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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Scalia
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Appellant New Energy Company of Indiana has challenged the constitutionality of Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §5735.145(B) (1986), a provision that awards a tax credit against the Ohio motor vehicle fuel sales tax for each gallon of ethanol sold (as a component of gasohol) by fuel dealers, but only if the ethanol is produced in Ohio or in a State that grants similar tax advantages to ethanol produced in Ohio. The question presented is whether § 5735.145(B) discriminates against interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause, U. S. Const., Art. I, §8, cl. 3.
I
Ethanol, or ethyl alcohol, is usually made from com. In the last decade it has come into widespread use as an automotive fuel, mixed with gasoline in a ratio of 1 to 9 to produce what is called gasohol. The interest in ethanol emerged in reaction to the petroleum market dislocations of the early 1970’s. The product was originally promoted as a means of achieving energy independence while providing a market for surplus corn; more recently, emphasis has shifted to its environmental advantages as a replacement for lead in enhancing fuel octane. See United States Department of Agriculture, Ethanol: Economic and Policy Tradeoffs 1 (1988). Ethanol was, however (and continues to be), more expensive than gasoline, and the emergence of ethanol production on a commercial scale dates from enactment of the first federal subsidy, in the form of an exemption from federal motor fuel excise taxes, in 1978. See Energy Tax Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-618, § 221, 92 Stat. 3185, codified, as amended, at 26 U. S. C. §§4041, 4081 (1982 ed. and Supp. IV). Since then, many States, particularly those in the grain-producing areas of the country, have enacted their own ethanol subsidies. See United States General Accounting Office, Importance and Impact of Federal Alcohol Fuel Tax Incentives 5 (1984). Ohio first passed such a measure in 1981, providing Ohio gasohol dealers a credit of so many cents per gallon of ethanol used in their product against the Ohio motor vehicle fuel sales tax payable on both ethanol and gasoline. This credit was originally available without regard to the source of the ethanol. See Act of June 10, 1981, § 1, 1981-1982 Ohio Leg. Acts 1693, 1731-1732. In 1984, however, Ohio enacted § 5735.145(B), which denies the credit to ethanol coming from States that do not grant a tax credit, exemption, or refund to ethanol from Ohio, or, if a State grants a smaller tax advantage than Ohio’s, granting only an equivalent credit to ethanol from that State.
Appellant is an Indiana limited partnership that manufactures ethanol in South Bend, Indiana, for sale in several States, including Ohio. Indiana repealed its tax exemption for ethanol, effective July 1, 1985, see Act of Mar. 5, 1984, §§ 4, 5, 8, 1984 Ind. Acts 189, 194-195, at which time it also passed legislation providing a direct subsidy to Indiana ethanol producers (the sole one of which was appellant). See Ind. Code §§4-4-10.1 to 4-4-10.8 (Supp. 1987). Thus, by reason of Ohio’s reciprocity provision, appellant’s ethanol sold in Ohio became ineligible for the Ohio tax credit. Appellant sought declaratory and injunctive relief in the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County, Ohio, alleging that § 5735.145(B) violated the Commerce Clause by discriminating against out-of-state ethanol producers to the advantage of in-state industry. The court denied relief, and the Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed. A divided Ohio Supreme Court initially reversed, finding that §5735.145(B) discriminated without adequate justification against products of out-of-state origin, and shielded Ohio producers from out-of-state competition. The Ohio Supreme Court then granted appel-lees’ motion for rehearing and reversed itself, a majority of the court finding that the provision was not protectionist or unreasonably burdensome. 32 Ohio St. 3d 206, 513 N. E. 2d 258 (1987). We noted probable jurisdiction. 484 U. S. 984 (1987).
II
It has long been accepted that the Commerce Clause not only grants Congress the authority to regulate commerce among the States, but also directly limits the power of the States to discriminate against interstate commerce. See, e. g., Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U. S. 322, 326 (1979); H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U. S. 525, 534-535 (1949); Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275 (1876). This “negative” aspect of the Commerce Clause prohibits economic protectionism — that is, regulatory measures designed to benefit in-state economic interests by burdening out-of-state competitors. See, e. g., Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U. S. 263, 270-273 (1984); H. P. Hood & Sons, supra, at 532-533; Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U. S. 434, 443 (1880). Thus, state statutes that clearly discriminate against interstate commerce are routinely struck down, see, e. g., Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U. S. 941 (1982); Lewis v. BT Investment Managers, Inc., 447 U. S. 27 (1980); Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U. S. 349 (1951), unless the discrimination is demonstrably justified by a valid factor unrelated to economic protectionism, see, e. g., Maine v. Taylor, 477 U. S. 131 (1986).
The Ohio provision at issue here explicitly deprives certain products of generally available beneficial tax treatment because they are made in certain other States, and thus on its face appears to violate the cardinal requirement of nondiscrimination. Appellees argue, however, that the availability of the tax credit to some out-of-state manufacturers (those in States that give tax advantages to Ohio-produced ethanol) shows that the Ohio provision, far from discriminating against interstate commerce, is likely to promote it, by encouraging other States to enact similar tax advantages that will spur the interstate sale of ethanol. We rejected a similar contention in an earlier “reciprocity” case, Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U. S. 366 (1976). The regulation at issue there permitted milk from out of State to be sold in Mississippi only if the State of origin accepted Mississippi milk on a reciprocal basis. Mississippi put forward, among other arguments, the assertion that “the reciprocity requirement is in effect a free-trade provision, advancing the identical national interest that is served by the Commerce Clause.” Id., at 378. In response, we said that “Mississippi may not use the threat of economic isolation as a weapon to force sister States to enter into even a desirable reciprocity agreement.” Id., at 379. More recently, we characterized a Nebraska reciprocity requirement for the export of ground water from the State as “facially discriminatory legislation” which merited “ ‘strictest scrutiny.’ ” Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, supra, at 958, quoting Hughes v. Oklahoma, supra, at 337.
It is true that in Cottrell and Sporhase the effect of a State’s refusal 'to accept the offered reciprocity was total elimination of all transport of the subject product into or out of the offering State; whereas in the present case the only effect of refusal is that the out-of-state product is placed at a substantial commercial disadvantage through discriminatory tax treatment. That makes no difference for purposes of Commerce Clause analysis. In the leading case of Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U. S. 511 (1935), the New York law excluding out-of-state milk did not impose an absolute ban, but rather allowed importation and sale so long as the initial purchase from the dairy farmer was made at or above the New York State-mandated price. In other words, just as the appellant here, in order to sell its product in Ohio, only has to cut its profits by reducing its sales price below the market price sufficiently to compensate the Ohio purchaser-retailer for the forgone tax credit, so also the milk wholesaler-distributor in Baldwin, in order to sell its product in New York, only had to cut its profits by increasing its purchase price above the market price sufficiently to meet the New York-prescribed minimum. We viewed the New York law as “an economic barrier against competition” that was “equivalent to a rampart of customs duties.” Id., at 527. Similarly, in Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm’n, 432 U. S. 333, 349-351 (1977), we found invalid under the Commerce Clause a North Carolina statute that did not exclude apples from other States, but merely imposed additional costs upon Washington sellers and deprived them of the commercial advantage of their distinctive grading system. The present law likewise imposes an economic disadvantage upon out-of-state sellers; and the promise to remove that if reciprocity is accepted no more justifies disparity of treatment than it would justify categorical exclusion. We have indicated that reciprocity requirements are not per se unlawful. See Cottrell, supra, at 378. But the case we cited for that proposition, Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U. S. 160, 167-168 (1916), discussed a context in which, if a State offered the reciprocity did not accept it, the consequence was, to be sure, less favored treatment for its citizens, but nonetheless treatment that complied with the minimum requirements of the Commerce Clause. Here, quite to the contrary, the threat used to induce Indiana’s acceptance is, in effect, taxing a product made by its manufacturers at a rate higher than the same product made by Ohio manufacturers, without (as we shall see) justification for the disparity.
Appellees argue that §5735.145(B) should not be considered discrimination against interstate commerce because its practical scope is so limited. Apparently only one Ohio ethanol manufacturer exists (appellee South Point Ethanol) and only one out-of-state manufacturer (appellant) is clearly disadvantaged by the provision. Our cases, however, indicate that where discrimination is patent, as it is here, neither a widespread advantage to in-state interests nor a widespread disadvantage to out-of-state competitors need be shown. For example, in Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, supra, we held unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause a special exemption from Hawaii’s liquor tax for certain locally produced alcoholic beverages (okolehao and fruit wine), even though other locally produced alcoholic beverages were subject to the tax. Id., at 265, 271. And in Lewis v. BT Investment Managers, Inc., supra, we held unconstitutional a Florida statute that excluded from certain business activities in Florida not all out-of-state entities, but only out-of-state bank holding companies, banks, or trust companies. In neither of these cases did we consider the size or number of the in-state businesses favored or the out-of-state businesses disfavored relevant to our determination. Varying the strength of the bar against economic protectionism according to the size and number of in-state and out-of-state firms affected would serve no purpose except the creation of new uncertainties in an already complex field.
Appellees contend that even if § 5735.145(B) is discriminatory, the discrimination is not covered by the Commerce Clause because of the so-called market-participant doctrine. That doctrine differentiates between a State’s acting in its distinctive governmental capacity, and a State’s acting in the more general capacity of a market participant; only the former is subject to the limitations of the negative Commerce Clause. See Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U. S. 794, 806-810 (1976). Thus, for example, when a State chooses to manufacture and sell cement, its business methods, including those that favor its residents, are of no greater constitutional concern than those of a private business. See Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U. S. 429, 438-439 (1980).
The market-participant doctrine has no application here. The Ohio action ultimately at issue is neither its purchase nor its sale of ethanol, but its assessment and computation of taxes — a primeval governmental activity. To be sure, the tax credit scheme has the purpose and effect of subsidizing a particular industry, as do many dispositions of the tax laws. That does not transform it into a form of state participation in the free market. Our opinion in Alexandria Scrap, supra, a case on which appellees place great reliance, does not remotely establish such a proposition. There we examined, and upheld against Commerce Clause attack on the basis of the market-participant doctrine, a Maryland cash subsidy program that discriminated in favor of in-state auto-hulk processors. The purpose of the program was to achieve the removal of unsightly abandoned autos from the State, id., at 796-797, and the Court characterized it as proprietary rather than regulatory activity, based on the analogy of the State to a private purchaser of the auto hulks, id., at 808-810. We have subsequently observed that subsidy programs unlike that of Alexandria Scrap might not be characterized as proprietary. See Reeves, Inc., supra, at 440, n. 14. We think it clear that Ohio’s assessment and computation of its fuel sales tax, regardless of whether it produces a subsidy, cannot plausibly be analogized to the activity of a private purchaser.
It has not escaped our notice that the appellant here, which is eligible to receive a cash subsidy under Indiana’s program for in-state ethanol producers, is the potential beneficiary of a scheme no less discriminatory than the one that it attacks, and no less effective in conferring a commercial advantage over out-of-state competitors. To believe the Indiana scheme is valid, however, is not to believe that the Ohio scheme must be valid as well. The Commerce Clause does not prohibit all state action designed to give its residents an advantage in the marketplace, but only action of that description in connection with the State’s regulation of interstate commerce. Direct subsidization of domestic industry does not ordinarily run afoul of that prohibition; discriminatory taxation of out-of-state manufacturers does. Of course, even if the Indiana subsidy were invalid, retaliatory violation of the Commerce Clause by Ohio would not be acceptable. See Cottrell, 424 U. S., at 379-380.
III
Our cases leave open the possibility that a State may vali date a statute that discriminates' against interstate commerce by showing that it advances a legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives. See, e. g., Maine v. Taylor, 477 U. S., at 138, 151; Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U. S., at 958; Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U. S., at 336-337; Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U. S., at 354. This is perhaps just another way of saying that what may appear to be a “discriminatory” provision in the constitutionally prohibited sense— that is, a protectionist enactment — may on closer analysis not be so. However it be put, the standards for such justification are high. Cf. Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U. S. 617, 624 (1978) (“[W]here simple economic protectionism is effected by state legislation, a virtually per se rule of invalidity has been erected”); Hughes v. Oklahoma, supra, at 337 (“[Fjacial discrimination by itself may be a. fatal defect” and “[a]t a minimum . . . invokes the strictest scrutiny”).
Appellees advance two justifications for the clear discrimination in the present case: health and commerce. As to the first, they argue that the provision encourages use of ethanol (in replacement of lead as a gasoline octane-enhancer) to reduce harmful exhaust emissions, both in Ohio itself and in surrounding States whose polluted atmosphere may reach Ohio. Certainly the protection of health is a legitimate state goal, and we assume for purposes of this argument that use of ethanol generally furthers it. But §5735.145(B) obviously does not, except perhaps by accident. As far as ethanol use in Ohio itself is concerned, there is no reason to suppose that ethanol produced in a State that does not offer tax advantages to ethanol produced in Ohio is less healthy, and thus should have its importation into Ohio suppressed by denial of the otherwise standard tax credit. And as far as ethanol use outside Ohio is concerned, surely that is just as effectively fostered by other States’ subsidizing ethanol production or sale in some fashion other than giving a tax credit to Ohio-produced ethanol; but these helpful expedients do not qualify for the tax credit. It could not be clearer that health is not the purpose of the provision, but is merely an occasional and accidental effect of achieving what is its purpose, favorable tax treatment for O/wo-prodúced ethanol. Essentially the same reasoning also responds to appellees’ second (and related) justification for the discrimination, that the reciprocity requirement is designed to increase commerce in ethanol by encouraging other States to enact ethanol subsidies. What is encouraged is hot ethanol subsidies in general, but only favorable treatment for Ohio-produced ethanol. In sum, appellees’ health and commerce justifications amount to no more than implausible speculation, which does not suffice to validate this plain discrimination against products of out-of-state manufacture.
# * *
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Ohio Supreme Court is
Reversed.
Section 5736.145(B) provides:
“The qualified fuel otherwise eligible for the qualified fuel credit shall not contain ethanol produced outside Ohio unless the tax commissioner determines that the fuel claimed to be eligible for credit contains ethanol produced in a state that also grants an exemption, .credit or refund from such state’s motor vehicle fuel excise tax or sales tax for similar fuel containing ethanol produced in Ohio; provided however, that such credit shall not exceed the amount of the credit allowable for qualified fuel containing ethanol produced in Ohio.”
This provision was passed in 1984 and took effect on January 1, 1985. After this litigation began, Ohio again amended its ethanol credit statute to reduce the amount of the credit and scheduled it for elimination in 1993. See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §5735.145 (Supp. 1987).
Appellant also argued there, as it has here, that § 5735.145(B) was an excessive burden on commerce under the test set forth in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U. S. 137, 142 (1970). To the extent that claim requires separate analysis we find it unnecessary to reach it, in light of our disposition of the discrimination claim. Appellant also alleged in the state courts violations of the Equal Protection Clause and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; those challenges are not at issue in this appeal.
We do not interpret the trial court’s acceptance of appellees’ proposed finding of fact of April 10, 1985, as a judicial finding that protecting health was in fact a purpose of the Ohio General Assembly, rather than merely one of several conceivable purposes for the enactment. In any event, a subjective purpose that has so little rational relationship to the provision in question is not merely implausible but, even if true, inadequate to validate patent discrimination against interstate commerce.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | H | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Scalia
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Under the Social Security Act, the Social Security Administration (SSA) is authorized to pay disability insurance benefits and Supplemental Security Income to persons who have a “disability.” A person qualifies as disabled, and thereby eligible for such benefits, “only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.” 42 U. S. C. §§423(d)(2)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(B). The issue we must decide is whether the SSA may determine that a claimant is not disabled because she remains physically and mentally able to do her previous work, without investigating whether that previous work exists in significant numbers in the national economy.
I
Pauline Thomas worked as an elevator operator for six years until her job was eliminated in August 1995. In June 1996, at age 53, Thomas applied for disability insurance benefits under Title II and Supplemental Security Income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. See 49 Stat. 622, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 401 et seq. (Title II); as added, 86 Stat. 1465, and as amended, § 1381 et seq. (Title XVI). She claimed that she suffered from, and was disabled by, heart disease and cervical and lumbar radiculopathy.
After the SSA denied Thomas’s application initially and on reconsideration, she requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). The ALJ found that Thomas had “hypertension, cardiac arrythmia, [and] cervical and lumbar strain/sprain.” Decision of ALJ 5, Record 15. He concluded, however, that Thomas was not under a “disability” because her “impairments do not prevent [her] from performing her past relevant work as an elevator operator.” Id,., at 6, Record 16. He rejected Thomas’s argument that she is unable to do her previous work because that work no longer exists in significant numbers in the national economy. The SSA’s Appeals Council denied Thomas’s request for review.
Thomas then challenged the ALJ’s ruling in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, renewing her argument that she is unable to do her previous work due to its scarcity. The District Court affirmed the ALJ, concluding that whether Thomas’s old job exists is irrelevant under the SSA’s regulations. Thomas v. Apfel, Civ. No. 99-2234 (Aug. 17, 2000). The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed and remanded. Over the dissent of three of its members, it held that the statute unambiguously provides that the ability to perform prior work disqualifies from benefits only if it is “substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.” 294 F. 3d 568, 572 (2002). That holding conflicts with the decisions of four other Courts of Appeals. See Quang Van Han v. Bowen, 882 F. 2d 1453, 1457 (CA9 1989); Garcia v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 46 F. 3d 552, 558 (CA6 1995); Pass v. Chater, 65 F. 3d 1200, 1206-1207 (CA4 1995); Rater v. Chater, 73 F. 3d 796, 799 (CA8 1996). We granted the SSA’s petition for certiorari. 537 U. S. 1187 (2003).
II.
As relevant to the present ease, Title II of the Act defines “disability” as the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U. S. C. § 423(d)(1)(A). That definition is qualified, however, as follows;
“An individual shall be determined to be under a disability only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy. ...” § 423(d)(2)(A) (emphases added).
“[W]ork which exists in the national economy” is defined to mean “work which exists in significant numbers either in the region where such individual lives or in several regions of the country.” Ibid. Title XVI of the Act, which governs Supplemental Security Income for disabled indigent persons, employs the same definition of “disability” used in Title II, including a qualification that is verbatim the same as § 423(d)(2)(A). See 42 U. S. C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B). For simplicity’s sake, we will refer only to the Title II provisions, but our analysis applies equally to Title XVI.
Section 423(d)(2)(A) establishes two requirements for disability. First, an individual’s physical or mental impairment must render him “unable to do his previous work.” Second, the impairment must also preclude him from “engaging] in any other kind of substantial gainful work.” The parties agree that the latter requirement is qualified by the clause that immediately follows it — “which exists in the national economy.” The issue in this case is whether that clause also qualifies “previous work.”
The SSA has answered this question in the negative. Acting pursuant to its statutory rulemaking authority, 42 U. S. C. §§ 405(a) (Title II), 1383(d)(1) (Title XVI), the agency has promulgated regulations establishing a five-step sequential evaluation process to determine disability. See 2Ó CFR §404.1520 (2003) (governing claims for disability insurance benefits); § 416.920 (parallel regulation governing claims for Supplemental Security Income). If at any step a finding of disability or nondisability can be made, the SSA will not review the claim further. At the first step, the agency will find nondisability unless the claimant shows that he is not working at a “substantial gainful activity.” §§404.1520(b), 416.920(b). At step two, the SSA will find nondisability unless the claimant shows that he has a “severe impairment,” defined as “any impairment or combination of impairments which significantly limits [the claimant’s] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). At step three, the agency determines whether the impairment which enabled the claimant to survive step two is on the list of impairments presumed severe enough to render one disabled; if so, the claimant qualifies. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d). If the claimant’s impairment is not on the list, the inquiry proceeds to step four, at which the SSA assesses whether the claimant can do his previous work; unless he shows that he cannot, he is determined not to be disabled. If the claimant survives the fourth stage, the fifth, and final, step requires the SSA to consider so-called “vocational factors” (the claimant’s age, education, and past work experience), and to determine whether the claimant is capable of performing other jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy. §§ 404.1520(f), 404.1560(c), 416.920(f), 416.960(e).
As the above description shows, step four can result in a determination of no disability without inquiry into whether the claimant’s previous work exists in the national economy; the regulations explicitly reserve inquiry into the national economy for step five. Thus, the SSA has made it perfectly clear that it does not interpret the clause “which exists in the national economy” in § 423(d)(2)(A) as applying to “previous work.” The issue presented is whether this agency interpretation must be accorded deference.
As we held in Chevron U S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 843 (1984), when a statute speaks clearly to the issue at hand we “must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress,” but when the statute “is silent or ambiguous” we must defer to a reasonable construction by the agency charged with its implementation. The Third Circuit held that, by referring first to “previous work” and then to “any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy,” 42 U. S. C. § 423(d)(2)(A) (emphasis added), the statute unambiguously indicates that the former is a species of the latter. “When,” it said, “a sentence sets out one or more specific items followed by ‘any other’ and a description, the specific items must fall within the description.” 294 F. 3d, at 572. We disagree. For the reasons discussed below, the interpretation adopted by SSA is at least a reasonable construction of the text and must therefore be given effect.
The Third Circuit’s reading disregards — indeed, is precisely contrary to — the grammatical “rule of the last antecedent,” according to which a limiting clause or phrase (here, the relative clause “which exists in the national economy”) should ordinarily be read as modifying only the noun or phrase that it immediately follows (here, “any other kind of substantial gainful work”). See 2A N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction §47.33, p. 369 (6th rev. ed. 2000) (“Referential and qualifying words and phrases, where no contrary intention appears, refer solely to the last antecedent”). While this rule is not an absolute and can assuredly be overcome by other indicia of meaning, we have said that construing a statute in accord with the rule is “quite sensible as a matter of grammar.” Nobelman v. American Savings Bank, 508 U. S. 324, 330 (1993). In FTC v. Mandel Brothers, Inc., 359 U. S. 385 (1959), this Court employed the rule to interpret a statute strikingly similar in structure to § 423(d)(2)(A) — a provision of the Fur Products Labeling Act, 15 U. S. C. § 69, which defined “ 'invoice’ ” as “ 'a written account, memorandum, list, or catalog... transported or delivered to a purchaser, consignee, factor, bailee, correspondent, or agent, or any other person who is engaged in dealing commercially in fur products or furs.”’ 359 U. S., at 386 (quoting 15 U. S. C. § 69(f)) (emphasis added). Like the Third Circuit here, the Court of Appeals in Mandel Brothers had interpreted the phrase “'any other’” as rendering the relative clause (“ 'who is engaged in dealing commercially’ ”) applicable to all the specifically listed categories. 359 U. S., at 389. This Court unanimously reversed, concluding that the “limiting clause is to be applied only to the last antecedent.” Id., at 389, and n. 4 (citing 2 J. Sutherland, Statutory Construction § 4921 (3d ed. 1943)).
An example will illustrate the error of the Third Circuit’s perception that the specifically enumerated “previous work” “must” be treated the same as the more general reference to “any other kind of substantial gainful work.” 294 F. 3d, at 572. Consider, for example, the case of parents who, before leaving their teenage son alone in the house for the weekend, warn him, “You will be punished if you throw a party or engage in any other activity that damages the house.” If the son nevertheless throws a party and is caught, he should hardly be able to avoid punishment by arguing that the house was not damaged. The parents proscribed (1) a party, and (2) any other activity that damages the house. As far as appears from what they said, their reasons for prohibiting the home-alone party may have had nothing to do with damage to the house — for instance, the risk that underage drinking or sexual activity would occur. And even if their only concern was to prevent damage, it does not follow from the fact that the same interest underlay both the specific and the general prohibition that proof of impairment of that interest is required for both. The parents, foreseeing that assessment of whether an activity had in fact “damaged” the house could be disputed by their son, might have wished to preclude all argument by specifying and categorically prohibiting the one activity — hosting a party — that was most likely to cause damage and most likely to occur.
The Third. Circuit suggested that interpreting the statute as does the SSA would lead to “absurd results.” Ibid. See also Kolman v. Sullivan, 925 F. 2d 212, 213 (CA7 1991) (the fact that a claimant could perform a past job that no longer exists would not be “a rational ground for denying benefits”). The court could conceive of “no plausible reason why Congress might have wanted to deny benefits to an otherwise qualified person simply because that person, although unable to perform any job that actually exists in the national economy, could perform a previous job that no longer exists.” 294 F. 3d, at 572-573. But on the very next page the Third Circuit conceived of just such a plausible reason, namely, that “in the vast majority of cases, a claimant who is found to have the capacity to perform her past work also will have the capacity to perform other types of work.” Id., at 574, n. 5. The conclusion which follows is that Congress could have determined that an analysis of a claimant’s physical and mental capacity to do his previous work would “in the vast majority of cases” serve as an effective and efficient administrative proxy for the claimant’s ability to do some work that does exist in the national economy. Such a proxy is üseful because the step-five inquiry into whether the claimant’s cumulative impairments preclude him from finding “other” work is very difficult, requiring consideration of “each of th[e] [vocational] factors and ... an individual assessment of each claimant’s abilities and limitations,” Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 460-461, n. 1 (1983) (citing 20 CFR §§404.1545-404.1565 (1982)). There is good reason to use a workable proxy that avoids the more expansive and individualized step-five analysis. As we have observed, “[t]he Social Security hearing system is ‘probably the largest adjudicative agency in the western world.’ . . . The need for efficiency is self-evident.” 461 U. S., at 461, n. 2 (citation omitted).
The Third Circuit rejected this proxy rationale because it would produce results that “may not always be true, and ... may not be true in this case.” 294 F. 3d, at 576. That logic would invalidate a vast number of the procedures employed by the administrative state. To generalize is to be imprecise. Virtually every legal (or other) rule has imperfect applications in particular circumstances. Cf. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U. S. 137, 157 (1987) (O’CONNOR, J., concurring) (“To be sure the Secretary faces an administrative task of staggering proportions in applying the disability benefits provisions of the Social Security Act. Perfection in processing millions of such claims annually is impossible”). It is true that, under the SSA’s interpretation, a worker with severely limited capacity who has managed to find easy work in a declining industry could be penalized for his troubles if the job later disappears. It is also true, however, that under the Third Circuit’s interpretation, impaired workers in declining or marginal industries who cannot do “other” work could simply refuse to return to their jobs — even though the jobs remain open and available — and nonetheless draw disability benefits. The proper Chevron inquiry is not whether the agency construction can give rise to undesirable results in some instances (as here both constructions can), but rather whether, in light of the alternatives, the agency construction is reasonable. In the present ease, the SSA’s authoritative interpretation certainly satisfies thát test.
We have considered respondent’s other arguments and find them to be without merit.
* * *
We need not decide today whether § 423(d)(2)(A) compels the interpretation given it by the SSA. It suffices to conclude, as we do, that § 423(d)(2)(A) does not unambiguously require a different interpretation, and that the SSA’s regulation is an entirely reasonable interpretation of the text. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
It is so ordered.
The step-four instructions to the claimant read as follows: “If we cannot make a decision based on your current work activity or on medical facts alone, and you have a severe impairments), we then review your residual functional capacity and the physical and mental demands of the work you have done in the past. If you can still do this kind of work, we will find that you are not disabled.” 20 CFR §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e) (2003).
In regulations that became effective on September 25, 2003, the SSA amended certain aspects of the five-step process in ways not material to this opinion. The provisions referred to as subsections (e) and (f) in this opinion are now subsections (f) and (g).
This interpretation was embodied in the regulations that first established the five-step process in 1978, see 43 Fed. Reg. 55349 (codified, as amended, at 20 CFR §§404.1520 and 416.920 (1982)). Even before enactment of § 423(d)(2)(A) as part of the Social Security Amendments of 1967, the SSA disallowed disability benefits when the inability to work was caused by “technological changes in the industry in which [the claimant] has worked.” 20 CFR § 404.1502(b) (1961).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | B | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Me. Chief Justice Burger
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented on this appeal from the Supreme Court of Wisconsin is whether a State may constitutionally require that an elected board of education prohibit teachers, other than union representatives, to speak at open meetings, at which public participation is permitted, if such speech is addressed to the subject of pending collective-bargaining negotiations.
The Madison Board of Education and Madison Teachers, Inc. (MTI), a labor union, were parties to a collective-bargaining agreement during the calendar year of 1971. In January 1971 negotiations commenced for renewal of the agreement and MTI submitted a number of proposals. One among them called for the inclusion of a so-called “fair-share” clause, which would require all teachers, whether members of MTI or not, to pay union dues to defray the costs of collective bargaining. Wisconsin law-expressly permits inclusion of “fair share” provisions in municipal employee collective-bargaining agreements. Wis. Stat. § 111.70 (2) (1973). Another proposal presented by the union was a provision for binding arbitration of teacher dismissals. Both of these provisions were resisted by the school board. The negotiations deadlocked in November 1971 with a number of issues still unresolved, among them “fair share” and arbitration.
During the same month, two teachers, Holmquist and Reed, who were members of the bargaining unit, but not members of the union, mailed a letter to all teachers in the district expressing opposition to the “fair share” proposal. Two hundred teachers replied, most commenting favorably on Holmquist and Reed’s position. Thereupon a petition was drafted calling for a one-year delay in the implementation of “fair share” while the proposal was more closely analyzed by an impartial committee. The petition was circulated to teachers in the district on December 6, 1971. Holmquist and Reed intended to present the results of their petition effort to the school board and to MTI at the school board’s public meeting that same evening.
Because of the stalemate in the negotiations, MTI arranged to have pickets present at the school board meeting. In addition, 300 to 400 teachers attended in support of the union’s position.. During a portion of the meeting devoted to expression of opinion by the public, the president of MTI took the floor and spoke on the subject of the ongoing negotiations. He concluded his remarks by presenting to the board a petition signed by 1,300-1,400 teachers calling for the expeditious resolution of the negotiations. Holmquist was next given the floor, after John Matthews, the business representative of MTI, unsuccessfully attempted to dissuade him from speaking. Matthews had also spoken to a member of the school board before the meeting and requested that the board refuse to permit Holmquist to speak. Holmquist stated that he represented “an informal committee of 72 teachers in 49 schools” and that he desired to inform the board of education, as he had already informed the union, of the results of an informational survey concerning the “fair share” clause. He then read the petition which had been circulated to the teachers in the district that morning and stated that in the 31 schools from which reports had been received, 53% of the teachers had already signed the petition.
Holmquist stated that neither side had adequately addressed the issue of “fair share” and that teachers were confused about- the meaning of the proposal. He concluded by saying: “Due to this confusion, we wish to take no stand on the proposal itself, but ask only that all alternatives be presented clearly to all teachers and more importantly to the general public to whom we are all responsible. We ask simply for communication, not confrontation.” The sole response from the school board was a question by the president inquiring whether Holmquist intended to present the board with' the petition. Holmquist answered that he would. Holmquist’s presentation had lasted approximately 2% minutes.
Later that evening, the board met in executive session and voted a proposal acceding to all of the union’s demands with the exception of “fair share.” During a negotiating session the following morning, MTI accepted the proposal and a contract was signed on December 14, 1971.
(1)
In January 1972, MTI filed a complaint with the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission (WERC) claiming that the board had committed a prohibited labor practice by permitting Holmquist to speak at the December 6 meeting. MTI claimed that in so doing the board had engaged in negotiations with a member of the bargaining unit other than the exclusive collective-bargaining representative, in violation of Wis. Stat. §§ 111.70 (3)(a)l, 4 (1973). Following a hearing the Commission concluded that the board was guilty of the prohibited labor practice and ordered that it “immediately cease and desist from permitting employes, other than representatives of Madison Teachers Inc., to appear and speak at meetings of the Board of Education, on matters subject to collective bargaining between it and Madison Teachers Inc.” The Commission’s action was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Dane County.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin affirmed. 69 Wis. 2d 200, 231 N. W. 2d 206. The court recognized that both the Federal and State Constitutions protect freedom of speech and the right to petition the government, but noted that these rights may be abridged in the face of “ ‘a clear and present danger that [the speech] will bring about the substantive evils that [the legislature] has a right to prevent.’ ” Id., at 211, 231 N. W. 2d, at 212, citing Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47 (1919). The court held that abridgment of the speech in this case was justified in order “to avoid the dangers attendant upon relative chaos in labor management relations.” 69 Wis. 2d, at 212, 231 N. W. 2d, at 213.
(2)
The Wisconsin court perceived “clear and present danger” based upon its conclusion that Holmquist’s speech before the school board constituted “negotiation” with the board. Permitting such “negotiation,” the court reasoned, would undermine the bargaining exclusivity guaranteed the majority union under Wis. Stat. § 111.70 (3)(a)4 (1973). From that premise it concluded that teachers’ First Amendment rights could be limited. Assuming, arguendo, that such a “danger” might in some circumstances justify some limitation of First Amendment rights, we are unable to read this record as presenting such danger as would justify curtailing speech.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court’s conclusion that Holmquist’s terse statement during the public meeting constituted negotiation with the board was based upon its adoption of the lower court’s determination that, “‘[e]ven though Holmquist’s statement superficially appears to be merely a “position statement,” the court deems from the total circumstances that it constituted “negotiating.” ’ ” This cryptic conclusion seems to ignore the ancient wisdom that calling a thing by a name does not make it so. Holmquist did not seek to bargain or offer to enter into any bargain with the board, nor does it appear that he was authorized by any other teachers to enter into any agreement on their behalf. Although his views were not consistent with those of MTI, communicating such views to the employer could not change the fact that MTI alone was authorized to negotiate and to enter into a contract with the board.
Moreover the school board meeting at which Holmquist was permitted to speak was open to the public. He addressed the school board not merely as one of its employees but also as a concerned citizen, seeking to express his views on an important decision of his government. We have held that teachers may not be “compelled to relinquish the First Amendment rights they would otherwise enjoy as citizens to comment on matters of public interest in connection with the operation of the public schools in which they work.” Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U. S. 563, 568 (1968). See also Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U. S. 589 (1967) ; Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479 (1960); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183 (1952). Where the State has opened a forum for direct citizen involvement, it is difficult to find justification for excluding teachers who make up the overwhelming proportion of school employees and who are most vitally concerned with the proceedings. It is conceded that any citizen could have presented precisely the same points and provided the board with the same information as did Holmquist.
Regardless of the extent to which true contract negotiations between a public body and its employees may be regulated— an issue we need not consider at this time — the participation in public discussion of public business cannot be confined to one category of interested individuals. To permit one side of a debatable public question to have a monopoly in expressing its views to the government is the antithesis of constitutional guarantees. Whatever its duties as an employer, when the board sits in public meetings to conduct public business and hear the views of citizens, it may not be required to discriminate between speakers on the basis of their employment, or the content of their speech. See Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92, 96 (1972).
(3)'
The WERC’s order is not limited to a determination that a prohibited labor practice had taken place in the past; it also restrains future conduct. By prohibiting the school board from “permitting employes ... to appear and speak at meetings of the Board of Education” the order constitutes an indirect, but effective, prohibition on persons such as Holmquist from communicating with their government. The order would have a substantial impact upon virtually all communication between teachers and the school board. The order prohibits speech by teachers “on matters subject to collective bargaining.” As the dissenting opinion below noted, however, there is virtually no subject concerning the operation of the school system that could not also be characterized as a potential subject of collective bargaining. Teachers not only constitute the overwhelming bulk of employees of the school system, but they are the very core of that system; restraining teachers’ expressions to the board on matters involving the operation of the schools would seriously impair the board’s ability to govern the district. The Wisconsin court’s reliance on Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S. 601 (1973), for the proposition that one whose conduct falls squarely within an otherwise valid proscription may not challenge that proscription on grounds of vagueness, is inapposite. The challenged portion of the order is designed to govern speech and conduct in the future, not to punish past conduct, and as such it is the essence of prior restraint.
The judgment of the Wisconsin Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
MTI had been certified on June 7, 1966, as majority collective-bargaining representative of the teachers in the district by the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission.
The text of the letter was as follows:
“Dear Fellow Madisonian Educator,
“E. C. — 0. L. 0. G. Y.
“Educator’s Choice — Obligatory Leadership Or Cover[n]anee by Fou
“SAVE FREEDOM OF CHOICE
“A Closed Shop (agency shop) Removes This Freedom
“1. Does an organization which represents the best interests of teachers and pupils NEED mandatory membership deductions?
“2. Need relationships between administrators and teachers be further strained by LEGALLY providing for mandatory adversary camps? “3. Should minority voices be mandatorily SILENCED?
“4. Could elimination of outside dissent produce NON-RESPONSIVENESS to change?
“5. And . . .
isn’t this lack of FREEDOM OF CHOICE undemocratic? “SUPPORT FREEDOM OF CHOICE— OPPOSE AGENCY SHOP
“I wish to maintain freedom of choice:
“I oppose agency shop on principle -
“I oppose agency shop and would sign a petition stating so -
“I oppose agency shop and would work actively to maintain freedom of choice -
“Let us hear from YOU.
“A1 Holmquist /s/ E. C.— O. L. 0. G. Y.
“A1 Holmquist P. 0. Box 5184
“Ralph Reed /s/ Madison, WI 53705
“Ralph Reed
“Teacher co-chairmen”
The text of the petition was as follows:
“To: Madison Board of Education December 6, 1971
Madison Teachers, Incorporated
“We the undersigned ask that the fair-share proposal (agency shop) being negotiated by Madison Teachers, Incorporated and the Madison Board of Education be deferred this year. We propose the following:
“1) The fair-share concept being negotiated be thoroughly studied by an impartial committee composed of representatives from all concerned groups.
“2) The findings of this study be made public.
“3) This impartial committee will ballot (written) all persons affected by the contract agreement for their opinion on the fair-share proposal.
“4) The results of this written ballot be made public.”
The statute provides in relevant part:
"(3) PROHIBITED PRACTICES AND THEIR PREVENTION, (a) It is a prohibited practice for a municipal employer individually or in concert with others:
“1. To. interfere with, restrain or coerce municipal employes in the exercise of their rights guaranteed in sub. (2).
“4. To refuse to bargain collectively with a representative of a majority of its employes in an appropriate collective bargaining unit. Such refusal shall include action by the employer to issue or seek to obtain contracts, including those provided for by statute, with individuals in the collective bargaining unit while collective bargaining, mediation or fact-finding concerning the terms and conditions of a new collective bargaining agreement is in progress, unless such individual contracts contain express language providing that the contract is subject to amendment by a subsequent collective bargaining agreement.”
The detennination of the state courts that certain conduct constituted “negotiating” under state law, standing alone, would not ordinarily be open to our review; only its use as a predicate for restraining speech opens it to review here.
This meeting was open to the public pursuant to a Wisconsin statute which requires certain governmental decisionmaking bodies to hold open meetings. Wis. Stat. § 66.77 (1) (1973), now § 19.81 (1) (1976). There are exceptions to the statute, and one of these has been interpreted to cover labor negotiations between a municipality and a labor organization. 54 Op. Atty. Gen. of Wis. vi (1965), cited with approval, Board of School Directors v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm’n, 42 Wis. 2d 637, 653, 168 N. W. 2d 92, 99-100 (1969). Thus, in contrast to the open session where the public was invited, the true bargaining sessions between the union and the board were conducted in private.
We need not decide whether a municipal corporation as an employer has First Amendment rights to hear the views of its citizens and employees. It is enough that Holmquist and other teachers and citizens have a protected right to communicate with the board. Since the board’s ability to hear them is “inextricably meshed” with the teachers’ right to speak, the board may assert those rights on behalf of Holmquist. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U. S. 396, 409 (1974).
Plainly, public bodies may confine their meetings to specified subject matter and may hold nonpublic sessions to transact business. See n. 6, supra.
The WERC order does not prohibit all speech to the board on the subject of collective bargaining. Union representatives would continue to be entitled to come before the board at its public meetings and make their views known. The impact of such a rule is underscored by the fact that the union need not rely upon public meetings to make its position known to the school board; it can also do so at closed negotiating sessions. See n. 6, supra.
Surely no one would question the absolute right of the nonunion teachers to consult among themselves, hold meetings, reduce their views to writing, and communicate those views to the public generally in pamphlets, letters, or expressions carried by the news media. It would strain First Amendment concepts extraordinarily to hold that dissident teachers could not communicate those views directly to the very decisionmaking body charged by law with making the choices raised by the contract renewal demands.
Counsel for the union conceded at oral argument that the WERC order was constitutionally overbroad, but asked the Court to narrow it simply to prohibit the board from negotiating with employees in the bargaining unit. It is not the function of this Court to undertake that task.
On the other hand, it is not the case that Holmquist was speaking “simply as a member of the community.” On the contrary, as noted, supra, at 171, Holmquist opened his remarks to the board by stating that he represented “an informal committee of 72 teachers in 49 schools.” Thus, he appeared and spoke both as an employee and a citizen exercising First Amendment rights.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | C | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
This case — and, indeed, this precise question — is now before the Court for the second time. Last Term, petitioner sought review of the decision of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirming his sentence of death, asserting that evidence was received during the penalty phase of his trial in contravention of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. After issuing our decision in Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U. S. 249 (1988), we granted the petition for a writ of certiorari, vacated the Texas court’s judgment, and remanded for further consideration in light of Satterwhite. 487 U. S. 1230 (1988). On remand, the Texas court reinstated its prior decision. Because that decision is inconsistent with our decisions in Satterwhite and Estelle v. Smith, 451 U. S. 454 (1981), we now grant the motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for a writ of certiorari and reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals.
In Estelle v. Smith we held that a capital defendant’s Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination precludes the state from subjecting him to a psychiatric examination concerning future dangerousness without first informing the defendant that he has a right to remain silent and that anything he says can be used against him at a sentencing proceeding. Id., at 461-469. We also held — and in this respect the Court’s judgment was unanimous — that, once a capital defendant is formally charged, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel precludes such an examination without first notifying counsel that “the psychiatric examination [will] encompass the issue of their client’s future dangerousness.” Id., at 471. See also id., at 474 (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment); ibid. (Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment). Last Term’s decision in Satterwhite reaffirmed this Sixth Amendment protection, emphasizing that “for a defendant charged with a capital crime, the decision whether to submit to a psychiatric examination designed to determine his future dangerousness is ‘literally a life or death matter’ which the defendant should not be required to face without ‘the guiding hand of counsel.’” 486 U. S., at 254 (citations omitted).
In this case there is no dispute that on the day of petitioner’s arrest the trial court, at the State’s request, ordered that a psychiatric examination be conducted by Dr. Richard Coons and a psychologist of Dr. Coons’ choice to determine petitioner’s competency to stand trial and sanity at the time of the offense. Dr. Coons examined petitioner on four occasions, and Dr. George Parker, a clinical psychologist, tested petitioner on two additional occasions. It is also undisputed that neither petitioner nor his attorney was notified that he would be examined on the issue of future dangerousness and that petitioner was not informed of his right to remain silent. Finally, it is uncontested that, over petitioner’s objection, Drs. Coons and Parker testified at petitioner’s sentencing hearing that based on these examinations they were of the view that petitioner “would commit future acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society.” 742 S. W. 2d 353, 356 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (en banc). The jury was persuaded of this fact, and petitioner was sentenced to death.
Despite the close similarity between the facts of this case and those at issue in Smith, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in its original decision declined to vacate petitioner’s sentence. 742 S. W. 2d, at 360. That decision was premised on alternative holdings: petitioner’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights were not violated, id,., at 357-359, and, even if they were, any error was harmless, id., at 359-360. After we granted the initial petition for a writ of certiorari, vacated the Court of Criminal Appeals’ judgment, and remanded for further consideration in light of Sattenvhite, the court reinstated its earlier decision holding that petitioner’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights were not violated. 767 S. W. 2d 759 (1989) (en banc). The court simply withdrew that portion of its original opinion that relied on harmless-error analysis, observing that the analysis it applied was “denounced” in Satterwhite and was, in any event, “superfluous to the disposition and constituted nothing more than obiter dictum.” 767 S. W. 2d, at 762. But, it made clear that its “initial determination of no Smith error, as well as the remaining holdings of [the] original opinion, . . . remained] undisturbed.” Ibid. In dissent, Judge Clinton wrote that to consider “that Satterwhite ‘solely concerned harmless error,’ ... is to disregard much in Part II of that opinion finding a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel.” Id., at 763. He also observed that “it is most unlikely that the Supreme Court would remand this cause for us to reconsider a superfluous harmless error analysis, albeit it was utterly flawed[,] [u]nless the Supreme Court believed ‘there was error in admitting the testimony of Drs. Coon[s] and Parker.’” Id., at 764 (citation omitted).
The Court of Criminal Appeals’ holding that petitioner’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights were not violated was based on its conclusion that petitioner waived those rights by introducing psychiatric testimony in support of a defense of insanity. 742 S. W. 2d, at 357-358. The court held that petitioner not only waived the right to object to the State’s use of the Coons and Parker testimony to rebut his defense, but that he also waived the right to object to the State’s use of this testimony to satisfy its burden at sentencing of proving the separate issue of future dangerousness. Id., at 358-359. Because the Court of Criminal Appeals conflated the Fifth and Sixth Amendment analyses, and provided no support for its conclusion that petitioner waived his Sixth Amendment right, its judgment must be reversed.
The principal support found in the Court of Criminal Appeals’ decision for the proposition that petitioner waived the right to object to the State’s use of the Coons and Parker testimony is the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in Battie v. Estelle, 655 F. 2d 692 (1981). In that case, the Court of Appeals suggested that if a defendant introduces psychiatric testimony to establish a mental-status defense, the government may be justified in also using such testimony to rebut the defense notwithstanding the defendant’s assertion that the psychiatric examination was conducted in violation of his right against self-incrimination. Id., at 700-702. In such circumstances, the defendant’s use of psychiatric testimony might constitute a waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege, just as the privilege would be waived if the defendant himself took the stand. Id., at 701-702, and n. 22. The Court of Appeals explained that “any burden imposed on the defense by this result is justified by the State’s overwhelming difficulty in responding to the defense psychiatric testimony without its own psychiatric examination of the accused and by the need to prevent fraudulent mental defenses.” Id., at 702 (footnote omitted).
Language contained in Smith and in our later decision in Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U. S. 402 (1987), provides some support for the Fifth Circuit’s discussion of waiver. In Smith we observed that “[wjhen a defendant asserts the insanity defense and introduces supporting psychiatric testimony, his silence may deprive the State of the only effective means it has of controverting his proof on an issue that he has interjected into the case.” 451 U. S., at 465. And in Buchanan the Court held that if a defendant requests a psychiatric examination in order to prove a mental-status defense, he waives the right to raise a Fifth Amendment challenge to the prosecution’s use of evidence obtained through that examination to rebut the defense. 483 U. S., at 422-423.
Significantly, the Court of Appeals made clear in Battie that it was dealing exclusively with the Fifth Amendment privilege and was not passing upon the defendant’s separate Sixth Amendment challenge. 655 F. 2d, at 694, n. 2. Likewise, the waiver discussions contained in Smith and Buchanan deal solely with the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. Indeed, both decisions separately discuss the Fifth and Sixth Amendment issues so as not to confuse the distinct analyses that apply. No mention of waiver is contained in the portion of either opinion discussing the Sixth Amendment right. This is for good reason. While it may be unfair to the state to permit a defendant to use psychiatric testimony without allowing the state a means to rebut that testimony, it certainly is not unfair to require the state to provide counsel with notice before examining the defendant concerning future dangerousness. Thus, if a defendant were to surprise the prosecution on the eve of trial by raising an insanity defense to be supported by psychiatric testimony, the court might be justified in ordering a continuance and directing that the defendant submit to examination by a state-appointed psychiatrist. There would be no justification, however, for also directing that defense counsel receive no notice of this examination.
The distinction between the appropriate Fifth and Sixth Amendment analyses was recognized in the Buchanan decision. In that case, the Court held that the defendant waived his Fifth Amendment privilege by raising a mental-status defense. 483 U. S., at 421-424. This conclusion, however, did not suffice to resolve the defendant’s separate Sixth Amendment claim. Thus, in a separate section of the opinion the Court went on to address the Sixth Amendment issue, concluding that on the facts of that case counsel knew what the scope of the examination would be before it took place. Id., at 424-425. Indeed, defense counsel himself requested the psychiatric examination at issue in Buchanan. Id., at 424. In contrast, in this case counsel did not know that the Coons and Parker examinations would involve the issue of future dangerousness.
In deciding that petitioner waived his right to object to the Coons and Parker testimony, the Court of Criminal Appeals in its initial opinion concentrated almost exclusively on petitioner’s Fifth Amendment claim to the exclusion of his separate contention that counsel should have been informed that he was to be examined on the issue of future dangerousness. Moreover, even after we remanded for further consideration in light of Satterwhite, a case that was premised exclusively on the Sixth Amendment, the court failed to give any further attention to the Sixth Amendment claim. Because the evidence of future dangerousness was taken in deprivation of petitioner’s right to the assistance of counsel, and because there is no basis for concluding that petitioner waived his Sixth Amendment right, we now hold that Smith and Satterwhite control and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals.
It is so ordered.
Under Texas law, a capital defendant may not be sentenced to death unless the State proves beyond a reasonable doubt that “there is a probability that the defendant [will] commit criminal acts of violence that [will] constitute a continuing threat to society.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 37.071(b)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1989).
We therefore have no occasion to address whether a waiver of the right to object to the use of psychiatric testimony at the guilt phase of a capital trial extends to the sentencing phase as well.
Unlike in Buchanan, our decision in Smith did not place petitioner’s attorney on notice concerning the scope or intended use of the psychiatric examinations. Most significantly, although the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals only recently rendered a decision on his direct appeal, petitioner was tried and convicted before Smith was decided. Moreover, even if counsel had anticipated the Smith decision, he would only have been on notice that by raising a mental-status defense he might open the door to “use of psychological evidence by the prosecution in rebuttal.” Buchanan, 483 U. S., at 425 (footnote omitted). Nothing in Smith, or any other decision of this Court, suggests that a defendant opens the door to the admission of psychiatric evidence on future dangerousness by raising an insanity defense at the guilt stage of trial.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | A | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice White
delivered the opinion of the Court.
HH
Edward Soldal and his family resided in their trailer home, which was located on a rented lot in the Willoway Terrace mobile home park in Elk Grove, Illinois. In May 1987, Terrace Properties, the owner of the park, and Margaret Hale, its manager, filed an eviction proceeding against the Soldáis in an Illinois state court. Under the Illinois Forcible Entry and Detainer Act, Ill. Rev. Stat., ch.. 110, ¶ 9-101 et seq. (1991), a tenant cannot be dispossessed absent a judgment of eviction. The suit was dismissed on June 2, 1987. A few months later, in August 1987, the owner brought a second proceeding of eviction, claiming nonpayment of rent. The case was set for trial on September 22, 1987.
Rather than await judgment in their favor, Terrace Properties and Hale, contrary to Illinois law, chose to evict the Soldáis forcibly two weeks prior to the scheduled hearing. On September 4, Hale notified the Cook County’s Sheriff’s Department that she was going to remove the trailer home from the park, and requested the presence of sheriff deputies to forestall any possible resistance. Later that day, two Terrace Properties employees arrived at the Soldáis’ home accompanied by Cook County Deputy Sheriff O’Neil. The employees proceeded to wrench the sewer and water connections off the side of the trailer home, disconnect the phone, tear off the trailer’s canopy and skirting, and hook the home to a tractor. Meanwhile, O’Neil explained to Edward Soldal that “ ‘he was there to see that [Soldal] didn’t interfere with [Willoway’s] work.’” Brief for Petitioner 6.
By this time, two more deputy sheriffs had arrived at the scene and Soldal told them that he wished to file a complaint for criminal trespass. They referred him to Deputy Lieutenant Jones, who was in Hale’s office. Jones asked Soldal to wait outside while he remained closeted with Hale and other Terrace Properties employees for over 20 minutes. After talking to a district attorney and making Soldal wait another half hour, Jones told Soldal that he would not accept a complaint because “ ‘it was between the landlord and the tenant . . . [and] they were going to go ahead and continue to move out the trailer.’” Id., at 8. Throughout this period, the deputy sheriffs knew that Terrace Properties did not have an eviction order and that its actions were unlawful. Eventually, and in the presence of an additional two deputy sheriffs, the Willoway workers pulled the trailer free of its moorings and towed it onto the street. Later, it was hauled to a neighboring property.
On September 9, the state judge assigned to the pending eviction proceedings ruled that the eviction had been unauthorized and ordered Terrace Properties to return the Sol-dais’ home to the lot. The home, however, was badly damaged. The Soldáis brought this action under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, alleging a violation of their rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. They claimed that Terrace Properties and Hale had conspired with Cook County deputy sheriffs to unreasonably seize and remove the Soldáis’ trailer home. The District Judge granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the Soldáis had failed to adduce any evidence to support their conspiracy theory and, therefore, the existence of state action necessary under § 1983.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, construing the facts in petitioners’ favor, accepted their contention that there was state action. However, it went on to hold that the removal of the Soldáis’ trailer did not constitute a seizure for purposes of the Fourth Amendment or a deprivation of due process for purposes of the Fourteenth.
On rehearing, a majority of the Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc, reaffirmed the panel decision. Acknowledging that what had occurred was a “seizure” in the literal sense of the word, the court reasoned that, because it was not made in the course of public law enforcement and because it did not invade the Soldáis’ privacy, it was not a seizure as contemplated by the Fourth Amendment. 942 F. 2d 1073, 1076 (1991). Interpreting prior cases of this Court, the Seventh Circuit concluded that, absent interference with privacy or liberty, a “pure deprivation of property” is not cognizable under the Fourth Amendment. Id., at 1078-1079. Rather, petitioners’ property interests were protected only by the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
We granted certiorari to consider whether the seizure and removal of the Soldáis’ trailer home implicated their Fourth Amendment rights, 603 U. S. 918 (1992), and now reverse.
II
The Fourth Amendment, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth, Ker v. California, 374 U. S. 23, 30 (1963), provides in pertinent part that the “right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . .
A “seizure” of property, we have explained, occurs when “there is some meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory interests in that property.” United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U. S. 109, 113 (1984). In addition, we have emphasized that “at the very core” of the Fourth Amendment “stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home.” Silverman v. United States, 366 U. S. 605, 611 (1961). See also. Oliver v. United States, 466 U. S. 170, 178-179 (1984); Wyman v. James, 400 U. S. 309, 316 (1971); Payton v. New York, 446 U. S. 573, 601 (1980).
As a result of the state action in this case, the Soldáis’ domicile was not only seized, it literally was carried away, giving new meaning to the term “mobile home.” We fail to see how being unceremoniously dispossessed of one’s home in the manner alleged to have occurred here can be viewed as anything but a seizure invoking the protection of the Fourth Amendment. Whether the Amendment was in fact violated is, of course, a different question that requires determining if the seizure was reasonable. That inquiry entails the weighing of various factors and is not before us. •
The Court of Appeals recognized that there had been a seizure, but concluded that it was a seizure only in a “technical” sense, not within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. This conclusion followed from a narrow reading of the Amendment, which the court construed to safeguard only privacy and liberty interests while leaving unprotected possessory interests where neither privacy nor liberty was at stake. Otherwise, the court said,
“a constitutional provision enacted two centuries ago [would] make every repossession and eviction with police assistance actionable under — of all things — the Fourth Amendments which] would both trivialize the amendment and gratuitously shift a large body of routine commercial litigation from the state courts to the federal courts. That trivializing, this shift, can be prevented by recognizing the difference between posses-sory and privacy interests.” 942 F. 2d, at 1077.
Because the officers had not entered Soldal’s house, rummaged through his possessions, or, in the Court of Appeals’ view, interfered with his liberty in the course of the eviction, the Fourth Amendment offered no protection against the “grave deprivation” of property that had occurred. Ibid.
We do not agree with this interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. The Amendment protects the people from unreasonable searches and seizures of “their persons, houses, papers, and effects.” This language surely cuts.against the novel holding below, and our cases unmistakably hold that the Amendment protects property as well as privacy. This much was made clear in Jacobsen, supra, where we explained that the first Clause of the Fourth Amendment
“protects two types of expectations, one involving ‘searches,’ the other ‘seizures.’ A ‘search’ occurs when an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable is infringed. A ‘seizure’ of property occurs where there is some meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory interests in that property.” 466 U. S., at 113 (footnote omitted).
See also id., at 120; Horton v. California, 496 U. S. 128, 183 (1990); Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U. S. 321, 328 (1987); Maryland v. Macon, 472 U. S. 463, 469 (1985); Texas v. Brown, 460 U. S. 730, 747-748 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment); United States v. Salvucci, 448 U. S. 83, 91, n. 6 (1980). Thus, having concluded that chemical testing of powder found in a package did not compromise its owner’s privacy, the Court in Jacobsen did not put an end to its inquiry, as would be required under the view adopted by the Court of Appeals and advocated by respondents. Instead, adhering to the teachings of United States v. Place, 462 U. S. 696 (1983), it went on to determine whether the invasion of the owners’ “possessory interests” occasioned by the destruction of the powder was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Jacobsen, supra, at 124-125. In Place, although we found that subjecting luggage to a “dog sniff” did not constitute a search for Fourth Amendment purposes because it did not compromise any privacy interest, taking custody of Place’s suitcase was deemed an unlawful seizure for it unreasonably infringed “the suspect’s possessory interest in his luggage.” 462 U. S., at 708. Although lacking a privacy component, the property rights in both instances nonetheless were not disregarded, but rather were afforded Fourth Amendment protection.
Respondents rely principally on precedents such as Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967), Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294 (1967), and Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U. S. 583 (1974), to demonstrate that the Fourth Amendment is only marginally concerned with property rights. But the message of those cases is that property rights are not the sole measure of Fourth Amendment violations. The Warden opinion thus observed, citing Jones v. United States, 362 U. S. 257 (1960), and Silverman v. United States, 365 U. S. 505 (1961), that the “principal” object of the Amendment is the protection of privacy rather than property and that “this shift in emphasis from property to privacy has come about through a subtle interplay of substantive and procedural reform.” 387 U. S., at 304. There was no suggestion that this shift in emphasis had snuffed out the previously recognized protection for property under the Fourth Amendment. Katz, in declaring violative of the Fourth Amendment the unwarranted overhearing of a telephone booth conversation, effectively ended any lingering notions that the protection of privacy depended on trespass into a protected area. In the course of its decision, the Katz Court stated that the Fourth Amendment can neither be translated into a provision dealing with constitutionally protected areas nor. into a general constitutional right to privacy. The Amendment, the Court said, protects individual privacy against certain kinds of governmental intrusion, “but its protections go further, and often have nothing to do with privacy at all.” 389 U. S., at 350.
As for Cardwell, a plurality of this Court held in that case that the Fourth Amendment did not bar the use in evidence of paint scrapings taken from and tire treads observed on the defendant’s automobile, which had been seized in a parking lot and towed to a police lockup. Gathering this evidence was not deemed to be a search, for nothing from the interior of the car and “no personal effects, which the Fourth Amendment traditionally has been deemed to protect” were searched or seized. 417 U. S., at 591 (opinion of Blackmun, J.). No meaningful privacy rights were invaded. But this left the argument, pressed by the dissent, that the evidence gathered was the product of a warrantless and hence illegal seizure of the car from the parking lot where the defendant had left it. However, the plurality was of the view that, because under the circumstances of the case there was probable cause to seize the car as an instrumentality of the crime, Fourth Amendment precedent permitted the seizure without a warrant. Id., at 593. Thus, both the plurality and dissenting Justices considered the defendant’s auto deserving of Fourth Amendment protection even though privacy interests were not at stake. They differed only in the degree of protection that the Amendment demanded.
The Court of Appeals appeared to find more specific support for confining the protection of the Fourth Amendment to privacy interests in our decision in Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U. S. 517 (1984). There, a state prison inmate sued, claiming that prison guards had entered his cell without consent and had seized and destroyed some of his personal effects. We ruled that an inmate, because of his status, enjoyed neither a right to privacy in his cell nor protection against unreasonable seizures of his personal effects. Id., at 526-528, and n. 8; id., at 538 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Whatever else the case held, it is of limited usefulness outside the prison context with respect to the coverage of the Fourth Amendment.
We thus are unconvinced that any of the Court’s prior cases supports the view that the Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable seizures of property only where privacy or liberty is also implicated. What is more, our “plain view” decisions make untenable such a construction of the Amendment. Suppose, for example, that police officers lawfully enter a house, by either complying with the warrant requirement or satisfying one of its recognized exceptions— e. g., through a valid consent or a showing of exigent circumstances. If they come across some item in plain view and seize it, no invasion of personal privacy has occurred. Horton, 496 U. S., at 133-134; Brown, supra, at 739 (opinion of Rehnquist, J.). If the boundaries of the Fourth Amendment were defined exclusively by rights of privacy, “plain view” seizures would not implicate that constitutional provision at all. Yet, far from being automatically upheld, “plain view” seizures have been scrupulously subjected to Fourth Amendment inquiry. Thus, in the absence of consent or a warrant permitting the seizure of the items in question, such seizures can be justified only if they meet the probable-cause standard, Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U. S. 321, 326-327 (1987), and if they are unaccompanied by unlawful trespass, Horton, 496 U. S., at 136-137. That is because, the absence of a privacy interest notwithstanding, “[a] seizure of the article ... would obviously invade the owner’s possessory interest.” Id., at 134; see also Brown, 460 U. S., at 739 (opinion of Rehnquist, J.). The plain-view doctrine “merely reflects an application of the Fourth Amendment’s central requirement of reasonableness to the law governing seizures of property.” Ibid.; Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 468 (1971); id., at 516 (White, J., concurring and dissenting).
The Court of Appeals understandably found it necessary to reconcile its holding with our recognition in the plain-view cases that the Fourth Amendment protects property as such. In so doing, the court did not distinguish this case on the ground that the seizure of the Soldáis’ home took place in a noncriminal context. Indeed, it acknowledged what is evident from our precedents — that the Amendment’s protection applies in the civil context as well. See O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U. S. 709 (1987); New Jersey v. T. L. O., 469 U. S. 325, 334-335 (1985); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 499, 504-506 (1978); Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U. S. 307, 312-313 (1978); Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, 387 U. S. 523, 528 (1967).
Nor did the Court of Appeals suggest that the Fourth Amendment applied exclusively to law enforcement activities. It observed, for example, that the Amendment’s protection would be triggered “by a search or other entry into the home incident to an eviction or repossession,” 942 F. 2d, at 1077. Instead, the court sought to explain why the Fourth Amendment protects against seizures of property in the plain-view context, but not in this case, as follows:
“[S]eizures made in the course of investigations by police or other law enforcement officers are almost always, as' in the plain view cases, the culmination of searches. The police search in order to seize, and it is the search and ensuing seizure that the Fourth Amendment by its reference to ‘searches and seizures’ seeks to regulate. Seizure means one thing when it is the outcome of a search; it may mean something else when it stands apart from a search or any other investigative activity. The Fourth Amendment may still nominally apply, but, precisely because there is no invasion of privacy, the usual rules do not apply.” Id., at 1079 (emphasis in original).
We have difficulty with this passage. The court seemingly construes the Amendment to protect only against seizures that are the outcome of a search. But our cases are to the contrary and hold that seizures of property are subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny even though no search within the meaning of the Amendment has taken place. See, e. g., Jacobsen, 466 U. S., at 120-125; Place, 462 U. S., at 706-707; Cardwell, 417 U. S., at 588-589. More generally, an officer who happens to come across an individual’s property in a public area could seize it only if Fourth Amendment standards are satisfied — for example, if the items are evidence of a crime or contraband. Cf. Payton v. New York, 445 U. S., at 587. We are also puzzled by the last sentence of the excerpt, where the court announces that the “usual rules” of the Fourth Amendment are inapplicable if the seizure is not the result of a search or any other investigative activity “precisely because there is no invasion of privacy.” For the plain-view cases clearly state that, notwithstanding the absence of any interference with privacy, seizures of effects that are not authorized by a warrant are reasonable only because there is probable cause to associate the property with criminal activity. The seizure of the weapons in Horton, for example, occurred in the midst of a search, yet we emphasized that it did not “involve any invasion of privacy.” 496 U. S., at 133. In short, our statement that such seizures must satisfy the Fourth Amendment and will be deemed reasonable only if the item’s incriminating character is “immediately apparent,” id., at 136-137, is at odds with the Court of Appeals’ approach.
The Court of Appeals’ effort is both interesting and creative, but at bottom it simply reasserts the earlier thesis that the Fourth Amendment protects privacy but not property. We remain unconvinced and see no justification for departing from our prior cases. In our view, the reason why an officer might enter a house or effectuate a seizure is wholly irrelevant to the threshold question whether the Amendment applies. What matters is the intrusion on the people’s security from governmental interference. Therefore, the right against unreasonable seizures would be no less transgressed if the seizure of the house was undertaken to collect evidence, verify compliance with a housing regulation, effect an eviction by the police, or on a whim, for no reason at all. As we have observed on more than one occasion, it would be “anomalous to say that the individual and his private property are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the individual is suspected of criminal behavior.” Camara, 387 U. S., at 530; see also O’Connor, 480 U. S., at 715; T. L. O., 469 U. S., at 335.
The Court of Appeals also stated that even if, contrary to its previous rulings, “there is some element or tincture of a Fourth Amendment seizure, it cannot carry the day for the Soldáis.” 942 F. 2d, at 1080. Relying on our decision in Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386 (1989), the court reasoned that it should look at the “dominant character of the conduct challenged in a section 1983 case [to] determine the constitutional standard under which it is evaluated.” 942 F. 2d, at 1080. Believing that the Soldáis' claim was more akin to a challenge against the deprivation of property without due process of law than against an unreasonable seizure, the court concluded that they should not be allowed to bring their suit under the guise of the Fourth Amendment.
But we see no basis for doling out constitutional protections in such fashion. Certain wrongs affect more than a single right and, accordingly, can implicate more than one of the Constitution’s commands. Where such multiple violations are alleged, we are not in the habit of identifying as a preliminary matter the claim’s “dominant” character. Rather, we examine each constitutional provision in turn. See, e. g., Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U. S. 517 (1984) (Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651 (1977) (Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause). Graham is not to the contrary. Its holding was that claims of excessive use of force should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness standard, rather than the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive due process test. We were guided by the fact that, in that case, both provisions targeted the same sort of governmental conduct and, as a result, we chose the more “explicit textual source of constitutional protection” over the “more generalized notion of ‘substantive due process.’” 490 U. S., at 394-395. Surely, Graham does not bar resort in this case to the Fourth Amendment’s specific protection for “houses, papers, and effects” rather than the general protection of property in the Due Process Clause.
III
Respondents are fearful, as was the Court of Appeals, that applying the Fourth Amendment in this context inevitably will carry it into territory unknown and unforeseen: routine repossessions, negligent actions of public employees that interfere with individuals’ right to enjoy their homes, and the like, thereby federalizing areas of law traditionally the concern of the States. For several reasons, we think the risk is exaggerated. To begin, our decision will have no impact on activities such as repossessions or attachments if they involve entry into the home, intrusion on individuals’ privacy, or interference with their liberty, because they would implicate the Fourth Amendment even on the Court of Appeals’ own terms. This was true of the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Specht with which, as we previously noted, the Court of Appeals expressed agreement.
More significantly, “reasonableness is still the ultimate standard” under the Fourth Amendment, Camara, supra, at 539, which means that numerous seizures of this type will survive constitutional scrutiny. As is true in other circumstances, the reasonableness determination will reflect a “careful balancing of governmental and private interests.” T. L. O., supra, at 341. Assuming, for example, that the officers were acting pursuant to a court order, as in Specht v. Jensen, 832 F. 2d 1516 (CA10 1987), or Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U. S. 67 (1972), and as often would be the case, a showing of unreasonableness on these facts would be a laborious task indeed. Cf. Simms v. Slacum, 3 Cranch 300, 301 (1806). Hence, while there is no guarantee against the filing of frivolous suits, had the ejection in this case properly awaited the state court’s judgment it is quite unlikely that the federal court would have been bothered with a § 1983 action alleging a Fourth Amendment violation.
Moreover, we doubt that the police will often choose to further an enterprise knowing that it is contrary to the law, or proceed to seize property in the absence of objectively reasonable grounds for doing so. In short, our reaffirmance of Fourth Amendment principles today should not foment a wave of new litigation in the federal courts.
>
The complaint here alleges that respondents, acting under color of state law, dispossessed the Soldáis of their trailer home by physically tearing it from its foundation and towing it to another lot. Taking these allegations as true, this was no “garden-variety” landlord-tenant or commercial dispute. The facts alleged suffice to constitute a “seizure” within the meaning of the . Fourth Amendment, for they plainly implicate the interests protected by that provision. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is, accordingly, reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
Jones’ statement was prompted by a district attorney’s advice that no criminal charges could be brought because, under Illinois law, a criminal action cannot be used to determine the right of possession. See Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 110, ¶ 9-101 et seq. (1991); People v. Evans, 163 Ill. App. 3d 561, 516 N. E. 2d 817 (1st Dist. 1987).
The Soldáis ultimately were evicted per court order in December 1987.
Title 42 U. S. C. § 1983 provides that:
“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.”
The court reiterated the panel’s conclusion that a conspiracy must be assumed on the state of the record and, therefore, that the case must be treated in its current posture “as if the deputy sheriffs themselves seized the trailer, disconnected it from the utilities, and towed it away.” 942 F. 2d 1073, 1076 (1991).
The court noted that, in light of the existence of adequate judicial remedies under state law, a claim for deprivation of property without due process of law was unlikely to succeed. Id., at 1075-1076. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U. S. 527 (1981). In any event, the Soldáis did not claim a violation of their procedural rights. As noted, the Seventh Circuit also held that respondents had not violated the Soldáis’ substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Petitioners assert that this was error, but in view of our disposition of the case we need not address the question at this time.
Under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, the Soldáis were required to establish that the respondents, acting under color of state law, deprived them of a constitutional right, in this instance, their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment freedom from unreasonable seizures by the State. See Monroe v. Pape, 366 U. S. 167, 184 (1961). Respondents request that we affirm on the ground that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that there was sufficient state action to support a § 1983 action. The alleged injury to the Soldáis, it is urged, was inflicted by private parties for whom the county is not responsible. Although respondents did not cross-petition, they are entitled to ask us to affirm on that ground if such action would not enlarge the judgment of the Court of Appeals in their favor. The Court of Appeals found that because the police prevented Soldal from using reasonable force to protect his home from private action that the officers knew was illegal, there was sufficient evidence of conspiracy between the private parties and the officers to foreclose summary judgment for respondents. We are not inclined to review that holding. See Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U. S. 144, 152-161 (1970).
In holding that the Fourth Amendment’s reach extends to property as such, we are mindful that the Amendment does not protect possessory interests in all kinds of property. See, e. g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U. S. 170, 176-177 (1984). This case, however, concerns a house, which the Amendment’s language explicitly includes, as it does a person’s effects.
Place also found that to detain luggage for 90 minutes was an unreasonable deprivation of the individual’s “liberty interest in proceeding with his itinerary,” which also is protected by the Fourth Amendment. 462 U. S., at 708-710.
When “operational necessities” exist, seizures can be justified on less than probable cause. 480 U. S., at 327. That in no way affects our analysis, for even then it is clear that the Fourth Amendment applies. Ibid.; see also United States v. Place, 462 U. S. 696, 703 (1983).
Of course, if the police officers’ presence in the home itself entailed a violation of the Fourth Amendment, no amount of probable cause to believe that an item in plain view constitutes incriminating evidence will justify its seizure. Horton, 496 U. S., at 136-137.
It is true that Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 18 How. 272 (1856), cast some doubt on the applicability of the Amendment to noncriminal encounters such as this. Id., at 285. But cases since that time have shed a different light, making clear that Fourth Amendment guarantees are triggered by governmental searches and seizures “without regard to the use to which [houses, papers, and effects] are applied.” Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294, 301 (1967). Murray’s Lessee’s broad statement that the Fourth Amendment “has no reference to civil proceedings for the recovery of debt” arguably only meant that the warrant requirement did not apply, as was suggested in G. M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U. S. 338, 352 (1977). Whatever its proper reading, we reaffirm today our basic understanding that the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures fully applies in the civil context.
This was the view expressed by the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Specht v. Jensen, 832 F. 2d 1516 (1987), remanded on unrelated grounds, 853 F. 2d 805 (1988) (en banc), with which the Seventh Circuit expressly agreed. 942 F. 2d, at 1076.
The officers in these cases were engaged in law enforcement and were ■looking for something that was found and seized. In this broad sense the seizures were the result of “searches,” but not in the Fourth Amendment sense. That the Court of Appeals might have been suggesting that the plain-view cases are explainable because they almost always occur in the course of law enforcement activities receives some support from the penultimate sentence of the quoted passage, where the court states that the word “seizure” might lose its usual meaning “when it stands apart from a search or any other investigative activity.” Id., at 1079 (emphasis added). And, in the following paragraph, it observes that “[ojutside of the law enforcement area the Fourth Amendment retains its force as a protection against searches, because they invade privacy. That is why we decline to confine the amendment to the law enforcement setting.” Id., at 1079-1080. Even if the court meant that seizures of property in the course of law enforcement activities, whether civil or criminal, implicate interests safeguarded by the Fourth Amendment, but that pure property interests are unprotected in the non-law-enforcement setting, we are not in accord, as indicated in the body of this opinion.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | A | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice KAGAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case is about Kansas's treatment of a criminal defendant's insanity claim. In Kansas, a defendant can invoke mental illness to show that he lacked the requisite mens rea (intent) for a crime. He can also raise mental illness after conviction to justify either a reduced term of imprisonment or commitment to a mental health facility. But Kansas, unlike many States, will not wholly exonerate a defendant on the ground that his illness prevented him from recognizing his criminal act as morally wrong. The issue here is whether the Constitution's Due Process Clause forces Kansas to do so-otherwise said, whether that Clause compels the acquittal of any defendant who, because of mental illness, could not tell right from wrong when committing his crime. We hold that the Clause imposes no such requirement.
I
A
In Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 749, 126 S.Ct. 2709, 165 L.Ed.2d 842 (2006), this Court catalogued state insanity defenses, counting four "strains variously combined to yield a diversity of American standards" for when to absolve mentally ill defendants of criminal culpability. The first strain asks about a defendant's "cognitive capacity"-whether a mental illness left him "unable to understand what he [was] doing" when he committed a crime. Id., at 747, 749, 126 S.Ct. 2709. The second examines his "moral capacity"-whether his illness rendered him "unable to understand that his action [was] wrong." Ibid. Those two inquiries, Clark explained, appeared as alternative pathways to acquittal in the landmark English ruling M'Naghten's Case, 10 Cl. & Fin. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H. L. 1843), as well as in many follow-on American decisions and statutes: If the defendant lacks either cognitive or moral capacity, he is not criminally responsible for his behavior. Yet a third "building block[ ]" of state insanity tests, gaining popularity from the mid-19th century on, focuses on "volitional incapacity"-whether a defendant's mental illness made him subject to "irresistible[ ] impulse[s]" or otherwise unable to "control[ ] his actions." Clark, 548 U.S. at 749, 750, n. 11, 126 S.Ct. 2709 ; see, e.g., Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577, 597, 2 So. 854, 866-867 (1887). And bringing up the rear, in Clark's narration, the "product-of-mental-illness test" broadly considers whether the defendant's criminal act stemmed from a mental disease. 548 U.S. at 749-750, 126 S.Ct. 2709.
As Clark explained, even that taxonomy fails to capture the field's complexity. See id., at 750, n. 11, 126 S.Ct. 2709. Most notable here, M'Naghten's "moral capacity" prong later produced a spinoff, adopted in many States, that does not refer to morality at all. Instead of examining whether a mentally ill defendant could grasp that his act was immoral, some jurisdictions took to asking whether the defendant could understand that his act was illegal. Compare, e.g., People v. Schmidt, 216 N.Y. 324, 333-334, 110 N.E. 945, 947 (1915) (Cardozo, J.) (asking about moral right and wrong), with, e.g., State v. Hamann, 285 N.W.2d 180, 183 (Iowa 1979) (substituting ideas of legal right and wrong). That change in legal standard matters when a mentally ill defendant knew that his act violated the law yet believed it morally justified. See, e.g., Schmidt, 216 N.Y. at 339, 110 N.E. at 949 ; People v. Serravo, 823 P.2d 128, 135 (Colo. 1992).
Kansas law provides that "[i]t shall be a defense to a prosecution under any statute that the defendant, as a result of mental disease or defect, lacked the culpable mental state required as an element of the offense charged." Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-5209 (2018 Cum. Supp.). Under that statute, a defendant may introduce any evidence of any mental illness to show that he did not have the intent needed to commit the charged crime. Suppose, for example, that the defendant shot someone dead and goes on trial for murder. He may then offer psychiatric testimony that he did not understand the function of a gun or the consequences of its use-more generally stated, "the nature and quality" of his actions. M'Naghten, 10 Cl. & Fin., at 210, 8 Eng. Rep., at 722. And a jury crediting that testimony must acquit him. As everyone here agrees, Kansas law thus uses M'Naghten's "cognitive capacity" prong-the inquiry into whether a mentally ill defendant could comprehend what he was doing when he committed a crime. See Brief for Petitioner 41; Brief for Respondent 31; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 18. If the defendant had no such capacity, he could not form the requisite intent-and thus is not criminally responsible.
At the same time, the Kansas statute provides that "[m]ental disease or defect is not otherwise a defense." § 21-5209. In other words, Kansas does not recognize any additional way that mental illness can produce an acquittal. Most important for this case, a defendant's moral incapacity cannot exonerate him, as it would if Kansas had adopted both original prongs of M'Naghten. Assume, for example, that a defendant killed someone because of an "insane delusion that God ha[d] ordained the sacrifice." Schmidt, 216 N.Y. at 339, 110 N.E. at 949. The defendant knew what he was doing (killing another person), but he could not tell moral right from wrong; indeed, he thought the murder morally justified. In many States, that fact would preclude a criminal conviction, although it would almost always lead to commitment in a mental health facility. In Kansas, by contrast, evidence of a mentally ill defendant's moral incapacity-or indeed, of anything except his cognitive inability to form the needed mens rea -can play no role in determining guilt.
That partly closed-door policy changes once a verdict is in. At the sentencing phase, a Kansas defendant has wide latitude to raise his mental illness as a reason to judge him not fully culpable and so to lessen his punishment. See §§ 21-6815(c)(1)(C), 21-6625(a). He may present evidence (of the kind M'Naghten deemed relevant) that his disease made him unable to understand his act's moral wrongness-as in the example just given of religious delusion. See § 21-6625(a). Or he may try to show (in line with M'Naghten's spinoff) that the illness prevented him from "appreciat[ing] the [conduct's] criminality." § 21-6625(a)(6). Or again, he may offer testimony (here invoking volitional incapacity) that he simply could not "conform [his] conduct" to legal restraints. Ibid. Kansas sentencing law thus provides for an individualized determination of how mental illness, in any or all of its aspects, affects culpability. And the same kind of evidence can persuade a court to place a defendant who needs psychiatric care in a mental health facility rather than a prison. See § 22-3430. In that way, a defendant in Kansas lacking, say, moral capacity may wind up in the same kind of institution as a like defendant in a State that would bar his conviction.
B
This case arises from a terrible crime. In early 2009, Karen Kahler filed for divorce from James Kahler and moved out of their home with their two teenage daughters and 9-year-old son. Over the following months, James Kahler became more and more distraught. On Thanksgiving weekend, he drove to the home of Karen's grandmother, where he knew his family was staying. Kahler entered through the back door and saw Karen and his son. He shot Karen twice, while allowing his son to flee the house. He then moved through the residence, shooting Karen's grandmother and each of his daughters in turn. All four of his victims died. Kahler surrendered to the police the next day and was charged with capital murder.
Before trial, Kahler filed a motion arguing that Kansas's treatment of insanity claims violates the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Kansas, he asserted, had "unconstitutionally abolished the insanity defense" by allowing the conviction of a mentally ill person "who cannot tell the difference between right and wrong." App. 11-12. The trial court denied the motion, leaving Kahler to attempt to show through psychiatric and other testimony that severe depression had prevented him from forming the intent to kill. See id., at 16; § 21-5209. The jury convicted Kahler of capital murder. At the penalty phase, the court permitted Kahler to offer additional evidence of his mental illness and to argue in whatever way he liked that it should mitigate his sentence. The jury still decided to impose the death penalty.
Kahler appealed, again challenging the constitutionality of Kansas's approach to insanity claims. The Kansas Supreme Court rejected his argument, relying on an earlier precedential decision. See 307 Kan. 374, 400-401, 410 P.3d 105, 124-125 (2018) (discussing State v. Bethel, 275 Kan. 456, 66 P.3d 840 (2003) ). There, the court denied that any single version of the insanity defense is so "ingrained in our legal system" as to count as "fundamental." Id., at 473, 66 P.3d at 851. The court thus found that "[d]ue process does not mandate that a State adopt a particular insanity test." Ibid.
Kahler then asked this Court to decide whether the Due Process Clause requires States to provide an insanity defense that acquits a defendant who could not "distinguish right from wrong" when committing his crime-or, otherwise put, whether that Clause requires States to adopt the moral-incapacity test from M'Naghten. Pet. for Cert. 18. We granted certiorari, 586 U.S. ----, 139 S.Ct. 1318, 203 L.Ed.2d 563 (2019), and now hold it does not.
II
A
A challenge like Kahler's must surmount a high bar. Under well-settled precedent, a state rule about criminal liability-laying out either the elements of or the defenses to a crime-violates due process only if it "offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental." Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 798, 72 S.Ct. 1002, 96 L.Ed. 1302 (1952) (internal quotation marks omitted). Our primary guide in applying that standard is "historical practice." Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 43, 116 S.Ct. 2013, 135 L.Ed.2d 361 (1996) (plurality opinion). And in assessing that practice, we look primarily to eminent common-law authorities (Blackstone, Coke, Hale, and the like), as well as to early English and American judicial decisions. See, e.g., id., at 44-45, 116 S.Ct. 2013 ;
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 202, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 53 L.Ed.2d 281 (1977). The question is whether a rule of criminal responsibility is so old and venerable-so entrenched in the central values of our legal system-as to prevent a State from ever choosing another. An affirmative answer, though not unheard of, is rare. See, e.g., Clark, 548 U.S. at 752, 126 S.Ct. 2709 ("[T]he conceptualization of criminal offenses" is mostly left to the States).
In Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 88 S.Ct. 2145, 20 L.Ed.2d 1254 (1968), this Court explained why. There, Texas declined to recognize "chronic alcoholism" as a defense to the crime of public drunkenness. Id., at 517, 88 S.Ct. 2145 (plurality opinion). The Court upheld that decision, emphasizing the paramount role of the States in setting "standards of criminal responsibility." Id., at 533, 88 S.Ct. 2145. In refusing to impose "a constitutional doctrine" defining those standards, the Court invoked the many "interlocking and overlapping concepts" that the law uses to assess when a person should be held criminally accountable for "his antisocial deeds." Id., at 535-536, 88 S.Ct. 2145. "The doctrines of actus reus, mens rea, insanity, mistake, justification, and duress"-the Court counted them off-reflect both the "evolving aims of the criminal law" and the "changing religious, moral, philosophical, and medical views of the nature of man." Id., at 536, 88 S.Ct. 2145. Or said a bit differently, crafting those doctrines involves balancing and rebalancing over time complex and oft-competing ideas about "social policy" and "moral culpability"-about the criminal law's "practical effectiveness" and its "ethical foundations." Id., at 538, 545, 548, 88 S.Ct. 2145 (Black, J., concurring). That "constantly shifting adjustment" could not proceed in the face of rigid "[c]onstitution[al] formulas." Id., at 536-537, 88 S.Ct. 2145 (plurality opinion). Within broad limits, Powell thus concluded, "doctrine[s] of criminal responsibility" must remain "the province of the States." Id., at 534, 536, 88 S.Ct. 2145.
Nowhere has the Court hewed more closely to that view than in addressing the contours of the insanity defense. Here, uncertainties about the human mind loom large. See, e.g., Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 81, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985) ("[P]sychiatrists disagree widely and frequently on what constitutes mental illness, on [proper] diagnos[es, and] on cure and treatment"). Even as some puzzles get resolved, others emerge. And those perennial gaps in knowledge intersect with differing opinions about how far, and in what ways, mental illness should excuse criminal conduct. See Clark, 548 U.S. at 749-752, 126 S.Ct. 2709 (canvassing how those competing views produced a wealth of insanity tests); supra, at 1024 - 1025. "This whole problem," we have noted, "has evoked wide disagreement." Leland, 343 U.S. at 801, 72 S.Ct. 1002. On such unsettled ground, we have hesitated to reduce "experimentation, and freeze [the] dialogue between law and psychiatry into a rigid constitutional mold." Powell, 392 U.S. at 536-537, 88 S.Ct. 2145. Indeed, while addressing the demand for an alcoholism defense in Powell, the Court pronounced-as something close to self-evident-that "[n]othing could be less fruitful" than to define a specific "insanity test in constitutional terms." Id., at 536, 88 S.Ct. 2145.
And twice before we have declined to do so. In Leland v. Oregon, a criminal defendant challenged as a violation of due process the State's use of the moral-incapacity test of insanity-the very test Kahler now asks us to require. See 343 U.S. at 800-801, 72 S.Ct. 1002. According to the defendant, Oregon instead had to adopt the volitional-incapacity (or irresistible-impulse) test to comply with the Constitution. See ibid. ; supra, at 1025. We rejected that argument. "[P]sychiatry," we first noted, "has made tremendous strides since [the moral-incapacity] test was laid down in M'Naghten's Case," implying that the test seemed a tad outdated. 343 U.S. at 800-801, 72 S.Ct. 1002. But still, we reasoned, "the progress of science has not reached a point where its learning" would demand "eliminat[ing] the right and wrong test from [the] criminal law." Id., at 801, 72 S.Ct. 1002. And anyway, we continued, the "choice of a test of legal sanity involves not only scientific knowledge but questions of basic policy" about when mental illness should absolve someone of "criminal responsibility." Ibid. The matter was thus best left to each State to decide on its own. The dissent agreed (while parting from the majority on another ground): "[I]t would be indefensible to impose upon the States[ ] one test rather than another for determining criminal culpability" for the mentally ill, "and thereby to displace a State's own choice." Id., at 803, 72 S.Ct. 1002 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
A half-century later, we reasoned similarly in Clark. There, the defendant objected to Arizona's decision to discard the cognitive-incapacity prong of M'Naghten and leave in place only the moral-incapacity one-essentially the flipside of what Kansas has done. Again, we saw no due process problem. Many States, we acknowledged, allowed a defendant to show insanity through either prong of M'Naghten. See 548 U.S. at 750, 126 S.Ct. 2709. But we denied that this approach "represents the minimum that a government must provide." Id., at 748, 126 S.Ct. 2709. In so doing, we invoked the States' traditional "capacity to define crimes and defenses," and noted how views of mental illness had been particularly "subject to flux and disagreement." Id., at 749, 752, 126 S.Ct. 2709. And then we surveyed the disparate ways that state laws had historically excused criminal conduct because of mental disease-those "strains variously combined to yield a diversity of American standards." See id., at 749-752, 126 S.Ct. 2709 ; supra, at 1025. The takeaway was "clear": A State's "insanity rule[ ] is substantially open to state choice." Clark, 548 U.S. at 752, 126 S.Ct. 2709. Reiterating Powell's statement, Clark held that "no particular" insanity test serves as "a baseline for due process." 548 U.S. at 752, 126 S.Ct. 2709. Or said just a bit differently, that "due process imposes no single canonical formulation of legal insanity." Id., at 753, 126 S.Ct. 2709.
B
Yet Kahler maintains that Kansas's treatment of insanity fails to satisfy due process. He sometimes makes his argument in the broadest of strokes, as he did before trial. See supra, at 1026 - 1027. Kansas, he then contends, has altogether "abolished the insanity defense," in disregard of hundreds of years of historical practice. Brief for Petitioner 39. His central claim, though, is more confined. It is that Kansas has impermissibly jettisoned the moral-incapacity test for insanity. See id., at 1030 - 1031, 1037. As earlier noted, both Clark and Leland described that test as coming from M'Naghten. See 548 U.S. at 749, 126 S.Ct. 2709 ; 343 U.S. at 801, 72 S.Ct. 1002 ; supra, at 1025, 1028 - 1029. But according to Kahler (and the dissent), the moral-incapacity inquiry emerged centuries before that decision, thus forming part of the English common-law heritage this country inherited. See Brief for Petitioner 21, 42; post, at 1039 - 1045 (opinion of BREYER, J.). And the test, he claims, served for all that time-and continuing into the present-as the touchstone of legal insanity: If a defendant could not understand that his act was morally wrong, then he could not be found criminally liable. See Brief for Petitioner 20-23; see also post, at 1045. So Kahler concludes that the moral-incapacity standard is a "principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental." Leland, 343 U.S. at 798, 72 S.Ct. 1002 ; see supra, at 1030. In essence-and contra Clark -that test is the "single canonical formulation of legal insanity" and thus the irreducible "baseline for due process." 548 U.S. at 752-753, 126 S.Ct. 2709 ; see supra, at 1029.
One point, first, of agreement: Kahler is right that for hundreds of years jurists and judges have recognized insanity (however defined) as relieving responsibility for a crime. "In criminal cases therefore," Sir William Blackstone wrote, "lunatics are not chargeable for their own acts, if committed when under these incapacities." 4 Commentaries on the Laws of England 24 (1769). Sir Edward Coke even earlier explained that in criminal cases, "the act and wrong of a mad man shall not be imputed to him." 2 Institutes of the Laws of England § 405, p. 247b (1628) (Coke). And so too Henry de Bracton thought that a "madman" could no sooner be found criminally liable than a child. 2 Bracton on Laws and Customs of England 384 (S. Thorne transl. 1968) (Bracton). That principle of non-culpability appeared in case after case involving allegedly insane defendants, on both sides of the Atlantic. "The defense of insanity[ ] is a defense for all crimes[,] from the highest to the lowest," said the Court in Old Bailey. Trial of Samuel Burt (July 19, 1786), in 6 Proceedings in the Old Bailey 874 (E. Hodgson ed. 1788) (Old Bailey Proceedings). Repeated Justice Story, when riding circuit: "In general, insanity is an excuse for the commission of every crime, because the party has not the possession of that reason, which includes responsibility." United States v. Drew, 25 F.Cas. 913, (No. 14993) (CC Mass. 1828); see also, e.g., State v. Marler, 2 Ala. 43, 49 (1841) ("If the prisoner was insane, he was not an accountable being"); Cornwell v. State, 8 Tenn. 147, 156 (1827) ("[P]erfect madness" will "free a man from punishment for crime"). We have not found a single case to the contrary.
But neither do we think Kansas departs from that broad principle. First, Kansas has an insanity defense negating criminal liability-even though not the type Kahler demands. As noted earlier, Kansas law provides that it is "a defense to a prosecution" that "the defendant, as a result of mental disease or defect, lacked the culpable mental state required" for a crime. § 21-5209 ; see supra, at 1025. That provision enables a defendant to present psychiatric and other evidence of mental illness to defend himself against a criminal charge. More specifically, the defendant can use that evidence to show that his illness left him without the cognitive capacity to form the requisite intent. See supra, at 1025 - 1026. Recall that such a defense was exactly what the defendant in Clark wanted, in preference to Arizona's moral-incapacity defense: His (unsuccessful) appeal rested on the trial court's exclusion of psychiatric testimony to show that he lacked the relevant mens rea. See 548 U.S. at 745-747, 126 S.Ct. 2709 ; supra, at 1029. Here, Kahler could do what Clark could not-try to show through such testimony that he had no intent to kill. Of course, Kahler would have preferred Arizona's kind of insanity defense (just as Clark would have liked Kansas's). But that does not mean that Kansas (any more than Arizona) failed to offer any insanity defense at all.
Second, and significantly, Kansas permits a defendant to offer whatever mental health evidence he deems relevant at sentencing. See §§ 21-6815(c)(1)(C), 21-6625(a); supra, at 1026. A mentally ill defendant may argue there that he is not blameworthy because he could not tell the difference between right and wrong. Or, because he did not know his conduct broke the law. Or, because he could not control his behavior. Or, because of anything else. In other words, any manifestation of mental illness that Kansas's guilt-phase insanity defense disregards-including the moral incapacity Kahler highlights-can come in later to mitigate culpability and lessen punishment. And that same kind of evidence can persuade a judge to replace any prison term with commitment to a mental health facility. See § 22-3430; supra, at 1039 - 1040. So as noted above, a defendant arguing moral incapacity may well receive the same treatment in Kansas as in States that would acquit-and, almost certainly, commit-him for that reason. See supra, at 1026 - 1027. In sum, Kansas does not bar, but only channels to sentencing, the mental health evidence that falls outside its intent-based insanity defense. When combined with Kansas's allowance of mental health evidence to show a defendant's inability to form criminal intent, that sentencing regime defeats Kahler's charge that the State has "abolish[ed] the insanity defense entirely." Brief for Petitioner 39.
So Kahler can prevail here only if he can show (again, contra Clark ) that due process demands a specific test of legal insanity-namely, whether mental illness prevented a defendant from understanding his act as immoral. Kansas, as we have explained, does not use that type of insanity rule. See supra, at 1025 - 1026. If a mentally ill defendant had enough cognitive function to form the intent to kill, Kansas law directs a conviction even if he believed the murder morally justified. In Kansas's judgment, that delusion does not make an intentional killer entirely blameless. See Brief for Respondent 40. Rather than eliminate, it only lessens the defendant's moral culpability. See ibid. And sentencing is the appropriate place to consider mitigation: The decisionmaker there can make a nuanced evaluation of blame, rather than choose, as a trial jury must, between all and nothing. See ibid. In any event, so Kansas thinks. Those views are contested and contestable; other States-many others-have made a different choice. But Kahler must show more than that. He must show that adopting the moral-incapacity version of the insanity rule is not a choice at all-because, again, that version is "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental." Leland, 343 U.S. at 798, 72 S.Ct. 1002. And he cannot. The historical record is, on any fair reading, complex-even messy. As we will detail, it reveals early versions of not only Kahler's proposed standard but also Kansas's alternative.
Early commentators on the common law proposed various formulations of the insanity defense, with some favoring a morality inquiry and others a mens rea approach. Kahler cites William Lambard's 16th-century treatise defining a "mad man" as one who "hath no knowledge of good nor evil" (the right and wrong of the day). Eirenarcha, ch. 21, p. 218 (1581). He likewise points to William Hawkins's statement, over a hundred years later, that a "lunatick[ ]" is not punishable because "under a natural disability of distinguishing between good and evil." 1 Pleas of the Crown § 1, p. 2 (1716) (capitalization omitted). Both true enough. But other early versions of the insanity test-and from a more famous trio of jurists-demanded the kind of cognitive impairment that prevented a defendant from understanding the nature of his acts, and thus intending his crime. Henry de Bracton's 13th-century treatise gave rise to what became known as the "wild beast" test. See J. Biggs, The Guilty Mind 82 (1955). Used for hundreds of years, it likened a "madman" to an "animal[ ] which lack[s] reason" and so could not have "the intention to injure." Bracton 384; see ibid. (A "madman" cannot commit a crime because "[i]t is will and purpose which mark" misdeeds). Sir Edward Coke similarly linked the definition of insanity to a defendant's inability to form criminal intent. He described a legally insane person in 1628 as so utterly "without his mind or discretion" that he could not have the needed mens rea. 2 Coke § 405, at 247b. So too Lord Matthew Hale a century later. He explained that insanity involves "a total alienation of the mind or perfect madness," such that a defendant could not act "animo felonico," meaning with felonious intent. 1 Pleas of the Crown, ch. 4, pp. 30, 37 (1736); see id., at 37 ("[F]or being under a full alienation of mind, he acts not per electionem or intentionem [by choice or intent]").
Quite a few of the old common-law cases similarly stressed the issue of cognitive capacity. To be sure, even these cases included some references to the ability to tell right from wrong (and the dissent eagerly cherry-picks every one of them). But the decisions' overall focus was less on whether a defendant thought his act moral than on whether he had the ability to do much thinking at all. In the canonical case of Rex v. Arnold, 16 How. St. Tr. 695 (1724), for example, the jury charge descended straight from Bracton:
"[I]t is not every kind of frantic humour or something unaccountable in a man's actions, that points him out to be such a madman as is to be exempted from punishment: it must be a man that is totally deprived of his understanding and memory, and doth not know what he is doing, no more than an infant, than a brute, or a wild beast." Id., at 764-765.
And the court offered an accompanying test linking that lack of reason to mens rea : If a man is "deprived of his reason, and consequently of his intention, he cannot be guilty." Id., at 764; see ibid. (defining a "madman" as a "person that hath no design"); see also Trial of William Walker (Apr. 21, 1784), in 4 Old Bailey Proceedings 544, 547 (asking whether the defendant had a "distemper of mind which had deprived him of the use of his reason" or instead whether "he knew what he was doing [and] meant to do it"); Beverley's Case, 4 Co. Rep. 123b, 124b, 76 Eng. Rep. 1118, 1121 (K. B. 1603) (asking whether a man "is deprived of reason and understanding" and so "cannot have a felonious intent"). The House of Lords used much the same standard in Rex v. Lord Ferrers, 19 How. St. Tr. 886 (1760), when sitting in judgment on one of its members. There, the Solicitor General told the Lords to address "the capacity and intention of the noble prisoner." Id., at 948. Relying heavily on Hale's treatise, he defined the legally insane as suffering from an "alienation of mind" and a "total[ ] want of reason." Id., at 947. And in recapping the evidence on that issue, he asked about the defendant's intention: "Did [Ferrers] proceed with deliberation? Did he know the consequences" of his act? Id., at 948.
In such cases, even the language of morality mostly worked in service of the emphasis on cognition and mens rea. The idea was that if a defendant had such a "total[ ] want of reason" as to preclude moral thinking, he could not possibly have formed the needed criminal intent. Id., at 947. Lord Chief Justice Mansfield put the point neatly in Bellingham's Case, 1 G. Collinson, Treatise on the Law Concerning Idiots, Lunatics, and Other Persons Non Compotes Mentis 636 (1812) (Collinson). He instructed the jury:
"If a man were deprived of all power of reasoning, so as not to be able to distinguish whether it was right or wrong to commit the most wicked transaction, he could not certainly do an act against the law. Such a man, so destitute of all power of judgment, could have no intention at all." Id., at 671.
On that account, moral incapacity was a byproduct of the kind of cognitive breakdown that precluded finding mens rea, rather than a self-sufficient test of insanity. See also Rex v. Offord, 5 Car. & P. 168, 169, 172 Eng. Rep. 924, 925 (N. P. 1831) ("express[ing] complete accordance in the observations of th[e] learned Judge" in Bellingham ). Or said another way, a mentally ill defendant's inability to distinguish right from wrong, rather than independently producing an insanity acquittal, served as a sign-almost a kind of evidence-that the defendant lacked the needed criminal intent.
Other early common-law cases do not adopt the mens rea approach-but neither can they sustain Kahler's position. Kahler relies mainly on Hadfield's Case, 27 How. St. Tr. 1281 (1800), to show that common-law courts would acquit a mentally ill defendant who understood the nature of his act, but believed it moral. See Reply Brief 4. There, the defendant had deliberately set out to assassinate King George III on the view that doing so would bring about the Second Coming. See 27 How. St. Tr., at 1322. The judge instructed the jury that the defendant was so "deranged" as to make acquittal appropriate. Id., at 1353. Maybe, as Kahler argues, that directive stemmed from the defendant's inability to
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | D | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
On March 24, 1986, after a jury trial in the Municipal Court of Beverly Hills Judicial District, California, appellant Eugene Carella was convicted of grand theft for failure to return a rented car. At his trial, the court adopted the prosecution’s requested instructions applying the statutory presumptions in Cal. Veh. Code Ann. § 10855 (West 1987) and Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 484(b) (West 1988). Specifically, over Carella’s objection, the court charged the jury as follows:
(1) “Presumption Respecting Theft by Fraud:
“Intent to commit theft by fraud is presumed if one who has leased or rented the personal property of another pursuant to a written contract fails to return the personal property to its owner within 20 days after the owner has made written demand by certified or registered mail following the expiration of the lease or rental agreement for return of the property so leased or rented.”
(2) “Presumption Respecting Embezzlement of a Leased or Rented Vehicle:
“Whenever any person who has leased or rented a vehicle wilfully and intentionally fails to return the vehicle to its owner within five days after the lease or rental agreement has expired, that person shall be presumed to have embezzled the vehicle.” App. 15.
On appeal to the Appellate Department of the Superior Court, the prosecution confessed error, acknowledging that these two instructions unconstitutionally imposed conclusive presumptions as to core elements of Carella’s crime. The Appellate Department disagreed, however, and validated the presumptions on the ground that Carella “never offered testimony concerning the nonexistence of the presumed facts. ...” Id., at 61. This disposition was so plainly at odds with prior decisions of this Court that we noted probable jurisdiction, 488 U. S. 964 (1988), and now reverse.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment denies States the power to deprive the accused of liberty unless the prosecution proves beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the charged offense. In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358, 364 (1970). Jury instructions relieving States of this burden violate a defendant’s due process rights. See Francis v. Franklin, 471 U. S. 307 (1985); Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U. S. 510 (1979). Such directions subvert the presumption of innocence accorded to accused persons and also invade the truth-finding task assigned solely to juries in criminal cases.
We explained in Francis and Sandstrom that courts should ask whether the presumption in question is mandatory, that is, whether the specific instruction, both alone and in the context of the overall charge, could have been understood by reasonable jurors to require them to find the presumed fact if the State proves certain predicate facts. See Sandstrom, supra, at 514. The prosecution understandably does not now dispute that the instructions in this case were phrased as commands, for those instructions were explicit and unqualified to that effect and were not explained elsewhere in the jury charge to be merely permissive. Carella’s jury was told first that a person “shall be presumed to have embezzled” a vehicle if it is not returned within 5 days of the expiration of the rental agreement; and second, that “intent to commit theft by fraud is presumed” from failure to return rented property within 20 days of demand.
These mandatory directions directly foreclosed independent jury consideration of whether the facts proved established certain elements of the offenses with which Carella was charged. The instructions also relieved the State of its burden of proof articulated in Winship, namely, proving by evidence every essential element of Carella’s crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The two instructions violated the Fourteenth Amendment.
The State insists that the error was in any event harmless. As we have in similar cases, we do not decide that issue here. In Sandstrom v. Montana, supra, at 515, the jury in a murder case was instructed that the “law presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts.” We held that, because the jury might have understood the presumption to be conclusive or as shifting the burden of persuasion, the instruction was constitutional error. There was a claim of harmless error, however, and even though the jury might have considered the presumption to be conclusive, we remanded for the state court to consider the issue if it so chose.
In Rose v. Clark, 478 U. S. 570 (1986), we again said that a Sandstrom error is subject to the harmless-error rule. “Nor is Sandstrom error equivalent to a directed verdict for the State. When a jury is instructed to presume malice from predicate facts, it still must find the existence of those facts beyond a reasonable doubt. Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U. S. 73, 96-97 (1983) (Powell, J., dissenting). In many cases, the predicate facts conclusively establish intent, so that no rational jury could find that the defendant committed the relevant criminal act but did not intend to cause injury. ... In that event the erroneous instruction is simply superfluous: the jury has found, in Winship’s words, ‘every fact necessary’ to establish every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Rose, supra, at 580-581 (footnote and citations omitted). We also observed that although we have the authority to make the harmless-error determination ourselves, we do not ordinarily do so. Hence, we remanded the case for the lower court to make that determination in the first instance.
We follow the same course here and reverse the judgment of the California court without deciding here whether no rational jury could find the predicate acts but fail to find the fact presumed. 478 U. S., at 580-581. Accordingly, the judgment of the Appellate Department is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Carella was acquitted of the charged violation of Cal. Veh. Code Ann. § 10851(a) (West 1987), which provides that the nonconsensual taking or driving of a vehicle is a “public offense” if accomplished with the specific “intent either to permanently or temporarily” deprive the owner of title or possession.
California Veh. Code Ann. § 10855 reads: “Whenever any person who has leased or rented a vehicle wilfully and intentionally fails to return the vehicle to its owner within five days after the lease or rental agreement has expired, that person shall be presumed to have embezzled the vehicle.”
California Penal Code Ann. § 484(b) reads: “Except as provided in Section 10855 of the Vehicle Code, intent to commit theft by fraud is presumed if one who has leased or rented the personal property of another pursuant to a written contract fails to return the personal property to its owner within 20 days after the owner has made written demand by certified or registered mail following the expiration of the lease or rental agreement for return of the property so leased or rented.”
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | A | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a diversity common-law action brought by the respondent, a former employee of petitioner railroad, in the United States District Court for the District of Nevada to recover damages from the railroad for allegedly wrongfully discharging him in violation of the collective bargaining agreement between it and the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen. The validity of the discharge was previously challenged upon the same grounds before the National Railroad Adjustment Board, First Division, in a proceeding brought by the Brotherhood on respondent’s behalf under § 3 First (i) of the Railway Labor Act, seeking the respondent’s reinstatement with back pay. The Board rendered an award in favor of the petitioner. The question for decision here is whether the respondent may pursue a common-law remedy for damages for his allegedly wrongful dismissal after having chosen to pursue' the statutory remedy which resulted in a determination by the National Adjustment Board that his dismissal was justified.
The respondent was employed, by petitioner as a swing brakeman (an extra brakeman who is not a regularly assigned member of a train crew) and was a member of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen. The collective bargaining agreement between the Brotherhood and the petitioner contained two provisions involved in the dispute over his discharge. One provision, .Article 32 (b), provided that: “Swing brakemen will not be tied up nor released at points where sleeping and eating accommodations are not available.” The other provision, Article 33 (a), provided that: “When a trainman is suspended for an alleged fault, no punishment will be fixed without, a thorough investigation, at which the accused may have a trainman of his choice present.”
On July 12, 1949, the respondent was called to “deadhead” on Train No. .37 from Las Vegas, Nevada, to Nipton, California, at which point he was to detrain and await assignment to another train traveling to Las Vegas. Train No. 37 arrived at Nipton at 10:30 p. m., and the train dispatcher assigned respondent to train No. X 1622E> which was due to arrive at Nipton around 4 a. m., en route to Las Vegas. The respondent complained that there were no facilities available in- Nipton for eating or sleeping and told the dispatcher he would go back to Las Vegas and return after getting something to eat. The. dispatcher refused to release him and orderéd him to wait the arrival of train X 1622E. The respondent disobeyed this instruction and deadheaded back to Las Vegas on a train which left Nipton at 11:10 p.m.
The railroad suspended the respondent on the morning of July 13. On July 16 he received a notice to appear at 10 a. m. on July 17 before an Assistant Superintendent of the railroad for an investigation. At the respondent’s request the investigation was postponed to the morning of July 18, at which time the respondent requested a further postponement until his representative, the Brotherhood’s Local Chairman, could be present. A postponement was again granted, until 2:30 p. m. of the 18th, but the respondent’s Local Chairman apparently was still not available at that time. When respondent failed to appear for the 2:30 hearing, the Assistant Superintendent proceeded with the investigation in his absence. The testimony of railroad witnesses was taken stenographically and transcribed; no evidence was received in respondent’s behalf. On July 24 the railroad notified the respondent that he was discharged.
The Brotherhood processed respondent’s grievance through the required management levels, and when settlement could not be reached, nor agreement arrived at for a joint submission to the National Railroad Adjustment Board, the Brotherhood, in January 1951, filed an ex parte submission with the Board’s First Division. Hearing was waived by the parties and the submission was considered on the papers filed by them.’ The Adjustment Board; on June 25, 1952, rendered its award “Claim denied,” with supporting findings.
Some three years after the filing of the award., the respondent, on June 6, 1955, brought the instant suit. His complaint alleges a cause of action predicated on the same grounds of allegedly wrongful dismissal in violation of the collective bargaining agreement which had been urged on the Adjustment Board, namely, (1) that he “was dismissed without cause” and (2) that he was dismissed without a “thorough investigation” because not “afforded an opportunity to have á trainman of his choice present at the investigation held” nor “afforded a reasonable opportunity. to prepare his defense,” “to present his defense,” “to have witnesses present” or “to participate in his own defense.” After filing an answer, the railroad moved for summary judgment on affidavits and other papers on file upon the ground that “any judicially enforceable cause of action arising from the- termination of the employment relationship ... is now barred by the adjudication and determination of the validity of such termination by the National Railroad Adjustment Board under the terms and conditions of said collective bargaining agreement, and pursuant to and in conformance with the Railway Labor Act . . . .” The District Court, without opinion, granted the motion and entered summary judgment in favor of the petitioner. The respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, assigning as the single point on the appeal that the District Court “erred in holding that the award of the National Railroad Adjustment Board entitled . . . [the railroad] to Summary Judgment.” The Court of Appeals, one judge dissenting, reversed, 255 F. 2d 663. Although the Court of Appeals held that the District Court would be “without jurisdiction to entertain the action if the Board award represents a determination on the merits,” id., at 666, the court concluded that while the question whether the railroad was entitled to discharge the respondent “was one of the two questions which Price submitted for Board determination,” “the Board made no determination on the mérits” but determined only that in “the manner in which the investigation was conducted by the carrier . . . none of Price’s rights in that regard was abridged,” and held that the District Court therefore had jurisdiction to entertain the action. Id., at 666-667. We granted certiorari to decide the important question raised by . the case of the interpretation' of the Railway Labor Act. 358 U. S. 892.
We do not agree with the Court, of Appbals’ holding that the Board’s award was based solely on its decision that Article 33 (á) was. not violated by. the railroad because respondent’s dismissal followed a “thorough investigation.” Rather we think the award also reflects the Board’s determination that respondent was discharged for good cause. Thus we agree with Judge Healy, dissenting in the Court of Appeals, that on the face of the customárily brief findings of the Board it appears “plain that the Board was of opinion, and in substance held, that the asserted violation by the Company of Article 32, even if true, would not serve to justify an employee’s violation of direct operating instructions and his abandonment of his post.” 255 F. 2d, at 667-668. Since the discharge could be set aside by the Board if either ground of the submission was sustained, the unqualified denial of the claim necessarily implied, we think, that the Board decided both grounds submitted adversely to the respondent. Even if the procedure followed by thq railroad constituted a proper investigation, the Board’s outright denial of the claim is explicable only on the ground that the Board also held that Article 32 (b) did not justify the respondent in disobeying the dispatcher’s instruction to remain at Nip-ton. We conclude that both issues were decided by the Board against the respondent, and therefore reach-the question whether the respondent, despite the adverse determination of the Adjustment Board, could pursue the common-law remedy for damages in the District Court.
Congress has said in § 3 First (m) of the Railway-Labor Act that the Adjustment Board’s “awards shall be final and binding upon botji parties to the dispute., except insofar as they shall contain a money award.” Respondent does not argue that a “money award” is anything other than an award directing the payment of money. Indeed-, it would distort the English language to interpret that term as including a refusal to award a money payment. Thus, the plain language of § 3 First (m), on its face, imports that Congress intended that the Board’s disposition of a grievance should preclude a subsequent court action by the losing party. Furthermore, we have said of the Railway Labor Act that “the specification of one remedy normally excludes another.” Switchmen’s Union v. National Mediation Board, 320 U. S. 297, 301. Thus, our duty to give, effect to the congressional purpose compels us to hold that the instant common-law action is precluded unless the overall scheme established by the Railway Labor Act and the legislative history clearly indicate a congressional intention contrary to that which the plain meaning of the words imports. Our understanding of the statutory scheme and the legislative history, however, reinforces what the statutory language already makes clear, namely, that Congress barred the employee’s subsequent resort to the common-law remedy after an adverse determination of his grievance by the Adjustment Board.
The purpose of the Railway Labor Act was to provide a framework for peaceful settlement of labor disputes between carriers and their employees to “insure to the public continuity and efficiency of interstate transportation service, and to protect the public from the injuries and losses consequent upon any impairment or interruption of interstate commerce through failures of managers and employees to settle peaceably their controversies.” H. R. Rep. No. 328, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 1. Congress did not, however, in the original 1926 Act, create the National Railroad Adjustment Board or make the use of such an agency compulsory upon the parties; rather the Act contemplated that settlement of disputes would be achieved through “machinery for amicable adjustment of labor disputes agreed upon by the parties . . . .” S. Rep. No. 606, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 4. Congress, therefore, provided that adjustment boards should be “created by agreement between any carrier or group of carriers, or the carriers as a whole, or its or their employees.” § 3 First of the Railway Labor Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 678. These adjustment boards, intended for use in settling what are termed minor disputes in the railroad industry, primarily grievances arising from the application of collective bargaining agreements to particular situations, see Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago River & I. R. Co., 353 U. S. 30, were thus to be established by voluntary, agreement. Congress, even in 1926 however, recognized that the boards would not be useful in bringing about industrial peace unless their decisions were binding on the parties. Thus the 1926 Act required that agreements creating adjustment boards must .stipulate “that decisions of adjustment boards shall be final and binding on both parties to the dispute; and it shall be the duty of both to abide by such decisions . . . ,” § 3 First (e) of the Railway Labor Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 579.
But the 1926 Act provided no sanctions to force the carriers and their employees to make agreements establishing adjustment boards and many railroads refused to participate on such boards or so limited their participation that the boards were ineffectual. Moreover, the boards which were created were composed of equal numbers of management and labor representatives and. deadlocks over particular cases became commonplace. Since no procedure for breaking such deadlocks was provided, many disputes remained unsettléd. As reported to Congress in 1934 by Mr. Eastman, Federal Coordinator of Transportation: “Another difficulty with the present law [the 1926 Act], even where an adjustment board has been established, is that, although its decisions are final and binding upon both parties, there can be no certainty that there will be a decision.” Hearings before Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce on S. 3266, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 17. Strike threats became frequent in an atmosphere of mutual recriminations which presented the danger of creating the very strife which the statute had been designed to avoid. Mr. Eastman reported to the House Rules Committee: “[Grievances on a number of roads have in the past few years accumulated to such an extent that the only remedy the men could see was to threaten a strike and thus secure appointment by the President of a fact finding board which could go into the whole situation. That has happened on several occasions. Some of these grievances have accumulated up into the hundreds on the various roads and when the situation finally became intolerable the men would threaten a strike . . . .” Hearings before the House Rules Committee, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 25; see also p. 14; see also Hearings before the Senate Interstate Commerce Committee, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 17; and see Elgin, J. & E. R. Co. v. Burley, 325 U. S. 711, 725-726.
The railroad labor organizations were particularly dissatisfied. They urged that effective adjustment of grievances could be attained only by amendments to the 1926 Act that would' establish a National Adjustment Board in which both carriers and employees would be required to participate, that would permit an employee to compel a carrier to submit a grievance to the Board, that would provide for a neutral person to break deadlocks occurring when the labor and management representatives divided equally, and, finally, that would make awards binding on the parties and enforceable in the courts, when favorable to the employees. These views prevailed in the Congress and resulted in the 1934 amendments which drastically changed the scheme of the Act. Act"of June 21, 1934, 48 Stat. 1185. The National Railroad Adjustment. Board was created and the carriers were required to participate through representatives selected'by them, § 3 First (a) .through (g)'. The Board is composed of four divisions each having jurisdiction over different employees and whose proceedings are independent of one another, § 3 First (h). Disputes between an employee or group of employees and a carrier or carriers growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements must, be handled in the usual manner up to and including the chief operating officers of the carrier designated to handle such disputes, but failing adjustment. the disputes may be referred by the parties or by either party to the appropriate division, §3 First (i). Upon failure of a division to agree upon an award because of a deadlock or inability to secure a majority vote of the division members, the division must appoint a neutral referee to sit with the division as a member thereof and make an award, ■§ 3 First (1). Awards are final and binding except insofar as they contain a money award; in case of dispute involving an interpretation of the award either party may request the division to interpret the award in the light of the dispute, § 3 First (m). In case of an award favorable to the petitioner, the division shall make an order, directed tó the carrier, to make the. award effective and if the payment of money is required to pay such. sum to the employee, § 3 First (o). If the carrier does not comply with an order, enforcement may be sought by a suit in a District Court of the United States as provided in § 3 First (p).
The labor spokesman for the proposal made it crystal clear that an essential feature of the proposal was that Board awards on grievances submitted by or on behalf of employees were to be final and binding upon the affected employees. The employees were willing to give up their remedies outside of the statute provided that a workable and binding statutory scheme was established to settle grievances. Mr. George Harrison, President of the Brotherhood of Railroad Clerks, stated: “Grievances come about because the men file them themselves. Railroads don’t institute grievances. Grievances are instituted against railroad officers’ actions, and we are willing to take our chances with this national-board because we believe, out of our experience, that the national board is the best and most efficient method of getting a determination of these many controversies . . . .” Hearings before the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce on S. 3266, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 33. “[W]e are now ready to concede' that we can risk having our grievances-go to a board and ge.t them determined . . . [but] if we are going to get a hodgepodge arrangement by law, rather than what is suggested by this bill,.then we don’t want to give up that right, because we only- give up the right because we feel that we will get a measure of justice by this machinery that we'suggest here.” Id., at 35; Mr. Eastman echoed this thought : “decisions of the adjustment board . . . are made final and binding by the terms of this act, and as I understand it, the labor organizations, none of them, are objecting to that provision. They have their day in court and they have their members on the adjustment board, and if an agreement cannot be reached between the parties .representing both sides on the adjustment board, a neutral man steps in and renders the decision, and they will be required to accept that decision when made.....” Hearings before House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H. R. 7650, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 59. See also id., at 58-65.
Thus the employees considered that their interests would be best served by a workable statutory scheme providing for the final-settlement of grievances by a tribunal composed of people experienced in the railroad industry. The employees’.representatives made it clear that, if such a statutory scheme were provided, the employees would accept the awards as to disputes processed through the schemé as final settlements of. those disputes which were not to be raised again.
Despite the conclusion compelled by the over-all scheme of the Railway Labor Act and its legislative history, it is suggested that because an enforcement proceeding against a noncomplying carrier under § 3 First (p) affords the defeated carrier some opportunity to relitigate the issues decided by the Adjustment Board, unfairness results if § 3 First (in) is construed so as to deny the employee the fight to maintain this common-law action. We are referred to the emphasis upon the consideration of avoiding unfairness expressed in United States v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 337 U. S. 426, which held that a denial by the Interstate Commerce Commission of a claim of a shipper for money reparations is reviewable in the federal courts, pointing out that a Commission award favorable to a shipper was not final and binding upon the railroad. But that holding rested upon an interpretation of 28 U. S. C. (1946 ed.) § 41 (28) providing that “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction . . . Of cases brought to enjoin, set aside, annul, or. suspend in whole or in part any order of the Interstate Commerce Commission.” • (Italics supplied.) In contrast, § 3 First (m) here involved, commands that the Adjustment Board’s “awards shall be final and binding upon both parties to the dispute, except insofar as they shall contain a money award.” The Adjustment Board’s award in controversy denied respondent’s claim for reinstatement and back pay, which, we have said, was not a “money. award.” Although the provisions for enforce-' ment of money awards in the Railway Labor Act, § 3 First (o) and (p), establish procedures similar to those under 49 U. S. C. § 16 (1) and (2) for enforcement of reparations orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission, § 3 First (m) with which, we are here concerned has no counterpart in the Interstate Commerce Act. The disparity in judicial review of Adjustment Board orders, if it can be said to be unfair at all,, was explicitly created by Congress, and it is for Congress to say whether it ought be removed.
Plainly the statutory scheme as revised by the 1934 amendments was designed for effective and final decision of grievances which arise daily, principally as matters of the administration and application of the provisions of collective bargaining agreements. This grist of labor relations is such that the statutory scheme cannot realistically- be squared with the contention that Congress did not purpose to foreclose litigation in the courts over grievances submitted to and disposed of by the Board, past the action under § 3 First (p) authorized against the noncomplying carrier, see Washington Terminal Co. v. Boswell, 75 U. S. App; D. C. 1, 124 F. 2d 235, aff’d by an equally divided Court, 319 U. S. 732, or the review sought of an award claimed to result from a denial of due process of law, see Ellerd v. Southern Pacific R. Co., 241 F. 2d 541; Barnett v. Pennsylvania-Reading Seashore Lines, 245 F. 2d 579, 582. So far as appears, all of the Courts of Appeals and District Courts which have dealt with this problem have reached the conclusion we reach here.. To say that the discharged employee may litigate the validity of- his discharge in a common-law action for damages after, failing to sustain his grievance before the Board is to say that Congress planned that the Board should function only to render advisory opinions, and intended the Act’s entire scheme for the settlement of-grievances to be regarded “as wholly conciliatory in character, involving no element'of legal effectiveness, with the consequence that the parties are entirely free to accept or ignore the Board’s decision ... [a contention] inconsistent with the Act’s terms, purposes and legislative history.” Elgin, J. & E. R. Co. v. Burley, 325 U. S. 711, 720-721.
We therefore hold that the respondent’s submission to the Board of his grievances as to the validity of his discharge precludes him from seeking damages in the instant common-law action.
The judgment of the Court, of Appeals is reversed and the case is remanded with direction to affirm the judgment of the District Court.
It is-so ordered.
Section 3 First (i) of the Railway Labor- Act, 48 St at. 1191, 45 U. S. C. § 153 First (i), provides:
“The disputes between an employee or group of employees and a carrier or carriers growing out of grievances or out of the inter-, pretation or application of agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions, including cases pending and unadjusted on June 21, 1934, shall be handled in. the usual manner up to and including the chief operating officer of the carrier designated to handle such disputes; but, failing to reach an ádjustméiít in this manner, the disputes may be referred by petition of the parties or by either party to the appropriate division of the Adjustment Board with a full statement of the facts and all supporting data bearing upon the disputes.”
It is conceded that respondent authorized the Brotherhood to bring his claim before the Adjustment Board. Compare Elgin, J. & E. R. Co. v. Burley, 325 U. S. 711, aff’d on rehearing, 327 U. S. 661.
The pertinent excerpts from the findings are the following:
“If the carrier is to have efficient operations on its railroad, employees must be relied on to obey operating instructions and orders. Claimant was found to have wilfully disobeyed his orders. This was insubordination and merited discipline.
“The employee . . . seeks complete vindication on the grounds that he was denied the investigation-provided by the rules of agreement. Thus, the only question for review is whether there was substantial •compliance with the investigation rule.
“Basically, the complaint is that the hearing was held when the claimant was not present.
“. . . The right of the employee to be heard before being disciplined is a personal right which he can waive by action, inaction, or failure to act in good faith. . . .
"... his position here would have been strengthened had he personally appeared at all stages of the proceeding to labor as best he could to preserve his record and to get his story to us first hand. All that the transcript reflects does claimant no credit, but leaves us with the feeling that the things of which he now complains Were planned by him that way.”
Garrison, The National Railroad Adjustment Board: A Unique Administrative Agency, 46 Yale L. J. 567, 584, describes the awards of the' First Division of the National Adjustment'.Board as follows:
“It will be noted that, except for the purely jurisdictional recitals, the findings consist of a single sentence (‘The evidence indicates that the movements made did not constitute switching under Article I-R’) which constitutes the nub of the whole decision. Rarely does this central finding consist of more than a sentence or two. To a lay reader the sentence quoted above is meaningless. In order that it may be more intelligible the findings in their printed form are preceded by the employees’ statement of facts taken from their submission, and a statement of their position (likewise extracted from the submission), followed by the management’s statement of facts and a statement of its position derived similarly from its submission. From these rival statements it is easy to determine what' the controversy is about, but it is not easy to determine from the laconic findings'the real basis upon which the decision was reached.”
In an interpretation announced on November 26, 1958, sought by the railroad under § 3 First (m) of the Railway Labor Act, the Board declared that its award reflected its conclusion that the railroad was justified in discharging respondent. This interpretation was not before the Court of Appeals in this case, and we refer to it only as further substantiation of our conclusion based on the iecord in the case.
Since respondent, instead of bringing his claim in court as was his right under Moore v. Illinois Central R. Co., 312 U. S. 630, chose to pursue that claim before the Adjustment Board, he does not even argue that a holding that the Railway Labor Act precludes a relitigation of that claim in the courts would deprive him of any constitutional right to a jury trial.
48 Stat. 1191-1192, 45 U..S. C. § 153 First (m). That section provides:
“The awards of the several divisions of the Adjustment Board shall be stated in writing. A copy of the awards shall be furnished to the respective parties to the controversy, and the awards shall be final and binding upon both parties to the dispute, except insofar as they shall contain a money award. In case a dispute arises involving an interpretation of the award the division of the Board upon request of either party shall interpret the award in the light of the dispute."
Despite the clear import of the statutory language and the legislative history the respondent argues that this Court’s holding in Moore v. Illinois R. Co., 312 U. S. 630, requires us to hold that the instant suit is not precluded. However, the holding in Moore was simply that a common-law remedy for damages might be pursued by a discharged employee who did not resort to. the statutory remedy before the Board to challenge the validity of his dismissal. A different question arises here where the employee obtained a determination from the Board, and, having lost, is seeking to relitigate in the courts the same issue as to the validity of his discharge.
See Hearings' before the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce on S. 3266, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 15. The Chairman of the United States Board of Mediation described § 3 First of the 1926 Act as follows: “The provision in the present [1926] act for adjustment boards is in practice about as near a fool provision as anything could possibly be. I mean this — that on the face of it they shall, by. agreement, do so and so. Well,-you can do pretty nearly anything by agreement, but how can you get them to agree ?” Hearings before the Senate Committee on Interstate. Commerce on S. 3266; 73d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 137.
Provision for judicial enforcement of awards against employees was thought to be unnecessary since grievances are usually asserted by employees challenging some action by the carrier, and if the grievance is not sustained by the Board, the award simply denies the claim and requires no affirmative action by the employee. If an unfavorable award results in a strike the carrier may obtain injunctive relief. Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago River & I. R. Co., 353 U. S. 30; see also Hearings before House Committee, on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H. R. 7650, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 58-65.
For discussion of the statutory scheme enacted in the Railway Labor Act and the 1934 amendments thereto, see Elgin, J. & E. R. Co. v. Burley, 325 U. S. 711; Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago River & I. R. Co., 353 U. S. 30; Washington Terminal Co. w. Boswell, 75 U. S. App. D. C. 1, 124 F. 2d 235, aff’d by an equally divided Court, 319 U. S. 732.
Section 3 First (p) of the Railway Labpr Act, 48 Stat. 1192, '45 U. S. C. § 153 First (p), provides:
“If a carrier does not comply with an order of a division of the Adjustment Board within the .time limit in such order, the petitioner . . . may file in the District Court of the United States . . . a petition setting forth briefly the causes for which he claims relief, and the order of the division of the Adjustment Board in the premises. Such suit in the District Court of the United States shall proceed in all respects as other civil suits, except that on the trial of such suit the findings and order of the division of the Adjustment'Board shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated, and except that the petitioner shall not be liable ~for costs in the district court nor for costs at any subsequent stage of the proceedings, unless they accrue upon his appeal, and such costs shall be paid out of the appropriation for the expenses of the courts of the United' States.. If the petitioner shall finally prevail he shall be allowed a reasonable attorney’s fee, to be taxed arid collected as a part of the costs of the suit. The district courts are empowered, under the rules of the court governing actions at law, to make such order and enter such judgment, by writ of mandamus or otherwise, as may be appropriate to enforce or set aside the order of the division of the Adjustment Board.”
Barnett v. Pennsylvania-Reading Seashore Lines, 245 F. 2d 579 (C. A. 3d Cir.); Bower v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 214 F. 2d 623 (C. A. 3d Cir.); Michel v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 188 F. 2d 224 (C. A. 5th Cir.); Reynolds v. Denver & R. G. W. R. Co., 174 F. 2d 673 (C. A. 10th Cir.); Washington Terminal Co. v. Boswell, 75 U. S. App. D. C. 1, 10, 124 F. 2d 235, 244 (C. A. D. C. Cir.), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 319 U. S. 732.
Weaver v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 141 F. Supp. 214 (D. C. S. D. N. Y.), aff’d per curiam, 240 F. 2d 350 (C. A. 2d Cir.); Byers v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 129 F. Supp. 109 (D. C. S. D. Cal.); Greenwood v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 129 F. Supp. 105 (D. C. S. D. Cal.); Farris v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 907 (D. C. W. D. Wash.); Parker v. Illinois Central R. Co., 108 F. Supp. 186 (D. C. N. D. Ill.); Futhey v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 96 F. Supp. 864 (D. C. N. D. Ill.); Kelly v. Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co., 75 F. Supp. 737 (D. C. E. D. Tenn.); Ramsey v. Chesapeake & O. R. Co., 75 Supp. 740 (D. C. N. D. Ohio); Berryman v. Pullman Co., 48 F. Supp. 542 (D. C. W. D. Mo.).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | H | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
OPINION OF THE COURT
[562 U.S. 182]
Justice Ginsburg
delivered the opinion of the Court.
We address in this case a procedural issue arising in a civil rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by Michelle Ortiz, a former inmate at the Ohio Reformatory for Women. Plaintiff below, petitioner here, Ortiz filed a complaint in federal court stating key facts on which she based claims for damages against superintending prison officers. On two consecutive nights during her one-year incarceration, Ortiz stated, she was sexually assaulted by a corrections officer. Although she promptly reported the first incident, she further
[562 U.S. 183]
alleged, prison authorities took no measures to protect her against the second assault. After that assault, Ortiz charged, and in retaliation for accounts she gave of the two episodes, prison officials placed her, shackled and handcuffed, in solitary confinement in a cell without adequate heat, clothing, bedding, or blankets. The treatment to which she was exposed, Ortiz claimed, violated her right, safeguarded by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, to reasonable protection from violence while in custody.
Principal defendants in the suit, Paula Jordan, a case manager at Ortiz’s living unit, and Rebecca Bright, a prison investigator, moved for summary judgment on their pleas of “qualified immunity,” a defense that shields officials from suit if their conduct “d[id] not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 73 L. Ed. 2d 396 (1982). Finding that the qualified immunity defense turned on material facts genuinely in dispute, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56(a), the District Judge denied summary judgment. Ortiz v. Voinovich, 211 F. Supp. 2d 917, 923-930 (SD Ohio 2002).
The case then proceeded to trial, and the jury returned verdicts for Ortiz against both Jordan and Bright. The two officers appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, targeting, inter alia, the denial of their pretrial motion for summary judgment. “[CJourts normally do not review the denial of a summary judgment motion after a trial on the merits,” the Court of Appeals recognized. 316 Fed. Appx. 449, 453 (2009). Nevertheless, the court continued, “denial of summary judgment based on qualified immunity is an exception to this rule.” Ibid. Reversing the judgment entered on the jury’s verdict, the appeals court held that both defendants were sheltered from Ortiz’s suit by qualified immunity.
We granted review, 559 U.S. 1092, 130 S. Ct. 2371, 176 L. Ed. 2d 767 (2010), to decide a threshold question on which the Circuits are split: May a party, as
[562 U.S. 184]
the Sixth Circuit believed, appeal an order denying summary judgment after a full trial on the merits? Our answer is no. The order retains its interlocutory character as simply a step along the route to final judgment. See Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546, 69 S. Ct. 1221, 93 L. Ed. 1528 (1949). Once the case proceeds to trial, the full record developed in court supersedes the record existing at the time of the summary-judgment motion. A qualified immunity defense, of course, does not vanish when a district court declines to rule on the plea summarily. The plea remains available to the defending officials at trial; but at that stage, the defense must be evaluated in light of the character and quality of the evidence received in court.
When summary judgment is sought on a qualified immunity defense, the court inquires whether the party opposing the motion has raised any triable issue barring summary adjudication. “[Office trial has been had,” however, “the availability of official immunity should be determined by the trial record, not the pleadings nor the summary judgment record.” 15AC. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure §3914.10, p. 684 (2d ed. 1992 and Supp. 2010). After trial, if defendants continue to urge qualified immunity, the decisive question, ordinarily, is whether the evidence favoring the party seeking relief is legally sufficient to overcome the defense. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 50(a), (b) (stating conditions on which judgment may be granted as a matter of law).
In the case before us, the Court of Appeals, although purporting to review the District Court’s denial of the prison
[562 U.S. 185]
officials’ pretrial summary-judgment motion, 316 Fed. Appx., at 453, several times pointed to evidence presented only at the trial stage of the proceedings, see id., at 453-454. The appeals court erred, but not fatally, by incorrectly placing its ruling under a summary-judgment headline. Its judgment was infirm, however, because Jordan’s and Bright’s failure to renew their motion for judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b) left the appellate forum with no warrant to reject the appraisal of the evidence by “the judge who saw and heard the witnesses and ha[d] the feel of the case which no appellate printed transcript can impart.” Cone v. West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co., 330 U.S. 212, 216, 67 S. Ct. 752, 91 L. Ed. 849 (1947).
I
Michelle Ortiz, serving a sentence for aggravated assault against her husband, maintained that she was sexually assaulted on consecutive days by Corrections Officer Douglas Schultz. On Friday, November 8, 1996, Ortiz recounted, Schultz walked up behind her in the washroom of her living quarters and grabbed one of her breasts. Ortiz fended off the assault, but Schultz returned later that day and threatened to “see [her] tomorrow,” Tr. 36.
The next day, Ortiz described the incident to Jordan. After assuring Ortiz that “no one has the right to touch you,” 316 Fed. Appx., at 451 (internal quotation marks omitted), Jordan told Ortiz that Schultz had been reassigned to another correctional facility and was serving his last day at the reformatory. Ortiz could file a written complaint, Jordan noted. She suggested, however, that Ortiz not do so, in view of Schultz’s imminent departure. Jordan advised Ortiz that she “always ha[d] the right to defend [her]self,” Tr. 43,
[562 U.S. 186]
and counseled her to “ ‘hang out with [her] friends’ for the rest of the day so that Schultz would not have the chance to be alone with her,” 316 Fed. Appx., at 451 (alteration in original).
The day of her conversation with Ortiz, Jordan wrote an incident report describing her version of the encounter. In that account, Jordan stated that Ortiz had refused to name her assailant or provide any other information about the assault. Jordan did not immediately notify her superiors of the assault Ortiz reported and Ortiz’s consequent fears about her safety. Taking the incident report home in her workbag, Jordan submitted it upon her return to work two days later.
Ortiz endeavored to follow Jordan’s advice about staying in the company of friends. But later in the day, feeling ill, she returned to her room and fell asleep. Three other inmates were in the room when Ortiz went to sleep. They were gone when she awoke to find Schultz standing over her, one hand fondling her left breast, the fingers of the other hand inside her underwear penetrating her vagina.
Bright’s investigation began two days after the second assault. During its course, Bright placed Ortiz in solitary confinement. Ortiz maintained that Bright isolated her in retaliation for her accusations against Schultz. Bright, however, testified that she segregated Ortiz because Ortiz continued to discuss the investigation with other inmates, disobeying Bright’s repeated instructions to refrain from speaking about it.
In her § 1983 action, Ortiz claimed that Jordan did nothing to ward off Schultz’s second sexual assault, despite Jordan’s awareness of the substantial risk of that occurrence. Bright, Ortiz charged, retaliated against her because she resisted Bright’s efforts to induce her to retract her accounts of Schultz’s assaults. (Schultz, having resigned from state employment, could not be found and served with process.) The District Court, noting multiple factual disputes material to Ortiz’s claims and the officers’ defense of qualified immunity,
[562 U.S. 187]
denied summary judgment to Jordan and Bright, 211 F. Supp. 2d, at 923-930; neither defendant appealed the District Court’s denial of summary judgment.
The case proceeded to trial, and a jury returned a verdict of $350,000 in compensatory and punitive damages against Jordan and $275,000 against Bright. Jordan and Bright sought judgment as a matter of law, pursuant to Rule 50(a), both at the close of Ortiz’s evidence and at the close of their own presentation. But they did not contest the jury’s liability finding by renewing, under Rule 50(b), their request for judgment as a matter of law. Nor did they request a new trial under Rule 59(a). The District Court entered judgment for Ortiz in accordance with the jury’s verdict.
On appeal, Jordan and Bright urged both that the District Court should have granted them summary judgment on their defense of qualified immunity and that the verdict was “against the weight of the evidence.” Final Brief for Defendants-Appellants in No. 06-3627 (CA6), pp. 21, 26. Appraising the parties’ evidence under a de novo standard of review, the Court of Appeals “reverse[d] the denial of qualified immunity to both Bright and Jordan.” 316 Fed. Appx., at 455.
We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict among the Circuits as to whether a party may appeal a denial of summary
[562 U.S. 188]
judgment after a district court has conducted a full trial on the merits. See n. 1, supra.
II
The jurisdiction of a Court of Appeals under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 extends only to “appeals from . . . final decisions of the district courts.” Ordinarily, orders denying summary judgment do not qualify as “final decisions” subject to appeal. Summary judgment must be denied when the court of first instance determines that a “genuine dispute as to [a] material fact” precludes immediate entry of judgment as a matter of law. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56(a). Such rulings, we have observed, are “by their terms interlocutory.” Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737, 744, 96 S. Ct. 1202, 47 L. Ed. 2d 435 (1976).
Because a plea of qualified immunity can spare an official not only from liability but from trial, we have recognized a limited exception to the categorization of summary-judgment denials as nonappealable orders. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525-526, 105 S. Ct. 2806, 86 L. Ed. 2d 411 (1985). When summary judgment is denied to a defendant who urges that qualified immunity shelters her from suit, the court’s order “finally and conclusively [disposes of] the defendant’s claim of right not to stand trial.” Id.., at 527, 105 S. Ct. 2806, 86 L. Ed. 2d 411 (emphasis deleted). Therefore, Mitchell held, an immediate appeal may be pursued. Ibid.
We clarified in Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 115 S. Ct. 2151, 132 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1995), that immediate appeal from the denial of summary judgment on a qualified immunity plea is available when the appeal presents a “purely legal issue,” illustratively, the determination of “what law was ‘clearly established’ ” at the time the defendant acted. Id., at 313, 115 S. Ct. 2151, 132 L. Ed. 2d 238. However, instant appeal is not available, Johnson held, when the district court determines that factual issues genuinely in dispute preclude summary adjudication. Ibid.
Jordan and Bright sought no immediate appeal from the denial of their motion for summary judgment. In light of Johnson, that abstinence is unsurprising. Moreover, even
[562 U.S. 189]
had instant appellate review been open to them, the time to seek that review expired well in advance of trial. See Fed. Rule App. Proc. 4(a)(1)(A) (notice of appeal must generally be filed “within 30 days after the judgment or order appealed from”). Nor did they avail themselves of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b), which permits the entry, postverdict, of judgment for the verdict loser if the court finds that the evidence was legally insufficient to sustain the verdict. See Rule 50(a), (b). Absent such a motion, we have repeatedly held, an appellate court is “powerless” to review the sufficiency of the evidence after trial. Unitherm Food Systems, Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 546 U.S. 394, 405, 126 S. Ct. 980, 163 L. Ed. 2d 974 (2006); see Cone, 330 U.S., at 218, 67 S. Ct. 752, 91 L. Ed. 849.
[562 U.S. 190]
“[Q]uestions going to the sufficiency of the evidence are not preserved for appellate review by a summary judgment motion alone,” Jordan and Bright acknowledge; rather, challenges of that order “must be renewed post-trial under Rule 50.” Brief for Respondents 11 (emphasis deleted). Jordan and Bright insist, however, in defense of the Sixth Circuit’s judgment, that sufficiency of the evidence is not what is at stake in this case. A qualified immunity plea raising an issue of a “purely legal nature,” they urge, ibid., is preserved for appeal by an unsuccessful motion for summary judgment, and need not be brought up again under Rule 50(b), id., at 11-12 (citing as pathmarking Rekhi v. Wildwood In dustries, Inc., 61 F.3d 1313, 1318 (CA7 1995)). Unlike an “evidence sufficiency” claim that necessarily “hinge[s] on the facts adduced at trial,” they maintain, a purely legal issue can be resolved “with reference only to undisputed facts.” Brief for Respondents 16 (quoting Mitchell, 472 U.S., at 530, n. 10, 105 S. Ct. 2806, 86 L. Ed. 2d 411).
We need not address this argument, for the officials’ claims of qualified immunity hardly present “purely legal” issues capable of resolution “with reference only to undisputed facts.” Cases fitting that bill typically involve contests not about what occurred, or why an action was taken or omitted, but disputes about the substance and clarity of pre-existing law. See Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 313, 116 S. Ct. 834, 133 L. Ed. 2d 773 (1996); Johnson, 515 U.S, at 317, 115 S. Ct. 2151, 132 L. Ed. 2d 238.
Here, however, the pre-existing law was not in controversy. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 847, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 128 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1994) (prison official may be held liable for “deliberate indifference” to a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment right to protection against violence while in custody if the official “knows that [the] inmat[e] facets] a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 592, 118 S. Ct. 1584, 140 L. Ed. 2d 759 (1998) (First
[562 U.S. 191]
Amendment shields prisoners from “retaliation for protected speech”). What was controverted, instead, were the facts that could render Jordan and Bright answerable for crossing a constitutional line. Disputed facts relevant to resolving the officials’ immunity pleas included: Was Jordan adequately informed, after the first assault, of the identity of the assailant, see App. 4, and of Ortiz’s fear of a further assault? What, if anything, could Jordan have done to distance Ortiz from the assailant, thereby insulating her against a second assault? See id., at 4-5. Did Bright place and retain Ortiz in solitary confinement as a retaliatory measure or as a control needed to safeguard the integrity of the investigation?
In sum, the qualified immunity defenses asserted by Jordan and Bright do not present “neat abstract issues of law.” See Johnson, 515 U.S., at 317, 115 S. Ct. 2151, 132 L. Ed. 2d 238 (quoting 15A C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure §3914.10, p. 644 (1992)). To the extent that the officials urge Ortiz has not proved her case, they were, by their own account, obliged to raise that sufficiency-of-the-evidence issue
[562 U.S. 192]
by postverdict motion for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b). See Brief for Respondents 11. They did not do so. The Court of Appeals, therefore, had no warrant to upset the jury’s decision on the officials’ liability.
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
. Compare, e.g., Black v. J. I. Case Co., 22 F.3d 568, 570-571 (CA5 1994) (declining to review denial of summary judgment after trial); Price v. Kramer, 200 F.3d 1237, 1243-1244 (CA9 2000) (no exception where summary judgment rejected assertion of qualified immunity), with Goff v. Bise, 173 F.3d 1068, 1072 (CA8 1999) (denial of summary judgment based on qualified immunity reviewable after trial on the merits); 316 Fed. Appx. 449, 453 (CA6 2009) (case below) (same).
. Ortiz maintained in her criminal prosecution that she acted in retaliation for multiple incidents of domestic violence to which she had been subjected over a span of several years. 316 Fed. Appx., at 450.
. The accounts of the episodes-in-suit described here recite facts the jury reasonably could have found from the testimony presented at trial.
. As to Jordan, the District Court determined, inter alia, that “a jury could reasonably find . . . that Ortiz did inform Jordan of Schultz’s identity,” and that “Ortiz made Jordan aware that [Ortiz] reasonably feared a further sexual attack.” 211 F. Supp. 2d, at 925. Concerning Bright, the court noted that “[a] jury could reasonably find that Brightfs] . . . purported reason for placing Ortiz in security control was pretextual.” Id., at 928.
. Judge Daughtrey dissented; in her view, the strength of the evidence against Jordan and Bright amply supported the jury’s verdict. 316 Fed. Appx., at 456-457. Quoting Kiphart v. Saturn Corp., 251 F.3d 573, 581 (CA6 2001), she observed that appellate courts “do not weigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses or substitute our own judgment for that of the jury.” 316 Fed. Appx., at 457.
. Jordan and Bright contend that their failure to file a Rule 50(b) motion cannot be the basis for overturning the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Because Ortiz presented no argument about the absence of a Rule 50(b) motion in her brief to the Sixth Circuit or in her petition for certiorari, Jordan and Bright argue, she has forfeited the objection. Jordan and Bright are not well positioned to make this argument. They did not suggest that Ortiz had forfeited her Rule 50(b) objection, or argue that such an objection is forfeitable, until their merits brief to this Court. Ordinarily we do not consider “a nonjurisdictional argument not raised in a respondent’s brief in opposition to a petition.” Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 34, 124 S. Ct. 1347, 158 L. Ed. 2d 64 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In any case, we do not see how Ortiz can be held to have forfeited her Rule 50(b) objection. The arguments Jordan and Bright made in the Court of Appeals invited no such objection. Jordan and Bright urged on appeal that the jury’s verdict was “against the weight of the evidence.” Final Brief for Defendants-Appellants in No. 06-3627 (CA6), pp. 21-43. A plea that a verdict is “against the weight of the evidence,” of course, is not equivalent to a plea that the evidence submitted at trial was insufficient to warrant submission of the case to the jury. 11 C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2806, pp. 65-67 (2d ed. 1995 and Supp. 2010). A determination that a verdict is against the weight of the evidence may gain a new trial for the verdict loser, but never a final judgment in that party’s favor. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 311 U.S. 243, 250-251, 61 S. Ct. 189, 85 L. Ed. 147 (1940). Ortiz objected, accordingly, that Jordan and Bright had not asked the District Court for a new trial and were therefore “bar[red] [from] appeal on this ground.” Final Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee in No. 06-3627 (CA6), p. 23. Ortiz thus responded altogether appropriately to the arguments Jordan and Bright made.
. The Court of Appeals held that Ortiz’s complaint had not properly tied her claim against Bright to the First Amendment. 316 Fed. Appx., at 455. “When an issue not raised by the pleadings is tried by the parties’ express or implied consent,’’ however, “it must be treated in all respects as if raised in the pleadings.’’ Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 15(b)(2). Bright, like the District Court, recognized the First Amendment interests at stake in Ortiz’s claim against her. See App. 11 (District Court, in ruling on Rule 50(a) motion, inquired into Bright’s authority to “regulat[e] speech of inmates’’); id., at 20 (Bright’s counsel argued that Ortiz’s segregation “would not have had a chilling effect’’ on her speech).
. Relevant to that matter, Bright testified at trial that, had Jordan “reported the first incident immediately, ‘the proper people would have taken a role in protecting Mrs. Ortiz.’ ’’ 316 Fed. Appx., at 457 (Daughtrey, J., dissenting).
. Apart from Bright’s testimony, the defense produced no evidence that Ortiz “continually’’ talked about the assaults or in any other way interfered with the investigation. See Tr. 271, 397 (Bright’s testimony acknowledging absence of any documentation regarding Ortiz’s conduct during investigation).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | B | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Black
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner and three others were convicted in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky on a charge of conspiracy to rob a federally insured bank in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 2113, the conviction having been based largely on evidence obtained by the search of a motorcar. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting the contentions, timely made in the trial and appellate courts, that both the original arrest, on a charge of vagrancy, and the subsequent search and seizure had violated the Fourth Amendment. 305 F. 2d 172. We granted certiorari. 373 U. S. 931. In the view we take of the case, we heed not decide whether the arrest was valid, since we hold that the search and seizure was not-.
