 F. 2d, at 1276. Absent a firm indication that Congress intended to locate initial APA review of agency action in the district courts, we will not presume that Congress intended to depart from the sound policy of placing initial APA review in the courts of appeals.
These considerations apply with full force in the present cases. Locating initial review in the district court would certainly result in duplication of effort and probably result in bifurcation of review in that persons seeking to use § 2.206 petitions to broaden the scope of ongoing Commission proceedings would, if unsuccessful, obtain review in the district court while review of the final order in the proceeding would occur in the court of appeals.
l — l I — t 1 — 1
Whether initial subject-matter jurisdiction lies initially in the courts of appeals must of course be governed by the intent of Congress and not by any views we may have about sound policy. Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc., supra, at 593. In these cases, the indications of legislative intent we have been able to discern suggest that Congress intended to locate initial subject-matter jurisdiction in the courts of appeals. This result is in harmony with Congress’ choice of Hobbs Act review for Commission licensing proceedings in § 2239(b) and is consistent with basic principles respecting the allocation of judicial review of agency action. We therefore hold that 42 U. S. C. § 2239 vests in the courts of appeals initial subject-matter jurisdiction over Commission orders denying § 2.206 citizen petitions. Accordingly, the judgment below is reversed, and the cases are remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Sections 181-189 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U. S. C. §§ 2231-2239, set forth a detailed and comprehensive licensing scheme to govern private construction and operation of nuclear power facilities.
Lorion claimed that (1) the reactor’s steam generator tubes had not been inspected; (2) the plugging and consequent deactivation of as many as 25% of the steam generator tubes overburdened the remaining functional tubes and therefore posed a risk of leakage in those tubes; and (3) the steel reactor pressure vessel had become dangerously brittle and therefore might not withstand the thermal shock that would accompany any emergency cooldown of the reactor core. App. 6-8.
The Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation institutes the requested proceeding by serving an order to show cause upon the licensee. According to Commission regulations this order must inform the licensee of, inter alia, the allegations against it, its right to respond, and its right to a hearing. 10 CFR § 2.202 (1984).
The claimed lack of inspection was found to have been mooted by a Commission staff inspection of the steam generator tubes on October 19, 1981, approximately one month after Lorion’s letter. The risk of leaking steam generator tubes was found not to pose a serious safety hazard. In any event, the chances of such leakage were found to be remote and the tubes were then being subjected to close monitoring by Commission staff. The risk of vessel cracking as a result of thermal shock was similarly found to be negligible. See In re Florida Power & Light Co. (Turkey Point Plant, Unit 4), 14 N. R. C. 1078 (1981).
The Court of Appeals transferred the case to the District Court pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1631. See App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 83-703, p. 15. In its opinion, the Court of Appeals had suggested that the District Court likely had subject-matter jurisdiction under either 28 U. S. C. § 1331 or 28 U. S. C. § 1337. See 229 U. S. App. D. C., at 447, 712 F. 2d, at 1479.
See Seacoast Anti-pollution League of New Hampshire v. NRC, 223 U. S. App. D. C. 288, 291, 690 F. 2d 1025, 1028 (1982).
See County of Rockland v. NRC, 709 F. 2d 766, 774 (CA2), cert. denied, 464 U. S. 993 (1983); Rockford County League of Women Voters v. NRC, 679 F. 2d 1218, 1219-1221 (CA7 1982).
In these cases we address only the question whether initial subject-matter jurisdiction is properly located in the court of appeals or the district court. That is the only question on which we granted certiorari, and it is the only question that the parties have briefed and argued before this Court. We express no views on the merits of respondent Lorion’s challenge to the Commission’s denial of her citizen petition made under the authority of 10 CFR § 2.206 (1984).
In addition, no party has argued that under the APA, 5 U. S. C. § 701(a)(2), Commission denials of §2.206 petitions are instances of presumptively unreviewable “agency action . . . committed to agency discretion by law” because they involve the exercise of enforcement discretion. See Heckler v. Chaney, post, at 828-835. Because the question has been neither briefed nor argued and is unnecessary to the decision of the issue presented in this case, we express no opinion as to its proper resolution. The issue is open to the Court of Appeals on remand should the Commission choose to press it.
This fact does not preclude a finding that denials of § 2.206 petitions should be viewed as orders in § 2239(a) “proceedings” for purposes of the judicial review provisions of § 2239(b); “[cjlearly, changes in administrative procedures may affect the scope and content of various types of agency orders and thus the subject matter embraced in a judicial proceeding to review such orders.” Foti v. INS, 375 U. S. 217, 230, n. 16 (1963).
For example, the Commission requires a person seeking a hearing in a licensing proceeding to establish at least one contention with basis and specificity, see BP I v. AEC, 163 U. S. App. D. C. 422, 502 F. 2d 424 (1974), and to make an initial showing that a genuine issue of material fact exists, 10 CFR §2.749 (1984). Similarly, rulemaking under § 2239(a) is typically accompanied only by notice and comment procedures. See Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. NRC, 218 U. S. App. D. C. 134, 673 F. 2d 525, cert, denied, 459 U. S. 835 (1982).
The cases before us present no question, and thus we express no opinion, as to the Commission’s authority to condition or restrict the statutory hearing requirement of 42 U. S. C. § 2239(a)(1) in these or any other ways. In particular, we express no opinion as to whether the Commission properly denied respondent Lorion’s request for a hearing on her §2.206 petition.
Respondent Lorion also argues that the Commission itself does not consider its denial of a § 2.206 petition an order issued in a “proceeding” as that term is understood in 42 U. S. C. § 2239(a)(1). This argument is based in large part on the language of 10 CFR § 2.206 (1984). That language authorizes the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation to “institute a proceeding” in response to a §2.206 petition raising substantial safety questions. An order denying a § 2.206 petition is an order refusing to institute a proceeding, respondent Lorion argues, and therefore cannot be an order issued in a proceeding because none has been instituted. Also, in some unfortunate language in its brief before the Court of Appeals below, the Commission argued that respondent Lorion had no right to a hearing because no “proceeding” commences until an order to show cause pursuant to 10 CFR § 2.202 (1984) is issued. See 229 U. S. App. D. C., at 446, 712 F. 2d, at 1478 (quoting Government brief below at 24-25). We do not think the issue of congressional intent as to subject-matter jurisdiction should turn on such semantic quibbles. In neither its regulations nor its initial brief below did the Commission intend to suggest an opinion as to the proper forum for judicial review of denials of § 2.206 petitions. The § 2.206 petition is but the first step in a process that will, if not terminated for any reason, culminate in a full formal proceeding under 42 U. S. C. § 2239(a)(1). We have already made clear that subject-matter jurisdiction to review summary orders terminating licensing proceedings prior to a full hearing should lie in the courts of appeals. See supra, at 742-743. The denial of a § 2.206 petition is simply a summary procedure that terminates a proceeding at the first step of the process. Thus initial court of appeals subject-matter jurisdiction over Commission denials of §2.206 petitions should not be rejected for the reason that these orders are not products of “proceedings.”
This argument in reality is a claim that denials of § 2.206 petitions occur too early in the process to be considered final orders in licensing proceedings. That argument, properly understood, is a claim that such Commission decisions are exercises of enforcement discretion. As such, the argument goes to whether such decisions are reviewable under the APA, see n. 8, supra, and not to whether the courts of appeals have initial subject-matter jurisdiction.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | I | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
The petition for writ of certiorari is granted. It appears from the Government’s suggestion of mootness and the memoranda filed in connection therewith that the petitioner is no longer in custody of the warden to whom the writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum was directed, and that the Government will take no further action under any order pursuant to which petitioner might be held in contempt. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals; the order of the District Court, issued May 29, 1959, directing the petitioner to appear before the grand jury; the order to show cause issued by the District Court on May 19, 1959; and the order of the District Court, entered April 3, 1959, denying the petitioner’s motion to quash the writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum, and directing him to appear before the grand jury oh April 9, 1959, are vacated. The cause is remanded to the District Court with instructions to dismiss the proceeding as moot.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | I | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Marshall
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issue in this case is whether petitioner's arrest was invalid because federal officers opened the closed but unlocked door of petitioner's apartment and entered in order to arrest him without first announcing their identity and purpose. We hold that the method of entry vitiated the arrest and therefore that evidence seized in the subsequent search incident thereto should not have been admitted at petitioner’s trial.
On February 19, 1966, one William Jones was detained at the border between California and Mexico by United States customs agents, who found in his possession an ounce of cocaine. After some questioning, Jones told the agents that he had been given the narcotics in Tijuana, Mexico, by a person named “Johnny," whom he had accompanied there from Los Angeles. He said he was to transport the narcotics to “Johnny” in the latter city.
Also found in Jones’ possession was a card on which was written the name “Johnny” and a Los Angeles telephone number. On the following day at about 3 p. m., Jones made a call to the telephone number listed on the card; a customs agent dialed the number, and with Jones’ permission, listened to the ensuing conversation. A male voice answered the call, and Jones addressed the man as “Johnny.” Jones said he was in San Diego, and still had “his thing.” The man asked Jones if he had “any trouble getting through the line.” Jones replied that he had not. Jones inquired whether “Johnny” planned to remain at home, and upon receiving an affirmative answer, indicated that he was on his way to Los Angeles, and would go to the man’s apartment.
At about 7:30 that evening, the customs agents went with Jones to an apartment building in Los Angeles. The agents returned to Jones the cocaine they had seized from him, and placed a small broadcasting device on him. The agents waited outside the building, listening on a receiving apparatus. Jones knocked on the apartment door; a woman answered. Jones asked if “Johnny” was in, and was told to wait a minute. Steps were heard and then a man asked Jones something about “getting through the line.” Because of noise from a phonograph in the apartment, reception from the broadcasting device on Jones’ person was poor, but agents did hear the word “package.”
The customs agents waited outside for five to 10 minutes, and- then proceeded to the apartment door. One knocked, waited a few seconds, and, receiving no response, opened the unlocked door, and entered the apartment with his gun drawn. Other agents followed, at least one of whom also had his gun drawn. They saw petitioner sitting on a couch, in the process of withdrawing his hand from under the adjacent cushion. After placing petitioner under arrest, an agent found the package of cocaine under the cushion, and subsequently other items (e. g., small pieces of tin foil) were found in the apartment; officers testified at trial they were adapted to packaging narcotics.
Petitioner and Jones were indicted for knowingly importing the cocaine into this country and concealing it, in violation of § 2 of the Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act, as amended, 35 Stat. 614, 21 U. S. C. §§ 173 and 174. Petitioner was tried alone. The narcotics seized at petitioner’s apartment were admitted into evidence, over objection. On appeal, following the conviction, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that the officers, in effecting entry to petitioner’s apartment by opening the closed but unlocked door, did not “break open” the door within the meaning of 18 U. S. C. § 3109 and therefore were not required by that statute to make a prior announcement of “authority and purpose.” 380 F. 2d 108. We granted certiorari, 389 TJ. S. 1003 (1967), to consider the somewhat uncomplicated but nonetheless significant issue of whether the agents’ entry was consonant with federal law. We hold that it was not, and therefore reverse.
The statute here involved, 18 U. S. C. § 3109, deals with the entry of federal officers into a dwelling in terms only in regard to the execution of a search warrant. This Court has held, however, that the validity of such an entry of a federal officer to effect an arrest without a warrant “must be tested by criteria identical with those embodied in” that statute. Miller v. United States, 357 U. S. 301, 306 (1958); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471, 482-484 (1963). We therefore agree with the parties and with the court below that we must look to § 3109 as controlling.
In Miller v. United States, supra, the commonlaw background to § 3109 was extensively examined. The Court there concluded, id., at 313:
“The requirement of prior notice of authority and purpose before forcing entry into a home is deeply rooted in our heritage and should not be given grudging application. Congress, codifying a tradition embedded in Anglo-American law, had declared in § 3109 the reverence of the law for the individual’s right of privacy in his house.”
It was also noted, id., at 313, n. 12, that another facet of the rule of announcement was, generally, to safeguard officers, who might be mistaken, upon an unannounced intrusion into a home, for someone with no right to be there. See also McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451, 460-461 (concurring opinion).
Considering the purposes of § 3109, it would indeed be a “grudging application” to hold, as the Government urges, that the use of “force” is an indispensable element of the statute. To be sure, the statute uses the phrase “break open” and that connotes some use of force. But linguistic analysis seldom is adequate when a statute is designed to incorporate fundamental values and the ongoing development of the common law. Thus, the California Supreme Court has recently interpreted the common-law rule of announcement codified in a state statute identical in relevant terms to § 3109 to apply to an entry by police through a closed but unlocked door. People v. Rosales, 68 Cal. 2d 299, 437 P. 2d 489 (1968). And it has been held that § 3109 applies to entries effected by the use of a passkey, which requires no more force than does the turning of a doorknob. An unannounced intrusion into a dwelling — what § 3109 basically proscribes — is no less an unannounced intrusion whether officers break down a door, force open a chain lock on a partially open door, open a locked door by use of a passkey, or, as here, open a closed but unlocked door. The protection afforded by, and the values inherent in, § 3109 must be “governed by something more than the fortuitous circumstance of an unlocked door.” Keiningham v. United States, 109 U. S. App. D. C. 272, 276, 287 F. 2d 126, 130 (1960).
The Government seeks to invoke an exception to the rule of announcement, contending that the agents’ lack of compliance with the statute is excused because an announcement might have endangered the informant Jones or the officers themselves. See, e. g., Gilbert v. United States, 366 F. 2d 923, 931 (C. A. 9th Cir. 1966), cert, denied, 388 U. S. 922 (1967); cf. Ker v. California, 374 U. S. 23, 39-40 (1963) (opinion of Clark, J.); id., at 47 (opinion of Brennan, J.). However, whether or not “exigent circumstances,” Miller v. United States, supra, at 309, would excuse compliance with § 3109, this record does not reveal any substantial basis for excusing the failure of the agents here to announce their authority and purpose. The agents had no basis for assuming petitioner was armed or might resist arrest, or that Jones was in any danger. Nor, as to the former, did the agents make any independent investigation of petitioner prior to setting the stage for his arrest with the narcotics in his possession.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
Mr. Justice Black dissents.
The Government contends in this Court that petitioner did not adequately raise at trial the issue of the agents’ manner of entry, and therefore that it did not have sufficient opportunity to indicate the full circumstances surrounding the entry and petitioner’s arrest. However, petitioner’s trial counsel, in the course of objecting, clearly stated there were no facts “sufficient to justify this officer’s breaking into” the apartment, and his objection was truncated by a ruling of the trial judge. In any event, the Government met the issue on the merits in the Court of Appeals, and apparently did not there contend the record was inadequate for its resolution; and the Court of Appeals decided the issue on the merits. In these circumstances, we are justified in likewise doing so.
“The officer may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house, or any part of a house, or anything therein, to execute a search warrant, if, after notice of his authority and purpose, he is refused admittance or when necessary to liberate himself or a person aiding him in the execution of the warrant.”
See also, e. g., Ng Pui Yu v. United States, 352 F. 2d 626, 631 (C. A. 9th Cir. 1965); Gatlin v. United States, 117 U. S. App. D. C. 123, 130, 326 F. 2d 666, 673 (C. A. D. C. Cir. 1963); United States v. Cruz, 265 F. Supp. 15, 21 (W. D. Tex. 1967).
See also Ker v. California, 374 U. S. 23, 47-59 (1963) (opinion of BreNNAN, J.).
While distinctions are obvious, a useful analogy is nonetheless afforded by the common and case law development of the law of burglary: a forcible entry has generally been eliminated as an element of that crime under statutes using the word “break,” or similar words. See R. Perkins, Criminal Law 149-150 (1957); J. Michael & H. Wechsler, Criminal Law and Its Administration 367-382 (1940); Note, A Rationale of the Law of Burglary, 51 Col. L. Rev. 1009, 1012-1015 (1951). Commentators on the law of arrest have viewed the development of that body of law as similar. See EL Voorhees, Law of Arrest §§ 159, 172-173 (1904); Wilgus, Arrest Without a Warrant, 22 Mich. L. Rev. 798, 806 (1924):
“What constitutes ‘breaking’ seems to be the same as in burglary: lifting a latch, turning a door knob, unhooking a chain or hasp, removing a prop to, or pushing open, a closed door of entrance to the house, — even a closed screen door ... is a breaking . . . .” (Footnotes omitted.)
See generally Blakey, The Rule of Announcement and Unlawful Entry, 112 U. Pa. L. Rev. 499 (1964).
See, e. g., Munoz v. United States, 325 F. 2d 23, 26 (C. A. 9th Cir. 1963); United States v. Sims, 231 F. Supp. 251, 254 (D. C. Md. 1964); cf. People v. Stephens, 249 Cal. App. 2d 113, 57 Cal. Rptr. 66 (1967). See also Ker v. California, 374 U. S., at 38.
We do not deal here with entries obtained by ruse, which have been viewed as involving no “breaking.” See, e. g., Smith v. United States, 357 F. 2d 486, 488 n. 1 (C. A. 5th Cir. 1966); Leahy v. United States, 272 F. 2d 487, 489 (C. A. 9th Cir. 1959). See also Wilgus, n. 5, supra, at 806.
Exceptions to any possible constitutional rule relating to announcement and entry have been recognized, see Ker v. California, supra, at 47 (opinion of BreNNAN, J.), and there is little reason why those limited exceptions might not also apply to § 3109, since they existed at common law, of which the statute is a codification. See generally Blakey, n. 5, supra.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | A | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Harlan
delivered the opinion of the • Court.
This is a companion case to Barr v. Matteo, ante, p. 564, decided today. Petitioner Howard in 1955 was a Captain in the United States Navy and Commander of the Boston Naval Shipyard. Respondent Lyons was National Commander of the Federal Employees Veterans Association, Inc., and respondent McAteer a local officer of that Association. Both respondents, were at all material times civilian employees at the Boston Naval Shipyard, and for several years before September 8, 1955, the Association was recognized by the shipyard as an employees’ representative group. On that date petitioner withdrew official recognition of the- Association — an action which is not here challenged. '
Respondents brought suit in the Massachusetts District Court, -invoking .diversity jurisdiction, and making the following, allegations: that on September 8, 1955, petitioner. circulated a statement defaming them; that the statement purported to be an official memorandum to the Chief of the Bureau of Ships and the Chief of Navy Industrial Relations, but was released by petitioner “outside of his official duties” to various newspapers and wire services and to the. members of the Massachusetts delegation in the Congress of'the'United States; that in circulating the statement petitioner acted “maliciously, wilfully, wickedly, recklessly and. falsely and with malice aforesight [sic]”; and thát the statement .was intended to and did injure the reputation of respondents.
' A copy of the statement complained of was filed with the complaint. It is in the form of an official report directed tó the Chief of the Bureau of Ships and the Chief of Industrial Relations of the Department of . the Navy, reciting petitioner’s dissatisfaction with the activities of the Federal Employees Veterans Association at the shipyard and announcing his intention to withdraw the recognition previously accorded it.
Petitioner answered, stating that the statement complained of was in fact an official communication, and that in sending copies of it to the Massachusetts congressional delegation he was acting within the scope of his duties and pursuant to Department of the Navy policy; and denying .that outside of his official duties he had released copies of the communication to the newspapers. He thereupon moved for summary judgment, attaching to the motion his own affidavit essentially repeating the statements from his answer above summarized, and an affidavit from the Commandant of the First Naval District. That affidavit stated that the Commandant was petitioner’s commanding officer; that the making of reports to the Bureau of Ships relative to any significant personnel action at the shipyard was one of petitioner’s official duties; that also among those duties was the furnishing of copies of such reports to the Massachusetts congressional delegation; and that the dissemination of the report of September 8,. 1955, to the newspapers had been made through official channels and approved by the acting Commandant of the First Naval District.
The District Court granted summary judgment for petitioner, holding that the uncontradicted affidavits conclusively showed that the statement complained of was published by petitioner “in the discharge of his official duties and in relation to matters committed to him for determination,” and that it was therefore absolutely privileged. On respondents’ appeal, the Court of Appeals held that the sending of the official report to petitioner’s superior officers was protected by an absolute privilege, and noted that reliance on the dissemination to the newspapers had been abandoned by respondents on appeal in the face of petitioner’s sworn' statement that he had hot been responsible for that publication. As to the publication to the Massachusetts congressional delegation, however, the court, one judge dissenting, refused to allow more than a qualified privilege, although recognizing that “it is true that these mémbers of Congress-did have an official interest in being kept advised of important developments in labor relations at the ■ Boston Naval Shipyard,” and that “the Commander of the Boston Naval Shipyard might have conceived it to be a proper exercise of his official functions to see to it that the members of Congress should receive copies of such official report . . . .” Accordingly, it reversed the judgment of the District* Court and remanded the case -for "trial. • 250 F. 2d 912.
We granted, certiorari to consider petitioner’s contention that the Court of Appeals had erred in failing to recognize his plea of absolute privilege in respect of the publication to members of Congress. 357 U. S. 903. Respondents did not cross-petition for certiorari.
At the outset, we take note of a question which the Court of Appeals, on its view of the case, did not find i.t necessary to resolve — whether the extent of the privilege in respect of civil liability for statements allegedly defamatory under state law which may be claimed by officers of the Federal Government, acting in the course of their duties, is a question as to which the federal courts. are bound to follow state law. We think that the very statement of the question dictates a negative answer.. The authority of a federal officer to act derives from federal sources, and the rule which recognizes a privilege finder appropriate circumstances as to statements made in the course of duty is one designed to promote the effective functioning of the Federal Government. No subject could be one of more peculiarly federal concern, and it would deny the very considerations which give the rule of privilege its being to leave determination of its extent to the vagaries of the laws of the several States. Cf. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U. S. 363. We hold that the validity of petitioner’s claim of absolute privilege must be judged by federal standards, to be formulated by the courts in the absence of legislative action by Congress.
Our decision in Barr v. Matteo, ante, p. 564, governs this case. As has been observed, petitioner and his commanding officer both stated in uncontradicted affidavits that the sending of copies of the report here at issue to members of the Massachusetts congressional delegation was part of petitioner’s official duties. Although of course such an averment by the defendant cannot foreclose the courts from examination of the question, we think that the affidavit of petitioner’s commanding officer,- and a Memorandum of Instructions issued by the Secretary of the Navy which petitioner has with our leave filed in this Court, plainly show that the District Court was correct in finding that the circulation of the report to the Massachusetts congressional delegation was “in the discharge of [petitioner’s] . . . official duties and in relation to matters committed to him for determination.”
Reversed.
No purpose would be served by setting out the entire, lengthy report. It is adequately summarized in the Court of Appeals’ opinion as follows:
“This letter alleged that' plaintiff Lyons by name, and the other plaintiff by description, ‘exercise a predominant influence’ in the organizational activities; that the organization has been giving wide distribution to a newsletter or bulletin; that this bulletin has become more and more unfairly .critical of the shipyard administration, for the purpose of not only thwarting the aims of the shipyard administration in the accomplishment of its mission, but also to further personal aims and self-interests of the individuals in control of the labor organization; that these ‘editorial expletives’ have adversely affected the general morale of employees of the shipyard, who are entitled to be protected against such ‘overt subversion’ by any labor group ‘whose methods and whose motives are unethical, uninhibited, and lack the integrity of purpose that could reasonably be expected.’ ” 250 F. 2d 912, 913;
SECNAV Instruction 5730.5, issued February 3, 1955, paragraph 12: “Congressional Notification of Actions of Interest. Members of Congress are very anxious to keep in touch with what is going on in their respective states and districts. Navy agencies shall keep them advised, if possible in advance, of any new actions or curtailment of actions which may affect them.”
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | H | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
The judgment is affirmed by an equally divided Court.
Justice Powell took no part in the decision of this case.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | A | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Kennedy
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The maritime oil transport industry presents ever-present, all too real dangers of oil spills from tanker ships, spills which could be catastrophes for the marine environment. After the supertanker Torrey Canyon spilled its cargo of 120,000 tons of crude oil off the coast of Cornwall, England, in 1967, both Congress and the State of Washington enacted more stringent regulations for these tankers and provided for more comprehensive remedies in the event of an oil spill. The ensuing question of federal pre-emption of the State’s laws was addressed by the Court in Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U. S. 151 (1978).
In 1989, the supertanker Exxon Valdez ran aground in Prince William Sound, Alaska, and its cargo of more than 53 million gallons of crude oil caused the largest oil spill in United States history. Again, both Congress and the State of Washington responded. Congress enacted new statutory provisions, and Washington adopted regulations governing tanker operations and design. Today we must determine whether these more recent state laws can stand despite the comprehensive federal regulatory scheme governing oil tankers. Relying on the same federal statute that controlled the analysis in Ray, we hold that some of the State’s regulations are pre-empted; as to the balance of the regulations, we remand the case so their validity may be assessed in light of the considerable federal interest at stake and in conformity with the principles we now discuss.
I
The State of Washington embraces some of the Nation’s most significant waters and coastal regions. Its Pacific Ocean seacoast consists, in large part, of wave-exposed rocky headlands separated by stretches of beach. Washington borders as well on the Columbia River estuary, dividing Washington from Oregon. Two other large estuaries, Grays Harbor and Willapa Bay, are also within Washington’s waters. Of special significance in these cases is the inland sea of Puget Sound, a 2,500 square mile body of water consisting of inlets, bays, and channels. More than 200 islands are located within the sound, and it sustains fisheries and plant and animal life of immense value to the Nation and to the world.
Passage from the Pacific Ocean to the quieter Puget Sound is through the Strait of Juan de Fuca, a channel 12 miles wide and 65 miles long which divides Washington from the Canadian Province of British Columbia. The international boundary is located midchannel. Access to Vancouver, Canada’s largest port, is through the strait. Traffic inbound from the Pacific Ocean, whether destined to ports in the United States or Canada, is routed through Washington’s waters; outbound traffic, whether from a port in Washington or Vancouver, is directed through Canadian waters. The pattern had its formal adoption in a 1979 agreement entered into by the United States and Canada. Agreement for a Cooperative Vessel Traffic Management System for the Juan de Fuca Region, 32 U. S. T. 377, T. I. A. S. No. 9706.
In addition to holding some of our vital waters, Washington is the site of major installations for the Nation’s oil industry and the destination or shipping point for huge volumes of oil and its end products. Refineries and product terminals are located adjacent to Puget Sound in ports including Cherry Point, Ferndale, Tacoma, and Anacortes. Canadian refineries are found near Vancouver on Burrard Inlet and the lower Fraser River. Crude oil is transported by sea to Puget Sound. Most is extracted from Alaska’s North Slope reserve and is shipped to Washington on United States flag vessels. Foreign-flag vessels arriving from nations such as Venezuela and Indonesia also call at Washington’s oil installations.
The bulk of oil transported on water is found in tankers, vessels which consist of a group of tanks contained in a ship-shaped hull, propelled by an isolated machinery plant at the stern. The Court described the increase in size and numbers of these ships close to three decades ago in Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U. S. 325, 335 (1973), noting that the average vessel size increased from 16,000 tons during World War II to 76,000 tons in 1966. (The term “tons” refers to “deadweight tons,” a way of measuring the cargo-carrying capacity of the vessels.) Between 1955 and 1968, the world tanker fleet grew from 2,500 vessels to 4,300. Ibid. By December 1973, 366 tankers in the world tanker fleet were in excess of 175,000 tons, see 1 M. Tusiani, The Petroleum Shipping Industry 79 (1996), and by 1998 the number of vessels considered “tankers” in the merchant fleets of the world numbered 6,739, see U. S. Dept, of Transp., Maritime Administration, Merchant Fleets of the World 1 (Oct. 1998).
The size of these vessels, the frequency of tanker operations, and the vast amount of oil transported by vessels with but one or two layers of metal between the cargo and the water present serious risks. Washington’s waters have been subjected to oil spills and further threatened by near misses. In December 1984, for example, the tanker ARCO Anchorage grounded in Port Angeles Harbor and spilled 239,000 gallons of Alaskan crude oil. The most notorious oil spill in recent times was in Prince William Sound, Alaska, where the grounding of the Exxon Valdez released more than 11 million gallons of crude oil and, like the Torrey Canyon spill before it, caused public officials intense concern over the threat of a spill.
Washington responded by enacting the state regulations now in issue. The legislature created the Office of Marine Safety, which it directed to establish standards for spill prevention plans to provide “the best achievable protection [BAP] from damages caused by the discharge of oil.” Wash. Rev. Code § 88.46.040(3) (1994). The Office of Marine Safety then promulgated the tanker design, equipment, reporting, and operating requirements now subject to attack by petitioners. Wash. Admin. Code (WAC) §317-21-130 et seq. (1999). A summary of the relevant regulations, as described by the Court of Appeals, is set out in the Appendix, infra.
a to comply with the Washington rules, possible sanctions include statutory penalties, restrictions of the vessel’s operations in state waters, and a denial of entry into state waters. Wash. Rev. Code §§88.46.070, 88.46.080, 88.46.090 (1994).
Association of Independent Tanker Owners (Intertanko) is a trade association whose 305 members own or operate more than 2,000 tankers of both United States and foreign registry. The organization represents approximately 80% of the world’s independently owned tanker fleet; and an estimated 60% of the oil imported into the United States is carried on Intertanko vessels. The association brought this suit seeking declaratory and injunc-tive relief against state and local officials responsible for enforcing the BAP regulations. Groups interested in environmental preservation intervened in defense of the laws. Intertanko argued that Washington’s BAP standards invaded areas long occupied by the Federal Government and imposed unique requirements in an area where national uniformity was mandated. Intertanko further contended that if local political subdivisions of every maritime nation were to impose differing regulatory regimes on tanker operations, the goal of national governments to develop effective international environmental and safety standards would be defeated.
Although the United States declined to intervene when the ease was in the District Court, the governments of 13 ocean-going nations expressed concerns through a diplomatic note directed to the United States. Intertanko lodged a copy of the note with the District Court. The concerned governments represented that “legislation by the State of Washington on tanker personnel, equipment and operations would cause inconsistency between the regulatory regime of the US Government and that of an individual State of the US. Differing regimes in different parts of the US would create uncertainty and confusion. This would also set an unwelcome precedent for other Federally administered countries.” Note Verbale from the Royal Danish Embassy to the U. S. Dept, of State 1 (June 14,1996).
The District Court rejected all of Intertanko’s arguments and upheld the state regulations. International Assn. of Independent Tanker Owners (Intertanko) v. Lowry, 947 F. Supp. 1484 (WD Wash. 1996). The appeal followed, and at that stage the United States intervened on Intertanko’s behalf, contending that the District Court’s ruling failed to give sufficient weight to the substantial foreign affairs interests of the Federal Government. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the State could enforce its laws, save the one requiring the vessels to install certain navigation and towing equipment. 148 F. 3d 1053 (1998). The Court of Appeals reasoned that this requirement, found in WAC §317-21-265, was “virtually identical to” requirements declared pre-empted in Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U. S. 151 (1978). 148 F. 3d, at 1066. Over Judge Graber’s dissent, the Court of Appeals denied petitions for rehearing en banc. 159 F. 3d 1220 (1998). Judge Graber, although unwilling, without further analysis, to conclude that the panel reached the wrong result, argued that the opinion was “incorrect in two exceptionally important respects: (1) The opinion places too much weight on two clauses in Title I of OPA 90 [The Oil Pollution Act of 1990] that limit OPA 90’s preemptive effect. (2) Portions of the opinion that discuss the Coast Guard regulations are inconsistent with Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court precedent.” Id., at 1221. We granted certiorari and now reverse. 527 U. S. 1063 (1999).
II
The State of Washington has enacted legislation in an area where the federal interest has been manifest since the beginning of our Republic and is now well established. The authority of Congress to regulate interstate navigation, without embarrassment from intervention of the separate States and resulting difficulties with foreign nations, was cited in the Federalist Papers as one of the reasons for adopting the Constitution. E. eg., The Federalist Nos. 44,12,64. In 1789, the First Congress enacted a law by which vessels with a federal certificate were entitled to “the benefits granted by any law of the United States.” Act of Sept. 1,1789, eh. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 55. The importance of maritime trade and the emergence of maritime transport by steamship resulted in further federal licensing requirements enacted to promote trade and to enhance the safety of crew members and passengers. See Act of July 7, 1838, ch. 191, 5 Stat. 304; Act of Mar. 3, 1843, ch. 94, 5 Stat. 626. In 1871, Congress enacted a comprehensive scheme of regulation for steam powered vessels, including provisions for licensing captains, chief mates, engineers, and pilots. Act of Feb. 28, 1871, eh. 100, 16 Stat. 440.