The police of Newport, Kentucky, received a telephone complaint at 3 o’clock one morning that “three suspicious men acting suspiciously”- had been seated in a motorcar parked in a business district since 10 o’clock the evening before. Four policemen straightaway went to the place where the car was parked and found petitioner and two companions. The officers asked the three men why they were parked there, but the men gave answers which the officers testified were unsatisfactory and evasive. All three men admitted that they were unemployed; all of them together had only 25 cents. One of the men said that he had bought the car the day before (which later turned out to be true), but he could not produce any title. They said that their reason for being there was to meet a truck driver who would pass through Newport that night, but they could not identify the company he worked for, could not say what his truck looked like, and did not know what time he would arrive. The officers arrested the three men for vagrancy, searched them for weapons, and took them to police headquarters. The car, which had not been searched at the time of the arrest, was driven by an officer to the station, from which it was towed to a garage. Soon after the men had been booked at the station, some of the police officers went to the garage to search the car and found two loaded revolvers in the glove compartment. They were unable to open the trunk and returned to the station, where a detective told one of the officers to go back and try to get into the trunk. The officer did so, was able to enter the trunk through the back seat of the car, and in the trunk found caps, women’s stockings (one with mouth and eye holes), rope, pillow slips, an illegally manufactured license plate equipped to be snapped over another plate, and other items. After the search, one of petitioner’s companions confessed that he and two others— he did not name petitioner — intended to rob a bank in Berry, Kentucky, a town about 51 miles from Newport. At this, the police called the Federal Bureau of Investigation into the case and turned over to the Bureau the articles found in the car. It was the use of these articles, over timely objections, which raised the Fourth Amendment question we here consider.
The Amendment provides:
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”
The question whether evidence obtained by state officers and used against a defendant in a federal trial was obtained by unreasonable search and seizure is to be judged as if the search and seizure had been made by federal officers. Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206 (1960). Our cases make it clear that searches of motorcars must meet the test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment before evidence obtained as a result of such searches is admissible. E. g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132 (1925); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160 (1949). Common sense dictates, of course, that questions involving searches of motorcars or other things readily moved cannot be treated as identical to questions arising out of searches of fixed structures like houses. For this reason, what may be an unreasonable search of a house may be reasonable in the case of a motorcar. See Carroll v. United States, supra, 267 U. S., at 153. But even in the case of motorcars, the test still is, was the search unreasonable. Therefore we must inquire whether the facts of this case are such as to fall within any of the exceptions to the constitutional rule that a search warrant must be had before a search may be made.
It is argued that the search and seizure was justified as incidental to a lawful arrest. Unquestionably, when a person is lawfully arrested, the police have the right, without a search warrant, to make a contemporaneous search of the person of the accused for weapons or for the fruits of or implements used to commit the crime. Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383, 392 (1914); Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 20, 30 (1925). This right to search and seize without a search warrant extends to things under the accused’s immediate control, Carroll v. United States, supra, 267 U. S., at 158, and, to an extent depending on the circumstances of the case, to the place where he is arrested, Agnello v. United States, supra, 269 U. S., at 30; Marron v. United States, 275 U. S. 192, 199 (1927); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56, 61-62 (1950). The rule allowing contemporaneous searches is justified, for example, by the need to seize weapons and other things which might be used to assault an officer or effect an escape, as well as by the need to prevent the destruction of evidence of the crime — things which might easily happen where the weapon or evidence is on the accused’s person or under his immediate control. But these justifications are absent where a search is remote in time or place from the arrest. Once an accused is under arrest and in custody, then a search made at another place, without a warrant, is simply not incident to the arrest. Agnello v. United States, supra, 269 U. S., at 31. Here, we may assume, as the Government urges, that, either because the arrests were valid or because the police had probable cause to think the car stolen, the police had the right to search the car when they first came on the scene. But this does not decide the question of the reasonableness of a search at a later time and at another place. See Stoner v. California, post, p. 483. The search of the car was not undertaken until petitioner and his companions had been arrested and taken in custody to the police station and the car had been towed to the garage. At this point there was no danger that any of the men arrested could have used any weapons in the car or could have destroyed any evidence of a crime — assuming that there are articles which can be the “fruits” or “implements” of the crime of vagrancy. Cf. United States v. Jeffers, 342 U. S. 48, 51-52 (1951). Nor, since the men were under arrest at the police station and the car was in police custody at a garage, was there any danger that the car would be moved out of the locality or jurisdiction. See Carroll v. United States, supra, 267 U. S., at 153. We think that the search was too remote in time or place to have been made as incidental to the arrest and conclude, therefore, that the search of the car without a warrant failed to meet the test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment, rendering the evidence obtained as a result of the search inadmissible.
Reversed and remanded.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | A | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Scalia
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Title VII of the Civil Rights employer who “has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year.” 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e(b). These cases present the question whether an employer “has” an employee on any working day on which the employer maintains an employment relationship with the employee, or only on working days on which the employee is actually receiving compensation from the employer.
I
Petitioner Darlene Walters was employed by respondent Metropolitan Educational Enterprises, Inc., a retail distributor of encyclopedias, dictionaries, and other educational materials. In 1990, she filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), claiming that Metropolitan had discriminated against her on account of her sex in failing to promote her to the position of credit manager. Soon after that, Metropolitan fired her.
On April 7,1993, petitioner EEOC filed suit against Metropolitan and its owner, respondent Leonard Bieber (hereinafter collectively Metropolitan), alleging that the firing constituted unlawful retaliation. Walters intervened in the suit. Metropolitan filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, claiming that the company did not pass the 15-employee threshold for coverage under Title VII.
The District Court granted Metropolitan’s motion to dismiss, 864 F. Supp. 71 (ND Ill. 1994), relying on Zimmerman v. North American Signal Co., 704 F. 2d 347, 354 (CA7 1983), which affirmed a District Court’s decision to count employees toward the 15-employee threshold only on days on which they actually performed work or were being compensated despite their absence. On appeal from the District Court’s judgment, the Court of Appeals reaffirmed Zimmerman. 60 F. 3d 1225 (CA7 1995). We granted certiorari. 516 U. S. 1171 (1996).
II
Petitioners’ suit rests on Title VII’s antiretaliation provision, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-3(a), which makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against any of its employees for filing complaints of discrimination. Metropolitan was subject to Title VII, however, only if, at the time of the alleged retaliation, it met the statutory definition of “employer,” to wit: “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year.” §2000e(b).
Metropolitan’s “working days” are Monday through Friday, and the “current” and “preceding” calendar years for purposes of the retaliatory-discharge claim are 1990 and 1989. The parties have stipulated that Metropolitan failed to satisfy the 15-employee threshold in 1989. During most of 1990, Metropolitan had between 15 and 17 employees on its payroll on each working day; but in only nine weeks of the year was it actually compensating 15 or more employees on each working day (including paid leave as compensation). The difference resulted from the fact that Metropolitan had two part-time hourly employees who ordinarily skipped one working day each week.
A
The parties agree that, on any particular day, all of the individuals with whom an employer has an employment relationship are “employees” of that employer. See 42 U. S. C. §2000e(f) (defining “employee” to mean “an individual employed by an employer”). Thus, individuals who are not receiving compensation from their employer on the day in question nonetheless qualify as “employees” on that day for purposes of §2000e(b)’s definition of “employer.” Respondents contend, however, and the Seventh Circuit held here, that an employer “has” an employee for a particular working day within the meaning of § 2000e(b) only when he is actually compensating the individual on that day. This position has also been adopted by the Eighth Circuit. See EEOC v. Garden & Associates, Ltd., 956 F. 2d 842, 843 (1992).
Petitioners “has” an employee is no different from the test for when an individual is an employee: whether the employer has an employment relationship with the individual on the day in question. This test is generally called the “payroll method,” since the employment relationship is most readily demonstrated by the individual’s appearance on the employer’s payroll. The payroll method was approved in dictum by the Fifth Circuit in Dumas v. Mount Vernon, 612 F. 2d 974, 979, n. 7 (1980), and was adopted by the First Circuit in Thurber v. Jack Reilly’s, Inc., 717 F. 2d 633, 634-635 (1983), cert. denied, 466 U. S. 904 (1984); see also Vera-Lozano v. International Broadcasting, 50 F. 3d 67, 69-70 (CA1 1995) (reaffirming • Thurber). The payroll method has also been adopted by the EEOC under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, which defines “employer” in precisely the way Title VII does. See 29 U. S. C. § 630(b); Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Notice No. N-915-052, Policy Guidance: Whether Part-Time Employees Are Employees (Apr. 1990), reprinted in App. to Pet. for Cert. 30a-40a (hereinafter EEOC Policy Guidance). The Department of Labor has likewise adopted the payroll method under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, which defines “employer” as a person who “employs 50 or more employees for each working day during each of 20 or more calendar workweeks in the current or preceding calendar year.” See 29 U. S. C. §2611(4)(A)(i); 29 CFR §§825.105(b)-(d) (1996). In its administration of Title VII, the EEOC has expressed a preference for the payroll method, see EEOC Policy Guidance, but it lacks rulemaking authority over the issue, see 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-12(a); EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U. S. 244, 257 (1991).
We think that the payroll method represents the fair reading of the statutory language, which sets as the criterion the number of employees that the employer “has” for each working day. In the absence of an indication to the contrary, words in a statute are assumed to bear their “ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.” Pioneer Investment Services Co. v. Brunswick Associates Ltd. Partnership, 507 U. S. 380, 388 (1993) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In common parlance, an employer “has” an employee if he maintains an employment relationship with that individual. See 1 The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary 1198 (1993) (def. 2: defining “have” to mean to “[p]ossess in a certain relationship”); American Heritage Dictionary 828 (3d ed. 1992) (def. 2: defining “have” to mean “to occupy a particular relation to”; giving as an example “had a great many disciples”); Webster’s New International Dictionary 1145 (2d ed. 1950) (def. 2: defining “have” to mean “[t]o possess, as something which appertains to, is connected with, or affects, one”; giving as an example “to have an ungrateful son”).
employees he had for a given working day, he would give as the answer the number of employees who were actually performing work on that day. That is possibly so. Language is a subtle enough thing that the phrase “have an employee for a given working day” (as opposed to “have an employee on a given day”) may be thought to convey the idea that the employee must actually be working on the day in question. But no one before us urges that interpretation of the language, which would count even salaried employees only on days that they are actually working. Such a disposition is so improbable and so impossible to administer (few employers keep daily attendance records of all their salaried employees) that Congress should be thought to have prescribed it only if the language could bear no other meaning. Metropolitan’s own proposed test does not focus on the question, “How many employees did you have at work on a particular working day?” but rather the question, “How many employees were you compensating on that day?” That question, unlike the other one, simply cannot be derived from any possible reading of the text.
B
The Court of Appeals rejected the straightforward meaning of “has fifteen or more employees” in § 2000e(b) because of a different supposed consequence of the added statutory qualification “for each working day.” In its view, if only the employment relationship were the intended focus, the statute would simply have required the employer to “ha[ve] fifteen or more employees ... in each of twenty or more calendar weeks,” without the further refinement “for each working day” of each of those weeks. This point would have some force (though it would still not produce the Court of Appeals’ focus on the number of employees being compen sated on a particular day) if indeed the ordinary meaning of “has fifteen or more employees” rendered “for each working day” superfluous. Statutes must be interpreted, if possible, to give each word some operative effect. United States v. Menasche, 348 U. S. 528, 538-539 (1955). But we do not agree that giving “has fifteen or more employees” its ordinary meaning renders “for each working day” superfluous. Without that qualification, it would be unclear whether an employee who departed in the middle of a calendar week would count toward the 15-employee minimum for that week; with the qualification, it is clear that he does not. Similarly, the adjective “working” within the phrase “for each working day” eliminates any ambiguity about whether employees who depart after the end of the workweek, but before the end of the calendar week, count toward the 15-employee minimum for that week.
The Court of Appeals thought that the mere exclusion of part-week employees was an improbable purpose of the phrase. “[Instances where employees begin work on Wednesdays or depart on Thursdays,” it said, “are unlikely to occur with sufficient frequency to merit inclusion in a federal anti-discrimination statute.” 60 F. 3d, at 1228. But it is not a matter of carving out special treatment for this (supposedly minuscule) class — as would be the case if, without the phrase “for each working day,” part-week employees would unquestionably be counted toward the statutory minimum. Without the phrase one would not be sure whether to count them or not, and in at least some cases the matter would have to be litigated. (Does a company have 15 employees “in” a week where, on all except the last workday, it has only 14? “In” a week where it hires a new employee on Saturday, a nonworkday, to begin on the next Monday? “In” a week where, in mid-week, one of 14 employees quits and is replaced by a different 14th employee?) We are decidedly of the view that the “mere” elimination of evident ambiguity is ample — indeed, admirable — justification for the inclusion of a statutory phrase; and that purpose alone is enough to “merit” enactment of the phrase at issue here. Moreover, the phenomenon of midweek commencement and termination of employment seems to us not as rare as the Court of Appeals believed. For many businesses payday, and hence hiring- and firing-day, is the end of the month rather than the end of the week. Metropolitan itself experienced 10 midweek arrivals or departures from its roughly 15-employee work force during 1990. Brief for Petitioner in No. 95-259, pp. 10-11.
Metropolitan points produces some strange consequences with regard to the coverage of Title VII. For example, an employee who works irregular hours, perhaps only a few days a month, will be counted toward the 15-employee minimum for every week in the month. Metropolitan’s approach reduces this problem (though it does not eliminate it entirely): The employee will be counted so long as he works one hour each day of the workweek. On the other hand, Metropolitan’s approach produces unique peculiarities of its own: A company that has 15 employees working for it on each day of a 5-day workweek is covered, but if it decides to add Saturday to its workweek with only one less than its full complement of employees, it will become exempt from coverage (despite being in fact a “larger” business). Unsalaried employees who work the same number of hours per week are counted or not counted, depending on how their hours are scheduled. A half-time worker who works only mornings is counted; a half-time worker who works alternate days is not. The fact is that neither interpretation of the coverage provision can cause it to be an entirely accurate measure of the size of a business.
In any event, Metropolitan to practical consequences as the basis for deciding the question before us. The approach it suggests would turn the coverage determination into an incredibly complex and expensive factual inquiry. Applying it in the present cases required the parties to spend 10 months poring over Metropolitan’s payroll registers, timecards, work diaries, and other timekeeping records to determine, for each working day of a 2-year period, how many employees were at work, how many were being paid on salaries, how many were on paid holiday leave, how many were on paid vacation leave, and how many were on paid sick leave. For an employer with 15 employees and a 5-day workweek, the number of daily working histories for the 2-year period is 7,800. The problems with Metropolitan’s compensation-based approach are magnified when employees are “compensated” on days off in ways less clear cut than holiday, vacation, or sick leave. If, for example, employees accumulate seniority rights or entitlements to holiday bonuses on their unpaid days off, it would be necessary to determine (or litigate) whether they are “receiving compensation” on those days for purposes of the coverage determination. Under the interpretation we adopt, by contrast, all one needs to know about a given employee for a given year is whether the employee started or ended employment during that year and, if so, when. He is counted as an employee for each working day after arrival and before departure.
Ill
As we have described, in determining the existence of an employment relationship, petitioners look first and primarily to whether the individual in question appears on the employer’s payroll. Metropolitan did not challenge this aspect of petitioners’ approach; its objection was the more basic one that existence of an employment relationship was not the criterion. For their part, petitioners emphasize that what is ultimately critical under their method is the existence of an employment relationship, not appearance on the payroll; an individual who appears on the payroll but is not an “employee” under traditional principles of agency law, see, e. g., Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U. S. 318, 323-324 (1992), would not count toward the 15-employee minimum. We agree with petitioners that the ultimate touchstone under § 2000e(b) is whether an employer has employment relationships with 15 or more individuals for each working day in 20 or more weeks during the year in question.
The parties’ stipulation in 1990 during which Metropolitan satisfied the 15-employee threshold using the payroll approach does not correspond precisely to the counting method petitioners have advocated here. The stipulation was arrived at by counting the number of employees on the payroll in each week of 1990, without regard to whether these employees were employed on each working day of the week. However, subtracting the nine weeks in which Metropolitan experienced midweek employment changes in 1990 from the 47 weeks of that year in which, according to the parties’ stipulation, Metropolitan had employment relationships with 15 or more employees, leaves 38 weeks in which Metropolitan satisfied the 15-employee threshold under the interpretation we adopt. Therefore, Metropolitan was an “employer” within the meaning of §2000e(b) for purposes of petitioners’ retaliatory-discharge claim.
* * *
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Walters (but not the EEOC) alleged that, in addition to violating Title VII’s antiretaliation provision, Metropolitan also violated the basic antidis-crimination provision, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2(a), by failing to promote her to credit manager in September 1989. In granting Metropolitan’s motion to dismiss, the District Court stated that the relevant years for determining Metropolitan’s status as an employer were 1989 and 1990. 864 F. Supp. 71, 72 (ND Ill. 1994). For purposes of Walters’ discrimination claim, however, the relevant years were 1988 and 1989. Because Walters did not mention this issue in her petition for certiorari or her brief on the merits, we treat any objection to the District Court’s disposition of the matter as waived.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | B | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Douglas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Interstate Commerce Commission has statutory power to grant motor carriers temporary operating authority “without hearings or other proceedings” when the authority relates to a “service for which there is an immediate and urgent need” and where there is “no carrier service capable of meeting such need.” Interstate Commerce Act § 210a, 52 Stat. 1238, as amended, 49 U. S. C. § 310a. The ICC processes applications for such authority under rules promulgated in 1965. 49 CFR pt. 1131. Among other things, those rules require that an applicant accompany his application with supporting statements of shippers that contain information “designed to establish an immediate and urgent need for service which cannot be met by existing carriers.” Id., § 1131.2 (c). Each such supporting statement “must contain at least” 11 items of information including the following:
“(8) Whether efforts have been made to obtain the service from existing motor, rail, or water carriers, and the dates and results of such efforts.
“(9) Names and addresses of existing carriers who have either failed or refused to provide the service, and the reasons given for any such failure or refusal.”
Appellant American Farm Lines (AFL) filed an application for temporary operating authority. The application was accompanied by a supporting statement of the Department of Defense (DOD). The ICC Temporary Authorities Board denied the application on the ground that the “applicant has not established that there exists an immediate and urgent need for any of the service proposed.” Division I of the ICC (acting as an Appellate Division) reversed the Board and granted AFL temporary authority. Protesting carriers sought review of this action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington. A single judge of the District Court temporarily restrained the operation of the ICC order and the ICC thereupon ordered postponement of the operation of its grant. At that time numerous petitions for reconsideration were pending before the Commission and the stay order did not direct the Commission to stay its hand with respect to them. The record was indeed not filed with the court until much later. Meanwhile, the Commission granted the petitions and reopened the proceeding to receive a further supporting statement of DOD. This took the form of the verified statement of Vincent F. Caputo, DOD Director for Transportation and Warehousing Policy, which was submitted as a purported reply to the pending petitions for reconsideration. Based upon this statement, the ICC entered a new order granting the AFL application. A single judge of the District Court restrained the operation of the new order. Thereafter a three-judge District Court conducted a full hearing on the merits. The ICC admitted at that stage that its first order “may not have been based upon evidence to support its conclusion,” but argued that there was no infirmity in the new order. The three-judge court set aside both orders. 298 F. Supp. 1006. Both AFL and ICC appealed to this Court and we noted probable jurisdiction. 396 U. S. 884.
I
The first alleged error in the case is the failure of the Interstate Commerce Commission to require strict compliance with its own rules. The rules in question, unlike some of our own, do not involve “jurisdictional” problems but only require certain information to be set forth in statements filed in support of applications of motor carriers for temporary operating authority.
The Caputo statement asserted that part of the tremendous volume of traffic that DOD moved in the territories involved had to be moved “in the most expeditious manner possible,” and that, since air transport was prohibitively expensive “except in the most extreme emergencies,” there was an “imperative” need for the most expeditious motor carrier service. The need for this expeditious transport did not rest merely on a desire to obtain the most efficient service, but in addition rested on the need to coordinate arrival times of shipments with factory production schedules and with ship-loading or airlift times for overseas shipments. The particular inadequacies in existing service were pointed out, namely, the delays inherent in joint-line service, regular-route service, and the use of single drivers. The statement did not assert that none of the existing carriers provided sufficiently expeditious service to meet DOD needs; rather it claimed that the carriers providing satisfactory service in the territories in question were so few in number that the additional services of AFL were required to meet DOD’s transportation needs.
Concededly, the Caputo statement did not give the dates of DOD’s efforts to secure service from other existing carriers, or a complete list of the names and addresses of the carriers who failed or refused to provide service, as required by the terms of subsections (8) and (9), 49 CFR § 1131.2 (c). Such a complete listing of this information, given the volume of traffic involved, would indeed have been a monumental undertaking.
The failure of the Caputo statement to provide these particular specifics did not prejudice the carriers in making precise and informed objections to AFL’s application. The briefest perusal of the objecting carriers’ replies, which cover some 156 pages in the printed record of these appeals, belies any such contention. Neither was the statement so devoid of information that it, along with the replies of the protesting carriers, could not support a finding that AFL’s service was required to meet DOD’s immediate and urgent transportation needs. In our view, the District Court exacted a standard of compliance with procedural rules that was wholly unnecessary to provide an adequate record to review the Commission’s decision.
The Commission is entitled to a measure of discretion in administering its own procedural rules in such a manner as it deems necessary to resolve quickly and correctly urgent transportation problems. It is argued that the rules were adopted to confer important procedural benefits upon individuals; in opposition it is said the rules were intended primarily to facilitate the development of relevant information for the Commission’s use in deciding applications for temporary authority.
We agree with the Commission that the rules were promulgated for the purpose of providing the “necessary information” for the Commission “to reach an informed and equitable decision” on temporary authority applications. ICC Policy Release of January 23, 1968. The Commission stated that requests for temporary authority would be turned down “if the applications do not adequately comply with [the] . . . rules.” Ibid. (Emphasis added.) The rules were not intended primarily to confer important procedural benefits upon individuals in the face of otherwise unfettered discretion as in Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U. S. 535; nor is this a case in which an agency required by rule to exercise independent discretion has failed to do so. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U. S. 260; Yellin v. United States, 374 U. S. 109. Thus there is no reason to exempt this case from the general principle that “[i]t is always within the discretion of a court or an administrative agency to relax or modify its procedural rules adopted for the orderly transaction of business before it when in a given case the ends of justice require it. The action of either in such a case is not reviewable except upon a showing of substantial prejudice to the complaining party.” NLRB v. Monsanto Chemical Co., 205 F. 2d 763, 764. And see NLRB v. Grace Co., 184 F. 2d 126, 129; Sun Oil Co. v. FPC, 256 F. 2d 233; McKenna v. Seaton, 104 U. S. App. D. C. 50, 259 F. 2d 780.
We deal here with the grant of temporary authority similar to that granted in Estes Express Lines v. United States, 292 F. Supp. 842, aff’d, 394 U. S. 718. There the grant of temporary authority was upheld even though there may not have been literal compliance with subsections (8) and (9) of the Commission’s rules. That result was in line with § 210a (a) of the Act which was designed to provide the Commission with a swift and procedurally simple ability to respond to urgent transportation needs. That functional approach is served by treating (8) and (9) not as inflexible procedural conditions but as tools to aid the Commission in exercising its discretion to meet “an immediate and urgent need” for services where the existing service is incapable of meeting that need. Unlike some rules, the present ones are mere aids to the exercise of the agency’s independent discretion.
II
After the Commission issued its first order, petitions for reconsideration were filed and before they were passed upon, some carriers filed suit and a single judge temporarily restrained operation of that first order. It was after that order issued and over a month before the case was argued to the three-judge court that the Commission granted the petitions for rehearing and reopened the record and received the Caputo verified statement.
The District Court held that the pendency of the review proceedings deprived the Commission of jurisdiction to reopen the administrative record.
Congress has provided as respects some regulatory systems that the agency may modify any finding up until the record is filed with a court. Such is the provision of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 61 Stat. 147, 29 U. S. C. § 160 (d) and § 160 (e), which provides that any subsequent changes in the record will be made only at the direction of the court. A similar provision is included in § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 719, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 45 (c) and in § 11. of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 734, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 21 (c). And a like provision is included in the review by the courts of appeals of orders of other designated federal agencies. 28 U. S. C. §2347 (c) (1964 ed., Supp. IV). But there is no such requirement in the Interstate Commerce Act. It indeed empowers the Commission “at any time to grant rehearings as to any decision, order, or requirement and to reverse, change, or modify the same.”
The power of the Commission to grant rehearings is not limited or qualified by the terms of 49 U. S. C. § 17 (6) or § 17 (7). Thus in § 17 (6) it is said, “Rehearing, reargument, or reconsideration may be granted if sufficient reason therefor be made to appear.” And § 17 (7) provides that if after rehearing or reconsideration the original decision, order, or requirement appears “unjust or unwarranted,” the Commission may “reverse, change, or modify” the same. These broad powers are plainly adequate to add to the findings or firm them up as the Commission deems desirable, absent any collision or interference with the District Court.
Unless Congress provides otherwise, “[wjhere a motion for rehearing is in fact filed there is no final action until the rehearing is denied.” Outland v. CAB, 109 U. S. App. D. C. 90, 93, 284 F. 2d 224, 227. In multi-party proceedings, such as the present one, some may seek judicial review and others may seek administrative reconsideration. “That both tribunals have jurisdiction does not mean, of course, that they will act at cross purposes.” Wrather-Alvarez Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 101 U. S. App. D. C. 324, 327, 248 F. 2d 646, 649. The concept “of an indivisible jurisdiction which must be all in one tribunal or all in the other may fit” some statutory schemes, ibid., but it does not fit this one.
This power of the Commission to reconsider a prior decision does not necessarily collide with the judicial power of review. For while the court properly could provide temporary relief against a Commission order, its issuance does not mean that the Commission loses all jurisdiction to complete the administrative process. It does mean that thereafter the Commission is “without power to act inconsistently with the court’s jurisdiction.” Inland Steel Co. v. United States, 306 U. S. 153, 160. When the Commission made the additional findings after its first order was stayed by the court, it did not act inconsistently with what the court had done. It did not interfere in the slightest with the court’s protective order. What the Commission did came before the court was ready to hear arguments on the merits and before the record was filed with it. Moreover, the Commission in light of the District Court's stay, by express terms, directed AFL not to perform operations under the first order and made the second order effective only on further order of the Commission. Since by the Act the Commission never lost jurisdiction to pass on petitions for rehearing, and since the stay order did not forbid it from acting on those pending petitions, it was not necessary for the Commission to seek permission of the court to make those rulings.
The Commission reopened the record merely to remedy a deficiency in it before any judicial review of the merits had commenced and fully honored the stay order of the District Court. It therefore acted in full harmony with the court’s jurisdiction.
Reversed.
Section 210a(a) provides in part:
“To enable the provision of service for which there is an immediate and urgent need to a point or points or within a territory having no carrier service capable of meeting such need, the Commission may, in its discretion and without hearings or other proceedings, grant temporary authority for such service by a common carrier or a contract carrier by motor vehicle, as the case may be. 2
49 CFR § 1131.4 (b) (2) defines the statutory term “immediate and urgent need” as follows:
“An immediate and urgent need justifying a grant of temporary authority will be determined to exist only where it is established that there is or soon will be an immediate transportation need which reasonably cannot be met by existing carrier service. Such a showing may involve a new or relocated plant, different method of distribution, new or unusual commodities, an origin or destination not presently served by carriers, a discontinuance of existing service, failure of existing carriers to provide service, or comparable situations which require new motor carrier service before an application for permanent authority can be filed and processed.”
See 49 CFR § 1131.2(c).
AFL is a federation of agricultural marketing cooperatives created in 1964 to provide transportation for its members. By-virtue of § 203 (b) (5) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 54 Stat. 921, as amended, 49 U. S. C. §303 (b)(5), AFL may transport freight for its members without obtaining a certificate of convenience and necessity from the ICC. In 1965 § 203 (b) (5) was construed to exempt from the certification requirement any freight transportation by an agricultural cooperative for shippers other than its own members to the extent that such nonmember transportation is incidental and necessary to its principal transportation activities. See Northwest Agricultural Cooperative Assn. v. ICC, 350 F. 2d 252. The next year, AFL began transporting freight for DOD. In 1968-1969 AFL’s ability to continue serving DOD was restricted by two events. First, certain competing carriers obtained injunctions prohibiting AFL from making two consecutive movements for DOD and from transporting freight for any nonmember except when going to pick up, or returning from delivery of, a member’s freight. Munitions Carriers Conference, Inc. v. American Farm Lines, 415 F. 2d 747. Second, § 203 (b) (5) was amended to restrict the exemption for agricultural cooperatives to those whose transportation for nonmembers does not exceed 15% of their total annual interstate transportation, measured by tonnage. See 82 Stat. 448, 49 U. S. C. §303 (b)(5) (1964 ed., Supp. IV). AFL had transported 74,155,685 pounds for DOD between December 1966 and June 1968, and, in an effort to continue providing this service, applied to the ICC in May 1968 for temporary operating authority. The authority sought was to transport general commodities, including Class A and B explosives moving on government bills of lading over irregular routes between points in Kentucky, Indiana, Illinois, Missouri, Arkansas, Louisiana, Texas, Oklahoma, and Kansas on the one hand, and points in Washington, California, Nevada, Utah,, and Arizona on the other.
AFL has applied to the ICC for a certificate of permanent authority. It was estimated at oral argument that final action on this application will not be taken by ICC before mid-1971. Meanwhile the ICC may extend the temporary authority. Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corp. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 353 U. S. 436.
The precise chronology of these events is shown in n. 9, infra.
ICC is not appealing from the District Court's decision setting aside' the first order.
It was once proposed that the same requirement be written into the law respecting those orders of the Commission reviewed by the courts of appeal as distinguished from the three-judge district courts. See H. R. Rep. No. 1619, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 4. But the ICC was deleted from the measure. Id., at 1. And the Act as approved covered only other designated agencies. 28 U. S. C. §2342 (1964 ed., Supp. IV).
See Baldwin v. Scott County Milling Co., 307 U. S. 478, 484.
The District Court’s stay was issued October 2, 1968. On October 9, the Commission stayed the effective date of its first order “until further order of the Commission.” On November 5, 1968, the Commission reopened the proceeding before it and directed AFL, in light of the District Court's order, “not to perform” any operations under its first order “until further order of the Commission.” On November 12, 1968, the Commission advised the District Court of its action. On December 20, 1968, the Commission entered its second order which authorized commencement of service by AFL only on further notice by the ICC. On December 31, 1968, a supplemental complaint was filed in the District Court challenging the Commission’s second order. On January 6, 1969, a single judge of the District Court stayed that order. On March 26, 1969, the District Court entered its judgment now being reviewed.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | H | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Stevens
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Supreme Court of California and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit have provided conflicting answers to the following question: “Whether to establish a prima facie case under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 (1986), the objector must show that it is more likely than not that the other party’s peremptory challenges, if unexplained, were based on impermissible group bias?” Pet. for Cert. i. Because both of those courts regularly review the validity of convictions obtained in California criminal trials, respondent, the State of California, agreed to petitioner’s request that we grant certiorari and resolve the conflict. We agree with the Ninth Circuit that the question presented must be answered in the negative, and accordingly reverse the judgment of the California Supreme Court.
I
Petitioner Jay Shawn Johnson, a black male, was convicted in a California trial court of second-degree murder and assault on a white 19-month-old child, resulting in death. During jury selection, a number of prospective jurors were removed for cause until 43 eligible jurors remained, 3 of whom were black. The prosecutor used 3 of his 12 peremptory challenges to remove the black prospective jurors. The resulting jury, including alternates, was all white.
After the prosecutor exercised the second of his three peremptory challenges against the prospective black jurors, defense counsel objected on the ground that the challenge was unconstitutionally based on race under both the California and United States Constitutions. People v. Johnson, 30 Cal. 4th 1302, 1307, 71 P. 3d 270, 272-273 (2003). Defense counsel alleged that the prosecutor “had no apparent reason to challenge this prospective juror ‘other than [her] racial identity.’ ” Ibid, (alteration in original). The trial judge did not ask the prosecutor to explain the rationale for his strikes. Instead, the judge simply found that petitioner had failed to establish a prima facie case under the governing state precedent, People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P. 2d 748 (1978), reasoning “ ‘that there’s not been shown a strong likelihood that the exercise of the peremptory challenges were based upon a group rather than an individual basis,’” 30 Cal. 4th, at 1307, 71 P. 3d, at 272 (emphasis added). The judge did, however, warn the prosecutor that “ ‘we are very close.’ ” People v. Johnson, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 727, 729 (Ct. App. 2001).
Defense counsel made an additional motion the next day when the prosecutor struck the final remaining prospective black juror. 30 Cal. 4th, at 1307, 71 P. 3d, at 272. Counsel argued that the prosecutor’s decision to challenge all of the prospective black jurors constituted a “systematic attempt to exclude African-Americans from the jury panel.” 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d, at 729. The trial judge still did not seek an explanation from the prosecutor. Instead, she explained that her own examination of the record had convinced her that the prosecutor’s strikes could be justified by race-neutral reasons. Specifically, the judge opined that the black venire members had offered equivocal or confused answers in their written questionnaires. 30 Cal. 4th, at 1307-1308, 71 P. 3d, at 272-273. Despite the fact that “ ‘the Court would not grant the challenges for cause, there were answers ... at least on the questionnaires themselves [such] that the Court felt that there was sufficient basis’ ” for the strikes. Id., at 1308, 71 P. 3d, at 273 (brackets added). Therefore, even considering that all of the prospective black jurors had been stricken from the pool, the judge determined that petitioner had failed to establish a prima facie case.
The California Court of Appeal set aside the conviction. People v. Johnson, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 727 (2001). Over the dissent of one judge, the majority ruled that the trial judge had erred by requiring petitioner to establish a “strong likelihood” that the peremptory strikes had been impermissibly based on race. Instead, the trial judge should have only required petitioner to proffer enough evidence to support an “inference” of discrimination. The Court of Appeal’s holding relied on decisions of this Court, prior California case law, and the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Wade v. Terhune, 202 F. 3d 1190 (2000). Applying the proper “reasonable inference” standard, the majority concluded that petitioner had produced sufficient evidence to support a prima facie case.
Respondent appealed, and the California Supreme Court reinstated petitioner’s conviction over the dissent of two justices. The court stressed that Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 (1986), left to state courts the task of establishing the standards used to evaluate the sufficiency of defendants’ prima facie cases. 30 Cal. 4th, at 1314, 71 P. 3d, at 277. The court then reviewed Batson, Wheeler, and those decisions’ progeny, and concluded that “Wheeler’s terms ‘strong likelihood’ and ‘reasonable inference’ state the same standard”— one that is entirely consistent with Batson. 30 Cal. 4th, at 1313, 71 P. 3d, at 277. A prima facie case under Batson establishes a “ ‘legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption,’ ” it does not merely constitute “enough evidence to permit the inference” that discrimination has occurred. 30 Cal. 4th, at 1315, 71 P. 3d, at 278. Batson, the court held, “permits a court to require the objector to present, not merely ‘some evidence’ permitting the inference, but ‘strong evidence’ that makes discriminatory intent more likely than not if the challenges are not explained.” 30 Cal. 4th, at 1316, 71 P. 3d, at 278. The court opined that while this burden is “not onerous,” it remains “substantial.” Ibid., 71 P. 3d, at 279.
Applying that standard, the court acknowledged that the case involved the “highly relevant” circumstance that a black defendant was “charged with killing ‘his White girlfriend’s child,’ ” and that “it certainly looks suspicious that all three African-American prospective jurors were removed from the jury.” Id., at 1326, 71 P. 3d, at 286. Yet petitioner’s Batson showing, the court held, consisted “primarily of the statistical disparity of peremptory challenges between African-Americans and others.” 30 Cal. 4th, at 1327, 71 P. 3d, at 287. Although those statistics were indeed “troubling and, as the trial court stated, the question was close,” id., at 1328, 71 P. 3d, at 287, the court decided to defer to the trial judge’s “carefully considered ruling.” Ibid We granted certio-rari, but dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction because the judgment was not yet final. Johnson v. California, 541 U. S. 428 (2004) (per curiam). After the California Court of Appeal decided the remaining issues, we again granted certiorari. 543 U. S. 1042 (2005).
II
The issue in this case is narrow but important. It concerns the scope of the first of three steps this Court enumerated in Batson, which together guide trial courts’ constitutional review of peremptory strikes. Those three Batson steps should by now be familiar. First, the defendant must make out a prima facie case “by showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.” 476 U. S., at 93-94 (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 239-242 (1976)). Second, once the defendant has made out a prima facie case, the “burden, shifts to the State to explain adequately the racial exclusion” by offering permissible race-neutral justifications for the strikes. 476 U. S., at 94; see also Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U. S. 625, 632 (1972). Third, “[i]f a race-neutral explanation is tendered, the trial court must then decide . . . whether the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful racial discrimination.” Purkett v. Elem, 514 U. S. 765, 767 (1995) (per curiam).
The question before us is whether Batson permits California to require at step one that “the objector must show that it is more likely than not the other party’s peremptory challenges, if unexplained, were based on impermissible group bias.” 30 Cal. 4th, at 1318, 71 P. 3d, at 280. Although we recognize that States do have flexibility in formulating appropriate procedures to comply with Batson, we conclude that California’s “more likely than not” standard is an inappropriate yardstick by which to measure the sufficiency of a prima facie case.
We begin with Batson itself, which on its own terms provides no support for California’s rule. There, we held that a prima facie case of discrimination can be made out by offering a wide variety of evidence, so long as the sum of the proffered facts gives “rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.” 476 U. S., at 94. We explained:
“[A] defendant may establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in selection of the petit jury solely on evidence concerning the prosecutor’s exercise of peremptory challenges at the defendant’s trial. To establish such a case, the defendant first must show that he is a member of a cognizable racial group, and that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire members of the defendant’s race. Second, the defendant is entitled to rely on the fact, as to which there can be no dispute, that peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection practice that permits 'those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate.’ Finally, the defendant must show that these facts and any other relevant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used that practice to exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on account of their race.” Id., at 96 (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U. S. 559, 562 (1953); citations omitted).
Indeed, Batson held that because the petitioner had timely objected to the prosecutor’s decision to strike “all black persons on the venire,” the trial court was in error when it “flatly rejected the objection without requiring the prosecutor to give an explanation for his action.” 476 U. S., at 100. We did not hold that the petitioner had proved discrimination. Rather, we remanded the case for farther proceedings because the trial court failed to demand an explanation from the prosecutor — i. e., to proceed to Batson’s second step— despite the fact that the petitioner’s evidence supported an inference of discrimination. Ibid.
Thus, in describing the burden-shifting framework, we assumed in Batson that the trial judge would have the benefit of all relevant circumstances, including the prosecutor’s explanation, before deciding whether it was more likely than not that the challenge was improperly motivated. We. did not intend the first step to be so onerous that a defendant, would have to persuade the judge — on the basis of all the facts, some of which are impossible for the defendant to know with certainty — that the challenge was more likely than not the product of purposeful discrimination. Instead, a defendant satisfies the requirements of Batson’s first step by producing evidence sufficient to permit the trial judge to draw an inference that discrimination has occurred.
Respondent, however, focuses on Batson’s ultimate sentence: “If the trial court decides that the facts establish, prima facie, purposeful discrimination and the prosecutor does not come forward with a neutral explanation for his action, our precedents require that petitioner’s conviction be reversed.” Ibid. For this to be true, respondent contends, a Batson claim must prove the ultimate facts by a preponderance of the evidence in the prima facie case; otherwise, the argument goes, a prosecutor’s failure to respond to a prima facie case would inexplicably entitle a defendant to judgment as a matter of law on the basis of nothing more than an inference that discrimination may have occurred. Brief for Respondent 13-18.
Respondent’s argument is misguided. Batson, of course, explicitly stated that the defendant ultimately carries the “burden of persuasion” to “ 'prove the existence of purposeful discrimination.’ ” 476 U. S., at 93 (quoting Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U. S. 545, 550 (1967)). This burden of persuasion “rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike.” Purkett, 514 U. S., at 768. Thus, even if the State produces only a frivolous or utterly nonsensical justification for its strike, the case does not end — it merely proceeds to step three. Ibid. The first two Batson steps govern the production of evidence that allows the trial court to determine the persuasiveness of the defendant’s constitutional claim. “It is not until the third step that the persuasiveness of the justification becomes relevant — the step in which the trial court determines whether the opponent of the strike has carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination.” Purkett, 514 U. S., at 768.
Batson’s purposes further support our conclusion. The constitutional interests Batson sought to vindicate are not limited to the rights possessed by the defendant on trial, see 476 U. S., at 87, nor to those citizens who desire to participate “in the administration of the law, as jurors,” Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303, 308 (1880). Undoubtedly, the overriding interest in eradicating discrimination from our civic institutions suffers whenever an individual is excluded from making a significant contribution to governance on account of his race. Yet the “harm from discriminatory jury selection extends beyond that inflicted on the defendant and the excluded juror to touch the entire community. Selection procedures that purposefully exclude black persons from juries undermine public confidence in the fairness of our system of justice.” Batson, 476 U. S., at 87; see also Smith v. Texas, 311 U. S. 128, 130 (1940) (“For racial discrimination to result in the exclusion from jury service of otherwise qualified groups not only violates our Constitution and the laws enacted under it but is at war with our basic concepts of a democratic society and a representative government” (footnote omitted)).
The Batson framework is designed to produce actual answers to suspicions and inferences that discrimination may have infected the jury selection process. See 476 U. S., at 97-98, and n. 20. The inherent uncertainty present in inquiries of discriminatory purpose counsels against engaging in needless and imperfect speculation when a direct answer can be obtained by asking a simple question. See Paulino v. Castro, 371 F. 3d 1083, 1090 (CA9 2004) (“[I]t does not matter that the prosecutor might have had good reasons ...[;] [w]hat matters is the real reason they were stricken” (emphasis deleted)); Holloway v. Horn, 355 F. 3d 707, 725 (CA3 2004) (speculation “does not aid our inquiry into the reasons the prosecutor actually harbored” for a peremptory strike). The three-step process thus simultaneously serves the public purposes Batson is designed to vindicate and encourages “prompt rulings on objections to peremptory challenges without substantial disruption of the jury selection process.” Hernandez v. New York, 500 U. S. 352, 358-359 (1991) (opinion of Kennedy, J.).
The disagreements among the state-court judges who reviewed the record in this case illustrate the imprecision of relying on judicial speculation to resolve plausible claims of discrimination. In this case the inference of discrimination was sufficient to invoke a comment by the trial judge “that 'we are very close,’ ” and on review, the California Supreme Court acknowledged that “it certainly looks suspicious that all three African-American prospective jurors were removed from the jury.” 30 Cal. 4th, at 1307, 1326, 71 P. 3d, at 273, 286. Those inferences that discrimination may have occurred were sufficient to establish a prima facie case under Batson.
The facts of this case well illustrate that California’s “more likely than not” standard is at odds with the prima facie inquiry mandated by Batson. The judgment of the California Supreme Court is therefore reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered
Petitioner’s state objection was made under People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P. 2d 748 (1978).
In reaching this holding, the Court of Appeal rejected the notion that a showing of a ‘“strong likelihood’” is equivalent to a “‘reasonable inference.’ ” To conclude so would “be as novel a proposition as the idea that ‘clear and convincing evidence’ has always meant a ‘preponderance of the evidence.’ ” 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d, at 733.
In dissent, Justice Kennard argued that “[r]equiring a defendant to persuade the trial court of the prosecutor’s discriminatory purpose at the first Wheeler-Batson stage short-circuits the process, and provides inadequate protection for the defendant’s right to a fair trial....” 30 Cal. 4th, at 1333, 71 P. 3d, at 291. The proper standard for measuring a prima facie case under Batson is whether the defendant has identified actions by the prosecutor that, “if unexplained, permit a reasonable inference of an improper purpose or motive.” 30 Cal. 4th, at 1339, 71 P. 3d, at 294. Trial judges, Justice Kennard argued, should not speculate when it is not “apparent that the [neutral] explanation was the true reason for the challenge.” Id., at 1340, 71 P. 3d, at 295.
An “inference” is generally understood to be a “conclusion reached by considering other facts and deducing a logical consequence from them.” Black’s Law Dictionary 781 (7th ed. 1999).
In Batson, we spoke of the methods by which prima facie cases could be proved in permissive terms. A defendant may satisfy his prima facie burden, we said, “by relying solely on the facts concerning [the selection of the venire] in his case.” 476 U. S., at 95 (emphasis in original). We declined to require proof of a pattern or practice because “‘[a] single invidiously discriminatory governmental act’ is not ‘immunized by the absence of such discrimination in the making of other comparable decisions.’” Ibid, (quoting Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 266, n. 14 (1977)).
In the unlikely hypothetical in which the prosecutor declines to respond to a trial judge’s inquiry regarding his justification for making a strike, the evidence before the judge would consist not only of the original facts from which the prima facie case was established, but also the prosecutor's refusal to justify his strike in light of the court's request. Such a refusal would provide additional support for the inference of discrimination raised by a defendant’s prima facie case. Cf. United States ex rel. Vajtauer v. Commissioner of Immigration, 273 U. S. 103, 111 (1927).
This explanation comports with our interpretation of the burden-shifting framework in eases arising under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See, e. g., Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U. S. 567, 577 (1978) (noting that the McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792 (1973), framework “is merely a sensible, orderly way to evaluate the evidence in light of common experience as it bears on the critical question of discrimination”); see also St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U. S. 502, 509-510, and n. 3 (1993) (holding that determinations at steps one and two of the McDonnell Douglas framework “can involve no credibility assessment” because “the burden-of-production determination necessarily precedes the credibility-assessment stage,” and that the burden-shifting framework triggered by a defendant’s prima face case is essentially just "a means of ‘arranging the presentation of evidence’ ” (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U. S. 977, 986 (1988))).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | B | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Marshall
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether a minor but permanent physical occupation of an owner’s property authorized by government constitutes a “taking” of property for which just compensation is due under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. New York law provides that a landlord must permit a cable television company to install its cable facilities upon his property. N. Y. Exec. Law §828(1) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982). In this case, the cable installation occupied portions of appellant’s roof and the side of her building. The New York Court of Appeals ruled that this appropriation does not amount to a taking. 53 N. Y. 2d 124, 423 N. E. 2d 320 (1981). Because we conclude that such a physical occupation of property is a taking, we reverse.
I
Appellant Jean Loretto purchased a five-story apartment building located at 303 West 105th Street, New York City, in 1971. The previous owner had granted appellees Teleprompter Corp. and Teleprompter Manhattan CATV (collectively Teleprompter) permission to install a cable on the building and the exclusive privilege of furnishing cable television (CATV) services to the tenants. The New York Court of Appeals described the installation as follows:
“On June 1, 1970 TelePrompter installed a cable slightly less than one-half inch in diameter and of approximately 30 feet in length along the length of the building about 18 inches above the roof top, and directional taps, approximately 4 inches by 4 inches by 4 inches, on the front and rear of the roof. By June 8, 1970 the cable had been extended another 4 to 6 feet and cable had been run from the directional taps to the adjoining building at 305 West 105th Street.” Id., at 135, 423 N. E. 2d, at 324.
Teleprompter also installed two large silver boxes along the roof cables. The cables are attached by screws or nails penetrating the masonry at approximately two-foot intervals, and other equipment is installed by bolts.
Initially, Teleprompter’s roof cables did not service appellant’s building. They were part of what could be described as a cable “highway” circumnavigating the city block, with service cables periodically dropped over the front or back of a building in which a tenant desired service. Crucial to such a network is the use of so-called “crossovers” — cable lines extending from one building to another in order to reach a new group of tenants. Two years after appellant purchased the building, Teleprompter connected a “noncrossover” line— i. e., one that provided CATV service to appellant’s own tenants — by dropping a line to the first floor down the front of appellant’s building.
Prior to 1973, Teleprompter routinely obtained authorization for its installations from property owners along the cable’s route, compensating the owners at the standard rate of 5% of the gross revenues that Teleprompter realized from the particular property. To facilitate tenant access to CATV, the State of New York enacted § 828 of the Executive Law, effective January 1, 1973. Section 828 provides that a landlord may not “interfere with the installation of cable television facilities upon his property or premises,” and may not demand payment from any tenant for permitting CATV, or demand payment from any CATV company “in excess of any amount which the [State Commission on Cable Television] shall, by regulation, determine to be reasonable.” The landlord may, however, require the CATV company or the tenant to bear the cost of installation and to indemnify for any damage caused by the installation. Pursuant to § 828(l)(b), the State Commission has ruled that a one-time $1 payment is the normal fee to which a landlord is entitled. In the Matter of Implementation of Section 828 of the Executive Law, No. 90004, Statement of General Policy (New York State Commission on Cable Television, Jan. 15,1976) (Statement of General Policy), App. 51-52; Clarification of General Policy (Aug. 27, 1976), App. 68-69. The Commission ruled that this nominal fee, which the Commission concluded was equivalent to what the landlord would receive if the property were condemned pursuant to New York’s Transportation Corporations Law, satisfied constitutional requirements “in the absence of a special showing of greater damages attributable to the taking.” Statement of General Policy, App. 52.
Appellant did not discover the existence of the cable until after she had purchased the building. She brought a class action against Teleprompter in 1976 on behalf of all owners of real property in the State on which Teleprompter has placed CATV components, alleging that Teleprompter’s installation was a trespass and, insofar as it relied on § 828, a taking without just compensation. She requested damages and injunctive relief. Appellee City of New York, which has granted Teleprompter an exclusive franchise to provide CATV within certain areas of Manhattan, intervened. The Supreme Court, Special Term, granted summary judgment to Teleprompter and the city, upholding the constitutionality of §828 in both crossover and noncrossover situations. 98 Misc. 2d 944, 415 N. Y. S. 2d 180 (1979). The Appellate Division affirmed without opinion. 73 App. Div. 2d 849, 422 N. Y. S. 2d 550 (1979).
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, over dissent, upheld the statute. 53 N. Y. 2d 124, 423 N. E. 2d 320 (1981). The court concluded that the law requires the landlord to allow both crossover and noncrossover installations but permits him to request payment from the CATV company under § 828(l)(b), at a level determined by the State Cable Commission, only for noncrossovers. The court then ruled that the law serves a legitimate police power purpose — eliminating landlord fees and conditions that inhibit the development of CATV, which has important educational and community benefits. Rejecting the argument that a physical occupation authorized by government is necessarily a taking, the court stated that the regulation does not have an excessive economic impact upon appellant when measured against her aggregate property rights, and that it does not interfere with any reasonable investment-backed expectations. Accordingly, the court held that § 828 does not work a taking of appellant’s property. Chief Judge Cooke dissented, reasoning that the physical appropriation of a portion of appellant’s property is a taking without regard to the balancing analysis courts ordinarily employ in evaluating whether a regulation is a taking.
In light of its holding, the Court of Appeals had no occasion to determine whether the $1 fee ordinarily awarded for a noncrossover installation was adequate compensation for the taking. Judge Gabrielli, concurring, agreed with the dissent that the law works a taking but concluded that the $1 presumptive award, together with the procedures permitting a landlord to demonstrate a greater entitlement, affords just compensation. We noted probable jurisdiction. 454 U. S. 938 (1981).
II
The Court of Appeals determined that §828 serves the legitimate public purpose of “rapid development of and maximum penetration by a means of communication which has important educational and community aspects,” 53 N. Y. 2d, at 143-144, 423 N. E. 2d, at 329, and thus is within the State’s police power. We have no reason to question that determination. It is a separate question, however, whether an otherwise valid regulation so frustrates property rights that compensation must be paid. See Penn Central Transporta tion Co. v. New York City, 438 U. S. 104, 127-128 (1978); Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. v. Morristown, 276 U. S. 182, 193 (1928). We conclude that a permanent physical occupation authorized by government is a taking without regard to the public interests that it may serve. Our constitutional history confirms the rule, recent cases do not question it, and the purposes of the Takings Clause compel its retention.
A
In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, supra, the Court surveyed some of the general principles governing the Takings Clause. The Court noted that no “set formula” existed to determine, in all cases, whether compensation is constitutionally due for a government restriction of property. Ordinarily, the Court must engage in “essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries.” Id., at 124. But the inquiry is not standardless. The economic impact of the regulation, especially the degree of interference with investment-backed expectations, is of particular significance. “So, too, is the character of the governmental action. A ‘taking’ may more readily be found when the interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government, than when interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.” Ibid, (citation omitted).
As Penn Central affirms, the Court has often upheld substantial regulation of an owner’s use of his own property where deemed necessary to promote the public interest. At the same time, we have long considered a physical intrusion by government to be a property restriction of an unusually serious character for purposes of the Takings Clause. Our cases further establish that when the physical intrusion reaches the extreme form of a permanent physical occupation, a taking has occurred. In such a case, “the character of the government action” not only is an important factor in resolving whether the action works a taking but also is determinative.
When faced with a constitutional challenge to a permanent physical occupation of real property, this Court has invariably found a taking. As early as 1872, in Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 13 Wall. 166, this Court held that the defendant’s construction, pursuant to state authority, of a dam which permanently flooded plaintiff’s property constituted a taking. A unanimous Court stated, without qualification, that “where real estate is actually invaded by superinduced additions of water, earth, sand, or other material, or by having any artificial structure placed on it, so as to effectually destroy or impair its usefulness, it is a taking, within the meaning of the Constitution.” Id., at 181. Seven years later, the Court reemphasized the importance of a physical occupation by distinguishing a regulation that merely restricted the use of private property. In Northern Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99 U. S. 635 (1879), the Court held that the city’s construction of a temporary dam in a river to permit construction of a tunnel was not a taking, even though the plaintiffs were thereby denied access to their premises, because the obstruction only impaired the use of plaintiffs’ property. The Court distinguished earlier cases in which permanent flooding of private property was regarded as a taking, e. g., Pumpelly, supra, as involving “a physical invasion of the real estate of the private owner, and a practical ouster of his possession.” In this case, by contrast, “[n]o entry was made upon the plaintiffs’ lot.” 99 U. S., at 642.
Since these early cases, this Court has consistently distinguished between flooding cases involving a permanent physical occupation, on the one hand, and cases involving a more temporary invasion, or government action outside the owner’s property that causes consequential damages within, on the other. A taking has always been found only in the former situation. See United States v. Lynah, 188 U. S. 445, 468-470 (1903); Bedford v. United States, 192 U. S. 217, 225 (1904); United States v. Cress, 243 U. S. 316, 327-328 (1917); Sanguinetti v. United States, 264 U. S. 146, 149 (1924) (to be a taking, flooding must “constitute an actual, permanent invasion of the land, amounting to an appropriation of, and not merely an injury to, the property”); United States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 339 U. S. 799, 809-810 (1950).
In St. Louis v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 148 U. S. 92 (1893), the Court applied the principles enunciated in Pumpelly to a situation closely analogous to the one presented today. In that case, the Court held that the city of St. Louis could exact reasonable compensation for a telegraph company’s placement of telegraph poles on the city’s public streets. The Court reasoned:
“The use which the [company] makes of the streets is an exclusive and permanent one, and not one temporary, shifting and in common with the general public. The ordinary traveler, whether on foot or in a vehicle, passes to and fro along the streets, and his use and occupation thereof are temporary and shifting. The space he occupies one moment he abandons the next to be occupied by any other traveller.... But the use made by the telegraph company is, in respect to so much of the space as it occupies with its poles, permanent and exclusive. It as effectually and permanently dispossesses the general public as if it had destroyed that amount of ground. Whatever benefit the public may receive in the way of transportation of messages, that space is, so far as respects its actual use for purposes of highway and personal travel, wholly lost to the public....
“... It matters not for what that exclusive appropriation is taken, whether for steam railroads or street railroads, telegraphs or telephones, the state may if it chooses exact from the party or corporation given such exclusive use pecuniary compensation to the general public for being deprived of the common use of the portion thus appropriated.” Id., at 98-99,101-102 (emphasis added).
Similarly, in Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 195 U. S. 540 (1904), a telegraph company constructed and operated telegraph lines over a railroad’s right of way. In holding that federal law did not grant the company the right of eminent domain or the right to operate the lines absent the railroad’s consent, the Court assumed that the invasion of the telephone lines would be a compensable taking. Id., at 570 (the right-of-way “cannot be appropriated in whole or in part except upon the payment of compensation”). Later cases, relying on the character of a physical occupation, clearly establish that permanent occupations of land by such installations as telegraph and telephone lines, rails, and underground pipes or wires are takings even if they occupy only relatively insubstantial amounts of space and do not seriously interfere with the landowner’s use of the rest of his land. See, e. g., Lovett v. West Va. Central Gas Co., 65 W. Va. 739, 65 S. E. 196 (1909); Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Webb, 393 S. W. 2d 117, 121 (Mo. App. 1965). Cf. Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. United States, 260 U. S. 327 (1922). See generally 2 J. Sackman, Nichols’ Law of Eminent Domain § 6.21 (rev. 3d ed. 1980).
More recent cases confirm the distinction between a permanent physical occupation, a physical invasion short of an occupation, and a regulation that merely restricts the use of property. In United States v. Causby, 328 U. S. 256 (1946), the Court ruled that frequent flights immediately above a landowner’s property constituted a taking, comparing such overflights to the quintessential form of a taking:
“If, by reason of the frequency and altitude of the flights, respondents could not use this land for any purpose, their loss would be complete. It would be as complete as if the United States had entered upon the surface of the land and taken exclusive possession of it.” Id., at 261 (footnote omitted).
As the Court further explained,
“We would not doubt that, if the United States erected an elevated railway over respondents’ land at the precise altitude where its planes now fly, there would be a partial taking, even though none of the supports of the structure rested on the land. The reason is that there would be an intrusion so immediate and direct as to subtract from the owner’s full enjoyment of the property and to limit his exploitation of it.” Id., at 264 — 265.
The Court concluded that the damages to the respondents “were not merely consequential. They were the product of a direct invasion of respondents’ domain.” Id., at 265-266. See also Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U. S. 84 (1962).
Two wartime takings cases are also instructive. In United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U. S. 114 (1951), the Court unanimously held that the Government’s seizure and direction of operation of a coal mine to prevent a national strike of coal miners constituted a taking, though members of the Court differed over which losses suffered during the period of Government control were compensable. The plurality had little difficulty concluding that because there had been an “actual taking of possession and control,” the taking was as clear as if the Government held full title and ownership. Id., at 116 (plurality opinion of Black, J., with whom Frankfurter, Douglas, and Jackson, JJ., joined; no other Justice challenged this portion of the opinion). In United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U. S. 155 (1958), by contrast, the Court found no taking where the Government had issued a wartime order requiring nonessential gold mines to cease operations for the purpose of conserving equipment and manpower for use in mines more essential to the war effort. Over dissenting Justice Harlan’s complaint that “as a practical matter the Order led to consequences no different from those that would have followed the temporary acquisition of physical possession of these mines by the United States,” id., at 181, the Court reasoned that “the Government did not occupy, use, or in any manner take physical possession of the gold mines or of the equipment connected with them.” Id., at 165-166. The Court concluded that the temporary though severe restriction on use of the mines was justified by the exigency of war. Cf. YMCA v. United States, 395 U. S. 85, 92 (1969) (“Ordinarily, of course, government occupation of private property deprives the private owner of his use of the property, and it is this deprivation for which the Constitution requires compensation”).
Although this Court’s most recent cases have not addressed the precise issue before us, they have emphasized that physical invasion cases are special and have not repudiated the rule that any permanent physical occupation is a taking. The cases state or imply that a physical invasion is subject to a balancing process, but they do not suggest that a permanent physical occupation would ever be exempt from the Takings Clause.
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, as noted above, contains one of the most complete discussions of the Takings Clause. The Court explained that resolving whether public action works a taking is ordinarily an ad hoc inquiry in which several factors are particularly significant— the economic impact of the regulation, the extent to which it interferes with investment-backed expectations, and the character of the governmental action. 438 U. S., at 124. The opinion does not repudiate the rule that a permanent physical occupation is a government action of such a unique character that it is a taking without regard to other factors that a court might ordinarily examine.
In Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U. S. 164 (1979), the Court held that the Government’s imposition of a navigational servitude requiring public access to a pond was a taking where the landowner had reasonably relied on Government consent in connecting the pond to navigable water. The Court emphasized that the servitude took the landowner’s right to exclude, “one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property.” Id., at 176. The Court explained:
“This is not a case in which the Government is exercising its regulatory power in a manner that will cause an insubstantial devaluation of petitioner’s private property; rather, the imposition of the navigational servitude in this context will result in an actual physical invasion of the privately owned marina.... And even if the Government physically invades only an easement in property, it must nonetheless pay compensation. See United States v. Causby, 328 U. S. 256, 265 (1946); Portsmouth Co. v. United States, 260 U. S. 327 (1922).Id., at 180 (emphasis added).
Although the easement of passage, not being a permanent occupation of land, was not considered a taking per se, Kaiser Aetna reemphasizes that a physical invasion is a government intrusion of an unusually serious character.
Another recent case underscores the constitutional distinction between a permanent occupation and a temporary physical invasion. In PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U. S. 74 (1980), the Court upheld a state constitutional requirement that shopping center owners permit individuals to exercise free speech and petition rights on their property, to which they had already invited the general public. The Court emphasized that the State Constitution does not prevent the owner from restricting expressive activities by imposing reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions to minimize interference with the owner’s commercial functions. Since the invasion was temporary and limited in nature, and since the owner had not exhibited an interest in excluding all persons from his property, “the fact that [the solicitors] may have ‘physically invaded’ [the owners’] property cannot be viewed as determinative.” Id., at 84.
In short, when the “character of the governmental action,” Penn Central, 438 U. S., at 124, is a permanent physical occupation of property, our cases uniformly have found a taking to the extent of the occupation, without regard to whether the action achieves an important public benefit or has only minimal economic impact on the owner.
B
The historical rule that a permanent physical occupation of another’s property is a taking has more than tradition to commend it. Such an appropriation is perhaps the most serious form of invasion of an owner’s property interests. To borrow a metaphor, cf. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U. S. 51, 65-66 (1979), the government does not simply take a single “strand” from the “bundle” of property rights: it chops through the bundle, taking a slice of every strand.
Property rights in a physical thing have been described as the rights “to possess, use and dispose of it.” United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U. S. 373, 378 (1945). To the extent that the government permanently occupies physical property, it effectively destroys each of these rights. First, the owner has no right to possess the occupied space himself, and also has no power to exclude the occupier from possession and use of the space. The power to exclude has traditionally been considered one of the most treasured strands in an owner’s bundle of property rights. See Kaiser Aetna, 444 U. S., at 179-180; see also Restatement of Property §7 (1936). Second, the permanent physical occupation of property forever denies the owner any power to control the use of the property; he not only cannot exclude others, but can make no nonpossessory use of the property. Although deprivation of the right to use and obtain a profit from property is not, in every case, independently sufficient to establish a taking, see Andrus v. Allard, supra, at 66, it is clearly relevant. Finally, even though the owner may retain the bare legal right to dispose of the occupied space by transfer or sale, the permanent occupation of that space by a stranger will ordinarily empty the right of any value, since the purchaser will also be unable to make any use of the property.
Moreover, an owner suffers a special kind of injury when a stranger directly invades and occupies the owner’s property. As Part II-A, supra, indicates, property law has long protected an owner’s expectation that he will be relatively undisturbed at least in the possession of his property. To require, as well, that the owner permit another to exercise complete dominion literally adds insult to injury. See Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1165, 1228, and n. 110 (1967). Furthermore, such an occupation is qualitatively more severe than a regulation of the use of property, even a regulation that imposes affirmative duties on the owner, since the owner may have no control over the timing, extent, or nature of the invasion. See n. 19, infra.
The traditional rule also avoids otherwise difficult line-drawing problems. New would disagree that if the State required landlords to permit third parties to install swimming pools on the landlords’ rooftops for the convenience of the tenants, the reqfiirement would be a taking. If the cable installation here occupied as much space, again, few would disagree that the occupation would be a taking. But constitutional protection for the rights of private property cannot be made to depend on the size of the area permanently occupied. Indeed, it is possible that in the future, additional cable installations that more significantly restrict a landlord’s use of the roof of his building will be made. Section 828 requires a landlord to permit such multiple installations.
Finally, whether a permanent physical occupation has occurred presents relatively few problems of proof. The placement of a fixed structure on land or real property is an obvious fact that will rarely be subject to dispute. Once the fact of occupation is shown, of course, a court should consider the extent of the occupation as one relevant factor in determining the compensation due. For that reason, moreover, there is less need to consider the extent of the occupation in determining whether there is a taking in the first instance.
C
Teleprompter’s cable installation on appellant’s building constitutes a taking under the traditional test. The installation involved a direct physical attachment of plates, boxes, wires, bolts, and screws to the building, completely occupying space immediately above and upon the roof and along the building’s exterior wall.
In light of our analysis, we find no constitutional difference between a crossover and a noncrossover installation. The portions of the installation necessary for both crossovers and noncrossovers permanently appropriate appellant’s property. Accordingly, each type of installation is a taking.
Appellees raise a series of objections to application of the traditional rule here. Teleprompter notes that the law applies only to buildings used as rental property, and draws the conclusion that the law is simply a permissible regulation of the use of real property. We fail to see, however, why a physical occupation of one type of property but not another type is any less a physical occupation. Insofar as Teleprompter means to suggest that this is not a permanent physical invasion, we must differ. So long as the property remains residential and a CATV company wishes to retain the installation, the landlord must permit it.
Teleprompter also asserts the related argument that the State has effectively granted a tenant the property right to have a CATV installation placed on the roof of his building, as an appurtenance to the tenant’s leasehold. The short answer is that § 828(l)(a) does not purport to give the tenant any enforceable property rights with respect to CATV installation, and the lower courts did not rest their decisions on this ground. Of course, Teleprompter, not appellant’s tenants, actually owns the installation. Moreover, the government does not have unlimited power to redefine property rights. See Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U. S. 155, 164 (1980) (“a State, by ipse dixit, may not transform private property into public property without compensation”).
Finally, we do not agree with appellees that application of the physical occupation rule will have dire consequences for the government’s power to adjust landlord-tenant relationships. This Court has consistently affirmed that States have broad power to regulate housing conditions in general and the landlord-tenant relationship in particular without paying compensation for all economic injuries that such regulation entails. See, e. g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U. S. 241 (1964) (discrimination in places of public accommodation); Queenside Hills Realty Co. v. Saxl, 328 U. S. 80 (1946) (fire regulation); Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U. S. 503 (1944) (rent control); Home Building & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398 (1934) (mortgage moratorium); Edgar A. Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel, 258 U. S. 242 (1922) (emergency housing law); Block v. Hirsh, 256 U. S. 135 (1921) (rent control). In none of these cases, however, did the government authorize the permanent occupation of the landlord’s property by a third party. Consequently, our holding today in no way alters the analysis governing the State’s power to require landlords to comply with building codes and provide utility connections, mailboxes, smoke detectors, fire extinguishers, and the like in the common area of a building. So long as these regulations do not require the landlord to suffer the physical occupation of a portion of his building by a third party, they will be analyzed under the multifactor inquiry generally applicable to nonpossessory governmental activity. See Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U. S. 104 (1978).
III
Our holding today is very narrow. We affirm the traditional rule that a permanent physical occupation of property is a taking. In such a case, the property owner entertains a historically rooted expectation of compensation, and the character of the invasion is qualitatively more intrusive than perhaps any other category of property regulation. We do not, however, question the equally substantial authority upholding a State’s broad power to impose appropriate restrictions upon an owner’s use of his property.
Furthermore, our conclusion that § 828 works a taking of a portion of appellant’s property does not presuppose that the fee which many landlords had obtained from Teleprompter prior to the law’s enactment is a proper measure of the value of the property taken. The issue of the amount of compensation that is due, on which we express no opinion, is a matter for the state courts to consider on remand.
The judgment of the New York Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV was formerly a subsidiary, and is now a division, of Teleprompter Corp.
The Court of Appeals defined a “crossover” more comprehensively as occurring:
“[W]hen (1) the line servicing the tenants in a particular building is extended to adjacent or adjoining buildings, (2) an amplifier which is placed on a building is used to amplify signals to tenants in that building and in a neighboring building or buildings, and (3) a line is placed on a building, none of the tenants of which are provided CATV service, for the purpose of providing service to an adjoining or adjacent building.” 53 N. Y. 2d, at 133, n. 6, 423 N. E. 2d, at 323, n. 6.
New York Exec. Law §828 (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982) provides in part:
“1. No landlord shall
“a. interfere with the installation of cable television facilities upon his property or premises, except that a landlord may require:
“i. that the installation of cable television facilities conform to such reasonable conditions as are necessary to protect the safety, functioning and appearance of the premises, and the convenience and well-being of other tenants;
“ii. that the cable television company or the tenant or a combination thereof bear the entire cost of the installation, operation or removal of such facilities; and
“iii. that the cable television company agree to indemnify the landlord for any damage caused by the installation, operation or removal of such facilities.
“b. demand or accept payment from any tenant, in any form, in exchange for permitting cable television service on or within his property or premises, or from any cable television company in exchange therefor in excess of any amount which the commission shall, by regulation, determine to be reasonable; or
“c. discriminate in rental charges, or otherwise, between tenants who receive cable television service and those who do not.”
Class-action status was granted in accordance with appellant’s request, except that owners of single-family dwellings on which a CATV component had been placed were excluded. Notice to the class has been postponed, however, by stipulation.
Professor Michelman has accurately summarized the case law concerning the role of the concept of physical invasions in the development of takings jurisprudence:
“At one time it was commonly held that, in the absence of explicit expropriation, a compensable ‘taking’ could occur only through physical encroachment and occupation. The modern significance of physical occupation is that courts, while they sometimes do hold nontrespassory injuries compensable, never deny compensation for a physical takeover. The one incontestable case for compensation (short of formal expropriation) seems to occur when the government deliberately brings it about that its agents, or the public at large, ‘regularly’ use, or ‘permanently’ occupy, space or a thing which theretofore was understood to be under private ownership.” Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1165, 1184 (1967) (emphasis in original; footnotes omitted).
See also 2 J. Sackman, Nichols’ Law of Eminent Domain 6-50, 6-51 (rev. 3d ed. 1980); L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 460 (1978).
For historical discussions, see 53 N. Y. 2d, at 157-158, 423 N. E. 2d, at 337-338 (Cooke, C. J., dissenting); F. Bosselman, D. Callies, & J. Banta, The Taking Issue 51 (1973); Stoebuek, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 Wash. L. Rev. 553, 600-601 (1972); Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in Perspective: Thirty Years of Supreme Court Expropriation Law, 1962 S. Ct. Rev. 63, 82; Cormack, Legal Concepts in Cases of Eminent Domain, 41 Yale L. J. 221, 225 (1931).
The City of New York objects that this case only involved a city’s right to charge for use of its streets, and not the power of eminent domain; the city could have excluded the company from any use of its streets. But the physical occupation principle upon which the right to compensation was based has often been cited as authority in eminent domain cases. See, e. g., Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 195 U. S. 540, 566-567 (1904); California v. United States, 395 F. 2d 261, 263, n. 4 (CA9 1968). Also, the Court squarely held that insofar as the company relied on a federal statute authorizing its use of post roads, an appropriation of state property would require compensation. St. Louis v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 148 U. S., at 101.
Early commentators viewed a physical occupation of real property as the quintessential deprivation of property.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | D | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Stevens
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In an action brought under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party to recover a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the award of costs. The question presented by this petition is whether fees may be assessed against state officials after a case has been settled by the entry of a consent decree, without any determination that the plaintiff’s constitutional rights have been violated.
Petitioner is responsible for the administration of Connecticut’s Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), a federally funded public assistance program. Respondent is a working recipient of AFDC benefits. Under state and federal regulations, the amount of her benefits depends, in part, on her net earnings, which are defined as her wages minus certain work-related expenses. In 1975 respondent filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut alleging that Connecticut’s AFDC regulations denied her credit for substantial portions of her actual work-related expenses, thus reducing the level of her benefits. Her complaint alleged that these regulations violated § 402 (a) (7) of the Social Security Act, 42 U. S. C. § 602 (a)(7), and the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The complaint further alleged that relief was authorized by 42 U. S. C. § 1983 and invoked federal jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1343.
A few months after the action was commenced, while discovery was underway, petitioner amended the AFDC regulations to authorize a deduction for all reasonable work-related expenses. After an interval of almost a year and a half, respondent filed an amended complaint alleging that actual expenses in excess of certain standard allowances were still being routinely disallowed. Thereafter, a settlement was negotiated and the District Court entered a consent decree that, among other things, provided for a substantial increase in the standard allowances and gave AFDC recipients the right to prove that their actual work-related expenses were in excess of the standard. The parties informally agreed that the question whether respondent was entitled to recover attorney’s fees would be submitted to the District Court after the entry of the consent decree.
Following an adversary hearing, the District Court awarded respondent’s counsel a fee of $3,012.19. 455 F. Supp. 1344 (1978). The court held that respondent was the “prevailing party” within the meaning of § 1988 because, while not prevailing “in every particular,” she had won “substantially all of the relief originally sought in her complaint” in the consent decree. Id., at 1347. The court also rejected petitioner’s argument that an award of fees against him was barred by the Eleventh Amendment in the absence of a judicial determination that respondent’s constitutional rights had been violated. Relying on the basic policy against deciding constitutional claims unnecessarily, the court held that respondent was entitled to fees under the Act because, in addition to her statutory claim, she had alleged constitutional claims that were sufficiently substantial to support federal jurisdiction under the reasoning of Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U. S. 528.
The Court of Appeals affirmed, 594 F. 2d 336 (CA2 1979), holding that Congress intended to authorize an award of fees in this kind of situation and that it had the constitutional power to do so. We granted certiorari to consider both the statutory and constitutional questions. 444 U. S. 824.
I
Petitioner’s first argument is that Congress did not intend to authorize the award of attorney’s fees in every type of § 1983 action, but rather limited the courts’ authority to award fees to cases in which § 1983 is invoked as a remedy for a constitutional violation or a violation of a federal statute providing for the protection of civil rights or equal rights. In support of this contention, petitioner relies on our holding in Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organisation, 441 U. S. 600, that there is no federal jurisdiction under § 1343 over § 1983 claims outside these categories and that there is therefore no jurisdiction under § 1343 over a § 1983 claim based solely on a violation of the Social Security Act. Characterizing respondent’s claim in this case as arising solely out of a Social Security Act violation, petitioner argues that the District Court had no authority under § 1988 to award her attorney’s fees.
Even if petitioner’s characterization of respondent’s claim were correct, his argument would have to be rejected. In Maine v. Thiboutot, ante, p. 1, decided this day, we hold that § 1988 applies to all types of § 1983 actions, including actions based solely on Social Security Act violations. As Mr. Justice Brennan’s opinion for the Court in Thihoutot demonstrates, neither the language of § 1988 nor its legislative history provides any basis for importing the distinctions Chapman made among § 1983 actions for purposes of federal jurisdiction into the award of attorney’s fees by a court that possesses jurisdiction over the claim.
We also find no merit in petitioner’s suggestion that respondent was not the “prevailing party” within the meaning of § 1988. The fact that respondent prevailed through a settlement rather than through litigation does not weaken her claim to fees. Nothing in the language of § 1988 conditions the District Court’s power to award fees on full litigation of the issues or on a judicial determination that the plaintiff’s rights have been violated. Moreover, the Senate Report expressly stated that “for purposes of the award of counsel fees, parties may be considered to have prevailed when they vindicate rights through a consent judgment or without formally obtaining relief.” S. Rep. No. 94-1011, p. 5 (1976).
Nor can we accept petitioner’s contention that respondent did not gain sufficient relief through the consent decree to be considered the prevailing party. The District Court’s contrary finding was based on its familiarity with the progress of the litigation through the pleading, discovery, and settlement negotiation stages. That finding was upheld by the Court of Appeals, and we see no reason to question its validity. See Graver Mfg. Co. v. Linde Co., 336 U. S. 271, 275.
II
Petitioner’s second argument is that, regardless of Congress’ intent, a federal court is barred by the Eleventh Amendment from awarding fees against a State in a case involving a purely statutory, non-civil-rights claim. Petitioner argues that Congress may empower federal courts to award fees against the States only insofar as it is exercising its power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce substantive rights conferred by that Amendment. Thus, petitioner contends that fees can only be assessed in § 1983 actions brought to vindicate Fourteenth Amendment rights or to enforce civil rights statutes that were themselves enacted pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In this case, there is no need to reach the question whether a federal court could award attorney’s fees against a State based on a statutory, non-civil-rights claim. For, contrary to petitioner’s characterization, respondent did allege violations of her Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal proteetion rights, which the District Court and the Court of Appeals both held to be sufficiently substantial to support federal jurisdiction under Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U. S. 528. Although petitioner is correct that the trial judge did not find any constitutional violation, the constitutional issues remained in the case until the entire dispute was settled by the entry of a consent decree. Under these circumstances, petitioner’s Eleventh Amendment claim is foreclosed by our decision in Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678.
In Hutto, we rejected the argument of the Attorney General of Arkansas that the general language of § 1988 was insufficient to overcome a State’s claim of immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, noting that “[t]he Court has never viewed the Eleventh Amendment as barring such awards, even in suits between States and individual litigants.” Id., at 695. Moreover, even if the Eleventh Amendment would otherwise present a barrier to an award of fees against a State, Congress was clearly acting within its power under i 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment in removing that barrier. Under § 5 Congress may pass any legislation that is appropriate to enforce the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. A statute awarding attorney’s fees to a person who prevails on a Fourteenth Amendment claim falls within the category of “appropriate” legislation. And clearly Congress was not limited to awarding fees only when a constitutional or civil rights claim is actually decided. We agree with the courts below that Congress was acting within its enforcement power in allowing the award of fees in a case in which the plaintiff prevails on a wholly statutory, non-civil-rights claim pendent to a substantial constitutional claim or in one in which both a statutory and a substantial constitutional claim are settled favorably to the plaintiff without adjudication. As the Court of Appeals pointed out, such a fee award “furthers the Congressional goal of encouraging suits to vindicate constitutional rights without undermining the longstanding judicial policy of avoiding unnecessary decision of important constitutional issues.” 594 F. 2d, at 342. It is thus an appropriate means of enforcing substantive rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The judgment is affirmed.
So ordered.
The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 2641, provides:
“In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1977, 1978, 1979, 1980, and 1981 of the Revised Statutes, title IX of Public Law 92-318, or in any civil action or proceeding, by or on behalf of the United States of America, to enforce, or charging a violation of, a provision of the United States Internal Revenue Code, or title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the cpsts.”
This statute is codifiéá in 42 U. S. C. § 1988; in the codification § 1979 of the Revised Statutes has been renumbered to refer to § 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code.
The action was filed against petitioner’s predecessor in oflice, Nicholas Norton, Commissioner of Welfare of the State of Connecticut. The title of the position has since been changed to “Commissioner of Income Maintenance.” We shall simply refer to the Commissioner as “petitioner.”
Connecticut’s Department of Social Services Manual provided that only certain enumerated expenses could be deducted; the amounts allowed for lunches and automobile transportation were limited to 50 cents per working day and 6 cents per mile respectively. App. 66. The complaint alleged that respondent's actual transportation expenses were 13.9 cents per mile and that her meal expenses amounted to $1.65 per day. Id., at 8.
The statute requires States to take into reasonably attributable to the earning of . . . income.” In Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U. S. 251, this Court held that participating States could not place arbitrary limits on the amount of work-related expenses that could be claimed by recipients. Although States may use standardized allowances for the sake of administrative convenience, they must give recipients the opportunity to demonstrate that their actual expenses exceed the standard.
In her complaint respondent alleged:
“28. Defendants’ practice and policy constitute an against persons whose work-related expenses exceed the allowances set forth in Index 332.31 and violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution by forbidding plaintiff and the class she represents ever from controverting the presumption that their work-related expenses exceeding the transportation and food allowances of Index 332.31 are reasonable.
“32. Defendants’ practice and policy violate the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution in that:
“a) Defendants’ practice sumption that the plaintiff’s work-related transportation and lunch allowances are unreasonable and operate to deny plaintiff and the class she represents a fair opportunity to rebut it.
“b) The standard lunch and transportation aEowances Index 332.31 are arbitrary in that they were not developed by a statisti-caUy fair averaging, nor do they reflect current prices.” App. 9-10.
“Every person, who, under color any custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.”
Title 28 U. S. C. §§ 1343 (3) and (4) provide as follows:
“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any person:
“(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States;
“(4) To recover damages or to secure equitable or other relief under any Act of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights, including the right to vote.”
As is customary, the consent decree did not purport to adjudicate respondent’s statutory or constitutional claims. Rather, it explicitly stated that “[n]othing in this Consent Decree is intended to constitute an admission of fault by either party to this action.” App. 76.
The court rejected petitioner’s constitutional claim on two grounds. First, it held that the Eleventh Amendment does not apply to an award of attorney’s fees because such fees are ancillary to the imposition of prospective relief within the reasoning of Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651. Second, the court held that, even if the Eleventh Amendment did apply, Congress had the power to authorize the assessment of fees in a case such as this under the Fourteenth Amendment:
“The State contends, however, that Congress’ power under the Fourteenth Amendment to override state sovereign immunity extends only to suits in which a party prevails on a constitutional claim. On this view, Congress cannot validly authorize a fee award against a state in the absence of a judicial determination that plaintiff had a meritorious constitutional claim. We disagree. We think it is within Congress’ Fourteenth Amendment power to authorize a fee award when a party prevails on a statutory claim as long as the pendent constitutional claim is a substantial one and arises out of the same operative facts. Such a fee award furthers the Congressional goal of encouraging suits to vindicate constitutional rights without undermining the longstanding judicial policy of avoiding unnecessary decision of important constitutional issues. As we understand the Supreme Court decisions, any appropriate means of implementing the Fourteenth Amendment overrides the State’s Eleventh Amendment rights, see, e. g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, supra, 427 U. S., at 453, 456; Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U. S. 641, 648-650 (1966). We hold that the authorization of attorneys’ fees to be awarded under the standards set forth above is an appropriate way to achieve the competing goals described above.” (Emphasis in original.) 594 F. 2d, at 342-343.
Petitioner ignores the fact that respondent did allege constitutional claims which the District Court and the Court of Appeals both found to be sufficiently substantial to support federal jurisdiction under Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U. S. 528. Under these circumstances petitioner could not have prevailed on his statutory argument even if the Court had reached the opposite result in Thihoutot. See n. 15, infra.
The jurisdictional statute at issue in Chapman, 28 U. S. C. § 1343, specifically limits district court jurisdiction to cases in which the plaintiff alleges a violation of a right secured by the Constitution or by a federal statute “providing for equal rights” or “civil rights.” Inasmuch as it does not create substantive rights at all, but merely provides a remedy for the violation of rights conferred by the Constitution or other statutes, § 1983 does not fall within the category of statutes providing for equal rights or civil rights. Therefore, there is not automatically federal jurisdiction under § 1343 whenever a plaintiff files a § 1983 claim; rather, the court must look to the underlying substantive right that was allegedly violated to determine whether that right was conferred by the Constitution or by a civil rights statute.
Section 1988 does not contain language like that in § 1343. Rather, § 1988 provides that attorney’s fees may be awarded to the prevailing party “[i]n any action or proceeding to enforce [§ 1983].” Although the reference to actions “to enforce” § 1983 is somewhat imprecise in light of the fact that § 1983 does not itself create substantive rights, the legislative history makes it perfectly clear that the Act was intended to apply in any action for which § 1983 provides a remedy. See Maine v. Thiboutot, ante, at 9-10.
The Eleventh Amendment provides:
“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”
The Eleventh Amendment issue was not before the Court in Thiboutot because that case involved an award of fees by a state court pursuant to § 1988. Ante, at 9, n. 7.
“The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”
Referring to the argument of the Attorney General, we said:
“[H]e argues that these plain indications of legislative intent are not enough. In his view, Congress must enact express statutory language making the States hable if it wishes to abrogate their immunity. The Attorney General points out that this Court has sometimes refused to impose retroactive liability on the States in the absence of an extraordinarily explicit statutory mandate. See Employees v. Missouri Public Health & Welfare Dept., 411 U. S. 279; see also Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651. But these cases concern retroactive liability for prelitigation conduct rather than expenses incurred in litigation seeking only prospective relief.
“The Act imposes attorney’s fees ‘as part of the costs.’ Costs have traditionally been awarded without regard for the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity. The practice of awarding costs against the States goes back to 1849 in this Court. See Missouri v. Iowa, 7 How. 660, 681; North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U. S. 583 (collecting cases). The Court has never viewed the Eleventh Amendment as barring such awards, even in suits between States and individual litigants.
“In Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Minnesota, 275 U. S. 70, the State challenged this Court’s award of costs, but we squarely rejected the State’s claim of immunity. Far from requiring an explicit abrogation of state immunity, we relied on a statutory mandate that was entirely silent on the question of state liability. The power to make the award was supported by ‘the inherent authority of the Court in the orderly administration of justice as between all parties litigant.’ Id., at 74. A federal court’s interest in orderly, expeditious proceedings ‘justifies [it] in treating the state just as any other litigant and in imposing costs upon it’ when an award is called for. Id., at 77.
“Just as a federal court may treat a State like any other litigant when it assesses costs, so also may Congress amend its definition of taxable costs and have the amended class of costs apply to the States, as it does to all other litigants, without expressly stating that it intends to abrogate the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity. For it would be absurd to require an express reference to state litigants whenever a filing fee, or a new item, such as an expert witness’ fees, is added to the category of taxable costs.” 437 U. S., at 696-697 (footnotes omitted).
The legislative history makes it clear that Congress intended fees to be awarded where a pendent constitutional claim is involved, even if the statutory claim on which the plaintiff prevailed is one for which fees cannot be awarded under the Act. The Report of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of' Representatives accompanying H. R. 15460, a bill substantially identical to the Senate bill that was finally enacted, stated:
“To the extent a plaintiff joins a claim under one of the statutes enumerated in H. R. 15460 with a claim that does not allow attorney fees, that plaintiff, if it prevails on the non-fee claim, is entitled to a determination on the other claim for the purpose of awarding counsel fees. Morales v. Haines, 486 F. 2d 880 (7th Cir. 1073). In some instances, however, the claim with fees may involve a constitutional question which the courts are reluctant to resolve if the non-constitutional claim is dispositive. Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U. S. 528 (1974). In such cases, if the claim for which fees may be awarded meets the 'substantiality’ test, see Hagans v. Lavine, supra; United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715 (1966), attorney’s fees may be allowed even though the court declines to enter judgment for the plaintiff on that claim, so long as the plaintiff prevails on the non-fee claim arising out of a 'common nucleus of operative fact.' United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, supra, at 725.” H. R. Rep. No. 94-1558, p. 4, n. 7 (1976).
Petitioner seeks to distinguish this case from Hutto v. Finney on the ground that Hutto involved an adjudication of a constitutional violation, rather than a statutory violation. However, as Mr. Justice Rehnquist noted in his dissent, 437 U. S., at 717-718, the underlying claim in Hutto was predicated on the Eighth Amendment as made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment rather than on any substantive provision of the Fourteenth Amendment itself. The prisoners’ claim in Hutto was therefore arguably more analogous to the statutory claim involved in this ease than to the constitutional claims asserted here or to the equal protection claim asserted in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | F | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Stewart
delivered the opinion of the Court.
On September 10, 1960, three days before the New Hampshire Democratic Party’s primary election of candidates for the United States Senate, the Concord Monitor, a daily newspaper in Concord, New Hampshire, published a syndicated “D. C. Merry-Go-Round” column discussing the forthcoming election. The column spoke of political maneuvering in the primary campaign, referred to the criminal records of several of the candidates, and characterized Alphonse Roy, one of the candidates, as a “former small-time bootlegger.” Roy was not elected in the primary, and he subsequently sued the Monitor Patriot Co. and the North American Newspaper Alliance (NANA), the distributor of the column, for libel.
The newspaper and NANA offered “truth” as their primary defense at trial, and evidence was presented on the issue of whether or not Roy had in fact been a bootlegger during the prohibition era. The defendants also alleged that they had published in good faith, without malice, with a reasonable belief in the probable truth of the charge, and on a lawful occasion. At the close of the evidence, the trial judge instructed the jury at great length on the law to be applied to the case. Three possible defenses emerged from these jury instructions.
First, the trial judge told the jury that Roy was a “public official” by virtue of his candidacy in the primary. As a consequence, a special rule, requiring a showing that the article was false and had been published with “knowledge of its falsity or with a reckless disregard of whether it was false or true,” would apply so long as the libel concerned “official conduct” as opposed to “private conduct.” This private-public distinction was elaborated as follows: “Is it more probable than otherwise that the publication that the plaintiff was a former small-time bootlegger was a public affair on a par with official conduct of public officials?” The trial judge went on:
“As a candidate for the United States Senate, the plaintiff was within the public official concept, and a candidate must surrender to public scrutiny and discussion so much of his private character as affects his fitness for office. That is, anything which might touch on Alphonse Roy’s fitness for the office of United States Senator would come within the concept of official conduct. If it would not touch upon or be relevant to his fitness for the office for which he was a candidate but was rather a bringing forward of the plaintiff’s long forgotten misconduct in which the public had no interest, then it would be a private matter in the private sector.”
The judge then instructed the jury that if it found the libel to be in the “public sector” it must bring in a verdict for NANA, since there had been no evidence that NANA had engaged in knowing or reckless falsehood, but that it still had to decide on the “preponderance of the evidence” whether the newspaper was liable.
Supposing the publication to be in the “private sector,” the trial judge instructed the jury that there were two possible defenses available to the newspaper and NANA. The first was “justification,” which would prevail if the jury found that the article was both true and published on a “lawful occasion.” The second defense was “conditional privilege,” which could prevail even if the jury found the article to be false, but only if it also found that its publication was “on a lawful occasion, in good faith, for a justifiable purpose, and with a belief founded on reasonable grounds of the truth of the matter published.”
The jury returned a verdict of $20,000, of which $10,000 was against the newspaper and $10,000 against NANA. On appeal, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, holding that the trial judge properly sent to the jury the question of whether or not the particular libel alleged was “relevant” to Roy’s fitness for office. 109 N. H. 441, 254 A. 2d 832. We granted certiorari in order to consider the constitutional issues presented by the case. 397 U. S. 904.
I
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 279-280, we held that the First and Fourteenth Amendments require “a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with ‘actual malice’ — that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” The rule of New York Times was based on a recognition that the First Amendment guarantee of a free press is inevitably in tension with state libel laws designed to secure society’s interest in the protection of individual reputation. The approach of New York Times was to identify a class of person- — ■ there public officials — and a type of activity — there official conduct — and to require as to defamations respecting them a particularly high standard of liability — knowing falsehood or reckless disregard of the truth. Later cases have made it clear that the applicability of this basic approach is not limited to those in public office or to the performance of official acts, or, for that matter, to conventional civil libel suits. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 64; Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U. S. 130; Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Assn. v. Bresler, 398 U. S. 6.
This case went to the jury in December 1966, after our decisions in New York Times and Garrison, but before Curtis and Greenbelt. The trial judge instructed the jury that Roy, as a candidate for elective public office, was a “public official,” and that characterization has not been challenged here. Given the later cases, it might be preferable to categorize a candidate as a “public figure,” if for no other reason than to avoid straining the common meaning of words. But the question is of no importance so far as the standard of liability in this case is concerned, for it is abundantly clear that, whichever term is applied, publications concerning candidates must be accorded at least as much protection under the First and Fourteenth Amendments as those concerning occupants of public office. That New York Times itself was intended to apply to candidates, in spite of the use of the more restricted “public official” terminology, is readily apparent from that opinion’s text and citations to case law. And if it be conceded that the First Amendment was “fashioned to assure the unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people,” Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, 484, then it can hardly be doubted that the constitutional guarantee has its fullest and most urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office.
II
The jury in this case returned verdicts against both the newspaper and NANA. It is clear, therefore, that it found the bootlegger charge to be in the “private sector,” since it had been instructed that unless it so found it could not impose liability on NANA. It is possible that having made this determination, it then concluded that the charge was true but “unjustified”— that is, that it had been published without a “lawful occasion.” In any event, under the trial judge’s instructions it was also free to return a money verdict if it found that the publication was false and had not been made “in good faith,” for a “justifiable purpose,” and with a “belief founded on reasonable grounds of the truth of the matter published.” Since this standard is far less stringent than that of knowing falsehood or reckless disregard of the truth, the judgment must be reversed unless it can be shown that the New York Times rule is not applicable because of the nature of the libel in question. Cf. Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron, post, p. 295.
The respondent argues that under New York Times a plaintiff has a special burden of proof only as to libels “relating to official conduct,” that for a candidate “official conduct” means “conduct relevant to fitness for office,” and that the public-private issue is one of fact for the jury. In our view, however, the syllogistic manipulation of distinctions between “private sectors” and “public sectors,” or matters of fact and matters of law, is of little utility in resolving questions of First Amendment protection.
In Garrison v. Louisiana, supra, we reversed a conviction for criminal libel of a man who had charged that a group of state court judges were inefficient, took excessive vacations, opposed official investigations of vice, and were possibly subject to “racketeer influences.” The Louisiana Supreme Court had held that these statements were not “criticisms. ... of the manner in which any one of the eight judges conducted his court when in session,” but rather were accusations of crime and “personal attacks upon the integrity and honesty” of the judges. This Court rejected the proposed distinction:
“Of course, any criticism of the manner in which a public official performs his duties will tend to affect his private, as well as his public, reputation. The New York Times rule is not rendered inapplicable merely because an official’s private reputation, as well as his public reputation, is harmed. The public-official rule protects the paramount public interest in a free flow of information to the people concerning public officials, their servants. To this end, anything which might touch on an official’s fitness for office is relevant. New personal attributes are more germane to fitness for office than dishonesty, malfeasance, or improper motivation, even though these characteristics may also affect the official’s private character.” 379 U. S., at 76-77.
Cf. Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron, supra.
The considerations that led us thus to reformulate the “official conduct” rule of New York Times in terms of “anything which might touch on an official’s fitness for office” apply with special force to the case of the candidate. Indeed, whatever vitality the “official conduct” concept may retain with regard to occupants of public office, cf. Garrison, supra, at 72 n. 8, it is clearly of little applicability in the context of an election campaign. The principal activity of a candidate in our political system, his “office,” so to speak, consists in putting before the voters every conceivable aspect of his public and private life that he thinks may lead the electorate to gain a good impression of him. A candidate who, for example, seeks to further his cause through the prominent display of his wife and children can hardly argue that his qualities as a husband or father remain of “purely private” concern. And the candidate who vaunts his spotless record and sterling integrity cannot convincingly cry “Foul!” when an opponent or an industrious reporter attempts to demonstrate the contrary. Any test adequate to safeguard First Amendment guarantees in this area must go far beyond the customary meaning of the phrase “official conduct.”
Given the realities of our political life, it is by no means easy to see what statements about a candidate might be altogether without relevance to his fitness for the office he seeks. The clash of reputations is the staple of election campaigns, and damage to reputation is, of course, the essence of libel. But whether there remains some exiguous area of defamation against which a candidate may have full recourse is a question we need not decide in this case. The trial judge presented the issue to the jury in the form of the question: “Is it more probable than otherwise that the publication that the plaintiff was a former small-time bootlegger was a public affair on a par with official conduct of public officials?” This instruction, and the others like it, left the jury far more leeway to act as censors than is consistent with the protection of the First and Fourteenth Amendments in the setting of a political campaign.
The application of the traditional concepts of tort law to the conduct of a political campaign is bound to raise dangers for freedom of speech and of the press. The reasonable-man standard of liability, for example, serves admirably the essential function of imposing an objective and socially acceptable limit on the freedom of an individual to act with relation to others. But under our system of government, we have chosen to afford protection even to “opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught with death,” Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 616, 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting). A community that imposed legal liability on all statements in a political campaign deemed “unreasonable” by a jury would have abandoned the First Amendment as we know it. Likewise, a “preponderance of the evidence” burden of proof plays an indispensable role in the control of private negligence. But we have recognized that in the realm of political belief “the tenets of one man may seem the rankest error to his neighbor,” and that the advocates whom we protect may resort to “exaggeration, to vilification of men who have been, or are, prominent in church or state, and even to false statement,” Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 310. It is simply inconsistent with this commitment to permit the imposition of liability for political speech that “more probably than otherwise” in the opinion of the jury “would not touch upon or be relevant” to a candidate’s fitness for office. Cf. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513, 525-526; Smith v. California, 361 U. S. 147.
It is perhaps unavoidable that in the area of tension between the Constitution and the various state laws of defamation there will be some uncertainty as to what publications are and what are not protected. The mental element of “knowing or reckless disregard” required under the New York Times test, for example, is not always easy of ascertainment. “Inevitably its outer limits will be marked out through case-by-case adjudication, as is true with so many legal standards for judging concrete cases, whether the standard is provided by the Constitution, statutes, or case law.” St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U. S. 727, 730-731. But there is a major, and in this case decisive, difference between liability based on a standard of care, and liability based on a judgment of the “relevance” of a past incident of criminal conduct to an official’s or a candidate’s fitness for office. A standard of care “can be neutral with respect to content of the speech involved, free of historical taint, and adjusted to strike a fair balance between the interests of the community in free circulation of information and those of individuals in seeking recompense for harm done by the circulation of defamatory falsehood.” Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, supra, at 153 (opinion of Harlan, J.). A standard of “relevance,” on the other hand, especially such a standard applied by a jury under the preponderance-of-the-evidence test, is unlikely to be neutral with respect to the content of speech and holds a real danger of becoming an instrument for the suppression of those “vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks,” New York Times, supra, at 270, which must be protected if the guarantees of the First and Fourteenth Amendments are to prevail.
We therefore hold as a matter of constitutional law that a charge of criminal conduct, no matter how remote in time or place, can never be irrelevant to an official’s or a candidate’s fitness for office for purposes of application of the “knowing falsehood or reckless disregard” rule of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. Since the jury in this case was permitted to make its own unguided determination that the charge of prior criminal activity was not “relevant,” and that the New York Times standard was thus inapplicable, the judgment must be reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
[For concurring opinion of Mr. Justice White, see post, p. 301.]
The text of the portion of the column concerning the New Hampshire primary was as follows:
“Political Snafu
“Rock-ribbed Republican New Hampshire, whose ex-Gov. Sherman Adams was top kick in the White House for years and whose Sen. Styles Bridges is still top kick on the GOP side of the Senate, is so fouled up in a primary snafu that the state may go Democratic this year. The primary verdict is due next Tuesday.
“Even that able Senate stalwart, Styles Bridges, is restirring himself. He has nothing to worry about from his Republican opponent, but the Democrats have put up a dynamic Dartmouth professor, Herbert Hill, against him. The professor came within 11,000 votes of defeating Sherman Adams, lately of vicuna-coat fame, in the 1948 gubernatorial race.
“Curiously, the Democratic primary has been cluttered with a motley assortment of candidates who have challenged Hill for the privilege of running against Bridges. That sly, old Republican disclaims any connection with it, but he appears pleased over the muddying of Democratic waters.
“One of Hill’s primary opponents Frank L. Sullivan, was released from the Grasmere County Work Farm just in time to file for the Senate. With a police record of no fewer than 19 convictions for drunkenness since 1945, he was serving his latest 90-day sentence.
“Curious Call
“To make sure he would get out in time to run for the Senate, a former small-time bootlegger and later U. S. Marshal, Alphonse Roy, telephoned the Grasmere warden about Sullivan.
“Ralph LaVallee in charge of Grasmere, admitted to this column that he had received a telephone inquiry from Roy as to whether Sullivan would be released in time to file. But the warden denied another report that Roy had announced he was calling ‘on behalf of my friend Styles.’
“ ‘I don’t want to get implicated in anything like that,’ said LaVallee, ‘Roy didn’t mention Senator Bridges/
“Sullivan happily got out of the workhouse in time to run for the most distinguished legislative body in the world. And who should turn up on the ballot but the same Alphonse Roy who was so eager to get him out of the clink.
“Because of the peculiar population division of New Hampshire, the Irish Catholics may be inclined to vote for a Frank Sullivan while the French Canadians could be attracted by a name like Alphonse Roy. The effect would be to cut down Herb Hill’s chances.
“Convicts For Senator
“Two other curious candidates, who tried to run in the Democratic primary against Hill, were Harold P. McCarthy who has a record of nine convictions for drunkenness, assault, and brawling, and Clement P. Robinson Jr., who has a record of six brushes with the law for drunkenness and traffic violations. Robinson also received a 30-day suspended sentence for stealing two power lawnmowers and a conviction for the nonsupport of his wife and three children.
"But at least Professor Hill managed to persuade the New Hampshire Ballot Law Commission into knocking McCarthy and Robinson off the ballot,”
The trial judge gave the jury the following definition of a “lawful occasion”:
“If the end to be attained by the publication is justifiable, that is, to give useful information to those who have a right and ought to know in order that they may act upon such information, the occasion is lawful. Where, however, there is merely the color of a lawful occasion and the defendant, instead of acting in good faith, assumes to act for some justifiable end merely as a pretense to publish and circulate defamatory matter, or for other unlawful purpose, he is liable in the same manner as if such pretense had not been resorted to.”
The trial judge placed the burden of showing a “lawful occasion” on the defendants.'
One of the citations was to a Kansas decision which admirably-stated the case for the inclusion of candidates within the rule:
“[I]t is of the utmost consequence that the people should discuss the character and qualifications of candidates for their suffrages. The importance to the state and to society of such discussions is so vast, and the advantages derived are so great, that they more than counterbalance the inconvenience of private persons whose conduct may be involved, and occasional injury to the reputations of individuals must yield to the public welfare, although at times such injury may be great. The public benefit from publicity is so great, and the chance of injury to private character so small, that such discussion must be privileged.” Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 724, 98 P. 281, 286 (1908).
A commentator writing in 1949 described the ambience as follows : “Charges of gross incompetence, disregard of the public interest, communist sympathies, and the like have usually filled the air; and hints of bribery, embezzlement, and other criminal conduct are not infrequent. If actionable defamation is possible in this field, one might suppose that the chief energies of the courts, for some time after every political campaign, would be absorbed by libel and slander suits.” Noel, Defamation of Public Officers and Candidates, 49 Col. L. Rev. 875,
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | C | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Black
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The petitioner, Gunther, worked as a fireman for respondent railroad for eight years, from 1916 to 1924, and as an engineer for 30 years, from 1924 until December 30, 1954. On that date, shortly after his seventy-first birthday, he was removed from active service because of an alleged physical disability. The railroad’s action was taken on the basis of reports made by its physicians, after physical examinations of petitioner, that in their opinion he was no longer physically qualified to work as a locomotive engineer because his “heart was in such condition that he would be likely to suffer an acute coronary episode.” Dissatisfied with the railroad doctors’ findings, Mr. Gunther went to a recognized specialist who, after examination, concluded that petitioner was qualified physically to continue work as an engineer. On the basis of this report petitioner requested the railroad to join him in the selection of a three-doctor board to re-examine his physical qualifications for return to service. The railroad refused. This disagreement led to prolonged litigation which has reached us 11 years after the controversy arose.
When the railroad refused to consent to the appointment of a new board of doctors to re-examine petitioner or to restore him to service, he filed a claim for reinstatement and back pay with the Railroad Adjustment Board, which was created by § 3 of the Railway Labor Act, as amended, to adjust, among other things, disputes of railroads and their employees “growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements concerning . . . rules, or working conditions . ...” The Adjustment Board, over the protests of the railroad, decided it had jurisdiction of the grievance and then, referring to past practice in similar cases, proceeded, as its findings show, to appoint a committee of three qualified physicians, to re-examine petitioner, “one chosen by carrier and one by the employe and the third by the two so selected, for the purpose of determining the facts as to claimant’s disability and the propriety of his removal from service.. ..” Subsequently, this committee of doctors examined petitioner and decided by a majority vote that he was physically qualified to act as an engineer, contrary to the prior findings of the railroad’s doctors. Upon the basis of these findings the Adjustment Board decided that the railroad had been wrong in disqualifying petitioner for service and sustained his claim “for reinstatement with pay for all time lost from October 15, 1955 . . . .” The railroad refused to comply with the Board’s order and petitioner as authorized by the Act filed this action in a district court of the United States for an appropriate court order to enforce the Adjustment Board’s award. After hearings the District Court, in its third opinion in the case, held the award erroneous and refused to enforce it. The District Court’s refusal was based on its conclusion that there were no express or implied provisions in the collective bargaining contract which in the court’s judgment limited in any way what it found to be the absolute right of the railroad, in absence of such provisions, to remove petitioner from active service whenever its physicians found in good faith “that plaintiff was physically disqualified from such service.” The Court of Appeals affirmed, agreeing with the interpretation put upon the contract by the District Court, and thereby rejected the Board’s interpretation of the contract and its decision on the merits of the dispute. 336 F. 2d 543. We granted certiorari because the holding of the two courts below seemed, in several respects, to run counter to the requirements of the Railway Labor Act as we have construed it. 380 U. S. 905.
I. Section 3 First (i) of the Railway Labor Act provides that “disputes between an employee or group of employees and a carrier or carriers growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements” are to be handled by the Adjustment Board. In § 3 Congress has established an expert body to settle “minor” grievances like petitioner’s which arise from day to day in the railroad industry. The Railroad Adjustment Board, composed equally of representatives of management and labor is peculiarly familiar with the thorny problems and the whole range of grievances that constantly exist in the railroad world. Its membership is in daily contact with workers and employers, and knows the industry’s language, customs, and practices. See Slocum v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 339 U. S. 239, 243-244. The Board’s decision here fairly read shows that it construed the collective bargaining provisions which secured seniority rights, together with other provisions of the contract, as justifying an interpretation of the contract guaranteeing to petitioner “priority in service according to his seniority and pursuant to the agreement so long as he is physically qualified.” The District Court, whose opinion was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, however, refused to accept the Board’s interpretation of this contract. Paying strict attention only to the bare words of the contract'and invoking old common-law rules for the interpretation of private employment contracts, the District Court found nothing in the agreement restricting the railroad’s right to remove its employees for physical disability upon the good-faith findings of disability by its own physicians. Certainly it cannot be said that the Board’s interpretation was wholly baseless and completely without reason. We hold that the District Court and the Court of Appeals as well went beyond their province in rejecting the Adjustment Board’s interpretation of this railroad collective bargaining agreement. As hereafter pointed out Congress, in the Railway Labor Act, invested the Adjustment Board with the broad power to arbitrate grievances and plainly intended that interpretation of these controversial provisions should be submitted for the decision of railroad men, both workers and management, serving on the Adjustment Board with their long experience and accepted expertise in this field.
II. The courts below were also of the opinion that the Board went beyond its jurisdiction in appointing a medical board of three physicians to decide for it the question of fact relating to petitioner’s physical qualifications to act as an engineer. We do not agree. The Adjustment Board, of course, is not limited to common-law rules of evidence in obtaining information. The medical board was composed of three doctors, one of whom was appointed by the company, one by petitioner, and the third by these two doctors. This not only seems an eminently fair method of selecting doctors to perform this medical task but it appears from the record that it is commonly used in the railroad world for the very purpose it was used here. In fact the record shows that under respondent’s present collective bargaining agreement with its engineers provision is made for determining a dispute precisely like the one before us by the appointment of a board of doctors in precisely the manner the Board used here. This Court has said that the Railway Labor Act’s “provisions dealing with the Adjustment Board were to be considered as compulsory arbitration in this limited field.” On a question like the one before us here, involving the health of petitioner, and his physical ability to operate an engine, arbitrators would probably find it difficult to find a better method for arriving at the truth than by the use of doctors selected as these doctors were. We reject the idea that the Adjustment Board in some way breached its duty or went beyond its power in relying as it did upon the finding of this board of doctors.
III. Section 3 First (m) provides that Adjustment Board awards “shall be final and binding upon both parties to the dispute, except insofar as they shall contain a money award.” The award of the Board in this case, based on the central finding that petitioner was wrongfully removed from service is twofold, consisting both of an order of reinstatement and the money award for lost earnings. Thus there arises the question of whether the District Court may open up the Board’s finding on the merits that the railroad wrongfully removed petitioner from his job merely because one part of the Board’s order contained a money award. We hold it cannot. This Court time and again has emphasized and re-emphasized that Congress intended minor grievances of railroad workers to be decided finally by the Railroad Adjustment Board. In Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago River & Indiana R. Co., 353 U. S. 30, the Court gave a Board decision the same finality that a decision of arbitrators would have. In Union Pacific R. Co. v. Price, 360 U. S. 601, the Court discussed the legislative history of the Act at length and pointed out that it “was designed for effective and final decision of grievances which arise daily” and that its “statutory scheme cannot realistically be squared with the contention that Congress did not purpose to foreclose litigation in the courts over grievances submitted to and disposed of by the Board . . . .” 360 U. S., at 616. Also in Locomotive Engineers v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 373 U. S. 33, the Court said that prior decisions of this Court had made it clear that the Adjustment Board provisions were to be considered as “compulsory arbitration in this limited field,” p. 40, “the complete and final means for settling minor disputes,” p. 39, and “a mandatory, exclusive, and comprehensive system for resolving grievance disputes.” P. 38.
The Railway Labor Act as construed in the foregoing and other opinions of this Court does not allow a federal district court to review an Adjustment Board’s determination of the merits of a grievance merely because a part of the Board’s award, growing from its determination on the merits, is a money award. The basic grievance here — that is, the complaint that petitioner has been wrongfully removed from active service as an engineer because of health — has been finally, completely, and irrevocably settled by the Adjustment Board’s decision. Consequently, the merits of the wrongful removal issue as decided by the Adjustment Board must be accepted by the District Court.
IV. There remains the question of further proceedings in this case with respect to the money aspect of the Board’s award. The Board did not determine the amount of back pay due petitioner on account of his wrongful removal from service. It merely sustained petitioner’s claim for “reinstatement with pay for all time lost from October 15, 1955.” Though the Board’s finding on the merits of the wrongful discharge must be accepted by the District Court, it has power under the Act to determine the size of the money award. The distinction between court review of the merits of a grievance and the size of the money award was drawn in Locomotive Engineers v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., supra, at pp. 40-41, when it was said that the computation of a time-lost award is “an issue wholly separable from the merits of the wrongful discharge issue.” On this separable issue the District Court may determine in this action how much time has been lost by reason of the wrongful removal of petitioner from active service, and any proper issues that can be raised with reference to the amount of money necessary to compensate for the time lost. In deciding this issue as to how much money petitioner will be entitled to receive because of lost time, the District Court will bear in mind the fact that the decision on the merits of the wrongful removal issue related to the time when the Board heard and decided the case. Seven years have elapsed since that time, long enough for many changes to have occurred in connection with petitioner’s health. This would, of course, be relevant in determining the amount of money to be paid him in a lawsuit which can, as the statute provides, proceed on this separable issue “in all respects as other civil suits” where damages must be determined.
The judgments of the courts below are reversed and the cause is remanded to the District Court for consideration not inconsistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
48 Stat. 1185, 45 U. S. C.-§151 et seq. (1964 ed.).
Section 3 First (i), 48 Stat. 1191, 45 U. S. C. § 153 First (i) (1964 ed.). This section also provides that disputes between railroad employees and their employers “failing to reach an adjustment . . . may be referred by petition of the parties or by either party to the appropriate division of the Adjustment Board with a full statement of the facts and all supporting data bearing upon the disputes.”
Section 3 First (p), 48 Stat. 1192, 45 U. S. C. § 153 First (p) (1964 ed.), provides:
“If a carrier does not comply with an order of a division of the Adjustment Board within the time limit in such order, the petitioner . . . may file in the District Court of the United States for the district in which he resides or in which is located the principal operating office of the carrier ... a petition setting forth briefly . . . the order of the division of the Adjustment Board in the premises. Such suit in the District Court of the United States shall proceed in all respects as other civil suits, except that on the trial of such suit the findings and order of the division of the Adjustment Board shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated .... The district courts are empowered, under the rules of the court governing actions at law, to make such order and enter such judgment, by writ of mandamus or otherwise, as may be appropriate to enforce or set aside the order of the division of the Adjustment Board.”
192 F. Supp. 882, 198 F. Supp. 402. The third opinion written by the court is not reported.
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago River & Indiana R. Co., 353 U. S. 30, 39.
48 Stat. 1191, 45 U. S. C. § 153 First (m) (1964 ed.).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | I | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Black
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The basic question presented in this case is whether the United States can have adjudicated under one complaint (1) the claim by a third person of a valuable possessory interest in government property and (2) condemnation and value of that interest, if any. In 1947 the United States leased an airfield to respondent Illinois Aircraft Services & Sales Co. The preamble to the lease stated that because of the strategic value of the field the Government considered it essential to retain it “in a stand-by status for post-war use in connection with Naval Aviation activities . . . One paragraph of the lease provided:
“It is understood and agreed-that this lease will at all times be revocable at will'by the Government upon presentation of notice of cancellation to the Lessee, in writing, sixty (60) days prior to such termination, ... in event of a national emergency and a decision by the Secretary of the Navy that such revocation is essential.”
In 1954 the Army wanted to use the property for an aerial defense missile (NIKE) site. Timely notice of revocation was delivered to respondent under the signatures of the Secretaries of the Army and Navy, stating that a national emergency declared'by the President in 1950 was still in effect and that' both Secretaries deemed revocation of the lease essential.- Respondent declined to leave the land, claiming that the Government had gone beyond the authority granted by the lease in attempting to revoke it for use by the Army rather than in connection with Naval Aviation activities mentioned in the preamble to the lease.
In order to obtain possession and use of the land as soon as possible-^and without waiting to try out the validity of the prior revocation in a separate action or actions — the Government filed a complaint to condemn whatever possessory interest respondent might be adjudicated to have. Although the Government’s complaint alleged that it had revoked the lease and, in effect, .that respondent had no compensable interest1 in the property taken, the District Court ruled that by suing for condemnation the United States had “elected” to abandon its prior revocation. On this basis the court.found that respondent had a compensable interest and let a jury determine its value. Under instructions that the lease was revocable only if needed for “aviation purposes” and that a NIKE site was not such a purpose, the jury returned a $25,000 verdict for respondents. On appeal the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed this verdict by a divided court. 258 F. 2d 17. It held (1) that the doctrine of “election of remedies” applied and barred consideration of the revocation whether state or federal law governed and (2) that the lease could only be validly revoked under its terms if the ■ Government planned to use the land for “aviation purposes.” To review the severe restrictions the court’s holding places on the ability of the United States to get, quickly, land it may need for government purposes, .we granted certiorari. 358 U. S. 945.
We cannot agree that the lease permitted revocation only if the Government wanted the land for “aviation purposes.” It- is true that the preamble to the agreement states that the airfield was leased, rather than sold, because it was needed in stand-by status for naval aviation activities. It is also true that immediately following the preamble there is a statement, common in many contracts,’ that “Now Therefore, in consideration of the foregoing, and of the covenants hereinafter mentioned, the Government” leases the airport. There is no indication, however, either in the lease itself or as far as we have been shown in :the history of the agreement, that this preamble and the formal legal statement immediately, following it meant to limit the express and unequivocal clause of the lease allowing revocation at the will of the. Secretary of the Navy in the event of a national emergency. Instead the preamble can be easily understood; in view of the Surplus Property Act of 1944, which required all surplus property to be disposed of, as a mere statement of why the property was not considered surplus. In. addition the statute which authorized the airport lease provided that such leases shall be revocable “at any time, unless the Secretary shall determine that the omission of such provision from the lease will promote the national defense or will be in the public interest. In any event each such lease shall be revocable by the Secretary . . . during a national emergency declared by the President.” Under the circumstances, we cannot and will not assume that an explicit revocation clause in the lease means any less than it seems to mean. We therefore hold that the revocation was valid and effective.
It follows necessarily from this that application of the doctrine of “election of remedies” would put the Government in an impossible situation. For under the'doctrine, the Government must choose either to abandon its power to revoke the leasg or to give up its right to immediate possession under condemnation law, a right which is not. here questioned. We see no reason either in justice Or authority why such a Hobson’s choice should'be imposed and why the Government should be forced t.o pay for property which it rightfully owns merely because it attempted to avoid delays which the applicable laws seek to prevent. Such a strict rule against combining different causes of action would certainly be out of harmony with modern legislation and rules designed to make trials as efficient, expeditious and inexpensive as fairness will permit.
Respondents argue, however, that election of remedies is part of the law of Illinois and that Illinois law applies here. We cannot agree with this view. Condemnation involves essential governmental functions. See Kohl v. United States, 91 U. S. 367. We have often held that where essential interests of the Federal Government are concerned, federal law rules unless Congress chooses to make' state laws applicable. It is- apparent that no such choice has been made here.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Reversed.,
The preamble reads:
“Whereas, because of its strategic value, it is considered essential that the said airfield and the facilities thereon, comprising the said United States Naval Outlying Airfield, be retained in a stand-by status for post-war use in connection with Naval Aviation activities; and
“Whereas, the use of the airfield and facilities- by the Lessee . . . will in no wise be detrimental to the present activities of the Navy Department, but is on the contrary deemed to be in the'best interest of the Government.”
The decision of the court below is also'in apparent conflict with United States v. San Geronimo Dev. Co., 154 F. 2d 78 (C. A. 1st Cir.), and United States v. Turner, 175 F. 2d 644 (C. A. 5th Cir.).
58 Stat. 767-770, 777, as amended, 50 U. S. C. App. (1946 ed.) §§ 1612 (e), 1613, 1620, 1632.
61 Stat. 774, 34 U. S. C. § 522a. The current version of this statute is found in 10 U. S. C. (Supp. V) § 2667. We assume without deciding that this statute is applicable although an argument can be made for the applicability of a prior statute. That law provided that leases must be “revocable at any time.” 39 Stat. 559, 34 U. S. C. (1946 ed.) § 522.
Cf. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U. S. 41, 48. See also Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., 1, 2, 18.
See, e. g., Kohl v. United States, 91 U. S. 367, 374; United States v. Miller, 317 U. S. 369, 380; Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U. S. 363; Bank of America Nat. T. & S. Assn. v. Parnell, 352 U. S. 29.
Respondents rely on 26 Stat. 316, as amended, 50 U. S. C. § 171, which provided that condemnation’ proceedings like the one here involved were “to be prosecutéd in accordance with the laws relating to suits for the condemnation of property of the States wherein the proceedings may be instituted.” But it is settled that this language required conformity in procedural matters only. See United States v. Miller, 317 U. S. 369, 379-380 (citing 25 Stat. 94); Kanakanui v. United States, 244 F. 923; Nebraska v. United States, 164 F. 2d 866, affirming United States v. 19,573.59 Acres of Land, 70 F. Supp. 610. And insofar as it required such procedural conformity it was clearly repealed by Rule 71A, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, at the time this suit was brought. It follows that federal law was wholly applicable to this case. In reaching this conclusion we express no opinion on the possible effect on other cases of the re-enactment of this conformity- clause in 70A Stat. 148, 10 U. S. C. (Supp. V) § 2663 (a) (1956), or its subsequent repeal, retroactive to the time of re-enactment, by the Act of September 2, 1958. 72 Stat. 1565, 1568.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | H | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
This case arises on a petition for certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which affirmed petitioner’s conviction on 10 counts of interstate transportation of property obtained by fraud, in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 2314, and on 12 counts of mail fraud, in violation of 18 U. S. C. 1 1341. 626 F. 2d 868. The court affirmed the interstate transportation convictions on the merits, and declined to address the “rather complex issues” presented by the mail fraud convictions, invoking the discretionary “concurrent sentence” doctrine. App. to Pet. for Cert. 6-7; see Barnes v. United States, 412 U. S. 837, 848, n. 16 (1973); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U. S. 784, 787-793 (1969). In light of the Solicitor General’s concession in this Court that the mail fraud convictions were invalid, Memorandum in Opposition 4-5, we grant the motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, grant certiorari, vacate the judgment of the Ninth Circuit affirming the mail fraud convictions, and remand for reconsideration of the applicability of the “concurrent sentence” doctrine to a conviction conceded by the United States to be erroneous.
It is so ordered.
Justice White dissents, essentially for the reasons stated by Justice Rehnquist in his dissenting, opinion.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | A | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
On November 5,1951, we ordered this cause “continued for such period as will enable counsel for petitioner to secure a determination from the Supreme Court of California as to whether the judgment herein was intended to rest on an adequate independent state ground or whether decision of the federal claim was necessary to the judgment rendered.” 342 U. S. 33, 34 (1951).
We have not yet been advised whether the Supreme Court of California has conducted any further proceedings in this case or has so entered as to become a part of the record, any order, opinion or certificate after November 5, 1951. We do not regard a letter, not apparently a part of the case record, received by the Clerk of this Court on March 31, 1952, signed by the Clerk of the Supreme Court of California as a sufficient “determination” of the question raised in our order of November 5, 1951.
Accordingly, the cause is ordered further continued for such period as will enable counsel for petitioner to secure from the Supreme Court of California its official determination as requested in our order of November 5, 1951.
Cause continued.
Mr. Justice Douglas, being of the opinion that the federal question in the case has been fully exposed, dissents.
Mr. Justice Minton took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | I | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Black
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents questions as to the validity of an order issued by petitioner, the Postmaster General, which directed that mail addressed to some of respondents be returned to the senders marked “Fraudulent,” and that postal money order sums payable to their order be returned to the remitters.
The respondent Publishers Service Company has conducted many contests to promote the circulation of newspapers in which it has advertised that prizes would be given for the solution of puzzles. Through its corporate subsidiaries, respondents Literary Classics, Inc., and Read Magazine, Inc., it publishes books and two monthly magazines called Read and Facts. The place of business is in New York City.
In 1945 respondents to promote sales of their books put on a nationally advertised project, known as the Facts Magazine Hall of Fame Puzzle Contest. The Postmaster General after a hearing found “upon evidence satisfactory to him” that the “puzzle contest” was “a scheme or device for obtaining money through the mails by means of false and fraudulent pretenses, representations, and promises, in violation of sections 259 and 732 of title 39, United States Code . . . .” Specifically, the Postmaster General found that the representations were false and fraudulent for two principal reasons. First, that prospective contestants were falsely led to believe that they might be eligible to win prizes upon payment of $3 as a maximum sum when in reality the minimum requirement was $9, and as it later developed they were finally called on to pay as much as $42 to be eligible for increased prize offers. Second, the Postmaster General found that though the contest was emphasized in advertisements as a “puzzle contest” it was not a puzzle contest; that respondents knew from experience that the puzzles were so easy that many people would solve all the “puzzles” and that prizes would be awarded only as a result of a tie-breaking letter-essay contest; and that contestants were deliberately misled concerning all these facts by artfully composed advertisements.
The contest was under the immediate supervision of respondents Henry Walsh Lee and Judith S. Johnson, editor-in-chief and “contest editor” respectively of Facts. The Postmaster General’s original fraud order related to mail and money orders directed to
“Puzzle Contest, Facts Magazine; Contest Editor, Facts Magazine; Judith S. Johnson, Contest Editor; Miss J. S. Johnson, Contest Editor; Contest Editor; Facts Magazine; and Henry Walsh Lee, Editor in Chief, Facts Magazine, and their officers and agents as such, at New York, New York.”
Respondents filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to enjoin enforcement of the order. They alleged its invalidity on the grounds that there was no substantial evidence to support the Postmaster General’s findings of fraud, and that the statutory provisions under which the order was issued authorize the Postmaster General to act as a censor and hence violate the First Amendment. The District Court issued a temporary restraining order but directed that pending further orders respondents should deposit in court all moneys and the proceeds of all checks and money orders received through the mails as qualifying fees for the Hall of Fame Puzzle Contest. After a hearing the respondents’ motion for summary judgment was granted on the ground that the findings were not supported by substantial evidence. 63 F. Supp. 318. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed on the same ground, one judge dissenting. 158 F. 2d 542. We granted certiorari.
The case has been twice argued in this Court. Briefs of both parties on the first argument dealt only with the question of whether the Postmaster General’s findings of fraud were supported by substantial evidence. But assuming validity of the findings, questions arose during the first oral argument concerning the scope of the fraud order. That order had included a direction to the New York postmaster to refuse to deliver any mail or to pay any money orders to Facts, its officers and agents, including its editor-in-chief, who was also editor of Read. The two monthly magazines, both published in New York, had an aggregate circulation of nearly five hundred thousand copies. We were told the total deprivation of the right of Facts and of the editor of the two magazines to receive mail and to cash money orders would practically put both magazines out of business. See Milwaukee Publishing Co. v. Burleson, 255 U. S. 407. Furthermore, the order was of indefinite duration and Facts and its affiliates have made a business of conducting contests to promote the circulation of books and magazines. The order, if indefinitely enforced, might have resulted in barring delivery of mail and payment of money orders in relation to other non-fraudulent contests as well as legitimate magazine business. All of the foregoing raised questions about the validity and scope of the original order, if unmodified, which we deemed of sufficient importance to justify further argument. For that reason we set the case down for reargument, requesting parties to discuss the validity and scope of the order, and whether, if invalid by reason of its scope, it could be so modified as to free it from statutory or constitutional objections.
Thereafter, and before reargument, the Postmaster General revoked the order insofar as it applied to Facts magazine, its editor-in-chief, and its officers and agents. As modified, the order bars delivery of mail and payment of money orders only to addressees designated in the contest advertisements:
“Puzzle Contest, Facts Magazine; Contest Editor,
Facts Magazine; Judith S. Johnson, Contest Editor;
Miss J. S. Johnson, Contest Editor; Contest Editor.”
The Postmaster General, so we are informed, does not construe the modified order as forbidding delivery of mail or payment of money orders to Facts magazine or even to Miss Judith (J. S.) Johnson, individually. So construed, the order is narrowly restricted to mail and money orders sent in relation to the Hall of Fame Puzzle Contest found fraudulent, and would not bar deliveries to the magazines, to their editor, or to the three corporate respondents. It would bar deliveries to Judith (J. S.) Johnson, only if sent to her at the designated address and in her capacity as “Contest Editor.” Likewise the District Court’s order impounding funds is limited to qualifying fees received in the Hall of Fame Puzzle Contest. If the Postmaster General’s action in modifying the order is valid, the questions we asked to have argued have largely been eliminated from the original order.
Respondents’ contentions now are: (1) The Postmaster General lacked power to modify his original fraud order, and hence that order remains subject to any and all of its original infirmities. (2) The findings on which the order is based are not supported by substantial evidence. (3) The statutes under which the order was issued violate various constitutional provisions.
First. Respondents’ contention that the Postmaster General was without power to modify the order by elimination of Facts magazine, its editor, and its officers and agents is based almost entirely on their two other grounds for asserting invalidity of the order. Of course, if the order were wholly invalid as to all of the respondents for these reasons, it could not have been validated merely by eliminating some of them from its terms. But laying aside respondents’ other contentions for the moment, we have no doubt as to the Postmaster General’s authority to modify the fraud order.
Having concluded that the original order was broader than necessary to reach the fraud proved, the Postmaster General not only possessed the power but he had the duty to reduce its scope to what was essential for that purpose. The purpose of mail fraud orders is not punishment, but prevention of future injury to the public by denying the use of the mails to aid a fraudulent scheme. See Comm’r v. Heininger, 320 U. S. 467, 474. Such orders if too broad could work great hardships and inflict unnecessary injuries upon innocent persons and businesses. No persuasive reason has been suggested why the Postmaster General should be without power to modify an order of this kind. Such an order is similar to an equitable injunction to restrain future conduct, and like such an injunction should be subject to modification whenever it appears that one or more of the restraints imposed are no longer needed to protect the public. United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U. S. 106, 114; see Skinner & Eddy Corp. v. United States, 249 U. S. 557, 570.
Furthermore, the modification here involved was for respondents’ benefit; it gave them a part of the very relief for which they prayed. It removed the ban against delivery of mail and payment of money orders to their magazine, its editor and its agents — a ban which we were told would have done them irreparable injury if left in effect. The possibility that another order might be entered against the eliminated respondents is too remote to require us to consider the original order as though the modification had never been made. See United States v. Hamburg-American Co., 239 U. S. 466, 475-476.
Nor does the modification subject respondents to any disadvantage in this case in reference to the impounded funds. Those funds are sums sent in as qualifying fees for the scheme found fraudulent. They are in court custody because of the court’s- restraining order; but for it they would have been returned to the senders as ordered by the Postmaster General. Now, as before the fraud order was modified, their disposition is dependent entirely upon the validity of the finding of fraud. Respondents could thus claim the funds only by asserting a right growing out of the scheme found fraudulent. The court having lawful command of such funds must allocate them to the remitters if the order is valid. See Inland Steel Co. v. United States, 306 U. S. 153, 156-158; United States v. Morgan, 307 U. S. 183, 194-195.
Second. Respondents contend that there was no substantial evidence to support the Postmaster General’s findings that they had represented that prizes could be won (1) on payment of only three dollars as contest fees or (2) by the mere solution of puzzles. They say that the very advertisements and circular letters to contestants from which these inferences were drawn by the Postmaster General contained language which showed that the first $3 series of puzzles might result in ties, making necessary a second and maybe a third $3 puzzle series, and that if these three efforts failed to determine the prize winners, they would then be selected on the basis of competitive letters, written by the tied contestants on the subject “The Puzzle I Found Most Interesting and Educational in This Contest.”
There were sentences in the respondents’ advertisements and communications which, standing alone, would have conveyed to a careful reader information as to the nine-dollar fees and the letter-essay feature of the contest. Had these sentences stood alone, doubtless the fraud findings of the Postmaster General would not have been justified. But they did not stand alone. They were but small and inconspicuous portions of lengthy descriptions used by respondents to present their contest to the public in their advertisements and letters. In reviewing-fraud findings of the Postmaster General, neither this Court nor any other is authorized to pick out parts of the advertisements on which respondents particularly rely, decide that these excerpts would have supported different findings, and set aside his order for that reason. We consider all the contents of the advertisements and letters, and all of the evidence, not to resolve contradictory inferences, but only to determine if there was evidence to support the Postmaster General’s findings of fraud. Leach v. Carlile, 258 U. S. 138, 140.
Respondents’ advertisements were long; their form letters to contestants discussing the contest, its terms, and its promises were even longer than the advertisements. Paradoxically, the advertisements constituted at the same time models of clarity and of obscurity — clarity in referring to prizes and to a “puzzle contest,” obscurity in referring to a remote possibility of a letter-essay contest. In bold type, almost an inch high, their advertisements referred to “$10,000 FIRST PRIZE PUZZLE CONTEST.” Time after time they used the words “puzzle” and “puzzle contest.” Conspicuous pictures of sample “puzzles” covered a large part of a page. Rebus “puzzles” Nos. 1 to 4 of the contest were there. An explanation of what each represented appeared above it. The first, it was explained, represented “the inventor of the phonograph and electric light,” the second “a Republican President who became Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.” The last two contained equally helpful clues to the “puzzles.” The advertisements left no doubt that the contest presented an opportunity to win large prizes in connection with solution of puzzles, which puzzles, to say the least, would not be too taxing on the imagination.
Readers who might have felt some reluctance about paying their money to enter an essay contest were not so impressively and conspicuously informed about that prospect; here the advertisement became a model of obscurity. In the lower left corner of one of the advertising pages appeared the “Official Rules of the Contest,” to which rules references were carefully placed in various parts of the advertisement, and which were printed, as the District Court’s opinion observed, “in small type.” There were ten rules. About the middle of Rule 9 appeared the only reference to the possible need for letters as a means of breaking ties. And it is impossible to say that the Postmaster General drew an unreasonable inference in concluding that competitive letter-writing thus obscurely referred to was mentioned only as a remote and unexpected contingency. The same kind of obscurity and doubt occurs in reference to the cost of the contest. The District Court in an opinion holding that the Postmaster General’s findings were not supported by the evidence had this to say about one advertisement which was widely used:
“Indeed, the advertisement is by no means a model of clarity and lucidity. It is diffuse and prolix, and at times somewhat obscure. Many of its salient provisions are printed in rather small type. An intensive and concentrated reading of the entire text is indispensable in order to arrive at an understanding of the entire scheme. Nevertheless, a close analysis of this material discloses the complete plan. Nothing is omitted, concealed or misrepresented. There is no deception. The well-founded criticisms of the plaintiffs’ literature are a far cry from justifying a conclusion that the announcement was a fraud on the public. . . . The conclusion is inevitable that there is no evidence to support the finding of fact on which the fraud order is based and that, therefore, the plaintiff is entitled to a permanent injunction against the enforcement of the order.”
We agree with the District Court that many people are intellectually capable of discovering the cost and nature of this contest by “intensive and concentrated reading” and by close analysis of these advertisements. Nevertheless, we believe that the Postmaster General could reasonably have concluded, as he did, that the advertisements and other writings had been artfully contrived and composed in such manner that they would confuse readers, distract their attention from the fact that the scheme was in reality an essay contest, and mislead them into thinking that they were entering a “rebus puzzle” contest, in which prizes could be won by an expenditure of not more than $3. That respondents’ past experience in similar contests enabled them to know at the beginning that essay writing, not puzzle solutions, would determine prize winners is hardly controvertible on this record. That experience was borne out in this contest by the fact that of the 90,000 contestants who submitted answers to the first series of 80 puzzles, 35,000 solved all of them, and of that number 27,000 had completed the first set of “tie-breaking puzzles” when the fraud order was issued. Under the circumstances, to advertise this as a puzzle contest instead of what it actually was cannot be attributed to a mere difference in “nomenclature”; such conduct falls far short of that fair dealing of which fraud is the antithesis.
Advertisements as a whole may be completely misleading although every sentence separately considered is literally true. This may be because things are omitted that should be said, or because advertisements are composed or purposefully printed in such way as to mislead. Wiser v. Lawler, 189 U. S. 260, 264; Farley v. Simmons, 99 F. 2d 343, 346; see also cases collected in 6 Eng. Rul. Cas. 129-131. That exceptionally acute and sophisticated readers might have been able by penetrating analysis to have deciphered the true nature of the contest’s terms is not sufficient to bar findings of fraud by a fact-finding tribunal. Questions of fraud may be determined in the light of the effect advertisements would most probably produce on ordinary minds. Durland v. United States, 161 U. S. 306-313, 314; Wiser v. Lawler, supra at 264; Oesting v. United States, 234 F. 304, 307. People have a right to assume that fraudulent advertising traps will not be laid to ensnare them. “Laws are made to protect the trusting as well as the suspicious.” Federal Trade Comm’n v. Standard Education Society, 302 U. S. 112, 116.
The Postmaster General found that respondents’ advertisements had been deliberately contrived to divert readers’ attention from material but adroitly obscured facts. That finding has substantial support in the evidence. The District Court and the Court of Appeals were wrong in holding the evidence insufficient.
Third. It is contended that §§ 259 and 732 of 39 U. S. C., the sections under which this order was issued, are in conflict with various constitutional provisions and that the statutes should be held unenforceable for this reason. Specifically, it is argued that the sections authorize a prior censorship and thus violate the First Amendment; authorize unreasonable searches and seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment; violate the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment; deny the kind of trial guaranteed in criminal proceedings by the Sixth Amendment and by Art. Ill, § 2, cl. 3; and inflict unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
In 1872 Congress first authorized the Postmaster General to forbid delivery of registered letters and payment of money orders to persons or companies found by the Postmaster General to be conducting an enterprise to obtain money by false pretenses through the use of the mails. 17 Stat. 322-323, 39 U. S. C. § 732. In the same statute Congress made it a crime to place letters, circulars, advertisements, etc., in the mails for the purpose of carrying out such fraudulent artifices or schemes. 17 Stat. 323, 18 U. S. C. § 338. In 1889 Congress declared “non-mailable” letters and other matter sent to help perpetrate frauds. 25 Stat. 874, 39 U. S. C. § 256. In 1895 the Postmaster General’s fraud order powers were extended to cover all letters or other matter sent by mail. 28 Stat. 964, 39 U. S. C. § 259. And Congress has passed many more statutes, such, for illustration, as the Securities and Exchange Act, 48 Stat. 77, 906, 15 U. S. C. § 77 (e), and the Federal Trade Commission Act as amended, 52 Stat. 114, 15 U. S. C. § 52, to protect people against fraudulent use of the mails.
All of the foregoing statutes, and others which need not be referred to specifically, manifest a purpose of Congress to utilize its powers, particularly over the mails and in interstate commerce, to protect people against fraud. This governmental power has always been recognized in this country and is firmly established. The particular statutes here attacked have been regularly enforced by the executive officers and the courts for more than half a century. They are now part and parcel of our governmental fabric. This Court in 1904, in the case of Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U. S. 497, sustained the constitutional power of Congress to enact the laws. The decision there rejected all the contentions now urged against the validity of the statutes in their entirety, insofar as the present contentions have any possible merit. No decision of this Court either before or after the Coyne case has questioned the power of Congress to pass these laws. The Coyne case has been cited with approval many times.
Recognizing that past decisions of this Court if adhered to preclude acceptance of their contentions, respondents urge that certain of our decisions since the Coyne case have partially undermined the philosophy on which it rested. Respondents refer particularly to comparatively recent decisions under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. None of the recent cases to which respondents refer, however, provide the slightest support for a contention that the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and freedom of the press include complete freedom, uncontrollable by Congress, to use the mails for perpetration of swindling schemes.
We reject the contention that we should overrule the Coyne case and declare these fraud order statutes to be wholly void and unenforceable.
An additional argument urged by respondents is that the fraud order statutes as interpreted and applied by the Postmaster General in this case violate some of the constitutional provisions above mentioned. We consider this suggestion only in connection with the modified order. Its future effect is merely to enjoin the continuation of conduct found fraudulent. Carried no further than this, the order has not even a slight resemblance to punishment — it only keeps respondents from getting the money of others by false pretenses and deprives them of a right to speak or print only to the extent necessary to protect others from their fraudulent artifices. And so far as the impounding order is concerned, of course respondents can have no just or legal claim to money mailed to them as a result of their fraudulent practices. Nor does the modified order jeopardize respondents’ magazine except to the extent, if any, that its circulation might be dependent on monies received from this contest scheme found fraudulent. A contention cannot be seriously considered which assümes that freedom of the press includes a right to raise money to promote circulation by deception of the public.
The order as modified is valid and its enforcement should not have been enjoined. The judgments of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia and of the District Court are reversed. The cause is remanded to the District Court to dismiss the petition for injunction and to provide for proper return to the remitters of the impounded funds sent in response to the fraudulent advertisements and communications.
It is so ordered.
“This case is ordered restored to the docket for reargument. On reargument counsel need not further discuss the sufficiency of the evidence to support the Postmaster General’s findings. They are requested to discuss the following:
"1. Does the fraud order prohibit delivery of mail and postal money orders to Facts Magazine and all its employees, including its editor-in-chief ? If so,
“(a) Is the order within the Postmaster General’s authority under 39 U. S. C. Secs. 259, 732?
“(b) If so, do these code provisions, in violation of the First Amendment or any other constitutional provisions, abridge the freedom of speech or press of either the senders or the sendees of the mail or the money orders?
“2. Does the fraud order prohibit indefinitely the delivery of mail or money orders which relate to subject matters or contests other than the contest on which the order is based? If so,
“(a) Is the order within the Postmaster General’s statutory authority ?
“(b) If so, are these code provisions in conflict with the Constitution of the United States ?
“3. Assuming that the order is in conflict with the code provisions or the Constitution, can it be modified in such way as to free it from statutory or constitutional objections? If so, by whom can the order be modified and by what procedure?”
Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233, 245-249; Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, 713, et seq.; Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252, 260-263; Craig v. Harney, 331 U. S. 367; Milwaukee Publishing Co. v. Burleson, 255 U. S. 407.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | C | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
MR. Justice Douglas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case, here on certiorari, presents important problems under § 77 of the Bankruptcy Act. 49 Stat. 911, 11 U. S. C. § 205. The Central Railroad Company of New Jersey (the debtor), of which petitioner is trustee, filed its petition for reorganization in 1939 shortly after receiving notice from the Attorney General of New Jersey that he would apply to a state court for a summary judgment for unpaid taxes of the debtor and seek to sell its property in satisfaction of the judgment. The tax assessments for the years 1932 to 1939 had been extensively litigated both in the state and federal courts and the results were for the most part adverse to the debtor. By the end of 1939 the tax claims of the State against the debtor, exclusive of interest and penalties, exceeded $15,000,000, while the liquid assets of the debtor available to pay them were apparently less than half that amount. The reorganization court stayed suits to collect the taxes but from time to time entered orders directing the debtor to make specified installment payments on account of the taxes for various years.
In 1941 the New Jersey legislature passed a law designed to lessen the tax burden of railroads in the State. P. L. 1941, chs. 290, 291. This law was implemented and somewhat modified in 1942. P. L. 1942, chs. 169, 241. These acts included changes in the tax rates and provided for installment payments of the full principal amount of unpaid property taxes without interest or penalties, which were due on or before December 1, 1940., The statutory settlement of the claims was conditioned on (1) the execution of installment payment plans and the payment of the first installment, and (2) a waiver of all rights to contest the legality or amount of any assessment made prior to December 1, 1941, together with written consent to the discontinuance and dismissal of all pending suits concerning such assessments. The reorganization court authorized petitioner to settle and compromise the delinquent taxes in accordance with the provisions of these acts. Petitioner undertook to comply with the statutory requirements, filing documents and payments required of a delinquent taxpayer, discontinuing litigation, and consenting to the discontinuance of pending appeals. The state officials — the Attorney General, Treasurer, and Comptroller — did not accept these tenders. Instead, the Attorney General instituted suit to enjoin the Treasurer from carrying out the provisions of the 1941 and 1942 acts. The result was a holding that the acts violated the New Jersey constitution. Wilentz v. Hendrickson, 135 N. J. Eq. 244, 38 A. 2d 199.
Meanwhile the reorganization court set a time within which all claims against the debtor should be filed. In compliance therewith the State Comptroller filed on behalf of the State of New Jersey a claim for taxes owing it. The proof of claim stated that over $18,000,000 had been paid on the tax claim, leaving unpaid some $12,000,000, plus interest of over $7,700,000, plus additional interest on those sums from December 1,1940. The proof of claim also stated that under New Jersey law the sums owed were secured by “a lien paramount to all other liens upon all the lands and tangible property and franchises of the company in this State.”
The debtor and trustee filed initial objections to the claim. They contended that the property of the debtor was grossly overvalued and that the debtor and other railroads had been intentionally and systematically discriminated against in the making of the assessments. They also objected to the interest or penalty part of the claim, contending, inter alia, that no interest accrued after the date when the debtor’s petition for reorganization was filed or during the period when collection of the taxes was enjoined and the debtor was in good faith contesting their validity. Subsequently they objected to the claim on the further ground that its amount and the time allowed for its payment were governed by the terms of settlement or compromise tendered under the 1941 and 1942 acts of the New Jersey legislature. They also contended that New Jersey had no lien on the debtor’s personal property. Like objections were made by a group of security holders of the debtor and by an indenture trustee. They also objected to the State’s claim on the ground that no part of it other than that representing the principal amount of taxes was entitled to a lien equal or paramount to the debtor’s general mortgage.
New Jersey, through her Attorney General, filed replies to the various objections which had been made to her claim, stating, inter alia, that the principal amount of the claim had been finally adjudicated and was lawfully owing, that the principal amount together with interest was entitled to priority under § 64 of the Bankruptcy Act, and that the claim was entitled to a paramount lien on all the lands, tangible property, and franchises of the debtor.
Shortly after Wilentz v. Hendrickson, supra, was decided, the trustee filed with the reorganization court a petition for adjudication of New Jersey’s tax claims which in substance recapitulated his earlier objections to the claim and asked for an adjudication that the. settlement or compromise tendered under the 1941 and 1942 acts of New Jersey was binding; or alternatively, if it was not binding, a determination of the extent to which the claim should be allowed and the relative rights, liens and priorities of the various claimants in the debtor’s assets.
The Attorney General of New Jersey thereupon entered a special appearance in the proceedings, claiming, inter alia, that the entertainment of the petition would constitute a prohibited suit against the State, both as respects the determination of the amount of the claim and its priority or lien.
The reorganization court referred New Jersey’s claim to a special master to consider this additional contention of the State, as well as the previous objections to it and the State’s replies thereto.
The special master rendered a report in 1945 in which he found (1) that the proofs of claim of New Jersey were properly filed by state officers acting in pursuance of their statutory authority; (2) that §77 confers on the reorganization court jurisdiction over the kind of claims asserted by the State in the proceeding and that such construction of the Act is not unconstitutional; and (3) that the entire property of the debtor is in custodia legis subject to the rights of lienholders, and that the reorganization court is the proper court to determine the validity and amount of the tax claims and their lien, subject to the limitations of Arkansas Corporation Commission v. Thompson, 313 U. S. 132, which he did not think were presently involved in the proceedings. New Jersey, through her Attorney General, filed objections to the report. The reorganization court overruled them and adopted and confirmed the report. New Jersey took an appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals. She also filed in that court a petition for a writ of prohibition in which she challenged the rulings of the reorganization court on the same grounds.
The Circuit Court of Appeals treated the appeal as if all of the questions presented were covered by Arkansas Corporation Commission v. Thompson, supra. It held that the “only matters left open” for the reorganization court were (1) mathematical error in the computation of the amount of the tax or (2) legal error in its assessment. It accordingly reversed the order of the reorganization court and dismissed the application for a writ of prohibition. 152 F. 2d 408, 418.
First. We think, contrary to the position of New Jersey, that the reorganization court had jurisdiction over the proof and allowance of the tax claims and that the exercise of that power was not a suit against the State. Section 77 deals not only with claims of private parties but with those of public agencies as well. Section 77 (b) defines “creditors” as “all holders of claims of whatever character against the debtor or its property, whether or not such claims would otherwise constitute provable claims under this Act.” And “claims” are defined to include “debts, whether liquidated or unliquidated, securities (other than stock and option warrants to subscribe to stock), liens, or other interests of whatever character.” Id. And § 77 (c) (7) provides for the prompt fixing of a reasonable time within which the “claims of creditors” may be filed and the manner in which they may be filed and allowed. The words “all holders of claims” have no qualification and are sufficiently broad to include public agencies as well as private parties. The “claims” of creditors include secured and unsecured claims. We find not the slightest suggestion that Congress left out the large class of tax claims which recurringly appears in reorganizations and often assumes, as here, large proportions. They are expressly included among provable claims in § 57n of the Bankruptcy Act, 52 Stat. 840, 867,11 U. S. C. § 93 (n). And the sweeping, all-inclusive definitions of “claims” and “creditors” in § 77 leave room for no exception under it.
When a State files a proof of claim in the reorganization court, it is using a traditional method of collecting a debt. A proof of claim is, of course, prima facie evidence of its validity. Whitney v. Dresser, 200 U. S. 532. But the bankruptcy court whose aid is sought for enforcement of an asserted claim is not bound to treat the tendered proof as conclusive. When objections are made, it is duty bound to pass on them. That process is, indeed, of basic importance in the administration of a bankruptcy estate whether the objective be liquidation or reorganization. Without that sifting process, unmeritorious or excessive claims might dilute the participation of the legitimate claimants.
It is traditional bankruptcy law that he who invokes the aid of the bankruptcy court by offering a proof of claim and demanding its allowance must abide the consequences of that procedure. Wiswall v. Campbell, 93 U. S. 347,351. If the claimant is a State, the procedure of proof and allowance is not transmuted into a suit against the State because the court entertains objections to the claim. The State is seeking something from the debtor. No judgment is sought against the State. The whole process of proof, allowance, and distribution is, shortly speaking, an adjudication of interests claimed in a res. It is none the less such because the claim is rejected in toto, reduced in part, given a priority inferior to that claimed, or satisfied in some way other than payment in cash. When the State becomes the actor and files a claim against the fund, it waives any immunity which it otherwise might have had respecting the adjudication of the claim. See Clark v. Barnard, 108 U. S. 436, 447-448; Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line, 200 U. S. 273, 284-289; Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U.S. 18, 24-25.
The extent of the constitutional authority of the bankruptcy court in this respect was passed upon in New York v. Irving Trust Co., 288 U. S. 329. In that case the Court sustained an order of the bankruptcy court which barred a State’s tax claim because not filed within the time fixed for the filing of claims. The Court stated, p. 333, “If a state desires to participate in the assets of a bankrupt, she must submit to appropriate requirements by the controlling power; otherwise, orderly and expeditious proceedings would be impossible and a fundamental purpose of the Bankruptcy Act would be frustrated.”
In the present circumstances there is, therefore, no collision between § 77 and the Constitution.
Nor can we conclude that the claim was not properly filed by the State. The State Comptroller, who filed the claim on behalf of the State, is authorized to “institute and direct prosecution . . . for just claims and debts due to the state.” N. J. R. S. §52:19-10c. And see id., § 52:19-15. The State Attorney General, who resisted the objections made to the claim, is authorized to “attend generally to all matters in which the state is a party or in which its rights and interests are involved.” Id., § 52: 17-2g. The special master, whose report the reorganization court adopted, held that what these officials did in this case was in pursuance of their authority. For that conclusion he relied on the statutes which we have mentioned and the practice in other reorganization proceedings. That construction of New Jersey law made by a federal judge of the New Jersey District Court is entitled to special weight. Steele v. General Mills, 329 U. S. 433. We find nothing which impeaches it. To hold otherwise might, indeed, imperil the claim which New Jersey so vigorously asserts. For it appears that the time for filing claims has expired and under the rule of New York v. Irving Trust Co., supra, a filing at this late date might come too late.
Second. New Jersey contends that Congress did not include a State’s tax liens within the scheme of § 77 proceedings. That is but another way of saying that since the State’s asserted liens attached before the reorganization petition was filed, the only property of the debtor in custodia legis was its equity after the tax liens were satisfied.
We do not agree with that conclusion. We partially answered the contention when we reviewed the broad, all-inclusive nature of the definitions of “creditors” and “claims” contained in § 77 (b). As those definitions make plain, “all holders of claims” include those who assert “liens” against the property of the debtor.
Section 77 (b), moreover, gives the reorganization court broad powers over all types of liens. Thus a plan of reorganization “shall include provisions modifying or altering the rights of creditors generally, or of any class of them, secured or unsecured, either through the issuance of new securities of any character or otherwise.” § 77 (b) (1). A plan of reorganization may provide for “the sale of all or any part of the property of the debtor either subject to or free from any lien at not less than a fair upset price.” § 77 (b) (5). (Italics added.) It may order “the distribution of all or any assets, or the proceeds derived from the sale thereof, among those having an interest therein.” Id. Or it may provide for “the satisfaction or modification of any liens” or “the curing or waiver of defaults.” Id. (Italics added.) This is comprehensive language suggesting that all liens are included, not that some are beyond the reach of the court. While valid liens existing at the commencement of bankruptcy proceedings have always been preserved, it has long been a function of the bankruptcy court to ascertain their validity and extent and to determine the method of their liquidation. Whitney v. Wenman, 198 U. S. 539, 552; Isaacs v. Hobbs Tie & Timber Co., 282 U. S. 734, 737-738; Straton v. New, 283 U. S. 318, 321. Moreover, both in receivership cases, New York v. Maclay, 288 U. S. 290; United States v. Texas, 314 U. S. 480, and in bankruptcy cases, Van Huffel v. Harkelrode, 284 U. S. 225; New York v. Irving Trust Co., supra, the authority of the court to deal with the lien of a State has long been recognized. In reorganization cases the task of resolving disputes as to liens is a common one for the court. See Institutional Investors v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co., 318 U. S. 523, 569. Indeed, before a plan of reorganization can be designed in accord with fair and equitable requirements, liens must be disentangled and their relative priorities ascertained. This problem, present in most reorganizations, is acute in the railroad field.
If the reorganization court lacked the power to deal with tax liens of a State, the assertion by a State of a lien would pull out chunks of an estate from the reorganization court and transfer a part of the struggle over the corpus into tax bureaus and other state tribunals. That would not only seriously impair the power of the court to administer the estate and adversely affect the power of the Interstate Commerce Commission and the court to promulgate a reorganization plan. See Ecker v. Western Pacific R. Corp., 318 U. S. 448, 466-475; Smith v. Hoboken Railroad, W. & S. C. Co., 328 U. S. 123. It would fly in the teeth of § 77 (a), which grants the reorganization court “exclusive jurisdiction of the debtor and its property wherever located.” That jurisdiction is not limited to the prevention of interference with the use of the property by the trustee; it “extends also to the adjudication of questions respecting the title.” Ex parte Baldwin, 291 U. S. 610, 616; Thompson v. Texas Mexican Ry. Co., 328 U. S. 134, 140. It is the exclusive jurisdiction of the reorganization court which gives it power to preserve the railway as a unit and as a going concern and to prevent it from being divided up and dismembered piecemeal. Only in that way can continuous operation of the road be assured and a plan of reorganization be effected which not only safeguards the interests of the various claimants but is also compatible with the public interest. Continental Bank v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 294 U. S. 648; Smith v. Hoboken Railroad, W. & S.C. Co., supra.
When § 77 is read against this historical background and in light of practical requirements, we cannot conceive that Congress gave the reorganization court power less replete than the sweeping language of § 77 suggests.
The constitutional authority of Congress to grant the bankruptcy court power to deal with the lien of a State has been settled. In Van Huffel v. Harkelrode, supra, the Court held that the bankruptcy court was constitutionally empowered to order a sale of property of a bankrupt free and clear of a lien of a State for taxes.
We hold that the reorganization court has jurisdiction over all of the property of the debtor, including that on which New Jersey asserts a lien, and that the power of the court to deal with liens extends to the lien which New Jersey claims.
Third. We held in Arkansas Corporation Commission v. Thompson, supra, that the reorganization court lacked the power under § 77 to redetermine for state tax purposes the property value of a railroad where that value had already been determined in state proceedings which afforded ample protection to the railroad’s rights. We adhere to that decision. Its ruling precludes redetermination by the reorganization court in this case of the valuations underlying the assessments made by the state authorities and the validity of those assessments used as the basis for the computation of the taxes. It may not therefore entertain the objections to New Jersey’s claim which tender those issues. The proper tribunals where those issues may be litigated, if they are still open for any year, are the state agencies and courts and, under special circumstances, the federal courts. Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U. S. 620. The Circuit Court of Appeals has reviewed at length the New Jersey procedure available for challenging the valuations which underlie assessments. 152 F. 2d pp. 411-414. By the standards of Arkansas Corporation Commission v. Thompson, supra, that procedure is adequate, so that relitigation of the question in the reorganization proceedings would not be appropriate.
Fourth. The rule of Arkansas Corporation Commission v. Thompson, supra, does not, however, preclude the reorganization court from adjudicating the other issues raised by the objections to New Jersey’s claim. The contrary view, which the Circuit Court of Appeals apparently took, fails to recognize historic bankruptcy powers which, as we have already pointed out, are part of the arsenal of authority granted the reorganization court by § 77.
(1) The validity and priority of one lien, whether or not claimed by a State, as against other liens, are questions for the reorganization court. Illustrating but not limiting the range of that inquiry are questions whether local law creates the lien asserted; whether it was sufficiently perfected prior to the petition for reorganization as to be good against other liens, cf. New York v. Maclay, supra; United States v. Texas, supra; whether, if it were inchoate at that time, it could be perfected subsequent to the petition, Lyford v. State of New York, 140 F. 2d 840; and whether the lien, though paramount, is subordinate to administration expenses or other claims under either the general bankruptcy rule, City of New York v. Hall, 139 F. 2d 935, or the equity rule, 5 Collier on Bankruptcy (14th ed.) 71 77.21. See Warren v. Palmer, 310 U. S. 132.
(2) The extent of the lien — to what property it applies, and whether it is restricted to realty or covers personal property or revenues as well — are also questions for the reorganization court. See Ecker v. Western Pacific R. Corp., supra, pp. 489, 503.
(3) The reorganization court may also adjudicate questions pertaining to the amount of a tax claim secured by a lien without crossing the forbidden line marked by Arkansas Corporation Commission v. Thompson, supra. There is, for example, the question whether the amount of the claim has been swollen by the inclusion of a forbidden penalty and thus to that extent does not meet the bankruptcy requirements for proof and allowance of claims. Section 57j of the Bankruptcy Act provides that debts owing a State as a “penalty or forfeiture” shall not be allowed. What claims accruing before bankruptcy and sought to be proved by a State are “penalties,” New York v. Jersawit, 263 U. S. 493, and what are not, Meilink v. Unemployment Reserves Commission, 314 U. S. 564; the applicability of § 57j to reorganizations under § 77; the liability of the estate for penalties incurred by the trustee in the operation of the business, Boteler v. Ingels, 308 U. S. 57; what interest, if any, accrues after the petition for reorganization has been filed, Vanston Committee v. Green, 329 U. S. 156, are all questions for the reorganization court.
(4) We noted in Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 308 U. S. 106, 130, that one useful and fitting function of a reorganization court was the compromise or settlement of claims, so that interminable litigation might be ended and the interests of expedition in promulgating a plan of reorganization served. That power, expressly included in the Bankruptcy Act and governed by our General Order No. 33, is part of the broad authority granted the reorganization court by § 77. Through the appropriate exercise of that power, the court may authorize the trustee to compromise claims, secured or unsecured, and may approve equitable adjustments of them, and so reduce or otherwise affect the participation that the claimant, whether a State or another, may have in the res which is in custodia legis.
It is urged in this case that the settlement and compromise of New Jersey’s tax claim which the reorganization court authorized the trustee to make under the so-called settlement acts of the New Jersey legislature of 1941 and 1942 was an appropriate exercise of that power; that the compromise was valid and binding under New Jersey law; and that even if the compromise was not valid, payments made by the trustee and the conduct of the parties have altered the claim as respects the lien, the principal amount of the claim, and the interest or penalty portion of it. New Jersey vigorously contests all and each of these contentions.
A phase of this controversy was before the Circuit Court of Appeals in In re Central R. Co. of New Jersey, supra. That court had before it on appeal the order of the reorganization court (entered prior to the decision in Wilentz v. Hendrickson, supra, holding the acts of 1941 and 1942 unconstitutional) which, on the basis of the compromise, allowed New Jersey’s claim only in a reduced amount. The Circuit Court of Appeals held (1) that it would have been more appropriate for the reorganization court to have stayed its hand pending determination of the state litigation and (2) that, in any event, it should not have passed on the constitutionality of the 1941 and 1942 acts without giving New Jersey an opportunity for a hearing and argument on the issue. This controversy is now in a different posture. New questions of local law emerge — whether Wilentz v. Hendrickson, supra, controls this case; whether a valid settlement can be made under an unconstitutional act and, if so, whether this alleged compromise was valid and effective; whether, if the settlement was not binding, the amount of the claim or the extent of the lien has been altered by the payments made during reorganization or by the conduct of the parties.
These points have been briefed and argued here. The difficulty is that neither the reorganization court nor the Circuit Court of Appeals passed on them. The reorganization court passed solely on a question of jurisdiction— whether it had the power to make adjudications concerning the amount of New Jersey’s claim which should be allowed and the validity and extent of her lien, or whether New Jersey’s sovereign immunity stood in the way of such determinations. And the Circuit Court of Appeals did not pass on these questions because it, too, was concerned solely with the question of jurisdiction.
These issues bristle with questions of New Jersey law on which we should not pass, even if we were to assume they are properly here, without the benefit of the views of judges who sit there and have a greater familiarity with local law and local practices than we. See Huddleston v. Dwyer, 322 U. S. 232, 237; Brillhart v. Excess Insurance Co., 316 U. S. 491, 497; Hammond v. Schappi Bus Line, 275 U. S. 164, 169; Wilson Cypress Co. v. Del Pozo, 236 U. S. 635, 656-657. And for a review of the earlier cases, see dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Brandéis in Railroad Commission v. Los Angeles R. Co., 280 U. S. 145, 164-165. Moreover, we are now advised that there is presently pending before the Circuit Court of Appeals an appeal by the Attorney General of New Jersey from an order of the reorganization court denying leave to join the trustee as party defendant in a suit in the New Jersey courts to determine whether there was a valid settlement of the tax claims and to stay further determination of that controversy in the federal court until the state courts have passed on the question. If the Circuit Court of Appeals orders the application granted, cf. Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309 U. S. 478, 483; Ex parte Baldwin, supra, p. 619, the state law phases of the controversy will be authoritatively settled. If the other course is followed, the issues can be resolved by the reorganization court on a record more adequate than the present one for purposes of review. Whatever procedure is followed, it is more fitting that those more versed than we in the intricacies and niceties of New Jersey law first pass on these questions.
We intimate no opinion on the merits of the settlement controversy. Nor do we intimate any view on the amount of the tax claim which should be allowed or on the validity, character, priority, or extent of the lien asserted by New Jersey, or on the manner in which it should be satisfied in a plan for reorganization. We only hold that the reorganization court could properly entertain all objections to the claim except those involving the valuations underlying the assessments and the validity of those assessments.
On the present record we do not know all the issues that were involved in the prolonged litigation concerning the taxes for the years in question. Hence, what we have said is subject to the limitation that res judicata may have made binding on the reorganization court various questions of local law, including the amount and validity of the taxes under New Jersey law and the character and extent of the lien which that law affords them.
We affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals and remand the cause to the District Court for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion.
So ordered.
The history of the litigation is reviewed in the opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals in this case. 152 F. 2d pp. 408-411.
Delinquencies of subsidiary companies of the debtor were also included.
The 1942 Act increased the 1941 franchise tax of the debtor. The waiver authorized by the reorganization court included a waiver of the right to contest the legality of that additional assessment.
See In re Central R. Co. of New Jersey, 136 F. 2d 633, which contains a review of the facts of this episode.
Like claims were also filed against subsidiaries of the debtor.
See H. Rep. No. 1409, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 13; S. Rep. No. 1916, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., pp. 5,16.
See Meyer v. Fleming, 327 U. S. 161, 169, footnote 18: “Sec. 77 (c) (7) provides that the judge 'shall promptly determine and fix a reasonable time within which the claims of creditors may be filed or evidenced and after which no claim not so filed or evidenced may participate except on order for cause shown . . This is the equity rule (5 Collier on Bankruptcy (1944) p. 537) which permits the filing of claims out of time provided the claim is equitable, the claimant is not chargeable with laches, and the assets have not been distributed (see Conklin v. United States Shipbuilding Co., 136 F. 1006, 1009-1010; Pennsylvania Steel Co. v. New York City R. Co., 198 F. 721, 740-742); and provided further that the late filing does not unduly delay the proceedings. Guaranty Trust Co. v. Henwood, 86 F. 2d 347, 353.”
Section 64a of the Bankruptcy Act determines the priority to which taxes owing a State are entitled and grants the bankruptcy court power to determine questions concerning “the amount or legality of any taxes.” In Arkansas Corporation Commission v. Thompson, supra, we reserved decision on whether § 64a was applicable in reorganizations under § 77. We do not reach that question here. For § 77 alone is adequate to sustain the asserted jurisdiction of the reorganization court over all the property of the debtor. See Lyford v. City of New York, 137 F. 2d 782, 785-786.
As stated in Isaacs v. Hobbs Tie & Timber Co., supra, p. 738, “while valid liens existing at the time of the commencement of a bankruptcy proceeding are preserved, it is solely within the power of a court of bankruptcy to ascertain their validity and amount and to decree the method of their liquidation.”
Section 77 (a) provides that if the petition is approved the reorganization court “during the pendency of the proceedings under this section and for the purposes thereof, . . . shall have and may exercise in addition to the powers conferred by this section all the powers, not inconsistent with this section, which a Federal court would have had if it had appointed a receiver in equity of the property of the debtor for any purpose.”
Section 57 j reads in full:
“Debts owing to the United States or any State or subdivision thereof as a penalty or forfeiture shall not be allowed, except for the amount of the pecuniary loss sustained by the act, transaction, or proceeding out of which the penalty or forfeiture arose, with reasonable and actual costs occasioned thereby and such interest as may have accrued thereon according to law.”
Section 77 (1) provides:
“In proceedings under this section and consistent with the provisions thereof, the jurisdiction and powers of the court, the duties of the debtor and the rights and liabilities of creditors, and of all persons with respect to the debtor and its property, shall be the same as if a voluntary petition for adjudication had been filed and a decree of adjudication had been entered on the day when the debtor’s petition was filed.”
Section 27 provides:
“The receiver or trustee may, with the approval of the court, compromise any controversy arising in the administration of the estate upon such terms as he may deem for the best interest of the estate.” 52 Stat. 855.
General Order No. 33 provides:
“Whenever a receiver, trustee or debtor in possession shall make application to the court for authority to submit to arbitration any controversy arising in the settlement of an estate, or for authority to compromise any such controversy, the application shall clearly and distinctly set forth the subject matter of the controversy, and the reasons why it is proper and for the best interest of the estate that the controversy should be settled by arbitration or compromise.” 305 U. S. 696.
See § 77 (1), note 11, supra, and § 77 (a), note 9, supra.
New Jersey et al. v. Central Railroad Co. of New Jersey, No. 8808. We are advised that by stipulation of the parties the case is being held in the Circuit Court of Appeals until the jurisdictional question involved in the instant case has been decided.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | H | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Chief Justice Warren
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this case we are required to determine whether, under the ,1954 Internal Revenue Code, expenditures for meals by a military officer stationed at a post to which his dependents were prohibited from accompanying him were deductible “traveling expenses . . . [incurred] while away from home” within the meaning of § 162 (a) (2) or whether instead they were nondeduetible “personal, living, or family expenses” within the meaning of § 262. At all pertinent times, respondent was a captain in the United States Marine Corps, attached to an aviation squadron. Immediately prior to October 1957, his permanent duty station was a Marine Corps base located at El Toro, California, and he lived nearby with his wife and children. On October 1, 1957, however, respondent and his squadron were transferred to Iwakuni, Japan, where they were to be based while serving a standard 15-month tour of duty in the Far East. Because dependents were prohibited from accompanying Marine Corps personnel to that duty station, respondent’s wife and children remained in California.
Of the 14½ months’ actual duration of respondent’s Far Eastern tour of duty, he was physically located at the Iwakuni base for 10 months. The remaining time was consumed by travel and short periods of duty at various other military bases; respondent was declared to be in a “travel status” for a period of 49 days, and he received additional compensation for those days on a per diem basis. .During the entire period of his service as a Marine Corps captain, both while, he served at bases in the United States and while he served abroad away from his family, respondent also received tax-free monthly allowances for quarters and subsistence.
On his 1958 income tax return, respondent claimed a deduction of $650, representing the cost of his meals at a rate of $65 per month for the 10 months spent at the Iwakuni base. The Commissioner of Internal . Revenue disallowed the deduction, ruling that the expenditure for meals was a “personal, living” expense under § 262 and not a travel expense under § 162 (a)(2). In the Commissioner’s view respondent’s “home” during the period in question was his permanent duty station at Iwakuni rather than California where his family resided; therefore, he was not “away from home” when he incurred the expenditure. The Tax Court upheld the Commissioner (40 T. C. 896), and respopdelit petitioned for review in the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. That court, in a per curiam decision with one judge dissenting, reversed the Tax Court and rejected the Commissioner’s definition of “home” for purposes of the deduction. 355 F.2d 294. The majority of the Court of Appeals ruled that the word “home” as used in § 162 (a) (2) of the Code must be given its usual meaning as the place of residence, not the place of business, of the taxpayer and his family. And since it was not reasonable for this taxpayer to move his family residence closer to his place of business, the “ordinary and necessary” requirement applicable to all § 162 deductions was met and the cost of meals at Iwakuni was deductible To resolve a direct conflict between this decision and a 1948 decision of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in another case involving a military officer, Bercaw v. Commissioner, 165 F. 2d 521, wé granted certiorari. 385 U. S. 809.
This case , then requires us to focus upon one of the three conditions which must be met before an item is deductible.as a travel expense under § 162 (a)(2). There is no question but that the expenditure here was “ordinary and necessary” and that there was a “direct connection between the expenditure and the carrying on of the trade or business of the taxpayer or of his employer.” Cf. Commissioner v. Flowers, 326 U. S. 465, 470 (1946); Peurifoy v. Commissioner, 358 U. S. 59 (1958). The essence of the case is whether respondent was “away from home” when he incurred the expenditure. And the answer to that question turns upon a determination of whether, under the circumstances related above, respondent’s “home”, in 1958 was his permanent duty station at Iwakuni, Japan, or, instead, the residence of his family in California.
From the Revenue Act of 1921 down to § 162 (a) (2) of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code Congress has provided a deduction from taxable income for travel expenses, including amounts expended for meals and lodging, while “away from home.” Although Congress has not defined the crucial phrase “away from home,” administrative rulings and regulations have been directed toward that problem. In 1921, a general rule was established to the Cfect that “home” meant the taxpayer’s principal place of business or employment whether or not it coincided with his place of residence. This interpretation prevented deductions of day-to-day commuting expenses which were not the unusual type of “traveling expense” to which the statute was directed. Cf. Commissioner v. Flowers, 326 U. S. 465, 470 (1946). Its logic has been applied to a host of other situations. Although certain refinements have been added, the essential position of the Commissioner has remained unchanged.
While the court below, together with the Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Sixth Circuits, has not always agreed with this interpretation, the Tax Court and all of the other courts of appeals which have considered it have sustained the Commissioner. The Commissioner’s interpretation of the word “home” in connection with travel-expense deductions was also made clear to Congress when in 1936 it was held that Members of Congress could not deduct expenses which they incurred in Washington, D. C., even though each also maintained a residence in the district from which he had been elected. Lindsay v. Commissioner, 34 B. T. A. 840. Congress did not respond to this ruling by amending the statutory language generally to provide that “home” was. intended to be synonymous with “residence,” but instead merely carved out an exception to cover the special travel-expense problems inherent in service as a national legislator.
The Commissioner argues that the fact that Congress has reviewed and re-enacted the pertinent language with an awareness of the administrative interpretation constitutes a legislative endorsement of the Commissioner’s position and is sufficient reason for reversing the judgment below. Helvering v. Winmill, 305 U. S. 79 (1938). But it is not necessary for us to decide here whether this congressional action (or inaction) constitutes approval and adoption of the Commissioner’s interpretation of “home” in all of its myriad applications since, in the context of the. military taxpayer, the Commissioner’s position has a firmer foundation. The Commissionerffias long held that a military taxpayer’s permanent duty station is also his home for purposes of determining deductibility of travel expenses. This position builds on the terminology employed by the military services to categorize various assignments and tours of duty, and also on the language and policy of the statutory provisions prescribing travel and transportation allowances for military personnel. For example, a Marine Corps directive, which was effective during respondent’s Far Eastern tour of duty, defined the length of standard tours of duty in terms of the commencement and termination dates of “permanent change[s] of station.” (Emphasis supplied.) Similarly, eligibility for certain statutory travel allowances turns upon whether an assignment constitutes a “change of permanent station” (emphasis supplied) or whether the serviceman is “away from his designated post of duty.” 37 U. S. C. § 404 (a)(1). Thus, the Commissioner’s position recognizes, as do the relevant statutes and the military services themselves, that the “permanence” of location in civilian life cannot find a complete parallel in military life which necessarily contemplates relatively frequent changes of location.
The nondeductibility of expenses incurred by a military taxpayer while at a permanent duty station was previously challenged in Bercaw v. Commissioner, 165 F. 2d 521 (C. A. 4th Cir. 1948). There, the taxpayer, a reserve army officer who was called to active duty and assigned to Fort Meade in Maryland where there were no quarters for dependents, sought to deduct expenditures for his meals and janitorial service as costs of traveling “away from home” in pursuit of his trade or business. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Tax Court’s disallowance of the deduction, stating:
“The taxpayer was engaged in the business of an Army officer. His place of business was his particular Army post. If his Army duties required him to travel, he would have received a per diem travel allowance which would not have been taxable. . . . But whenever he made a permanent change of station that place of duty became his place of business and there was his ‘home’ within the meaning of Section 23(a)(1)(A). . . . Thus the expenditures for meals . . . while at this post were personal living expenses and nondeductible . . . .” 165 F. 2d, at 524.
Since the Bercaw decision, the Commissioner has reiterated his position in Rev. Rui. 55-571,1955-2 Cum. Bull. 44. And until the decision of the court below in the 'present case, neither the courts nor Congress had disturbed the Commissioner’s interpretation of “home” as it pertained to military personnel.
Additional support for the Commissioner’s position is found in the fact that Congress traditionally has provided a special system of tax-free allowances for military personnel. These allowances now range from monthly payments for quarters and subsistence to per diem payments when the serviceman is declared in a “travel status.” Provision may also be made for financial relief to assist dependents in relocating when they are prohibited from accompanying a serviceman on a change of permanent duty station. In the present case, respondent received the per diem payments while he was away from his permanent duty station. His quarters at Iwakuni were provided without cost to him, and at the same time he continued to receive á tax-free quarters allowance of approximately $102.50 per month; he also received a tax-free subsistence allowance of approximately $42.50 per month at all relevant times.. Moreover, because his assignment to Iwakuni was a change of permanent station, his wife and children could have moved their residence to another part of the United States at the Government’s expense; however, they elected not to exercise that option.
Underlying the system of special allowances is congressional recognition of the fact that military life poses unusual financial problems. The system is designed to provide complete and direct relief from such problems as opposed to the incomplete and indirect relief which an income tax deduction affords to a civilian business traveler. If the system of allowances is in fact inadequate, or if there are inconsistencies in the Commissioner's application of the travel-expense provision to military personnel, it is the province of Congress and the Commissioner, not the courts, to make the appropriate adjustments. Given the Commissioner’s long-standing and judicially approved interpretation, the knowledge of that interpretation by Congress, and the fact that Congress has chosen to deal specially by tax-free, allowances with the financial problems peculiar to military life, we must agree with the Commissioner that the military taxpayer is not “away from home” when he is at his permanent duty station whether or not it is feasible or even permissible for his family to reside with him there. The judgment is, therefore,
Reversed.
“There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the: taxable year in carrying on any trade or business, including—
“(2) traveling expenses (including the entire amount expended for meals and lodging) while away from home in the pursuit of a trade or business . . . .” § 162 (a) (2) of the Internal Revenue Code. of 1954, 26 U. S. C. § 162 (a)(2) (1958 ed.).
“Except as otherwise expressly provided in this chapter, no deduction shall be allowed for personal; living, or family expenses.” § 262 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U. S. C. § 262.
Since a joint income tax return was filed by Captain and Mrs. Stidger, both are respondents here. In this opinion, however, the terms “respondent” and “taxpayer” refer only to Captain Stidger.
Revenue Act of 1921, c. 136, §214 (a), 42 Stat. 239.
O. D. 864, 4 Cum. Bull. 211 (1921); O. D. 1021, 5 Cum. Bull. 174 (1921).
See, e. g.; I. T. 1490, 1-2 Cum. Bull. 89 (1922); Rev. Rul. 60-189, 1960-1 Cum. Bull. 60. See also note 22, infra.
In addition to the instant case, see also Wright v. Hartsell, 305 F. 2d 221 (C. A. 9th Cir. 1962).
Steinhort v. Commissioner, 335 F. 2d 496 (C. A. 5th Cir. 1964); United States v. Le Blanc, 278 F. 2d 571 (C. A. 5th Cir. 1960).
Burns v. Gray, 287 F. 2d 698 (C. A. 6th Cir. 1961).
See, e. g., Friedman v. Commissioner, 37 T. C. 539 (1961); Carroll v. Commissioner, 20 T. C. 382 (1953). The facts of the Carroll case are closely analogous to the circumstances surrounding the claimed deduction here. The taxpayer there was an employee of the War Department who in 1947 was transferred to a “permanent duty station” in Korea for a minimum of one year. His wife and child remained in the United States. A deduction for the cost of meals and lodging while in Korea was not allowed by the Tax Court which noted that the taxpayer’s employer (1) designated Korea as a “permanent duty station” and (2) granted per diem travel allowances only while the taxpayer was en route to and from Korea, not while he was based there. See also Todd v. Commissioner, 10 T. C. 655 (1948).
See, e. g., O’Toole v. Commissioner, 243 F. 2d 302 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1957); Coerver v. Commissioner, 297 F. 2d 837 (C. A: 3d Cir. 1962), affirming 36 T. C. 252 (1961); Bercaw v. Commissioner, 165 F. 2d 521 (C. A. 4th Cir. 1948); England v. United States, 345 F. 2d 414 (C. A. 7th Cir. 1965); Cockrell v. Commissioner, 321 F. 2d 504 (C. A. 8th Cir. 1963); and York v. Commissioner, 82 U. S. App. D. C. 63, 160 F. 2d 385 (1947). The Courts of Appeals for the First and Tenth Circuits apparently have not taken a position on this question.
66 Stat. 467. The exception was carried over to the 1954 Code and now reads: “For purposes of the preceding sentence, the place of residence of a Member of Congress . . . within the State, congressional district, Territory, or possession which he represents in Congress shall be considered his'home, but amounts expended by such Members within each taxable year for living expenses shall not be deductible for income tax purposes in excess of $3,000.” 26 U. S. C. §162 (a).
Marine Corps Order 1300.8B, c. 1, issued July 1, 1958,- Record, p. 24.
See generally Advisory Commission on Service Pay, Career Compensation for the Uniformed Forces, Appendix 13-18 (1948).
37 U. S. C. §403.
37 U. S. C. § 402.
37 U. S. C. § 404. See also 37 U. S. C. §§ 405-412.
37 U. S. C. §406 (h).
37 U. S. C. § 403 (d) provides: “A member of a uniformed service who is assigned to quarters of the United States or a housing facility under the jurisdiction of a uniformed service may not be denied the basic allowance for quarters if, because of orders of competent authority, his dependents are prevented from occupying those quarters.”
In 1948, the Hook Commission, which had been appointed by the Secretary of Defense to study military compensation, issued its report and recommendations. Advisory Commission on Service Pay, Career Compensation for the Uniformed Forces (1948). That report formed a principal basis for the Career Compensation Act of 1949, c. 681, 63 Stat. 802. On the subjects of subsistence and quarters allowances, the Commission state! (Appendix," p. 17):
• “The theory behind the subsistence allowance is that since the officer is required to arrange and provide his subsistence at all times and since he has no choice as to the place where he is to be stationed and therefore does not have the choice of the average citizen as to the place and manner of subsisting himself, it is necessary to provide him with an allowance at all times so that he may bear that expense wherever stationed.
“Because an officer is transferred frequently from place to place and is required to dig up his roots at the old station and transplant them to the new station, the Government has acknowledged for years its obligation to furnish quarters to the officer for occupancy by himself and his dependents.”
Congress has through the years evidenced a determination to maintain the various allowances at levels consistent with the necessary financial burdens borne by servicemen. See, e. g., id., at 35 and Appendix 13-48; H. R. Rep. No. 779, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., p. 19. In 1963, Congress enacted yet another measure designed to provide direct relief for dependents separated from servicemen on permanent duty outside this country or in Alaska. 37 U. S. C. §427 (b). Under specified conditions, this provision authorizes an allowance of $30 monthly. It was established because Congress recognized that separated families incur additional expenses. See H. R. Rep. No. 208, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 29. That recognition is, of course, the same one that underlies the travel-expense deduction for civilian taxpayers.
The Commissioner has. taken the position that a naval officer may deduct as a traveling expense the cost of his meals aboard ship while the ship is away from its home port. Rev. Rui. 55-571,1955-2 Cum. Bull. 44. It is contended that respondent’s situation at Iwa-kuni was directly analogous to that of a naval officer on a ship at sea for an extended period of time. The Commissioner justifies the discrepant treatment by arguing that a naval officer should be treated like the engineer of a train, a bus driver, or an airplane pilot for purposes of the travel-expense deduction; the principal place of business of such taxpayers is their home terminal and they are allowed the deduction when away from that terminal on business trips. We are not.convinced that respondent’s situation was in all relevant respects analogous to that of a naval officer at sea. In any event, during oral orgument we were advised that the Commissioner is re-examining his position with respect to naval officers.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | L | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Black
announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion in which Mr. Justice Douglas, Mr. Justice Brennan, and Mr. Justice Marshall join.
This is one of two cases now before us from two different States in which applicants have been denied admission to practice law solely because they refused to answer questions about their personal beliefs or their affiliations with organizations that advocate certain ideas about government. Sharp conflicts and close divisions have arisen in this Court concerning the power of States to refuse to permit applicants to practice law in cases where bar examiners have been suspicious about applicants’ loyalties and their views on Communism and revolution. This has been an increasingly divisive and bitter issue for some years, especially since Senator Joseph McCarthy from Wisconsin stirred up anti-Communist feelings and fears by his “investigations” in the early 1950’s. One applicant named Raphael Konigs-berg was denied admission in California and this Court reversed. Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U. S. 252 (1957). The State nevertheless denied him admission a second time, and this Court then affirmed by a 5-to-4 decision. 366 U. S. 36 (1961). An applicant named Rudolph Schware was denied admission in New Mexico and this Court reversed, with five Justices agreeing on one opinion, three Justices on another opinion, and one not participating. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U. S. 232 (1957). In another case an applicant named George Anastaplo was denied admission in Illinois on grounds similar to those involved in Konigsberg and Schware, and the denial was affirmed by a 5-to-4 margin. In re Anastaplo, 366 U. S. 82 (1961). See also In re Summers, 325 U. S. 561 (1945). With sharp divisions in this Court, our docket and those of the Courts of Appeals have been filled for years with litigation involving inquisitions about beliefs and associations and refusals to let people practice law and hold public or even private jobs solely because public authorities have been suspicious of their ideas. Usually these denials of employment have not been based on any overt acts of misconduct or lawlessness, and the litigation has continued to raise serious questions of alleged violations of the First Amendment and other guarantees of the Bill of Rights.
The foregoing cases and others contain thousands of pages of confusing formulas, refined reasonings, and puzzling holdings that touch on the same suspicions and fears about citizenship and loyalty. However we have concluded the best way to handle this case is to narrate its simple facts and then relate them to the 45 words that make up the First Amendment.
These are the facts.
The petitioner, Sara Baird, graduated from law school at Stanford University in California in 1967. So far as the record shows there is not now and never has been a single mark against her moral character. She has taken the examination prescribed by Arizona, and the answer of the State admits that she satisfactorily passed it. Among the questions she answered was No. 25, which called on her to reveal all organizations with which she had been associated since she reached 16 years of age. This question she answered to the satisfaction of the Arizona Bar Committee. Consequently there is no charge or intimation that Mrs. Baird has not listed the organizations to which she has belonged since becoming 16. In addition, however, she was asked to state whether she had ever been a member of the Communist Party or any organization “that advocates overthrow of the United States Government by force or violence.” When she refused to answer this question, the Committee declined to process her application further or recommend her admission to the bar. The Arizona Supreme Court then denied her petition for an order to the Committee to show cause why she should not be admitted to practice law. We granted certiorari. 394 U. S. 957.
In Arizona it is perjury to answer the bar committee’s questions falsely, and perjury is punishable as a felony. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-561 (1956). In effect this young lady was asked by the State to make a guess as to whether any organization to which she ever belonged “advocates overthrow of the United States Government by force or violence.” There may well be provisions of the Federal Constitution other than the First Amendment that would protect an applicant to a state bar from being subjected to a question potentially so hazardous to her liberty. But whether or not there are other provisions that protect her, we think the First Amendment does so here. That Amendment, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth, forbids any “law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble . . . .” Mr. Justice Roberts, in referring to the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of religion, said:
“Thus the Amendment embraces two concepts,— freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society.” Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 303-304 (1940).
See also Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147, 160-161 (1939); West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 642 (1943). And we have made it clear that: “This conjunction of liberties is not peculiar to religious activity and institutions alone. The First Amendment gives freedom of mind the same security as freedom of conscience.” Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516, 531 (1945). The protection of the First Amendment also extends to the right of association. As we said in Schneider v. Smith, 390 U. S. 17, 25 (1968):
“The First Amendment’s ban against Congress ‘abridging’ freedom of speech, the right peaceably to assemble and to petition, and the ‘associational freedom’. . . that goes with those rights create a preserve where the views of the individual are made inviolate.”
See also Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479, 485-487 (1960); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U. S. 516 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449 (1958).
The First Amendment’s protection of association prohibits a State from excluding a person from a profession or punishing him solely because he is a member of a particular political organization or because he holds certain beliefs. United States v. Robel, 389 U. S. 258, 266 (1967); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U. S. 589, 607 (1967). Similarly, when a State attempts to make inquiries about a person’s beliefs or associations, its power is limited by the First Amendment. Broad and sweeping state inquiries into these protected areas, as Arizona has engaged in here, discourage citizens from exercising rights protected by the Constitution. Shelton v. Tucker, supra; Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee, 372 U. S. 539 (1963); Cf. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513 (1958).
When a State seeks to inquire about an individual’s beliefs and associations a heavy burden lies upon it to show that the inquiry is necessary to protect a legitimate state interest. Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee, supra, at 546. Of course Arizona has a legitimate interest in determining whether petitioner has the qualities of character and the professional competence requisite to the practice of law. But here petitioner has already supplied the Committee with extensive personal and professional information to assist its determination. By her answers to questions other than No. 25, and her listing of former employers, law school professors, and other references, she has made available to the Committee the information relevant to her fitness to practice law. And whatever justification may be offered, a State may not inquire about a man’s views or associations solely for the purpose of withholding a right or benefit because of what he believes.
Much has been written about the application of the First Amendment to cases where penalties have been imposed on people because of their beliefs. Some of what has been written is reconcilable with what we have said here and some of it is not. Without detailed reference to all prior cases, it is sufficient to say we hold that views and beliefs are immune from bar association inquisitions designed to lay a foundation for barring an applicant from the practice of law. Clearly Arizona has engaged in such questioning here.
The practice of law is not a matter of grace, but of right for one who is qualified by his learning and his moral character. See Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, supra, and Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333 (1867). This record is wholly barren of one word, sentence, or paragraph that tends to show this lady is not morally and professionally fit to serve honorably and well as a member of the legal profession. It was error not to process her application and not to admit her to the Arizona Bar. The judgment of the Arizona Supreme Court is reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
[For dissenting opinion of Me. Justice Hablan, see post, p. 34.]
The other is No. 18, In re Stolar, post, p. 23. See also No. 49, Law Students Civil Rights Research Council v. Wadmond, post, p. 154.
See, e. g., Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U. S. 485 (1952); Beilan v. Board of Education, 357 U. S. 399 (1958); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U. S. 11 (1966); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U. S. 589 (1967); United States v. Robel, 389 U. S. 258 (1967).
See the cases cited in n. 2, supra. See also Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479 (1960); American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382, 445 (1950) (Black, J., dissenting); cf. Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U. S. 516 (1960); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513 (1958); Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U. S. 399 (1961); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449 (1958); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U. S. 444 (1969).
App. 18.
Question No. 27, App. 18.
Response of the Committee on Examinations and Admissions to Order to Show Cause. App. 4.
Respondent has argued that even when an applicant has answered Question 25, listing the organizations to which she has belonged since the age of 16, Question 27 still serves a useful and legitimate function. Respondent urges:
“Assume an answer including an organization by name such as ‘The Sons and Daughters of I Will Arise.’ This could truly be a Christian group with religious objectives. But also it could be an organization devoted to the objectives of Lenin, Stalin or any other deceased person whose teachings and objectives were not conducive to the continued security and welfare of our government and way of life.” Brief for Respondent 8.
The organizations petitioner listed in response to question 25 were: Church Choir; Girl Scouts; Girls Athletic Association; Young Republicans; Young Democrats; Stanford Law Association; Law School Civil Rights Research Council. Respondent does not state which of these organizations may threaten the security of the Republic.
The committee urges that it is entitled to demand an answer to Question 27 because:
“Unless we are to conclude that one who truly and sincerely believes in the overthrow of the United States Government by force and violence is also qualified to practice law in our Arizona courts, then an answer to this question is indeed appropriate. The Committee again emphasizes that a mere answer of ‘yes’ would not lead to an automatic rejection of the application. It would lead to an investigation and interrogation as to whether or not the applicant presently entertains the view that a violent overthrow of the United States Government is something to be sought after. If the answer to this inquiry was ‘yes’ then indeed we would reject the application and recommend against admission.” (Emphasis added.) Memorandum in Support of Response to Petition for Order to Show Cause, App. 5-6.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | C | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
The petition for writ of certiorari is granted and the judgment of the Florida Circuit Court is reversed. Robinson v. Florida, 378 U. S. 153.
Respondent asserts that the judgment below rests on an adequate independent state ground in that petitioners, through misunderstanding or oversight, failed to obtain certification of the Circuit Court record submitted with their otherwise timely petition for writ of certiorari in the Florida District Court of Appeal, First District. Petitioners tried to correct this non jurisdictional defect (see, e. g., Aris v. State, 162 So. 2d 670 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.)) when notified of it, but their petition was dismissed nonetheless. We do not find this procedural ground adequate to bar review by this Court. See Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U. S. 313; NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449; NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U. S. 288.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | B | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Me. Justice Black
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The basic question here is whether the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures bars the United States from utilizing certain documentary evidence in this civil antitrust proceeding instituted in the United States District Court of Rhode Island. Subsidiary procedural questions involve the doctrine of res judicata We proceed at once to consideration of the important basic question since for reasons later given we reject the subsidiary res judicata contentions.
First. Whether the Government has a right to utilize the documentary evidence in this civil proceeding can be best understood by an immediate reference to this Court’s holding in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U. S. 385. Appellees here contend that the Silverthorne holding is a complete and permanent bar to the Government’s introduction of the documents as evidence, to the use of the documents to obtain other evidence, or for any other purpose.
The facts in the Silverthorne case as found by this Court were these: The Silverthornes having been indicted were arrested at their homes early in the morning and detained in custody for some hours. While so detained Government officers “without a shadow of authority” went to the office of their company and made a clean sweep of all the books, papers and documents found there. “All the employees were taken or directed to go to the office of the District Attorney of the United States to which also the books, &c., were taken at once.” The District Court ordered all books, etc., returned on a finding that the search and seizure violated the constitutional rights of the parties. Photographs and copies of the papers having been made, a new indictment was returned based upon the knowledge thus obtained. Subpoenas were then issued calling for production of the original papers. Upon refusal to produce, one of the Silverthornes was imprisoned for contempt.
This Court viewed the whole performance of the unlawful search and seizure of the Silverthorne books and papers as an “outrage,” planned or at least ratified by the Government. Under these circumstances it was held that the Government was neither entitled to use the original documents nor any knowledge obtained from the originals, the photostats, or the copies. The rule announced was that evidence or knowledge “gained by the Government’s own wrong” is not merely forbidden to be “used before the Court but that it shall not be used at all.” Other cases in this Court have applied the same rule. It is an extraordinary sanction, judicially imposed, to limit searches and seizures to those conducted in strict compliance with the commands of the Fourth Amendment.
In the case before us, however, United States officers did not go to the appellees’ offices and seize their documents. Officers served a court subpoena on appellees calling on them to produce certain designated documents for use in a grand jury investigation. Appellees challenged the subpoena on the ground that it was so broad and sweeping as to constitute an unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment. The District Court at all times has rejected this contention, and appellees do not urge it here. Thus it cannot be thought that the form of the subpoena or the method of its enforcement constitutes even a “constructive” search or seizure barred as “unreasonable” by the Fourth Amendment. Oklahoma Press Co. v. Walling, 327 U. S. 186, 202-208. And up to this point nothing that happened in this case is even remotely analogous to the situation that evoked this Court’s condemnation in the Silverthorne case. But the District Court found and appellees here urge that subsequent developments in this case call for application of the Silverthorne rule. Those developments were as follows:
The grand jury before which the documents were produced returned an indictment against appellees and others charging violations of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. Shortly after we decided Ballard v. United States, 329 U. S. 187, the District Court on motion of appellees dismissed the indictment on the ground that the court practice of intentionally and systematically excluding women from the grand jury panel rendered the grand jury an illegally constituted body. On the same day the court granted appellees’ motion for return of the previously impounded documents. Later the court ordered the Government to return a number of photostats that had been made of the original documents. In an opinion discussing return of the photostats the District Court reaffirmed its belief that the “subpoenas did not violate the Fourth Amendment and the Government was entitled to have the documents produced for presentation to a legal grand jury.” The court held, however, that “when the grand jury turned out to be illegally constituted and the indictment was dismissed . . . the subpoenas amounted to unreasonable searches and seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment . . . .”
In order to implement a congressional policy to have the grand jury a “truly representative” cross section of the community, we held in the Ballard case, supra, that exclusion of women from the grand jury required dismissal of an indictment. The effect of the District Court’s holding here was to add to the Ballard requirement for dismissal of the indictment a further extraordinary sanction devised by this Court to prevent violations of the Fourth Amendment. For here there was no official culpability in issuance or service of the subpoena duces tecum. The sole ultimate reason for the District Court’s application of the Silverthorne rule was that no women were on the grand jury, a circumstance that bears only a remote if not wholly theoretical relationship to search and seizure. We cannot agree that the Silverthorne rule requires such a result.
Aside from the limited extent to which the Fourth Amendment applies to the subpoena process, see Oklahoma Press Co. v. Walling, 327 U. S. 186, there are other reasons why the Silverthorne exclusionary rule should not be extended to the situation in this case. That rule stems from the Fourth Amendment. This Court has said that the Fourth Amendment command rests “upon the desirability of having magistrates rather than police officers determine when searches and seizures are permissible and what limitations should be placed upon such activities.” Trupiano v. United States, 334 U. S. 699, 705; see also McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451, 455-456. The Silverthorne search and seizure was made without any authority from a magistrate. And the seizure was so sweeping in nature that it probably could not have been authorized by a search warrant. Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383, 393-394. The Silverthorne exclusionary rule as explained in that case and others is designed to safeguard the privacy of people, and to prevent seizure of their papers and property except in compliance with valid judicial process. As tersely stated in the Silverthorne case the rule’s purpose is to prevent the Fourth Amendment from being reduced to “a form of words.”
Only by engaging in the most exaggerated apprehensions can the action of the prosecuting officers in this case be considered a threat to the Fourth Amendment. They went to the court for their subpoena. The court approved it. There is no claim that the subpoena was obtained or served in an improper manner or that any Government officer committed a wrong in the way the documents were handled or returned. At least many of the documents were highly relevant to the serious monopoly offenses charged against appellees. That there were no women on the grand jury did not contribute to any invasion of appellees’ privacy. Dismissal of the indictment could not transform what had been proper official conduct into the type of conduct condemned in the Silverthorne and other cases.
It is true that a metaphysical argument can be made to support a strained analogy between the situation here and that in the Silverthorne and other cases. That argument is that the “illegal” grand jury was only a “so-called” grand jury, and that the considered judicial command for production of papers before it must be treated as though the court had ordered production of papers before a group of appellees’ competitors. This argument has a superficial plausibility on the word level, but if our attention is directed to substance rather than symbols the speciousness of the argument is exposed.
Whatever injury appellees may have suffered resulted from the absence of women on the grand jury and that injury has been remedied by freeing appellees from prosecution under the indictment. Furthermore the search and seizure here, if such it can be called in any true sense, was not the kind that has prompted this Court to hold that the Government has by wrongful conduct of its officers forfeited all opportunity to make use of evidence unlawfully seized. We decline to extend the Silverthorne rule to such an extent. The Fourth Amendment, important as it is in our society, does not call for imposition of judicial sanctions where enforcing officers have followed the law with such punctilious regard as they have here. We hold that dismissal of the grand jury because no women were on it is no sufficient reason for holding that the Government is barred from making use of the summoned documents.
Second. At the same time the District Court ordered the indictment dismissed it also ordered that the documents be returned to the defendants. The Government did not appeal from the order dismissing the indictment. See United States v. Hark, 320 U. S. 531, 535-36. It is contended that by its failure to appeal, the Government is barred by the doctrine of res judicata from challenging the dismissal and return orders.
Assuming that the Government by failure to appeal is barred from challenging the court's holding that the grand jury was illegally constituted and that the documents were properly ordered returned, it by no means follows that these orders permanently barred the Government from any future use of the documents as evidence. For the Government forfeited no rights to use the documents in a future valid proceeding by failing to appeal from the dismissal of the indictment — a dismissal it believed to be supported by our holding in the Ballard case. And dismissal of the pending indictment after holding the grand jury illegal created a situation where appellees were entitled to return of their papers as a matter of course. Consequently an appeal from the return order alone, even if such an appeal could have been taken, would have availed the Government nothing. For the foregoing reasons we hold that orders dismissing the indictment and requiring return of the documents did not affect the Government’s right to have the documents produced in these civil proceedings.
For the same reasons we hold that the Government’s right to demand production in this civil case was not affected by the District Court’s later order requiring return of photostatic copies of the documents. Return of the photostats, like return of the originals, necessarily followed from the dismissal of the indictment. This was recognized by the District Court when in directing return of the photostats the court said, “Since these motions stem from Indictment No. 6055, the Clerk is ordered to make the motions, the hearings thereon, and this opinion part of the record of said indictment.”
Third. For their claim of res judicata appellees also rely on a third order of the District Court “precluding and restraining the United States from using in any way or for any purpose any knowledge, information or evidence obtained from or contained in any of the aforesaid illegally seized papers and documents.” This order was entered prior to the court’s action in this civil proceeding in which it quashed the subpoena duces tecum and refused to order production of the documents. Appellees contend that this order was a “decree of judicial outlawry” against any future Government use of the papers or knowledge acquired from them; that the Government could have but did not appeal from the order; that for this reason the “decree of judicial outlawry” had become final and binding upon the Government at the time it asked for production in this proceeding. The Government denies that the order had or was intended to have the broad proscriptive effect urged by respondents. In addition, the Government contends that the order was interlocutory and therefore not appealable. On this latter premise the Government relies on “familiar law that only a final judgment is res judicata as between the parties.” Merriam Co. v. Saalfield, 241 U. S. 22, 28.
To some extent both phases of the contention — scope of the order and its appealability — depend upon whether the proceeding was handled by the court as an independent plenary proceeding or one to suppress evidence at a forthcoming trial. For a judgment in an independent plenary proceeding for return of property and its suppression as evidence is final and appealable and the scope of relief in such a case may extend far beyond its effect on a pending trial; but a decision on a motion to return or suppress evidence in a pending trial may be no more than a procedural step in a particular case and in such event the effect of the decision would not extend beyond that case. Whether a motion is to be treated as independent and plenary or as merely a procedural step in a pending trial must be determined by particular circumstances. See Cogen v. United States, 278 U. S. 221. The circumstances here we think show that the order now considered was not one of permanent general “outlawry” against all use of the documents involved, but an order to prevent their use in a particular criminal proceeding then pending.
After the court had dismissed the indictment because no women were on the jury, the Government filed in the same District Court an information charging the same offense. The defendants filed a motion in the information proceeding (1) to dismiss the information; (2) in the alternative to dismiss and expunge those facts of the information based on knowledge obtained from the papers and documents; (3) to preclude and restrain the United States from using in any way or for any purpose knowledge or evidence obtained from or contained in the documents. The court denied (1) and (2) but granted (3). The motion, court opinion, and court order bore the title and number (6070) of the criminal information proceeding. During the argument colloquies took place between court and counsel which emphasized that the motion related to “Criminal 6070.”
The motion was argued at length before the district judge. Government counsel took the position that the court’s order on the motion would not be appealable. See Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U. S. 323; United States v. Rosenwasser, 145 F. 2d 1015. He therefore asked the court to be careful about the form of the order, expressing apprehensions that counsel for appellees would later argue that the order entered in the criminal proceeding was broad enough to bar use of the documents in the civil proceedings. Government counsel indicated his plans subsequently to present the issue of the Government’s right to use the documents in this civil proceeding, taking the position that an appeal would then lie. He therefore asked the court to await entry of any order until his plans could be carried out. Appellees’ counsel told the court that “The plans which Mr. Kelleher has concern Civil 6055. This is Criminal 6070.” And the court told Government counsel that the preclusion order would preclude use of the documents “only in this [criminal] action.” The court further said to Government counsel that if the court made a wrong order “Then you can go ahead as you contend or plan to go ahead in your civil action.” Finally, just before conclusion of the hearing on the order, the court told Government counsel, “I don’t see how this is going to prejudice you in some other case, and this Court is only concerned with 6070 [criminal information charge] at this time, as I understand it.”
We hold that the proceedings leading up to the preclusion order must be deemed a part of the criminal proceedings, see Cogen v. United States, 278 U. S. 221, 227; that the order did not preclude use of the documents except in these proceedings; and that this order does not stand as a bar to consideration of the availability of the documents for use as evidence in this civil case.
Other contentions of appellees have been considered and found to be without merit.
Reversed.
Appellees have moved to dismiss this appeal taken by the United States under § 2 of the Expediting Act of February 11, 1903, 32 Stat. 823, 15 U. S. C. § 29, as amended, Act of June 25, 1948, § 17, 62 Stat. 869, 989. The decision appealed from was as follows: “The Government’s ‘request’ for judgment and relief prayed for in the complaint is denied and judgment may be entered dismissing the action without prejudice. It is so ordered.”
This judgment followed the court’s action in denying the Government’s motions for production of documents essential to prove the Government’s case. The record fails to sustain appellees’ contention that the Government invited the court to enter this order denying relief and dismissing the action. That the dismissal was without prejudice to filing another suit does not make the cause unappealable, for denial of relief and dismissal of the case ended this suit so far as the District Court was concerned. Wecker v. National Enameling Co., 204 U. S. 176, 181-182. See also United, States v. National City Lines, 334 U. S. 573, 577, and Bowles v. Beatrice Creamery Co., 146 F. 2d 774. The motion to dismiss the appeal is overruled.
Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383; Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10; Go-Bart Co. v. United States, 282 U. S. 344; Byars v. United States, 273 U. S. 28; Gouled v. United States, 255 U. S. 298; United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U. S. 452; Trupiano v. United States, 334 U. S. 699; and cf. Harris v. United States, 331 U. S. 145; Zap v. United States, 328 U. S. 624; Davis v. United States, 328 U. S. 582.
26 Stat. 209, as amended 50 Stat. 693, 15 U. S. C. §§ 1, 2.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | A | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mb. Justice Blackmun
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Section 53 (1) of the New York Civil Service Law reads:
“Except as herein otherwise provided, no person shall be eligible for appointment for any position in the competitive class unless he is a citizen of the United States.”
The four appellees, Patrick McL. Dougall, Esperanza Jorge, Teresa Vargas, and Sylvia Castro, are federally registered resident aliens. When, because of their alien-age, they were discharged in 1971 from their competitive civil service positions with the city of New York, the appellees instituted this class action challenging the constitutionality of § 53. The named defendants, and appellants here, were the Administrator of the city’s Human Resources Administration (HRA), and the city’s Director of Personnel and Chairman of its Civil Service Commission. The appellees sought (1) a declaration that the statute was invalid under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, (2) injunctive relief against any refusal, on the ground of alienage, to appoint and employ the appellees, and all persons similarly situated, in civil service positions in the competitive class, and (3) damages for lost earnings. A defense motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction was denied by Judge Tenney, 330 F. Supp. 265 (SDNY 1971). A three-judge court was convened. That court ruled that the statute was violative of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Supremacy Clause, and granted injunctive relief. 339 F. Supp. 906 (SDNY 1971). Judge Lumbard joined the court’s opinion and judgment, but wrote separately in concurrence. Id., at 911. Probable jurisdiction was noted. 407 U. S. 908 (1972).
I
Prior to December 28, 1970, the appellees were employed by nonprofit organizations that received funds through HRA from the United States Office of Economic Opportunity. These supportive funds ceased to be available about that time and the organizations, with approximately 450 employees, including the appellees and 16 other noncitizens, were absorbed by the Manpower Career and Development Agency (MCDA) of HRA. The appellant Administrator advised the transferees that they would be employed by the city. The appellees in fact were so employed in MCDA. In February, however, they were informed that they were ineligible for employment by the city and that they would be dismissed under the statutory mandate of § 53 (1). Shortly thereafter, they were discharged from MCDA solely because of their alienage.
Appellee Dougall was born in Georgetown, Guyana, in September 1927. He has been a resident of New York City since 1964. He was employed by MCDA as an administrative assistant in the staff Development Unit.
Appellee Jorge was born in November 1948 in the Dominican Republic. She has been a resident of New York City since 1967. She was employed by the Puerto Rican Forum as a clerk-typist and, later, as a human resources technician. She worked in the latter capacity for MCDA.
Appellee Vargas was born in the Dominican Republic in June 1946. She has been a resident of New York City since 1963. She worked as a clerk-typist for the Puerto Rican Forum and in the same capacity for MCDA.
Appellee Castro was born in El Salvador in June 1944. She has resided in New York City since 1967. She was employed by the Puerto Rican Forum as an assistant counselor and then as a human resources technician and worked in the latter capacity for MCDA.
The record does not disclose that any of the four appellees ever took any step to attain United States citizenship.
The District Court, in reaching its conclusion that § 53 was unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment, placed primary reliance on this Court’s decisions in Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365 (1971), and Takahashi v. Fish Comm’n, 334 U. S. 410 (1948), and, to an extent, on Purdy & Fitzpatrick v. State, 71 Cal. 2d 566, 456 P. 2d 645 (1969). On the basis of these cases, the court also concluded that § 53 was in conflict with Congress’ comprehensive regulation of immigration and naturalization because, in effect, it denied appellees entrance to, and abode in, New York. Accordingly, the court held, § 53 encroached upon an exclusive federal power and was constitutionally impermissible under Art. VI, cl. 2, of the Constitution.
II
As is so often the case, it is important at the outset to define the precise and narrow issue that is here presented. The Court is faced only with the question whether New York’s flat statutory prohibition against the employment of aliens in the competitive classified civil service is constitutionally valid. The Court is not asked to decide whether a particular alien, any more than a particular citizen, may be refused employment or discharged on an individual basis for whatever legitimate reason the State might possess..
Neither is the Court reviewing a legislative scheme that bars some or all aliens from closely defined and limited classes of public employment on a uniform and consistent basis. The New York scheme, instead, is indiscriminate. The general standard is enunciated in the State’s Constitution, Art. Y, § 6, and is to the effect that appointments and promotions in the civil service “shall be made according to merit and fitness to be ascertained, as far as practicable, by examination which, as far as practicable, shall be competitive.” In line with this rather flexible constitutional measure, the classified service is divided by statute into four classes. New York Civil Service Law § 40. The first is the exempt class. It includes, generally, the higher offices in the state executive departments, certain municipal officers, certain judicial employees, and positions for which a competitive or noncompetitive examination may be found to be impracticable. The exempt class contains no citizenship restriction whatsoever. § 41. The second is the noncompetitive class. This includes positions, not otherwise classified, for which a noncompetitive examination would be practicable. There is no citizenship requirement. § 42. The third is the labor class. This includes unskilled laborers holding positions for which competitive examinations would be impracticable. No alienage exclusion is imposed. § 43. The fourth is the competitive class with which we are here concerned. This includes all positions for which it is practicable to determine merit and fitness by a competitive examination. § 44. Only citizens of the United States may hold positions in this class. § 53. The limits of these several classes, particularly the competitive class from which the appellees were deemed to be disqualified, are not readily defined. It would appear, however, that, consistent with the broad scope of the cited constitutional provision, the competitive class reaches various positions in nearly the full range of work tasks, that is, all the way from the menial to the policy making.
Apart from the classified civil service, New York has an unclassified service. § 35. This includes, among others, all elective offices, offices filled by legislative appointment, employees of the legislature, various offices filled by the Governor, and teachers. No citizenship requirement is present there.
Other constitutional and statutory citizenship requirements round out the New York scheme. The constitution of the State provides that voters, Art. II, §1, members of the legislature, Art. Ill, § 7, the Governor and Lieutenant-Governor, Art. IV, § 2, and the Comptroller and Attorney-General, Art. V, § 1, are to be United States citizens. And Public Officers Law § 3 requires that any person holding “a civil office” be a citizen of the United States. A “civil office” is apparently one that “possesses any of the attributes of a public officer or . . . involve [s] some portion of the soverign [sic] power.” 1967 Op. N. Y. Atty. Gen. 60; New York Post Corp. v. Moses, 12 App. Div. 2d 243, 250, 210 N. Y. S. 2d 88, 95, rev’d on other grounds, 10 N. Y. 2d 199, 176 N. E. 2d 709 (1961).
We thus have constitutional provisions and a number of statutes that, together, constitute New York’s scheme for the exclusion of aliens from public employment. The present case concerns only § 53 of the Civil Service Law. The section’s constitutionality, however, is to be judged in the context of the State’s broad statutory framework and the justifications the State presents.
III
It is established, of course, that an alien is entitled to the shelter of the Equal Protection Clause. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365, 371 (1971); Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 39 (1915); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U. S. 228, 238 (1896); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 369 (1886). See In re Griffiths, post, p. 7l7. This protection extends, specifically, in the words of Mr. Justice Hughes, to aliens who “work for a living in the common occupations of the community.” Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S., at 41.
A. Appellants argue, however, that § 53 does not violate the equal protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment because the statute “establishes a generic classification reflecting the special requirements of public employment in the career civil service.” The distinction drawn between the citizen and the alien, it is said, “rests on the fundamental concept of identity between a government and the members, or citizens, of the state.” The civil servant “participates directly in the formulation and execution of government policy,” and thus must be free of competing obligations to another power. The State’s interest in having an employee of undivided loyalty is substantial, for obligations attendant upon foreign citizenship “might impair the exercise of his judgment or jeopardize public confidence in his objectivity.” Emphasis is placed on our decision in United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U. S. 75 (1947), upholding the Hatch Act and its proscription of political activity by certain public employees, and it is said that the public employer “has broad discretion to establish qualifications for its employees related to the integrity and efficiency of the operations of government.”
It is at once apparent, however, that appellants’ asserted justification proves both too much and too little. As the above outline of the New York scheme reveals, the State’s broad prohibition of the employment of aliens applies to many positions with respect to which the State’s proffered justification has little, if any, relationship. At the same time, the prohibition has no application at all to positions that would seem naturally to fall within the State’s asserted purpose. Our standard of review of statutes that treat aliens differently from citizens requires a greater degree of precision.
In Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S., at 372, we observed that aliens as a class “are a prime example of a ‘discrete and insular’ minority (see United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 152-153, n. 4 (1938)),” and that classifications based on alienage are “subject to close judicial scrutiny.” And as long as a quarter century ago we held that the State’s power “to apply its laws exclusively to its alien inhabitants as a class is confined within narrow limits.” Takahashi v. Fish Comm’n, 334 U. S., at 420. We therefore look to the substantiality of the State’s interest in enforcing the statute in question, and to the narrowness of the limits within which the discrimination is confined.
Applying this standard to New York’s purpose in confining civil servants in the competitive class to those persons who have no ties of citizenship elsewhere, § 53 does not withstand the necessary close scrutiny. We recognize a State’s interest in establishing its own form of government, and in limiting participation in that government to those who are within “the basic conception of a political community.” Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330, 344 (1972). We recognize, too, the State’s broad power to define its political community. But in seeking to achieve this substantial purpose, with discrimination against aliens, the means the State employs must be precisely drawn in light of the acknowledged purpose.
Section 53 is neither narrowly confined nor precise in its application. Its imposed ineligibility may apply to the “sanitation man, class B,” Perotta v. Gregory, 4 Misc. 2d 769, 158 N. Y. S. 2d 221 (1957), to the typist, and to the office worker, as well as to the person who directly participates in the formulation and execution of important state policy. The citizenship restriction sweeps indiscriminately. Viewing the entire constitutional and statutory framework in the light of the State’s asserted interest, the great breadth of the requirement is even more evident. Sections 35 and 41 of the Civil Service Law, relating generally to persons holding elective and high appointive offices, contain no citizenship restrictions. Indeed, even § 53 permits an alien to hold a classified civil service position under certain circumstances. In view of the breadth and imprecision of § 53 in the context of the State’s interest, we conclude that the statute does not withstand close judicial scrutiny.
B. Appellants further contend, however, that the State’s legitimate interest is greater than simply limiting to citizens those high public offices that have to do with the formulation and execution of state policy. Understandably relying on this Court’s decisions in Crane v. New York, 239 U. S. 195 (1915), Heim v. McCall, 239 U. S. 175 (1915), and Clarke v. Deckebach, 274 U. S. 392 (1927), appellants argue that a State constitutionally may confine public employment to citizens. Mr. Justice (then Judge) Cardozo accepted this “special public interest” argument because of the State’s concern with “the restriction of the resources of the state to the advancement and profit of the members of the state.” People v. Crane, 214 N. Y. 154, 161, 108 N. E. 427, 429, aff’d, 239 U. S. 195 (1915). We rejected that approach, however, in the context of public assistance in Graham, where it was observed that “the special public interest doctrine was heavily grounded on the notion that '[wjhatever is a privilege, rather than a right, may be made dependent upon citizenship.’ People v. Crane .... But this Court now has rejected the concept that constitutional rights turn upon whether a governmental benefit is characterized as a 'right’ or as a 'privilege.’ ” 403 U. S., at 374. See also Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398, 404 (1963); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618, 627 n. 6 (1969); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254, 262 (1970); Bell v. Burson, 402 U. S. 535, 539 (1971).
Appellants argue that our rejection of the special-public-interest doctrine in a public assistance case does not require its rejection here. That the doctrine has particular applicability with regard to public employment is demonstrated, according to appellants, by the decisions in Crane and Heim that upheld, under Fourteenth Amendment challenge, those provisions of the New York Labor Law that confined employment on public works to citizens of the United States. See M. Konvitz, The Alien and the Asiatic in American Law, c. 6 (1946).
We perceive no basis for holding the special-public-interest doctrine inapplicable in Graham and yet applicable and controlling here. A resident alien may reside lawfully in New York for a long period of time. He must pay taxes. And he is subject to service in this country’s Armed Forces. 50 U. S. C. App. § 454 (a). See Astrup v. Immigration Service, 402 U. S. 509 (1971). The doctrine, rooted as it is in the concepts of privilege and of the desirability of confining the use of public resources, has no applicability in this case. To the extent that Crane, Heim, and Clarke intimate otherwise, they were weakened by the decisions in Takahashi and Graham, and are not to be considered as controlling here.
C. The State would tender other justifications for § 53’s bar to employment of aliens in the competitive civil service. It is said that career civil service is intended for the long-term employee, and that the alien, who is subject to deportation and, as well, to conscription by his own country, is likely to remain only temporarily in a civil service position. We fully agree with the District Court’s response to this contention:
“There is no offer of proof on this issue and [appellants] would be hard pressed to demonstrate that a permanent resident alien who has resided in New York or the surrounding area for a number of years, as have [appellees], and whose family also resides here, would be a poorer risk for a career position in New York . . . than an American citizen who, prior to his employment with the City or State, had been residing in another state.” 339 F. Supp., at 909.
Appellants further assert that employment of aliens in the career civil service would be inefficient, for when aliens eventually leave their positions, the State will have the expense of hiring and training replacements. Even if we could accept the premise underlying this argument — that aliens are more likely to leave their work than citizens — and assuming that this rationale could be logically confined to the classified competitive civil service, the State’s suggestion does not withstand examination. As we stated in Graham, noting the general identity of an alien’s obligations with those of a citizen, the “ 'justification of limiting expenses is particularly inappropriate and unreasonable when the discriminated class consists of aliens.’ ” 403 U. S., at 376.
We hold that § 53, which denies all aliens the right to hold positions in New York’s classified competitive civil service, violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee.
Because of this conclusion, we need not reach the issue whether the citizenship restriction is in conflict with Congress’ comprehensive regulation of immigration and naturalization. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S., at 376-380.
IV
While we rule that § 53 is unconstitutional, we do not hold that, on the basis of an individualized determination, an alien may not be refused, or discharged from, public employment, even on the basis of noncitizenship, if the refusal to hire, or the discharge, rests on legitimate state interests that relate to qualifications for a particular position or to the characteristics of the employee. We hold only that a flat ban on the employment of aliens in positions that have little, if any, relation to a State’s legitimate interest, cannot withstand scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Neither do we hold that a State may not, in an appropriately defined class of positions, require citizenship as a qualification for office. Just as “the Framers of the Constitution intended the States to keep for themselves, as provided in the Tenth Amendment, the power to regulate elections,” Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U. S. 112, 124-125 (1970) (footnote omitted) (opinion of Black, J.); see id., at 201 (opinion of Harlan, J.), and id., at 293-294 (opinion of Stewart, J.), “[e]ach State has the power to prescribe the qualifications of its officers and the manner in which they shall be chosen.” Boyd v. Thayer, 143 U. S. 135, 161 (1892). See Lather v. Borden, 7 How. 1, 41 (1849); Pope v. Williams, 193 U. S. 621, 632-633 (1904). Such power inheres in the State by virtue of its obligation, already noted above, “to preserve the basic conception of a political community.” Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S., at 344. And this power and responsibility of the State applies, not only to the qualifications of voters, but also to persons holding state elective or important nonelective executive, legislative, and judicial positions, for officers who participate directly in the formulation, execution, or review of broad public policy perform functions that go to the heart of representative government. There, as Judge Lumbard phrased it in his separate concurrence, is “where citizenship bears some rational relationship to the special demands of the particular position.” 339 F. Supp., at 911.
We have held, of course, that such state action, particularly with respect to voter qualifications, is not wholly immune from scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. See, for example, Kramer v. Union School District, 395 U. S. 621 (1969). But our scrutiny will not be so demanding where we deal with matters resting firmly within a State’s constitutional prerogatives. Id., at 625; Carrington v. Rash, 380 U. S. 89, 91 (1965). This is no more than a recognition of a State’s historical power to exclude aliens from participation in its democratic political institutions, Pope v. Williams, 193 U. S., at 632-634; Boyd v. Thayer, 143 U. S., at 161, and a recognition of a State’s constitutional responsibility for the establishment and operation of its own government, as well as the qualifications of an appropriately designated class of public office holders. U. S. Const. Art. IV, §4; U. S. Const. Arndt. X; Luther v. Borden, supra; see In re Duncan, 139 U. S. 449, 461 (1891). This Court has never held that aliens have a constitutional right to vote or to hold high public office under the Equal Protection Clause. Indeed, implicit in many of this Court’s voting rights decisions is the notion that citizenship is a permissible criterion for limiting such rights. Kramer v. Union School District, 395 U. S., at 625; Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 567, 568 (1964); Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U. S. 663, 666-667 (1966); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U. S., at 91, 93-94, 96; Lassiter v. Northampton Election Board, 360 U. S. 45, 50-51 (1959); Mason v. Missouri, 179 U. S. 328, 335 (1900). A restriction on the employment of noncitizens, narrowly confined, could have particular relevance to this important state responsibility, for alienage itself is a factor that reasonably could be employed in defining “political community.”
The judgment of the District Court is
Affirmed.
The restriction has its statutory source in Laws of New York, 1939, c. 767, § 1. We are advised that the legislation was declarative of an administrative practice that had existed for many years. Tr. of Oral Arg. 43, 45.
Section 53 (2) of N. Y. Civ. Serv. Law (Supp. 1972-1973) makes a temporary exception to the citizenship requirement:
“2. Notwithstanding any of the provisions of this chapter or of any other law, whenever a department head or appointing authority deems that an acute shortage of employees exists in any particular class or classes of positions by reason of a lack of a sufficient number of qualified personnel available for recruitment, he may present evidence thereof to the state or municipal civil service commission having jurisdiction which, after due inquiry, may determine the existence of such shortage and waive the citizenship requirement for appointment to such class or classes of positions. The state commission or such municipal commission, as the case may be, shall annually review each such waiver of the citizenship requirement, and shall revoke any such waiver whenever it finds that a shortage no longer exists. A non-citizen appointed pursuant to the provisions of this section shall not be eligible for continued employment unless he diligently prosecutes the procedures for citizenship.”
It is to be observed that an appointment under this exception permits the alien to continue his employment only until, on annual review, it is deemed that “a shortage no longer exists.” And, in any event, the alien ‘'shall not be eligible for continued employment unless he diligently prosecutes the procedures for citizenship.”
The court found jurisdiction in the Civil Rights Statutes, 28 U. S. C. §§ 1343 (3) and (4). 339 F. Supp. 906, 907 n. 5. It held that the suit was properly maintainable as a class action and defined the class as consisting of “all permanent resident aliens residing in New York State who, but for the enforcement of Section 53, would otherwise be eligible to compete for employment in the competitive class of Civil Service.” Id., at 907 n. 4.
Affidavit of Harold 0. Basden, Director of Personnel of the Human Resources Administration, App. 31-33.
Section 45 of the New York Civil Service Law, applicable to employees of a private institution acquired by the State or a public agency, contains a restriction, similar to that in §53 (1), against the employment of an alien in a position classified in the competitive class.
The appellants in their answer alleged that appellee Castro was terminated for the additional reason that she lacked sufficient experience to qualify for the position of senior human resources technician. App. 49. The three-judge court in its order, App. 93, excluded appellee Castro from the recognized class. That exclusion is not contested here.
Brief for Appellants 17.
Id., at 22.
Id., at 23.
Ibid.
Id., at 13.
In the past, the Court has invoked the special-public-interest doctrine to uphold statutes that, in the absence of overriding treaties, limit the right of noncitizens to exploit a State’s natural resources, McCready v. Virginia, 94 U. S. 391 (1877), Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U. S. 138 (1914); to inherit real property, Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U. S. 483 (1880), Blythe v. Hinckley, 180 U. S. 333 (1901); and to acquire and own land, Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U. S. 197 (1923), Porterfield v. Webb, 263 U. S. 225 (1923), Webb v. O’Brien, 263 U. S. 313 (1923), Frick v. Webb, 263 U. S. 326 (1923); but see Oyama v. California, 332 U. S. 633 (1948).
We are aware that citizenship requirements are imposed in certain aspects of the federal service. See 5 U. S. C. §3301; Exec. Order No. 10577, 19 Fed. Reg. 7521, §2.1 (1954); 5 CFR §§ 338.101, 302.203 (g) (1973); and, for example, Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriation Act, 1972, § 602, Pub. L. 92-49, 85 Stat. 122, and Public Works Appropriations Act, 1971, § 502, Pub. L. 91-439, 84 Stat. 902. In deciding the present case, we intimate no view as to whether these federal citizenship requirements are or are not susceptible of constitutional challenge. See Jalil v. Hampton, 148 U. S. App. D. C. 415, 460 F. 2d 923, cert. denied, 409 U. S. 887 (1972); Comment, Aliens and the Civil Service: A Closed Door?, 61 Geo. L. J. 207 (1972).
In congressional debates leading to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, there is clear evidence that Congress not only knew that as a matter of local practice aliens had not been granted the right to vote, but that under the amendment they did not receive a constitutional right of suffrage or a constitutional right to participate in the political process of state government, and that, indeed, the right to vote and the concomitant right of participation in the political process were matters of local law. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 141-142, 2766-2767 (1866).
It is noteworthy, as well, that the 40th Congress considered and very nearly proposed a version of the Fifteenth Amendment that expressly would have prohibited discriminatory qualifications not only for voting but also for holding office. The provision was struck in conference. It is evident from the debate that, for whatever motive, its opponents wanted the States to retain control over the qualifications for office. Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 3d Sess., at 1425-1426, 1623-1633 (1869). And, of course, the Fifteenth Amendment applies by its terms only to “citizens.”
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | B | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
The judgment is reversed. San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U. S. 236.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | J | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
The appeal is dismissed for want of a substantial federal question.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter would note probable jurisdiction and hear the case, the more so inasmuch as the transactions which New York has taxed concerned foreign commerce, unlike those which were involved in Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U. S. 450.
Mr. Justice Douglas is also of the opinion that probable jurisdiction should be noted.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | J | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Reed
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondent California Electric Power Company produces electricity in California, partially by hydroelectric projects licensed under Part I of the Federal Power Act, 41 Stat. 1063, as amended by Title II of the Public Utility Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 838, 16 U. S. C. § 791a et seq., and markets the greater portion of it, subject to respondent Public Utilities Commission’s authority, in that State. The jurisdictional dispute which is our present concern relates only to certain power sales by the Company to the Navy Department and to Mineral County, Nevada, for consumption there. This power, following production, is transmitted at 55,000 volts to the Company’s Mill Creek substation in California, about 25 miles from the border, on its own lines. There it is figuratively taken over by the Navy and by the County, and delivered on their lines at the same high voltage to Hawthorne, Nevada, where it is stepped down for local distribution and consumption. The Navy’s power is used at its ammunition depot, largely in official industrial operations; between 15% and 29%, however, is distributed for consumption in the private households and enterprises of tenants at the Navy’s low-cost housing project nearby. These sales are metered individually and each purchaser is billed according to his own use. The power purchased by the County is all resold to local consumers, with the exception of minor line losses and official use.
The Navy’s contract for purchase of the power was negotiated in 1943, and provided for termination on 60-day notice; the County’s was entered into in 1945 for a stated period of three years. In 1947 the Power Company applied to the State Commission for a general rate increase which, after hearings at which the Navy was represented, was granted. Thereafter, the Company terminated its Navy contract and failed to renew that with the County, giving notice of its intention to apply the new schedule to these sales. Both purchasers demurred, and the Company reapplied to the State Commission for a ruling as to the applicability of the general schedule to these particular operations. After some early state exploratory hearings, the Federal Power Commission, on February 15, 1950, issued an order to the Company to show cause as to why the rates were not subject to exclusive federal jurisdiction. Thus joined, the issues were heard by both agencies at a joint proceeding on March 20 and 21, 1950. Both eventually decided in favor of their own asserted authority. The State Commission’s supporting opinion was denied review by the California Supreme Court on January 21, 1952, thus affirming its holding, while that of the Federal Power Commission was likewise approved by the Federal Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, California Electric Power Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 199 F. 2d 206. As a federal question concerning the applicability of Part II of the Act was raised, certiorari was granted, 344 U. S. 810, to bring the record here from the state proceedings under 28 U. S. C. § 1257 (3).
I.
Federal authority, which we think obtains, is asserted under Part II of the Federal Power Act. This applies “to the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce and to the sale of electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce.” § 201(b). Regulation of the rates of such sales — other types of authority in connection with such interstate transmission operations are granted in other sections — -rests on §§ 205 (a) and 206 (a). The preliminary issue as to whether the operations in question fall within the concept of interstate commerce, on which the federal power initially depends, can be shortly disposed of, for Powell v. United States Cartridge Co., 339 U. S. 497, 509-515, firmly established that commerce includes the transportation of public property, while the irrelevance of the fact that this electricity is transmitted across the state boundary over lines owned by the Navy and by the County, as purchasers, may be seen from Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 319 U. S. 61, 69, 71, and Illinois Gas Co. v. Public Service Co., 314 U. S. 498.
The most serious contentions pressed in opposition to application of Part II, arise from the self-limiting statement therein that the Act is “to extend only to those matters which are not subject to regulation by the States.” So respondents contend that Power Commission jurisdiction only begins where the local regulatory power ends, and point to Part I, § 20, as supporting their contention that the limitation applies to the facts of this case. Section 20 provides that when power from projects licensed under Part I, which that energy sold to the Navy and the County includes,
“shall enter into interstate or foreign commerce the rates... and the service... by any... licensee... or by any person, corporation, or association purchasing power from such licensee for sale and distribution or use in public service shall be reasonable... to the customer... and whenever any of the States directly concerned has not provided a commission or other authority to enforce the requirements of this section within such State... or such States are unable to agree through their properly constituted authorities on the services... or on the rates... jurisdiction is hereby conferred upon the commission... to regulate... so much of the services... and... rates... therefor as constitute interstate or foreign commerce....” 41 Stat. 1073, 16 U. S. C. § 813.
Both Nevada and California have regulatory agencies with certain rate powers. And we may assume, though the Government asserts otherwise, that both agencies can enforce reasonable rate orders and have not disagreed. Respondents point to this as satisfying § 20, and thus ousting any Part II regulation. In short, they contend — what at first blush may appear anomalous— that federal rate jurisdiction under Part II may be prohibited by the fact that some portion of the power sold originated in hydroelectric projects federally licensed under Part I. We do not agree.
Admittedly, § 20 contemplated state regulation. And it may well be, as indicated by the congressional hearings, that Congress quite frankly chose the local authorities to regulate the bulk of interstate sales of electricity from licensed projects. In fact, a contrary view would have been almost astonishing as an historical proposition, for neither the large interstate operations of electric utilities that have developed during the last thirty years, nor the concomitant desirability of federal regulation, could have been foreseen in 1920. Long-range transmission was not then adequately developed, nor had the various local utilities by then undergone the integration into large centralized systems which later came about. So we may assume that Congress, as a policy judgment, accepted and adapted the substantial tradition of local utility regulation to power production licensed under the federal Act.
But there is no evidence that this was done with any firm intent to settle with the states a power essentially national. For whatever views of the draftsmen of § 20 as to the efficacy of state regulation, the jurisdictional lines between local and national authority were not finally determined until this Court’s opinion in Public Utilities Commission v. Attleboro Steam & Electric Co., 273 U. S. 83. This decision followed the Federal Water Power Act by some seven years. In short, that case established what has unquestionably become a fixed premise of our constitutional law but what was not at all clear in 1920, that the Commerce Clause forbade state regulation of some utility rates. State power was held not to extend to an interstate sale “in wholesale quantities, not to consumers, but to distributing companies for resale to consumers.” 273 U. S., at 89. Attleboro reiterated and accepted the holding of Pennsylvania Gas Co. v. Public Service Commission, 252 U. S. 23, that sales across the state line direct to consumers is a local matter within the authority of the agency of the importing state. But it prohibited regulation of wholesale sales for resale by either interested commission.
Respondents seek to escape that doctrine, however, by pointing to the fact that there was not there involved sales of electricity produced at a project licensed under Part I. They admit that absent § 20 of that Part, the later Part II authority would apply exclusively and determine the result. But, they say, § 20 creates an exception, which the language of Attleboro did not reach, for hydroelectric energy transmitted across state lines under the aegis of coordinated state regulation. In short, it is alleged that § 20 “conferred jurisdiction” on the states.
We do not agree. Attleboro declared state regulation of interstate transmission of power for resale forbidden as a direct burden on commerce. The states may act as to such a subject only when Congress has specifically granted permission for the exercise of this state power over articles moving interstate which would otherwise be immune. In re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545, 560-562. Section 20 cannot bear this interpretation; it did not establish the source of the energy as a significant factor determining whether state or -federal authority applied. It is quite different from those few unique federal statutes this Court has heretofore considered, "subjecting interstate commerce... to present and future state prohibitions,” or regulation, Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland R. Co., 242 U. S. 311, 326, in the exercise of the constitutional commerce power. Its language indicates no consideration or desire to alter the limits of state power otherwise imposed by the Commerce Clause; it merely states that the federal power shall not be invoked unless certain conditions of state inability to regulate obtain. Section 20 quite obviously is not based on any recognition of the constitutional barrier, but rather assumes what Attleboro held did not exist — state authority to reach interstate sales of energy for resale; its sole concern is the application of federal regulation on the possible failure of the states to empower their regulatory agencies or their inability to agree.
Nor can it soundly be said that Congress in § 20 of Part I charged the states with responsibility of regulating rates of interstate sales of electricity through the use of the federal power over government property. U. S. Const.. Art. 4, § 3, cl. 2. As indicated in our discussion of the commerce power, there was in 1920 when § 20 was enacted no full appreciation of the limits of state power over sales of electricity for export or import for resale. So the language of § 20 required reasonable rates to consumers of electricity moving interstate and then added the provision that when no state commission was provided to enforce reasonable rates, or the states interested could not agree, the Federal Power Commission could act. We do not think such an arrangement for water power electricity as Part I, § 20, provides can be held to block the general authority of Part II. See note 13, infra.
The actions of the Congress following the Attleboro decision do not reflect any different interpretation of § 20. We note some interest in the application of that section in the light of the opinion, but nothing that is decisive of respondents’ contentions. In 1929, Senator Couzens introduced an amendment to his then pending bill, S. 6, 71st Cong., 1st Sess., to establish federal regulation of communications. The amendment, § 47 et seq., would have established a federal rate authority over all interstate power sales. “Power” was defined, § 47 (a) (4), to include electric energy, “whether or not produced by a licensee under the Federal Water Power Act.” The bill was referred to Committee, but Congress took no final action. In the next year, the same Committee held hearings on S. Res. 80, concerning a purported breakdown in the investigative powers of the Federal Power Commission as it then was constituted. The decision of the Commission of February 28, 1929, reported F. P. C. Ninth Ann. Rep. 119, was introduced. This argued that, as a result of Attleboro, the Commission had exclusive jurisdiction over rates of interstate wholesale-for-resale sales of licensed hydroelectric power, until displaced by a § 20 agreement of the interested states which received congressional approval as a compact.
The first positive congressional action in the field, of course, was the Federal Power Act of 1935. The sweep of the statute is wholly inconsistent with any asserted state power as fixed by § 20 of the 1920 Act. We have examined the legislative history; its purport is quite clear. Part II was intended to “fill the gap”- — the phrase is repeated many times in the hearings, congressional debates and contemporary literature — left by Attleboro in utility regulation. Congress interpreted that case as prohibiting state control of wholesale rates in interstate commerce for resale, and so armed the Federal Power Commission with precisely that power. There is nothing to indicate that Congress’ conception of the states’ disability in 1935, or of the power it gave the Commission by Part II, did not include Part I electricity. In fact, the unqualified statements concerning Part II favor the opposite construction, for we find the Act explained time and again as empowering the agency with rate authority over interstate wholesale sales for resale; not once is this authority spoken of as one conditioned on the electricity concerned having been produced by steam generators or at nonlicensed dams.
This would largely determine our interpretation of the ambiguous reference to “matters... subject to regulation by the States,” § 201 (a), if nothing more were available to work with. However, there is other proof that Congress did not have in mind § 20-type state regulation. The limiting clause is spoken of only as protecting state regulation of local affairs, including rates of intrastate and interstate-for-consumption sales: “Facilities for local distribution and for the production and transmission of energy solely for one’s own use and not for resale are excluded.” Hearings, House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H. R. 5423, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 385. The phrase is not once mentioned as the distinct affirmation of state power over interstate sales for resale under § 20 that respondents apparently would recognize it to be. There are indeed further reasons for rejecting respondents’ construction of § 201 (a). The nature of the generating facilities, in the first place, has no functional significance for rate regulation; the same considerations that lead Congress to enact federal authority over interstate electricity in general would have been similarly applicable to power generated at licensed projects. Secondly, contemporary literature was frankly divided over whether any power over interstate sales for resale remained with the states after Attleboro. We cannot assume that Congress enacted Part II with the purpose of permitting the states to regulate hydroelectric energy through § 20. This is especially so in view of the dearth of legislative discussion of the matter.
So we conclude that the limitations of § 201 (a) on federal regulation cannot, and were not intended to, preserve an exclusive state regulation of wholesale hydroelectric sales across state borders. Even if we conceived of the matter as one peculiarly limited to the statutory wording of § 201 (a), our statement that “[exceptions to the primary grant of jurisdiction in the section are to be strictly construed,” Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 331 U. S. 682, 690-691, would be as applicable here as to § 1 (b) of the Natural Gas Act. “Production” and “distribution” are elsewhere specifically excluded from Commission jurisdiction, § 201 (b); the phrase relied on in § 201 (a) was originally drafted as a declaration of “policy,” and the rewording which gave it its present more succinct form was unaccompanied by any “mention [of] this change as one of substance.” Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 319 U. S. 61, 76, referring to H. R. Rep. No. 1318, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 26. “It cannot nullify a clear and specific grant of jurisdiction, even if the particular grant seems inconsistent with the broadly expressed purpose.” Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 324 U. S. 515, 527. To conceive of it now as a bench mark of the Commission’s power, or an affirmation of state authority over any interstate sales for resale, would be to speculate about a congressional purpose for which there is no support.
Part II is a direct result of Attleboro. They are to be read together. The latter left no power in the states to regulate licensees’ sales for resale in interstate commerce, while the former established federal jurisdiction over such sales. Discussion of the constitutional problem as reflected in that statute and the Natural Gas Act in recent cases supports this conclusion. Especially in the litigation arising under the Gas Act has this Court expressed the view that the limitations established on Commission jurisdiction therein were designed to coordinate precisely with those constitutionally imposed on the states. Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U. S. 591, 609-610; Panhandle Pipe Line Co. v. Public Service Commission, 332 U. S. 507, 514-515; Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 331 U. S. 682, 690-691; Illinois Natural Gas Co. v. Public Service Co., 314 U. S. 498, 506.
II.
We turn next to a definitional problem raised by respondents, relating to the sales to Mineral County. In short, it is this: §201 extends Commission jurisdiction to “sale of electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce.” Subsection (d) of that section states:
“The term'sale of electric energy at wholesale’ when used in this Part means a sale of electric energy to any person for resale.”
And § 3 (4) equates “person” with “individual or a corporation,” while § 3 (3) excludes municipalities defined in § 3 (7) from the scope of the latter term. So respondents argue that the sales to Mineral County are neatly and decisively excluded from Part II rate regulation.
The use of these sections in support of an indirect exception to Part II has no support in the statutory scheme as a whole. Sections 306 and 313 (a), in fact, look quite the other way. They provide for complaints and petitions for rehearing by municipalities. And § 3 (7) contemplates municipalities as users and distributors of power. To accept respondents’ contention as to Mineral County would thwart the premise of these provisions: that such political subdivisions of the states can be aggrieved by the failure of a public utility selling power to them to satisfy the requirements of Part II.
Nor do we find any evidence of conscious coordination of §§ 3 (3), (4) and 201 (d) from the legislative history. True, they were simultaneously enacted, and, in fact, the interpolation of the word “person” into § 201 (d) occurred after the §§ 3 (3) and 3 (4) definitions were in existence in S. 2796, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., as passed by the Senate and reported to the House, June 13, 1935. But this alteration came at the insistence of the House. The Senate had provided for jurisdiction over sales occurring before or after interstate transmission,'ibid., §201 (f), and the House amendment, from which § 201 (d) in its present form stemmed, covered sales during the transmission across state lines for the first time. So the House Report is, we think, significant in its redefinition of the section: “A ‘wholesale’ transaction is defined to mean the sale of electric energy for resale.” H. R. Rep. No. 1318, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 8. We conclude, therefore, that the Congress attached no significance of substance to the addition of the word “person,” and in fact did not intend it as a limitation on Commission jurisdiction. Indeed quite the contrary was sought by the House amendment of §201 (d).
A third factor, in addition to the statutory scheme and legislative history of § 201 (d), is the rejection of respondents’ contention by the Commission and courts. Three circuits have just recently done so, and the Federal Power Commission’s long assertion that it has authority over rates of sales to municipalities has probably risen to tLe dignity of an agency “policy.” We have often stated our sympathy with established administrative interpretations such as this. Cf. United States v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 310 U. S. 534, 549.
Where the language and purpose of the questioned statute is clear, courts, of course, follow the legislative direction in interpretation. Where the words are ambiguous, the judiciary may properly use the legislative history to reach a conclusion. And that method of determining congressional purpose is likewise applicable when the literal words would bring about an end completely at variance with the purpose of the statute. Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Abilene Oil Co., 204 U. S. 426; Feres v. United States, 340 U. S. 135; International Union v. Juneau Spruce Corp., 342 U. S. 237, 243; Johansen v. United States, 343 U. S. 427, 432. So here, since it is our judgment that neither the legislative aim nor the realities of coordinated rate regulation compel it, we reject respondents’ plea that the Federal Power Commission can exercise no authority over sales to Mineral County, and, for similar reasons, the Company’s contention in No. 205 that the sales to the Navy are not sales to a “person.”
III.
The claim that the sales here occurred over “local distribution” facilities, § 201 (b), and were not “for resale” because the contracts did not state as much, are insubstantial. The sales were made in California but the facilities supplied “local distribution” only after the current was subdivided for individual consumers. But a final question- — whether the Federal Power Commission may exercise rate authority over the entire amount of power sold or merely that which is resold by the Navy and the County- — requires rather more extended discussion.
Certainly the concrete fact of resale of some portion of the electricity transmitted from a state to a point outside thereof invokes federal jurisdiction at the outset, despite the fact that the power thus used traveled along its interstate route “commingled” with other power sold by the same seller and eventually directly consumed by the same purchaser-distributor. But the Government argues from this that all the power exchanged between the same parties over the same facilities is subject to Commission order, irrespective of whether resold or not. For this proposition it relies on an alleged similarity between the problem as thus stated and that decided in Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 343 U. S. 414, 419. We held there that the federal rate authority must apply to all electricity sold, despite the fact that it was made up of power transmitted across state lines as well, as that produced locally. The impossibility of separating interstate from intrastate electricity consumed by each purchaser is patent. In such a case, federal rate jurisdiction must attach-to each distributor’s negotiated agreement with the seller irrespective of occasional and unpredictable use of non-jurisdictional intrastate power.
There, however, the problem was whether the sales of electricity were in “interstate commerce.” Here, it is a different one whether the entire sale is a “sale for resale.” For purposes of this case, we need not decide the question of whether a somewhat similar “commingling” — of power resold with that consumed directly by the purchaser — requires entire federal jurisdiction. For, even assuming arguendo respondents’ proposition that it may be proportionally limited, we hold that the record before us in this case does not present a set of facts or findings justifying that result. By the statute, Commission jurisdiction extends to “sales for resale,” “but not to any other sale.” § 201 (b). The problem, then, in applying respondents’ suggested interpretation, is to decide just what power transaction falls within this category of “sale for resale”— whether one involving the entire volume of electricity transmitted to the Navy or merely that which the buyer resells to others; the determinant is the delineation of “sale for resale.” See Panhandle Pipe Line Co. v. Public Service Commission, 332 U. S. 507, 516-517. Assuming respondents’ theory, this would turn, of course, on whether an essentially separate transaction covering the power directly consumed by the purchaser is identifiable. The present record will not permit such a finding. It may be that as an engineering proposition, accurate measurement of the volume resold and the volume directly consumed by the two parties is possible for each billing period. But there is no record evidence of separate rates, separate negotiations, separate contracts or separate rate regulation by official bodies, in short that the “sales” themselves were separate, and it is in these terms that the Act would require us to fix the limits of the jurisdictional grant. The attention of the Commission was not directed towards this matter. The question will not be ripe for our consideration until the California Commission has had an opportunity to perfect the record and to consider the problem.
Reversed.
California Electric Power Co., 50 Cal. P. U. C. 749, and California Electric Power Co., 89 P. U. R. (N. S.) 359, respectively.
There was some doubt as to the effect of the apparently conflicting orders, reflecting on the wisdom of our exercise of the power to review. The respondents contend that the state order merely permitted, but did not require, application of the higher rates to the Navy and County sales. The distinction, whatever its abstract attraction, misses the point that we are here considering whether or not the state agency had jurisdiction at the outset to consider these rates at all. That the order would have no concrete effect on the prices petitioners must pay is irrelevant and unlikely as well.
The Federal Power Commission merely ordered the Company to cease charging other than filed rates and so, while constituting a determinative assertion of its jurisdiction, apparently does not foreclose the submission of a new schedule, with usual rate-making procedures before the federal body. 18 CFR §§ 35.3, 35.5, 35.20.
§ 205 (a): “A11 rates and charges made, demanded, or received by any public utility for or in connection with the transmission or sale of electric energy subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, and all rules and regulations affecting or pertaining to such rates or charges shall be just and reasonable...
§ 206 (a): “Whenever the Commission, after a hearing had upon its own motion or upon complaint, shall find that any rate, charge, or classification, demanded, observed, charged, or collected by any public utility for any transmission or sale subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, or that any rule, regulation, practice, or contract affecting such rate, charge, or classification is unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory or preferential, the Commission shall determine the just and reasonable rate, charge, classification, rule, regulation, practice, or contract to be thereafter observed and in force, and shall fix the same by order.”
§ 201 (a): “It is hereby declared that the business of transmitting and selling electric energy... is affected with a public interest, and that Federal regulation of matters relating to... the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce and the sale of such energy at wholesale in interstate commerce is necessary in the public interest, such Federal regulation, however, to extend only to those matters which are not subject to regulation by the States.”
Section 201 (b) states, in apparently similar vein, that the Act is not to “deprive a State or State commission of its lawful authority now exercised over the exportation of hydroelectric energy which is transmitted across a State line.” The provision certainly does not go beyond that of § 201 (a), noted in the opinion, in limiting federal authority. This is true, not only because of the substantial similarity of the language, but also because it appears not to have been drafted with state rate regulation in mind. Rather, 79 Cong. Rec. 10527 indicates that the provision was intended to preserve the validity of certain state statutes prohibiting or regulating the volume of state power exported. Compare S. 2796, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., as introduced, § 201 (b), and idem as reported in the House, Union Calendar No. 451, § 201 (b). It has been so construed. Safe Harbor Water Power Corp., 5 F. P. C. 221, 235.
Section 20’s reference to state agreement has never been wholly clear. See footnotes 13, 16 and 19, infra. Our opinion, Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 343 U. S. 414, did not settle the issue, and it has been judicially discussed only rarely.
Hearings, House Committee on Water Power, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. 65.
It was, of course, more than historical accident that caused the simultaneous passage of the Holding Company Act and the Federal Power Act; in fact, their mutual consideration by the 79th Congress, 1st Sess., see 79 Cong. Rec. passim, strikingly indicates Congress’ realization that state regulation had failed, both because of the giantism of the holding company and because of inability to reach interstate sales. See Davis, Influence of Federal Trade Commission’s Investigations, 14 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 21.
See Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100; Adams Express Co. v. Kentucky, 238 U. S. 190; Rosenberger v. Pacific Express Co., 241 U. S. 48; Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland R. Co., 242 U. S. 311; Whitfield v. Ohio, 297 U. S. 431; Kentucky Whip & Collar Co. v. Illinois Central R. Co., 299 U. S. 334, 350.
Compare the Wilson Act, 26 Stat. 313 (alcoholic beverages), the Webb-Kenyon Act, 37 Stat. 699, 27 U. S. C. § 122 (same); 32 Stat. 193 (oleomargarine); the Reed Amendment to the National Appropriation Act of 1917, 39 Stat. 1069 (alcoholic beverages); the Hawes-Cooper Act, 45 Stat. 1084, 49 U. S. C. § 60; and the Ashurst-Sumners Act, 49 Stat. 494, 18 U. S. C. §§ 1761, 1762 (convict-made goods).
Hearings, House Committee on Water Power, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. 62-66, 95-97, is most illuminating in this regard. O. C. Merrill presented the views of the Secretaries of Agriculture, Interior and War. He discussed at some length the problem of sales across state lines and suggested that the proposed § 20 solution was desirable. It left regulation to the interested states “if they do it; and they are doing it now.” Ibid., at 97. “The intention of the draft was this: That in so far as the local authorities have the power, and exercise it, over rates and service, the Federal commission should leave it alone.” Ibid., at 62. There is no suggestion that § 20 was conceived as an act of federal permission; indeed Merrill explicitly states his ignorance as to whether any permission was needed: “I do not know whether the question has even come before the courts as to whether such business is or is not interstate commerce, within the meaning of the commerce clause of the Constitution, so that exclusive jurisdiction would be vested in the Federal Government, if it wished to exercise it.” Mr. Doremus: “It might be a power which Congress could exercise, or, if it failed to exercise it, could be left in the jurisdiction of the State.” Mr. Merrill: “It is my judgment that so long as it is satisfactorily handled by the several States it had better be left with them.” Ibid., at 97.
See Hearings, Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce on S. 6, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. Section 47 (h) stated that the purpose of the amendments was not to "abridge the jurisdiction or authority of any State to regulate, to the same extent as if this Act had not been passed, the rates and charges for the sale to consumers within the State of any power transmitted in interstate commerce,” unless a “substantial number” of those consumers sought federal regulation.
Hearings, Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce on S. Res. 80, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 265.
“In cases of interstate and foreign commerce of the character illustrated in the Pennssdvania Gas Co. case [direct sales to consumers], supra, I [the Chief Counsel of the Commission; the Commission approved the statement as its own Decision February 28, 1929] am of the opinion that the Federal Power Commission has no jurisdiction over any matter for the regulation of which the State has already provided a commission with the requisite authority. This appears to be the very situation which Congress had in mind when it conferred a conditional jurisdiction upon the commission. If such a State commission does not exist, the jurisdiction of the Federal Power Commission applies in full. If the State has a commission with authority over a part only of the matters specified in section 20, the jurisdiction of the Federal Power Commission extends to the remainder of such matters.
“In cases of interstate and foreign commerce of the character illustrated in the Attleboro case, supra, it seems clear that the States individually have no jurisdiction at all; that having no individual jurisdiction they can not acquire it jointly by agreements between themselves, except by specific authorization of Congress in the manner hereinafter discussed; and that, in absence of such authorization, the only 'agency with authority to regulate, in cases of this kind, the specific matters set forth in section 20 is the Federal Power Commission.” F. P. C. Ninth Ann. Rep. 123-124.
The Report went on to state that § 20 could not be interpreted as a “permissive” statute. Ibid., 127-129. The “compact” interpretation of § 20 was adopted in Safe Harbor Water Power Corp. v. Federal Power Commission, 124 F. 2d 800.
See footnote 16, infra.
The conception of the Federal Commission’s new function was perhaps more revolutionary than could be gathered by merely comparing the new Act with § 20. For it appears that despite the latter provision for limited rate regulation, in fact substantially nothing in that direction had been attempted, at least by 1930. Hearings, Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce on S. Res. 80, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 79, 262. The Commission had only three accountants, all of whom were concerned with evaluation of proposed licensed hydroelectric projects. Ibid., 38.
In fact, Colonel Tyler, Chief Engineer, Federal Power Commission, expressly alluded to the fact that, for federal authority to be effective, it would have to reach all interstate electricity, and not just that which is produced at licensed dams. Ibid., at 195. Here, of course, respondents theorize that a small admixture of hydroelectric power will defeat federal jurisdiction.
In fact, the House Report on the bill, commenting on § 305 of the Act, stated that specific reference to officials of licensees had been deleted because “such licensees when interstate operating public-utility companies will be subject to the provisions of the section in any event.” H. R. Rep. No. 1318, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 31.
For general discussion of the scope of Part II, see Hearings, Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce on S. 1725, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 250-251; H. R. Rep. No. 1318, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | J | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Douglas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a suit for treble damages, 38 Stat. 731,15 U. S. C. § 15, brought for violations of § 2 (a) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, 49 Stat. 1526, 15 U. S. C. § 13 (a), and of § 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U. S. C. § 13a. The jury found for petitioner; the Court of Appeals reversed, 208 F. 2d 777; and we granted certiorari, 347 U. S. 1012, because of the importance of the question of law presented.
Petitioner was engaged in the bakery business at Santa Rosa, New Mexico, none of his activities being interstate in character. Respondent is a corporation in the baking business at Clovis, New Mexico. It is one of several corporations having interlocking ownership and management, all in the Mead family and associates. These corporations maintain plants at Lubbock and Big Spring, Texas, and at Hobbs, Roswell, and Clovis, New Mexico. They all market their bread under the name “Mead’s Fine Bread” and promote the product through a common advertising program. These corporations purchase their flour and bread wrappers as a unit. Respondent sells bread in Farwell, Texas, a town which it serves with a bread truck operating out of Clovis, New Mexico.
For some months, petitioner and respondent were in competition in Santa Rosa. There is evidence that, on the threat of petitioner to move his bakery to another town, the local Santa Rosa merchants agreed to purchase petitioner’s products exclusively. Respondent, labeling that action a boycott, cut the wholesale price of bread in Santa Rosa from 14 cents to 7 cents for a pound loaf and from 21 cents to 11 cents for a pound-and-a-half loaf. The Mead companies did not cut the prices of bread in any other town; and respondent did not cut its prices of bread in Farwell, Texas.
The price war continued from September 1948 to April 1949, and as a result petitioner was forced to close his business.
The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment for petitioner on the ground that the injury resulting from the price cutting was to a purely local competitor whose business was in no way related to interstate commerce. “If competition was lessened or a monopoly created,” said the Court of Appeals, “it was purely local in its scope and effect and in no way related to or affected interstate commerce.” 208 F. 2d 777, 780.
Section 2 (a) of the Clayton Act, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 13 (a), provides in part:
“It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality, where either or any of the purchases involved in such discrimination are in commerce, where such commodities are sold for use, consumption, or resale within the United States . . . and where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them . . . .”
Section 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U. S. C. § 13a, provides in part:
“It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce, ... to sell . . . goods in any part of the United States at prices lower than those exacted by said person elsewhere in the United States for the purpose of destroying competition, or eliminating a competitor in such part of the United States; or, to sell . . . goods at unreasonably low prices for the purpose of destroying competition or eliminating a competitor.”
Those sections on their face seem to cover the instant case. Respondent is engaged in commerce, selling bread both locally and interstate. In the course of such business, it made price discriminations, maintaining the price in the interstate transactions and cutting the price in the intrastate sales. The destruction of a competitor was plainly established, as required by the amended § 2 (a) of the Clayton Act; and the evidence to support a finding of purpose to eliminate a competitor, as required by § 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act, was ample.
The Court of Appeals read the antitrust laws as reaching local transactions only where: (1) the local restraint has an effect on the free flow of interstate trade or commerce (e. g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U. S. 111); or (2) the restraint on or the monopoly of local trade is effected through the utilization of interstate mechanisms (e. g., Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U. S. 143); or (3) local prices are fixed by the use of interstate commercial transactions (e. g., United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, 324 U. S. 293); or (4) the discriminatory sales are to purchasers who compete in interstate commerce (e. g., Corn Products Refining Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 324 U. S. 726); or (5) interstate commerce is in some other way used to destroy competition or is injured or impaired as a result of unlawful acts.
We think that the practices in the present case are also included within the scope of the antitrust laws. We have here an interstate industry increasing its domain through outlawed competitive practices. The victim, to be sure, is only a local merchant; and no interstate transactions are used to destroy him. But the beneficiary is an interstate business; the treasury used to finance the warfare is drawn from interstate, as well as local, sources which include not only respondent but also a group of interlocked companies engaged in the same line of business; and the prices on the interstate sales, both by respondent and by the other Mead companies, are kept high while the local prices are lowered. If this method of competition were approved, the pattern for growth of monopoly would be simple. As long as the price warfare was strictly intrastate, interstate business could grow and expand with impunity at the expense of local merchants. The competitive advantage would then be with the interstate combines, not by reason of their skills or efficiency but because of their strength and ability to wage price wars. The profits made in interstate activities would underwrite the losses of local price-cutting campaigns. No instrumentality of interstate commerce would be used to destroy the local merchant and expand the domain of the combine. But the opportunities afforded by interstate commerce would be employed to injure local trade. Congress, as guardian of the Commerce Clause, certainly has power to say that those advantages shall not attach to the privilege of doing an interstate business.
This type of price cutting was held to be “foreign to any legitimate commercial competition” even prior to the Robinson-Patman Act. See Porto Rican American Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 30 F. 2d 234, 237. It seems plain to us that Congress went at least that far in the Robinson-Patman Act. As we have shown, the facts charged and found read upon the words of the statute. And the history of the Act shows it was designed to have the reach now claimed for it by petitioner. Congressman Utterback, manager of the bill in the House, included this type of case in the price cutting that he claimed was outlawed:
“Where, however, a manufacturer sells to customers both within the State and beyond the State, he may not favor either to the disadvantage of the other; he may not use the privilege of interstate commerce to the injury of his local trade, nor may he favor his local trade to the injury of his interstate trade. The Federal power to regulate interstate commerce is the power both to limit its employment to the injury of business within the State, and to protect interstate commerce itself from injury by influences within the State.” 80 Cong. Rec. 9417.
It is, we think, clear that Congress by the Clayton Act and Robinson-Patman Act barred the use of interstate business to destroy local business, outlawing the price cutting employed by respondent.
Other points are pressed on us by respondent in support of the judgment of the Court of Appeals. But we have examined them and found them not substantial. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and affirm the judgment of the District Court.
So ordered.
The case first reached the Court of Appeals on appeal from a dismissal of the action at the close of plaintiff’s case. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the suit was precluded by petitioner’s own illegal acts which initiated the alleged price discrimination. 184 F. 2d 338. We granted a petition for certiorari, vacated that judgment, and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for further consideration in light of Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U. S. 211. See Moore v. Mead Service Co., 340 U. S. 944. On reconsideration, the Court of Appeals receded from its former position, reversed the judgment dismissing the complaint, and remanded the case for trial. 190 F. 2d 540.
Respondent contends that the so-called boycott justified its price cutting. In Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, 340 U. S. 211, 214, we said, “If petitioner and others were guilty of infractions of the antitrust laws, they could be held responsible in appropriate proceedings brought against them by the Government or by injured private persons. The alleged illegal conduct of petitioner, however, could not legalize the unlawful combination by respondents nor immunize them against liability to those they injured.” We need not pursue the matter, for respondent obtained a charge on this phase of the case as to which it cannot complain. The District Court charged the jury that respondent would not be liable if the price cutting was “for the purpose of regaining its own market or of reestablishing competition and not to destroy competition or to eliminate a competitor.”
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | H | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
Respondent Carl Mathiason was convicted of first-degree burglary after a bench trial in which his confession was critical to the State’s case. At trial he moved to suppress the confession as the fruit of questioning by the police not preceded by the warnings required in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966). The trial court refused to exclude the confession because it found that Mathiason was not in custody at the time of the confession.
The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed respondent’s conviction, but on his petition for review in the Supreme Court of Oregon that court by a divided vote reversed the conviction. It found that although Mathiason had not been arrested or otherwise formally detained, “the interrogation took place in a ‘coercive environment’ ” of the sort to which Miranda was intended to apply. The court conceded that its holding was contrary to decisions in other jurisdictions, and referred in particular to People v. Yukl, 25 N. Y. 2d 585, 256 N. E. 2d 172 (1969). The State of Oregon has petitioned for certiorari to review the judgment of the Supreme Court of Oregon. We think that court has read Miranda too broadly, and we therefore reverse its judgment.
The Supreme Court of Oregon described the factual situation surrounding the confession as follows:
“An officer of the State Police investigated a theft at a residence near Pendleton. He asked the lady of the house which had been burglarized if she suspected anyone. She replied that the defendant was the only one she could think of. The defendant was a parolee and a 'close associate’ of her son. The officer tried to contact defendant on three or four occasions with no success. Finally, about 25 days after the burglary, the officer left his card at defendant’s apartment with a note asking him to call because ‘I’d like to discuss something with you.’ The next afternoon the defendant did call. The officer asked where it would be convenient to meet. The defendant had no preference; so the officer asked if the defendant could meet him at the state patrol office in about an hour and a half, about 5:00 p. m. The patrol office was about two blocks from defendant’s apartment. The building housed several state agencies.
“The officer met defendant in the hallway, shook hands and took him into an office. The defendant was told he was not under arrest. The door was closed. The two sat across a desk. The police radio in another room could be heard. The officer told defendant he wanted to talk to him about a burglary and that his truthfulness would possibly be considered by the district attorney or judge. The officer further advised that the police believed defendant was involved in the burglary and [falsely stated that] defendant’s fingerprints were found at the scene. The defendant sat for a few .minutes and then said he had taken the property. This occurred within five minutes after defendant had come to the office. The officer then advised defendant of his Miranda rights and took a taped confession.
“At the end of the taped conversation the officer told defendant he was not arresting him at this time; he was released to go about his job and return to his family. The officer said he was referring the case to the district attorney for him to determine whether criminal charges would be brought. It was 5:30 p. m. when the defendant left the office.
“The officer gave all the testimony relevant to this issue. The defendant did not take the stand either at the hearing on the motion to suppress or at the trial.” 275 Ore. 1, 3-4, 549 P. 2d 673, 674 (1976).
The Supreme Court of Oregon reasoned from these facts that:
“We hold the interrogation took place in a 'coercive environment.’ The parties were in the offices of the State Police; they were alone behind closed doors; the officer informed the defendant he was a suspect in a theft and the authorities had evidence incriminating him in the crime; and the defendant was a parolee under supervision. We are of the opinion that this evidence is not overcome by the evidence that the defendant came to the office in response to a request and was told he was not under arrest.” Id., at 5, 549 P. 2d, at 675.
Our decision in Miranda set forth rules of police procedure applicable to “custodial interrogation.” “By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” 384 U. S., at 444. Subsequently we have found the Miranda principle applicable to questioning which takes place in a prison setting during a suspect’s term of imprisonment on a separate offense, Mathis v. United States, 391 U. S. 1 (1968), and to questioning taking place in a suspect’s home, after he has been arrested and is no longer free to go where he pleases, Orozco v. Texas, 394 U. S. 324 (1969).
In the present case, however, there is no indication that the questioning took place in a context where respondent’s freedom to depart was restricted in any way. He came voluntarily to the police station, where he was immediately informed that he was not under arrest. At the close of a %-hour interview respondent did in fact leave the police station without hindrance. It is clear from these facts that Mathiason was not in custody “or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.”
Such a noncustodial situation is not converted to one in which Miranda applies simply because a reviewing court concludes that, even in the absence of any formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement, the questioning took place in a “coercive environment.” Any interview of one suspected of a crime by a police officer will have coercive aspects to it, simply by virtue of the fact that the police officer is part of a law enforcement system which may ultimately cause the suspect to be charged with a crime. But police officers are not required to administer Miranda warnings to everyone whom they question. Nor is the requirement of warnings to be ifnposed simply because the questioning takes place in the station house, or because the questioned person is one whom the police suspect. Miranda warnings are required only where there has been such a restriction on a person’s freedom as to render him “in custody.” It was that sort of coercive environment to which Miranda by its terms was made applicable, and to which it is limited.
The officer’s false statement about having discovered Mathiason’s fingerprints at the scene was found by the Supreme Court of Oregon to be another circumstance contributing to the coercive environment which makes the Miranda rationale applicable. Whatever relevance this fact may have to other issues in the case, it has nothing to do with whether respondent was in custody for purposes of the Miranda rule.
The petition for certiorari is granted, the judgment of the Oregon Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
Mr. Justice Brennan would grant the writ but dissents from the summary disposition and would set the case for oral argument.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | A | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Sotomayor
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This Court has long recognized that sentencing judges “exercise a wide discretion” in the types of evidence they may consider when imposing sentence and that “[h]ighly relevant — if not essential — to [the] selection of an appropriate sentence is the possession of the fullest information possible concerning the defendant’s life and characteristics.” Williams v. New York, 337 U. S. 241, 246-247 (1949). Congress codified this principle at 18 U. S. C. §3661, which provides that “[n]o limitation shall be placed on the information” a sentencing court may consider “concerning the [defendant’s] background, character, and conduct,” and at § 3553(a), which sets forth certain factors that sentencing courts must consider, including “the history and characteristics of the defendant,” § 3553(a)(1). The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit concluded in this case that the District Court, when resentencing petitioner after his initial sentence had been set aside on appeal, could not consider evidence of petitioner’s rehabilitation since his initial sentencing. That conclusion conflicts with longstanding principles of federal sentencing law and Congress’ express directives in §§3661 and 3553(a). Although a separate statutory provision, § 3742(g)(2), prohibits a district court at resentencing from imposing a sentence outside the Federal Sentencing Guidelines range except upon a ground it relied upon at the prior sentencing — thus effectively precluding the court from considering postsentencing rehabilitation for purposes of imposing a non-Guidelines sentence — that provision did not survive our holding in United States v. Booker, 543 U. S. 220 (2005), and we expressly invalidate it today.
We hold that when a defendant’s sentence has been set aside on appeal, a district court at resentencing may consider evidence of the defendant’s postsentencing rehabilitation and that such evidence may, in appropriate cases, support a downward variance from the now-advisory Federal Sentencing Guidelines range. Separately, we affirm the Court of Appeals’ ruling that the law of the case doctrine did not require the District Court in this case to apply the same percentage departure from the Guidelines range for substantial assistance that had been applied at petitioner’s prior sentencing.
I
In October 2003, petitioner Jason Pepper was arrested and charged with conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine in violation of 21 U. S. C. §846. After pleading guilty, Pepper appeared for sentencing before then-Chief Judge Mark W. Bennett of the U. S. District Court for the Northern District of Iowa. Pepper’s sentencing range under the Guidelines was 97 to 121 months. The Government moved for a downward departure pursuant to USSG § 5K1.1 based on Pepper’s substantial assistance and recommended a 15-percent downward departure. The District Court, however, sentenced Pepper to a 24-month prison term, resulting in an approximately 75-percent downward departure from the low end of the Guidelines range, to be followed by five years of supervised release. The Government appealed Pepper’s sentence, and in June 2005, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded for resentencing in light of our intervening decision in Booker (and for another reason not relevant here). See United States v. Pepper, 412 F. 3d 995, 999 (Pepper I). Pepper completed his 24-month sentence three days after Pepper I was issued and began serving his term of supervised release.
In May 2006, the District Court conducted a resentencing hearing and heard from three witnesses. In his testimony, Pepper first recounted that while he had previously been a drug addict, he successfully completed a 500-hour drug treatment program while in prison and he no longer used any drugs. App. 104-105. Pepper then explained that since his release from prison, he had enrolled at a local community college as a full-time student and had earned A’s in all of his classes in the prior semester. Id., at 106-107. Pepper also testified that he had obtained employment within a few weeks after being released from custody and was continuing to work part time while attending school. Id., at 106-110. Pepper confirmed that he was in compliance with all the conditions of his supervised release and described his changed attitude since his arrest. See id., at 111 (“[M]y life was basically headed to either where — I guess where I ended up, in prison, or death. Now I have some optimism about my life, about what I can do with my life. I’m glad that I got this chance to try again I guess you could say at a decent life.... My life was going nowhere before, and I think that it’s going somewhere now”).
Pepper’s father testified that he had virtually no contact with Pepper during the 5-year period leading up to his arrest. Id., at 117. Pepper’s drug treatment program, according to his father, “truly sobered him up” and “made his way of thinking change.” Id., at 121. He explained that Pepper was now “much more mature” and “serious in terms of planning for the future,” id., at 119, and that as a consequence, he had reestablished a relationship with his son, id., at 118-119.
Finally, Pepper’s probation officer testified that, in his view, a 24-month sentence would be reasonable in light of Pepper’s substantial assistance, postsentencing rehabilitation, and demonstrated low risk of recidivism. Id., at 126-131. The probation officer also prepared a sentencing memorandum that further set forth the reasons supporting his recommendation for a 24-month sentence.
The District Court adopted as its findings of fact the testimony of the three witnesses and the probation officer’s sentencing memorandum. The court granted a 40-percent downward departure based on Pepper’s substantial assistance, reducing the bottom of the Guidelines range from 97 to 58 months. The court then granted a further 59-percent downward variance based on, inter alia, Pepper’s rehabilitation since his initial sentencing. Id., at 143-148. The court sentenced Pepper to 24 months of imprisonment, concluding that “it would [not] advance any purpose of federal sentencing policy or any other policy behind the federal sentencing guidelines to send this defendant back to prison.” Id., at 149-150.
The Government again appealed Pepper’s sentence, and the Court of Appeals again reversed and remanded for re-sentencing. See United States v. Pepper, 486 F. 3d 408, 410, 413 (CA8 2007) (Pepper II). The court concluded that, while it was “a close call, [it could not] say the district court abused its discretion” by granting the 40-percent downward departure for substantial assistance. Id., at 411. The court found the further 59-percent downward variance, however, to be an abuse of discretion. Id., at 412-413. In doing so, the court held that Pepper’s “post-sentencing rehabilitation was an impermissible factor to consider in granting a downward variance.” Id., at 413. The court stated that evidence of postsenteneing rehabilitation “ ‘is not relevant and will not be permitted at resentencing because the district court could not have considered that evidence at the time of the original sentencing,’” and permitting courts to consider postsenteneing rehabilitation at resentencing “would create unwarranted sentencing disparities and inject.blatant inequities into the sentencing process.” Ibid. The Court of Appeals directed that the case be assigned to a different district judge for resentencing. Ibid.
After the Court of Appeals’ mandate issued, Pepper’s case was reassigned on remand to Chief Judge Linda R. Reade. In July 2007, Chief Judge Reade issued an order on the scope of the remand from Pepper II, stating that “[t]he court will not consider itself bound to reduce [Pepper’s] advisory Sentencing Guidelines range by 40% pursuant to USSG §5K1.1.” United States v. Pepper, No. 03-CR-4113-LRR, 2007 WL 2076041, *4 (ND Iowa). In the meantime, Pepper petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari, and in January 2008, we granted the petition, vacated the judgment in Pepper II, and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for further consideration in light of Gall v. United States, 552 U. S. 38 (2007). See Pepper v. United States, 552 U. S. 1089 (2008).
On remand, the Court of Appeals held that Gall did not alter its prior conclusion that “post-sentence rehabilitation is an impermissible factor to consider in granting a downward variance.” 518 F. 3d 949, 953 (CA8 2008) (Pepper III). The court again reversed the sentence and remanded for resentencing.
In October 2008, Chief Judge Reade convened Pepper’s second' resentencing hearing: Pepper informed the court that he was still attending school and was now working as a supervisor for the night crew at a warehouse retailer, where he was recently selected by management as “associate of the year” and was likely to be promoted the following January. App. 320, 323. Pepper also stated that he had recently married and was now supporting his wife and her daughter. Id., at 321. Pepper’s father reiterated that Pepper was moving forward in both his career and his family life and that he remained in close touch with his son. See id., at 300-304.
In December 2008, Chief Judge Reade issued a sentencing memorandum. Noting that the remand language of Pepper III was nearly identical to the language in Pepper II, the court again observed that it was “not bound to reduce [Pepper’s] advisory Sentencing Guidelines range by 40%” for substantial assistance and concluded that Pepper was entitled only to a 20-percent downward departure because the assistance was “timely, helpful and important” but “in no way extraordinary.” Sealed Sentencing Memorandum in No. 03-CR-4113-LRR (ND Iowa), Record, Doc. 198, pp. 7, 10. The court also rejected Pepper’s request for a downward variance based on, inter alia, his postsentencing rehabilitation. Id., at 16.
The District Court reconvened Pepper’s resentencing hearing in January 2009. The court’s decision to grant a 20-percent downward departure for substantial assistance resulted in an advisory Guidelines range of 77 to 97 months. The court also granted the Government’s motion under Rule 35(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to account for investigative assistance Pepper provided after he was initially sentenced. The court imposed a 65-month term of imprisonment, to be followed by 12 months of supervised release.
The Court of Appeals affirmed Pepper’s 65-month sentence. 570 F. 3d 958 (CA8 2009) (Pepper IV). As relevant here, the Court of Appeals rejected Pepper’s argument that the District Court erred in refusing to consider his postsen-teneing rehabilitation. The court acknowledged that “Pepper made significant progress during and following his initial period of imprisonment” and “commend[ed] Pepper on the positive changes he has made in his life,” but concluded that Pepper’s argument was foreclosed by Circuit precedent holding that “post-sentencing rehabilitation is not a permissible factor to consider in granting a downward variance.” Id., at 964-965 (citing United States v. Jenners, 473 F. 3d 894, 899 (CA8 2007); United States v. McMannus, 496 F. 3d 846, 852, n. 4 (CA8 2007)).
The Court of Appeals also rejected Pepper’s claim that the scope of the remand and the law of the case from Pepper II and Pepper III required the District Court to reduce the applicable Guidelines range by at least 40 percent pursuant to USSG §5K1.1. The court noted that its remand orders in Pepper II and Pepper III were “general remand[s] for resentencing,” which “did not place any limitations on the discretion of the newly assigned district court judge in re-sentencing.” 570 F. 3d, at 963. The court further noted that, although issues decided by an appellate court become law of the case on remand to the sentencing court, its earlier decisions merely held that a 40-percent downward departure for substantial assistance was not an abuse of discretion, not that the District Court would be bound by the 40-percent departure previously granted. Id., at 963-964.
We granted Pepper’s petition for a writ of certiorari, 561 U. S. 1024 (2010), to decide two questions: (1) whether a district court, after a defendant’s sentence has been set aside on appeal,, may consider evidence of a defendant’s postsen-tencing rehabilitation to support a downward variance when resentencing the defendant, a question that has divided the Courts of Appeals; and (2) whether the resentencing court was required, under the law of the ease doctrine, to apply the same percentage departure from the Guidelines range for substantial assistance that had been applied at Pepper’s prior sentencing. Because the United States has confessed error in the Court of Appeals’ ruling on the first question, we appointed an amicus curiae to defend the Court of Appeals’ judgment. We now vacate the Eighth Circuit’s ruling on the first question and affirm its ruling on the second.
II
A
“It has been uniform and constant in the federal judicial tradition for the sentencing judge to consider every convicted person as an individual and every case as a unique study in the human failings that sometimes mitigate, sometimes magnify, the crime and the punishment to ensue.” Koon v. United States, 518 U. S. 81, 113 (1996). Underlying this tradition is the principle that “the punishment should fit the offender and not merely the crime.” Williams, 337 U. S., at 247; see also Pennsylvania ex rel. Sullivan v. Ashe, 302 U. S. 51, 55 (1937) (“For the determination of sentences, justice generally requires consideration of more than the particular acts by which the crime was committed and that there be taken into account the circumstances of the offense together with the character and propensities of the offender”).
Consistent with this principle, we have observed that “both before and since the American colonies became a nation, courts in this country and in England practiced a policy under which a sentencing judge could exercise a wide discretion in the sources and types of evidence used to assist him in determining the kind and extent of punishment to be imposed within limits fixed by law.” Williams, 337 U. S., at 246. In particular, we have emphasized that “[hjighly relevant — if not essential — to [the] selection of an appropriate sentence is the possession of the fullest information possible concerning the defendant’s life and characteristics.” Id., at 247. Permitting sentencing courts to consider the widest possible breadth of information about a defendant “ensures that the punishment will suit not merely the offense but the individual defendant.” Wasman v. United States, 468 U. S. 559, 564 (1984).
In 1970, Congress codified the “longstanding principle that sentencing courts have broad discretion to consider various kinds of information” at 18 U. S. C. § 3577 (1970 ed.). United States v. Watts, 519 U. S. 148, 151 (1997) (per curiam). Section 3577 provided:
“No limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence.” (Emphasis added.)
In the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (SRA), 18 U. S. C. §3551 et seq., Congress effected fundamental changes to federal sentencing by creating the Federal Sentencing Commission and introducing the Guidelines scheme. In doing so, however, Congress recodified §3577 without change at §3661. The Sentencing Commission, moreover, expressly incorporated § 3661 in the Guidelines:
“In determining the sentence to impose within the guideline range, or whether a departure from the guidelines is warranted, the court may consider, without limitation, any information concerning the background, character and conduct of the defendant, unless otherwise prohibited by law. See 18 U. S. C. § 3661.” USSG § 1B1.4 (Nov. 2010) (emphasis added).
Both Congress and the Sentencing Commission thus expressly preserved the traditional discretion of sentencing courts to “conduct an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the kind of information [they] may consider, or the source from which it may come.” United States v. Tucker, 404 U. S. 443, 446 (1972).
The SRA did constrain sentencing courts’ discretion in important respects, most notably by making the Guidelines mandatory, see 18 U. S. C. § 3553(b)(1) (2000 ed., Supp. IV), and by specifying various factors that courts must consider in exercising their discretion, see § 3553(a). In our seminal decision in Booker, we held that where facts found by a judge by a preponderance of the evidence increased the applicable Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory in those circumstances violated the Sixth Amendment right of criminal defendants to be tried by a jury and to have every element of an offense proved by the Government beyond a reasonable doubt. 543 U. S., at 243-244. Our remedial opinion in Booker invalidated two offending provisions in the SRA, see id., at 245 (invalidating 18 U. S. C. §§ 3553(b)(1), 3742(e)), and instructed the district courts to treat the Guidelines as “effectively advisory,” 543 U. S., at 245.
Our post-Booker opinions make clear that, although a sentencing court must “give respectful consideration to the Guidelines, Booker permits the court to tailor the sentence in light of other statutory concerns as well.” Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U. S. 85, 101 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Accordingly, although the “Guidelines should be the starting point and the initial benchmark,” district courts may impose sentences within statutory limits based on appropriate consideration of all of the factors listed in § 3553(a), subject to appellate review for “reasonableness.” Gall, 552 U. S., at 49-51. This sentencing framework applies both at a defendant’s initial sentencing and at any subsequent resentencing after a sentence has been set aside on appeal. See 18 U. S. C. § 3742(g) (“A district court to which a case is remanded... shall resen-tenee a defendant in accordance with section 3553”); see also Dillon v. United States, 560 U. S. 817, 828, 827 (2010) (distinguishing between “sentence-modification proceedings” under 18 U. S. C. § 3582(c)(2), which “do not implicate the interests identified in Booker,” and “plenary resentencing proceedings,” which do).
B
In light of the federal sentencing framework described above, we think it clear that when a defendant’s sentence has been set aside oh appeal and his case remanded for resen-tencing, a district court may consider evidence of a defendant’s rehabilitation since his prior sentencing and that such evidence may, in appropriate cases, support a downward variance from the advisory Guidelines range.
Preliminarily, Congress could not have been clearer in directing that “[n]o limitation... be placed on the information concerning the background, character, and conduct” of a defendant that a district court may “receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence.” 18 U. S. C. §3661. The plain language of §3661 makes no distinction between a defendant’s initial sentencing and a subsequent resentencing after a prior sentence has been set aside on appeal. We have recognized that “the broad language of § 3661” does not provide “any basis for the courts to invent a blanket prohibition against considering certain types of evidence at sentencing.” Watts, 519 U. S., at 152. A categorical bar on the consideration of postsentencing rehabilitation evidence would directly contravene Congress’ expressed intent in § 3661.
In addition, evidence of postsentencing rehabilitation may be highly relevant to several of the § 3553(a) factors that Congress has expressly instructed district courts to consider at sentencing. For example, evidence of postsentencing rehabilitation may plainly be relevant to “the history and characteristics of the defendant.” § 3553(a)(1). Such evidence may also be pertinent to “the need for the sentence imposed” to serve the general purposes of sentencing set forth in § 3553(a)(2) — in particular, to “afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct,” “protect the public from farther crimes of the defendant,” and “provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training... or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner.” §§ 3553(a)(2)(B)-(D); see McMannus, 496 F. 3d, at 853 (Melloy, J., concurring) (“In assessing... deterrence, protection of the public and rehabilitation, 18 U.S. C. § 3553(a)(2)(B)(C) & (D), there would seem to be no better evidence than a defendant’s post-incarceration conduct”). Postsentencing rehabilitation may also critically inform a sentencing judge’s overarching duty under § 3553(a) to “impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary,” to comply with the sentencing purposes set forth in § 3553(a)(2).
As the original sentencing judge recognized, the extensive evidence of Pepper’s rehabilitation since his initial sentencing is clearly relevant to the selection of an appropriate sen-tenee in this case. Most fundamentally, evidence of Pepper’s conduct since his release from custody in June 2005 provides the most up-to-date picture of Pepper’s “history and characteristics.” § 3553(a)(1); see United States v. Bryson, 229 F. 3d 425, 426 (CA2 2000) (per curiam) (“[A] court’s duty is. always to sentence the defendant as he stands before the court on the day of sentencing”). At the time of his initial sentencing in 2004, Pepper was a 25-year-old drug addiet who was unemployed, estranged from his family, and had recently sold drugs as part of a methamphetamine conspiracy. By the time of his second resentencing in 2009, Pepper had been drug free for nearly five years, had attended college and achieved high grades, was a top employee at his job slated for a promotion, had reestablished a relationship with his father, and was married and supporting his wife’s daughter. There is no question that this evidence of Pepper’s conduct since his initial sentencing constitutes a critical part of the “history and characteristics” of a defendant that Congress intended sentencing courts to consider. § 3553(a).
Pepper’s postsentencing conduct also sheds light on the likelihood that he will engage in future criminal conduct, a central factor that district courts must assess when imposing sentence. See §§3553(a)(2)(B)-(C); Gall, 552 U. S., at 59 (“Gall’s self-motivated rehabilitation... lends strong support to the conclusion that imprisonment was not necessary to deter Gall from engaging in future criminal conduct or to protect the public from his future criminal acts” (citing §§ 3553(a)(2)(B)-(C))). As recognized by Pepper’s probation officer, Pepper’s steady employment, as well as his successful completion of a 500-hour drug treatment program and his drug-free condition, also suggest a diminished need for “educational or vocational training... or other correctional treatment.” § 3553(a)(2)(D). Finally, Pepper’s exemplary postsentencing conduct may be taken as the most accurate indicator of “his present purposes and tendencies and significantly to suggest the period of restraint and the kind of discipline that ought to be imposed upon him.” Ashe, 302 U. S., at 55. Accordingly, evidence of Pepper’s postsen-tencing rehabilitation bears directly on the District Court’s overarching duty to “impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary,” to serve' the purposes of sentencing. § 3553(a).
In sum, the Court of Appeals’ ruling prohibiting the District Court from considering any evidence of Pepper’s postsentencing rehabilitation at resentencing conflicts with longstanding principles of federal sentencing law and contravenes Congress’ directives in §§3661 and 3553(a).
C
Amicus nevertheless advances two principal arguments in defense of the Court of Appeals’ ruling: (1) 18 U. S. C. § 3742(g)(2), which restricts the discretion of a resentencing court on remand to impose a non-Guidelines sentence, effectively forecloses consideration of a defendant’s postsentenc-ing rehabilitation; and (2) permitting district courts to consider postsentencing rehabilitation would defeat Congress’ objectives under § 3553(a). We are not persuaded.
1
Amicus’ main argument relies on 18 U. S. C. § 3742(g)(2), a provision that the Court of Appeals did not cite below. That provision states that when a sentence is set aside on appeal, the district court to which the case is remanded:
“shall not impose a sentence outside the applicable guidelines range except upon a ground that—
“(A) was specifically and affirmatively included in the written statement of reasons required by section 3553(c) in connection with the previous sentencing of the defendant prior to the appeal; and
“(B) was held by the court of appeals, in remanding the case, to be a permissible ground of departure.”
In operation, § 3742(g)(2) restricts the discretion of a district court on remand by precluding the court from imposing a sentence outside the Guidelines range except upon a “ground of departure” that was expressly relied upon in the prior sentencing and upheld on appeal. Amicus thus correctly contends that, on its face, § 3742(g)(2) effectively forecloses a resentencing court from considering evidence of a defendant’s postsentencing rehabilitation for purposes of imposing a non-Guidelines sentence because, as a practical matter, such evidence did not exist at the time of the prior sentencing. As the Government concedes, however, § 3742(g)(2) is invalid after Booker.
As we have explained, Booker held that where judicial factfinding increases a defendant’s applicable Sentencing Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory in those circumstances would violate the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to be tried by a jury and to have every element of an offense proved by the Government beyond a reasonable doubt. See supra, at 489-490. We recognized in Booker that, although the SRA permitted departures from the applicable Guidelines range in limited circumstances, “departures are not available in every case, and in fact are unavailable in most.” 543 U. S., at 234. Because in those instances, “the judge is bound to impose a sentence within the Guidelines range,” we concluded that the availability of departures in certain circumstances “does not avoid the constitutional issue.” Ibid.
To remedy the constitutional problem, we rendered the Guidelines effectively advisory by invalidating two provisions of the SRA: 18 U. S. C. § 3553(b)(1) (2000 ed., Supp. IV), which generally required sentencing courts to impose a sentence within the applicable Guidelines range, and § 3742(e) (2000 ed. and Supp. IV), which prescribed the standard of appellate review, including de novo review of Guidelines departures. 543 U. S., at 259. We invalidated these provisions even though we recognized that mandatory application of the Guidelines would not always result in a Sixth Amendment violation. Indeed, although the Government suggested in Booker that we render the Guidelines advisory only in cases in which the Constitution prohibits judicial fact-finding, we rejected that two-track proposal, reasoning that “Congress would not have authorized a mandatory system in some cases and a nonmandatory system in others, given the administrative complexities that such a system would create.” Id., at 266; see Dillon, 560 U. S., at 829-830 (“The incomplete remedy we rejected in Booker would have required courts to treat the Guidelines differently in similar proceedings, leading potentially to unfair results and considerable administrative challenges”).
We did not expressly mention § 3742(g)(2) in Booker, but the rationale we set forth in that opinion for invalidating §§ 3553(b)(1) and 3742(e) applies equally to § 3742(g)(2). As with those provisions, § 3742(g)(2) requires district courts effectively to treat the Guidelines as mandatory in an entire set of cases. Specifically, § 3742(g)(2) precludes a district court on remand from imposing a sentence “outside the applicable guidelines range” except upon a “ground of departure” that was expressly relied upon by the court at the prior sentencing and upheld by the court of appeals. In circumstances in which the district court did not rely upon such a departure ground at the prior sentencing, § 3742(g)(2) would require the court on remand to impose a sentence within the applicable Guidelines range, thus rendering the Guidelines effectively mandatory. Because in a large set of cases, judicial factfinding will increase the applicable Guidelines range beyond that supported solely by the facts established by the jury verdict (or guilty plea), requiring a sentencing judge on remand to apply the Guidelines range, as § 3742(g)(2) does, will often result in a Sixth Amendment violation for the reasons we explained in Booker. Accordingly, as with the provisions in Booker, the proper remedy here is to invalidate § 3742(g)(2).
The sentencing proceeding at issue in Booker itself illustrates why § 3742(g)(2) cannot withstand Sixth Amendment scrutiny. The District Court in Booker increased the defendant's then-mandatory Guidelines range based on a drug-quantity finding that it, rather than the jury, made. 543 U. S., at 227. After we held that the Guidelines must be treated as advisory, we remanded the case for resentencing. Id., at 267. Had § 3742(g)(2) remained valid after Booker, the District Court on remand would have been required to sentence within the Guidelines range because it did not depart from the Guidelines at the original sentencing. Accordingly, the resentencing judge in Booker would have been required under § 3742(g)(2) to impose a Guidelines sentence based on judge-found facts concerning drug quantity, the precise result that Booker forbids.
The same result would occur in any sentencing in which a district court erroneously refuses to impose a sentence outside the Guidelines range “based on a misunderstanding of its authority to depart under or vary from the Guidelines.” Reply Brief for United States 16. For example, if § 3742(g)(2) remained valid, there would be no remedy at re-sentencing if a district court erroneously believed the Guidelines were presumptively reasonable, see Nelson v. United States, 555 U. S. 350, 352 (2009) (per curiam), or if it mistakenly thought that a non-Guidelines sentence required extraordinary circumstances, see Gall, 552 U. S., at 47, or if it incorrectly concluded that it could not vary from the Guidelines based on a policy disagreement with their disparate treatment of crack and powder cocaine, see Kimbrough, 552 U. S., at 101. In such cases, the district court at the initial sentencing proceeding will necessarily have imposed a sentence within the Guidelines range, and thus § 3742(g)(2) would require the imposition of a Guidelines sentence on remand. See Reply Brief for Petitioner 3-5 (describing further categories of cases where “the Booker remedy would be entirely unavailable if § 3742(g)(2) were valid”).
To be sure, applying § 3742(g)(2) at resentencing would not always result in a Sixth Amendment violation. For example, where the applicable Guidelines range rests solely on facts found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, application of § 3742(g)(2) at resentencing would not render the sentence constitutionally infirm. But, as explained above, that possibility was equally true with respect to the sentencing provisions we invalidated in Booker. See supra, at 495. As with those provisions, “we cannot assume that Congress, if faced with the statute’s invalidity in key applications, would have preferred to apply the statute in as many other instances as possible.” 543 U. S., at 248. Just as we rejected a two-track system in Booker that would have made the Guidelines mandatory in some cases and advisory in others, we reject a partial invalidation of § 3742(g)(2) that would leave us with the same result.
The fact that § 3742(g)(2) permits a resentencing court on remand to impose a non-Guidelines sentence in cases where the prior sentence expressly relied upon a departure upheld by the court of appeals also does not cure the constitutional infirmity. As explained above, we observed in Booker that the availability of departures from the applicable Guidelines ranges in specified circumstances “does not avoid the constitutional issue.” Id., at 234. Because “departures are not available in every case, and in fact are unavailable in most,” ibid., we held that remedying the Sixth Amendment problem required invalidation of § 3553(b)(1). That same remedial approach requires us to invalidate § 3742(g)(2).
Amicus contends that any constitutional infirmity in § 3742(g)(2) can be remedied by invalidating §3742(j)(1)(B) rather than § 3742(g)(2). Brief for Amicus Curiae in Support of Judgment Below 21-22. Section 3742(j)(1)(B) provides that a “ground of departure” is “permissible” for purposes of § 3742(g)(2)(B) only if it is, inter alia, “authorized under section 3553(b).” In Booker, we noted that “statutory cross-references” to the SEA provisions we invalidated were also constitutionally infirm. 543 U. S., at 259. Because § 3742(j)(1)(B) incorporates a cross-reference to § 3553(b)(1), one of the provisions we invalidated in Booker, amicus suggests that invalidating § 3742(j)(1)(B) would cure any constitutional defect in § 3742(g)(2)(B). As the Government explains, however, even if § 3742(j)(1)(B) were invalidated and a district court could depart on any ground at an initial sentencing, the district court would not be able to depart on any new ground at resentencing so long as § 3742(g)(2) remains in force. Because amicus’ proposed solution would still result in the Guidelines being effectively mandatory at re-sentencing in an entire set of eases, it fails to remedy the fundamental constitutional defect of § 3742(g)(2).
2
Amicus’ next cluster of arguments focuses on Congress’ sentencing objectives under § 3553(a). Preliminarily, ami-cus contends that even if § 3742(g)(2) is constitutionally invalid, that provision reflects a congressional policy determination that only information available at the time of original sentencing should be considered, and that this policy determination should inform our analysis of whether § 3553(a) permits consideration of postsentencing rehabilitation evidence. This argument, however, is based on a faulty premise.
Contrary to amicus’ contention, § 3742(g)(2) does not reflect a congressional purpose to preclude consideration of evidence of postsentencing rehabilitation at resentencing. To be sure, § 3742(g
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | A | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner was tried in the Federal District Court for the Northern District of Illinois on December 18, 1953, for robbery of a federally insured savings and loan a,sso-ciation, the General Savings and Loan Association of Cicero, Illinois, in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 2113. The case was tried to a jury and resulted in an acquittal. On January 8, 1954,- an Illinois grand jury indicted Bartkus. The facts recited in the Illinois indictment were substantially identical to those contained in the prior federal indictment. The Illinois indictment charged that these facts constituted a violation of Illinois Revised Statutes, 1951, c. 38, § 501,-a robbery statute..Bartkus was tried and convicted in the Criminal Court of Cook County and was sentenced to life imprisonment under the Illinois Habitual Criminal Statute. Ill. Rev. Stat., 1951, c. 38, § 602.
The Illinois trial court considered and rejected petitioner’s plea of autrefois acquit. That ruling and other alleged errors were challenged before the Illinois Supreme Court which affirmed the conviction. 7 Ill. 2d 138, 130 N. E. 2d 187. We granted certiorari because the petition raised a substantial question concerning the application of the Fourteenth Amendment. 352 U.' S. 907, 958. On January 6, 1958, the judgment below was affirmed by "’.an equally divided Court. 355 U. S. 281. On May 26, 1958, the Court granted a petition for rehearing, vacated the judgment entered January 6, 1958, and restored the case to the calendar for reargument. 356 U. S. 969.
The state and federal prosecutions were separately con-' ducted. It is true that the agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation who had conducted the investigation on • behalf of the Federal Government turned over to the Illinois prosecuting officials all the evidence he had gathered against the petitioner. Concededly, some of that evidence had been gathered after acquittal in the federal court. The only other connection between the two trials is to be foufld in a suggestion that the federal sentencing of the accomplices who testified against petitioner in both trials was purposely continued by the federal court until after they testified in the state trial. The record establishes that the prosecution was undertaken by state prosecuting officials within their discretionary responsibility arid on the basis of evidence that conduct contrary to the penal code of Illinois had occurred within their jurisdiction. It establishes also that federal officials acted in cooperation with state authorities, as is the conventional practice between the two sets of prosecutors throughout the country. It does not support the claim that the State of Illinois in bringing its prosecution was merely a tool of the federal authorities, who thereby avoided the prohibition of the Fifth Amendment against a retrial of a federal prosecution after an acquittal. It does not sustain a conclusion.that the state prosecution.was a sham and, a cover for. a federal prosecution, and thereby in essential fact another federal prosecution.
Since the new prosecution was by Illinois, and not by the Federal Government, the claim of unconstitutionality must rest upon the Due Process Ólause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Prior cases in this Court relating to successive state and federal prosecutions have been concerned with the Fifth Amendment,- and the scope of its proscription'of second prosecutions by the Federal Government, not with the Fourteénth Amendment’s effect on state action. We are now called upon to draw on the considerations which have guided the Court in applying the limitations of the Fourteenth Amendment on state powers. We have held from the beginning and uniformly that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply to the States any of the provisions of the first eight amendments as such. The relevant historical materials have been canvassed by this Court and by legal scholars. These materials demonstrate conclusively that Congress and the members of the legislatures of the ratifying States did' not contemplate that the Fourteenth Amendment was a short-hand incorporation of the first eight amendments making them applicable as explicit restrictions upon the States.
Evidencing the interpretation by both Congress and the States of the Fourteenth Amendment is a comparison of the constitutions of the ratifying States with the Federal Constitution. Having regard only to the grand jury guarantee of the Fifth Amendment, the criminal jury guarantee of the Sixth Amendment, and the civil jury guarantee of the Seventh Amendment, it is apparent that if the first eight amendments were being applied verbatim to the States, ten of the thirty ratifying States would have impliedly been imposing upon themselves constitutional requirements on vital issues of state policies contrary to those present in their own constitutions. Or, to approach the matter in a different way, they would be covertly altering provisions of their own constitutions in disregard of the amendment procedures required by those constitutions. Five other States would have been qnder-taking procedures not in conflict with, but not required by their constitutions. Thus only one-half, or fifteen, of. the ratifying States had constitutions in explicit accord with these provisions of the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Amendments. Of these fifteen, four made alterations in their constitutions by 1875 which brought them into important conflict with one or more of these provisions of the Federal Constitution. One of the States whose constitution had not included any provision on one of the three procedures under investigation adopted a provision in 1890 which was inconsistent with the Federal Constitution. And so by 1890 only eleven of the thirty ratifying States were in explicit accord with these provisions of the first eight amendments to the Federal Constitution. Four were silent as to one or more of the provisions and fifteen were in open conflict with these same provisions..