The Court in Cooley v. Board of Wardens of Port of Philadelphia ex rel. Soc. for Relief of Distressed Pilots, 12 How. 299 (1852), stated that there would be instances in which state regulation of maritime commerce is inappropriate even absent the exercise of federal authority, although in the case before it the Court found the challenged state regulations were permitted in light of local needs and conditions. Where Congress had acted, however, the Court had little difficulty in finding state vessel requirements were preempted by federal laws which governed the certification of vessels and standards of operation. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 (1824), invalidated a New York law that attempted to grant a monopoly to operate steamboats on the ground it was inconsistent with the coasting license held by the vessel owner challenging the exclusive franchise. And in Sinnot v. Davenport, 22 How. 227 (1859), the Court decided that the federal license held by the vessel contained “the only guards and restraints, which Congress has seen fit to annex to the privileges of ships and vessels engaged in the coasting trade.” Id., at 241. The Court went on to explain that in such a circumstance, state laws on the subject must yield: “In every such ease, the act of Congress or treaty is supreme; and the law of the State, though enacted in the exercise of powers not controverted, must yield to it.” Id., at 243.
Against this background, Congress has enacted a series of statutes pertaining to maritime tanker transports and has ratified international agreements on the subject. We begin by referring to the principal statutes and international instruments discussed by the parties.
1. The Tank Vessel Act.
The Tank Vessel Act of 1936,49 Stat. 1889, enacted specific requirements for operation of covered vessels. The Act provided that “[i]n order to secure effective provisions against the hazards of life and property,” additional federal rules could be adopted with respect to the “design and construction, alteration, or repair of such vessels,” “the operation of such vessels,” and “the requirements of the manning of such vessels and the duties and qualifications of the officers and crews thereof.” The purpose of the Act was to establish “a reasonable and uniform set of rules and regulations concerning... vessels carrying the type of cargo deemed dangerous.” H. R. Rep. No. 2962, 74th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1936). The Tank Vessel Act was the primary source for regulating tank vessels for the next 30 years, until the Torrey Canyon grounding led Congress to take new action.
2. The Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972.
Responding to the Torrey Canyon spill, Congress enacted the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 (PWSA). The Act, as amended by the Port and Tanker Safety Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 1471, contains two somewhat overlapping titles, both of which may, as the Ray Court explained, preclude enforcement of state laws, though not by the same pre-emption analysis. Title I concerns vessel traffic “in any port or place under the jurisdiction of the United States.” 110 Stat. 3934, 33 U. S. C. § 1223(a)(1) (1994 ed., Supp. III). Under Title I, the Coast Guard may enact measures for controlling vessel traffic or for protecting navigation and the marine environment, but. it is not required to do so. Ibid.
Title II does require the Coast Guard to issue regulations, regulations addressing the “design, construction, alteration, repair, maintenance, operation, equipping, personnel qualification, and manning of vessels... that may be necessary for increased protection against hazards to life and property, for navigation and vessel safety, and for enhanced protection of the marine environment.” 46 U. S. C. § 3703(a).
The critical provisions of the PWSA described above remain operative, but the Act has been amended, most significantly by the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA), 104 Stat. 484. OPA, enacted in response to the Exxon Valdez spill, requires separate discussion.
3. The Oil Pollution Act of 1990.
The OPA contains nine titles, two having the most significance for these cases. Title I is captioned “Oil Pollution Liability, and Compensation” and adds extensive new provisions to the United States Code. See 104 Stat. 2375, 33 U. S. C. § 2701 et seq. (1994 ed. and Supp. III). Title I imposes liability (for both removal costs and damages) on parties responsible for an oil spill. § 2702. Other provisions provide defenses to, and limitations on, this liability. 33 U. S. C. §§ 2703,2704. Of considerable importance to these cases are OPA’s saving clauses, found in Title I of the Act, § 2718, and to be discussed below.
Title IV of OPA is entitled “Prevention and Removal.” For the most part, it amends existing statutory provisions or instructs the Secretary of Transportation (whose departments include the Coast Guard) to take action under previous grants of rulemaking authority. For example, Title IV instructs the Coast Guard to require reporting of marine casualties resulting in a “significant harm to the environment.” 46 U. S. C. § 6101(a)(5) (1994 ed. and Supp. V). Title IV further requires the Secretary to issue regulations to define those areas, including Puget Sound, on which single hulled tankers shall be escorted by other vessels. 104 Stat. 523. By incremental dates specified in the Act, all covered tanker vessels must have a double hull. 46 U. S. C. § 3703a.
k. Treaties and International Agreements.
The scheme of regulation includes a significant and intricate complex of international treaties and maritime agreements bearing upon the licensing and operation of vessels. We are advised by the United States that the international regime depends upon the principle of reciprocity. That is to say, the certification of a vessel by the government of its own flag nation warrants that the ship has complied with international standards, and vessels with those certificates may enter ports of the signatory nations. Brief for United States 3.
Illustrative of treaties and agreements to which the United States is a party are the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, 32 U. S. T. 47, T. I. A. S. No. 9700, the International Convention for Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, S. Exec. Doc. C, 93-1, 12 I. L. M. 1319, as amended by 1978 Protocol, S. Exec. Doc. C, 96-1,17 I. L. M. 546, and the International Convention of Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers, With Annex, 1978 (STCW), S. Exec. Doc. EE, 96-1, C. T. I. A. No. 7624.
The United States argues that these treaties, as the supreme law of the land, have pre-emptive force over the state regulations in question here. We need not reach that issue at this stage of the case because the state regulations we address in detail below are pre-empted by federal statute and regulations. The existence of the treaties and agreements on standards of shipping is of relevance, of course, for these agreements give force to the longstanding rule that the enactment of a uniform federal scheme displaces state law, and the treaties indicate Congress will have demanded national uniformity regarding maritime commerce. See Ray, 435 U. S., at 166 (recognizing Congress anticipated “arriving at international standards for building tank vessels” and understanding “the Nation was to speak with one voice” on these matters). In later proceedings, if it is deemed necessary for full disposition of the case, it should be open to the parties to argue whether the specific international agreements and treaties are of binding, pre-emptive force. We do not reach those questions, for it may be that pre-emption principles applicable to the basic federal statutory structure will suffice, upon remand, for a complete determination.
III
In Ray v. Atlantic Richfield, supra, the Court was asked to review, in light of an established federal and international regulatory scheme, comprehensive tanker regulations imposed by the State of Washington. The Court held that the PWSA and Coast Guard regulations promulgated under that Act pre-empted a state pilotage requirement, Washington’s limitation on tanker size, and tanker design and construction rules.
In these cases, petitioners relied on Ray to argue that Washington’s more recent state regulations were preempted as well. The Court of Appeals, however, concluded that Ray retained little validity in light of subsequent action by Congress. We disagree. The Ray Court’s interpretation of the PWSA is correct and controlling. Its basic analytic structure explains why federal pre-emption analysis applies to the challenged regulations and allows scope and due recognition for the traditional authority of the States and localities to regulate some matters of local concern.
At the outset, it is necessary to explain that the essential framework of Ray, and of the PWSA which it interpreted, are of continuing force, neither having been superseded by subsequent authority relevant to these cases. In narrowing the pre-emptive effect given the PWSA in Ray, the Court of Appeals relied upon OPA’s saving clauses, finding in their language a return of authority to the States. Title I of OPA contains two saving clauses, stating:
“(a) Preservation of State authorities...
“Nothing in this Act or the Act of March 3, 1851 shall—
“(1) affect, or be construed or interpreted as preempting, the authority of any State or political subdivision thereof from imposing any additional liability or requirements with respect to—
“(A) the discharge of oil or other pollution by oil within such State....
“(c) Additional requirements and liabilities; penalties
“Nothing in this Act, the Act of March 3, 1851 (46 U. S. C. 183 et seq.), or section 9509 of [the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (26 U. S. C. 9509)], shall in any way affect, or be construed to affect, the authority of the United States or any State or political subdivision thereof—
“(1) to impose additional liability or additional requirements
“relating to the discharge, or substantial threat of a discharge, of oil.” 33 U. S. C. § 2718.
The Court of Appeals placed more weight on the saving clauses than those provisions can bear, either from a textual standpoint or from a consideration of the whole federal regulatory scheme of which OPA is but a part.
The saving clauses are found in Title I of OPA, captioned Oil Pollution Liability and Compensation and creating a liability scheme for oil pollution. In contrast to the Washington rules at issue here, Title I does not regulate vessel operation, design, or manning. Placement of the saving clauses in Title I of OPA suggests that Congress intended to preserve state laws of a scope similar to the matters contained in Title I of OPA, not all state laws similar to the matters covered by the whole of OPA or to the whole subject of maritime oil transport. The evident purpose of the saving clauses is to preserve state laws which, rather than imposing substantive regulation of a vessel’s primary conduct, establish liability rules and financial requirements relating to oil spills. See Gutierrez v. Ada, 528 U. S. 250, 255 (2000) (words of a statute should be interpreted consistent with their neighbors to avoid giving unintended breadth to an Act of Congress).
Our conclusion is fortified by Congress’ decision to limit the saving clauses by the same key words it used in declaring the scope of Title I of OPA, Title I of OPA permits recovery of damages involving vessels “from which oil is discharged, or which pos[e] the substantial threat of a discharge of oil.” 33 U. S. C. § 2702(a). The saving clauses, in parallel manner, permit States to impose liability or requirements “relating to the discharge, or substantial threat of a discharge, of oil.” § 2718(e). In its titles following Title I, OPA addresses matters including licensing and certificates of registry, 104 Stat. 509; duties of senior licensed officers to relieve the master, id., at 511; manning standards for foreign vessels, id., at 513; reporting of marine casualties, ibid.; minimum standards for plating thickness, id., at 515; tank vessel manning requirements, id., at 517; and tank vessel construction standards, id., at 517-518, among other extensive regulations. If Congress had intended to disrupt national uniformity in all of these matters, it would not have done so by placement of the saving clauses in Title I.
The saving clauses are further limited in effect to “this Act, the Act of March 3, 1851..., or section 9509 of [the Internal Revenue Code].” §§ 2718(a) and (c). These explicit qualifiers are inconsistent with interpreting the saving clauses to alter the pre-emptive effect of the PWSA or regulations promulgated thereunder. The text of the statute indicates no intent to allow States to impose wide-ranging regulation of the at-sea operation of tankers. The clauses may preserve a State’s ability to enact laws of a scope similar to Title I, but do not extend to subjects addressed in the other titles of the Act or other acts.
Limiting the saving clauses as we have determined respects the established federal-state balance in matters of maritime commerce between the subjects as to which the States retain concurrent powers and those over which the federal authority displaces state control. We have upheld state laws imposing liability for pollution caused by oil spills. See Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U. S., at 325. Our view of OPA’s saving clauses preserves this important role for the States, which is unchallenged here. We think it quite unlikely that Congress would use a means so indirect as the saving clauses in Title I of OPA to upset the settled division of authority by allowing States to impose additional unique substantive regulation on the at-sea conduct of vessels. We decline to give broad effect to saving clauses where doing so would upset the careful regulatory scheme established by federal law. See, e. g., Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U. S. 374, 385 (1992); American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Central Office Telephone, Inc., 524 U. S. 214, 227-228 (1998).
From the text of OPA and the long-established understanding of the appropriate balance between federal and state regulation of maritime commerce, we hold that the pre-emptive effect of the PWSA and regulations promulgated under it are not affected by OPA. We doubt Congress will be surprised by our conclusion, for the Conference Report on OPA shared our view that the statute “does not disturb the Supreme Court’s decision in Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U. S. 151 (1978).” H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 101-653, p. 122 (1990). The holding in Ray also survives the enactment of OPA undiminished, and we turn to a detailed discussion of that case.
As we mentioned above, the Ray Court confronted á claim by the operator of a Puget Sound refinery that federal law precluded Washington from enforcing laws imposing certain substantive requirements on tankers. The Ray Court prefaced its analysis of the state regulations with the following observation:
“The Court’s prior cases indicate that when a State’s exercise of its police power is challenged under the Supremacy Clause, ‘we start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.’ Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218, 230 (1947).” 435 U. S., at 157.
The fragmentary quote from Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218 (1947), does not support the scope given to it by the Court of Appeals or by respondents.
quoted a fragment of a much longer paragraph found in Rice. The quoted fragment is followed by extensive and careful qualifications to show the different approaches taken by the Court in various contexts. We need not discuss that careful explanation in detail, however. To explain the full intent of the Rice quotation, it suffices to quote in full the sentence in question and two sentences preceding it. The Rice opinion stated: “The question in each ease is what the purpose of Congress was. Congress legislated here in a field which the States have traditionally occupied. So we start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.” 331 U. S., at 230 (citations omitted).
The qualification given by the word “so” and by the preceding sentences in Rice are of considerable consequence. As Rice indicates, an “assumption” of nonpre-emption is not triggered when the State regulates in an area where there has been a history of significant federal presence. See also Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U. S. 519, 525 (1977) (“assumption” is triggered where “the field which Congress is said to have pre-empted has been traditionally occupied by the States”); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U. S. 470, 485 (1996) (citing Rice in case involving medical negligence, a subject historically regulated by the States). In Ray, and in the case before us, Congress has legislated in the field from the earliest days of the Republic, creating an extensive federal statutory and regulatory scheme.
The state laws now in question bear upon national and international maritime commerce, and in this area there is no beginning assumption that concurrent regulation by the State is a valid exercise of its police powers. Rather, we must ask whether the local laws in question are consistent with the federal statutory structure, which has as one of its objectives a uniformity of regulation for maritime commerce. No artificial presumption aids us in determining the scope of appropriate local regulation under the PWSA, which, as we discuss below, does preserve, in Title I of that Act, the historic role of the States to regulate local ports and waters under appropriate circumstances. At the same time, as we also discuss below, uniform, national rules regarding general tanker design, operation, and seaworthiness have been mandated by Title II of the PWSA.
The Ray Court confirmed the important proposition that the subject and scope of Title I of the PWSA allows a State to regulate its ports and waterways, so long as the regulation is based on “the peculiarities of local waters that call for special precautionary measures.” 435 U. S., at 171. Title I allows state rules directed to local circumstances and problems, such as water depth and narrowness, idiosyncratic to a particular port or waterway. Ibid. There is -no preemption by operation of Title I itself if the state regulation is so directed and if the Coast Guard has not adopted regulations on the subject or determined that regulation is unnecessary or inappropriate. This principle is consistent with recognition of an important role for States and localities in the regulation of the Nation’s waterways and ports. E. g., Cooley, 12 How., at 319 (recognizing state authority to adopt plans “applicable to the local peculiarities of the ports within their limits”). It is fundamental in our federal structure that States have vast residual powers. Those powers, unless constrained or displaced by the existence of federal authority or by proper federal enactments, are often exercised in concurrence with those of the National Government. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819).
made apparent, the States may enforce rules governed by Title I of the PWSA unless they run counter to an exercise of federal authority. The analysis under Title I of the PWSA, then, is one of conflict pre-emption, which occurs “when compliance with both state and federal law is impossible, or when the state law'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objective of Congress.’” California v. ARC America Corp., 490 U. S. 93, 100-101 (1989) (citations omitted). In this context, Coast Guard regulations are to be given preemptive effect over conflicting state laws. City of New York v. FCC, 486 U. S. 57, 63-64 (1988) (“ ‘[A] federal agency acting within the scope of its congressionally delegated authority may pre-empt state regulation’ and hence render unenforceable state or local laws that are otherwise not inconsistent with federal law”). Ray defined the relevant inquiry for Title I pre-emption as whether the Coast Guard has promulgated its own requirement on the subject or has decided that no such requirement should be imposed at all. 435 U. S., at 171-172; see also id., at 178 (“ ‘[Wjhere failure of... federal officials affirmatively to exercise their full authority takes on the character of a ruling that no such regulation is appropriate or approved pursuant to the policy of the statute,’ States are not permitted to use their police power to enact such a regulation. Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Board, 330 U. S. 767, 774 (1947)”). Ray also recognized that, even in the context of a regulation related to local waters, a federal official with an overview of all possible ramifications of a particular requirement might be in the best position to balance all the competing interests. Id., at 177.
While Ray explained that Congress, in Title I of the PWSA, preserved state authority to regulate the peculiarities of local waters if there was no conflict with federal regulatory determinations, the Court further held that Congress, in Title II of the PWSA, mandated federal rules on the subjects or matters there specified, demanding uniformity. Id., at 168 (“Title II leaves no room for the States to impose different or stricter design requirements than those which Congress has enacted with the hope of having them internationally adopted or has accepted as the result of international accord. A state law in this area... would frustrate the congressional desire of achieving uniform, international standards”). Title II requires the Coast Guard to impose national regulations governing the general seaworthiness of tankers and their crews. Id., at 160. Under Ray’s interpretation of the Title II PWSA provision now found at 46 U. S. C. § 3703(a), only the Federal Government may regulate the “design, construction, alteration, repair, maintenance, operation, equipping, personnel qualification, and manning” of tanker vessels.
In Ray, this principle was applied to hold that Washington’s tanker design and construction rules were pre-empted. Those requirements failed because they were within a field reserved for federal regulation under 46 U. S. C. §391a (1982 ed.), the predecessor to § 3703(a). We reaffirm Ray’s holding on this point. Contrary to the suggestion of the Court of Appeals, the field of pre-emption established by § 3703(a) cannot be limited to tanker “design” and “construction,” terms which cannot be read in isolation from the other subjects found in that section. Title II of the PWSA covers “design, construction, alteration, repair, maintenance, operation, equipping, personnel qualification, and manning” of tanker vessels. Ibid. Congress has left no room for state regulation of these matters. See Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U. S. 141 (1982) (explaining field pre-emption). As the Ray Court stated: “[T]he Supremacy Clause dictates that the federal judgment that a vessel is safe to navigate United States waters prevail over the contrary state judgment. Enforcement of the state requirements would at least frustrate what seems to us to be the evident congressional intention to establish a uniform federal regime controlling the design of oil tankers.” 435 U. S., at 165.
The existence of some overlapping coverage between the two titles of the PWSA may make it difficult to determine whether a pre-emption question is controlled by conflict preemption principles, applicable generally to Title I, or by field pre-emption rules, applicable generally to Title II. The Ray Court acknowledged the difficulty, but declined to resolve every question by the greater pre-emptive force of Title II. We follow the same approach, and conflict pre-emption under Title I will be applicable in some, although not all, cases. We recognize
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | J | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Harlan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Section 15 (a) (3) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 1068, 29 U. S. C. §215 (a)(3), makes it unlawful for an émployer covered by that Act—
“to discharge or in any other manner. discriminate against any employee because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or related to this Act . . . -
By § 17 of the Act, 52 Stat. 1069, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 217, the District Courts are given jurisdiction—
“for cause shown, to restrain violations of section ■ 15: Provided, That no court shall have jurisdiction, in ^any action brought by the Secretary of ’ Labor to restrain such- violations, to .order the pay-mefit to employees of unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation or an additional equal amount as liquidated damages in such action.”-'
The question for decision is whether, in an action • brought'by the Secretary of Labor to enjoin violations of § 15 (a) (3), Section 17 empowers a District Court to order reimbursement for loss of wages caused by an unlawful discharge or other discrimination.
The facts, as found by the District Court, are hot in dispute. Several of the employees of the respondent corporation had sought the aid of the Secretary of Labor, petitioner he.re, in seeking to recover wages allegedly unpaid in violation of §§ 6 (a) and 7 (a) of the Act. The Secretary instituted an action pursuant to § 16 (c) of the statute, 63 Stat. 919, 29 U. S. C. § 216 (c), on behalf of the aggrieved employees, for. the recovery of the unpaid compensation. After the commencement of such action, respondents commenced a course of discriminatory conduct against three of the complaining employees, culminating in their discharge. In a second action by the Secretary, pursuant to § 17, this discrimination was found by the District Court to have been caused by respondents’ “displeasure” over the actions of the employees. in authorizing suit.
Finding the evidence of unlawful discrimination “clear and convincing,” the District Court granted an injunction against further discrimination and ordered reinstatement of the three discharged employees, without loss of seniority. As to reimburseme: c for loss of wages, the court, expressly reserving the question whether it had jurisdiction to order such reimbursement, declined in the exercise of its discretion to do so. On appeal, the Court of Appeals did not reach the question of abuse of discretion, for-it held that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to order reimbursement of lost, wages resulting from an unlawful discharge. 260 F. 2d 929. The decision being in conflict with that of the Court of A'ppeals for the Second Circuit in Walling v. O’Grady, 146 F. 2d 422, we granted certiorari. 359 U. S. 964.
We initially consider § 17 apart from the effect of its proviso, which was added in 1949. The court below took as the touchstone for * decision the principle that to be upheld the jurisdiction here contested “must be expressly conferred by an act of Congress or be necessarily implied from a congressional enactment.” 260 F. 2d, at 933. In this the court was mistaken. The proper criterion is that laid down in Porter v. Warner Co., 328 U. S. 395. This Court there dealt with an action brought by the Price Administrator under the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 to enjoin the collection of excessive rents and to require the landlord to reimburse it-s tenants for moneys paid as a result of past violations. We upheld the implied power to order reimbursement, in language of the greatest relevance here:
“Thus the Administrator invoked the jurisdiction of the District Court to enjoin acts and practices made illegal by the Act and to enforce compliance witii the Act. Such a jurisdiction is an equitable one. Unless otherwise provided by statute, all the inherent equitable powers of the District Court are available for the proper and complete exercise of that jurisdiction. And since the public interest is involved in a proceeding of this nature, those equi- . table powers assume an even broader and more flexible character than when only a private controversy is at stake¡ .... [T]he court may go beyond the matters immediately underlying its equitable jurisdiction ... and give whatever other relief may be necessary under the circumstances. . . .
“Moreover, the comprehensiveness of this equitable jurisdiction is not to be denied or limited in the absence of a clear and valid legislative command. Unless a statute in so many words, or by a necessary' and inescapable inference, restricts the court’s jurisdiction in eqüity, the full scope of that jurisdiction is to be recognized and applied. The great principles of equity, securing complete justice, should not be yielded to light inferences, or doubtful construction.’ Brown v. Swann, 10 Pet. 497, 503. . . .” 328 U. S., at 397-398.
The applicability of this principle is not to be denied, either because the Court there considered a wartime statute, or because, having set forth the governing inquiry,, it went on to find in the language of the statute affirmative confirmation of the power to order reimbursement. Id., at 399. When Congress entrusts to an equity court the enforcement of prohibitions contained in a regulatory enactment, it must be taken to have acted cognizant of the historic power of equity £o provide complete relief in light of the statutory purposes. As this Court long ago recognized, “there is inherent in the Courts of Equity a jurisdiction to . . . give effect to the policy of the legislature.” Clark v. Smith, 13 Pet. 195, 203. To the policy of the Fair Labor Standards Act we therefore now turn.
The central aim of the Act was to achieve, in those industries within its scope, certain minimum labor standards. See § 2 of the Act, 52 Stat. 1060, 29 U. S. C. § 202. The provisions of the statute affect weekly wage dealings between vast numbers of business establishments and employees. For weighty practical and other reasons, Congress did not. seek to secure compliance with prescribed standards through continuing detailed federal supervision or inspection of payrolls. Rather it chose to rely on information and complaints received from employees seeking to vindicate rights claimed to have been denied, plainly, effective enforcement could thus only bé. expected if employees felt free to approach officials with their grievances. This end' the prohibition of S 15 (a) (3) against discharges and other discriminatory practices was designed to serve. For it needs no argument to show that fear of economic retaliation might often operate to induce aggrieved employees quietly to accept substandard conditions. Cf. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 397. By the proscription of retaliatory acts set forth in § 15 (a)(3), and its enforcement in equity by the Sec-, retary pursuant to § 17, Congress sought to foster a climate in which compliance with the substantive provisions of the Act would be enhanced.
In this context, the. significance of reimbursement of lost wages becomes apparent. To an employee considering an attempt to secure his just wage deserts under the-Act, the valué of such an effort may pale when set against the prospect of discharge and the total loss'of wages-for the indeterminate period necessary to seek and obtain reinstatement. Resort to statutory remedies might thus often take on the character of a calculated risk, with restitution of partial deficiencies in wages due for past work perhaps obtainable only at the cost of irremediable entire loss of pay for an unpredictable period. Faced with such alternatives, employees understandably might decide that matters had best be left as they are. We cannot read the Act as presenting those it sought to protect with what is little more than a Hobson’s choice.
Respondents argue that, in the absence of a contrary contractual provision, an employee cannot’recover lost wages owing to a discriminatory discharge, and that the jurisdiction here invoked is therefore to be regarded as “punitive,” outside the function of equity unless expressly authorized by the statute. We intimate no view as to the validity of the premise, for it in no way supports the conclusion. Whatever- the rights of the parties may be under traditional notions of contract law, it is clear that under § 15 (a) (3) such a discharge is not permissible. Even assuming, without deciding, that the Act did not contemplate the private vindication of rights it bestowed, the public remedy is not thereby rendered punitive, where the measure of reimbursement is compensatory only, Respondents cannot be heard to assert that wages are ordered to be paid for services which were not performed, for it was the employer’s own unlawful conduct which deprived the employees of their opportunity to render services.
It is contended, however, that even though equitable jurisdiction to restore lost wages resulting from an unlawful discharge may originally have existed under § 17, such jurisdiction was withdrawn by the 1949 proviso which disabled courts in § 17 actions from awarding “unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation or an additional equal amount as liquidated damages . . . .” Ante, p. 289. When considered against its background we think the proviso has no such effect.
Shortly before the enactment of this proviso the Court of Appeals for .the Second Circuit had decided in McComb v. Frank Scerbo & Sons, 177 F. 2d 137, that in a § 17 suit brought by the Secretary to enjoin violations of the minimum wage and overtime provisions of the Act, the court had power to order reimbursement of iinpaid overtime wages. The effect of this decision was to enable the Secretary in such a suit to recover on-behalf of employees that which would otherwise have been recoverable, only, in an action brought by the employees themselves under § 16 (b) of the statute, 52 Stat. 1069, 29 U. S. C. § 216 (b). The § 17 proviso was aiméd at doing away with this result. Even so, Congress did not see fit to undo the effects of Scerbo entirely, for at the time it enacted the § 17 proviso it also added to the Act § 16 (c), whereby the Secretary was empowered to bring a representative action on behalf of' employees to recover unpaid wages in cases other than those involving “an issue of law which has not been settled finally by the courts.” 63 Stat. 919, 29 U. S. C. § 216 (c). Thus, presumably Congress felt that the Secretary should not lend his weight to, nor be. burdened with, actions for unpaid wages except in the clearest cases.
We find no indication in the- language of the § 17 proviso, or in the legislative history, that Congress intended the proviso to have a wider effect, that is, that it was intended to apply to reimbursement of lost wages incident to a wrongful discharge, as distinguished from the recoupment of underpayments of the statutorily prescribed rates for those while still employed. The proviso speaks entirely in terms of unpaid minimum wages and overtime. In effectuating the policies of the Act the proper reach of equity power in suits by the Secretary under the wage provisions of the statute, and that in suits under the discharge provisions, are attended by quite different considerations, which, in passing the 1949 amendments, Congress evidently had in mind. We are not persuaded by respondents’ argument that because the Second Circuit in Scerbo partially relied on its earlier decision in Walling v. O’Grady, supra, and because the House Conference Report on the 1949 amendments stated that the § 17 proviso “will have the effect of reversing such decisions as McComb v. Scerbo . . . in which the court included a restitütioh order in an injunction decree granted under section 17,” H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 1453, 81st Cong., lst Sess., p. 32, the proviso must be taken as having been intended to overrule the O’Grady case as well. O’Grady was a discriminatory "discharge case, not a wage case as was Scerbo. And before the 1949 amendments expressions of other lower courts had indicated a point of yiew similar to that espoused in Scerbo. See Fleming v. Alderman, 51 F. Supp. 800; Walling v. Miller, 138 F. 2d 629; Fleming v. Warshawsky & Co., 123 F. 2d 622.
Rather than expressing a general repudiation of equitable jurisdiction to order reimbursement to effectuate the policies of the Act, we think that the 1949 amend-’ ments evidence a purpose to make only limited modifications in the nature and extent of the Secretary’s power to obtain reimbursement of unpaid compensation. This being so, there is no warrant for construing the § 17 proviso as reaching beyond suits to enjoin violations of the minimum wage and overtime provisions of the statute, so as wholly to eradicate any jurisdiction to restore wage losses to employees discharged in violation of § 15 (a) (3). To the contrary, in view of the related character of the issues presented in O’Grady and Scerbo, the modification in the area treated by the latter case bespeaks an intention to leave the O’Grady decision intact. The 1949 amendments, then, only serve to confirm the result we reach independently of them.
We hold that, in an .action by the Secretary to restrain violations of § 15 (a)(3), a District Court has jurisdiction to order an employer to reimburse employees, unlawfully discharged or otherwise discriminated against, for wages lost because of that discharge or discrimination. The Court of Appeals did not reach the question whether the District Cohrt abused its discretion in declining to order reimbursement. While, because of what we have found to be the statutory purposes there is doubtless little room for the exercise of discretion not to order reimbursement, since we do not have the entire record before us we shall remand the case to the Court of Appeals for consideration of that issue.
Reversed and remanded.
Mr. Justice Douglas, while joining in this opinion, agrees with Mr. Justice Whittaker that other remedies are available and that any remedy obtained in this equity action is complementary to them.
In addition to the conduct prohibited by §15 (a)(3), various other activities are .proscribed by paragraphs (1), (2), (4), and (5) of subdivision (a) of that section.
The opinion of the District Court is reported in 13 WH Cases 709.
Cf. Bonner v. Elizabeth Arden, Inc., 177 F. 2d 703, 705; Powell v. Washington Post Co., 105 U. S. App. D. C. 374, 375, 267 F. 2d 651, 652.
A further limitation was that there would be no right to seek double damages, which are recoverable only in actions brought by employees under § 16 (b).
The Conference Report makes this clear: “This proviso has been inserted ... in view of the provision of the conference agreement contained in section 16 (c) of the act which authorizes the Administrator in certain cases to bring suits for damages for unpaid minimum wages and overtime compensation owing to employees at the written request of such employees. Under the conference agreement the proviso does not preclude the Administrator from joining in a single complaint causes of action arising under section 16 (c) and section 17.” H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 1453, 81st Cong., 1st Sess.,- p. 32; see 95 Cong. Rec. 14879.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | G | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner contends that its efforts to affect the product standard-setting process of a private association are immune from antitrust liability under the Noerr doctrine primarily because the association’s standards are widely adopted into law by state and local governments. Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U. S. 127 (1961) (Noerr). The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that Noerr immunity did not apply. We affirm.
I
The National Fire Protection Association (Association) is a private, voluntary organization with more than 31,500 individual and group members representing industry, labor, academia, insurers, organized medicine, firefighters, and government. The Association, among other things, publishes product standards and codes related to fire protection through a process known as “consensus standard making. ” One of the codes it publishes is the National Electrical Code (Code), which establishes product and performance requirements for the design and installation of electrical wiring systems. Revised every three years, the Code is the most influential electrical code in the nation. A substantial number of state and local governments routinely adopt the Code into law with little or no change; private certification laboratories, such as Underwriters Laboratories, normally will not list and label an electrical product that does not meet Code standards; many underwriters will refuse to insure structures that are not built in conformity with the Code; and many electrical inspectors, contractors, and distributors will not use a product that falls outside the Code.
Among the electrical products covered by the Code is electrical conduit, the hollow tubing used as a raceway to carry electrical wires through the walls and floors of buildings. Throughout the relevant period, the Code permitted using electrical conduit made of steel, and almost all conduit sold was in fact steel conduit. Starting in 1980, respondent began to offer plastic conduit made of polyvinyl chloride. Respondent claims its plastic conduit offers significant competitive advantages over steel conduit, including pliability, lower installed cost, and lower susceptibility to short circuiting. In 1980, however, there was also a scientific basis for concern that, during fires in high-rise buildings, polyvinyl chloride conduit might burn and emit toxic fumes.
Respondent initiated a proposal to include polyvinyl chloride conduit as an approved type of electrical conduit in the 1981 edition of the Code. Following approval by one of the Association’s professional panels, this proposal was scheduled for consideration at the 1980 annual meeting, where it could be adopted or rejected by a simple majority of the members present. Alarmed that, if approved, respondent’s product might pose a competitive threat to steel conduit, petitioner, the Nation’s largest producer of steel conduit, met to plan strategy with, among others, members of the steel industry, other steel conduit manufacturers, and its independent sales agents. They collectively agreed to exclude respondent’s product from the 1981 Code by packing the upcoming annual meeting with new Association members whose only function would be to vote against the polyvinyl chloride proposal.
Combined, the steel interests recruited 230 persons to join the Association and to attend the annual meeting to vote against the proposal. Petitioner alone recruited 155 persons —including employees, executives, sales agents, the agents’ employees, employees from two divisions that did not sell electrical products, and the wife of a national sales director. Petitioner and the other steel interests also paid over $100,000 for the membership, registration, and attendance expenses of these voters. At the annual meeting, the steel group voters were instructed where to sit and how and when to vote by group leaders who used walkie-talkies and hand signals to facilitate communication. Few of the steel group voters had any of the technical documentation necessary to follow the meeting. None of them spoke at the meeting to give their reasons for opposing the proposal to approve polyvinyl chloride conduit. Nonetheless, with their solid vote in opposition, the proposal was rejected and returned to committee by a vote of 394 to 390. Respondent appealed the membership’s vote to the Association’s Board of Directors, but the Board denied the appeal on the ground that, although the Association’s rules had been circumvented, they had not been violated.