Similarly imposing evidence of the understanding of the Due Process Clause is supplied by the history of the admission of the twelve States entering the Union after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. In the case of each, Congress required that the State’s constitution be “not repugnant” to the Constitution of the United States. Not one of the constitutions of the twelve States contains all three of the procedures relating to grand jury, criminal jury, and civil jury. In fact all twelve have provisions obviously different from the requirements of the Fifth,. Sixth, or Seventh Amendments., And yet, in the case of each admission, either the President of the United States, or Congress, or both have found that the constitution was in conformity with the Enabling Act and the Constitution of the United States. Nor is there warrant to believe that the States in adopting constitutions with the specific purpose of complying with the requisites of admission were in fact evading the demands of the Constitution of the United States.
Surely this compels the conclusion that Congress and the States have always believed that the Due Process Clause brought into play a basis of restrictions upon the States other than the undisclosed incorporation of the original eight amendments. In Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516, this Court considered due process in its historical setting, reviewed its development as a concept in Anglo-American law from the time of the Magna Carta until the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment and concluded that it was intended to be a flexible concept, responsive to thought and experience— experience which is reflected in a solid body of judicial opinion, all manifesting deep convictions to be. unfolded by a process of “inclusion and exclusion.” Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, 104. Time and again this Court has attempted by general phrases not to define but to indicate the purport of due process and to adumbrate the continuing adjudicatory process in its application. The statement by Mr. Justice Cardozo in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, has especially commended itself and been frequently cited in later opinions. Referring to specific situations, he wrote:
“In these and other situations immunities that are valid as against the federal government by force of the specific pledges of particular amendments have been found to be implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, and thus, through the Fourteenth Amendment, become valid as against the states.” 302 U. S., at 324-325.
About the meaning of due process, in broad perspective unrelated to the first eight amendments, he suggested that it prohibited to the States only those practices “repugnant to the conscience of mankind.” 302 U. S., at 323. In applying these phrases in Palko, the Court ruled that, while at some point the cruelty of harassment-by multiple prosecutions by a State would offend due process, the specific limitation imposed on the Federal Government by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment did not bind the States.
Decisions of this Court concerning the application of the Due Process Clause reveal the necessary process of balancing relevant and conflicting factors in the judicial application of that Clause. In Chambers v. Florida, 309 U. S. 227, we held that a state ^conviction of murder was void because it was based upon a confession elicited by applying third-degree methods to the defendant. But we have, also held that a second execution necessitated by a mechanical failure in the first attempt was not in violation of due process. Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U. S. 459. Decisions under the Due Process Clause require close and perceptive inquiry into fundamental principles of our society. The Anglo-American system of law is based not upon transcendental revelation but upon the conscience of society ascertained as best it may' be by a tribunal disciplined for the task and environed by the best safeguards for disinterestedness and detachment.
Constitutional challenge to successive state and federal prosecutions based upon the same transaction or conduct is not a new question before the Court though it has now been presented with conspicuous ability. The Fifth Amendment’s proscription of double jeopardy has been invoked and rejected in over twenty cases of real or hypothetical successive state and federal prosécution cases before this Court. While United States v. Lanza, 260 U. S. 377, was the first case in which we squarely held valid a federal prosecution arising out of the-same facts which had been the basis of a state, conviction, the validity of such a prosecution by the Federal Government has not been questioned by this Court since the opinion in Fox v. Ohio, 5 How. 410, more than one hundred years ago.
In Fox v. Ohio. argument was made to the Supreme Court that an Ohio conviction for uttering counterfeit money was invalid. This assertion of invalidity was,based in large part upon the argument that since Congress had imposed federal sanctions for the counterfeiting of money, a failure to find that the Supremacy Clause precluded the States from punishing related conduct would expose an individual to double punishment. Mr. Justice Daniel, writing for the Court (with Mr. Justice McLean dissenting), recognized as true that there was a possibility of double punishment, but denied that from this flowed a finding of pre-emption, concluding instead that both the Federal and State Governments retained the power to impose criminal sanctions, the United States because of its interest in protecting the purity of its currency, the States because of their interest in protecting their citizéns against fraud.
In some eight state cases decided prior to Fox the courts of seven States had discussed the validity of successive state and federal prosecutions. In three, Missouri, North Carolina, and Virginia, it had been said that there would be no plea in bar to prevent the second prosecution. Discussions in two cases in South Carolina were in conflict — the earlier opinion expressing belief that there would be a bar, the later, without acknowledging disagreement with the first, denying the availability of a plea in bar. In three other States, Vermont, Massachusetts, and Michigan, courts had stated that a prosecution by one government would bar prosecution by another government of a crime based on the same conduct. The persuasiveness of the Massachusetts and Michigan decisions is somewhat impaired by the precedent upon which they relied in their reasoning. In the Supreme Court case cited in the Massachusetts and Michigan cases, Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 1, there is some language to the effect that there would be a bar to a second prosecution by a different government. 5 Wheat., at 31. But that language by Mr. Justice Washington reflected his belief that the state statute imposed state sanctions for violation of a federal criminal law. 5 Wheat., at 28. As he viewed the matter, the two trials would not be of similar crimes arising out of the' same conduct; they would be of the same crime. Mr. Justice Johnson agreed that if the state courts had become empowered to try the defendant for the federal offense, then such a state trial would bar a federal prosecution. 5 Wheat., at 35. Thus Houston v. Moore can be cited only for the presence of a bar in a case in which the second trial is for a violation of the very statute whose violation by the same conduct has already been tried in the courts of another government empowered to try that question.
The significance of this historical background of decisions prior to Fox is that it was, taking a position most favorable to advocates of the bars of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict in cases like that before this Court, totally inconclusive. Conflicting opinions concerning the applicability of the plea in bar' may manifest conflict in conscience. They certainly do not manifest agreement that to permit successive state and federal prosecutions for different crimes arising from the same acts would be repugnant to those standards of outlawry which offend the conception of due process outlined in. Palko. (It is worth noting that Palko sustained a first degree murder conviction.returned in a second trial after an appeal by the State from an acquittal of first degree murder.) The early state decisions had clarified the issue by stating the opposing arguments. The process of this Court’s response to the Fifth Amendment challenge was begun in Fox v. Ohio, continued in United States v. Marigold, 9 How. 560, and was completed in Moore v. Illinois, 14 How. 13. Mr. Justice Grier, writing for the Court in Moore v. Illinois, gave definitive statement to the rule which had-been evolving:
“An offence, in its legal signification, means the transgression of a law.” 14 How., at 19.
“Every citizen of the United States is also a citizen of a State or territory. He may be said to owe allegiance to two sovereigns, and may be liable'to punishment for an infraction of the laws of either. The same act may be an offence or transgression of the laws of both.” 14 How., at 20.
“That either or both may (if they see fit) punish such an offender,, cannot be doubted. Yet it cannot be truly averred that the offender has been twice punished for the same offence; but only that by one act he has committed two offences, for each of which he is justly punishable. He could not plead the punishment by one in bar to a conviction by the other.” Ibid.
In a dozen cases decided by this Court between Moore v. Illinois and United States v. Lanza this Court had occasion to reaffirm the principle first enunciated in Fox v. Ohio. Since Lanza the Court has five times repeated the rule that successive state and federal prosecutions are not in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Indeed Mr. Justice Holmes once wrote-of this rule that it “is too plain to need moré than statement.” One of the post-Lanza cases, Jerome v. United States, 318 U. S. 101, involved the same federal statute under which Bartkus was indicted and in Jerome this Court recognized that successive state and federal prosecutions were thereby made possible because all States had general robbery statutes. Nonetheless, a unanimous Court, as recently as 1943, accepted as unquestioned constitutional law that such successive prosecutions would not violate the proscription of double jeopardy included in the Fifth Amendment. 318 U. S., at 105.
The lower federal coürts have of course been in accord with this Court. Although some can be cited only in that they follow the decisions of this Court, others manifest reflection upon the issues involved and express reasoned approval of the two-sovereignty principle. In United States v. Barnhart, 22 F. 285, the Oregon Circuit Court was presented with a case just the obverse of the present one: the prior trial and acquittal was by a state court; the subsequent trial was by a federal court. The Circuit Court rejected defendant’s plea of autrefois acquit, saying that the hardship of the second trial might operate to persuade against the bringing of a subsequent prosecution but could not bar it.
The experience of state courts in dealing with successive prosecutions by different governments is obviously also. relevant in considering whether or not the Illinois prosecution of Bartkus violated due process of law. Of the twenty-eight States which have considered the validity of successive state and federal prosecutions as against a challenge of violation of either a state constitutional double-jeopardy provision or a common-law evidentiary rule of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict, twenty-seven have refused to rule that the second prosecution was or would be barred. These States were not bound to follow this Court and its interpretation of the Fifth Amendment. The rules, constitutional, statutory, or common law which bound them, drew upon the same experience as did the Fifth Amendment, but were and are of separate and independent authority.
Not all of the state cases manifest careful reasoning, for in some of them the language concerning double jeopardy is but offhand dictum. But in an array of state cases there may be found full consideration of the arguments supporting and denying a bar to a second prosecution. These courts interpreted their rules as not proscribing a second prosecution where the first was by a different government and for violation of a different statute.
With this body of precedent as irrefutable evidence that state and federal courts have for years refused to bar a second trial even though there had' been á prior trial by.another government for a similar offense, it would be disregard of a long, unbroken, unquestioned course of impressive adjudication, for the Court now to rule that due process' compels such a bar. A practical justification for rejecting such a reading of due process also commends itself in aid of this interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Screws v. United States, 325 U. S. 91, defendants were tried and convicted in a federal court under federal statutes with maximum sentences of a year and two. years respectively. But' the state crime there involved was a capital offense. Were the federal prosecution of a comparatively minor offense to prevent state prosecution of so grave an infraction of state law, the result would be a shocking and untoward deprivation of the historic right arid obligation of the States to maintain peace and order within their confines. It would be in derogation of our federal system to displace the reserved power of States over state offenses by reason of prosecution of minor federal offenses by federal authorities beyond the control of the States.
Some recent suggestions that the Constitution was in reality a deft device for establishing a centralized government are not only without factual justification but fly in the face of history. It has more accurately been shown that the men who wrote the Constitution as well as the citizens of the member States of the Confederation were fearful of the power of centralized government and sought to limit its power. Mr. Justice Brandéis has written that separation of powers was adopted in the Constitution “not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power.” Time has not lessened the concern of the Founders in devising a federal system which would likewise be a safeguard against arbitrary government. The greatest self-restraint is necessary when that federal system yields results with which a court is in little sympathy.
The entire history of litigation and contention over the question of the imposition of,a bar to. a second prosecution by a government other than the one first prosecuting is'a manifestation of the evolutionary unfolding of. law. Today a number of States have statutes which bar a second prosecution if the defendant has been once tried by another government for a similar offense. A study of the cases under the New York statute, which is typical of these laws, demonstrates that the task of determining when the federal and state statutes are so much alike that a prosecution under the former bars a prosecution under the latter is a difficult one. The proper solution of that problem frequently depends upon a judgment of the gravamen of the state statute. It depends also upon an understanding of the scope of the bar that has been historically granted in the State to prevent successive state prosecutions. Both these problems are ones with which the States are.obviously more competent to deal than is this Court. Furthermore, the rules resulting will intimately affect the efforts of a State to develop a rational and just body of criminal law in the protection of its citizens. We ought not to utilize the Fourteenth Amendment to interfere with this development. Finally, experience such as that of New York may give aid to Congress in its consideration of adoption of similar provisions in individual federal criminal statutes or in' the federal criminal, code.
Precedent, experience, and reason alike support the conclusion that Alfonse Bartkus has not been deprived of due process of law by the State of Illinois.
Affirmed.
[For dissenting opinion of Mr. Jxjstice Black, see post, p. 150.]
[For dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Brennan, see post, p. 164.]
See Proceedings of the Attorney General’s Conference on Crime (1934). At the conclusion of the state trial of Bartkus, State’s Attorney Gutknecht thus reviewed the cooperation between federal and state officials:
“We have had a number of cases where the state’s attorney’s office have been cooperating very well with.the federal authorities, particularly in the narcotics cases, because in that connection the federal government should have the first authority in handling them because narcotics is a nation-wide criminal organization, and so when I see people going through this town and criticising the County of Cook and the City of Chicago, because of the police, the state’s attorney and the judges cooperating with the federal authorities, and giving that as proof of the fact that since we don’t take the lead we must be negligent in our duties, I am particularly glad to see a ease where the federal authorities came to the state’s attorney.
“We are cooperating with the federal authorities and they are cooperating with us, and these statements in this city to thé effect that the fact that the federal authorities are in the county is a sign of breakdown in law enforcement in Cook County is utter nonsense.
“The federal authorities have duties and we have duties. We are doing our duty and this is an illustration of it, and we are glad to continue to cooperate with the federal authorities. Give them the first play where it is their duty, as in narcotics, and we take over where our duty calls for-us to carry the burden....”
Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516; In re Kemmler, 136 U. S. 436; Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581; Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78; Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319; Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46.
Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of.Rights? The Original Understanding, 2 Stan. L. Rev. 5.
See Appendix, post, p. 140, in which are detailed the provisions.in the constitutions of the ratifying States, and of the States later admitted to the Union which correspond to these federal guarantees in the Fifth, Sixth', and Seventh Amendments.
Cf. Fox v. Ohio, 5 How. 410, 435, in which, in ruling that the Fifth Amendment was not to be read as applying to the States, Mr. Justice Daniel wrote: “it is neither probable nor credible that the States should have anxiously insisted to ingraft upon the f' deral constitution restrictions upon their own authority...
See, e. g., 36 Stat. 569.-
See, e. g., 37 Stat. 1728.
See, e. g., Leland v. Oregon, 343 U. S. 790, 801; Rochin v. California, 342 U. S. 165, 169; Bute v. Illinois, 333 U. S. 640, 659.
It has not been deemed relevant to discussion of our problem to consider dubious English precedents concerning the effect of foreign criminal judgments on the ability of English courts to try charges arising out of the same conduct — dubious in part because of the confused and inadequate reporting of the case on which much is based, see the varying versions of Rex v. Hutchinson found in Beak v. Thyrwhit, 3 Mod. 194, 87 Eng. Rep. 124 (reported as Beake v. Tyrrell in 1 Show. 6, 89 Eng. Rep. 411, and as Beake v. Tirrell in Comberbach 120, 90 Eng. Rep. 379), Burrows v. Jemino, 2 Strange 733, 93 Eng. Rep. 815 (reported as Burroughs v. Jamineau in Mos. 1, 25 Eng. Rep. 235, as Burrows v. Jemineau in Sel. Cas. 70, 25 Eng. Rep. 228, as Burrows v. Jemineau in 2 Eq. Ca. Abr. 476, and as Burrows v. Jemineau in 22 Eng. Rep. 443), and explained in Gage v. Bulkeley, Ridg. Cas. 263, 27 Eng. Rep. 824. Such precedents are dubious also because they reflect a power of discretion vested in English judges not relevant to the constitutional law of our federalism.
Mattison v. State, 3 Mo. *421.
State v. Brown, 2 N. C. *100.
Hendrick v. Commonwealth, 5 Leigh (Va.) 707.
State v. Antonio, 2 Treadway’s Const. Rep. (S. C.) 776.
State v. Tutt, 2 Bailey (S. C.) 44.
State v. Randall, 2 Aikens (Vt.) 89.
Commonwealth v. Fuller, 8 Metcalf (Mass.) 313.
Harlan v. People, 1 Douglass’ Rep. (Mich.) 207.
Mr. Justice Story’s dissenting opinion in Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 1, 47, displays dislike of the possibility, of multiple prosecutions, id., at 72, but also suggests the possibility that under some circumstances a state acquittal might not bar a federal prosecution, id., at 74-75.
United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542; Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U. S. 509; Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371; United States v. Arjona, 120 U. S. 479; Cross v. North Carolina, 132 U. S. 131; In re Loney, 134 U. S. 372; Pettibone v. United States, 148 U. S. 197; Crossley v. California, 168 U. S. 640; Sexton v. California, 189 U. S. 319; Matter of Heff, 197 U. S. 488; Grafton v. United States, 206 U. S. 333; Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U. S. 254.
Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U. S. 312; Westfall v. United States, 274 U. S. 256; Puerto Rico v. The Shell Co., 302 U. S. 253; Jerome v. United States, 318 U. S. 101; Screws v. United States, 325 U. S. 91.
Westfall v. United States, 274 U. S. 256, 258.
In a chapter in Handbook on Interstate Crime Control, a book prepared in 1938 by the Interstate Commission on Crime, Gordon Dean, then Special Executive Assistant to the Attorney General of the United States, wrote:
“Mention should also be made of the National Bank Robbery statute. This statute punishes robberies of national banks, banks which are members of the Federal Reserve System, and banks the funds of which are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. And here again there has been no usurpation by the federal government. The states still may prosecute any robbery of any bank within their jurisdiction, and they frequently do. There have been several cases in the last few years where men have been convicted both under the state and federal law for robbing the same bank. In. fact, there have been cases where men have been tried'under the law of one jurisdiction, acquitted, and on the same facts tried under the law of the other sovereignty and convicted. Bank robbers know. today that ‘flight/ their most valuable weapon, has, under the operation of the National Bank Robbery statute, proved quite impotent. The bank robbery rate has been cut in half, and there has been a fine relation between state and federal agencies in the apprehension and trial of bank robbers.” Id., at 114.'
McKinney v. Landon, 209 F. 300 (C. A. 8th Cir.); Morris v. United States, 229 F. 516 (C. A. 8th Cir.); Vandell v. United States, 6 F. 2d 188 (C. A. 2d Cir.); United States v. Levine, 129 F. 2d 745 (C. A. 2d Cir.); Serio v. United States, 203 F. 2d 576 (C. A. 5th Cir.); Jolley v. United States, 232 F. 2d 83 (C. A. 5th Cir.); Smith v. United States, 243 F. 2d 877 (C. A. 6th Cir.); Rios v. United States, 256 F. 2d 173 (C. A. 9th Cir.); United States v. Amy, 24 Fed. Cas. No. 14,445 (C. C. Va.); United States v. Given, 25 Fed. Cas. No. 15,211 (C. C. Del.); United States v. Barnhart, 22 F. 285 (C. C. Ore.); United States v. Palan, 167 F. 991 (C. C. S. D. N. Y.); United States v. Wells, 28 Fed. Cas. No. 16,665 (D. C. Minn.); United States v. Casey, 247 F. 362 (D. C. S. D. Ohio); United States v. Holt, 270 F. 639 (D. C. N. Dak.); In re Morgan, 80 F. Supp. 810. (D. C. N. D. Iowa); United States v. Mandile, 119. F. Supp. 266 (D. C. E. D. N. Y.). Of the many prohibition cases in the lower federal courts only United States v. Holt has been included; its inclusion is meant to represent that body of cases and is particularly justified by' its careful reasoning concerning the. entire question of dual sovereignties and double jeopardy. It is believed that the list contains most of the nonpro-hibition cases in the' lower federal- courts discussing and favoring the rule that trial in one jurisdictioñ does not bar prosecution in another for a different offense arising from the same act. Three lower federal court cases have been found questioning the validity of the rule: Ex parte Houghton, 7 F. 657, 8 F. 897 (D. C. Vt.); In re Stubbs, 133 F.1012 (C. C. W. D. Wash.); United States v. Candelaria,.131 F. Supp. 797 (D. C. S. D. Cal.).
States Denying the BaR.
Arizona. Henderson v. State, 30 Ariz. 113, 244 P. 1020 (despite a limited statutory bar, holding successive federal and state prosecutions permitted where one is for possession and the other for transportation).
Arkansas. State v. Duncan, 221 Ark. 681, 255 S. W. 2d 430.
California. People v. McDonnell, 80 Cal. 285, 22 P. 190; People v. Candelaria, 139 Cal. App. 2d 432, 294 P. 2d 120; People v. Candelaria, 153 Cal. App. 2d 879, 315 P. 2d 386 (these two Candelaria cases indicate that the California statutory bar, a statute of the kind discussed below, prevents a state robbery prosecution after a federal robbery prosecution, but not a state burglary prosecution in the same circumstances).
Georgia. Scheinfain v. Aldredge, 191 Ga. 479, 12 S. E. 2d 868; Bryson v. State, 27 Ga. App. 230, 108 S. E. 63.
Illinois. Hoke v. People, 122 Ill. 511, 13 N. E. 823.
Indiana. Heier v. State, 191 Ind. 410, 133 N. E. 200; Dashing v. State, 78 Ind. 357.
Iowa. State v. Moore, 143 Iowa 240, 121 N. W. 1052.
Kentucky. Hall v. Commonwealth, 197 Ky. 179, 246 S. W. 441.
Louisiana. State v. Breaux, 161 La. 368, 108 So. 773, aff’d per cur., 273 U. S. 645.
Maine. See State v. Gauthier, 12. Me. 522, 529-531, 118 A. 380, 383-385.
Massachusetts. Commonwealth v. Nickerson, 236 Mass. 281, 128 N. E. 273.
Michigan. In re Illova, 351 Mich. 204, 88 N. W. 2d 589.
Minnesota. State v. Holm, 139 Minn. 267, 166 N. W. 181.
Missouri. In re January, 295 Mo. 653, 246 S. W. 241.
New Hampshire. State v. Whittemore, 50 N. H. 245.
New Jersey. State v. Cioffe, 130 N. J. L. 160, 32 A. 2d 79.
New York. People v. Welch, 141 N. Y. 266, 36 N. E. 328.
North Carolina. See State v. Brown, 2 N. C. *100, 101.
Oregon. State v. Frach, 162 Ore. 602, 94 P. 2d 143.
Pennsylvania. See Commonwealth ex rel. O’Brien v. Burke, 171 Pa. Super. 273, 90 A. 2d 246.
South Carolina. State v. Tutt, 2 Bailey 44.
Tennessee. State v. Rhodes, 146 Tenn. 398, 242 S. W. 642; State v. Rankin, 4 Coldw. 145.
Vermont. State v. O’Brien, 106 Vt. 97, 170 A. 98.
Virginia. Jett v. Commonwealth, 18 Gratt. (59 Va.) 933.
Washington. State v. Kenney, 83 Wash. 441, 145 P. 450.
West Virginia. State v. Holesapple, 92 W. Va. 645,
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | A | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Chief Justice Roberts
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Before a State may take property and sell it for unpaid taxes, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the government to provide the owner “notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.” Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U. S. 306, 313 (1950). We granted certiorari to determine whether, when notice of a tax sale is mailed to the owner and returned undelivered, the government must take additional reasonable steps to provide notice before taking the owner’s property.
I
In 1967, petitioner Gary Jones purchased a house at 717 North Bryan Street in Little Rock, Arkansas. He lived in the house with his wife until they separated in 1993. Jones then moved into an apartment in Little Rock, and his wife continued to live in the North Bryan Street house. Jones paid his mortgage each month for 30 years, and the mortgage company paid Jones’ property taxes. After Jones paid off his mortgage in 1997, the property taxes went unpaid, and the property was certified as delinquent.
In April 2000, respondent Mark Wilcox, the Commissioner of State Lands (Commissioner), attempted to notify Jones of his tax delinquency, and his right to redeem the property, by mailing a certified letter to Jones at the North Bryan Street address. See Ark. Code Ann. §26-37-301 (1997). The packet of information stated that unless Jones redeemed the property, it would be subject to public sale two years later on April 17, 2002. See ibid. Nobody was home to sign for the letter, and nobody appeared at the post office to retrieve the letter within the next 15 days. The post office returned the unopened packet to the Commissioner marked “'unclaimed.’ ” Pet. for Cert. 3.
Two years later, and just a few weeks before the public sale, the Commissioner published a notice of public sale in the Arkansas Democrat Gazette. No bids were submitted, which permitted the State to negotiate a private sale of the property. See § 26-37-202(b). Several months later, respondent Linda Flowers submitted a purchase offer. The Commissioner mailed another certified letter to Jones at the North Bryan Street address, attempting to notify him that his house would be sold to Flowers if he did not pay his taxes. Like the first letter, the second was also returned to the Commissioner marked “unclaimed.” Pet. for Cert. 3. Flowers purchased the house, which the parties stipulated in the trial court had a fair market value of $80,000, for $21,042.15. Record 224. Immediately after the 30-day period for postsale redemption passed, see § 26-37-202(e), Flowers had an unlawful detainer notice delivered to the property. The notice was served on Jones’ daughter, who contacted Jones and notified him of the tax sale. Id., at 11 (Exh. B).
Jones filed a lawsuit in Arkansas state court against the Commissioner and Flowers, alleging that the Commissioner’s failure to provide notice of the tax sale and of Jones’ right to redeem resulted in the taking of his property without due process. The Commissioner and Flowers moved for summary judgment on the ground that the two unclaimed letters sent by the Commissioner were a constitutionally adequate attempt at notice, and Jones filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Commissioner and Flowers. App. to Pet. for Cert. 12a-13a. It concluded that the Arkansas tax sale statute, which set forth the notice procedure followed by the Commissioner, complied with constitutional due process requirements.
Jones appealed, and the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment. 359 Ark. 443, 198 S. W. 3d 520 (2004). The court noted our precedent stating that due process does not require actual notice, see Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U. S. 161, 170 (2002), and it held that attempting to provide notice by certified mail satisfied due process in the circumstances presented, 359 Ark., at 453-454, 198 S. W. 3d, at 526-527.
We granted certiorari, 545 U. S. 1165 (2005), to resolve a conflict among the Circuits and State Supreme Courts concerning whether the Due Process Clause requires the government to take additional reasonable steps to notify a property owner when notice of a tax sale is returned undelivered. Compare, e. g., Akey v. Clinton County, 375 F. 3d 231, 236 (CA2 2004) (“In light of the notice’s return, the County was required to use ‘reasonably diligent efforts’ to ascertain Akey’s correct address”), and Kennedy v. Mossafa, 100 N. Y. 2d 1, 9, 789 N. E. 2d 607, 611 (2003) (“[W]e reject the view that the enforcing officer’s obligation is always satisfied by sending the notice to the address listed in the tax roll, even where the notice is returned as undeliverable”), with Smith v. Cliffs on the Bay Condominium Assn., 463 Mich. 420, 429, 617 N. W. 2d 536, 541 (2000) (per curiam) (“The fact that one of the mailings was returned by the post office as undeliverable does not impose on the state the obligation to undertake an investigation to see if a new address... could be located”). We hold that when mailed notice of a tax sale is returned unclaimed, the State must take additional reasonable steps to attempt to provide notice to the property owner before selling his property, if it is practicable to do so. Under the circumstances presented here, additional reasonable steps were available to the State. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Arkansas Supreme Court.
II
A
Due process does not require that a property owner receive actual notice before the government may take his property. Dusenbery, supra, at 170. Rather, we have stated that due process requires the government to provide “notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” Mullane, 339 U. S., at 314. The Commissioner argues that once the State provided notice reasonably calculated to apprise Jones of the impending tax sale by mailing him a certified letter, due process was satisfied. The Arkansas statutory scheme is reasonably calculated to provide notice, the Commissioner continues, because it provides for notice by certified mail to an address that the property owner is responsible for keeping up to date. See Ark. Code Ann. §26-35-705 (1997). The Commissioner notes this Court’s ample precedent condoning notice by mail, see, e. g., Dusenbery, supra, at 169; Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc. v. Pope, 485 U. S. 478, 490 (1988); Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U. S. 791, 798 (1983); Mullane, supra, at 318-319, and adds that the Arkansas scheme exceeds constitutional requirements by requiring the Commissioner to use certified mail. Brief for Respondent Commissioner 14-15.
It is true that this Court has deemed notice constitutionally sufficient if it was reasonably calculated to reach the intended recipient when sent. See, e. g., Dusenbery, supra, at 168-169; Mullane, 339 U. S., at 314. In each of these cases, the government attempted to provide notice and heard nothing back indicating that anything had gone awry, and we stated that “[t]he reasonableness and hence the constitutional validity of [the] chosen method may be defended on the ground that it is in itself reasonably certain to inform those affected.” Id., at 315; see also Dusenbery, supra, at 170. But we have never addressed whether due process entails further responsibility when the government becomes aware prior to the taking that its attempt at notice has failed. That is a new wrinkle, and we have explained that the “notice required will vary with circumstances and conditions.” Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U. S. 112, 115 (1956). The question presented is whether such knowledge on the government’s part is a “circumstance and condition” that varies the “notice required.”
The Courts of Appeals and State Supreme Courts have addressed this question on frequent occasions, and most have decided that when the government learns its attempt at notice has failed, due process requires the government to do something more before real property may be sold in a tax sale. See, e. g., Plemons v. Gale, 396 F. 3d 569, 576 (CA4 2005); Akey, supra, at 236; Hamilton v. Renewed Hope, Inc., 277 Ga. 465, 468, 589 S. E. 2d 81, 85 (2003); Kennedy, supra, at 9, 789 N. E. 2d, at 611; Malone v. Robinson, 614 A. 2d 33, 38 (D. C. App. 1992) (per curiam); St. George Antiochian Orthodox Christian Church v. Aggarwal, 326 Md. 90, 103, 603 A. 2d 484, 490 (1992); Wells Fargo Credit Corp. v. Ziegler, 780 P. 2d 703, 705 (Okla. 1989); Rosenberg v. Smidt, 727 P. 2d 778, 780-783 (Alaska 1986); Giacobbi v. Hall, 109 Idaho 293, 297, 707 P. 2d 404, 408 (1985); Tracy v. County of Chester, Tax Claim Bureau, 507 Pa. 288, 296, 489 A. 2d 1334, 1338-1339 (1985). But see Smith, 463 Mich., at 429, 617 N. W. 2d, at 541; Dahn v. Trownsell, 1998 SD 36, ¶ 23, 576 N. W. 2d 535, 541-542; Elizondo v. Read, 588 N. E. 2d 501, 504 (Ind. 1992); Atlantic City v. Block C-11, Lot 11, 74 N. J. 34, 39-40, 376 A. 2d 926, 928 (1977). Many States already require in their statutes that the government do more than simply mail notice to delinquent owners, either at the outset or as a followup measure if initial mailed notice is ineffective.
In Mullane, we stated that “when notice is a person’s due... [t]he means employed must be such as one desirous of actually informing the absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it,” 339 U. S., at 315, and that assessing the adequacy of a particular form of notice requires balancing the “interest of the State” against “the individual interest sought to be protected by the Fourteenth Amendment,” id,., at 314. Our leading cases on notice have evaluated the adequacy of notice given to beneficiaries of a common trust fund, Mullane, supra; a mortgagee, Mennonite, 462 U. S. 791; owners of seized cash and automobiles, Dusenbery, 534 U. S. 161; Robinson v. Hanrahan, 409 U. S. 38 (1972) (per curiam); creditors of an estate, Tulsa Professional, 485 U. S. 478; and tenants living in public housing, Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U. S. 444 (1982). In this case, we evaluate the adequacy of notice prior to the State extinguishing a property owner’s interest in a home.
We do not think that a person who actually desired to inform a real property owner of an impending tax sale of a house he owns would do nothing when a certified letter sent to the owner is returned unclaimed. If the Commissioner prepared a stack of letters to mail to delinquent taxpayers, handed them to the postman, and then watched as the departing postman accidentally dropped the letters down a storm drain, one would certainly expect the Commissioner’s office to prepare a new stack of letters and send them again. No one “desirous of actually informing” the owners would simply shrug his shoulders as the letters disappeared and say “I tried.” Failure to follow up. would be unreasonable, despite the fact that the letters were reasonably calculated to reach their intended recipients when delivered to the postman.
By the same token, when a letter is returned by the post office, the sender will ordinarily attempt to resend it, if it is practicable to do so. See Small v. United States, 136 F. 3d 1334, 1337 (CADC 1998). This is especially true when, as here, the subject matter of the letter concerns such an important and irreversible prospect as the loss of a house. Although the State may have made a reasonable calculation of how to reach Jones, it had good reason to suspect when the notice was returned that Jones was “no better off than if the notice had never been sent.” Malone, 614 A. 2d, at 37. Deciding to take no further action is not what someone “desirous of actually informing” Jones would do; such a person would take further reasonable steps if any were available.
In prior cases, we have required the government to consider unique information about an intended recipient regardless of whether a statutory scheme is reasonably calculated to provide notice in the ordinary case. In Robinson v. Hanrahan, we held that notice of forfeiture proceedings sent to a vehicle owner’s home address was inadequate when the State knew that the property owner was in prison. 409 U. S., at 40. In Covey v. Town of Somers, 351 U. S. 141 (1956), we held that notice of foreclosure by mailing, posting, and publication was inadequate when town officials knew that the property owner was incompetent and without a guardian’s protection. Id., at 146-147.
The Commissioner points out that in these cases, the State was aware of such information before it calculated how best to provide notice. But it is difficult to explain why due process would have settled for something less if the government had learned after notice was sent, but before the taking occurred, that the property owner was in prison or was incompetent. Under Robinson and Covey, the government’s knowledge that notice pursuant to the normal procedure was ineffective triggered an obligation on the government’s part to take additional steps to effect notice. That knowledge was one of the “practicalities and peculiarities of the case,” Mullane, supra, at 314-315, that the Court took into account in determining whether constitutional requirements were met. It should similarly be taken into account in assessing the adequacy of notice in.this case. The dissent dismisses the State’s knowledge that its notice was ineffective as “learned long after the fact,” post, at 246, n. 5 (opinion of Thomas, J.), but the notice letter was promptly returned to the State two to three weeks after it was sent, and the Arkansas statutory regime precludes the State from taking the property for two years while the property owner may exercise his right to redeem, see Ark. Code Ann. §26-37-301 (Supp. 2005).
It is certainly true, as the Commissioner and Solicitor General contend, that the failure of notice in a specific case does not establish the inadequacy of the attempted notice; in that sense, the constitutionality of a particular procedure for notice is assessed ex ante, rather than post hoc. But if a feature of the State’s chosen procedure is that it promptly provides additional information to the government about the effectiveness of notice, it does not contravene the ex ante principle to consider what the government does with that information in assessing the adequacy of the chosen procedure. After all, the State knew ex ante that it would promptly learn whether its effort to effect notice through certified mail had succeeded. It would not be inconsistent with the approach the Court has taken in notice cases to ask, with respect to a procedure under which telephone calls were placed to owners, what the State did when no one answered. Asking what the State does when a notice letter is returned unclaimed is not substantively different.
The Commissioner has three further arguments for why reasonable followup measures were not required in this case. First, notice was sent to an address that Jones provided and had a legal obligation to keep updated. See Ark. Code Ann. § 26-35-705 (1997). Second, “after failing to receive a property tax bill and pay property taxes, a property holder is on inquiry-notice that his property is subject to governmental taking.” Brief for Respondent Commissioner 18-19. Third, Jones was obliged to ensure that those in whose hands he left his property would alert him if it was in jeopardy. None of these contentions relieves the State of its constitutional obligation to provide adequate notice.
The Commissioner does not argue that Jones’ failure to comply with a statutory obligation to keep his address updated forfeits his right to constitutionally sufficient notice, and we agree. Id., at 19; see also Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 16, n. 5 (“ ‘[A] party’s ability to take steps to safeguard its own interests does not relieve the State of its constitutional obligation’ ” (quoting Mennonite, 462 U. S., at 799)). In Robinson, we noted that Illinois law required each vehicle owner to register his address with the secretary of state, and that the State’s vehicle forfeiture scheme provided for notice by mail to the address listed in the secretary’s records. See 409 U. S., at 38, n. 1 (citing Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 95½, §3-405 (1971), and ch. 38, §36-1 (1969)). But we found that the State had not provided constitutionally sufficient notice, despite having followed its reasonably calculated scheme, because it knew that Robinson could not be reached at his address of record. 409 U. S., at 39-40. Although Ark. Code Ann. § 26-35-705 provides strong support for the Commissioner’s argument that mailing a certified letter to Jones at 717 North Bryan Street was reasonably calculated to reach him, it does not alter the reasonableness of the Commissioner’s position that he must do nothing more when the notice is promptly returned “unclaimed.”
As for the Commissioner’s inquiry notice argument, the common knowledge that property may become subject to government taking when taxes are not paid does not excuse the government from complying with its constitutional obligation of notice before taking private property. We have previously stated the opposite: An interested party’s “knowledge of delinquency in the payment of taxes is not equivalent to notice that a tax sale is pending.” Mennonite, supra, at 800. It is at least as widely known that arrestees have the right to remain silent, and that anything they say may be used against them, see Dickerson v. United States, 530 U. S. 428, 443 (2000) (“Miranda [v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966),] has become embedded in routine police practice to the point where the warnings have become part of our national culture”), but that knowledge does not excuse a police failure to provide Miranda warnings. Arkansas affords even a delinquent taxpayer the right to settle accounts with the State and redeem his property, so Jones’ failure to pay his taxes in a timely manner cannot by itself excuse inadequate notice.
Finally, the Commissioner reminds us of a statement from Mullane that the State can assume an owner leaves his property in the hands of one who will inform him if his interest is in jeopardy. 339 U. S., at 316. But in this passage, Justice Jackson writes of “libel of a ship, attachment of a chattel!,] or entry upon real estate in the name of law” — such “seizures]” of property, he concluded, “may reasonably be expected to come promptly to the owner’s attention.” Ibid. An occupant, however, is not charged with acting as the owner’s agent in all respects, and it is quite a leap from Justice Jackson’s examples to conclude that it is an obligation of tenancy to follow up with certified mail of unknown content addressed to the owner. In fact, the State makes it impossible for the occupant to learn why the Commissioner is writing the owner, because an occupant cannot call for a certified letter without first obtaining the owner’s signature. For all the occupant knows, the Commissioner of State Lands might write to certain residents about a variety of matters he finds important, such as state parks or highway construction; it would by no means be obvious to an occupant observing a certified mail slip from the Commissioner that the owner is in danger of losing his property. In any event, there is no record evidence that notices of attempted delivery were left at 717 North Bryan Street.
Jones should have been more diligent with respect to his property, no question. People must pay their taxes, and the government may hold citizens accountable for tax delinquency by taking their property. But before forcing a citizen to satisfy his debt by forfeiting his property, due process requires the government to provide adequate notice of the impending taking. U. S. Const., Arndt. 14; Mennonite, supra, at 799.
B
In response to the returned form suggesting that Jones had not received notice that he was about to lose his property, the State did — nothing. For the reasons stated, we conclude the State should have taken additional reasonable steps to notify Jones, if practicable to do so. The question remains whether there were any such available steps. While “[i]t is not our responsibility to prescribe the form of service that the [government] should adopt,” Greene, 456 U. S., at 455, n. 9, if there were no reasonable additional steps the government could have taken upon return of the unclaimed notice letter, it cannot be faulted for doing nothing.
We think there were several reasonable steps the State could have taken. What steps are reasonable in response to new information depends upon what the new information reveals. The return of the certified letter marked “unclaimed” meant either that Jones still lived at 717 North Bryan Street, but was not home when the postman called and did not retrieve the letter at the post office, or that Jones no longer resided at that address. One reasonable step primarily addressed to the former possibility would be for the State to resend the notice by regular mail, so that a signature was not required. The Commissioner says that use of certified mail makes actual notice more likely, because requiring the recipient’s signature protects against misdelivery. But that is only true, of course, when someone is home to sign for the letter, or to inform the mail carrier that he has arrived at the wrong address. Otherwise, “[certified mail is dispatched and handled in transit as ordinary mail,” United States Postal Service, Domestic Mail Manual § 503.3.2.1 (Mar. 16, 2006), and the use of certified mail might make actual notice less likely in some cases — the letter cannot be left like regular mail to be examined at the end of the day, and it can only be retrieved from the post office for a specified period of time. Following up with regular mail might also increase the chances of actual notice to Jones if— as it turned out — he had moved. Even occupants who ignored certified mail notice slips addressed to the owner (if any had been left) might scrawl the owner’s new address on the notice packet and leave it for the postman to retrieve, or notify Jones directly.
Other reasonable followup measures, directed at the possibility that Jones had moved as well as that he had simply not retrieved the certified letter, would have been to post notice on the front door, or to address otherwise undeliverable mail to “occupant.” Most States that explicitly outline additional procedures in their tax sale statutes require just such steps. See n. 2, supra. Either approach would increase the likelihood that the owner would be notified that he was about to lose his property, given the failure of a letter deliverable only to the owner in person. That is clear in the case of an owner who still resided at the premises. It is also true in the case of an owner who has moved: Occupants who might disregard a certified mail slip not addressed to them are less likely to ignore posted notice, and a letter addressed to them (even as “occupant”) might be opened and read. In either case, there is a significant chance the occupants will alert the owner, if only because a change in ownership could well affect their own occupancy. In fact, Jones first learned of the State’s effort to sell his house when he was alerted by one of the occupants — his daughter — after she was served with an unlawful detainer notice.
Jones believes that the Commissioner should have searched for his new address in the Little Rock phonebook and other government records such as income tax rolls. We do not believe the government was required to go this far. As the Commissioner points out, the return of Jones’ mail marked “unclaimed” did not necessarily mean that 717 North Bryan Street was an incorrect address; it merely informed the Commissioner that no one appeared to sign for the mail before the designated date on which it would be returned to the sender. An open-ended search for a new address —. especially when the State obligates the taxpayer to keep his address updated with the tax collector, see Ark. Code Ann. §26-35-705 (1997) — imposes burdens on the State significantly greater than the several relatively easy options outlined above.
The Commissioner complains about the burden of even those additional steps, but his argument is belied by Arkansas’ current requirement that notice to homestead owners be accomplished by personal service if certified mail is returned, § 26-37-301(e) (Supp. 2005), and the fact that Arkansas transfers the cost of notice to the taxpayer or the tax sale purchaser, §26-37-104(a). The Commissioner has offered no estimate of how many notice letters are returned, and no facts to support the dissent’s assertion that the Commissioner must now physically locate “tens of thousands of properties every year.” Post, at 248. Citing our decision in Greene v. Lindsey, the Solicitor General adds that posted notice could be taken down by children or vandals. But in Greene, we noted that outside the specific facts of that case, posting notice on real property is “a singularly appropriate and effective way of ensuring that a person... is actually apprised of proceedings against him.” 456 U. S., at 452-453. Successfully providing notice is often the most efficient way to collect unpaid taxes, see Mennonite, 462 U. S., at 800, n. 5 (more effective notice may ease burden on State if recipient arranges to pay delinquent taxes prior to tax sale); Tr. of Oral Arg. 24 (85 percent of tax delinquent properties in Arkansas are redeemed upon notice of delinquency), but rather than taking relatively easy additional steps to effect notice, the State undertook the burden and expense of purchasing a newspaper advertisement, conducting an auction, and then negotiating a private sale of the property to Flowers.
The Solicitor General argues that requiring further effort when the government learns that notice was not delivered will cause the government to favor modes of providing notice that do not generate additional information — for example, starting (and stopping) with regular mail instead of certified mail. We find this unlikely, as we have no doubt that the government repeatedly finds itself being asked to prove that notice was sent and received. Using certified mail provides the State with documentation of personal delivery and protection against false claims that notice was never received. That added security, however, comes at a price — the State also learns when notice has not been received. We conclude that, under the circumstances presented, the State cannot simply ignore that information in proceeding to take and sell the owner’s property — any more than it could ignore the information that the owner in Robinson was in jail, or that the owner in Covey was incompetent.
Though the Commissioner argues that followup measures are not constitutionally required, he reminds us that the State did make some attempt to follow up with Jones by publishing notice in the newspaper a few weeks before the public sale. Several decades ago, this Court observed that “[cjhance alone” brings a person’s attention to “an advertisement in small type inserted in the back pages of a newspaper,” Mullane, 339 U. S., at 315, and that notice by publication is adequate only where “it is not reasonably possible or practicable to give more adequate warning,” id., at 317. Following up by publication was not constitutionally adequate under the circumstances presented here because, as we have explained, it was possible and practicable to give Jones more adequate warning of the impending tax sale.
The dissent forcefully articulates some basic principles about constitutionally required notice, principles from which we have no intention to depart. In particular, we disclaim any “new rule” that is “contrary to Dusenbery and a significant departure from Mullane.” Post, at 244. In Dusenbery, the Government was aware that someone at the prison had signed for the prisoner’s notice letter, and we determined that this attempt at notice was adequate, despite the fact that the State could have made notice more likely by requiring the prisoner to sign for the letter himself. 534 U. S., at 171. In this case, of course, the notice letter was returned to the Commissioner, informing him that his attempt at notice had failed.
As for Mullane, it directs that “when notice is a person’s due... [t]he means employed must be such as one desirous of actually informing the absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it.” 339 U. S., at 315. Mindful of the dissent’s concerns, we conclude, at the end of the day, that someone who actually wanted to alert Jones that he was in danger of losing his house would do more when the attempted notice letter was returned unclaimed, and there was more that reasonably could be done.
As noted, “[i]t is not our responsibility to prescribe the form of service that the [government] should adopt.” Greene, supra, at 455, n. 9. In prior cases finding notice inadequate, we have not attempted to redraft the State’s notice statute. See, e. g., Tulsa Professional, 485 U. S., at 490-491; Robinson, 409 U. S., at 40; Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U. S. 208, 213-214 (1962); Walker, 352 U. S., at 116; Covey, 351 U. S., at 146-147. The State can determine how to proceed in response to our conclusion that notice was inadequate here, and the States have taken a variety of approaches to the present question. See n. 2, supra. It suffices for present purposes that we are confident that additional reasonable steps were available for Arkansas to employ before taking Jones’ property.
* * *
There is no reason to suppose that the State will ever be less than fully zealous in its efforts to secure the tax revenue it needs. The same cannot be said for the State’s efforts to ensure that its citizens receive proper notice before the State takes action against them. In this case, the State is exerting extraordinary power against a property owner — taking and selling a house he owns. It is not too much to insist that the State do a bit more to attempt to let him know about it when the notice letter addressed to him is returned unclaimed.
The Commissioner’s effort to provide notice to Jones of an impending tax sale of his house was insufficient to satisfy due process given the circumstances of this case. The judgment of the Arkansas Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Alito took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Most Courts of Appeals have also concluded that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires the Federal Government to take further reasonable steps in the property forfeiture context. See, e. g., United States v. Ritchie, 342 F. 3d 903, 911 (CA9 2003); Foehl v. United States, 238 F. 3d 474, 480 (CA3 2001); Small v. United States, 136 F. 3d 1334, 1337-1338 (CADC 1998); Torres v. $36,256.80 U. S. Currency, 25 F. 3d 1154, 1161 (CA2 1994); Barrera-Montenegro v. United States, 74 F. 3d 657, 660 (CA5 1996); United States v. Rodgers, 108 F. 3d 1247, 1252-1253 (CA10 1997); see also Garcia v. Meza, 235 F. 3d 287, 291 (CA7 2000) (declining to adopt a per se rule that only examines notice at the time it is sent, but also declining to impose an affirmative duty to seek out claimants in every case where notice is returned undelivered). But see Madewell v. Downs, 68 F. 3d 1030, 1047 (CA8 1995); Sarit v. United States Drug Enforcement Admin., 987 F. 2d 10, 14-15 (CA1 1993).
Many States require that notice be given to the occupants of the property as a matter of course. See Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code Ann. § 3704.7 (West Supp. 2006); Ga. Code Ann. § 48-4-45(a)(1)(B) (Supp. 2005); Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 35, §§200/21-75(a), 200/22-10, 200/22-15 (West 2005); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 36, §1073 (1990); Md. Tax-Prop. Code Ann. §14-836(b)(4)(i)(2) (Lexis 2001); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §211.78i(3) (West 2005); Minn. Stat. §281.23, subd. 6 (2004); Mont. Code Ann. §§15-18-212(1)(a), (2)(a) (2005); N. D. Cent. Code Ann. §57-28-04(3) (Lexis 2005); Okla. Stat., Tit. 68, § 3118(A) (West Supp. 2006); S. D. Codified Laws §10-25-5 (2004); Utah Code Ann. §59-2-1351(2)(a) (Lexis 2004); Wis. Stat. §75.12(1) (2003-2004); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-13-108(e)(v)(B) (1997-2005). Some States require that notice be posted on the property or at the property owner’s last known address either at the outset, see Del. Code Ann., Tit. 9, §§8724, 8772 (1989 and Supp. 2004); Ga. Code Ann. §48-4-78(d) (Supp.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | D | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Stevens
announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, and VI, and an opinion with respect to Parts III, IV, and V, in which Justice Souter, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer join.
The question presented in this case is whether the accused’s Sixth Amendment right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him” was violated by admitting into evidence at his trial a nontestifying accomplice’s entire confession that contained some statements against the accomplice’s penal interest and others that inculpated the accused.
1 — I
On December 4, 1995, three men — Benjamin Lee Lilly (petitioner), his brother Mark, and Mark’s roommate, Gary Wayne Barker — broke into a home and stole nine bottles of liquor, three loaded guns, and a safe. The next day, the men drank the stolen liquor, robbed a small country store, and shot at geese with their stolen weapons. After their car broke down, they abducted Alex DeFilippis and used his vehicle to drive to a deserted location. One of them shot and killed DeFilippis. The three men then committed two more robberies before they were apprehended by the police late in the evening of December 5.
After taking them into custody, the police questioned each of the three men separately. Petitioner did not mention the murder to the police and stated that the other two men had forced him to participate in the robberies. Petitioner’s brother Mark and Barker told the police somewhat different accounts of the crimes, but both maintained that petitioner masterminded the robberies and was the one who had killed DeFilippis.
A tape recording of Mark’s initial oral statement indicates that he was questioned from 1:35 a.m. until 2:12 a.m. on December 6. The police interrogated him again from 2:30 a.m. until 2:53 a.m. During both interviews, Mark continually emphasized how drunk he had been during the entire spree. When asked about his participation in the string of crimes, Mark admitted that he stole liquor during the initial burglary and that he stole a 12-pack of beer during the robbery of the liquor store. Mark also conceded that he had handled a gun earlier that day and that he was present during the more serious thefts and the homicide.
The police told Mark that he would be charged with armed robbery and that, unless he broke “family ties,” petitioner “may be dragging you right in to a life sentence,” App. 257. Mark acknowledged that he would be sent away to the penitentiary. He claimed, however, that while he had primarily been drinking, petitioner and Barker had “got some guns or something” during the initial burglary. Id., at 250. Mark said that Barker had pulled a gun in one of the robberies. He further insisted that petitioner had instigated the carjacking and that he (Mark) “didn’t have nothing to do with the shooting” of DeFilippis. Id., at 256. In a brief portion of one of his statements, Mark stated that petitioner was the one who shot DeFilippis.
The Commonwealth of Virginia charged petitioner with several offenses, including the murder of DeFilippis, and tried him separately. At trial, the Commonwealth called Mark as a witness, but he invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The Commonwealth therefore offered to introduce into evidence the statements Mark made to the police after his arrest, arguing that they were admissible as declarations of an unavailable witness against penal interest. Petitioner objected on the ground that the statements were not actually against Mark’s penal interest because they shifted responsibility for the crimes to Barker and to petitioner, and that their admission would violate the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause. The trial judge overruled the objection and admitted the tape recordings and written transcripts of the statements in their entirety. The jury found petitioner guilty of robbery, abduction, carjacking, possession of a firearm by a felon, and four charges of illegal use of a firearm, for which offenses he received consecutive prison sentences of two life terms plus 27 years. The jury also convicted petitioner of capital murder and recommended a sentence of death, which the court imposed.
The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed petitioner’s convictions and sentences. As is relevant here, the court first concluded that Mark’s statements were declarations of an unavailable witness against penal interest; that the statements’ reliability was established by other evidence; and, therefore, that they fell within an exception to the Virginia hearsay rule. The court then turned to petitioner’s Confrontation Clause challenge. It began by relying on our opinion in White v. Illinois, 502 U. S. 346 (1992), for the proposition that “ '[w]here proffered hearsay has sufficient guarantees of reliability to come within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule, the Confrontation Clause is satisfied.’” 255 Va. 558, 574, 499 S. E. 2d 522, 534 (1998) (quoting White, 502 U. S., at 356). The Virginia court also remarked:
“[AJdmissiblity into evidence of the statement against penal interest of an unavailable witness is a 'firmly rooted’ exception to the hearsay rule in Virginia. Thus, we hold that the trial court did not err in admitting Mark Lilly’s statements into evidence.” 255 Va., at 575, 499 S. E. 2d, at 534.
“That Mark Lilly’s statements were self-serving, in that they tended to shift principal responsibility to others or to offer claims of mitigating circumstances, goes to the weight the jury eould assign to them and not to their admissibility.” Id., at 574,499 S. E. 2d, at 534.
Our concern that this decision represented a significant departure from our Confrontation Clause jurisprudence prompted us to grant certiorari. 525 U. S. 981 (1998).
II
As an initial matter, the Commonwealth asserts that we should decline to exercise jurisdiction over petitioner’s claim because he did not fairly present his Confrontation Clause challenge to the Supreme Court of Virginia. We disagree. Although petitioner focused on state hearsay law in his challenge to the admission of Mark’s statements, petitioner expressly argued in his opening brief to that court that the admission of the statements violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. He expanded his Sixth Amendment argument in his reply brief and cited Lee v. Illinois, 476 U. S. 530 (1986), and Williamson v. United States, 512 U. S. 594 (1994), in response to the Commonwealth’s contention that the admission of the statements was constitutional. These arguments, particularly the reliance on our Confrontation Clause opinion in Lee, sufficed to raise in the Supreme Court of Virginia the constitutionality of admitting Mark’s statements. See Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U. S. 400, 406, n. 9 (1988). Indeed, the court addressed petitioner’s Confrontation Clause claim without mentioning any waiver problems.
1 — i HH ► — i
In all criminal prosecutions, state as well as federal, the accused has a right, guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, “to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” U. S. Const., Amdt. 6; Pointer v. Texas, 380 U. S. 400 (1965) (applying Sixth Amendment to the States). “The central concern of the Confrontation Clause is to ensure the reliability of the evidence against a criminal defendant by subjecting it to rigorous testing in the context of an adversary proceeding before the trier of fact.” Maryland v. Craig, 497 U. S. 836, 845 (1990). When the government seeks to offer a declarant’s out-of-court statements against the accused, and, as in this case, the declarant is unavailable, courts must decide whether the Clause permits the government to deny the accused his usual right to force the declarant “to submit to cross-examination, the 'greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth.’ ” California v. Green, 399 U. S. 149, 158 (1970) (footnote and citation omitted).
In our most recent case interpreting the Confrontation Clause, White v. Illinois, 502 U. S. 346 (1992), we rejected the suggestion that the Clause should be narrowly construed to apply only to practices comparable to “a particular abuse common in 16th- and 17th-century England: prosecuting a defendant through the presentation of ex parte affidavits, without the affiants ever being produced at trial.” Id., at 352. This abuse included using out-of-court depositions and “ 'confessions of accomplices.’ ” Green, 399 U. S., at 157. Accord, White, 502 U. S., at 361, 363 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (noting that this rule applies even if the confession is “found to be reliable”). Because that restrictive reading of the Clause’s term “witnesses” would have virtually eliminated the Clause’s role in restricting the admission of hearsay testimony, we considered it foreclosed by our prior cases. Instead, we adhered to our general framework, summarized in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U. S. 56 (1980), that the veracity of hearsay statements is sufficiently dependable to allow the untested admission of such statements against an accused when (1) “the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception” or (2) it contains “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness” such that adversarial testing would be expected to add little, if anything, to the statements’ reliability. Id., at 66.
Before turning to the dual Roberts inquiries, however, we note that the statements taken from petitioner’s brother in the early, morning of December 6 were obviously obtained for the purpose-of creating evidence that would be useful at a future trial. The analogy to the presentation of ex parte affidavits in the early English proceedings thus brings the Confrontation Clause into play no matter how narrowly its gateway might be read.
IV
The Supreme Court of Virginia held that the admission of Mark Lilly’s confession was constitutional primarily because, in its view, it was against Mark’s penal interest and because “the statement against penal interest of an unavailable witness is a ‘firmly rooted’ exception to the hearsay rule in Virginia.” 255 Va., at 575, 449 S. E. 2d, at 534. We assume, as we must, that Mark’s statements were against his penal interest as a matter of state law, but the question whether the statements fall within a firmly rooted hearsay exception for Confrontation Clause purposes is a question of federal law. Accordingly, it is appropriate to begin our analysis by examining the “firmly rooted” doctrine and the roots of the “against penal interest” exception.
We have allowed the admission of statements falling within a firmly rooted hearsay exception since the Court’s recognition in Mattox v. United States, 156 U. S. 237 (1895), that the Framers of the Sixth Amendment “obviously intended to... respec[t]” certain unquestionable rules of evidence in drafting the Confrontation Clause. Id., at 243. Justice Brown, writing for the Court in that case, did not question the wisdom of excluding deposition testimony, ex parte affidavits and their equivalents. But he reasoned that an unduly strict and “technical” reading of the Clause would have the effect of excluding other hearsay evidence, such as dying declarations, whose admissibility neither the Framers nor anyone else 100 years later “would have [had] the hardihood... to question.” Ibid.
We now describe a hearsay exception as “firmly rooted” if, in light of “longstanding judicial and legislative experience,” Idaho v. Wright, 497 U. S. 805, 817 (1990), it “rest[s] [on] such [a] solid foundatio[n] that admission of virtually any evidence within [it] comports with the ‘substance of the constitutional protection.5 " Roberts, 448 U. S., at 66 (quoting Mattox, 156 U. S., at 244). This standard is designed to allow the introduction of statements falling within a category of hearsay whose conditions have proved over time “to remove all temptation to falsehood, and to enforce as strict an adherence to the truth as would the obligation of an oath" and cross-examination at a trial. Ibid. In White, for instance, we held that the hearsay exception for spontaneous declarations is firmly rooted because it “is at least two centuries old,” currently “widely accepted among the States,” and carries “substantial guarantees of... trustworthiness... [that] cannot be recaptured even by later in-court testimony.” 502 U. S., at 355-856, and n. 8. Established practice, in short, must confirm that statements falling within a category of hearsay inherently “earr[y] special guarantees of credibility" essentially equivalent to, or greater than, those produced by the Constitution’s preference for cross-examined trial testimony. Id., at 356.
The “against penal interest” exception to the hearsay rule — unlike other previously recognized firmly rooted exceptions — is not generally based on the maxim that statements made without a motive to reflect on the legal consequences of one’s statement, and in situations that are exceptionally conducive to veracity, lack the dangers of inaccuracy that typically accompany hearsay. The exception, rather, is founded on the broad assumption “that a person is unlikely to fabricate a statement against his own interest at the time it is made.” Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U. S. 284, 299 (1973).
We have previously noted that, due to the sweeping scope of the label, the simple categorization of a statement as a “ ‘declaration against penal interest’... defines too large a class for meaningful Confrontation Clause analysis.” Lee v. Illinois, 476 U. S., at 544, n. 5. In criminal trials, statements against penal interest are offered into evidence in three principal situations: (1) as voluntary admissions against the declarant; (2) as exculpatory evidence offered by a defendant who claims that the declarant committed, or was involved in, the offense; and (3) as evidence offered by the prosecution to establish the guilt of an alleged accomplice of the declarant. It is useful to consider the three categories and their roots separately.
Statements in the first category — voluntary admissions of the declarant — are routinely offered into evidence against the maker of the statement and carry a distinguished heritage confirming their admissibility when so used. See G. Gilbert, Evidence 139-140 (1756); Lambe’s Case, 2 Leach 552, 168 Eng. Rep. 379 (1791); State v. Kirby, 1 Strob. 155, 156 (1846); State v. Cowan, 29 N. C. 239, 246 (1847). Thus, assuming that Mark Lilly’s statements were taken in conformance with constitutional prerequisites, they would unquestionably be admissible against him if he were on trial for stealing alcoholic beverages.
If Mark were a codefendant in a joint trial, however, even the use of his confession to prove his guilt might have an adverse impact on the rights of his accomplices. When dealing with admissions against penal interest, we have taken great care to separate using admissions against the declarant (the first category above) from using them against other criminal defendants (the third category).
In Bruton v. United States, 391 U. S. 123 (1968), two co-defendants, Evans and Bruton, were tried jointly and convicted of armed postal robbery. A postal inspector testified that Evans had orally confessed that he and Bruton had committed the crime. The jury was instructed that Evans’ confession was admissible against him, but could not be considered in assessing Bruton’s guilt. Despite that instruction, this Court concluded that the introduction of Evans’ confession posed such a serious threat to Bruton’s right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him that he was entitled to a new trial. The case is relevant to the issue before us today, not because of its principal holding concerning the ability or inability of the jury to follow the judge’s instruction, but rather because it was common ground among all of the Justices that the fact that the confession was a statement against the penal interest of Evans did not justify its use against Bruton. As Justice White noted at the outset of his dissent, “nothing in that confession which was relevant and material to Bruton’s case was admissible against Bruton.” Id., at 138.
In the years since Bruton was decided, we have reviewed a number of cases in which one defendant’s confession has been introduced into evidence in a joint trial pursuant to instructions that it could be used against him but not against his codefendant. Despite frequent disagreement over matters such as the adequacy of the trial judge’s instructions, or the sufficiency of the redaction of ambiguous references to the declarant’s accomplice, we have consistently either stated or assumed that the mere fact that one accomplice’s confession qualified as a statement against his penal interest did not justify its use as evidence against another person. See Gray v. Maryland, 523 U. S. 185, 194-195 (1998) (stating that because the use of an accomplice’s confession “creates a special, and vital, need for cross-examination,” a prosecutor desiring to offer such evidence must comply with Bruton, hold separate trials, use separate juries, or abandon the use of the confession); 523 U. S., at 200 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that codefendant’s confessions “may not be considered for the purpose of determining [the defendant’s] guilt”); Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U. S. 200, 206 (1987) (“[W]here two defendants are tried jointly, the pretrial confession of one cannot be admitted against the other unless the confessing defendant takes the stand”); Cruz v. New York, 481 U. S. 186, 189-190, 193 (1987) (same).
The second category of statements against penal interest encompasses those offered as exculpatory evidence by a defendant who claims that it was the maker of the statement, rather than he, who committed (or was involved in) the crime in question. In this context, our Court, over the dissent of Justice Holmes, originally followed the 19th-century English rule that categorically refused to recognize any “against penal interest” exception to the hearsay rule, holding instead that under federal law only hearsay statements against pecuniary (and perhaps proprietary) interest were sufficiently reliable to warrant their admission at the trial of someone other than the declarant. See Donnelly v. United States, 228 U. S. 243, 272-277 (1913). Indeed, most States adhered to this approach well into the latter half of the 20th century. See Chambers, 410 U. S., at 299 (collecting citations).
As time passed, however, the precise Donnelly rule, which barred the admission of other persons’ confessions that exculpated the accused, became the subject of increasing criticism. Professor Wigmore, for example, remarked years after Donnelly:
“The only practical consequences of this unreasoning limitation are shocking to the sense of justice; for, in its commonest application, it requires, in a criminal trial, the rejection of a confession, however well authenticated, of a person deceased or insane or fled from the jurisdiction (and therefore quite unavailable) who has avowed himself to be the true culprit.... It is therefore not too late to retrace our steps, and to discard this barbarous doctrine, which would refuse to let an innocent accused vindicate himself even by producing to the tribunal a perfectly authenticated written confession, made on the very gallows, by the true culprit now beyond the reach of justice.” 5 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 1477, pp. 289-290 (3d ed. 1940).
See also Scolari v. United States, 406 F. 2d 563, 564 (CA9 1969) (criticizing Donnelly); United States v. Annunziato, 293 F. 2d 373, 378 (CA2 1961) (Friendly, J.) (same); Hines v. Commonwealth, 136 Va. 728, 117 S. E. 843 (1923) (criticizing Donnelly and refusing to incorporate it into state law); Wright, Uniform Rules and Hearsay, 26 U. Cin. L. Rev. 575 (1957).
Finally, in 1973, this Court endorsed the more enlightened view in Chambers, holding that the Due Process Clause affords criminal defendants the right to introduce into evidence third parties’ declarations against penal interest— their confessions — when the circumstances surrounding the statements “provid[e] considerable assurance of their reliability.” 410 U. S., at 300. Not surprisingly, most States have now amended their hearsay rules to allow the admission of such statements under against-penal-interest exceptions. See 5 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 1476, p. 352, and n. 9 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1974); id., §1477, at 360, and n. 7; J. Wigmore, Evidence §§ 1476 and 1477, pp. 618-626 (A. Best ed. Supp. 1998). But because hearsay statements of this sort are, by definition, offered by the accused, the admission of such statements does not implicate Confrontation Clause concerns. Thus, there is no need to decide whether the reliability of such statements is so inherently dependable that they would constitute a firmly rooted hearsay exception.
The third category includes cases, like the one before us today, in which the government seeks to introduce “a confession by an accomplice which incriminates a criminal defendant.” Lee, 476 U. S., at 544, n. 5. The practice of admitting statements in this category under an exception to the hearsay rule — to the extent that such a practice exists in certain jurisdictions — is, unlike the first category or even the second, of quite recent vintage. This category also typically includes statements that, when offered in the absence of the declarant, function similarly to those used in the ancient ex parte affidavit system.
Most important, this third category of hearsay encompasses statements that are inherently unreliable. Typical of the ground swell of scholarly and judicial criticism that culminated in the Chambers decision, Wigmore’s treatise still expressly distinguishes accomplices’ confessions that inculpate themselves and the accused as beyond a proper understanding of the against-penal-interest exception because an accomplice often has a considerable interest in “confessing and betraying his eoeriminals.” 5 Wigmore, Evidence § 1477, at 358, n. 1 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1974). Consistent with this scholarship and the assumption that underlies the analysis in our Bruton line of cases, we have over the years “spoken with one voice in declaring presumptively unreliable accomplices’ confessions that incriminate defendants.” Lee, 476 U. S., at 541. See also Cruz, 481 U. S., at 195 (White, J., dissenting) (such statements “have traditionally been viewed with special suspicion”); Bruton, 391 U. S., at 136 (such statements are “inevitably suspect”).
In Crawford v. United States, 212 U. S. 183 (1909), this Court stated that even when an alleged accomplice testifies, his confession that “incriminate[s] himself together with defendant... ought to be received with suspicion, and with the very greatest care and caution, and ought not to be passed upon by the jury under the same rules governing other and apparently credible witnesses.” Id., at 204. Over 30 years ago, we applied this principle to the Sixth Amendment. We held in Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 415 (1965), that the admission of a nontestifying accomplice’s confession, which shifted responsibility and implicated the defendant as the triggerman, “plainly denied [the defendant] the right of cross-examination secured by the Confrontation Clause.” Id., at 419.
In Lee, we reaffirmed Douglas and explained that its holding “was premised on the basic understanding that when one person accuses another of a crime under circumstances in which the declarant stands to gain by inculpating another, the accusation is presumptively suspect and must be subjected to the scrutiny of cross-examination.” 476 U. S., at 541. This is so because
“th[e] truthfinding function of the Confrontation Clause is uniquely threatened when an accomplice’s confession is sought to be introduced against a criminal defendant without the benefit of cross-examination.... 'Due to his strong motivation to implicate the defendant and to exonerate himself, a codefendant’s statements about what the defendant said or did are less credible than ordinary hearsay evidence.’” Ibid. (quoting Bruton, 391 U. S., at 141 (White, J., dissenting)).
Indeed, even the dissenting Justices in Lee agreed that “accomplice confessions ordinarily are untrustworthy precisely because they are not unambiguously adverse to the penal interest of the declarant,” but instead are likely to be attempts to minimize the declarant’s culpability. 476 U. S., at 552-553 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
We have adhered to this approach in construing the Federal Rules of Evidence. Thus, in Williamson v. United States, 512 U. S. 594 (1994), without reaching the Confrontation Clause issue, we held that an accomplice’s statement against his own penal interest was not admissible against the defendant. We once again noted the presumptive unreliability of the “non-self-inculpatory” portions of the statement: “One of the most effective ways to lie is to mix falsehood with truth, especially truth that seems particularly persuasive because of its self-inculpatory nature.” Id., at 599-601.
It is clear that our cases consistently have viewed an accomplice’s statements that shift or spread the blame to a criminal defendant as falling outside the realm of those “hearsay exeeption[s] [that are] so trustworthy that adversarial testing can be expected to add little to [the statements’] reliability.” White, 502 U. S., at 357. This view is also reflected in several States’ hearsay law. Indeed, prior to 1995, it appears that even Virginia rarely allowed statements against the penal interest of the declarant to be used at criminal trials. See, e. g., Ellison v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 404, 247 S. E. 2d 685 (1978). That Virginia relaxed that portion of its hearsay law when it decided Chandler v. Commonwealth, 249 Va. 270, 455 S. E. 2d 219 (1995), and that it later apparently concluded that all statements against penal interest fall within “a ‘firmly rooted’ exception to the hearsay rule in Virginia,” 255 Va., at 575, 499 S. E. 2d, at 534, is of no consequence. The decisive fact, which we make explicit today, is that accomplices’ confessions that inculpate a criminal defendant are not within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule as that concept has been defined in our Confrontation Clause jurisprudence.
V
Aside from its conclusion that Mark’s statements were admissible under a firmly rooted hearsay exception, the Supreme Court of Virginia also affirmed the trial court’s holding that the statements were “reliable].., in the context of the facts and circumstances under which [they were] given” because (i) “Mark Lilly was cognizant of the import of his statements and that he was implicating himself as a participant in numerous crimes” and (ii) “[elements of [his] statements were independently corroborated” by other evidence offered at trial Id., at 574, 499 S. E. 2d, at 534. See also App. 18 (trial court’s decision). The Commonwealth contends that we should defer to this “fact-intensive” determination. It further argues that these two indicia of reliability, coupled with the facts that the police read Mark his Miranda rights and did not promise him leniency in exchange for his statements, demonstrate that the circumstances surrounding his statements bore “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness,” Roberts, 448 U. S., at 66, sufficient to satisfy the Confrontation Clause’s residual admissibility test.
The residual “trustworthiness” test credits the axiom that a rigid application of the Clause’s standard for admissibility might in an exceptional ease exclude a statement of an unavailable witness that is incontestably probative, competent, and reliable, yet nonetheless outside of any firmly rooted hearsay exception. Cf. id., at 68; Mattox, 156 U. S., at 243-244. When a court can be confident — as in the context of hearsay falling within a firmly rooted exception — that “the declarant’s truthfulness is so clear from the surrounding circumstances that the test of cross-examination would be of marginal utility,” the Sixth Amendment’s residual “trustworthiness” test allows the admission of the declarant’s statements. Wright, 497 U. S., at 820.
Nothing in our prior opinions, however, suggests that appellate courts should defer to lower courts’ determinations regarding whether a hearsay statement has particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. To the contrary, those opinions indicate that we have assumed, as with other fact-intensive, mixed questions of constitutional law, that “[^Independent review is... necessary... to maintain control of, and to clarify, the legal principles” governing the factual circumstances necessary to satisfy the protections of the Bill of Rights. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U. S. 690, 697 (1996) (holding that appellate courts should review reasonable suspicion and probable-cause determinations de novo). We, of course, accept the Virginia courts’ determination that Mark’s statements were reliable for purposes of state hearsay law, and, as should any appellate court, we review the presence or absence of historical facts for clear error. But the surrounding circumstances relevant to a Sixth Amendment admissibility determination do not include the declar-ant’s in-eourt demeanor (otherwise the declarant would be testifying) or any other factor uniquely suited to the province of trial courts. For these reasons, when deciding whether the admission of a declarant’s out-of-court statements violates the Confrontation Clause, courts should independently review whether the government’s proffered guarantees of trustworthiness satisfy the demands of the Clause.
The Commonwealth correctly notes that “the presumption of unreliability that attaches to codefendants’ confessions... may be rebutted.” Lee, 476 U. S., at 543. We have held, in fact, that any inherent unreliability that accompanies co-conspirator statements made during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy is per se rebutted by the circumstances giving rise to the long history of admitting such statements. See Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U. S. 171, 182-184 (1987). Nonetheless, the historical underpinnings of the Confrontation Clause and the sweep of our prior confrontation cases offer one cogent reminder: It is highly unlikely that the presumptive unreliability that attaches to accomplices’ confessions that shift or spread blame can be effectively rebutted when the statements are given under conditions that implicate the core concerns of the old ex parte affidavit practice — that is, when the government is involved in the statements’ production, and when the statements describe past events and have not been subjected to adversarial testing.
Applying these principles, the Commonwealth’s asserted guarantees of trustworthiness fail to convince us that Mark’s confession was sufficiently reliable as to be admissible without allowing petitioner to cross-examine him. That other evidence at trial corroborated portions of Mark’s statements is irrelevant. We have squarely rejected the notion that “evidence corroborating the truth of a hearsay statement may properly support a finding that the statement bears 'particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.’ ” Wright, 497 U. S., at 822. In Wright, we concluded that the admission of hearsay statements by a child declarant violated the Confrontation Clause even though the statements were admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule recognized in Idaho, and even though they were corroborated by other evidence. We recognized that it was theoretically possible for such statements to possess “'particularized guarantees of trustworthiness’” that would justify their admissibility, but we refused to allow the State to “bootstrap on” the trustworthiness of other evidence. “To be admissible under the Confrontation Clause,” we held, “hearsay evidence used to convict a defendant must possess indicia of reliability by virtue of its inherent trustworthiness, not by reference to other evidence at trial.” Ibid.
Nor did the police’s informing Mark of his Miranda rights render the circumstances surrounding his statements significantly more trustworthy. We noted in rejecting a similar argument in Lee that a finding that a confession was “voluntary for Fifth Amendment purposes... does not bear on the question of whether the confession was also free from any desire, motive, or impulse [the declarant] may have had either to mitigate the appearance of his own culpability by spreading the blame or to overstate [the defendant’s] involvement” in the crimes at issue. 476 U. S., at 544. By the same token, we believe that a suspect’s consciousness of his Miranda rights has little, if any, bearing on the likelihood of truthfulness of his statements. When a suspect is in custody for his obvious involvement in serious crimes, his knowledge that anything he says may be used against him militates against depending on his veracity.
The Commonwealth’s next proffered basis for reliability— that Mark knew he was exposing himself to criminal liability — merely restates the fact that portions of his statements were technically against penal interest. And as we have explained, such statements are suspect insofar as they inculpate other persons. “[T]hat a person is making a broadly self-inculpatory confession does not make more credible the confession’s non-self-inculpatory parts.” Williamson, 512 U. S., at 599. Accord, Lee, 476 U. S., at 545. Similarly, the absence of an express promise of leniency to Mark does not enhance his statements’ reliability to the level necessary for their untested admission. The police need not tell a person who is in custody that his statements may gain him leniency in order for the suspect to surmise that speaking up, and particularly placing blame on his cohorts, may inure to his advantage.
It is abundantly clear that neither the words that Mark spoke nor the setting in which he was questioned provides any basis for concluding that his comments regarding petitioner’s guilt were so reliable that there was no need to subject them to adversarial testing in a trial setting. Mark was in custody for his involvement in, and knowledge of, serious crimes and made his statements under the supervision of governmental authorities. He was primarily responding to the officers’ leading questions, which were asked without any contemporaneous cross-examination by adverse parties. Thus, Mark had a natural motive to attempt to exculpate himself as much as possible. See id., at 544-545; Dutton v. Evans, 400 U. S. 74, 98 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in result). Mark also was obviously still under the influence of alcohol
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | A | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
These cases concern the constitutionality of § 4 (e)- of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. That law, in the respects pertinent in these cases, provides that no person who has successfully completed the sixth primary grade in a public school in, or a private school accredited by, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in which the language of instruction was other than English shall be denied the right to vote in any election because of his inability to read or write English. Appellees, registered voters in New York City, brought this suit to challenge the constitutionality of § 4 (e) insofar as it pro tanto prohibits the enforcement of the election laws of New York requiring an ability to read and write English as a condition of voting. Under these laws many of the several hundred thousand New York City residents who have migrated there from the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico had previously been denied the right to vote, and ap-pellees attack § 4 (e) insofar as it would enable many of these citizens to vote. Pursuant to § 14 (b) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, appellees commenced this proceeding in the District Court for the District of Columbia seeking a declaration that § 4 (e) is invalid and an injunction prohibiting appellants, the Attorney General of the United States and the New York City Board of Elections, from either enforcing or complying with §4(e). A three-judge district court was designated. 28 U. S. C. §§ 2282, 2284 (1964 ed.). Upon cross motions for summary judgment, that court, one judge dissenting, granted the declaratory and injunctive relief appellees sought. The court held that in enacting § 4 (e) Congress exceeded the powers granted to it by the Constitution and therefore usurped powers reserved to the States by the Tenth Amendment. 247 F. Supp. 196. Appeals were taken directly to this Court, 28 U. S. C. §§ 1252, 1253 (1964 ed.), and we noted probable jurisdiction. 382 U. S. 1007. We reverse. We hold that, in the application challenged in these cases, § 4 (e) is a proper exercise of the powers granted to Congress by § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and that by force of the Supremacy Clause, Article VI, the New York English literacy requirement cannot be enforced to the extent that it is inconsistent with § 4 (e).
Under the distribution of powers effected by the Constitution, the States establish qualifications for voting for state officers, arid the qualifications established by the States for voting for members of the most numerous branch of the state legislature also determine who may vote for United States Representatives and Senators, Art. I, § 2; Seventeenth Amendment; Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U. S. 651, 663. But, of course, the States have no power to grant or withhold the franchise on conditions that are forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment, or any other provision of the Constitution. Such exercises of state power are no more immune to the limitations of the Fourteenth Amendment than any other state action. The Equal Protection Clause itself has been held to forbid some state laws that restrict the right to vote.
The Attorney General of the State of New York argues that an exercise of congressional power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment that prohibits the enforcement of a state law can only be sustained if the judicial branch determines that the state law is prohibited by the provisions of the Amendment that Congress sought to enforce. More specifically, he urges that § 4 (e) cannot be sustained as appropriate legislation to enforce the Equal Protection Clause unless the judiciary decides — even with the guidance of a congressional judgment — that the application of the English literacy requirement prohibited by § 4 (e) is forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause itself. We disagree. Neither the language nor history of § 5 supports such a construction. As was said with regard to § 5 in Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339, 345, “It is the power of Congress which has been enlarged. Congress is authorized to enforce the prohibitions by appropriate legislation. Some legislation is contemplated to make the amendments fully effective.” A construction of § 5 that would require a judicial determination that the enforcement of the state law precluded by Congress violated the Amendment, as a condition of sustaining the congressional enactment, would depreciate both congressional resourcefulness and congressional responsibility for implementing the Amendment. It would confine the legislative power in this context to the insignificant role of abrogating only those state laws that the judicial branch was prepared to adjudge unconstitutional, or of merely informing the judgment of the judiciary by particularizing the “majestic generalities” of § 1 of the Amendment. See Fay v. New York, 332 U. S. 261, 282-284.
Thus our task in this case is not to determine whether the New York English literacy requirement as applied to deny the right to vote to a person who successfully completed the sixth grade in a Puerto Rican school violates the Equal Protection Clause. Accordingly, our decision in Lassiter v. Northampton Election Bd., 360 U. S. 45, sustaining the North Carolina English literacy requirement as not in all circumstances prohibited by the first sections of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, is inapposite. Compare also Guinn v. United States, 238 U. S. 347, 366; Camacho v. Doe, 31 Misc. 2d 692, 221 N. Y. S. 2d 262 (1958), aff’d 7 N. Y. 2d 762, 163 N. E. 2d 140 (1959); Camacho v. Rogers, 199 F. Supp. 155 (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1961). Lassiter did not present the question before us here: Without regard to whether the judiciary would find that the Equal Protection Clause itself nullifies New York’s English literacy requirement as so applied, could Congress prohibit the enforcement of the state law by legislating under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment? In answering this question, our task is limited to determining whether such legislation is, as required by § 5, appropriate legislation to enforce the Equal Protection Clause.
By including § 5 the draftsmen sought to grant to Congress, by a specific provision applicable to the Fourteenth Amendment, the same broad powers expressed in the Necessary and Proper Clause, Art. I, § 8, cl. 18. The classic formulation of the reach of those powers was established by Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 421:
“Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.”
Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S., at 345-346, decided 12 years after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, held that congressional power under § 5 had this same broad scope:
“Whatever legislation is appropriate, that is, adapted to carry out the objects the amendments have in view, whatever tends to enforce submission to the prohibitions they contain, and to secure to all persons the enjoyment of perfect equality of civil rights and the equal protection of the laws against State denial or invasion, if not prohibited, is brought within the domain of congressional power.”
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303, 311; Virginia v. Rives, 100 U. S. 313, 318. Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment grants Congress a similar power to enforce by “appropriate legislation” the provisions of that amendment; and we recently held in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, 326, that “[t)he basic test to be applied in a case involving § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment is the same as in all cases concerning the express powers of Congress with relation to the reserved powers of the States.” That test was identified as the one formulated in McCulloch v. Maryland. See also James Everard’s Breweries v. Day, 265 U. S. 545, 558-559 (Eighteenth Amendment). Thus the McCulloch v. Maryland standard is the measure of what constitutes “appropriate legislation” under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Correctly viewed, § 5 is a positive grant of legislative power authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in determining whether and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.
We therefore proceed to the consideration whether § 4 (e) is “appropriate legislation” to enforce the Equal Protection Clause, that is, under the McCulloch v. Maryland standard, whether § 4 (e) may be regarded as an enactment to enforce the Equal Protection Clause, whether it is “plainly adapted to that end” and whether it is not prohibited by but is consistent with “the letter and spirit of the constitution.”
There can be no doubt that § 4 (e) may be regarded as an enactment to enforce the Equal Protection Clause. Congress explicitly declared that it enacted § 4 (e) “to secure the rights under the fourteenth amendment of persons educated in American-flag schools in which the predominant classroom language was other than English.” The persons referred to include those who have migrated from the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico to New York and who have been denied the right to vote because of their inability to read and write English, and the Fourteenth Amendment rights referred to include those emanating from the Equal Protection Clause. More specifically, § 4 (e) may be viewed as a measure to secure for the Puerto Rican community residing in New York nondiscriminatory treatment by government — both in the imposition of voting qualifications and the provision or administration of governmental services, such as public schools, public housing and law enforcement.
Section 4 (e) may be readily seen as “plainly adapted” to furthering these aims of the Equal Protection Clause. The practical effect of § 4 (e) is to prohibit New York from denying the right to vote to large segments of its Puerto Rican community. Congress has thus prohibited the State from denying to that community the right that is “preservative of all rights.” Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 370. This enhanced political power will be helpful in gaining nondiscriminatory treatment in public services for the entire Puerto Rican community. Section 4 (e) thereby enables the Puerto Rican minority better to obtain “perfect equality of civil rights and the equal protection of the laws.” It was well within congressional authority to say that this need of the Puerto Rican minority for the vote warranted federal intrusion upon any state interests served by the English literacy requirement. It was for Congress, as the branch that made this judgment, to assess and weigh the various conflicting considerations — the risk or pervasiveness of the discrimination in governmental services, the effectiveness of eliminating the state restriction on the right to vote as a means of dealing with the evil, the adequacy or availability of alternative remedies, and the nature and significance of the state interests that would be affected by the nullification of the English literacy requirement as' applied to residents who have successfully completed the sixth grade in a Puerto Rican school. It is not for us to review the congressional resolution of these factors. It is enough that we be able to perceive a basis upon which the Congress might resolve the conflict as it did. There plainly was such a basis to support § 4 (e) in the application in question in this case. Any contrary conclusion would require us to be blind to the realities familiar to the legislators.
The result is no different if we confine our inquiry to the question whether § 4 (e) was merely legislation aimed at the elimination of an invidious discrimination in establishing voter qualifications. We are told that New York’s English literacy requirement originated in the desire to provide an incentive for non-English speaking immigrants to learn the English language and in order to assure the intelligent exercise of the franchise. Yet Congress might well have questioned, in light of the many exemptions provided, and some evidence suggesting that prejudice played a prominent role in the enactment of the requirement, whether these were actually the interests being served. Congress might have also questioned whether denial of a right deemed so precious and fundamental in our society was a necessary or appropriate means of encouraging persons to learn English, or of furthering the goal of an intelligent exercise of the franchise. Finally, Congress might well have concluded that as a means of furthering the intelligent exercise of the franchise, an ability to read or understand Spanish is as effective as ability to read English for those to whom Spanish-language newspapers and Spanish-language radio and television programs are available to inform them of election issues and governmental affairs. Since Congress undertook to legislate so as to preclude the enforcement of the state law, and did so in the context of a general appraisal of literacy requirements for voting, see South Carolina v. Katzenbach, supra, to which it brought a specially informed legislative competence, it was Congress’ prerogative to weigh these competing considerations. Here again, it is enough that we perceive a basis upon which Congress might predicate a judgment that the application of New York’s English literacy requirement to deny the right to vote to a person with a sixth grade education in Puerto Rican schools in which the language of instruction was other than English constituted an invidious discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
There remains the question whether the congressional remedies adopted in § 4 (e) constitute means which are not prohibited by, but are consistent “with the letter and spirit of the constitution.” The only respect in which appellees contend that § 4 (e) fails in this regard is that the section itself works an invidious discrimination in violation of the Fifth Amendment by prohibiting the enforcement of the English literacy requirement only for those educated in American-flag schools (schools located within United States jurisdiction) in which the language of instruction was other than English, and not for those educated in schools beyond the territorial limits of the United States in which the language of instruction was also other than English. This is not a complaint that Congress, in enacting § 4 (e), has unconstitutionally denied or diluted anyone’s right to vote but rather that Congress violated the Constitution by not extending the relief effected in § 4 (e) to those educated in non-American-flag schools. We need not pause to determine whether appellees have a sufficient personal interest to have § 4 (e) invalidated on this ground, see generally United States v. Raines, 362 U. S. 17, since the argument, in our view, falls on the merits.
Section 4 (e) does not restrict or deny the franchise but in effect extends the franchise to persons who otherwise would be denied it by state law. Thus we need not decide whether a state literacy law conditioning the right to vote on achieving a certain level of education in an American-flag school (regardless of the language of instruction) discriminates invidiously against those educated in non-American-flag schools. We need only decide whether the challenged limitation on the relief effected in § 4 (e) was permissible. In deciding that question, the principle that calls for the closest scrutiny of distinctions in laws denying fundamental rights, see n. 15, supra, is inapplicable; for the distinction challenged by appellees is presented only as a limitation on a reform measure aimed at eliminating an existing barrier to the exercise of the franchise. Rather, in deciding the constitutional propriety of the limitations in such a reform measure we are guided by the familiar principles that a “statute is not invalid under the Constitution because it might have gone farther than it did,” Roschen v. Ward, 279 U. S. 337, 339, that a legislature need not “strike at all evils at the same time,” Semler v. Dental Examiners, 294 U. S. 608, 610, and that “reform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind,” Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U. S. 483, 489.
Guided by these principles, we are satisfied that ap-pellees’ challenge to this limitation in § 4 (e) is without merit. In the context of the case before us, the congressional choice to limit the relief effected in § 4 (e) may, for example, reflect Congress’ greater familiarity with the quality of instruction in American-flag schools, a recognition of the unique historic relationship between the Congress and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, an awareness of the Federal Government’s acceptance of the desirability of the use of Spanish as the language of instruction in Commonwealth schools, and the fact that Congress has fostered policies encouraging migration from the Commonwealth to the States. We have no occasion to determine in this case whether such factors would justify a similar distinction embodied in a voting-qualification law that denied the franchise to persons educated in non-American-flag schools. We hold only that the limitation on relief effected in § 4 (e) does not constitute a forbidden discrimination since these factors might well have been the basis for the decision of Congress to go “no farther than it did.”
We therefore conclude that § 4 (e), in the application challenged in this case, is appropriate legislation to enforce the Equal Protection Clause and that the judgment of the District Court must be and hereby is
Reversed.
Mr. Justice Douglas joins the Court’s opinion except for the discussion, at pp. 656-658, of the question whether the congressional remedies adopted in § 4 (e) constitute means which are not prohibited by, but are consistent with “the letter and spirit of the constitution.” On that question, he reserves judgment until such time as it is presented by a member of the class against which that particular discrimination is directed.
The full text of §4 (e) is as follows:
“(1) Congress hereby declares that to secure the rights under the fourteenth amendment of persons educated in Ameriean-flag schools in which the predominant classroom language was other than English, it is necessary to prohibit the States from conditioning the right to vote of such persons on ability to read, write, understand, or interpret any matter in the English language.
“(2) No person who demonstrates that he has successfully completed the sixth primary grade in a public school in, or a private school accredited by, any State or territory, the District of Columbia, or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in which the predominant classroom language was other than English, shall be denied the right to vote in any Federal, State, or local election because of his inability to read, write, understand, or interpret any matter in the English language, except that in States in which State law provides that a different level of education is presumptive of literacy, he shall demonstrate that he has successfully completed an equivalent level of education in a public school in, or a private school accredited by, any State or territory, the District of Columbia, or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in which the predominant classroom language was other than English.” 79 Stat. 439, 42 U. S. C. § 1973b (e) (1964 ed., Supp. I).
Article II, § 1, of the New York Constitution provides, in pertinent part:
“Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions, after January first, one thousand nine hundred twenty-two, no person shall become entitled to vote by attaining majority, by naturalization or otherwise, unless such person is also able, except for physical disability, to read and write English.”
Section 150 of the New York Election Law provides, in pertinent part:
"... In the case of a person who became entitled to vote in this state by attaining majority, by naturalization or otherwise after January first, nineteen hundred twenty-two, such person must, in addition to the foregoing provisions, be able, except for physical disability, to read and write English. A 'new voter,’ within the meaning of this article, is a person who, if he is entitled to vote in this state, shall have become so entitled on or after January first, nineteen hundred twenty-two, and who has not already voted at a general election in the state of New York after making proof of ability to read and write English, in the manner provided in section one hundred sixty-eight.”
Section 168 of the New York Election Law provides, in pertinent part:
“1. The board of regents of the state of New York shall make provisions for the giving of literacy tests.
“2. . . . But a new voter may present as evidence of literacy a certificate or diploma showing that he has completed the work up to and including the sixth grade of an approved elementary school or of an approved higher school in which English is the language of instruction or a certificate or diploma showing that he has completed the work up to and including the sixth grade in a public school or a private school accredited by the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in which school instruction is carried on predominantly in the English language or a matriculation card issued by a college or university to a student then at such institution or a certificate or a letter signed by an official of the university or college certifying to such attendance.”
Section 168 of the Election Law as it now reads was enacted while § 4 (e) was under consideration in Congress. See 111 Cong. Rec. 19376-19377. The prior law required the successful completion of the eighth rather than the sixth grade in a school in which the language of instruction was English.
This limitation on appellees’ challenge to §4(e), and thus on the scope of our inquiry, does not distort the primary intent of §4(e). The measure was sponsored in the Senate by Senators Javits and Kennedy and in the House by Representatives Gilbert and Ryan, all of New York, for the explicit purpose of dealing with the disenfranchisement of large segments of the Puerto Rican population in New York. Throughout the congressional debate it was repeatedly acknowledged that § 4 (e) had particular reference to the Puerto Rican population in New York. That situation was the almost exclusive subject of discussion. See 111 Cong. Rec. 11028, 11060-11074, 15666, 16235-16245, 16282-16283, 19192-19201, 19375-19378; see also Voting Rights, Hearings before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Committee on the Judiciary on H. R. 6400, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 100-101, 420-421, 508-517 (1965). The Solicitor General infonns us in his brief to this Court, that in all probability the practical effect of § 4 (e) will be limited to enfranchising those educated in Puerto Rican schools. He advises us that, aside from the schools in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, there are no public or parochial schools in the territorial limits of the United States in which the predominant language of instruction is other than English and which would have generally been attended by persons who are otherwise qualified to vote save for their lack of literacy in English.
Section 14 (b) provides, in pertinent part:
“No court other than the District. Court for the District of Columbia . . . shall have jurisdiction to issue . . . any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction against the . . . enforcement of any provision of this Act or any action of any Federal officer or employee pursuant hereto.” 79 Stat. 445, 42 U. S. C. § 19731 (b) (1964 ed., Supp. I).
The Attorney General of the United States was initially named as the sole defendant. The New York City Board of Elections was joined as a defendant after it publicly announced its intention to comply with § 4 (e); it has taken the position in these proceedings that § 4 (e) is a proper exercise of congressional power. The Attorney General of the State of New York has participated as amicus curiae in the proceedings below and in this Court, urging § 4 (e) be declared unconstitutional. The United States was granted leave to intervene as a defendant, 28 U. S. C. §2403 (1964 ed.); Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 24 (a).
“Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”
It is therefore unnecessary for us to consider whether § 4 (e) could be sustained as an exercise of power under the Territorial Clause, Art. IV, §3; see dissenting opinion of Judge McGowan below, 247 F. Supp., at 204; or as a measure to discharge certain treaty obligations of the United States, see Treaty of Paris of 1898, 30 Stat. 1754, 1759; United Nations Charter, Articles 55 and 56; Art. I, § 8, cl. 18. Nor need we consider whether § 4 (e) could be sustained insofar as it relates to the election of federal officers as an exercise of congressional power under Art. I, §4, see Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162, 171; United States v. Classic, 313 U. S. 299, 315; Literacy Tests and Voter Requirements in Federal and State Elections, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on S. 480, S. 2750, and S. 2979, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 302, 306-311 (1962) (brief of the Attorney General); nor whether § 4 (e) could be sustained, insofar as it relates to the election of state officers, as an exercise of congressional power to enforce the clause guaranteeing to each State a republican form of government, Art. IV, §4; Art. I, §8, cl. 18.
Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U. S. 663; Carrington v. Rash, 380 U. S. 89. See also United States v. Mississippi, 380 U. S. 128; Louisiana v. United States, 380 U. S. 145, 151; Lassiter v. Northampton Election Bd., 360 U. S. 45; Pope v. Williams, 193 U. S.621, 632-634; Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162; cf. Burns v. Richardson, ante, p. 73, at 92; Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533.
For the historical evidence suggesting that the sponsors and supporters of the Amendment were primarily interested in augmenting the power of Congress, rather than the judiciary, see generally Frantz, Congressional Power to Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment Against Private Acts, 73 Yale L. J. 1353, 1356-1357; Harris, The Quest for Equality, 33-56 (1960); tenBroek, The Antislavery Origins of the Fourteenth Amendment 187-217 (1951).
Senator Howard, in introducing the proposed Amendment to the Senate, described § 5 as “a direct affirmative delegation of power to Congress,” and added:
“It casts upon Congress the responsibility of seeing to it, for the future, that all the sections of the amendment are carried out in good faith, and that no State infringes .the rights of persons or property. I look upon this clause as indispensable for the reason that it thus imposes upon Congress this power and this duty. It enables Congress, in case the States shall enact laws in conflict with the principles of the amendment, to correct that legislation by a formal congressional enactment.” Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 2766, 2768 (1866).
This statement of § 5’s purpose was not questioned by anyone in the course of the debate. Flack, The Adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment 138 (1908).
In fact, earlier drafts of the proposed Amendment- employed the “necessary and proper” terminology to describe the scope of congressional power under the Amendment. See tenBroek, The Antislavery Origins of the Fourteenth Amendment 187-190 (1951). The substitution of the “appropriate legislation” formula was never thought to have the effect of diminishing the scope of this congressional power. See, e. g., Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App. 83 (Representative Bingham, a principal draftsman of the Amendment and the earlier proposals).
Contrary to the suggestion of the dissent, post, p. 668, § 5 does not grant Congress power to exercise discretion in the other direction and to enact “statutes so as in effect to dilute equal protection and due process decisions of this Court.” We emphasize that Congress’ power under § 5 is limited to adopting measures to enforce the guarantees of the Amendment; § 5 grants Congress no power to restrict, abrogate, or dilute these guarantees. Thus, for example, an enactment authorizing the States to establish racially segregated systems of education would not be — as required by § 5 — a measure “to enforce” the Equal Protection Clause since that clause of its own force prohibits such state laws.
Cf. James Everard’s Breweries v. Day, supra, which held that, under the Enforcement Clause of the Eighteenth Amendment, Congress could prohibit the prescription of intoxicating malt liquor for medicinal purposes even though the Amendment itself only prohibited the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes. Cf. also the settled principle applied in the Shreveport Case (Houston, E. & W. T. R. Co. v. United States, 234 U. S. 342), and expressed in United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100, 118, that the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce “extends to those activities intrastate which so affect interstate commerce or the exercise of the power of Congress over it as to make regulation of them appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate end ...” Accord, Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U. S. 241, 268.
See, e. g., 111 Cong. Rec. 11061-11062, 11065-11066, 16240; Literacy Tests and Voter Requirements in Federal and State Elections, Senate Hearings, n. 5, supra, 507-508.
The principal exemption complained of is that for persons who had been eligible to vote before January 1, 1922. See n. 2, supra.
This evidence consists in part of statements made in the Constitutional Convention first considering the English literacy requirement, such as the following made by the sponsor of the measure: “More precious even than the forms of government are the mental qualities of our race. While those stand unimpaired, all is safe. They are exposed to a single danger, and that is that by constantly changing our voting citizenship through the wholesale, but valuable and necessary infusion of Southern and Eastern European races . . . . The danger has begun. . . . We should check it.” III New York State Constitutional Convention 3012 (Rev. Record 1916).
See also id,., at 3015-3017, 3021-3055. This evidence was reinforced by an understanding of the cultural milieu at the time of proposal and enactment, spanning a period from 1915 to 1921 — not one of the enlightened eras of our history. See generally Chafee, Free Speech in the United States 102, 237, 269-282 (1954 ed.). Congress was aware of this evidence. See, e. g., Literacy Tests and Voter Requirements in Federal and State Elections, Senate Hearings, n. 5, supra, 507-513; Voting Rights, House Hearings, n. 3, supra, 508-513.
Other States have found ways of assuring an intelligent exercise of the franchise short of total disenfranchisement of persons not literate in English. For example, in Hawaii, where literacy in either English or Hawaiian suffices, candidates’ names may be printed in both languages, Hawaii Rev. Laws § 11-38 (1963 Supp.); New York 'itself already provides assistance for those exempt from the literacy requirement and are literate in no language, N. Y. Election Law § 169; and, of course, the problem of assuring the intelligent exercise of the franchise has been met by those States, more than 30 in number, that have no literacy requirement at all, see e. g., Fla. Stat. Ann. §§97.061, 101.061 (1960) (form of personal assistance); New Mexico Stat. Ann. §§ 3-2-11, 3-3-13 (personal assistance for those literate in no language), §§ 3-3-7, 3-3-12, 3-2-41 (1953) (ballots and instructions authorized to be printed in English or Spanish). Section 4 (e) does not preclude resort to these alternative methods of assuring the intelligent exercise of the franchise. True, the statute precludes, for a certain class, disenfranchisement and thus limits the States’ choice of means of satisfying a purported state interest. But our cases have held that the States can be required to tailor carefully the means of satisfying a legitimate state interest when fundamental liberties and rights are threatened, see, e. g., Carrington v. Rash, 380 U. S. 89, 96; Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U. S. 663, 670; Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516, 529-530; Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 95-96; United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 152-153, n. 4; Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390; and Congress is free to apply the same principle in the exercise of its powers.
See, e. g., 111 Cong. Rec. 11060-11061, 15666, 16235. The record in this case includes affidavits describing the nature of New York’s two major Spanish-language newspapers, one daily and one weekly, and its three full-time Spanish-language radio stations and affidavits from those who have campaigned in Spanish-speaking areas.
See, e. g., Ill Cong. Rec. 11061 (Senator Long of Louisiana and Senator Young), 11064 (Senator Holland), drawing on their experience with voters literate in a language other than English. See also an affidavit from Representative Willis of Louisiana expressing the view that on the basis of his thirty years' personal experience in politics he has “formed a definite opinion that French-speaking voters who are illiterate in English generally have as clear a grasp of the issues and an understanding of the candidates, as do people who read and write the English language.”
See, e. g., 111 Cong. Rec. 11060-11061.
See Magruder, The Commonwealth Status of Puerto Rico, 15 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1 (1953).
See, e. g., 111 Cong. Rec. 11060-11061, 11066, 11073, 16235. See Osuna, A History of Education in Puerto Rico (1949).
See, e. g., 111 Cong. Rec. 16235; Voting Rights, House Hearings, n. 3, supra, 362. See also Jones Act of 1917, 39 Stat. 953, conferring United States citizenship on all citizens of Puerto Rico.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | B | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
The judgment is reversed. The petitioner’s notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals from a judgment of the District Court for the Northern District of New York, together with his appeal bond, was received at the office of the Clerk of the District Court within the 30 days prescribed by 28 U. S. C. § 2107 for filing a notice of appeal. In dispatching these papers the petitioner inadvertently failed to include the $5 fee required by 28 U. S. C. § 1917 to be paid “upon the filing” of a notice of appeal. The Clerk notified the petitioner of his omission, and declined to “file” the notice of appeal until he received the $5 fee three or four days later. By that time the 30-day period for appeal had expired. Upon petitioner’s motion the District Court made a nunc pro tunc order according the notice of appeal a filing date as of the date it was originally received by the Clerk.
The Court of Appeals, without opinion, dismissed the appeal as untimely. We think that the Clerk's receipt of the notice of appeal within the 30-day period satisfied the requirements of § 2107, and that untimely payment of the § 1917 fee did not vitiate the validity of petitioner’s notice of appeal. Anything to the contrary in such cases as Mondakota Gas Co. v. Montana-Dakota Utilities Co., 194 F. 2d 705 (C. A. 9th Cir. 1952), we disapprove. Our conclusion does not leave § 1917 without other sanctions.
Reversed.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | I | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Black
delivered the opinion of the Court.
A criminal information filed in a Florida state court charged that these eighteen appellants had violated § 509.141 of the Florida Statutes by remaining in a restaurant after the manager had requested them to leave. The material facts are not in dispute and show: Shell’s City Restaurant', which is one of nineteen departments in Shell’s Department Store in Miami, had, at the time of appellants’ arrest, a policy of refusing to serve Negroes. Appellants, Negroes and whites, went as a group into the restaurant and seated themselves at tables. In accordance with the restaurant’s policy, the manager told appellants they would not be served. The manager called the police and, accompanied by one policeman, went to each table, again told appellants they would not be served, and requested them to leave. They refused. The police officers then advised them to leave, and when appellants persisted in their refusal the police placed them all under arrest.
At the trial, the Shell’s City management explained that, while Negroes were welcomed as customers in the store’s other departments, serving Negroes in the restaurant would be “very detrimental to our business” because of the objections of white customers. After these facts had been brought out during the examination of the State’s witnesses, appellants moved for a directed verdict on the ground that their arrest, prosecution, and conviction by the State on this evidence would amount to state discrimination against them on account of color, thereby violating the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection of the laws. This motion was denied. The appellants calling no witnesses, the trial court stayed the adjudication of guilt and the imposition of sentence and placed appellants on probation, as authorized by § 948.01 (3) of the Florida Statutes. On appeal, after various jurisdictional rulings in the Florida appellate courts, the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed, holding the statute under which appellants were convicted to be nondiscriminatory. 144 So. 2d 811. The case is properly here on appeal under 28 U. S. C. § 1257 (2), and we noted probable jurisdiction. 374 U. S. 803.
In this case we do not reach the broad question whether the Fourteenth Amendment of its own force forbids a State to arrest and prosecute those who, having been asked to leave a restaurant because of their color, refuse to do so. For here there are additional circumstances which, we think, call for reversal because of our holding in Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U. S. 244. The petitioners in Peterson were convicted of trespass in violation of a city ordinance after they had seated themselves at a lunch counter and remained there over the manager’s protest. At that time, however, there existed another Greenville ordinance which made it unlawful for restaurants to serve meals to white persons and colored persons in the same room or at the same table or counter. In Peterson the city argued that the manager’s refusal to serve Negroes was based on his own personal preference, which did not amount to “state action” forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment. But we held that the case must be decided on the basis of what the ordinance required people to do, not on the basis of what the manager wanted to do. We said:
“When a state agency passes a law compelling persons to discriminate against other persons because of race, and the State’s criminal processes are employed in a way which enforces the discrimination mandated by that law, such a palpable violation of the Fourteenth Amendment cannot be saved by attempting to separate the mental urges of the discriminators.” 373 U. S., at 248.
See also Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U. S. 267.
In the present case, when appellants were arrested and tried the Florida Board of Health had in effect a regulation, adopted under “authority of the Florida Legislature” and applicable to restaurants, which provided that “where colored persons are employed or accommodated” separate toilet and lavatory rooms must be provided. A month before petitioners were arrested, the State of Florida had issued a “Food and Drink Services” manual, based on state regulations. The manual said that as a “basic requirement,”
“Separate facilities shall be provided for each sex and for each race whether employed or served in the establishment.”
While these Florida regulations do not directly and expressly forbid restaurants to serve both white and colored people together, they certainly embody a state policy putting burdens upon any restaurant which serves both races, burdens bound to discourage the serving of the two races together. Of course, state action, of the kind that falls within the proscription of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, may be brought about through the State’s administrative and regulatory agencies just as through its legislature. Cf. Lombard v. Louisiana, supra, 373 U. S., at 273. Here as in Peterson v. City of Greenville, supra, we conclude that the State through its regulations has become involved to such a significant extent in bringing about restaurant segregation that appellants’ trespass convictions must be held to reflect that state policy and therefore to violate the Fourteenth Amendment.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Florida is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Mr. Justice Douglas would reverse the judgment below for the reasons stated in his opinion in No. 12, Bell v. Maryland, post, p. 242.
Mr. Justice Harlan, considering himself bound by Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U. S. 244, acquiesces in the judgment of the Court.
The statute says that a manager or other person in authority at a restaurant (among other places named in the statute) shall have the right to remove or cause to be removed any person “who, in the opinion of the management, is a person whom it would be detrimental” to the restaurant to serve. The management must first give notice, orally or in writing, that the guest depart. The statute then provides, “[A]ny guest who shall remain or attempt to remain in such . . . restaurant . . . after being requested, as aforesaid, to depart therefrom, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor . . . .”
See 132 So. 2d 3 (Supreme Court of Florida); 132 So. 2d 771 (District Court of Appeal of Florida).
Florida State Sanitary Code, c. VII, § 6. The substance of this regulation was reissued on June 26, 1962, and is now part of Florida Administrative Code, c. 170C, § 8.06.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | B | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Acting under § 10 (c) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (the Taft-Hartley Act), 61 Stat. 136, 147, 29 U. S. C. (Supp. IV) § 160 (c), the National Labor Relations Board ordered the reinstatement of eleven dis-criminatorily discharged employees of the Seven-Up Bottling Company, with back pay “to be computed upon a quarterly basis in the manner established by the Board in F. W. Woolworth Company.” 92 N. L. R. B. 1622, 1640. In the Woolworth case, 90 N. L. R. B. 289, the Board said:
“The public interest in discouraging obstacles to industrial peace requires that we seek to bring about, in unfair labor practice cases, ‘a restoration of the situation, as nearly as possible, to that which would have obtained but for the illegal discrimination.’ In order that this end may be effectively accomplished through the medium of reinstatement coupled with back pay, we shall order, in the case before us and in future cases, that the loss of pay be computed on the basis of each separate calendar quarter or portion thereof during the period from the Respondent’s discriminatory action to the date of a proper offer of reinstatement. The quarterly periods, hereinafter called 'quarters,’ shall begin with the first day of January, April, July, and October. Loss of pay shall be determined by deducting from a sum equal to that which [the employee] would normally have earned for each such quarter or portion thereof, [his] net earnings, if any, in other employment during that period. Earnings in one particular quarter shall have no effect upon the back-pay liability for any other quarter.” 90 N. L. R. B., at 292-293.
In the proceeding in which the Board sought enforcement of the order against the Seven-Up Bottling Company, the Court of Appeals sustained the claim of the Company that the Woolworth formula could not be applied against it: “The employee is entitled to be made whole, but no more. The employees here involved were not compensated on a quarterly basis. We see no sufficient reason to so compute their back pay during suspension. . . . There is nothing to indicate that the conditions apprehended by the Board in the Woolworth case, exist here.” 196 F. 2d 424, 427-428. Accordingly, the court modified the Board’s order so that back pay would be awarded on the basis of the entire period during which an employee was denied reemployment in violation of the Act rather than on a quarterly basis. Since the general method of computing back pay is obviously a matter of importance in the administration of the Act, we brought the case here. 344 U. S. 811.
Section 10 (c) of the Taft-Hartley Act, under which the Board made its award, derives unchanged, so far as is now relevant, from the National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act. 49 Stat. 449, 454. It charges the Board with the task of devising remedies to effectuate the policies of the Act. Of course the remedies must be functions of the purposes to be accomplished, and in making back pay awards, the Board operates under a further limitation. It must have regard for considerations governing the mitigation of damages; it must, that is, heed “the importance of taking fair account, in a civilized legal system, of every socially desirable factor in the final judgment.” Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Labor Board, 313 U. S. 177, 198. Subject to these limitations, however, the power, which is a broad discretionary one, is for the Board to wield, not for the courts. In fashioning remedies to undo the effects of violations of the Act, the Board must draw on enlightenment gained from experience. When the Board, “in the exercise of its informed discretion,” makes an order of restoration by way of back pay, the order “should stand unless it can be shown that the order is a patent attempt to achieve ends other than those which can fairly be said to effectuate the policies of the Act.” Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. Labor Board, 319 U. S. 533, 540. The Woolworth formula, as a general method of computation, is, under this test, proof against judicial challenge.
The Board’s very first published order awarded as back pay wages which would normally have been earned “during the period from the date of . . . discharge to the date of [an] offer of reinstatement . . . less the amount . . . earned subsequent to discharge . . . .” Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 1 N. L. R. B. 1, 51 (1935), enforced sub nom. Labor Board v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 303 U. S. 261. For fifteen years the Board followed the practice it had laid down in that case and calculated back pay on the basis of the entire period between discharge and offer of reinstatement. In 1950, in F. W. Woolworth Company, supra, the Board said: “The cumulative experience of many years discloses that this form of remedial provision falls short of effectuating the basic purposes and policies of the Act.” 90 N. L. R. B., at 291. The Board considered that its Pennsylvania Greyhound formula for computing back pay adversely affected “the companion remedy of reinstatement.” When an employee, sometime after discharge, obtained a better paying job than the one he was discharged from, it became profitable for the employer to delay an offer of reinstatement as long as possible, since every day the employee put in on the better paying job reduced back pay liability. Again, the old formula, in the same circumstances, put added pressure on the employee to waive his right to reinstatement, since by doing so he could terminate the running of back pay and prevent the continuing reduction of the sum coming to him. To avoid these consequences the Board laid down its new method of computation. 90 N. L. R. B., at 292-293.
It is not for us to weigh these or countervailing considerations. Nor should we require the Board to make a quantitative appraisal of the relevant factors, assuming the unlikely, that such an appraisal is feasible. As is true of many comparable judgments by those who are steeped in the actual workings of these specialized matters, the Board’s conclusions may “express an intuition of experience which outruns analysis and sums up many unnamed and tangled impressions . . and they are none the worse for it. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. Co. v. Babcock, 204 U. S. 585, 598. It is as true of the Labor Board as it was of the agency in the Babcock case that “[t]he Board was created for the purpose of using its judgment and its knowledge.” Ibid.
It will not be denied that the Board may be mindful of the practical interplay of two remedies, back pay and reinstatement, both within the scope of its authority. Surely it may so fashion one remedy that it complements, rather than conflicts with, another. It is the business of the Board to give coordinated effect to the policies of the Act. We prefer to deal with these realities and to avoid entering into the bog of logomachy, as we are invited to, by debate about what is “remedial” and what is “punitive.” It seems more profitable to stick closely to the direction of the Act by considering what order does, as this does, and what order does not, bear appropriate relation to the policies of the Act. Cf. Labor Board v. Gullett Gin Co., 340 U. S. 361. Of course, Republic Steel Corp. v. Labor Board, 311 U. S. 7, dealt with a different situation, and its holding remains undisturbed.
It is urged, however, that no evidence in this record supports this back pay order; that the Board’s formula and the reasons it assigned for adopting it do not rest on data which the Board has derived in the course of the proceedings before us. But in devising a remedy the Board is not confined to the record of a particular proceeding. “Cumulative experience” begets understanding and insight by which judgments not objectively demonstrable are validated or qualified or invalidated. The constant process of trial and error, on a wider and fuller scale than a single adversary litigation permits, differentiates perhaps more than anything else the administrative from the judicial process. “[T]he relation of remedy to policy is peculiarly a matter for administrative competence . . . .” Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Labor Board, supra, 313 U. S., at 194. That competence could not be exercised if in fashioning remedies the administrative agency were restricted to considering only what was before it in a single proceeding.
This is not to say that the Board may apply a remedy it has worked out on the basis of its experience, without regard to circumstances which may make its application to a particular situation oppressive and therefore not calculated to effectuate a policy of the Act. The Company in this case maintains that it operates a seasonal business, that its employees may earn three times as much in the first and fourth quarters of a year as in the second and third, and that a quarterly calculation of back pay would in this context be obviously unjust. The Board suggests that it will be time enough to deal with such special facts in this case if the Board and the Company cannot agree on the fair application of the Woolworth formula after the order is sustained. But in case of such disagreement, the Company can be heard as of right on the issue it now raises only in the course of contempt proceedings and at the risk involved in them. We do not think contempt proceedings are appropriate for the settlement of such an issue. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Labor Board, supra, 313 U. S., at 200. Indeed, the Board’s pre-Woolworth formula was adapted to varying circumstances as a result of proceedings had before the Board prior to the issuance of orders. See, e. g., Crossett Lumber Company, 8 N. L. R. B. 440, 496-498; Gullett Gin Company, Inc., 83 N. L. R. B. 1, 2, n. 4, .enforced sub nom. Labor Board v. Gullett Gin Co., supra. We assume that the Woolworth formula will be applied in like manner.
In any event, this aspect of the problem is not now properly here. The Company never made before the Board the objection it now bases on the seasonal nature of its business. Section 10 (e) of the Act, 61 Stat. 136, 147, 148, 29 U. S. C. (Supp. IV) § 160 (e), provides: “No objection that has not been urged before the Board, its member, agent, or agency, shall be considered by the court, unless the failure or neglect to urge such objection shall be excused because of extraordinary circumstances.” In its Exception XXII to the Intermediate Report of the Trial Examiner, the Company objected that the recommendations as to the remedy were contrary to, and unsupported by, the evidence and contrary to law. This is not adequate notice that the Company intends to press the specific issue it now raises. Marshall Field & Co. v. Labor Board, 318 U. S. 253. The Company did not urge this issue either before the Board or in the Court of Appeals. No extraordinary circumstances are present such as would justify permitting the issue to be raised here for the first time.
The Company contends, finally, that though it might have been within the authority of the Board to devise the Woolworth formula under the language of the National Labor Relations Act, the fact that that language was reenacted while the Board adhered to its pre-Woolworth formula has deprived the Board of power to depart from the latter. We are told that Congress studied with unusual care the case law which had developed under the statute Congress was revising and reenacting by the Labor Management Relations Act, and that it adopted new language whenever it desired results other than the ones reached by the cases. We are cited to Labor Board v. Gullett Gin Co., supra, and asked to conclude as a general proposition that whenever Congress reenacted without change provisions of the National Labor Relations Act it thereby froze administrative decisions rendered under those provisions. Gullett Gin carries no such generalization. Having held that the Board’s practice of failing to deduct unemployment compensation payments in the calculation of back pay awards did not go beyond its powers, we said in that case that our holding was supported by the fact that Congress had reenacted the relevant part of § 10 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act with what we took to be notice of this practice. We thought Congress could be said to have agreed that the Board was acting within the authority Congress meant it to have.
Assuming Congress was aware of the Board’s pre-Woolworth practice of calculating back pay on the basis of the entire period from discharge to offer of reinstatement, we could say here, as we did in Gullett Gin, that Congress by its reenactment indicated its agreement that the Board’s practice was authorized. That leads us nowhere on the present issue, though it is only this far that what we said in Gullett Gin can lead us. In that case as here, again assuming notice, if Congress was satisfied that the Board was acting within its powers, the thing for it to do was what it did — reenact without change. In that case as here — though, of course, we had no occasion to say so in that case — if Congress had been more than satisfied with the Board’s practice, if it had wanted to be certain that the Board would not in future profit by its experience, it would have had to do more than it did; it would have had to change the language of the statute so as to take from the Board the discretionary power to mould remedies suited to practical needs which we had declared the Board to have and which the Board was asserting and exercising. We cannot infer an intent to withdraw the grant of such power from what is at most a silent approval of specific exercises of it.
We hold that the Board’s order is to be enforced.
Reversed.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | G | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Souter
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Controlled Substances Act (CSA) makes it a felony “to use any communication facility in committing or in causing or facilitating” certain felonies prohibited by the statute. 84 Stat. 1263, 21 U. S. C. § 843(b). The question here is whether someone violates § 843(b) in making a misdemeanor drug purchase because his phone call to the dealer can be said to facilitate the felony of drug distribution. The answer is no.
I
Federal Bureau of Investigation agents believed Mohammed Said was selling cocaine and got a warrant to tap his cell phone. In the course of listening in, they recorded six calls between Said and petitioner Salman Khade Abuelhawa, during which Abuelhawa arranged to buy cocaine from Said in two separate transactions, each time a single gram. Abuelhawa’s two purchases were misdemeanors, §844, while Said’s two sales were felonies, §§ 841(a)(1) and (b). The Government nonetheless charged Abuelhawa with six felonies on the theory that each of the phone calls, whether placed by Abuelhawa or by Said, had been made “in causing or facilitating” Said’s felonies, in violation of § 843(b). Abuelhawa moved for acquittal as a matter of law, arguing that his efforts to commit the misdemeanors of buying cocaine could not be treated as causing or facilitating Said’s felonies, but the District Court denied his motion, App. to Pet. for Cert. 20a-25a, and the jury convicted him on all six felony counts.
Abuelhawa argued the same point to the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, with as much success. The Circuit reasoned that “for purposes of § 843(b), ‘facilitate’ should be given its ‘common meaning — to make easier or less difficult, or to assist or aid.’” 523 F. 3d 415, 420 (2008) (quoting United States v. Lozano, 839 F. 2d 1020, 1023 (CA4 1988)). The court said Abuelhawa’s use of a phone to buy cocaine counted as ordinary facilitation because it “undoubtedly made Said’s cocaine distribution easier; in fact, ‘it made the sale possible.’” 523 F. 3d, at 421 (quoting United States v. Binkley, 903 F. 2d 1130, 1136 (CA7 1990); emphasis deleted). We granted certiorari, 555 U. S. 1028 (2008), to resolve a split among the Courts of Appeals on the scope of § 843(b), and we now reverse.
II
The Government’s argument is a reprise of the Fourth Circuit’s opinion, that Abuelhawa’s use of his cell phone satisfies the plain meaning of “facilitate” because it “allow[ed] the transaction to take place more efficiently, and with less risk of detection, than if the purchaser and seller had to meet in person.” Brief for United States 10. And of course on the literal plane, the phone calls could be described as “facilitating” drug distribution; they “undoubtedly made... distribution easier.” 523 F. 3d, at 421. But stopping there would ignore the rule that, because statutes are not read as a collection of isolated phrases, see United States Nat. Bank of Ore. v. Independent Ins. Agents of America, Inc., 508 U. S. 439, 455 (1993), “[a] word in a statute may or may not extend to the outer limits of its definitional possibilities,” Dolan v. Postal Service, 546 U. S. 481, 486 (2006). We think the word here does not.
To begin with, the Government’s literal sweep of “facilitate” sits uncomfortably with common usage. Where a transaction like a sale necessarily presupposes two parties with specific roles, it would be odd to speak of one party as facilitating the conduct of the other. A buyer does not just make a sale easier; he makes the sale possible. No buyer, no sale; the buyer’s part is already implied by the term “sale,” and the word “facilitate” adds nothing. We would not say that the borrower facilitates the bank loan.
The Government, however, replies that using the instrument of communication under § 843(b) is different from borrowing the money or merely handing over the sale price for cocaine. Drugs can be sold without anyone’s mailing a letter or using a cell phone. Because cell phones, say, really do make it easier for dealers to break the law, Congress probably meant to ratchet up the culpability of the buyer who calls ahead. But we think that argument comes up short against several more reasons that count against the Government’s position.
The common usage that limits “facilitate” to the efforts of someone other than a primary or necessary actor in the commission of a substantive crime has its parallel in the decided cases. The traditional law is that where a statute treats one side of a bilateral transaction more leniently, adding to the penalty of the party on that side for facilitating the action by the other would upend the calibration of punishment set by the legislature, a line of reasoning exemplified in the courts’ consistent refusal to treat noncriminal liquor purchases as falling under the prohibition against aiding or abetting the illegal sale of alcohol. See Lott v. United States, 205 F. 28, 29-31 (CA9 1913) (collecting cases). And this Court followed the same course in rejecting the broadest possible reading of a similar provision in Gebardi v. United States, 287 U. S. 112 (1932). The question there was whether a woman who voluntarily crossed a state line with a man to engage in “illicit sexual relations” could be tagged with “aid[ing] or assist[ing] in ... transporting, in interstate or foreign commerce . .. any woman or girl for the purpose of prostitution or of debauchery, or for any other immoral purpose” in violation of the Mann Act, ch. 395, 36 Stat. 825. Gebardi, 287 U. S., at 116-118 (internal quotation marks omitted). Since the statutory penalties were “clearly directed against the acts of the transporter as distinguished from the consent of the subject of the transportation,” we refused to “infer that the mere acquiescence of the woman transported was intended to be condemned by the general language punishing those who aid and assist the transporter, any more than it has been inferred that the purchaser of liquor was to be regarded as an abettor of the illegal sale.” Id., at 119 (footnote omitted).
These cases do not strictly control the outcome of this one, but we think they have a bearing here, in two ways. As we have said many times, we presume legislatures act with case law in mind, e. g., Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 362, 380-381, and n. 12 (2000), and we presume here that when Congress enacted § 843(b), it was familiar with the traditional judicial limitation on applying terms like “aid,” “abet,” and “assist.” We thus think it likely that Congress had comparable scope in mind when it used the term “facilitate,” a word with equivalent meaning, compare Black’s Law Dictionary 76 (8th ed. 2004) (defining “aid and abet” as to “facilitate the commission of a crime”) with id., at 627 (defining “facilitation” as “[t]he act or an instance of aiding or helping; . .. the act of making it easier for another person to commit a crime”).
And applying the presumption is supported significantly by the fact that here, as in the earlier cases, any broader reading of “facilitate” would for practical purposes skew the congressional calibration of respective buyer-seller penalties. When the statute was enacted, the use of land lines in drug transactions was common, and in these days when everyone over the age of three seems to carry a cell phone, the Government’s interpretation would skew the calibration of penalties very substantially. The respect owed to that penalty calibration cannot be minimized. Prior to 1970, Congress punished the receipt, concealment, purchase, or sale of any narcotic drug as a felony, see 21 U. S. C. § 174 (1964 ed.) (repealed), and on top of that added a minimum of two years, and up to five, for using a communication facility in committing, causing, or facilitating, any drug “offense,” 18 U. S. C. § 1403 (1964 ed.). In 1970, however, the CSA, 84 Stat. 1242, 21 U. S. C. § 801 et seq., downgraded simple possession of a controlled substance to a misdemeanor, 21 U. S. C. § 844(a) (2006 ed.), and simultaneously limited the communications provision to prohibiting only the facilitation of a drug “felony,” § 843(b). This history drives home what is already clear in the current statutory text: Congress meant to treat purchasing drugs for personal use more leniently than the felony of distributing drugs, and to narrow the scope of the communications provision to cover only those who facilitate a drug felony. Yet, under the Government’s reading of § 843(b), in a substantial number of cases Congress would for all practical purposes simultaneously have graded back up to felony status with the left hand the same offense it had dropped to a misdemeanor with the right. As the Government sees it, Abuelhawa’s use of a phone in making two small drug purchases would subject him, in fact, to six felony counts and a potential sentence of 24 years in prison, even though buying the same drugs minus the phone would have supported only two misdemeanor counts and 2 years of prison. Given the CSA’s distinction between simple possession and distribution, and the background history of these offenses, it is impossible to believe that Congress intended “facilitating” to cause that 12-fold quantum leap in punishment for simple drug possessors.
The Government suggests that this background usage and the 1970 choice to reduce culpability for possession is beside the point because Congress sometimes incorporates aggravating factors into the Criminal Code, and the phone use here is just one of them; the Government mentions possession by a prior drug offender, a felony punishable by up to two years’ imprisonment. And, for perspective, the Government points to unauthorized possession of flunitrazepam, a drug used to incapacitate rape victims, which is punishable by imprisonment up to three years. Brief for United States 20. It would not be strange, the Government says, for Congress to “decid[e] to treat the use of a communication facility in a drug transaction as a significant act warranting additional punishment” because “[tjoday’s communication facilities . . . make illicit drug transactions easier and more efficient . . . [and] greatly reduce the risk that the participants will be detected while negotiating a transaction.” Id., at 23-24.
We are skeptical. There is no question that Congress intended § 843(b) to impede illicit drug transactions by penalizing the use of communication devices in coordinating illegal drug operations, and no doubt that its purpose will be served regardless of the outcome in this case. But it does not follow that Congress also meant a first-time buyer’s phone calls to get two small quantities of drugs for personal use to expose him to punishment 12 times more severe than a purchase by a recidivist offender and 8 times more severe than the unauthorized possession of a drug used by rapists. To the contrary, Congress used no language spelling out a purpose so improbable, but legislated against a background usage of terms such as “aid,” “abet,” and “assist” that points in the opposite direction and accords with the CSA’s choice to classify small purchases as misdemeanors. The Government’s position is just too unlikely.
Ill
The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
In full, § 843(b) provides:
“It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to use any communication facility in committing or in causing or facilitating the commission of any act or acts constituting a felony under any provision of this subchapter or subchapter II of this chapter. Each separate use of a communication facility shall be a separate offense under this subsection. For purposes of this subsection, the term ‘communication facility’ means any and all public and private instrumentalities used or useful in the transmission of writing, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds of all kinds and includes mail, telephone, wire, radio, and all other means of communication.”
Section 843(d) provides, subject to exceptions not at issue here, that “any person who violates this section shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not more than 4 years, a fine ..., or both.”
Compare, e. g., United States v. Binkley, 903 F. 2d 1130, 1135-1136 (CA7 1990) (buyer’s use of phone in purchasing drugs facilitates seller’s drug distribution), with United States v. Baggett, 890 F. 2d 1095, 1097-1098 (CA10 1989) (buyer’s use of phone in purchasing drugs does not facilitate seller’s drug distribution); United States v. Martin, 599 F. 2d 880, 888-889 (CA9 1979) (same), overruled on other grounds, United States v. De Bright, 730 F 2d 1255 (CA9 1984).
The Government’s suggestion that a result like this is not anomalous because a prosecutor could exercise his discretion to seek a lower sentence, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 41, simply begs the question. Of course, Congress legislates against a background assumption of prosecutorial discretion, but this tells us nothing about the boundaries of punishment within which Congress intended the discretion to be exercised; prosecutorial discretion is not a reason for courts to give improbable breadth to criminal statutes. And it ill behooves the Government to invoke discretionary power in this case, with the prosecutor seeking a sentencing potential of 24 years when the primary offense is the purchase of two grams of cocaine. For that matter, see id., at 41-43 (concession by Government that current Department of Justice guidelines require individual prosecutors who bring charges to charge the maximum crime supported by the facts in a case).
The Government does nothing for its own cause by noting that 21 U. S. C. §856 makes it a felony to facilitate “the simple possession of drugs by others by making available for use... a place for the purpose of unlawfully using a controlled substance” even though the crime facilitated may be a mere misdemeanor. Brief for United States 21 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). This shows that Congress knew how to be clear in punishing the facilitation of a misdemeanor as a felony, and it only highlights Congress’s decision to limit § 843(b) to the facilitation of a “felony.”
The Government asks us to affirm the Fourth Circuit on an alternative ground: that Abuelhawa used a communication facility “in causing” Said’s drug felony rather than “in ... facilitating” the felony. But the Government’s argument on this point takes the same form as its argument about the term “facilitate,” and the reasons that lead us to reject the one argument apply just as well to the other.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | A | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Blackmun
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented by this case is whether respondent’s suit against the United States is time barred. In 1954, the Government sold respondent’s interests in three Indian allotments to the United States Forest Service for inclusion in the Chippewa National Forest in Minnesota. Respondent claims that the sale was void. We hold that respondent’s suit is an action “to adjudicate a disputed title to real property in which the United States claims an interest,” within the meaning of the Quiet Title Act of 1972, 28 U. S. C. §2409a(a), and therefore is barred by that Act’s 12-year period of limitations. See 28 U. S. C. §2409a(f).
I
In 1905, pursuant to the General Allotment Act of 1887, 24 Stat. 388, as amended, 25 U. S. C. §331 et seq. (1982 ed. and Supp. II), and the Nelson Act of 1889, 25 Stat. 642, three Chippewa Indian ancestors of respondent Florence Blacketter Mottaz each received an 80-acre allotment on the Leech Lake Reservation in Cass County, Minn. Title to each of these allotments was held in trust by the United States. Respondent eventually inherited a one-fifth interest in one of the allotments and a one-thirtieth interest in each of the other two.
In the early 1950’s, some holders of fractional interests in Leech Lake allotments petitioned the Department of the Interior to permit them to sell their lands. On April 30, 1953, the Department’s Office of Indian Affairs sent respondent two forms, captioned “Consent to Sale of Inherited Lands.” App. 42, 43. Accompanying the forms was a letter which read in part:
“As stated before, some of the owners have requested the sale of this land. Both land and timber, if any, have been appraised; and as soon as we get the consent to sell, an effort will be made to obtain a buyer by advertising for sale bids. This land will not be sold unless the high bid is equal to, or more than, the appraised value. If no reply is received from you within ten (10) days, it will be assumed that you have no objection to the sale.” Id., at 15.
The consent forms indicated that one of the allotments was appraised at $420.50 and the other at $605.75. Respondent neither replied to the letter nor returned the consent forms. In 1954, despite the lack of express consent from every person who held an interest in any of the three allotments, the Government sold them to the United States Forest Service.
Respondent visited the regional office of the Bureau of Indian Affairs in May 1967 and expressed an interest in selling her inherited Indian lands. Later that month, the realty officer sent her a letter informing her of her allotment interests. The letter did not mention the Leech Lake allotments. Id., at 17. Respondent in 1981 again requested a list of her interests. In its reply, the Bureau set forth the allotments currently held in trust for her and, in addition, noted that she once had held interests in the Leech Lake allotments which had been sold by the Secretary as part of the so-called “Secretarial Transfer” program. Id., at 44-45.
II
In 1981, respondent filed suit against the United States in the Federal District Court for the District of Minnesota. She claimed jurisdiction under 25 U. S. C. § 345, 28 U. S. C. §§1331, 1346, 1353, and 2415, and the Fifth Amendment. App. 7. She alleged that the sales of her three Leech Lake allotments “made without [her] consent or permission... were, therefore, illegal sales and transfers and are void.” Id., at 8. In addition, respondent raised four other claims regarding the sale: that the United States had breached its fiduciary duty in selling lands held in trust for her without first obtaining her consent; that the United States had acted negligently in selling her lands; that she had been deprived of property without due process; and that her property had been taken for public use without just compensation. Id., at 10. Respondent also sought to represent both a nationwide and a Minnesota-based class of similarly situated Indian claimants. Id., at 8-9.
Respondent originally sought either “[d]amages in a monetary sum equal to the current fair market value of each parcel illegally transferred” or “rescission of the illegal sale or transfer and the vesting of title of each individual parcel in the names of the appropriate descendants, heirs and assigns.” Id., at 10. After a preliminary hearing, she voluntarily dismissed, without prejudice, her claim requesting rescission. Id., at 12.
The District Court ruled that respondent’s claims were barred by 28 U. S. C. § 2401(a), the general statute of limitations governing actions against the United States. That section provides, in pertinent part, that “every civil action commenced against the United States shall be barred unless the complaint is filed within six years after the right of action first accrues.” The court held that respondent’s cause of action first accrued when she learned of the sale of the lands. Since respondent’s deposition “clearly reveal[ed] that she had knowledge of the sale in 1954,” App. to Pet. for Cert. 10a, her suit, filed 27 years after the sale, was barred.
The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded. 753 F. 2d 71 (CA8 1985). While it recognized that respondent’s complaint was somewhat opaque, it rejected the Government’s claim that respondent was seeking, not simply to establish title to the allotments, but also to obtain damages for alleged negligence and breach of fiduciary duty: the complaint “must be read as raising the one essential claim that her land was sold without her consent, that she did not receive payment for her land, and that accordingly the sale was void and she retains title to the land.” Id., at 75. The claim for damages equal to the current fair market value of the land “must be construed as equivalent to a claim for return of the land itself.” Ibid.
The Court of Appeals ruled that such a claim could not be time barred. This Court in Ewert v. Bluejacket, 259 U. S. 129 (1922), had held that the sale of an allotment to a Government agent in violation of federal law is “ ‘void and confers no right upon the wrongdoer,’” id., at 138, quoting Waskey v. Hammer, 223 U. S. 85, 94 (1912), and had refused to apply principles of laches to bar the Indians’ claim against Ewert. Although Ewert v. Bluejacket did not consider whether federal statutes of limitations apply to land claims brought by Indian allottees, the Court of Appeals found that § 2401(a) “does not bar claims of title to allotments because Ewert is based on the principle that, if the underlying sale of land is void, the concept that a cause of action ‘accrues’ at some point is inapplicable because the allottee simply retains title all along.” 753 F. 2d, at 74.
Thus, the Court of Appeals concluded that the statute of limitations question depended on the resolution of several preliminary issues. It therefore remanded the case to the District Court to determine whether the Secretary lacked the authority in 1954 to sell respondent’s lands without her consent, and, if such a sale would have been unauthorized, whether respondent either had consented or had actually received payment following the sale, in which case her consent could be inferred. If respondent proved on remand that the sale was illegal, then, “[i]n light of the land’s inclusion within the Chippewa National Forest and the thirty years which have passed since the sale,... she may force the government to pay her the fair market value of the land rather than to simply return the land itself.” Id., at 75.
The Government petitioned for rehearing and rehearing en banc. In its petition, the Government claimed, apparently for the first time, that respondent’s suit to recover land currently held by the United States was barred, not by the general 6-year statute of limitations in § 2401(a), but rather by the 12-year limitations period established by the Quiet Title Act. 2 Record 16. In addition, the Government argued that the Court of Appeals’ holding that respondent could compel the United States to pay her the fair market value of her property involved relief “of the type typically provided by the Tucker Act,” ibid., but a Tucker Act claim would clearly be barred by the 6-year statute of limitations. The Court of Appeals denied the Government’s petition. App. to Pet. for Cert. 13a. Because of the importance of the issue, we granted certiorari to consider whether respondent’s claim was barred under either § 2401(a) or §2409a(f), the limitations provision governing Quiet Title Act claims. 474 U. S. 994 (1985).
Ill
When the United States consents to be sued, the terms of its waiver of sovereign immunity define the extent of the court’s jurisdiction. United States v. Sherwood, 312 U. S. 584, 586 (1941). In particular, “[w]hen waiver legislation contains a statute of limitations, the limitations provision constitutes a condition on the waiver of sovereign immunity.” Block v. North Dakota, 461 U. S. 273, 287 (1983). Neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals discussed the precise source of its jurisdiction, and the parties at various times before this Court have identified the jurisdictional basis of respondent’s suit as the Quiet Title Act, 28 U. S. C. §§ 1346(f) and 2409a; the Allotment Acts, 25 U. S. C. §345 and 28 U. S. C. § 1353; and the Tucker Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1346(a)(2). Thus, we must decide which, if any, of these statutes conferred jurisdiction on the District Court and the Court of Appeals, and then determine whether respondent’s suit was brought within the relevant limitations period.
A
In Block v. North Dakota, 461 U. S., at 286, this Court held that “Congress intended the QTA to provide the exclusive means by which adverse claimants could challenge the United States’ title to real property.” Here, respondent contests the United States’ claim that it acquired title to the allotments in 1954. We think that respondent’s suit falls within the scope of the Quiet Title Act, 28 U. S. C. § 2409a(a), which governs “civil action[s]... to adjudicate a disputed title to real property in which the United States claims an interest.” Respondent’s description of her claim clearly brings it within the Act’s scope:
“At no time in this proceeding did respondent drop her claim for title. To the contrary, the claim for title is the essence and bottom line of respondent’s case. Her position is simply that the land remains in the name of Mottaz and the other heirs of the property despite what some pieces of paper executed by petitioner without her consent and without a court hearing purport to do.” Brief for Respondent 3.
See also 753 F. 2d, at 74, 75. The relief respondent seeks confirms this characterization of her suit. Respondent does not seek recovery of her share of the proceeds realized by the United States from the 1954 sale but allegedly never distributed. A claim for monetary damages in that amount would involve a concession that title had passed to the United States Forest Service in 1954 and that the sole issue was whether respondent was fairly compensated for the taking of her interests in the allotments. Rather, respondent demands damages in the amount of the current fair market value of her interests. What respondent seeks is a declaration that she alone possesses valid title to her interests in the allotments and that the title asserted by the United States is defective, and an order requiring the United States to pay her the value of her interest today in order properly to transfer title.
Nonetheless, respondent claims that her suit is not governed by the Quiet Title Act because, by its own terms, that Act “does not apply to trust or restricted Indian lands,” § 2409a(a), such as the lands in which she asserts an interest. Respondent misconstrues this exclusion, which operates solely to retain the United States’ immunity from suit by third parties challenging the United States’ title to land held in trust for Indians. See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 92-575, p. 6 (1971); H. R. Rep. No. 92-1559, p. 13 (1972); Dispute of Titles on Public Lands, Hearing on S. 216, S. 579, and S. 721 before the Subcommittee on Public Lands of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 19 (1971). Thus, when the United States claims an interest in real property based on that property’s status as trust or restricted Indian lands, the Quiet Title Act does not waive the Government’s immunity. Here, however, the United States claims an interest in the Leech Lake lands, not on behalf of Indian beneficiaries of a trust, but rather on behalf of the United States Forest Service and the Chippewa National Forest. Thus, the Act provides the United States’ consent to suit concerning its claim to these lands, provided, of course, that the plaintiff challenging the Government’s title meets the conditions attached to the United States’ waiver of immunity.
The limitations period is a central condition of the consent given by the Act. See, e. g., Block, 461 U. S., at 283-285; H. R. Rep. No. 92-1559, supra, at 5, 7-8. The Act provides:
“Any civil action under this section shall be barred unless it is commenced within twelve years of the date upon which it is accrued. Such action shall be deemed to have accrued on the date the plaintiff or his predecessor in interest knew or should have known of the claim of the United States.” 28 U. S. C. §2409a(f).
The District Court expressly found that respondent knew of the sale in 1954. Moreover, the list of interests provided to respondent by the Bureau of Indian Affairs in 1967 did not include any of the three Leech Lake allotments. Thus, by 1967, at the very latest, respondent was on notice that the Government did not recognize her title to the allotments. Whether respondent actually knew that the allotments had been included within the Chippewa National Forest and thus were claimed by the United States, her undisputed knowledge that the Government no longer recognized her as having a valid claim to the allotments satisfies the “should have known” prong of § 2409a(f)’s accrual test. Her claim is therefore barred.
B
Respondent, however, seeks to avoid the carefully crafted limitations of the Quiet Title Act by characterizing her suit as a claim for an allotment under the General Allotment Act of 1887, 24 Stat. 388, as amended, 25 U. S. C. § 331 et seq. (1982 ed. and Supp. II). That Act grants jurisdiction to the district courts over suits “involving the right... to any allotment.” 25 U. S. C. §345. Respondent claims that the general 6-year statute of limitations governing all civil actions against the Government, 28 U. S. C. § 2401(a), does not apply to cases brought under the General Allotment Act, and that her claim therefore cannot be time barred. We need not reach the question whether § 2401(a) applies to claims brought under § 345 of the General Allotment Act, and, if it does, when a cause of action begins to run, since we conclude that respondent cannot use §345 for a quiet title action against the Government.
Section 345 grants federal district courts jurisdiction over two types of cases: (i) proceedings “involving the right of any person, in whole or in part of Indian blood or descent, to any allotment of land under any law or treaty,” and (ii) proceedings “in relation to” the claimed right of a person of Indian descent to land that was once allotted. Section 345 thus contemplates two types of suits involving allotments: suits seeking the issuance of an allotment, see, e. g., Arenas v. United States, 322 U. S. 419 (1944), and suits involving “‘the interests and rights of the Indian in his allotment or patent after he has acquired it,’” Scholder v. United States, 428 F. 2d 1123, 1129 (CA9), cert. denied, 400 U. S. 942 (1970), quoting United States v. Pierce, 235 F. 2d 885, 889 (CA9 1956).
The structure of §345 strongly suggests, however, that § 345 itself waives the Government’s immunity only with respect to the former class of cases: those seeking an original allotment. In those suits, §345 provides that “the parties thereto shall be the claimant as plaintiff and the United States as party defendant” (emphasis added), while, as to the latter class of cases, no mention of the United States’ participation is made. Accordingly, in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U. S. 128 (1972), this Court held that, to the extent that § 345 involves a waiver of federal immunity, as opposed to a grant of subject-matter jurisdiction to the district courts, that section “authorizes, and provides governmental consent for, only actions for allotments.” 406 U. S., at 142 (emphasis added). See also Naganab v. Hitchcock, 202 U. S. 473 (1906) (sovereign immunity precludes suit against United States regarding disposition of Indian lands).
That federal courts may have general subject-matter jurisdiction over claims to quiet title to allotments brought by Indians, see n. 9, supra, does not therefore mean that the United States has waived its immunity in cases where an Indian challenges the United States’ claim of title in its own right. As the Court already has noted, Congress intended the Quiet Title Act “to provide the exclusive means by which adverse claimants [can] challenge the United States’ title to real property.” Block, 461 U. S., at 286. In Block, the State of North Dakota sued the federal officers responsible for supervising a riverbed within the State which both the State and the Federal Government claimed to own and sought an injunction barring them from exercising privileges of ownership over the bed. The Court held that such an “officer’s suit” was precluded since it would circumvent the “carefully crafted provisions of the QTA deemed necessary for the protection of the national public interest.” Id., at 284-285. To permit challenges to the Government’s claim of title to be brought under other jurisdictional provisions might mean that “the QTA’s 12-year statute of limitations, the one point on which the Executive Branch was most insistent, could be avoided, and, contrary to the wish of Congress, an unlimited number of suits involving stale claims might be instituted.” Id., at 285. Moreover, to permit officer’s suits might thwart Congress’ determination that the Government be given the option of paying just compensation and thereby keeping land even after an adverse judgment, see § 2409a(b), in order to avoid disruption of ongoing federal activities involving the disputed property. 461 U. S., at 285.
To permit suits against the United States under the General Allotment Act poses similar dangers. Not only could it permit plaintiffs to avoid the Quiet Title Act’s 12-year statute of limitations, but it could also seriously disrupt ongoing federal programs. The remedial clause of the General Allotment Act provides that a judgment in favor of an Indian claimant “shall have the same effect... as if such allotment had been allowed and approved by [the Secretary of the Interior].” 25 U. S. C. § 345. Thus, if plaintiffs were permitted to sue under the General Allotment Act, they would be entitled to actual possession of the challenged property. This would pose precisely the threat to ongoing federal activities on the property that the Quiet Title Act was intended to avoid. That the plaintiff in this case claims the right to elect a remedy that would not require the Government to relinquish its possession of the disputed lands is irrelevant: the Quiet Title Act expressly gives that choice to the Government, not the claimant. 28 U. S. C. §2409a(b). In light of Congress’ purposes in enacting the Quiet Title Act, we cannot conclude that Congress intended to permit persons in respondent’s position to avoid that Act’s strictures.
C
At oral argument, respondent claimed that her case is based solely on the General Allotment Act. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 23, 26. Nevertheless, at various times during this litigation, both parties have identified the Tucker Act as providing a source of federal jurisdiction over respondent’s claims. Although respondent and the Government apparently agree that a suit based on the Tucker Act would be barred by the general 6-year statute of limitations, 28 U. S. C. § 2401(a), we must address the possibility that the District Court’s jurisdiction rested on the Tucker Act because, if it did, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit may have lacked jurisdiction over respondent’s appeal.
Prior to the passage of the Quiet Title Act, adverse claimants had resorted to the Tucker Act to circumvent the Government’s immunity from quiet title suits. Rather than seeking a declaration that they owned the property at issue, such claimants would concede that the Government possessed title and then would seek compensation for the Government’s having taken the property from them. See Block, 461 U. S., at 280-281; H. R. Rep. No. 92-1559, at 9, 12. In light of the Quiet Title Act’s explicit statement that § 2409a(a) does not “apply to or affect actions which may be or could have been brought under sections 1346... [or] 1491... of this title,” we cannot conclude that Tucker Act-based suits, like the officer’s suit at issue in Block, are clearly precluded by the passage of the Quiet Title Act.
But regardless of whether other claimants may invoke the district courts’ Tucker Act jurisdiction to hear their claims, it is clear that respondent has not brought a case falling within the scope of the Tucker Act. In Healy v. Sea Gull Specialty Co., 237 U. S. 479, 480 (1915), Justice Holmes, writing for a unanimous Court, stated that “the plaintiff is absolute master of what jurisdiction he will appeal to,” and noted that “[jjurisdiction generally depends upon the case made and relief demanded by the plaintiff.” Thus, since the “essential features,” id., at 481, of Healy’s case involved allegations of patent infringement and a request for the relief characteristically provided by patent law, Healy could invoke federal patent law jurisdiction despite the fact that the measure of damages was fixed by contract.
Respondent now invokes federal jurisdiction only under the General Allocation Act and its jurisdictional counterpart. Moreover, the case she has made, and the relief she seeks, do not fit within the scope of the Tucker Act. A Tucker Act-based lands suit would seek damages equal to just compensation for an already completed taking of the claimant’s land. See, e. g., Block, 461 U. S., at 280-281; H. R. Rep. No. 92-1559, at 7, 9, 12-13. As we have noted, however, respondent is not seeking whatever compensation she allegedly was denied in 1954. Rather, she claims she still owns her interests in the allotments, and she seeks to force the Government to buy those interests. She claims, in essence, that no legally cognizable taking has yet occurred. See Brief for Respondent 3-4. Respondent and the Court of Appeals view payment rather than return of the land as an appropriate remedy because respondent’s allotments now lie within the Chippewa National Forest. But neither views this payment as representing damages for the Government’s past acts, the essence of a Tucker Act claim for monetary relief. See, e. g., United States v. Mitchell, 463 U. S. 206 (1983). Since this Indian respondent’s claim was not based on the Tucker Act, her appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit was proper.
IV
Federal law rightly provides Indians with a range of special protections. But even for Indian plaintiffs, “[a] waiver of sovereign immunity ‘cannot be lightly implied but must be unequivocally expressed.’” United States v. Mitchell, 445 U. S. 535, 538 (1980), quoting United States v. King, 395 U. S. 1, 4 (1969). Congress has consented to a suit challenging the Federal Government’s title to real property only if the action is brought within the 12-year period set by the Quiet Title Act. The limitations provision of the Quiet Title Act reflects a clear congressional judgment that the national public interest requires barring stale challenges to the United States’ claim to real property, whatever the merits of those challenges. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
It is so ordered.