In October 1981, respondent brought this suit in Federal District Court, alleging that petitioner and others had unreasonably restrained trade in the electrical conduit market in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act. 26 Stat. 209, 15 U. S. C. § 1. A bifurcated jury trial began in March 1985. Petitioner conceded that it had conspired with the other steel interests to exclude respondent’s product from the Code and that it had a pecuniary interest to do so. The jury, instructed under the rule of reason that respondent carried the burden of showing that the anticompetitive effects of petitioner’s actions outweighed any procompetitive benefits of standard setting, found petitioner liable. In answers to special interrogatories, the jury found that petitioner did not violate any rules of the Association and acted, at least in part, based on a genuine belief that plastic conduit was unsafe, but that petitioner nonetheless did “subvert” the consensus standard-making process of the Association. App. 23-24. The jury also made special findings that petitioner’s actions had an adverse impact on competition, were not the least restrictive means of expressing petitioner’s opposition to the use of polyvinyl chloride conduit in the marketplace, and unreasonably restrained trade in violation of the antitrust laws. The jury then awarded respondent damages, to be trebled, of $3.8 million for lost profits resulting from the effect that excluding polyvinyl chloride conduit from the 1981 Code had of its own force in the marketplace. No damages were awarded for injuries stemming from the adoption of the 1981 Code by governmental entities.
The District Court then granted a judgment n.o.v. for petitioner, reasoning that Noerr immunity applied because the Association was “akin to a legislature” and because petitioner, “by the use of methods consistent with acceptable standards of political action, genuinely intended to influence the [Association] with respect to the National Electrical Code, and to thereby influence the various state and local legislative bodies which adopt the [Code].” App. to Pet. for Cert. 28a, 30a. The Court of Appeals reversed, rejecting both the argument that the Association should be treated as a “quasi-legislative” body because legislatures routinely adopt the Code and the argument that efforts to influence the Code were immune under Noerr as indirect attempts to influence state and local governments. 817 F. 2d 938 (1987). We granted certiorari to address important issues regarding the application of Noerr immunity to private standard-setting associations. 484 U. S. 814 (1987).
H — t HH
Concerted efforts to restrain or monopolize trade by petitioning government officials are protected from antitrust liability under the doctrine established by Noerr; Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U. S. 657, 669-672 (1965); and California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U. S. 508 (1972). The scope of this protection depends, however, on the source, context, and nature of the anticompetitive restraint at issue. “[W]here a restraint upon trade or monopolization is the result of valid governmental action, as opposed to private action,” those urging the governmental action enjoy absolute immunity from antitrust liability for the anti-competitive restraint. Noerr, 365 U. S., at 136; see also Pennington, supra, at 671. In addition, where, independent of any government action, the anticompetitive restraint results directly from private action, the restraint cannot form the basis for antitrust liability if it is “incidental” to a valid effort to influence governmental action. Noerr, supra, at 143. The validity of such efforts, and thus the applicability of Noerr immunity, varies with the context and nature of the activity. A publicity campaign directed at the general public, seeking legislation or executive action, enjoys antitrust immunity even when the campaign employs unethical and deceptive methods. Noerr, supra, at 140-141. But in less political arenas, unethical and deceptive practices can constitute abuses of administrative or judicial processes that may result in antitrust violations. California Motor Transport, supra, at 512-513.
In this case, the restraint of trade on which liability was predicated was the Association’s exclusion of respondent’s product from the Code, and no damages were imposed for the incorporation of that Code by any government. The relevant context is thus the standard-setting process of a private association. Typically, private standard-setting associations, like the Association in this case, include members having horizontal and vertical business relations. See generally 7 P. Areeda, Antitrust Law ¶ 1477, p. 343 (1986) (trade and standard-setting associations routinely treated as continuing conspiracies of their members). There is no doubt that the members of such associations often have economic incentives to restrain competition and that the product standards set by such associations have a serious potential for anticompetitive harm. See American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U. S. 556, 571 (1982). Agreement on a product standard is, after all, implicitly an agreement not to manufacture, distribute, or purchase certain types of products. Accordingly, private standard-setting associations have traditionally been objects of antitrust scrutiny. See, e. g., ibid.; Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U. S. 656 (1961) (per curiam). See also FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 U. S. 447 (1986). When, however, private associations promulgate safety standards based on the merits of objective expert judgments and through procedures that prevent the standard-setting process from being biased by members with economic interests in stifling product competition, cf. Hydrolevel, supra, at 570-573 (noting absence of “meaningful safeguards”), those private standards can have significant procompetitive advantages. It is this potential for pro-competitive benefits that has led most lower courts to apply rule-of-reason analysis to product standard-setting by private associations.
Given this context, petitioner does not enjoy the immunity accorded those who merely urge the government to restrain trade. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the Association cannot be treated as a “quasi-legislative” body simply because legislatures routinely adopt the Code the Association publishes. 817 F. 2d, at 943-944. Whatever de facto authority the Association enjoys, no official authority has been conferred on it by any government, and the decisionmaking body of the Association is composed, at least in part, of persons with economic incentives to restrain trade. See Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U. S. 690, 707-708 (1962). See also id., at 706-707; Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U. S. 773, 791-792 (1975). “We may presume, absent a showing to the contrary, that [a government] acts in the public interest. A private party, on the other hand, may be presumed to be acting primarily on his or its own behalf.” Hallie v. Eau Claire, 471 U. S. 34, 45 (1985). The dividing line between restraints resulting from governmental action and those resulting from private action may not always be obvious. But where, as here, the restraint is imposed by persons unaccountable to the public and without official authority, many of whom have personal financial interests in restraining competition, we have no difficulty concluding that the restraint has resulted from private action.
Noerr immunity might still apply, however, if, as petitioner argues, the exclusion of polyvinyl chloride conduit from the Code, and the effect that exclusion had of its own force in the marketplace, were incidental to a valid effort to influence governmental action. Petitioner notes that the lion’s share of the anticompetitive effect in this case came from the predictable adoption of the Code into law by a large number of state and local governments. See 817 F. 2d, at 939, n. 1. Indeed, petitioner argues that, because state and local governments rely so heavily on the Code and lack the resources or technical expertise to second-guess it, efforts to influence the Association’s standard-setting process are the most effective means of influencing legislation regulating electrical conduit. This claim to Noerr immunity has some force. The effort to influence governmental action in this case certainly cannot be characterized as a sham given the actual adoption of the 1981 Code into a number of statutes and local ordinances. Nor can we quarrel with petitioner’s contention that, given the widespread adoption of the Code into law, any effect the 1981 Code had in the marketplace of its own force was, in the main, incidental to petitioner’s genuine effort to influence governmental action. And, as petitioner persuasively argues, the claim of Noerr immunity cannot be dismissed on the ground that the conduct at issue involved no “direct” petitioning of government officials, for Noerr itself immunized a form of “indirect” petitioning. See Noerr (immunizing a publicity campaign directed at the general public on the ground that it was part of an effort to influence legislative and executive action).
Nonetheless, the validity of petitioner’s actions remains an issue. We cannot agree with petitioner’s absolutist position that the Noerr doctrine immunizes every concerted effort that is genuinely intended to influence governmental action. If all such conduct were immunized then, for example, competitors would be free to enter into horizontal price agreements as long as they wished to propose that price as an appropriate level for governmental ratemaking or price supports. But see Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 324 U. S. 439, 456-463 (1945). Horizontal conspiracies or boycotts designed to exact higher prices or other economic advantages from the government would be immunized on the ground that they are genuinely intended to influence the government to agree to the conspirators’ terms. But see Georgia v. Evans, 316 U. S. 159 (1942). Firms could claim immunity for boycotts or horizontal output restrictions on the ground that they are intended to dramatize the plight of their industry and spur legislative action. Immunity might even be claimed for anticompetitive mergers on the theory that they give the merging corporations added political clout. Nor is it necessarily dispositive that packing the Association’s meeting may have been the most effective means of securing government action, for one could imagine situations where the most effective means of influencing government officials is bribery, and we have never suggested that that kind of attempt to influence the government merits protection. We thus conclude that the Noerr immunity of anticompetitive activity intended to influence the government depends not only on its impact, but also on the context and nature of the activity.
Here petitioner’s actions took place within the context of the standard-setting process of a private association. Having concluded that the Association is not a “quasi-legislative” body, we reject petitioner’s argument that any efforts to influence the Association must be treated as efforts to influence a “quasi-legislature” and given the same wide berth accorded legislative lobbying. That rounding up supporters is an acceptable and constitutionally protected method of influencing elections does not mean that rounding up economically interested persons to set private standards must also be protected. Nor do we agree with petitioner’s contention that, regardless of the Association’s nonlegislative status, the effort to influence the Code should receive the same wide latitude given ethically dubious efforts to influence legislative action in the political arena, see Noerr, 365 U. S., at 140-141, simply because the ultimate aim of the effort to influence the private standard-setting process was (principally) legislative action. The ultimate aim is not dispositive. A misrepresentation to a court would not necessarily be entitled to the same antitrust immunity allowed deceptive practices in the political arena simply because the odds were very good that the court’s decision would be codified — nor for that matter would misrepresentations made under oath at a legislative committee hearing in the hopes of spurring legislative action.
What distinguishes this case from Noerr and its progeny is that the context and nature of petitioner’s activity make it the type of commercial activity that has traditionally had its validity determined by the antitrust laws themselves. True, in Noerr we immunized conduct that could be characterized as a conspiracy among railroads to destroy business relations between truckers and their customers. Noerr, supra, at 142. But we noted there:
“There are no specific findings that the railroads attempted directly to persuade anyone not to deal with the truckers. Moreover, all the evidence in the record, both oral and documentary, deals with the railroads’ efforts to influence the passage and enforcement of laws. Circulars, speeches, newspaper articles, editorials, magazine articles, memoranda and all other documents discuss in one way or another the railroads’ charges that heavy trucks injure the roads, violate the laws and create traffic hazards, and urge that truckers should be forced to pay a fair share of the costs of rebuilding the roads, that they should be compelled to obey the laws, and that limits should be placed upon the weight of the loads they are permitted to carry.” 365 U. S., at 142-143.
In light of those findings, we characterized the railroads’ activity as a classic “attempt ... to influence legislation by a campaign of publicity,” an “inevitable” and “incidental” effect of which was “the infliction of some direct injury upon the interests of the party against whom the campaign is directed.” Id., at 143. The essential character of such a publicity campaign was, we concluded, political, and could not be segregated from the activity’s impact on business. Rather, the plaintiff’s cause of action simply embraced the inherent possibility in such political fights “that one group or the other will get hurt by the arguments that are made.” Id., at 144. As a political activity, special factors counseled against regulating the publicity campaign under the antitrust laws:
“Insofar as [the Sherman] Act sets up a code of ethics at all, it is a code that condemns trade restraints, not political activity, and, as we have already pointed out, a publicity campaign to influence governmental action falls clearly into the category of political activity. The proscriptions of the Act, tailored as they are for the business world, are not at all appropriate for application in the political arena. Congress has traditionally exercised extreme caution in legislating with respect to problems relating to the conduct of political activities, a caution which has been reflected in the decisions of this Court interpreting such legislation. All of this caution would go for naught if we permitted an extension of the Sherman Act to regulate activities of that nature simply because those activities have a commercial impact and involve conduct that can be termed unethical.” Id., at 140-141 (footnote omitted).
In Noerr, then, the political context and nature of the activity precluded inquiry into its antitrust validity.
Here the context and nature of the activity do not counsel against inquiry into its validity. Unlike the publicity campaign in Noerr, the activity at issue here did not take place in the open political arena, where partisanship is the hallmark of decisionmaking, but within the confines of a private standard-setting process. The validity of conduct within that process has long been defined and circumscribed by the antitrust laws without regard to whether the private standards are likely to be adopted into law. See supra, at 500. Indeed, because private standard-setting by associations comprising firms with horizontal and vertical business relations is permitted at all under the antitrust laws only on the understanding that it will be conducted in a nonpartisan manner offering procompetitive benefits, see ibid., the standards of conduct in this context are, at least in some respects, more rigorous than the standards of conduct prevailing in the partisan political arena or in the adversarial process of adjudication. The activity at issue here thus cannot, as in Noerr, be characterized as an activity that has traditionally been regulated with extreme caution, see Noerr, 365 U. S., at 141, or as an activity that “bear[s] little if any resemblance to the combinations normally held violative of the Sherman Act,” id., at 136. And petitioner did not confine itself to efforts to persuade an independent decisionmaker, cf. id., at 138, 139 (describing the immunized conduct as “mere solicitation”); rather, it organized and orchestrated the actual exercise of the Association’s decisionmaking authority in setting a standard. Nor can the setting of the Association’s Code be characterized as merely an exercise of the power of persuasion, for it in part involves the exercise of market power. The Association’s members, after all, include consumers, distributors, and manufacturers of electrical conduit, and any agreement to exclude polyvinyl chloride conduit from the Code is in part an implicit agreement not to trade in that type of electrical conduit. Cf. id., at 136. Although one could reason backwards from the legislative impact of the Code to the conclusion that the conduct at issue here is “political,” we think that, given the context and nature of the conduct, it can more aptly be characterized as commercial activity with a political impact. Just as' the antitrust laws should not regulate political activities “simply because those activities have a commercial impact,” id., at 141, so the antitrust laws should not necessarily immunize what are in essence commercial activities simply because they have a political impact.
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U. S. 886 (1982), is not to the contrary. In that case we held that the First Amendment protected the nonviolent elements of a boycott of white merchants organized by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and designed to make white government and business leaders comply with a list of demands for equality and racial justice. Although the boy-cotters intended to inflict economic injury on the merchants, the boycott was not motivated by any desire to lessen competition or to reap economic benefits but by the aim of vindicating rights of equality and freedom lying at the heart of the Constitution, and the boycotters were consumers who did not stand to profit financially from a lessening of competition in the boycotted market. Id., at 914-915.. Here, in contrast, petitioner was at least partially motivated by the desire to lessen competition, and, because of petitioner^ line of business, stood to reap substantial economic benefits from making it difficult for respondent to compete.
Thus in this case the context and nature of petitioner’s efforts to influence the Code persuade us that the validity of those efforts must, despite their political impact, be evaluated under the standards of conduct set forth by the antitrust laws that govern the private standard-setting process. The antitrust validity of these efforts is not established, without more, by petitioner’s literal compliance with the rules of the Association, for the hope of procompetitive benefits depends upon the existence of safeguards sufficient to prevent the standard-setting process from being biased by members with economic interests in restraining competition. An association cannot validate the anticompetitive activities of its members simply by adopting rules that fail to provide such safeguards. The issue of immunity in this case thus collapses into the issue of antitrust liability. Although we do not here set forth the rules of antitrust liability governing the private standard-setting process, we hold that at least where, as here, an economically interested party exercises decision-making authority in formulating a product standard for a private association that comprises market participants, that party enjoys no Noerr immunity from any antitrust liability flowing from the effect the standard has of its own force in the marketplace.
This conclusion does not deprive state and local governments of input and information from interested individuals or organizations or leave petitioner without ample means to petition those governments. Cf. Noerr, 365 U. S., at 137-138. See also California Motor Transport, 404 U. S., at 510. Petitioner, and others concerned about the safety or competitive threat of polyvinyl chloride conduit, can, with full antitrust immunity, engage in concerted efforts to influence those governments through direct lobbying, publicity campaigns, and other traditional avenues of political expression. To the extent state and local governments are more difficult to persuade through these other avenues, that no doubt reflects their preference for and confidence in the nonpartisan consensus process that petitioner has undermined. Petitioner remains free to take advantage of the forum provided by the standard-setting process by presenting and vigorously arguing accurate scientific evidence before a nonpartisan private standard-setting body. And petitioner can avoid the strictures of the private standard-setting process by attempting to influence legislatures through other forums. What petitioner may not do (without exposing itself to possible antitrust liability for direct injuries) is bias the process by, as in this case, stacking the private standard-setting body with decisionmakers sharing their economic interest in restraining competition.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
Respondent also sought a tentative interim amendment to the Code, but that was denied on the ground that there was not sufficient exigency to merit an interim amendment. The Association subsequently approved use of polyvinyl chloride conduit for buildings of less than three stories in the 1984 Code, and for all buildings in the 1987 Code.
Although the District Court was of the view that at trial respondent relied solely on the theory that its injury “flowed from legislative action,” App. to Pet. for Cert. 31a, the Court of Appeals determined that respondent was awarded damages only on the theory “that the stigma of not obtaining [Code] approval of its products and [petitioner’s] ‘marketing’ of that stigma caused independent marketplace harm to [respondent] in those jurisdictions permitting use of [polyvinyl chloride] conduit, as well as those which later adopted the 1984 [Code], which permitted use of [polyvinyl chloride] conduit in buildings less than three stories high. [Respondent] did not seek redress for any injury arising from the adoption of the [Code] by the various governments.” 817 F. 2d 938, 941, n. 3 (1987) (emphasis added). We decide the case as it was framed by the Court of Appeals.
We also granted certiorari on the issue whether, if not immune under Noerr, petitioner’s conduct violated the Sherman Act, but we now vacate our grant of that issue as improvident.
Of course, in whatever forum, private action that is not genuinely aimed at procuring favorable government action is a mere sham that cannot be deemed a valid effort to influence government action. Noerr, 365 U. S., at 144; California Motor Transport, 404 U. S., at 511.
“Product standardization might impair competition in several ways. . . . [It] might deprive some consumers of a desired product, eliminate quality competition, exclude rival producers, or facilitate oligopolistic pricing by easing rivals’ ability to monitor each other’s prices.” 7 P. Areeda, Antitrust Law ¶ 1503, p. 373 (1986).
See 2 J. von Kalinowski, Antitrust Laws and Trade Regulation §§6I.01[3], 61.03, 61.04, pp. 61-6 to 61-7, 61-18 to 61-29 (1981) (collecting cases). Concerted efforts to enforce (rather than just agree upon) private product standards face more rigorous antitrust scrutiny. See Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U. S. 656, 659-660 (1961) (per curiam). See also Fashion Originators’ Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U. S. 457 (1941).
See, e. g., California Motor Transport, supra, at 513 (stating in dicta that “Conspiracy with a licensing authority to eliminate a competitor” or “bribery of a public purchasing agent” may violate the antitrust laws); Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U. S. 657, 671, and n. 4 (1965) (holding that immunity applied but noting that the trade restraint at issue “was the act of a public official who is not claimed to be a co-conspirator” and contrasting Continental Ore); Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U. S. 690, 707-708 (1962); 1 P. Areeda & D. Turner, Antitrust Law ¶ 206 (1978) (discussing the extent to which Noerr immunity should apply to commercial transactions involving the government). See also Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U. S. 773, 791-792 (1975); Continental Ore, supra, at 706-707.
The effect, independent of government action, that the 1981 Code had in the marketplace may to some extent have been exacerbated by petitioner’s efforts to “market” the stigma respondent’s product suffered by being excluded from the Code. See 817 F. 2d, at 941, n. 3. Given our disposition infra, we need not decide whether, or to what extent, these “marketing” efforts alter the incidental status of the resulting anticompetitive harm. See generally Noerr, 365 U. S., at 142 (noting that in that case there were, “no specific findings that the railroads attempted directly to persuade anyone not to deal with the truckers”).
Similarly in California Motor Transport any antitrust review of the validity of the activity at issue was limited and structured by the fact that there the antitrust defendants were “us[ing] the channels and procedures of state and federal agencies and courts.” 404 U. S., at 511; see also id., at 512-513.
It is admittedly difficult to draw the precise lines separating anti-competitive political activity that is immunized despite its commercial impact from anticompetitive commercial activity that is unprotected despite its political impact, and this is itself a case close to the line. For that reason we caution that our decision today depends on the context and nature of the activity. Although criticizing the uncertainty of such a particularized inquiry, post, at 513, the dissent does not dispute that the types of activity we describe supra, at 503-504, could not be immune under Noerr and fails to offer an intelligible alternative for distinguishing those nonim-mune activities from the activity at issue in this case. Rather, the dissent states without elaboration that the sham exception “is enough to- guard against flagrant abuse,” post, at 516, apparently embracing the conclusion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that the sham exception covers the activity of a defendant who “genuinely seeks to achieve his governmental result, but does so through improper means.” Sessions Tank Liners, Inc. v. Joor Mfg., Inc., 827 F. 2d 458, 465, n. 5 (1987) (emphasis in original). Such a use of the word “sham” distorts its meaning and bears little relation to the sham exception Noerr described to cover activity that was not genuinely intended to influence governmental action. 365 U. S., at 144. See also P. Areeda & H. Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 203. 1a, pp. 13-14 (Supp. 1987). More importantly, the Ninth Circuit’s approach renders “sham” no more than a label courts could apply to activity they deem unworthy of antitrust immunity (probably based on unarticulated consideration of the nature and context of the activity), thus providing a certain superficial certainty but no real “intelligible guidance” to courts or litigants. Post, at 513. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the very activity the dissent deems protected was an unprotected “sham.” 827 F. 2d, at 465.
Although the absence of such anticompetitive motives and incentives is relevant to determining whether petitioner’s restraint of trade is protected under Claiborne Hardware, we do not suggest that the absence of anticompetitive purpose is necessary for Noerr immunity. As the dissent points out, in Noerr itself the major purpose of the activity at issue was anticompetitive. Post, at 512-513. Our statement that the “ultimate aim” of petitioner “is not dispositive,” supra, at 504, stands only for the proposition that, at least outside the political context, the mere fact that an anticompetitive activity is also intended to influence governmental action is not alone sufficient to render that activity immune from antitrust liability.
Even petitioner’s counsel concedes, for example, that Noerr would not apply if the Association had a rule giving the steel conduit manufacturers a veto over changes in the Code. Tr. of Oral Arg. 41-42.
The dissent mistakenly asserts that we today hold that Noerr immunity does not apply to mere efforts to persuade others to exclude a competitor’s product from a private code. See post, at 514-516. Our holding is expressly limited to cases where an “economically interested party exercises decisionmaking authority in formulating a product standard for a private association that comprises market participants.” Supra, at 509 (emphasis added); see also supra, at 506-507 (relying in part on the distinction between activity involving the exercise of decisionmaking authority and market power and activity involving mere attempts to persuade an independent decisionmaker). Cf. Noerr, 365 U. S., at 136. The dissent also mistakenly asserts that this description encompasses all private standard-setting associations. See post, at 515. In fact, many such associations are composed of members with expertise but no economic interest in suppressing competition. See, e. g., Sessions, supra, at 461, and n. 2.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | H | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Harlan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
We brought this case here to consider whether The Harrisburg, 119 U. S. 199, in which this Court held in 1886 that maritime law does not afford a cause of action for wrongful death, should any longer be regarded as acceptable law.
The complaint sets forth that Edward Moragne, a longshoreman, was killed while working aboard the vessel Palmetto State in navigable waters within the State of Florida. Petitioner, as his widow and representative of his estate, brought this suit in a state court against respondent States Marine Lines, Inc., the owner of the vessel, to recover damages for wrongful death and for the pain and suffering experienced by the decedent prior to his death. The claims were predicated upon both negligence and the unseaworthiness of the vessel.
States Marine removed the case to the Federal District Court for the Middle District of Florida on the basis of diversity of citizenship, see 28 U. S. C. §§ 1332, 1441, and there filed a third-party complaint against respondent Gulf Florida Terminal Company, the decedent’s employer, asserting that Gulf had contracted to perform stevedoring services on the vessel in a workmanlike manner and that any negligence or unseaworthiness causing the accident resulted from Gulf’s operations.
Both States Marine and Gulf sought dismissal of the portion of petitioner’s complaint that requested damages for wrongful death on the basis of unseaworthiness. They contended that maritime law provided no recovery for wrongful death within a State’s territorial waters, and that the statutory right of action for death under Florida law, Fla. Stat. § 768.01 (1965), did not encompass unseaworthiness as a basis of liability. The District Court dismissed the challenged portion of the complaint on this ground, citing this Court’s decision in The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U. S. 588 (1959), and cases construing the state statute, but made the certification necessary under 28 U. S. C. § 1292 (b) to allow petitioner an interlocutory appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
The Court of Appeals took advantage of a procedure furnished by state law, Fla. Stat. §25.031 (1965), to certify to the Florida Supreme Court the question whether the state wrongful-death statute allowed recovery for unseaworthiness as that concept is understood in maritime law. After reviewing the history of the Florida Act, the state court answered this question in the negative. 211 So. 2d 161 (1968). On return of the case to the Court of Appeals, that court affirmed the District Court’s order, rejecting petitioner’s argument that she was entitled to reversal under federal maritime law without regard to the scope of the state statute. 409 F. 2d 32 (1969). The court stated that its disposition was compelled by our decision in The Tungus. We granted certiorari, 396 U. S. 900 (1969), and invited the United States to participate as amicus curiae, id., at 952, to reconsider the important question of remedies under federal maritime law for tortious deaths on state territorial waters.
In The Tungus this Court divided on the consequences that should flow from the rule of maritime law that “in the absence of a statute there is no action for wrongful death,” first announced in The Harrisburg. All members of the Court agreed that where a death on state territorial waters is left remediless by the general maritime law and by federal statutes, a remedy may be provided under any applicable state law giving a right of action for death by wrongful act. However, four Justices dissented from the Court’s further holding that “when admiralty adopts a State’s right of action for wrongful death, it must enforce the right as an integrated whole, with whatever conditions and limitations the creating State has attached.” 358 U. S., at 592. The dissenters would have held that federal maritime law could utilize the state law to “supply a remedy” for breaches of federally imposed duties, without regard to any substantive limitations contained in the state law. Id., at 697, 599.
The extent of the role to be played by state law under The Tungus has been the subject of substantial debate and uncertainty in this Court, see Hess v. United States, 361 U. S. 314 (1960); Goett v. Union Carbide Corp., 361 U. S. 340 (1960), with opinions on both sides of the question acknowledging the shortcomings in the present law. See 361 U. S., at 314-315, 338-339. On fresh consideration of the entire subject, we have concluded that the primary source of the confusion is not to be found in The Tungus, but in The Harrisburg, and that the latter decision, somewhat dubious even when rendered, is such an unjustifiable anomaly in the present maritime law that it should no longer be followed. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
I
The Court's opinion in The Harrisburg acknowledged that the result reached had little justification except in primitive English legal history — a history far removed from the American law of remedies for maritime deaths. That case, like this, was a suit on behalf of the family of a maritime worker for his death on the navigable waters of a State. Following several precedents in the lower federal courts, the trial court awarded damages against the ship causing the death, and the circuit court affirmed, ruling that death by maritime tort “may be complained of as an injury, and the wrong redressed under the general maritime law.” 15 F. 610, 614 (1883). This Court, in reversing, relied primarily on its then-recent decision in Insurance Co. v. Brame, 95 U. S. 754 (1878), in which it had held that in American common law, as in English, “no civil action lies for an injury which results in... death.” Id., at 756. In The Harrisburg, as in Brame, the Court did not examine the justifications for this common-law rule; rather, it simply noted that “we know of no country that has adopted a different rule on this subject for the sea from that which it maintains on the land,” and concluded, despite contrary decisions of the lower federal courts both before and after Brame, that the rule of Brame should apply equally to maritime deaths. 119 U. S., at 213.
Our analysis of the history of the common-law rule indicates that it was based on a particular set of factors that had, when The Harrisburg was decided, long since been thrown into discard even in England, and that had never existed in this country at all. Further, regardless of the viability of the rule in 1886 as applied to American land-based affairs, it is difficult to discern an adequate reason for its extension to admiralty, a system of law then already differentiated in many respects from the common law.
One would expect, upon an inquiry into the sources of the common-law rule, to find a clear and compelling justification for what seems a striking departure from the result dictated by elementary principles in the law of remedies. Where existing law imposes a primary duty, violations of which are compensable if they cause injury, nothing in ordinary notions of justice suggests that a violation should be nonactionable simply because it was serious enough to cause death. On the contrary, that rule has been criticized ever since its inception, and described in such terms as “barbarous.” E. g., Osborn v. Gillett, L. R. 8 Ex. 88, 94 (1873) (Lord Bramwell, dissenting) ; F. Pollock, Law of Torts 55 (Landon ed. 1951); 3 W. Holdsworth, History of English Law 676-677 (3d ed. 1927). Because the primary duty already exists, the decision whether to allow recovery for violations causing death is entirely a remedial matter. It is true that the harms to be assuaged are not identical in the two cases: in the case of mere injury, the person physically harmed is made whole for his harm, while in the case of death, those closest to him — usually spouse and children — seek to recover for their total loss of one on whom they depended. This difference, however, even when coupled with the practical difficulties of defining the class of beneficiaries who may recover for death, does not seem to account for the law’s refusal to recognize a wrongful killing as an actionable tort. One expects, therefore, to find a persuasive, independent justification for this apparent legal anomaly.
Legal historians have concluded that the sole substantial basis for the rule at common law is a feature of the early English law that did not survive into this century— the felony-merger doctrine. See Pollock, supra, at 52-57; Holdsworth, The Origin of the Rule in Baker v. Bolton, 32 L. Q. Rev. 431 (1916). According to this doctrine, the common law did not allow civil recovery for an act that constituted both a tort and a felony. The tort was treated as less important than the offense against the Crown, and was merged into, or pre-empted by, the felony. Smith v. Sykes, 1 Freem. 224, 89 Eng. Rep. 160 (K. B. 1677); Higgins v. Butcher, Yel. 89, 80 Eng. Rep. 61 (K. B. 1606). The doctrine found practical justification in the fact that the punishment for the felony was the death of the felon and the forfeiture of his property to the Crown; thus, after the crime had been punished, nothing remained of the felon or his property on which to base a civil action. Since all intentional or negligent homicide was felonious, there could be no civil suit for wrongful death.
The first explicit statement of the common-law rule against recovery for wrongful death came in the opinion of Lord Ellenborough, sitting at nisi prius, in Baker v. Bolton, 1 Camp. 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (1808). That opinion did not cite authority, or give supporting reasoning, or refer to the felony-merger doctrine in announcing that “[i]n a civil Court, the death of a human being could not be complained of as an injury.” Ibid. Nor had the felony-merger doctrine seemingly been cited as the basis for the denial of recovery in any of the other reported wrongful-death cases since the earliest ones, in the 17th century. E. g., Smith v. Sykes, supra; Higgins v. Butcher, supra. However, it seems clear from those first cases that the rule of Baker v. Bolton did derive from the felony-merger doctrine, and that there was no other ground on which it might be supported even at the time of its inception. The House of Lords in 1916 confirmed this historical derivation, and held that although the felony-merger doctrine was no longer part of the law, the rule against recovery for wrongful death should continue except as modified by statute. Admiralty Commissioners v. S. S. Amerika, [1917] A. C. 38. Lord Parker’s opinion acknowledged that the rule was “anomalous... to the scientific jurist,” but concluded that because it had once found justification in the doctrine that “the trespass was drowned in the felony,” it should continue as a rule “explicable on historical grounds” even after the disappearance of that justification. Id., at 44, 50; see 3 W. Holdsworth, History of English Law 676-677 (3d ed. 1927). Lord Sumner agreed, relying in part on the fact that this Court had adopted the English rule in Brame. Although conceding the force of Lord Bramwell’s dissent in Osborn v. Gillett, L. R. 8 Ex. 88, 93 (1873), against the rule, Lord Parker stated that it was not “any part of the functions of this House to consider what rules ought to prevail in a logical and scientific system of jurisprudence,” and thus that he was bound simply to follow the past decisions. [1917] A. C., at 42-43.
The historical justification marshaled for the rule in England never existed in this country. In limited instances American law did adopt a vestige of the felony-merger doctrine, to the effect that a civil action was delayed until after the criminal trial. However, in this country the felony punishment did not include forfeiture of property; therefore, there was nothing, even in those limited instances, to bar a subsequent civil suit. E. g., Grosso v. Delaware, Lackawanna & West. R. Co., 50 N. J. L. 317, 319-320, 13 A. 233, 234 (1888); Hyatt v. Adams. 16 Mich. 180, 185-188 (1867); see W. Prosser, Law of Torts 8, 920-924 (3d ed. 1964). Nevertheless, despite some early cases in which the rule was rejected as “incapable of vindication,” e. g., Sullivan v. Union Pac. R. Co., 23 F. Cas. 368, 371 (No. 13,599) (C. C. Neb. 1874); Shields v. Yonge, 15 Ga. 349 (1854); cf. Cross v. Guthery, 2 Root 90, 92 (Conn. 1794), American courts generally adopted the English rule as the common law of this country as well. Throughout the period of this adoption, culminating in this Court’s decision in Brame, the courts failed to produce any satisfactory justification for applying the rule in this country.
Some courts explained that their holdings were prompted by an asserted difficulty in computation of damages for wrongful death or by a “repugnance... to setting a price upon human life.” E. g., Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. New York & N. H. R. Co., 25 Conn. 265, 272-273 (1856); Hyatt v. Adams, supra, at 191. However, other courts have recognized that calculation of the loss sustained by dependents or by the estate of the deceased, which is required under most present wrongful-death statutes, see Smith, Wrongful Death Damages in North Carolina, 44 N. C. L. Rev. 402, 405-406, nn. 17, 18 (1966), does not present difficulties more insurmountable than assessment of damages for many nonfatal personal injuries. See Hollyday v. The David Reeves, 12 F. Cas. 386, 388 (No. 6,625) (D. C. Md. 1879); Green v. Hudson River R. Co., 28 Barb. 9, 17-18 (N. Y. 1858).
It was suggested by some courts and commentators that the prohibition of nonstatutory wrongful-death actions derived support from the ancient common-law rule that a personal cause of action in tort did not survive the death of its possessor, e. g., Eden v. Lexington & Frankfort R. Co., 53 Ky. 204, 206 (1853); and the decision in Baker v. Bolton itself may have been influenced by this principle. Holdsworth, The Origin of the Rule in Baker v. Bolton, 32 L. Q. Rev. 431, 435 (1916). However, it is now universally recognized that because this principle pertains only to the victim’s own personal claims, such as for pain and suffering, it has no bearing on the question whether a dependent should be permitted to recover for the injury he suffers from the victim’s death. See ibid.; Pollock, supra, at 53; Win-field, Death as Affecting Liability in Tort, 29 Col. L. Rev. 239-250, 253 (1929).
The most likely reason that the English rule was adopted in this country without much question is simply that it had the blessing of age. That was the thrust of this Court’s opinion in Brame, as well as many of the lower court opinions. E. g., Grosso v. Delaware, Lackawanna & West. R. Co., supra. Such nearly automatic adoption seems at odds with the general principle, widely accepted during the early years of our Nation, that while “[o]ur ancestors brought with them [the] general principles [of the common law] and claimed it as their birthright;... they brought with them and adopted only that portion which was applicable to their situation.” Van Ness v. Pacard, 2 Pet. 137, 144 (1829) (Story, J.); The Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 558, 571-574 (1875); see R. Pound, The Formative Era of American Law 93-97 (1938); H. Hart & A. Sacks, The Legal Process 450 (tent. ed. 1958). The American courts never made the inquiry whether this particular English rule, bitterly criticized in England, “was applicable to their situation,” and it is difficult to imagine on what basis they might have concluded that it was.
Further, even after the decision in Brame, it is not apparent why the Court in The Harrisburg concluded that there should not be a different rule for admiralty from that applied at common law. Maritime law had always, in this country as in England, been a thing apart from the common law. It was, to a large extent, administered by different courts; it owed a much greater debt to the civil law; and, from its focus on a particular subject matter, it developed general principles unknown to the common law. These principles included a special solicitude for the welfare of those men who undertook to venture upon hazardous and unpredictable sea voyages. See generally G. Gilmore & C. Black, The Law of Admiralty 1-11, 253 (1957); P. Edelman, Maritime Injury and Death 1 (1960). These factors suggest that there might have been no anomaly in adoption of a different rule to govern maritime relations, and that the common-law rule, criticized as unjust in its own domain, might wisely have been rejected as incompatible with the law of the sea. This was the conclusion reached by Chief Justice Chase, prior to The Harrisburg, sitting on circuit in The Sea Gull, 21 F. Cas. 909 (No. 12,578) (C. C. Md. 1865). He there remarked that
“There are cases, indeed, in which it has been held that in a suit at law, no redress can be had by the surviving representative for injuries occasioned by the death of one through the wrong of another; but these are all common-law cases, and the common law has its peculiar rules in relation to this subject, traceable to the feudal system and its forfeitures... and certainly it better becomes the humane and liberal character of proceedings in admiralty to give than to withhold the remedy, when not required to withhold it by established and inflexible rules.” Id., at 910.
Numerous other federal maritime cases, on similar reasoning, had reached the same result. E. g., The Columbia, 27 F. 704 (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1886); The Manhasset, 18 F. 918 (D. C. E. D. Va. 1884); The E. B. Ward, Jr., 17 F. 456 (C. C. E. D. La. 1883); The Garland, 5 F. 924 (D. C. E. D. Mich. 1881); Holmes v. O. & C. R. Co., 5 F. 75 (D. C. Ore. 1880); The Towanda, 24 F. Cas. 74 (No. 14,109) (C. C. E. D. Pa. 1877); Plummer v. Webb, 19 F. Cas. 894 (No. 11,234) (D. C. Maine 1825) ; Hollyday v. The David Reeves, 12 F. Cas. 386 (No. 6,625) (D. C. Md. 1879). Despite the tenor of these cases, some decided after Brame, the Court in The Harrisburg concluded that “the admiralty judges in the United States did not rely for their jurisdiction on any rule of the maritime law different from that of the common law, but [only] on their opinion that the rule of the English common law was not founded in reason, and had not become firmly established in the jurisprudence of this country.” 119 U. S., at 208. Without discussing any considerations that might support a different rule for admiralty, the Court held that maritime law must be identical in this respect to the common law.
II
We need not, however, pronounce a verdict on whether The Harrisburg, when decided, was a correct extrapolation of the principles of decisional law then in existence. A development of major significance has intervened, making clear that the rule against recovery for wrongful death is sharply out of keeping with the policies of modern American maritime law. This development is the wholesale abandonment of the rule in most of the areas where it once held sway, quite evidently prompted by the same sense of the rule’s injustice that generated so much criticism of its original promulgation.
To some extent this rejection has been judicial. The English House of Lords in 1937 emasculated the rule without expressly overruling it. Rose v. Ford, [1937] A. C. 826. Lord Atkin remarked about the decision in S. S. Amerika that “[t]he reasons given, whether historical or otherwise, may seem unsatisfactory,” and that “if the rule is really based on the relevant death being due to felony, it should long ago have been relegated to a museum.” At any rate, he saw “no reason for extending the illogical doctrine... to any case where it does not clearly apply.” Id., at 833, 834. Lord Atkin concluded that, while the doctrine barred recognition of a claim in the dependents for the wrongful death of a person, it did not bar recognition of a common-law claim in the decedent himself for “loss of expectation of life” — a claim that vested in the person in the interval between the injury and death, and thereupon passed, with the aid of a survival statute, to the representative of his estate. He expressed no doubt that the claim was “capable of being estimated in terms of money: and that the calculation should be made.” Id., at 834. Thus, except that the measure of damages might differ, the representative was allowed to recover on behalf of the heirs what they could not recover in their own names.
Much earlier, however, the legislatures both here and in England began to evidence unanimous disapproval of the rule against recovery for wrongful death. The first statute partially abrogating the rule was Lord Campbell’s Act, 9 & 10 Viet., c. 93 (1846), which granted recovery to the families of persons killed by tortious conduct, “although the Death shall have been caused under such Circumstances as amount in Law to Felony.”
In the United States, every State today has enacted a wrongful-death statute. See Smith, supra, 44 N. C. L. Rev. 402. The Congress has created actions for wrongful deaths of railroad employees, Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 45 U. S. C. §§ 51-59; of merchant seamen, Jones Act, 46 U. S. C. § 688; and of persons on the high seas, Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U. S. C. §§ 761, 762. Congress has also, in the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1346 (b), made the United States subject to liability in certain circumstances for negligently caused wrongful death to the same extent as a private person. See, e. g., Richards v. United States, 369 U. S. 1 (1962).
These numerous and broadly applicable statutes, taken as a whole, make it clear that there is no present public policy against allowing recovery for wrongful death. The statutes evidence a wide rejection by the legislatures of whatever justifications may once have existed for a general refusal to allow such recovery. This legislative establishment of policy carries significance beyond the particular scope of each of the statutes involved. The policy thus established has become itself a part of our law, to be given its appropriate weight not only in matters of statutory construction but also in those of deci-sional law. See Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, in Harvard Legal Essays 213, 226-227 (1934). Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking also for Chief Justice Taft and Justices Brandéis and McKenna, stated on the very topic of remedies for wrongful death:
“[I]t seems to me that courts in dealing with statutes sometimes have been too slow to recognize that statutes even when in terms covering only particular cases may imply a policy different from that of the common law, and therefore may exclude a reference to the common law for the purpose of limiting their scope. Johnson v. United States, 163 Fed. 30, 32. Without going into the reasons for the notion that an action (other than an appeal) does not lie for causing the death of a human being, it is enough to say that they have disappeared. The policy that forbade such an action, if it was more profound than the absence of a remedy when a man’s body was hanged and his goods confiscated for the felony, has been shown not to be the policy of present law by statutes of the United States and of most if not all of the States.” Panama R. Co. v. Rock, 266 U. S. 209, 216 (1924) (dissenting opinion).
Dean Pound subsequently echoed this observation, concluding that: “Today we should be thinking of the death statutes as part of the general law.” Pound, Comment on State Death Statutes — Application to Death in Admiralty, 13 NACCA L. J. 188, 189 (1954); see Cox v. Roth, 348 U. S. 207, 210 (1955).
This appreciation of the broader role played by legislation in the development of the law reflects the practices of common-law court's from the most ancient times. As Professor Landis has said, “much of what is ordinarily regarded as 'common law’ finds its source in legislative enactment.” Landis, supra, at 214. It has always been the duty of the common-law court to perceive the impact of major legislative innovations and to interweave the new legislative policies with the inherited body of common-law principles — many of them deriving from earlier legislative exertions.
The legislature does not, of course, merely enact general policies. By the terms of a statute, it also indicates its conception of the sphere within which the policy is to have effect. In many cases the scope of a statute may reflect nothing more than the dimensions of the particular problem that came to the attention of the legislature, inviting the conclusion that the legislative policy is equally applicable to other situations in which the mischief is identical. This conclusion is reinforced where there exists not one enactment but a course of legislation dealing with a series of situations, and where the generality of the underlying principle is attested by the legislation of other jurisdictions. Id., at 215-216, 220-222. On the other hand, the legislature may, in order to promote other, conflicting interests, prescribe with particularity the compass of the legislative aim, erecting a strong inference that territories beyond the boundaries so drawn are not to feel the impact of the new legislative dispensation. We must, therefore, analyze with care the congressional enactments that have abrogated the common-law rule in the maritime field, to determine the impact of the fact that none applies in terms to the situation of this case. See Part III, infra. However, it is sufficient at this point to conclude, as Mr. Justice Holmes did 45 years ago, that the work of the legislatures has made the allowance of recovery for wrongful death the general rule of American law, and its denial the exception. Where death is caused by the breach of a duty imposed by federal maritime law, Congress has established a policy favoring recovery in the absence of a legislative direction to except a particular class of cases.
Ill
Our undertaking, therefore, is to determine whether Congress has given such a direction in its legislation granting remedies for wrongful deaths in portions of the maritime domain. We find that Congress has given no affirmative indication of an intent to preclude the judicial allowance of a remedy for wrongful death to persons in the situation of this petitioner.
From the date of The Harrisburg until 1920, there was no remedy for death on the high seas caused by breach of one of the duties imposed by federal maritime law. For deaths within state territorial waters, the federal law accommodated the humane policies of state wrongful-death statutes by allowing recovery whenever an applicable state statute favored such recovery. Congress acted in 1920 to furnish the remedy denied by the courts for deaths beyond the jurisdiction of any State, by passing two landmark statutes. The first of these was the Death on the High Seas Act, 41 Stat. 537, 46 U. S. C. §761 et seq. Section 1 of that Act provides that:
“Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default occurring on the high seas beyond a marine league from the shore of any State,... the personal representative of the decedent may maintain a suit for damages in the district courts of the United States, in admiralty, for the exclusive benefit of the decedent’s wife, husband, parent, child, or dependent relative against the vessel, person, or corporation which would have been liable if death had not ensued.”
Section 7 of the Act further provides:
“The provisions of any State statute giving or regulating rights of action or remedies for death shall not be affected by this [Act]. Nor shall this [Act] apply to the Great Lakes or to any waters within the territorial limits of any State....”
The second statute was the Jones Act, 41 Stat. 1007, 46 U. S. C. § 688, which, by extending to seamen the protections of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, provided a right of recovery against their employers for negligence resulting in injury or death. This right follows from the seaman’s employment status and is not limited to injury or death occurring on the high seas.
The United States, participating as amicus curiae, contended at oral argument that these statutes, if construed to forbid recognition of a general maritime remedy for wrongful death within territorial waters, would perpetuate three anomalies of present law. The first of these is simply the discrepancy produced whenever the rule of The Harrisburg holds sway: within territorial waters, identical conduct violating federal law (here the furnishing of an unseaworthy vessel) produces liability if the victim is merely injured, but frequently not if he is killed. As we have concluded, such a distinction is not compatible with the general policies of federal maritime law.
The second incongruity is that identical breaches of the duty to provide a seaworthy ship, resulting in death, produce liability outside the three-mile limit — since a claim under the Death on the High Seas Act may be founded on unseaworthiness, see Kernan v. American Dredging Co., 355 U. S. 426, 430 n. 4 (1958) — but not within the territorial waters of a State whose local statute excludes unseaworthiness claims. The United States argues that since the substantive duty is federal, and federal maritime jurisdiction covers navigable waters within and without the three-mile limit, no rational policy supports this distinction in the availability of a remedy.
The third, and assertedly the “strangest” anomaly is that a true seaman — that is, a member of a ship’s company, covered by the Jones Act — is provided no remedy for death caused by unseaworthiness within territorial waters, while a longshoreman, to whom the duty of seaworthiness was extended only because he performs work traditionally done by seamen, does have such a remedy when allowed by a state statute.
There is much force to the United States’ argument that these distinctions are so lacking in any apparent justification that we should not, in the absence of compelling evidence, presume that Congress affirmatively intended to freeze them into maritime law. There should be no presumption that Congress has removed this Court’s traditional responsibility to vindicate the policies of maritime law by ceding that function exclusively to the States. However, respondents argue that an intent to do just that is manifested by the portions of the Death on the High Seas Act quoted above.
The legislative history of the Act suggests that respondents misconceive the thrust of the congressional concern. Both the Senate and House Reports consist primarily of quoted remarks by supporters of the proposed Act. Those supporters stated that the rule of The Harrisburg, which had been rejected by “[ejvery country of western Europe,” was “a disgrace to a civilized people.” “There is no reason why the admiralty law of the United States should longer depend on the statute laws of the States.... Congress can now bring our maritime law into line with the laws of those enlightened nations which confer a right of action for death at sea.” The Act would accomplish that result “for deaths on the high seas, leaving unimpaired the rights under State statutes as to deaths on waters within the territorial jurisdiction of the States.... This is for the purpose of uniformity, as the States can not properly legislate for the high seas.” S. Rep. No. 216, 66th Cong., 1st Sess., 3, 4 (1919); H. R. Rep. No. 674, 66th Cong., 2d Sess., 3, 4 (1920). The discussion of the bill on the floor of the House evidenced the same concern that a cause of action be provided “in cases where there is now no remedy,” 59 Cong. Rec. 4486, and at the same time that “the power of the States to create actions for wrongful death in no way be affected by enactment of the federal law.” The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U. S., at 593.
Read in light of the state of maritime law in 1920, we believe this legislative history indicates that Congress intended to ensure the continued availability of a remedy, historically provided by the States, for deaths in territorial waters; its failure to extend the Act to cover such deaths primarily reflected the lack of necessity for coverage by a federal statute, rather than an affirmative desire to insulate such deaths from the benefits of any federal remedy that might be available independently of the Act. The void that existed in maritime law up until 1920 was the absence of any remedy for wrongful death on the high seas. Congress, in acting to fill that void, legislated only to the three-mile limit because that was the extent of the problem. The express provision that state remedies in territorial waters were not disturbed by the Act ensured that Congress’ solution of one problem would not create another by inviting the courts to find that the Act pre-empted the entire field, destroying the state remedies that had previously existed.
The beneficiaries of persons meeting death on territorial waters did not suffer at that time from being excluded from the coverage of the Act. To the contrary, the state remedies that were left undisturbed not only were familiar but also may actually have been more generous than the remedy provided by the new Act. On the one hand, the primary basis of recovery under state wrongful-death statutes was negligence. On the other hand, the substantive duties imposed at that time by general maritime law were vastly different from those that presently exist. “[T]he seaman’s right to recover damages for injuries caused by unseaworth
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | H | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Breyer
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) sued several officers and directors of City Federal Savings Bank, claiming that they had violated the legal standard of care they owed that federally chartered, federally insured institution. The case here focuses upon the legal standard for determining whether or not their behavior was improper. It asks where courts should look to find the standard of care to measure the legal propriety of the defendants’ conduct — to state law, to federal common law, or to a special federal (103 Stat. 243, 12 U. S. C. § 1821(k)) that speaks of “gross negligence”? of conduct as
We conclude that long as the state standard (such as simple negligence) is stricter than that of the federal statute. The federal statute nonetheless sets a “gross negligence” floor, which applies as a substitute for state standards that are more relaxed.
H-1
In 1989, City Federal Savings Bank (City Federal), a federal savings association, went into receivership. The RTC, as receiver, brought this action in the bank’s narrie against officers and directors. (Throughout this opinion, we use the more colloquial term “bank” to refer to a variety of institutions such as “federal savings associations.”) The complaint said that the defendants had acted (or failed to act) in ways that led City Federal to make various bad development, construction, and business acquisition loans. It claimed that these actions (or omissions) were unlawful because they amounted to gross negligence, simple negligence, and breaches of fiduciary duty. to a fed-
The defendants eral statute, 12 U. S. C. § 1821 (k), that says in part that a “director or officer” of a federally insured bank “may be held personally liable for monetary damages” in an RTC-initiated “civil action ... for gross negligence” or “similar conduct... that demonstrates a greater disregard of a duty of care (than gross negligence) . . . .” (Emphasis added.) They argued that, by authorizing actions for gross negligence or more seriously culpable conduct, the statute intended to forbid actions based upon less seriously culpable conduct, such as conduct that rose only to the level of simple negligence. The District Court agreed and dismissed all but the gross negligence claims.
The Third Circuit, providing an interlocutory appeal, 28 U. S. C. § 1292(b), reversed. It interpreted the federal statute as simply offering a safeguard against state legislation that had watered down applicable state standards of care— below a gross negligence benchmark. As so interpreted, the statute did not prohibit actions resting upon stricter standard of care rules — whether those stricter standard of care rules originated in state law (which the Circuit found applicable in the case of state-chartered banks) or in federal common law (which the Circuit found applicable in the case of federally chartered banks). Resolution Trust Corp. v. Cityfed Financial Corp., 57 F. 3d 1231, 1243-1244, 1245-1249 (1995). Noting that City Federal is a federally chartered savings institution, the Circuit concluded that the RTC was free “to pursue any claims for negligence or breach of fiduciary duty available as a matter of federal common law.” Id., at 1249.
The defendants, pointing to variations in the Circuits’ interpretations of the “gross negligence” statute, sought cer-tiorari. Compare Resolution Trust Corp. v. Frates, 52 F. 3d 295 (CA10 1995) (§ 1821(k) prohibits federal common-law actions for simple negligence), with Cityfed, supra, at 1246-1249 (§ 1821(k) does not prohibit federal common-law actions for simple negligence). And we granted review.
I — I
We begin by temporarily setting the federal “gross negligence” statute to the side, and by asking whether, were there no such statute, federal common law would provide the applicable legal standard. We recognize, as did the Third Circuit, that this Court did once articulate federal common-law corporate governance standards, applicable to federally chartered banks. Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U. S. 132 (1891). See also Martin v. Webb, 110 U. S. 7, 15 (1884) (directors must “use ordinary diligence ... and ... exercise reasonable control”); Bowerman v. the Court found its rules of decision in federal common law long before it held, in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938), that “[tjhere is no federal general common law.” Id., at 78. The Third Circuit, while considering itself bound by Briggs, asked whether relevant federal common-law standards could have survived Erie. We conclude that they did not and that (except as modified in Part III, infra) state law, not federal common law, provides the applicable rules for decision. call
This Court has recently “federal common law” in the strictest sense, i. e., a rule of decision that amounts, not simply to an interpretation of a federal statute or a properly promulgated administrative rule, but, rather, to the judicial “creation” of a special federal rule of decision. See Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U. S. 630, 640-643 (1981). The Court has said that “cases in which judicial creation of a special federal rule would be justified . . . are . . . ‘few and restricted.’” O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U. S. 79, 87 (1994) (quoting Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U. S. 647, 651 (1963)). “Whether latent federal power should be exercised to displace state law is primarily a decision for Congress,” not the federal courts. Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 384 U. S. 63, 68 (1966). Nor does the existence of related federal statutes automatically show that Congress intended courts to create federal common-law rules, for “‘Congress acts . . . against the background of the total corpus juris of the states ....’” Id., at 68 (quoting H. Hart & H. Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal System 435 (1953)). Thus, normally, when courts decide to fashion rules of federal common law, “the guiding principle is that a significant conflict between some federal policy or interest and the use of state law . . . must first be specifically shown.” 384 U. S., at 68. Indeed, such a “conflict” is normally a “precondition.” O’Melveny, supra, at 87. See also United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U. S. 715, 728 (1979); Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc., 500 U. S. 90, 98 (1991).
No one doubts the power of Congress to legislate rules for deciding cases like the one before us. Indeed, Congress has enacted related legislation. Certain federal statutes specify, for example, how to form “national banks” (i e., a federally chartered bank), how to amend the articles of association, how shareholders are to vote, directors’ qualifications, the form of a bank’s “organization certificate,” minimum capital requirements, and a list of corporate powers. See 12 U. S. C. § 21 et seq. Other federal statutes regulate the activities of federally chartered savings associations in various ways. E. g., 12 U. S. C. '§ 1464(b) (various regulations on savings associations, such as interest rate on loans). No one argues, however, that either these statutes, or federal regulations validly promulgated pursuant to statute, set forth general corporate governance standards of the sort at issue applicable to a federally chartered savings association such as City Federal. Cf. 61 Fed. Reg. 4866 (1996) (to be codified in 12 CFR § 7.2000) (discussed infra, at 224) (describing governance procedures applicable to federally chartered national banks, but not federal savings associations). Consequently, we must decide whether the application of state-law standards of care to such banks would conflict with, and thereby significantly threaten, a federal policy or interest.
We have examined each of the basic arguments that the respondent implicitly or explicitly raises. In our view, they do not point to a conflict or threat that is significant, and we shall explain why. (The respondent, by the way, is now the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation — the FDIC — which has replaced the RTC pursuant to a new federal statute. 12 U.S. C. § 1441a(b)(4)(A).)
First, the FDIC invokes the need for “uniformity.” Federal common law, it says, will provide uniformity, but “[superimposing state standards of fiduciary responsibility over standards developed by a federal chartering authority would . . . 'upset the balance’ that the 'may strike . . . Brief for Respondent 23 (quoting Kamen, supra, at 103). To invoke the concept of “uniformity,” however, is not to prove its need. Cf. Kimbell Foods, supra, at 730 (rejecting “generalized pleas for uniformity”); O’Melveny, supra, at 88 (same). insured banks is
For one thing, about equally divided between federally chartered and state-chartered banks, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 1 Statistics on Banking: A Statistical History of the United States Banking Industry, p. B-9 (Aug. 1995) (Table SI-9) (showing that, in 1989, there were 1,595 federally chartered institutions and 1,492 state-chartered ones); and a federal standard that increases uniformity among the former would increase disparity with the latter. has thrived
For another, our despite disparities in matters of corporate governance. Consider, for example, the divergent state-law governance standards applicable to banks chartered in different States, e. g., Ind. Code § 23-l-35-l(e)(2) (1994) (directors not liable unless conduct constitutes at least “willful misconduct or recklessness”); Iowa Code §524.605 (1995) (providing ordinary negligence standard), as well as the different ways in which lower courts since 1891 have interpreted Briggs’ “federal common law” standard. Compare Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation v. Mason, 115 F. 2d 548, 551-552 (CA3 1940) (applying standard similar to simple negligence), with Washington Bancorporation v. Said, 812 F. Supp. 1256, 1266 (DC 1993) (Briggs did not apply “simple negligence” standard of care). See R. Stevens & B. Nielson, The Standard of Care for Directors and Officers of Federally Chartered Depository Institutions: It’s Gross Negligence Regardless of Whether Section 1821(k) Preempts Federal Common Law, 13 Ann. Review Banking L. 169, 172 (1994) (in part because of “widely varying results, the federal common law standard of care is neither fully developed, nor well settled”). See also infra, at 223 (citing cases in which state governance law has been applied to national banks). Indeed, the Comptroller of the Currency, acting through regulation, permits considerable disparity in the standard of care applicable to federally chartered banks other than savings banks (which are under the jurisdiction of the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), 12 U. S. C. §§ 1462a, 1463(a)). See 61 Fed. Reg. 4866 (1996) (to be codified in 12 CFR § 7.2000) (permitting banks, within broad limits, “to follow the corporate governance procedures of the law of the state in which the main office of the bank is located ... [or] the Delaware General Corporation Law ... or the [Model Business Corporation Act]”).
Second, the FDIC at times suggests that courts must apply a federal common-law standard of care simply because the banks in question are federally chartered. This argument, with little more, might have seemed a strong one during most of the first century of our Nation’s history, for then state-chartered banks were the norm and federally chartered banks an exception — and federal banks often encountered hostility and deleterious state laws. See B. Klebaner, American Commercial Banking: A History 4-11 (1990) (tracing the origin of the dual banking system to the 1780 Philadelphia Bank and discussing proposals of a then-young Alexander Hamilton); B. Hammond, Banks and Politics in America: From the Revolution to the Civil War 41-66 (1957) (describing the controversial, but successful, Federalist proposals for the first and second federally chartered Bank of the United States).
After President Madison helped to create the second Bank of the United States, for example, many States enacted laws that taxed the federal bank in an effort to weaken it. This Court held those taxes unconstitutional. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 431 (1819) (“[T]he power to tax involves the power to destroy”). See also Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738 (1824) (federal marshals acted lawfully in seizing funds from a state tax collector who had hurdled the counter at the Chilicothe Branch of the Bank of the United States and taken $100,000 from the vault). Still, 10 years later President Andrew Jackson effectively killed the bank. His Secretary of the Treasury Roger Taney (later Chief Justice), believing state banks fully able to serve the Nation, took steps to “ushe[r] in the era of expansive state banking.” A. Pollard, J. Passaic, K. Ellis, & J. Daly, Banking Law in the United States 16 (1988). See also Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky, 11 Pet. 257 (1837) (permitting state banks to issue paper money in certain circumstances).
During and after the reemerged. Moved in part by war-related financing needs, Treasury Secretary (later Chief Justice) Salmon P. Chase proposed, and Congress enacted, laws providing for federally chartered banks, Act of Feb. 20, 1863, ch. 43, 12 Stat. 655, and encouraging state banks to obtain federal charters. Act of June 3, 1864, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99 (only federally chartered banks can issue national currency). See also Veazie v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533 (1869) (opinion of Chase, C. J.) (upholding constitutionality of federal taxation of state banks). Just before World War I, Congress created the federal reserve system. Act of Dec. 23,1913, ch. 6,38 Stat. 251. After that war, it created several federal banking agencies with regulatory authority over both federal and state banks. Act of June 16, 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162. And in 1933, it provided for the federal chartering of savings banks. Act of June 13, 1933, ch. 62, 48 Stat. 128.
This latter history is relevant ter this Court held that federally chartered banks are subject to state law. See National Bank v. Commonwealth, 9 Wall. 353, 361 (1870). In National Bank the Court distinguished McCulloch by recalling that Maryland’s taxes were “used ... to destroy,” and it added that federal banks
“are subject to the laws of the State, and are governed in their daily course of business far more by the laws of the State than of the nation. All their contracts are governed and construed by State laws. Their acquisition and transfer of property, their right to collect their debts, and their liability to be sued for debts, are all based on State law. It is only when the State law incapacitates the banks from discharging their duties to the government that it becomes unconstitutional.” 9 Wall., at 362.
The Court subsequently found numerous state laws applicable to federally chartered banks. See, e. g., Davis v. Elmira Savings Bank, 161 U. S. 275, 290 (1896) (“Nothing, of course, in this opinion is intended to deny the operation of general and undiscriminating state laws on the contracts of national banks, so long as such laws do not conflict with the letter or the general objects and purposes of Congressional legislation”); First Nat. Bank in St. Louis v. Missouri, 263 U. S. 640, 656 (1924) (national banks “are subject to the laws of a State in respect of their affairs unless such laws interfere with the purposes of their creation, tend to impair or destroy their efficiency as federal agencies or conflict with the paramount law of the United States”); Wichita Royalty Co. v. City Nat. Bank of Wichita Falls, 306 U. S. 103 (1939) (applying state law to tort claim by depositor against directors of a national bank); Anderson Nat. Bank v. Luckett, 321 U. S. 233, 248 (1944) (“[Njational banks are subject to state laws, unless those laws infringe the national banking laws or impose an undue burden on the performance of the banks’ functions”); California Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Guerra, 479 U. S. 272 (1987) (applying state employment discrimination law to federally chartered savings and loan association).
purposes, consequence is the following: To point to a federal charter by itself shows no conflict, threat, or need for “federal common law.” It does not answer the critical question.
Third, the FDIC refers to a conflict of laws principle called the “internal affairs doctrine” — a doctrine that this Court has described as
“a conflict of laws principle which recognizes that only one State should have the authority to regulate a corporation’s internal affairs — matters peculiar to the relationships among or between the corporation and its current officers, directors, and shareholders — because otherwise a corporation could be faced with conflicting demands.” Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U. S. 624, 645 (1982).
States normally look to the State of a business’ incorporation for the law that provides the relevant corporate governance general standard of care. Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws §309 (1971). And by analogy, it has been argued, courts should look to federal law to find the standard of care governing officers and directors of federally chartered banks. See Resolution Trust Corporation v. Chapman, 29 F. 3d 1120, 1123-1124 (CA7 1994). this
To find a justification for ment, however, is to substitute analogy or formal symmetry for the controlling legal requirement, namely, the existence of a need to create federal common law arising out of a significant conflict or threat to a federal interest. O’Melveny, 512 U. S., at 85, 87. The internal affairs doctrine shows no such need, for it seeks only to avoid conflict by requiring that there be a single point of legal reference. Nothing in that doctrine suggests that the single source of law must be federal. See Chapman, supra, at 1126-1127 (Posner, C. J., dissenting). In the absence of a governing federal common law, courts applying the internal affairs doctrine could find (we do not say that they will find) that the State closest analogically to the State of incorporation of an ordinary business is the State in which the federally chartered bank has its main office or maintains its principal place of business. Cf. 61 Fed. Reg. 4866 (1996) (to be codified in 12 CFR § 7.2000) (federally chartered commercial banks may “follow the corporate governance procedures of the law of the state in which the main office of the bank is located”). So to apply state law, as we have said, would tend to avoid disparity between federally chartered and state-chartered banks (that might be next door to each other). And, of course, if this approach proved problematic, Congress and federal agencies acting pursuant to congressionally delegated authority remain free to provide to the contrary.
Fourth, the FDIC points to statutes that provide the OTS, a federal regulatory agency, with authority to fine, or to remove from office, savings bank officers and directors for certain breaches of fiduciary duty. The FDIC adds that in “the course of such proceedings, the OTS, applying the ordinary-care standard [of Briggs,] . . . has spoken authoritatively respecting the duty of care owed by directors and officers to federal savings associations.” Brief for Respondent 23-25 (citations omitted). The FDIC does not claim, however, that these OTS statements, interpreting a pre-existing judge-made federal common-law standard (i. e., that of Briggs) themselves amounted to an agency effort to promulgate a binding regulation pursuant to delegated congressional authority. Nor have we found, in our examination of the relevant OTS opinions, any convincing evidence of a relevant, significant conflict or threat to a federal interest.
Finally, we note that here, as in O’Melveny, the FDIC is acting only as a receiver of a failed institution; it is not pursuing the interest of the Federal Government as a bank insurer — an interest likely present whether the insured institution is state, or federally, chartered.
In sum, we can find no significant conflict with, or threat to, a federal interest. The federal need is far weaker than was present in what the Court has called the “ Tew and restricted’ instances,” Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U. S. 304, 313 (1981), in which this Court has created a federal common law. Consider, for example, Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U. S. 92 (1938) (controversy between two States regarding apportionment of streamwater); Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U. S. 500 (1988) (Federal Government contractors and civil liability of federal officials); United States v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 332 U. S. 301, 305 (1947) (relationship between Federal Government and members of its Armed Forces); Howard v. Lyons, 360 U. S. 593, 597 (1959) (liability of federal officers in the course of official duty); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U. S. 398, 425 (1964) (relationships with other countries). See also Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U. S. 630, 641 (1981) (“[A]bsent some congressional authorization to formulate substantive rules of decision, federal common law exists only in such narrow areas as those concerned with the rights and obligations of the United States, interstate and international disputes implicating the conflicting rights of States or our relations with foreign nations, and admiralty cases”). Indeed, the interests in many of the cases where this Court has declined to recognize federal common law appear at least as strong as, if not stronger than, those present here. E. g., Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 384 U. S. 63 (1966) (applying state law to claims for land owned and leased by the Federal Government); Kimbell Foods, 440 U. S., at 726, 732-738 (applying state law to priority of liens under federal lending programs). enun-
We conclude that the ciated in cases such as Briggs did not survive this . Court’s later decision in Erie v. Tompkins. There is no federal common law that would create a general standard of care applicable to this case.