For a general discussion of the allotment program, see F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 612-632 (1982).
By the Act of May 14, 1948, ch. 293, 62 Stat. 236, 25 U. S. C. §483, the Secretary of the Interior “is authorized in his discretion, and upon application of the Indians owners... to remove restrictions against alienation, and to approve conveyances, with respect to lands or interests in lands held by individual Indians.”
No contemporaneous document concerning the third allotment appears in the record.
In the late 1970’s, the Bureau sought to identify potential land claims that might be affected by the statute of limitations set forth in 28 U. S. C. § 2415 (1982 ed. and Supp. II), which pertains, among other things, to certain contract and tort actions brought by the United States on behalf of Indians. (In 1982, § 2415 was amended to apply, as well, to contract and tort claims brought by individual Indians and tribes.) The Bureau identified as “Secretarial transfers” those sales made without the consent of all the heirs. See H. R. Rep. No. 97-954, p. 7 (1982); see generally County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U. S. 226, 242-243 (1985) (discussing § 2415 claims).
The District Court also rejected respondent’s arguments that § 2401(a) does not apply to suits by Indians for breach of fiduciary duties, and that § 2415’s special provisions dealing with Indian land claims override the general statute of limitations established by § 2401(a). With respect to the former claim, the court stated: “By its very terms 28 U. S. C. § 2401(a) applies to ‘every civil action commenced against the United States.... ’” App. to Pet. for Cert. 10a (emphasis in District Court opinion). With respect to the latter claim, the court held that §2415 “applies to actions brought on behalf of a recognized tribe or individual Indian” by the United States (emphasis in original). App. to Pet. for Cert. 10a. It does not, however, “permit claims against the United States.” Id., at 10a-lla (emphasis in original).
In urging that such an exemption be included in the Quiet Title Act, the Solicitor for the Department of the Interior noted that excluding suits against the United States seeking title to lands held by the United States in trust for Indians was necessary to prevent abridgment of “solemn obligations” and “specific commitments” that the Federal Government had made to the Indians regarding Indian lands. A unilateral waiver of the Federal Government’s immunity would subject those lands to suit without the Indians’ consent. See H. R. Rep. No. 92-1559, p. 13 (1972).
Our finding that respondent's cause of action accrued more than 12 years prior to her filing suit does not rest on the fact that the letter sent by the Government in 1953 informed respondent that the failure to reply within 10 days would be deemed a consent to the sale. That letter expressly noted that the land would be sold only if a bid of at least its appraised value were received. App. 15. It therefore was entirely possible that no sale would occur even if respondent expressly had consented to the sale. Respondent’s cause of action accrued only because she in fact knew that a sale had been completed and knew, or should have known, that the Government was the purchaser.
Title 25 U. S. C. § 345 reads in full:
“All persons who are in whole or in part of Indian blood or descent who are entitled to an allotment of land under any law of Congress, or who claim to be so entitled to land under any allotment Act or under any grant made by Congress, or who claim to have been unlawfully denied or excluded from any allotment or parcel of land to which they claim to be lawfully entitled by virtue of any Act of Congress, may commence and prosecute or defend any action, suit, or proceeding in relation to their right thereto in the proper district court of the United States; and said district courts are given jurisdiction to try and determine any action, suit, or proceeding arising within their respective jurisdictions involving the right of any person, in whole or in part of Indian blood or descent, to any allotment of land under any law or treaty (and in said suit the parties thereto shall be the claimant as plaintiff and the United States as party defendant); and the judgment or decree of any such court in favor of any claimant to an allotment of land shall have the same effect, when properly certified to the Secretary of the Interior, as if such allotment had been allowed and approved by him, but this provision shall not apply to any lands now held by either of the Five Civilized Tribes, nor to any of the lands within the Quapaw Indian Agency: Provided, That the right of appeal shall be allowed to either party as in other cases.”
A corresponding provision governing district court jurisdiction appears in 28 U. S. C. § 1353. Respondent invoked jurisdiction under both § 345 and § 1353 in her complaint. App. 7.
In fact, § 345 has been used by Indians to sue parties other than the United States to quiet title to land originally given under various allotment schemes. See, e. g., Begay v. Albers, 721 F. 2d 1274 (CA10 1983); Vicenti v. United States, 470 F. 2d 845 (CA10 1972), cert. dism’d, 414 U. S. 1057 (1973) (plaintiffs sought recovery of title from private parties; suit against the United States for damages held barred by sovereign immunity). To hold that in all cases brought under § 345 the United States must be named as a party defendant would restrict the access to federal courts afforded Indians raising claims or defenses involving their land entitlements because the United States would obviously not be a proper party in many private disputes that relate to land claims originally granted by various Allotment Acts.
The Indian Claims Limitation Act of 1982, 96 Stat. 1976, which amended 28 U. S. C. § 2415(a), essentially tolls— for a time — the general 6-year statute of limitations for many damages actions that may be brought by the Federal Government on behalf of Indians. Respondent claims that § 2415 also shows that Congress did not intend the general 6-year statute of limitations for damages actions brought against the Federal Government, 28 U. S. C. § 2401, to apply to her claim. But § 2415 is expressly inapplicable to actions “to establish the title to, or right of possession of, real or personal property.” 28 U. S. C. § 2415(c). In County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U. S., at 240-241, the Court concluded that Indian land claims not subject to any federal limitations period were presumptively exempt from state statutes of limitations as well. Respondent’s claim, however, is based on a particular federal statute — the Quiet Title Act — that contains its own limitations period.
Under 28 U. S. C. § 1295(a)(2), the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit possesses exclusive jurisdiction over an appeal from a district court’s decision
“if the jurisdiction of that court was based, in whole or in part, on section 1346 of this title, except that jurisdiction of an appeal in a case brought in a district court under section 1346(a)(1), 1346(b), 1346(e), or 1346(f) of this title or under section 1346(a)(2) when the claim is founded upon an Act of Congress or a regulation of an executive department providing for internal revenue shall be governed by sections 1291,1292, and 1294 of this title [the provisions granting jurisdiction to the regional courts of appeals].”
Thus, if the District Court’s jurisdiction here depended on the Tucker Act, § 1346(a)(2), then the Eighth Circuit lacked jurisdiction over respondent’s appeal, and we would have to vacate its’judgment and remand the case with directions to transfer the appeal pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1631 to the Federal Circuit. See, e. g., Ballam v. United States, 474 U. S. 898 (1986); Pacyna v. Marsh, 474 U. S. 1078 (1986).
In light of our conclusion that the District Court’s jurisdiction was not based on the Tucker Act, but instead rested on § 1346(f) (Quiet Title Act claims), we need not reach the difficult and unsettled question of how an appeal raising both issues committed to the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction and issues outside its jurisdiction is to be treated. See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 97-275, pp. 19-20 (1981); H. R. Rep. No. 97-312, p. 41 (1981); Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit — 1981, Hearings on H. R. 2405 before the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 90 (1981) (testimony of James W. Geriak); Cihlar & Goldstein, A Dialogue About the Potential Issues in the Patent Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 10 APLA Q. J. 284 (1982); Drabiak, Jurisdiction of the New Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 73 Ill. B. J. 218 (1984); Newman, Tails and Dogs: Patent and Antitrust Appeals in the Court
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | B | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Kennedy
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Arizona provides tax credits for contributions to school tuition organizations, or STOs. STOs use these contributions to provide scholarships to students attending private schools, many of which are religious. Respondents are a group of Arizona taxpayers who challenge the STO tax credit as a violation of Establishment Clause principles under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. After the Arizona Supreme Court rejected a similar Establishment Clause claim on the merits, respondents sought intervention from the Federal Judiciary.
To obtain a determination on the merits in federal court, parties seeking relief must show that they have standing under Article III of the Constitution. Standing in Establishment Clause cases may be shown in various ways. Some plaintiffs may demonstrate standing based on the direct harm of what is claimed to be an establishment of religion, such as a mandatory prayer in a public school classroom. See School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203, 224, n. 9 (1963). Other plaintiffs may demonstrate standing on the ground that they have incurred a cost or been denied a benefit on account of their religion. Those costs and benefits can result from alleged discrimination in the tax code, such as when the availability of a tax exemption is conditioned on religious affiliation. See Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U. S. 1, 8 (1989) (plurality opinion).
For their part, respondents contend that they have standing to challenge Arizona’s STO tax credit for one and only one reason: because they are Arizona taxpayers. But the mere fact that a plaintiff is a taxpayer is not generally deemed sufficient to establish standing in federal court. To overcome that rule, respondents must rely on an exception created in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83 (1968). For the reasons discussed below, respondents cannot take advantage of Flast’s narrow exception to the general rule against taxpayer standing. As a consequence, respondents lacked standing to commence this action, and their suit must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
r-H
Respondents challenged § 43-1089, a provision of the Arizona Tax Code. See 1997 Ariz. Sess. Laws § 43-1087, codified, as amended, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 43-1089 (West Supp. 2010). Section 43-1089 allows Arizona taxpayers to obtain dollar-for-dollar tax credits of up to $500 per person and $1,000 per married couple for contributions to STOs. § 43-1089(A). If the credit exceeds an individual’s tax liability, the credit’s unused portion can be carried forward up to five years. § 43-1089(D). Under a version of § 43-1089 in effect during the pendency of this lawsuit, a charitable organization could be deemed an STO only upon certain conditions. See § 43-1089 (West 2006). The organization was required to be exempt from federal taxation under § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986. § 43-1089(G)(3) (West Supp. 2005). It could not limit its scholarships to students attending only one school. Ibid. And it had to allocate “at least ninety per cent of its annual revenue for educational scholarships or tuition grants” to children attending qualified schools. Ibid. A “qualified school,” in turn, was defined in part as a private school in Arizona that did not discriminate on the basis of race, color, handicap, familial status, or national origin. § 43-1089(G)(2).
In an earlier lawsuit filed in state court, Arizona taxpayers challenged § 43-1089, invoking both the United States Constitution and the Arizona Constitution. The Arizona Supreme Court rejected the taxpayers’ claims on the merits. Kotterman v. Killian, 193 Ariz. 273, 972 P. 2d 606 (1999). This Court denied certiorari. Rhodes v. Killian, 528 U. S. 810 (1999); Kotterman v. Killian, 528 U. S. 921 (1999).
The present action was filed in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona. It named the director of the Arizona Department of Revenue as defendant. The Arizona taxpayers who brought the suit claimed that §43-1089 violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, as incorporated against the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. Respondents alleged that §43-1089 allows STOs “to use State income-tax revenues to pay tuition for students at religious schools,” some of which “discriminate on the basis of religion in selecting students.” Complaint in No. 00-0287 (D Ariz.), ¶¶ 29-31, App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 09-987, pp. 125a-126a. Respondents requested, among other forms of relief, an injunction against the issuance of §43-1089 tax credits for contributions to religious STOs. The District Court dismissed respondents’ suit as jurisdictionally barred by the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1341. The Court of Appeals reversed. This Court agreed with the Court of Appeals and affirmed. Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U. S. 88 (2004).
On remand, the Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization and other interested parties intervened. The District Court once more dismissed respondents’ suit, this time for failure to state a claim. Once again, the Court of Appeals reversed. It held that respondents had standing under Flast v. Cohen, supra. 562 F. 3d 1002 (CA9 2009). Reaching the merits, the Court of Appeals ruled that respondents had stated a claim that § 43-1089 violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The full Court of Appeals denied en banc review, with eight judges dissenting. 586 F. 3d 649 (CA9 2009). This Court granted certiorari. 560 U. S. 924 (2010).
II
The concept and operation of the separation of powers in our National Government have their principal foundation in the first three Articles of the Constitution. Under Article III, the Federal Judiciary is vested with the “Power” to resolve not questions and issues but “Cases” or “Controversies.” This language restricts the federal judicial power “to the traditional role of the Anglo-American courts.” Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 555 U. S. 488, 492 (2009). In the English legal tradition, the need to redress an injury resulting from a specific dispute taught the efficacy of judicial resolution and gave, legitimacy to judicial decrees. The importance of resolving specific eases was visible, for example, in the incremental approach of the common law and in equity’s consideration of exceptional circumstances. The Framers paid heed to these lessons. See U. S. Const., Art. Ill, § 2 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity . . . ”). By rules consistent with the longstanding practices of Anglo-American courts a plaintiff who seeks to invoke the federal judicial power must assert more than just the “generalized interest of all citizens in constitutional governance.” Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U. S. 208, 217 (1974).
Continued adherence to the case-or-eontroversy requirement of Article III maintains the public’s confidence in an uneleeted but restrained Federal Judiciary. If the judicial power were “extended to every question under the constitution,” Chief Justice Marshall once explained, federal courts might take possession of “almost every subject proper for legislative discussion and decision.” 4 Papers of John Marshall 95 (C. Cullen ed. 1984) (quoted in DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U. S. 332,341 (2006)). The legislative and executive departments of the Federal Government, no less than the judicial department, have a duty to defend the Constitution. See U. S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 3. That shared obligation is incompatible with the suggestion that federal courts might wield an “unconditioned authority to determine the constitutionality of legislative or executive acts.” Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U. S. 464, 471 (1982). For the federal courts to decide questions of law arising outside of cases and controversies would be inimical to the Constitution’s democratic character. And the resulting conflict between the judicial and the political branches would not, “in the long run, be beneficial to either.” United States v. Richardson, 418 U. S. 166, 188-189 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring). Instructed by Chief Justice Marshall’s admonition, this Court takes care to observe the “role assigned to the judiciary” within the Constitution’s “tripartite allocation of power.” Valley Forge, supra, at 474 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Ill
To state a case or controversy under Article III, a plaintiff must establish standing. Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S. 737, 751 (1984). The minimum constitutional requirements for standing were explained in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555 (1992).
“First, the plaintiff must have suffered an 'injury in fact’ — an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) 'actual or imminent, not “conjectural” or “hypothetical.”’ Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of — the injury has to be 'fairly .. . tracefable] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not . . . th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court.’ Third, it must be 'likely,’ as opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ that the injury will be 'redressed by a favorable decision.’ ” Id., at 560-561 (citations and footnote omitted).
In requiring a particular injury, the Court meant “that the injury must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.” Id., at 560, n. 1. The question now before the Court is whether respondents, the plaintiffs in the trial court, satisfy the requisite elements of standing.
A
Respondents suggest that their status as Arizona taxpayers provides them with standing to challenge the STO tax credit. Absent special circumstances, however, standing cannot be based on a plaintiff’s mere status as a taxpayer. This Court has rejected the general proposition that an individual who has paid taxes has a “continuing, legally cognizable interest in ensuring that those funds are not used by the Government in a way that violates the Constitution.” Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc., 551 U. S. 587, 599 (2007) (plurality opinion). This precept has been referred to as the rule against taxpayer standing.
The doctrinal basis for the rule was discussed in Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447 (1923) (decided with Massachusetts v. Mellon). There, a taxpayer-plaintiff had alleged that certain federal expenditures were in excess of congressional authority under the Constitution. The plaintiff argued that she had standing to raise her claim because she had an interest in the Government Treasury and because the allegedly unconstitutional expenditure of Government funds would affect her personal tax liability. The Court rejected those arguments. The “effect upon future taxation, of any payment out of funds,” was too “remote, fluctuating and uncertain” to give rise to a ease or controversy. Id., at 487. And the taxpayer-plaintiff’s “interest in the moneys of the Treasury,” the Court recognized, was necessarily “shared with millions of others.” Ibid. As a consequence, Frothingham held that the taxpayer-plaintiff had not presented a “judicial controversy” appropriate for resolution in federal court but rather a “matter of public . . . concern” that could be pursued only through the political process. Id., at 487-489.
In a second pertinent case, Doremus v. Board of Ed. of Hawthorne, 342 U. S. 429 (1952), the Court considered Frothingham’s prohibition on taxpayer standing in connection with an alleged Establishment Clause violation. A New Jersey statute had provided that public school teachers would read Bible verses to their students at the start of each schoolday. A plaintiff sought to have the law enjoined, asserting standing based on her status as a taxpayer. Writing for the Court, Justice Jackson reiterated the foundational role that Article III standing plays in our separation of powers.
“‘The party who invokes the power [of the federal courts] must be able to show not only that the statute is invalid but that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally.’ ” Doremus, supra, at 434 (quoting Frotkingham, supra, at 488).
The plaintiff in Doremus lacked any “direct and particular financial interest” in the suit, and, as a result, a decision on the merits would have been merely “advisory.” 342 U. S., at 434-435. It followed that the plaintiff’s allegations did not give rise to a case or controversy subject to judicial resolution under Article III. Ibid. Cf. School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U. S., at 224, n. 9 (finding standing where state laws required Bible readings or prayer in public schools, not because plaintiffs were state taxpayers but because their children were enrolled in public schools and so were “directly affected” by the challenged laws).
In holdings consistent with Frothingham and Doremus, more recent decisions have explained that claims of taxpayer standing rest on unjustifiable economic and political speculation. ' When a government expends resources or declines to impose a tax, its budget does not necessarily suffer. On the contrary, the purpose of many governmental expenditures and tax benefits is “to spur economic activity, which in turn increases government revenues.” Daimler Chrysler, 547 U. S., at 344.
Difficulties persist even if one assumes that an expenditure or tax benefit depletes the government’s coffers. To find injury, a court must speculate “that elected officials will increase a taxpayer-plaintiff’s tax bill to make up a deficit.” Ibid. And to find redressability, a court must assume that, were the remedy the taxpayers seek to be allowed, “legislators will pass along the supposed increased revenue in the form of tax reductions.” Ibid. It would be “pure speculation” to conclude that an injunction against a government expenditure or tax benefit “would result in any actual tax relief” for a taxpayer-plaintiff. ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U. S. 605, 614 (1989) (opinion of Kennedy, X).
These well-established principles apply to the present cases. Respondents may be right that Arizona’s STO tax credits have an estimated annual value of over $50 million. See Brief for Respondent Winn et al. 42; see also Arizona Dept, of Revenue, Revenue Impact of Arizona’s Tax Expenditures FY 2009/10, p. 48 (preliminary Nov. 15, 2010) (reporting the total estimated “value” of STO tax credits claimed over a 1-year period). The education of its young people is, of course, one of the State’s principal missions and responsibilities; and the consequent costs will make up a significant portion of the state budget. That, however, is just the beginning of the analysis.
By helping students obtain scholarships to private schools, both religious and secular, the STO program might relieve the burden placed on Arizona’s public schools. The result could be an immediate and permanent cost savings for the State. See Brief for Petitioner Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization 31 (discussing studies indicating that the STO program may on net save the State money); see also Mueller v. Allen, 463 U. S. 388, 395 (1983) (“By educating a substantial number of students [private] schools relieve public schools of a correspondingly great burden — to the benefit of all taxpayers”). Underscoring the potential financial benefits of the STO program, the average value of an STO scholarship may be far less than the average cost of educating an Arizona public school student. See Brief for Petitioner Garriott 38. Because it encourages scholarships for attendance at private schools, the STO tax credit may not cause the State to incur any financial loss.
Even assuming the STO tax credit has an adverse effect on Arizona’s annual budget, problems would remain. To •conclude there is a particular injury in fact would require speculation that Arizona lawmakers react to revenue shortfalls by increasing respondents’ tax liability. Daimler-Ckrysler, 547 U. S., at 344. A finding of causation would depend on the additional determination that any tax increase would be traceable to the STO tax credits, as distinct from other governmental expenditures or other tax benefits. Respondents have not established that an injunction against application of the STO tax credit would prompt Arizona legislators to “pass along the supposed increased revenue in the form of tax reductions.” Ibid. Those matters, too, are conjectural.
Each of the inferential steps to show causation and redressability depends on premises as to which there remains considerable doubt. The taxpayers have not shown that any interest they have in protecting the state treasury would be advanced. Even were they to show some closer link, that interest is still of a general character, not particular to certain persons. Nor have the taxpayers shown that higher taxes will result from the tuition credit scheme. The rule against taxpayer standing, a rule designed both to avoid speculation and to insist on particular injury, applies to respondents’ lawsuit. The taxpayers, then, must rely on an exception to the rule, an exception next to be considered.
B
The primary contention of respondents, of course, is that, despite the general rule that taxpayers lack standing to object to expenditures alleged to be unconstitutional, their suit falls within the exception established by Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83. It must be noted at the outset that, as this Court has explained, Flast’s holding provides a “narrow exception” to “the general rule against taxpayer standing.” Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U. S. 589, 618 (1988).
At issue in Flast was the standing of federal taxpayers to object, on First Amendment grounds, to a congressional statute that allowed expenditures of federal funds from the General Treasury to support, among other programs, “instruction in reading, arithmetic, and other subjects in religious schools, and to purchase textbooks and other instructional materials for use in such schools.” 392 U. S., at 85-86. Flast held that taxpayers have standing when two conditions are met.
The first condition is that there must be a “logical link” between the plaintiff’s taxpayer status “and the type of legislative enactment attacked.” Id., at 102. This condition was not satisfied in Doremus because the statute challenged in that case — providing for the recitation of Bible passages in public schools — involved at most an “incidental expenditure of tax funds.” Flast, 392 U. S., at 102. In Flast, by-contrast, the allegation was that the Federal Government violated the Establishment Clause in the exercise of its legislative authority both to collect and spend tax dollars. Id., at 103. In the decades since Flast, the Court has been careful to enforce this requirement. See Hein, 551 U. S. 587 (no standing under Flast to challenge federal executive actions funded by general appropriations); Valley Forge, 454 U. S. 464 (no standing under Flast to challenge an agency’s decision to transfer a parcel of federal property pursuant to the Property Clause).
The second condition for standing under Flast is that there must be “a nexus” between the plaintiff’s taxpayer status and “the precise nature of the constitutional infringement alleged.” 392 U. S., at 102. This condition was deemed satisfied in Flast based on the allegation that Government funds had been spent on an outlay for religion in contravention of the Establishment Clause. Id., at 85-86. In Frothingkam, by contrast, the claim was that Congress had exceeded its constitutional authority without regard to any specific prohibition. 392 U. S., at 104-105. Confirming that Flast turned on the unique features of Establishment Clause violations, this Court has “declined to lower the taxpayer standing bar in suits alleging violations of any constitutional provision apart from the Establishment Clause.” Hein, supra, at 609 (plurality opinion); see also Richardson, 418 U. S. 166 (Statement and Account Clause); Schlesinger, 418 U. S. 208 (Incompatibility Clause).
After stating the two conditions for taxpayer standing, Flast considered them together, explaining that individuals suffer a particular injury for standing purposes when, in violation of the Establishment Clause and by means of “the taxing and spending power,” their property is transferred through the Government's Treasury to a sectarian entity. 392 U. S., at 105-106. As Flast put it: “The taxpayer’s allegation in such cases would be that his tax money is being extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional protections against such abuses of legislative power.” Id., at 106. Flast thus “understood the 'injury’ alleged in Establishment Clause challenges to federal spending to be the very ‘extraction] and spen[ding]’ of ‘tax money’ in aid of religion alleged by a plaintiff.” DaimlerChrysler, 547 U. S., at 348 (quoting Flast, 392 U. S., at 106). “Such an injury,” Flast continued, is unlike “generalized grievances about the conduct of government” and so is “appropriate for judicial redress.” Ibid.
Flast found support for its finding of personal injury in “the history of the Establishment Clause,” particularly James Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments. DaimlerChrysler, supra, at 348. In 1785, the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia considered a “tax levy to support teachers of the Christian religion.” Flast, supra, at 104, n. 24; see A Bill Establishing a Provision for Teachers of the Christian Religion, reprinted in Everson v. Board of Ed. of Ewing, 330 U. S. 1, 74 (1947) (supplemental appendix to dissent of Rutledge, J.). Under the proposed assessment bill, taxpayers would direct their payments to Christian societies of their choosing. Ibid. If a taxpayer made no such choice, the General Assembly was to divert his funds to “seminaries of learning,” at least some of which “undoubtedly would have been religious in character.” Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U. S. 819, 869, n. 1 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id., at 853, n. 1 (Thomas, J., concurring). However the “seminaries” provision might have functioned in practice, critics took the position that the proposed bill threatened compulsory religious contributions. See, e. g., T. Buckley, Church and State in Revolutionary Virginia, 1776-1787, pp. 133-134 (1977); H. Eckenrode, Separation of Church and State in Virginia 106-108 (1910).
In the Memorial and Remonstrance, Madison objected to the proposed assessment on the ground that it would coerce a form of religious devotion in violation of conscience. In Madison’s view, government should not “'force a citizen to contribute three pence only of his property for the support of any one establishment.’” Flast, supra, at 103 (quoting 2 Writings of James Madison 183, 186 (G. Hunt ed. 1901)). This Madisonian prohibition does not depend on the amount of property conscripted for sectarian ends. Any such taking, even one amounting to “three pence only,” violates conscience. 392 U. S., at 103; cf. supra, at 134-135. The proposed bill ultimately died in committee; and the General Assembly instead enacted legislation forbidding “compelled” support of religion. See A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, reprinted in 2 Papers of Thomas Jefferson 545-546 (J. Boyd ed. 1950); see also Flast, 392 U. S., at 104, n. 24. Madison himself went on to become, as Flast put it, “the leading architect of the religion clauses of the First Amendment.” Id., at 103. Flast was thus informed by “the specific evils” identified in the public arguments of “those who drafted the Establishment Clause and fought for its adoption.” Id., at 103-104; see also Feldman, Intellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause, 77 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 346,351 (2002) (“[T]he Framers’ generation worried that conscience would be violated if citizens were required to pay taxes to support religious institutions with whose beliefs they disagreed”); McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Element of Establishment, 27 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 933, 936-939 (1986).
Respondents contend that these principles demonstrate their standing to challenge the STO tax credit. In their view the tax credit is, for Flast purposes, best understood as a governmental expenditure. That is incorrect.
It is easy to see that tax credits and governmental expenditures can have similar economic consequences, at least for beneficiaries whose tax liability is sufficiently large to take full advantage of the credit. Yet tax credits and governmental expenditures do not both implicate individual taxpayers in sectarian activities. A dissenter whose tax dollars are “extracted and spent” knows that he has in some small measure been made to contribute to an establishment in violation of conscience. Flast, supra, at 106. In that instance the taxpayer’s direct and particular connection with the establishment does not depend on economic speculation or political conjecture. The connection would exist even if the conscientious dissenter’s tax liability were unaffected or reduced. See Daimler Chrysler, supra, at 348-349. When the government declines to impose a tax, by contrast, there is no such connection between dissenting taxpayer and alleged establishment. Any financial injury remains speculative. See supra, at 134-138. And awarding some citizens a tax credit allows other citizens to retain control over their own funds in accordance with their own consciences.
The distinction between governmental expenditures and tax credits refutes respondents’ assertion of standing. When Arizona taxpayers choose to contribute to STOs, they spend their own money, not money the State has collected from respondents or from other taxpayers. Arizona’s § 43-1089 does not “extrac[t] and spen[d]” a conscientious dissenter’s funds in service of an establishment, Flast, 392 U. S., at 106, or “ ‘force a citizen to contribute three pence only of his property’ ” to a sectarian organization, id., at 103 (quoting 2 Writings of James Madison, supra, at 186). On the contrary, respondents and other Arizona taxpayers remain free to pay their own tax bills, without contributing to an STO. Respondents are likewise able to contribute to an STO of their choice, either religious or secular. And respondents also have the option of contributing to other charitable organizations, in which case respondents may become eligible for a tax deduction or a different tax credit. See, e. g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 43-1088 (West Supp. 2010). The STO tax credit is not tantamount to a religious tax or to a tithe and does not visit the injury identified in Flast. It follows that respondents have neither alleged an injury for standing purposes under general rules nor met the Flast exception. Finding standing under these circumstances would be more than the extension of Flast “to the limits of its logic.” Hein, 551U. S., at 615 (plurality opinion). It would he a departure from Flast's stated rationale.
Furthermore, respondents cannot satisfy the requirements of causation and redressability. When the government collects and spends taxpayer money, governmental choices are responsible for the transfer of wealth. In that case a resulting subsidy of religious activity is, for purposes of Flast, traceable to the government’s expenditures. And an injunction against those expenditures would address the objections of conscience raised by taxpayer-plaintiffs. See Daimler-Chrysler, 547 U. S., at 344. Here, by contrast, contributions result from the decisions of private taxpayers regarding their own funds. Private citizens create private STOs; STOs choose beneficiary schools; and taxpayers then contribute to STOs. While the State, at the outset, affords the opportunity to create and contribute to an STO, the tax credit system is implemented by private action and with no state intervention. Objecting taxpayers know that their fellow citizens, not the State, decide to contribute and in fact make the contribution. These considerations prevent any injury the objectors may suffer from being fairly traceable to the government. And while an injunction against application of the tax credit most likely would reduce contributions to STOs, that remedy would not affect noncontributing taxpayers or their tax payments. As a result, any injury suffered by respondents would not be remedied by an injunction limiting the tax credit’s operation.
Resisting this conclusion, respondents suggest that Arizonans who benefit from § 43-1089 tax credits in effect are paying their state income tax to STOs. In respondents’ view, tax credits give rise to standing even if tax deductions do not, since only the former yield a dollar-for-dollar reduction in final tax liability. See Brief for Respondent Winn et al. 5-6; Tr. of Oral Arg. 35-36. But what matters under Flast is whether sectarian STOs receive government funds drawn from general tax revenues, so that moneys have been extracted from a citizen and handed to a religious institution in violation of the citizen’s conscience. Under that inquiry, respondents’ argument fails. Like contributions that lead to charitable tax deductions, contributions yielding STO tax credits are not owed to the State and, in fact, pass directly from taxpayers to private organizations. Respondents’ contrary position assumes that income should be treated as if it were government property even if it has not come into the tax collector’s hands. .That premise finds no basis in standing jurisprudence. Private bank accounts cannot be equated with the Arizona state treasury.
The conclusion that the Flast exception is inapplicable at first may seem in tension with several earlier cases, all addressing Establishment Clause issues and all decided after Flast. See Mueller, 463 U. S. 388; Committee for Public Ed. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756 (1973); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U. S. 734 (1973); Walz v. Tax Comm’n of City of New York, 397 U. S. 664 (1970); cf. Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U. S. 88 (reaching only threshold jurisdictional issues). But those cases do not mention standing and so are not contrary to the conclusion reached here. When a potential jurisdictional defect is neither noted nor discussed in a federal decision, the decision does not stand for the proposition that no defect existed. See, e. g., Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U. S. 528, 535, n. 5 (1974) (“[W]hen questions of jurisdiction have been passed on in prior decisions sub silentio, this Court has never considered itself bound when a subsequent case finally brings the jurisdictional issue before us”); United States v. L. A. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U. S. 33, 38 (1952) (“Even as to our own judicial power of jurisdiction, this Court has followed the lead of Mr. Chief Justice Marshall who held that this Court is not bound by a prior exercise of jurisdiction in a case where it was not questioned and it was passed sub silentio”); Frothingkam, 262 U. S., at 486. The Court would risk error if it relied on assumptions that have gone unstated and unexamined.
Furthermore, if a law or practice, including a tax credit, disadvantages a particular religious group or a particular nonreligious group, the disadvantaged party would not have to rely on Flast to obtain redress for a resulting injury. See Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U. S., at 8 (plurality opinion) (finding standing where a general interest magazine sought to recover tax payments on the ground that religious periodicals were exempt from the tax). Because standing in Establishment Clause cases can be shown in various ways, it is far from clear that any nonbinding sub silentio holdings in the cases respondents cite would have depended on Flast. See, e. g., Walz, supra, at 666-667 (explaining that the plaintiff was an “owner of real estate” in New York City who objected to the city’s issuance of “property tax exemptions to religious organizations”). That the plaintiffs in those cases could have advanced arguments for jurisdiction independent of Flast makes it particularly inappropriate to determine whether or why standing should have been found where the issue was left unexplored.
If an establishment of religion is alleged to cause real injury to particular individuals, the federal courts may adjudicate the matter. Like other constitutional provisions, the Establishment Clause acquires substance and meaning when explained, elaborated, and enforced in the context of actual disputes. That reality underlies the case-or-controversy requirement, a requirement that has not been satisfied here.
* * *
New exercises of the judicial power are more likely to undermine public confidence in the neutrality and integrity of the Judiciary than one which casts the Court in the role of a Council of Revision, conferring on itself the power to invalidate laws at the behest of anyone who disagrees with them. In an era of frequent litigation, class actions, sweeping injunctions with prospective effect, and continuing jurisdiction to enforce judicial remedies, courts must be more careful to insist on the formal rules of standing, not less so. Making the Article III standing inquiry all the more necessary are the significant implications of constitutional litigation, which can result in rules of wide applicability that are beyond Congress’ power to change.
The present suit serves as an illustration of these principles. The fact that respondents are state taxpayers does not give them standing to challenge the subsidies that § 43-1089 allegedly provides to religious STOs. To alter the rules of standing or weaken their requisite elements would be inconsistent with the case-or-controversy limitation on federal jurisdiction imposed by Article III.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
It is so ordered.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | I | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Black
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in unequivocal terms that no person may “be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” To protect this right Congress has declared that the failure of a defendant to testify in his own defense “shall not create any presumption against him.” Ordinarily, the effectuation of this protection is a relatively simple matter — if the defendant chooses not to take the stand, no comment or argument about his failure to testify is permitted. But where for any reason it becomes necessary to try a particular charge more than one time, a more complicated problem may be presented. For a defendant may choose to remain silent at his first trial and then decide to take the stand at a subsequent trial. When this occurs, questions arise as to the propriety of comment or argument in the second trial based upon the defendant’s failure to take the stand at his previous trial. This case turns upon such a question.
Petitioner has been tried three times in the District Court for the District of Columbia upon an indictment charging that he had committed first-degree murder under a felony-murder statute. In all three trials, petitioner’s chief defense has been insanity but, on each occasion, the jury has rejected this defense and returned a verdict of guilty upon which the District of Columbia’s mandatory death sentence has been imposed. After the first two trials, in which petitioner did not testify, the convictions and death sentences were set aside on, the basis of trial errors that the Court of Appeals found had prevented a proper consideration of the case by the jury. At the third trial, in an apparent effort to bolster the contention of insanity, petitioner was placed upon the stand and asked a number of questions by defense counsel — a maneuver obviously made for the purpose of giving the jury an opportunity directly to observe the functioning of petitioner’s mental processes in the hope that such an exhibition would persuade them that his memory and mental comprehension were defective. Petitioner’s responses to these questions were aptly described by the court below as “gibberish without meaning.”
Upon cross-examination, the prosecutor attempted without noticeable success to demonstrate that these irrational answers were given by petitioner in furtherance of his plan to feign a mental weakness that did not exist. To this end, the prosecutor asked petitioner a number of questions about statements petitioner had allegedly made subsequent to his arrest, apparently in the hope that one of these questions would surprise petitioner and provoke a sensible response. When petitioner continued to talk in the same manner that he had used upon direct examination, the prosecutor concluded his cross-examination with the following remarks in the form of questions: “Willie, you were tried on two other occasions.” And, “This is the first time you have gone on the stand, isn’t it, Willie?”
The defense moved immediately for a mistrial on the ground that it was highly prejudicial for the prosecutor to inform the jury of the defendant’s failure to take the stand in his previous trials. The prosecutor defended his actions on the ground that this “is a fact that the Jury is entitled to know.” The trial judge agreed with the prosecutor, denied the motion for a mistrial, and the trial proceeded, culminating in the third verdict of guilty and death sentence. On appeal, the case was heard by all nine members of the Court of Appeals sitting en banc and was affirmed by a 5-4 vote — the majority concluding that the issue was controlled by the decision of this Court in Raffel v. United States, and the minority concluding that the issue was controlled by our decision in Grunewald v. United States. We granted certiorari to consider whether it was error for the trial court to deny the motion for a mistrial under the circumstances.
In this Court, the Government concedes that the question put to the defendant about his prior failures to testify cannot be justified under Raffel, Grünewald, or any other of this Court’s prior decisions. This concession, which we accept as proper, rests upon the Government’s recognition of the fact that in no case has this Court intimated that there is such a basic inconsistency between silence at one trial and taking the stand at a subsequent trial that the fact of prior silence can be used to impeach any testimony which a defendant elects to give at a later trial. The Raffel case, relied upon by the majority below, involved a situation in which Raffel had sat silent at his first trial in the face of testimony by a government agent that Raffel had previously made admissions pointing to his guilt. On a second trial, Raffel took the stand and denied the truth of this same testimony offered by the same witness. Under these circumstances, this Court held that Raffel’s silence at the first trial could be shown in order to discredit his testimony at the second trial on the theory that the silence itself constituted an admission as to the truth of the agent’s testimony. The result was that Raffel’s silence at the first trial was held properly admitted to impeach the specific testimony he offered at the second trial. Here, on the other hand, the defendant’s entire “testimony” comprised nothing more than “gibberish without meaning” with the result that there was no specific testimony to impeach. Any attempt to impeach this defendant as a witness could therefore have related only to his demeanor on the stand, and, indeed, the majority below expressly rested its conclusion upon the view that the prosecution had the right under Raffel to test the genuineness of this sort of “demeanor-evidence” by questions as to why it was not offered at previous trials. But if Raffel could properly be read as standing for this proposition, such questions would be permissible in every instance, for whenever a witness takes the stand, he necessarily puts the genuineness of his demeanor into issue. The Government quite properly concedes that this cannot be the law since it would conflict with the precise holding of this Court in the Grünewald case.
Despite this concession, however, the Government persists in the contention that petitioner’s conviction should be upheld, arguing that the error committed was harmless and could not have affected the jury’s verdict. This argument is rested upon three grounds: first, that the jury may not even have heard the improper question; secondly, that even if the jury did hear the question, it may not have inferred that petitioner in fact did not testify at his previous trial; and, finally, that even if the jury did infer that petitioner did not testify previously, no inference adverse to petitioner would have been drawn from this fact. The first two of these grounds can be quickly disposed of. We can think of no justification for ignoring the part of a record showing error on a mere conjecture that the jury might not have heard the testimony that part of the record represents. Nor do we believe it reasonable to argue that the jury trying this cáse would not have inferred that this defendant had failed to testify in his prior trials when the prosecutor asked, “This is the first time you have gone on the stand, isn’t it, Willie?” Indeed, the recognition that such an inference will in all likelihood be drawn from leading questions of this kind lies at the root of the long-established rule that such questions may not properly be put unless the inference, if drawn, would be factually true. Thus, the Government’s argument that the error was harmless must stand or fall upon the third ground it urges — that the jury’s awareness of petitioner’s failure to take the stand at his previous trials would not have prejudiced the consideration of his case. The disposition of this contention requires the statement of a few more of the relevant facts of the case.
In connection with the defense of insanity, petitioner had introduced evidence of both mental disease and mental defect, as those terms are applied in the relevant law of the District of Columbia. On the mental disease issue, the testimony was that petitioner was suffering from manic depressive psychosis, a disease which the record shows tends to fluctuate considerably in its manifestations from time to time. On the mental defect issue, the defense introduced evidence that petitioner had an intelligence level in the moronic class. The case went to the jury on both of these points, the jury being directed to acquit if it found the homicide to have been the product either of mental disease or mental defect. Petitioner’s “testimony” thus raised at least two different issues in the minds of the jury: first, whether petitioner was simply feigning this testimony; and, secondly, whether, if not, petitioner’s condition at the time of his third trial fairly represented his condition at the time of the act charged in the indictment.
We think it apparent that the jury’s awareness of petitioner’s failure to testify at his first two trials could have affected its deliberations on either or both of these issues. Thus, the jury might well have thought it likely that petitioner elected to feign this “testimony” out of desperation brought on by his failure to gain acquittal without it in the two previous trials. Similarly, even if the jury believed petitioner’s “testimony” was genuine, .it might have thought that petitioner’s condition was caused by a mental disease and concluded that it is unlikely that a disease that had manifested itself only one out of three times for exhibition at trial was active at the occasion of the homicide. Or, on the same assumption, it might have thought that petitioner’s failure to exhibit himself at the previous trials indicated that the condition manifested at this trial was the result of a worsening in his mental condition since those trials and, consequently, also since the commission of the acts charged in the indictment. There may be other ways in which the jury might have used the information improperly given it by the prosecution — we have mentioned more than enough already, however, to satisfy ourselves that the Government’s contention that the error was harmless must be rejected.
The Government’s final contention is that even if the error was prejudicial the conviction should be allowed to stand on the theory that the error was not sufficiently prejudicial to warrant the granting of a mistrial and the defense made no request for cautionary instructions. One answer to this argument is to be found in the Government’s own brief. For, in its argument regarding the possibility that the jury may not have been aware of the improper question, the Government stresses the fact that the question was not emphasized by any reference to it in the instructions to the jury. During the course of this argument the Government expressly recognizes that the danger of the situation would have been increased by a cautionary instruction in that such an instruction would have again brought the jury’s attention to petitioner’s prior failures to testify. Plainly, the defense was under no obligation to take such a risk. The motion for a mistrial was entirely appropriate and, indeed, necessary to protect the interests of petitioner.
We thus conclude that this conviction and sentence against petitioner cannot stand. In doing so, we agree with the point made by the Government in its brief — that it is regrettable when the concurrent findings of 36 jurors are not sufficient finally to terminate a case. But under our system, a man is entitled to the findings of 12 jurors on evidence fairly and properly presented to them. Petitioner may not be deprived of his life until that right is accorded him. That right was denied here by the prosecutor’s improper questions.
Reversed.
“In trial of all persons charged with the commission of offenses against the United States and in all proceedings in courts martial and courts of inquiry in any State, District, Possession or Territory, the person charged shall, at his own request, be a competent witness. His failure to make such request shall not create any presumption against him.” 62 Stat. 833, 18 U. S. C. § 3481.
Wilson v. United, States, 149 U. S. 60.
“Whoever, being of sound memory and discretion, kills another purposely, either of deliberate and premeditated malice or by means of poison, or in perpetrating or attempting to perpetrate any offense punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary, or without purpose so to do kills another in perpetrating or in attempting to perpetrate any arson, as defined in section 22-401 or 22-402 of this Code, rape, mayhem, robbery, or kidnapping, or in perpetrating or in attempting to perpetrate any housebreaking while armed with or using a dangerous weapon, is guilty of murder in the first degree.” District of Columbia Code § 22-2401. (Emphasis supplied.)
Section 22-2404 of the District of Columbia Code provides: “The punishment of murder in the first degree shall be death by electrocution.”
The first conviction was set aside because of erroneous instructions on the defense of insanity. 94 U. S. App. D. C. 293, 214 F. 2d 879. The second conviction was set aside because of improper argument by the prosecutor. 101 U. S. App. D. C. 51, 247 F. 2d 42.
107 U. S. App. D. C. 159, 160, 275 F.2d 617, 618. The following excerpt from petitioner's testimony is entirely typical:
“Q. Who is your lawyer?
■“A. Well, I mean, I am my own lawyer, as far as my concern.
“Q. Have I been representing you here the last couple days?
“A. As far as I am concerned, you all look the same to me.
“Q. Do you know what is going on in this courtroom the last couple days?
“A. I ain’t asked about what is going on. It is up to you go on and describe yourself. I mean, don’t ask me. As far as I am just sitting here.
“Q. Did you ever hear the name Harry Honigman [the man with whose murder petitioner was charged] before?
“A. I haven’t.
“Q. Do you know you are charged with first degree murder ?
“A. As far as I am concerned, I ain’t charged with nothing.
“Q. What is first degree murder; do you know?
“A. I don’t know.”
The record reveals the following exchange at the conclusion of the cross-examination of petitioner by the prosecutor, a Mr. Smithson:
“Q. Willie, you were tried on two other occasions.
“A. Well, I don’t care how many occasions, how many case — you say case. I was a case man once in a time.
“Q. This is the first time you have gone on the stand, isn’t it, Willie?
“A. What?
"Q. This is the first time you have gone on the stand, isn’t it, Willie?
“A. I am always the stand; I am everything, I done told you.
“Mr. Smithson: That is all.”
107 U. S. App. D. C. 159, 275 F. 2d 617.
271 U. S. 494.
353 U. S. 391.
363 U. S. 818. The petition for certiorari also raised objections based upon other alleged errors during the course of the trial. In view of our disposition of the primary issue and because the actions complained of may not arise at any subsequent trial, we find it unnecessary to pass upon these other objections.
Thus, the majority reasoned: “The logical and permissible first step under Raffel v. United States, supra, was to have him say whether he had previously testified in order to lay the groundwork for developing an inconsistency inherent in the difference in his ‘demeanor-evidence’ in the two trials.” 107 U. S. App. D. C. 159, 167, 275 F. 2d 617, 625.
This is so because the defendant’s credibility is in issue whenever he testifies. If the failure to testify at a previous trial were to amount to evidence that testimony at a subsequent trial was feigned or perjurious, the fact of failure to testify would always be admissible.
The holding in Grünewald was that the defendant’s answers to certain questions were not inconsistent with his previous reliance upon the Fifth Amendment to excuse a refusal to answer those very same questions. Since defendant’s testimony placed his credibility in issue, the necessary implication of that holding is that his prior refusal to testify could not be used to impeach his general credibility.
III Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed.), § 780. Wigmore quotes Chitty, Practice of the Law, 2d ed., III, 901, for the proposition: “It is an established rule, as regards cross-examination, that a counsel'has no right, even in order to detect or catch a witness in a falsity, falsely to assume or pretend that the witness had previously sworn or stated differently to the fact, or that a matter had previously been proved when it had not.” This Court has previously recognized that principle. Berger v. United States, 295 U. S. 78, 84.
The difference between the terms “disease” and “defect” was explained in the charge to the jury in the following manner: “We'use ‘disease’ in the sense of a condition which is considered capable of either improving or deteriorating. We use ‘defect’ in the sense of a condition which is not considered capable of either improving or deteriorating, and which may be either congenital or the result of injury, or the residual effect of a physical or mental disease.”
These instructions stemmed from the test of criminal responsibility that prevails in the District of Columbia under the decision of the Court of Appeals in Durham v. United States, 94 U. S. App. D. C. 228, 214 F. 2d 862.
This second issue arises from the fact that the jury was not here trying the question whether petitioner was mentally competent to stand trial. Under the District of Columbia practice, that question is decided in a separate proceeding. See District of Columbia Code §24-301.
Johnson v. United States, 318 U. S. 189, relied upon by the Government, does not sustain its argument on this point. There the defense made no objection at all, choosing instead to rest its chances upon the verdict of the jury. Petitioner here made no such choice for he has repeatedly pressed his right to a mistrial, in the. District Court, in the Court of Appeals, and here.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | A | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for writ of certiorari are granted. The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded for further consideration in light of Sanders v. United States, 373 U. S. 1.
Mr. Justice Clark and Mr. Justice Harlan would deny certiorari on the basis of their dissent in Sanders v. United States, 373 U. S., at 23.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | A | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice White
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In 1973, appellants began operating an adult bookstore in the commercial zone in the Borough of Mount Ephraim in Camden County, N. J. The store sold adult books, magazines, and films. Amusement licenses shortly issued permitting the store to install coin-operated devices by virtue of which a customer could sit in a booth, insert a coin, and watch an adult film. In 1976, the store introduced an additional coin-operated mechanism permitting the customer to watch a live dancer, usually nude, performing behind a glass panel. Complaints were soon filed against appellants charging that the bookstore’s exhibition of live dancing violated § 99-15B of Mount Ephraim’s zoning ordinance, which described the permitted uses in a commercial zone, in which the store was located, as follows:
“B. Principal permitted uses on the land and in buildings.
“(1) Offices and banks; taverns; restaurants and luncheonettes for sit-down dinners only and with no drive-in facilities; automobile sales; retail stores, such as but not limited to food, wearing apparel, millinery, fabrics, hardware, lumber, jewelry, paint, wallpaper, appliances, flowers, gifts, books, stationery, pharmacy, liquors, cleaners, novelties, hobbies and toys; repair shops for shoes, jewels, clothes and appliances; barbershops and beauty salons; cleaners and laundries; pet stores; and nurseries. Offices may, in addition, be permitted to a group of four (4) stores or more without additional parking, provided the offices do not exceed the equivalent of twenty percent (20%) of the gross floor area of the stores.
“(2) Motels.” Mount Ephraim Code § 99-15B (1), (2) (1979).
Section 99-4 of the Borough’s code provided that “[a] 11 uses not expressly permitted in this chapter are prohibited.”
Appellants were found guilty in the Municipal Court and fines were imposed. Appeal was taken to the Camden County Court, where a trial de novo was held on the record made in the Municipal Court and appellants were again found guilty. The County Court first rejected appellants’ claim that the ordinance was being selectively and improperly enforced against them because other establishments offering live entertainment were permitted in the commercial zones. Those establishments, the court held, were permitted, nonconforming uses that had existed prior to the passage of the ordinance. In response to appellants’ defense based on the First and Fourteenth Amendments, the court recognized that “live nude dancing is protected by the First Amendment” but was of the view that “First Amendment guarantees are not involved” since the case “involves solely a zoning ordinance” under which “[l]ive entertainment is simply not a permitted use in any establishment” whether the entertainment is a nude dance or some other form of live presentation. App. to Juris. Statement 8a, 12a. Reliance was placed on the statement in Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U. S. 50, 62 (1976), that “[t]he mere fact that the commercial exploitation of material protected by the First Amendment is subject to zoning and other licensing requirements is not a sufficient reason for invalidating these ordinances.” The Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey affirmed appellants’ convictions in a per curiam opinion “essentially for the reasons” given by the County Court. App. to Juris. Statement 14a. The Supreme Court of New Jersey denied further review. Id., at 17a, 18a.
Appellants appealed to this Court. Their principal claim is that the imposition of criminal penalties under an ordinance prohibiting all live entertainment, including nonob-scene, nude dancing, violated their rights of free expression guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. We noted probable jurisdiction, 449 U. S. 897 (1980), and now set aside appellants’ convictions.
I
As the Mount Ephraim Code has been construed by the New Jersey courts — a construction that is binding upon us — ■ “live entertainment,” including nude dancing, is “not a permitted use in any establishment” in the Borough of Mount Ephraim. App. to Juris. Statement 12a. By excluding live entertainment throughout the Borough, the Mount Ephraim ordinance prohibits a wide range of expression that has long been held to be within the protections of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Entertainment, as well as political and ideological speech, is protected; motion pictures, programs broadcast by radio and television, and live entertainment, such as musical and dramatic works, fall within the First Amendment guarantee. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U. S. 495 (1952); Schacht v. United States, 398 U. S. 58 (1970); Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U. S. 153 (1974); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U. S. 546 (1975); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U. S. 205 (1975); Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc. 422 U. S. 922 (1975). See also California v. LaRue, 409 U. S. 109, 118 (1972); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., supra, at 61, 62. Nor may an entertainment program be prohibited solely because it displays the nude human figure. “[N]udity alone” does not place otherwise protected material outside the mantle of the First Amendment. Jenkins v. Georgia, supra, at 161; Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, supra; Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, supra, at 211-212, 213. Furthermore, as the state courts in this case recognized, nude dancing is not without its First Amendment protections from official regulation. Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., supra; Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, supra; California v. LaRue, supra.
Whatever First Amendment protection should be extended to nude dancing, live or on film, however, the Mount Ephraim ordinance prohibits all live entertainment in the Borough: no property in the Borough may be principally used for the commercial production of plays, concerts, musicals, dance, or any other form of live entertainment. Because appellants’ claims are rooted in the First Amendment, they are entitled to rely on the impact of the ordinance on the expressive activities of others as well as their own. “Because overbroad laws, like vague ones, deter privileged activities], our cases firmly establish appellant’s standing to raise an overbreadth challenge.” Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104, 114 (1972).
II
The First Amendment requires that there be sufficient justification for the exclusion of a broad category of protected expression as one of the permitted commercial uses in the Borough. The justification does not appear on the face of the ordinance since the ordinance itself is ambiguous with respect to whether live entertainment is permitted: § 99-15B purports to specify only the “principal” permitted uses in commercial establishments, and its listing of permitted retail establishments is expressly nonexclusive; yet, § 99-4 declares that all uses not expressly permitted are forbidden. The state courts at least partially resolved the ambiguity by declaring live entertainment to be an impermissible commercial use. In doing so, the County Court, whose opinion was adopted by the Appellate Division of the Superior Court, sought to avoid or to meet the First Amendment issue only by declaring that the restriction on the use of appellants’ property was contained in a zoning ordinance that excluded all live entertainment from the Borough, including live nude dancing.
The power of local governments to zone and control land use is undoubtedly broad and its proper exercise is an essential aspect of achieving a satisfactory quality of life in both urban and rural communities. But the zoning power is not infinite and unchallengeable; it “must be exercised within constitutional limits.” Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494, 514 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). Accordingly, it is subject to judicial review; and as is most often the case, the standard of review is determined by the nature of the right assertedly threatened or violated rather than by the power being exercised or the specific limitation imposed. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516, 529-530 (1945).
Where property interests are adversely affected by zoning, the courts generally have emphasized the breadth of municipal power to control land use and have sustained the regulation if it is rationally related to legitimate state concerns and does not deprive the owner of economically viable use of his property. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U. S. 255, 260 (1980); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U. S. 1 (1974); Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365, 395 (1926). But an ordinance may fail even under that limited standard of review. Moore v. East Cleveland, supra, at 520 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment); Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U. S. 183 (1928).
Beyond that, as is true of other ordinances, when a zoning law infringes upon a protected liberty, it must be narrowly drawn and must further a sufficiently substantial government interest. In Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147 (1939), for example, the Court recognized its obligation to assess the sub-stantiality of the justification offered for a regulation that significantly impinged on freedom of speech:
“Mere legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public convenience may well support regulation directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient to justify such as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions. And so, as cases arise, the delicate and difficult task falls upon the courts to weigh the circumstances and to appraise the substantiality of the reasons advanced in support of the regulation of the free enjoyment of [First Amendment] rights.” Id., at 161.
Similarly, in Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U. S. 620, 637 (1980), it was emphasized that the Court must not only assess the substantiality of the governmental interests asserted but also determine whether those interests could be served by means that would be less intrusive on activity protected by the First Amendment: Justice Powell said much the same thing in addressing the validity of a zoning ordinance in Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U. S., at 499: when the government intrudes on one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, “this Court must examine carefully the importance of the governmental interests advanced and the extent to which they are served by the challenged regulation.” Because the ordinance challenged in this case significantly limits communicative activity within the Borough, we must scrutinize both the interests advanced by the Borough to justify this limitation on protected expression and the means chosen to further those interests.
“The Village may serve its legitimate interests, but it must do so by narrowly drawn regulations designed to serve those interests without unnecessarily interfering with First Amendment freedoms. Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U. S., at 620; First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765, 786 (1978). ‘Broad prophylactic rules in the area of free expression are suspect. Precision of regulation must be the touchstone. . . .’ NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 438 (1963).”
As an initial matter, this case is not controlled by Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., the decision relied upon by the Camden County Court. Although the Court there stated that a zoning ordinance is not invalid merely because it regulates activity protected under the First Amendment, it emphasized that the challenged restriction on the location of adult movie theaters imposed a minimal burden on protected speech. 427 U. S., at 62. The restriction did not affect the number of adult movie theaters that could operate in the city; it merely dispersed them. The Court did not imply that a municipality could ban all adult theaters — much less all live entertainment or all nude dancing — from its commercial districts citywide. Moreover, it was emphasized in that case that the evidence presented to the Detroit Common Council indicated that the concentration of adult movie theaters in limited areas led to deterioration of surrounding neighborhoods, and it was concluded that the city had justified the incidental burden on First Amendment interests resulting from merely dispersing, but not excluding, adult theaters.
In this case, however, Mount Ephraim has not adequately justified its substantial restriction of protected activity. None of the justifications asserted in this Court was articulated by the state courts and none of them withstands scrutiny. First, the Borough contends that permitting live entertainment would conflict with its plan to create a commercial area that caters only to the “immediate needs” of its residents and that would enable them to purchase at local stores the few items they occasionally forgot to buy outside the Borough. No evidence was introduced below to support this assertion, and it is difficult to reconcile this characterization of the Borough’s commercial zones with the provisions of the ordinance. Section 99-15A expressly states that the purpose of creating commercial zones was to provide areas for “local and regional commercial operations.” (Emphasis added.) The range of permitted uses goes far beyond providing for the “immediate needs” of the residents. Motels, hardware stores, lumber stores, banks, offices, and car showrooms are permitted in commercial zones. The list of permitted “retail stores” is nonexclusive, and it includes such services as beauty salons, barbershops, cleaners, and restaurants. Virtually the only item or service that may not be sold in a commercial zone is entertainment, or at least live entertainment. The Borough’s first justification is patently insufficient.
Second, Mount Ephraim contends that it may selectively exclude commercial live entertainment from the broad range of commercial uses permitted in the Borough for reasons normally associated with zoning in commercial districts, that is, to avoid the problems that may be associated with live entertainment, such as parking, trash, police protection, and medical facilities. The Borough has presented no evidence, and it is not immediately apparent as a matter of experience, that live entertainment poses problems of this nature more significant than those associated with various permitted uses; nor does it appear that the Borough’s zoning authority has arrived at a defensible conclusion that unusual problems are presented by live entertainment. Cf. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U. S., at 54-55, and n. 6. We do not find it self-evident that a theater, for example, would create greater parking problems than would a restaurant. Even less apparent is what unique problems would be posed by exhibiting live nude dancing in connection with the sale of adult books and films, particularly since the bookstore is licensed to exhibit nude dancing on films. It may be that some forms of live entertainment would create problems that are not associated with the commercial uses presently permitted in Mount Ephraim. Yet this ordinance is not narrowly drawn to respond to what might be the distinctive problems arising from certain types of live entertainment, and it is not clear that a more selective approach would fail to address those unique problems if any there are. The Borough has not established that its interests could not be met by restrictions that are less intrusive on protected forms of expression.
The Borough also suggests that § 99-15B is a reasonable “time, place, and manner” restriction; yet it does not identify the municipal interests making it reasonable to exclude all commercial live entertainment but to allow a variety of other commercial uses in the Borough. In Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104 (1972), we stated:
“The nature of a place, 'the pattern of its normal activities, dictate the kinds of regulations of time, place, and manner that are reasonable.’ . . . The crucial question is whether the manner of expression is basically incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place at a particular time. Our cases make clear that in assessing the reasonableness of a regulation, we must weigh heavily the fact that communication is involved; the regulation must be narrowly tailored to further the State’s legitimate interest.” Id., at 116-117 (footnotes omitted).
Thus, the initial question in determining the validity of the exclusion as a time, place, and manner restriction is whether live entertainment is “basically incompatible with the normal activity [in the commercial zones].” As discussed above, no evidence has been presented to establish that live entertainment is incompatible with the uses presently permitted by the Borough. Mount Ephraim asserts that it could have chosen to eliminate all commercial uses within its boundaries. Yet we must assess the exclusion of live entertainment in light of the commercial uses Mount Ephraim allows, not in light of what the Borough might have done.
To be reasonable, time, place, and manner restrictions not only must serve significant state interests but also must leave open adequate alternative channels of communication. Grayned v. City of Rockford, supra, at 116, 118; Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77, 85-87 (1949); see also Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm’n of New York, 447 U. S. 530, 535 (1980); Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U. S. 748, 771 (1976). Here, the Borough totally excludes all live entertainment, including non-obscene nude dancing that is otherwise protected by the First Amendment. As we have observed, Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., supra, did not purport to approve the total exclusion from the city of theaters showing adult, but not obscene, materials. It was carefully noted in that case that the number of regulated establishments was not limited and that “[t]he situation would be quite different if the ordinance had the effect of suppressing, or greatly restricting access to, lawful speech.” 427 U. S., at 71, n. 35.
The Borough nevertheless contends that live entertainment in general and nude dancing in particular are amply available in close-by areas outside the limits of the Borough. Its position suggests the argument that if there were countywide zoning, it would be quite legal to allow live entertainment in only selected areas of the county and to exclude it from primarily residential communities, such as the Borough of Mount Ephraim. This may very well be true, but the Borough cannot avail itself of that argument in this case. There is no countywide zoning in Camden County, and Mount Ephraim is free under state law to impose its own zoning restrictions, within constitutional limits. Furthermore, there is no evidence in this record to support the proposition that the kind of entertainment appellants wish to provide is available in reasonably nearby areas. The courts below made no such findings; and at least in their absence, the ordinance excluding live entertainment from the commercial zone cannot constitutionally be applied to appellants so as to criminalize the activities for which they have been fined. “[0]ne is not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place.” Schneider v. State, 308 U. S., at 163.
Accordingly, the convictions of these appellants are infirm, and the judgment of the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
The zoning ordinance establishes three types of zones. The “R-l” residential district is zoned for single-family dwellings. The “R-2” residential district is zoned for single-family dwellings, townhouses, and garden apartments. The “C” district is zoned for commercial use, as specified in § 99-15 of the Mount Ephraim Code. See Mount Ephraim Code §99-7 (1979).
Section 99-15A states the purpose of the commercial zone:
“A. Purpose. The purpose of this district is to provide areas for local and regional commercial operations. The zone district pattern recognizes the strip commercial pattern which exists along Kings Highway and the Black Horse Pike. It is intended, however, to encourage such existing uses and any new uses or redevelopment to improve upon the zoning districts of greater depth by encouraging shopping-center-type development with buildings related to each other in design, landscaping and site planning and by requiring off-street parking, controlled ingress and egress, greater building setbacks, buffer areas along property lines adjacent to residential uses, and a concentration of commercial uses into fewer locations to eliminate the strip pattern.”
The building inspector, who is responsible for enforcing the zoning ordinance, testified that three establishments located in commercial zones of the Borough offered live music. However, he stated that they were permitted to do so only because this use of the premises preceded the enactment of the zoning ordinance and thus qualified as a “nonconforming” use under the ordinance. Munic. Ct. Tr. 21-25, 35-36, 55-59.
The Police Chief also testified. He stated that he knew of no live entertainment in the commercial zones other than that offered by appellants and by the three establishments mentioned by the building inspector. Id., at 67.
Appellants also contend that the zoning ordinance, as applied to them, violates due process and equal protection, since the Borough has acted arbitrarily and irrationally in prohibiting booths in which customers can view live nude dancing while permitting coin-operated movie booths. Since we sustain appellants’ First Amendment challenge to the ordinance, we do not address these additional claims.
The Borough’s counsel asserted at oral argument that the ordinance would not prohibit noncommercial live entertainment, such as singing Christmas carols at an office party. Tr. of Oral Arg. 33. Apparently a high school could perform a play if it did not charge admission. However, the ordinance prohibits the production of plays in commercial theaters. Id., at 34.
Service stations are not listed as principal permitted uses in § 99-15B. However, both § 99-15E (“Area and yard requirements”) and § 99-15F (“Minimum off-street parking”) specifically refer to service stations, and § 99-15J limits the construction or expansion of service stations in a designated area of the commercial district. Service stations would thus appear to be permitted uses even though not expressly listed in § 99-15B.
Various official views have been expressed as to what extent entertainment is excluded from the commercial zone. At the initial evidentiary hearing, the prosecutor suggested that the ordinance only banned “live entertainment” in commercial establishments. Munic. Ct. Tr. 49 (emphasis added). By contrast, the building inspector for the Borough stated that there was no basis for distinguishing between five entertainment and other entertainment under the ordinance. Id., at 20, 50. Before this Court, the Borough asserted in its brief that the ordinance “does not prohibit all entertainment, but only live entertainment,” Brief for Appellee 21, yet counsel for the Borough stated during oral argument that the ordinance prohibits commercial establishments from offering any entertainment. Tr. of Oral Arg. 40. The County Court ruled that “live entertainment” is not a permitted use under § 99-15B, but it did not consider whether nonlive entertainment might be a permitted use. At oral argument, counsel for appellants referred to a movie theater in the Borough, Tr. of Oral Arg. 9, but counsel for the Borough explained that it is permitted only because it is a nonconforming use. Id., at 28, 38-40.
In Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U. S. 1 (1974), the Court upheld a zoning ordinance that restricted the use of land to “one-family” dwellings. The Court -concluded that the municipality’s definition of a “family” (no more than two unrelated persons) did not burden any fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution. Id., at 7. Thus, it merely had to bear a rational relationship to a permissible state objective. Id., at 8. Justice Marshall dissented, asserting that the ordinance impinged on fundamental personal rights:
“[Thus,] it can withstand constitutional scrutiny only upon a clear showing that the burden imposed is necessary to protect a compelling and substantial governmental interest .... [T]he onus of demonstrating that no less intrusive means will adequately protect the compelling state interest and that the challenged statute is sufficiently narrowly drawn, is upon the party seeking to justify the burden.” Id., at 18 (citation omitted).
Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494 (1977), like Belle Terre, involved an ordinance that limited the occupancy of each dwelling to a single family. Unlike the ordinance challenged in Belle Terre, however, this ordinance defined “family” in a manner that prevented certain relatives from living together. Justice Powell, joined by three other Justices, concluded that the ordinance impermissibly impinged upon protected liberty interests. 431 U. S., at 499. Justice Stevens concluded that the ordinance did not even survive the Euclid test. 431 U. S., at 520-521. The dissenting opinions did not contend that zoning ordinances must always be deferentially reviewed. Rather, the dissenting Justices who addressed the issue rejected the view that the ordinance impinged upon interests that required heightened protection under the Due Process Clause. Id., at 537 (Stewart, J., joined by Rehnquist, J., dissenting), id., at 549 (White, J., dissenting).
Even where a challenged regulation restricts freedom of expression only incidentally or only in a small number of cases, we have scrutinized the governmental interest furthered by the regulation and have stated that the regulation must be narrowly drawn to avoid unnecessary intrusion on freedom of expression. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 376-377(1968).
Several municipalities argued in Schneider that their antileafletting ordinances were designed to prevent littering of the streets. The Court did not deny that the ordinances would further that purpose, but it concluded that the cities’ interest in preventing littering was not sufficiently strong to justify the limitation on First Amendment rights. The Court pointed out that the cities were free to pursue other methods of preventing littering, such as punishing those who actually threw papers on the streets. 308 U. S., at 162.
Village of Schaumburg invalidated on First Amendment grounds a municipal ordinance prohibiting the solicitation of contributions by charitable organizations that did not use at least 75% of their receipts for “charitable purposes.” Although recognizing that the Village had substantial interests “ ‘in protecting the public from fraud, crime, and undue annoyance,’ ” 444 IT. S., at 636, we found these interests were “only peripherally promoted by the 75-percent requirement and could be sufficiently served by measures less destructive of First Amendment interests.” Ibid.
Justice Stevens relied on the District Court’s finding that compliance with the challenged ordinances would only impose a slight burden on First Amendment rights, since there were “myriad locations” within ■ the city where new adult movie theaters could be located in compliance with the ordinances. 427 U. S., at 71, n. 35.
Similarly, Justice Powell’s concurring opinion stressed that the effect of the challenged ordinance on First Amendment interests was “incidental and minimal.” Id., at 78. He did not suggest that a municipality could validly exclude theaters from its commercial zones if it had included other businesses presenting similar problems. Although he regarded the burden imposed by the ordinance as minimal, Justice Powell examined the city’s justification for the restriction before he concluded that the ordinance was valid. Id., at 82, and n. 5. Emphasizing that the restriction was tailored to the particular problem identified by the city council, he acknowledged that “[t]he case would have present [ed] a different situation had Detroit brought within the ordinance types of theaters that had not been shown to contribute to the deterioration of surrounding areas.” Id., at 82.
Id., at 71, and n. 34 (opinion of Stevens, J.); id., at 82, n. 5 (Powell, J., concurring).
If the New Jersey courts had expressly interpreted this ordinance as banning all entertainment, we would reach the same result.
Mount Ephraim’s counsel stated in this Court that these stores were available “[i]f you come home at night and you forgot to buy your bread, your milk, your gift.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 40.
At present, this effect is somewhat lessened by the presence of at least three establishments that are permitted to offer live entertainment as a nonconforming use. See n. 3, supra. These uses apparently may continue indefinitely, since the Mount Ephraim Code does not require nonconforming uses to be terminated within a specified period of time. See Mount Ephraim Code § 99-24 (1979). The Borough’s decision to permit live entertainment as a nonconforming use only undermines the Borough’s contention that live entertainment poses inherent problems that justify its exclusion.
The Borough also speculates that it may have concluded that live nude dancing is undesirable. Brief for Appellee 20. It is noted that in California v. LaRue, 409 U. S. 109 (1972), this Court identified a number of problems that California sought to eliminate by prohibiting certain explicitly sexual entertainment in bars and in nightclubs licensed to serve liquor. This speculation lends no support to the challenged ordinance. First, § 99-15B excludes all live entertainment, not just live nude dancing. Even if Mount Ephraim might validly place restrictions on certain forms of live nude dancing under a narrowly drawn ordinance, this would not justify the exclusion of all live entertainment or, insofar as this record reveals, even the nude dancing involved in this case. Second, the regulation challenged in California v. LaRue was adopted only after the Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control had determined that significant problems were linked to the activity that was later regulated. Third, in California v. LaRue the Court relied heavily on the State’s power under the Twenty-first Amendment. Cf. Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U. S. 922 (1975).
Mount Ephraim has responded to the parking problems presented by the uses that are permitted in commercial zones by requiring that each type of commercial establishment provide a specified amount of parking. See Mount Ephraim Code §§ 99-15F (1979).
Mount Ephraim argued in its brief that nonlive entertainment is an adequate substitute for live entertainment. Brief for Appellee 20-21. This contention was apparently abandoned at oral argument, since the Borough’s counsel stated that the ordinance bans all commercial entertainment. At any rate, the argument is an inadequate response to the fact that live entertainment, which the ordinance bans, is protected by the First Amendment.
Thus, our decision today does not establish that every unit of local government entrusted with zoning responsibilities must provide a commercial zone in which live entertainment is permitted.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | C | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Blackmun
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this case we are called upon to determine the standard for admitting expert scientific testimony in a federal trial.
I
Petitioners Jason Daubert and Eric Schuller are minor children born with serious birth defects. They and their parents sued respondent in California state court, alleging that the birth defects had been caused by the mothers’ ingestion of Bendectin, a prescription antinausea drug marketed by respondent. Respondent removed the suits to federal court on diversity grounds.
After extensive discovery, respondent moved for summary judgment, contending that Bendectin does not cause birth defects in humans and that petitioners would be unable to come forward with any admissible evidence that it does. In support of its motion, respondent submitted an affidavit of Steven H. Lamm, physician and epidemiologist, who is a well-credentialed expert on the risks from exposure to various chemical substances. Doctor Lamm stated that he had reviewed all the literature on Bendectin and human birth defects — more than 30 published studies involving over 130,000 patients. No study had found Bendectin to be a human teratogen (i e., a substance capable of causing malformations in fetuses). On the basis of this review, Doctor Lamm concluded that maternal use of Bendectin during the first trimester of pregnancy has not been shown to be a risk factor for human birth defects.
Petitioners did not (and do not) contest this characterization of the published record regarding Bendectin. Instead, they responded to respondent’s motion with the testimony of eight experts of their own, each of whom also possessed impressive credentials. These experts had concluded that Bendectin can cause birth defects. Their conclusions were based upon “in vitro” (test tube) and “in vivo” (live) animal studies that found a link between Bendectin and malformations; pharmacological studies of the chemical structure of Bendectin that purported to show similarities between the structure of the drug and that of other substances known to cause birth defects; and the “reanalysis” of previously published epidemiological (human statistical) studies.
The District Court granted respondent’s motion for summary judgment. The court stated that scientific evidence is admissible only if the principle upon which it is based is “‘sufficiently established to have general acceptance in the field to which it belongs.’” 727 F. Supp. 570, 572 (SD Cal. 1989), quoting United States v. Kilgus, 571 F. 2d 508, 510 (CA9 1978). The court concluded that petitioners’ evidence did not meet this standard. Given the vast body of epidemiological data concerning Bendectin, the court held, expert opinion which is not based on epidemiological evidence is not admissible to establish causation. 727 F. Supp., at 575. Thus, the animal-cell studies, live-animal studies, and chemical-structure analyses on which petitioners had relied could not raise by themselves a reasonably disputable jury issue regarding causation. Ibid. Petitioners’ epidemiological analyses, based as they were on recalculations of data in previously published studies that had found no causal link between the drug and birth defects, were ruled to be inadmissible because they had not been published or subjected to peer review. Ibid.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. 951 F. 2d 1128 (1991). Citing Frye v. United States, 54 App. D. C. 46, 47, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (1923), the court stated that expert opinion based on a scientific technique is inadmissible unless the technique is “generally accepted” as reliable in the relevant scientific community. 951 F. 2d, at 1129-1130. The court declared that expert opinion based on a methodology that diverges “significantly from the procedures accepted by recognized authorities in the field ... cannot be shown to be ‘generally accepted as a reliable technique.’ ” Id., at 1130, quoting United States v. Solomon, 753 F. 2d 1522, 1526 (CA9 1985).
The court emphasized that other Courts of Appeals considering the risks of Bendectin had refused to admit reanalyses of epidemiological studies that had been neither published nor subjected to peer review. 951 F. 2d, at 1130-1131. Those courts had found unpublished reanalyses “particularly problematic in light of the massive weight of the original published studies supporting [respondent’s] position, all of which had undergone full scrutiny from the scientific community.” Id., at 1130. Contending that reanalysis is generally accepted by the scientific community only when it is subjected to verification and scrutiny by others in the field, the Court of Appeals rejected petitioners’ reanalyses as “unpublished, not subjected to the normal peer review process and generated solely for use in litigation.” Id., at 1131. The court concluded that petitioners’ evidence provided an insufficient foundation to allow admission of expert testimony that Bendectin caused their injuries and, accordingly, that petitioners could not satisfy their burden of proving causation at trial.
We granted certiorari, 506 U. S. 914 (1992), in light of sharp divisions among the courts regarding the proper standard for the admission of expert testimony. Compare, e. g., United States v. Shorter, 257 U. S. App. D. C. 358, 363-364, 809 F. 2d 54, 59-60 (applying the “general acceptance” standard), cert. denied, 484 U. S. 817 (1987), with DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911 F. 2d 941, 955 (CA3 1990) (rejecting the “general acceptance” standard).
II
A
In the 70 years since its formulation in the Frye case, the “general acceptance” test has been the dominant standard for determining the admissibility of novel scientific evidence at trial. See E. Green & C. Nesson, Problems, Cases, and Materials on Evidence 649 (1983). Although under increasing attack of late, the rule continues to be followed by a majority of courts, including the Ninth Circuit.
The Frye test has its origin in a short and citation-free 1923 decision concerning the admissibility of evidence derived from a systolic blood pressure deception test, a crude precursor to the polygraph machine. In what has become a famous (perhaps infamous) passage, the then Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia described the device and its operation and declared:
“Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.” 54 App. D. C., at 47, 293 F., at 1014 (emphasis added).
Because the deception test had “not yet gained such standing and scientific recognition among physiological and psychological authorities as would justify the courts in admitting expert testimony deduced from the discovery, development, and experiments thus far made,” evidence of its results was ruled inadmissible. Ibid.
The merits of the Frye test have been much debated, and scholarship on its proper scope and application is legion. Petitioners’ primary attack, however, is not on the content but on the continuing authority of the rule. They contend that the Frye test was superseded by the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence. We agree.
We interpret the legislatively enacted Federal Rules of Evidence as we would any statute. Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U. S. 153, 163 (1988). Rule 402 provides the baseline:
“All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.”
“Relevant evidence” is defined as that which has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Rule 401. The Rules’ basic standard of relevance thus is a liberal one.
Frye, of course, predated the Rules by half a century. In United States v. Abel, 469 U. S. 45 (1984), we considered the pertinence of background common law in interpreting the Rules of Evidence. We noted that the Rules occupy the field, id., at 49, but, quoting Professor Cleary, the Reporter, explained that the common law nevertheless could serve as an aid to their application:
“ ‘In principle, under the Federal Rules no common law of evidence remains. “All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided . . . .” In reality, of course, the body of common law knowledge continues to exist, though in the somewhat altered form of a source of guidance in the exercise of delegated powers.’” Id., at 51-52.
We found the common-law precept at issue in the Abel case entirely consistent with Rule 402’s general requirement of admissibility, and considered it unlikely that the drafters had intended to change the rule. Id., at 50-51. In Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U. S. 171 (1987), on the other hand, the Court was unable to find a particular common-law doctrine in the Rules, and so held it superseded.
Here there is a specific Rule that speaks to the contested issue. Rule 702, governing expert testimony, provides:
“If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.”
Nothing in the text of this Rule establishes “general acceptance” as an absolute prerequisite to admissibility. Nor does respondent present any clear indication that Rule 702 or the Rules as a whole were intended to incorporate a “general acceptance” standard. The drafting history makes no mention of Frye, and a rigid “general acceptance” requirement would be at odds with the “liberal thrust” of the Federal Rules and their “general approach of relaxing the traditional barriers to ‘opinion’ testimony.” Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U. S., at 169 (citing Rules 701 to 705). See also Weinstein, Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence is Sound; It Should Not Be Amended, 138 F. R. D. 631 (1991) (“The Rules were designed to depend primarily upon lawyer-adversaries and sensible triers of fact to evaluate conflicts”). Given the Rules’ permissive backdrop and their inclusion of a specific rule on expert testimony that does not mention “general acceptance,” the assertion that the Rules somehow assimilated Frye is unconvincing. Frye made “general acceptance” the exclusive test for admitting expert scientific testimony. That austere standard, absent from, and incompatible with, the Federal Rules of Evidence, should not be applied in federal trials.
B
That the Frye test was displaced by the Rules of Evidence does not mean, however, that the Rules themselves place no limits on the admissibility of purportedly scientific evidence. Nor is the trial judge disabled from screening such evidence. To the contrary, under the Rules the trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.
The primary locus of this obligation is Rule 702, which clearly contemplates some degree of regulation of the subjects and theories about which an expert may testify. “If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue” an expert “may testify thereto.” (Emphasis added.) The subject of an expert’s testimony must be “scientific . . . knowledge.” The adjective “scientific” implies a grounding in the methods and procedures of science. Similarly, the word “knowledge” connotes more than subjective belief or unsupported speculation. The term “applies to any body of known facts or to any body of ideas inferred from such facts or accepted as truths on good grounds.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1252 (1986). Of course, it would be unreasonable to conclude that the subject of scientific testimony must be “known” to a certainty; arguably, there are no certainties in science. See, e. g., Brief for Nicolaas Bloembergen et al. as Amici Curiae 9 (“Indeed, scientists do not assert that they know what is immutably ‘true’ — they are committed to searching for new, temporary, theories to explain, as best they can, phenomena”); Brief for American Association for the Advancement of Science et al. as Amici Curiae 7-8 (“Science is not an encyclopedic body of knowledge about the universe. Instead, it represents a process for proposing and refining theoretical explanations about the world that are subject to further testing and refinement” (emphasis in original)). But, in order to qualify as “scientific knowledge,” an inference or assertion must be derived by the scientific method. Proposed testimony must be supported by appropriate validation — i. e., “good grounds,” based on what is known. In short, the requirement that an expert’s testimony pertain to “scientific knowledge” establishes a standard of evidentiary reliability.
Rule 702 further requires that the evidence or testimony “assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” This condition goes primarily to relevance. “Expert testimony which does not relate to any issue in the case is not relevant and, ergo, non-helpful.” 3 Weinstein & Berger ¶ 702[02], p. 702-18. See also United States v. Downing, 753 F. 2d 1224, 1242 (CA3 1985) (“An additional consideration under Rule 702 — and another aspect of relevancy — is whether expert testimony proffered in the case is sufficiently tied to the facts of the case that it will aid the jury in resolving a factual dispute”). The consideration has been aptly described by Judge Becker as one of “fit.” Ibid. “Fit” is not always obvious, and scientific validity for one purpose is not necessarily scientific validity for other, unrelated purposes. See Starrs, Frye v. United States Restructured and Revitalized: A Proposal to Amend Federal Evidence Rule 702, 26 Jurimetrics J. 249, 258 (1986). The study of the phases of the moon, for example, may provide valid scientific “knowledge” about whether a certain night was dark, and if darkness is a fact in issue, the knowledge will assist the trier of fact. However (absent creditable grounds supporting such a link), evidence that the moon was full on a certain night will not assist the trier of fact in determining whether an individual was unusually likely to have behaved irrationally on that night. Rule 702’s “helpfulness” standard requires a valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry as a precondition to admissibility.
That these requirements are embodied in Rule 702 is not surprising. Unlike an ordinary witness, see Rule 701, an expert is permitted wide latitude to offer opinions, including those that are not based on firsthand knowledge or observation. See Rules 702 and 703. Presumably, this relaxation of the usual requirement of firsthand knowledge — a rule which represents “a ‘most pervasive manifestation’ of the common law insistence upon ‘the most reliable sources of information,’ ” Advisory Committee’s Notes on Fed. Rule Evid. 602, 28 U. S. C. App., p. 755 (citation omitted) — is premised on an assumption that the expert’s opinion will have a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of his discipline.
C
Faced with a proffer of expert scientific testimony, then, the trial judge must determine at the outset, pursuant to Rule 104(a), whether the expert is proposing to testify to (1) scientific knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue. This entails a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue. We are confident that federal judges possess the capacity to undertake this review. Many factors will bear on the inquiry, and we do not presume to set out a definitive checklist or test. But some general observations are appropriate.
Ordinarily, a key question to be answered in determining whether a theory or technique is scientific knowledge that will assist the trier of fact will be whether it can be (and has been) tested. “Scientific methodology today is based on generating hypotheses and testing them to see if they can be falsified; indeed, this methodology is what distinguishes science from other fields of human inquiry.” Green 645. See also C. Hempel, Philosophy of Natural Science 49 (1966) (“[T]he statements constituting a scientific explanation must be capable of empirical test”); K. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge 37 (5th ed. 1989) (“[T]he criterion of the scientific status of a theory is its falsifiability, or refutability, or testability”) (emphasis deleted).
Another pertinent consideration is whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication. Publication (which is but one element of peer review) is not a sine qua non of admissibility; it does not necessarily correlate with reliability, see S. Jasanoff, The Fifth Branch: Science Advisors as Policymakers 61-76 (1990), and in some instances well-grounded but innovative theories will not have been published, see Horrobin, The Philosophical Basis of Peer Review and the Suppression of Innovation, 263 JAMA 1438 (1990). Some propositions, moreover, are too particular, too new, or of too limited interest to be published. But submission to the scrutiny of the scientific community is a component of “good science,” in part because it increases the likelihood that substantive flaws in methodology will be detected. See J. Ziman, Reliable Knowledge: An Exploration of the Grounds for Belief in Science 130-133 (1978); Reiman & Angell, How Good Is Peer Review?, 321 New Eng. J. Med. 827 (1989). The fact of publication (or lack thereof) in a peer reviewed journal thus will be a relevant, though not dispositive, consideration in assessing the scientific validity of a particular technique or methodology on which an opinion is premised.
Additionally, in the case of a particular scientific technique, the court ordinarily should consider the known or potential rate of error, see, e. g., United States v. Smith, 869 F. 2d 348, 353-354 (CA7 1989) (surveying studies of the error rate of spectrographic voice identification technique), and the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique’s operation, see United States v. Williams, 583 F. 2d 1194, 1198 (CA2 1978) (noting professional organization’s standard governing spectrographic analysis), cert. denied, 439 U. S. 1117 (1979).
Finally, “general acceptance” can yet have a bearing on the inquiry. A “reliability assessment does not require, although it does permit, explicit identification of a relevant scientific community and an express determination of a particular degree of acceptance within that community.” United States v. Downing, 753 F. 2d, at 1238. See also 3 Weinstein & Berger ¶ 702[03], pp. 702-41 to 702-42. Widespread acceptance can be an important factor in ruling particular evidence admissible, and “a known technique which has been able to attract only minimal support within the community,” Downing, 753 F. 2d, at 1238, may properly be viewed with skepticism.
The inquiry envisioned by Rule 702 is, we emphasize, a flexible one. Its overarching subject is the scientific validity — and thus the evidentiary relevance and reliability — of the principles that underlie a proposed submission. The focus, of course, must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate.
Throughout, a judge assessing a proffer of expert scientific testimony under Rule 702 should also be mindful of other applicable rules. Rule 703 provides that expert opinions based on otherwise inadmissible hearsay are to be admitted only if the facts or data are “of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject.” Rule 706 allows the court at its discretion to procure the assistance of an expert of its own choosing. Finally, Rule 403 permits the exclusion of relevant evidence “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury . . . .” Judge Weinstein has explained: “Expert evidence can be both powerful and quite misleading because of the difficulty in evaluating it. Because of this risk, the judge in weighing possible prejudice against probative force under Rule 403 of the present rules exercises more control over experts than over lay witnesses.” Weinstein, 138 F. R. D., at 632.
Ill
We conclude by briefly addressing what appear to be two underlying concerns of the parties and amici in this case. Respondent expresses apprehension that abandonment of “general acceptance” as the exclusive requirement for admission will result in a “free-for-all” in which befuddled juries are confounded by absurd and irrational pseudoscientific assertions. In this regard respondent seems to us to be overly pessimistic about the capabilities of the jury and of the adversary system generally. Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence. See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U. S. 44, 61 (1987). Additionally, in the event the trial court concludes that the scintilla of evidence presented supporting a position is insufficient to allow a reasonable juror to conclude that the position more likely than not is true, the court remains free to direct a judgment, Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 50(a), and likewise to grant summary judgment, Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56. Cf., e. g., Turpin v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 959 F. 2d 1349 (CA6) (holding that scientific evidence that provided foundation for expert testimony, viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, was not sufficient to allow a jury to find it more probable than not that defendant caused plaintiff’s injury), cert. denied, 506 U. S. 826 (1992); Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 874 F. 2d 307 (CA5 1989) (reversing judgment entered on jury verdict for plaintiffs because evidence regarding causation was insufficient), modified, 884 F. 2d 166 (CA5 1989), cert. denied, 494 U. S. 1046 (1990); Green 680-681. These conventional devices, rather than wholesale exclusion under an uncompromising “general acceptance” test, are the appropriate safeguards where the basis of scientific testimony meets the standards of Rule 702.
Petitioners and, to a greater extent, their amici exhibit a different concern. They suggest that recognition of a screening role for the judge that allows for the exclusion of “invalid” evidence will sanction a stifling and repressive scientific orthodoxy and will be inimical to the search for truth. See, e. g., Brief for Ronald Bayer et al. as Amici Curiae. It is true that open debate is an essential part of both legal and scientific analyses. Yet there are important differences between the quest for truth in the courtroom and the quest for truth in the laboratory. Scientific conclusions are subject to perpetual revision. Law, on the other hand, must resolve disputes finally and quickly. The scientific project is advanced by broad and wide-ranging consideration of a multitude of hypotheses, for those that are incorrect will eventually be shown to be so, and that in itself is an advance. Conjectures that are probably wrong are of little use, however, in the project of reaching a quick, final, and binding legal judgment — often of great consequence — about a particular set of events in the past. We recognize that, in practice, a gatekeeping role for the judge, no matter how flexible, inevitably on occasion will prevent the jury from learning of authentic insights and innovations. That, nevertheless, is the balance that is struck by Rules of Evidence designed not for the exhaustive search for cosmic understanding but for the particularized resolution of legal disputes.
IV
To summarize: “General acceptance” is not a necessary precondition to the admissibility of scientific evidence under the Federal Rules of Evidence, but the Rules of Evidence— especially Rule 702 — do assign to the trial judge the task of ensuring that an expert’s testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand. Pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid principles will satisfy those demands.
The inquiries of the District Court and the Court of Appeals focused almost exclusively on “general acceptance,” as gauged by publication and the decisions of other courts. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Doctor Lamm received his master’s and doctor of medicine degrees from the University of Southern California. He has served as a consultant in birth-defect epidemiology for the National Center for Health Statistics and has published numerous articles on the magnitude of risk from exposure to various chemical and biological substances. App. 34-44.
For example, Shanna Helen Swan, who received a master’s degree in biostatistics from Columbia University and a doctorate in statistics from the University of California at Berkeley, is chief of the section of the California Department of Health and Services that determines causes of birth defects and has served as a consultant to the World Health Organization, the Food and Drug Administration, and the National Institutes of Health. Id., at 113-114, 131-132. Stuart A. Newman, who received his bachelor’s degree in chemistry from Columbia University and his master’s and doctorate in chemistry from the University of Chicago, is a professor at New York Medical College and has spent over a decade studying the effect of chemicals on limb development. Id., at 54-56. The credentials of the others are similarly impressive. See id., at 61-66, 73-80, 148-153, 187-192, and Attachments 12, 20, 21, 26, 31, and 32 to Petitioners’ Opposition to Summary Judgment in No. 84-2013-G(I) (SD Cal.).
For a catalog of the many cases on either side of this controversy, see P. Giannelli & E. Imwinkelried, Scientific Evidence § 1-5, pp. 10-14 (1986 and Supp. 1991).
See, e. g., Green, Expert Witnesses and Sufficiency of Evidence in Toxic Substances Litigation: The Legacy of Agent Orange and Bendectin Litigation, 86 Nw. U. L. Rev. 643 (1992) (hereinafter Green); Becker & Orenstein, The Federal Rules of Evidence After Sixteen Years — The Effect of “Plain Meaning” Jurisprudence, the Need for an Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence, and Suggestions for Selective Revision of the Rules, 60 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 857, 876-885 (1992); Hanson, James Alphonzo Frye is Sixty-Five Years Old; Should He Retire?, 16 West. St. U. L. Rev. 357 (1989); Black, A Unified Theory of Scientific Evidence, 56 Ford. L. Rev. 595 (1988); Imwinkelried, The “Bases” of Expert Testimony: The Syllogistic Structure of Scientific Testimony, 67 N. C. L. Rev. 1 (1988); Proposals for a Model Rule on the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence, 26 Jurimetrics J. 235 (1986); Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, a Half-Century Later, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 1197 (1980); The Supreme Court, 1986 Term, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 7, 119, 125-127 (1987).
Indeed, the debates over Frye are such a well-established part of the academic landscape that a distinct term — “Frt/e-ologist”—has been advanced to describe those who take part. See Behringer, Introduction, Proposals for a Model Rule on the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence, 26 Jurimetrics J. 237, 239 (1986), quoting Lacey, Scientific Evidence, 24 Jurimetrics J. 254, 264 (1984).
Like the question of Frye’s merit, the dispute over its survival has divided courts and commentators. Compare, e. g., United States v. Williams, 583 F. 2d 1194 (CA2 1978) (Frye is superseded by the Rules of Evidence), cert. denied, 439 U. S. 1117 (1979), with Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F. 2d 1106, 1111, 1115-1116 (CA5 1991) (en banc) (Frye and the Rules coexist), cert. denied, 503 U. S. 912 (1992), 3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein’s Evidence ¶ 702[03], pp. 702-36 to 702-37 (1988) (hereinafter Weinstein & Berger) (Frye is dead), and M. Graham, Handbook of Federal Evidence § 703.2 (3d ed. 1991) (Frye lives). See generally P. Giannelli & E. Imwinkelried, Scientific Evidence § 1-5, at 28-29 (citing authorities).
Because we hold that Frye has been superseded and base the discussion that follows on the content of the eongressionally enacted Federal Rules of Evidence, we do not address petitioners’ argument that application of the Frye rule in this diversity case, as the application of a judge-made rule affecting substantive rights, would violate the doctrine of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938).
The Chief Justice “do[es] not doubt that Rule 702 confides to the judge some gatekeeping responsibility,” post, at 600, but would neither say how it does so nor explain what that role entails. We believe the better course is to note the nature and source of the duty.
Rule 702 also applies to “technical, or other specialized knowledge.” Our discussion is limited to the scientific context because that is the nature of the expertise offered here.
We note that scientists typically distinguish between “validity” (does the principle support what it purports to show?) and “reliability” (does application of the principle produce consistent results?). See Black, 56 Ford. L. Rev., at 599. Although “the difference between accuracy, validity, and reliability may be such that each is distinct from the other by no more than a hen’s kick,” Starrs, Frye v. United States Restructured and Revitalized: A Proposal to Amend Federal Evidence Rule 702, 26 Jurimetrics J. 249, 256 (1986), our reference here is to evidentiary reliability— that is, trustworthiness. Cf., e. g., Advisory Committee’s Notes on Fed. Rule Evid. 602, 28 U. S. C. App., p. 755 (“ ‘[T]he rule requiring that a witness who testifies to a fact which can be perceived by the senses must have had an opportunity to observe, and must have actually observed the fact’ is a ‘most pervasive manifestation’ of the common law insistence upon ‘the most reliable sources of information’” (citation omitted)); Advisory Committee’s Notes on Art. VIII of Rules of Evidence, 28 U. S. C. App., p. 770 (hearsay exceptions will be recognized only “under circumstances supposed to furnish guarantees of trustworthiness”). In a case involving scientific evidence, evidentiary reliability will be based upon scientific validity.
Rule 104(a) provides:
“Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court, subject to the provisions of subdivision (b) [pertaining to conditional admissions]. In making its determination it is not bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect to privileges.” These matters should be established by a preponderance of proof. See Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U. S. 171, 175-176 (1987).
Although the Frye decision itself focused exclusively on “novel” scientific techniques, we do not read the requirements of Rule 702 to apply specially or exclusively to unconventional evidence. Of course, well-established propositions are less likely to be challenged than those that are novel, and they are more handily defended. Indeed, theories that are so firmly established as to have attained the status of scientific law, such as the laws of thermodynamics, properly are subject to judicial notice under Federal Rule of Evidence 201.
A number of authorities have presented variations on the reliability approach, each with its own slightly different set of factors. See, e. g., Downing, 763 F. 2d, at 1238-1239 (on which our discussion draws in part); 3 Weinstein & Berger ¶ 702[03], pp. 702-41 to 702-42 (on which the Downing court in turn partially relied); McCormick, Scientific Evidence: Defining a New Approach to Admissibility, 67 Iowa L. Rev. 879, 911-912 (1982); and Symposium on Science and the Rules of Evidence, 99 F. R. D. 187, 231 (1983) (statement by Margaret Berger). To the extent that they focus on the reliability of evidence as ensured by the scientific validity of its underlying principles, all these versions may well have merit, although we express no opinion regarding any of their particular details.
This is not to say that judicial interpretation, as opposed to adjudicative factfinding, does not share basic characteristics of the scientific endeavor: “The work of a judge is in one sense enduring and in another ephemeral. ... In the endless process of testing and retesting, there is a constant rejection of the dross and a constant retention of whatever is pure and sound and fine.” B. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 178-179 (1921).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | I | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court of Ohio affirming a judgment of conviction of a criminal offense entered in the Court of Common Pleas, Wyandot County, Ohio.
The motion to substitute Margie Wetzel, Administratrix of the Estate of Edward J. Wetzel, who died April 26, 1962, as appellant in place of Edward J. Wetzel is granted. The motion of appellee to dismiss the appeal for want of a substantial federal question is granted.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | I | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court.
Before us for review are orders of a three-judge court in the Western District of Texas effectively directing the State not to conduct this year's elections using districting plans that the court itself adopted some years earlier. The court developed those plans for use in the 2012 elections pursuant to our directions in Perry v. Perez, 565 U.S. 388, 132 S.Ct. 934, 181 L.Ed.2d 900 (2012) (per curiam ). We instructed the three-judge court to start with the plans adopted by the Texas Legislature in 2011 but to make adjustments as required by the Constitution and the Voting Rights Act. Id., at 392-396, 132 S.Ct. 934. After those plans were used in 2012, the Texas Legislature enacted them (with only minor modifications) in 2013, and the plans were used again in both 2014 and 2016.
Last year, however, the three-judge court reversed its prior analysis and held that some of the districts in those plans are unlawful. After reviewing the repealed 2011 plans, which had never been used, the court found that they were tainted by discriminatory intent and that the 2013 Legislature had not "cured" that "taint."
We now hold that the three-judge court committed a fundamental legal error. It was the challengers' burden to show that the 2013 Legislature acted with discriminatory intent when it enacted plans that the court itself had produced. The 2013 Legislature was not obligated to show that it had "cured" the unlawful intent that the court attributed to the 2011 Legislature. Thus, the essential pillar of the three-judge court's reasoning was critically flawed.
When the congressional and state legislative districts are reviewed under the proper legal standards, all but one of them, we conclude, are lawful.
I
A
The 2010 decennial census revealed that the population of Texas had grown by more than 20% and the State was therefore apportioned four additional seats in the United States House of Representatives. C.J.S. 369a. To accommodate this new allocation and the population changes shown by the census, the Legislature adopted a new congressional districting plan, as well as new districting maps for the two houses of the State Legislature.
Redistricting is never easy, and the task was especially complicated in Texas in 2011. Not only was the Legislature required to draw districts that were substantially equal in population, see Perry, supra, at 391-392, 126 S.Ct. 2594 ; Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964) ; Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 84 S.Ct. 526, 11 L.Ed.2d 481 (1964), and to comply with special state-law districting rules, but federal law imposed complex and delicately balanced requirements regarding the consideration of race.
Then, as now, federal law restricted the use of race in making districting decisions. The Equal Protection Clause forbids "racial gerrymandering," that is, intentionally assigning citizens to a district on the basis of race without sufficient justification. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 641, 113 S.Ct. 2816, 125 L.Ed.2d 511 (1993). It also prohibits intentional "vote dilution"-"invidiously... minimiz[ing] or cancel[ing] out the voting potential of racial or ethnic minorities." Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 66-67, 100 S.Ct. 1490, 64 L.Ed.2d 47 (1980) (plurality opinion).
While the Equal Protection Clause imposes these important restrictions, its application in the field of districting is complicated. For one thing, because a voter's race sometimes correlates closely with political party preference, see Cooper v. Harris, 581 U.S. ----, ---- - ----, 137 S.Ct. 1455, 1473-1474, 197 L.Ed.2d 837 (2017) ; Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 243, 121 S.Ct. 1452, 149 L.Ed.2d 430 (2001), it may be very difficult for a court to determine whether a districting decision was based on race or party preference. Here, the three-judge court found that the two factors were virtually indistinguishable.
At the same time that the Equal Protection Clause restricts the consideration of race in the districting process, compliance with the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 437, as amended, 52 U.S.C. § 10301 et seq. (VRA), pulls in the opposite direction: It often insists that districts be created precisely because of race. Two provisions of the VRA exert such demands, and in 2011, Texas was subject to both.
At that time, Texas was covered by § 5 of the VRA and was thus barred from making any districting changes unless it could prove that they did not result in "retrogression" with respect to the ability of racial minorities to elect the candidates of their choice. Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 575 U.S. ----, ----, 135 S.Ct. 1257, 1263, 191 L.Ed.2d 314 (2015). That showing obviously demanded consideration of race.
On top of this, Texas was (and still is) required to comply with § 2 of the VRA. A State violates § 2 if its districting plan provides " 'less opportunity' " for racial minorities " 'to elect representatives of their choice.' " League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 425, 126 S.Ct. 2594, 165 L.Ed.2d 609 (2006) (LULAC ). In a series of cases tracing back to Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 106 S.Ct. 2752, 92 L.Ed.2d 25 (1986), we have interpreted this standard to mean that, under certain circumstance, States must draw "opportunity" districts in which minority groups form "effective majorit[ies]," LULAC, supra, at 426, 126 S.Ct. 2594.
Since the Equal Protection Clause restricts consideration of race and the VRA demands consideration of race, a legislature attempting to produce a lawful districting plan is vulnerable to " 'competing hazards of liability.' " Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 977, 116 S.Ct. 1941, 135 L.Ed.2d 248 (1996) (plurality opinion). In an effort to harmonize these conflicting demands, we have assumed that compliance with the VRA may justify the consideration of race in a way that would not otherwise be allowed. In technical terms, we have assumed that complying with the VRA is a compelling state interest, see, e.g., Bethune-Hill v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 580 U.S. ----, ----, 137 S.Ct. 788, 800-801, 197 L.Ed.2d 85 (2017) ; Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 915, 116 S.Ct. 1894, 135 L.Ed.2d 207 (1996), and that a State's consideration of race in making a districting decision is narrowly tailored and thus satisfies strict scrutiny if the State has " 'good reasons' " for believing that its decision is necessary in order to comply with the VRA. Cooper, supra, at ----, 137 S.Ct., at 1464.
B
Facing this legal obstacle course, the Texas Legislature in 2011 adopted new districting plans, but those plans were immediately tied up in litigation and were never used. Several plaintiff groups quickly filed challenges in the District Court for the Western District of Texas, arguing that some of the districts in the new plans were racial gerrymanders, some were based on intentional vote dilution, and some had the effect of depriving minorities of the equal opportunity to elect the candidates of their choice. This case was assigned to a three-judge court, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a). (We will call this court "the Texas court" or simply "the District Court.")
The situation was further complicated by the requirement that Texas obtain preclearance of its new plans. To do this, Texas filed for a declaratory judgment in the District Court for the District of Columbia. See Texas v. United States, 887 F.Supp.2d 133 (2012). (We will call this court "the D.C. court.") By early 2012, the D.C. court had not yet issued a decision, and Texas needed usable plans for its rapidly approaching primaries. Accordingly, the Texas court drew up interim plans for that purpose. Perez v. Perry, 835 F.Supp.2d 209 (W.D.Tex.2011). In creating those plans, the majority of the Texas court thought that it was not "required to give any deference to the Legislature's enacted plan." Id., at 213. Instead, it based its plans on what it called "neutral principles that advance the interest of the collective public good." Id., at 212.
Texas challenged those court-ordered plans in this Court, and we reversed. Perry v. Perez, 565 U.S. 388, 132 S.Ct. 934, 181 L.Ed.2d 900 (2012) (per curiam ). Noting that "[r]edistricting is 'primarily the duty and responsibility of the State,' " we held that the Texas court should have respected the legislative judgments embodied in the 2011 plans to the extent allowed by the Constitution and the VRA. Id., at 392-399, 132 S.Ct. 934.
We remanded the case with very specific instructions. The Texas court was told to start with the plans adopted by the Legislature but to modify those plans as needed so as "not to incorporate... any legal defects." Id., at 394, 132 S.Ct. 934. With respect to claims under the Constitution or § 2 of the VRA, the District Court was told to change a district if the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their challenge. Ibid. And with respect to § 5 claims, the court was instructed to make whatever changes were needed to obviate any legal claim that was "not insubstantial." Id., at 395, 132 S.Ct. 934. Thus, our instructions, in an abundance of caution, demanded changes in the challenged 2011 plans without proof that those changes were actually required by either the Constitution or the VRA.
On remand, the Texas court ordered additional briefing and heard two more days of argument. App. 29a, 35a-50a; Order in Civ. No. 11-cv-00360, Doc. No. 616. It issued two opinions, totaling more than 70 pages, and analyzed disputed districts in detail. C.J.S. 367a-423a; H.J.S. 300a-315a. While stressing the preliminary nature of its determinations, see C.J.S. 368a; H.J.S. 314a-315a, the court found that some districts required change and that others were lawful, C.J.S. 367a-423a; H.J.S. 300a-315a. The court then adopted plans for the State's congressional districts and for both houses of the State Legislature. (The plan for the State Senate is not at issue.)
Both the congressional plan and the plan for the Texas House departed significantly from the State's 2011 plans. At least 8 of the 36 congressional districts were markedly altered, and 21 districts in the plan for the Texas House were "substantially" changed. H.J.S. 314a; C.J.S. 397a-408a.
In August 2012, the D.C. court denied preclearance of the plans adopted by the Legislature in 2011, see Texas v. United States, supra, so the State conducted the 2012 elections under the interim plans devised by the Texas court. At the same time, Texas filed an appeal in this Court contesting the decision of the D.C. court, but that appeal ultimately died for two reasons.
First, the 2011 plans were repealed. The Texas attorney general urged the Legislature to pass new redistricting plans, C.J.S. 429a, and in his view, the "best way to remedy the violations found by the D.C. court" was to "adopt the [Texas court's] interim plans as the State's permanent redistricting maps." Id., at 432a. Doing so, he said, would "confirm the legislature's intent" to adopt "a redistricting plan that fully comports with the law." Id., at 429a.
The Governor called a special session to do just that, and the Legislature complied. One of the legislative sponsors, Senator Seliger, explained that, although " 'the Texas Legislature remains confident that the legislatively-drawn maps adopted in 2011 are fair and legal..., there remain several outstanding legal questions regarding these maps that undermine the stability and predictability of the electoral process in Texas.' " 274 F.Supp.3d 624, 649, n. 40 (D.C.Cir.2017). Counsel for one of the plaintiff groups, the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF), testified in favor of the plans. C.J.S. 436a-439a. The 2013 Legislature then repealed the 2011 plans and enacted the Texas court's interim plans with just a few minor changes. The federal congressional plan was not altered at all, and only small modifications were made to the plan for the Texas House. C.J.S. Findings 231a-232a.
On the day after the Legislature passed the new plans and the day before the Governor signed them, this Court issued its decision in Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 133 S.Ct. 2612, 186 L.Ed.2d 651 (2013), which invalidated the coverage formula in § 4 of the Voting Rights Act. Now no longer subject to § 5, Texas obtained a vacatur of the D.C. court's order on preclearance. 274 F.Supp.3d, at 634-635, and n. 11.
With the never-effective 2011 plans now repealed and any preclearance issues overcome by events, the State argued in the Texas court that the plaintiffs' case against the 2011 plans was moot. In September 2013, the Texas court allowed the plaintiffs to amend their complaints to challenge the 2013 plans, but the court held that their challenges to the 2011 plans were still alive, reasoning that the repeal of the 2011 plans represented the "voluntary cessation" of allegedly unconstitutional conduct.
Texas conducted its 2014 and 2016 elections under the plans that had been preliminarily approved by the Texas court and subsequently adopted (with only minor changes) by the Legislature in 2013. But in March and April 2017, after multiple trials, the Texas court issued a pair of rulings on the defunct 2011 plans. The court reaffirmed the conclusions it had reached in 2012 about defects in the 2011 plans, and it went further. Contrary to its earlier decision, it held that Congressional District (CD) 35 is an impermissible racial gerrymander and that CD27 violates § 2 of the Voting Rights Act because it has the effect of diluting the electoral opportunities of Latino voters. C.J.S. 181a, 193a-194a. Previously, the court had provided detailed reasons for rejecting the very arguments that it now accepted. Id., at 409a-423a. Similarly, the court held that multiple districts in the plan for the Texas House were the result of intentional vote dilution. These included districts in the counties of Nueces (House District (HD) 32, HD34), Bell (HD54, HD55), and Dallas (HD103, HD104, HD105). H.J.S. 275a-276a.
In August 2017, having ruled on the repealed 2011 plans, the Texas court finally turned its attention to the plans then in effect-i.e., the plans that had been developed by the court, adopted by the Legislature in 2013, and used in both the 2014 and 2016 elections. The court invalidated the districts in those plans that correspond to districts in the 2011 plan that it had just held to be unlawful, i.e., CD27, CD35, HD32, HD34, HD54, HD55, HD103, HD104, and HD105. See 274 F.Supp.3d 624 (2017) (No. 17-586) and 267 F.Supp.3d 750 (2017) (No. 17-626).
In reaching these conclusions, the court pointed to the discriminatory intent allegedly harbored by the 2011 Legislature, and it attributed this same intent to the 2013 Legislature because it had failed to "engage in a deliberative process to ensure that the 2013 plans cured any taint from the 2011 plans." 274 F.Supp.3d, at 645-652 ; 267 F.Supp.3d, at 757. The court saw "no indication that the Legislature looked to see whether any discriminatory taint remained in the plans." 274 F.Supp.3d, at 649. And it faulted the State because it "did not accept [findings of the D.C. court] and instead appealed to the Supreme Court." Ibid. Seeing no evidence that the State had undergone "a change of heart," the court concluded that the Legislature's "decision to adopt the [District Court's] plans" was a "litigation strategy designed to insulate the 2011 or 2013 plans from further challenge, regardless of their legal infirmities." Id., at 649-650. Finally, summarizing its analysis, the court reiterated that the 2011 Legislature's "discriminatory taint was not removed by the [2013] Legislature's enactment of the Court's interim plans, because the Legislature engaged in no deliberative process to remove any such taint, and in fact intended any such taint to be maintained but be safe from remedy." Id., at 686.
The Texas court's decisions about CD35 and all but three of the Texas House districts were based entirely on its finding that the 2013 Legislature had not purged its predecessor's discriminatory intent. However, the court also held that three districts-CD27, HD32, and HD34-were invalid under § 2 of the Voting Rights Act because they had the effect of depriving Latinos of the equal opportunity to elect their candidates of choice. Id., at 682-686 ; 267 F.Supp.3d, at 775-783. And the court found independent proof that HD90 was a racial gerrymander. Id., at 788-794.
The court held that violations in all these districts "must be remedied." 274 F.Supp.3d, at 686 ; see also 267 F.Supp.3d, at 795 (describing State House district violations that "must be remedied"). Mindful that October 1 was the deadline for the Texas Secretary of State to provide voter registration templates to the State's counties, App. 380a-381a, the court took steps to bring about prompt remedial action. In two orders issued on August 15 and 24, the Texas attorney general was instructed to advise the court, within three days, "whether the Legislature intends to take up redistricting in an effort to cure these violations." 274 F.Supp.3d, at 686 ; 267 F.Supp.3d, at 795. If the Legislature chose not to do so, the court warned, it would "hold a hearing to consider remedial plans." Ibid. After the Governor made clear that the State would not act, the court ordered the parties to proceed with a hearing on the congressional plan on September 5, as well as a hearing on the plan for the Texas House on September 6. 274 F.Supp.3d, at 686 ; 267 F.Supp.3d, at 795 ; App. 134a-136a; Defendants' Opposed Motion To Stay Order on Plan C235 Pending Appeal or Final Judgment in Civ. No. 11-cv-00360, Doc. 1538, pp. 3-4; Defendants' Opposed Motion To Stay Order on Plan H358 Pending Appeal or Final Judgment, Doc. No. 1550, pp. 4-5.
Texas applied for stays of both orders, but the District Court denied the applications. App. 134a-136a. Texas then asked this Court to stay the orders, and we granted that relief. After receiving jurisdictional statements, we postponed consideration of jurisdiction and set the cases for consolidated argument. 583 U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 735, 199 L.Ed.2d 601 (2018).
II
Before reaching the merits of these appeals, we must assure ourselves that we have jurisdiction to review the orders at issue. Appellants claim that the orders amount to injunctions and are therefore appealable to this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1253. Appellees disagree, contending that the orders do not qualify as injunctions. We hold that we have jurisdiction because the orders were effectively injunctions in that they barred Texas from using the districting plans now in effect to conduct this year's elections.
A
The Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, "established the general principle that only final decisions of the federal district courts would be reviewable on appeal." Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 83, 101 S.Ct. 993, 67 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981) (emphasis deleted). But because "rigid application of this principle was found to create undue hardship in some cases," Congress created exceptions. Ibid. Two are relevant here. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1253 to hear an appeal from an order of a three-judge district court "granting or denying... an interlocutory or permanent injunction." Similarly, § 1292(a)(1) gives the courts of appeals jurisdiction over "[i]nterlocutory orders of the district courts" "granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions," "except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court."
The orders in these cases fall within § 1253. To be sure, the District Court did not call its orders "injunctions"-in fact, it disclaimed the term, App. 134a-136a-but the label attached to an order is not dispositive. We have previously made clear that where an order has the "practical effect" of granting or denying an injunction, it should be treated as such for purposes of appellate jurisdiction. Carson, supra, at 83, 101 S.Ct. 993 ; see also Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 287-288, 108 S.Ct. 1133, 99 L.Ed.2d 296 (1988). We applied this test in Carson, holding that an order that declined to enter a consent decree prohibiting certain conduct could be appealed under § 1292(a)(1) because it was the practical equivalent of an order denying an injunction and threatened serious and perhaps irreparable harm if not immediately reviewed. 450 U.S., at 83-84, 86-90, 101 S.Ct. 993.
This "practical effect" rule serves a valuable purpose. If an interlocutory injunction is improperly granted or denied, much harm can occur before the final decision in the district court. Lawful and important conduct may be barred, and unlawful and harmful conduct may be allowed to continue. Recognizing this, Congress authorized interlocutory appellate review of such orders. But if the availability of interlocutory review depended on the district court's use of the term "injunction" or some other particular language, Congress's scheme could be frustrated. The harms that Congress wanted to avoid could occur so long as the district court was careful about its terminology. The "practical effect" inquiry prevents such manipulation.
In analogous contexts, we have not allowed district courts to "shield [their] orders from appellate review" by avoiding the label "injunction." Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 87, 94 S.Ct. 937, 39 L.Ed.2d 166 (1974). For instance, in Sampson, we held that an order labeled a temporary restraining order (which is not appealable under § 1292(a)(1) ) should be treated as a "preliminary injunction" (which is appealable) since the order had the same practical effect as a preliminary injunction. Id., at 86-88, 94 S.Ct. 937.
Appellees and the dissent contend that the "practical effect" approach should be confined to § 1292(a)(1), but we see no good reason why it should not apply to § 1253 as well. Appellees note that we "narrowly constru[e]" § 1253, Goldstein v. Cox, 396 U.S. 471, 478, 90 S.Ct. 671, 24 L.Ed.2d 663 (1970), but we also construe § 1292(a)(1)"narrowly," Carson, supra, at 84, 101 S.Ct. 993. In addition, the relevant language in the two provisions is nearly identical; both provisions serve the same purpose; and we have previously called them "analogous." Goldstein, supra, at 475, 90 S.Ct. 671.
The provisions are also textually interlocked. Section 1292(a)(1) does not apply where "direct review may be had in the Supreme Court," i.e., where § 1253 applies. If the "practical effects" test applied under § 1292(a)(1) but not § 1253, the consequences would be unfortunate and strange. We would have to identify the magic language needed for an order to qualify as an order granting or denying an injunction, and that standard would hardly constitute the sort of "[s]imple" rule that the dissent prizes. See post, at 2342 - 2343 (opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.). Then, having developed that standard, we would have to apply it in any case in which a party took an appeal to us from an order of a three-judge court that clearly had the practical effect of an injunction. If we concluded that the magic-words test was not met, the order would appear to be appealable to one of the courts of appeals under § 1292(a)(1). In the language of that provision, the order would be an "orde[r] of [a] district cour[t] of the United States... granting [an] injunctio[n]." And because this Court would lack jurisdiction under § 1253, the appeal would not fall within § 1292(1)'s exception for cases "where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court." Having taken pains to provide for review in this Court, and not in the courts of appeals, of three-judge court orders granting injunctions Congress surely did not intend to produce that result.
Appellees argue that an order denying an injunction (the situation in Carson ) and an order granting an injunction (the situation here) should be treated differently, Brief for Appellees in No. 17-586, p. 27, but they offer no convincing reason for doing so. No authority supports their argument. The language of §§ 1253 and 1292(a)(1) makes no such distinction, and we have stated that the "practical effect" analysis applies to the "granting or denying" of injunctions. Gulfstream, supra, at 287-288, 108 S.Ct. 1133.
In addition, appellees' suggested distinction would put appellate courts in an awkward position. Suppose that a district court granted an injunction that was narrower than the one requested by the moving party. Would an appellate court (whether this Court or a court of appeals) have jurisdiction to rule on only part of that decision? Suppose the appellate court concluded that the district court was correct in refusing to give the movant all the injunctive relief it sought because the movant's entire claim was doomed to fail. Would the appellate court be limited to holding only that the lower court properly denied the relief that was withheld? The rule advocated by the appellees would needlessly complicate appellate review.
Finally, appellees point in passing to Rule 65(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires that an injunction "state its terms specifically" and "describe in reasonable detail... the act or acts restrained or required." Rules 65(d)(1)(B), (C) ; see Brief for Appellees in No. 17-586, at 27. But as explained in Gunn v. University Comm. to End War in Viet Nam, 399 U.S. 383, 389, n. 4, 90 S.Ct. 2013, 26 L.Ed.2d 684 (1970), we have never suggested that a failure to meet the specificity requirements of Rule 65(d) would "deprive the Court of jurisdiction under § 1253."
A contrary holding would be perverse. Rule 65(d) protects the party against which an injunction is issued by requiring clear notice as to what that party must do or refrain from doing. Where a vague injunction does not comply with Rule 65(d), the aggrieved party has a particularly strong need for appellate review. It would be odd to hold that there can be no appeal in such a circumstance.
For these reasons, we hold that we have jurisdiction under § 1253 to hear an appeal from an order that has the same practical effect as one granting or denying an injunction.
B
With these principles settled, we conclude that the orders in these cases qualify as interlocutory injunctions under § 1253. The text of the orders and the context in which they were issued make this clear.
The orders are unequivocal that the current legislative plans "violate § 2 and the Fourteenth Amendment" and that these violations "must be remedied."
274 F.Supp.3d, at 686 ; see also, e.g., 267 F.Supp.3d, at 795 ("[V]iolations found by this Court in its Order on [the State House plan] now require a remedy"); ibid. ("In Bell County, the intentional discrimination previously found by the Court must be remedied"); ibid. ("In Dallas County, the intentional discrimination previously found by the Court must be remedied").
We do not suggest that this language alone is sufficient to show that the orders had the practical effect of enjoining use of the current plans in this year's elections, but the court did not stop with these pronouncements. As we have noted, the orders required the Texas attorney general to inform the court within three days whether the Legislature would remedy the violations, and the orders stated that if the Legislature did not intend to adopt new plans, the court would hold remedial hearings.
The short time given the Legislature to respond is strong evidence that the three-judge court did not intend to allow the elections to go ahead under the plans it had just condemned. The Legislature was not in session, so in order to take up the task of redistricting, the Governor would have been required to convene a special session-which is no small matter. And, when the Governor declined to call a special session, the court moved ahead with its scheduled hearings and invited the parties to continue preparing for them even after this Court administratively stayed the August 15 order.
The import of these actions is unmistakable: The court intended to have new plans ready for use in this year's elections. Nothing in the record even hints that the court contemplated the possibility of allowing the elections to proceed under the 2013 plans.
What is more, Texas had reason to believe that it would risk deleterious consequences if it defied the court and attempted to conduct the elections under the plans that the court had found to be based on intentional racial discrimination. In the very orders at issue, the court inferred discriminatory intent from Texas's choice to appeal the D.C. court's preclearance decision rather than immediately taking steps to bring its plans into compliance with that decision. 274 F.Supp.3d, at 649 ; see Part III, infra. Reading such an order, Texas had reason to fear that if it tried to conduct elections under plans that the court had found to be racially discriminatory, the court would infer an evil motive and perhaps subject the State once again to the strictures of preclearance under § 3(c) of the Voting Rights Act. This is a remedy that the plaintiffs hoped to obtain, see, e.g., App. 177a, and that the District Court seemed inclined to consider, see C.J.S. 122a-123a (declining to declare moot the challenges to the long-since-repealed 2011 plans because "there remains the possibility of declaratory and equitable relief under § 3(c)").
Contending that the orders here do not qualify under § 1253, appellees analogize this case to Gunn, 399 U.S. 383, 90 S.Ct. 2013, 26 L.Ed.2d 684, but there is no relevant similarity. In Gunn, anti-war protesters were charged with violating a Texas "disturbing-the-peace statute," id., at 384, 90 S.Ct. 2013 and they challenged the constitutionality of the statute in federal court. After the state charges were dismissed, the District Court issued a "discursive" opinion "expressing the view that [the statute was] constitutionally invalid." Id., at 386-387, 90 S.Ct. 2013. But the court then refrained from going any further, "pending the next session, special or general, of the Texas legislature, at which time the State of Texas may, if it so desires, enact such disturbing-the-peace statute as will meet constitutional requirements." University Comm. to End War in Viet Nam v. Gunn, 289 F.Supp. 469, 475 (W.D.Tex.1968). The defendants appealed to this Court, and at the time of our decision two years later, neither the Legislature nor the District Court had taken any further action. We therefore held that we lacked jurisdiction under § 1253. The District Court order in that case did not have the same practical effect as an injunction. Indeed, it had no practical effect whatsoever and is thus entirely different from the orders now before us.
Appellees suggest that appellate jurisdiction is lacking in this case because we do not know at this point "what a remedy would entail, who it would affect, and when it would be implemented." Brief for Appellees in No. 17-586, at 27. The dissent makes a similar argument with respect to two of the Texas House districts. Post, at 2342. But the issue here is whether this year's elections can be held under the plans enacted by the Legislature, not whether any particular remedies would
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | B | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Burton
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this proceeding we are limited to the consideration of the following questions: (1) is it barred by the statute of limitations and, if not, (2) is it barred by the principles of res judicata, or estoppel, or the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment? For the reasons hereafter stated, we hold that it is barred by the statute of limitations. We do not reach or discuss the second question.
The issues raised by the first question are:
1. Whether the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act has suspended the running of the general three-year statute of limitations in relation to the offenses charged in—
Count I, under the general conspiracy statute;
Count II, under § 346 (a)(1) of the Nationality Act of 1940; or
Count III, under § 346 (a)(6) of the Nationality Act of 1940; and
2. Whether the saving clause in § 21 of the Act of June 25, 1948, which enacted the present Criminal Code into law, continued in effect the special five-year statute of limitations of § 346 (g) of the Nationality Act of 1940 in relation to violations of § 346 (a) of that Act.
For the reasons set forth, we reach a negative conclusion on each of the above issues.
Petitioner Harry Bridges entered the United States in 1920 as an immigrant seaman from Australia. Subsequently, he defeated two attempts of the United States to deport him because of his alleged Communist Party membership or affiliation. The second such attempt culminated June 18, 1945, in Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U. S. 135.
June 23, 1945, he applied, in the San Francisco office of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, for a Certificate of Arrival and a Preliminary Form for Petition for Naturalization. August 8, he appeared, with petitioners Schmidt and Robertson, before an examiner for a preliminary examination. Each of the three testified that Bridges was not a member of the Communist Party.
September 17, 1945, Bridges appeared in the Superior Court in San Francisco for the naturalization hearing. Schmidt and Robertson testified that they had known Bridges for five years or longer, that he was a resident of the United States during that time and that they vouched for his loyalty to the United States. Bridges gave the following answers under oath:
“Q. Do you now, or have you ever, belonged to any organization that advocated the overthrow of the government by force or violence?
“A. No.
“Q. Do you now, or have you ever, belonged to the Communist Party in the United States?
“A. I have not, I do not.”
He was then admitted to citizenship.
May 25, 1949, more than three years later, a grand jury in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California returned the present indictment in three counts.
Count I charges the three petitioners with a conspiracy to defraud the United States by impairing, obstructing and defeating the proper administration of its naturalization laws by having Bridges fraudulently petition for and obtain naturalization by falsely and fraudulently stating to the naturalization court that he had never belonged to the Communist Party in the United States, and that such statement was known at all times by each of the petitioners to be false and fraudulent. The appearance and testimony of the petitioners in the naturalization proceeding were alleged as the overt acts in the conspiracy.
That count is laid under the following general conspiracy statute:
“If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United States, or to defraud the United States in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such parties do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each of the parties to such conspiracy shall be fined not more than ten thousand dollars, or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.” § 37 of the old Criminal Code, 35 Stat. 1096, 18 U. S. C. § 88, now 18 U. S. C. (Supp. V) § 371.
Count II charges Bridges with wilfully and knowingly making a false statement under oath in the naturalization proceeding when he testified that he was not and had not been a member of the Communist Party. Count II is laid under § 346 (a)(1) of the Nationality Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 1163, 8 U. S. C. § 746 (a)(1), which makes it a felony for any person—
“Knowingly to make a false statement under oath, either orally or in writing, in any case, proceeding, or matter relating to, or under, or by virtue of any law of the United States relating to naturalization or citizenship.”
Count III charges Schmidt and Robertson with wil-fully and knowingly aiding Bridges, who was not entitled thereto, to obtain a Certificate of Naturalization which was to be procured by false and fraudulent statements. It avers that they knew that Bridges was a member of the Communist Party and that he had made false and fraudulent representations in the naturalization proceeding. Count III is laid under § 346 (a)(5) of the Nationality Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 1164, 8 IT. S. C. § 746 (a)(5), which makes it a felony—
“To encourage, aid, advise, or assist any person not entitled thereto to obtain, accept, or receive any certificate of arrival, declaration of intention, certificate of naturalization, or certificate of citizenship, or other documentary evidence of naturalization or of citizenship—
“a. Knowing the same to have been procured by fraud;...
Petitioners each moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground, inter alia, that each count was barred by the statute of limitations. The motions were denied. 86 F. Supp. 922. The trial resulted in a jury verdict of guilty on each count. Bridges received concurrent sentences of imprisonment for two years on Count I and five years on Count II. The other petitioners each received concurrent sentences of imprisonment for two years on each of Counts I and III. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 199 F. 2d 811. Rehearing en banc was denied. 201 F. 2d 254. Because of an indicated conflict between that decision and part of the decision in Marzani v. United States, 83 U. S. App. D. C. 78, 168 F. 2d 133, affirmed by an equally divided Court, 335 U. S. 895, 336 U. S. 922, as well as its conflict in part with United States v. Obermeier, 186 F. 2d 243 (C. A. 2d Cir.), and because of the importance of the issues, we granted certiorari, 345 U. S. 904.
The acts charged occurred in 1945. Accordingly, unless the general three-year statute of limitations is suspended or superseded, the indictment, found in 1949, was out of time and must be dismissed.
I. The running o/ the general three-year statute of limitations was not suspended by the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act in relation to the offenses charged in any of the counts.
A. The suspension prescribed by the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act applies to offenses involving the defrauding of the United States or any agency thereof, whether by conspiracy or not, and in any manner, but only where the fraud is of a pecuniary nature or at least of a nature concerning property.
The Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act creates an exception to a long-standing congressional “policy of repose” that is fundamental to our society and our criminal law. From 1790 to 1876, the general limitation applicable to noncapital offenses was two years and since then it has been three years. In relation to a comparable exception stated in § 1110 (a) as the limitation applicable under the Revenue Act of 1926, Mr. Justice Roberts, speaking for the Court, said:
“Moreover, the concluding clause of the section, though denominated a proviso, is an excepting clause and therefore to be narrowly construed. United States v. McElvain, 272 U. S. 633, 639. [] And as the section has to do with statutory crimes it is to be liberally interpreted in favor of repose, and ought not to be extended by construction to embrace so-called frauds not so denominated by the statutes creating offenses.” United States v. Scharton, 285 U. S. 518, 521-522.
The legislative history of this exception emphasizes the propriety of its conservative interpretation. It indicates a purpose to suspend the general statute of limitations only as to war frauds of a pecuniary nature or of a nature concerning property. It nowhere suggests a purpose to swallow up the three-year limitation to the extent necessary to reach the offenses before us.
The present Suspension Act had its origin in the Act of August 24, 1942. See United States v. Smith, 342 U. S. 225, 226-227. That Act was a wartime measure reviving for World War II substantially the same exception to the general statute of limitations which, from 1921 to 1927, had been directed at the war frauds of World War I. The Committee Reports show that in 1921 Congress aimed the proviso at the pecuniary frauds growing out of war contracts. Congress was concerned with the exceptional opportunities to defraud the United States that were inherent in its gigantic and hastily organized procurement program. It sought to help safeguard the treasury from such frauds by increasing the time allowed for their discovery and prosecution. In 1942, the reports and proceedings demonstrate a like purpose, coupled with a design to readopt the World War I policy.
This interpretation of the scope of the 1942 provision was expressly approved in Marzani v. United States, 83 U. S. App. D. C. 78-82, 168 F. 2d 133-137. As to nine counts based upon the amended False Claims Act, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the 1942 Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act did not suspend the three-year statute of limitations. Those counts charged that false statements had been made to government agencies in relation to Communist Party membership, in connection with an application for a position in the government service. Referring to United States v. Gilliland, 312 U. S. 86, the Court of Appeals said:
“Thus, the [Supreme] Court held that defrauding the United States in a pecuniary or financial sense is not a constituent ingredient of offenses under the False Claims Act.
“It necessarily follows, in our view, that the Suspension Act does not apply to offenses under the False Claims Act. The Supreme Court has clearly said (1) that a statute identical in pertinent part with the Suspension Act does not apply to offenses of which defrauding the United States in a pecuniary way is not an essential ingredient; and (2) that such defrauding of the United States is not an essential ingredient of offenses under the False Claims statute.” 83 U. S. App. D. C., at 81, 168 F. 2d, at 136.
Brought here on several issues, including dismissal of the nine counts, that case was twice affirmed, without opinion, by an evenly divided Court. 335 U. S. 895, 336 U. S. 922. See also, United States v. Cohn, 270 U. S. 339.
As the offenses here charged are those of knowingly making a false statement under oath in a proceeding relating to naturalization (Count II), or of conspiring to have someone do so (Count I), or of aiding someone to obtain a Certificate of Naturalization knowing it to be procured by fraud (Count III), none of them involve the defrauding of the United States in any pecuniary manner or in a manner concerning property. We accordingly hold that, for that reason, the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act does not apply to those offenses.
B. A further ground for our conclusion is that this Court already has interpreted the language before us, or similar language in comparable Acts, to mean that the wartime suspension of limitations authorized by Congress is limited strictly to offenses in which defrauding or attempting to defraud the United States is an essential ingredient of the offense charged. Decisions of this Court, made prior to 1942, had so interpreted the earlier legislation that its substantial reenactment, in 1942, carried with it the interpretation above stated. United States v. Scharton, 285 U. S. 518; United States v. Mc-Elvain, 272 U. S. 633; United States v. Noveck, 271 U. S. 201. See also, Braverman v. United States, 317 U. S. 49, 54-55, and United States v. Cohn, 270 U. S. 339.
The simplest demonstration of this point appears in Count II. The offense there charged is that Bridges knowingly made a false material statement in a naturalization proceeding. In that offense, as in the comparable offense of perjury, fraud is not an essential ingredient. The offense is complete without proof of fraud, although fraud often accompanies it. The above-cited cases show that even though the offense may be committed in a pecuniary transaction involving a financial loss to the Government, that fact, alone, is not enough to suspend the running of the three-year statute of limitations. Under the doctrine of these cases, the suspension does not apply to the offense charged unless, under the statute creating the offense, fraud is an essential ingredient of it. The purpose of the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act is not that of generally suspending the three-year statute, e. g., in cases -of perjury, larceny and like crimes. It seeks to suspend the running of it only where fraud against the Government is an essential ingredient of the crime. In view of the opportunity to commit such frauds in time of war, and in view of the difficulty of their prompt discovery and prosecution, the Government seeks extra time to deal with them. Nothing in § 346 (a) (1) makes fraud an essential ingredient of the offense of making a false material statement under oath in a naturalization proceeding.
Likewise, in Count III, the aiding of someone to commit that offense, in violation of § 346 (a) (5), does not require proof of fraud as an essential ingredient. If, as here, the main offense is complete with the proof of perjury, the suspension does not apply to the charge of aiding in the commission of that offense. The insertion in the indictment. of the words “procured by fraud” does not change the offense charged. The embellishment of the indictment does not lengthen the time for prosecution. It is the statutory definition of the offense that determines whether or not the statute of limitations comes within the Suspension Act.
So it is with Count I. A charge of conspiracy to commit a certain substantive offense is not entitled to a longer statute of limitations than the charge of committing the offense itself. There is no additional time prescribed for indictments for conspiracies as such. The insertion of surplus words in the indictment does not change the nature of the offense charged.
“The language of the proviso cannot reasonably be read to include all conspiracies as defined by § 37. [The general conspiracy section of the old Criminal Code, now 18 U. S. C. (Supp. V) § 371.] But if the proviso could be construed to include any conspiracies, obviously it would be limited to those to commit the substantive offenses which it covers.” United States v. McElvain, 272 U. S. 633, 639.
The Government contends that the General Conspiracy Act under which Count I is laid comprises two classes of conspiracies: (1) “to commit any offense against the United States” and (2) “to defraud the United States in any manner or for any purpose.” It urges that the indictment here charges a conspiracy to defraud the United States under the second clause. It suggests that, under that clause, proof of a specific intent to defraud is an essential ingredient of the offense and thus brings Count I within the Suspension Act. The fallacy in that argument is that, while the indictment may be framed in the language of the second clause, both it and the proof to support it rely solely on the fact of a conspiracy to commit the substantive offenses violating § 346 (a) (1) or § 346 (a) (5) as charged in Counts II and III. Count I actually charges that petitioners conspired to “defraud the United States” only by causing the commission of the identical offenses charged in Counts II and III. The use in Count I of language copied from the second clause of the conspiracy statute merely cloaks a factual charge of conspiring to cause, or knowingly to aid, Bridges to make a false statement under oath in his naturalization proceeding, or to obtain by false statements a Certificate of Naturalization to which he was not entitled.
The Court of Appeals in Marzani v. United States, supra, was convinced that the Suspension Act did not apply to such offenses, as those here involved, under the False Claims Act, no matter what words descriptive of fraud were added to the indictment, so long as fraud was not an essential ingredient of the offense defined in the statute. Another Court of Appeals arrived at a like conclusion in United States v. Obermeier, 186 F. 2d 243, 256-257, with respect to offenses under the statute involved in Count II of the instant indictment.
II. The saving clause in § 21 of the Act of June 25,1948, does not “save” the special five-year statute of limitations of the Nationality Act of 1940 so as to apply it to the violations of that Act charged in Counts II and III.
The Government contends, alternatively, that the indictment, which was found May 25, 1949, was timely as to Counts II and III, even if the Suspension Act is not applicable to this indictment. Its alternative contention is that those counts respectively charge violations of § 346 (a)(1) and (5) of the Nationality Act of 1940 which occurred in 1945 and that the indictment for them was found within the special five-year limitation of § 346 (g) of that Act. It appears, however, that § 346 (a-h) was expressly repealed, as of September 1, 1948, by § 21 of the Act of June 25,1948, which enacted the new Criminal Code into law. Including its controversial saving clause, that repealing section reads as follows:
“Sec. 21. The sections or parts thereof of the Revised Statutes or Statutes at Large enumerated in the following schedule are hereby repealed. [] Any rights or liabilities now existing under such sections or parts thereof shall not be affected by this repeal.” 62 Stat. 862.
By such repeal of § 346 (g), the general three-year statute of limitations became applicable. 18 U. S. C. (Supp. V) § 3282. Three years having expired before the indictment was found, § 3282 bars the instant indictment. The Government, however, contends that the above-quoted saving clause in § 21 refers not only to substantive liabilities but also to the period during which a crime may be prosecuted and thus includes the special five-year limitation contained in § 346 (g). This issue was presented to the Court of Appeals in the instant case and was decided against the Government. 199 F. 2d 811, 819-820. In doing so, the court relied in part upon a like conclusion of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in United States v. Obermeier, swpra. That case related to an indictment in two counts for knowingly making, in 1945, in a naturalization proceeding, as here, false statements under oath in relation to membership in the Communist Party. The review of legislative materials and court decisions made there need not be repeated here in reaching the same result — that the saving clause in § 21 did not keep the special five-year limitation alive after September 1, 1948.
The purpose of Congress to substitute the general three-year limitation in place of the special five-year limitation is indicated in the Reviser’s Note to 18 U. S. C. (Supp. V) § 3282 which says:
“In the consolidation of these sections the 5-year period of limitation for violations of the Nationality Code, provided for in said section 746 (g) of title 8, U. S. C., 1940 ed., Aliens and Nationality, is reduced to 3 years. There seemed no sound basis for considering 3 years adequate in the case of heinous felonies and gross frauds against the United States but inadequate for misuse of a passport or false statement to a naturalization examiner.”
To adopt the interpretation proposed by the Government would produce the situation that offenses committed in August, 1948, would be indictable until August, 1953, whereas like offenses committed in the following October, 1948, would not be indictable after October, 1951. The longer period for the prosecution of the earlier offenses has no relation to war conditions. Such a result is not to be inferred without a clear direction to that effect.
Finally, to interpret the words “rights or liabilities” in the saving clause as including such procedural incidents as the period within which indictments may be found would overlook the practice of Congress to specify the saving of such limitations expressly when and if Congress wished them to be “saved.” In the Revised Statutes of 1874, § 5598 preserved “All offenses committed, and all penalties or forfeitures” but, nevertheless, § 5599 was inserted to add “All acts of limitation, whether applicable to civil causes and proceedings, or to the prosecution of offenses, or for the recovery of penalties or forfeitures....” The 1909 Criminal Code contained similar provisions in §§ 343 and 344. 35 Stat. 1159. In 1933, when the Revised Statutes were reexamined and obsolete sections (including § 5598) were repealed, § 5599 was retained. 47 Stat. 1431. The reason then given for its retention was that the survival clause in the general repealing statute, 47 Stat. 1431, referred “only to ‘rights’ and ‘liabilities’ and not to remedies, recourse to which may be barred by limitation.” S. Rep. No. 1205, 72d Cong., 2d Sess. 3. See Campbell v. Holt, 115 U. S. 620.
As the general three-year statute of limitations is applicable to each of the offenses charged and has been neither suspended by the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act, nor made inapplicable by § 21 of the Act of June 25, 1948, the indictment in this proceeding came too late to be effective. The motion to dismiss it should have been granted when first made. The judgment of the Court of Appeals, accordingly, is reversed and the cause is remanded to the District Court with direction to dismiss the indictment.
Reversed and remanded.
Me. Justice Jackson and Me. Justice Claek took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
18 U. S. C. (Supp. V) § 3287.
18 U. S. C. (Supp. V) § 3282.
§ 37 of the Criminal Code, 35 Stat. 1096, 18 U. S. C. § 88, now 18 U. S. C. (Supp. V) § 371.
54 Stat. 1163, 8 U. S. C. §746 (a)(1), now 18 U. S. C. (Supp. V) §1015 (a).
54 Stat. 1164, 8 U. S. C. § 746 (a) (5), now 18 U. S. C. (Supp. V) § 1425.
62 Stat. 862.
54 Stat. 1167, 8 U. S. C. § 746 (g).
Section 346 (a) was repealed by § 21 of the Act of June 25, 1948, 62 Stat. 862, 868. Simultaneously, §346 (a)(1) was substantially reenacted in 18 U. S. C. (Supp. V) § 1015 (a). For the effect, if any, of the saving clause in § 21 upon the statute of limitations relating to § 346 (a), see pp. 224-227, infra.
See note 8, supra, as to repeal of § 346 (a). Simultaneously, § 346 (a) (5) was substantially reenacted in 18 U. S. C. (Supp. V) § 1425.
The grant was limited to questions 1 and 2 presented by the petition for the writ, viz. :
“(1) Whether, in view of prior adjudications (including the determination of this Court in Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U. S. 136), this proceeding is barred, in whole or in part, by the principles of res judicata, or estoppel, or the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.
“(2) Whether this proceeding is barred by the statute of limitations.”
“Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, no person shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished for any offense, not capital, unless the indictment is found or the information is instituted within three years next after such offense shall have been committed.” 18 U. S. C. (Supp. V) § 3282.
1 Stat. 119; R. S. § 1044; 19 Stat. 32-33. The limitation as to treason or other capital offenses was three years from 1790 until it was removed in 1939. 1 Stat. 119; R. S. § 1043; 53 Stat. 1198; 18 U. S. C. (Supp. V) § 3281.
44 Stat. 114-115, 18 U. S. C. (1925 ed., Supp. V) § 585.
“... The purpose of the added proviso [to the general limitation section] was to carve out a special class of eases. It is to be construed strictly, and held to apply only to cases shown to be clearly within its purpose.” United States v. McElvain, 272 U. S. 633, 639.
“... the running of any existing statute of limitations applicable to offenses involving the defrauding or attempts to defraud the United States or any agency thereof, whether by conspiracy or not, and in any manner, and now indictable under any existing statutes, shall be suspended until June 30, 1945, or until such earlier time as the Congress by concurrent resolution, or the President, may designate... 56 Stat. 747-748.
This was amended in 1944 by the insertion of more specific references to war contracts and to the handling of property under the Surplus Property Act of 1944. 58 Stat. 667 and 781. Since September 1, 1948, 18 U. S. C. (Supp. Y) § 3287 has provided that—
“When the United States is at war the running of any statute of limitations applicable to any offense (1) involving fraud or attempted fraud against the United States or any agency thereof in any manner, whether by conspiracy or not, or (2) committed in connection with the acquisition, care, handling, custody, control or disposition of any real or personal property of the United States, or (3) committed in connection with the negotiation, procurement, award, performance, payment for, interim financing, cancelation, or other termination or settlement, of any contract, subcontract, or purchase order which is connected with or related to the prosecution of the war, or with any disposition of termination inventory by any war contractor or Government agency, shall be suspended until three years after the termination of hostilities as proclaimed by the President or by a concurrent resolution of Congress....”
The President proclaimed the termination of hostilities of World War II, December 31, 1946. 3 CFR, 1946 Supp., 77-78.
“Sec. 1044.... : Provided, however, That in offenses involving the defrauding or attempts to defraud the United States or any agency thereof, whether by conspiracy or not, and in any manner, and now indictable under any existing statutes, the period of limitation shall be six years....” 42 Stat. 220, November 17, 1921.
This proviso was eliminated by 45 Stat. 51, December 27, 1927.
In 1921, H. R. Rep. No. 365, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, supporting the bill to enact the proviso, said:
“The Department of Justice has been engaged in the investigation and is now engaged in the investigation of various alleged offenses, consisting largely of frauds against the Government which are claimed to have occurred during the war with Germany and since its conclusion. Many of these alleged offenses grew out of the [contractual] relation of the Government with various persons and corporations engaged in the furnishing of military and naval supplies of various kinds. Many of these transactions require the most minute investigation in order to ascertain the exact facts, and in every case a considerable period must elapse before such facts may be gathered from the files and other sources that the department may know whether prosecutions are justified or not. In many cases months, and perhaps considerable longer periods, will be required for such investigations.” See also, 61 Cong. Rec. 7060-7061, 7640.
In 1927, H. R. Rep. No. 16, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, supporting the bill to eliminate the 1921 proviso, said:
“In 1921 the Attorney General represented that he was desirous of having further time to investigate alleged war frauds, and that owing to the nature of the investigations the statute of limitations might run before it would be possible to obtain indictments, and he therefore requested that the period of the statute of limitations applicable to conspiracy to defraud the Government of the United States should be extended from three years to six years. The Congress complied with the request and the limitation was extended from three to six years as to that particular class of offenses.
“The reasons for the above change have ceased to exist; that is, the Department of Justice announced some time ago that it did not propose to attempt any further prosecution of offenses of that character, that is to say, offenses giving rise to the statute.” See also, 69 Cong. Rec. 473, 842.
In 1942, S. Rep. No. 1544, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 2, supporting the suspension of the running of the statute, said:
“The purpose of the proposed legislation is to suspend any existing statutes of limitations applicable to offenses involving the defrauding or attempts to defraud the United States or any agency thereof, for the period of the present war. Contracting for the United States is done through its various agencies, including the departments and independent establishments and Government-owned and Government-controlled corporations, and frauds against all of these agencies are intended to be embraced by the bill.
“During the World War many frauds committed against the Government were not discovered until the 3-year statute of limitations had almost expired, and as stated in the committee report hereinafter referred to, many of the alleged offenses were barred from prosecution. The general criminal statute of limitations (Rev. Stats., see. 1044) was amended on November 17, 1921, extending the period to 6 years in respect to offenses involving frauds against the United States....
“During normal times the present 3-year statute of limitations may afford the Department of Justice sufficient time to investigate, discover, and gather evidence to prosecute frauds against the Government. The United States, however, is engaged in a gigantic war program. Huge sums of money are being expended for materials and equipment in order to carry on the war successfully. Although steps have been taken to prevent and to prosecute frauds against the Government, it is recognized that in the varied dealings opportunities will no doubt be presented for unscrupulous persons to defraud the Government or some agency. These frauds may be difficult to discover as is often true of this type of offense and many of them may not come to light for some time to come. The law-enforcement branch of the Government is also busily engaged in its many duties, including the enforcement of the espionage, sabotage, and other laws.”
A similar statement was made in H. R. Rep. No. 2051, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2, supporting the same bill, H. R. 6484. See also, 88 Cong. Rec. 6160. This bill, readopting the 1921 policy, was introduced at the suggestion of the Attorney General in lieu of a proposal then pending to suspend the running of the statute of limitations for every offense punishable under the laws of the United States. Hearings before Subcommittee No. 4 of the House Committee on the Judiciary on H. R,. 4916, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 6, 8, and see 88 Cong. Rec. 4759-4760.
Haas v. Henkel, 216 U. S. 462, and Hammerschmidt v. United States, 265 U. S. 182, are not to the contrary. The statements there made refer to conspiracies to defraud the United States “in any manner or for any purpose” as used in the second clause of the general conspiracy section. See §37 of the old Criminal Code, 35 Stat. 1096, now § 371 of the new Criminal Code, 18 U. S. C. (Supp. V). See also, United States v. Gilliland, 312 U. S. 86. They do not control the interpretation of the provisions in the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act discussed in this opinion.
§ 37 of the old Criminal Code, 35 Stat. 1096, 18 U. S. C. § 88, now 18 U. S. C. (Supp. V) § 371, see p. 213, supra.
“(g) No person shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished for any crime arising under the provisions of this Act unless the indictment is found or the information is filed within five years next after the commission of such crime.’' 54 Stat. 1167, 8 U. S. C. §746 (g).
In that schedule of repealed sections, at 62 Stat. 868, are §§ 346 (a-h), (1), and 347 of the Nationality Act of 1940, also identified as from Chapter 876, 54 Stat. 1163-1168, approved October 14, 1940.
See note 11, supra.
In United States v. Smith, 342 U. S. 225, 226-227, n. 1, we assumed, without deciding, that this reservation had no effect on the running of a statute of limitations.
See also, the general saving clause that was in the Revised Statutes but has been regarded as not applicable to matters of
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | A | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
Respondents sued petitioner in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas seeking to recover damages for death and personal injury resulting from the premature explosion of a 105-mm. howitzer round in Cambodia. Federal jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship. The District Court held that the Texas law of strict liability in tort governed and submitted the case to the jury on that theory. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed a judgment in favor of respondents. 512 F. 2d 77 (1975).
The Court of Appeals stated that were it to apply Texas choice-of-law rules, the substantive law of Cambodia, the place of injury, would certainly control as to the wrongful death, and perhaps as to the claim for personal injury. It declined nevertheless to apply Texas choice-of-law rules, based in part on an earlier decision in Lester v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 433 F. 2d 884 (CA5 1970), cert. denied, 402 U. S. 909 (1971), which it summarized as holding that “[w]e refused to look to the Louisiana conflict of law rule, deciding that as a matter of federal choice of law, we could not apply the law of a jurisdiction that had no interest in the case, no policy at stake.” 512 F. 2d, at 80 (emphasis in original). The Court of Appeals further supported its decision on the grounds that the rationale for applying the traditional conflicts rule applied by Texas “is not operative under the present facts”; and that it was “a Court of the United States, an instrumentality created to effectuate the laws and policies of the United States.”