Ill
We now turn to a further question: Does federal statutory law (namely, the federal “gross negligence” statute) supplant any state-law standard of care? The relevant parts of that statute read as follows:
“A director or officer of an insured depository institution may be held personally liable for monetary damages in any civil action by, on behalf of, or at the request or direction of the Corporation ... acting as conservator or receiver ... for gross negligence, including any similar conduct or conduct that demonstrates a greater disregard of a duty of care (than gross negligence) including intentional tortious conduct, as such terms are defined and determined under applicable State law. Nothing in this paragraph shall impair or affect any right of the Corporation under other applicable law.” 12 U. S. C. § 1821(k) (emphasis added).
Lower courts have taken different positions about whether this statute, in stating that directors and officers “may be held personally liable” for conduct that amounts to “gross negligence” or worse, immunizes them from liability for conduct that is less culpable than gross negligence such as simple negligence. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation v. McSweeney, 976 F. 2d 532, 537, n. 5 (CA9 1992), cert. denied, 508 U. S. 950 (1993); Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation v. Canfield, 967 F. 2d 443, 446, n. 3 (CA10) (en banc), cert. dism’d, 506 U. S. 993 (1992); Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation v. Swager, 773 F. Supp. 1244 (Minn. 1991). See also Pet. for Cert, i (“The questions presented for review are: 1. Whether Section 1821(k) supplants ‘federal common law’ and constitutes the exclusive standard of liability in a civil damage action brought by the Resolution Trust Corporation ...”); Brief for American Bankers Association et al. as Amici Curiae 7-8.
In our view, the statute’s “gross negligence” standard provides only a floor — a guarantee that officers and directors must meet at least a gross negligence standard. It does not stand in the way of a stricter standard that the laws of some States provide.
For one thing, the language of the statute contains a saving clause that, read literally, preserves the applicability of stricter state standards. It says “[njothing in this paragraph shall impair or affect any right of the Corporation under other applicable law.” 12 U. S. C. § 1821(k) (emphasis added). The petitioner, in contending places federal common law, says that “any right” means only a right created elsewhere in the same Act of Congress, for example, by various regulatory enforcement provisions. E. g., § 1818(b) (cease-and-desist provision). But that is not what the Act says nor does its language compel so restrictive a reading. That language, read naturally, suggests an interpretation broad enough to save rights provided by other state, or federal, law. a
For another thing, Congress background of failing savings associations, see 135 Cong. Rec. 121 (1989) (statement of Rep. Roth); 135 Cong. Rec. 1760 (1989) (statement of Sen. Graham), large federal payments to insured bank depositors, and recent changes in state law designed to limit pre-existing officer and director negligence liability. See, e. g., Fla. Stat. § 607.0831 (1993) (“recklessness or an act or omission . . . committed in bad faith or with malicious purpose”); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1701.59(D) (1994) (“deliberate intent to cause injury to the corporation or undertaken with reckless disregard for the best interests of the corporation”). The state-law changes would have made it more difficult for the Federal Government to recover, from negligent officers and directors, federal funds spent to rescue failing savings banks and their depositors. And the background as a whole supports a reading of the statute as an effort to preserve the Federal Government’s ability to recover funds by creating a standard of care floor.
The legislative history, as this conclusion. Members of Congress repeatedly referred to the harm that liability-relaxing changes in state law had caused the Federal Government, hence the taxpayer, as federal banking agencies tried to recover, from negligent officers and directors, some of the money that federal insurers had to pay to depositors in their failed banks. E. g., 135 Cong. Rec. 7150-7151 (1989) (statement of Sen. Riegle) (“[T]he establishment of a Federal standard of care is based on the overriding Federal interest in protecting the soundness of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation fund and is very limited in scope. It is not a wholesale preemption of longstanding principles of corporate governance . . To have pre-empted state law with a uniform federal “gross negligence” standard would have cured the problem in some instances (where state law was weaker) but would have aggravated it in others (where state law was stronger).
history says more. The relevant Senate Report addresses the point specifically. It says:
“This subsection does not prevent the FDIC from pursuing claims under State law or under other applicable Federal law, if such law permits the officers or directors of a financial institution to be sued (1) for violating a lower standard of care, such as simple negligence.” S. Rep. No. 101-19, p. 318 (1989).
This Report was not published until two weeks after Congress enacted the law. But, as petitioner elsewhere concedes, the Report was circulated within Congress several weeks before Congress voted. In fact Senator Riegle, the Banking Committee Chairman, read the statement, on his own behalf and that of Senator Garn, six weeks before Congress voted on the law. 135 Cong. Rec. 12374 (1989). Contrast Clarke v. Securities Industry Assn., 479 U. S. 388, 407 (1987) (refusing to “attach substantial weight” to a Representative’s statement made 10 days after the enactment of the law).
The history is not all on one side. The Congressional Record contains one statement that suggests a competing congressional purpose, namely, to protect bank officers and directors from too strict a liability standard. 135 Cong. Rec. 7150 (1989) (statement of Sen. Sanford) (supporting “provisions relating to State laws affecting the liability of officers and directors of financial institutions” because “these changes are essential if we are to attract qualified officers and directors to serve in our financial have not found other such statements. And that statement is inconsistent with the language of the Senate Report. It suggests an interpretation of the statute largely rejected in the lower courts, namely, that it pre-empts stricter state law as applied to state-chartered, as well as to federally chartered, institutions. See, e. g., McSweeney, 976 F. 2d, at 540-541 (rejecting the interpretation as applied to state-chartered banks); Canfield, 967 F. 2d, at 448-449 (same). alternative
The petitioner, in ground in this Court, made a final complicated argument to explain why 12 U. S. C. § 1821(k) displaces federal common law. He points to the universally conceded fact that the “gross negligence” statute applies to federal, as well as to state, banks. He then assumes, for sake of the argument, that in the absence of the statute, federal common law would determine liability for federal banks. He then asks why Congress would have applied the “gross negligence” statute to federal banks unless it wanted that statute to set an absolute standard, not a floor. After all, on the assumption that, without the statute, federal common law would hold federal directors and officers to a standard as strict, or stricter, there would have been no need for the statute unless (as applied to federal banks) it intended to set a universal standard, freeing officers and directors from the potentially less strict standard of the common law, and not what, given the assumptions, would be a totally unnecessary floor. This argument, taken to its logical conclusion, would also suggest that state standards of simple negligence would be displaced by the federal gross negligence statute. lies
One obvious short answer in the fact that our conclusion in Part II runs contrary to the argument’s critical assumption, namely, that federal common law sets the standard of liability applicable to federal banks. State law applies. Without that assumption, the need for a “gross negligence” floor in the ease of federally chartered banks is identical to the need in the case of state-chartered banks. In both instances, the floor is needed to limit state efforts to weaken liability standards; in both instances a floor serves that purpose; and the reasons for believing the statute only sets such a floor are equally strong.
A more thorough answer lies in the fact that Congress nowhere separated its consideration of federally chartered, from that of state-chartered, banks. Congress did not ask whether- one looked to federal common law or to state law to find the liability standard applicable to federally chartered banks. Nor did it try to determine the content of federal common law. One can reconcile congressional silence on the matter with a “gross negligence” statute, the language of which brings all banks (federal- and state-chartered) within its scope, simply by assuming that Congress, when enacting the statute, wanted to leave other law, including the law applicable to federally chartered banks, exactly where Congress found it. That, after all, is what the statute says. And the saving clause language taken at face value permits Congress to achieve its basic objective (providing a “gross negligence” floor) without having to unravel the arcane intricacies of federal common law. In our view, this understanding of congressional intent better explains the statute’s language and history than the petitioner’s interpretation, imputing to Congress an intent to apply a uniform “gross negligence” standard to federally chartered, but not state chartered, institutions.
For these reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | H | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The respondent, Carbon Black Export, Inc., a Delaware corporation, brought a libel in admiralty in the District Court for the Southern District of Texas for damage sustained to a shipment of carbon black during an ocean voyage from Houston and New Orleans to various Italian ports. The libel was one in rem against the vessel in question, the S. S. Monrosa, then in the port of Houston on another voyage, and in personam against the Monrosa’s-owner, Navigazione Alta Italia, an Italian corporation. The latter filed an appearance in response to the libel in personam, and, as owner of the vessel, filed a claim to it, and prayed to defend the libel in rem. In respect to the libel in rem, a stipulation to abide the decree, in the penal sum of $100,000, was filed by the claimant and the National Surety Company, its surety, and approved by the present respondeat. . Navigazione Alta Italia then moved that the District Court decline'jurisdiction over the cause, on the grounds that the parties had agreed, by a provision in the bills of lading covering the shipment, that controversies in regard to cargo damage shoúld be settled only in the courts of Genoa, Italy. The District Court granted the motion, subject to the filing of a bond by Navigazione Alta Italia in the sum of $100,000 to respond to whatever judgment might finally be rendered on the cause of action in question. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed. It found the provision in the bill of lading in terms inapplicable to suits in rem,- and it declined to enforce its terms to require a dismissal of the libel in personam. 254 F. 2d 297. 'We granted certiorari, 358 U. S. 809, because of an indicated conflict in principle between the Fifth Circuit’s views as to enforceability of such provisions and those taken by the Second Circuit, primarily in William H. Muller & Co. v. Swedish American Line Ltd., 224 F. 2d 806.
We do not believe that this case affords us an appropriate instance to pass upon the extent to which effect can be given to such stipulations in ocean bills of lading not to resort to. the courts of this country. The provision in this case was one of many printed provisions in a form bill of lading prepared by the carrier and presented by it for use in shipments on its vessel. It reads:
“27. — ALSO, that no legal proceedings may be brought against the Captain or Shipowners or their Agents in respect to any loss of or damage to any goods herein specified except in Genoa, it being understood and agreed that every other Tribunal in the place or places where the goods were shipped or landed is incompetent, not withstanding that the ship may be legally represented there.”
We find ourselves in agreement with the views of the Court of Appeals below that this clause should not be read as limiting the maintenance of an action in rem, cf. The Maggie Hammond, 9 Wall. 435, 449-450, against the vessel to enforce a maritime lien for proper carriage. The initial words are particularly appropriate to a restriction of the clause to in personam actions, and the rest of the language is intelligible on this premise. In accord-anee with the familiar rule in such circumstances, we will not stretch the language when the party drafting such a form contract has not included a provision it easily might have. The Caledonia, 157 U. S. 124, 137; The Majestic, 166 U. S. 375, 386; Compania de Navigacion La Flecha v. Brauer, 168 U. S. 104, 118. Considerations involved in construing exemptions from carriers’ liability provided by Acts of Congress are, we think, quite different. See Consumers Import Co. v. Kabushiki Kaisha Kawasaki Zosenjo, 320 U. S. 249. It is a form contract, not a statute, that we construe here.
Accordingly, after oral argument, we have concluded that the Court of Appeals was correct in holding that the libel in rem was properly maintainable. Both parties approved a secured stipulation to release thé vessel from seizure under, the libel, in an amount substantially the same as the recovery demanded by the libellant. This same amount the District Court denominated as proper security against a recovery elsewhere. We need not conjure up doubts in this regard that the parties never •expressed. While the parties were entitled to have the judgments of the courts below as to whether the libel in personam was also maintainable, we do not .believe.it a proper exercise of our discretionary jurisdiction to pass on that aspect of the case, which alone presents the question which led us to grant certiorari. It appears that in any event the respondent will be able to try its claim in the District Court.
In the light of these circumstances, which “were not... fully apprehended at the time. certiorari was granted,” Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 352 U. S. 521, 559 (separate opinion), the writ of certiorari will be dismissed as improvidently granted. Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., 349 U. S. 70, 75; Goins v. United States, 306 U. S. 622; Moor v. Texas & New Orleans R. Co., 297 U. S. 101; Southern Power Co. v. North Carolina Public Service Co., 263 U. S. 508. Cf. Hammerstein v. Superior Court of California, 341 U. S. 491, 492; McCarthy v. Bruner, 323 U. S. 673; Layne & Bowler Corp. v. Western Well Works, Inc., 261 U. S. 387, 392-393; Tyrrell, v. District of Columbia, 243 U. S. 1. Examination of a case on the merits, on oral argument, may bring into “proper focus” a consideration which, though present in the record at the time of granting the writ, only later indicates that the grant was improvident. See Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., supra, at 73. While this Court decides questions of public importance, it decides them in the context of meaningful litigation. Its function in resolving conflicts among the Courts of Appeals is judicial, not simply administrative or managerial. Resolution here of the extent to which these bill of lading provisions may be given effect by our courts can await a day when the issue is posed less abstractly.
Writ of certiorari dismissed.
We note that in another place the bill of lading makes specific recognition of suits both in rem and in 'personam. Clause 35 provides:
“35. — In any event the Carrier and the ship shall be discharged from all liability in respect of dess or damage unless suit is brought within one year after the delivery of the goods or the date when the goods should have been delivered. Suit shall not be deemed brought until jurisdiction shall have been obtained over the Carrier and/or the ship by service of process or by an agreement to appear.”
While the first sentence is verbatim from § 3 (6) of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 49 Stat. 1209, 46 U. S. C. § 1303 (6), the language nevertheless reinforces the fact that if both categories of suit were to be included under Clause 27, apt words to accomplish this were readily available, and were in fact used in another clause of the bill.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | H | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Harlan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The petitioner, German S. Lopez, was tried in a federal court on a four-count indictment charging him with attempted bribery of an Internal Revenue Agent, Roger S. Davis, in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 201. The questions before us for review are:' (1) whether the trial court’s treatment of “entrapment” constituted reversible error; and (2) whether Davis’ testimony relating to a conversation with petitioner on October 24, 1961, which formed the basis of the three, counts, of the indictment on which petitiofier was convicted, and a wire recording of that conversation^ were properly admitted into evidence.
The evidence at the trial related to three meetings between Lopez, and Davis that took place at Clauson’s Inn, situated at North Falmouth, Massachusetts, and operated by Lopez under a lease. Davis, who was investigating possible evasion of excise taxes in the area, first visited the Inn on the afternoon of August 31,1961, when he asked.Lopez whether there was any. dancing, singing, or other entertainment in the evenings and showed him an advertisement for the Inn which stated that there was. Lopez said there was no entertainment and denied responsibility for the advertisement. Davis returned again that evening and saw dancing in the bar and lounge. He described the Inn in a report to his superior the next day as a “potential delinquent” and said that he would “follow up.”
Davis next returned to the Inn on October 21, when he again saw dancing in the bar and lounge, and" spoke with Lopez. • Davis’ testimony about this meeting may be summarized as follows:. Early in the. discussion, Davis told Lopez that he thought the establishment would be liable for a cabaret tax and asked to see the books, but Lopez resisted and suggested that they continue the conversation in his,office. Once there, Lopez suggested that he would like to avoid all “aggravation” and to reach an'“agreement.” After Davis said he could not drop the matter and would return the following' week; Lopez said he didn’t wish to “insult” Davis and that he didn’t know whether to take him into his “confidence.” Receiving no reply, Lopez put some money on the desk saying:
“You can drop this case. Here’s $200. Buy your wife a present. And I’ll have more money for you at Christmas time. This is all I have now.”
Davis balked, and Lopez urged him to take the money and to bring his wife and family for a weekend “as my guest.” Following some questioning as to the extent of Lopez’ business, during the course of which Davis estimated a year’s tax as running to $3,000, Lopez added another $220 to the money on the desk, stating that he did not want to be bothered with returns for past years but would file a return, for the current quarter. More importunities on Lopez’ part followed and Davis finally took the money. Before Davis left, Lopez again said he .would file a return for the current quarter and asked Davis to come back, on October 24.
Lopez, in his version of the events of October 21, admitted giving the $420 to Davis but said the money was given in an effort to have Davis prepare his returns and-get his books in proper order. According to Lopez’ testimony, he told Davis that he would file returns from October 17 on, since on that date the Inn had changed its policy to one of entertainment.
After leaving the Inn, Davis-reported the meeting to a •fellow agent and to his superior and turned over the $420 to a Regional Inspector. On the morning of October 24, he met with four Internal Revenue Inspectors, who instructed him to keep his appointment with Lopez, to “pretend to play along with the scheme,” and to draw the conversation back to the meeting of October 21. Davis was then equipped with two electronic devices, a pocket battery-operated transmitter, (which subsequently failed to work) and a pocket wiré recorder, which recorded the conversation between. Lopez and Davis at their meeting later in the day.
According to the recording of that conversation, Davis suggested they talk in Lopez’ office and, once inside the office, Davis started to explain the excise tax form and to discuss the return. Before any computations were made, Lopez said he had never thought he needed to file a cabaret tax return, and the conversation then continued:
“Lopez: . . . Whatever we decide to do from here on I’d like you to be on my side and visit with me. Deduct anything you think you should and I’ll be happy to . . . because you may prevent something coming up in the office. If you think I should be advised about it let me know. Pick up the phone. I can meet you in town or anywhere you want. For your information the other night I have to . . .
“Davis: Well, you know I’ve got a job to do.
“Lopez: Yes, and Uncle Sam'is bigger than you and I are and we pay a lot of taxes, and if we can benefit something by it individually, let’s keep it that way and believe me anything that transpires between you and I, not even my wife or my accountant or anybody is aware of it. So I want you to feel that way about it.”
The two then discussed receipts and the potential tax liability for 1959-1961, and Lopez protested that Davis’ estimates were very high, although he did not deny the fact' of liability. After Davis said, “I don’t want to get greedy or anything,” Lopez gave him $200 and later in the conversation told Davis he could bring his family down for a free weekend, and should “[c]ome in every so often and I’ll give you a couple of hundred dollars every time you come in.” At one point, Lopez said “Now if you should suggest that T should file returns from this point on, I’ll do it. If you suggest that I can get by without doing it, then just drop in every so often and I’ll . . .” Lopez also confirmed that he had given Davis $420 on October 21.
Lopez, in his testimony, did not question the accuracy of the recording and in fact said little 'more about the meeting of October 24 than that Davis had goné into a lot of figures and that he (Lopez) had become emotionally upset because he felt that Davis “was not there for the purpose that he came in there fpr on October 21st.” He did not suggest that Davis had induced him to offer any bribes.
The first of the four counts in the ensuing indictment charged that at the meeting of October 21, Lopez gave Davis the $420 with intent to induce Davis, among other things, “to refrain from making an examination of the books and records relating to'sales and receipts” at the Inn from 1959-1961. The remaining three counts related to the meeting of October 24, and charged three separate acts of attempted bribery, each fpr the purpose of influencing Davis to aid in concealing sales, receipts, and any cabaret tax due for the years 1959-1961. The acts were the giving of $200 to Davis (Count 2), the promise of an additional $200 the following month (Count 3), and the promise of a free weekend for Davis and his family (Count 4).
Prior to trial, petitioner filed a motion to suppress as evidence the wire recording of the October 24 conversation between Lopez and Davis. After hearing, this motion was denied. At trial, the motion was renewed and again denied, and the recording was received in evidence. Petitioner did not object to the testimony of Agent Davis relating to the October 24 conversation.
In his charge to the jury, the trial judge emphasized the presumption of innocence and the burden on the Government to establish “every essential element” of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. He then detailed what these essential .element's were and called particjulár attention to the contrast between the specific intent charged in Count 1 — to prevent an examination of books and records — and the more general-intent charged in the other three counts — to conceal liability for the tax in question. He strongly suggested -that the specific intent alleged in Count 1 had not been established beyond a reasonable doubt.
Although defense counsel had briefly adverted to the possibility of “entrapment” in'his summation to the jury, he did not request jüdgment of acquittal on that ground. Nor did he request any instruction on the point- or offer at the trial any evidence particularly aimed at such a defense. Nevertheless, the trial judge did. charge on , entrapment. Petitioner made no objection to this •' instruction, or to any'other aspect of the charge.
The jury acquitted On Count 1 and found petitioner guilty on Counts 2, 3 and 4. • A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict “as a matter of law on the evidence” was denied, and petitioner was sentenced to a term of imprisonment for one year.
Following per curiam affirmance of the conviction by the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, 305 F. 2d 825, we granted certiorari, 371 U. S. 859, to consider the two questions stated at the outset of this opinion. Supra, pp. 428-429.
I.
The defense of entrapment, its meaning, purpose, and application, are problems that have sharply divided this Court on past occasions. See Sorrells v. United States, 287 U. S. 435; Sherman v. United States, 356 U. S. 369; Masciale v. United States, 356 U. S. 386. Whether in the absence of a conclusive showing the defense is for the court or the jury, and whether the controlling standard looks only to the conduct of the Government, or also takes into account the predisposition of the defendant, are among the issues that have been mooted. We need not, however, concern ourselves with any of these questions here, for under any approach, petitioner’s belated claim' of entrapment is insubstantial, and the record fails to show any prejudice that would warrant reversal on this score.
The conduct with which the defense of entrapment is concerned is the manufacturing of crime by law enforcement officials and their agents. Such conduct, of course, is far different from the permissible stratagems involved in the detection, and prevention of crime. Thus before the issue of entrapment can fairly be said to have been presented in a criminal prosecution there must have been at least some showing of the kind of conduct by government agents which may well have induced the accused to commit the crime charged.
In the case before us, we think that such a showing has not been made-. ■ It is undisputed .that at the meeting of October 21, petitioner made an unsolicited offer of $420 to Agent Davis; The references to the October 21 offer in the recorded conversation scarcely leave room for doubt that this offer was made for the same general purpose as the bribes offered at the October 24 meeting: to obtain Davis’ assistance in concealing any cabaret tax liability for past and present periods. As to the meeting of October 24, the recording shows that petitioner’s improper overtures began almost at the outset of the discussion, when he stated: “Deduct anything you think you should and I’ll be happy to . . . because 'you may prevent something coming up in the office.” This and similar statements preceded Davis’ computations, and his comment, “I don’t want to get greedy,” on which petitioner so heavily relies. Moreover, we find nothing in the recording as a whole, or in petitioner’s own testimony, to suggest that his conduct on October 24 was instigated by Davis. Upon any reasonable assessment , of the record, it seems manifest that all that Davis was doing was to afford an opportunity for the continuation of a course of criminal conduct, upon which the petitioner had earlier voluntarily embarked, under circumstances susceptible of proof.
It is therefore evident that, under any theory, entrapment has not been shown as a matter of law. Indeed, the paucity of the showing might well have justified' a refusal, to instruct the jury at all on entrapment. But in any event no request for such an instruction was made, and there was no objection to the instruction given. Under these circumstances, petitioner may not now challenge the form of that instruction. See Fed. Rules Crim. Proc., 30.; Moore v. United States, 262 F. 2d 216; Martinez v. United States, 300 F. 2d 9. Nor was there on this score any such plain error in the charge, affecting substantial rights, as would warrant reversal despite the failure to object. See Féd. Rules Crim. Proc., 52 (b). Since the record does not disclose a sufficient showing that petitioner was induced to offer a'bribe, we cannot conclude that he was prejudiced by the charge on burden of proof, even assuming that the burden called for was too great. By the same token, we are not persuaded that in this case it is significant to determine whether entrapment should turn on the effect of the Government’s conduct on “men of ordinary firmness,” as the court charged, or on the effect on the particular defendant. Accordingly, we do not reach the question whether the charge was in every respect a correct statement of the law. It is enough to say that in the circumstances of this case, there was in any event no reversible error.
II.
Petitioner’s remaining contentions concern the admissibility of the evidence relating to his conversation with Davis on October 24. His argument is primarily addressed to the recording of the conversation, which he claims was obtained in violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment. Recognizing the weakness of this position if Davis was properly permitted to testify about the same conversation, petitioner now challenges that testimony as well, although he failed to do so at the trial. His theory is that, in view of Davis’ alleged falsification of his mission, he gained access to petitioner’s office by misrepresentation and all evidence obtained in the office, i. e., his conversation with petitioner, was illegally “seized.” In support of this theory, he relies on Gouled v. United States, 255 U. S. 298, and Silverman v. United States, 365 U. S. 505. But under the circumstances of the present case, neither of these decisions lends any comfort to petitioner, and indeed their rationale buttresses the conclusion that the evidence was properly admitted. See On Lee v. United States, 343 U. S. 747.
We need not be long detained by the belated claim that Davis should not have been permitted to testify, about the conversation of October 24. Davis was not guilty of an unlawful invasion of petitioner’s office simply because his apparent willingness to accept a bribe -was not real. Compare Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471. He-was in the office with petitioner’s consent, and while there he did not violate the privacy of the office by seizing something surreptitiously without petitioner’s knowledge. Compare Gouled v. United States, supra. The only evidence obtained consisted of statements made by Lopez to Davis, statements which Lopez knew full well could be used against him by Davis if he wished. We decline to hold that whenever an offer of a bribe is made in private, and the offeree does not intend to accept, that offer is a constitutionally protected communication.
Once it' is plain that Davis could properly, testify about his conversation' with Lopez, the constitutional claim relating to the recording of that conversation emerges in proper perspective. The Court has in the past sustained instances of “electronic eavesdropping’’ against constitutional challenge, when devices have been used to enable government agents to overhear conversations which would have been beyond the reach of the human ear. See, e. g., Olmstedd v. United States, 277 U. S. 438; Goldman v. United States, 316 U. S. 129. It has. been insisted only that the electronic device not be planted by an unlawful physical invasion of a constitutionally protected area. Silverman v. United States, supra. The validity of these decisions is not in question, here. Indeed this case involves no “eavesdropping” whatever in any proper sense of that term. The Government did not use an electronic device to listen in bn conversations it could not otherwise have heard. Instead, the device was used only to obtain the most reliable evidence possible of a conversation in which the Government’s own agent was a participant and which that agent was fully entitled to disclose. And the device was not planted by means of an unlawful physical invasion of petitioner’s premises under circumstances which would violate the Fourth Amendment. It was carried in and out by-an agent who was there with petitioner’s assent, and it neither saw nor heard more than the agent himself.
The case is thus quite similar to Rathbun v. United States, 355 U. S. 107, in which we sustained against statutory attack the admission in evidence of the testimony of a policeman as to a conversation he overheard on an extension telephone with the consent of a party to the conversation. The present case, if anything, is even clearer, since in Rathbun it was conceded by all concerned “that either party may record the conversation and publish it.” 355 U. S., at 110. (Emphasis added.)
Stripped to its essentials, petitioner’s argument amounts to saying that he has a constitutional right to rely on possible flaws in the agent’s memory, or to challenge the agent’s credibility without being beset by corroborating evidence that is not susceptible of impeachment. For no other argument can justify excluding an accurate version of a conversation that the agent could testify to from memory. We think the risk that petitioner took in offering a bribe to Davis fairly included the risk that the offer would be accurately reproduced in court, whether by faultless memory or mechanical recording.
It is urged that whether or not the recording violated petitioner’s constitutional rights, we should prevent its introduction in evidence in this federal trial in the exercise of our supervisory powers. But the court’s inherent power to refuse to receive material evidence is a power that must be sparingly exercised. Its application' in the present case, where there has been no manifestly improper conduct by federal officials, would be wholly unwarranted.
The function of a criminal trial is to seek out and determine the truth or falsity of the charges brought against the defendant. Proper fulfillment of this function requires that, constitutional limitations aside, all relevant, competent evidence be admissible, unless the manner in which it has been obtained — for example, by violating some statute or rule of procedure — compels the formulation of a rule excluding its introduction in a federal court. See, e. g., McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332; Mallory v. United States, 354 U. S. 449.
When we look for the overriding considerations that might require the exclusion of the highly useful evidence involved here, we find nothing. There has been no invasion of constitutionally protected rights, and no violation Of federalilaw or rules of procedure. Indeed, there has not even been any electronic eavesdropping on a private conversation which government agents could not otherwise have overheard. There has, in short, been no act of any kind which could justify the creation of an exclusionary rule. We therefore conclude that the judgment of the Court of Appeals must be
Affirmed.
18 U. S. C. §201 provides:
“Whoever promises, offers, or gives any money or thing of value ... to ány officer or employee or person acting for or on behalf of the United States, or any department or agency thereof, in any official function . . . with intent to influence his decision or action on any question,' matter, cause, or proceeding which- may at any time be pending, or which may by law be brought before him in his official capacity, or in his place of trust or profit, or with intent to influence him to commit or aid in committing, or to collude in, .or allow, any fraud, or make.opportunity for the commission of any fraud, on the United States, or to induce him to do or omit to do any act in violation of his lawful duty, shall be fined not more than three times the amount of such money or value of such thing or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.”.
There have been no omissions from this passage. The indicated elisions appear in the original record.
Count 1 also charged that the money was given to induce Davis “to refrain . . . from computing a cabaret tax on . . . [the business of the Inn], and from reporting same to the Internal Revenue Service.”
“Now the law with respect to entrapment is this: if a government agent by improper means or over-bearing persuasion or wrongful conduct induces a person of ordinary firmness to commit a crime which he would not otherwise commit, then under those circumstances the defendant is to be acquitted, not because he did not do something ‘ wrongful but because he was induced to do a wrongful act which he would not otherwise have done.
“Now needless to say in all types of law enforcement, particularly with respect to matters involving certain types of regulatory statutes, it is often difficult for the government to get evidence, and government agents may properly,- and without violating the law, or their duty, take such steps as make it possible to procure evidence even though such steps involve their own participation, provided that their participation is not a deliberate temptation to men of ordinary firmness, provided that they do not cause a crime to be committed by someone who does not have a criminal disposition to commit that crime.
“The burden of proof with respect to entrapment is on the defendant. And you are to ask. yourself whether in .fact on the evidence you heard you are persuaded by the preponderance of that evidence that-'Agent Davis, as it were, created the crime and the temptation, and he, Agent Davis, was the instigator and author of a crime that would, never under any circumstances have taken place, had he not used .unfair means.”
That this was the purpose of the October 21 offer is in no way inconsistent with the verdict of acquittal on Count 1. Count 1, as noted above, charged, among other things, a specific intent to induce the agent not to examine books and records, and the court in its charge attached great emphasis to the language of this count. Thus it may well have been that the acquittal on Count 1 was based solely on the jury’s conclusion that the Government had not proved the existence of the specific intent beyond a reasonable doubt.
Petitioner claims that Davis’ assertions of the existence of cabaret tax liability, and of the extent of that liability, were so recklessly false as to suggest or require a finding of entrapment. But as noted, petitioner’s overtures preceded these assertions, and in any event, Davis had ample basis for believing that taxes were due, and petitioner never undertook to deny his liability during the conversation on October 24. Although Davis conceded that he may have made some errors in computation because of “nervousness,” petitioner in his testimony made no claim that these computations led to the bribe offers.
Petitioner does not claim that the issue of entrapment should always be decided by the court and never submitted to the jury, and we are not now presented with that question. See Sherman v. United States, 356 U. S. 369; Masciale v. United States, 356 U. S. 386.
Rule 30 provides in pertinent part:
“No party may assign as error any portion of the charge or omission therefrom unless he objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter to which he objects and the grounds of his objection. Opportunity shall be given to make the objection out of the hearing of the jury.”
The Fourth Amendment provides: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or .affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”
In On Lee, the defendant had been induced to make certain statements by an old acquaintance who, .without the defendant’s knowledge, had turned government informer and was carrying a small concealed microphone which transmitted the conversation to a narcotics agent some distance away. Thus any differences between On Lee and this case cut against the petitioner.
The trustworthiness of the recording is not challenged.
Since Agent Davis himself testified to the conversation with petitioner which was the subject matter of the recording, the question whether there may be circumstances in which the use of such recordings in evidence should be limited to-purposes of “corroboration” is not presented by this case.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | A | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (which we shall refer to as the "Litigation Act") forbids the bringing of large securities class actions based upon violations of state law. It says that plaintiffs may not maintain a class action "based upon the statutory or common law of any State" in which the plaintiffs allege "a misrepresentation or omission of a material fact in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security." 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(1) (emphasis added). The Act defines "class actions" as those involving more than 50 members. See § 78bb(f)(5). It defines "covered security" narrowly to include only securities traded on a national exchange (or, here irrelevant, those issued by investment companies). §§ 78bb(f)(5)(E), 77r(b)(1)-(2).
The question before us is whether the Litigation Act encompasses a class action in which the plaintiffs allege (1) that they "purchase[d]" uncovered securities (certificates of deposit that are not traded on any national exchange), but (2) that the defendants falsely told the victims that the uncovered securities were backed by covered securities. We note that the plaintiffs do not allege that the defendants' misrepresentations led anyone to buy or to sell (or to maintain positions in) covered securities. Under these circumstances, we conclude the Act does not apply.
In light of the dissent's characterization of our holding, post, at 1077 - 1078 (opinion of KENNEDY, j.)-which we believe is incorrect-we specify at the outset that this holding does not limit the Federal Government's authority to prosecute "frauds like the one here." Post, at 1077 - 1078. The Federal Government has in fact brought successful prosecutions against the fraudsters at the heart of this litigation, see infra, at 1074 - 1075, and we fail to understand the dissent's repeated suggestions to the contrary, post, at 1073, 1073 - 1074, 1077 - 1078, 1078, 1081. Rather, as we shall explain, we believe the basic consequence of our holding is that, without limiting the Federal Government's prosecution power in any significant way, it will permit victims of this (and similar) frauds to recover damages under state law. See infra, at 1079 - 1081. Under the dissent's approach, they would have no such ability.