We believe that the Court of Appeals either misinterpreted our longstanding decision in Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U. S. 487 (1941), or else determined for itself that it was no longer of controlling force in a case such as this. We are of the opinion that Klaxon is by its terms applicable here and should have been adhered to by the Court of Appeals. In Klaxon, supra, at 496, this Court said:
“The conflict of laws rules to be applied by the federal court in Delaware must conform to those prevailing in Delaware’s state courts. Otherwise, the accident of diversity of citizenship would constantly disturb equal administration of justice in coordinate state and federal courts sitting side by side. See Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, [304 U. S. 64, 74-77 (1938)].” (Footnote omitted.)
By parity of reasoning, the conflict-of-laws rules to be applied by a federal court in Texas must conform to those prevailing in the Texas state courts. A federal court in a diversity case is not free to engraft onto those state rules exceptions or modifications which may commend themselves to the federal court, but which have not commended themselves to the State in which the federal court sits. The Court of Appeals in this case should identify and follow the Texas conflicts rule. What substantive law will govern when Texas’ rule is applied is a matter to be determined by the Court of Appeals.
The petition for certiorari is granted, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Mr. Justice Douglas took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | H | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice White
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this ease, we consider whether the Fourth Amendment permits the seizure of contraband detected through a police officer’s sense of touch during a protective patdown search.
I
On the evening of November 9,1989, two Minneapolis police officers were patrolling an area on the city’s north side in a marked squad car. At about 8:15 p.m., one of the officers observed respondent leaving a 12-unit apartment building on Morgan Avenue North. The officer, having previously responded to complaints of drug sales in the building’s hallways and having executed several search warrants on the premises, considered the building to be a notorious “crack house.” According to testimony credited by the trial court, respondent began walking toward the police but, upon spotting the squad ear and making eye contact with one of the officers, abruptly halted and began walking in the opposite direction. His suspicion aroused, this officer watched as respondent turned and entered an alley on the other side of the apartment building. Based upon respondent’s seemingly evasive actions and the fact that he had just left a building known for cocaine traffic, the officers decided to stop respondent and investigate further.
The officers pulled their squad car into the alley and ordered respondent to stop and submit to a patdown search. The search revealed no weapons, but the officer conducting the search did take an interest in a small lump in respondent’s nylon jacket. The officer later testified:
“[A]s I pat-searched the front of his body, I felt a lump, a small lump, in the front pocket. I examined it with my fingers and it slid and it felt to be a lump of crack cocaine in cellophane.” Tr. 9 (Feb. 20,1990).
The officer then reached into respondent’s pocket and retrieved a small plastic bag containing one fifth of one gram of crack cocaine. Respondent was arrested and charged in Hennepin County District Court with possession of a controlled substance.
Before trial, respondent moved to suppress the cocaine. The trial court first concluded that the officers were justified under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968), in stopping respondent to investigate whether he might be engaged in criminal activity. The court further found that the officers were justified in frisking respondent to ensure that he was not carrying a weapon. Finally, analogizing to the “plain-view” doctrine, under which officers may make a warrantless seizure of contraband found in plain view during a lawful search for other items, the trial court ruled that the officers’ seizure of the cocaine did not violate the Fourth Amendment:
“To this Court there is no distinction as to which sensory perception the officer uses to conclude that the material is contraband. An experienced officer may rely upon his sense of smell in DWI stops or in recognizing the smell of burning marijuana in an automobile. The sound of a shotgun being racked would clearly support certain reactions by an officer. The sense of touch, grounded in experience and training, is as reliable as perceptions drawn from other senses. ‘Plain feel/ therefore, is no different than plain view and will equally support the seizure here.” App. to Pet. for Cert. C-5.
His suppression motion having failed, respondent proceeded to trial and was found guilty.
On appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed. The court agreed with the trial court that the investigative stop and protective patdown search of respondent were lawful under Terry because the officers had a reasonable belief based on specific and articulable facts that respondent was engaged in criminal behavior and that he might be armed and dangerous. The court concluded, however, that the officers had overstepped the bounds allowed by Terry in seizing the cocaine. In doing so, the Court of Appeals “deeline[d] to adopt the plain feel exception” to the warrant requirement. 469 N. W. 2d 462, 466 (1991).
The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed. Like the Court of Appeals, the State Supreme Court held that both the stop and the frisk of respondent were valid under Terry, but found the seizure of the cocaine to be unconstitutional. The court expressly refused “to extend the plain view doctrine to the sense of touch” on the grounds that “the sense of touch is inherently less immediate and less reliable than the sense of sight” and that “the sense of touch is far more intrusive into the personal privacy that is at the core of the [Fjourth [AJmendment.” 481 N. W. 2d 840, 845 (1992). The court thus appeared to adopt a categorical rule barring the seizure of any contraband detected by an officer through the sense of touch during a patdown search for weapons. The court further noted that “[e]ven if we recognized a ‘plain feel’ exception, the search in this case would not qualify” because “[t]he pat search of the defendant went far beyond what is permissible under Terry.” Id., at 843, 844, n. 1. As the State Supreme Court read the record, the officer conducting the search ascertained that the lump in respondent’s jacket was contraband only after probing and investigating what he certainly knew was not a weapon. See id., at 844.
We granted certiorari, 506 U. S. 814 (1992), to resolve a conflict among the state and federal courts over whether contraband detected through the sense of touch during a patdown search may be admitted into evidence. We now affirm.
II
A
The Fourth Amendment, made applicable to the States by way of the Fourteenth Amendment, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961), guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” Time and again, this Court has observed that searches and seizures “ ‘conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment — subject only to a few specifically established and well delineated exceptions/” Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U. S. 17, 19-20 (1984) (per curiam) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 357 (1967) (footnotes omitted)); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U. S. 385, 390 (1978); see also United States v. Place, 462 U. S. 696, 701 (1983). One such exception was recognized in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968), which held that “where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot . . . ,” the officer may briefly stop the suspicious person and make “reasonable inquiries” aimed at confirming or dispelling his suspicions. Id., at 30; see also Adams v. Williams, 407 U. S. 143, 145-146 (1972).
Terry further held that “[w]hen an officer is justified in believing that the individual whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at close range is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others,” the officer may conduct a patdown search “to determine whether the person is in fact carrying a weapon.” 392 U. S., at 24. “The purpose of this limited search is not to discover evidence of crime, but to allow the officer to pursue his investigation without fear of violence . . . .” Adams, supra, at 146. Rather, a protective search — permitted without a warrant and on the basis of reasonable suspicion less than probable cause — must be strictly “limited to that which is necessary for the discovery of weapons which might be used to harm the officer or others nearby.” Terry, supra, at 26; see also Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032, 1049, and 1052, n. 16 (1983); Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U. S. 85, 93-94 (1979). If the protective search goes beyond what is necessary to determine if the suspect is armed, it is no longer valid under Terry and its fruits will be suppressed. Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 40, 65-66 (1968).
These principles were settled 25 years ago when, on the same day, the Court announced its decisions in Terry and Sibron. The question presented today is whether police officers may seize nonthreatening contraband detected during a protective patdown search of the sort permitted by Terry. We think the answer is clearly that they may, so long as the officers’ search stays within the bounds marked by Terry.
B
We have already held that police officers, at least under certain circumstances, may seize contraband detected during the lawful execution of a Terry search. In Michigan v. Long, supra, for example, police approached a man who had driven his car into a ditch and who appeared to be under the influence of some intoxicant. As the man moved to reenter the car from the roadside, police spotted a knife on the floorboard. The officers stopped the man, subjected him to a patdown search, and then inspected the interior of the vehicle for other weapons. During the search of the passenger compartment, the police discovered an open pouch containing marijuana and seized it. This Court upheld the validity of the search and seizure under Terry. The Court held first that, in the context of a roadside encounter, where police have reasonable suspicion based on specific and articulable facts to believe that a driver may be armed and dangerous, they may conduct a protective search for weapons not only of the driver’s person but also of the passenger compartment of the automobile. 463 U. S., at 1049. Of course, the protective search of the vehicle, being justified solely by the danger that weapons stored there could be used against the officers or bystanders, must be “limited to those areas in which a weapon may be placed or hidden.” Ibid. The Court then held: “If, while conducting a legitimate Terry search of the interior of the automobile, the officer should, as here, dis-. cover contraband other than weapons, he clearly cannot be required to ignore the contraband, and the Fourth Amendment does not require its suppression in such circumstances.” Id., at 1050; accord, Sibron, 392 U. S., at 69-70 (White, J., concurring); id., at 79 (Harlan, J., concurring in result).
The Court in Long justified this latter holding by reference to our cases under the “plain-view” doctrine. See Long, supra, at 1050; see also United States v. Hensley, 469 U. S. 221, 235 (1985) (upholding plain-view seizure in context of Terry stop). Under that doctrine, if police are lawfully in a position from which they view an object, if its incriminating character is immediately apparent, and if the officers have a lawful right of access to the object, they may seize it without a warrant. See Horton v. California, 496 U. S. 128, 136-137 (1990); Texas v. Brown, 460 U. S. 730, 739 (1983) (plurality opinion). If, however, the police lack probable cause to believe that an object in plain view is contraband without conducting some further search of the object — i. e., if “its incriminating character [is not] ‘immediately apparent,’” Horton, supra, at 136—the plain-view doctrine cannot justify its seizure. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U. S. 321 (1987).
We think that this doctrine has an obvious application by analogy to cases in which an officer discovers contraband through the sense of touch during an otherwise lawful search. The rationale of the plain-view doctrine is that if contraband is left in open View and is observed by a police officer from a lawful vantage point, there has been no invasion of a legitimate expectation of privacy and thus no “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment — or at least no search independent of the initial intrusion that gave the officers their vantage point. See Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U. S. 765, 771 (1983); Texas v. Brown, supra, at 740. The warrantless seizure of contraband that presents itself in this manner is deemed justified by the realization that resort to a neutral magistrate under such circumstances would often be impracticable and would do little to promote the objectives of the Fourth Amendment. See Hicks, supra, at 326-327; Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 467-468, 469-470 (1971) (opinion of Stewart, J.). The same can be said of tactile discoveries of contraband. If a police officer lawfully pats down a suspect’s outer clothing and feels an object whose contour or mass makes its identity immediately apparent, there has been no invasion of the suspect’s privacy beyond that already authorized by the officer’s search for weapons; if the object is contraband, its warrantless seizure would be justified by the same practical considerations that inhere in the plain-view context.
The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected an analogy to the plain-view doctrine on two grounds: first, its belief that “the sense of touch is inherently less immediate and less reliable than the sense of sight,” and second, that “the sense of touch is far more intrusive into the personal privacy that is at the core of the [Fjourth [Ajmendment.” 481 N. W. 2d, at 845. We have a somewhat different view. First, Terry itself demonstrates that the sense of touch is capable of revealing the nature of an object with sufficient reliability to support a seizure. The very premise of Terry, after all, is that officers will be able to detect the presence of weapons through the sense of touch and Terry upheld precisely such a seizure. Even if it were true that the sense of touch is generally less reliable than the sense of sight, that only suggests that officers will less often be able to justify seizures of unseen contraband. Regardless of whether the officer detects the contraband by sight or by touch, however, the Fourth Amendment’s requirement that the officer have probable cause to believe that the item is contraband before seizing it ensures against excessively speculative seizures. The court’s second concern — that touch is more intrusive into privacy than is sight — is inapposite in light of the fact that the intrusion the court fears has already been authorized by the lawful search for weapons. The seizure of an item whose identity is already known occasions no further invasion of privacy. See Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U. S. 56, 66 (1992); Horton, supra, at 141; United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U. S. 109, 120 (1984). Accordingly, the suspect’s privacy interests are not advanced by a categorical rule barring the seizure of contraband plainly detected through the sense of touch.
Ill
It remains to apply these principles to the facts of this case. Respondent has not challenged the finding made by the trial court and affirmed by both the Court of Appeals and the State Supreme Court that the police were justified under Terry in stopping him and frisking him for weapons. Thus, the dispositive question before this Court is whether the officer who conducted the search was acting within the lawful bounds marked by Terry at the time he gained probable cause to believe that the lump in respondent’s jacket was contraband. The State District Court did not make precise findings on this point, instead finding simply that the officer, after feeling “a small, hard object wrapped in plastic” in respondent’s pocket, “formed the opinion that the object. . . was crack . . . cocaine.” App. to Pet. for Cert. C-2. The District Court also noted that the officer made “no claim that he suspected this object to be a weapon,” id., at C-5, a finding affirmed on appeal, see 469 N. W. 2d, at 464 (the officer “never thought the lump was a weapon”). The Minnesota Supreme Court, after “a close examination of the record,” held that the officer’s own testimony “belies any notion that he ‘immediately’” recognized the lump as crack cocaine. See 481 N. W. 2d, at 844. Rather, the court concluded, the officer determined that the lump was contraband only after “squeezing, sliding and otherwise manipulating the contents of the defendant’s pocket” — a pocket which the officer already knew contained no weapon. Ibid.
Under the State Supreme Court’s interpretation of the record before it, it is clear that the court was correct in holding that the police officer in this ease overstepped the bounds of the “strictly circumscribed” search for weapons allowed under Terry. See Terry, 392 U. S., at 26. Where, as here, “an officer who is executing a valid search for one item seizes a different item,” this Court rightly “has been sensitive to the danger . . . that officers will enlarge a specific authorization, furnished by a warrant or an exigency, into the equivalent of a general warrant to rummage and seize at will.” Texas v. Brown, 460 U. S., at 748 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). Here, the officer’s continued exploration of respondent’s pocket after having concluded that it contained no weapon was unrelated to “[t]he sole justification of the search [under Terry:]. .. the protection of the police officer and others nearby.” 392 U. S., at 29. It therefore amounted to the sort of evidentiary search that Terry expressly refused to authorize, see id., at 26, and that we have condemned in subsequent cases. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S., at 1049, n. 14; Sibron, 392 U. S., at 65-66.
Once again, the analogy to the plain-view doctrine is apt. In Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U. S. 321 (1987), this Court held invalid the seizure of stolen stereo equipment found by police while executing a valid search for other evidence. Although the police were lawfully on the premises, they obtained probable cause to believe that the stereo equipment was contraband only after moving the equipment to permit officers to read its serial numbers. The subsequent seizure of the equipment could not be justified by the plain-view doctrine, this Court explained, because the incriminating character of the stereo equipment was not immediately apparent; rather, probable cause to believe that the equipment was stolen arose only as a result of a further search — the moving of the equipment — that was not authorized by a search warrant or by any exception to the warrant requirement. The facts of this case are very similar. Although the officer was lawfully in a position to feel the lump in respondent’s pocket, because Terry entitled him to place his hands upon respondent’s jacket, the court below determined that the incriminating character of the object was not immediately apparent to him. Rather, the officer determined that the item was contraband only after conducting a further search, one not authorized by Terry or by any other exception to the warrant requirement. Because this further search of respondent’s pocket was constitutionally invalid, the seizure of the cocaine that followed is likewise unconstitutional. Horton, 496 U. S., at 140.
IV
For these reasons, the judgment of the Minnesota Supreme Court is
Affirmed.
Most state and federal courts have recognized a so-called “plain-feel” or “plain-touch” corollary to the plain-view doctrine. See United States v. Coleman, 969 F. 2d 126, 132 (CA5 1992); United States v. Salazar, 945 F. 2d 47, 51 (CA2 1991), cert. denied, 504 U. S. 923 (1992); United States v. Buchannon, 878 F. 2d 1065, 1067 (CA8 1989); United States v. Williams, 262 U. S. App. D. C. 112, 119-124, 822 F. 2d 1174, 1181-1186 (1987); United States v. Norman, 701 F. 2d 295, 297 (CA4), cert. denied, 464 U. S. 820 (1983); People v. Chavers, 33 Cal. 3d 462, 471-473, 658 P. 2d 96, 102-104 (1983); Dickerson v. State, No. 228, 1993 Del. LEXIS 12, *3-*4 (Jan. 26, 1993); State v. Guy, 172 Wis. 2d 86, 101-102, 492 N. W. 2d 311, 317-318 (1992). Some state courts, however, like the Minnesota court in this case, have rejected such a corollary. See People v. Diaz, 81 N. Y. 2d 106, 612 N. E. 2d 298 (1993); State v. Collins, 139 Ariz. 434, 435-438, 679 P. 2d 80, 81-84 (Ct. App. 1983); People v. McCarty, 11 Ill. App. 3d 421, 422, 296 N. E. 2d 862, 863 (1973); State v. Rhodes, 788 P 2d 1380, 1381 (Okla. Crim. App. 1990); State v. Broadnax, 98 Wash. 2d 289, 296-301, 654 P. 2d 96, 101-103 (1982); cf. Commonwealth v. Marconi, 408 Pa. Super. 601, 611-615, and n. 17, 597 A. 2d 616, 621-623, and n. 17 (1991), appeal denied, 531 Pa. 638, 611 A. 2d 711 (1992).
Before reaching the merits of the Fourth Amendment issue, we must address respondent’s contention that the case is moot. After respondent was found guilty of the drug possession charge, the trial court sentenced respondent under a diversionary sentencing statute to a 2-year period of probation. As allowed by the diversionary scheme, no judgment of conviction was entered and, upon respondent’s successful completion of probation, the original charges were dismissed. See Minn. Stat. § 152.18 (1992). Respondent argues that the case has been rendered moot by the dismissal of the original criminal charges. We often have observed, however, that "the possibility of a criminal defendant’s suffering ‘collateral legal consequences’ from a sentence already served” precludes a finding of mootness. Pennsylvania v. Minims, 434 U. S. 106, 108, it 3 (1977) (per curiam); see also Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U. S. 387, 391, n. 4 (1985); Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 40, 53-58 (1968). In this case, Minnesota law provides that the proceeding which culminated in finding respondent guilty “shall not be deemed a conviction for purposes of disqualifications or disabilities imposed by law upon conviction of a crime or for any other purpose.” Minn. Stat. § 152.18 (1992). The statute also provides, however, that a nonpublic record of the charges dismissed pursuant to the statute “shall be retained by the department of public safety for the purpose of use by the courts in determining the merits of subsequent proceedings” against the respondent. Ibid. Construing this provision, the Minnesota Supreme Court has held that “[t]he statute contemplates use of the record should [a] defendant have ‘future difficulties with the law.’” State v. Goodrich, 256 N. W. 2d 506, 512 (1977). Moreover, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has held that a diversionary disposition under § 152.18 may be included in calculating a defendant’s criminal history category in the event of a subsequent federal conviction. United States v. Frank, 932 F. 2d 700, 701 (1991). Thus, we must conclude that reinstatement of the record of the charges against respondent would carry collateral legal consequences and that, therefore, a live controversy remains.
“[T]he police officer in each [case would have] had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the prior justification . . , and permits the warrantless seizure.” Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 466 (1971) (opinion of Stewart, J.).
We also note that this Court’s opinion in Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U. S. 85 (1979), appeared to contemplate the possibility that police officers could obtain probable cause justifying a seizure of contraband through the sense of touch In that case, police officers had entered a tavern and subjected its patrons to patdown searches. While patting down the petitioner Ybarra, an “officer felt what he described as ‘a cigarette pack with objects in it,'” seized it, and discovered heroin inside. Id., at 88-89. The State argued that the seizure was constitutional on the grounds that the officer obtained probable cause to believe that Ybarra was carrying contraband during the course of a lawful Terry frisk. Ybarra, supra, at 92. This Court rejected that argument on the grounds that “[t]he initial frisk of Ybarra was simply not supported by a reasonable belief that he was armed and presently dangerous,” as required by Terry. 444 U. S., at 92-93. The Court added: “[s]ince we conclude that the initial patdown of Ybarra was not justified under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, we need not decide whether or not the presence on Ybarra's person of 'a cigarette pack with objects in it’ yielded probable cause to believe that Ybarra was carrying any illegal substance.” Id., at 93, n. 5. The Court’s analysis does not suggest, and indeed seems inconsistent with, the existence of a categorical bar against seizures of contraband detected manually during a Terry patdown search.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | A | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Scalia
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In 1986, petitioner David H. Lucas paid $976,000 for two residential lots on the Isle of Palms in Charleston County, South Carolina, on which he intended to build single-family homes. In 1988, however, the South Carolina Legislature enacted the Beachfront Management Act, S. C. Code Ann. § 48-39-250 et seq. (Supp. 1990), which had the direct effect of barring petitioner from erecting any permanent habitable structures on his two parcels.' See §48-39-290(A). A state trial court found that this prohibition rendered Lucas’s parcels "valueless.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 37. This case requires us to decide whether the Act’s dramatic effect on the economic value of Lucas’s lots accomplished a taking of private property under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments requiring the payment of “just compensation.” U. S. Const., Arndt. 5.
I
A
South Carolina’s expressed interest in intensively managing development activities in the so-called “coastal zone” dates from 1977 when, in the aftermath of Congress’s passage of the federal Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 1280, as amended, 16 U. S. C. § 1451 et seq., the legislature enacted a Coastal Zone Management Act of its own. See S. C. Code Ann. § 48-39-10 et seq. (1987). In its original form, the South Carolina Act required owners of coastal zone land that qualified as a “critical area” (defined in the legislation to include beaches and immediately adjacent sand dunes, §48-39-10(J)) to obtain a permit from the newly created South Carolina Coastal Council (Council) (respondent here) prior to committing the land to a “use other than the use the critical area was devoted to on [September 28, 1977].” § 48-39-130(A).
In the late 1970’s, Lucas and others began extensive residential development of the Isle of Palms, a barrier island situated eastward of the city of Charleston. Toward the close of the development cycle for one residential subdivision known as “Beaehwood East,” Lucas in 1986 purchased the two lots at issue in this litigation for his own account. No portion of the lots, which were located approximately 300 feet from the beach, qualified as a “critical area” under the 1977 Act; accordingly, at the time Lucas acquired these parcels, he was not legally obliged to obtain a permit from the Council in advance of any development activity. His intention with respect to the lots was to do what the owners of the immediately adjacent parcels had already done: erect single-family residences. He commissioned architectural drawings for this purpose.
The Beachfront Management Act brought Lucas’s plans to an abrupt end. Under that 1988 legislation, the Council was directed to establish a “baseline” connecting the landward-most “pointfs] of erosion... during the past forty years” in the region of the Isle of Palms that includes Lucas’s lots. S. C. Code Ann. § 48-39-280(A)(2) (Supp. 1988). In action not challenged here, the Council fixed this baseline landward of Lucas’s parcels. That was significant, for under the Act construction of occupable improvements was flatly prohibited seaward of a line drawn 20 feet landward of, and parallel to, the baseline. §48-39-290(A). The Act provided no exceptions.
B
Lucas promptly filed suit in the South Carolina Court of Common Pleas, contending that the Beachfront Management Act’s construction bar effected a taking of his property without just compensation. Lucas did not take issue with the validity of the Act as a lawful exercise of South Carolina’s police power, but contended that the Act’s complete extin-guishment of his property’s value entitled him to compensation regardless of whether the legislature had acted in furtherance of legitimate police power objectives. Following a bench trial, the court agreed. Among its factual determinations was the finding that “at the time Lucas purchased the two lots, both were zoned for single-family residential construction and... there were no restrictions imposed upon such use of the property by either the State of South Carolina, the County of Charleston, or the Town of the Isle of Palms.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 36. The trial court further found that the Beachfront Management Act decreed a permanent ban on construction insofar as Lucas’s lots were concerned, and that this prohibition “deprive[d] Lucas of any reasonable economic use of the lots,... eliminated the unrestricted right of use, and rendered] them valueless.” Id., at 37. The court thus concluded that Lucas’s properties had been “taken” by operation of the Act, and it ordered respondent to pay “just compensation” in the amount of $1,232,387.50. Id., at 40.
The Supreme Court of South Carolina reversed. It found dispositive what it described as Lucas’s concession “that the Beachfront Management Act [was] properly and validly designed to preserve... South Carolina’s beaches.” 304 S. C. 376, 379, 404 S. E. 2d 895, 896 (1991). Failing an attack on the validity of the statute as such, the court believed itself bound to accept the “uncontested... findings” of the South Carolina Legislature that new construction in the coastal zone — such as petitioner intended — threatened this public resource. Id., at 383, 404 S. E. 2d, at 898. The court ruled that when a regulation respecting the use of property is designed “to prevent serious public harm,” id., at 383, 404 S. E. 2d, at 899 (citing, inter alia, Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623 (1887)), no compensation is owing under the Takings Clause regardless of the regulation’s effect on the property’s value.
Two justices dissented. They acknowledged that our Mugler line of cases recognizes governmental power to prohibit “noxious” uses of property — i. e., uses of property akin to “public nuisances” — without having to pay compensation. But they would not have characterized the Beachfront Management Act’s “primary purpose [as] the prevention of a nuisance.” 304 S. C., at 395, 404 S. E. 2d, at 906 (Harwell, J., dissenting). To the dissenters, the chief purposes of the legislation, among them the promotion of tourism and the creation of a “habitat for indigenous flora and fauna,” could not fairly be compared to nuisance abatement. Id., at 396, 404 S. E. 2d, at 906. As a consequence, they would have affirmed the trial court’s conclusion that the Act’s obliteration of the value of petitioner’s lots accomplished a taking.
We granted certiorari. 502 U. S. 966 (1991).
h-< h-Í
As a threshold matter, we must briefly address the Council’s suggestion that this case is inappropriate for plenary review. After briefing and argument before the South Carolina Supreme Court, but prior to issuance of that court’s opinion, the Beachfront Management Act was amended to authorize the Council, in certain circumstances, to issue “special permits” for the construction or reconstruction of habitable structures seaward of the baseline. See S. C. Code Ann. §48-39-290(D)(l) (Supp. 1991). According to the Council, this amendment renders Lucas’s claim of a permanent deprivation unripe, as Lucas may yet be able to secure permission to build on his property. “[The Court’s] cases,” we are reminded, “uniformly reflect an insistence on knowing the nature and extent of permitted development before adjudicating the constitutionality of the regulations that purport to limit it.” MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U. S. 340, 351 (1986). See also Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U. S. 255, 260 (1980). Because petitioner “has not yet obtained a final decision regarding how [he] will be allowed to develop [his] property,” Williamson County Regional Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U. S. 172, 190 (1985), the Council argues that he is not yet entitled to definitive adjudication of his takings claim in this Court.
We think these considerations would preclude review had the South Carolina Supreme Court rested its judgment on ripeness grounds, as it was (essentially) invited to do by the Council. See Brief for Respondent 9, n. 3. The South Carolina Supreme Court shrugged off the possibility of further administrative and trial proceedings, however, preferring to dispose of Lucas’s takings claim on the merits. Cf., e. g., San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. San Diego, 450 U. S. 621, 631-632 (1981). This unusual disposition does not preclude Lucas from applying for a permit under the 1990 amendment for future construction, and challenging, on takings grounds, any denial. But it does preclude, both practically and legally, any takings claim with respect to Lucas’s past deprivation, i. e., for his having been denied construction rights during the period before the 1990 amendment. See generally First Englisk Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U. S. 304 (1987) (holding that temporary deprivations of use are compensable under the Takings Clause). Without even so much as commenting upon the consequences of the South Carolina Supreme Court’s judgment in this respect, the Council insists that permitting Lucas to press his claim of a past deprivation on this appeal would be improper, since “the issues of whether and to what extent [Lucas] has incurred a temporary taking,., have simply never been addressed.” Brief for Respondent 11. Yet Lucas had no reason to proceed on a “temporary taking” theory at trial, or even to seek remand for that purpose prior to submission of the ease to the South Carolina Supreme Court, since as the Act then read, the taking was unconditional and permanent. Moreover, given the breadth of the South Carolina Supreme Court’s holding and judgment, Lucas would plainly be unable (absent our intervention now) to obtain further state-court adjudication with respect to the 1988-1990 period.
In these circumstances, we think it would not accord with sound process to insist that Lucas pursue the late-created “special permit” procedure before his takings claim can be considered ripe. Lucas has properly alleged Article III injury in fact in this ease, with respect to both the pre-1990 and post-1990 constraints placed on the use of his parcels by the Beachfront Management Act. That there is a discretionary “special permit” procedure by which he may regain — for the future, at least — beneficial use of his land goes only to the prudential “ripeness” of Lucas’s challenge, and for the reasons discussed we do not think it prudent to apply that prudential requirement here. See Esposito v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 939 F. 2d 165, 168 (CA4 1991), cert. denied, post, p. 1219. We leave for decision on remand, of course, the questions left unaddressed by the South Carolina Supreme Court as a consequence of its categorical disposition.
Ill
A
Prior to Justice Holmes’s exposition in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S. 393 (1922), it was generally thought that the Takings Clause reached only a “direct appropriation” of property, Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457, 551 (1871), or the functional equivalent of a “practical ouster of [the owner’s] possession,” Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99 U. S. 635, 642 (1879). See also Gibson v. United States, 166 U. S. 269, 275-276 (1897). Justice Holmes recognized in Mahon, however, that if the protection against physical appropriations of private property was to be meaningfully enforced, the government’s power to redefine the range of interests included in the ownership of property was necessarily constrained by constitutional limits. 260 U. S., at 414-415. If, instead, the uses of private property were subject to unbridled, uncompensated qualification under the police power, “the natural tendency of human nature [would be] to extend the qualification more and more until at last private property disappear[ed].” Id., at 415. These considerations gave birth in that case to the oft-cited maxim that, “while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.” Ibid.
Nevertheless, our decision in Mahon offered little insight into when, and under what circumstances, a given regulation would be seen as going “too far” for purposes of the Fifth Amendment. In 70-odd years of succeeding “regulatory takings” jurisprudence, we have generally eschewed any “ ‘set formula’ ” for determining how far is too far, preferring to “engag[e] in... essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries.” Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U. S. 104, 124 (1978) (quoting Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U. S. 590, 594 (1962)). See Epstein, Takings: Descent and Resurrection, 1987 S. Ct. Rev. 1, 4. We have, however, described at least two discrete categories of regulatory action as com-pensable without case-specific inquiry into the public interest advanced in support of the restraint. The first encompasses regulations that compel the property owner to suffer a physical “invasion” of his property. In general (at least with regard to permanent invasions), no matter how minute the intrusion, and no matter how weighty the public purpose behind it, we have required compensation. For example, in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U. S. 419 (1982), we determined that New York’s law requiring landlords to allow television cable companies to emplace cable facilities in their apartment buildings constituted a taking, id., at 435-440, even though the facilities occupied at most only IV2 cubic feet of the landlords’ property, see id., at 438, n. 16. See also United States v. Causby, 328 U. S. 256, 265, and n. 10 (1946) (physical invasions of airspace); cf. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U. S. 164 (1979) (imposition of navigational servitude upon private marina).
The second situation in which we have found categorical treatment appropriate is where regulation denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land. See Agins, 447 U. S., at 260; see also Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U. S. 825, 834 (1987); Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U. S. 470, 495 (1987); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U. S. 264, 295-296 (1981). As we have said on numerous occasions, the Fifth Amendment is violated when land-use regulation “does not substantially advance legitimate state interests or denies an owner economically viable use of his land” Agins, supra, at 260 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
We have never set forth the justification for this rule. Perhaps it is simply, as Justice Brennan suggested, that total deprivation of beneficial use is, from the landowner’s point of view, the equivalent of a physical appropriation. See San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. San Diego, 450 U. S., at 652 (dissenting opinion). “[F]or what is the land but the profits thereof[?3” 1 E. Coke, Institutes, ch. X, §1 (1st Am. ed. 1812). Surely, at least, in the extraordinary circumstance when no productive or economically beneficial use of land is permitted, it is less realistic to indulge our usual assumption that the legislature is simply “adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life,” Penn Central Transportation Co., 438 U. S., at 124, in a manner that secures an “average reciprocity of advantage” to everyone concerned, Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S., at 415. And the functional basis for permitting the government, by regulation, to affect property values without compensation — that “Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law,” id., at 413 — does not apply to the relatively rare situations where the government has deprived a landowner of all economically beneficial uses.
On the other side of the balance, affirmatively supporting a compensation requirement, is the fact that regulations that leave the owner of land without economically beneficial or productive options for its use — typically, as here, by requiring land to be left substantially in its natural state — carry with them a heightened risk that private property is being pressed into some form of public service under the guise of mitigating serious public harm. See, e. g., Annicelli v. South Kingstown, 463 A. 2d 133, 140-141 (R. 1.1983) (prohibition on construction adjacent to beach justified on twin grounds of safety and “conservation of open space”); Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Parsippany-Troy Hills Township, 40 N. J. 539, 552-553, 193 A. 2d 232, 240 (1963) (prohibition on filling marshlands imposed in order to preserve region as water detention basin and create wildlife refuge). As Justice Brennan explained: “From the government's point of view, the benefits flowing to the public from preservation of open space through regulation may be equally great as from creating a wildlife refuge through formal condemnation or increasing electricity production through a dam project that floods private property.” San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., supra, at 652 (dissenting opinion). The many statutes on the books, both state and federal, that provide for the use of eminent domain to impose servitudes on private scenic lands preventing developmental uses, or to acquire such lands altogether, suggest the practical equivalence in this setting of negative regulation and appropriation. See, e.g., 16 U. S. C. §410ff-l(a) (authorizing acquisition of “lands, waters, or interests [within Channel Islands National Park] (including but not limited to scenic easements)”); §460aa-2(a) (authorizing acquisition of “any lands, or lesser interests therein, including mineral interests and scenic easements” within Sawtooth National Recreation Area); §§3921-3923 (authorizing acquisition of wetlands); N. C. Gen. Stat. § 113A-38 (1990) (authorizing acquisition of, inter alia, “ ‘scenic easements’ ” within the North Carolina natural and scenic rivers system); Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 11-15-101 to 11-15-108 (1987) (authorizing acquisition of “protective easements” and other rights in real property adjacent to State’s historic, architectural, archaeological, or cultural resources).
We think, in short, that there are good reasons for our frequently expressed belief that when the owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is, to leave his property economically idle, he has suffered a taking.
B
The trial court found Lucas’s two beachfront lots to have been rendered valueless by respondent’s enforcement of the coastal-zone construction ban. Under Lucas’s theory of the case, which rested upon our "no economically viable use” statements, that finding entitled him to compensation. Lucas believed it unnecessary to take issue with either the purposes behind the Beachfront Management Act, or the means chosen by the South Carolina Legislature to effectuate those purposes, The South Carolina Supreme Court, however, thought otherwise. In its view, the Beachfront Management Act was no ordinary enactment, but involved an exercise of South Carolina’s “police powers” to mitigate the harm to the public interest that petitioner’s use of his land might occasion. 304 S. C., at 384, 404 S. E. 2d, at 899. By neglecting to dispute the findings enumerated in the Act or otherwise to challenge the legislature’s purposes, petitioner “concede[d] that the beaeh/dune area of South Carolina's shores is an extremely valuable public resource; that the erection of new construction, inter alia, contributes to the erosion and destruction of this public resource; and that discouraging new construction in close proximity to the beaeh/dune area is necessary to prevent a great public harm.” Id,, at 382-383, 404 S. E. 2d, at 898. In the court’s view, these concessions brought petitioner’s challenge within a long line of this Court’s cases sustaining against Due Process and Takings Clause challenges the State’s use of its “police powers” to enjoin a property owner from activities akin to public nuisances. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623 (1887) (law prohibiting manufacture of alcoholic beverages); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U. S. 394 (1915) (law barring operation of brick mill in residential área); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U. S. 272 (1928) (order to destroy diseased cedar trees to prevent infection of nearby orchards); Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U. S. 590 (1962) (law effectively preventing continued operation of quarry in residential area).
It is correct that many of our prior opinions have suggested that “harmful or noxious uses” of property may be proscribed by government regulation without the requirement of compensation. For a number of reasons, however, we think the South Carolina Supreme Court was too quick to conclude that that principle decides the present case. The “harmful or noxious uses” principle was the Court’s early attempt to describe in theoretical terms why government may, consistent with the Takings Clause, affect property values by regulation without incurring an obligation to compensate — a reality we nowadays acknowledge explicitly with respect to the full scope of the State’s police power. See, e. g., Penn Central Transportation Co., 438 U. S., at 125 (where State “reasonably concluded] that ‘the health, safety, morals, or general welfare’ would be promoted by prohibiting particular contemplated uses of land,” compensation need not accompany prohibition); see also Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U. S., at 834-835 (“Our cases have not elaborated on the standards for determining what constitutes a ‘legitimate state interest[,]’ [but] [t]hey have made clear... that a broad range of governmental purposes and regulations satisfy these requirements”). We made this very point in Penn Central Transportation Co., where, in the course of sustaining New York City’s landmarks preservation program against a takings challenge, we rejected the petitioner’s suggestion that Mugler and the cases following it were premised on, and thus limited by, some objective conception of “noxiousness”:
“[T]he uses in issue in Hadacheck, Miller, and Goldblatt were perfectly lawful in themselves. They involved no ‘blameworthiness,... moral wrongdoing or conscious act of dangerous risk-taking which induce[d society] to shift the cost to a pa[rt]icular individual.’ Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 Yale L. J. 36, 50 (1964). These cases are better understood as resting not on any supposed ‘noxious’ quality of the prohibited uses but rather on the ground that the restrictions were reasonably related to the implementation of a policy — not unlike historic preservation — expected to produce a widespread public benefit and applicable to all similarly situated property.” 438 U. S., at 133-134, n. 30.
“Harmful or noxious use” analysis was, in other words, simply the progenitor of our more contemporary statements that “land-use regulation does not effect a taking if it ‘substantially advance[s] legitimate state interests’... Nollan, supra, at 834 (quoting Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U. S., at 260); see also Penn Central Transportation Co., supra, at 127; Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365, 387-388 (1926).
The transition- from our early focus on control of “noxious” uses to our contemporary understanding of the broad realm within which government may regulate without compensation was an easy one, since the distinction between “harm-preventing” and “benefit-conferring” regulation is often in the eye of the beholder. It is quite possible, for example, to describe in either fashion the ecological, economic, and esthetic concerns that inspired the South Carolina Legislature in the present ease. One could say that imposing a servitude on Lucas’s land is necessary in order to prevent his use of it from “harming” South Carolina’s ecological resources; or, instead, in order to achieve the “benefits” of an ecological preserve. Compare, e. g., Claridge v. New Hampshire Wetlands Board, 125 N. H. 745, 752, 485 A. 2d 287, 292 (1984) (owner may, without compensation, be barred from filling wetlands because landfilling would deprive adjacent coastal habitats and marine fisheries of ecological support), with, e. g., Bartlett v. Zoning Comm’n of Old Lyme) 161 Conn. 24, 30, 282 A. 2d 907, 910 (1971) (owner barred from filling tidal marshland must be compensated, despite municipality’s “laudable” goal of “preserving] marshlands from encroachment or destruction”). Whether one or the other of the competing characterizations will come to one’s lips in a particular case depends primarily upon one’s evaluation of the worth of competing uses of real estate. See Restatement (Second) of Torts §822, Comment g, p. 112 (1979) (“Practically all human activities unless carried on in a wilderness interfere to some extent with others or involve some risk of interference”). A given restraint will be seen as mitigating “harm” to the adjacent parcels or securing a “benefit” for them, depending upon the observer’s evaluation of the relative importance of the use that the restraint favors. See Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 Yale L. J. 36,49 (1964) (“[T]he problem [in this area] is not one of noxiousness or harm-creating activity at all; rather it is a problem of inconsistency between perfectly innocent and independently desirable uses”). Whether Lucas’s construction of single-family residences on his parcels should be described as bringing “harm” to South Carolina’s adjacent ecological resources thus depends principally upon whether the describer believes that the State’s use interest in nurturing those resources is so important that any competing adjacent use must yield.
When it is understood that “prevention of harmful use” was merely our early formulation of the police power justification necessary to sustain (without compensation) any regulatory diminution in value; and that the distinction between regulation that “prevents harmful use” and that which “confers benefits” is difficult, if not impossible, to discern on an objective, value-free basis; it becomes self-evident that noxious-use logic cannot serve as a touchstone to distinguish regulatory “takings” — which require compensation — from regulatory deprivations that do not require compensation. A fortiori the legislature’s recitation of a noxious-use justification cannot be the basis for departing from our categorical rule that total regulatory takings must be compensated. If it were, departure would virtually always be allowed. The South Carolina Supreme Court’s approach would essentially nullify Mahon’s affirmation of limits to the noncompensable exercise of the police power. Our cases provide no support for this: None of them that employed the logic of “harmful use” prevention to sustain a regulation involved an allegation that the regulation wholly eliminated the value of the claimant’s land. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn., 480 U. S., at 513-514 (Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting).
Where the State seeks to sustain regulation that deprives land of all economically beneficial use, we think it may resist compensation only if the logically antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner’s estate shows that the proscribed use interests were not part of his title to begin with. This accords, we think, with our “takings” jurisprudence, which has traditionally been guided by the understandings of our citizens regarding the content of, and the State’s power over, the “bundle of rights” that they acquire when they obtain title to property. It seems to us that the property owner necessarily expects the uses of his property to be restricted, from time to time, by various measures newly enacted by the State in legitimate exercise of its police powers; “[a]s long recognized, some values are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield to the police power.” Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S., at 413. And in the case of personal property, by reason of the State’s traditionally high degree of control over commercial dealings, he ought to be aware of the possibility that new regulation might even render his property economically worthless (at least if the property’s only economically productive use is sale or manufacture for sale). See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U. S. 51, 66-67 (1979) (prohibition on sale of eagle feathers). In the case of land, however, we think the notion pressed by the Council that title is somehow held subject to the “implied limitation” that the State may subsequently eliminate all economically valuable use is inconsistent with the historical compact recorded in the Takings Clause that has become part of our constitutional culture.
Where “permanent physical occupation” of land is concerned, we have refused to allow the government to decree it anew (without compensation), no matter how weighty the asserted “public interests” involved, Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U. S., at 426 — though we assuredly would permit the government to assert a permanent easement that was a pre-existing limitation upon the landowner’s title. Compare Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U. S. 141, 163 (1900) (interests of “riparian owner in the submerged lands... bordering on a public navigable water” held subject to Government’s navigational servitude), with Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U. S., at 178-180 (imposition of navigational servitude on marina created and rendered navigable at private expense held to constitute a taking). We believe similar treatment must be accorded confiscatory regulations, i. e., regulations that prohibit all economically beneficial use of land: Any limitation so severe cannot be newly legislated or decreed (without compensation), but must inhere in the title itself, in the restrictions that background principles of the State’s law of property and nuisance already place upon land ownership. A law or decree with such an effect must, in other words, do no more than duplicate the result that could have been achieved in the courts — by adjacent landowners (or other uniquely affected persons) under the State’s law of private nuisance, or by the State under its complementary power to abate nuisances that affect the public generally, or otherwise.
On this analysis, the owner of a lakebed, for example, would not be entitled to compensation when he is denied the requisite permit to engage in a landfilling operation that would have the effect of flooding others’ land. Nor the corporate owner of a nuclear generating plant, when it is directed to remove all improvements from its land upon discovery that the plant sits astride an earthquake fault. Such regulatory action may well have the effect of eliminating the land’s only economically productive use, but it does not proscribe a productive use that was previously permissible under relevant property and nuisance principles. The use of these properties for what are now expressly prohibited purposes was always unlawful, and (subject to other constitutional limitations) it was open to the State at any point to make the implication of those background principles of nuisance and property law explicit. See Miehelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness, Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1165, 1239-1241 (1967). In light of our traditional resort to “existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law” to define the range of interests that qualify for protection as “property” under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564, 577 (1972); see, e. g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U. S. 986, 1011-1012 (1984); Hughes v. Washington, 389 U. S. 290, 295 (1967) (Stewart, J., concur-' ring), this recognition that the Takings Clause does not require compensation when an owner is barred from putting land to a use that is proscribed by those “existing rules or understandings” is surely unexceptional. When, however, a regulation that declares “off-limits” all economically productive or beneficial uses of land goes beyond what the relevant background principles would dictate, compensation must be paid to sustain it.
The “total taking” inquiry we require today will ordinarily entail (as the application of state nuisance law ordinarily entails) analysis of, among other things, the degree of harm to public lands and resources, or adjacent private property, posed by the claimant’s proposed activities, see, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 826, 827, the social value of the claimant’s activities and their suitability to the locality in question, see, e. g., id., §§ 828(a) and (b), 881, and the relative ease with which the alleged harm can be avoided through measures taken by the claimant and the government (or adjacent private landowners) alike, see, e. g., id., §§ 827(e), 828(c), 830. The fact that a particular use has long been engaged in by similarly situated owners ordinarily imports a lack of any common-law prohibition (though changed circumstances or new knowledge may make what was previously permissible no longer so, see id., § 827, Comment g. So also does the fact that other landowners, similarly situated, are permitted to continue the use denied to the claimant.
It seems unlikely that common-law principles would have prevented the erection of any habitable or productive improvements on petitioner’s land; they rarely support prohibition of the “essential use” of land, Curtin v. Benson, 222 U. S. 78, 86 (1911). The question, however, is one of state law to be dealt with on remand. We emphasize that to win its ease South Carolina must do more than proffer the legislature’s declaration that the uses Lucas desires are inconsistent with the public interest, or the conclusory assertion that they violate a common-law maxim such as sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas. As we have said, a “State, by ipse dixit,
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | D | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Stevens
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Motivated by its interest in the safety and attractive appearance of its streets and sidewalks, the city of Cincinnati has refused to allow respondents to distribute their commercial publications through freestanding newsracks located on public property. The question presented is whether this refusal is consistent with the First Amendment. In agreement with the District Court and the Court of Appeals, we hold that it is not.
I
Respondent Discovery Network, Inc., is engaged in the business of providing adult educational, recreational, and social programs to individuals in the Cincinnati area. It advertises those programs in a free magazine that it publishes nine times a year. Although these magazines consist primarily of promotional material pertaining to Discovery’s courses, they also include some information about current events of general interest. Approximately one-third of these magazines are distributed through the 38 newsracks that the city authorized Discovery to place on public property in 1989.
Respondent Harmon Publishing Company, Inc., publishes and distributes a free magazine that advertises real" estate for sale at various locations throughout the United States. The magazine contains listings and photographs of available residential properties in the greater Cincinnati area, and also includes some information about interest rates, market trends, and other real estate matters. In 1989, Harmon received the city’s permission to install 24 newsracks at approved locations. About 15% of its distribution in the Cincinnati area is through those devices.
In March 1990, the city’s Director of Public Works notified each of the respondents that its permit to use dispensing devices on public property was revoked, and ordered the newsracks removed within 30 days. Each notice explained that respondent’s publication was a “commercial handbill” within the meaning of §714-1-C of the Municipal Code and therefore §714-23 of the code prohibited its distribution on public property. Respondents were granted administrative hearings and review by the Sidewalk Appeals Committee. Although the Committee did not modify the city’s position, it agreed to allow the dispensing devices to remain in place pending a judicial determination of the constitutionality of its prohibition. Respondents then commenced this litigation in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio.
After an evidentiary hearing the District Court concluded that “the regulatory scheme advanced by the City of Cincinnati completely prohibiting the distribution of commercial handbills on the public right of way violates the First Amendment. ” The court found that both publications were “commercial speech” entitled to First Amendment protection because they concerned lawful activity and were not misleading. While it recognized that a city “may regulate publication dispensing devices pursuant to its substantial interest in promoting safety and esthetics on or about the public right of way,” the District Court held, relying on Board of Trustees of State University of N. Y. v. Fox, 492 U. S. 469 (1989), that the city had the burden of establishing “a reasonable ‘fit' between the legislature’s ends and the means chosen to accomplish those ends.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 23a. (quoting Fox, 492 U. S., at 480). It explained that the “fit” in this case was unreasonable because the number of newsracks dispensing commercial handbills was “minute” compared with the total number (1,500-2,000) on the public right of way, and because they affected public safety in only a minimal way. Moreover, the practices in other communities indicated that the city’s safety and esthetic interests could be adequately protected “by regulating the size, shape, number or placement of such devices.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 24a.
On appeal, the city argued that since a number of courts had held that a complete ban on the use of newsracks dispensing traditional newspapers would be unconstitutional, and that the “Constitution... accords a lesser protection to commercial speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression,” Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N. Y., 447 U. S. 557, 563 (1980), its preferential treatment of newspapers over commercial publications was a permissible method of serving its legitimate interest in ensuring safe streets and regulating visual blight. The Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that the lesser status of commercial speech is relevant only when its regulation was designed either to prevent false or misleading advertising, or to alleviate distinctive adverse effects of the specific speech at issue. Because Cincinnati sought to regulate only the “manner” in which respondents’ publications were distributed, as opposed to their content or any harm caused by their content, the court reasoned that respondents’ publications had “high value” for purposes of the Fox “reasonable fit” test. 946 F. 2d 464, 471 (CA6 1991) (italics omitted). Applying that test, the Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court that the burden placed on speech “cannot be justified by the paltry gains in safety and beauty achieved by the ordinance.” Ibid. The importance of the Court of Appeals decision, together with the dramatic growth in the use of newsracks throughout the country, prompted our grant of certiorari. 503 U. S. 918 (1992).
HH H-1
There is no claim in this case that there is anything unlawful or misleading about the contents of respondents’ publications. Moreover, respondents do not challenge their characterization as “commercial speech.” Nor do respondents question the substantiality of the city’s interest in safety and esthetics. It was, therefore, proper for the District Court and the Court of Appeals to judge the validity of the city’s prohibition under the standards we set forth in Central Hudson and Fox. It was the city’s burden to establish a “reasonable fit” between its legitimate interests in safety and esthetics and its choice of a limited and selective prohibition of newsracks as the means chosen to serve those interests.
There is ample support in the record for the conclusion that the city did not “establish the reasonable fit we require.” Fox, 492 U. S., at 480. The ordinance on which it relied was an outdated prohibition against the distribution of any commercial handbills on public property. It was enacted long before any concern about newsracks developed. Its apparent purpose was to prevent the kind of visual blight caused by littering, rather than any harm associated with permanent, freestanding dispensing devices. The fact that the city failed to address its recently developed concern about newsracks by regulating their size, shape, appearance, or number indicates that it has not “carefully calculated” the costs and benefits associated with the burden on speech imposed by its prohibition. The benefit to be derived from the removal of 62 newsracks while about 1,500-2,000 remain in place was considered “minute” by the District Court and “paltry” by the Court of Appeals. We share their evaluation of the “fit” between the city’s goal and its method of achieving it.
In seeking reversal, the city argues that it is wrong to focus attention on the relatively small number of newsracks affected by its prohibition, because the city’s central concern is with the overall number of newsracks on its sidewalks, rather than with the unattractive appearance of a handful of dispensing devices. It contends, first, that a categorical prohibition on the use of newsracks to disseminate commercial messages burdens no more speech than is necessary to further its interest in limiting the number of newsracks; and, second, that the prohibition is a valid “time, place, and manner” regulation because it is content neutral and leaves open ample alternative channels of communication. We consider these arguments in turn.
II
The city argues that there is a close fit between its ban on newsracks dispensing “commercial handbills” and its interests in safety and esthetics because every decrease in the number of such dispensing devices necessarily effects an increase in safety and an improvement in the attractiveness of the cityscape. In the city’s view, the prohibition is thus entirely related to its legitimate interests in safety and esthetics.
We accept the validity of the city’s proposition, but consider it an insufficient justification for the discrimination against respondents’ use of newsracks that are no more harmful than the permitted newsracks, and have only a minimal impact on the overall number of newsracks on the city’s sidewalks. The major premise supporting the city’s argument is the proposition that commercial speech has only a low value. Based on that premise, the city contends that the fact that assertedly more valuable publications are allowed to use newsracks does not undermine its judgment that its esthetic and safety interests are stronger than the interest in allowing commercial speakers to have similar access to the reading public.
We cannot agree. In our view, the city’s argument attaches more importance to the distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech than our cases warrant and seriously underestimates the value of commercial speech.
This very case illustrates the difficulty of drawing bright lines that will clearly cabin commercial speech in a distinct category. For respondents’ publications share important characteristics with the publications that the city classifies as “newspapers.” Particularly, they are “commercial handbills” within the meaning of §714-1-C of the city’s code because they contain advertising, a feature that apparently also places ordinary newspapers within the same category. Separate provisions in the code specifically authorize the distribution of “newspapers” on the public right of way, but that term is not defined. Presumably, respondents’ publications do not qualify as newspapers because an examination of their content discloses a higher ratio of advertising to other text, such as news and feature stories, than is found in the exempted publications. Indeed, Cincinnati’s City Manager has determined that publications that qualify as newspapers and therefore can be distributed by newsrack are those that are published daily and/or weekly and “primarily presen[t] coverage of, and commentary on, current events.” App. 230 (emphasis added).
The absence of a categorical definition of the difference between “newspapers” and “commercial handbills” in the city’s code is also a characteristic of our opinions considering the constitutionality of regulations of commercial speech. Fifty years ago, we concluded that the distribution of a commercial handbill was unprotected by the First Amendment, even though half of its content consisted of political protest. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U. S. 52 (1942). A few years later, over Justice Black’s dissent, we held that the “commercial feature” of door-to-door solicitation of magazine subscriptions was a sufficient reason for denying First Amendment protection to that activity. Breará v. Alexandria, 341 U. S. 622 (1951). Subsequent opinions, however, recognized that important commercial attributes of various forms of communication do not qualify their entitlement to constitutional protection. Thus, in Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U. S. 748 (1976), we explained:
“We begin with several propositions that already are settled or beyond serious dispute. It is clear, for example, that speech does not lose its First Amendment protection because money is spent to project it, as in a paid advertisement of one form or another. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 35-59 (1976); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm’n, 413 U. S., at 384; New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S., at 266. Speech likewise is protected even though it is carried in a form that is ‘sold’ for profit, Smith v. California, 361 U. S. 147, 150 (1959) (books); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U. S. 495, 501 (1952) (motion pictures); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S., at 111 (religious literature), and even though it may involve a solicitation to purchase or otherwise pay or contribute money. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra; NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 429 (1963); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U. S., at 417; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 306-307 (1940).
“If there is a kind of commercial speech that lacks all First Amendment protection, therefore it must be distinguished by its content. Yet the speech whose content deprives it of protection cannot simply be speech on a commercial subject. No one would contend that our pharmacist may be prevented from being heard on the subject of whether, in general, pharmaceutical prices should be regulated, or their advertisement forbidden. Nor can it be dispositive that a commercial advertisement is noneditorial, and merely reports a fact. Purely factual matter of public interest may claim protection. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U. S., at 822; Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 102 (1940).” Id., at 761-762.
We then held that even speech that does no more than propose a commercial transaction is protected by the First Amendment. Id., at 762.
In later opinions we have stated that speech proposing a commercial transaction is entitled to lesser protection than other constitutionally guaranteed expression. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U. S. 447, 455-456 (1978). We have also suggested that such lesser protection was appropriate for a somewhat larger category of commercial speech — “that is, expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience.” Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm’n of New York, 447 U. S., at 561. We did not, however, use that definition in either Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U. S. 60 (1983), or in Board of Trustees of State University of N. Y. v. Fox, 492 U. S. 469 (1989).
In the Bolger case we held that a federal statute prohibiting the mailing of unsolicited advertisements for contraceptives could not be applied to the appellee’s promotional materials. Most of the appellee’s mailings consisted primarily of price and quantity information, and thus fell “within the core notion of commercial speech — ‘speech which does “no more than propose a commercial transaction.”’” Bolger, 463 U. S., at 66 (quoting Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U. S., at 762, in turn quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U. S. 376, 385 (1973)). Relying in part on the appellee’s economic motivation, the Court also answered the “closer question” about the proper label for informational pamphlets that were concededly advertisements referring to a specific product, and concluded that they also were “commercial speech.” 463 U. S., at 66-67. It is noteworthy that in reaching that conclusion we did not simply apply the broader definition of commercial speech advanced in Central Hudson — a definition that obviously would have encompassed the mailings — but rather “examined [them] carefully to ensure that speech deserving of greater constitutional protection is not inadvertently suppressed.” 463 U. S., at 66. In Fox, we described the category even more narrowly, by characterizing the proposal of a commercial transaction as “the test for identifying commercial speech.” 492 U. S., at 473-474 (emphasis added).
Under the Fox test it is clear that much of the material in ordinary newspapers is commercial speech and, conversely, that the editorial content in respondents’ promotional publications is not what we have described as “core” commercial speech. There is no doubt a “commonsense” basis for distinguishing between the two, but under both the city’s code and our cases the difference is a matter of degree.
Nevertheless, for the purpose of deciding this case, we assume that all of the speech barred from Cincinnati’s sidewalks is what we have labeled “core” commercial speech and that no such speech is found in publications that are allowed to use newsracks. We nonetheless agree with the Court of Appeals that Cincinnati’s actions in this case run afoul of the First Amendment. Not only does Cincinnati’s categorical ban on commercial newsracks place too much importance on the distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech, but in this case, the distinction bears no relationship whatsoever to the particular interests that the city has asserted. It is therefore an impermissible means of responding to the city’s admittedly legitimate interests. Cf. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N. Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U. S. 105, 120 (1991) (distinction drawn by Son of Sam law between income derived from criminal’s descriptions of his crime and other sources “has nothing to do with” State’s interest in transferring proceeds of crime from criminals to victims); Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S. 455, 465 (1980) (State’s interest in residential privacy cannot sustain statute permitting labor picketing, but prohibiting nonlabor picketing when “nothing in the content-based labor-nonlabor distinction has any bearing whatsoever on privacy”).
The city has asserted an interest in esthetics, but respondent publishers’ newsracks are no greater an eyesore than the newsracks permitted to remain on Cincinnati’s sidewalks. Each newsrack, whether containing “newspapers” or “commercial handbills,” is equally unattractive. While there was some testimony in the District Court that commercial publications are distinct from noncommercial publications in their capacity to proliferate, the evidence of such was exceedingly weak, the Court of Appeals discounted it, 946 F. 2d, at 466-467, and n. 3, and Cincinnati does not reassert that particular argument in this Court. As we have explained, the city’s primary concern, as argued to us, is with the aggregate number of newsracks on its streets. On that score, however, all newsracks, regardless of whether they contain commercial or noncommercial publications, are equally at fault. In fact, the newspapers are arguably the greater culprit because of their superior number.
Cincinnati has not asserted an interest in preventing commercial harms by regulating the information distributed by respondent publishers’ newsracks, which is, of course, the typical reason why commercial speech can be subject to greater governmental regulation than noncommercial speech. See, e. g., Bolger, 463 U. S., at 81 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) (“[T]he commercial aspects of a message may provide a justification for regulation that is not present when the communication has no commercial character”); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U. S., at 456-456 (commercial speech, unlike other varieties of speech, “occurs in an area traditionally subject to government regulation”).
A closer examination of one of the cases we have mentioned, Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products, demonstrates the fallacy of the city’s argument that a reasonable fit is established by the mere fact that the entire burden imposed on commercial speech by its newsrack policy may in some small way limit the total number of newsracks on Cincinnati’s sidewalks. Here, the city contends that safety concerns and visual blight may be addressed by a prohibition that distinguishes between commercial and noncommercial publications that are equally responsible for those problems. In Bolger, however, in rejecting the Government’s reliance on its interest in protecting the public from “offensive” speech, “[we] specifically declined to recognize a distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech that would render this interest a sufficient justification for a prohibition of commercial speech.” 463 U. S., at 71-72 (citing Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U. S. 678, 701, n. 28 (1977)). Moreover, the fact that the regulation “provide[d] only the most limited incremental support for the interest asserted,” 463 U. S., at 73 — that it achieved only a “marginal degree of protection,” ibid., for that interest — supported our holding that the prohibition was invalid. Finally, in Bolger, as in this case, the burden on commercial speech was imposed by denying the speaker access to one method of distribution— there the United States mails, and here the placement of newsracks on public property — without interfering with alternative means of access to the audience. As then-Justice Rehnquist explained in his separate opinion, that fact did not minimize the significance of the burden:
“[T]he Postal Service argues that Youngs can communicate with the public otherwise than through the mail. [This argument falls] wide of the mark. A prohibition on the use of the mails is a significant restriction of First Amendment rights. We have noted that ‘“[t]he United States may give up the Post Office when it sees fit, but while it carries it on the use of the mails is as much a part of free speech as the right to use our tongues.”’ Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U. S., at 416, quoting Milwaukee Social Democratic Publishing Co. v. Burleson, 256 U. S. 407, 437 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting).” Id., at 79-80 (footnote omitted).
In a similar vein, even if we assume, arguendo, that the city might entirely prohibit the use of newsracks on public property, as long as this avenue of communication remains open, these devices continue to play a significant role in the dissemination of protected speech.
In the absence of some basis for distinguishing between “newspapers” and “commercial handbills” that is relevant to an interest asserted by the city, we are unwilling to recognize Cincinnati’s bare assertion that the “low value” of commercial speech is a sufficient justification for. its selective and categorical ban on newsracks dispensing “commercial handbills.” Our holding, however, is narrow. As should be clear from the above discussion, we do not reach the question whether, given certain facts and under certain circumstances, a community might be able to justify differential treatment of commercial and noncommercial newsracks. We simply hold that on this record Cincinnati has failed to make such a showing. Because the distinction Cincinnati has drawn has absolutely no bearing on the interests it has asserted, we have no difficulty concluding, as did the two courts below, that the city has not established the “fit” between its goals and its chosen means that is required by our opinion in Fox. It remains to consider the city’s argument that its prohibition is a permissible time, place, and manner regulation.
IV
The Court has held that government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of engaging in protected speech provided that they are adequately justified “‘without reference to the content of the regulated speech.’” Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U. S. 781, 791 (1989), quoting Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U. S. 288, 293 (1984). Thus, a prohibition against the use of sound trucks emitting “loud and raucous” noise in residential neighborhoods is permissible if it applies equally to music, political speech, and advertising. See generally Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77 (1949). The city contends that its regulation of newsracks qualifies as such a restriction because the interests in safety and esthetics that it serves are entirely unrelated to the content of respondents’ publications. Thus, the argument goes, the justification for the regulation is content neutral.
The argument is unpersuasive because the very basis for the regulation is the difference in content between ordinary newspapers and commercial speech. True, there is no evidence that the city has acted with animus toward the ideas contained within respondents’ publications, but just last Term we expressly rejected the argument that “discriminatory... treatment is suspect under the First Amendment only when the legislature intends to suppress certain ideas.” Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N. Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 602 U. S., at 117. Regardless of the mens rea of the city, it has enacted a sweeping ban on the use of news-racks that distribute “commercial handbills,” but not “newspapers.” Under the city’s newsrack policy, whether any particular newsrack falls within the ban is determined by the content of the publication resting inside that newsrack. Thus, by any commonsense understanding of the term, the ban in this case is “content based.”
Nor are we persuaded that our statements that the test for whether a regulation is content based turns on the “justification” for the regulation, see, e. g., Ward, 491 U. S., at 791; Clark, 468 U. S., at 293, compel a different conclusion. We agree with the city that its desire to limit the total number of newsracks is “justified” by its interests in safety and esthetics. The city has not, however, limited the number of newsracks; it has limited (to zero) the number of newsracks distributing commercial publications. As we have explained, there is no justification for that particular regulation other than the city’s naked assertion that commercial speech has “low value.” It is the absence of a neutral justification for its selective ban on newsracks that prevents the city from defending its newsrack policy as content neutral.
By the same reasoning, the city’s heavy reliance on Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U. S. 41 (1986), is misplaced. In Renton, a city ordinance imposed particular zoning regulations on movie theaters showing adult films. The Court recognized that the ordinance did not fall neatly into the “content-based” or “content-neutral” category in that “the ordinance treats theaters that specialize in adult films differently from other kinds of theaters.” Id., at 47. We upheld the regulation, however, largely because it was justified not by an interest in suppressing adult films, but by the city’s concern for the “secondary effects” of such theaters on the surrounding neighborhoods. Id., at 47-49. In contrast to the speech at issue in Renton, there are no secondary effects attributable to respondent publishers’ newsracks that distinguish them from the newsracks Cincinnati permits to remain on its sidewalks.
In sum, the city’s newsrack policy is neither content neutral nor, as demonstrated in Part III, swpra, “narrowly tailored.” Thus, regardless of whether or not it leaves open ample alternative channels of communication, it cannot be justified as a legitimate time, place, or manner restriction on protected speech.
Cincinnati has enacted a sweeping ban that bars from its sidewalks a whole class of constitutionally protected speech. As did the District Court and the Court of Appeals, we conclude that Cincinnati has failed to justify that policy. The regulation is not a permissible regulation of commercial speech, for on this record it is clear that the interests that Cincinnati has asserted are unrelated to any distinction between “commercial handbills” and “newspapers.” Moreover, because the ban is predicated on the content of the publications distributed by the subject newsracks, it is not a valid time, place, or manner restriction on protected speech. For these reasons, Cincinnati’s categorical ban on the distribution, via newsrack, of “commercial handbills” cannot be squared with the dictates of the First Amendment.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
The First Amendment provides, in part: “Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press....” The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has been construed to make this prohibition applicable to state action. See, e. g., Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359 (1931); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444 (1938).
That section provides:
“ ‘Commercial Handbill’ shall mean any printed or written matter, dodger, circular, leaflet, pamphlet, paper, booklet or any other printed or otherwise reproduced original or copies of any matter of literature:
“(a) Which advertises for sale any merchandise, product, commodity or thing; or
“(b) Which directs attention to any business or mercantile or commercial establishment, or other activity, for the purpose of directly promoting the interest thereof by sales; or
“(c) Which directs attention to or advertises any meeting, theatrical performance, exhibition or event of any kind for which an admission fee is charged for the purpose of private gain or profit.” Cincinnati Municipal Code § 714-1-C (1992).
That section provides:
“No person shall throw or deposit any commercial or non-commercial handbill in or upon any sidewalk, street or other public place within the city. Nor shall any person hand out or distribute or sell any commercial handbill in any public place. Provided, however, that it shall not be unlawful on any sidewalk, street or other public place within the city for any person to hand out or distribute, without charge to. the receiver thereof, any non-commercial handbill to any person willing to accept it, except within or around the city hall building.” § 714-23.
App. to Pet. for Cert. 25a.
Id., at 23a.
“Such regulation,” the District Court noted, “allows [a] city to control the visual effect of the devices and to keep them from interfering with public safety without completely prohibiting the speech in question.” Id., at 24a.
See Sentinel Communications Co. v. Watts, 936 F. 2d 1189, 1196-1197 (CA11 1991), and cases cited therein.
In the words of the Court of Appeals:
“This ‘lesser protection’ afforded commercial speech is crucial to Cincinnati’s argument on appeal. Cincinnati argues that placing the entire burden of achieving its goal of safer streets and a more harmonious landscape on commercial speech is justified by this lesser protection.” 946 F. 2d 464, 469 (CA6 1991). See also id., at 471 (“The [city’s] defense of that ordinance rests solely on the low value allegedly accorded to commercial speech in general”).
The Court of Appeals also noted that the general ban on the distribution of handbills had been on the books long before the newsrack problem arose. Id., at 473.
We are advised that almost half of the single copy sales of newspapers are now distributed through newsracks. See Brief for American Newspaper Publishers Association et al. as Amici Curiae 2.
While the Court of Appeals ultimately applied the standards set forth in Central Hudson and Fox, its analysis at least suggested that those standards might not apply to the type of regulation at issue in this case. For if commercial speech is entitled to “lesser protection” only when the regulation is aimed at either the content of the speech or the particular adverse effects stemming from that content, it would seem to follow that a regulation that is not so directed should be evaluated under the standards applicable to regulations on fully protected speech, not the more lenient standards by which we judge regulations on commercial speech. Because we conclude that Cincinnati’s ban on commercial newsracks cannot withstand scrutiny under Central Hudson and Fox, we need not decide whether that policy should be subjected to more exacting review.
As we stated in Fox:
“[Wjhile we have insisted that the free flow of commercial information is valuable enough to justify imposing on would-be regulators the costs of distinguishing... the harmless from the harmful, we have not gone so far as to impose upon them the burden of demonstrating that the distinguishment is 100% complete, or that the manner of restriction is absolutely the least severe that will achieve the desired end. What our decisions require is a ‘fit’ between the legislature’s ends and the means chosen to accomplish those ends — a fit that is not necessarily perfect, but reasonable; that represents not necessarily the single best disposition but one whose scope is in proportion to the interest served; that employs not necessarily the least restrictive means but, as we have put it in the other contexts discussed above, a means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective. Within those bounds we leave it to governmental deci-sionmakers to judge what manner of regulation may best be employed.... “Here we require the government goal to be substantial, and the cost to be carefully calculated. Moreover, since the State bears the burden of justifying its restrictions, it must affirmatively establish the reasonable fit we require.” 492 U. S., at 480 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
We reject the city’s argument that the lower courts’ and our consideration of alternative, less drastic measures by which the city could effectuate its interests in safety and esthetics somehow violates Fox’s holding that regulations on commercial speech are not subject to “least-restrictive-means” analysis. To repeat, see n. 12, swpra, while we have rejected the “least-restrictive-means” test for judging restrictions on commercial speech, so too have we rejected mere rational-basis review. A regulation need not be “absolutely the least severe that will achieve the desired end,” Fox, 492 U. S., at 480, but if there are numerous and obvious less-burdensome alternatives to the restriction on commercial speech, that is certainly a relevant consideration in determining whether the “fit” between ends and means is reasonable.
See n. 2, supra.
Cincinnati Municipal Code § 862-1 (1992) provides:
“Permission is hereby granted to any person or persons lawfully authorized to engage in the business of selling newspapers to occupy space on the sidewalks of city streets for selling newspapers, either in the morning or afternoon, where permission has been obtained from the owner or tenant of the adjoining building.”
Some ordinary newspapers try to maintain a ratio of 70% advertising to 30% editorial content. See generally C. Fink, Strategic Newspaper Management 43 (1988).
Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U. S. 350 (1977), summarized the reasons for extending First Amendment protection to “core” commercial speech:
“The listener’s interest [in commercial speech] is substantial: the consumer’s concern for the free flow of commercial speech often may be far keener than his concern for urgent political dialogue. Moreover, significant societal interests are served by such speech. Advertising, though entirely commercial, may often carry information of import to significant issues of the day. See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U. S. 809 (1975). And commercial speech serves to inform the public of the availability, nature, and prices of products and services, and thus performs an indispensable role in the allocation of resources in a free enterprise system. See FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U. S. 568, 603-604 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). In short, such speech serves individual and societal interests in assuring informed and reliable decisionmaking.” Id., at 364.
Of course, we were not the first to recognize the value of commercial speech:
“ ‘[Advertisements] are well calculated to enlarge and enlighten the public mind, and are worthy of being enumerated among the many methods of awakening and maintaining the popular attention, with which more modern times, beyond all preceding example, abound.”’ D. Boorstin, The Americans: The Colonial Experience 328, 415 (1958), quoting I. Thomas, History of Printing in America with a Biography of Printers, and an Account of Newspapers (2d ed. 1810).
When the Court first advanced the broader definition of commercial speech, a similar concern had been expressed. See Central Hudson, 447 U. S., at 579 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
We note that because Cincinnati’s regulatory scheme depends on a governmental determination as to whether a particular publication is a “commercial handbill” or a “newspaper,” it raises some of the same concerns as the newsrack ordinance struck down in Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U. S. 750 (1988). The ordinance at issue in Lakewood vested in the mayor authority to grant or deny a newspaper’s application for a newsrack permit, but contained no explicit limit on the scope of the mayor’s discretion. The Court struck down the ordinance, reasoning that a licensing scheme that vests such unbridled
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | C | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Breyer
announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Part III, an opinion with respect to Parts I, II, and V, in which Justice Stevens, Justice O’Connor, and Justice Sou-TER join, and an opinion with respect to Parts IV and VI, in which Justice Stevens and Justice Souter join.
These cases present First Amendment challenges to three statutory provisions that seek to regulate the broadcasting of “patently offensive” sex-related material on cable television. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 (1992 Act or Act), 106 Stat. 1486, §§ 10(a), 10(b), and 10(c), 47 U. S. C. §§ 532(h), 532(j), and note following § 531. The provisions apply to programs broadcast over cable on what are known as “leased access channels” and “public, educational, or governmental channels.” Two of the provisions essentially permit a cable system operator to prohibit the broadcasting of “programming” that the “operator reasonably believes describes or depicts sexual or excretory activities or organs in a patently offensive manner.” 1992 Act, § 10(a); see § 10(c). See also In re Implementation of Section 10 of the Cable Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992: Indecent Programming and Other Types of Materials on Cable Access Channels, First Report and Order, 8 FCC Red 998 (1993) (First Report and Order); In re Implementation of Section 10 of the Cable Consumer Protection and Competition Act of1992, Indecent Programming and Other Types of Materials on Cable Access Channels, Second Report and Order, 8 FCC Red 2638 (1993) (Second Report and Order). The remaining provision requires cable system operators to segregate certain “patently offensive” programming, to place it on a single channel, and to block that channel from viewer access unless the viewer requests access in advance and in writing. 1992 Act, § 10(b); 47 CFR § 76.701(g) (1995).
We conclude that the first provision — which permits the operator to decide whether or not to broadcast such programs on leased access channels — is consistent with the First Amendment. The second provision, which requires leased channel operators to segregate and to block that programming, and the third provision, applicable to public, educational, and governmental channels, violate the First Amendment, for they are not appropriately tailored to achieve the basic, legitimate objective of protecting children from exposure to “patently offensive” material.
I
Cable operators typically own a physical cable network used to convey programming over several dozen cable channels into subscribers’ houses. Program sources vary from channel to channel. Most channels carry programming produced by independent firms, including “many national and regional cable programming networks that have emerged in recent years,” Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U. S. 622, 629 (1994), as well as some programming that the system operator itself (or an operator affiliate) may provide. Other channels may simply retransmit through cable the signals of over-the-air broadcast stations. Ibid. Certain special channels here at issue, called “leased channels” and “public, educational, or governmental channels,” carry programs provided by those to whom the law gives special cable system access rights.
A “leased channel” is a channel that federal law requires a cable system operator to reserve for commercial lease by unaffiliated third parties. About 10 to 15 percent of a cable system’s channels would typically fall into this category. See 47 U. S. C. § 532(b). “[P]ublic, educational, or governmental channels” (which we shall call “public access” channels) are channels that, over the years, local governments have required cable system operators to set aside for public, educational, or governmental purposes as part of the consideration an operator gives in return for permission to install cables under city streets and to use public rights-of-way. See § 531; see also H. R. Rep. No. 98-934, p. 30 (1984) (authorizing local authorities to require creation of public access channels). Between 1984 and 1992, federal law (as had much pre-1984 state law, in respect to public access channels) prohibited cable system operators from exercising any editorial control over the content of any program broadcast over either leased or public access channels. See 47 U. S. C. §§ 531(e) (public access), 532(c)(2) (leased access).
In 1992, in an effort to control sexually explicit programming conveyed over access channels, Congress enacted the three provisions before us. The first two provisions relate to leased channels. The first says:
“This subsection shall permit a cable operator to enforce prospectively a written and published policy of prohibiting programming that the cable operator reasonably believes describes or depicts sexual or excretory activities or organs in a patently offensive manner as measured by contemporary community standards.” 1992 Act, § 10(a)(2), 106 Stat. 1486.
The second provision, applicable only to leased channels, requires cable operators to segregate and to block similar programming if they decide to permit, rather than to prohibit, its broadcast. The provision tells the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commission) to promulgate regulations that will (a) require “programmers to inform cable operators if the program[ming] would be indecent as defined by Commission regulations”; (b) require “cable operators to place” such material “on a single channel”; and (e) require “cable operators to block such single channel unless the subscriber requests access to such channel in writing.” 1992 Act, § 10(b)(1). The Commission issued regulations defining the material at issue in terms virtually identical to those we have already set forth, namely, as descriptions or depictions of “sexual or excretory activities or organs in a patently offensive manner” as measured by the cable viewing community. First Report and Order ¶ ¶ 33-38, at 1003-1004. The regulations require the cable operators to place this material on a single channel and to block it (say, by scrambling). They also require the system operator to provide access to the blocked channel “within 30 days” of a subscriber’s written request for access and to reblock it within 30 days of a subscriber’s request to do so. 47 CFR § 76.701(c) (1995).
The third provision is similar to the first provision, but applies only to public access channels. The relevant statutory section instructs the FCC to promulgate regulations that will
“enable a cable operator of a cable system to prohibit the use, on such system, of any channel capacity of any public, educational, or governmental access facility for any programming which contains obscene material, sexually explicit conduct, or material soliciting or promoting unlawful conduct.” 1992 Act, § 10(c), 106 Stat. 1486.
The FCC, carrying out this statutory instruction, promulgated regulations defining “sexually explicit” in language almost identical to that in the statute’s leased channel provision, namely, as descriptions or depictions of “sexual or excretory activities or organs in a patently offensive manner” as measured by the cable viewing community. See 47 CFR §76.702 (1995) (incorporating definition from § 76.701(g)).
The upshot is, as we said at the beginning, that the federal law before us (the statute as implemented through regulations) now permits cable operators either to allow or to forbid the transmission of “patently offensive” sex-related materials over both leased and public access channels, and requires those operators, at a minimum, to segregate and to block transmission of that same material on leased channels.
Petitioners, claiming that the three statutory provisions, as implemented by the Commission regulations, violate the First Amendment, sought judicial review of the Commission’s First Report and Order and its Second Report and Order in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. A panel of that Circuit agreed with petitioners that the provisions violated the First Amendment. Alliance for Community Media v. FCC, 10 F. 3d 812 (1993). The entire Court of Appeals, however, heard the case en banc and reached the opposite conclusion. It held that all three statutory provisions (as implemented) were consistent with the First Amendment. Alliance for Community Media v. FCC, 56 F. 3d 105 (1995). Four of the eleven en banc appeals court judges dissented. Two of the dissenting judges concluded that all three provisions violated the First Amendment. Two others thought that either one, or two, but not all three of the provisions, violated the First Amendment. We granted certiorari to review the en banc court’s First Amendment determinations.
II
We turn initially to the provision that 'permits cable system operators to prohibit “patently offensive” (or “indecent”) programming transmitted over leased access channels. 1992 Act, § 10(a). The Court of Appeals held that this provision did not violate the First Amendment because the First Amendment prohibits only “Congress” (and, through the Fourteenth Amendment, a “State”), not private individuals, from “abridging the freedom of speech.” Although the court said that it found no “state action,” 56 F. 3d, at 113, it could not have meant that phrase literally, for, of course, petitioners attack (as “abridging]... speech”) a congressional statute — which, by definition, is an Act of “Congress.” More likely, the court viewed this statute’s “permissive” provisions as not themselves restricting speech, but, rather, as simply reaffirming the authority to pick and choose programming that a private entity, say, a private broadcaster, would have had in the absence of intervention by any federal, or local, governmental entity.
We recognize that the First Amendment, the terms of which apply to governmental action, ordinarily does not itself throw into constitutional doubt the decisions of private citizens to permit, or to restrict, speech — and this is so ordinarily even where those decisions take place within the framework of a regulatory regime such as broadcasting. Were that not so, courts might have to face the difficult, and potentially restrictive, practical task of deciding which, among any number of private parties involved in providing a program (for example, networks, station owners, program editors, and program producers), is the “speaker” whose rights may not be abridged, and who is the speech-restricting “censor.” Furthermore, as this Court has held, the editorial function itself is an aspect of “speech,” see Turner, 512 U. S., at 636, and a court’s decision that a private party, say, the station owner, is a “censor,” could itself interfere with that private “censor’s” freedom to speak as an editor. Thus, not surprisingly, this Court’s First Amendment broadcasting cases have dealt with governmental efforts to restrict, not governmental efforts to provide or to maintain, a broadcaster’s freedom to pick and to choose programming. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U. S. 94 (1973) (striking restrictions on broadcaster’s ability to refuse to carry political advertising); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367 (1969) (upholding restrictions on editorial authority); FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U. S. 364 (1984) (striking restrictions); cf. Consolidated Edison Co. of N. Y. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of N. Y., 447 U. S. 530 (1980) (striking ban on political speech by public utility using its billing envelopes as a broadcast medium); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of N. Y, 447 U. S. 557 (1980) (striking restriction on public utility advertising).
Nonetheless, petitioners, while conceding that this is ordinarily so, point to circumstances that, in their view, make the analogy with private broadcasters inapposite and make these cases special ones, warranting a different constitutional result. As a practical matter, they say, cable system operators have considerably more power to “censor” program viewing than do broadcasters, for individual communities typically have only one cable system, linking broadcasters and other program providers with each community’s many subscribers. See Turner, supra, at 633 (only one cable system in most communities; nationally more than 60% of homes subscribe to cable, which then becomes the primary or sole source of video programming in the overwhelming majority of these homes). Moreover, concern about system operators’ exercise of this considerable power originally led government— local and federal — to insist that operators provide leased and public access channels free of operator editorial control. H. R. Rep. No. 98-934, at 30-31. To permit system operators to supervise programming on leased access channels will create the very private-censorship risk that this anticensorship effort sought to avoid. At the same time, petitioners add, cable systems have two relevant special characteristics. They are unusually involved with government, for they depend upon government permission and government facilities (streets, rights-of-way) to string the cable necessary for their services. And in respect to leased channels, their speech interests are relatively weak because they act less like editors, such as newspapers or television broadcasters, than like common carriers, such as telephone companies.
Under these circumstances, petitioners conclude, Congress’ “permissive” law, in actuality, will “abridge” their free speech. And this Court should treat that law as a con-gressionally imposed, content-based, restriction unredeemed as a properly tailored effort to serve a “compelling interest.” See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N. Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U. S. 105, 118 (1991); Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U. S. 115, 126 (1989). They further analogize the provisions to constitutionally forbidden content-based restrictions upon speech taking place in “public forums” such as public streets, parks, or buildings dedicated to open speech and communication. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, Inc., 473 U. S. 788, 802 (1985); Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators’ Assn., 460 U. S. 37, 45 (1983); see also H. R. Rep. No. 98-934, supra, at 30 (identifying public access channels as the electronic equivalent of a “speaker’s soap box”). And, finally, petitioners say that the legal standard the law contains (the “patently offensive” standard) is unconstitutionally vague. See, e. g., Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U. S. 676 (1968) (rejecting censorship ordinance as vague, even though it was intended to protect children).
Like petitioners, Justices Kennedy and Thomas would have us decide these cases simply by transferring and applying literally categorical standards this Court has developed in other contexts. For Justice Kennedy, leased access channels are like a common carrier, cablecast is a protected medium, strict scrutiny applies, § 10(a) fails this test, and, therefore, § 10(a) is invalid. Post, at 796-801,806-807. For Justice Thomas, the case is simple because the cable operator who owns the system over which access channels are broadcast, like a bookstore owner with respect to what it displays on the shelves, has a predominant First Amendment interest. Post, at 816-817, 822-824. Both categorical approaches suffer from the same flaws: They import law developed in very different contexts into a new and changing environment, and they lack the flexibility necessary to allow government to respond to very serious practical problems without sacrificing the free exchange of ideas the First Amendment is designed to protect.
The history of this Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence, however, is one of continual development, as the Constitution’s general command that “Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press,” has been applied to new circumstances requiring different adaptations of prior principles and precedents. The essence of that protection is that Congress may not regulate speech except in cases of extraordinary need and with the exercise of a degree of care that we have not elsewhere required. See, e. g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47, 51-52 (1919); Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 616, 627-628 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 639 (1943); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U. S. 397, 418-420 (1989). At the same time, our cases have not left Congress or the States powerless to address the most serious problems. See, e. g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568 (1942); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U. S. 50 (1976); FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U. S. 726 (1978).
Over the years, this Court has restated and refined these basic First Amendment principles, adopting them more particularly to the balance of competing interests and the special circumstances of each field of application. See, e. g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 (1964) (allowing criticism of public officials to be regulated by civil libel only if the plaintiff shows actual malice); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U. S. 323 (1974) (allowing greater regulation of speech harming individuals who are not public officials, but still requiring a negligence standard); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367 (1969) (employing highly flexible standard in response to the scarcity problem unique to over-the-air broadcast); Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U. S. 221, 231-232 (1987) (requiring “compelling state interest” and a “narrowly drawn” means in context of differential taxation of media); Sable, supra, at 126, 131 (applying “compelling interest,” “least restrictive means,” and “narrowly tailored” requirements to indecent telephone communications); Turner, 512 U. S., at 641 (using “heightened scrutiny” to address content-neutral regulations of cable system broadcasts); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U. S., at 566 (restriction on commercial speech cannot be “more extensive than is necessary” to serve a “substantial” government interest).
This tradition teaches that the First Amendment embodies an overarching commitment to protect speech from government regulation through close judicial scrutiny, thereby enforcing the Constitution’s constraints, but without imposing judicial formulas so rigid that they become a strait jacket that disables government from responding to serious problems. This Court, in different contexts, has consistently held that government may directly regulate speech to address extraordinary problems, where its regulations are appropriately tailored to resolve those problems without imposing an unnecessarily great restriction on speech. Justices Kennedy and Thomas would have us further declare which, among the many applications of the general approach that this Court has developed over the years, we are applying here. But no definitive choice among competing analogies (broadcast, common carrier, bookstore) allows us to declare a rigid single standard, good for now and for all future media and purposes. That is not to say that we reject all the more specific formulations of the standard — they appropriately cover the vast majority of cases involving government regulation of speech. Rather, aware as we are of the changes taking place in the law, the technology, and the industrial structure related to telecommunications, see, e. g., Telecommunications Act of 1996, 110 Stat. 56; S. Rep. No. 104-23 (1995); H. R. Rep. No. 104-204 (1995), we believe it unwise and unnecessary definitively to pick one analogy or one specific set of words now. See Columbia Broadcasting, 412 U. S., at 102 (“The problems of regulation are rendered more difficult because the broadcast industry is dynamic in terms of technological change; solutions adequate a decade ago are not necessarily so now, and those acceptable today may well be outmoded 10 years hence”); Pacifica, supra, at 748 (“We have long recognized that each medium of expression presents special First Amendment problems”). We therefore think it premature to answer the broad questions that Justices Kennedy and Thomas raise in their efforts to find a definitive analogy, deciding, for example, the extent to which private property can be designated a public forum, compare post, at 791-793, 794 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part, and dissenting in part), with post, at 826-829 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part); whether public access channels are a public forum, post, at 791-792 (opinion of Kennedy, J.); whether the Government’s viewpoint neutral decision to limit a public forum is subject to the same scrutiny as a selective exclusion from a pre-existing public forum, post, at 799-803 (opinion of Kennedy, J.); whether exclusion from common carriage must for all purposes be treated like exclusion from a public forum, post, at 797-798 (opinion of Kennedy, J.); and whether the interests of the owners of communications media always subordinate the interests of all other users of a medium, post, at 816-817 (opinion of Thomas, J.).
Rather than decide these issues, we can decide these cases more narrowly, by closely scrutinizing § 10(a) to assure that it properly addresses an extremely important problem, without imposing, in light of the relevant interests, an unnecessarily great restriction on speech. The importance of the interest at stake here — protecting children from exposure to patently offensive depictions of sex; the accommodation of the interests of programmers in maintaining access channels and of cable operators in editing the contents of their channels; the similarity of the problem and its solution to those at issue in Pacifica; and the flexibility inherent in an approach that permits private cable operators to make editorial decisions, lead us to conclude that § 10(a) is a sufficiently tailored response to an extraordinarily important problem.
First, the provision before us comes accompanied with an extremely important justification, one that this Court has often found compelling — the need to protect children from exposure to patently offensive sex-related material. Sable Communications, 492 U. S., at 126; Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U. S. 629, 639-640 (1968); New York v. Ferber, 458 U. S. 747, 756-757 (1982).
Second, the provision arises in a very particular context— congressional permission for cable operators to regulate programming that, but for a previous Act of Congress, would have had no path of access to cable channels free of an operator’s control. The First Amendment interests involved are therefore complex, and require a balance between those interests served by the access requirements themselves (increasing the availability of avenues of expression to programmers who otherwise would not have them), H. R. Rep. No. 98-934, at 31-36, and the disadvantage to the First Amendment interests of cable operators and other programmers (those to whom the cable operator would have assigned the channels devoted to access). See Turner, 512 U. S., at 635-637.
Third, the problem Congress addressed here is remarkably similar to the problem addressed by the FCC in Pacifica, and the balance Congress struck is commensurate with the balance we approved there. In Pacifica this Court considered a governmental ban of a radio broadcast of “indecent” materials, defined in part, like the provisions before us, to include
“ ‘language that describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities and organs, at times of the day when there is a reasonable risk that children may be in the audience.’ ” 438 U. S., at 732 (quoting 56 F. C. C. 2d 94, 98 (1975)).
The Court found this ban constitutionally permissible primarily because “broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children” and children were likely listeners to the program there at issue — an afternoon radio broadcast. 438 U. S., at 749-750. In addition, the Court wrote, “the broadcast media have established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all Americans,” id., at 748, “[p]atently offensive, indecent material... confronts the citizen, not only in public, but also in the privacy of the home,” generally without sufficient prior warning to allow the recipient to avert his or her eyes or ears, ibid.; and “[a]dults who feel the need may purchase tapes and records or go to theaters and nightclubs” to hear similar performances, id., at 750, n. 28.
All these factors are present here. Cable television broadcasting, including access channel broadcasting, is as “accessible to children” as over-the-air broadcasting, if not more so. See Heeter, Greenberg, Baldwin, Paugh, Srig-ley, & Atkin, Parental Influences on Viewing Style, in Cable-viewing 140 (C. Heeter & B. Greenberg eds. 1988) (children spend more time watching television and view more channels than do their parents, whether their household subscribes to cable or receives television over the air). Cable television systems, including access channels, “have established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all Americans.” Pacifica, supra, at 748. See Jost, The Future of Television, 4 The CQ Researcher 1131, 1146 (Dec. 23, 1994) (63% of American homes subscribe to cable); Greenberg, Heeter, D’Alessio, & Sipes, Cable and Noncable Viewing Style Comparisons, in Cableviewing, supra, at 207 (cable households spend more of their day, on average, watching television, and will watch more channels, than households without cable service). “Patently offensive” material from these stations can “confron[t] the citizen” in the “privacy of the home,” Pa-cifica, supra, at 748, with little or no prior warning. Cable-viewing, supra, at 217-218 (while cable subscribers tend to use guides more than do broadcast viewers, there was no difference among these groups in the amount of viewing that was planned, and, in fact, cable subscribers tended to sample more channels before settling on a program, thereby making them more, not less, susceptible to random exposure to unwanted materials). There is nothing to stop “adults who feel the need” from finding similar programming elsewhere, say, on tape or in theaters. In fact, the power of cable systems to control home program viewing is not absolute. Over-the-air broadcasting and direct broadcast satellites already provide alternative ways for programmers to reach the home and are likely to do so to a greater extent in the near future. See generally Telecommunications Act of 1996, §201, 110 Stat. 107 (advanced television services), §205 (direct broadcast satellite), § 302 (video programming by telephone companies), and §304 (availability of navigation devices to enhance multichannel programming); L. Johnson, Toward Competition in Cable Television (1994).
Fourth, the permissive nature of § 10(a) means that it likely restricts speech less than, not more than, the ban at issue in Pacifica. The provision removes a restriction as to some speakers — namely, cable operators. See supra, at 743. Moreover, although the provision does create a risk that a program will not appear, that risk is not the same as the certainty that accompanies a governmental ban. In fact, a glance at the programming that cable operators allow on their own (nonaccess) channels suggests that this distinction is not theoretical, but real. See App. 393 (regular channel broadcast of Playboy and “Real Sex” programming). Finally, the provision’s permissive nature brings with it a flexibility that allows cable operators, for example, not to ban broadcasts, but, say, to rearrange broadcast times, better to fit the desires of adult audiences while lessening the risks of harm to children. See First Report and Order ¶ 31, at 1003 (interpreting the Act’s provisions to allow cable operators broad discretion over what to do with offensive materials). In all these respects, the permissive nature of the approach taken by Congress renders this measure appropriate as a means of achieving the underlying purpose of protecting children.
Of course, cable system operators may not always rearrange or reschedule patently offensive programming. Sometimes, as petitioners fear, they may ban the programming instead. But the same may be said of Pacifica’s ban. In practice, the FCC’s daytime broadcast ban could have become a total ban, depending upon how private operators (programmers, station owners, networks) responded to it. They would have had to decide whether to reschedule the daytime show for nighttime broadcast in light of comparative audience demand and a host of other practical factors that similarly would determine the practical outcomes of the provisions before us. The upshot, in both cases, must be uncertainty as to practical consequences — of the governmental ban in the one case and of the permission in the other. That common uncertainty makes it difficult to say the provision here is, in any respect, more restrictive than the order in Pacifica. At the same time, in the respects we discussed, the provision is significantly less restrictive.
The existence of this complex balance of interests persuades us that the permissive nature of the provision, coupled with its viewpoint-neutral application, is a constitutionally permissible way to protect children from the type of sexual material that concerned Congress, while accommodating both the First Amendment interests served by the access requirements and those served in restoring to cable operators a degree of the editorial control that Congress removed in 1984.
Our basic disagreement with Justice Kennedy is narrow. Like him, we believe that we must scrutinize § 10(a) with the greatest care. Like Justices Kennedy and Thomas, we believe that the interest of protecting children that § 10(a) purports to serve is compelling. But we part company with Justice Kennedy on two issues. First, Justice Kennedy’s focus on categorical analysis forces him to disregard the cable system operators’ interests. Post, at 805-806. We, on the other hand, recognize that in the context of cable broadcast that involves an access requirement (here, its partial removal), and unlike in most cases where we have explicitly required “narrow tailoring,” the expressive interests of cable operators do play a legitimate role. Cf. Turner, 512 U. S., at 636-637. While we cannot agree with Justice Thomas that everything turns on the rights of the cable owner, see post, at 823-824, we also cannot agree with Justice Kennedy that we must ignore the expressive interests of cable operators altogether. Second, Justice Kennedy’s application of a very strict “narrow tailoring” test depends upon an analogy with a category (“the public forum cases”), which has been distilled over time from the similarities of many cases. Rather than seeking an analogy to a category of cases, however, we have looked to the cases themselves. And, as we have said, we found that Pacifica provides the closest analogy and lends considerable support to our conclusion.
Petitioners and Justice Kennedy, see post, at 797-798, 803-804, argue that the opposite result is required by two other cases: Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U. S. 115 (1989), a case in which this Court found unconstitutional a statute that banned “indecent” telephone messages, and Turner, in which this Court stated that cable broadcast receives full First Amendment protection. See 512 U. S., at 637-641. The ban at issue in Sable, however, was not only a total governmentally imposed ban on a category of communications, but also involved a communications medium, telephone service, that was significantly less likely to expose children to the banned material, was less intrusive, and allowed for significantly more control over what comes into the home than either broadcasting or the cable transmission system before us. See 492 U. S., at 128. The Court’s distinction in Turner, furthermore, between cable and broadcast television, relied on the inapplicability of the spectrum scarcity problem to cable. See 512 U. S., at 637-641. While that distinction was relevant in Turner to the justification for structural regulations at issue there (the “must carry” rules), it has little to do with a case that involves the effects of television viewing on children. Those effects are the result of how parents and children view television programming, and how pervasive and intrusive that programming is. In that respect, cable and broadcast television differ little, if at all. See supra, at 744-745. Justice Kennedy would have us decide that all common carriage exclusions are subject to the highest scrutiny, see post, at 796-799, and then decide these cases on the basis of categories that provide imprecise analogies rather than on the basis of a more contextual assessment, consistent with our First Amendment tradition, of assessing whether Congress carefully and appropriately addressed a serious problem.
Petitioners also rely on this Court’s “public forum” cases. They point to Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators’ Assn., 460 U. S., at 45, a case in which this Court said that “public forums” are “places” that the government “has opened for use by the public as a place for expressive activity,” or which “by long tradition... have been devoted to assembly and debate.” Ibid. See also Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, Inc., 473 U. S., at 801 (assuming public forums may include “private property dedicated to public use”). They add that the Government cannot “enforce a content-based exclusion” from a public forum unless “necessary to serve a compelling state interest” and “narrowly drawn.” Perry, supra, at 45. They further argue that the statute’s permissive provisions unjustifiably exclude material, on the basis of content, from the “public forum” that the Government has created in the form of access channels. Justice Kennedy adds by analogy that the decision to exclude certain content from common carriage is similarly subject to strict scrutiny, and here does not satisfy that standard of review. See post, at 796-799, 805-807.
For three reasons, however, it is unnecessary, indeed, unwise, for us definitively to decide whether or how to apply the public forum doctrine to leased access channels. First, while it may be that content-based exclusions from the right to use common carriers could violate the First Amendment, see post, at 796-800 (opinion of Kennedy, J.), it is not at all clear that the public forum doctrine should be imported wholesale into the area of common carriage regulation. As discussed above, we are wary of the notion that a partial analogy in one context, for which we have developed doctrines, can compel a full range of decisions in such a new and changing area. See supra, at 739-743. Second, it is plain from this Court’s cases that a public forum “may be created for a limited purpose.” Perry, supra, at 46, n. 7; see also Cornelius, supra, at 802 (“[T]he government ‘is not required to indefinitely retain the open character of the facility’”)
(quoting Perry, supra, at 46). Our cases have not yet determined, however, that government’s decision to dedicate a public forum to one type of content or another is necessarily subject, to the highest level of scrutiny. Must
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | C | sc_issuearea |
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Mr. Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449, as amended, 61 Stat. 136, 29 U. S. C. §§ 151 to 168, was further amended in 1974 to extend its coverage and protection to employees of nonprofit health-care institutions. Act of July 26, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-360, 88 Stat. 395. Petitioner is a Boston nonprofit hospital whose employees are covered by the amended Act. This case presents the question whether the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit erred in ordering enforcement of that part of an order of the National Labor Relations Board based on the Board’s finding that petitioner, in violation of §§ 8 (a)(1) and (3), 29 U. S. C. §§ 158 (a)(1) and (3), interfered with its employees’ rights guaranteed by § 7 of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 157, by issuing and enforcing a rule that prohibits employees from soliciting union support and distributing union literature during nonworking time in the hospital cafeteria and coffeeshop used primarily by employees but also used by patients and visitors.
In 1970, prior to the advent of any union organizational activity at the hospital, petitioner announced a rule barring solicitation and distribution of literature in any area to which patients or visitors have access. Petitioner permitted these activities only in certain employee locker rooms and certain adjacent restrooms. App. 59. In July 1974, however, as a result of a proceeding instituted against it before the Massachusetts Labor Relations Commission, petitioner announced a rule permitting solicitation in the cafeteria on a one-to-one basis while maintaining the total ban on distribution. Id., at 67. On March 6, 1975, shortly after the NLRB acquired jurisdiction, petitioner reinstated its previous rule limiting employee solicitation and distribution to certain employee locker rooms and restrooms. Id., at 70. That rule provides:
“There is to be no soliciting of the general public (patients, visitors) on Hospital property. Soliciting and the distribution of literature to B. I. employees may be done by other B. I. employees, when neither individual is on his or her working time, in employee-only areas— employee locker rooms and certain adjacent rest rooms. Elsewhere within the Hospital, including patient-care and all other work areas, and areas open to the public such as lobbies, cafeteria and coffee shop, corridors, elevators, gift shop, etc., there is to be no solicitation nor distribution of literature.
“Solicitation or distribution of literature on Hospital property by non-employees is expressly prohibited at all times.
“Consistent with our long-standing practices, the annual appeal campaigns of the United Fund and of the Combined Jewish Philanthropies for voluntary charitable gifts will continue to be carried out by the Hospital.” Id., at 70-71.
Upon a charge filed by the union, the Board issued a complaint and the matter was tried before an Administrative Law Judge. The Board affirmed the rulings, findings, and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge that petitioner's issuance and maintenance of the rules violated § 8 (a) (1) and the disciplining of an employee for an infraction of them violated §8 (a)(3). 223 N. L. R. B. 1193 (1976). The Administrative Law Judge found that there were few places in which employees’ § 7 rights effectively could be exercised, that petitioner had not offered any convincing evidence that the rule was necessary to prevent disruptions in patient care, and that, on balance, the rule was an unjustified infringement of § 7 rights. See 223 N. L. R. B., at 1198. The Board issued an order, paragraph 1 of which broadly required petitioner to cease and desist from interfering with “concerted union activities” and “exercise of [employees’] rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act,” and paragraph 2 (b) of which required petitioner to “[r]escind its written rule prohibiting distribution of union literature and union solicitation in its cafeteria and coffeeshop.” 223 N. L. R. B., at 1199, as modified, id., at 1193.
The Court of Appeals accepted as settled law that rules restricting employee solicitation during nonworking time, and distribution during nonworking time in nonworking areas are presumptively invalid in the absence of special circumstances to justify them, 554 F. 2d 477, 480 (1977), and held that, since “[i]n this case, the application of the employer’s no-solicitation, no-distribution rules to the cafeteria and coffee shop banned concerted activities in non-working areas during non-working time... [t]he burden, therefore, was on the hospital to show that special circumstances justified its curtailment of protected activities in these two places.” Ibid. After review of the record, the court held that “the Board did not err in finding that the hospital had not justified its no-solicitation, no-distribution rule as it related to the cafeteria and coffee shop.” Id., at 481. The court refused to enforce paragraph 1 of the Board’s order, however, on the ground that no proclivity to violate the Act had been shown to support that broad cease-and-desist order. It also enforced paragraph 2 (b) only after adding to the order the clarifying words “that part of” so that petitioner was required to “[rjescind that part of its written rule prohibiting distribution [of union literature and union solicitation in its cafeteria and coffeeshop],” id., at 482 (emphasis in original), to make clear that the validity of the rules as applied to areas outside the cafeteria and coffee-shop remained open. The Board has not sought review of the Court of Appeals’ rulings in these respects. The narrow question for decision, therefore, is whether the Court of Appeals erred in enforcing the Board’s order requiring petitioner to rescind the rules as applied to the hospital’s eating facilities. Because of a suggested conflict among Courts of Appeals as to the validity of restrictions upon solicitation and distribution in patient-access areas of the hospital, such as petitioner’s cafeteria and coffeeshop, we granted certiorari. 434 U. S. 1033 (1978). We affirm.
I
Although petitioner employs approximately 2,200 regular employees, only a fraction of them have access to many of the areas in which solicitation is permitted. Solicitation and distribution are not permitted in all locker areas. Rather, of the total number of locker areas only six separate and scattered locker areas containing 613 lockers are accessible to all employees for these purposes. Moreover, most of these rooms are divided and restricted on the basis of sex, and in any event are not generally used even by petitioner to communicate messages to employees. The cafeteria, on the other hand, is a common gathering room for employees. A 3-day survey conducted by petitioner revealed that 77% of the cafeteria’s patrons were employees while only 9% were visitors and 1.56% patients. The cafeteria is also equipped with vending machines used by employees for snacks during coffeebreaks and other nonworking time.
Petitioner itself has recognized that the cafeteria is a natural gathering place for employees on nonworking time, for it has used and permitted use of the cafeteria for solicitation and distribution to employees for purposes other than union activity. For example, petitioner maintains an official bulletin board in the cafeteria for communicating certain messages to employees. On occasion it has set up special tables in or near the cafeteria entrance to aid solicitation of contributions for the United Way or United Fund charities, the Jewish Philanthropies Organization Drive, the Israel Emergency Fund, and to recruit members for the credit union. When petitioner embarked upon an intensive cost-reduction program, styled “Save a Buck a Day” or “BAD,” it used the cafeteria to post banners and distribute informational literature touting the program to employees, and, significantly, generally did not use the locker rooms and restrooms for this purpose. In addition to these official uses, petitioner maintains an unofficial bulletin board in the cafeteria for the employees’ use, a rack and small table which display commercial literature, such as travel brochures, and information of interest only to employees, such as carpool openings.
“[T]here are relatively few places where employees can congregate or meet on hospital grounds or in the nearby vicinity for the purpose of discussing nonwork related matters other than in the cafeteria; secondly, the area in the neighborhood of the hospital is congested and provides no ready access to employees”; 223 N. L. R. B., at 1198 (opinion of Administrative Law Judge). Petitioner, moreover, has adopted the policy of refusing to make available to unions the names and addresses of employees unless ordered to do so by the Board. App. 33. Petitioner has also made antiunion statements in a newsletter distributed to employees with their paychecks at their work stations.
On October 25, 1974, Ann Schunior, a medical technician in the Department of Medicine, was distributing the union newsletter As We See It by circulating from table to table. She approached only persons she thought were employees, and if not sure of their employee status, inquired whether they were, explaining that she was distributing literature for employees. Petitioner’s general director witnessed this activity, advised Schunior that she was violating the hospital’s no-distribution rule, and demanded that she cease the distribution. A written warning notice was issued to Schunior the same day advising that she had been in flagrant violation of the hospital’s rules and that further violations would result in dismissal. 223 N. L. R. B., at 1195-1196. The publication As We See It was objectionable to petitioner because certain issues were said to contain remarks which disparaged the hospital’s ability to provide adequate patient care, primarily because of under-staffing. Id., at 1196.
II
A
We have long accepted the Board’s view that the right of employees to self-organize and bargain collectively established by § 7 of the NLRA, 29 U. S. C. § 157, necessarily encompasses the right effectively to communicate with one another regarding self-organization at the jobsite. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U. S. 793 (1945), articulated the broad legal principle which must govern the Board's enforcement of this right in the myriad factual situations in which it is sought to be exercised:
“[The Board must adjust] the undisputed right of self-organization assured to employees under the Wagner Act and the equally undisputed right of employers to maintain discipline in their establishments. Like so many others, these rights are not unlimited in the sense that they can be exercised without regard to any duty which the existence of rights in others may place upon employer or employee.” Id., at 797-798.
That principle was further developed in NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U. S. 105 (1956), where the Court stated:
“Accommodation between [employee-organization rights and employer-property rights] must be obtained with as little destruction of one as is consistent with the maintenance of the other.” Id., at 112.
Based on its experience in enforcing the Act, the Board developed legal rules applying the principle of accommodation. The effect of these rules is to make particular restrictions on employee solicitation and distribution presumptively lawful or unlawful under §8 (a)(1) subject to the introduction of evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption. Thus, the Board has held that restrictions on employee solicitation during nonworking time, and on distribution during nonworking time in non working areas, are violative of § 8 (a)(1) unless the employer justifies them by a showing of special circumstances which make the rule necessary to maintain production or discipline. In the case of retail marketing establishments, including public restaurants, however, the Board has held that solicitation and distribution may be prohibited on the selling floor at all times.
Republic Aviation Corp., supra, sustained the Board’s general approach to adjudication of §8 (a)(1) charges. There we held that the Board is free to adopt, in light of its experience, a rule that, absent special circumstances, a particular employer restriction is presumptively an unreasonable interference with § 7 rights constituting an unfair labor practice under § 8 (a) (Í), without the necessity of proving the underlying generic facts which persuaded it to reach that conclusion. The validity of such a rule (<[l]ike a statutory presumption or one established by regulation,... perhaps in varying degree, depends upon the rationality between what is proved and what is inferred.” Republic Aviation, supra, at 804-805 (footnote omitted). The Board here relied on, and petitioner challenges, the fashioning of a similar presumption applicable to hospitals.
B
Although, prior to the 1974 amendments, the Board had considered the validity of no-solicitation and no-distribution rules in the context of proprietary hospitals, no clear rule emerged from its decisions. In Summit Nursing & Convalescent Home, Inc., 196 N. L. R. B. 769 (1972), enf. denied, 472 F. 2d 1380 (CA6 1973), a divided panel, reversing the Administrative Law Judge, held unlawful a rule prohibiting solicitation or distribution “at any time in the patient or public area within the [nursing] home, or in the nurses’ stations.” Another divided panel, in Cuyan Valley Hospital, Inc., 198 N. L. R. B. 107 (1972), affirming the Trial Examiner, held lawful a rule prohibiting “soliciting in working areas during working hours.” In Guyan Valley the Trial Examiner noted that the employer’s rule did not interfere with “solicitation... in the waiting room, the employees’ dining room, and the parking lot.” Id., at 111. The Board apparently relied upon this fact to distinguish it from Summit Nursing, supra. See 198 N. L. R. B., at 107 n. 2. Finally, in Bellaire General Hospital, 203 N. L. R. B. 1105 (1973), the panel which had split in Summit Nursing, unanimously held unlawful a rule prohibiting solicitation and distribution “by employees while off duty or during working hours.” 203 N. L. R. B., at 1108.
This series of somewhat inconclusive decisions was the background against which, after the 1974 amendments, the full Board considered development of a rule establishing the permissible reach of employer rules prohibiting solicitation and distribution in all health-care institutions. In a unanimous opinion, in St. John’s Hospital & School of Nursing, Inc., 222 N. L. R. B. 1150 (1976), the Board concluded that the special characteristics of hospitals justify a rule different from that which the Board generally applies to other employers. On the basis of evidence and aided by the briefs amici curiae filed by the American Hospital Association and District 1199 of the National Union of Hospital and Health Care Employees, the Board found:
“that the primary function of a hospital is patient care and that a tranquil atmosphere is essential to the carrying out of that function. In order to provide this atmosphere, hospitals may be justified in imposing somewhat more stringent prohibitions on solicitation than are generally permitted. For example, a hospital may be warranted in prohibiting solicitation even on nonworking time in strictly patient care areas, such as the patients’ rooms, operating rooms, and places where patients receive treatment, such as x-ray and therapy areas. Solicitation at any time in those areas might be unsettling to the patients — particularly those who are seriously ill and thus need quiet and peace of mind.” Ibid, (emphasis added).
The Board concluded that prohibiting solicitation in such situations was justified and required striking the balance against employees’ interests in organizational activity. The Board determined, however, that the balance should be struck against the prohibition in areas other than immediate patient-care areas such as lounges and cafeterias absent a showing, that disruption to patient care would necessarily result if solicitation and distribution were permitted in those areas. The Board concluded, on a record devoid of evidence which contradicted that assessment, that the possibility of disruption to patient care in those areas must be deemed remote.
Ill
Petitioner challenges the qualified extension of the rule affirmed in Republic Aviation to hospitals on several grounds: First, it argues that the Board’s decision conflicts with the congressional policy evinced in the 1974 hospital amendments that the “self-organizational activities of health care employees not be allowed to ‘disrupt the continuity of patient care.’ ” Brief for Petitioner 10. Second, it argues that the basis for that rule, the principle of limited judicial review of agency action, is inapposite here because the Board is acting outside of its area of expertise. Third, it argues that the Board's decision is unsupported by evidence and is irrational. Finally, it argues that it is irrational to distinguish between the non-employee-access cafeteria involved here and the public-access restaurants in which the Board has upheld solicitation bans.
A
Contrary to petitioner’s assertion, nothing in the legislative history of the 1974 amendments indicates a congressional policy inconsistent with the Board’s general approach to enforcement of § 7 self-organizational rights in the hospital context. First, there is no reason to believe, as petitioner asserts, that Congress intended either to prohibit solicitation entirely in the health-care industry or to limit it to the extent the Board had required at the time the 1974 amendments were enacted. In extending coverage of the Act to nonprofit hospitals, Congress enacted special provisions for strike notice and mediation, applicable solely to the health-care industry, intended to avoid disruptions of patient care caused by strikes. It is significant that, although, as indicated, supra, at 494, at the time the 1974 amendments were enacted, the Board had spoken with neither clarity nor one voice on the issue, Congress did not enact any special provision regarding solicitation and distribution in particular or disruption of patient care in general other than through strikes. We can only infer, therefore, that Congress was satisfied to rely on the Board to continue to exercise the responsibility to strike the appropriate balance between the interests of hospital employees, patients, and employers.
Second, nothing in the legislative history supports petitioner’s argument that the particular approach to enforcement of § 7 rights in the hospital context adopted by the Board is inconsistent with congressional policy. The elimination of the nonprofit-hospital exemption reflected Congress’ judgment that hospital care would be improved by extending the protection of the Act to nonprofit health-care employees. Congress found that wages were low and working conditions poor in the health-care industry, and that as a result, employee morale was low and employment turnover high. Congress determined that the extension of organizational and collective-bargaining rights would ameliorate these conditions and elevate the standard of patient care. Congress also found that “the exemption... had resulted in numerous instances of recognition strikes and picketing. Coverage under the Act should completely eliminate the need for such activity, since the procedures of the Act will be available to resolve organizational and recognition disputes.” S. Rep. No. 93-766, p. 3 (1974).
It is true, as petitioner argues, that Congress felt that “the needs of patients in health care institutions required special consideration in the Act...,” ibid., and that among the witnesses before the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, “[t]here was a recognized concern for the need to avoid disruption of patient care wherever possible.” Id., at 6. But these statements do not support petitioner’s further contention that congressional policy establishes that the very fact that hospitals are involved justifies, without more, a restrictive no-solicitation rule the validity of which must be sustained unless the Board proves that patient care will not be disrupted. To begin with, the congressional statements quoted, when placed in context, offer no support for such an argument. Moreover, Congress addressed its concern for the unique problems presented by labor disputes in the health-care industry by adding specific strike-notice and mediation provisions designed to avert interruption in the delivery of critical health-care services; none expresses a policy in favor of curtailing self-organizational rights. Indeed, although Congress recognized that strikes could cause complete disruption of patient care and enacted provisions designed to forestall them, it apparently felt that extension of the right to strike was sufficiently important to fulfillment of its goals to permit strikes despite that result. If Congress was willing to countenance the total, albeit temporary, disruption of patient care caused by strikes in order to achieve harmonious employer-employee relations and long-term improved health care, we cannot say it necessarily regarded appropriately regulated solicitation and distribution in areas such as the cafeteria as undesirable without evidence of a substantial threat of harm to patients. In light of Congress’ express finding that improvements in health care would result from the right to organize, and that unionism is necessary to overcome the poor working conditions retarding the delivery of quality health care, we therefore cannot say that the Board’s policy — which requires that absent such a showing solicitation and distribution be permitted in the hospital except in areas where patient care is likely to be disrupted — is an impermissible construction of the Act’s policies as applied to the health-care industry by the 1974 amendments. Even if the legislative history arguably pointed toward a contrary view, the Board’s construction of the statute’s policies would be entitled to considerable deference. NLRB v. Iron Workers, 434 U. S. 335, 350 (1978); NLRB v. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U. S. 251, 266-267 (1975).
B
Petitioner disputes the applicability of the principle of limited judicial review of Board action generally and of the principle announced in Republic Aviation, regarding the Board’s authority to fashion generalized rules in light of its experience, in particular, to the Board’s decision involving hospitals. Arguing that the Board’s conclusion regarding the likelihood of disruption to patient care which solicitation in a patient-access cafeteria would produce is essentially a medical judgment outside of the Board’s area of expertise, it contends that the Board’s decision is not entitled to deference. Rather, since it, not the Board, is responsible for establishing hospital policies to ensure the well-being of its patients, the Board may not set aside such a policy without specifically disproving the hospital’s judgment that solicitation and distribution in the cafeteria would disrupt patient care. Brief for Petitioner 18. We think that this argument fundamentally misconceives the institutional role of the Board.
It is the Board on which Congress conferred the authority to develop and apply fundamental national labor policy. Because it is to the Board that Congress entrusted the task of “applying the Act’s general prohibitory language in the light of the infinite combinations of events which might be charged as violative of its terms,” Republic Aviation, 324 U. S., at 798, that body, if it is to accomplish the task which Congress set for it, necessarily must have authority to formulate rules to fill the interstices of the broad statutory provisions. It is true that the Board is not expert in the delivery of health-care services, but neither is it in pharmacology, chemical manufacturing, lumbering, shipping, or any of a host of varied and specialized business enterprises over which the Act confers jurisdiction. But the Board is expert in federal national labor relations policy, and it is in the Board, not petitioner, that the 1974 amendments vested responsibility for developing that policy in the health-care industry. It is not surprising or unnatural that petitioner’s assessment of the need for a particular practice might overcompensate its goals, and give too little weight to employee organizational interests. Here, as in many other contexts of labor policy, “[t]he ultimate problem is the balancing of the conflicting legitimate interests. The function of striking that balance to effectuate national labor policy is often a difficult and delicate responsibility, which the Congress committed primarily to the National Labor Relations Board, subject to limited judicial review.” NLRB v. Truck Drivers, 353 U. S. 87, 96 (1957). The judicial role is narrow: The rule which the Board adopts is judicially reviewable for consistency with the Act, and for rationality, but if it satisfies those criteria, the Board’s application of the rule, if supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole, must be enforced. NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U. S. 221, 235-236 (1963); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U. S. 177, 194 (1941).
C
Petitioner’s contention that the Board’s decision is unsupported by evidence and irrational is without merit. Notwithstanding petitioner’s challenge, the Board’s conclusion that “the possibility of any disruption in patient care resulting from solicitation or distribution of literature is remote,” St. John’s Hospital & School of Nursing, Inc., 222 N. L. R. B., at 1151, as applied to petitioner’s cafeteria, is fully supported by the record. The Board had before it evidence that patients’ meals are provided in their rooms. A patient is not allowed to visit the cafeteria unless his doctor certifies that he is well enough to do so. Thus, patient use of the cafeteria is voluntary, random, and infrequent. It is of critical significance that only 1.56% of the cafeteria’s patrons are patients. Patients who frequent the cafeteria would not expect to receive special attention or primary care there and any unusually sensitive to seeing union literature distributed or overhearing discussions about unionism, readily could avoid the cafeteria without interfering with the hospital’s program of care. Especially telling is the fact that petitioner, under compulsion of the Massachusetts Labor Commission, permitted limited union solicitation in the cafeteria for a significant period, apparently without untoward effects, and that petitioner, who logically is in the best position to offer evidence on the point, was unable to introduce any evidence to show that solicitation or distribution was or would be harmful.
There was also cogent evidence that petitioner itself recognized that at least some solicitation and distribution would not upset patients and undermine its function of providing quality medical care. It thus appears that petitioner’s rule was more restrictive than necessary to avert that result. Petitioner had permitted use of the cafeteria for other types of solicitation, including fund drives, which, if not to be equated with union solicitation in terms of potential for generating controversy, at least indicates that the hospital regarded the cafeteria as sufficiently commodious to admit solicitation and distribution without disruption. While in other contexts, it has been recognized that organizational activity can result in behavior which, as petitioner argues and we agree, would be undesirable in the hospital’s cafeteria, the Board has not foreclosed the hospital from imposing less restrictive means of regulating organizational activity more nearly directed toward the harm to be avoided.
The Board was, of course, free to draw an inference from these facts in light of its experience, the validity of which “depends upon the rationality between what is proved and what is inferred.” Republic Aviation, 324 U. S., at 805 (footnote omitted). It cannot fairly be said that the inference drawn by the Board regarding the likelihood of disruption of patient care in light of this evidence was irrational.
Similarly, it is the Board upon whom the duty falls in the first instance to determine the relative strength of the conflicting interests and to balance their weight. As the Court noted in Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U. S. 507, 522 (1976), “[t]he locus of [the] accommodation [between the legitimate interests of both] may fall at differing points along the spectrum depending on the nature and strength of the respective § 7 rights and private property rights asserted in any given context.” Here, the employees' interests are at their strongest, for unlike the interests involved in NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U. S., at 113, “[the] activity was carried on by employees already rightfully on the employer’s property.” Hudgens, 424 U. S., at 521-522, n. 10. “[T]he employer’s management interests rather than his property interests [are] involved.... This difference is 'one of substance.’ ” Ibid. (citations omitted).
On the other hand, in the context of health-care facilities, the importance of the employer’s interest in protecting patients from disturbance cannot be gainsaid. While outside of the health-care context, the availability of alternative means of communication is not, with respect to employee organizational activity, a necessary inquiry, see Babcock & Wilcox, supra, at 112-113, it may be that the importance of the employer’s interest here demands use of a more finely calibrated scale. For example, the availability of one part of a health-care facility for organizational activity might be regarded as a factor required to be considered in evaluating the permissibility of restrictions in other areas of the same facility. That consideration is inapposite here, however, where the only areas in which organizational rights are permitted is not conducive to their exercise. Moreover, the area in which organizational rights are sought here is a “natural gathering are [a]” for employees, 554 F. 2d, at 481, and one in which the risk of harm to patients is relatively low as compared to potential alternative locations within the facility. On the basis of the record before it, we cannot say that the Board, in evaluating the relative strength of the competing interests, failed to consider any factor appropriately to be taken into account. Cf. Babcock <fc Wilcox, supra.
D
Petitioner’s argument that it is irrational to hold, as the Board has, on the one hand, that a rule prohibiting solicitation in the dining area of a public restaurant is lawful because solicitation has the tendency to upset patrons, while one prohibiting like activity in a hospital's cafeteria is unlawful absent evidence that nonemployee patrons would be upset, on the other, has only superficial appeal. That argument wholly fails to consider that the Board concluded that these rules struck the appropriate balance between organizational and employer rights in the particular industry to1 which each is applicable. In the retail marketing and restaurant industries, the primary purpose of the operation is to serve customers, and this is done on the selling floor of a store or in the dining area of a restaurant. Employee solicitation in these areas, if disruptive, necessarily would directly and substantially interfere with the employer’s business. On the other hand, it would be an unusual store or restaurant which did not have stockrooms, kitchens, and other nonpublic areas, and in those areas employee solicitation of nonworking employees must be permitted. In that context, the Board concluded that, on balance, employees’ organizational interests do not outweigh the employer’s interests in prohibiting solicitation on the selling floor.
In the hospital context the situation is quite different. The main function of the hospital is patient care and therapy and those functions are largely performed in areas such as operating rooms, patients’ rooms, and patients’ lounges. The Board does not prohibit rules forbidding organizational activity in these areas. On the other hand, a hospital cafeteria, 77 % of whose patrons are employees, and which is a natural gathering place for employees, functions more as an employee-service area than a patient-care area. While it is true that the fact of access by visitors and patients renders the analogy to areas such as stockrooms in retail operations less than complete, it cannot be said that when the primary function and use of the cafeteria, the availability of alternative areas of the facility in which § 7 rights effectively could be exercised, and the remoteness of interference with patient care are considered, it was irrational to strike the balance in favor of § 7 rights in the hospital cafeteria and against them in public restaurants. The Board’s explanation of the consistent principle underlying the different results in each situation cannot fairly be challenged. St. John’s Hospital & School of Nursing, Inc., 222 N. L. R. B., at 1150-1151, n. 3.
IV
In summary, we reject as without merit petitioner’s contention that, in enacting the 1974 health-care amendments, Congress intended the Board to apply different principles regarding no-solicitation and no-distribution rules to hospitals because of their patient-care functions. We therefore hold that the Board’s general approach of requiring health-care facilities to permit employee solicitation and distribution during nonworking time in nonworking areas, where the facility has not justified the prohibitions as necessary to avoid disruption of health-care operations or disturbance of patients, is consistent with the Act. We hold further that, with respect to the application of that principle to petitioner’s cafeteria, the Board was appropriately sensitive to the importance of petitioner’s interest in maintaining a tranquil environment for patients. Insofar as petitioner’s challenge is to the substan-tiality of the evidence supporting the Board’s conclusions, this Court’s review is, of course, limited. “Whether on the record as a whole there is substantial evidence to support agency findings is a question which Congress has placed in the keeping of the Courts of Appeals. This Court will intervene only in what ought to be the rare instance when the standard appears to have been misapprehended or grossly misapplied.” Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U. S. 474, 491 (1951). We cannot say that the Court of Appeals’ assessment of the record either “misapprehended” or “grossly misapplied” that standard. The Court of Appeals did note, however, that the Board’s guidelines are still in flux and are far from self-defining, concluding, and we agree:
“[T]he Board [bears] a heavy continuing responsibility to review its policies concerning organizational activities in various parts of hospitals. Hospitals carry on a public function of the utmost seriousness and importance. They give rise to unique considerations that do not apply in the industrial settings with which the Board is more familiar. The Board should stand ready to revise its rulings if future experience demonstrates that the well-being of patients is in fact jeopardized.” 554 F. 2d, at 481.
The authority of the Board to modify its construction of the Act in light of its cumulative experience is, of course, clear. NLRB v. Iron Workers, 434 U. S., at 351; NLRB v. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U. S., at 265-267.
Affirmed.
Coverage was achieved by deleting from the definition of “employer” in §2 (2) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 152 (2), the provision that an employer shall not include “any corporation or association operating a hospital, if no part of the net earnings inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual....” Act of June 23, 1947, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136.
The July 1974 rule was in effect at the time the complaint was filed. Prior to the hearing before the Administrative Law Judge, however, the Board amended its complaint to encompass the March 6, 1975, policy which prohibited all solicitation and distribution in the cafeteria.
The charges leading to the complaint were filed by Massachusetts Hospital Workers’ Union, Local 880, Service Employees International Union, AFL-CIO.
Petitioner’s application of the rules to other areas not devoted to immediate patient care has since been litigated before the Board in another case. Beth Israel Hospital, 228 N. L. R. B. 1495, 95 LRRM 1087 (1977).
The Court of Appeals in this case, and the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Lutheran Hosp. v. NLRB, 564 F. 2d 208 (1977), cert. pending, No. 77-1289, have enforced Board orders protecting solicitation and distribution in cafeterias and coffeeshops. In Lutheran Hospital, the order enforced extended beyond cafeterias to all areas other than “immediate patient care areas.” The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, St. John’s Hospital & School of Nursing, Inc. v. NLRB, 557 F. 2d 1368 (1977), together with the Courts of Appeals for the District of Columbia and Sixth Circuits, have denied enforcement to similar Board orders applicable to cafeterias as well as to other patient-access
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | G | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Stevens
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether a tax on the possession of illegal drugs assessed after the State has imposed a criminal penalty for the same conduct may violate the constitutional prohibition against successive punishments for the same offense.
I
Montana’s Dangerous Drug Tax Act took effect on October 1, 1987. The Act imposes a tax “on the possession and storage of dangerous drugs,” Mont. Code Ann. §15-25-111 (1987), and expressly provides that the tax is to be “collected only after any state or federal fines or forfeitures have been satisfied.” §15-25-111(3). The tax is either 10 percent of the assessed market value of the drugs as determined by the Montana Department of Revenue (DOR) or a specified amount depending on the drug ($100 per ounce for marijuana, for example, and $250 per ounce for hashish), whichever is greater. § 15-25-111(2). The Act directs the state treasurer to allocate the tax proceeds to special funds to support “youth evaluation” and “chemical abuse” programs and “to enforce the drug laws.” §§ 15-25-121, 15-25-122.
In addition to imposing reporting responsibilities on law enforcement agencies, the Act also authorizes the DOR to adopt rules to administer and enforce the tax. Under those rules, taxpayers must file a return within 72 hours of their arrest. Mont. Admin. Rule 42.34.102(1) (1988). The Rule also provides that “[a]t the time of arrest law enforcement personnel shall complete the dangerous drug information report as required by the department and afford the taxpayer an opportunity to sign it.” Rule 42.34.102(3). If the taxpayer refuses to do so, the law enforcement officer is required to file the form within 72 hours of the arrest. Ibid. The “associated criminal nature of assessments under this act” justifies the expedited collection procedures. See Rule 42.34.103(3). The taxpayer has no obligation to file a return or to pay any tax unless and until he is arrested.
II
The six respondents, all members of the extended Kurth family, have for years operated a mixed grain and livestock farm in central Montana. In 1986 they began to cultivate and sell marijuana. About two weeks after the new Dangerous Drug Tax Act went into effect, Montana law enforcement officers raided the farm, arrested the Kurths, and confiscated all the marijuana plants, materials, and paraphernalia they found. In re Kurth Ranch, 145 B. R. 61, 66 (Bkrtcy. Ct. Mont. 1990). The raid put an end to the marijuana business and gave rise to four separate legal proceedings.
In one of those proceedings, the State filed criminal charges against all six respondents in the Montana District Court, charging each with conspiracy to possess drugs with the intent to sell, Mont. Code Ann. §45-4-102 (1987), or, in the alternative, possession of drugs with the intent to sell, §45-9-103. Each respondent initially pleaded not guilty, but subsequently entered into a plea agreement. On July 18, 1988, the court sentenced Richard Kurth and Judith Kurth to prison and imposed suspended or deferred sentences on the other four family members.
The county attorney also filed a civil forfeiture action seeking recovery of cash and equipment used in the marijuana operation. The confiscated drugs were not involved in that action, presumably because law enforcement agents had destroyed them after an inventory. Respondents settled the forfeiture action with an agreement to forfeit $18,016.83 in cash and various items of equipment.
The third proceeding involved the assessment of the new tax on dangerous drugs. Despite difficulties the DOR had in applying the Act for the first time, it ultimately attempted to collect almost $900,000 in taxes on marijuana plants, harvested marijuana, hash tar and hash oil, interest, and penalties. The Kurths contested the assessments in administrative proceedings. Those proceedings were automatically stayed in September 1988, however, when the Kurths initiated the fourth legal proceeding triggered by the raid on their farm: a petition for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U. S. C. § 362(a).
In the bankruptcy proceedings, the Kurths objected to the DOR’s proof of claim for unpaid drug taxes and challenged the constitutionality of the Montana tax. After a trial, the Bankruptcy Court held most of the assessment invalid as a matter of state law, but concluded that an assessment of $181,000 on 1,811 ounces of harvested marijuana was authorized by the Act. It held that assessment invalid under the Federal Constitution.
Relying primarily on United States v. Halper, 490 U. S. 435 (1989), the Bankruptcy Court decided that the assessment constituted a form of double jeopardy. The court rejected the State’s argument that the tax was not a penalty because it was designed to recover law enforcement costs; as the court noted, the DOR “failed to introduce one scintilla of evidence as to cost of the above government programs or costs of law enforcement incurred to combat illegal drug activity.” 145 B. R., at 74. After noting that a portion of the assessment resulted in a tax eight times the product’s market value, the court explained that the punitive character of the tax was evident
“because drug tax laws have historically been regarded as penal in nature, the Montana Act promotes the traditional aims of punishment — retribution and deterrence, the tax applies to behavior which is already a crime, the tax allows for sanctions by restraint of Debtors’ property, the tax requires a finding of illegal possession of dangerous drugs and therefore a finding of scienter, the tax will promote elimination of illegal drug possession, and the tax appears excessive in relation to the alternate purpose assigned, especially in the absence of any record developed by the State as to societal costs. Finally, the tax follows arrest for possession of illegal drugs and the tax report is made by law enforcement officers, not the taxpayer, who may or may not sign the report.” Id., at 75-76.
These aspects led the court to the “inescapable conclusion” that the drug tax statute’s purpose was deterrence and punishment. Id., at 76.
The District Court affirmed. Agreeing with the Bankruptcy Court’s findings and reasoning, it concluded that the Montana Dangerous Drug Tax Act “simply punishes the Kurths a second time for the same criminal conduct.” In re Kurth Ranch, CV-90-084-GF, 1991 WL 365065 (D. Mont., Apr. 23,1991) (reprinted at App. to Pet. for Cert. 22). That and the DOR’s failure to provide an accounting of its actual damages or costs convinced the Bankruptcy Court that the tax assessments violated the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause. Ibid.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit also affirmed, but based its conclusion largely on the State’s refusal to offer evidence justifying the tax, and accordingly refused to hold the tax unconstitutional on its face. In re Kurth Ranch, 986 F. 2d 1308, 1312 (1993). The court first determined that under Halper, a disproportionately large civil penalty can be punitive for double jeopardy purposes. 986 F. 2d, at 1310. That the assessment is called a tax, as opposed to some kind of penalty, is not controlling. Id., at 1310-1311. The central inquiry under Halper, the court determined, is whether the sanction imposed is rationally related to the damages the government suffered. 986 F. 2d, at 1311. That inquiry only applies to cases in which there has been a separate criminal conviction, however. The court concluded that the. Kurths were entitled to an accounting to determine if the sanction constitutes an impermissible second punishment, and because the State refused to offer any such evidence, it held the tax unconstitutional as applied to the Kurths. Id., at 1312.
While this case was pending on appeal, the Montana Supreme Court reversed two lower state-court decisions that had held that the Dangerous Drug Tax Act was a form of double jeopardy. Sorensen v. State Dept, of Revenue, 254 Mont. 61, 836 P. 2d 29 (1992). Over the dissent of two justices, the State Supreme Court found that the legislature had intended to establish a civil, not a criminal, penalty and that the tax had a remedial purpose other than promoting retribution and deterrence. Id., at 65, 836 P. 2d, at 31. The court found that Halper was not controlling, both because it expressly announced “ ‘a rule for the rare case’ ” and because the case involved a civil penalty, not a tax. 254 Mont., at 67, 836 P. 2d, at 32-33. The Sorensen court concluded that the drug tax was not excessive and that a tax, unlike the civil sanction at issue in Halper, requires no proof of the State’s remedial costs on the part of the State. 254 Mont., at 67-68, 836 P. 2d, at 33.
The Montana Supreme Court’s decision is directly at odds with the conclusion reached in the federal proceedings involving the Kurths. We therefore granted certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals. 509 U. S. 953 (1993). We now affirm its judgment.
Ill
In Halper we considered “whether and under what circumstances a civil penalty may constitute ‘punishment’ for the purposes of double jeopardy analysis.” 490 U. S., at 436. Our answer to that question does not decide the different question whether Montana’s tax should be characterized as punishment.
Halper was convicted of 65 separate violations of the criminal false claims statute, 18 U. S. C. § 287, each involving a demand for $12 in reimbursement for medical services worth only $3. After Halper was sentenced to two years in prison and fined $5,000, the Government filed a separate action to recover a $2,000 civil penalty for each of the 65 violations. See 31 U. S. C. § 3729 (1982 ed., Supp. II). The District Court found that the $130,000 recovery the statute authorized “bore no ‘rational relation’ to the sum of the Government’s $585 actual loss plus its costs in investigating and prosecuting Halper’s false claims.” 490 U. S., at 439. In the court’s view, a civil penalty “more than 220 times greater than the Government’s measurable los[s] qualified as punishment” that was barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause. Ibid.
On direct appeal to this Court, we rejected the Government’s submission that the Double Jeopardy Clause only applied to punishment imposed in criminal proceedings, reasoning that its violation “can be identified only by assessing the character of the actual sanctions imposed on the individual by the machinery of the state.” Id., at 447. In making such an assessment, “the labels ‘criminal’ and ‘civil’ are not of paramount importance.” Ibid. Accepting the District Court’s findings, we held that “a defendant who already has been punished in a criminal prosecution may not be subjected to an additional civil sanction to the extent that the second sanction may not fairly be characterized as remedial, but only as a deterrent or retribution.” Id., at 448-449.
Halper thus decided that the legislature’s description of a statute as civil does not foreclose the possibility that it has a punitive character. We also recognized in Halper that a so-called civil “penalty” may be remedial in character if it merely reimburses the government for its actual costs arising from the defendant’s criminal conduct. Id., at 449-450, 452. We therefore remanded the case to the District Court to determine what portion of the statutory penalty could be sustained as compensation for the Government’s actual damages.
Halper did not, however, consider whether a tax may similarly be characterized as punitive.
IV
Criminal fines, civil penalties, civil forfeitures, and taxes all share certain features: They generate government revenues, impose fiscal burdens on individuals, and deter certain behavior. All of these sanctions are subject to constitutional constraints. A government may not impose criminal fines without first establishing guilt by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Cf. In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358 (1970). A defendant convicted and punished for an offense may not have a nonremedial civil penalty imposed against him for the same offense in a separate proceeding. United States v. Halper, 490 U. S. 435 (1989). A civil forfeiture may violate the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against excessive fines. Austin v. United States, 509 U. S. 602 (1993). And a statute imposing a tax on unlawful conduct may be invalid because its reporting requirements compel taxpayers to incriminate themselves. Marchetti v. United States, 390 U. S. 39 (1968).
As a general matter, the unlawfulness of an activity does not prevent its taxation. Id., at 44; United States v. Constantine, 296 U. S. 287, 293 (1935); James v. United States, 366 U. S. 213 (1961). Montana no doubt could collect its tax on the possession of marijuana, for example, if it had not previously, punished the taxpayer for the same offense, or, indeed, if it had assessed the tax in the same proceeding that resulted in his conviction. Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U. S. 359, 368-369 (1983); see also Halper, 490 U. S., at 450. Here, we ask only whether the tax has punitive characteristics that subject it to the constraints of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Although we have never held that a tax violated the Double Jeopardy Clause, we have assumed that one might. In the context of other constitutional requirements, we have repeatedly examined taxes for constitutional validity. We have cautioned against invalidating a tax simply because its enforcement might be oppressive or because the legislature’s motive was somehow suspect. A. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U. S. 40, 44 (1934). Yet we have also recognized that “there comes a time in the extension of the penalizing features of the so-called tax when it loses its character as such and becomes a mere penalty with the characteristics of regulation and punishment.” Id., at 46 (citing Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U. S. 20, 38 (1922)). That comment, together with Halper’s unequivocal statement that labels do not control in a double jeopardy inquiry, indicates that a tax is not immune from double jeopardy scrutiny simply because it is a tax.
Halper recognized that “[t]his constitutional protection is intrinsically personal,” and that only “the character of the actual sanctions” can substantiate a possible double jeopardy violation. 490 U. S., at 447. Whereas fines, penalties, and forfeitures are readily characterized as sanctions, taxes are typically different because they are usually motivated by revenue-raising, rather than punitive, purposes. Yet at some point, an exaction labeled as a tax approaches punishment, and our task is to determine whether Montana’s drug tax crosses that line.
We begin by noting that neither a high rate of taxation nor an obvious deterrent purpose automatically marks this tax as a form of punishment. In this case, although those factors are not dispositive, they are at least consistent with a punitive character. A significant part of the assessment was more than eight times the drug’s market value — a remarkably high tax. That the Montana Legislature intended the tax to deter people from possessing marijuana is beyond question. The DOR reminds us, however, that many taxes that are presumed valid, such as taxes on cigarettes and alcohol, are also both high and motivated to some extent by an interest in deterrence. Indeed, although no double jeopardy challenge was at issue, this Court sustained the steep $100-per-ounce federal tax on marijuana in United States v. Sanchez, 340 U. S. 42 (1950). Thus, while a high tax rate and deterrent purpose lend support to the characterization of the drug tax as punishment, these features, in and of themselves, do not necessarily render the tax punitive. Cf. Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U. S. 506, 513-514 (1937).
Other unusual features, however, set the Montana statute apart from most taxes. First, this so-called tax is conditioned on the commission of a crime. That condition is “significant of penal and prohibitory intent rather than the gathering of revenue.” Moreover, the Court has relied on the absence of such a condition to support its conclusion that a particular federal tax was a civil, rather than a criminal, sanction. In this case, the tax assessment not only hinges on the commission of a crime, it also is exacted only after the taxpayer has been arrested for the precise conduct that gives rise to the tax obligation in the first place. Persons who have been arrested for possessing marijuana constitute the entire class of taxpayers subject to the Montana tax.
Taxes imposed upon illegal activities are fundamentally different from taxes with a pure revenue-raising purpose that are imposed despite their adverse effect on the taxed activity. But they differ as well from mixed-motive taxes that governments impose both to deter a disfavored activity and to raise money. By imposing cigarette taxes, for example, a government wants to discourage smoking. But because the product’s benefits — such as creating employment, satisfying consumer demand, and providing tax revenues— are regarded as outweighing the harm, that government will allow the manufacture, sale, and use of cigarettes as long as the manufacturers, sellers, and smokers pay high taxes that reduce consumption and increase government revenue. These justifications vanish when the taxed activity is completely forbidden, for the legitimate revenue-raising purpose that might support such a tax could be equally well served by increasing the fine imposed upon conviction.
The Montana tax is exceptional for an additional reason. Although it purports to be a species of property tax — that is, a “tax on the possession and storage of dangerous drugs,” Mont. Code Ann. §15-25-111 (1987) — it is levied on goods that the taxpayer neither owns nor possesses when the tax is imposed. Indeed, the State presumably destroyed the contraband goods in this case before the tax on them was assessed. If a statute that amounts to a confiscation of property is unconstitutional, Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U. S. 312, 326 (1932); Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U. S. 531, 542 (1927), a tax on previously confiscated goods is at least questionable. A tax on “possession” of goods that no longer exist and that the taxpayer never lawfully possessed has an unmistakable punitive character. This tax, imposed on criminals and no others, departs so far from normal revenue laws as to become a form of punishment.
Taken as a whole, this drug tax is a concoction of anomalies, too far removed in crucial respects from a standard tax assessment to escape characterization as punishment for the purpose of double jeopardy analysis.
V
Because Montana’s tax is fairly characterized as punishment, the judgment of the Court of Appeals must be affirmed. In Halper, we recognized that a civil penalty may be imposed as a remedy for actual costs to the State that are attributable to the defendant’s conduct. 490 U. S., at 452. Yet as The Chief Justice points out, tax statutes serve a purpose quite different from civil penalties, and Halper’s method of determining whether the exaction was remedial or punitive “simply does not work in the case of a tax statute.” Post, at 787 (dissenting opinion). Subjecting Montana’s drug tax to Halper’s test for civil penalties is therefore inappropriate. Even if it were proper to permit such a showing, Montana has not claimed that its assessment in this case even remotely approximates the cost of investigating, apprehending, and prosecuting the Kurths, or that it roughly relates to any actual damages that they caused the State. And in any event, the formula by which Montana computed the tax assessment would have been the same regardless of the amount of the State’s damages and, indeed, regardless of whether it suffered any harm at all.
This drug tax is not the kind of remedial sanction that may follow the first punishment of a criminal offense. Instead, it is a second punishment within the contemplation of a constitutional protection that has “deep roots in our history and jurisprudence,” Halper, 490 U. S., at 440, and therefore must be imposed during the first prosecution or not at all. The proceeding Montana initiated to collect a tax on the possession of drugs was the functional equivalent of a successive criminal prosecution that placed the Kurths in jeopardy a second time “for the same offence.”
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
The Fifth Amendment provides that “No person shall... be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb....” The Double Jeopardy Clause protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and multiple punishments for the same offense. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U. S. 711, 717 (1969). Although its text mentions only harms to “life or limb,” it is well settled that the Amendment covers imprisonment and monetary penalties. See, e. g., Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163 (1874); United States v. Halper, 490 U. S. 435 (1989). In Benton v. Maryland, 395 U. S. 784,794 (1969), we held that this guarantee “represents a fundamental ideal in our constitutional heritage, and that it should apply to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.” See W. LaFave & J. Israel, Criminal Procedure 1058-1059 (2d ed. 1992); 2 D. Rudstein, C. Erlinder, & D. Thomas, Criminal Constitutional Law ¶ 11.01[3][b], pp. 11-59 to 11-60 (1993).
Mont. Code Ann. §§15-25-101 through 15-25-123 (1987). See In re Kurth Ranch, 145 B. R. 61, 66 (Bkrtcy. Ct. Mont. 1990). We refer throughout this opinion to the 1987 edition of the Montana Code — the version in effect at the time of the Kurths’ arrest. Some sections of the Dangerous Drug Tax Act have since been amended.
The Act defines “dangerous drug” as that term is defined in the Montana Code provisions that criminalize the possession of such drugs, see Mont. Code Ann. §§ 15-25-103(2), 50-32-101(6), 45-9-102 (1987), and authorize their seizure, see § 44-12-103.
According to the Act’s preamble, the Montana Legislature recognizes that the use of dangerous drugs is not acceptable, but concludes that because the manufacturing and sale of such drugs has an economic impact on the State, “it is appropriate that some of the revenue generated by this tax be devoted to continuing investigative efforts directed toward the identification, arrest, and prosecution of individuals involved in conducting illegal continuing criminal enterprises that affect the distribution of dangerous drugs in Montana.” 1987 Mont. Laws, ch. 563, p. 1416.
Section 5(1) of the Act provides that “[a]ll law enforcement personnel and peace officers shall promptly report each person subject to the tax to the department, together with such other information which the department may require, in a manner and on a form prescribed by the department.” Mont. Code Ann. § 15-25-113(1) (1987).
The respondents are Richard Kurth; his wife, Judith Kurth; their son, Douglas Kurth; their daughter, Cindy Halley; Douglas’ wife, Rhonda Kurth; and Cindy’s husband, Clayton Halley.
The Drug Tax Report listed the following seized items:
“Item #1: 2155 marijuana plants in various stages of growth,
“Item #2: 7 gallons of hash oil, (lined out),
“Item #3: 4 bags of marijuana at two pounds each,
“Item #4: 65/one gram vials of hash tar,
“Item #5:14 baby food size jars of hash tar,
“Item #6: 7 pint jars of hash tar,
“Item #7:1 bag of marijuana, 1/4 pound,
“Item #8: 5 plastic bags of marijuana, total 2230 grams,
“Item #9: approximately 100 pounds of marijuana stems, leaves, parts,
etc.” 145 B. R., at 66-67.
Plaintiff’s Exhs. 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13; 145 B. R., at 64-65. Richard Kurth was also charged with criminal sale of dangerous drugs (marijuana), Mont. Code Ann. §45-9-101 (1987), criminal possession of a dangerous drug (marijuana) with intent to sell, §45-9-103, solicitation to commit the offense of criminal possession of a dangerous drug (marijuana) with intent to sell, § 45-4-101, and criminal possession of a dangerous drug (hashish), § 45-9-102. See Plaintiff’s Exh. 3.
Because only one respondent, Richard Kurth, was adjudged guilty of the offense of possession (the other five pleaded guilty to the conspiracy count), Montana has suggested that only he has standing to argue that the tax on possession constitutes a second punishment for the same offense. Respondents counter that Montana’s withdrawal of the possession charges pursuant to the plea agreements would bar a second prosecution for possession. The issue was not raised below, so we do not address it.
The precise figure appears to be $894,940.99. 145 B. R., at 68. The Court of Appeals’ figure of “nearly $865,000,” In re Kurth Ranch, 986 F. 2d 1308, 1310 (CA9 1993), apparently failed to take account of the $30,000 collected before computation of the final assessment. 145 B. R., at 68.
Specifically, the Bankruptcy Court held that the assessments on the live marijuana plants and the marijuana oil were “arbitrary” and “lacked any basis in fact.” Id., at 69.
That portion is the tax imposed upon 100 pounds of “shake.” “Shake” refers to the stems, leaves, and other loose parts of the marijuana plant that have less value because of their lower levels of tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), the chemical substance in marijuana that activates a user’s senses. Id., at 66. Officials placed the market value for shake at $200 per pound. Thus, when Montana taxed the shake at $100 per ounce, or $1,600 per pound, it taxed it at eight times its market value. Id., at 72.
It is on this basis that the court distinguished this Court’s cases holding a federal marijuana tax to be nonpunitive, see Minor v. United States, 396 U. S. 87 (1969); United States v. Sanchez, 340 U. S. 42 (1950), which did not involve previous criminal convictions. 986 F. 2d, at 1311. The court acknowledged that a State may legitimately tax criminal activities, ibid., (citing Marchetti v. United States, 390 U. S. 39, 44 (1968)), and that a civil sanction need not satisfy a remedial analysis when it is imposed apart from a criminal conviction. 986 F 2d, at 1311 (citing Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U. S. 609, 623 (1981)).
We noted, however, that whether a sanction constitutes punishment is not determined from the defendant’s perspective, as even remedial sanctions carry the “sting of punishment.” 490 U. S., at 447, n. 7 (citing United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U. S. 537, 551 (1943)).
Notably, in reaching that conclusion we relied in part on an earlier case recognizing that a tax statute might be considered punitive in character for double jeopardy purposes. See 490 U. S., at 443. That case, United States v. La Franca, 282 U. S. 568 (1931), observed that the words “tax” and “penalty” “are not interchangeable, one for the other” and that “if an exaction be clearly a penalty it cannot be converted into a tax by the simple expedient of calling it such.” Id., at 572. See also Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U. S. 557, 561 (1922) (“The mere use of the word ‘tax’ in an act primarily designed to define and suppress crime is not enough to show that within the true intendment of the term a tax was laid”).
In Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U. S. 391 (1938), for example, this Court considered a Revenue Act provision requiring the taxpayer to pay an additional 50 percent of the total amount of any deficiency due to fraud with an intent to evade the tax. The Court assumed such a penalty could trigger double jeopardy protection if it were intended for punishment, but it nevertheless held that the statute was constitutional because the 50 percent addition to the tax was remedial, not punitive. Id., at 398-405. Although the penalty at issue in Mitchell is arguably better characterized as a sanction for fraud than a tax, the Court described it interchangeably as a “sanction,” id., at 405, 406, an “addition to the tax,” id., at 405, an “assessment,” id., at 396, and a “tax,” id., at 398, making nothing of the potential import of the distinction.
The State recovered 1,811 ounces of marijuana with an estimated value of $46,000, and taxed the marijuana at $100 per ounce (that is, the greater of 10 percent of market value or $100 per ounce), for a total tax of $181,000. The State thus taxed the drugs at about 400 percent of their market value. Compared to similar taxes on legal goods and activities, Montana’s tax — assessed at a rate of 10 percent or roughly 400 percent of market value, whichever is greater — appears to be unrivaled. Even the taxes identified by the United States, which supports the DOR as amicus curiae, do not approach a level this high. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 23-24. The United States notes hypothetically, for example, that the current 24-cent-per-pack federal tax on cigarettes could, under a new health plan, be increased to 99 cents, resulting in a total tax burden that “could easily surpass” the 80 percent rate that Montana imposed on the part of the marijuana consisting of the higher valued “‘buds.’” Ibid. The Government offers no such example, however, of a tax equivalent to that assessed on the combined cache of buds and lower valued “shake.” See n. 12, supra.
For example, although the Act’s preamble evinces a clear motivation to raise revenue, it also indicates that the tax will provide for anticrime initiatives by “burdening” violators of the law instead of “law abiding taxpayers”; that use of dangerous drugs is not acceptable; and that the Act is not intended to “give credence” to any notion that manufacturing, selling, or using drugs is legal or proper. 1987 Mont. Laws, ch. 563, p. 1416.
United States v. Constantine, 296 U. S. 287, 295 (1935) (concluding that a tax was motivated by penal instead of revenue-raising intent in part because the taxpayer had to pay an additional sum based on his illegal conduct). See also United States v. La Franca, 282 U. S., at 571, 575 (holding that a liquor tax assessed only against those prosecuted for illegal manufacture or sale of liquor was barred on statutory grounds, thus avoiding the “grave constitutional question” whether double jeopardy principles precluded such an assessment).
In Sanchez we examined a federal marijuana tax, IRC §2590-(a)(2) (since repealed, but last codified at 26 U. S. C. §4741 et seq. (1964)), that taxed the transfer of marijuana to a person who has not paid a special tax and registered. Under the statute, the transferor’s liability arose when the transferee failed to pay the tax; as a result, “[s]ince his tax liability does not in effect rest on criminal conduct, the tax can be properly called a civil rather than a criminal sanction.” 340 U. S., at 45.
This statute therefore does not raise the question whether an ostensibly civil proceeding that is designed to inflict punishment may bar a subsequent proceeding that is admittedly criminal in character. See Justice Scalia’s dissent, post, at 804. Nor does the statute require us to comment on the permissibility of “multiple punishments” imposed in the same proceeding, cf. Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163 (1874); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U. S. 711 (1969), since it involves separate sanctions imposed in successive proceedings.
In this case, it is significant that the same sovereign that criminalized the activity also imposed the tax. Contrarily, most of oür cases confirming that the unlawfiilness of an activity does not prevent its taxation involve taxes on acts prohibited by other sovereigns. For example, United States v. Constantine, 296 U. S. 287 (1935), involved a federal excise tax on retail liquor sales that violated state law. Id., at 293. Likewise, in James v. United States, 366 U. S. 213 (1961), a federal tax on embezzled money was imposed upon a man who had pleaded guilty in state court to conspiracy to embezzle. Id., at 214. And Marchetti v. United States, 390 U. S. 39 (1968), involved a federal tax on gambling activities primarily prohibited under state law, though as the Court there noted, some federal statutes also prohibited activities ancillary to wagering. Id., at 44-47. The importance of the distinction between same sovereign proceedings and dual sovereign proceedings also is borne out by our cases holding that the Constitution does not prohibit successive prosecutions by different sovereigns based on the same conduct. See, e. g., Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U. S. 121 (1959) (state prosecution after federal); Abbate v. United States, 359 U. S. 187 (1959) (federal prosecution after state).
Curiously, one of two alternative measures of the tax is the market value of a substance that cannot legally be marketed.
Courts — including this Court in United States v. Sanchez, 340 U. S. 42 (1950) — have frequently commented on the punishing and deterrent nature of drug taxes. See, e. g., Sims v. State Tax Comm’n, 841 P. 2d 6,13 (Utah 1992); Rehg v. Illinois Dept. of Revenue, 152 Ill. 2d 504, 515, 605 N. E. 2d 525, 531 (1992); State v. Gallup, 500 N. W. 2d 437, 445 (Iowa 1993); State v. Roberts, 384 N. W. 2d 688, 691 (S. D. 1986); State
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | A | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice SOTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to Part III-C.
The Constitution forbids the passage of ex post facto laws, a category that includes "[e]very law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed." Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 390, 1 L.Ed. 648 (1798) (emphasis deleted). The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines set forth an advisory sentencing range for each defendant convicted in federal court. We consider here whether there is an ex post facto violation when a defendant is sentenced under Guidelines promulgated after he committed his criminal acts and the new version provides a higher applicable Guidelines sentencing range than the version in place at the time of the offense. We hold that there is.
I
Petitioner Marvin Peugh and his cousin, Steven Hollewell, ran two farming-related businesses in Illinois. Grainery, Inc., bought, stored, and sold grain; Agri-Tech, Inc., provided farming services to landowners and tenants. When the Grainery began experiencing cash-flow problems, Peugh and Hollewell engaged in two fraudulent schemes. First, they obtained a series of bank loans by representing falsely the existence of contracts for future grain deliveries from Agri-Tech to the Grainery. When they failed to pay back the principal on these loans, the bank suffered losses of over $2 million. Second, they artificially inflated the balances of accounts under their control by "check kiting," or writing bad checks between their accounts. This scheme allowed them to overdraw an account by $471,000. They engaged in their illicit conduct in 1999 and 2000.
When their acts were uncovered, Peugh and Hollewell were charged with nine counts of bank fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344. While Hollewell pleaded guilty to one count of check kiting, Peugh pleaded not guilty and went to trial, where he testified that he had not intended to defraud the banks. The jury found him guilty of five counts of bank fraud and acquitted him of the remaining counts.
At sentencing, Peugh argued that the Ex Post Facto Clause required that he be sentenced under the 1998 version of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in effect at the time of his offenses, rather than under the 2009 version in effect at the time of sentencing. The two versions yielded significantly different results for Peugh's applicable Guidelines sentencing range. Under the 1998 Guidelines, Peugh's base offense level was 6. United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual § 2F1.1 (Nov. 1998) (USSG). Thirteen levels were added for a loss amount of over $2.5 million, ibid., and 2 levels for obstruction of justice because of Peugh's perjury at trial, see USSG § 3C1.1 (Nov. 1998). The total offense level under the 1998 Guidelines was therefore 19. As a first-time offender, Peugh was in Criminal History Category I, and so his sentencing range under the 1998 Guidelines was 30 to 37 months. USSG, ch. 5, pt. A (Nov. 1998).
The 2009 Guidelines in effect when Peugh was sentenced in May 2010 assigned more severe consequences to his acts. First, the base offense level was raised from 6 to 7 for crimes, like Peugh's, that have a statutory maximum term of imprisonment of 20 years or more. See USSG § 2B1.1 (Nov. 2009); 18 U.S.C. § 1344. Second, the enhancement for a loss exceeding $2.5 million was 18, a 5-level increase from the 1998 Guidelines.
USSG 2B1.1 (Nov. 2009). After adding the 2-level enhancement for obstruction of justice, Peugh's total offense level under the 2009 Guidelines was 27. With a Criminal History Category of I, Peugh's sentencing range rose under the 2009 Guidelines to 70 to 87 months. USSG, ch. 5, pt. A (Nov. 2009). The low end of the 2009 Guidelines range was 33 months higher than the high end of the 1998 Guidelines range.
At the sentencing hearing, the District Court rejected Peugh's argument that applying the 2009 Guidelines violated the Ex Post Facto Clause, noting that it was foreclosed by Seventh Circuit precedent. App. 30 (discussing United States v. Demaree, 459 F.3d 791 (2006) ). The District Court declined to give Peugh a downward variance, concluding that "a sentence within the [G]uideline [s] range is the most appropriate sentence in this case," App. 100. It sentenced Peugh to 70 months' imprisonment, ibid., the bottom of the 2009 Guidelines range.
The Seventh Circuit, in keeping with its decision in Demaree, rejected Peugh's ex post facto claim and affirmed his conviction and sentence. 675 F.3d 736 (2012). We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals over whether the Ex Post Facto Clause may be violated when a defendant is sentenced under the version of the Sentencing Guidelines in effect at the time of sentencing rather than the version in effect at the time the crime was committed, and the newer Guidelines yield a higher applicable sentencing range. 568 U.S. ----, 133 S.Ct. 594, 184 L.Ed.2d 389 (2012). We now reverse.
II
Prior to 1984, the broad discretion of sentencing courts and parole officers had led to significant sentencing disparities among similarly situated offenders. To address this problem, Congress created the United States Sentencing Commission. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 362, 366-367, 109 S.Ct. 647, 102 L.Ed.2d 714 (1989). The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 98 Stat. 1987, eliminated parole in the federal system and directed the Sentencing Commission to promulgate uniform guidelines that would be binding on federal courts at sentencing. Mistretta, 488 U.S., at 367, 109 S.Ct. 647. The Commission produced the now familiar Sentencing Guidelines: a system under which a set of inputs specific to a given case (the particular characteristics of the offense and offender) yielded a predetermined output (a range of months within which the defendant could be sentenced).
In United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), however, this Court held that mandatory Guidelines ran afoul of the Sixth Amendment by allowing judges to find facts that increased the penalty for a crime beyond "the maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict." See also Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). The appropriate remedy for this violation, the Court determined, was to strike those portions of the Sentencing Reform Act that rendered the Guidelines mandatory. Booker, 543 U.S., at 245-258, 125 S.Ct. 738. Under the resulting scheme, a district court is still required to consult the Guidelines. See id., at 259-260, 264, 125 S.Ct. 738; 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4)(A). But the Guidelines are no longer binding, and the district court must consider all of the factors set forth in § 3553(a) to guide its discretion at sentencing, see Booker, 543 U.S., at 259-260, 264, 125 S.Ct. 738. The Booker remedy, "while not the system Congress enacted," was designed to "continue to move sentencing in Congress' preferred direction, helping to avoid excessive sentencing disparities while maintaining flexibility sufficient to individualize sentences where necessary." Id., at 264-265, 125 S.Ct. 738.
Our subsequent decisions have clarified the role that the Guidelines play in sentencing procedures, both at the district court level and when sentences are reviewed on appeal. First, "a district court should begin all sentencing proceedings by correctly calculating the applicable Guidelines range. As a matter of administration and to secure nationwide consistency, the Guidelines should be the starting point and the initial benchmark." Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007) (citation omitted). The district court must then consider the arguments of the parties and the factors set forth in § 3553(a). Id., at 49-50, 128 S.Ct. 586. The district court "may not presume that the Guidelines range is reasonable," id., at 50, 128 S.Ct. 586; and it "may in appropriate cases impose a non-Guidelines sentence based on disagreement with the [Sentencing] Commission's views,"
Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. ----, ----, 131 S.Ct. 1229, 1247, 179 L.Ed.2d 196 (2011) (citing Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 109-110, 128 S.Ct. 558, 169 L.Ed.2d 481 (2007) ). The district court must explain the basis for its chosen sentence on the record. Gall, 552 U.S., at 50, 128 S.Ct. 586."[A] major departure [from the Guidelines] should be supported by a more significant justification than a minor one." Ibid.
On appeal, the district court's sentence is reviewed for reasonableness under an abuse-of-discretion standard. See id., at 51, 128 S.Ct. 586; Booker, 543 U.S., at 261-264, 125 S.Ct. 738. Failure to calculate the correct Guidelines range constitutes procedural error, as does treating the Guidelines as mandatory. Gall, 552 U.S., at 51, 128 S.Ct. 586. The court of appeals may, but is not required to, presume that a within-Guidelines sentence is reasonable. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007). The reviewing court may not apply a heightened standard of review or a presumption of unreasonableness to sentences outside the Guidelines range, although it "will, of course, take into account the totality of the circumstances, including the extent of any variance from the Guidelines range." Gall, 552 U.S., at 49-51, 128 S.Ct. 586. We have indicated that "a district court's decision to vary from the advisory Guidelines may attract greatest respect when" it is based on the particular facts of a case. Kimbrough, 552 U.S., at 109, 128 S.Ct. 558. Overall, this system "requires a court to give respectful consideration to the Guidelines," but it "permits the court to tailor the sentence in light of other statutory concerns as well." Id., at 101, 128 S.Ct. 558 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4)(A)(ii), district courts are instructed to apply the Sentencing Guidelines issued by the United States Sentencing Commission that are "in effect on the date the defendant is sentenced." The Sentencing Guidelines reiterate that statutory directive, with the proviso that "[i]f the Court determines that use of the Guidelines Manual in effect on the date that the defendant is sentenced would violate the [E]x [P]ost [F]acto [C]lause of the United States Constitution, the court shall use the Guidelines Manual in effect on the date that the offense of conviction was committed." USSG §§ 1B1.11(a), (b)(1) (Nov. 2012). Whether the Ex Post Facto Clause was violated by the use of the more onerous Guidelines in effect on the date of Peugh's sentencing is the question presented here.
III
A
The Constitution prohibits both federal and state governments from enacting any "ex post facto Law." Art. I, § 9, cl. 3 ; Art. I, § 10. The phrase " 'ex post facto law' was a term of art with an established meaning at the time of the framing." Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 41, 110 S.Ct. 2715, 111 L.Ed.2d 30 (1990). In Calder v. Bull, Justice Chase reviewed the definition that the term had acquired in English common law:
"1st. Every law that makes an action done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action. 2d. Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed. 3d. Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed. 4th. Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony, than the law required at the time of the commission of the offence, in order to convict the offender." 3 Dall., at 390 (emphasis deleted).
See also Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 521-525, 120 S.Ct. 1620, 146 L.Ed.2d 577 (2000) (discussing Calder v. Bull and the common-law understanding of the term). Building on Justice Chase's formulation of what constitutes an "ex post facto Law," our cases "have not attempted to precisely delimit the scope of this Latin phrase, but have instead given it substance by an accretion of case law." Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 292, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977).
At issue here is Calder's third category of ex post facto laws, those that "chang[e] the punishment, and inflic[t] a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed." 3 Dall., at 390. Peugh's claim is that the Clause was violated because the 2009 Guidelines call for a greater punishment than attached to bank fraud in 2000, when his crimes were completed. The Government counters that because the more punitive Guidelines applied at Peugh's sentencing were only advisory, there was no ex post facto problem.
Each of the parties can point to prior decisions of this Court that lend support to its view. On the one hand, we have never accepted the proposition that a law must increase the maximum sentence for which a defendant is eligible in order to violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. See, e.g., Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397, 57 S.Ct. 797, 81 L.Ed. 1182 (1937). Moreover, the fact that the sentencing authority exercises some measure of discretion will also not defeat an ex post facto claim. See Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 253, 120 S.Ct. 1362, 146 L.Ed.2d 236 (2000). On the other hand, we have made it clear that mere speculation or conjecture that a change in law will retrospectively increase the punishment for a crime will not suffice to establish a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. See California Dept. of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 509, 115 S.Ct. 1597, 131 L.Ed.2d 588 (1995). The touchstone of this Court's inquiry is whether a given change in law presents a "'sufficient risk of increasing the measure of punishment attached to the covered crimes.' " Garner, 529 U.S., at 250, 120 S.Ct. 1362 (quoting Morales, 514 U.S., at 509, 115 S.Ct. 1597). The question when a change in law creates such a risk is "a matter of degree"; the test cannot be reduced to a "single formula." Id., at 509, 115 S.Ct. 1597 (internal quotation marks omitted). B
The most relevant of our prior decisions for assessing whether the requisite degree of risk is present here is Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 107 S.Ct. 2446, 96 L.Ed.2d 351 (1987), in which this Court considered an ex post facto challenge to a sentencing guidelines scheme implemented by the State of Florida. Under Florida's system, a calculation under the guidelines yielded a presumptive sentencing range. Id., at 426, 107 S.Ct. 2446. This range was assumed to be appropriate, and the sentencing judge had discretion to fix a sentence within that range " 'without the requirement of a written explanation.' " Ibid. (quoting Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 3.701(d)(8) (1983)). If the court wished to depart from the guidelines range, however, it was required to give "clear and convincing reasons in writing for doing so." 482 U.S., at 426, 107 S.Ct. 2446. A within-guidelines sentence was unreviewable; a non-guidelines sentence was subject to appellate review. Ibid.
The petitioner in Miller had been sentenced under new guidelines that yielded a higher sentencing range than the guidelines that had been in place at the time of his crime, and he had received a sentence at the top of the new range. Ibid. This Court found an ex post facto violation. We emphasized that in order to impose the petitioner's sentence under the pre-existing guidelines, the sentencing judge would have been required to provide clear and convincing reasons in writing for the departure, and the sentence would then have been reviewable on appeal. Id., at 432, 107 S.Ct. 2446. In contrast, because the sentence imposed was within the new guidelines range, it required no explanation and was unreviewable. Id., at 432-433, 107 S.Ct. 2446. The fact that Florida's guidelines "create[d] a high hurdle that must be cleared before discretion can be exercised" was sufficient to render the changed guidelines an ex post facto law. Id., at 435, 107 S.Ct. 2446.
Miller thus establishes that applying amended sentencing guidelines that increase a defendant's recommended sentence can violate the Ex Post Facto Clause, notwithstanding the fact that sentencing courts possess discretion to deviate from the recommended sentencing range. The sentencing scheme in Miller was designed to channel sentences for similarly situated offenders into a specified range. Its reason-giving requirements and standards of appellate review meant that while variation was possible, it was burdensome; and so in the ordinary case, a defendant would receive a within-guidelines sentence.
Under the Florida system, therefore, an increase in the guidelines range applicable to an offender created a significant risk that he would receive a higher sentence. The same principles apply here.
The post-Booker federal sentencing scheme aims to achieve uniformity by ensuring that sentencing decisions are anchored by the Guidelines and that they remain a meaningful benchmark through the process of appellate review. See Kimbrough, 552 U.S., at 107, 128 S.Ct. 558. As we have described, "district courts must begin their analysis with the Guidelines and remain cognizant of them throughout the sentencing process." Gall, 552 U.S., at 50, n. 6, 128 S.Ct. 586 (emphasis added). Failing to calculate the correct Guidelines range constitutes procedural error. Id., at 51, 128 S.Ct. 586. A district court contemplating a non-Guidelines sentence "must consider the extent of the deviation and ensure that the justification is sufficiently compelling to support the degree of the variance." Id., at 50, 128 S.Ct. 586. See also Pepper, 562 U.S., at ----, 131 S.Ct., at 1252 (BREYER, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) ("[T]he law permits the court to disregard the Guidelines only where it is'reasonable' for a court to do so" (citing Booker, 543 U.S., at 261-262, 125 S.Ct. 738) ).
These requirements mean that "[i]n the usual sentencing,... the judge will use the Guidelines range as the starting point in the analysis and impose a sentence within the range." Freeman v. United States, 564 U.S. ----, ----, 131 S.Ct. 2685, 2692, 180 L.Ed.2d 519 (2011) (plurality opinion). Even if the sentencing judge sees a reason to vary from the Guidelines, "if the judge uses the sentencing range as the beginning point to explain the decision to deviate from it, then the Guidelines are in a real sense the basis for the sentence." Ibid. (emphasis added). See also id., at ----, 131 S.Ct., at 2695 (SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in judgment) (stating that outside the context of a Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement, "in the normal course the district judge's calculation of the Guidelines range applicable to the charged offenses will serve as the basis for the term of imprisonment imposed"). That a district court may ultimately sentence a given defendant outside the Guidelines range does not deprive the Guidelines of force as the framework for sentencing. Indeed, the rule that an incorrect Guidelines calculation is procedural error ensures that they remain the starting point for every sentencing calculation in the federal system.
Similarly, appellate review for reasonableness using the Guidelines as a benchmark helps promote uniformity by "tend[ing] to iron out sentencing differences." Booker, 543 U.S., at 263, 125 S.Ct. 738. Courts of appeals may presume a within-Guidelines sentence is reasonable, see Rita, 551 U.S., at 347, 127 S.Ct. 2456, and they may further "consider the extent of the deviation" from the Guidelines as part of their reasonableness review, Gall, 552 U.S., at 51, 128 S.Ct. 586. As in Miller, then, the post-Booker sentencing regime puts in place procedural "hurdle[s]" that, in practice, make the imposition of a non- Guidelines sentence less likely. See 482 U.S., at 435, 107 S.Ct. 2446. This is a more difficult case than Miller, because there are relevant differences between Florida's sentencing scheme and the current federal sentencing regime. The Florida Legislature had made a within-guidelines sentence unreviewable; whereas in the federal system, the courts of appeals may-but are not required to-presume that a within-Guidelines sentence is reasonable. And under Florida's scheme, a sentencing court departing from the guideline range was required to provide "clear and convincing" reasons for the departure; whereas this Court has not, post-Booker, applied such an exacting across-the-board standard of review to variances. Rather, we have held that a district court varying from the Federal Guidelines should provide an explanation adequate to the extent of the departure. See Gall, 552 U.S., at 51, 128 S.Ct. 586.
But contrary to the arguments advanced by the Government and Justice THOMAS' dissent (hereinafter dissent), see Brief for United States 23-24; post, at 2090 - 2091, these differences are not dispositive. Although the federal system's procedural rules establish gentler checks on the sentencing court's discretion than Florida's did, they nevertheless impose a series of requirements on sentencing courts that cabin the exercise of that discretion. Common sense indicates that in general, this system will steer district courts to more within-Guidelines sentences.
Peugh points to considerable empirical evidence indicating that the Sentencing Guidelines have the intended effect of influencing the sentences imposed by judges. Even after Booker rendered the Sentencing Guidelines advisory, district courts have in the vast majority of cases imposed either within-Guidelines sentences or sentences that depart downward from the Guidelines on the Government's motion. See United States Sentencing Commission, 2011 Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics, p. 63 (Figure G) (16th ed.) (USSC). In less than one-fifth of cases since 2007 have district courts imposed above- or below-Guidelines sentences absent a Government motion. See ibid. See also Baron-Evans & Stith, Booker Rules, 160 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1631, 1677 (2012). Moreover, the Sentencing Commission's data indicate that when a Guidelines range moves up or down, offenders' sentences move with it. See USSC, Final Quarterly Data Report, FY 2012, p. 32 (Figure C); USSC, Report on the Continuing Impact of United States v. Booker on Federal Sentencing, Pt. A, pp. 60-68 (2012).
The federal system adopts procedural measures intended to make the Guidelines the lodestone of sentencing. A retrospective increase in the Guidelines range applicable to a defendant creates a sufficient risk of a higher sentence to constitute an ex post facto violation.
C
Our holding today is consistent with basic principles of fairness that animate the Ex Post Facto Clause. The Framers considered ex post facto laws to be "contrary to the first principles of the social compact and to every principle of sound legislation." The Federalist No. 44, p. 282 (C.
Rossiter ed. 1961) (J. Madison). The Clause ensures that individuals have fair warning of applicable laws and guards against vindictive legislative action. See Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28-29, 101 S.Ct. 960, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981) ; see also post, at 2094 - 2095. Even where these concerns are not directly implicated, however, the Clause also safeguards "a fundamental fairness interest... in having the government abide by the rules of law it establishes to govern the circumstances under which it can deprive a person of his or her liberty or life." Carmell, 529 U.S., at 533, 120 S.Ct. 1620.
The Sentencing Guidelines represent the Federal Government's authoritative view of the appropriate sentences for specific crimes. When Peugh committed his crime, the recommended sentence was 30 to 37 months. When he was sentenced, it was 70 to 87 months. "[T]he purpose and effect of the change in [the Guidelines calculation] was to increase the rates and length of incarceration for [fraud]." Miller, 482 U.S., at 431, 107 S.Ct. 2446 (citing Florida Bar: Amendment to Rules of Criminal Procedure (3.701, 3.988-Sentencing Guidelines), 451 So.2d 824, 824, n. (1984) (per curiam ) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)). Such a retrospective increase in the measure of punishment raises clear ex post facto concerns. We have previously recognized, for instance, that a defendant charged with an increased punishment for his crime is likely to feel enhanced pressure to plead guilty. See Carmell, 529 U.S., at 534, n. 24, 120 S.Ct. 1620; Weaver, 450 U.S., at 32, 101 S.Ct. 960. This pressure does not disappear simply because the Guidelines range is advisory; the defendant will be aware that the range is intended to, and usually does, exert controlling influence on the sentence that the court will impose.
We are therefore not persuaded by the argument advanced by the Government and also suggested by the dissent that the animating principles of the Ex Post Facto Clause are not implicated by this case. While the Government argues that the Sentencing Commission is insulated from legislative interference, see Brief for United States 42-44, our precedents make clear that the coverage of the Ex Post Facto Clause is not limited to legislative acts, see Garner, 529 U.S., at 247, 257, 120 S.Ct. 1362 (recognizing that a change in a parole board's rules could, given an adequate showing, run afoul of the Ex Post Facto Clause). It is true that we held, in Irizarry v. United States, 553 U.S. 708, 713-714, 128 S.Ct. 2198, 171 L.Ed.2d 28 (2008), that a defendant does not have an "expectation subject to due process protection" that he will be sentenced within the Guidelines range. But, contrary to the dissent's view, see post, at 2083 - 2085, the Ex Post Facto Clause does not merely protect reliance interests.
It also reflects principles of "fundamental justice." Carmell, 529 U.S., at 531, 120 S.Ct. 1620.
IV
The Government's principal argument that there is no constitutional violation in this case is that the Sentencing Guidelines lack sufficient legal effect to attain the status of a "law" within the meaning of the Ex Post Facto Clause. Whereas the pre-Booker Guidelines "ha[d] the force and effect of laws," Booker, 543 U.S., at 234, 125 S.Ct. 738, the post-Booker Guidelines, the Government contends, have lost that status due to their advisory nature.
The dissent echoes this argument. Post, at 2088 - 2090, 2091 - 2092.
The distinction that the Government draws is necessarily a fine one, because our precedents firmly establish that changes in law need not bind a sentencing authority in order to violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. So, for example, a law can run afoul of the Clause even if it does not alter the statutory maximum punishment attached to a crime. In Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397, 57 S.Ct. 797, 81 L.Ed. 1182, this Court considered an ex post facto challenge to a Washington law altering the statutory penalty for grand larceny from a range of 0 to 15 years' imprisonment to a mandatory term of 15 years' imprisonment. Although the upper boundary of the sentencing court's power to punish remained unchanged, it was enough that the petitioners were "deprived of all opportunity to receive a sentence which would give them freedom from custody and control prior to the expiration of the 15-year term." Id., at 402, 57 S.Ct. 797 (emphasis added).
In addition, our cases make clear that "[t]he presence of discretion does not displace the protections of the Ex Post Facto Clause." Garner, 529 U.S., at 253, 120 S.Ct. 1362. In a series of cases, for example, this Court has considered the validity under the Ex Post Facto Clause of state laws altering the terms on which discretionary parole or early release was available to prisoners. See Garner, 529 U.S. 244, 120 S.Ct. 1362, 146 L.Ed.2d 236; Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 115 S.Ct. 1597, 131 L.Ed.2d 588; Weaver, 450 U.S. 24, 101 S.Ct. 960, 67 L.Ed.2d 17. Although these cases reached differing conclusions with respect to whether there was an ex post facto violation, in none of them did we indicate that the mere fact that the prisoner was not guaranteed parole but rather received it at the will of the parole board was fatal to his claim. See Garner, 529 U.S., at 253, 120 S.Ct. 1362; Morales, 514 U.S., at 508-510, and n. 6, 115 S.Ct. 1597; Weaver, 450 U.S., at 30-31, 101 S.Ct. 960.
The Government does not challenge these holdings but rather argues, in essence, that the Guidelines are too much like guideposts and not enough like fences to give rise to an ex post facto violation. It contrasts the Sentencing Guidelines with the Florida system at issue in Miller, which, the Government indicates, really did place "a substantial legislative constraint on the judge's exercise of sentencing discretion." Brief for United States 21. But as we have explained at length, the difference between the federal system and the scheme the Court considered in Miller is one in degree, not in kind. The Florida system did not achieve its "binding legal effect," Brief for United States 22, by mandating a within-guidelines sentence in every case. Rather, it achieved its "binding legal effect" through a set of procedural rules and standards for appellate review that, in combination, encouraged district courts to sentence within the guidelines. See Miller, 482 U.S., at 432-433, 107 S.Ct. 2446. We have detailed all of the ways in which the federal sentencing regime after Booker does the same.
The Government elaborates its argument that the Sentencing Guidelines do not have adequate legal force to constitute an ex post facto violation by reviewing the various features of the post-Booker sentencing regime that, in its view, tend to render the Guidelines purely advisory. As we have noted, district courts may not presume that a within-Guidelines sentence is reasonable; they may "in appropriate cases impose a non-Guidelines sentence based on a disagreement with the Commission's views," Pepper, 562 U.S., at ----, 131 S.Ct., at 1247; and all sentences are reviewed under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. See supra, at 2079 - 2081.
While the Government accurately describes several attributes of federal sentencing after Booker, the conclusion it draws by isolating these features of the system is ultimately not supportable. On the Government's account, the Guidelines are just one among many persuasive sources a sentencing court can consult, no different from a "policy paper." Brief for United States 28. The Government's argument fails to acknowledge, however, that district courts are not required to consult any policy paper in order to avoid reversible procedural error; nor must they "consider the extent of [their] deviation" from a given policy paper and "ensure that the justification is sufficiently compelling to support the degree of the variance," Gall, 552 U.S., at 50, 128 S.Ct. 586. Courts of appeals, in turn, are not permitted to presume that a sentence that comports with a particular policy paper is reasonable; nor do courts of appeals, in considering whether the district court's sentence was reasonable, weigh the extent of any departure from a given policy paper in determining whether the district court abused its discretion, see id., at 51, 128 S.Ct. 586. It is simply not the case that the Sentencing Guidelines are merely a volume that the district court reads with academic interest in the course of sentencing.
Of course, as the Government and the dissent point out, notwithstanding a rule that retrospective application of a higher Guidelines range violates the Ex Post Facto Clause, sentencing courts will be free to give careful consideration to the current version of the Guidelines as representing the most recent views of the agency charged by Congress with developing sentencing policy. See post, at 2081 - 2082 (citing Demaree, 459 F.3d, at 795). But this does not render our holding "purely semantic." Id., at 795. District courts must begin their sentencing analysis with the Guidelines in effect
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | A | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Blackmun
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether a common carrier’s violation of credit regulations issued by the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) bars the carrier’s collection of a lawful freight charge from a shipper-consignor who, under the terms of the shipment’s bill of lading, is primarily liable for the charge.
I
Petitioner Southern Pacific Transportation Company (SP) is a common carrier by rail. Respondent Commercial Metals Company (Metals), a Delaware corporation with principal place of business in Dallas, Tex., is in the business of buying and selling steel goods. Petitioner instituted this action against respondent in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas to recover freight charges for three cars of steel cobble shipped by rail in 1974 from Detroit, Mich., to Alhambra, Cal.
Each of the three shipments was consigned by Metals to Penn Central Transportation Company, as initial carrier, under the uniform straight bill of lading prescribed by the ICC. Each bill of lading included a “nonrecourse” clause that the consignor might sign. That clause reads: “Subject to Section 7 of Conditions, if the shipment is to be delivered to the consignee without recourse on the consignor, the consignor shall sign the following statement: The carrier shall not make delivery of this shipment without payment of freight and all other lawful charges.” In each instance, respondent Metals, as consignor, failed to execute this nonre-course clause. Metals, however, already had received payment for the goods prior to shipment. Tr. of Oral Arg. 5, 6, 24-25; Brief for Respondent 21.
The first of the three cars was tendered to Penn Central at Detroit on April 11, 1974, for transportation to Careo Steel Corporation (Careo), as consignee, in Alhambra. SP released the car to Careo on April 25 without collecting the freight charge in advance of delivery. On the same day, however, SP mailed to Careo a bill for $4,634.11, the correct amount of the charge. Careo was not a credit patron of SP and had never applied to SP for credit. SP never before had made a delivery to Careo. Nevertheless, the carrier made no investigation of Carco’s credit standing.
The second and third shipments took place on May 2, 1974, when Metals consigned two other cars of cobble to Penn Central for transportation to Careo. SP delivered the cars to Careo on May 16. This time, SP released the cars only after receiving checks from Careo in the respective amounts of $5,761.79 and $2,383.67 for the freight charges. The larger amount was correct, but the smaller check should have been for $3,283.66 and thus was $900 short. On May 20, SP issued freight bills in the correct amounts to Careo. The two checks were dishonored by Carco’s bank for insufficient funds.
In August 1974, after efforts to collect the unpaid freight charges from Careo had proved fruitless, SP filed suit against Careo in a California state court. Attempts to serve the summons and complaint were unsuccessful.
On December 17,1976, more than 30 months after the shipments, SP notified Metals of Carco’s failure to pay the freight charges. SP requested that Metals, as the consignor who had failed to execute the nonrecourse provision in the bills of lading, pay the $13,679.56 total charges in satisfaction of its primary liability for the three shipments. This was the first notice to Metals that the freight charges had not been collected from Careo. When payment was not forthcoming, SP instituted the present action against Metals in federal court.
On this record, stipulated by the parties, the District Court ruled that SP had established a prima facie case for the recovery of the freight charges from Metals. It found the charges correct and in accord with applicable tariffs and that no part of those charges had been paid. App. 22. “Absent a showing of valid and affirmative defenses,” then, Metals was liable to the carrier. Id., at 23. The court rejected Metals’ claim that the passage of time barred SP’s recovery; although Metals lacked notice until December 1976 that the charges for the 1974 shipments had not been paid, the court noted that the applicable period of limitation was three years and that the carrier had been making efforts to locate Carco and to receive payment.
The District Court, however, went on to hold that Metals had established a valid equitable defense to SP’s collection of the charges by showing that SP had failed to comply with the ICC’s credit regulations promulgated pursuant to § 3(2) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U. S. C. § 3(2). App. 23. See 49 CFR pt. 1320 (1981). The court was not persuaded by SP’s suggestion that Metals had failed to avail itself of its contractual opportunity for exoneration afforded by the non-recourse provision in the bills of lading. The court concluded: “The loss sustained by [SP] was due entirely to its own fault and negligence by failing to take the proper credit precautions when it delivered the goods to Careo. ... I think that it is fundamentally unfair and inequitable for the defendant in this case to pay for the gross negligence of the plaintiff.” App. 24. Accordingly, judgment was entered for Metals. Id., at 26.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed that judgment. 641 F. 2d 235 (1981). Like the District Court, the Court of Appeals acknowledged that in the absence of a valid defense, Metals must be held liable to SP for the freight charges. Id., at 236. The court felt, however, that § 3(2) of the Act, the payment-before-delivery provision, provided a barrier to the carrier’s collection of the charges from the consignor. The implementing regulation, which modified the statutory mandate by allowing for delivery of freight on credit for up to five days, nevertheless was “quite strict.” Ibid. Thus, Metals could assert as a defense the carrier’s extension of credit to Careo without adequate precautions for a period in excess of that provided by the regulation. The court concluded: “Under these circumstances, we are compelled to hold that the carrier’s failure to comply with the applicable ICC regulations is a defense, available to [Metals], in an action by [SP] for unpaid freight charges.” Id., at 239.
Because of a conflict in the decided cases, we granted certiorari. 454 U. S. 1052 (1981).
HH I — (
Since 1919, the ICC has prescribed a uniform bill of lading for use on all interstate domestic shipments of freight by rail. See In re Bills of Lading, 52 I. C. C. 671 (1919), modified, 64 I. C. C. 357 (1921), further modified, 66 I. C. C. 63 (1922). The bill of lading is the basic transportation contract between the shipper-consignor and the carrier; its terms and conditions bind the shipper and all connecting carriers. Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Leatherwood, 250 U. S. 478, 481 (1919). “Each [term] has in effect the force of a statute, of which all affected must take notice.” Ibid. Unless the bill provides to the contrary, the consignor remains primarily liable for the freight charges. When the ICC first promulgated the uniform bill of lading, it stated:
“The consignor, being the one with whom the contract of transportation is made, is originally liable for the carrier’s charges and unless he is specifically exempted by the provisions of the bill of lading, or unless the goods are received and transported under such circumstances as to clearly indicate an exemption for him, the carrier is entitled to look to the consignor for his charges.” In re Bills of Lading, 52 I. C. C., at 721.
This rule has not changed over time. Recently, the ICC again observed that the consignor’s liability “is governed by the bill of lading contract between the parties and must be decided by interpreting that contract.” C-G-F Grain Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 351 I. C. C. 710, 712 (1976).
Clearly, then, under the contract between Metals as consignor and SP as the carrier, the consignor was primarily liable for the freight charges in question. Just as clearly, however, Metals was in a position to effectuate its release from liability by executing the nonrecourse clause in the bill of lading. Signing that clause would have operated to excuse Metals from liability. By failing to execute the nonrecourse provision, Metals continued to be primarily liable for those charges. Illinois Steel Co. v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 320 U. S. 508, 513 (1944); New York, N. H. & H.R. Co. v. California Fruit Growers Exchange, 125 Conn. 241, 254-255, 5 A. 2d 353, 359, cert. denied, 308 U. S. 567 (1939). See also Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Central Iron Co., 265 U. S. 59, 65-67 (1924).
It is perhaps appropriate to note that a carrier has not only the right but also the duty to recover its proper charges for services performed. Id., at 65-66, and n. 3. See Pitts burgh, C., C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Fink, 250 U. S. 577, 581-583 (1919). This rule of strict adherence to statutory standards is in line with the historic purpose of the Interstate Commerce Act — to achieve uniformity in freight transportation charges, and thereby to eliminate the discrimination and favoritism that had plagued the railroad industry in the late 19th century. Midstate Horticultural Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 320 U. S. 356, 361 (1943); New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. v. ICC, 200 U. S. 361, 391 (1906).
Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals correctly found that SP had established a prima facie case of Metals’ liability for the freight charges in question by proving that Metals had failed to sign the nonrecourse clause. This much, indeed, is conceded by Metals. Brief for Respondent 11; Tr. of Oral Arg. 31.
Ill
SP concedes that its failure to collect all freight charges from Carco before releasing the shipments violated the ICC regulation with regard to at least the first of the three shipments. Id., at 4, 17. See 49 CFR § 1320.1 (1981), quoted in n. 6, supra. The question, then, is whether the Court of Appeals properly found that SP’s violation of the regulation provided Metals with an equitable affirmative defense to SP’s prima facie case.
A. The ICC has comprehensively regulated the extension of credit to shippers by rail carriers. See 49 CFR pt. 1320 (1981). Yet neither the statute under which the regulations were promulgated, 49 U. S. C. §3(2), nor the regulations themselves intimate that a carrier’s violation of the credit rules automatically precludes it from collecting the lawful freight charge. Nor does either contain any words of affirmative defense to a freight charge action. Indeed, to the extent the ICC has spoken to this question, it has stated: “[A] violation of section 3(2) by [a carrier], in itself, would have had no effect on [a consignor’s] responsibility for payment of undercharges.” C-G-F Grain Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 351 I. C. C., at 712. Although § 3(2) “prohibits a rail carrier from delivering freight without collecting all charges thereon[,] ... it contains no provision shielding a consignor from liability for lawful charges.” Ibid. Thus, at least in dictum, the ICC has suggested that “[t]he question of [a consignor’s] liability [under a bill of lading] does not turn on whether any provision of the act has been violated.” Ibid.
We view the absence of any provision for an affirmative defense in the ICC’s credit regulations as an administrative construction of the statute that aids our determination of congressional intent. “[L]egislative silence is not always the result of a lack of prescience; it may instead betoken permission or, perhaps, considered abstention from regulation. . . . Accordingly, caution must temper judicial creativity in the face of legislative or regulatory silence.” Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U. S. 555, 565 (1980). We so regard the administrative silence here. When an administrative agency historically has engaged in comprehensive regulation of an industry’s credit practices, the agency’s silence regarding an affirmative defense based on a violation of those regulations must be deemed significant.
B. The legislative and administrative history of the credit regulations further indicates that this silence was not inadvertent — the intent of the rules was to protect carriers, not to penalize them. Prior to 1918, the Federal Government did not regulate the extension of credit by rail carriers. Wartime regulation revealed, however, that a general requirement of payment before delivery would protect the working capital of carriers and avoid discrimination among credit recipients. Cf. Ex parte No. MC-1, 2 M. C. C. 365, 374 (1937). After the first World War, when Congress returned the railroads to private control, § 405 of the Transportation Act, 1920, 41 Stat. 479, added paragraph (2) to § 3 of the Interstate Commerce Act. See n. 5, supra. The regulations adopted by the ICC in 1920 under the statute as so amended permitted railroads to extend limited credit to shippers on a nondiscriminatory basis. The regulations have remained largely unchanged to the present time. Until 1971, no court seriously suggested that a violation of the credit regulations precluded a carrier from collecting a freight charge from the party with primary liability. Instead, a defense of estoppel based on a violation of the credit regulations was held to be inconsistent with the purpose of the regulations themselves. Courts were concerned that a rule permitting selective estoppels would defeat the antidiscrim-inatory purpose of the Act and would weaken the capital structure of common carriers. See, e. g., Western Maryland R. Co. v. Cross, 96 W. Va. 666, 673, 123 S. E. 572, 575 (1924); Chicago Junction R. Co. v. Duluth Log Co., 161 Minn. 466, 469, 202 N. W. 24, 25 (1925); East Texas Motor Freight Lines v. Franklin County Distilling Co., 184 S. W. 2d 505, 507 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944).
Despite the absence of any textual or historical support for an affirmative defense in either the statute or the regulations, the Court of Appeals concluded that Metals could raise SP’s failure to comply fully with the regulations as an absolute equitable defense to SP’s freight charge action. The Court of Appeals relied primarily on what it regarded as “a closely analogous situation,” 641 F. 2d, at 237, presented in Consolidated Freightways Corp. v. Admiral Corp., 442 F. 2d 56 (CA7 1971). On examination, however, that Seventh Circuit case plainly is distinguishable from the present one. The defendant there was a consignee to whom goods had been delivered under bills of lading marked “prepaid.” Relying upon the carrier’s explicit representation of prepayment, the consignee paid the amount of the freight charges to the shipper-consignor. In fact, however, the carrier had extended credit to the consignor and had failed to collect the charges within the period allowed by the regulations. When the consignor went out of business, the carrier turned to the consignee for payment. The Court of Appeals, by a divided vote, held the carrier estopped.
Admiral differs from this case in four crucial respects. First, in Admiral, the carrier not only violated ICC credit regulations but also made to the defendant a material misrepresentation regarding prepayment. The carrier here, in contrast, was charged solely with failure to observe the applicable ICC credit regulations. Second, in the Seventh Circuit case, the consignee-defendant had paid full freight charges to the consignor. Had the Seventh Circuit also awarded relief to the carrier, it would have “require[d] an innocent consignee to defray freight charges exactly double the amount contemplated by the applicable tariffs.” 442 F. 2d, at 65 (Stevens, J., concurring). Here, the defendant paid no freight charges; thus, an award of relief to the carrier creates no possibility of enforcing a double payment.
Third, in Admiral, the grounds for equitable estoppel were created by the consignee’s payment of freight charges in detrimental reliance on the carrier’s misrepresentation. The carrier’s violation of the credit regulations offered only “additional grounds for the intervention of the principles of equity.” Id., at 60 (majority opinion). In this case, there is no suggestion that the consignor knew of, or changed its position detrimentally in reliance on, the carrier’s credit violation. Fourth, and most significant, the defendant-consignee in the Seventh Circuit case had no means by which to protect itself from freight charge liability. In this case, of course, the defendant-consignor could have protected itself completely simply by signing the nonrecourse clause in the bills of lading.
C. Finally, public policy concerns disfavor judicial implication of affirmative defenses based on carrier violations of the Commission's credit regulations. We recognize that the regulations are technical. Thousands of railcars are delivered every day by the country’s railroads. See Association of American Railroads, Yearbook of Railroad Facts 25 (1981) (approximately 62,000 deliveries per day). Almost inevitably, some cars will be delivered to noncredit patrons, some freight bills will be sent out late, and some accounts will not be collected within the specified time. A 1966 study by the ICC’s Bureau of Enforcement found that almost a third of 15,751 bills examined were overdue and that over half of those overdue were delinquent more than 10 days. See In re Regulations for Payment of Rates and Charges, 326 I. C. C. 483, 485 (1966). After appraising this data, the ICC agreed that “the evidence establishes many and continued violations of the credit regulations. However, we are unable to conclude on this record that rigid rules . . . would provide a practical or desirable solution. [Tjhere are many reasons for credit violations which are beyond correction by rules, e. g., where shippers have unexpected peak workloads, where there are controversies over amounts due, where additional information is needed such as weights or evaluations, where standard office procedures are in the process of change, where temporary cash flow problems occur, and where it becomes necessary to check the validity of charges with third persons. Stringent credit rules . . . would destroy the flexibility needed to meet problems of this nature.” Id., at 489-490. Indeed, in 1980, the ICC proposed repealing the credit regulations altogether, noting that “apparent, widespread noncompliance with the regulations indicates that the payment periods and other time limits prescribed are simply not realistic for many of the situations in which they apply.” Ex parte Nos. MC-1, 73, 143, and 170, 45 Fed. Reg. 31766.
It thus appears that the Court of Appeals in the present case implied an affirmative defense that would penalize railroads for violations of the credit regulations just as the agency responsible for administering those regulations was pronouncing them unrealistic. The prospect raised for the carrier is that it will be barred from recovering lawful freight charges, even from a consignor'who fails to execute the non-recourse clause, for possibly unavoidable violations of the credit rules. “The obvious consequence would be to discourage [carriers] from extending credit where the operation of this rather difficult statute is in doubt.” Bruce’s Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U. S. 743, 753 (1947). Ironically, those shippers who pay their bills currently in a responsible manner would suffer as a result.
Metals argues that a ruling for SP places SP “in the unrealistic position of being incapable of doing any wrong” and therefore creates “no incentive [for carriers] to improve inefficient and careless credit practices.” Brief for Respondent 12. Metals further claims that the loss at issue here would not have occurred if SP only had complied with its obligations under the regulations. Id., at 24. The answer to this is that the ICC has ample authority to police the credit practices of carriers and thereby to deter improper practices. This authority includes the power to issue a cease-and-desist order, see Shaw Warehouse Co. v. Southern R. Co., 308 I. C. C. 609, 633-634, 637 (1959), appeal dism’d sub nom. Southern R. Co. v. United States, 186 F. Supp. 29 (ND Ala. 1960); the power to seek a federal-court injunction requiring a carrier to comply with the regulations, see ICC v. All-American, Inc., 505 F. 2d 1360 (CA7 1974); and the power to bring suit for the $5,000 civil forfeiture, provided by 49 U. S. C. § 16(8) and 49 U. S. C. § 11901(a) (1976 ed., Supp. III), for each knowing violation of an order of the Commission, see, e. g., United States v. Western Pacific R. Co., 385 F. 2d 161 (CA10 1967), cert. denied sub nom. Denver & R. G. W. R. Co. v. United States, 391 U. S. 919 (1968); United States v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 308 F. Supp. 293 (ED Pa. 1969).
Thus, the ICC may regulate the credit practices of carriers even without the judicially created remedy of forfeiture of freight charges. Furthermore, a reading of the cited cases reveals that the question whether a credit violation has occurred often will require the ICC or the courts to conduct a factual inquiry as to the carrier’s intent to violate the regulations. The “credit violation defense” adopted by the Court of Appeals requires a carrier to forfeit freight charges without regard to the nature of its violation. This inflexible approach disenables courts from considering the carrier’s intent, the degree of the shipper’s fault, the effect of enforcement on the carrier’s existing permissible credit practices, and other subjective factors in deciding whether or not to enforce a shipper’s primary liability for freight charges.
Metals also advances a number of “double payment” cases in support of its claim for an affirmative defense. See, e. g., Southern Pacific Transp. Co. v. Campbell Soup Co., 455 F. 2d 1219 (CA8 1972); Consolidated Freightways Corp. v. Admiral Corp., 442 F. 2d 56 (CA7 1971); Farrell Lines, Inc. v. Titan Industrial Corp., 306 F. Supp. 1348 (SDNY), aff’d, 419 F. 2d 835 (CA2 1969), cert. denied, 397 U. S. 1042 (1970); Southern Pacific Co. v. Valley Frosted Foods Co., 178 Pa. Super. 217, 116 A. 2d 70 (1955). To be sure, these cases speak in equity terms. But none of these cases turned solely on a carrier’s violation of credit regulations. Each and all of them involved a carrier’s misrepresentation, such as a false assertion of prepayment on the bill of lading, upon which a consignee detrimentally relied only to find itself later sued by the carrier for the same freight charges. We find that these double payment cases constitute their own category and stand against the placement of duplication of liability upon an innocent party. See Consolidated Freightways Corp. v. Admiral Corp., 442 F. 2d, at 65 (Stevens, J., concurring).
As we have noted above, no similar double payment liability is in prospect here. Metals, not the carrier, selected the consignee. Furthermore, Metals has been paid for its goods while the carrier has not been paid for its services. The carrier unsuccessfully has pursued its remedies against the consignee before turning to the shipper-consignor for payment. Nor had the statute of limitation run when SP finally sued Metals for payment.
We, of course, are in no position to condone slipshod collection practices and a carrier’s violation of the governing regulations. But the terms of the bill of lading are specific and clear. Metals’ failure to execute the nonrecourse provision in the bill of lading specifically placed upon it primary liability for the freight charges. To permit SP’s violation of the credit regulations to be raised as an affirmative defense to its prima facie case would serve to nullify the enforceability of the nonrecourse clause. Nor do we believe that judicial implication of such a defense is necessary to encourage carrier compliance with credit rules. Railroads have real economic incentives to collect their freight charges from consignees insofar as they are able. The remedies for a carrier’s violations of the regulations are best left to the ICC for such resolution as it thinks proper.
We therefore hold that the Court of Appeals erred by permitting Metáis to assert an affirmative defense against SP based on its violation of the ICC credit regulations. Such “equities” as may exist by virtue of the carrier’s delay and its violation of the credit regulations are insufficient in magnitude to overcome the time-honored rule that under such circumstances, no “act or omission of the carrier (except the running of the statute of limitations) [will] estop or preclude it from enforcing payment of the full amount by a person liable therefor.” Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Central Iron Co., 265 U. S., at 65.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
It is so ordered.
The shipments moved over the respective lines of the Penn Central, the St. Louis Southwestern Railway Company (an SP subsidiary), and the SP. Pursuant to an interline agreement, SP has paid the other two carriers their proportionate shares of the freight charges earned on the shipments.
Section 7 of the Conditions of the Bill of Lading reads in pertinent part:
“The owner or consignee shall pay the freight and average, if any, and all other lawful charges accruing on said property; but, except in those instances where it may lawfully be authorized to do so, no carrier by railroad shall deliver or relinquish possession at destination of the property covered by this bill of lading until all tariff rates and charges thereon have been paid. The consignor shall be liable for the freight and all other lawful charges, except that if the consignor stipulates, by signature, in the space provided for that purpose on the face of this bill of lading that the carrier shall not make delivery without requiring payment of such charges and the carrier, contrary to such stipulation, shall make delivery without requiring such payment, the consignor (except as hereinafter provided) shall not be liable for such charges. . . . The term ‘delivering carrier’ means the line-haul carrier making ultimate delivery.” (Emphasis added.)
SP suggests that the $900 difference was occasioned by a transposition of the initial digits. Brief for Petitioner 31, n. 21. No explanation of the one-eent variance is offered.
In 1978, the Interstate Commerce Act was revised and recodified by Pub. L. 95-473, 92 Stat. 1337, as 49 U. S. C. § 10101 et seq. (1976 ed., Supp. III). Because the transactions at issue in this case took place prior to 1978, we refer to the Act in its prior form unless otherwise specified.
Section 3(2) reads:
“No carrier by railroad . . . shall deliver or relinquish possession at destination of any freight . . . shipment transported by it until all tariff rates and charges thereon have been paid, except under such rules and regulations as the Commission may from time to time prescribe to govern the settlement of all such rates and charges and to prevent unjust discrimination . . . .”
The applicable regulation reads in pertinent part:
“The carrier, upon taking precautions deemed by it to be sufficient to assure payment of the tariff charges within the credit periods specified in this part, may relinquish possession of the freight in advance of the payment of the tariff charges thereon and may extend credit in the amount of such charges to those who undertake to pay such charges, such persons herein being called shippers, for a period of i days (or 5 days where retention or possession of freight by the carrier until tariff rates and charges thereon have been paid will retard prompt delivery or will retard prompt release of equipment or station facilities) as set forth in this part.” 49 CFR § 1320.1 (1981) (emphasis added).
In agreement with the decision of the Fifth Circuit in the present case is Brown Transportation Corp. v. Atcon, Inc., 144 Ga. App. 301, 241 S. E. 2d 15 (1977), cert. denied sub nom. Brown Transport Corp. v. Atcon, Inc., 439 U. S. 1014 (1978) (with two Justices dissenting). The contrary result has been reached in other cases. See, e. g., Consolidated Freightways Corp. v. Pacheco Int’l Corp., 488 F. Supp. 68 (CD Cal. 1979), and Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Marcelletti, 256 Mich. 411, 240 N. W. 4 (1932).
There is disagreement, too, as to whether equitable defenses may be asserted in various other situations where regulated carriers seek to recover lawful tariff charges. Compare, e. g., Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Hofberger, 259 Ark. 322, 532 S. W. 2d 759 (1976), and Westover v. United Van Lines, Inc., 154 Ga. App. 865, 270 S. E. 2d 74 (1980) (defenses upheld), with Bartlett-Collins Co. v. Surinam Nav. Co., 381 F. 2d 546 (CA10 1967); American Red Ball Transit Co. v. McCarthy, 114 N. H. 514, 323 A. 2d 897 (1974), cert. denied, 420 U. S. 930 (1975); Western Maryland R. Co. v. Cross, 96 W. Va. 666, 123 S. E. 572 (1924); and Arizona Feeds v. Southern Pacific Transp. Co., 21 Ariz. App. 346, 519 P. 2d 199 (1974) (defenses not recognized).
This division prompted one commentator some years ago to refer to the “striking lack of uniformity in decisions concerning the liability of consignors and consignees despite the obvious need for uniformity in interstate commercial transactions.” Note, Carriers: Federal Bills of Lading: Liability of Parties to a Prepaid Shipment, 38 Cornell L. Q. 596, 603 (1953).
The form of the bill of lading has been modified several times since 1922, see, e. g., In re Bills of Lading, 245 I. C. C. 527 (1941), but only the 1921 and 1922 modifications affected the provisions of the bill of lading relevant to this case.
Metals now asserts, as well, that SP’s actions violated § 7 of the Conditions of the Bill of Lading, see n. 2, supra, and thus constituted a complete abrogation of SP’s contractual obligations under the bill of lading. See Brief for Respondent 11. SP answers that this argument was presented to neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals. See Reply Brief for Petitioner 4. Because the Court of Appeals did not rely on this theory to grant respondent relief, and because we did not grant certiorari to consider this breach-of-contract claim, we decline to address it.
The methodology of this study was questioned by the railroads. The roads’ own figures, however, showed that of 445,984 collectible items accrued during the period of the investigation, more than 10,000 resulted in credit violations. 326 I. C. C., at 486.
The facts of this case illustrate the problems that may arise when a court ventures to create law in this highly technical field. The rulings of the District Court and the Court of Appeals denied SP recovery not only for the first car, which was delivered without any payment upon the freight charge, but also for the two cars for which it did demand payment before delivery and received checks for the charges.
Yet acceptance of a proper check as payment for a freight charge is an acknowledged commercial practice in the railroad industry. See Fullerton Lumber Co. v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co., 282 U. S. 520, 522 (1931); see also 49 CFR § 1320.13 (1981). It therefore is at least possible that SP’s insistence on payment by check before releasing the second and third cars constituted compliance with the regulations, which require only that the railroad take “precautions deemed by it to be sufficient to assure payment of the tariff charges.” 49 CFR § 1320.1 (1981). It is true, of course, that the check for one car was understated by $900, but, as has been noted, SP mailed a freight bill for the correct amount to Careo within four days of the delivery. See 49 CFR § 1320.5 (1981) (carrier may extend credit for up to 30 days on balance due in the event of undercharges).
Furthermore, it is by no means clear that SP could safely have deferred delivery of the second and third cars until after Careo had paid the charges on the first car. The carrier’s lien for unpaid charges covers only the goods in the immediate shipment. 49 U. S. C. § 105. See Atlas S.S. Co. v. Colombian Land Co., 102 F. 358, 361 (CA2 1900). Once Careo offered to pay the charges on the second and third cars, even serious suspicion about Carco’s financial health might not have allowed SP to withhold delivery without risking liability to Careo for conversion of its goods. See 49 U. S. C. § 88 (carrier’s duty to deliver goods on demand).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | H | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
Petitioner was convicted of having knowingly possessed a counterfeit $20 bill. After the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed his conviction he filed this petition for a writ of certiorari. We are now advised that petitioner has died.
It is true that the petition for certiorari is out of time under our Rule 22 (2), though timeliness under our rules, of course, presents no jurisdictional question. Subsequent to the affirmance of his conviction below, petitioner filed a timely petition for rehearing. Upon his inquiry to the Court of Appeals he was informed that he would be notified as to the disposition of his petition as soon as the court acted. When several months passed without any word, petitioner again wrote to that court. In reply, on September 8, 1970, he received a copy of the order dated March 5, 1970, denying his petition for rehearing. Within three weeks from receipt of the denial from the Court of Appeals his petition for a writ of certiorari was docketed in this Court. On these facts waiver of our Rule 22 is proper.
Our cases where a petitioner dies while a review is pending are not free of ambiguity. In a recent mandamus action the petitioner died and we granted certi-orari, vacated the judgment below, and ordered the complaint dismissed. Fletcher v. Bryan, 361 U. S. 126. In a state habeas corpus case we granted certiorari and vacated the judgment so that the state court could také whatever action it deemed proper. Garvin v. Cochran, 371 U. S. 27. Our practice in cases on direct review from state convictions has been to dismiss the proceedings. See Gersewitz v. New York, 326 U. S. 687. In an earlier case the Court announced the appeal had abated, Johnson v. Tennessee, 214 U. S. 485, while in another the Court stated the cause had abated. List v. Pennsylvania, 131 U. S. 396.
In federal criminal cases we developed the practice of dismissing the writ of certiorari and remanding the cause tp the court below. Singer v. United States, 323 U. S. 338, 346; American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U. S. 781, 815 n. 11; United States v. Johnson, 319 U. S. 503, 520 n. 1. We have cited United States v. Pomeroy, 152 F. 279, rev’d sub nom. United States v. New York Central & H. R. R. Co., 164 F. 324, and United States v. Dunne, 173 F. 254, in suggesting such disposition on remand “as law and justice require,” but beyond this we have basically allowed the scope of the abatement to be determined by the lower federal courts.
The status of abatement caused by death on direct review has recently been discussed by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Crooker v. United States, 325 F. 2d 318. In reviewing the cases that court concluded that the lower federal courts were unanimous on the rule to be applied: death pending direct review of a criminal conviction abates not only the appeal but also all proceedings had in the prosecution from its inception. Id., at 320. As stated in List v. Pennsylvania, supra, on death of the convicted petitioner the “cause has abated.”
The unanimity of the lower federal courts which have worked with this problem over the years from Pomeroy to Crooker is impressive. We believe they have adopted the correct rule. Accordingly, the motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for a writ of certiorari are granted. The judgment below is vacated and the case is remanded to the District Court with directions to .dismiss the indictment.
It is so ordered.
Mr. Justice Marshall,
whom The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Stewart join,
believes that the case should be disposed of as follows:
The petitioner having died while his petition for certi-orari was pending before this Court, we dismiss the petition as moot and direct the Court of Appeals to note this action on its records.
It is suggested that Crooker is different because it involved a right of appeal, while here we deal with a petition for a writ of certiorari. It is, of course, true that appeals are a matter of right while decisions on certiorari petitions are wholly discretionary. Congress, however, has given a right to petition for certiorari and petitioner exercised that right. No decision had been made on that petition prior to his death. Since death will prevent any review on the merits, whether the situation is an appeal or certiorari, the distinction between the two would not seem to be important for present purposes.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | I | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Blackmun
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this case we are concerned with an employer’s gender-based fetal-protection policy. May an employer exclude a fertile female employee from certain jobs because of its concern for the health of the fetus the woman might conceive?
HH
Respondent Johnson Controls, Inc., manufactures batteries. In the manufacturing process, the element lead is a primary ingredient. Occupational exposure to lead entails health risks, including the risk of harm to any fetus carried by a female employee.
Before the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 241, became law, Johnson Controls did not employ any woman in a battery-manufacturing job. In June 1977, however, it announced its first official policy concerning its employment of women in lead-exposure work:
“[Protection of the health of the unborn child is the immediate and direct responsibility of the prospective parents. While the medical profession and the company can support them in the exercise of this responsibility, it cannot assume it for them without simultaneously infringing their rights as persons.
“.... Since not all women who can become mothers wish to become mothers (or will become mothers), it would appear to be illegal discrimination to treat all who are capable of pregnancy as though they will become pregnant.” App. 140.
Consistent with that view, Johnson Controls “stopped short of excluding women capable of bearing children from lead exposure,” id., at 138, but emphasized that a woman who expected to have a child should not choose a job in which she would have such exposure. The company also required a woman who wished to be considered for employment to sign a statement that she had been advised of the risk of having a child while she was exposed to lead. The statement informed the woman that although there was evidence “that women exposed to lead have a higher rate of abortion,” this evidence was “not as clear... as the relationship between cigarette smoking and cancer,” but that it was, “medically speaking, just good sense not to run that risk if you want children and do not want to expose the unborn child to risk, however small....” Id., at 142-143.
Five years later, in 1982, Johnson Controls shifted from a policy of warning to a policy of exclusion. Between 1979 and 1983, eight employees became pregnant while maintaining blood lead levels in excess of 30 micrograms per deciliter. Tr. of Oral Arg. 25, 34. This appeared to be the critical level noted by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) for a worker who was planning to have a family. See 29 CFR § 1910.1025 (1990). The company responded by announcing a broad exclusion of women from jobs that exposed them to lead:
“ [I]t is [Johnson Controls’] policy that women who are pregnant or who are capable of bearing children will not be placed into jobs involving lead exposure or which could expose them to lead through the exercise of job bidding, bumping, transfer or promotion rights.” App. 85-86.
The policy defined “women... capable of bearing children” as “[a]ll women except those whose inability to bear children is medically documented.” Id., at 81. It further stated that an unacceptable work station was one where, “over the past year,” an employee had recorded a blood lead level of more than 30 micrograms per deciliter or the work site had yielded an air sample containing a lead level in excess of 30 micrograms per cubic meter. Ibid.
II
In April 1984, petitioners filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin a class action challenging Johnson Controls’ fetal-protection policy as sex discrimination that violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq. Among the individual plaintiffs were petitioners Mary Craig, who had chosen to be sterilized in order to avoid losing her job, Elsie Nason, a 50-year-old divorcee, who had suffered a loss in compensation when she was transferred out of a job where she was exposed to lead, and Donald Penney, who had been denied a request for a leave of absence for the purpose of lowering his lead level because he intended to become a father. Upon stipulation of the parties, the District Court certified a class consisting of “all past, present and future production and maintenance employees” in United Auto Workers bargaining units at nine of Johnson Controls’ plants “who have been and continue to be affected by [the employer’s] Fetal Protection Policy implemented in 1982.” No. 84-C-0472 (Feb. 25, 1985), pp. 1, 2.
The District Court granted summary judgment for defendant-respondent Johnson Controls. 680 F. Supp. 309 (1988). Applying a three-part business necessity defense derived from fetal-protection cases in the Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits, the District Court concluded that while “there is a disagreement among the experts regarding the effect of lead on the fetus,” the hazard to the fetus through exposure to lead was established by “a considerable body of opinion”; that although “[e]xpert opinion has been provided which holds that lead also affects the reproductive abilities of men and women... [and] that these effects are as great as the effects of exposure of the fetus... a great body of experts are of the opinion that the fetus is more vulnerable to levels of lead that would not affect adults”; and that petitioners had “failed to establish that there is an acceptable alternative policy which would protect the fetus.” Id., at 315-316. The court stated that, in view of this disposition of the business necessity defense, it did not “have to undertake a bona fide occupational qualification’s [sic] (BFOQ) analysis.” Id., at 316, n. 5.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed the summary judgment by a 7-to-4 vote. 886 F. 2d 871 (1989). The majority held that the proper standard for evaluating the fetal-protection policy was the defense of business necessity; that Johnson Controls was entitled to summary judgment under that defense; and that even if the proper standard was a BFOQ, Johnson Controls still was entitled to summary judgment.
The Court of Appeals, see id., at 883-885, first reviewed fetal-protection opinions from the Eleventh and Fourth Circuits. See Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hospital, 726 F. 2d 1543 (CA11 1984), and Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F. 2d 1172 (CA4 1982). Those opinions established the three-step business necessity inquiry: whether there is a substantial health risk to the fetus; whether transmission of the hazard to the fetus occurs only through women; and whether there is a less discriminatory alternative equally capable of preventing the health hazard to the fetus. 886 F. 2d, at 885. The Court of Appeals agreed with the Eleventh and Fourth Circuits that “the components of the business necessity defense the courts of appeals and the EEOC have utilized in fetal protection cases balance the interests of the employer, the employee and the unborn child in a manner consistent with Title VII.” Id., at 886. The court further noted that, under Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U. S. 642 (1989), the burden of persuasion remained on the plaintiff in challenging a business necessity defense, and — unlike the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits — it thus imposed the burden on the plaintiffs for all three steps. 886 F. 2d, at 887-893. Cf. Hayes, 726 F. 2d, at 1549, and Wright, 697 F. 2d, at 1187.
Applying this business necessity defense, the Court of Appeals ruled that Johnson Controls should prevail. Specifically, the court concluded that there was no genuine issue of material fact about the substantial health-risk factor because the parties agreed that there was a substantial risk to a fetus from lead exposure. 886 F. 2d, at 888-889. The Court of Appeals also concluded that, unlike the evidence of risk to the fetus from the mother’s exposure, the evidence of risk from the father’s exposure, which petitioners presented, “is, at best, speculative and unconvincing.” Id., at 889. Finally, the court found that petitioners had waived the issue of less discriminatory alternatives by not adequately presenting it. It said that, in any event, petitioners had not produced evidence of less discriminatory alternatives in the District Court. Id., at 890-893.
Having concluded that the business necessity defense was the appropriate framework and that Johnson Controls satis-fled that standard, the court proceeded to discuss the BFOQ defense and concluded that Johnson Controls met that test, too. Id., at 893-894. The en banc majority ruled that industrial safety is part of the essence of respondent’s business, and that the fetal-protection policy is reasonably necessary to further that concern. Quoting Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U. S. 321, 335 (1977), the majority emphasized that, in view of the goal of protecting the unborn, “more is at stake” than simply an individual woman’s decision to weigh and accept the risks of employment. 886 F. 2d, at 898.
Judges Cudahy and Posner dissented and would have reversed the judgment and remanded the case for trial. Judge Cudahy explained: “It may (and should) be difficult to establish a BFOQ here but I would afford the defendant an opportunity to try.” Id., at 901. “[T]he BFOQ defense need not be narrowly limited to matters of worker productivity, product quality and occupational safety.” Id., at 902, n. 1. He concluded that this case’s “painful complexities are manifestly unsuited for summary judgment.” Id., at 902.
Judge Posner stated: “I think it a mistake to suppose that we can decide this case once and for all on so meager a record.” Ibid. He, too, emphasized that, under Title VII, a fetal-protection policy which explicitly applied just to women could be defended only as a BFOQ. He observed that Title VII defines a BFOQ defense as a “‘bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation’ ” of a business, and that “the ‘normal operation’ of a business encompasses ethical, legal, and business concerns about the effects of an employer’s activities on third parties.” Id., at 902 and 904. He emphasized, however, that whether a particular policy is lawful is a question of fact that should ordinarily be resolved at trial. Id., at 906. Like Judge Cudahy, he stressed that “it will be the rare case where the lawfulness of such a policy can be decided on the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.” Ibid.
Judge Easterbrook, also in dissent and joined by Judge Flaum, agreed with Judges Cudahy and Posner that the only defense available to Johnson Controls was the BFOQ. He concluded, however, that the BFOQ defense would not prevail because respondent’s stated concern for the health of the unborn was irrelevant to the operation of its business under the BFOQ. He also viewed the employer’s concern as irrelevant to a woman’s ability or inability to work under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act’s amendment to Title VII, 92 Stat. 2076, 42 U. S. C. §2000e(k). Judge Easterbrook also stressed what he considered the excessive breadth of Johnson Controls’ policy. It applied to all women (except those with medical proof of incapacity to bear children) although most women in an industrial labor forcé do not become pregnant, most of those who do become pregnant will have blood lead levels under 30 micrograms per deciliter, and most of those who become pregnant with levels exceeding that figure will bear normal children anyway. 886 F. 2d, at 912-913. “Concerns about a tiny minority of women cannot set the standard by which all are judged.” Id., at 913.
With its ruling, the Seventh Circuit became the first Court of Appeals to hold that a fetal-protection policy directed exclusively at women could qualify as a BFOQ. We granted certiorari, 494 U. S. 1055 (1990), to resolve the obvious conflict between the Fourth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits on this issue, and to address the important and difficult question whether an employer, seeking to protect potential fetuses, may discriminate against women just because of their ability to become pregnant.
HH h-i hH
The bias m Johnson Controls’ policy is obvious. Fertile men, but not fertile women, are given a choice as to whether they wish to risk their reproductive health for a particular job. Section 703(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 255, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §2000e-2(a), prohibits sex-based classifications in terms and conditions of employment, in hiring and discharging decisions, and in other employment decisions that adversely affect an employee’s status. Respondent’s fetal-protection policy explicitly discriminates against women on the basis of their sex. The policy excludes women with childbearing capacity from lead-exposed jobs and so creates a facial classification based on gender. Respondent assumes as much in its brief before this Court. Brief for Respondent 17, n. 24.
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals assumed, as did the two appellate courts that already had confronted the issue, that sex-specific fetal-protection policies do not involve facial discrimination. 886 F. 2d, at 886-887; Hayes, 726 F. 2d, at 1547; Wright, 697 F. 2d, at 1190. These courts analyzed the policies as though they were facially neutral and had only a discriminatory effect upon the employment opportunities of women. Consequently, the courts looked to see if each employer in question had established that its policy was justified as a business necessity. The business necessity standard is more lenient for the employer than the statutory BFOQ defense. The Court of Appeals here went one step further and invoked the burden-shifting framework set forth in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U. S. 642 (1989), thus requiring petitioners to bear the burden of persuasion on all questions. 886 F. 2d, at 887-888. The court assumed that because the asserted reason for the sex-based exclusion (protecting women’s unconceived offspring) was ostensibly benign, the policy was not sex-based discrimination. That assumption, however, was incorrect.
First, Johnson Controls’ policy classifies on the basis of gender and childbearing capacity, rather than fertility alone. Respondent does not seek to protect the unconceived children of all its employees. Despite evidence in the record about the debilitating effect of lead exposure on the male reproductive system, Johnson Controls is concerned only with the harms that may befall the unborn offspring of its female employees. Accordingly, it appears that Johnson Controls would have lost in the Eleventh Circuit under Hayes because its policy does not “effectively and equally protec[t] the offspring of all employees.” 726 F. 2d, at 1548. This Court faced a conceptually similar situation in Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U. S. 542 (1971), and found sex discrimination because the policy established “one hiring policy for women and another for men — each having pre-school-age children.” Id., at 544. Johnson Controls’ policy is facially discriminatory because it requires only a female employee to produce proof that she is not capable of reproducing.
Our conclusion is bolstered by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA), 42 U. S. C. § 2000e(k), in which Congress explicitly provided that, for purposes of Title VII, discrimination “ ‘on the basis of sex’ ” includes discrimination “because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.” “The Pregnancy Discrimination Act has now made clear that, for all Title VII purposes, discrimination based on a woman’s pregnancy is, on its face, discrimination because of her sex.” Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U. S. 669, 684 (1983). In its use of the words “capable of bearing children” in the 1982 policy statement as the criterion for exclusion, Johnson Controls explicitly classifies on the basis of potential for pregnancy. Under the PDA, such a classification must be regarded, for Title VII purposes, in the same light as explicit sex discrimination. Respondent has chosen to treat all its female employees as potentially pregnant; that choice evinces discrimination on the basis of sex.
We concluded above that Johnson Controls’ policy is not neutral because it does not apply to the reproductive capacity of the company’s male employees in the same way as it applies to that of the females. Moreover, the absence of a malevolent motive does not convert a facially discriminatory policy into a neutral policy with a discriminatory effect. Whether an employment practice involves disparate treatment through explicit facial discrimination does not depend on why the employer discriminates but rather on the explicit terms of the discrimination. In Martin Marietta, supra, the motives underlying the employers’ express exclusion of women did not alter the intentionally discriminatory character of the policy. Nor did the arguably benign motives lead to consideration of a business necessity defense. The question in that case was whether the discrimination in question could be justified under § 703(e) as a BFOQ. The beneficence of an employer’s purpose does not undermine the conclusion that an explicit gender-based policy is sex discrimination under § 703(a) and thus may be defended only as a BFOQ.
The enforcement policy of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission accords with this conclusion. On January 24, 1990, the EEOC issued a Policy Guidance in the light of the Seventh Circuit’s decision in the present case. App. to Pet. for Cert. 127a. The document noted: “For the plaintiff to bear the burden of proof in a case in which there is direct evidence of a facially discriminatory policy is wholly inconsistent with settled Title VII law.” Id., at 133a. The Commission concluded: “[W]e now think BFOQ is the better approach.” Id., at 134a.
In sum, Johnson Controls’ policy “does not pass the simple test of whether the evidence shows ‘treatment of a person in a manner which but for that person’s sex would be different.’” Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U. S. 702, 711 (1978), quoting Developments in the Law, Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1109, 1170 (1971). We hold that Johnson Controls’ fetal-protection policy is sex discrimination forbidden under Title VII unless respondent can establish that sex is a “bona fide occupational qualification.”
rH <1
Under § 703(e)(1) of Title VII, an employer may discriminate on the basis of “religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise.” 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2(e)(l). We therefore turn to the question whether Johnson Controls’ fetal-protection policy is one of those “certain instances” that come within the BFOQ exception.
The BFOQ defense is written narrowly, and this Court has read it narrowly. See, e. g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U. S. 321, 332-337 (1977); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U. S. 111, 122-125 (1985). We have read the BFOQ language of § 4(f) of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 81 Stat. 603, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 623(f)(1), which tracks the BFOQ provision in Title VII, just as narrowly. See Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U. S. 400 (1985). Our emphasis on the restrictive scope of the BFOQ defense is grounded on both the language and the legislative history of § 703.
The wording of the BFOQ defense contains several terms of restriction that indicate that the exception reaches only special situations. The statute thus limits the situations in which discrimination is permissible to “certain instances” where sex discrimination is “reasonably necessary” to the “normal operation” of the “particular” business. Each one of these terms — certain, normal, particular — prevents the use of general subjective standards and favors an objective, verifiable requirement. But the most telling term is “occupational”; this indicates that these objective, verifiable requirements must concern job-related skills and aptitudes.
Justice White defines “occupational” as meaning related to a job. Post, at 212, n. 1. According to him, any discriminatory requirement imposed by an employer is “job-related” simply because the employer has chosen to make the requirement a condition of employment. In effect, he argues that sterility may be an occupational qualification for women because Johnson Controls has chosen to require it. This reading of “occupational” renders the word mere surplusage. “Qualification” by itself would encompass an employer’s idiosyncratic requirements. By modifying “qualification” with “occupational,” Congress narrowed the term to qualifications that affect an employee’s ability to do the job.
Johnson Controls argues that its fetal-protection policy falls within the so-called safety exception to the BFOQ. Our cases have stressed that discrimination on the basis of sex because of safety concerns is allowed only in narrow circumstances. In Dothard v. Rawlinson, this Court indicated that danger to a woman herself does not justify discrimination. 433 U. S., at 335. We there allowed the employer to hire only male guards in contact areas of maximum-security male penitentiaries only because more was at stake than the “individual woman’s decision to weigh and accept the risks of employment.” Ibid. We found sex to be a BFOQ inasmuch as the employment of a female guard would create real risks of safety to others if violence broke out because the guard was a woman. Sex discrimination was tolerated because sex was related to the guard’s ability to do the job — maintaining prison security. We also required in Dothard a high correlation between sex and ability to perform job functions and refused to allow employers to use sex as a proxy for strength although it might be a fairly accurate one.
Similarly, some courts have approved airlines’ layoffs of pregnant flight attendants at different points during the first five months of pregnancy on the ground that the employer’s policy was necessary to ensure the safety of passengers. See Harriss v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 649 F. 2d 670 (CA9 1980); Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 633 F. 2d 361 (CA4 1980), cert. denied, 450 U. S. 965 (1981); Condit v. United Air Lines, Inc., 558 F. 2d 1176 (CA4 1977), cert. denied, 435 U. S. 934 (1978); In re National Airlines, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 249 (SD Fla. 1977). In two of these cases, the courts pointedly indicated that fetal, as opposed to passenger, safety was best left to the mother. Burwell, 633 F. 2d, at 371; National Airlines, 434 F. Supp., at 259.
We considered safety to third parties in Western Airlines, Inc. v. Criswell, supra, in the context of the ADEA. We focused upon “the nature of the flight engineer’s tasks,” and the “actual capabilities of persons over age 60” in relation to those tasks. 472 U. S., at 406. Our safety concerns were not independent of the individual’s ability to perform the assigned tasks, but rather involved the possibility that, because of age-connected debility, a flight engineer might not properly assist the pilot, and might thereby cause a safety emergency. Furthermore, although we considered the safety of third parties in Dothard and Criswell, those third parties were indispensable to the particular business at issue. In Dothard, the third parties were the inmates; in Criswell, the third parties were the passengers on the plane. We stressed that in order to qualify as a BFOQ, a job qualification must relate to the “‘essence,’” Dothard, 433 U. S., at 333 (emphasis deleted), or to the “central mission of the employer’s business,” Criswell, 472 U. S., at 413.
Justice White ignores the “essence of the business” test and so concludes that “protecting fetal safety while carrying out the duties of battery manufacturing is as much a legitimate concern as is safety to third parties in guarding prisons (Dothard) or flying airplanes (Criswell).” Post, at 217. By limiting his discussion to cost and safety concerns and rejecting the “essence of the business” test that our case law has established, he seeks to expand what is now the narrow BFOQ defense. Third-party safety considerations properly entered into the BFOQ analysis in Dothard and Criswell because they went to the core of the employee’s job performance. Moreover, that performance involved the central purpose of the enterprise. Dothard, 433 U. S., at 335 (“The essence of a correctional counselor’s job is to maintain prison security”); Criswell, 472 U. S., at 413 (the central mission of the airline’s business was the safe transportation of its passengers). Justice White attempts to transform this case into one of customer safety. The unconceived fetuses of Johnson Controls’ female employees, however, are neither customers nor third parties whose safety is essential to the business of battery manufacturing.. No one can disregard the possibility of injury to future children; the BFOQ, however, is not so broad that it transforms this deep social concern into an essential aspect of battery making.
Our case law, therefore, makes clear that the safety exception is limited to instances in which sex or pregnancy actually interferes with the employee’s ability to perform the job. This approach is consistent with the language of the BFOQ provision itself, for it suggests that permissible distinctions based on sex must relate to ability to perform the duties of the job. Johnson Controls suggests, however, that we expand the exception to allow fetal-protection policies that mandate particular standards for pregnant or fertile women. We decline to do so. Such an expansion contradicts not only the language of the BFOQ and the narrowness of its exception, but also the plain language and history of the PDA.
The PDA’s amendment to Title VII contains a BFOQ standard of its own: Unless pregnant employees differ from others “in their ability or inability to work,” they must be “treated the same” as other employees “for all employment-related purposes.” 42 U. S. C. §2000e(k). This language clearly sets forth Congress’ remedy for discrimination on the basis of pregnancy and potential pregnancy. Women who are either pregnant or potentially pregnant must be treated like others “similar in their ability... to work.” Ibid. In other words, women as capable of doing their jobs as their male counterparts may not be forced to choose between having a child and having a job.
Justice White asserts that the PDA did not alter the BFOQ defense. Post, at 218. He arrives at this conclusion by ignoring the second clause of the Act, which states that “women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes... as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work.” 42 U. S. C. § 2000e(k). Until this day, every Member of this Court had acknowledged that “[t]he second clause [of the PDA] could not be clearer: it mandates that pregnant employees ‘shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes’ as nonpregnant employees similarly situated with respect to their ability or inability to work.” California Federal Savings and Loan Assn. v. Guerra, 479 U. S. 272, 297 (1987) (White, J., dissenting). Justice White now seeks to read the second clause out of the Act.
The legislative history confirms what the language of the PDA compels. Both the House and Senate Reports accompanying the legislation indicate that this statutory standard was chosen to protect female workers from being treated differently from other employees simply because of their capacity to bear children. See Amending Title VII, Civil Rights Act of 1964, S. Rep. No. 96-331, pp. 4-6 (1977):
“Under this bill, the treatment of pregnant women in covered employment must focus not on their condition alone but on the actual effects of that condition on their ability to work. Pregnant women who are able to work must be permitted to work on the same conditions as other employees....
“[U]nder this bill, employers will no longer be permitted to force women who become pregnant to stop working regardless of their ability to continue.”
See also Prohibition of Sex Discrimination Based on Pregnancy, H. R. Rep. No. 95-948, pp. 3-6 (1978).
This history counsels against expanding the BFOQ to allow fetal-protection policies. The Senate Report quoted above states that employers may not require a pregnant woman to stop working at any time during her pregnancy unless she is unable to do her work. Employment late in pregnancy often imposes risks on the unborn child, see Chavkin, Walking a Tightrope: Pregnancy, Parenting, and Work, in Double Exposure 196, 196-202 (W. Chavkin ed. 1984), but Congress indicated that the employer may take into account only the woman’s ability to get her job done. See Becker, From Muller v. Oregon to Fetal Vulnerability Policies, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1219, 1255-1256 (1986). With the PDA, Congress made clear that the decision to become pregnant or to work while being either pregnant or capable of becoming pregnant was reserved for each individual woman to make for herself.
We conclude that the language of both the BFOQ provision and the PDA which amended it, as well as the legislative history and the case law, prohibit an employer from discriminating against a woman because of her capacity to become pregnant unless her reproductive potential prevents her from performing the duties of her job. We reiterate our holdings in Criswell and Dothard that an employer must direct its concerns about a woman’s ability to perform her job safely and efficiently to those aspects of the woman’s job-related activities that fall within the “essence” of the particular business.
V
We have no difficulty concluding that Johnson Controls cannot establish a BFOQ. Fertile women, as far as appears in the record, participate in the manufacture of batteries as efficiently as anyone else. Johnson Controls’ professed moral and ethical concerns about the welfare of the next generation do not suffice to establish a BFOQ of female sterility. Decisions about the welfare of future children must be left to the parents who conceive, bear, support, and raise them rather than to the employers who hire those parents. Congress has mandated this choice through Title VII, as amended by the PDA. Johnson Controls has attempted to exclude women because of their reproductive capacity. Title VII and the PDA simply do not allow a woman’s dismissal because of her failure to submit to sterilization.
Nor can concerns about the welfare of the next generation be considered a part of the “essence” of Johnson Controls’ business. Judge Easterbrook in this case pertinently observed: “It is word play to say that ‘the job’ at Johnson [Controls] is to make batteries without risk to fetuses in the same way ‘the job’ at Western Air Lines is to fly planes without crashing.” 886 F. 2d, at 913.
Johnson Controls argues that it must exclude all fertile women because it is impossible to tell which women will become pregnant while working with lead. This argument is somewhat academic in light of our conclusion that the company may not exclude fertile women at all; it perhaps is worth noting, however, that Johnson Controls has shown no “factual basis for believing that all or substantially all women would be unable to perform safely and efficiently the duties of the job involved.” Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F. 2d 228, 235 (CA5 1969), quoted with approval in Dothard, 433 U. S., at 333. Even on this sparse record, it is apparent that Johnson Controls is concerned about only a small minority of women. Of the eight pregnancies reported among the female employees, it has not been shown that any of the babies have birth defects or other abnormalities. The record does not reveal the birth rate for Johnson Controls’ female workers, but national statistics show that approximately nine percent of all fertile women become pregnant each year. The birthrate drops to two percent for blue collar workers over age 30. See Becker, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev., at 1233. Johnson Controls’ fear of prenatal injury, no matter how sincere, does not begin to show that substantially all of its fertile women employees are incapable of doing their jobs.
I — 1 >
A word about tort liability and the increased cost of fertile women in the workplace is perhaps necessary. One of the dissenting judges in this case expressed concern about an employer’s tort liability and concluded that liability for a potential injury to a fetus is a social cost that Title VII does not require a company to ignore. 886 F. 2d, at 904-905. It is correct to say that Title VII does not prevent the employer from having a conscience. The statute, however, does prevent sex-specific fetal-protection policies. These two aspects of Title VII do not conflict.
More than 40 States currently recognize a right to recover for a prenatal injury based either on negligence or on wrongful death. See, e. g., Wolfe v. Isbell, 291 Ala. 327, 333-334, 280 So. 2d 758, 763 (1973); Simon v. Mullin, 34 Conn. Supp. 139, 147, 380 A. 2d 1353, 1357 (1977). See also Note, 22 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 747, 754-756, and nn. 54, 57, and 58 (1988) (listing cases). According to Johnson Controls, however, the company complies with the lead standard developed by OSHA and warns its female employees about the damaging effects of lead. It is worth noting that OSHA gave the problem of lead lengthy consideration and concluded that “there is no basis whatsoever for the claim that women of childbearing age should be excluded from the workplace in order to protect the fetus or the course of pregnancy.” 43 Fed. Reg. 52952, 52966 (1978). See also id., at 54354, 54398. Instead, OSHA established a series of mandatory protections which, taken together, “should effectively minimize any risk to the fetus and newborn child.” Id., at 52966. See 29 CFR § 1910.1025(k)(ii) (1990). Without negligence, it would be difficult for a court to find liability on the part of the employer. If, under general tort principles, Title VII bans sex-specific fetal-protection policies, the
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | B | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
The writ of certiorari is dismissed as improvidently granted.
It is so ordered.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | I | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Me. Justice Powell
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question in these consolidated cases is whether a state prosecutor may seek to impeach a defendant’s exculpatory story, told for the first time at trial, by cross-examining the defendant about his failure to have told the story after receiving Miranda warnings at the time of his arrest. We conclude that use of the defendant’s post-arrest silence in this manner violates due process, and therefore reverse the convictions of both petitioners.
I
Petitioners Doyle and Wood were arrested together and charged with selling 10 pounds of marihuana to a local narcotics bureau informant. They were convicted in the Common Pleas Court of Tuscarawas County, Ohio, in separate trials held about one week apart. The evidence at their trials was identical in all material respects.
The State’s witnesses sketched a picture of a routine marihuana transaction. William Bonnell, a well-known “street person” with a long criminal record, offered to assist the local narcotics investigation unit in setting up drug “pushers” in return for support in his efforts to receive lenient treatment in his latest legal problems. The narcotics agents agreed. A short time later, Bonnell advised the unit that he had arranged a “buy” of 10 pounds of marihuana and needed $1,750 to pay for it. Since the banks were closed and time was short, the agents were able to collect only $1,320. Bonnell took this money and left for the rendezvous, under surveillance by four narcotics agents in two cars. As planned, he met petitioners in a bar in Dover, Ohio. From there, he and petitioner Wood drove in Bonnell’s pickup truck to the nearby town of New Philadelphia, Ohio, while petitioner Doyle drove off to obtain the marihuana and then meet them at a prearranged location in New Philadelphia. The narcotics agents followed the Bonnell truck. When Doyle arrived at Bonnell’s waiting truck in New Philadelphia, the two vehicles proceeded to a parking lot where the transaction took place. Bonnell left in his truck, and Doyle and Wood departed in Doyle’s car. They quickly discovered that they had been paid $430 less than the agreed-upon price, and began circling the neighborhood looking for Bonnell. They were stopped within minutes by New Philadelphia police acting on radioed instructions from the narcotics agents. One of those agents, Kenneth Beamer, arrived on the scene promptly, arrested petitioners, and gave them Miranda warnings. A search of the car, authorized by warrant, uncovered the $1,320.
At both trials, defense counsel’s cross-examination of the participating narcotics agents was aimed primarily at establishing that, due to a limited view of the parking lot, none of them had seen the actual transaction but had seen only Bonnell standing next to Doyle’s car with a package under his arm, presumably after the transaction. Each petitioner took the stand at his trial and admitted practically everything about the State’s case except the most crucial point: who was selling marihuana to whom. According to petitioners, Bonnell had framed them. The arrangement had been for Bonnell to sell Doyle 10 pounds of marihuana. Doyle had left the Dover bar for the purpose of borrowing the necessary money, but while driving by himself had decided that he only wanted one or two pounds instead of the agreed-upon 10 pounds. When Bonnell reached Doyle's car in the New Philadelphia parking lot, with the marihuana under his arm, Doyle tried to explain his change of mind. Bonnell grew angry, threw the $1,320 into Doyle’s car, and took all 10 pounds of the marihuana back to his truck. The ensuing chase was the effort of Wood and Doyle to catch Bonnell to find out what the $1,320 was all about.
Petitioners’ explanation of the events presented some difficulty for the prosecution, as it was not entirely implausible and there was little if any direct evidence to contradict it. As part of a wide-ranging cross-examination for impeachment purposes, and in an effort to undercut the explanation, the prosecutor asked each petitioner at his respective trial why he had not told the frameup story to Agent Beamer when he arrested petitioners. In the first trial, that of petitioner Wood, the following colloquy occurred:
“Q. [By the prosecutor.] Mr. Beamer did arrive on the scene?
“A. [By Wood.] Yes, he did.
“Q. And I assume you told him all about what happened to you?
“A. No.
“Q. You didn’t tell Mr. Beamer?
“A. No.
“Q. You didn’t tell Mr. Beamer this guy put $1,300 in your car?
“A. No, sir.
“Q. And we can’t understand any reason why anyone would put money in your car and you were chasing him around town and trying to give it back?
“A. I didn’t understand that.
“Q. You mean you didn’t tell him that?
“A. Tell him what?
“Q. Mr. Wood, if that is all you had to do with this and you are innocent, when Mr. Beamer arrived on the scene why didn’t you tell him?
“Q, But in any event you didn’t bother to tell Mr. Beamer anything about this?
“A. No, sir.”
Defense counsel’s timely objections to the above questions of the prosecutor were overruled. The cross-examination of petitioner Doyle at his trial contained a similar exchange, and again defense counsel’s timely objections were overruled.
Each petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, Fifth District, Tuscarawas County, alleging, inter alia, that the trial court erred in allowing the prosecutor to cross-examine the petitioner at his trial about his post-arrest silence. The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, stating as to the contentions about the post-arrest silence:
“This was not evidence offered by the state in its case in chief as confession by silence or as substantive evidence of guilt but rather cross examination of a witness as to why he had not told the same story earlier at his first opportunity.
“We find no error in this. It goes to credibility of the witness.”
The Supreme Court of Ohio denied further review. We granted certiorari to decide whether impeachment use of a defendant’s post-arrest silence violates any provision of the Constitution, a question left open last Term in United States v. Hale, 422 U. S. 171 (1975), and on which the Federal Courts of Appeals are in conflict. See id., at 173 n. 2.
II
The State pleads necessity as justification for the prosecutor’s action in these cases. It argues that the discrepancy between an exculpatory story at trial and silence at time of arrest gives rise to an inference that the story was fabricated somewhere along the way, perhaps to fit within the seams of the State’s case as it was developed at pretrial hearings. Noting that the prosecution usually has little else with which to counter such an exculpatory story, the State seeks only the right to cross-examine a defendant as to post-arrest silence for the limited purpose of impeachment. In support of its position the State emphasizes the importance of cross-examination in general, see Brown v. United States, 356 U. S. 148, 154-155 (1958), and relies upon those cases in which this Court has permitted use for impeachment purposes of post-arrest statements that were inadmissible as evidence of guilt because of an officer’s failure to follow Miranda’s dictates. Harris v. New York, 401 U. S. 222 (1971); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U. S. 714 (1975); see also Walder v. United States, 347 U. S. 62 (1954). Thus, although the State does not suggest petitioners’ silence could be used as evidence of guilt, it contends that the need to present to the jury all information relevant to the truth of petitioners’ exculpatory story fully justifies the cross-examination that is at issue.
Despite the importance of cross-examination, we have concluded that the Miranda decision compels rejection of the State’s position. The warnings mandated by that case, as a prophylactic means of safeguarding Fifth Amendment rights, see Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U. S. 433, 443-444 (1974), require that a person taken into custody be advised immediately that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says may be used against him, and that he has a right to retained or appointed counsel before submitting to interrogation. Silence in the wake of these warnings may be nothing more than the arrestee’s exercise of these Miranda rights. Thus, every post-arrest silence is insolubly ambiguous because of what the State is required to advise the person arrested. See United States v. Hale, supra, at 177. Moreover, while it is true that the Miranda warnings contain no express assurance that silence will carry no penalty, such assurance is implicit to any person who receives the warnings. In such circumstances, it would be fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of due process to allow the arrested person’s silence to be used to impeach an explanation subsequently offered at trial. Mr. Justice White, concurring in the judgment in United States v. Hale, supra, at 182-183, put it very well:
“[W]hen a person under arrest is informed, as Miranda requires, that he may remain silent, that anything he says may be used against him, and that he may have an attorney if he wishes, it seems to me that it does not comport with due process to permit the prosecution during the trial to call attention to his silence at the time of arrest and to insist that because he did not speak about the facts of the case at that time, as he was told he need not do, an unfavorable inference might be drawn as to the truth of his trial testimony. . . . Surely Hale was not informed here that his silence, as well as his words, could be used against him at trial. Indeed, anyone would reasonably conclude from Miranda warnings that this would not be the case.”
We hold that the use for impeachment purposes of petitioners’ silence, at the time of arrest and after receiving Miranda warnings, violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The State has not claimed that such use in the circumstances of this case might have been harmless error. Accordingly, petitioners’ convictions are reversed and their causes remanded to the state courts for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 467-473 (1966).
Defense counsel’s efforts were not totally successful. One of the four narcotics agents testified at both trials that he had seen the package passed through the window of Doyle’s car to Bonnell. In an effort to impeach that testimony, defense counsel played a tape of the preliminary hearing at which the same agent had testified only to seeing the package under Bonnell’s arm. The agent did not retract his trial testimony, and both he and the prosecutor explained the apparent inconsistency by noting that the examination at the preliminary hearing had not focused upon whether anyone had seen the package pass to Bonnell.
See n. 2, supra.
Trial transcript in Ohio v. Wood, No. 10657, Common Pleas Court, Tuscarawas County, Ohio (hereafter Wood Tr.), 465-470.
Trial transcript in Ohio v. Doyle, No. 10656, Common Pleas Court, Tuscarawas County, Ohio (hereafter Doyle Ti\), 504M507:
“Q. [By the prosecutor.] . . . You are innocent?
“A. [By Doyle.] I am innocent. Yes Sir.
“Q. That's why you told the police department and Kenneth Beamer when they arrived—
“A. ... I didn’t tell them about my innocence. No.
“Q. You said nothing at all about how you had been set up?
"Q. Did Mr. Wood?
“A. Not that I recall, Sir.
“Q. As a matter of fact, if I recall your testimony correctly, you said instead of protesting your innocence, as you do today, you said in response to a question of Mr. Beamer, — 'I don’t know what you are talking about.’
“A. I believe what I said, — ‘What’s this all about?’ If I remember, that’s the only thing I said.
“A. I was questioning, you know, what it was about. That’s what I didn’t know. I knew that I was trying to buy, which was wrong, but I didn’t know what was going on. I didn’t know that Bill Bonnell was trying to frame me, or what-have-you.
“Q. All right, — But you didn’t protest your innocence at that time?
“A. Not until I knew what was going on.”
In addition, the court in both trials permitted the prosecutor, over more objections, to argue petitioners’ post-arrest silence to the jury. Closing Argument of Prosecutor 13-14, supplementing Wood Tr.; Doyle Tr. 515, 526.
Petitioners also claim constitutional error because each of them was cross-examined by the prosecutor as to why he had not told the exculpatory story at the preliminary hearing or any other time prior to the trials. In addition, error of constitutional dimension is asserted because each petitioner was cross-examined as to post-arrest, preliminary hearing, and general pretrial silence when he testified as a defense witness at the other petitioner’s trial. These averments of error present different considerations from those implicated by cross-examining petitioners as defendants as to their silence after receiving Miranda warnings at the time of arrest. In view of our disposition of this case we find it unnecessary to reach these additional issues.
We recognize, of course, that unless prosecutors are allowed wide leeway in the scope of impeachment cross-examination some defendants would be able to frustrate the truth-seeking function of a trial by presenting tailored defenses insulated from effective challenge. See generally Fitzpatrick v. United States, 178 U. S. 304, 315 (1900).
The dissent by Mr. Justice Stevens expresses the view that the giving of Miranda warnings does not lessen the “probative value of [a defendant’s] silence . . . .” Post, at 621. But in United States v. Hale, 422 U. S. 171, 177 (1975), we noted that silence at the time of arrest may be inherently ambiguous even apart from the effect of Miranda warnings, for in a given case there may be several explanations for the silence that are consistent with the existence of an exculpatory explanation. In Hale we exercised our supervisory powers over federal courts. The instant cases, unlike Hale, come to us from a state court and thus provide no occasion for the exercise of our supervisory powers. Nor is it necessary, in view of our holding above, to express an opinion on the probative value for impeachment purposes of petitioners' silence. We note only that the Hale court considered silence at the time of arrest likely to be ambiguous and thus of dubious probative value.
A somewhat analogous situation was presented in Johnson v. United States, 318 U. S. 189 (1943). A defendant who testified at his trial was permitted by the trial judge to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in response to certain questions on cross-examination. This Court assumed that it would not have been error for the trial court to have denied the privilege in the circumstances, see id., at 196, in which case a failure to answer would have been a proper basis for adverse inferences and a proper subject for prosecutorial comment. But because the privilege had been granted, even if erroneously, “the requirements of fair trial” made it error for the trial court to permit comment upon the defendant’s silence. Ibid.
“An accused having the assurance of the court that his claim of privilege would be granted might well be entrapped if his assertion of the privilege could then be used against him. His real choice might then be quite different from his apparent one. . . . Elementary fairness requires that an accused should not be misled on that score,” Id., at 197.
Johnson was decided under this Court’s supervisory powers over the federal courts. But the necessity for elementary fairness is not unique to the federal criminal system. Cf. Raley v. Ohio, 360 U. S. 423, 437-440 (1959).
The dissenting opinion relies on the fact that petitioners in this ease, when cross-examined about their silence, did not offer reliance on Miranda warnings as a justification. But the error we perceive lies in the cross-examination on this question, thereby implying an inconsistency that the jury might construe as evidence of guilt. After an arrested person is formally advised by an officer of the law that he has a right to remain silent, the unfairness occurs when the prosecution, in the presence of the jury, is allowed to undertake impeachment on the basis of what may be the exercise of that right.
It goes almost without saying that the fact of post-arrest silence could be used by the prosecution to contradict a defendant who testifies to an exculpatory version of events and claims to have told the police the same version upon arrest. In that situation the fact of earlier silence would not be used to impeach the exculpatory story, but rather to ehafienge the defendant’s testimony as to his behavior following arrest. Cf. United States v. Fairchild, 505 F. 2d 1378, 1383 (CA5 1975).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | A | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice White
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this case, the Court of Appeals found that respondents’ promise of future “labor, experience, and expertise” permitted confirmation of their Chapter 11 reorganization plan over the objections of their creditors, even though the plan violated the “absolute priority rule” of the Bankruptcy Code. Because we find this conclusion at odds with the Code and our cases, we reverse.
I — I
Respondents operate a failing family farm in Nobles County, Minnesota. Between 1965 and 1984 they obtained loans from petitioners, securing the loans with their farmland, machinery, crops, livestock, and farm proceeds. In November 1984, respondents defaulted on their loan payments to petitioner Norwest Bank Worthington; at the time, the aggregate loan balance owed the petitioners exceeded $1 million.
Following the default, Norwest filed a replevin action in Minnesota state court seeking possession of the farm equipment respondents had pledged as security. However, two weeks later respondents obtained an automatic stay of the replevin proceedings, when they filed a petition for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U. S. C. § 362(a) (1982 ed. and Supp. IV).
Petitioners filed motions in the Bankruptcy Court for relief from the automatic stay. 11 U. S. C. § 362(d) (1982 ed., Supp. IV). After decisions by the Bankruptcy and the District Courts, these motions were ultimately considered by the Court of Appeals, which prohibited petitioners from repossessing any equipment, pending a determination by the District Court of the probability of success of a reorganization plan to be filed by respondents. App. to Pet. for Cert. A-76 — A-77. On remand, the District Court found respondents’ reorganization plan to be “utter[ly] unfeasibl[e].” Id., at A-86. It therefore affirmed the Bankruptcy Court’s initial decision to grant petitioners relief from the automatic stay.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed. It found that respondents could file a feasible reorganization plan. 794 F. 2d 388, 399 (CA8 1986). Consequently, the Court of Appeals remanded the case with instructions that the Bankruptcy Court entertain and confirm a reorganization plan which comported with an outline suggested in a lengthy appendix to the Eighth Circuit’s opinion. Id., at 408-414.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals rejected petitioners’ contention that, because of the “absolute priority rule” in the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U. S. C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) (1982 ed. and Supp. IV), their legitimate objections to any reorganization plan which allowed respondents to retain an interest in the farm property was sufficient to bar confirmation of such a plan. Petitioners contended that the absolute priority rule prohibited respondents from retaining their equity interest in the farm, which is junior to the creditors’ unsecured claims. But the Court of Appeals, relying on this Court’s decision in Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 308 U. S. 106 (1939), held that the absolute priority rule did not bar respondents from retaining their equity interest in the farm if they contributed “money or money’s worth” to the reorganized enterprise. It further concluded that respondents’ “yearly contributions of labor, experience, and expertise” would constitute a contribution of “money or money’s worth,” and therefore would permit confirmation of a reorganization plan over petitioners’ objections. 794 F. 2d, at 402-403. Judge John Gibson, in dissent, criticized the majority’s application of the absolute priority rule and its reading of Los Angeles Lumber as “unprecedented, illogical, and unfair.” 794 F. 2d, at 406. He concluded that the absolute priority rule barred respondents’ retention of an equity interest in the farm over petitioners’ legitimate objections.
After the Eighth Circuit — sharply divided — denied rehearing en banc, id., at 414-415, petitioners sought review by this Court. We granted certiorari to consider the Court of Appeals’ application of the absolute priority rule, 483 U. S. 1004 (1987), and now reverse.
II
As the Court of Appeals stated, the absolute priority rule “provides that a dissenting class of unsecured creditors must be provided for in full before any junior class can receive or retain any property [under a reorganization] plan.” 794 F. 2d, at 401. The rule had its genesis in judicial construction of the undefined requirement of the early bankruptcy statute that reorganization plans be “fair and equitable.” See Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U. S. 482, 504-505 (1913); Louisville Trust Co. v. Louisville, N. A. & C. R. Co., 174 U. S. 674, 684 (1899). The rule has since gained express statutory force, and was incorporated into Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code adopted in 1978. See 11 U. S. C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) (1982 ed., Supp. IV). Under current law, no Chapter 11 reorganization plan can be confirmed over the creditors’ legitimate objections (absent certain conditions not relevant here) if it fails to comply with the absolute priority rule.
There is little doubt that a reorganization plan in which respondents retain an equity interest in the farm is contrary to the absolute priority rule. The Court of Appeals did not suggest otherwise in ruling for respondents, but found that such a plan could be confirmed over petitioners’ objections because of an “exception” or “modification” to -the absolute priority rule recognized in this Court’s cases.
The Court of Appeals relied on the following dicta in Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., supra, at 121-122:
“It is, of course, clear that there are circumstances under which stockholders may participate in a plan of reorganization of an insolvent debtor. . . .
“[W]e believe that to accord ‘the creditor of his full right of priority against the corporate assets’ where the debtor is insolvent, the stockholder’s participation must be based on a contribution in money or money’s worth, reasonably equivalent in view of all the circumstances to the participation of the stockholder.”
The Court of Appeals found this language applicable to this case, concluding that respondents’ future contributions of “labor, experience, and expertise” in running the farm — because they have “value” and are “measurable” — are “money or money’s worth” within the meaning of Los Angeles Lumber. 794 F. 2d, at 402. We disagree.
Los Angeles Lumber itself rejected an analogous proposition, finding that the promise of the existing shareholders to pledge their “financial standing and influence in the community” and their “continuity of management” to the reorganized enterprise was “[in]adequate consideration” that could not possibly be deemed “money’s worth.” 308 U. S., at 122. No doubt, the efforts promised by the Los Angeles Lumber equity holders — like those of respondents — had “value” and would have been of some benefit to any reorganized enterprise. But ultimately, as the Court said in Los Angeles Lumber, “[t]hey reflect merely vague hopes or possibilities.” Id., at 122-123. The same is true of respondents’ pledge of future labor and management skills.
Viewed from the time of approval of the plan, respondents’ promise of future services is intangible, inalienable, and, in all likelihood, unenforceable. It “has no place in the asset column of the balance sheet of the new [entity].” Los Angeles Lumber, 308 U. S., at 122-123. Unlike “money or money’s worth,” a promise of future services cannot be exchanged in any market for something of value to the creditors today. In fact, no decision of this Court or any Court of Appeals, other than the decision below, has ever found a promise to contribute future labor, management, or expertise sufficient to qualify for the Los Angeles Lumber exception to the absolute priority rule. In short, there is no way to distinguish between the promises respondents proffer here and those of the shareholders in Los Angeles Lumber; neither is an adequate contribution to escape the absolute priority rule.
Respondents suggest that, even if their proposed contributions to the reorganized farm do not fit within the Los Angeles Lumber dicta, they do satisfy some broader exception to the absolute priority rule. Brief for Respondents 23-24. But no such broader exception exists. Even if Congress meant to retain the Los Angeles Lumber exception to the absolute priority rule when it codified the rule in Chapter 11 — a proposition that can be debated, see n. 3, supra — it is clear that Congress had no intention to expand that exception any further. When considering adoption of the current Code, Congress received a proposal by the Bankruptcy Commission to modify the absolute priority rule to permit equity holders to participate in a reorganized enterprise based on their contribution of “continued management. . . essential to the business” or other participation beyond “money or money’s worth.” See H. R. Doc. No. 93-137, pt. 1, pp. 258-259 (1973). This proposal — quite similar to the Court of Appeals’ holding in this case — prompted adverse reactions from numerous sources. Congress ultimately rejected the proposed liberalization of the absolute priority rule and adopted the codification of the rule now found in 11 U. S. C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) (1982. ed. and Supp. IV). “This [section] codifies the absolute priority rule from the dissenting class on down.” See H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, p. 413 (1977). We think the statutory language and the legislative history of § 1129(b) clearly bar any expansion of any exception to the absolute priority rule beyond that recognized in our cases at the time Congress enacted the 1978 Bankruptcy Code.
In sum, we find no support in the Code or our previous decisions for the Court of Appeals’ application of the absolute priority rule in this case. We conclude that the rule applies here, and respondents’ promise of future labor warrants no exception to its operation.
i — I I — I I — I
Respondents advance two additional arguments seeking to obviate the conclusion mandated by the absolute priority rule.
A
Respondents first advance a variety of “equitable arguments” which, they say, prevent the result we reach today. Respondents contend that the nature of bankruptcy proceedings — namely, their status as proceedings in “equity” — prevents petitioners from inequitably voting in the class of unsecured creditors, and requires that a “fair and equitable” reorganization plan in the best interests of all creditors and debtors be confirmed. See Brief for Respondents 14-16, 23-24. Similarly, the Court of Appeals found it significant that — in its view — respondents’ wholly unsecured creditors (as opposed to petitioners, who have partially secured claims) would fare better under the proposed reorganization plan than if the farm was liquidated. 794 F. 2d, at 402.
The short answer to these arguments is that whatever equitable powers remain in the bankruptcy courts must and can only be exercised within the confines of the Bankruptcy Code. The Code provides that undersecured creditors can vote in the class of unsecured creditors, 11 U. S. C. § 506(a), the Code provides that a “fair and equitable” reorganization plan is one which complies with the absolute priority rule, 11 U. S. C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) (1982 ed. and Supp. IV), and the Code provides that it is up to the creditors — and not the courts — to accept or reject a reorganization plan which fails to provide them adequate protection or fails to honor the absolute priority rule, 11 U. S. C. § 1126 (1982 ed. and Supp. IV).
The Court of Appeals may well have believed that petitioners or other unsecured creditors would be better off if respondents’ reorganization plan was confirmed. But that determination is for the creditors to make in the manner specified by the Code. 11 U. S. C. § 1126(c). Here, the principal creditors entitled to vote in the class of unsecured creditors (i. e., petitioners) objected to the proposed reorganization. This was their prerogative under the Code, and courts applying the Code must effectuate their decision.
B
Respondents further argue that the absolute priority rule has no application in this case, where the property which the junior interest holders wish to retain has no value'to the senior unsecured creditors. In such a case, respondents argue, “the creditors are deprived of nothing if such a so-called ‘interest’ continues in the possession of the reorganized debtor.” Brief for Respondents 19. Here, respondents contend, because the farm has no “going concern” value (apart from their own labor on it), any equity interest they retain in a reorganization of the farm is worthless, and therefore is not “property” under 11 U. S. C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) (1982 ed. and Supp. IV).
We join with the consensus of authority which has rejected this “no value” theory. Even where debts far exceed the current value of assets, a debtor who retains his equity interest in the enterprise retains “property.” Whether the value is “present or prospective, for dividends or only for purposes of control” a retained equity interest is a property interest to “which the creditors [are] entitled . . . before the stockholders [can] retain it for any purpose whatever.” Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U. S., at 508. Indeed, even in a sole proprietorship, where “going concern” value may be minimal, there may still be some value in the control of the enterprise; obviously, also at issue is the interest in potential future profits of a now-insolvent business. See SEC v. Canandaigua Enterprises Corp., 339 F. 2d 14, 21 (CA2 1964) (Friendly, J.). And while the Code itself does not define what “property” means as the term is used in § 1129(b), the relevant legislative history suggests that Congress’ meaning was quite broad. “ ‘[P]roperty’ includes both tangible and intangible property.” See H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 413.
Moreover, respondents’ “no value” theory is particularly inapposite in this case. This argument appears not to have been presented to the Eighth Circuit, which implicitly concluded — to the contrary of respondents’ position here — that the equity interest respondents desire to retain has some value. See 794 F. 2d, at 402-403. Even cursory consideration reveals that the respondents’ retained interest under the plan might be “valuable” for one of several reasons. For example, the Court of Appeals provided that respondents would be entitled to a share of any profits earned by the sale of secured property during the reorganization period, id., at
403, and n. 18 —an interest which can hardly be considered “worthless.” And there is great common sense in petitioners’ contention that “obviously, there is some going concern value here, or the parties would not have been litigating over it for the last three years.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 15-16.
Consequently, we think that the interest respondents would retain under any reorganization must be considered “property” under § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii), and therefore can only be retained pursuant to a plan accepted by their creditors or formulated in compliance with the absolute priority rule. Since neither is true in this case, the Court of Appeals’ judgment for respondents cannot stand.
> I — I
In rejecting respondents’ position, we do not take lightly the concerns which militated the Eighth Circuit towards its result. As a Bankruptcy Judge commented on the Court of Appeals’ decision in this case:
“We understand the motivation behind the majority opinion in Ahlers. Farm bankruptcies are in a state of crisis and we, too, sympathize with the plight of the American farmer. Nevertheless, the solution proposed by the Ahlers majority is contrary to the Bankruptcy Code and a long line of case law.” In re Stegall, 64 B. R. 296, 300 (Bkrtcy. Ct. CD Ill. 1986).
Family farms hold a special place in our Nation’s history and folklore. Respondents and amici paint a grim picture of the problems facing farm families today, and present an eloquent appeal for action on their behalf. Yet relief from current farm woes cannot come from a misconstruction of the applicable bankruptcy laws, but rather, only from action by Congress.
The error of the Court of Appeals’ approach is further revealed by an examination of a measure Congress has recently enacted to cope with these very same concerns, the Family Farmers Bankruptcy Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-554, §255, 100 Stat. 3105-3114. The Act creates a new Chapter 12 bankruptcy proceeding, under which family farmers can retain an equity interest in their farms while making loan repayments under a reorganization plan. See 11 U. S. C. § 1201 et seq. (1982 ed., Supp. IV).
The legislative history of the Act makes it clear that one of Congress’ principal concerns in adopting Chapter 12 was the difficulties farmers encountered in seeking to reorganize under Chapter 11. And yet, as respondents concede,- the Court of Appeals’ decision here creates a method of proceeding under Chapter 11 which is far more advantageous to farmers than is Chapter 12. See Brief for Respondents 6-9; Tr. of Oral Arg. 23-25. Thus, given respondents’ reading of Chapter 11, Congress enacted a relief provision in Chapter 12 which is less favorable to its intended beneficiaries than is current law. But in-adopting Chapter 12, Congress thought it was doing just the opposite. “[W]here, as here, Congress adopts a new law . . . [it] normally can be presumed to have had knowledge of the interpretation given to the [old] law.” Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U. S. 575, 581 (1978). We think Congress’ understanding of Chapter 11 and its absolute priority rule — and not respondents’ — is the correct one. We do not believe that Congress created, in Chapter 12, an option for farm reorganizations less accessible to most farmers than current Chapter 11 proceedings.
V
In sum, because we find the decision below to be contrary to the Bankruptcy Code and this Court’s previous cases, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Kennedy took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
In relevant part, 11 U. S. C. § 1129(b) (1982 ed. and Supp. IV) provides:
“(1) . . . [T]he court. . . shall confirm the plan ... if the plan ... is fair and equitable ....
“(2) . .. [T]he condition that a plan be fair and equitable . . . includes the following requirements:
“(B) With respect to a class of unsecured claims —
“(i) the plan provides that each holder of a claim of such class receive or retain on account of such claim property of a value, as of the effective date of the plan, equal to the allowed amount of such claim; or
“(ii) the holder of any claim or interest that is junior to the claims of such class will not receive or retain under the plan on account of such junior claim or interest any property.”
Petitioners contended, and the Court of Appeals agreed, that they must be treated as unsecured creditors for purpose of any reorganization plan because their claims were substantially undersecured. See 794 F. 2d 388, 399 (CA8 1986); 11 U. S. C. § 506(a). Petitioners further argued, and the Court of Appeals also agreed, that any reorganization plan for respondents could not comply with § 1129(b)(2)(B)(i), because respondents could not possibly provide petitioners with property equal to the allowed amount of their claims. See 794 F. 2d, at 401.
Thus, the Court of Appeals concluded that respondents’ reorganization plan would have to comply with § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) — the codification of the absolute priority rule — in order to be confirmed. Ibid.
Respondents do not contest this conclusion, but rather, argue (1) that their proposal to retain an equity interest in the farm and equipment is confirmable under an exception to the absolute priority rule, Brief for Respondents 21-25, and (2) that the rule does not (or should not) apply to their reorganization plan for various reasons, id., at 14-21. For reasons we discuss infra, at 204-206, and in Part III, we find these arguments unpersuasive.
The United States, as amicus curiae, urges us to reverse the Court of Appeals’ ruling and hold that codification of the absolute priority rule has eliminated any “exception” to that rule suggested by Los Angeles Lumber. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 17-23. Relying on the statutory language and the legislative history, the United States argues that the 1978 Bankruptcy Code “dropped the infusion-of-new-capital exception to the absolute priority rule.” Id., at 22.
We need not reach this question to resolve the instant dispute. As we discuss infra, at 204-206, we think it clear that even if the Los Angeles Lumber exception to the absolute priority rule has survived enactment of the Bankruptcy Code, this exception does not encompass respondents’ promise to contribute their “labor, experience, and expertise” to the reorganized enterprise.
Thus, our decision today should not be taken as any comment on the continuing vitality of the Los Angeles Lumber exception — a question which has divided the lower courts since passage of the Code in 1978. Compare, e. g., In re Sawmill Hydraulics, Inc., 72 B. R. 454, 456, and n. 1 (Bkrtcy. Ct. CD Ill. 1987), with, e. g., In re Pine Lake Village Apartment Co., 19 B. R. 819, 833 (Bkrtcy. Ct. SDNY 1982). Rather, we simply conclude that even if an “infusion-of~‘money-or-money’s-worth”’ exception to the absolute priority rule has survived the enactment of § 1129(b), respondents’ proposed contribution to the reorganization plan is inadequate to gain the benefit of this exception.
“[Pjrevious attempts to qualify non-capital equity in the absolute priority context have been unanimously rejected.” Koger & Acconcia, In re Ahlers: Capitalizing on Sweat, 42 J. Mo. Bar 455, 458 (1986). See also 794 F. 2d, at 407 (Gibson, J., dissenting); In re Baugh, 73 B. R. 414, 418 (Bkrtcy. Ct. ED Ark. 1987); In re Pecht, 57 B. R. 137, 139-141 (Bkrtcy. Ct. ED Va. 1986).
In support of their position, respondents rely extensively on SEC v. United States Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U. S. 434 (1940). See Tr. of Oral Arg. 31-33, 35-37. However, the relevant portion of that case concerned a chapter of the old bankruptcy statutes under which the absolute priority rule did not apply. See SEC v. United States Realty & Improvement Co., supra, at 453-454. Thus, that case is wholly inapposite here.
See, e. g., Hearings on S. 235 and S. 236 before the Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, p. 1044 (1975) (statement of Prof. Vernon Countryman); id., at 710 (statement of Phillip A. Loomis, Jr., Comm’r of the Securities and Exchange Comm’n); Brudney, The Bankruptcy Commission’s Proposed “Modifications” of the Absolute Priority Rule, 48 Am. Bankr. L. J. 305, 336-339 (1974).
Respondents note that one Bankruptcy Court has accepted the “no value” theory in a case similar to this one. See In re Star City Rebuilders, Inc., 62 B. R. 983, 988-989 (WD Va. 1986). But even in so doing, the Bankruptcy Court acknowledged that the bulk of authority was to the contrary. See id., at 989; see also In re Modern Glass Specialists, Inc., 42 B. R. 139, 140-141 (Bkrtcy. Ct. ED Wisc. 1984); In re Huckabee Auto Co., 33 B. R. 132, 141 (Bkrtcy. Ct. MD Ga. 1981); In re Landau Boat Co., 8 B. R. 436, 438-439 (Bkrtcy. Ct. WD Mo. 1981).
Petitioners contend that the Star City decision is the only one to accept the “no value” theory. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 16. Respondents did not contest this assertion or provide authority to the contrary.
See Brief for Respondents 8-11; Brief for State of Arkansas et al. as Amici Curiae 1-2.
Even if current farm problems “justified” a judicial modification of the absolute priority rule along the line of the Court of Appeals’ opinion, not the least of the problems with the decision below is that there is no way to limit it to family farms, or even to small businesses generally. The shareholders of any corporate debtor might be able to evade the absolute priority rule under the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning; such a result surely cannot be squared with the case law or the Code as they are discussed supra.
Respondents apparently cannot qualify for relief under Chapter 12 because they do not meet the requirements that Congress has adopted in defining what is an eligible “family farm” for purposes of Chapter 12. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 23; 11 U. S. C. § 101(17) (1982 ed., Supp. IV).
In addition, respondents may be disqualified from filing under Chapter 12 because they had previously filed under Chapter 11. The Bankruptcy Courts are divided on the issue. Compare, e. g., In re Big Dry Angus Ranch, Inc., 69 B. R. 695, 699-701 (Mont. 1987), with, e. g., In re B. A. V., Inc., 68 B. R. 411, 412-413 (Colo. 1986).
See 132 Cong. Rec. 28592 (1986) (statement of Sen. Thurmond); id., at 28593 (statement of Sen. Grassley). Congress seemed particularly aware of the specific obstacle that the absolute priority rule posed to farm reorganizations. See Anderson, An Analysis of Pending Bills to Provide Family Farm Debtor Relief Under the Bankruptcy Code, reprinted in 132 Cong. Rec. 28593, 28599 (1986).
“Under this new chapter, it will be easier for a family farmer to confirm a plan of reorganization.” Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference, reprinted in 132 Cong. Rec. 28143, 28144 (1986).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | H | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice O’Connor
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Today we construe three provisions of the federal firearms statutes:
“It shall be unlawful for any person who has been convicted . . . [of] a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year ... [to possess] any firearm ....” 18 U. S. C. § 922(g).
“What constitutes a conviction... shall be determined in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction in which the proceedings were held.” § 921(a)(20) (the choice-of-law clause).
“Any conviction which has been expunged, or set aside or for which a person has been pardoned or has had civil rights restored shall not be considered a conviction----” Ibid, (the exemption clause).
The question before us is which jurisdiction’s law is to be considered in determining whether a felon “has had civil rights restored” for a prior federal conviction.
I
Each of the petitioners was convicted of violating § 922(g). Beecham was convicted in Federal District Court in North Carolina, Jones in Federal District Court in West Virginia. Beecham’s relevant prior conviction was a 1979 federal conviction in Tennessee, for violating 18 U. S. C. § 922(h). App. 11. Jones’ prior convictions were two West Virginia state convictions, for breaking and entering and for forgery, and one 1971 federal conviction in Ohio for interstate transportation of a stolen automobile. Id., at 19-20.
Jones had gotten his civil rights restored by West Virginia, so his two West Virginia state convictions were not considered. Beecham claimed his civil rights had been restored by Tennessee, the State in which he had been convicted of his federal offense. The question presented to the District Courts was whether these restorations of civil rights by States could remove the disabilities imposed as a result of Beecham’s and Jones’ federal convictions.
In both cases, the District Courts concluded the answer was “yes,” though for different reasons: In Beecham’s case the court looked to the law of the State in which the earlier federal crime was committed (Tennessee); in Jones’ case the court looked to the law of the State in which Jones lived when he committed the § 922(g) offense (West Virginia). The Fourth Circuit reversed both rulings, reasoning that state restoration of civil rights could not undo the federal disability flowing from a federal conviction. See 993 F. 2d 1131 (1993) (Jones’ case) and 993 F. 2d 1539 (1993) (judgt. order in Beecham’s case). We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict this decision created with United States v. Edwards, 946 F. 2d 1347 (CA8 1991), and United States v. Geyler, 932 F. 2d 1330 (CA9 1991). 510 U. S. 975 (1993).
II
The question in these cases is how the choice-of-law clause and the exemption clause of §921(a)(20) are related. If, as the Fourth Circuit held, the choice-of-law clause applies to the exemption clause, then we must look to whether Beech-am’s and Jones’ civil rights were restored under federal law (the law of the jurisdiction in which the earlier proceedings were held). On the other hand, if, as the Eighth and Ninth Circuits concluded, the two clauses ought to be read separately, see Geyler, supra, at 1334-1335; Edwards, supra, at 1349-1350, then we would have to come up with a special choice-of-law principle for the exemption clause.
We think the Fourth Circuit’s reading is the better one. Throughout the statutory scheme, the inquiry is: Does the person have a qualifying conviction on his record? Section 922(g) imposes a disability on people who “ha[ve] been convicted.” The choice-of-law clause defines the rule for determining “[w]hat constitutes a conviction.” The exemption clause says that a conviction for which a person has had civil rights restored “shall not be considered a conviction.” Asking whether a person has had civil rights restored is thus just one step in determining whether something should “be considered a conviction.” By the terms of the choice-of-law clause, this determination is governed by the law of the convicting jurisdiction.
This interpretation is supported by the fact that the other three procedures listed in the exemption clause — pardons, expungements, and set-asides — are either always or almost always (depending on whether one considers a federal grant of habeas corpus to be a “set-aside,” a question we do not now decide) done by the jurisdiction of conviction. That several items in a list share an attribute counsels in favor of interpreting the other items as possessing that attribute as well. Dole v. Steelworkers, 494 U. S. 26, 36 (1990); Third Nat. Bank in Nashville v. Irnpac Limited, Inc., 432 U. S. 312, 322 (1977); Jarecki v. G. D. Searle & Co., 367 U. S. 303, 307 (1961). Though this canon of construction is by no means a hard and fast rule, it is a factor pointing toward the Fourth Circuit’s construction of the statute.
In light of the statutory structure, the fact that both clauses speak of “conviction[s]” rebuts the Eighth and Ninth Circuits’ argument that the two clauses “pertain to two entirely different sets of circumstances” — “the question of what constitutes a conviction” and “the effect of post-conviction events.” Geyler, supra, at 1334-1335; see also Edwards, supra, at 1349. The exemption clause does not simply say that a person whose civil rights have been restored is exempted from §922(g)’s firearms disqualification. It says that the person’s conviction “shall not be considered a conviction.” The effect of postconviction events is therefore, under the statutory scheme, just one element of the question of what constitutes a conviction.
Likewise, the presence of the choice-of-law clause rebuts the Eighth and Ninth Circuits’ argument that the “plain, unlimited language,” Edwards, supra, at 1349; see also Geyler, supra, at 1334, of the exemption clause — with its reference to “[a]ny conviction ... for which a person has ... had civil rights restored” (emphasis added) — refers to all civil rights restorations, even those by a jurisdiction other than the one in which the conviction was entered. Regardless of what the quoted phrase might mean standing alone, in conjunction with the choice-of-law clause it must refer only to restorations of civil rights by the convicting jurisdiction. The plain meaning that we seek to discern is the plain meaning of the whole statute, not of isolated sentences. See King v. St. Vincent’s Hospital, 502 U. S. 215, 221 (1991); Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U. S. 107, 115 (1989); Shell Oil Co. v. Iowa Dept, of Revenue, 488 U. S. 19, 26 (1988).
We are also unpersuaded by the Ninth Circuit’s argument that “[b]ecause there is no federal procedure for restoring civil rights to a federal felon, Congress could not have expected that the federal government would perform this function,” and that therefore “[t]he reference in § 921(a)(20) to the restoration of civil rights must be to the state procedure.” Geyler, 932 F. 2d, at 1333. This reasoning assumes that Congress intended felons convicted by all jurisdictions to have access to all the procedures (pardon, expungement, set-aside, and civil rights restoration) specified in the exemption clause; but nothing in § 921(a)(20) supports the assumption on which this reasoning is based. Many jurisdictions have no procedure for restoring civil rights. See Apps. A and B to Brief for Petitioners (indicating that at least 11 States — Arkansas, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Texas, Vermont, and Virginia suspend felons’ civil rights but provide no procedure for restoring them); see, e. g., Mo. Rev. Stat. § 561.026 (1979 and Supp. 1994); United States v. Thomas, 991 F. 2d 206, 213-214 (CA5) (Texas law), cert, denied, 510 U. S. 1014 (1993). However one reads the statutory scheme — as looking to the law of the convicting jurisdiction, or to the law of the State in which the prior conduct took place, or to the law of the State in which the felon now lives or has at one time lived — people in some jurisdictions would have options open to them that people in other jurisdictions may lack. Under our reading of the statute, a person convicted in federal court is no worse off than a person convicted in a court of a State that does not restore civil rights.
Because the statutory language is unambiguous, the rule of lenity, which petitioners urge us to employ here, is inapplicable. See Chapman v. United States, 500 U. S. 453, 463-464 (1991). Of course, by denying the existence of an ambiguity, we do not claim to be perfectly certain that we have divined Congress’ intentions as to this particular situation. It is possible that the phrases on which our reading of the statute turns — “[w]hat constitutes a conviction” and “shall not be considered a conviction” — were accidents of statutory drafting; it is possible that some legislators thought the two sentences of § 921(a)(20) should be read separately, or, more likely, that they never considered the matter at all. And we recognize that in enacting the choice-of-law clause, legislators may have been simply responding to our decision in Dickerson v. New Banner Institute, Inc., 460 U. S. 103 (1983), which held that federal law rather than state law controls the definition of what constitutes a conviction, not setting forth a choice-of-law principle for the restoration of civil rights following a conviction.
But our task is not the hopeless one of ascertaining what the legislators who passed the law would have decided had they reconvened to consider petitioners’ particular cases. Rather, it is to determine whether the language the legislators actually enacted has a plain, unambiguous meaning. In this instance, we believe it does.
Ill
We therefore conclude that petitioners can take advantage of § 921(a)(20) only if they have had their civil rights restored under federal law, and accordingly affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
So ordered.
We express no opinion on whether a federal felon cannot have his civil rights restored under federal law. This is a complicated question, one which involves the interpretation of the federal law relating to federal civil rights, see U. S. Const., Art. I, §2, cl. 1 (right to vote for Representatives); U. S. Const., Amdt. XVII (right to vote for Senators); 28 U. S. C. § 1865 (right to serve on a jury); consideration of the possible relevance of 18 U. S. C. § 925(c) (1988 ed., Supp. IV), which allows the Secretary of the Treasury to grant relief from the disability imposed by § 922(g); and the determination whether civil rights must be restored by an affirmative act of a Government official, see United States v. Ramos, 961 F. 2d 1003,1008 (CA1), cert, denied, 506 U. S. 934 (1992), or whether they may be restored automatically by operation of law, see United States v. Hall, 20 F. 3d 1066 (CA10 1994). We do not address these matters today.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | A | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Sotomayor
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Section 1291 of the Judicial Code confers on federal courts of appeals jurisdiction to review “final decisions of the district courts.” 28 U. S. C. § 1291. Although “final decisions” typically are ones that trigger the entry of judgment, they also include a small set of prejudgment orders that are “collateral to” the merits of an action and “too important” to be denied immediate review. Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541, 546 (1949). In this case, petitioner Mohawk Industries, Inc., attempted to bring a collateral order appeal after the District Court ordered it to disclose certain confidential materials on the ground that Mohawk had waived the attorney-client privilege. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
The question before us is whether disclosure orders adverse to the attorney-client privilege qualify for immediate appeal under the collateral order doctrine. Agreeing with the Court of Appeals, we hold that they do not. Postjudgment appeals, together with other review mechanisms, suffice to protect the rights of litigants and preserve the vitality of the attorney-client privilege.
I
In 2007, respondent Norman Carpenter, a former shift supervisor at a Mohawk manufacturing facility, filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, alleging that Mohawk had terminated him in violation of 42 U. S. C. § 1985(2) and various Georgia laws. According to Carpenter’s complaint, his termination came after he informed a member of Mohawk’s human resources department in an e-mail that the company was employing undocumented immigrants. At the time, unbeknownst to Carpenter, Mohawk stood accused in a pending class-action lawsuit of conspiring to drive down the wages of its legal employees by knowingly hiring undocumented workers in violation of federal and state racketeering laws. See Wil liams v. Mohawk Indus., Inc., No. 4:04-cv-00003-HLM (ND Ga., Jan. 6, 2004). Company officials directed Carpenter to meet with the company’s retained counsel in the Williams case, and counsel allegedly pressured Carpenter to recant his statements. When he refused, Carpenter alleges, Mohawk fired him under false pretenses. App. 57a-64a.
After learning of Carpenter’s complaint, the plaintiffs in the Williams case sought an evidentiary hearing to explore Carpenter’s allegations. In its response to their motion, Mohawk described Carpenter’s accusations as “pure fantasy” and recounted the “true facts” of Carpenter’s dismissal. App. 208a. According to Mohawk, Carpenter himself had “engaged in blatant and illegal misconduct” by attempting to have Mohawk hire an undocumented worker. Id., at 209a. The company “commenced an immediate investigation,” during which retained counsel interviewed Carpenter. Id., at 210a. Because Carpenter’s “efforts to cause Mohawk to circumvent federal immigration law” “blatantly violated Mohawk policy,” the company terminated him. Ibid.
As these events were unfolding in the Williams case, discovery was underway in Carpenter’s case. Carpenter filed a motion to compel Mohawk to produce information concerning his meeting with retained counsel and the company’s termination decision. Mohawk maintained that the requested information was protected by the attorney-client privilege.
The District Court agreed that the privilege applied to the requested information, but it granted Carpenter’s motion to compel disclosure after concluding that Mohawk had implicitly waived the privilege through its representations in the Williams case. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 51a. The court declined to certify its order for interlocutory appeal under 28 U. S. C. § 1292(b). But, recognizing “the seriousness of its [waiver] finding,” it stayed its ruling to allow Mohawk to explore other potential “avenues to appeal . . . , such as a petition for mandamus or appealing this Order under the collateral order doctrine.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 52a.
Mohawk filed a notice of appeal and a petition for a writ of mandamus to the Eleventh Circuit. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1291, holding that the District Court’s ruling did not qualify as an immediately appealable collateral order within the meaning of Cohen, 337 U. S. 541. “Under Cohen,” the Court of Appeals explained, “an order is appealable if it (1) conclusively determines the disputed question; (2) resolves an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action; and (3) is effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” 541 F. 3d 1048, 1052 (2008) (per curiam). According to the court, the District Court’s waiver ruling satisfied the first two of these requirements but not the third, because “a discovery order that implicates the attorney-client privilege” can be adequately reviewed “on appeal from a final judgment.” Ibid. The Court of Appeals also rejected Mohawk’s mandamus petition, finding no “clear usurpation of power or abuse of discretion” by the District Court. Id., at 1055. We granted certiorari, 555 U. S. 1152 (2009), to resolve a conflict among the Circuits concerning the availability of collateral appeals in the attorney-client privilege context.
II
A
By statute, courts of appeals “have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States, . . . except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court.” 28 U. S. C. § 1291. A “final decisio[n]” is typically one “by which a district court disassociates itself from a case.” Swint v. Chambers County Comm’n, 514 U. S. 35, 42 (1995). This Court, however, “has long given” § 1291 a “practical rather than a technical construction.” Cohen, 337 U. S., at 546. As we held in Cohen, the statute encompasses not only judgments that “terminate an action,” but also a “small class” of collateral rulings that, although they do not end the litigation, are appropriately deemed “final.” Id., at 545-546. “That small category includes only decisions that are conclusive, that resolve important questions separate from the merits, and that are effectively unreviewable on appeal from the final judgment in the underlying action.” Swint, 514 U. S., at 42.
In applying Cohen’s collateral order doctrine, we have stressed that it must “never be allowed to swallow the general rule that a party is entitled to a single appeal, to be deferred until final judgment has been entered.” Digital Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U. S. 863, 868 (1994) (citation omitted); see also Will v. Hallock, 546 U. S. 345, 350 (2006) (“emphasizing [the doctrine’s] modest scope”). Our admonition reflects a healthy respect for the virtues of the final-judgment rule. Permitting piecemeal, prejudgment appeals, we have recognized, undermines “efficient judicial administration” and encroaches upon the prerogatives of district court judges, who play a “special role” in managing ongoing litigation. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U. S. 368, 374 (1981); see also Richardson-Merrell Inc. v. Koller, 472 U. S. 424, 436 (1985) (“[T]he district judge can better exercise [his or her] responsibility [to police the prejudgment tactics of litigants] if the appellate courts do not repeatedly intervene to second-guess prejudgment rulings”).
The justification for immediate appeal must therefore be sufficiently strong to overcome the usual benefits of deferring appeal until litigation concludes. This requirement finds expression in two of the three traditional Cohen conditions. The second condition insists upon “important questions separate from the merits.” Swint, 514 U. S., at 42 (emphasis added). More significantly, “the third Cohen question, whether a right is ‘adequately vindicable’ or ‘effectively reviewable,’ simply cannot be answered without a judgment about the value of the interests that would be lost through rigorous application of a final judgment requirement.” Digital Equipment, 511 U. S., at 878-879. That a ruling “may burden litigants in ways that are only imperfectly reparable by appellate reversal of a final district court judgment... has never sufficed.” Id., at 872. Instead, the decisive consideration is whether delaying review until the entry of final judgment “would imperil a substantial public interest” or “some particular value of a high order.” Will, 546 U. S., at 352-353.
In making this determination, we do not engage in an “individualized jurisdictional inquiry.” Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U. S. 463, 473 (1978). Rather, our focus is on “the entire category to which a claim belongs.” Digital Equipment, 511 U. S., at 868. As long as the class of claims, taken as a whole, can be adequately vindicated by other means, “the chance that the litigation at hand might be speeded, or a ‘particular injustic[e]’ averted,” does not provide a basis for jurisdiction under § 1291. Ibid, (quoting Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U. S. 517, 529 (1988); alteration in original).
B
In the present case, the Court of Appeals concluded that the District Court’s privilege-waiver order satisfied the first two conditions of the collateral order doctrine — conclusiveness and separateness — but not the third — effective unreviewability. Because we agree with the Court of Appeals that collateral order appeals are not necessary to ensure effective review of orders adverse to the attorney-client privilege, we do not decide whether the other Cohen requirements are met.
Mohawk does not dispute that “we have generally denied review of pretrial discovery orders.” Firestone, 449 U. S., at 377; see also 15B C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure §3914.23, p. 123 (2d ed. 1992) (hereinafter Wright & Miller) (“[T]he rule remains settled that most discovery rulings are not final”). Mohawk contends, however, that rulings implicating the attorney-client privilege differ in kind from run-of-the-mill discovery orders because of the important institutional interests at stake. According to Mohawk, the right to maintain attorney-client confidences — the sine qua non of a meaningful attorney-client relationship — is “irreparably destroyed absent immediate appeal” of adverse privilege rulings. Brief for Petitioner 23.
We readily acknowledge the importance of the attorney-client privilege, which “is one of the oldest recognized privileges for confidential communications.” Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U. S. 399, 403 (1998). By assuring confidentiality, the privilege encourages clients to make “full and frank” disclosures to their attorneys, who are then better able to provide candid advice and effective representation. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U. S. 383, 389 (1981). This, in turn, serves “broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of justice.” Ibid.
The crucial question, however, is not whether an interest is important in the abstract; it is whether deferring review until final judgment so imperils the interest as to justify the cost of allowing immediate appeal of the entire class of relevant orders. We routinely require litigants to wait until after final judgment to vindicate valuable rights, including rights central to our adversarial system. See, e.g., Richardson-Merrell, 472 U. S., at 426 (holding an order disqualifying counsel in a civil case did not qualify for immediate appeal under the collateral order doctrine); Flanagan v. United States, 465 U. S. 259, 260 (1984) (reaching the same result in a criminal case, notwithstanding the Sixth Amendment rights at stake). In Digital Equipment, we rejected an assertion that collateral order review was necessary to promote “the public policy favoring voluntary resolution of disputes.” 511 U. S., at 881. “It defies common sense,” we explained, “to maintain that parties’ readiness to settle will be significantly dampened (or the corresponding public interest impaired) by a rule that a district court’s decision to let allegedly barred litigation go forward may be challenged as a matter of right only on appeal from a judgment for the plaintiff’s favor.” Ibid.
We reach a similar conclusion here. In our estimation, postjudgment appeals generally suffice to protect the rights of litigants and ensure the vitality of the attorney-client privilege. Appellate courts can remedy the improper disclosure of privileged material in the same way they remedy a host of other erroneous evidentiary rulings: by vacating an adverse judgment and remanding for a new trial in which the protected material and its fruits are excluded from evidence.
Dismissing such relief as inadequate, Mohawk emphasizes that the attorney-client privilege does not merely “prohibi[t] use of protected information at trial”; it provides a “right not to disclose the privileged information in the first place.” Brief for Petitioner 25. Mohawk is undoubtedly correct that an order to disclose privileged information intrudes on the confidentiality of attorney-client communications. But deferring review until final judgment does not meaningfully reduce the ex ante incentives for full and frank consultations between clients and counsel.
One reason for the lack of a discernible chill is that, in deciding how freely to speak, clients and counsel are unlikely to focus on the remote prospect of an erroneous disclosure order, let alone on the timing of a possible appeal. Whether or not immediate collateral order appeals are available, clients and counsel must account for the possibility that they will later be required by law to disclose their communications for a variety of reasons — for example, because they misjudged the scope of the privilege, because they waived the privilege, or because their communications fell within the privilege’s crime-fraud exception. Most district court rulings on these matters involve the routine application of settled legal principles. They are unlikely to be reversed on appeal, particularly when they rest on factual determinations for which appellate deference is the norm. See, e. g., Richardson-Merrell, 472 U. S., at 434 (“Most pretrial orders of district judges are ultimately affirmed by appellate courts”); Reise v. Board of Regents, 957 F. 2d 293, 295 (CA7 1992) (noting that “almost all interlocutory appeals from discovery orders would end in affirmance” because “the district court possesses discretion, and review is deferential”). The breadth of the privilege and the narrowness of its exceptions will thus tend to exert a much greater influence on the conduct of clients and counsel than the small risk that the law will be misapplied.
Moreover, were attorneys and clients to reflect upon their appellate options, they would find that litigants confronted with a particularly injurious or novel privilege ruling have several potential avenues of review apart from collateral order appeal. First, a party may ask the district court to certify, and the court of appeals to accept, an interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1292(b). The preconditions for § 1292(b) review — “a controlling question of law,” the prompt resolution of which “may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation” — are most likely to be satisfied when a privilege ruling involves a new legal question or is of special consequence, and district courts should not hesitate to certify an interlocutory appeal in such cases. Second, in extraordinary circumstances — i. e., when a disclosure order “amount[s] to a judicial usurpation of power or a clear abuse of discretion,” or otherwise works a manifest injustice — a party may petition the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus. Cheney v. United States Dist. Court for D. C., 542 U. S. 367, 390 (2004) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Firestone, 449 U. S., at 378-379, n. 13. While these discretionary review mechanisms do not provide relief in every case, they serve as useful “safety valve[s]” for promptly correcting serious errors. Digital Equipment, 511 U. S., at 883.
Another long-recognized option is for a party to defy a disclosure order and incur court-imposed sanctions. District courts have a range of sanctions from which to choose, including “directing that the matters embraced in the order or other designated facts be taken as established for purposes of the action,” “prohibiting the disobedient party from supporting or opposing designated claims or defenses,” or “striking pleadings in whole or in part.” Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 37(b)(2)(A)(i)-(iii). Such sanctions allow a party to obtain post judgment review without having to reveal its privileged information. Alternatively, when the circumstances warrant it, a district court may hold a noncomplying party in contempt. The party can then appeal directly from that ruling, at least when the contempt citation can be characterized as a criminal punishment. See, e. g., Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United States, 506 U. S. 9, 18, n. 11 (1992); Firestone, 449 U. S., at 377; Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U. S. 323, 328 (1940); see also Wright & Miller §3914.23, at 140-155.
These established mechanisms for appellate review not only provide assurances to clients and counsel about the security of their confidential communications; they also go a long way toward addressing Mohawk’s concern that, absent collateral order appeals of adverse attorney-client privilege rulings, some litigants may experience severe hardship. Mohawk is no doubt right that an order to disclose privileged material may, in some situations, have implications beyond the case at hand. But the same can be said about many categories of pretrial discovery orders for which collateral order appeals are unavailable. As with these other orders, rulings adverse to the privilege vary in their significance; some may be momentous, but others are more mundane. Section 1292(b) appeals, mandamus, and appeals from contempt citations facilitate immediate review of some of the more consequential attorney-client privilege rulings. Moreover, protective orders are available to limit the spillover effects of disclosing sensitive information. That a fraction of orders adverse to the attorney-client privilege may nevertheless harm individual litigants in ways that are “only imperfectly reparable” does not justify making all such orders immediately appealable as of right under §1291. Digital Equipment, 511 U. S., at 872.
In short, the limited benefits of applying “the blunt, categorical instrument of §1291 collateral order appeal” to privilege-related disclosure orders simply cannot justify the likely institutional costs. Id., at 883. Permitting parties to undertake successive, piecemeal appeals of all adverse attorney-client rulings would unduly delay the resolution of district court litigation and needlessly burden the courts of appeals. See Wright & Miller §3914.23, at 123 (“Routine appeal from disputed discovery orders would disrupt the orderly progress of the litigation, swamp the courts of appeals, and substantially reduce the district court’s ability to control the discovery process”); cf. Cunningham v. Hamilton County, 527 U. S. 198, 209 (1999) (expressing concern that allowing immediate appeal as of right from orders fining attorneys for discovery violations would result in “the very sorts of piecemeal appeals and concomitant delays that the final judgment rule was designed to prevent”). Attempting to downplay such concerns, Mohawk asserts that the three Circuits in which the collateral order doctrine currently applies to adverse privilege rulings have seen only a trickle of appeals. But this may be due to the fact that the practice in all three Circuits is relatively new and not yet widely known. Were this Court to approve collateral order appeals in the attorney-client privilege context, many more litigants would likely choose that route. They would also likely seek to extend such a ruling to disclosure orders implicating many other categories of sensitive information, raising an array of line-drawing difficulties.
C
In concluding that sufficiently effective review of adverse attorney-client privilege rulings can be had without resort to the Cohen doctrine, we reiterate that the class of collaterally appealable orders must remain “narrow and selective in its membership.” Will, 546 U. S., at 350. This admonition has acquired special force in recent years with the enactment of legislation designating rulemaking, “not expansion by court decision,” as the preferred means for determining whether and when prejudgment orders should be immediately appealable. Swint, 514 U. S., at 48. Specifically, Congress in 1990 amended the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U. S. C. § 2071 et seq., to authorize this Court to adopt rules “defin[ing] when a ruling of a district court is final for the purposes of appeal under section 1291.” § 2072(c). Shortly thereafter, and along similar lines, Congress empowered this Court to “prescribe rules, in accordance with [§ 2072], to provide for an appeal of an interlocutory decision to the courts of appeals that is not otherwise provided for under [§ 1292].” § 1292(e). These provisions, we have recognized, “warran[t] the Judiciary’s full respect.” Swint, 514 U. S., at 48; see also Cunningham, 527 U. S., at 210.