I
A
The relevant statutory framework has four parts:
(1) Section 10(b) of the underlying regulatory statute, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 48 Stat. 891, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2012 ed.). This well-known statutory provision forbids the "use" or "employ[ment]" of "any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance" "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security." § 78j(b).
Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5 similarly forbids the use of any "device, scheme, or artifice to defraud" (including the making of "any untrue statement of a material fact" or any similar "omi[ssion]") "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security." 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2013).
For purposes of these provisions, the Securities Exchange Act defines "security" broadly to include not just things traded on national exchanges, but also "any note, stock, treasury stock, security future, security-based swap, bond, debenture... [or] certificate of deposit for a security." 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10). See also §§ 77b(a)(1), 80a-2(a)(36), 80b-2(a)(18) (providing virtually identical definitions of "security" for the Securities Act of 1933, the Investment Company Act of 1940, and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940).
(2) A statute-based private right of action. The Court has read § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 as providing injured persons with a private right of action to sue for damages suffered through those provisions' violation. See, e.g.,Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730, 95 S.Ct. 1917, 44 L.Ed.2d 539 (1975).
The scope of the private right of action is more limited than the scope of the statutes upon which it is based. See Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 153, 155, 166, 128 S.Ct. 761, 169 L.Ed.2d 627 (2008) (private right does not cover suits against "secondary actors" who had no "role in preparing or disseminating" a stock issuer's fraudulent "financial statements"); Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N. A., 511 U.S. 164, 179, 114 S.Ct. 1439, 128 L.Ed.2d 119 (1994) (private right does not extend to actions against "aiders and abettors" of securities fraud); Blue Chip Stamps, supra, at 737, 95 S.Ct. 1917 (private right extends only to purchasers and sellers, not to holders, of securities).
(3) The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA). 109 Stat. 737, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1, 78u-4. This law imposes procedural and substantive limitations upon the scope of the private right of action available under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. It requires plaintiffs to meet heightened pleading standards. It permits defendants to obtain automatic stays of discovery. It limits recoverable damages and attorney's fees. And it creates a new "safe harbor" for forward-looking statements. See §§ 78u-4, 78u-5.
(4) The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act. 112 Stat. 3227, 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(1)(A). As we said at the outset, this 1998 law forbids any
"covered class action based upon the statutory or common law of any State... by any private party alleging-"(A) a misrepresentation or omission of a material fact in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security; or
"(B) that the defendant used or employed any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security." §§ 78bb(f)(1)(A)-(B).
The law defines "covered security" narrowly. It is a security that "satisfies the standards for a covered security specified in paragraph (1) or (2) of section 18(b) of the Securities Act of 1933." § 78bb(f)(5)(E). And the relevant paragraphs of § 18(b) of the 1933 Act define a "covered security" as "[a security] listed, or authorized for listing, on a national securities exchange," § 77r(b)(1) (or, though not relevant here, as a security issued by an "investment company," § 77r(b)(2)). The Litigation Act also specifies that a "covered security" must be listed or authorized for listing on a national exchange "at the time during which it is alleged that the misrepresentation, omission, or manipulative or deceptive conduct occurred." § 78bb(f)(5)(E).
The Litigation Act sets forth exceptions. It does not apply to class actions with fewer than 51 "persons or prospective class members." § 78bb(f)(5)(B). It does not apply to actions brought on behalf of a State itself. § 78bb(f)(3)(B)(i). It does not apply to class actions based on the law "of the State in which the issuer is incorporated." § 78bb(f)(3)(A)(i). And it reserves the authority of state securities commissions "to investigate and bring enforcement actions." § 78bb(f)(4).
We are here primarily interested in the Litigation Act's phrase "misrepresentation or omission of a material fact in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security." § 78bb(f)(1)(A). Unless this phrase applies to the class actions before us, the plaintiffs may maintain their state-law-based class actions, and they may do so either in federal or state court. Otherwise, their class actions are precluded altogether. See § 78bb(f)(2) (providing for the removal from state to federal court of class actions that meet the specifications of paragraph 1, and for the dismissal of such suits by the district court).
B
1
The plaintiffs in these actions (respondents here) say that Allen Stanford and several of his companies ran a multibillion dollar Ponzi scheme. Essentially, Stanford and his companies sold the plaintiffs certificates of deposit in Stanford International Bank. Those certificates "were debt assets that promised a fixed rate of return." Roland v. Green, 675 F.3d 503, 522 (C.A.5 2012). The plaintiffs expected that Stanford International Bank would use the money it received to buy highly lucrative assets. But instead, Stanford and his associates used the money provided by new investors to repay old investors, to finance an elaborate lifestyle, and to finance speculative real estate ventures.
The Department of Justice brought related criminal charges against Allen Stanford. A jury convicted Stanford of mail fraud, wire fraud, conspiracy to commit money laundering, and obstruction of a Securities and Exchange Commission investigation. Stanford was sentenced to prison and required to forfeit $6 billion. The SEC, noting that the Bank certificates of deposit fell within the 1934 Securities Exchange Act's broad definition of "security," filed a § 10(b) civil case against Allen Stanford, the Stanford International Bank, and related Stanford companies and associates. The SEC won the civil action, and the court imposed a civil penalty of $6 billion.
2
The plaintiffs in each of the four civil class actions are private investors who bought the Bank's certificates of deposit. Two groups of plaintiffs filed their actions in Louisiana state court against firms and individuals who helped sell the Bank's certificates by working as "investment advisers" affiliated with Stanford, or who provided Stanford-related companies with trust, insurance, accounting, or reporting services. (The defendants included a respondent here, SEI Investments Company.) The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants helped the Bank perpetrate the fraud, thereby violating Louisiana state law.
Two other groups of plaintiffs filed their actions in federal court for the Northern District of Texas. One group sued Willis of Colorado (and related Willis companies) and Bowen, Miclette & Britt, two insurance brokers; the other group sued Proskauer Rose and Chadbourne & Parke, two law firms. Both groups claimed that the defendants helped the Bank (and Allen Stanford) perpetrate the fraud or conceal it from regulators, thereby violating Texas securities law.
The Louisiana state-court defendants removed their cases to federal court, and the Judicial Panel on Multi-District Litigation moved the Louisiana cases to the Northern District of Texas. A single federal judge heard all four class actions.
The defendants in each of the cases moved to dismiss the complaints. The District Court concluded that the Litigation Act required dismissal. The court recognized that the certificates of deposit themselves were not "covered securities" under the Litigation Act, for they were not " 'traded nationally [or] listed on a regulated national exchange.' " App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 12-86, p. 62. But each complaint in one way or another alleged that the fraud included misrepresentations that the Bank maintained significant holdings in " 'highly marketable securities issued by stable governments [and] strong multinational companies,' " and that the Bank's ownership of these "covered" securities made investments in the uncovered certificates more secure. Id., at 66. The court concluded that this circumstance provided the requisite statutory "connection" between (1) the plaintiffs' state-law fraud claims, and (2) "transactions in covered securities." Id., at 64, 66-67. Hence, the court dismissed the class actions under the Litigation Act. Id., at 75. See also 675 F.3d, at 511.
All four sets of plaintiffs appealed. The Fifth Circuit reversed. It agreed with the District Court that the complaints described misrepresentations about the Bank's investments in nationally traded securities. Still, the "heart, crux, and gravamen of" the "allegedly fraudulent scheme was representing... that the [uncovered] CDs were a'safe and secure' investment that was preferable to other investments for many reasons." Id., at 522. The court held that the falsehoods about the Bank's holdings in covered securities were too " 'tangentially related' " to the "crux" of the fraud to trigger the Litigation Act. Id., at 520, 522 (quoting Madden v. Cowen & Co., 576 F.3d 957, 965-966 (C.A.9 2009)). "That the CDs were marketed with some vague references to [the Bank's] portfolio containing instruments that might be [covered by the Litigation Act] seems tangential to the schemes," to the point where the complaints fall outside the scope of that Act. 675 F.3d, at 522.
Defendants in the four class actions sought certiorari. We granted their petitions.
II
The question before us concerns the scope of the Litigation Act's phrase "misrepresentation or omission of a material fact in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security." § 78bb(f)(1)(A). How broad is that scope? Does it extend further than misrepresentations that are material to the purchase or sale of a covered security?
In our view, the scope of this language does not extend further. To put the matter more specifically: A fraudulent misrepresentation or omission is not made "in connection with" such a "purchase or sale of a covered security" unless it is material to a decision by one or more individuals (other than the fraudster) to buy or to sell a "covered security." We add that in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 126 S.Ct. 1503, 164 L.Ed.2d 179 (2006), we held that the Litigation Act precluded a suit where the plaintiffs alleged a "fraudulent manipulation of stock prices" that was material to and " 'coincide[d]' with" third-party securities transactions, while also inducing the plaintiffs to "hold their stocks long beyond the point when, had the truth been known, they would have sold." Id., at 75, 85, 89, 126 S.Ct. 1503 (citing United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651, 117 S.Ct. 2199, 138 L.Ed.2d 724 (1997)). We do not here modify Dabit.
A
We reach this interpretation of the Litigation Act for several reasons. First, the Act focuses upon transactions in covered securities, not upon transactions in uncovered securities. An interpretation that insists upon a material connection with a transaction in a covered security is consistent with the Act's basic focus.
Second, a natural reading of the Act's language supports our interpretation. The language requires the dismissal of a state-law-based class action where a private party alleges a "misrepresentation or omission of a material fact" (or engages in other forms of deception, not relevant here) "in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security." § 78bb(f)(1). The phrase "material fact in connection with the purchase or sale" suggests a connection that matters. And for present purposes, a connection matters where the misrepresentation makes a significant difference to someone's decision to purchase or to sell a covered security, not to purchase or to sell an uncovered security, something about which the Act expresses no concern. See generally Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 563 U.S. ----, ----, 131 S.Ct. 1309, 1317-1319, 179 L.Ed.2d 398 (2011) (a misrepresentation or omission is "material" if a reasonable investor would have considered the information significant when contemplating a statutorily relevant investment decision). Further, the "someone" making that decision to purchase or sell must be a party other than the fraudster. If the only party who decides to buy or sell a covered security as a result of a lie is the liar, that is not a "connection" that matters.
Third, prior case law supports our interpretation. As far as we are aware, every securities case in which this Court has found a fraud to be "in connection with" a purchase or sale of a security has involved victims who took, who tried to take, who divested themselves of, who tried to divest themselves of, or who maintained an ownership interest in financial instruments that fall within the relevant statutory definition. See, e.g.,Dabit, supra, at 77, 126 S.Ct. 1503 (Litigation Act: victims were "holders" of covered securities that the defendant's fraud caused to become overvalued); SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 822, 122 S.Ct. 1899, 153 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002)
(§ 10(b): victims were "duped into believing" that the defendant would " 'invest' their assets in the stock market"); Wharf (Holdings) Ltd. v. United Int'l Holdings, Inc., 532 U.S. 588, 592, 121 S.Ct. 1776, 149 L.Ed.2d 845 (2001) (§ 10(b): victim purchased an oral option to buy 10% of a company's stock); O'Hagan,supra, at 655-656, 117 S.Ct. 2199 (§ 10(b): victims were "members of the investing public" harmed by the defendant's "gain[ing of an] advantageous market position" through insider trading); Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 10, 92 S.Ct. 165, 30 L.Ed.2d 128 (1971) (§ 10(b): victim was "injured as an investor" when the fraud deprived it of "compensation for the sale of its valuable block of securities"). We have found no Court case involving a fraud "in connection with" the purchase or sale of a statutorily defined security in which the victims did not fit one of these descriptions. And the dissent apparently has not either.
Although the dissent characterizes our approach as "new," post, at 1073, and tries to describe several of our prior cases, such as Zandford or Dabit, in a different way, post, at 1079 - 1080, it cannot escape the fact that every case it cites involved a victim who took, tried to take, or maintained an ownership position in the statutorily relevant securities through "purchases" or "sales" induced by the fraud. E.g., Zandford, supra, at 815, 820, 122 S.Ct. 1899 (fraudster told customers he would " 'conservatively invest' their money" in the stock market and made sales of "his customer's securities," but pocketed the proceeds (emphasis added)); Dabit, supra, at 76, 85, 89, 126 S.Ct. 1503 (the "misrepresentations and manipulative tactics caused [the plaintiffs] to hold onto overvalued securities" while also inducing third parties to trade them); In re Orlando Joseph Jett, 82 S.E.C. Docket 1211, 1236-1237 (2004) (trader's scheme "greatly inflated the reporting trading profits" that his firm "used to determine... the amount of capital he was permitted to commit on the firm's behalf " (emphasis added)).
Fourth, we read the Litigation Act in light of and consistent with the underlying regulatory statutes, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Securities Act of 1933. The regulatory statutes refer to persons engaged in securities transactions that lead to the taking or dissolving of ownership positions. And they make it illegal to deceive a person when he or she is doing so. Section 5 of the 1933 Act, for example, makes it unlawful to "offer to sell or offer to buy... any security, unless a registration statement has been filed as to such security." 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c). Section 17 of the 1933 Act makes it unlawful "in the offer or sale of any securities... to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material fact." §§ 77q(a)(1)-(2). And § 10(b) of the 1934 Act makes it unlawful to "use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security... any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance." § 78j(b).
Not only language but also purpose suggests a statutory focus upon transactions involving the statutorily relevant securities. The basic purpose of the 1934 and 1933 regulatory statutes is "to insure honest securities markets and thereby promote investor confidence." See O'Hagan, supra, at 658, 117 S.Ct. 2199. Nothing in the regulatory statutes suggests their object is to protect persons whose connection with the statutorily defined securities is more remote than words such as "buy," "sell," and the like, indicate. Nor does anything in the Litigation Act provide us with reasons for interpreting its similar language more broadly.
The dissent correctly points out that the federal securities laws have another purpose, beyond protecting investors. Namely, they also seek to protect securities issuers, as well as the investment advisers, accountants, and brokers who help them sell financial products, from abusive class-action lawsuits. Post, at 1074 - 1075. Both the PSLRA and the Litigation Act were enacted in service of that goal. By imposing heightened pleading standards, limiting damages, and pre-empting state-law suits where the claims pertained to covered securities, Congress sought to reduce frivolous suits and mitigate legal costs for firms and investment professionals that participate in the market for nationally traded securities.
We fail to see, however, how our decision today undermines that objective. The dissent worries our approach will "subject many persons and entities whose profession it is to give advice, counsel, and assistance in investing in the securities markets to complex and costly state-law litigation." Post, at 1074. To the contrary, the only issuers, investment advisers, or accountants that today's decision will continue to subject to state-law liability are those who do not sell or participate in selling securities traded on U.S. national exchanges. We concede that this means a bank, chartered in Antigua and whose sole product is a fixed-rate debt instrument not traded on a U.S. exchange, will not be able to claim the benefit of preclusion under the Litigation Act. But it is difficult to see why the federal securities laws would be-or should be-concerned with shielding such entities from lawsuits.
Fifth, to interpret the necessary statutory "connection" more broadly than we do here would interfere with state efforts to provide remedies for victims of ordinary state-law frauds. A broader interpretation would allow the Litigation Act to cover, and thereby to prohibit, a lawsuit brought by creditors of a small business that falsely represented it was creditworthy, in part because it owns or intends to own exchange-traded stock. It could prohibit a lawsuit brought by homeowners against a mortgage broker for lying about the interest rates on their mortgages-if, say, the broker (not the homeowners) later sold the mortgages to a bank which then securitized them in a pool and sold off pieces as "covered securities." Brief for Sixteen Law Professors as Amici Curiae 24.
The dissent all but admits this. Its proposed rule is that whenever "the purchase or sale of the securities [including by the fraudster] is what enables the fraud," the Litigation Act pre-empts the suit. Post, at 1078. In other words, any time one person convinces another to loan him money, by pretending he owns nationally traded securities or will acquire them for himself in the future, the action constitutes federal securities fraud, is subject to federal enforcement, and is also precluded by the Litigation Act if it qualifies as a "covered class action" under § 78bb(f)(5)(B) ( e.g., involves more than 50 members). Leaving aside whether this would work a significant expansion of the scope of liability under the federal securities laws, it unquestionably would limit the scope of protection under state laws that seek to provide remedies to victims of garden-variety fraud.
The text of the Litigation Act reflects congressional care to avoid such results. Under numerous provisions, it purposefully maintains state legal authority, especially over matters that are primarily of state concern. See §§ 78bb(f)(1)(A)-(B) (limiting preclusion to lawsuits involving "covered," i.e., nationally traded, securities); § 78bb(f)(4) (providing that the "securities commission... of any State shall retain jurisdiction under the laws of such State to investigate and bring enforcement actions"); § 78bb(f)(3)(B) (preserving States' authority to bring suits of the kind forbidden to private class-action plaintiffs). See also 112 Stat. 3227 ("Congress finds that... it is appropriate to enact national standards for securities class action lawsuits involving nationally traded securities, while preserving the appropriate enforcement powers of State securities regulators"). A broad interpretation of the Litigation Act works at cross-purposes with this state-oriented concern. Cf. Zandford, 535 U.S., at 820, 122 S.Ct. 1899 (warning against "constru[ing]" the phrase "in connection with" "so broadly as to convert any common-law fraud that happens to involve securities into a violation of § 10(b)"); Wharf (Holdings) Ltd., 532 U.S., at 596, 121 S.Ct. 1776 (recognizing that "ordinary state breach-of-contract claims" are "actions that lie outside the [Securities Exchange] Act's basic objectives").
B
Respondents and the Government make two important counterarguments. Respondents point to statements we have made suggesting we should give the phrase "in connection with" a broad interpretation. In Dabit, for example, we said that the Court has consistently "espoused a broad interpretation" of "in connection with" in the context of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, and we added that the Litigation Act language similarly warranted a "broad construction." 547 U.S., at 85-86, 126 S.Ct. 1503. In Bankers Life, we said that, if a deceptive practice "touch[es]" a securities transaction, it meets § 10(b)'s "in connection with" requirement, 404 U.S., at 12, 92 S.Ct. 165, and in O'Hagan, we said the fraud and the purchase or sale of a security must simply "coincide." 521 U.S., at 656, 117 S.Ct. 2199. The idea, we explained in Zandford, is that the phrase "should be 'construed not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its remedial purposes.' " 535 U.S., at 819, 122 S.Ct. 1899 (quoting Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151, 92 S.Ct. 1456, 31 L.Ed.2d 741 (1972)).
Every one of these cases, however, concerned a false statement (or the like) that was "material" to another individual's decision to "purchase or s[ell]" a statutorily defined "security" or "covered security." Dabit,supra, at 75-77, 126 S.Ct. 1503;Zandford, supra, at 822, 122 S.Ct. 1899;Wharf (Holdings) Ltd.,supra, at 590-592, 121 S.Ct. 1776;O'Hagan, supra, at 655-657, 117 S.Ct. 2199;Bankers Life, supra, at 10, 92 S.Ct. 165. And the relevant statements or omissions were material to a transaction in the relevant securities by or on behalf of someone other than the fraudster.
Second, the Government points out that § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act also uses the phrase "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security." 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). And the Government warns that a narrow interpretation of "in connection with" here threatens a similarly narrow interpretation there, which could limit the SEC's enforcement capabilities. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 28.
We do not understand, however, how our interpretation could significantly curtail the SEC's enforcement powers. As far as the Government has explained the matter, our interpretation seems perfectly consistent with past SEC practice. For one thing, we have cast no doubt on the SEC's ability to bring enforcement actions against Stanford and Stanford International Bank. The SEC has already done so successfully. As we have repeatedly pointed out, the term "security" under § 10(b) covers a wide range of financial products beyond those traded on national exchanges, apparently including the Bank's certificates of deposit at issue in these cases. No one here denies that, for § 10(b) purposes, the "material" misrepresentations by Stanford and his associates were made "in connection with" the "purchases" of those certificates.
We find it surprising that the dissent worries that our decision will "narro [w] and constric[t] essential protection for our national securities market," post, at 1073, and put "frauds like the one here... not within the reach of federal regulation," post, at 1077 - 1078. That would be news to Allen Stanford, who was sentenced to 110 years in federal prison after a successful federal prosecution, and to Stanford International Bank, which was ordered to pay billions in federal fines, after the same. Frauds like the one here-including this fraud itself-will continue to be within the reach of federal regulation because the authority of the SEC and Department of Justice extends to all "securities," not just to those traded on national exchanges. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10); accord, § 77b(a)(1), § 80a-2(a)(36), § 80b-2(a)(18). When the fraudster peddles an uncovered security like the CDs here, the Federal Government will have the full scope of its usual powers to act. The only difference between our approach and that of the dissent, is that we also preserve the ability for investors to obtain relief under state laws when the fraud bears so remote a connection to the national securities market that no person actually believed he was taking an ownership position in that market.
Thus, despite the Government's and the dissent's hand wringing, neither has been able to point to an example of any prior SEC enforcement action brought during the past 80 years that our holding today would have prevented the SEC from bringing. At oral argument, the Government referred to an administrative proceeding, In re Richard Line, 62 S.E.C. Docket 2879 (1996), as its best example. Our examination of the report of that case, however, indicates that the defendant was a fraudster to whom the fraud's victims had loaned money, expecting that he would purchase securities on their behalf. Id., at 2880 ("Line represented to investors that he would invest their non-admitted assets in various securities, including U.S. Treasury notes, mutual fund shares, and collateralized debt obligations"); ibid. ("[He] fabricated account statements which falsely recited that securities had been purchased on behalf of certain investors").
The Government's brief refers to two other proceedings as demonstrating the SEC's broad § 10(b) enforcement powers. Each, however, involved defrauded investors who had tried to take an ownership interest in the relevant securities. Jett, 82 S.E.C. Docket, at 1251 (involving a § 10(b) action where a defrauded trading firm's "decision to purchase or 'invest' in strips or bonds... stemmed directly from the activity that constituted the fraud"); In re D.S. Waddy & Co., 30 S.E.C. 367, 368 (1949) (involving a § 10(b) action where a broker "appropriated to his own use money paid to him by customers for securities purchases"). We have examined SEC records without finding any further examples.
For these reasons, the dissent's warning that our decision will "inhibit" "litigants from using federal law to police frauds" and will "undermine the primacy of federal law in policing abuses in the securities markets" rings hollow. Post, at 1073 - 1074, 1074 - 1075. The dissent cannot point to one example of a federal securities action-public or private-that would have been permissible in the past but that our approach will disallow in the future. And the irony of the dissent's position is that federal law would have precluded private recovery in these very suits, because § 10(b) does not create a private right of action for investors vis-à-vis "secondary actors" or "aiders and abettors" of securities fraud. Stoneridge Investment Partners, 552 U.S., at 152, 155, 128 S.Ct. 761;Central Bank of Denver, 511 U.S., at 180, 114 S.Ct. 1439; accord, Brief for Petitioners in No. 12-86, p. 46 ("Any federal securities action against Petitioners would clearly run afoul of Central Bank and Stoneridge"); Brief for Respondents 48 (same); Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 28 (same).
III
Respondents' complaints specify that their claims rest upon their purchases of uncovered, not of covered, securities. Our search for allegations that might bring their allegations within the scope of the Litigation Act reveals the following:
(1) The first set of Texas plaintiffs alleged that they bought certificates of deposit from Stanford International Bank because they were told "the CDs issued by SIB were safer even than U.S. bank-issued CDs" and "could be redeemed at any time," given that the Bank "only invested the money [ i.e., the Bank's money obtained from its certificate sale proceeds] in safe, secure, and liquid assets." App. 433. They claimed Stanford "touted the high quality of SIB's investment portfolio," and such falsehoods were material to their decision to purchase the uncovered certificates. Id., at 444.
(2) The second set of Texas plaintiffs contended that they, too, purchased the Bank's certificates on the belief "that their money was being invested in safe, liquid investments." Id., at 715. They alleged that the Bank's marketing materials stated it devoted "the greater part of its assets" to "first grade investment bonds (AAA, AA+, AA) and shares of stock (of great reputation, liquidity, and credibility)." Id., at 744 (emphasis deleted).
(3) Both groups of Louisiana plaintiffs alleged that they were induced to purchase the certificates based on misrepresentations that the Bank's assets were "
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | H | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Chief Justice Burger
delivered the opinion of the Court:
The question presented is whether § 8 of the Clayton Act bars interlocking directorates between a bank and a competing insurance company.
1 — 1
In 1975, the United States brought these companion test cases (now consolidated) against 10 corporations arid 5 individuals. The corporations were three banks and their three respective holding companies, and four mutual life insurance companies. The five individuals each served on the board of directors of one of the banks or bank holding companies and one of the insurance companies. It was stipulated that the interlocked banks and insurance companies compete in the interstate market for mortgage and real estate loans.
The Government asserts that interlocking directorates between banks and insurance companies violate §8 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 732, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 19. The fourth paragraph of § 8, on which the Government relies, provides:
“No person at the same time shall be a director in any two or more corporations, any one of which has capital, surplus, and undivided profits aggregating more than $1,000,000, engaged in whole or in part in commerce, other than banks, banking associations, trust companies, and common carriers subject to the Act to regulate commerce, approved February fourth, eighteen hundred and eighty-seven, if such corporations are or shall have been theretofore, by virtue of their business and location of operation, competitors, so that the elimination of competition by agreement between them would constitute a violation of any of the provisions of any of the antitrust laws.” (Emphasis added.)
In short, this statute forbids a person to serve simultaneously on the boards of directors of two or more corporations that meet certain specifications, namely, that the corporations be engaged in commerce, at least one of them having capital, surplus, and undivided profits worth more than $1 million, that they be competitors, and that they be “other than banks, banking associations, trust companies, and common carriers . . .
According to the Government, the language “[n]o person at the same time shall be a director in any two or more corporations . . . other than banks” prohibits interlocking directorates between any two or more competing corporations, but excludes from this general prohibition interlocking directorates between banks. The Government argues that the purpose of the “other than banks” clause was simply to prevent overlapping regulation of interlocks between banks, which are separately regulated in the first three paragraphs of § 8. Thus, it interprets the fourth paragraph of §8 to reach interlocks between banks and nonbanks, which interlocks are otherwise unregulated. Petitioners respond that the “other than banks” clause expressly excludes interlocking directorates involving banks from the scope of the fourth paragraph of §8.
On cross-motions for summary judgment, the United States District Court for the Northern District of California granted summary judgment for petitioners and dismissed the Government’s suits. United States v. Crocker National Corp., 422 F. Supp. 686 (1976). The District Court held:
“[A] normal reading of the statutory language Two . . . corporations . . . other than banks’ compels the conclusion that the statute applies only to two corporations, neither of which is a bank.
“[A]n ordinary reading of the statutory prohibition ‘[n]o person . . . shall [serve as] a director in any two or more corporations . . . other than banks’ means that banks were not to be subject to this prohibition.” Id., at 689-690.
Although the District Court saw no need for further factual inquiry in light of the “clear statutory language,” id., at 690, it observed that this interpretation of the statute was “confirmed by 60 years of administrative and Congressional interpretation, as well as by the legislative history underlying section 8.” Id., at 703.
A divided Court of Appeals reversed. United States v. Crocker National Corp., 656 F. 2d 428 (CA9 1981). Unlike the District Court, the majority viewed the statutory language as ambiguous. It stated that the “other than banks” clause could be interpreted equally plausibly to mean either “two or more corporations [none of which are] banks,” or “two or more corporations [not all of which are] banks.” Id., at 434 (emphasis deleted). Relying chiefly on its view of the underlying policy of the Clayton Act, the Court of Appeals held that the fourth paragraph of § 8 should be interpreted to bar all interlocking directorates between banks and competing nonbanking corporations.
In the view of the Court of Appeals, petitioners’ position left a “gap” in the coverage of § 8. Discerning nothing in the legislative history directly bearing on the applicability of § 8 to interlocking directorates between banks and nonbanking corporations, the Court of Appeals relied on the broad purpose of Congress to condemn “interlocking directorates between large competing corporations,” id., at 439, as support for an interpretation of §8 leaving no “loopholes.” It thus interpreted the “other than banks” language to refer back to the interlocks between banks regulated in the preceding paragraphs of § 8; this interpretation left interlocking directorates between banks and nonbanks subject to the general bar of the fourth paragraph of §8.
We granted certiorari, 456 U. S. 1005 (1982), and we reverse.
II
The Clayton Act of 1914 was passed in a period when Congress was focusing on the perceived evils of corporate bigness and monopoly. President Wilson, for example, had made the “trusts” a core issue of his 1912 campaign; Congress followed up with the Pujo Committee investigation into the investment banking trust. See generally Travers, Interlocks in Corporate Management and the Antitrust Laws, 46 Texas L. Rev. 819, 824-829 (1968). Interlocks between large corporations were seen in the public debate as per se antagonistic to the public interest; many, including President Wilson, called for legislation that would, among other things, ban all kinds of interlocks. Interlocks were condemned regardless of whether the relationship between the corporations was horizontal or vertical; whether it was accomplished through the sharing of personnel, including directors and officers; or whether it was achieved through interlocking stock holdings or other indirect forms of domination. See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess., 15 (1914); Hearings on Trust Legislation before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 63d Cong., 2d Sess., 816, 818-820, 823, 925 (1914) (hereafter Trust Hearings). Plainly, these were policy matters appropriate for Congress to resolve.
However, when the Clayton Act was enacted, its scope was considerably less comprehensive than many of the proposals pressed upon Congress. Rather than enacting a broad scheme to ban all interlocks between potential competitors, Congress approached the problem of interlocks selectively, limiting both the classes of corporations and the kinds of interlocks subject to regulation.
Three classes of business organizations are regulated by the Clayton Act’s provisions concerning corporate interlocks and each class is subject to different restraints. Clayton Act §§8 and 10, 15 U. S. C. §§ 19 and 20. Section 10 regulates, but does not prohibit, certain types of interlocks between common carriers and various other corporations with which the carrier has a supplier or customer relationship; it does not regulate horizontal interlocks between competing common carriers. The first three paragraphs of §8 regulate interlocks between banks and trust companies that meet certain geographic and other requirements. These provisions bar a wide range of personnel interlocks, including common directors, officers, and employees. The fourth paragraph of §8 concerns the class of competing corporations “other than banks, banking associations, trust companies, and common carriers”; it prohibits only shared directors between competing corporations and does not bar any other kind of personnel interlock or any kind of vertical interlock. It is against this pattern of specific and limited regulation of corporate interlocks that we approach the narrow statutory question presented.
The starting point, as always, is the language of the statute. The narrow question here is whether the fourth paragraph of § 8 of the Clayton Act bars interlocking directorates involving a bank and a nonbanking corporation with which it competes. The language of the statute is unambiguous in prohibiting interlocking directorates between “two or more corporations . . . other than banks.” The most natural reading of this language is that the interlocked corporations must all be corporations “other than banks.” It is self-evident that a bank and a nonbanking corporation are not both corporations “other than banks.” Thus, the fourth paragraph of §8 by its express terms does not prohibit interlocking directorates between a bank and a competing nonbanking corporation. This reading of the statute is reinforced both by the structure of the Clayton Act and by the structure of the fourth paragraph of § 8.
The Clayton Act selectively regulates interlocks with respect to three different classes of business organizations: those interlocks between banks are covered in the first three paragraphs of § 8 and those interlocks involving common carriers are covered by § 10. Viewed in this framework, the purpose of the “other than” clause in the fourth paragraph of § 8 was to exclude altogether interlocking directorates involving either banks or common carriers. Moreover, this interpretation is the only one consistent with the treatment of “common carriers” in the “other than” clause.
The Government does not dispute that the language “two or more corporations . . . other than banks [or] common carriers” completely excludes from the fourth paragraph any interlocking directorates in which any of the corporations involved is a common carrier; it should follow, logically, that it also excludes interlocking directorates involving banks. Put another way, the language “two or more corporations... other than banks [or] common carriers” means “two or more corporations none of which is a common carrier” To be consistent, that language must also be interpreted to mean “two or more corporations none of which is a bank”
In our view, it strains the meaning of ordinary words to read “two or more corporations other than common carriers” to mean something completely different from “two or more corporations other than banks,” as the Court of Appeals did. 656 F. 2d, at 442-443. In Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U. S. 807, 826 (1980), for example, we rejected as unreasonable the claim that the word “filed” could have two different meanings in two separate subsections of the same statute. Similarly, we reject as unreasonable the contention that Congress intended the phrase “other than” to mean one thing when applied to “banks” and another thing as applied to “common carriers,” where the phrase “other than” modifies both words in the same clause.
The language of the fourth paragraph of § 8 supports this interpretation. The fourth paragraph begins with a general bar against interlocking directorates: “No person at the same time shall be a director in any two or more corporations.” This general bar is limited by four separate clauses, each of which modifies the phrase “two or more corporations.” That is, the statute applies only to “two or more corporations” which satisfy these four additional requirements. Clearly, the first clause need be satisfied by only one of the interlocked corporations. By its own terms, it applies to “any one” of the “two or more corporations.” None of the other clauses contain similar language. Rather, they are all written in general language that applies to all the interlocked corporations. Had Congress wished the “other than banks” clause to apply to only one of the interlocked corporations, it would not have presented any difficulty to have said so explicitly as in the first clause.
In rejecting the Government’s present interpretation of § 8, we by no means depart from our long-held policy of giving great weight to the contemporaneous interpretation of a challenged statute by an agency charged with its enforcement, e. g., Edwards’ Lessee v. Darby, 12 Wheat. 206, 210 (1827). But the Government does not come to this case with a consistent history of enforcing or attempting to enforce § 8 in accord with what it urges now. On the contrary, for over 60 years the Government made no attempt, either by filing suit or by seeking voluntary resignations, to apply § 8 to interlocks between banks and nonbanking corporations, even though interlocking directorates between banks and insurance companies were widespread and a matter of public record throughout the period. We find it difficult to believe that the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, which share authority for enforcement of the Clayton Act, and the Congress, which oversees those agencies, would have overlooked or ignored the pervasive and open practice of interlocking directorates between banks and insurance companies had it been thought contrary to the law.
It is true, of course, that “[authority actually granted by Congress . . . cannot evaporate through lack of administrative exercise,” FTC v. Bunte Brothers, Inc., 312 U. S. 349, 352 (1941); the mere failure of administrative agencies to act is in no sense “a binding administrative interpretation” that the Government lacks the authority to act. United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U. S. 586, 590 (1957). However,
“just as established practice may shed light on the extent of power conveyed by general statutory language, so the want of assertion of power by those who presumably would be alert to exercise it, is equally significant in determining whether such power was actually conferred.” FTC v. Bunte Brothers, Inc., supra, at 352.
Similarly, in FPC v. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co., 337 U. S. 498, 513 (1949), this Court held that “[f]ailure to use such an important power for so long a time indicates to us that the Commission did not believe the power existed.” In the circumstances of this case, the Government’s failure for over 60 years to exercise the power it now claims under § 8 strongly suggests that it did not read the statute as granting such power.
When a court reaches the same reading of the statute as the practical construction given it by the enforcing agencies over a 60-year span, that is a powerful weight supporting such reading. Here, moreover, the business community directly affected and the enforcing agencies and the Congress have read this statute the same way for 60 years. It is not wholly without significance that Members of Congress and their staffs who have written about this issue have stated that §8 “does not apply to interlocks between commercial banks and competing financial institutions, such as mutual savings banks, insurance companies, and small loan companies.” Letter from Rep. Wright Patman to Hon. Arthur F. Burns, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board (June 1, 1970), reprinted in The Banking Reform Act of 1971: Hearings on H. R. 5700 before the House Committee on Banking and Currency, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 271 (1971). While these views are not binding on this Court, the weight of informed opinion over the years strongly supports the District Court holding that Congress intended the statute to be interpreted according to its plain meaning.
It is not surprising that for more than a half century literally thousands of citizens in the business world have served as directors of both banks and insurance companies in reli-anee on what was universally perceived as plain statutory language. These citizens were reassured that the Government’s reading of that language indicated that their conduct was lawful. The Government brushes this aside, saying in effect that it will not bring suits against those directors who resign within a reasonable time. Tr. of Oral Arg. 30-31. However, those who elect to resign under this “amnesty” would nonetheless carry a stigma of sorts as violators of federal laws. Equally, and perhaps more, important, such persons face possible civil liability in unknown amounts, liability against which the Government cannot, and does not purport to, render them immune. See id., at 30. While it is arguable that wise antitrust policy counsels against permitting interlocking directorates between banks and competing insurance companies, that policy must be implemented by Congress, and not by a crabbed interpretation of the words of a statute which so many in authority have interpreted in accordance with its plain meaning for so long. If changes in economic factors or considerations of public policy counsel the extension of the Clayton Act to the categories of interlocking directorates implicated here, it is a simple matter for Congress to say so clearly.
If any doubt remains as to the meaning of the statute, that doubt is removed by the legislative history. The relevant provisions of the Clayton Act went through four legislative stages: (1) the initial “tentative bill,” (2) the House bill introduced by Representative Clayton, (3) the Senate amendments, and (4) the final bill of the Joint Conference Committee which was enacted into law as the Clayton Act. The evolution of the bill, along with the remarks in Committee and on the floor, rebuts the Government’s claim that Congress intended to reach bank-nonbank interlocks in the fourth paragraph of §8.
The tentative bill proposed by Representative Clayton had three sections dealing with director interlocks. Reprinted in Trust Hearings, at 1577-1579. Section 1 prohibited certain director and officer interlocks between railroads and specified other corporations, including banks. Section 2 prohibited certain interlocks between banks. Section 4, the precursor to the current paragraph 4 of § 8, presumed a violation of the Sherman Act from the existence of a director interlock. It provided, in pertinent part:
“That if. . . any two or more corporations, engaged in whole or in part in interstate or foreign commerce, have a common director or directors, the fact of such common director or directors shall be conclusive evidence that there exists no real competition between such corporations; and if such corporations shall have been theretofore, or are, or shall have been . . . natural competitors, such elimination of competition thus conclusively presumed shall constitute a combination between the said corporations in restraint of interstate or foreign commerce . . . .” Id., at 1579.
Extensive hearings were held on this “tentative bill.” Louis D. Brandéis, then an adviser to President Wilson, testified that the tentative bill was inadequate to meet what he saw as the need for a broad prohibition against vertical as well as horizontal interlocks. See generally id., at 681-688. Representative Carlin objected: “We attempted to do that by section 4 of the bill. Section 1 deals with the railroads, section 2 with the banks, and section 4 with indus-trials.” Id., at 681. Brandéis responded that “as you have section 4 there your clause is limited to a linking together of two industrial corporations who are competitors . . . .” Ibid.
Brandéis also testified to the need to prohibit interlocking directorates between all large banks. Id., at 921-925. He argued that Congress had the power to do this since “banking is interstate commerce.” Id., at 928-924. He then turned from the banks to the “other financial concern doing business in the same place” with which the interlocking directorates should be, but were not under the tentative bill, prohibited:
“Mr. Brandéis: . . . Now, what is a financial concern as I have used that term? I should say that term ‘financial concern’ includes not only a bank which is a member of a national reserve system but any other bank.
“Mr. Volstead: Would you include an insurance company?
“Mr. Brandéis: And an insurance company also. It seems to me that both banks and insurance companies, which have a usual place of business in the same place, . . . ought to be included in that prohibition.” Id., at 925 (emphasis added).
Two facts emerge fi’om this exchange. First, the tentative bill dealt with the different classes of corporations (banks, railroads, and industrials) separately and in different ways. Section 2 dealt exclusively with banks and §4 exclusively with industrial corporations. Second, the tentative bill was not understood as prohibiting interlocking directorates between banks and “other financial concern[s] doing business in the same place” such as insurance companies.
At the conclusion of the hearings, Representative Clayton introduced H. R. 15657, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. (May 2, 1914), reprinted in Trust Hearings, at 1931-1952, which eventually was enacted as the Clayton Act. Section 9 of that bill generally paralleled the structure of the current §8. The third paragraph of § 9 (which became the fourth paragraph of the present § 8) provided in pertinent part:
“[N]o person at the same time shall be a director in any two or more corporations, either of which has capital, surplus, and undivided profits aggregating more than $1,000,000, engaged in whole or in part in commerce, other than common carriers subject to [the Interstate Commerce Act] . . . .” (Emphasis added.)
The Committee Report on this bill stated that “[t]his section is divided into three paragraphs, each of which relates to the particular class of corporations described, and the provisions of each paragraph are limited in their application to the corporations belonging to the class named herein.” H. R. Rep. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess., 18 (1914), reprinted in Trust Hearings, at 1970. The first paragraph related solely to the “eligibility of directors in interstate-railroad corporations,” ibid.; the second paragraph dealt with the “eligibility of directors, officers, and employees of banks, banking associations, and trust companies,” id., at 1971; and the third, “industrial corporations” paragraph concerned “the eligibility of directors in industrial corporations engaged in commerce,” ibid. Nothing in this Report suggests that the third paragraph was intended to deal with directors in banks who also serve as directors in industrial corporations.
The House debates on § 9 of H. R. 15657 confirm that Congress intended to deal separately with banks, railroads, and industrial corporations, and did not intend the third paragraph of § 9 to regulate or prohibit interlocks between these different classes of corporations. During a debate over the banking provisions of §9, Representative Cullop explained the relationship of the industrial corporations paragraph to the banking paragraphs:
“That [industrial corporations paragraph] refers to some other corporation than a bank. That does not apply to a bank.
“This has no reference to the banking business.
“Mr. CARLIN: That relates to industrial commerce.
“Mr. CULLOP: Yes. That does not relate to banking. That relates to industrial and commercial corporations, or institutions of that kind, but has no reference whatsoever to the banking business.” 51 Cong. Rec. 9604 (1914) (emphasis added).
The House passed H. R. 15657 with changes not relevant here and sent the bill to the Senate. There, the provisions regulating bank interlocks met with considerable opposition and were ultimately eliminated by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. The Senate Report explained:
“A Senate amendment to this section strikes out the entire paragraph which relates to interlocking directorates of banks and trust companies [the first three paragraphs of the current §8]. In proposing this amendment a majority of the Committee believed that such legislation as this more properly belongs to the domain of banking rather than of commerce and such additional regulation of bank directorates as may be wise and just should be made by amendments to the national bank acts, and the enforcement of it given to the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Reserve Board.” S. Rep. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess., 48 (1914).
However, the Senate Committee did not change the industrial corporations paragraph at all: “The House provision in this section relating to interlocking directorates of industrial corporations is not proposed to be changed or amended in any respect.” Ibid. The Senate passed the bill as reported out by the Senate Committee.
Given the Senate’s expressed intent not to regulate bank interlocks, it is not reasonable to believe that the Senate understood the third paragraph of § 9, which it left untouched, to bar interlocking directorates involving banks. When the Conference Committee met to iron out differences between the House and Senate bills, it restored the banking provisions but added the words “other than banks, banking associations, trust companies” to the “other than common carriers” clause in the industrial corporations paragraph (which became the fourth paragraph of the current §8). The most reasonable explanation for this addition is that it clarified what the Senate already understood to be the case: the industrial corporations paragraph did not reach interlocking directorates involving banks.
This interpretation is supported by the floor debate in the House on the Conference bill. Of those who spoke on the House floor, only Representative Mann thought that the original House version of the industrial corporations paragraph (§ 9, paragraph 3, of H. R. 15657) applied to interlocking directorates with banks. He objected that the amendment adding “banks” to the “other than common carriers” clause therefore materially changed the meaning of the fourth paragraph:
“I know of nothing more vital which was before the House than the power and the right to prevent interlocking directorates of banks. . . . That was one of the basic things that the committee made findings on, and when this bill was prepared it provided a prohibition against interlocking directorates of banks. The House passed it in that shape. The Senate passed it in that shape. But the House conferees, without authority . . . have provided that banks shall no longer be controlled by this prohibition of interlocking directorates where banks are in competition.” 51 Cong. Rec. 16270 (1914).
In response, Representatives Sherley and Webb both argued that Representative Mann had misconstrued the bill as it had originally been passed by the House. Representative Webb explained:
“[T]he third paragraph of section 9 as the bill passed the House was never intended to apply to banks, because we had an express paragraph in section 9 which took care of interlocking directorates in banks.
“. . . Now, it would be idiotic to say that we included also banks and banking associations in the paragraph referring to industrial corporations; and in order to make the paragraph perfectly plain, we inserted ‘other than banks and banks [sic] associations’ and common carriers, which had no effect upon the meaning of that section.” Id., at 16271.
Representative Sherley echoed Representative Webb’s argument that at no time in its evolution did the industrial corporations paragraph ever prohibit interlocking directorates involving banks. Id., at 16271-16272. He concluded:
“To say that it was not within the province of the conference to make it clear that only certain banks should be within the provision touching certain interlocking directorates, and that the provision touching industrial corporations [the present fourth paragraph of §8] was confined to such industrial corporations and should not by any stretch of construction be held to include banks, is to say what seems to be contrary ... to the plain common sense of the situation.” Id., at 16272.
In reviewing this colloquy, it should be remembered that Representatives Webb and Sherley voted for the Clayton Act as it originally passed the House, while Representative Mann voted against it. Id., at 9911. Thus, greater weight is to be accorded the views of Representatives Webb and Sherley concerning the proper interpretation of the original bill than to the views of Representative Mann. See NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers, 377 U. S. 58, 66 (1964). Moreover, the fact that the Speaker of the House overruled Representative Mann’s point of order suggests that he accepted Representatives Webb’s and Sherley’s interpretation. Finally, regardless of which Member correctly interpreted the original House bill, the fact remains that they all agreed that under the Conference bill, interlocking directorates involving banks were not covered by the industrial corporations paragraph.
The dissent argues that the “sole purpose of the [‘other than banks’ amendment] was to make clear that bank-bank interlocks would be governed exclusively by the preceding paragraphs, rather than by the competing corporations paragraph.” Post, at 145. This interpretation ignores the fact that the minimum size requirements in the banking and industrial corporations provisions were not comparable. As the Clayton Act was originally enacted, the banking provisions measured size on the basis of “deposits, capital, surplus, and undivided profits” aggregating $5 million or more; the industrial corporations paragraph measured size on the basis of “capital, surplus, and undivided profits” aggregating $1 minion or more without regard to “deposits.” Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914, § 8, 38 Stat. 732-733. There is no reason to assume that a bank with “deposits, capital, surplus, and undivided profits” of $5 million is comparable to a bank with “capital, surplus, and undivided profits” of $1 million. Thus, the provisions do not dovetail in the manner suggested by the dissent.
It may well be, as the dissent speculates, post, at 146-147, that a number of Congressmen mistakenly thought that banking was not interstate commerce. Nonetheless, Congress chose to deal with the problems of industrial and financial concentration according to the class of corporations involved. It chose to regulate banks in what are now the first three paragraphs of § 8; to regulate common carriers in what is now § 10; and to regulate industrial and commercial corporations in the fourth paragraph of § 8. We are bound to respect that choice; we are not to rewrite the statute based on our notions of appropriate policy.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Reversed.
Justice Powell took no part in the decision of this case.
The Court of Appeals also rejected petitioners’ claim that the interlocked insurance companies and bank holding companies were not “competitors” within the meaning of §8. 656 F. 2d, at 450-451. In light of our disposition of the case, we need not reach this issue.
The District Court found that at present “approximately 40% of the insurance company directors in America are also bank directors.” United States v. Crocker National Corp., 422 F. Supp. 686, 691 (1976). According to the American Council of Life Insurance, 79% of its 550 members report having directors who are also directors of banks; of that 79%, bank directors constituted an average 33% of the insurance companies’ boards. Brief for American Council of Life Insurance as Amicus Curiae 3. It is likely that a substantial number of these interlocking directorates are between insurance companies and banks that compete in the credit markets, and hence under the Government’s interpretation violate § 8.
Another indication of the Government’s longstanding position is a 1950 Federal Trade Commission Report which specifically interpreted § 8 not to apply to interlocking directorates between banks and nonbanking corporations. Federal Trade Commission, Report on Interlocking Directorates 10 (1951). The Federal Trade Commission’s later decision, In re Perpetual Federal Savings & Loan Assn., 90 F. T. C. 608 (1977), vacated on other grounds, 94 F. T. C. 401 (1979), that such interlocking directorates violate § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U. S. C. § 45 (1976 ed. and Supp. Y), does not undermine the Commission’s earlier analysis of § 8 of the Clayton Act.
Accord, Subcommittee on Domestic Finance of the House Committee on Banking and Currency, Control of Commercial Banks and Interlocks Among Financial Institutions, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (Subcomm. Print 1967), reprinted in 1 Subcommittee on Domestic Finance of the House Committee on Banking and Currency, Commercial Banks and Their Trust Activities: Emerging Influence on the American Economy, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 881, 925-926 (Subcomm. Print 1968) (the Clayton Act “does not apply to interlocks between commercial banks and competing financial institutions, such as mutual savings banks, insurance companies, and small loan companies”); Subcommittee on Antitrust of the House Committee on the Judiciary, Interlocks in Corporate Management, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 25-26 (Comm. Print 1965) (the fourth paragraph of § 8 “does [not] apply to interlocks with banks”).
See also, e. g., Advisory Committee on Banking to the Comptroller of the Currency, National Banks and the Future 94 (1962); 1982 Duke L. J. 938, 939, 949.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | H | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Marshall
delivered the opinion of the Court.
A tax-exempt organization must pay tax on income that it earns by carrying on a business not “substantially related” to the purposes for which the organization has received its exemption from federal taxation. The question before-this Court is whether respondent, a tax-exempt organization, must pay tax on the profits it earns by selling commercial advertising space in its professional journal, The Annals of Internal Medicine.
I
Respondent, the American College of Physicians, is an organization exempt from taxation under § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. The purposes of the College, as stated in its articles of incorporation, are to maintain high standards in medical education and medical practice; to encourage research, especially in clinical medicine; and to foster measures for the prevention of disease and for the improvement of public health. App. 16a. The principal facts were stipulated at trial. In furtherance of its exempt purposes, respondent publishes The Annals of Internal Medicine (Annals), a highly regarded monthly medical journal containing scholarly articles relevant to the practice of internal medicine. Each issue of Annals contains advertisements for pharmaceuticals, medical supplies, and equipment useful in the practice of internal medicine, as well as notices of positions available in that field. Respondent has a longstanding policy of accepting only advertisements containing information about the use of medical products, and screens proffered advertisements for accuracy and relevance to internal medicine. The advertisements are clustered in two groups, one at the front and one at the back of each issue.
In 1975, Annals produced gross advertising income of $1,376,322. After expenses and deductible losses were subtracted, there remained a net income of $153,388. Respondent reported this figure as taxable income and paid taxes on it in the amount of $55,965. Respondent then filed a timely claim with the Internal Revenue Service for refund of these taxes, and when the Government demurred, filed suit in the United States Claims Court.
The Claims Court held a trial and concluded that the advertisements in Annals were not substantially related to respondent’s tax-exempt purposes. 3 Cl. Ct. 531 (1983). Rather, after finding various facts regarding the nature of the College’s advertising business, it concluded that any correlation between the advertisements and respondent’s educational purpose was incidental because “the comprehensiveness and content of the advertising package is entirely dependent on each manufacturer’s willingness to pay for space and the imagination of its advertising agency. ” Id., at 535. Accordingly, the court determined that the advertising proceeds were taxable.
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed. 743 F. 2d 1570 (1984). It held clearly erroneous the trial court’s finding that the advertising was not substantially related to respondent’s tax-exempt purpose. The Court of Appeals believed that the trial court had focused too much on the commercial character of the advertising business and not enough on the actual contribution of the advertisements to the education of the journal’s readers. It held that respondent had established the requisite substantial relation and its entitlement to exemption from taxation. Id., at 1578. We granted the Government’s petition for certiorari, 473 U. S. 904 (1985), and now reverse.
I — I I — I
The taxation of business income not “substantially related” to the objectives of exempt organizations dates from the Revenue Act of 1950, Ch. 994, 64 Stat. 906 (1950 Act). The statute was enacted in response to perceived abuses of the tax laws by tax-exempt organizations that engaged in profit-making activities. Prior law had required only that the profits garnered by exempt organizations be used in furtherance of tax-exempt purposes, without regard to the source of those profits. See Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden de Predicadores, 263 U. S. 578, 581 (1924); C. F. Mueller Co. v. Commissioner, 190 F. 2d 120 (CA3 1951); Roche’s Beach, Inc. v. Commissioner, 96 F. 2d 776 (CA2 1938). As a result, tax-exempt organizations were able to carry on full-fledged commercial enterprises in competition with corporations whose profits were fully taxable. See Revenue Revision of 1950: Hearings before the House Committee on Ways and Means, Vol. I, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 18-19 (1950) (hereinafter cited as 1950 House Hearings) (describing universities’ production of “automobile parts, chinaware, and food products, and the operation of theatres, oil wells, and cotton gins”). Congress perceived a need to restrain the unfair competition fostered by the tax laws. See H. R. Rep. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 36-37 (1950).
Nevertheless, Congress did not force exempt organizations to abandon all commercial ventures, nor did it levy a tax only upon businesses that bore no relation at all to the tax-exempt purposes of an organization, as some of the 1950 Act’s proponents had suggested. See, e. g., 1950 House Hearings, at 4, 19, 165. Rather, in the 1950 Act it struck a balance between its two objectives of encouraging benevolent enterprise and restraining unfair competition by imposing a tax on the “unrelated business taxable income” of tax-exempt organizations. 26 U. S. C. § 511(a)(1).
“Unrelated business taxable income” was defined as “the gross income derived by any organization from any unrelated trade or business . . . regularly carried on by it . . . .” § 512(a)(1). Congress defined an “unrelated trade or business” as “any trade or business the conduct of which is not substantially related ... to the exercise or performance by such organization of its charitable, educational, or other purpose or function constituting the basis for its exemption . . . .” § 513(a). Whether respondent’s advertising income is taxable, therefore, depends upon (1) whether the publication of paid advertising is a “trade or business,” (2) whether it is regularly carried on, and (3) whether it is substantially related to respondent’s tax-exempt purposes.
Ill
A
Satisfaction of the first condition is conceded in this case, as it must be, because Congress has declared unambiguously that the publication of paid advertising is a trade or business activity distinct from the publication of accompanying educational articles and editorial comment.
In 1967, the Treasury promulgated a regulation interpreting the unrelated business income provision of the 1950 Act. The regulation defined “trade or business” to include not only a complete business enterprise, but also any component activity of a business. Treas. Reg. §1.513-l(b), 26 CFR § 1.513 — 1(b) (1985) (first published at 32 Fed. Reg. 17657 (1967)). This revolutionary approach to the identification of a “trade or business” had a significant effect on advertising, which theretofore had been considered simply a part of a unified publishing business. The new regulation segregated the “trade or business” of selling advertising space from the “trade or business” of publishing a journal, an approach commonly referred to as “fragmenting” the enterprise of publishing into its component parts:
“[Activities of soliciting, selling, and publishing commercial advertising do not lose identity as a trade or business even though the advertising is published in an exempt organization periodical which contains editorial matter related to the exempt purposes of the organization.” 26 CFR § 1.513-l(b) (1985).
In 1969, Congress responded to widespread criticism of those Treasury regulations by passing the Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487 (1969 Act). That legislation specifically endorsed the Treasury’s concept of “fragmenting” the publishing enterprise into its component activities, and adopted, in a new § 513(c), much of the language of the regulation that defined advertising as a separate trade or business:
“Advertising, etc., activities ... an activity does not lose identity as a trade or business merely because it is carried on . . . within a larger complex of other endeavors which may, or may not, be related to the exempt purposes of the organization.” 26 U. S. C. § 513(c).
The statute clearly established advertising as a trade or business, the first prong of the inquiry into the taxation of unrelated business income.
The presence of the second condition, that the business be regularly carried on, is also undisputed here. The satisfaction of the third condition, however, that of “substantial relation,” is vigorously contested, and that issue forms the crux of the controversy before us.
B
According to the Government, Congress and the Treasury established a blanket rule that advertising published by tax-exempt professional journals can never be substantially related to the purposes of those journals and is, therefore, always a taxable business. Respondent,, however, contends that each case must be determined on the basis of the characteristics of the advertisements and journal in question. Each party finds support for its position in the governing statute and regulations issued by the Department of the Treasury.
In its 1967 regulations, the Treasury not only addressed the “fragmentation” issue discussed above, but also attempted to clarify the statutory “substantially related” standard found in § 513(a). It provided that the conduct of a tax-exempt business must have a causal relation to the organization’s exempt purpose (other than through the generation of income), and that “the production or distribution of the goods or the performance of the services from which the gross income is derived must contribute importantly to the accomplishment of [the exempt] purposes.” Treas. Reg. § 1.513-l(d)(2), 26 CFR § 1.513-l(d)(2) (1985) (emphasis added). In illustration of its new test for substantial relation, the Treasury provided an example whose interpretation is central to the resolution of the issue before us. Example 7 of Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1 (d)(4)(iv) involves “Z,” an exempt association formed to advance the interests of a particular profession and drawing its membership from that profession. Z publishes a monthly journal containing articles and other editorial material that contribute importantly to the tax-exempt purpose. Z derives income from advertising products within the field of professional interest of the members:
“Following a practice common among taxable magazines which publish advertising, Z requires its advertising to comply with certain general standards of taste, fairness, and accuracy; but within those limits the form, content, and manner of presentation of the advertising messages are governed by the basic objective of the advertisers to promote the sale of the advertised products. While the advertisements contain certain information, the informational function of the advertising is incidental to the controlling aim of stimulating demand for the advertised products and differs in no essential respect from the informational function of any commercial advertising. Like taxable publishers of advertising, Z accepts advertising only from those who are willing to pay its published rates. Although continuing education of its members in matters pertaining to their profession is one of the purposes for which Z is granted exemption, the publication of advertising designed and selected in the manner of ordinary commercial advertising is not an educational activity of the kind contemplated by the exemption statute; it differs fundamentally from such an activity both in its governing objective and in its method. Accordingly, Z’s publication of advertising does not contribute importantly to the accomplishment of its exempt purposes; and the income which it derives from advertising constitutes gross income from unrelated trade or business.” § 1.513 — l(d)(4)(iv), Example 7.
The Government contends both that Example 7 creates a per se rule of taxation for journal advertising income and that Congress intended to adopt that rule, together with the remainder of the 1967 regulations, into law in the 1969 Act. We find both of these contentions unpersuasive.
Read as a whole, the regulations do not appear to create the type of blanket rule of taxability that the Government urges upon us. On the contrary, the regulations specifically condition tax exemption of business income upon the importance of the business activity’s contribution to the particular exempt purpose at issue, and direct that “[w]hether activities productive of gross income contribute importantly to the accomplishment of any purpose for which an organization is granted an exemption depends in each case upon the facts and circumstances involved,” § 1.513 — 1(d)(2) (emphasis added). Example 7 need not be interpreted as being inconsistent with that general rule. Attributing to the term “example” its ordinary meaning, we believe that Example 7 is best construed as an illustration of one possible application, under given circumstances, of the regulatory standard for determining substantial relation.
The interpretative difficulty of Example 7 arises primarily from its failure to distinguish clearly between the statements intended to provide hypothetical facts and those designed to posit the necessary legal consequences of those facts. Just at the point in the lengthy Example at which the facts would appear to end and the analysis to begin, a pivotal statement appears: “the informational function of the advertising is incidental to the controlling aim of stimulating demand for the advertised products.” The Government’s position depends upon reading this statement as a general proposition of law, while respondent would read it as a statement of fact that may be true by hypothesis of “Z” and its journal, but is not true of Annals.
We recognize that the language of the Example is amenable to either interpretation. Nevertheless, several considerations lead us to believe that the Treasury did not intend to set out a per se statement of law. First, when the regulations were proposed in early 1967, the Treasury expressed a clear intention to treat all commercial advertising as an unrelated business. See Technical Information Release No. 889, CCH 1967 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. ¶ 6557. When the regulations were issued in final form, however, following much criticism and the addition of Example 7, they included no such statement of intention. 32 Fed. Reg. 17657 (1967). Second, a blanket rule of taxation for advertising in professional journals would contradict the explicit case-by-case requirement articulated in Treas. Reg. § 1.513 — 1(d)(2), and we are reluctant to attribute to the Treasury an intention to depart from its own general principle in the absence of clear support for doing so. Finally, at the time the regulations were issued, the 1950 Act had been interpreted to mean that business activities customarily engaged in by tax-exempt organizations would continue to be considered “substantially related” and untaxed. See Note, The Macaroni Monopoly: The Developing Concept of Unrelated Business Income of Exempt Organizations, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1280, 1291 (1968). A per se rule of taxation for the activity, traditional among tax-exempt journals, of carrying commercial advertising would have been a significant departure from that prevailing view. Thus, in 1967 the idea of a per se rule of taxation for all journal advertising revenue was sufficiently controversial, its effect so substantial, and its statutory authorization so tenuous, that we simply cannot attribute to the Treasury the intent to take that step in the form of an ambiguous example, appended to a subpart of a subsection of a subparagraph of a regulation.
It is still possible, of course, that, regardless of what the Treasury actually meant by its 1967 regulations, Congress read those regulations as creating a blanket rule of taxation, and intended to adopt that rule into law in the 1969 Act. The Government appears to embrace this view, which it supports with certain statements in the legislative history of the 1969 Act. For example, the Government cites to a statement in the House Report, discussing the taxation of advertising income of journals published by tax-exempt organizations:
“Your committee believes that a business competing with taxpaying organizations should not be granted an unfair competitive advantage by operating tax free unless the business contributes importantly to the exempt function. It has concluded that by that standard, advertising in a journal published by an exempt organization is not related to the organization’s exempt functions, and therefore it believes that this income should be taxed.” H. R. Rep. No. 91-413, pt. 1, p. 50 (1969).
Similar views appear in the Senate Report:
“Present law. — In December 1967, the Treasury Department promulgated regulations under which the income from advertising and similar activities is treated as ‘unrelated business income’ even though such advertising for example may appear in a periodical related to the educational or other exempt purpose of the organization.
“General reasons for change. —The committee agrees with the House that the regulations reached an appropriate result in specifying that when an exempt organization carries on an advertising business in competition with other taxpaying advertising businesses, it should pay a tax on the advertising income. The statutory language on which the regulations are based, however, is sufficiently unclear so that substantial litigation could result from these regulations. For this reason, the committee agrees with the House that the regulations, insofar as they apply to advertising and related activities, should be placed in the tax laws.” S. Rep. No. 91-552, p. 75 (1969).
Based on this language, the Government argues that the 1969 Act created a per se rule of taxation for advertising income. The weakness of this otherwise persuasive argument, however, is that the quoted discussion appears in the Reports solely in support of the legislators’ decision to enact § 513(c), the provision approving the fragmentation of “trade or business.” Although § 513(c) was a significant change in the tax law that removed one barrier to the taxation of advertising proceeds, it cannot be construed as a comment upon the two other distinct conditions — “regularly carried on” and “not substantially related” — whose satisfaction is prerequisite to taxation of business income under the 1950 Act. Congress did not incorporate into the 1969 Act the language of the regulation defining “substantial relation,” nor did the statute refer in any other way to the issue of the relation between advertising and exempt functions, even though that issue had been hotly debated at the hearings. See, e. g., Tax Reform, 1969: Hearings before the House Committee on Ways and Means, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 1113, 1118, 1192, 1241 (1969). Thus, we have no reason to conclude from the Committee Reports that Congress resolved the dispute whether, in a specific case, a journal’s carriage of advertising could so advance its educational objectives as to be “substantially related” to those objectives within the meaning of the 1950 Act.
It is possible that the Committees’ discussion of advertising reflects merely an erroneous assumption that the “fragmentation” provision of § 513(c), without more, would establish the automatic taxation of journal advertising revenue. Alternatively, the quoted passages could be read to indicate the Committees’ intention affirmatively to endorse what they believed to be existing practice, or even to change the law substantially. The truth is that, other than a general reluctance to consider commercial advertisements generally as substantially related to the purposes of tax-exempt journals, no congressional view of the issue emerges from the quoted excerpts of the Reports. Thus, despite the Reports’ seeming endorsement of a per se rule, we are hesitant to rely on that inconclusive legislative history either to supply a provision not enacted by Congress, see Commissioner v. Acker, 361 U. S. 87, 93 (1959); 1 J. Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation §3.29 (Weinstein rev. 1985), or to define a statutory-term enacted by a prior Congress. See SEC v. Sloan, 436 U. S. 103, 121 (1978); United States v. Price, 361 U. S. 304, 313 (1960). Cf. TVA v. Hill, 437 U. S. 153, 193 (1978). We agree, therefore, with both the Claims Court and the Court of Appeals in their tacit rejection of the Government’s argument that the Treasury and Congress intended to establish a per se rule requiring the taxation of income from all commercial advertisements of all tax-exempt journals without a specific analysis of the circumstances.
IV
It remains to be determined whether, in this case, the business of selling advertising space is “substantially related”— or, in the words of the regulation, “contributes importantly”— to the purposes for which respondent enjoys an exemption from federal taxation. Respondent has maintained throughout this litigation that the advertising in Annals performs an educational function supplemental to that of the journal’s editorial content. App. 7a. Testimony of respondent’s witnesses at trial tended to show that drug advertising performs a valuable function for doctors by disseminating information on recent developments in drug manufacture and use. Id., at 27a, 38a, 43a. In addition, respondent has contended that the role played by the Food and Drug Administration, in regulating much of the form and content of prescription-drug advertisements, enhances the contribution that such advertisements make to the readers’ education. All of these factors, respondent argues, distinguish the advertising in Annals from standard commercial advertising. Respondent approaches the question of substantial relation from the perspective of the journal’s subscribers; it points to the benefit that they may glean from reading the advertisements and concludes that that benefit is substantial enough to satisfy the statutory test for tax exemption. The Court of Appeals took the same approach. It concluded that the advertisements performed various “essential” functions for physicians, 743 F. 2d, at 1576, and found a substantial relation based entirely upon the medically related content of the advertisements as a group.
The Government, on the other hand, looks to the conduct of the tax-exempt organization itself, inquiring whether the publishers of Annals have performed the advertising services in a manner that evinces an intention to use the advertisements for the purpose of contributing to the educational value of the journal. Also approaching the question from the vantage point of the College, the Claims Court emphasized the lack of a comprehensive presentation of the material contained in the advertisements. It commented upon the “hit-or-miss nature of the advertising,” 3 Cl. Ct., at 543, n. 3, and observed that the “differences between ads plainly reflected the advertiser’s marketing strategy rather than their probable importance to the reader.” Id., at 534. “[A]ny educational function [the advertising] may have served was incidental to its purpose of raising revenue.” Id., at 535.
We believe that the Claims Court was correct to concentrate its scrutiny upon the conduct of the College rather than upon the educational quality of the advertisements. For all advertisements contain some information, and if a modicum of informative content were enough to supply the important contribution necessary to achieve tax exemption for commercial advertising, it would be the rare advertisement indeed that would fail to meet the test. Yet the statutory and regulatory scheme, even if not creating a per se rule against tax exemption, is clearly antagonistic to the concept of a per se rule for exemption for advertising revenue. Moreover, the statute provides that a tax will be imposed on “any trade or business the conduct of which is not substantially related,” 26 U. S. C. § 513(a) (emphasis added), directing our focus to the manner in which the tax-exempt organization operates its business. The implication of the statute is confirmed by the regulations, which emphasize the “manner” of designing and selecting the advertisements. See Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1 (d)(4)(iv), Example 7, 26 CFR § 1.513-l(d)(4)(iv), Example 7 (1985). Thus, the Claims Court properly directed its attention to the College’s conduct of its advertising business, and it found the following pertinent facts:
“The evidence is clear that plaintiff did not use the advertising to provide its readers a comprehensive or systematic presentation of any aspect of the goods or services publicized. Those companies willing to pay for advertising space got it; others did not. Moreover, some of the advertising was for established drugs or devices and was repeated from one month to another, undermining the suggestion that the advertising was principally designed to alert readers of recent developments [citing, as examples, ads for Valium, Insulin and Maalox]. Some ads even concerned matters that had no conceivable relationship to the College’s tax-exempt purposes.” 3 Cl. Ct., at 534 (footnotes omitted).
These facts find adequate support in the record. See, e. g., App. 29a-30a, 59a. Considering them in light of the applicable legal standard, we are bound to conclude that the advertising in Annals does not contribute importantly to the journal’s educational purposes. This is not to say that the College could not control its publication of advertisements in such a way as to reflect an intention to contribute importantly to its educational functions. By coordinating the content of the advertisements with the editorial content of the issue, or by publishing only advertisements reflecting new developments in the pharmaceutical market, for example, perhaps the College could satisfy the stringent standards erected by Congress and the Treasury. In this case, however, we have concluded that the Court of Appeals erroneously focused exclusively upon the information that is invariably conveyed by commercial advertising, and consequently failed to give effect to the governing statute and regulations. Its judgment, accordingly, is
Reversed.
Title 26 U. S. C. § 501(c)(3) exempts from taxation entities “organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes,” with certain restrictions on their activities, including prohibition of political activity.
The 1967 Treasury regulations at issue in this case, published in final form at 32 Fed. Reg. 17657 (1967), have not been amended in pertinent part since their promulgation, and references to those regulations herein are to the current version.
See, e. g., Moore, Current Problems of Exempt Organizations, 24 Tax L. Rev. 469, 476 (1969); Middleditch & Webster, The new unrelated business income Regs: what they mean; how to cope with them, 28 J. Tax. 174, 178 (1968); Webster, New proposals change definition of unrelated business-income, 27 J. Tax. 42, 43 (1967); Weithom & Liles, Unrelated Business Income Tax: Changes Affecting Journal Advertising Revenues, 45 Taxes 791, 798 (1967). See also Tax Reform, 1969: Hearings before the House Committee on Ways and Means, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 1129, 1184, 1223 (1969). Numerous bills were introduced in the 90th Congress, 1st Session, in an unsuccessful attempt to overturn the regulations, even before they became final. See, e. g., H. R. 8765; H. R. 8766; H. R. 9103; H. R. 9468; H. R. 9661; H. R. 9763; H. R. 10150; H. R. 10997; H. R. 10998; H. R. 11491; H. R. 11492. And several years later, two federal courts struck down the 1967 regulations as exceeding pre-1969 statutory authority, insofar as they required the “fragmentation” of publishing activities. See American College of Physicians v. United States, 209 Ct. Cl. 23, 29, 530 F. 2d 930, 933 (1976); Massachusetts Medical Society v. United States, 514 F. 2d 153, 154 (CA1 1975).
Indeed, different excerpts suggest that perhaps the House Committee did not construe the statute as creating a per se rule. In its explanation of § 513(c), the House Report states that “the advertising contained in a publication of an exempt organization may be subject to the tax under section 511 even though the editorial content of the publication may be related to the exempt purposes of the organization.” H. R. Rep. No. 91-413, pt. 2, p. 26 (1969) (emphasis added).
This conclusion is consistent with the Treasury’s own approach to analogous problems. See, e. g., Rev. Rui. 82-139,1982-2 Cum. Bull. 108 (advertisements in county bar journal; no per se rule); Rev. Rui. 72-431, 1972-2 Cum. Bull. 281 (exempt organization’s sale of mailing lists to commercial advertisers; no per se rule). Our rejection of the per se rule renders it unnecessary for us to address respondent’s alternative argument that any such rule should apply only to associations organized under § 501(c)(6) of the Internal Revenue Code.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | L | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Powell
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Supervisors and managerial employees are excluded from the categories of employees entitled to the benefits of collective bargaining under the National Labor Relations Act. The question presented is whether the full-time faculty of Yeshiva University fall within those exclusions.
I
Yeshiva is a private university which conducts a broad range of arts and sciences programs at its five undergraduate and eight graduate schools in New York City. On October 30, 1974, the Yeshiva University Faculty Association (Union) filed a representation petition with the National Labor Relations Board (Board). The Union sought certification as bargaining agent for the full-time faculty members at 10 of the 13 schools. The University opposed the petition on the ground that all of its faculty members are managerial or supervisory personnel and hence not employees within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act (Act). A Board-appointed hearing officer held hearings over a period of five months, generating a voluminous record.
The evidence at the hearings showed that a central administrative hierarchy serves all of the University’s schools. Ultimate authority is vested in a Board of Trustees, whose members (other than the President) hold no administrative positions at the University. The President sits on the Board of Trustees and serves as chief executive officer, assisted by four Vice Presidents who oversee, respectively, medical affairs and science, student affairs, business affairs, and academic affairs. An Executive Council of Deans and administrators makes recommendations to the President on a wide variety of matters.
University-wide policies are formulated by the central administration with the approval of the Board of Trustees, and include general guidelines dealing with teaching loads, salary scales, tenure, sabbaticals, retirement, and fringe benefits. The budget for each school is drafted by its Dean or Director, subject to approval by the President after consultation with a committee of administrators. The faculty participate in University-wide governance through their representatives on an elected student-faculty advisory council. The only University-wide faculty body is the Faculty Review Committee, composed of elected representatives who adjust grievances by informal negotiation and also may make formal recommendations to the Dean of the affected school or to the President. Such recommendations are purely advisory.
The individual schools within the University are substantially autonomous. Each is headed by a Dean or Director, and faculty members at each school meet formally and informally to discuss and decide matters of institutional and professional concern. At four schools, formal meetings are convened regularly pursuant to written bylaws. The remaining faculties meet when convened by the Dean or Director. Most of the schools also have faculty committees concerned with special areas of educational policy. Faculty welfare committees negotiate with administrators concerning salary and conditions of employment. Through these meetings and committees, the faculty at each school effectively determine its curriculum, grading system, admission and matriculation standards, academic calendars, and course schedules.
Faculty power at Yeshiva’s schools extends beyond strictly academic concerns. The faculty at each school make recommendations to the Dean or Director in every case of faculty hiring, tenure, sabbaticals, termination and promotion. Although the final decision is reached by the central administration on the advice of the Dean or Director, the overwhelming majority of faculty recommendations are implemented. Even when financial problems in the early 1970’s restricted Yeshiva’s budget, faculty recommendations still largely controlled personnel decisions made within the constraints imposed by the administration. Indeed, the faculty of one school recently drew up new and binding policies expanding their own role in these matters. In addition, some faculties make final decisions regarding the admission, expulsion, and graduation of individual students. Others have decided questions involving teaching loads, student absence policies, tuition and enrollment levels, and in one case the location of a school.
II
A three-member panel of the Board granted the Union’s petition in December 1975, and directed an election in a bargaining unit consisting of all full-time faculty members at the affected schools. 221 N. L. R. B. 1053. The unit included Assistant Deans, senior professors, and department chairmen, as well as associate professors, assistant professors, and instructors. Deans and Directors were excluded. The Board summarily rejected the University’s contention that its entire faculty are managerial, viewing the claim as a request for reconsideration of previous Board decisions on the issue. Instead of making findings of fact as to Yeshiva, the Board referred generally to the record and found no “significan [t]” difference between this faculty and others it had considered. The Board concluded that the faculty are professional employees entitled to the protection of the Act because “faculty participation in collegial decision making is on a collective rather than individual basis, it is exercised in the faculty’s own interest rather than fin the interest of the employer,’ and final authority rests with the board of trustees.” Id., at 1054 (footnote omitted).
The Union won the election and was certified by the Board. The University refused to bargain, reasserting its view that the faculty are managerial. In the subsequent unfair labor practice proceeding, the Board refused to reconsider its holding in the representation proceeding and ordered the University,to bargain with the Union. 231 N. L. R. B. 597 (1977). When the University still refused to sit down at the negotiating table, the Board sought enforcement in the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which denied the petition. 582 F. 2d 686 (1978).
Since the Board had made no findings of fact, the court examined the record and related the circumstances in considerable detail. It agreed that the faculty are professional employees under § 2 (12) of the Act. 29 U. S. C. § 152 (12). But the court found that the Board had ignored “the extensive control of Yeshiva’s faculty” over academic and personnel decisions as well as the “crucial role of the full-time faculty in determining other central policies of the institution.” 582 F. 2d, at 698. The court concluded that such power is not an exercise of individual professional expertise. Rather, the faculty are, “in effect, substantially and pervasively operating the enterprise.” Ibid. Accordingly, the court held that the faculty are endowed with “managerial status” sufficient to remove them from the coverage of the Act. We granted certiorari, 440 U. S. 906 (1979), and now affirm.
Ill
There is no evidence that Congress has considered whether a university faculty may organize for collective bargaining under the Act. Indeed, when the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts were approved, it was thought that congressional power did not extend to university faculties because they were employed by nonprofit institutions which did not “affect corn-merce.” See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U. S. 490, 504-505 (1979). Moreover, the authority structure of a university does not fit neatly within the statutory scheme we are asked to interpret. The Board itself has noted that the concept of collegiality “does not square with the traditional authority structures with which th[e] Act was designed to cope in the typical organizations of the commercial world.” Adelphi University, 195 N. L. R. B. 639, 648 (1972).
The Act was intended to accommodate the type of management-employee relations that prevail in the pyramidal hierarchies of private industry. Ibid. In contrast, authority in the typical “mature” private university is divided between a central administration and one or more collegial bodies. See J. Baldridge, Power and Conflict in the University 114 (1971). This system of “shared authority” evolved from the medieval model of collegial decisionmaking in which guilds of scholars were responsible only to themselves. See N. Fehl, The Idea of a University in East and West 36-46 (1962); D. Knowles, The Evolution of Medieval Thought 164-168 (1962). At early universities, the faculty were the school. Although faculties have been subject to external control in the United States since colonial times, J. Brubacher & W. Rudy, Higher Education in Transition: A History of American Colleges and Universities, 1636-1976, pp. 25-30 (3d ed. 1976), traditions of collegiality continue to play a significant role at many universities, including Yeshiva. For these reasons, the Board has recognized that principles developed for use in the industrial setting cannot be “imposed blindly on the academic world.” Syracuse University, 204 N. L. R. B. 641, 643 (1973).
The absence of explicit congressional direction, of course, does not preclude the Board from reaching any particular type of employment. See NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U. S. Ill, 124—131 (1944). Acting under its responsibility for adapting the broad provisions of the Act to differing workplaces, the Board asserted jurisdiction over a university for the first time in 1970. Cornell University, 183 N. L. R. B. 329 (1970). Within a year it had approved the formation of bargaining units composed of faculty members. C. W. Post Center, 189 N. L. R. B. 904 (1971). The Board reasoned that faculty members are “professional employees” within the meaning of § 2 (12) of the Act and therefore are entitled to the benefits of collective bargaining. 189 N. L. R. B., at 905; 29 U. S. C. § 152 (12).
Yeshiva does not contend that its faculty are not professionals under the statute. But professionals, like other employees, may be exempted from coverage under the Act’s ex-elusion for “supervisors” who use independent judgment in overseeing other employees in the interest of the employer, or under the judicially implied exclusion for “managerial employees” who are involved in developing and enforcing employer policy. Both exemptions grow out of the same concern: That an employer is entitled to the undivided loyalty of its representatives. Beasley v. Food Fair of North Carolina, 416 U. S. 653, 661-662 (1974); see NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U. S. 267, 281-282 (1974). Because the Court of Appeals found the faculty to be managerial employees, it did not decide the question of their supervisory status. In view of our agreement with that court’s application of the managerial exclusion, we also need not resolve that issue of statutory interpretation.
IV
Managerial employees are defined as those who “ 'formulate and effectuate management policies by expressing and making operative the decisions of their employer.’ ” NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., supra, at 288 (quoting Palace Laundry Dry Cleaning Corp., 75 N. L. R. B. 320, 323, n. 4 (1947)). These employees are “much higher in the managerial structure” than those explicitly mentioned by Congress, which “regarded [them] as so clearly outside the Act that no specific exclusionary provision was thought necessary.” 416 U. S., at 283. Managerial employees must exercise discretion within, or even independently of, established employer policy and must be aligned with management. See id., at 286-287 (citing cases). Although the Board has established no firm criteria for determining when an employee is so aligned, normally an employee may be excluded as managerial only if he represents management interests by taking or recommending discretionary actions that effectively control or implement employer policy.
The Board does not contend that the Yeshiva faculty’s decisionmaking is too insignificant to be deemed managerial. Nor does it suggest that the role of the faculty is merely advisory and thus not managerial. Instead, it contends that the managerial exclusion cannot be applied in a straightforward fashion to professional employees because those employees often appear to be exercising managerial authority when they are merely performing routine job duties. The status of such employees, in the Board's view, must be determined by reference to the “alignment with management” criterion. The Board argues that the Yeshiva faculty are not aligned with management because they are expected to exercise “independent professional judgment” while participating in academic governance, and because they are neither “expected to conform to management policies [nor] judged according to their effectiveness in carrying out those policies.” Because of this independence, the Board contends there is no danger of divided loyalty and no need for the managerial exclusion. In its view, union pressure cannot divert the faculty from adhering to the interests of the university, because the university itself expects its faculty to pursue professional values rather than institutional interests. The Board concludes that application of the managerial exclusion to such employees would frustrate the national labor policy in favor of collective bargaining.
This “independent professional judgment” test was not applied in the decision we are asked to uphold. The Board's opinion relies exclusively on its previous faculty decisions for both legal and factual analysis. 221 N. L. R. B., at 1054. But those decisions only dimly foreshadow the reasoning now proffered to the Court. Without explanation, the Board initially announced two different rationales for faculty cases, then quickly transformed them into a litany to be repeated in case after case: (i) faculty authority.is collective, (ii) it is exercised in the faculty’s own interest rather than in the interest of the university, and (iii) final authority rests with the board of trustees. Northeastern University, 218 N. L. R. B. 247, 250 (1975); University of Miami, 213 N. L. R. B. 634, 634 (1974); see Tusculum College, 199 N. L. R. B. 28, 30 (1972). In their arguments in this case, the Board’s lawyers have abandoned the first and third branches of this analysis, which in any event were flatly inconsistent with its precedents, and have transformed the second into a theory that does not appear clearly in any Board opinion.
V
The controlling consideration in this case is that the faculty of Yeshiva University exercise authority which in any other context unquestionably would be managerial. Their authority in academic matters is absolute. They decide what courses will be offered, when they will be scheduled, and to whom they will be taught. They debate and determine teaching methods, grading policies, and matriculation standards. They effectively decide which students will be admitted, retained, and graduated. On occasion their views have determined the size of the student body, the tuition to be charged, and the location of a school. When one considers the function of a university, it is difficult to imagine decisions more managerial than these. To the extent the industrial analogy applies, the faculty determines within each school the product to be produced, the terms upon which it will be offered, and the customers who will be served.
The Board nevertheless insists that these decisions are not managerial because they require the exercise of independent professional judgment. We are not persuaded by this argument. There may be some tension between the Act’s exclusion of managerial employees and its inclusion of professionals, since most professionals in managerial positions continue to draw on their special skills and training. But we have been directed to no authority suggesting that that tension can be resolved by reference to the “independent professional judgment” criterion proposed in this case. Outside the university context, the Board routinely has applied the managerial and supervisory exclusions to professionals in executive positions without inquiring whether their decisions were based on management policy rather than professional expertise. Indeed, the Board has twice implicitly rejected the contention that decisions based on professional judgment cannot be managerial. Since the Board does not suggest that the “independent professional judgment” test is to be limited to university faculty, its new approach would overrule sub silentio this body of Board precedent and could result in the indiscriminate recharacterization as covered employees of professionals working in supervisory and managerial capacities.
Moreover, the Board’s approach would undermine the goal it purports to serve: To ensure that employees who exercise discretionary authority on behalf of the employer will not divide their loyalty between employer and union. In arguing that a faculty member exercising independent judgment acts primarily in his own interest and therefore does not represent the interest of his employer, the Board assumes that the professional interests of the faculty and the interests of the institution are distinct, separable entities with which a faculty member could not simultaneously be aligned. The Court of Appeals found no justification for this distinction, and we perceive none. In fact, the faculty’s professional interests — as applied to governance at a university like Yeshiva — cannot be separated from those of the institution.
In such a university, the predominant policy normally is to operate a quality institution of higher learning that will accomplish broadly defined educational goals within the limits of its financial resources. The "business” of a university is education, and its vitality ultimately must depend on academic policies that largely are formulated and generally are implemented by faculty governance decisions. See K. Mortimer & T. McConnell, Sharing Authority Effectively 23-24 (1978). Faculty members enhance their own standing and fulfill their professional mission by ensuring that the university’s objectives are met. But there can be no doubt that the quest for academic excellence and institutional distinction is a “policy” to which the administration expects the faculty to adhere, whether it be defined as a professional or an institutional goal. It is fruitless to ask whether an employee is “expected to conform” to one goal or another when the two are essentially the same. See NLRB v. Scott Paper Co., 440 F. 2d 625, 630 (CA1 1971) (tractor owner-operators); Deaton Truck Line, Inc. v. NLRB, 337 F. 2d 697, 699 (CA5 1964) (same), cert. denied, 381 U. S. 903 (1965).
The problem of divided loyalty is particularly acute for a university like Yeshiva, which depends on the professional judgment of its faculty to formulate and apply crucial policies constrained only by necessarily general institutional goals. The university requires faculty participation in governance because professional expertise is indispensable to the formulation and implementation of academic policy. It may appear, as the Board contends, that the professor performing governance functions is less “accountable” for departures from institutional policy than a middle-level industrial manager whose discretion is more confined. Moreover, traditional systems of collegiality and tenure insulate the professor from some of the sanctions applied to an industrial manager who fails to adhere to company policy. But the analogy of the university to industry need not, and indeed cannot, be complete. It is clear that Yeshiva and like universities must rely on their faculties to participate in the making and implementation of their policies. The large measure of independence enjoyed by faculty members can only increase the danger that divided loyalty will lead to those harms that the Board traditionally has sought to prevent.
We certainly are not suggesting an application of the managerial exclusion that would sweep all professionals outside the Act in derogation of Congress’ expressed intent to protect them. The Board has recognized that employees whose deci-sionmaking is limited to the routine discharge of professional duties in projects to which they have been assigned cannot be excluded from coverage even if union membership arguably may involve some divided loyalty. Only if an employee’s activities fall outside the scope of the duties routinely performed by similarly.situated professionals will he be found aligned with management. We think these decisions accurately capture the intent of Congress, and that they provide an appropriate starting point for analysis in cases involving professionals alleged to be managerial.
VI
Finally, the Board contends that the deference due its expertise in these matters requires us to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals. The question we decide today is a mixed one of fact and law. But the Board’s opinion may be searcheddn vain for relevant findings of fact. The absence of factual analysis apparently reflects the Board’s view that the managerial status of particular faculties may be decided on the basis of conclusory rationales rather than examination of the facts of each case. The Court of Appeals took a different view, and determined that the faculty of Yeshiva University, “in effect, substantially and pervasively operat[e] the enterprise.” 582 F. 2d, at 698. We find no reason to reject this conclusion. As our decisions consistently show, we accord great respect to the expertise of the Board when its conclusions are rationally based on articulated facts and consistent with the Act. Beth Israel Hospital v. NLRB, 437 U. S. 483, 501 (1978). In this case, we hold that the Board’s decision satisfies neither criterion.
Affirmed.
49 Stat. 449, as amended, 61 Stat. 136, 73 Stat. 519, 29 U. S. C. § 151 et seq.; see 29 U. S. C. §§ 152 (3), 152 (11), 164 (a); NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U. S. 267 (1974).
The schools involved are Yeshiva College, Stern College for Women, Teacher’s Institute for Women, Erna Michael College, Yeshiva Program, James Striar School of General Jewish Studies, Belfer Graduate School of Sciences, Ferkauf Graduate School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Wurzweiler School of Social Work, and Bernard Revel Graduate School. The Union did not seek to represent the faculty of the medical school, the graduate school of medical sciences, the Yeshiva High School, or any of the theological programs affiliated with the University. A law school has been opened since the time of the hearings, but it does not figure in this case.
At Yeshiva College, budget requests prepared by the senior professor in each subject area receive the “perfunctory” approval of the Dean “99 percent” of the time and have never been rejected by the central administration. App. 298-299. A council of elected department chairmen at Ferkauf approves the school’s budget allocations when discretionary funds are available. Id., at 626-627. All of these professors were included in the bargaining unit approved by the Board.
For example, the Deans at Yeshiva and Erna Michael Colleges regard faculty actions as binding. Id., at 248-249, 312-313. Administrators testified that no academic initiative of either faculty had been vetoed since at least 1968. Id., at 250, 313. When the Stern College faculty disagreed with the Dean’s decision to delete the education major, the major was rein-stituted. Id., at 191. The Director of the Teacher’s Institute for Women testified that “the faculty is the school,” id, at 379, while the Director of the James Striar School described his position as the “executive arm of the faculty,” which had overruled him on occasion, id., at 360-361. All decisions regarding academic matters at the Yeshiva Program and Bernard Revel are made by faculty consensus. Id., at 574, 583-586. The “internal operation of [Wurzweiler] has been heavily governed by faculty decisions,” according to its Dean. Id., at 502.
One Dean estimated that 98% of faculty hiring recommendations were ultimately given effect. Id., at 624. Others could not recall an instance when a faculty recommendation had been overruled. Id., at 193-194. At Stem College, the Dean in six years has never overturned a promotion decision. Ibid. The President has accepted all decisions of the Yeshiva College faculty as to promotions and sabbaticals, including decisions opposed by the Dean. Id., at 268-270. At Erna Michael, the Dean has never hired a full-time faculty member without the consent of the affected senior professor, id., at 333-335, and the Director of Teacher’s Institute for Women stated baldly that no teacher had ever been hired if “there was the slightest objection, even on one faculty member’s part.” Id., at 388. The faculty at both these schools have overridden recommendations made by the deans. No promotion or grant of tenure has ever been made at Ferkauf over faculty opposition. Id., at 620, 633. The Dean of Belfer testified that he had no right to override faculty decisions on tenure and nonrenewal. Id., at 419.
The Director of Teacher’s Institute for Women once recommended that the school move to Brooklyn to attract students. The faculty rejected the proposal and the school remained in Manhattan. Id., at 379-380.
“Full-time faculty” were defined as those
“appointed to the University in the titles of professor, associate professor, assistant professor, instructor, or any adjunct or visiting thereof, department chairmen, division chairmen, senior faculty and assistant deans, but excluding... part-time faculty; lecturers; principal investigators; deans, acting deans and directors; [and others not relevant to this action].” 221 N. L. R. B., at 1057.
The term “faculty” in this opinion refers to the members of this unit as defined by the Board.
Identical language had been employed in at least two other Board decisions. See infra, at 684M385. In this case, it was not supported by a single citation to the record. MR. Justice BreNNAN’s dissent relies on this language, post, at 696, and adds that a faculty’s “primary concerns are academic and relate solely to its own professional reputation,” post, at 701. The view that faculty governance authority “is exercised in the faculty’s own interest” rather than that of the University assumes a lack of responsibility that certainly is not reflected in this record.
See also S. Rep. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 7 (1935) (dispute between employer and college professor would not be covered); H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 36 (1947) (listing professional employees covered by new statutory provision without mentioning teachers); S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 11, 19 (1947) (same).
See the inaugural address of Williams College President Paul Ansel Chadbourne, quoted in Kahn, The NLRB and Higher Education: The Failure of Policymaking Through Adjudication, 21 UCLA L. Rev. 63, 70, n. 16 (1973) (‘"Professors are sometimes spoken of as working for the college. They are the college’ ”) (emphasis in original); Davis, Unions and Higher Education: Another View, 49 Ed. Record 139, 143 (1968) (“The president... is not the faculty’s master. He is as much the faculty’s administrator as he is the board [of trustees’] ”); n. 4, supra.
The Board has suggested that Congress tacitly approved the formation of faculty units in 1974, when the Act was amended to eliminate the exemption accorded to nonprofit hospitals. Although Congress appears to have agreed that nonprofit institutions “affect commerce” under modem economic conditions, H. R. Rep. No. 93-1051, p. 4 (1974); 120 Cong. Rec. 12938 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Williams), there is nothing to suggest that Congress considered the status of university faculties.
The Act provides broadly that “employees” have organizational and other rights. 29 U. S. C. § 157. Section 2 (3) defines “employee” in general terms, 29 U. S. C. §152(3); §2(12) defines “professional employee” in some detail, 29 U. S. C. § 152 (12); and § 9 (b) (1) prohibits the Board from creating a bargaining unit that includes both professional and nonprofessional employees unless a majority of the professionals vote for inclusion, 29 U. S. C. § 159 (b) (1).
An employee may be excluded if he has authority over any one of 12 enumerated personnel actions, including hiring and firing. 29 U. S. C. §§ 152 (3), 152 (11), 164 (a). The Board has held repeatedly that professionals may be excluded as supervisors. E. g., University of Vermont, 223 N. L. R. B. 423, 426 (1976); Presbyterian Medical Center, 218 N. L. R. B. 1266, 1267-1269 (1975).
NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U. S. 267 (1974). The Board never has doubted that the managerial exclusion may be applied to professionals in a proper case. E. g., Sutter Community Hospitals of Sacramento, 227 N. L. R. B. 181, 193 (1976); see General Dynamics Corp., 213 N. L. R. B. 841, 857-858 (1974); Westinghouse Electric Corp., 113 N. L. R. B. 337, 339 (1955).
B. g., Sutter Community Hospitals of Sacramento, supra, at 193; Bell Aerospace, 219 N. L. R. B. 384, 385-386 (1975) (on remand); General Dynamics Corp., supra, at 857; see NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., supra, at 274, 286-289.
The Board has found decisions of far less significance to the employer to be managerial when the affected employees were aligned with management. Swift & Co., 115 N. L. R. B. 752, 753 (1956) (procurement drivers who made purchases for employers); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 112 N. L. R. B. 571, 573 (1955) (production schedulers); Peter Kiewit Sons’ Co., 106 N. L. R. B. 194, 196 (1953) (lecturers who indoctrinated new employees); Western Electric Co., 100 N. L. R. B. 420, 423 (1952) (personnel investigators who made hiring recommendations); American Locomotive Co., 92 N. L. R. B. 115, 116-117 (1950) (buyers who made substantial purchases on employer's behalf).
The Union does argue that the faculty's authority is merely advisory. But the fact that the administration holds a rarely exercised veto power does not diminish the faculty's effective power in policymaking and implementation. See nn. 4, 5, supra. The statutory definition of “supervisor” expressly contemplates that those employees who “effectively... recommend” the enumerated actions are to be excluded as supervisory. 29 U. S. C. § 152 (11). Consistent with the concern for divided loyalty, the relevant consideration is effective recommendation or control rather than final authority. That rationale applies with equal force to the managerial exclusion.
Two cases simply announced that faculty authority is neither managerial nor supervisory because it is exercised collectively. C. W. Post Center, 189 N. L. R. B. 904, 905 (1971); Fordham University, 193 N. L. R. B. 134, 135 (1971). The Board later acknowledged that “a genuine system of collegiality would tend to confound us,” but held that the modem university departs from that system because “ultimate authority” is vested in a board of trustees which neither attempts to convert the faculty into managerial entities nor advises them to advocate management interests. Adelphi University, 195 N. L. R. B. 639, 648 (1972). See Fairleigh Dickinson University, 227 N. L. R. B. 239, 241 (1976).
Citing these three factors, the Board concludes in each case that faculty are professional employees. It has never explained the reasoning connecting the premise with the conclusion, although an argument similar to that made by its lawyers in this case appears in one concurring opinion. Northeastern University, 218 N. L. R. B., at 257 (opinion of Member Kennedy).
Although the Board has preserved the points in footnotes to its brief, it no longer contends that “collective authority” and “lack of ultimate authority” are legal rationales. They are now said to be facts which, respectively, “fortif[y]” the Board’s view that faculty members act in their own interest, and contradict the premise that the university is a “self-governing communit[y] of scholars.” Reply Brief for Petitioner in No. 78-857, p. 11, n. 8. Cf. n. 8, supra.
The “collective authority” branch has never been applied to supervisors who work through committees. E. g., Florida Southern College, 196 N. L. R. B. 888, 889 (1972). Nor was it thought to bar managerial status for employees who owned enough stock to give them, as a group, a substantial voice in the employer’s affairs. See Sida of Hawaii, Inc., 191 N. L. R. B. 194, 195 (1971); Red and White Airway Cab Co., 123 N. L. R. B. 83, 85 (1959); Brookings Plywood Corp., 98 N. L. R. B. 794, 798-799 (1952). Ultimate authority, the third branch, has never been thought to be a prerequisite to supervisory or managerial status. Indeed, it could not be since every corporation vests that power in its board of directors.
We do not, of course, substitute counsel’s post hoc rationale for the reasoning supplied by the Board itself. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U. S. 194, 196 (1947). Because the first and third branches of the Board’s analysis are insupportable, the Board’s only colorable theory is the “interest of the employer” branch. The argument presented to us is an expanded and considerably refined version of that notion.
The record shows that faculty members at Yeshiva also play a predominant role in faculty hiring, tenure, sabbaticals, termination and promotion. See supra, at 677, and n. 5. These decisions clearly have both managerial and supervisory characteristics. Since we do not reach the question of supervisory status, we need not rely primarily on these features of 'faculty authority.
The Board has cited no case directly applying an “independent professional judgment” standard. On the related question of accountability for implementation of management policies, it cites only NLRB v. Fullerton Publishing Co., 283 F. 2d 545, 550 (CA9 1960), which held that a news editor “responsibly directed” his department so as to fall within the definition of a supervisor, 29 U. S. C. §152(11). The court looked in part to accountability in rejecting the claim that the editor merely relayed assignments and thus was not “responsible” for directing employees as required by the statute. The case did not involve the managerial exclusion and has no application to the issues before us.
See eases cited in nn. 13 and 14, supra. A strict “conformity to management policy” test ignores the dual nature of the managerial role, since managers by definition not only conform to established policies but also exercise their own judgment within the range of those policies. See Bell Aerospace, 219 N. L. R. B., at 385 (quoting Eastern Camera & Photo Corp., 140 N. L. R. B. 569, 571 (1963)).
University of Chicago Library, 205 N. L. R. B. 220, 221-222, 229 (1973), enf’d, 506 F. 2d 1402 (CA7 1974) (reversing an Administrative Law Judge’s decision which had been premised on the “professional judgment” rationale); Sutter Community Hospitals of Sacramento, 227 N. L. R. B., at 193 (excluding as managerial a clinical specialist who used interdisciplinary professional skills to run a hospital department).
At Yeshiva, administrative concerns with scarce resources and University-wide balance have led to occasional vetoes of faculty action. But such infrequent administrative reversals
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | G | sc_issuearea |
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