Indeed, the rulemaking process has important virtues. It draws on the collective experience of bench and bar, see 28 U. S. C. § 2073, and it facilitates the adoption of measured, practical solutions. We expect that the combination of standard postjudgment appeals, § 1292(b) appeals, mandamus, and contempt appeals will continue to provide adequate protection to litigants ordered to disclose materials purportedly subject to the attorney-client privilege. Any further avenue for immediate appeal of such rulings should be furnished, if at all, through rulemaking, with the opportunity for full airing it provides.
* * *
In sum, we conclude that the collateral order doctrine does not extend to disclosure orders adverse to the attorney-client privilege. Effective appellate review can be had by other means. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
It is so ordered.
Three Circuits have permitted collateral order appeals of attorney-client privilege rulings. See In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litigation, 479 F. 3d 1078, 1087-1088 (CA9 2007); United States v. Philip Morris Inc., 314 F. 3d 612, 617-621 (CADC 2003); In re Ford Motor Co., 110 F. 3d 954, 957-964 (CA3 1997). The remaining Circuits to consider the question have found such orders nonappealable. See, e.g., Boughton v. Cotter Corp., 10 F. 3d 746, 749-750 (CA10 1993); Texaco Inc. v. Louisiana Land & Exploration Co., 995 F 2d 43, 44 (CA5 1993); Reise v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Wisconsin System, 957 F. 2d 293, 295 (CA7 1992); Chase Manhattan Bank, N. A. v. Turner & Newall, PLC, 964 F. 2d 159, 162-163 (CA2 1992); Quantum Corp. v. Tandon Corp., 940 F. 2d 642, 643-644 (CA Fed. 1991).
Perhaps the situation would be different if district courts were systematically underenforeing the privilege, but we have no indication that this is the case.
Mohawk itself petitioned the Eleventh Circuit for a writ of mandamus. See supra, at 105. It has not asked us to review the Court of Appeals’ denial of that relief.
Participating as amicus curiae in support of respondent Carpenter, the United States contends that collateral order appeals should be available for rulings involving certain governmental privileges “in light of their structural constitutional grounding under the separation of powers, relatively rare invocation, and unique importance to governmental functions.” Brief for United States 28. We express no view on that issue.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | I | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Rehnquist
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The jury trying petitioner acquitted him of one of several counts, but was unable to agree as to the others. The District Court declared a mistrial as to these counts of the indictment and set them down for retrial. Petitioner moved to bar his retrial, claiming that a second trial would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment because evidence sufficient to convict on the remaining counts had not been presented by the Government at the first trial. The District Court denied this motion, and the Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner’s appeal from that ruling for lack of jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1291. We now reverse that jurisdictional determination and proceed to address the merits of petitioner’s double jeopardy claim. We find the claim unavailing, since it lacks its necessary predicate, there having been no termination of original jeopardy.
Petitioner was indicted in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia on two counts of distributing a controlled substance, in violation of 21 U. S. C. § 841(a)(1), and one count of conspiring to distribute a controlled substance, in violation of 21 U. S. C. § 846. Twice — at the close of the Government’s case in chief and before submission of the case to the jury — he moved unsuccessfully for judgment of acquittal on the ground that the Government had failed to introduce sufficient evidence to warrant a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury acquitted petitioner of one substantive narcotics violation, but was unable to reach a verdict on the two remaining counts. The District Court declared a mistrial as to these two remaining counts and scheduled a retrial, at which point petitioner renewed his motion for judgment of acquittal based on the legal insufficiency of the evidence. In addition, petitioner argued at this time that retrial was barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The District Court denied both motions and petitioner appealed.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit dismissed petitioner’s appeal for want of jurisdiction. 226 U. S. App. D. C. 342, 702 F. 2d 1079 (1983). The Court of Appeals reasoned that its jurisdiction to review petitioner’s double jeopardy claim depended upon the appealability of the District Court’s ruling on petitioner’s motion for judgment of acquittal based on the insufficiency of the evidence. Because the District Court’s ruling on the latter motion was not a final judgment appealable under 28 U. S. C. § 1291, that ruling could only be reviewed if it fell within the collateral-order doctrine enunciated by this Court in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541 (1949). The court held that the ruling on the legal sufficiency of the evidence was “anything but collateral,” and thus it lacked appellate jurisdiction to review that claim. 226 U. S. App. D. C., at 344-345, 702 F. 2d, at 1081-1082. Since the merits of petitioner’s double jeopardy claim depended entirely on reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, the court concluded that petitioner had failed to present a double jeopardy claim which could be reviewed at that point. We granted certio-rari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, 464 U. S. 890 (1983), because of a conflict with the decision reached by the Third Circuit in United States v. McQuilkin, 673 F. 2d 681 (1982), and because of the implications of the decision below for the administration of criminal justice.
Petitioner contends that under our decisions in Abney v. United States, 431 U. S. 651 (1977), and Burks v. United States, 437 U. S. 1 (1978), he is entitled to an interlocutory review of his claim that a second trial is barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause because the Government failed to introduce legally sufficient evidence to go to the jury at the first trial. Burks, however, involved no issue of interlocutory review, since it was an appeal from a final judgment of conviction. But Abney arose in the context of an interlocutory appeal. There we held that denial of a defendant’s, pretrial motion to dismiss an indictment on double jeopardy grounds was appealable as a “collateral order” under 28 U. S. C. § 1291. Despite the strong congressional policy embodied in § 1291 against interlocutory appeals in criminal cases, DiBella v. United States, 369 U. S. 121, 126 (1962), we held that the claim in Abney met the three-part test established in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., supra, because a double jeopardy claim contested the very power of the Government to bring a person to trial, and the right would be significantly impaired if review were deferred until after the trial. We said:
“Obviously, [this] aspec[t] of the guarantee’s protections would be lost if the accused were forced to ‘run the gauntlet’ a second time before an appeal could be taken; even if the accused is acquitted, or, if convicted, has his conviction ultimately reversed on double jeopardy grounds, he has been forced to endure a trial that the Double Jeopardy Clause was designed to prohibit. Com sequently, if a criminal defendant is to avoid exposure to double jeopardy and thereby enjoy the full protection of the Clause, his double jeopardy challenge to the indictment must be reviewable before that subsequent exposure occurs.” 431 U. S., at 662 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
The Government contends, and the Court of Appeals agreed, that the double jeopardy claim raised by petitioner in this case does not meet the three-part test of the Cohen case. It argues that resolution of the double jeopardy claim inevitably involves evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence against petitioner at the first trial, and therefore the claim is not completely collateral to the merits of the charge against petitioner. Cf. Abney, supra, at 660. To dispose of petitioner’s double jeopardy claim, the reviewing court would have to conclude that the evidence introduced at the first trial on these counts was insufficient as a matter of law to convict petitioner. This canvassing of the record would be indistinguishable from an assessment of the sufficiency of the evidence that would be reviewed after a judgment of conviction, and, of course, would go to the heart of the Government’s case on the merits. The Government and the Court of Appeals, therefore, are of the view that petitioner’s double jeopardy claim may be only reviewed following a final judgment of conviction after a second trial.
All of this may be conceded, and yet we think that the collateral-order doctrine applied in Abney should not be read so narrowly as to bar from interlocutory review the type of double jeopardy claim asserted here. Petitioner seeks review of the sufficiency of the evidence at his first trial, not to reverse a judgment entered on that evidence, but as a necessary component of his separate claim of double jeopardy. While consideration of petitioner’s double jeopardy claim would require the appellate court to canvass the sufficiency of the evidence at the first trial, this fact alone does not prevent the District Court’s order denying petitioner’s double jeopardy claim from being appealable.
The Government understandably expresses concern that interlocutory appeals of this nature may disrupt the administration of criminal justice. But allowing appeals such as this is completely consistent with the Court’s admonition in Cohen that the words “final decision” in § 1291 should have a “practical rather than a technical construction.” Cohen, 337 U. S., at 546. Petitioner’s first trial had ended and his second trial had been rescheduled before he asserted his double jeopardy claim to bar retrial. There was thus no effort to interrupt or delay proceedings during the time that a jury was empaneled or that the District Court had under advisement motions relating to the first trial. Moreover, we have indicated that the appealability of a double jeopardy claim depends upon its being at least “colorable,” United States v. MacDonald, 435 U. S. 850, 862 (1978), and that “frivolous claims of former jeopardy” may be weeded out by summary procedures, Abney, supra, at 662, n. 8. Cf. United States v. Head, 697 F. 2d 1200, 1204 (CA4 1982). These limitations, together with the continuing requirement that the order of the District Court which is appealed from be a “final” decision on the double jeopardy claim, provide adequate insurance against the evils which the Government fears. Thus, we hold that petitioner has raised a colorable double jeopardy claim appealable under 28 U. S. C § 1291.
Turning to the merits of petitioner’s double jeopardy claim, we reject it. He asserts that if the Government failed to introduce sufficient evidence to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at his first trial, he may not be tried again following a declaration of a mistrial because of a hung jury. While petitioner bases this contention on Burks v. United States, 437 U. S. 1 (1978), we do not agree that Burks resulted in the sweeping change in the law of double jeopardy which petitioner would have us hold. In Burks we held that once a defendant obtained an unreversed appellate ruling that the Government had failed to introduce sufficient evidence to convict him at trial, a second trial was barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause. Id., at 18. We overruled prior decisions such as Bryan v. United States, 338 U. S. 552 (1950), in which we held that if a defendant successfully sought reversal of his conviction on appeal because of insufficient evidence, retrial following such reversal was not barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause.
The Court in Burks did not deal with the situation in which a trial court declares a mistrial because of a jury’s inability to agree on a verdict. Thus, petitioner’s reliance on Burks in the context of the present case can be supported only if that decision laid down some overriding principle of double jeopardy law that was applicable across the board in situations totally different from the facts out of which it arose. But it is quite clear that our decision in Burks did not extend beyond the procedural setting in which it arose. Where, as here, there has been only a mistrial resulting from a hung jury, Burks simply does not require that an appellate court rule on the sufficiency of the evidence because retrial might be barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause. See Justices of Boston Municipal Court v. Lydon, 466 U. S. 294, 308-310 (1984).
The case law dealing with the application of the prohibition against placing a defendant twice in jeopardy following a mistrial because of a hung jury has its own sources and logic. It has been established for 160 years, since the opinion of Justice Story in United States v. Perez, 9 Wheat. 579 (1824), that a failure of the jury to agree on a verdict was an instance of “manifest necessity” which permitted a trial judge to terminate the first trial and retry the defendant, because “the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated.” Id., at 580. Since that time we have had occasion to examine the application of double jeopardy principles to mistrials granted for reasons other than the inability of the jury to agree, whether the mistrial is granted on the motion of the prosecution, see Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U. S. 458 (1973), or on the motion of the defendant, see Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U. S. 667 (1982); United States v. Dinitz, 424 U. S. 600 (1976). Nevertheless, we have constantly adhered to the rule that a retrial following a “hung jury” does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. Logan v. United States, 144 U. S. 263, 297-298 (1892). Explaining our reasons for this conclusion in Arizona v. Washington, 434 U. S. 497 (1978), we said:
“[Without exception, the courts have held that the trial judge may discharge a genuinely deadlocked jury and require the defendant to submit to a second trial. This rule accords recognition to society’s interest in giving the prosecution one complete opportunity to convict those who have violated its laws.” Id., at 509.
We are entirely unwilling to uproot this settled line of cases by extending the reasoning of Burks, which arose out of an appellate finding of insufficiency of evidence to convict following a jury verdict of guilty, to a situation where the jury is unable to agree on a verdict. Thirty-five years ago we said in Wade v. Hunter, 336 U. S. 684, 688-689 (1949):
“The double-jeopardy provision of the Fifth Amendment, however, does not mean that every time a defendant is put to trial before a competent tribunal he is entitled to go free if the trial fails to end in a final judgment. Such a rule would create an insuperable obstacle to the administration of justice in many cases in which there is no semblance of the type of oppressive practices at which the double-jeopardy prohibition is aimed. There may be unforeseeable circumstances that arise during a trial making its completion impossible, such as the failure of a jury to agree on a verdict. In such event the purpose of law to protect society from those guilty of crimes frequently would be frustrated by denying courts power to put the defendant to trial again. . . . What has been said is enough to show that a defendant’s valued right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal must in some instances be subordinated to the public’s interest in fair trials designed to end in just judgments.”
We think that the principles governing our decision in Burks, and the principles governing our decisions in the hung jury cases, are readily reconciled when we recognize that the protection of the Double Jeopardy Clause by its terms applies only if there has been some event, such as an acquittal, which terminates the original jeopardy. See Justices of Boston Municipal Court, supra; Price v. Georgia, 398 U. S. 323, 329 (1970). Since jeopardy attached here when the jury was sworn, see United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U. S. 564, 569 (1977), petitioner’s argument necessarily assumes that the judicial declaration of a mistrial was an event which terminated jeopardy in his case and which allowed him to assert a valid claim of double jeopardy.
But this proposition is irreconcilable with cases such as Perez and Logan, and we hold on the authority of these cases that the failure of the jury to reach a verdict is not an event which terminates jeopardy. Our holding in Burks established only that an appellate court’s finding of insufficient evidence to convict on appeal from a judgment of conviction is for double jeopardy purposes, the equivalent of an acquittal; it obviously did not establish, consistently with cases such as Perez, that a hung jury is the equivalent of an acquittal. Justice Holmes’ aphorism that “a page of history is worth a volume of logic” sensibly applies here, and we reaffirm the proposition that a trial court’s declaration of a mistrial following a hung jury is not an event that terminates the original jeopardy to which petitioner was subjected. The Government, like the defendant, is entitled to resolution of the case by verdict from the jury, and jeopardy does not terminate when the jury is discharged because it is unable to agree. Regardless of the sufficiency of the evidence at petitioner’s first trial, he has no valid double jeopardy claim to prevent his retrial.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals on the question of jurisdiction, and on the merits conclude that the District Court was correct in denying petitioner’s motion to bar retrial.
It is so ordered.
The substance of petitioner’s claim that the Government’s evidence was insufficient to convict is that the evidence established that petitioner was involved in only one drug transaction, an event which alone, he argues, is insufficient to support a charge of conspiracy. Alternatively, petitioner argues that even if the evidence supports a finding that two drug sales took place, these sales were so isolated in time that no conspiracy could be inferred from their occurrence. Petitioner’s case depends, however, on excluding from consideration all statements made by his alleged co-conspirator implicating petitioner in the drug scheme. In light of our holding that petitioner has no valid double jeopardy claim, we have no occasion to address this argument.
The text of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment reads: “[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.”
Judge Scalia dissented, arguing that under our decision in Abney v. United States, 431 U. S. 651 (1977), the court had jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1291 to review petitioner’s double jeopardy claim. Judge Scalia would have held, however, that petitioner failed to raise a meritorious double jeopardy claim.
Two other Circuits that have considered the question have reached the same conclusion as the Court of Appeals in this case. See United States v. Ellis, 646 F. 2d 132, 135 (CA4 1981); United States v. Becton, 632 F. 2d 1294, 1297 (CA5 1980), cert. denied, 454 U. S. 837 (1981).
Of course, a trial court’s finding of insufficient evidence also is the equivalent of an acquittal, see Hudson v. Louisiana, 450 U. S. 40, 44-45, n. 5 (1981), but Burks was not necessary to establish that principle. See Burks v. United States, 437 U. S., at 11, citing Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U. S. 141 (1962); Kepner v. United States, 195 U. S. 100 (1904).
It follows logically from our holding today that claims of double jeopardy such as petitioner’s are no longer “colorable” double jeopardy claims which may be appealed before final judgment. A colorable claim, of course, presupposes that there is some possible validity to a claim. Cf. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U. S. 745, 751-752 (1983); Florida Dept. of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U. S. 670, 694-695 (1982). Since no set of facts will support the assertion of a claim of double jeopardy like petitioner’s in the future, there is no possibility that a defendant’s double jeopardy rights will be violated by a new trial, and there is little need to interpose the delay of appellate review before a second trial can begin.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | A | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
MR. Justice Rehnquist
delivered the opinion of the Court.
These consolidated cases arise out of the 1973 crash of a Lear Jet shortly after takeoff from the DeKalb-Peachtree Airport. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, en banc, affirmed the dismissal of petitioners' complaint against respondent DeKalb County (hereafter respondent), holding that principles of federal common law were applicable to the resolution of petitioners’ breach-of-contract claim. We granted certiorari to consider whether federal or state law should have been applied to that claim; we conclude that the latter should govern.
I
Petitioners are, respectively, the survivors of deceased passengers, the assignee of the jet aircraft owner, and a burn victim. They brought separate lawsuits, later consolidated, against respondent in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. The basis for federal jurisdiction was diversity of citizenship, 28 U. S. C. § 1332, and the complaints asserted that respondent was liable on three independent theories: negligence, nuisance, and breach of contract. The District Court granted respondent’s motion to dismiss each of these claims. The courts below have unanimously agreed that the negligence and nuisance theories are without merit; only the propriety of the dismissal of the contract claims remains in the cases.
Petitioners seek to impose liability on respondent as third-party beneficiaries of contracts between it and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Their complaints allege that respondent entered into six grant agreements with the FAA. E. g., App. 15. Under the terms of the contracts respondent agreed to
“take action to restrict the use of land adjacent to or in the immediate vicinity of the Airport to activities and purposes compatible with normal airport operations including landing and takeoff of aircraft.” Id., at 19.
Petitioners assert that respondent breached the FAA contracts by owning and maintaining a garbage dump adjacent to the airport, and that the cause of the crash was the ingestion of birds swarming from the dump into the jet engines of the aircraft.
Applying Georgia law, the District Court found that petitioners’ claims as third-party beneficiaries under the FAA contracts were barred by the county’s governmental immunity, and dismissed the complaints under Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 12 (b)(6). A divided panel of the Court of Appeals decided that under state law petitioners could sue as third-party beneficiaries and that governmental immunity would not bar the suit. Miree v. United States, 526 F. 2d 679 (1976). The dissenting judge argued that the court should have applied federal rather than state law; he concluded that under the principles of federal common law the petitioners in this case did not have standing to sue as third-party beneficiaries of the contracts. Sitting en banc, the Court of Appeals reversed the panel on the breach-of-contract issue and adopted the panel dissent on this point as its opinion. Miree v. United States, 538 F. 2d 643 (1976). Judge Morgan, who had written the panel opinion, argued for five dissenters that there was no identifiable federal interest in the outcome of this diversity case, and thus that federal common law had no applicability.
II
Since the only basis of federal jurisdiction alleged for petitioners’ claim against respondent is diversity of citizenship, 28 U. S. C. § 1332, the case would unquestionably be governed by Georgia law, Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938), but for the fact that the United States is a party to the contracts in question, entered into pursuant to federal statute. See Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 219, as amended, 49 U. S. C. § 1701 et seq. (1970 ed. and Supp. V). The en banc majority of the Court of Appeals adopted, by reference, the view that, given these factors, application of federal common law was required:
“Although jurisdiction here is based upon diversity, the contract we are interpreting is one in which the United States is a party, and one which is entered into pursuant to authority conferred by federal statute. The necessity of uniformity of decision demands that federal common law, rather than state law, control the contract’s interpretation. United States v. Seckinger, 1970, 397 U. S. 203 . . . ; Smith v. United States, 5 Cir. 1974, 497 F. 2d 500; First National Bank v. Small Business Administration, 5 Cir. 1970, 429 F. 2d 280.” Miree v. United States, 526 F. 2d, at 686 (footnote omitted).
We do not agree with the conclusion of the Court of Appeals. The litigation before us raises no question regarding the liability of the United States or the responsibilities of the United States under the contracts. The relevant inquiry is a narrow one: whether petitioners as third-party beneficiaries of the contracts have standing to sue respondent. While federal common law may govern even in diversity cases where a uniform national rule is necessary to further the interests of the Federal Government, Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U. S. 363 (1943), the application of federal common law to resolve the issue presented here would promote no federal interests even approaching the magnitude of those found in Clearfield Trust:
“The issuance of commercial paper by the United States is on a vast scale and transactions in that paper from issuance to payment will commonly occur in several states. The application of state law, even without the conflict of laws rules of the forum, would subject the rights and duties of the United States to exceptional uncertainty. It would lead to great diversity in results by making identical transactions subject to the vagaries of the laws of the several states. The desirability of a uniform rule is plain.” Id., at 367.
But, in this case, the resolution of petitioners’ breach-of-contract claim against respondent will have no direct effect upon the United States or its Treasury. The Solicitor General, waiving his right to respond in these cases, advised us:
“In the course of the proceedings below, the United States determined that its interests would not be directly affected by the resolution of these issue[s] and therefore did not participate in briefing or argument in the court of appeals. In view of these considerations, the United States does not intend to respond to the petitions unless it is requested to do so by the Court.”
The operations of the United States in connection with FAA grants such as these are undoubtedly of considerable magnitude. However, we see no reason for concluding that these operations would be burdened or subjected to uncertainty by variant state-law interpretations regarding whether those with whom the United States contracts might be sued by third-party beneficiaries to the contracts. Since only the rights of private litigants are at issue here, we find the Clearfield Trust rationale inapplicable.
We think our conclusion that these cases do not fit within the Clearfield Trust rule follows from the Court's later decision in Bank of America Nat. Trust & Sav. Assn. v. Parnell, 352 U. S. 29 (1956), in which the Court declined to apply that rule in a fact situation analogous to this one. Parnell was a diversity action between private parties involving United States bonds. The Bank of America had sued Parnell to recover funds that he had obtained by cashing the bonds, which had been stolen from the bank. There were two issues: whether the bonds were “overdue” and whether Parnell had taken the bonds in good faith. The Court of Appeals, over a dissent, applied federal law to resolve both issues; this Court reversed with respect to the good-faith issue. After stressing that the basis for the Clearfield Trust decision was that the application of state law in that case would “subject the rights and duties of the United States to exceptional uncertainty,” 352 U. S., at 33, the Court rejected the application of the Clearfield Trust rationale:
“Securities issued by the Government generate immediate interests of the Government. These were dealt with in Clearfield Trust and in National Metropolitan Bank v. United States, 323 U. S. 454. But they also radiate interests in transactions between private parties. The present litigation is purely between private parties and does not touch the rights and duties of the United States.” 352 U. S., at 33.
The Court recognized, as we do here, that the application of state law to the issue of good faith did not preclude the application of federal law to questions directly involving the rights and duties of the Federal Government, and found:
“Federal law of course governs the interpretation of the nature of the rights and obligations created by the Government bonds themselves. A decision with respect to the 'overdueness’ of the bonds is therefore a matter of federal law, which, in view of our holding, we need not elucidate.” Id., at 34.
The parallel between Parnell and these cases is obvious. The question of whether petitioners may sue respondent does not require decision under federal common law since the litigation is among private parties and no substantial rights or duties of the United States hinge on its outcome. On the other hand, nothing we say here forecloses the applicability of federal common law in interpreting the rights and duties of the United States under federal contracts.
Nor is the fact that the United States has a substantial interest in regulating aircraft travel and promoting air travel safety sufficient, given the narrow question before us, to call into play the rule of Clearfield Trust. In Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 384 U. S. 63, 68 (1966), the Court discussed the nature of a federal interest sufficient to bring forth the application of federal common law:
“In deciding whether rules of federal common law should be fashioned, normally the guiding principle is that a significant conflict between some federal policy or interest and the use of state law in the premises must first be specifically shown. It is by no means enough that, as we may assume, Congress could under the Constitution readily enact a complete code of law governing transactions in federal mineral leases among private parties. Whether latent federal power should be exercised to displace state law is primarily a decision for Congress.” (Emphasis added.)
The question of whether private parties may, as third-party beneficiaries, sue a municipality for breach of the FAA contracts involves this federal interest only insofar as such lawsuits might be thought to advance federal aviation policy by inducing compliance with FAA safety provisions. However, even assuming the correctness of this notion, we adhere to the language in Wallis, cited above, stating that the issue of whether to displace state law on an issue such as this is primarily a decision for Congress. Congress has chosen not to do so in this case. Actually the application of federal common law, as interpreted by the Court of Appeals here would frustrate this federal interest pro tanto, since that court held that this breach-of-contract lawsuit would not lie under federal law. On the other hand, at least in the opinion of the majority of the panel below, Georgia law would countenance the action. Even assuming that a different result were to be reached under federal common law, we think this language from Wallis all but forecloses its application to these cases:
“Apart from the highly abstract nature of [the federal] interest, there has been no showing that state law is not adequate to achieve it.” Id., at 71.
We conclude that any federal interest in the outcome of the question before us “is far too speculative, far too remote a possibility to justify the application of federal law to transactions essentially of local concern.” Parnell, 352 U. S., at 33-34.
Although we have determined that Georgia law should be applied to the question raised by respondent’s motion to dismiss, we shall not undertake to decide the correct outcome under Georgia law. The dissent to the panel opinion, in a footnote, stated that Georgia law would preclude petitioners from suing as third-party beneficiaries. The panel opinion, of course, held otherwise. We doubt that the Court of Appeals would deem itself bound by the dicta found in the footnote to the dissenting opinion which were simply later adopted by reference in the en banc majority opinion. We therefore vacate the judgment and remand to the Court of Appeals for consideration of the claim under applicable Georgia law.
Ill
Petitioners have argued in this Court that the Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970 provides an implied civil right of action to recover for death or injury due to violation of the Act. 84 Stat. 219, as amended, 49 U. S. C. § 1701 et seq. (1970 ed. and Supp. V); Petitioners, however, allege only diversity of citizenship as the basis for federal jurisdiction of their lawsuits; they do not rely upon federal-question jurisdiction, 28 U. S. G. § 1331, which would be more consistent with a theory of an implied federal cause of action under that Act. The complaints sought recovery solely on the grounds of negligence, nuisance, and breach of contract. There is no indication that petitioners alleged a violation of a federal statute and a right to recovery for such a violation. The fact that this asserted basis of liability is so obviously an afterthought may be some indication of its merit, but since it was neither pleaded, argued, nor briefed either in the District Court or in the Court of Appeals, we will not consider it. Cf. Lawn v. United States, 355 U. S. 339, 362-363, n. 16 (1958).
The judgment is vacated, and the cases are remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Petitioners also sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act. See 28 U. S. C. §§ 1346 (b), 2671 et seq. The litigation before us arises out of the District Court’s granting of respondent DeKalb County’s motion to dismiss and the entry of final judgment under Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 54 (b). The United States has made no similar motion, and is not a party to the cases in this Court.
In reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint in the context of a motion to dismiss we, of course, treat all of the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as true.
The Clearfield Trust rule may apply in diversity cases. See Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co., 317 U. S. 173 (1942); Bank of America Nat. Trust & Sav. Assn. v. Parnell, 352 U. S. 29 (1956); Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 384 U. S. 63 (1966).
There is no indication that petitioners’ tort claim against the United States, see n. 1, supra, will be affected by the resolution of this issue. Indeed, the Federal Tort Claims Act itself looks to state law in determining liability. 28U.S. C. § 1346 (b).
The Congress has considered, but not passed, a bill to provide for a federal cause of action arising out of aircraft disasters. See Hearings on S. 961 before the Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, pt. 2, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
In language similar to that used in the FAA grant agreements, §§ 1718 (3) and (4) require, as a condition precedent to approval of an airport development project, written assurances that the airport approaches will be safely maintained and that the use of land adjacent to the airport will be restricted to uses compatible with aircraft takeoff and landing.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | H | sc_issuearea |
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Mr. Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented is whether, in a case in which intent is an element of the crime charged; the jury instruction, “the law presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts,” violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s requirement that the State prove every element of a criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
I
On November 22, 1976, 18-year-old David Sandstrom confessed to the slaying of Annie Jessen. Based upon the confession and corroborating evidence, petitioner was charged on December 2 with “deliberate homicide,” Mont. Code Ann. § 45-5-102 (1978), in that he “purposely or knowingly caused the death of Annie Jessen.” App. 3. At trial, Sandstrom’s attorney informed the jury that, although his client admitted killing Jessen, he did not do so “purposely or knowingly,” and was therefore not guilty of “deliberate homicide” but of a lesser crime. Id., at 6-8. The basic support for this contention was the testimony of two court-appointed mental health experts, each of whom described for the jury petitioner’s mental state at the time of the incident. Sandstrom’s attorney argued that this testimony demonstrated that petitioner, due to a personality disorder aggravated by alcohol consumption, did not kill Annie Jessen “purposely or knowingly.”
The prosecution requested the trial judge to instruct the jury that “[t]he law presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts.” Petitioner’s counsel objected, arguing that “the instruction has the effect of shifting the burden of proof on the issue of” purpose or knowledge to the defense, and that “that is impermissible under the Federal Constitution, due process of law.” Id., at 34. He offered to provide a number of federal decisions in support of the objection, including this Court’s holding in Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684 (1975), but was told by the judge: “You can give those to the Supreme Court. The objection is overruled.” App. 34. The instruction was delivered, the jury found petitioner guilty of deliberate homicide, id., at 38, and petitioner was sentenced to 100 years in prison.
Sandstrom appealed to the Supreme Court of Montana, again contending that the instruction shifted to the defendant the burden of disproving an element of the crime charged, in violation of Mullaney v. Wilbur, supra, In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358 (1970), and Patterson v. New York, 432 U. S. 197 (1977). The Montana court conceded that these cases did prohibit shifting the burden of proof to the defendant by means of a presumption, but held that the cases “do not prohibit allocation of some burden of proof to a defendant under certain circumstances.” 176 Mont. 492, 497, 580 P. 2d 106, 109 (1978). Since in the court’s view, “[defendant's sole burden under instruction No. 5 was to produce some evidence that he did not intend the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts, not to disprove that he acted ‘purposely’ or ‘knowingly,’ . . . the instruction does not violate due process standards as defined by the United States or Montana Constitution ...Ibid, (emphasis added).
Both federal and state courts have held, under a variety of rationales, that the giving of an instruction similar to that challenged here is fatal to the validity of a criminal conviction. We granted certiorari, 439 U. S. 1067 (1979), to decide the important question of the instruction’s constitutionality. We reverse.
II
The threshold inquiry in ascertaining the constitutional analysis applicable to this kind of jury instruction is to determine the nature of the presumption it describes. See Ulster County Court v. Allen, ante, at 157-163. That determination requires careful attention to the words actually spoken to the jury, see ante, at 157-159, n. 16, for whether a defendant has been accorded his constitutional rights depends upon the way in which a reasonable juror could have interpreted the instruction.
Respondent argues, first, that the instruction merely described a permissive inference — that is, it allowed but did not require the jury to draw conclusions about defendant’s intent from his actions — and that such inferences are constitutional. Brief for Respondent 3, 15. These arguments need not detain us long, for even respondent admits that “it’s possible” that the jury believed they were required to apply the presumption. Tr. of Oral Arg. 28. Sandstrom’s jurors were told that “[t]he law presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts.” They were not told that they had a choice, or that they might infer that conclusion; they were told only that the law presumed it. It is clear that a reasonable juror could easily have viewed such an instruction as mandatory. See generally United States v. Wharton, 139 U. S. App. D. C. 293, 298, 433 F. 2d 451, 456 (1970); Green v. United States, 132 U. S. App. D. C. 98, 99, 405 F. 2d 1368, 1369 (1968). See also Montana Rule of Evidence 301 (a).
In the alternative, respondent urges that, even if viewed as a mandatory presumption rather than as a permissive inference, the presumption did not conclusively establish intent but rather could be rebutted. On this view, the instruction required the jury, if satisfied as to the facts which trigger the presumption, to find intent unless the defendant offered evidence to the contrary. Moreover, according to the State, all the defendant had to do to rebut the presumption was produce “some” contrary evidence; he did not have to “prove” that he lacked the required mental state. Thus, “[a]t most, it placed a burden of production on the petitioner,” but “did not shift to petitioner the burden of persuasion with respect to any element of the offense . . . .” Brief for Respondent 3 (emphasis added). Again, respondent contends that presumptions with this limited effect pass constitutional muster.
We need not review respondent’s constitutional argument on this point either, however, for we reject this characterization of the presumption as well. Respondent concedes there is a “risk” that the jury, once having found petitioner’s act voluntary, would interpret the instruction as automatically directing a finding of intent. Tr. of Oral Arg. 29. Moreover, the State also concedes that numerous courts “have differed as to the effect of the presumption when given as a jury instruction without further explanation as to its use by the jury,” and that some have found it to shift more than the burden of production, and even to have conclusive effect. Brief for Respondent 17. Nonetheless, the State contends that the only authoritative reading of the effect of the presumption resides in the Supreme Court of Montana. And the State argues that by holding that “[djefendant’s sole burden under instruction No. 5 was to produce some evidence that he did not intend the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts, not to disprove that he acted ‘purposely’ or ‘knowingly,’ ” 176 Mont., at 497-498, 580 P. 2d, at 109 (emphasis added), the Montana Supreme Court decisively established that the presumption at most affected only the burden of going forward with evidence of intent — that is, the burden of production.
The Supreme Court of Montana is, of course, the final authority on the legal weight to be given a presumption under Montana law, but it is not the final authority on the interpretation which a jury could have given the instruction. If Montana intended its presumption to have only the effect described by its Supreme Court, then we are convinced that a reasonable juror could well have been misled by the instruction given, and could have believed that the presumption was not limited to requiring the defendant to satisfy only a burden of production. Petitioner’s jury was told that “[t]he law presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts.” They were not told that the presumption could be rebutted, as the Montana Supreme Court held, by the defendant’s simple presentation of “some” evidence; nor even that it could be rebutted at all. Given the common definition of “presume” as “to suppose to be true without proof,” Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary 911 (1974), and given the lack of qualifying instructions as to the legal effect of the presumption, we cannot discount the possibility that the jury may have interpreted the instruction in either of two more stringent ways.
First, a reasonable jury could well have interpreted the presumption as “conclusive,” that is, not technically as a presumption at all, but rather as an irrebuttable direction by the court to find intent once convinced of the facts triggering the presumption. Alternatively, the jury may have interpreted the instruction as a direction to find intent upon proof of the defendant’s voluntary actions (and their “ordinary” consequences), unless the defendant proved the contrary by some quantum of proof which may well have been considerably greater than “some” evidence — thus effectively shifting the burden of persuasion on the element of intent. Numerous federal and state courts have warned that instructions of the type given here can be interpreted in just these ways. See generally United States v. Wharton, 139 U. S. App. D. C. 293, 433 F. 2d 451 (1970); Berkovitz v. United States, 213 F. 2d 468 (CA5 1954); State v. Roberts, 88 Wash. 2d 337, 341-342, 562 P. 2d 1259, 1261-1262 (1977) (en banc); State v. War- button, 211 Kan. 506, 509, 506 P. 2d 1152, 1155 (1973); Hall v. State, 49 Ala. App. 381, 385, 272 So. 2d 590, 593 (Crim. App. 1973). See also United States v. Chiantese, 560 F. 2d 1244, 1255 (CA5 1977). And although the Montana Supreme Court held to the contrary in this case, Montana’s own Rules of Evidence expressly state that the presumption at issue here may be overcome only “by a preponderance of evidence contrary to the presumption.” Montana Rule of Evidence 301 (b)(2). Such a requirement shifts not only the burden of production, but also the ultimate burden of persuasion on the issue of intent.
We do not reject the possibility that some jurors may have interpreted the challenged instruction as permissive, or, if mandatory, as requiring only that the defendant come forward with “some” evidence in rebuttal. However, the fact that a reasonable juror could have given the presumption conclusive or persuasion-shifting effect means that we cannot discount the possibility that Sandstrom’s jurors actually did proceed upon one or the other of these latter interpretations. And that means that unless these kinds of presumptions are constitutional, the instruction cannot be adjudged valid. Ulster County Court v. Allen, ante, at 159-160, n. 17, and at 175-176 (Powell, J., dissenting); Bachellar v. Maryland, 397 U. S. 564, 570-571 (1970); Leary v. United States, 395 U. S. 6, 31-32 (1969); Carpenters v. United States, 330 U. S. 395, 408-409 (1947); Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U. S. 607, 611-614 (1946). It is the line of cases urged by petitioner, and exemplified by In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358 (1970), that provides the appropriate mode of constitutional analysis for these kinds of presumptions.
III
In Winship, this Court stated:
“Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of the reasonable-doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.” Id., at 364 (emphasis added).
Accord, Patterson v. New York, 432 U. S., at 210. The petitioner here was charged with and convicted of deliberate homicide, committed purposely or knowingly, under Mont. Code Ann. § 45-5-102 (a) (1978). See App. 3, 42. It is clear that under Montana law, whether the crime was committed purposely or knowingly is a fact necessary to constitute the crime of deliberate homicide. Indeed, it was the lone element of the offense at issue in Sandstrom’s trial, as he confessed to causing the death of the victim, told the jury that knowledge and purpose were the only questions he was controverting, and introduced evidence solely on those points. App. 6-8. Moreover, it is conceded that proof of defendant’s “intent” would be sufficient to establish this element. Thus, the question before this Court is whether the challenged jury instruction had the effect of relieving the State of the burden of proof enunciated in Winship on the critical question of petitioner’s state of mind. We conclude that under either of the two possible interpretations of the instruction set out above, precisely that effect would result, and that the instruction therefore represents constitutional error.
We consider first the validity of a conclusive presumption. This Court has considered such a presumption on at least two prior occasions. In Morissette v. United States, 342 U. S. 246 (1952), the defendant was charged with willful and knowing theft of Government property. Although his attorney argued that for his client to be found guilty, “the taking must have been with felonious intent,” the trial judge ruled that “[t]hat is presumed by his own act.” Id., at 249. After first concluding that intent was in fact an element of the crime charged, and after declaring that “[w]here intent of the accused is an ingredient of 'the crime charged, its existence is ... a jury issue,” Morissette held:
“It follows that the■ trial court may not withdraw or prejudge the issue by instruction that the law raises a presumption of intent from an act. It often is tempting to cast in terms of a ‘presumption’ a conclusion which a court thinks probable from given facts. . . . [But] [w]e think presumptive intent has no place in this case. A conclusive presumption which testimony could not overthrow would effectively eliminate intent as an ingredient of the offense. A-presumption which would permit but not require the jury to assume intent from an isolated fact would prejudge a conclusion which the jury should reach of its own volition. A presumption which would permit the jury to make an assumption which all the evidence considered together does not logically establish would give to a proven fact an artificial and fictional effect. In either case, this presumption would conflict with the overriding presumption of innocence with which the law endows the accused and which extends to every element of the crime.” Id., at 274-275. (Emphasis added; footnote omitted.)
Just last Term, in United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U. S. 422 (1978), we reaffirmed the holding of Moris-sette. In that case defendants, who were charged with criminal violations of the Sherman Act, challenged the following jury instruction:
“The law presumes that a person intends the necessary and natural consequences of his acts. Therefore, if the effect of the exchanges of pricing information was to raise, fix, maintain, and stabilize prices, then the parties to them are presumed, as a matter of law, to have intended that result.” 438 U. S., at 430.
After again determining that the offense included the element of intent, we held:
“[A] defendant’s state of mind or intent is an element of a criminal antitrust offense which . . . cannot be taken from the trier of fact through reliance on a legal presumption of wrongful intent from proof of an effect on prices. Cf. Morissette v. United States ....
“Although an effect on prices may well support an inference that the defendant had knowledge of the probability of such a consequence at the time he acted, the jury must remain free to consider additional evidence before accepting or rejecting the inference. . . . [ Ultimately the decision on the issue of intent must be left to the trier of fact alone. The instruction given invaded this fact-finding function.” Id., at 435, 446 (emphasis added).
See also Hickory v. United States, 160 U. S. 408, 422 (1896).
As in Morissette and United States Oypsum Co., a conclusive presumption in this case would “conflict with the overriding presumption of innocence with which the law endows the accused and which extends to every element of the crime,” and would “invade [the] factfinding function” which in a criminal case the law assigns solely to the jury. The instruction announced to David Sandstrom’s jury may well have had exactly these consequences. Upon finding proof of one element of the crime (causing death), and of facts insufficient to establish the second (the voluntariness and “ordinary consequences” of defendant’s action), Sandstrom’s jurors could reasonably have concluded that they were directed to find against defendant on the element of intent. The State was thus not forced to prove “beyond a reasonable doubt . . . every fact necessary to constitute the crime . . . charged,” 397 U. S., at 364, and defendant was deprived of his constitutional rights as explicated in Winship.
A presumption which, although not conclusive, had the effect of shifting the burden of persuasion to the defendant, would have suffered from similar infirmities. If Sandstrom’s jury interpreted the presumption in that manner, it could have concluded that upon proof by the State of the slaying, and of additional facts not themselves establishing the element of intent, the burden was shifted to the defendant to prove that he lacked the requisite mental state. Such a presumption was found constitutionally deficient in Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684 (1975). In Mullaney, the charge was murder, which under Maine law required proof not only of intent but of malice. The trial court charged the jury that “ 'malice aforethought is an essential and indispensable element of the crime of murder.’ ” Id., at 686. However, it also instructed that if the prosecution established that the homicide was both intentional and unlawful, malice aforethought was to be implied unless the defendant proved by a fair preponderance of the evidence that he acted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation. Ibid. As we recounted just two Terms ago in Patterson v. New York, "[t]his Court . . . unanimously agreed with the Court of Appeals that Wilbur’s due process rights had been invaded by the presumption casting upon him the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he had acted in the heat of passion upon sudden provocation.” 432 U. S., at 214. And Patterson reaffirmed that "a State must prove every ingredient of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt, and . . . may not shift the burden of proof to the defendant” by means of such a presumption. Id., at 215.
Because David Sandstrom’s jury may have interpreted the judge’s instruction as constituting either a burden-shifting presumption like that in Mullaney, or a conclusive presumption like those in Morissette and United States Gypsum, Co., and because either interpretation would have deprived defendant of his right to the due process of law, we hold the instruction given in this case unconstitutional.
IV
Respondent has proposed two alternative rationales for affirming petitioner’s conviction, even if the presumption at issue in this case is unconstitutional. First, the State notes that the jury was instructed that deliberate homicide may be committed “purposely or knowingly.” App. 35 (emphasis added). Since the jury was also instructed that a person “intends” the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts, but was not provided with a definition of “intends,” respondent argues that jurors could have interpreted the word as referring only to the defendant’s “purpose.” Thus, a jury which convicted Sandstrom solely for his “knowledge,” and which interpreted “intends” as relevant only to “purpose”, would not have needed to rely upon the tainted presumption at all.
We cannot accept respondent’s argument. As an initial matter, we are not at all certain that a jury would interpret the word “intends” as bearing solely upon purpose. As we said in United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U. S., at 445, “[t]he element of intent in the criminal law has traditionally been viewed as a bifurcated concept embracing either the specific requirement of purpose or the more general one of knowledge or awareness.” See also W. LaFave & A. Scott, Criminal Law 196 (1972).
But, more significantly, even if a jury could have ignored the presumption and found defendant guilty because he acted knowingly, we cannot be certain that this is what they did do. As the jury’s verdict was a general one, App. 38, we have no way of knowing that Sandstrom was not convicted on the basis of the unconstitutional instruction. And “[i]t has long been settled that when a case is submitted to the jury on alternative theories the unconstitutionality of any of the theories requires that the conviction be set aside. See, e. g., Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359 (1931).” Leary v. United States, 395 U. S., at 31-32. See Ulster County Court v. Allen, ante, at 159-160, n. 17, and at 175-176 (Powell, J., dissenting); Bachellar v. Maryland, 397 U. S., at 570-571; Carpenters v. United States, 330 U. S., at 408-409; Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U. S., at 611-614.
Respondent’s final argument is that even if the jury did rely upon the unconstitutional instruction, this constituted harmless error under Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18 (1967), because both defendant’s confession and the psychiatrist’s testimony demonstrated that Sandstrom possessed the requisite mental state. Brief for Respondent 4-13. In reply, it is said that petitioner confessed only to the slaying and not to his mental state, that the psychiatrist’s testimony amply supported his defense, Brief for Petitioner 15-16, and that in any event an unconstitutional jury instruction on an element of the crime can never constitute harmless error, see generally Carpenters v. United States, supra, at 408-409; Bollenbach v. United States, supra, at 614, 615. As none of these issues was considered by the Supreme Court of Montana, we decline to reach them as an initial matter here. See Moore v. Illinois, 434 U. S. 220, 232 (1977); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U. S. 1, 11 (1970). The Montana court will, of course, be free to consider them on remand if it so desires. Ibid. Accordingly, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Montana is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
The statute provides:
“45-5-101. Criminal homicide. (1) A person commits the offense of criminal homicide if he purposely, knowingly, or negligently causes the death of another human being.
“(2) Criminal homicide is deliberate homicide, mitigated deliberate homicide, or negligent homicide.
“45-5-102. Deliberate homicide. (1) Except as provided in 45-5-103 (1), criminal homicide constitutes deliberate homicide if:
“(a) it is committed purposely or knowingly . . . .”
Petitioner initially filed a notice of intent to rely on “mental disease or defect excluding criminal responsibility” as a defense. That defense required evidence that defendant was “unable either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.” Mont. Code Ann. §46-14-101 (1978). The defense was withdrawn at trial, with the petitioner contending that, although he was not “unable” to form the requisite intent, he did not have it at the time of the killing.
See Chappell v. United States, 270 F. 2d 274 (CA9 1959); Bloch v. United States, 221 F. 2d 786 (CA9 1955); Berkovitz v. United States, 213 F. 2d 468 (CA5 1954); Wardlaw v. United States, 203 F. 2d 884 (CA5 1953); State v. Warbritton, 211 Kan. 506, 506 P. 2d 1152 (1973); Hall v. State, 49 Ala. App. 381, 385, 272 So. 2d 590, 593 (Crim. App. 1973). See also United States v. Wharton, 139 U. S. App. D. C. 293, 433 F. 2d 451 (1970). In addition, two United States Courts of Appeals have ordered their District Courts to delete the instruction in future cases. See United States v. Garrett, 574 F. 2d 778 (CA3 1978); United States v. Chiantese, 560 F. 2d 1244 (CA5 1977). The standard reference work for federal instructions, 1 E. Devitt & C. Blackmar, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions 405 (3d ed. 1977), describes the instruction as “clearly erroneous,” and as constituting “reversible error,” id., at 448.
“Rule 301. (a) Presumption defined. A presumption is an assumption of fact that the law requires to be made from another fact or group of facts found or otherwise established in the action or proceeding.” (Emphasis added.)
For purposes of argument, we accept respondent’s definition of the production burden when applied to a defendant in a criminal case. We note, however, that the burden is often described quite differently when it rests upon the prosecution. See United States v. Vuitch, 402 U. S. 62, 72 n. 7 (1971) (“evidence from which a jury could find a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt”); C. McCormick, Evidence § 338, p. 790, and n. 33 (2d ed. 1972), p. 101, and n. 34.1 (Supp. 1978). We also note that the effect of a failure to meet the production burden is significantly different for the defendant and prosecution. When the prosecution fails to meet it, a directed verdict in favor of the defense results. Such a consequence is not possible upon a defendant’s failure, however, as verdicts may not be directed against defendants in criminal cases. United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U. S. 564, 572-573 (1977); Carpenters v. United States, 330 U. S. 395, 408 (1947); Mims v. United States, 375 F. 2d 135, 148 (CA5 1967).
Montana Code Ann. § 26-1-602 (1978) states:
“ '[Disputable presumptions’ . . . may be controverted by other evidence. The following are of that kind:
“3. that a person intends the ordinary consequence of his voluntary act.”
Montana Rule of Evidence 301 provides:
“(b)(2) All presumptions, other than conclusive presumptions, are disputable presumptions and may be controverted. A disputable presumption may be overcome by a preponderance of evidence contrary to the presumption. Unless the presumption is overcome, the trier of fact must find the assumed fact in accordance with the presumption.” (Emphasis added.)
See also Monaghan v. Standard Motor Co., 96 Mont. 165, 173-174, 29 P. 2d 378, 379-380 (1934). At oral argument, the Attorney General of Montana agreed that “admittedly Montana law . . . states that a presumption requires a person to overcome that presumption by a preponderance of evidence.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 30.
We do not, of course, cite this Rule of Evidence to dispute the Montana Supreme Court’s interpretation of its own law. It merely serves as evidence that a reasonable man — here, apparently, the drafter of Montana’s own Rules of Evidence — could interpret the presumption at issue in this case as shifting to the defendant the burden of proving his innocence by a preponderance of the evidence.
The potential for these interpretations of the presumption was not removed by the other instructions given at the trial. It is true that the jury was instructed generally that the accused was presumed innocent until proved guilty, and that the State had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant caused the death of the deceased purposely or knowingly. App. 34-35; Brief for Respondent 21. But this is not rhetorically inconsistent with a conclusive or burden-shifting presumption. The jury could have interpreted the two sets of instructions as indicating that the presumption was a means by which proof beyond a reasonable doubt as to intent could be satisfied. For example, if the presumption were viewed as conclusive, the jury could have believed that, although intent must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, proof of the voluntary slaying and its ordinary consequences constituted proof of intent beyond a reasonable doubt. Cf. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684, 703 n. 31 (1975) (“These procedural devices require (in the case of a presumption) ... the trier of fact to conclude that the prosecution has met its burden of proof with respect to the presumed . . . fact by having satisfactorily established other facts”).
Given our ultimate result in this case, we do not need to consider what kind of constitutional analysis would be appropriate for other kinds of presumptions.
Another line of our cases also deals with the validity of certain kinds of presumptions. See Ulster County Court v. Allen, ante, p. 140; Barnes v. United States, 412 U. S. 837 (1973); Turner v. United States, 396 U. S. 398 (1970); Leary v. United States, 395 U. S. 6 (1969); United States v. Romano, 382 U. S. 136 (1965); United States v. Gainey, 380 U. S. 63 (1965); Roviaro v. United States, 353 U. S. 53 (1957); Tot v. United States, 319 U. S. 463 (1943). These eases did not, however, involve presumptions of the conclusive or persuasion-shifting variety. See Ulster County Court v. Allen, ante, at 157, and n. 16; and at 169 (Powell, J., dissenting); Mullaney v. Wilbur, supra, at 703 n. 31; Leary v. United States, supra, at 35; Roviaro v. United States, supra, at 63; C. McCormick, Evidence 831 (2d ed. 1972).
A line of even older cases urged upon us by respondent is equally inapplicable. In Agnew v. United States, 165 U. S. 36, 50 (1897), the trial court’s instruction expressly stated that the presumption was not conclusive, and this Court found that other problems with the instruction were cured by the charge considered as a whole. The other proffered eases simply involved general comments by the Court upon the validity of presuming intent from action. See Radio Officers v. NLRB, 347 U. S. 17, 45 (1954); Cramer v. United States, 325 U. S. 1, 31 (1945). See also Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145, 167 (1879) (religious objection to polygamy law not a defense).
The statute is set out at n. 1, supra. In State v. McKenzie, 177 Mont. 280, 327-328, 581 P. 2d 1205, 1232 (1978), the Montana Supreme Court stated:
“In Montana, a person commits the offense of deliberate homicide if he purposely or knowingly causes the death of another human being. Sections 94^5-102 (l)(a), 9A-5-101 (1), R. C. M. 1947. The statutorily defined dements of the offense, each of which the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt, are therefore causing the death of another human being with the knowledge that you are causing or with the purpose to cause the death of that human being.” (Emphasis added.)
Accord, State v. Collins, 178 Mont. 36, 45, 582 P. 2d 1179, 1184 (1978) (“committing the homicide 'purposely or knowingly’ is an element of deliberate homicide”).
Respondent agrees that “intent” and “purpose” are roughly synonymous, see also Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary 601 (1974), but contests the relevance of “intent” to “knowledge.” See Tr. of Oral Arg. 18; Brief for Respondent 8-9. This problem is discussed in Part IV, infra.
The jurors were instructed:
“INSTRUCTION NO. 7
“ ‘Knowingly’ is defined as follows: A person acts knowingly with respect to conduct or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when he is aware of his conduct or that the circumstance exists. A person acts knowingly with respect to the result of conduct described by a statute defining an offense when he is aware that it is highly probable that such result will be caused by his conduct. When knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a person is aware of a high probability of its existence. Equivalent terms such as ‘knowing’ or ‘with knowledge’ have the same meaning.
“INSTRUCTION NO. 8
“ ‘Purposely’ is defined as follows: A person acts purposely with respect to a result or to conduct described by a statute defining an offense if it is his conscious object to engage in that conduct or to cause that result.” App. 35-36.
Indeed, with respondent’s interpretation of “intends” as going solely to “purpose,” it would be surprising if the jury considered “knowledge” before it considered “purpose.” With the assistance of the presumption, the latter would have been easier to find than the former, and there is no reason to believe the jury would have deliberately undertaken the more difficult task.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | A | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
It appearing from the joint suggestion of mootness that, subsequent to the judgment of reversal by the Court of Appeals of the judgment of the District Court and the filing and granting of the petition for writ of certiorari, a consent judgment was entered by the District Court and that said judgment has been satisfied, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated and the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals with directions to dismiss the appeal as moot.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | I | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Rehnquist
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner is a Delaware corporation which has its principal place of business in Oklahoma. During the 1970’s it produced or purchased natural gas from leased land located in 11 different States, and sold most of the gas in interstate commerce. Respondents are some 28,000 of the royalty owners possessing rights to the leases from which petitioner produced the gas; they reside in all 50 States, the District of Columbia, and several foreign countries. Respondents brought a class action against petitioner in the Kansas state court, seeking to recover interest on royalty payments which had been delayed by petitioner. They recovered judgment in the trial court, and the Supreme Court of Kansas affirmed the judgment over petitioner’s contentions that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prevented Kansas from adjudicating the claims of all the respondents, and that the Due Process Clause and the Full Faith and Credit Clause of Article IV of the Constitution prohibited the application of Kansas law to all of the transactions between petitioner and respondents. 235 Kan. 195, 679 P. 2d 1159 (1984). We granted certiorari to consider these claims. 469 U. S. 879 (1984). We reject petitioner’s jurisdictional claim, but sustain its claim regarding the choice of law.
Because petitioner sold the gas to its customers in interstate commerce, it was required to secure approval for price increases from what was then the Federal Power Commission, and is now the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. Under its regulations the Federal Power Commission permitted petitioner to propose and collect tentative higher gas prices, subject to final approval by the Commission. If the Commission eventually denied petitioner’s proposed price increase or reduced the proposed increase, petitioner would have to refund to its customers the difference between the approved price and the higher price charged, plus interest at a rate set by statute. See 18 CFR § 154.102 (1984).
Although petitioner received higher gas prices pending review by the Commission, petitioner suspended any increase in royalties paid to the royalty owners because the higher price could be subject to recoupment by petitioner’s customers. Petitioner agreed to pay the higher royalty only if the royalty owners would provide petitioner with a bond or indemnity for the increase, plus interest, in case the price increase was not ultimately approved and a refund was due to the customers. Petitioner set the interest rate on the indemnity agreements at the same interest rate the Commission would have required petitioner to refund to its customers. A small percentage of the royalty owners provided this indemnity and received royalties immediately from the interim price increases; these royalty owners are unimportant to this case.
The remaining royalty owners received no royalty on the unapproved portion of the prices until the Federal Power Commission approval of those prices became final. Royalties on the unapproved portion of the gas price were suspended three times by petitioner, corresponding to. its three proposed price increases in the mid-1970’s. In three written opinions the Commission approved all of petitioner’s tentative price increases, so petitioner paid to its royalty owners the suspended royalties of $3.7 million in 1976, $4.7 million in 1977, and $2.9 million in 1978. Petitioner paid no interest to the royalty owners although it had the use of the suspended royalty money for a number of years.
Respondents Irl Shutts, Robert Anderson, and Betty Anderson filed suit against petitioner in Kansas state court, seeking interest payments on their suspended royalties which petitioner had possessed pending the Commission’s approval of the price increases. Shutts is a resident of Kansas, and the Andersons live in Oklahoma. Shutts and the Ander-sons own gas leases in Oklahoma and Texas. Over petitioner’s objection the Kansas trial court granted respondents’ motion to certify the suit as a class action under Kansas law. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-223 et seq. (1983). The class as certified was comprised of 33,000 royalty owners who had royalties suspended by petitioner. The average claim of each royalty owner for interest on the suspended royalties was $100.
After the class was certified respondents provided each class member with notice through first-class mail. The notice described the action and informed each class member that he could appear in person or by counsel; otherwise each member would be represented by Shutts and the Ander-sons, the named plaintiffs. The notices also stated that class members would be included in the class and bound by the judgment unless they “opted out” of the lawsuit by executing and returning a “request for exclusion” that was included with the notice. The final class as certified contained 28,100 members; 3,400 had “opted out” of the class by returning the request for exclusion, and notice could not be delivered to another 1,500 members, who were also excluded. Less than 1,000 of the class members resided in Kansas. Only a minuscule amount, approximately one quarter of one percent, of the gas leases involved in the lawsuit were on Kansas land.
After petitioner’s mandamus petition to decertify the class was denied, Phillips Petroleum v. Duckworth, No. 82-54608 (Kan., June 28, 1982), cert. denied, 459 U. S. 1103 (1983), the case was tried to the court. The court found petitioner liable under Kansas law for interest on the suspended royalties to all class members. The trial court relied heavily on an earlier, unrelated class action involving the same nominal plaintiff and the same defendant, Shutts, Executor v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 222 Kan. 527, 567 P. 2d 1292 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U. S. 1068 (1978). The Kansas Supreme Court had held in Shutts, Executor that a gas company owed interest to royalty owners for royalties suspended pending final Commission approval of a price increase. No federal statutes touched on the liability for suspended royalties, and the court in Shutts, Executor held as a matter of Kansas equity law that the applicable interest rates for computation of interest on suspended royalties were the interest rates at which the gas company would have had to reimburse its customers had its interim price increase been rejected by the Commission. The court in Shutts, Executor viewed these as the fairest interest rates because they were also the rates that petitioner required the royalty owners to meet in their indemnity agreements in order to avoid suspended royalties.
The trial court in the present case applied the rule from Shutts, Executor, and held petitioner liable for prejudgment and postjudgment interest on the suspended royalties, computed at the Commission rates governing petitioner’s three price increases. See 18 CPR §154.102 (1984). The applicable interest rates were: 7% for royalties retained until October 1974; 9% for royalties retained between October 1974 and September 1979; and thereafter at the average prime rate. The trial court did not determine whether any difference existed between the laws of Kansas and other States, or whether another State’s laws should be applied to non-Kansas plaintiffs or to royalties from leases in States other than Kansas. 235 Kan., at 221, 679 P. 2d, at 1180.
Petitioner raised two principal claims in its appeal to the Supreme Court of Kansas. It first asserted that the Kansas trial court did not possess personal jurisdiction over absent plaintiff class members as required by International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310 (1945), and similar cases. Related to this first claim was petitioner’s contention that the “opt-out” notice to absent class members, which forced them to return the request for exclusion in order to avoid the suit, was insufficient to bind class members who were not residents of Kansas or who did not possess “minimum contacts” with Kansas. Second, petitioner claimed that Kansas courts could not apply Kansas law to every claim in the dispute. The trial court should have looked to the laws of each State where the leases were located to determine, on the basis of conflict of laws principles, whether interest on the suspended royalties was recoverable, and at what rate.
The Supreme Court of Kansas held that the entire cause of action was maintainable under the Kansas class-action statute, and the court rejected both of petitioner’s claims. 235 Kan. 195, 679 P. 2d 1159 (1984). First, it held that the absent class members were plaintiffs, not defendants, and thus the traditional minimum contacts test of International Shoe did not apply. The court held that nonresident class-action plaintiffs were only entitled to adequate notice, an opportunity to be heard, an opportunity to opt out of the case, and adequate representation by the named plaintiffs. If these procedural due process minima were met, according to the court, Kansas could assert jurisdiction over the plaintiff class and bind each class member with a judgment on his claim. The court surveyed the course of the litigation and concluded that all of these minima had been met.
The court also rejected petitioner’s contention that Kansas law could not be applied to plaintiffs and royalty arrangements having no connection with Kansas. The court stated that generally the law of the forum controlled all claims unless “compelling reasons” existed to apply a different law. The court found no compelling reasons, and noted that “[t]he plaintiff class members have indicated their desire to have this action determined under the laws of Kansas.” 235 Kan., at 222, 679 P. 2d, at 1181. The court affirmed as a matter of Kansas equity law the award of interest on the suspended royalties, at the rates imposed by the trial court. The court set the postjudgment interest rate on all claims at the Kansas statutory rate of 15%. Id,., at 224, 679 P. 2d, at 1183.
H-I
As a threshold matter we must determine whether petitioner has standing to assert the claim that Kansas did not possess proper jurisdiction over the many plaintiffs in the class who were not Kansas residents and had no connection to Kansas. Respondents claim that a party generally may assert only his own rights, and that petitioner has no standing to assert the rights of its adversary, the plaintiff class, in order to defeat the judgment in favor of the class.
Standing to sue in any Article III court is, of course, a federal question which does not depend on the party’s prior standing in state court. Doremus v. Board of Education, 342 U. S. 429, 434 (1952); Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 204 (1962). Generally stated, federal standing requires an allegation of a present or immediate injury in fact, where the party requesting standing has “alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues.” Ibid. There must be some causal connection between the asserted injury and the challenged action, and the injury must be of the type “likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.” Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U. S. 464, 472 (1982). See Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U. S. 26, 41-42 (1976); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 261 (1977).
Additional prudential limitations on standing may exist even though the Article III requirements are met because “the judiciary seeks to avoid deciding questions of broad social import where no individual rights would be vindicated and to limit access to the federal courts to those litigants best suited to assert a particular claim.” Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U. S. 91, 99-100 (1979). One of these prudential limits on standing is that a litigant must normally assert his own legal interests rather than those of third parties. See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U. S. 106 (1976); Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190 (1976).
Respondents claim that petitioner is barred by the rule requiring that a party assert only his own rights; they point out that respondents and petitioner are adversaries and do not have allied interests such that petitioner would be a good proponent of class members’ interests. They further urge that petitioner’s interference is unneeded because the class members have had opportunity to complain about Kansas’ assertion of jurisdiction over their claim, but none have done so. See Singleton, supra, at 113-114.
Respondents may be correct that petitioner does not possess standing's tertii, but this is not the issue. Petitioner seeks to vindicate its own interests. As a class-action defendant petitioner is in a unique predicament. If Kansas does not possess jurisdiction over this plaintiff class, petitioner will be bound to 28,100 judgment holders scattered across the globe, but none of these will be bound by the Kansas decree. Petitioner could be subject to numerous later individual suits by these class members because a judgment issued without proper personal jurisdiction over an absent party is not entitled to full faith and credit elsewhere and thus has no res judicata effect as to that party. Whether it wins or loses on the merits, petitioner has a distinct and personal interest in seeing the entire plaintiff class bound by res judicata just as petitioner is bound. The only way a class-action defendant like petitioner can assure itself of this binding effect of the judgment is to ascertain that the forum court has jurisdiction over every plaintiff whose claim it seeks to adjudicate, sufficient to support a defense of res judicata in a later suit for damages by class members.
While it is true that a court adjudicating a dispute may not be able to predetermine the res judicata effect of its own judgment, petitioner has alleged that it would be obviously and immediately injured if this class-action judgment against it became final without binding the plaintiff class. We think that such an injury is sufficient to give petitioner standing on its own right to raise the jurisdiction claim in this Court.
Petitioner’s posture is somewhat similar to the trust settlor defendant in Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U. S. 235 (1958), who we found to have standing to challenge the forum’s personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state trust company which was an indispensable party under the forum State’s law. Because the court could not proceed with the action without jurisdiction over the trust company, we observed that “any defendant affected by the court’s judgment ha[d] that ‘direct and substantial personal interest in the outcome’ that is necessary to challenge whether that jurisdiction was in fact acquired.” Id., at 245, quoting Chicago v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 357 U. S. 77 (1958).
II
Reduced to its essentials, petitioner’s argument is that unless out-of-state plaintiffs affirmatively consent, the Kansas courts may not exert jurisdiction over their claims. Petitioner claims that failure to execute and return the “request for exclusion” provided with the class notice cannot constitute consent of the out-of-state plaintiffs; thus Kansas courts may exercise jurisdiction over these plaintiffs only if the plaintiffs possess the sufficient “minimum contacts” with Kansas as that term is used in cases involving personal jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants. E. g., International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310 (1945); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U. S. 186 (1977); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U. S. 286 (1980). Since Kansas had no prelitigation contact with many of the plaintiffs and leases involved, petitioner claims that Kansas has exceeded its jurisdictional reach and thereby violated the due process rights of the absent plaintiffs.
In International Shoe we were faced with an out-of-state corporation which sought to avoid the exercise of personal, jurisdiction over it as a defendant by a Washington state court. We held that the extent of the defendant’s due process protection would depend “upon the quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws....” 326 U. S., at 319. We noted that the Due Process Clause did not permit a State to make a binding judgment against a person with whom the State had no contacts, ties, or relations. Ibid. If the defendant possessed certain minimum contacts with the State, so that it was “reasonable and just, according to our traditional conception of fair play and substantial justice” for a State to exercise personal jurisdiction, the State could force the defendant to defend himself in the forum, upon pain of default, and could bind him to a judgment. Id., at 320.
The purpose of this test, of course, is to protect a defendant from the travail of defending in a distant forum, unless the defendant’s contacts with the forum make it just to force him to defend there. As we explained in Woodson, supra, the defendant’s contacts should be such that “he should reasonably anticipate being haled” into the forum. 444 U. S., at 297. In Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U. S. 694, 702-703, and n. 10 (1982), we explained that the requirement that a court have personal jurisdiction comes from the Due Process Clause’s protection of the defendant’s personal liberty interest, and said that the requirement “represents a restriction on judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of individual liberty.” (Footnote omitted.)
Although the cases like Shaffer and Woodson which petitioner relies on for a minimum contacts requirement all dealt with out-of-state defendants or parties in the procedural posture of a defendant, cf. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dunlevy, 241 U. S. 518 (1916); Estin v. Estin, 334 U. S. 541 (1948), petitioner claims that the same analysis must apply to absent class-action plaintiffs. In this regard petitioner correctly points out that a chose in action is a constitutionally recognized property interest possessed by each of the plaintiffs. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U. S. 306 (1950). An adverse judgment by Kansas courts in this case may extinguish the chose in action forever through res judicata. Such an adverse judgment, petitioner claims, would be every bit as onerous to an absent plaintiff as an adverse judgment on the merits would be to a defendant. Thus, the same due process protections should apply to absent plaintiffs: Kansas should not be able to exert jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ claims unless the plaintiffs have sufficient minimum contacts with Kansas.
We think petitioner’s premise is in error. The burdens placed by a State upon an absent class-action plaintiff are not of the same order or magnitude as those it places upon an absent defendant. An out-of-state defendant summoned by a plaintiff is faced with the full powers of the forum State to render judgment against it. The defendant must generally hire counsel and travel to the forum to defend itself from the plaintiff’s claim, or suffer a default judgment. The defendant may be forced to participate in extended and often costly discovery, and will be forced to respond in damages or to comply with some other form of remedy imposed by the court should it lose the suit. The defendant may also face liability for court costs and attorney’s fees. These burdens are substantial, and the minimum contacts requirement of the Due Process Clause prevents the forum State from unfairly imposing them upon the defendant.
A class-action plaintiff, however, is in quite a different posture. The Court noted this difference in Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U. S. 32, 40-41 (1940), which explained that a “class” or “representative” suit was an exception to the rule that one could not be bound by judgment in personam unless one was made fully a party in the traditional sense. Ibid., citing Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 (1878). As the Court pointed out in Hansberry, the class action was an invention of equity to enable it to proceed to a decree in suits where the number of those interested in the litigation was too great to permit joinder. The absent parties would be bound by the decree so long as the named parties adequately represented the absent class and the prosecution of the litigation was within the common interest. 311 U. S., at 41.
Modern plaintiff class actions follow the same goals, permitting litigation of a suit involving common questions when there are too many plaintiffs for proper joinder. Class actions also may permit the plaintiffs to pool claims which would be uneconomical to litigate individually. For example, this lawsuit involves claims averaging about $100 per plaintiff; most of the plaintiffs would have no realistic day in court if a class action were not available.
In sharp contrast to the predicament of a defendant haled into an out-of-state forum, the plaintiffs in this suit were not haled anywhere to defend themselves upon pain of a default judgment. As commentators have noted, from the plaintiffs’ point of view a class action resembles a “quasi-administrative proceeding, conducted by the judge.” 3B J. Moore & J. Kennedy, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶23.45 [4.-5] (1984); Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 Harv. L. Rev. 356, 398 (1967).
A plaintiff class in Kansas and numerous other jurisdictions cannot first be certified unless the judge, with the aid of the named plaintiffs and defendant, conducts an inquiry into the common nature of the named plaintiffs’ and the absent plaintiffs’ claims, the adequacy of representation, the jurisdiction possessed over the class, and any other matters that will bear upon proper representation of the absent plaintiffs’ interest. See, e. g., Kan. Stat. Ann. §60-223 (1983); Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23. Unlike a defendant in a civil suit, a class-action plaintiff is not required to fend for himself. See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-223(d) (1983). The court and named plaintiffs protect his interests. Indeed, the class-action defendant itself has a great interest in ensuring that the absent plaintiffs’ claims are properly before the forum. In this case, for example, the defendant sought to avoid class certification by alleging that the absent plaintiffs would not be adequately represented and were not amenable to jurisdiction. See Phillips Petroleum v. Duckworth, No. 82-54608 (Kan., June 28, 1982).
The concern of the typical class-action rules for the absent plaintiffs is manifested in other ways. Most jurisdictions, including Kansas, require that a class action, once certified, may not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court. In many jurisdictions such as Kansas the court may amend the pleadings to ensure that all sections of the class are represented adequately. Kan. Stat. Ann. §60-223(d) (1983); see also, e. g., Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23(d).
Besides this continuing solicitude for their rights, absent plaintiff class members are not subject to other burdens imposed upon defendants. They need not hire counsel or appear. They are almost never subject to counterclaims or cross-claims, or liability for fees or costs. Absent plaintiff class members are not subject to coercive or punitive remedies. Nor will an adverse judgment typically bind an absent plaintiff for any damages, although a valid adverse judgment may extinguish any of the plaintiff’s claims which were litigated.
Unlike a defendant in a normal civil suit, an absent class-action plaintiff is not required to do anything. He may sit back and allow the litigation to run its course, content in knowing that there are safeguards provided for his protection. In most class actions an absent plaintiff is provided at least with an opportunity to “opt out” of the class, and if he takes advantage of that opportunity he is removed from the litigation entirely. This was true of the Kansas proceedings in this case. The Kansas procedure provided for the mailing of a notice to each class member by first-class mail. The notice, as we have previously indicated, described the action and informed the class member that he could appear in person or by counsel, in default of which he would be represented by the named plaintiffs and their attorneys. The notice further stated that class members would be included in the class and bound by the judgment unless they “opted out” by executing and returning a “request for exclusion” that was included in the notice.
Petitioner contends, however, that the “opt out” procedure provided by Kansas is not good enough, and that an “opt in” procedure is required to satisfy the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Insofar as plaintiffs who have no minimum contacts with the forum State are concerned, an “opt in” provision would require that each class member affirmatively consent to his inclusion within the class.
Because States place fewer burdens upon absent class plaintiffs than they do upon absent defendants in nonclass suits, the Due Process Clause need not and does not afford the former as much protection from state-court jurisdiction as it does the latter. The Fourteenth Amendment does protect “persons,” not “defendants,” however, so absent plaintiffs as well as absent defendants are entitled to some protection from the jurisdiction of a forum State which seeks to adjudicate their claims. In this case we hold that a forum State may exercise jurisdiction over the claim of an absent class-action plaintiff, even though that plaintiff may not possess the minimum contacts with the forum which would support personal jurisdiction over a defendant. If the forum State wishes to bind an absent plaintiff concerning a claim for money damages or similar relief at law, it must provide minimal procedural due process protection. The plaintiff must receive notice plus an opportunity to be heard and participate in the litigation, whether in person or through counsel. The notice must be the best practicable, “reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” Mullane, 339 U. S., at 314-315; cf. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U. S. 156, 174-175 (1974). The notice should describe the action and the plaintiffs’ rights in it. Additionally, we hold that due process requires at a minimum that an absent plaintiff be provided with an opportunity to remove himself from the class by executing and returning an “opt out” or “request for exclusion” form to the court. Finally, the Due Process Clause of course requires that the named plaintiff at all times adequately represent the interests of the absent class members. Hansberry, 311 U. S., at 42-43, 45.
We reject petitioner’s contention that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that absent plaintiffs affirmatively “opt in” to the class, rather than be deemed members of the class if they do not “opt out.” We think that such a contention is supported by little, if any precedent, and that it ignores the differences between class-action plaintiffs, on the one hand, and defendants in nonclass civil suits on the other. Any plaintiff may consent to jurisdiction. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U. S. 770 (1984). The essential question, then, is how stringent the requirement for a showing of consent will be.
We think that the procedure followed by Kansas, where a fully descriptive notice is sent first-class mail to each class member, with an explanation of the right to “opt out,” satisfies due process. Requiring a plaintiff to affirmatively request inclusion would probably impede the prosecution of those class actions involving an aggregation of small individual claims, where a large number of claims are required to make it economical to bring suit. See, e. g., Eisen, supra, at 161. The plaintiff’s claim may be so small, or the plaintiff so unfamiliar with the law, that he would not file suit individually, nor would he affirmatively request inclusion in the class if such a request were required by the Constitution. If, on the other hand, the plaintiff’s claim is sufficiently large or important that he wishes to litigate it on his own, he will likely have retained an attorney or have thought about filing suit, and should be fully capable of exercising his right to “opt out.”
In this case over 3,400 members of the potential class did “opt out,” which belies the contention that “opt out” procedures result in guaranteed jurisdiction by inertia. Another 1,500 were excluded because the notice and “opt out” form was undeliverable. We think that such results show that the “opt out” procedure provided by Kansas is by no means pro forma, and that the Constitution does not require more to protect what must be the somewhat rare species of class member who is unwilling to execute an “opt out” form, but whose claim is nonetheless so important that he cannot be presumed to consent to being a member of the class by his failure to do so. Petitioner’s “opt in” requirement would require the invalidation of score's of state statutes and of the class-action provision of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and for the reasons stated we do not think that the Constitution requires the State to sacrifice the obvious advantages in judicial efficiency resulting from the “opt out” approach for the protection of the rara avis portrayed by petitioner.
We therefore hold that the protection afforded the plaintiff class members by the Kansas statute satisfies the Due Process Clause. The interests of the absent plaintiffs are sufficiently protected by the forum State when those plaintiffs are provided with a request for exclusion that can be returned within a reasonable time to the court. See Insurance Corp. of Ireland, 456 U. S., at 702-703, and n. 10. Both the Kansas trial court and the Supreme Court of Kansas held that the class received adequate representation, and no party disputes that conclusion here. We conclude that the Kansas court properly asserted personal jurisdiction over the absent plaintiffs and their claims against petitioner.
HH HH 1 — 1
The Kansas courts applied Kansas contract and Kansas equity law to every claim in this case, notwithstanding that over 99% of the gas leases and some 97% of the plaintiffs in the case had no apparent connection to the State of Kansas except for this lawsuit. Petitioner protested that the Kansas courts should apply the laws of the States where the leases were located, or at least apply Texas and Oklahoma law because so many of the leases came from those States. The Kansas courts disregarded this contention and found petitioner liable for interest on the suspended royalties as a matter of Kansás law, and set the interest rates under Kansas equity principles.
Petitioner contends that total application of Kansas substantive law violated the constitutional limitations on choice of law mandated by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Full Faith and Credit Clause of Article IV, § 1. We must first determine whether Kansas law conflicts in any material way with any other law which could apply. There can be no injury in applying Kansas law if it is not in conflict with that of any other jurisdiction connected to this suit.
Petitioner claims that Kansas law conflicts with that of a number of States connected to this litigation, especially Texas and Oklahoma. These putative conflicts range from the direct to the tangential, and may be addressed by the Supreme Court of Kansas on remand under the correct constitutional standard. For example, there is no recorded Oklahoma decision dealing with interest liability for suspended royalties: whether Oklahoma is likely to impose liability would require a survey of Oklahoma oil and gas law. Even if Oklahoma found such liability, petitioner shows that Oklahoma would most likely apply its constitutional and statutory 6% interest rate rather than the much higher Kansas rates applied in this litigation. Okla. Const., Art XIV, §2; Okla. Stat., Tit. 15, §266 (Supp. 1984-1985); Rendezvous Trails of America, Inc. v. Ayers, 612 P. 2d 1384, 1385 (Okla. App. 1980); Smith v. Robinson, 594 P. 2d 364 (Okla. 1979); West Edmond Hunton Lime Unit v. Young, 325 P. 2d 1047 (Okla. 1958).
Additionally, petitioner points to an Oklahoma statute which excuses liability for interest if a creditor accepts payment of the full principal without a claim for interest, Okla. Stat., Tit. 23, §8 (1951). Cf. Webster Drilling Co. v. Sterling Oil of Oklahoma, Inc., 376 P. 2d 236 (Okla. 1962). Petitioner contends that by ignoring this statute the Kansas courts created liability that does not exist in Oklahoma.
Petitioner also points out several conflicts between Kansas and Texas law. Although Texas recognizes interest liability for suspended royalties, Texas has never awarded any such interest at a rate greater than 6%, which corresponds with the Texas constitutional and statutory rate. Tex. Const., Art. 16, § 11; Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann., Art. 5069-1.03 (Vernon 1971). See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Stahl Petroleum Co., 569 S. W. 2d 480 (Tex. 1978); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Adams, 513 F. 2d 355 (CA5), cert. denied, 423 U. S. 930 (1975); cf. Maxey v. Texas Commerce Bank, 580 S. W. 2d 340, 341 (Tex. 1979). Moreover, at least one court interpreting Texas law appears to have held that Texas excuses interest liability once the gas company offers to take an indemnity from the royalty owner and pay him the suspended royalty while the price increase is still tentative. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Riverside Gas Compression Co., 409 F. Supp. 486, 495-496 (ND Tex. 1976). Such a rule is contrary to Kansas law as applied below, but if applied to the Texas plaintiffs or leases in this case, would vastly reduce petitioner’s liability.
The conflicts on the applicable interest rates, alone — which we do not think can be labeled “false conflicts” without a more thoroughgoing treatment than was accorded them by the Supreme Court of Kansas — certainly amounted to millions of dollars in liability. We think that the Supreme Court of Kansas erred in deciding on the basis that it did that the application of its laws to all claims would be constitutional.
Four Terms ago we addressed a similar situation in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U. S. 302 (1981). In that case we were confronted with two conflicting rules of state insurance law. Minnesota permitted the “stacking” of separate uninsured motorist policies while Wisconsin did not. Although the decedent lived in Wisconsin, took out insurance policies and was killed there, he was employed in Minnesota, and after his death his widow moved to Minnesota for reasons unrelated to the litigation, and was appointed personal representative of his estate. She filed suit in Minnesota courts, which applied the Minnesota stacking rule.
The plurality in Allstate noted that a particular set of facts giving rise to litigation could justify, constitutionally, the application of more than one jurisdiction’s laws. The plurality recognized, however, that the Due Process Clause and the Full Faith and Credit Clause provided modest restrictions on the application of forum law. These restrictions required “that for a State’s substantive law to be selected in a constitutionally permissible manner, that State must have a significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.” Id., at 312-313. The dissenting Justices were in substantial agreement with this principle. Id., at 332 (opinion of Powell, J., joined by Burger, C. J., and Rehnquist, J.). The dissent stressed that the Due Process Clause prohibited the application of law which was only casually or slightly related to the litigation, while the Full Faith and Credit Clause required the forum to respect the laws and judgments of other States, subject to the forum’s own interests in furthering its public policy. Id., at 335-336.
The plurality in Allstate affirmed the application of Minnesota law because of the forum’s significant contacts to the litigation which supported the State’s interest in applying its law. See id., at 313-329. Kansas’ contacts to this litigation, as explained by the Kansas Supreme Court, can be gleaned from the opinion below.
Petitioner owns
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | D | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice KAGAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
In two basically identical statutes passed in the early 1990s, Congress sought to strip the States of their sovereign immunity from patent and copyright infringement suits. Not long after, this Court held in Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 119 S.Ct. 2199, 144 L.Ed.2d 575 (1999), that the patent statute lacked a valid constitutional basis. Today, we take up the copyright statute. We find that our decision in Florida Prepaid compels the same conclusion.
I
In 1717, the pirate Edward Teach, better known as Blackbeard, captured a French slave ship in the West Indies and renamed her Queen Anne's Revenge. The vessel became his flagship. Carrying some 40 cannons and 300 men, the Revenge took many prizes as she sailed around the Caribbean and up the North American coast. But her reign over those seas was short-lived. In 1718, the ship ran aground on a sandbar a mile off Beaufort, North Carolina. Blackbeard and most of his crew escaped without harm. Not so the Revenge. She sank beneath the waters, where she lay undisturbed for nearly 300 years.
In 1996, a marine salvage company named Intersal, Inc., discovered the shipwreck. Under federal and state law, the wreck belongs to North Carolina. See 102 Stat. 433, 43 U.S.C. § 2105(c) ; N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 121-22 (2019). But the State contracted with Intersal to take charge of the recovery activities. Intersal in turn retained petitioner Frederick Allen, a local videographer, to document the operation. For over a decade, Allen created videos and photos of divers' efforts to salvage the Revenge's guns, anchors, and other remains. He registered copyrights in all those works.
This suit arises from North Carolina's publication of some of Allen's videos and photos. Allen first protested in 2013 that the State was infringing his copyrights by uploading his work to its website without permission. To address that allegation, North Carolina agreed to a settlement paying Allen $15,000 and laying out the parties' respective rights to the materials. But Allen and the State soon found themselves embroiled in another dispute. Allen complained that North Carolina had impermissibly posted five of his videos online and used one of his photos in a newsletter. When the State declined to admit wrongdoing, Allen filed this action in Federal District Court. It charges the State with copyright infringement (call it a modern form of piracy) and seeks money damages.
North Carolina moved to dismiss the suit on the ground of sovereign immunity. It invoked the general rule that federal courts cannot hear suits brought by individuals against nonconsenting States. See State Defendants' Memorandum in No. 15-627 (EDNC), Doc. 50, p. 7. But Allen responded that an exception to the rule applied because Congress had abrogated the States' sovereign immunity from suits like his. See Plaintiffs' Response, Doc. 57, p. 7. The Copyright Remedy Clarification Act of 1990 (CRCA or Act) provides that a State "shall not be immune, under the Eleventh Amendment [or] any other doctrine of sovereign immunity, from suit in Federal court" for copyright infringement. 17 U.S.C. § 511(a). And the Act specifies that in such a suit a State will be liable, and subject to remedies, "in the same manner and to the same extent as" a private party. § 501(a); see § 511(b). That meant, Allen contended, that his suit against North Carolina could go forward.
The District Court agreed. Quoting the CRCA's text, the court first found that "Congress has stated clearly its intent to abrogate sovereign immunity for copyright claims against a state." 244 F.Supp.3d 525, 533 (E.D.N.C. 2017). And that abrogation, the court next held, had a proper constitutional basis. Florida Prepaid and other precedent, the District Court acknowledged, precluded Congress from using its Article I powers-including its authority over copyrights-to take away a State's sovereign immunity. See 244 F.Supp.3d at 534. But in the court's view, Florida Prepaid left open an alternative route to abrogation. Given the States' "pattern" of "abus[ive]" copyright infringement, the court held, Congress could accomplish its object under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 244 F.Supp.3d at 535.
On interlocutory appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed. It read Florida Prepaid to prevent recourse to Section 5 no less than to Article I. A Section 5 abrogation, the Fourth Circuit explained, must be "congruent and proportional" to the Fourteenth Amendment injury it seeks to remedy. 895 F.3d 337, 350 (2018). Florida Prepaid had applied that principle to reject Congress's attempt, in the Patent Remedy Act, to abolish the States' immunity from patent infringement suits. See 527 U.S. at 630, 119 S.Ct. 2199. In the Fourth Circuit's view, nothing distinguished the CRCA. That abrogation, the court reasoned, was "equally broad" and rested on a "similar legislative record" of constitutional harm. 895 F.3d at 352. So Section 5 could not save the law.
Because the Court of Appeals held a federal statute invalid, this Court granted certiorari. 587 U.S. ----, 139 S.Ct. 2664, 204 L.Ed.2d 1068 (2019). We now affirm.
II
In our constitutional scheme, a federal court generally may not hear a suit brought by any person against a nonconsenting State. That bar is nowhere explicitly set out in the Constitution. The text of the Eleventh Amendment (the single most relevant provision) applies only if the plaintiff is not a citizen of the defendant State. But this Court has long understood that Amendment to "stand not so much for what it says" as for the broader "presupposition of our constitutional structure which it confirms." Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779, 111 S.Ct. 2578, 115 L.Ed.2d 686 (1991). That premise, the Court has explained, has several parts. First, "each State is a sovereign entity in our federal system." Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996). Next, "[i]t is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to [a] suit" absent consent. Id., at 54 n. 13, 116 S.Ct. 1114 (quoting The Federalist No. 81, p. 487 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton)). And last, that fundamental aspect of sovereignty constrains federal "judicial authority." Blatchford, 501 U.S. at 779, 111 S.Ct. 2578.
But not entirely. This Court has permitted a federal court to entertain a suit against a nonconsenting State on two conditions. First, Congress must have enacted "unequivocal statutory language" abrogating the States' immunity from the suit. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 56, 116 S.Ct. 1114 (internal quotation marks omitted);
see Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 228, 109 S.Ct. 2397, 105 L.Ed.2d 181 (1989) (requiring Congress to "mak[e] its intention unmistakably clear"). And second, some constitutional provision must allow Congress to have thus encroached on the States' sovereignty. Not even the most crystalline abrogation can take effect unless it is "a valid exercise of constitutional authority." Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 78, 120 S.Ct. 631, 145 L.Ed.2d 522 (2000).
No one here disputes that Congress used clear enough language to abrogate the States' immunity from copyright infringement suits. As described above, the CRCA provides that States "shall not be immune" from those actions in federal court. § 511(a) ; see supra, at 999 - 1000. And the Act specifies that a State stands in the identical position as a private defendant-exposed to liability and remedies "in the same manner and to the same extent." § 501(a); see § 511(b). So there is no doubt what Congress meant to accomplish. Indeed, this Court held in Florida Prepaid that the essentially verbatim provisions of the Patent Remedy Act "could not have [made] any clearer" Congress's intent to remove the States' immunity. 527 U.S. at 635, 119 S.Ct. 2199.
The contested question is whether Congress had authority to take that step. Allen maintains that it did, under either of two constitutional provisions. He first points to the clause in Article I empowering Congress to provide copyright protection. If that fails, he invokes Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which authorizes Congress to "enforce" the commands of the Due Process Clause. Neither contention can succeed. The slate on which we write today is anything but clean. Florida Prepaid, along with other precedent, forecloses each of Allen's arguments.
A
Congress has power under Article I "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." § 8, cl. 8. That provision-call it the Intellectual Property Clause-enables Congress to grant both copyrights and patents. And the monopoly rights so given impose a corresponding duty (i.e., not to infringe) on States no less than private parties. See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 560, 93 S.Ct. 2303, 37 L.Ed.2d 163 (1973).
In Allen's view, Congress's authority to abrogate sovereign immunity from copyright suits naturally follows. Abrogation is the single best-or maybe, he says, the only-way for Congress to "secur[e]" a copyright holder's "exclusive Right[s]" as against a State's intrusion. See Brief for Petitioners 20 (quoting Art. I, § 8, cl. 8). So, Allen contends, the authority to take that step must fall within the Article I grant of power to protect intellectual property.
The problem for Allen is that this Court has already rejected his theory. The Intellectual Property Clause, as just noted, covers copyrights and patents alike. So it was the first place the Florida Prepaid Court looked when deciding whether the Patent Remedy Act validly stripped the States of immunity from infringement suits. In doing so, we acknowledged the reason for Congress to put "States on the same footing as private parties" in patent litigation. 527 U.S. at 647, 119 S.Ct. 2199. It was, just as Allen says here, to ensure "uniform, surefire protection" of intellectual property. Reply Brief 10. That was a "proper Article I concern," we allowed. 527 U.S. at 648, 119 S.Ct. 2199. But still, we said, Congress could not use its Article I power over patents to remove the States' immunity.
We based that conclusion on Seminole Tribe v. Florida, decided three years earlier. There, the Court had held that "Article I cannot be used to circumvent" the limits sovereign immunity "place[s] upon federal jurisdiction." 517 U.S. at 73, 116 S.Ct. 1114. That proscription ended the matter. Because Congress could not "abrogate state sovereign immunity [under] Article I," Florida Prepaid explained, the Intellectual Property Clause could not support the Patent Remedy Act. 527 U.S. at 636, 119 S.Ct. 2199. And to extend the point to this case: if not the Patent Remedy Act, not its copyright equivalent either, and for the same reason. Here too, the power to "secur[e]" an intellectual property owner's "exclusive Right" under Article I stops when it runs into sovereign immunity. § 8, cl. 8.
Allen claims, however, that a later case offers an exit ramp from Florida Prepaid. In Central Va. Community College v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 359, 126 S.Ct. 990, 163 L.Ed.2d 945 (2006), we held that Article I's Bankruptcy Clause enables Congress to subject nonconsenting States to bankruptcy proceedings (there, to recover a preferential transfer). We thus exempted the Bankruptcy Clause from Seminole Tribe's general rule that Article I cannot justify haling a State into federal court. In bankruptcy, we decided, sovereign immunity has no place. But if that is true, Allen asks, why not say the same thing here? Allen reads Katz as "adopt[ing] a clause-by-clause approach to evaluating whether a particular clause of Article I" allows the abrogation of sovereign immunity. Brief for Petitioners 20. And he claims that the Intellectual Property Clause "supplies singular warrant" for Congress to take that step. Ibid. That is so, Allen reiterates, because "Congress could not'secur[e]' authors' 'exclusive Right' to their works if [it] were powerless" to make States pay for infringing conduct. Ibid.
But everything in Katz is about and limited to the Bankruptcy Clause; the opinion reflects what might be called bankruptcy exceptionalism. In part, Katz rested on the "singular nature" of bankruptcy jurisdiction. 546 U.S. at 369, n. 9, 126 S.Ct. 990. That jurisdiction is, and was at the Founding, "principally in rem "-meaning that it is "premised on the debtor and his estate, and not on the creditors" (including a State). Id., at 369-370, 126 S.Ct. 990 (internal quotation marks omitted). For that reason, we thought, "it does not implicate States' sovereignty to nearly the same degree as other kinds of jurisdiction." Id., at 362, 126 S.Ct. 990. In remaining part, Katz focused on the Bankruptcy Clause's "unique history." Id., at 369 n. 9, 126 S.Ct. 990. The Clause emerged from a felt need to curb the States' authority. The States, we explained, "had wildly divergent schemes" for discharging debt, and often "refus[ed] to respect one another's discharge orders." Id., at 365, 377, 126 S.Ct. 990. "[T]he Framers' primary goal" in adopting the Clause was to address that problem-to stop "competing sovereigns[ ]" from interfering with a debtor's discharge. Id., at 373, 126 S.Ct. 990. And in that project, the Framers intended federal courts to play a leading role. The nation's first Bankruptcy Act, for example, empowered those courts to order that States release people they were holding in debtors' prisons. See id., at 374, 126 S.Ct. 990. So through and through, we thought, the Bankruptcy Clause embraced the idea that federal courts could impose on state sovereignty. In that, it was sui generis -again, "unique"-among Article I's grants of authority. Id., at 369 n. 9, 126 S.Ct. 990.
Indeed, Katz's view of the Bankruptcy Clause had a yet more striking aspect, which further separates it from any other. The Court might have concluded from its analysis that the Clause allows Congress to abrogate the States' sovereign immunity (as Allen argues the Intellectual Property Clause does). But it did not; it instead went further. Relying on the above account of the Framers' intentions, the Court found that the Bankruptcy Clause itself did the abrogating. Id., at 379, 126 S.Ct. 990 ("[T]he relevant 'abrogation' is the one effected in the plan of the [Constitutional] Convention"). Or stated another way, we decided that no congressional abrogation was needed because the States had already "agreed in the plan of the Convention not to assert any sovereign immunity defense" in bankruptcy proceedings. Id., at 377, 126 S.Ct. 990. We therefore discarded our usual rule-which Allen accepts as applying here-that Congress must speak, and indeed speak unequivocally, to abrogate sovereign immunity. Compare id., at 378-379, 126 S.Ct. 990 ("[O]ur decision today" does not "rest[ ] on any statement Congress ha[s] made on the subject of state sovereign immunity"), with supra, at 1000 - 1001 (our ordinary rule). Our decision, in short, viewed bankruptcy as on a different plane, governed by principles all its own. Nothing in that understanding invites the kind of general, "clause-by-clause" reexamination of Article I that Allen proposes. See supra, at 1002. To the contrary, it points to a good-for-one-clause-only holding.
And even if Katz's confines were not so clear, Florida Prepaid, together with stare decisis, would still doom Allen's argument. As Allen recognizes, if the Intellectual Property Clause permits the CRCA's abrogation, it also would permit the Patent Remedy Act's. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 9 (predicting that if his position prevailed, "ultimately, the Patent Remedy Act would be revisited and properly upheld as a valid exercise of Congress's Article I power"). Again, there is no difference between copyrights and patents under the Clause, nor any material difference between the two statutes' provisions. See supra, at 999, and n. 1, 6. So we would have to overrule Florida Prepaid if we were to decide this case Allen's way. But stare decisis, this Court has understood, is a "foundation stone of the rule of law." Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, 572 U.S. 782, 798, 134 S.Ct. 2024, 188 L.Ed.2d 1071 (2014). To reverse a decision, we demand a "special justification," over and above the belief "that the precedent was wrongly decided." Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 573 U.S. 258, 266, 134 S.Ct. 2398, 189 L.Ed.2d 339 (2014). Allen offers us nothing special at all; he contends only that if the Court were to use a clause-by-clause approach, it would discover that Florida Prepaid was wrong (because, he says again, the decision misjudged Congress's authority under the Intellectual Property Clause). See Brief for Petitioners 37; supra, at 1002. And with that charge of error alone, Allen cannot overcome stare decisis.
B
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, unlike almost all of Article I, can authorize Congress to strip the States of immunity. The Fourteenth Amendment "fundamentally altered the balance of state and federal power" that the original Constitution and the Eleventh Amendment struck. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59, 116 S.Ct. 1114. Its first section imposes prohibitions on the States, including (as relevant here) that none may "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." Section 5 then gives Congress the "power to enforce, by appropriate legislation," those limitations on the States' authority. That power, the Court has long held, may enable Congress to abrogate the States' immunity and thus subject them to suit in federal court. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456, 96 S.Ct. 2666, 49 L.Ed.2d 614 (1976).
For an abrogation statute to be "appropriate" under Section 5, it must be tailored to "remedy or prevent" conduct infringing the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive prohibitions. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519, 117 S.Ct. 2157, 138 L.Ed.2d 624 (1997). Congress can permit suits against States for actual violations of the rights guaranteed in Section 1. See Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 456, 96 S.Ct. 2666. And to deter those violations, it can allow suits against States for "a somewhat broader swath of conduct," including acts constitutional in themselves. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 81, 120 S.Ct. 631. But Congress cannot use its "power to enforce" the Fourteenth Amendment to alter what that Amendment bars. See id., at 88, 120 S.Ct. 631 (prohibiting Congress from "substantively redefin[ing]" the Fourteenth Amendment's requirements). That means a congressional abrogation is valid under Section 5 only if it sufficiently connects to conduct courts have held Section 1 to proscribe.
To decide whether a law passes muster, this Court has framed a type of means-end test. For Congress's action to fall within its Section 5 authority, we have said, "[t]here must be a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end." Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520, 117 S.Ct. 2157. On the one hand, courts are to consider the constitutional problem Congress faced-both the nature and the extent of state conduct violating the Fourteenth Amendment. That assessment usually (though not inevitably) focuses on the legislative record, which shows the evidence Congress had before it of a constitutional wrong. See Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 646, 119 S.Ct. 2199. On the other hand, courts are to examine the scope of the response Congress chose to address that injury. Here, a critical question is how far, and for what reasons, Congress has gone beyond redressing actual constitutional violations. Hard problems often require forceful responses and, as noted above, Section 5 allows Congress to "enact[ ] reasonably prophylactic legislation" to deter constitutional harm. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 88, 120 S.Ct. 631 ; Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536, 117 S.Ct. 2157 (Congress's conclusions on that score are "entitled to much deference"); supra, at 1003 - 1004. But "[s]trong measures appropriate to address one harm may be an unwarranted response to another, lesser one." Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530, 117 S.Ct. 2157. Always, what Congress has done must be in keeping with the Fourteenth Amendment rules it has the power to "enforce."
All this raises the question: When does the Fourteenth Amendment care about copyright infringement? Sometimes, no doubt. Copyrights are a form of property. See Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 128, 52 S.Ct. 546, 76 L.Ed. 1010 (1932). And the Fourteenth Amendment bars the States from "depriv[ing]" a person of property "without due process of law." But even if sometimes, by no means always. Under our precedent, a merely negligent act does not "deprive" a person of property. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328, 106 S.Ct. 662, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986). So an infringement must be intentional, or at least reckless, to come within the reach of the Due Process Clause. See id., at 334, n. 3, 106 S.Ct. 662 (reserving whether reckless conduct suffices). And more: A State cannot violate that Clause unless it fails to offer an adequate remedy for an infringement, because such a remedy itself satisfies the demand of "due process." See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984). That means within the broader world of state copyright infringement is a smaller one where the Due Process Clause comes into play.
Because the same is true of patent infringement, Florida Prepaid again serves as the critical precedent. That decision defined the scope of unconstitutional infringement in line with the caselaw cited above-as intentional conduct for which there is no adequate state remedy. See 527 U.S., at 642-643, 645, 119 S.Ct. 2199. It then searched for evidence of that sort of infringement in the legislative record of the Patent Remedy Act. And it determined that the statute's abrogation of immunity-again, the equivalent of the CRCA's-was out of all proportion to what it found. That analysis is the starting point of our inquiry here. And indeed, it must be the ending point too unless the evidence of unconstitutional infringement is materially different for copyrights than patents. Consider once more, then, Florida Prepaid, now not on Article I but on Section 5.
In enacting the Patent Remedy Act, Florida Prepaid found, Congress did not identify a pattern of unconstitutional patent infringement. To begin with, we explained, there was only thin evidence of States infringing patents at all-putting aside whether those actions violated due process. The House Report, recognizing that "many states comply with patent law," offered just two examples of patent infringement suits against the States. Id., at 640, 119 S.Ct. 2199 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 101-960, pt. 1, p. 38 (1990)). The appellate court below, boasting some greater research prowess, discovered another seven in the century-plus between 1880 and 1990. See 527 U.S. at 640, 119 S.Ct. 2199. Even the bill's House sponsor conceded the lack of "any evidence" of "widespread violation of patent laws." Id., at 641, 119 S.Ct. 2199 (quoting statement of Rep. Kastenmeier). What was more, there was no evidence that any instance of infringement by States crossed constitutional lines. Congress, we observed, "did not focus" on intentional or reckless conduct; to the contrary, the legislative record suggested that "most state infringement was innocent or at worst negligent." Id., at 645, 119 S.Ct. 2199. And similarly, Congress "barely considered the availability of state remedies for patent infringement." Id., at 643, 119 S.Ct. 2199. So, we concluded, nothing could support the idea that States were more than sporadically (if that) "depriving patent owners of property without due process of law." Id., at 646, 119 S.Ct. 2199.
Given that absence of evidence, Florida Prepaid held, the Patent Remedy Act swept too far. Recall what the Patent Remedy Act did-and did not. It abrogated sovereign immunity for any and every patent suit, thereby "plac[ing] States on the same footing as private parties." Id., at 647, 119 S.Ct. 2199. It did not set any limits. It did not, for example, confine the abrogation to suits alleging "nonnegligent infringement or infringement authorized [by] state policy." Ibid. Neither did it target States refusing to offer alternative remedies to patent holders. No, it exposed all States to the hilt-on a record that failed to show they had caused any discernible constitutional harm (or, indeed, much harm at all). That imbalance made it impossible to view the legislation "as responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior." Id., at 646, 119 S.Ct. 2199 (quoting Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532, 117 S.Ct. 2157 ). The statute's "indiscriminate scope" was too "out of proportion" to any due process problem. 527 U.S. at 646-647, 119 S.Ct. 2199. It aimed not to correct such a problem, but to "provide a uniform remedy for patent infringement" writ large. Id., at 647, 119 S.Ct. 2199. The Patent Remedy Act, in short, did not "enforce" Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment-and so was not "appropriate" under Section 5.
Could, then, this case come out differently? Given the identical scope of the CRCA and Patent Remedy Act, that could happen only if the former law responded to materially stronger evidence of infringement, especially of the unconstitutional kind. Allen points to a significant disparity in how Congress created a record for the two statutes. See Brief for Petitioners 7-10, 47-50. Before enacting the CRCA, Congress asked the then-Register of Copyrights, Ralph Oman, to submit a report about the effects of the Eleventh Amendment on copyright enforcement. Oman and his staff conducted a year-long examination, which included a request for public comments eliciting letters from about 40 copyright holders and industry groups. The final 158-page report concluded that "copyright proprietors have demonstrated they will suffer immediate harm if they are unable to sue infringing states in federal court." Copyright Office, Copyright Liability of States and the Eleventh Amendment 103 (1988) (Oman Report). Is that report enough, as Allen claims, to flip Florida Prepaid's outcome when it comes to copyright cases against the States?
It is not. Behind the headline-grabbing conclusion, nothing in the Oman Report, or the rest of the legislative record, cures the problems we identified in Florida Prepaid. As an initial matter, the concrete evidence of States infringing copyrights (even ignoring whether those acts violate due process) is scarcely more impressive than what the Florida Prepaid Court saw. Despite undertaking an exhaustive search, Oman came up with only a dozen possible examples of state infringement. He listed seven court cases brought against States (with another two dismissed on the merits) and five anecdotes taken from public comments (but not further corroborated). See Oman Report, at 7-9, 90-97. In testifying about the report, Oman acknowledged that state infringement is "not widespread" and "the States are not going to get involved in wholesale violation of the copyright laws." Hearings on H. R. 1131 before the Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of Justice, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 53 (1989) (House Hearings). Indeed, he opined: "They are all respectful of the copyright law" and "will continue to respect the law"; what State, after all, would "want[ ] to get a reputation as a copyright pirate?" Id., at 8. The bill's House and Senate sponsors got the point. The former admitted that "there have not been any significant number" of copyright violations by States. Id., at 48 (Rep. Kastenmeier). And the latter conceded he could not currently see "a big problem." Hearings on S. 497 before the Subcommittee on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 130 (1989) (Sen. DeConcini). This is not, to put the matter charitably, the stuff from which Section 5 legislation ordinarily arises.
And it gets only worse. Neither the Oman Report nor any other part of the legislative record shows concern with whether the States' copyright infringements (however few and far between) violated the Due Process Clause. Of the 12 infringements listed in the report, only two appear intentional, as they must be to raise a constitutional issue. See Oman Report, at 7-8, 91 (describing a judicial finding of "willful" infringement and a public comment charging continued infringement after a copyright owner complained). As Oman testified, the far greater problem was the frequency of "honest mistakes" or "innocent" misunderstandings; the benefit of the bill, he therefore thought, would be to "guard against sloppiness." House Hearings, at 9. Likewise, the legislative record contains no information about the availability of state-law remedies for copyright infringement (such as contract or unjust enrichment suits)-even though they might themselves satisfy due process. Those deficiencies in the record match the ones Florida Prepaid emphasized. See 527 U.S. at 643-645, 119 S.Ct. 2199. Here no less than there, they signal an absence of constitutional harm.
Under Florida Prepaid, the CRCA thus must fail our "congruence and proportionality" test. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520, 117 S.Ct. 2157. As just shown, the evidence of Fourteenth Amendment injury supporting the CRCA and the Patent Remedy Act is equivalent-for both, that is, exceedingly slight. And the scope of the two statutes is identical-extending to every infringement case against a State. It follows that the balance the laws strike between constitutional wrong and statutory remedy is correspondingly askew. In this case, as in Florida Prepaid, the law's "indiscriminate scope" is "out of proportion" to any due process problem. 527 U.S. at 646-647, 119 S.Ct. 2199 ; see supra, at 1005 - 1006. In this case, as in that one, the statute aims to "provide a uniform remedy" for statutory infringement, rather than to redress or prevent unconstitutional conduct. 527 U.S. at 647, 119 S.Ct. 2199 ; see supra, at 1005 - 1006. And so in this case, as in that one, the law is invalid under Section 5.
That conclusion, however, need not prevent Congress from passing a valid copyright abrogation law in the future. In doing so, Congress would presumably approach the issue differently than when it passed the CRCA. At that time, the Court had not yet decided Seminole Tribe, so Congress probably thought that Article I could support its all-out abrogation of immunity. See supra, at 1002. And to the extent it relied on Section 5, Congress acted before this Court created the "congruence and proportionality" test. See supra, at 1004. For that reason, Congress likely did not appreciate the importance of linking the scope of its abrogation to the redress or prevention of unconstitutional injuries-and of creating a legislative record to back up that connection. But going forward, Congress will know those rules. And under them, if it detects violations of due process, then it may enact a proportionate response. That kind of tailored statute can effectively stop States from behaving as copyright pirates. Even while respecting constitutional limits, it can bring digital Blackbeards to justice.
III
Florida Prepaid all but prewrote our decision today. That precedent made clear that Article I's Intellectual Property Clause could not provide the basis for an abrogation of sovereign immunity. And it held that Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment could not support an abrogation on a legislative record like the one here. For both those reasons, we affirm the judgment below.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | J | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam:
The motion of the Government to remand the case to the District Court is denied.
The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to the District Court with instructions to grant the defendants a new trial.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Burton, and Mr. Justice Harlan dissent, believing the Government’s motion to remand should be granted, and reserve the right to file an opinion.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | A | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Souter
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondent David Lanier was convicted under 18 U. S. C. § 242 of criminally violating the constitutional rights of five women by assaulting them sexually while Lanier served as a state judge. The Sixth Circuit reversed his convictions on the ground that the constitutional right in issue had not previously been identified by this Court in a case with fundamentally similar facts. The question is whether this standard of notice is higher than the Constitution requires, and we hold that it is.
I
David Lanier was formerly the sole state Chancery Court judge for two rural counties in western Tennessee. The trial record, read most favorably to the jury’s verdict, shows that from 1989 to 1991, while Lanier was in office, he sexually assaulted several women in his judicial chambers. The two most serious assaults were against a woman whose divorce proceedings had come before Lanier and whose daughter’s custody remained subject to his jurisdiction. When the woman applied for a secretarial job at Lanier’s courthouse, Lanier interviewed her and suggested that he might have to reexamine the daughter’s custody. When the woman got up to leave, Lanier grabbed her, sexually assaulted her, and finally committed oral rape. A few weeks later, Lanier inveigled the woman into returning to the courthouse again to get information about another job opportunity, and again sexually assaulted and orally raped her. App. 44-67. On five other occasions Lanier sexually assaulted four other women: two of his secretaries, a Youth Services Officer of the juvenile court over which Lanier presided, and a local coordinator for a federal program who was in Lanier’s chambers to discuss a matter affecting the same court. Id., at 13-43, 67-109.
Ultimately, Lanier was charged with 11 violations of §242, each count of the indictment alleging that, acting willfully and under color of Tennessee law, he had deprived the victim of “rights and privileges which are secured and protected by the Constitution and the laws of the United States, namely the right not to be deprived of liberty without due process of law, including the right to be free from wilful sexual assault.” Id., at 5-12. Before trial, Lanier moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that § 242 is void for vagueness. The District Court denied the motion.
The trial judge instructed the jury on the Government’s burden to prove as an element of the offense that the defendant deprived the victim of rights secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States:
“Included in the liberty protected by the [Due Process Clause of the] Fourteenth Amendment is the concept of personal bodily integrity and the right to be free of unauthorized and unlawful physical abuse by state intrusion. Thus, this protected right of liberty provides that no person shall be subject to physical or bodily abuse without lawful justification by a state official acting or claiming to act under the color of the laws of any state of the United States when that official’s conduct is so demeaning and harmful under all the circumstances as to shock one’s conscience]. Freedom from such physical abuse includes the right to be free from certain sexually motivated physical assaults and coerced sexual battery. It is not, however, every unjustified touching or grabbing by a state official that constitutes a violation of a person’s constitutional rights. The physical abuse must be of a serious substantial nature that involves physical force, mental coercion, bodily injury or emotional damage which is shocking to one’s conscience].” Id., at 186-187.
The jury returned verdicts of guilty on seven counts, and not guilty on three (one count having been dismissed at the close of the Government’s evidence). It also found that the two oral rapes resulted in “bodily injury,” for which Lanier was subject to 10-year terms of imprisonment on each count, in addition to 1-year terms under the other five counts of conviction, see §242. He was sentenced to consecutive maximum terms totaling 25 years.
A panel of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions and sentence, 33 F. 3d 639 (1994), but the full court vacated that decision and granted rehearing en banc, 43 F. 3d 1033 (1995). On rehearing, the court set aside Lanier’s convictions for “lack of any notice to the public that this ambiguous criminal statute [i. e., § 242] includes simple or sexual assault crimes within its coverage.” 73 F. 3d 1380, 1384 (1996). Invoking general canons for interpreting criminal statutes, as well as this Court’s plurality opinion in Screws v. United States, 325 U. S. 91 (1945), the Sixth Circuit held that criminal liability may be imposed under § 242 only if the constitutional right said to have been violated is first identified in a decision of this Court (not any other federal, or state, court), and only when the right has been held to apply in “a factual situation fundamentally similar to the one at bar.” 73 F. 3d, at 1393. The Court of Appeals regarded these combined requirements as “substantially higher than the ‘clearly established’ standard used to judge qualified immunity” in civil cases under Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1983. 73 F. 3d, at 1393. Finding no decision of this Court applying a right to be free from unjustified assault or invasions of bodily integrity in a situation “fundamentally similar” to those charged, the Sixth Circuit reversed the judgment of conviction with instructions to dismiss the indictment. Two judges would not have dismissed the felony counts charging the oral rapes but concurred in dismissing the misdemeanor counts, while three members of the court dissented as to all dismissals.
We granted certiorari to review the standard for determining whether particular conduct falls within the range of criminal liability under §242. 518 U. S. 1004 (1996). We now vacate and remand.
II
Section 242 is a Reconstruction Era civil rights statute making it criminal to act (1) “willfully” and (2) under color of law (3) to deprive a person of rights protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States. 18 U. S. C. §242; Screws v. United States, supra. The en banc decision of the Sixth Circuit dealt only with the last of these elements, and it is with that element alone that we are concerned here.
The general language of §242, referring to “the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States,” is matched by the breadth of its companion conspiracy statute, §241, which speaks of conspiracies to prevent “the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to [any person] by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Thus, in lieu of describing the specific conduct it forbids, each statute’s general terms incorporate constitutional law by reference, see United States v. Kozminski, 487 U. S. 931, 941 (1988); United States v. Price, 383 U. S. 787, 797, 805 (1966), and many of the incorporated constitutional guarantees are, of course, themselves stated with some catholicity of phrasing. The result is that neither the statutes nor a good many of their constitutional referents delineate the range of forbidden conduct with particularity.
The right to due process enforced by § 242 and said to have been violated by Lanier presents a case in point, with the irony that a prosecution to enforce one application of its spacious protection of liberty can threaten the accused with deprivation of another: what Justice Holmes spoke of as “fair warning ... in language that the common world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed. To make the warning fair, so far as possible the line should be clear.” McBoyle v. United States, 283 U. S. 25, 27 (1931). “ ‘The . . . principle is that no man shall be held criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed.’ ” Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U. S. 347, 351 (1964) (quoting United States v. Harriss, 347 U. S. 612, 617 (1954)).
There are three related manifestations of the fair warning requirement. First, the vagueness doctrine bars enforcement of “a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.” Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U. S. 385, 391 (1926); accord, Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U. S. 352, 357 (1983); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U. S. 451, 453 (1939). Second, as a sort of “junior version of the vagueness doctrine,” H. Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction 95 (1968), the canon of strict construction of criminal statutes, or rule of lenity, ensures fair warning by so resolving ambiguity in a criminal statute as to apply it only to conduct clearly covered. See, e. g., Liparota v. United States, 471 U. S. 419, 427 (1985); United States v. Bass, 404 U. S. 336, 347-348 (1971); McBoyle, supra, at 27. Third, although clarity at the requisite level may be supplied by judicial gloss on an otherwise uncertain statute, see, e. g., Bouie, supra, at 357-359; Kolender, supra, at 355-356; Lanzetta, supra, at 455-457; Jeffries, Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 Va. L. Rev. 189, 207 (1985), due process bars courts from applying a novel construction of a criminal statute to conduct that neither the statute nor any prior judicial decision has fairly disclosed to be within its scope, see, e. g., Marks v. United States, 430 U. S. 188, 191-192 (1977); Rabe v. Washington, 405 U. S. 313 (1972) (per curiam); Bouie, supra, at 353-354; cf. U. S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 3; id., §10, cl. 1; Bouie, supra, at 353-354 (Ex Post Facto Clauses bar legislatures from making substantive criminal offenses retroactive). In each of these guises, the touchstone is whether the statute, either standing alone or as construed, made it reasonably clear at the relevant time that the defendant’s conduct was criminal.
We applied this standard in Screws v. United States, 325 U. S. 91 (1945), which recognized that the expansive language of due process that provides a basis for judicial review is, when incorporated by reference into §242, generally ill suited to the far different task of giving fair warning about the scope of criminal liability. The Screws plurality identified the affront to the warning requirement posed by employing § 242 to place “the accused ... on trial for an offense, the nature of which the statute does not define and hence of which it gives no warning.” Id., at 101. At the same time, the same Justices recognized that this constitutional difficulty does not arise when the accused is charged with violating a “right which has been made specific either by the express terms of the Constitution or laws of the United States or by decisions interpreting them.” Id., at 104. When broad constitutional requirements have been “made specific” by the text or settled interpretations, willful violators “certainly are in no position to say that they had no adequate advance notice that they would be visited with punishment. . . . [T]hey are not punished for violating an unknowable something.” Id., at 105. Accordingly, Screws limited the statute’s coverage to rights fairly warned of, having been “made specific” by the time of the charged conduct. See also Kozminski, supra, at 941 (parallel construction of §241).
The Sixth Circuit, in this case, added two glosses to the made-specific standard of fair warning. In its view, a generally phrased constitutional right has been made specific within the meaning of Screws only if a prior decision of this Court has declared the right, and then only when this Court has applied its ruling in a case with facts “fundamentally similar” to the case being prosecuted. 73 F. 3d, at 1393. None of the considerations advanced in this case, however, persuade us that either a decision of this Court or the extreme level of factual specificity envisioned by the Court of Appeals is necessary in every instance to give fair warning.
First, contrary to the Court of Appeals, see ibid., we think it unsound to read Screws as reasoning that only this Court’s decisions could provide the required warning. Although the Screws plurality gave two examples involving decisions of the Court, their opinion referred in general terms to rights made specific by “decisions interpreting” the Constitution, see 325 U. S., at 104 (plurality opinion), and no subsequent case has held that the universe of relevant interpretive decisions is confined to our opinions. While United States v. Kozminski, 487 U. S. 931 (1988), a case under §241 for violating Thirteenth Amendment rights, did characterize our task as ascertaining the crime charged “by looking to the scope of the Thirteenth Amendment prohibition . . . specified in our prior decisions,” id., at 941, in at least one other case we have specifically referred to a decision of a Court of Appeals in defining the established scope of a constitutional right for purposes of §241 liability, see Anderson v. United States, 417 U. S. 211, 223-227 (1974). It is also to the point, as we explain below, that in applying the rule of qualified immunity under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971), we have referred to decisions of the Courts of Appeals when enquiring whether a right was “clearly established.” See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U. S. 511, 533 (1985); Davis v. Scherer, 468 U. S. 183, 191-192 (1984); see also id., at 203-205 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Elder v. Holloway, 510 U. S. 510, 516 (1994) (treating Court of Appeals decision as “relevant authority” that must be considered as part of qualified immunity enquiry). Although the Sixth Circuit was concerned, and rightly so, that disparate decisions in various Circuits might leave the law insufficiently certain even on a point widely considered, such a circumstance may be taken into account in deciding whether the warning is fair enough, without any need for a categorical rule that decisions of the Courts of Appeals and other courts are inadequate as a matter of law to provide it.
Nor have our decisions demanded precedents that applied the right at issue to a factual situation that is “fundamentally similar” at the level of specificity meant by the Sixth Circuit in using that phrase. To the contrary, we have upheld convictions under § 241 or § 242 despite notable factual distinctions between the precedents relied on and the cases then before the Court, so long as the prior decisions gave reasonable warning that the conduct then at issue violated constitutional rights. See United States v. Guest, 383 U. S. 745, 759, n. 17 (1966) (prior cases established right of interstate travel, but later case was the first to address the deprivation of this right by private persons); United States v. Saylor, 322 U. S. 385 (1944) (pre-Screws; prior cases established right to have legitimate vote counted, whereas later case involved dilution of legitimate votes through casting of fraudulent ballots); United States v. Classic, 313 U. S. 299, 321-324 (1941) (pre-Screws; prior cases established right to have vote counted in general election, whereas later case involved primary election); see also Screws, 325 U. S., at 106 (stating that Classic met the test being announced).
But even putting these examples aside, we think that the Sixth Circuit’s “fundamentally similar” standard would lead trial judges to demand a degree of certainty at once unnecessarily high and likely to beget much wrangling. This danger flows from the Court of Appeals’ stated view, 73 F. 3d, at 1393, that due process under § 242 demands more than the “clearly established” law required for a public officer to be held civilly liable for a constitutional violation under § 1983 or Bivens, see Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U. S. 635 (1987) (Bivens action); Davis v. Scherer, supra (§1983 action). This, we think, is error.
In the civil sphere, we have explained that qualified immunity seeks to ensure that defendants “reasonably can anticipate when their conduct may give rise to liability,” id., at 195, by attaching liability only if “[t]he contours of the right [violated are] sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right,” Anderson, supra, at 640. So conceived, the object of the “clearly established” immunity standard is not different from that of “fair warning” as it relates to law “made specific” for the purpose of validly applying §242. The fact that one has a civil and the other a criminal law role is of no significance; both serve the same objective, and in effect the qualified immunity test is simply the adaptation of the fair warning standard to give officials (and, ultimately, governments) the same protection from civil liability and its consequences that individuals have traditionally possessed in the face of vague criminal statutes. To require something clearer than “clearly established” would, then, call for something beyond “fair warning.”
This is not to say, of course, that the single warning standard points to a single level of specificity sufficient in every instance. In some circumstances, as when an earlier case expressly leaves open whether a general rule applies to the particular type of conduct at issue, a very high degree of prior factual particularity may be necessary. See, e. g., Mitchell v. Forsyth, supra, at 530-535, and n. 12. But general statements of the law are not inherently incapable of giving fair and clear warning, and in other instances a general constitutional rule already identified in the decisional law may apply with obvious clarity to the specific conduct in question, even though “the very action in question has [not] previously been held unlawful,” Anderson, supra, at 640. As Judge Daughtrey noted in her dissenting opinion in this case: “ ‘The easiest cases don’t even arise. There has never been ... a section 1983 case accusing welfare officials of selling foster children into slavery; it does not follow that if such a case arose, the officials would be immune from damages [or criminal] liability.’” 73 F. 3d, at 1410 (quoting K. H. Through Murphy v. Morgan, 914 F. 2d 846, 851 (CA7 1990)); see also Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U. S. 104, 110 (1972) (due process requirements are not “designed to convert into a constitutional dilemma the practical difficulties in drawing criminal statutes both general enough to take into account a variety of human conduct and sufficiently specific to provide fair warning that certain kinds of conduct are prohibited”); Williams v. United States, 341 U. S. 97, 101 (1951) (holding that beating to obtain a confession plainly violates § 242). In sum, as with civil liability under § 1983 or Bivens, all that can usefully be said about criminal liability under §242 is that it may be imposed for deprivation of a constitutional right if, but only if, “in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness [under the Constitution is] apparent,” Anderson, supra, at 640. Where it is, the constitutional requirement of fair warning is satisfied.
Because the Court of Appeals used the wrong gauge in deciding whether prior judicial decisions gave fair warning that respondent’s actions violated constitutional rights, we vacate the judgment and remand the case for application of the proper standard.
It is so ordered.
The present § 242 has its roots in portions of three Reconstruction Era Civil Rights Acts, whose substantive criminal provisions were consolidated in a single section in 1874. See 2 Cong. Rec. 827-828 (1874) (describing derivation of consolidated criminal civil rights law from §§ 1 and 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27; §§ 16 and 17 of the Civil Rights Act of 1870,16 Stat. 144; and § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871,17 Stat. 13). Although those statutory forebears created criminal sanctions only for violations of some enumerated rights and privileges, the consolidated statute of 1874 expanded the law’s scope to apply to deprivations of all constitutional rights, despite the “customary stout assertions of the codifiers that they had merely clarified and reorganized without changing substance.” United States v. Price, 383 U. S. 787, 803 (1966). Since the 1874 recodification, Congress has revisited § 242 on several occasions, without contracting its substantive scope. See 35 Stat. 1092 (1909) (adding willfulness requirement); 82 Stat. 75 (1968) (enhancing penalties for some violations); 102 Stat. 4396 (1988) (same); 108 Stat. 1970, 2109, 2113, 2147 (1994) (same).
Thus, we do not address the argument, pressed by respondent, that the actions for which he was convicted were not taken under color of law. The Sixth Circuit discussed that issue only in the original panel opinion, subsequently vacated, but did not reach the question in the en banc decision under review here. To the extent the issue remains open, we leave its consideration in the first instance to the Court of Appeals on remand.
“Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully subjects any person in any State, Territory, or District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or to different punishments, pains, or penalties, on account of such person being an alien, or by reason of his color, or race, than are prescribed for the punishment of citizens,” shall be subject to specified criminal penalties.
Insofar as pertinent: “If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person in any State, Territory, or District in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having so exercised the same,” they shall be subject to specified criminal penalties.
The fair warning requirement also reflects the deference due to the legislature, which possesses the power to define crimes and their punishment. See United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76, 95 (1820); United States v. Aguilar, 515 U. S. 593, 600 (1995). See generally H. Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction 79-96 (1968) (discussing “principle of legality,” “that conduct may not be treated as criminal unless it has been so defined by [a competent] authority . . . before it has taken place,” as implementing separation of powers, providing notice, and preventing abuses of official discretion) (quotation at 80); Jeffries, Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 Va. L. Rev. 189 (1985).
This process of “making specific” does not, as the Sixth Circuit believed, qualify Screws as “the only Supreme Court case in our legal history in which a majority of the Court seems [to have been] willing to create a common law crime.” 73 F. 3d 1380, 1391 (1996). Federal crimes are defined by Congress, not the courts, Kozminski, 487 U. S., at 939; United States v. Wiltberger, supra, at 95, and Screws did not “create a common Iaw crime”; it narrowly construed a broadly worded Act of Congress, and the policies favoring strict construction of criminal statutes oblige us to carry out congressional intent as far as the Constitution will admit, see Kozminski, supra, at 939; Huddleston v. United States, 415 U. S. 814, 831 (1974); United States v. Morris, 14 Pet. 464, 475 (1840). Nor is §242’s pedigree as an Act of Congress tainted by its birth at the hands of codifiers who arguably made substantive changes in the pre-existing law, see n. 1, supra, as the Sixth Circuit concluded from the statutory history, 73 F. 3d, at 1384-1387. The legislative intent of Congress is to be derived from the language and structure of the statute itself, if possible, not from the assertions of codifiers directly at odds with clear statutory language. See, e. g., United States v. Wells, 519 U. S. 482, 496-497 (1997). Further, the Sixth Circuit’s conclusion that Congress never intended § 242 to extend to “newly-created constitutional rights,” 73 F. 3d, at 1387, is belied by the fact that Congress has increased the penalties for the section’s violation several times since Screws was decided, without contracting its substantive scope, see n. 1, supra.
We also leave consideration of other issues that may remain open to the Court of Appeals on remand. Several of the arguments tendered by-respondent here are, however, plainly without merit and need not be left open. First, Lanier’s contention that Screws excluded rights protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from the ambit of §242 is contradicted by the language of Screws itself as well as later eases. See Screws v. United States, 325 U. S. 91, 100, 106 (1945); United States v. Price, 383 U. S., at 789, and n. 2,793 (§ 242 is enforcement legislation enacted under §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and encompasses violations of rights guaranteed under the Due Process Clause). Second, although DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Servs., 489 U. S. 189 (1989), generally limits the constitutional duty of officials to protect against assault by private parties to cases where the victim is in custody, DeShaney does not hold, as respondent maintains, that there is no constitutional right to be free from assault committed by state officials themselves outside of a custodial setting. Third, contrary to respondent’s claim, Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386, 394 (1989), does not hold that all constitutional claims relating to physically abusive government conduct must arise under either the Fourth or Eighth Amendments; rather, Graham simply requires that if a constitutional claim is covered by a specific constitutional provision, such as the Fourth or Eighth Amendment, the claim must be analyzed under the standard appropriate to that specific provision, not under the rubric of substantive due process.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | A | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice O’Connor
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In United States v. Ross, 456 U. S. 798 (1982), the Court held that if police officers have probable cause to search a lawfully stopped vehicle, they may conduct a warrantless search of any containers found inside that may conceal the object of the search. The issue in the present case is whether Ross authorizes a warrantless search of packages several days after they were removed from vehicles that police officers had probable cause to believe contained contraband. Although the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that under Ross the police officers could have searched the packages when they were first discovered in the vehicles, the court concluded that the delay after the initial seizure made the subsequent warrantless search unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 707 F. 2d 1093 (1983). We granted certiorari, 467 U. S. 1250 (1984), and we now reverse.
I
Pursuant to an investigation of a suspected drug smuggling operation, a United States Customs officer went to respondent Duarte’s residence in Tucson, Ariz., where he saw two pickup trucks. The Customs officer observed the trucks drive away, and he contacted other officers who conducted ground and air surveillance of the trucks as they traveled 100 miles to a remote private airstrip near Bowie, Ariz., approximately 50 miles from the Mexican border. Soon after the trucks arrived, a small aircraft landed. Although the Customs officers on the ground were unable to see what transpired, their counterparts in the air informed them that one of the trucks had approached the airplane. After a short time, the aircraft departed. A second small aircraft landed and then departed.
Two Customs officers on the ground came closer and parked their vehicles about 30 yards from the two trucks. One officer approached to investigate and saw an individual at the rear of one of the trucks covering the contents with a blanket. The officer ordered respondents to come out from behind the trucks and to lie on the ground. As he and the other officer walked towards the trucks, they smelled the odor of marihuana. They saw in the back of the trucks packages wrapped in dark green plastic and sealed with tape. Based on their prior experience, the officers knew that smuggled marihuana is commonly packaged in this manner. Respondents Duarte, Leon, Gomez, Redmond, and Soto were arrested at the scene. The Customs Office surveillance aircraft followed the two small airplanes back to Tucson. Respondents Johns and Hearron, the pilots, were arrested upon landing.
The Customs officers did not search the pickup trucks at the desert airstrip. Instead, after arresting the respondents who were at the scene, the Customs officers took the trucks back to Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) headquarters in Tucson. The packages were removed from the trucks and placed in a DEA warehouse. Without obtaining a search warrant, DEA agents opened some of the packages and took samples that later proved to be marihuana. Although the record leaves unclear precisely when the agents opened the packages, the parties do not dispute the conclusion of the Court of Appeals, 707 F. 2d, at 1095, that the search occurred three days after the packages were seized from the pickup trucks.
A federal grand jury in the District of Arizona indicted respondents for conspiracy to possess and possession of marihuana with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U. S. C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. Before trial, the District Court granted respondents’ motion to suppress the marihuana, and the Government appealed pursuant to 18 U. S. C. § 3731. The Court of Appeals rejected the Government’s contentions that the plain odor of marihuana emanating from the packages made a warrant unnecessary and that respondents Johns and Hearron lacked standing to challenge the search of the packages. 707 F. 2d, at 1095-1096, 1099-1100. Neither of these issues is before this Court. Finally, the Court of Appeals held that Ross did not authorize the warrantless search of the packages three days after they were removed from the pickup trucks. 707 F. 2d, at 1097-1099. Because we disagree with this conclusion, we reverse.
II
Respondents argue that we should affirm the suppression of the marihuana on the ground that the Customs officers never had probable cause to conduct a vehicle search, and therefore Ross is inapplicable to this case. Instead, respondents contend that United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1 (1977), establishes that the warrantless search was unlawful. These arguments are not persuasive. The events surrounding the rendezvous of the aircraft and the pickup trucks at the isolated desert airstrip indicated that the vehicles were involved in smuggling activity. The Customs officers on the ground were unable to observe the airplanes after they landed, and consequently did not see the packages loaded into the pickup trucks. After the officers came closer and detected the distinct odor of marihuana, they had probable cause to believe that the vehicles contained contraband. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 149, 162 (1925). Given their experience with drug smuggling cases, the officers no doubt suspected that the scent was emanating from the packages that they observed in the back of the pickup trucks. The officers, however, were unaware of the packages until they approached the trucks, and contraband might well have been hidden elsewhere in the vehicles. We agree with the Court of Appeals, see 707 F. 2d, at 1097, that the Customs officers had probable cause to believe that not only the packages but also the vehicles themselves contained contraband.
Under the circumstances of this case, respondents’ reliance on Chadwick is misplaced. In Chadwick, police officers had probable cause to believe that a footlocker contained contraband. As soon as the footlocker was placed in the trunk of an automobile, the officers seized the footlocker and later searched it without obtaining a warrant. The Court in Chadwick refused to hold that probable cause generally supports the warrantless search of luggage. 433 U. S., at 11-13. Chadwick, however, did not involve the exception to the warrant requirement recognized in Carroll v. United States, supra, because the police had no probable cause to believe that the automobile, as contrasted to the footlocker, contained contraband. See 433 U. S., at 11-12. This point is underscored by our decision in Ross, which held that notwithstanding Chadwick police officers may conduct a warrantless search of containers discovered in the course of a lawful vehicle search. See 456 U. S., at 810-814. Given our conclusion that the Customs officers had probable cause to believe that the pickup trucks contained contraband, Chadwick is simply inapposite. See 456 U. S., at 817.
Respondents further contend that the record fails to show that a vehicle search ever in fact occurred. This argument is meritless. It is true that the trucks were not searched at the scene, and the record leaves unclear whether the Customs officers thoroughly searched the trucks after they were taken to DEA headquarters. The record does show, however, that the packages were unloaded from the trucks. Thus, the Customs officers conducted a vehicle search at least to the extent of entering the trucks and removing the packages. The possibility that the officers did not search the vehicles more extensively does not affect our conclusion that the packages were removed pursuant to a vehicle search. The issue presented by this case is whether the subsequent warrantless search was unreasonable merely because it occurred three days after the packages were unloaded from the pickup trucks.
Ill
Our analysis of the central issue in this case begins with our decision in Ross. There the Court observed that the exception to the warrant requirement recognized by Carroll allows a search of the same scope as could be authorized by a magistrate. 456 U. S., at 823, 825. “A warrant to search a vehicle would support a search of every part of the vehicle that might contain the object of the search.” Id., at 821. Although probable cause may not generally justify a war-rantless search of a container, the Court noted that the protection afforded by the Fourth Amendment varies in different settings. Id., at 823. “[A]n individual’s expectation of privacy in a vehicle and its contents may not survive if probable cause is given to believe that the vehicle is transporting contraband.” Ibid. Cf. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U. S. 364, 367-368 (1976) (discussing lesser expectation of privacy in motor vehicles); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U. S. 583, 590-591 (1974) (plurality opinion). Consequently, “[i]f probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search.” Ross, 456 U. S., at 825.
Ross, as the Court of Appeals acknowledged, 707 F. 2d, at 1098, establishes that the Customs officers could have lawfully searched the packages when they were first discovered inside the trucks at the desert airstrip. Moreover, our previous decisions indicate that the officers acted permissibly by waiting until they returned to DEA headquarters before they searched the vehicles and removed their contents. See id., at 1099. There is no requirement that the warrantless search of a vehicle occur contemporaneously with its lawful seizure. Texas v. White, 423 U. S. 67, 68 (1975) (per curiam); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42, 52 (1970). “[T]he justification to conduct such a warrantless search does not vanish once the car has been immobilized.” Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U. S. 259, 261 (1982) (per curiam). A vehicle lawfully in police custody may be searched on the basis of probable cause to believe that it contains contraband, and there is no requirement of exigent circumstances to justify such a warrantless search. Id., at 261-262; see also Florida v. Meyers, 466 U. S. 380 (1984) (per curiam).
The Court of Appeals concluded that Ross allows warrant-less searches of containers only if the search occurs “immediately” as part of the vehicle inspection or “soon thereafter.” See 707 F. 2d, at 1099. Neither Ross nor our other vehicle search cases suggest any such limitation. Ross involved the warrantless search of two different containers. After making a roadside arrest of the driver of an automobile, police officers opened the trunk and discovered a paper bag that contained what appeared to be narcotics. Ross, supra, at 801. The officers took the car to police headquarters and after a more thorough search discovered a leather pouch containing currency. 456 U. S., at 801. Ross did not distinguish between the search of the paper bag that occurred at the scene of arrest and the later search of the leather pouch. Because the police had probable cause to search the entire vehicle, the Court concluded that the police were entitled to open the containers discovered inside without first obtaining a warrant. See id., at 817. Ross did not suggest that this conclusion was affected by the fact that the leather pouch was not searched until after the police had impounded the vehicle or by the existence of exigent circumstances that might have made it impractical to secure a warrant for the search of the container. Instead, Ross indicated that the legality of the search was determined by reference to the exception to the warrant requirement recognized by Carroll.
Ross, as the Court of Appeals noted, did observe in a footnote that if police may immediately search a vehicle on the street without a warrant, “a search soon thereafter at the police station is permitted if the vehicle is impounded.” 456 U. S., at 807, n. 9. When read in context, these remarks plainly do not suggest that searches of containers discovered in the course of a vehicle search are subject to temporal restrictions not applicable to the vehicle search itself. Moreover, Ross expressly refused to limit the application of the Carroll exception by requiring police officers to secure a warrant before they searched containers found inside a lawfully stopped vehicle. 456 U. S., at 821, n. 28. “The scope of a warrantless search of an automobile ... is not defined by the nature of the container in which the contraband is secreted. Rather, it is defined by the object of the search and the places in which there is probable cause to believe that it may be found.” Id., at 824. Consequently, the fact that a container is involved does not in itself either expand or contract the well-established exception to the warrant requirement recognized in Carroll. See 456 U. S., at 824.
The approach of the Court of Appeals not only lacks support in our decision in Ross, but it also fails to further the privacy interests protected by the Fourth Amendment. Whether respondents ever had a privacy interest in the packages reeking of marihuana is debatable. We have previously observed that certain containers may not support a reasonable expectation of privacy because their contents can be inferred from their outward appearance, Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U. S. 753, 764-765, n. 13 (1979), and based on this rationale the Fourth Circuit has held that “plain odor” may justify a warrantless search of a container. See United States v. Haley, 669 F. 2d 201, 203-204, and n. 3, cert. denied, 457 U. S. 1117 (1982). The Ninth Circuit, however, rejected this approach, 707 F. 2d, at 1096, and the Government has not pursued this issue on appeal. We need not determine whether respondents possessed a legitimate expectation of privacy in the packages. Because the Customs officers had probable cause to believe that the pickup trucks contained contraband, any expectation of privacy in the vehicles or their contents was subject to the authority of the officers to conduct a warrantless search. See Ross, 456 U. S., at 823.
The warrantless search of the packages was not unreasonable merely because the Customs officers returned to Tucson and placed the packages in a DEA warehouse rather than immediately opening them. Cf. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U. S. 109, 119-120 (1984) (no privacy interest in package that was in possession of and had been examined by private party); Michigan v. Thomas, supra, at 261. The practical effect of the opposite conclusion would only be to direct police officers to search immediately all containers that they discover in the course of a vehicle search. Cf. Ross, supra, at 807, n. 9 (noting similar consequence if police could not conduct warrantless search after vehicle is impounded). This result would be of little benefit to the person whose property is searched, and where police officers are entitled to seize the container and continue to have probable cause to believe that it contains contraband, we do not think that delay in the execution of the warrantless search is necessarily unreasonable. Cf. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U. S., at 592-593 (impoundment and 1-day delay did not make examination of exterior of vehicle unreasonable where it could have been done on the spot); United States v. Edwards, 415 U. S. 800, 805-806 (1974) (warrantless search of suspect’s clothing permissible notwithstanding delay after initial arrest).
We do not suggest that police officers may indefinitely retain possession of a vehicle and its contents before they complete a vehicle search. Cf. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 523 (1971) (White, J., dissenting). Nor do we foreclose the possibility that the owner of a vehicle or its contents might attempt to prove that delay in the completion of a vehicle search was unreasonable because it adversely affected a privacy or possessory interest. Cf. United States v. Place, 462 U. S. 696 (1983). We note that in this case there was probable cause to believe that the trucks contained contraband and there is no plausible argument that the object of the search could not have been concealed in the packages. Respondents do not challenge the legitimacy of the seizure of the trucks or the packages, and they never sought return of the property. Thus, respondents have not even alleged, much less proved, that the delay in the search of packages adversely affected legitimate interests protected by the Fourth Amendment. Inasmuch as the Government was entitled to seize the packages and could have searched them immediately without a warrant, we conclude that the war-rantless search three days after the packages were placed in the DEA warehouse was reasonable and consistent with our precedent involving searches of impounded vehicles. See Florida v. Meyers, 466 U. S. 380 (1984); Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U. S. 259 (1982); Cooper v. California, 386 U. S. 58, 61-62 (1967) (upholding warrantless search that took place seven days after seizure of automobile pending forfeiture proceedings).
Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | A | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Chief Justice Burger
delivered the opinion of the Court.
We granted certiorari to determine whether a parent corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary are legally capable of conspiring with each other under § 1 of the Sherman Act.
I
A.
The predecessor to petitioner Regal Tube Co. was established in Chicago in 1955 to manufacture structural steel tubing used in heavy equipment, cargo vehicles, and construction. From 1955 to 1968 it remained a wholly owned subsidiary of C. E. Robinson Co. In 1968 Lear Siegler, Inc., purchased Regal Tube Co. and operated it as an unincorporated division. David Grohne, who had previously served as vice president and general manager of Regal, became president of the division after the acquisition.
In 1972 petitioner Copperweld Corp. purchased the Regal division from Lear Siegler; the sale agreement bound Lear Siegler and its subsidiaries not to compete with Regal in the United States for five years. Copperweld then transferred Regal’s assets to a newly formed, wholly owned Pennsylvania corporation, petitioner Regal Tube Co. The new subsidiary continued to conduct its manufacturing operations in Chicago but shared Copperweld’s corporate headquarters in Pittsburgh.
Shortly before Copperweld acquired Regal, David Grohne accepted a job as a corporate officer of Lear Siegler. After the acquisition, while continuing to work for Lear Siegler, Grohne set out to establish his own steel tubing business to compete in the same market as Regal. In May 1972 he formed respondent Independence Tube Corp., which soon secured an offer from the Yoder Co. to supply a tubing mill. In December 1972 respondent gave Yoder a purchase order to have a mill ready by the end of December 1973.
When executives at Regal and Copperweld learned of Grohne’s plans, they initially hoped that Lear Siegler’s non-competition agreement would thwart the new competitor. Although their lawyer advised them that Grohne was not bound by the agreement, he did suggest that petitioners might obtain an injunction against Grohne’s activities if he made use of any technical information or trade secrets belonging to Regal. The legal opinion was given to Regal and Copperweld along with a letter to be sent to anyone with whom Grohne attempted to deal. The letter warned that Copperweld would be “greatly concerned if [Grohne] contemplates entering the structural tube market... in competition with Regal Tube” and promised to take “any and all steps which are necessary to protect our rights under the terms of our purchase agreement and to protect the know-how, trade secrets, etc., which we purchased from Lear Siegler.” Petitioners later asserted that the letter was intended only to prevent third parties from developing reliance interests that might later make a court reluctant to enjoin Grohne’s operations.
When Yoder accepted respondent’s order for a tubing mill on February 19, 1973, Copperweld sent Yoder one of these letters; two days later Yoder voided its acceptance. After respondent’s efforts to resurrect the deal failed, respondent arranged to have a mill supplied by another company, which performed its agreement even though it too received a warning letter from Copperweld. Respondent began operations on September 13,1974, nine months later than it could have if Yoder had supplied the mill when originally agreed.
Although the letter to Yoder was petitioners’ most successful effort to discourage those contemplating doing business with respondent, it was not their only one. Copperweld repeatedly contacted banks that were considering financing respondent’s operations. One or both petitioners also approached real estate firms that were considering providing plant space to respondent and contacted prospective suppliers and customers of the new company.
B
In 1976 respondent filed this action in the District Court against petitioners and Yoder. The jury found that Copperweld and Regal had conspired to violate §1 of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 1, but that Yoder was not part of the conspiracy. It also found that Copperweld, but not Regal, had interfered with respondent’s contractual relationship with Yoder; that Regal, but not Copperweld, had interfered with respondent’s contractual relationship with a potential customer of respondent, Deere Plow & Planter Works, and had slandered respondent to Deere; and that Yoder had breached its contract to supply a tubing mill.
At a separate damages phase, the judge instructed the jury that the damages for the antitrust violation and for the inducement of the Yoder contract breach should be identical and not double counted. The jury then awarded $2,499,009 against petitioners on the antitrust claim, which was trebled to $7,497,027. It awarded $15,000 against Regal alone on the contractual interference and slander counts pertaining to Deere. The court also awarded attorney’s fees and costs after denying petitioners’ motions for judgment n.o.v. and for a new trial.
C
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. 691 F. 2d 310 (1982). It noted that the exoneration of Yoder from antitrust liability left a parent corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary as the only parties to the § 1 conspiracy. The court questioned the wisdom of subjecting an “intra-enterprise” conspiracy to antitrust liability, when the same conduct by a corporation and an unincorporated division would escape liability for lack of the requisite two legal persons. However, relying on its decision in Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F. 2d 704 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U. S. 917 (1980), the Court of Appeals held that liability was appropriate “when there is enough separation between the two entities to make treating them as two independent actors sensible.” 691 F. 2d, at 318. It held that the jury instructions took account of the proper factors for determining how much separation Copperweld and Regal in fact maintained in the conduct of their businesses. It also held that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that Regal was more like a separate corporate entity than a mere service arm of the parent.
We granted certiorari to reexamine the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine, 462 U. S. 1131 (1983), and we reverse.
Review of this case calls directly into question whether the coordinated acts of a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary can, in the legal sense contemplated by § 1 of the Sherman Act, constitute a combination or conspiracy. The so-called “intra-enterprise conspiracy” doctrine provides that § 1 liability is not foreclosed merely because a parent and its subsidiary are subject to common ownership. The doctrine derives from declarations in several of this Court’s opinions.
In no case has the Court considered the merits of the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine in depth. Indeed, the concept arose from a far narrower rule. Although the Court has expressed approval of the doctrine on a number of occasions, a finding of intra-enterprise conspiracy was in all but perhaps one instance unnecessary to the result.
The problem began with United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U. S. 218 (1947). The controlling shareholder of the Checker Cab Manufacturing Corp., Morris Markin, also controlled numerous companies operating taxicabs in four cities. With few exceptions, the operating companies had once been independent and had come under Markin’s control by acquisition or merger. The complaint alleged conspiracies under §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act among Markin, Checker, and five corporations in the operating system. The Court stated that even restraints in a vertically integrated enterprise were not “necessarily” outside of the Sherman Act, observing that an unreasonable restraint
“may result as readily from a conspiracy among those who are affiliated or integrated under common ownership as from a conspiracy among those who are otherwise independent. Similarly, any affiliation or integration flowing from an illegal conspiracy cannot insulate the conspirators from the sanctions which Congress has imposed. The corporate interrelationships of the conspirators, in other words, are not determinative of the applicability of the Sherman Act. That statute is aimed at substance rather than form. See Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U. S. 344, 360-361, 376-377.
“And so in this case, the common ownership and control of the various corporate appellees are impotent to liberate the alleged combination and conspiracy from the impact of the Act. The complaint charges that the restraint of interstate trade was not only effected by the combination of the appellees but was the primary object of the combination. The theory of the complaint... is that ‘dominating power’ over the cab operating companies ‘was not obtained by normal expansion... but by deliberate, calculated purchase for control.’” Id., at 227-228 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Reading Co., 253 U. S. 26, 57 (1920)).
It is the underscored language that later breathed life into the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine. The passage as a whole, however, more accurately stands for a quite different proposition. It has long been clear that a pattern of acquisitions may itself create a combination illegal under § 1, especially when an original anticompetitive purpose is evident from the affiliated corporations’ subsequent conduct. The Yellow Cab passage is most fairly read in light of this settled rule. In Yellow Cab, the affiliation of the defendants was irrelevant because the original acquisitions were themselves illegal. An affiliation “flowing from an illegal conspiracy” would not avert sanctions. Common ownership and control were irrelevant because restraint of trade was “the primary object of the combination,” which was created in a “‘deliberate, calculated’ ” manner. Other language in the opinion is to the same effect.
The Court’s opinion relies on Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U. S. 344 (1933); however, examination of that case reveals that it gives very little support for the broad doctrine Yellow Cab has been thought to announce. On the contrary, the language of Chief Justice Hughes speaking for the Court in Appalachian Coals supports a contrary conclusion. After observing that “[t]he restrictions the Act imposes are not mechanical or artificial,” 288 U. S., at 360, he went on to state:
“The argument that integration may be considered a normal expansion of business, while a combination of independent producers in a common selling agency should be treated as abnormal — that one is a legitimate enterprise and the other is not — makes but an artificial distinction. The Anti-Trust Act aims at substance.” Id., at 377.
As we shall see, infra, at 771-774, it is the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine itself that “makes but an artificial distinction” at the expense of substance.
The ambiguity of the Yellow Cab holding yielded the one case giving support to the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine. In Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U. S. 211 (1951), the Court held that two wholly owned subsidiaries of a liquor distiller were guilty under § 1 of the Sherman Act for jointly refusing to supply a wholesaler who declined to abide by a maximum resale pricing scheme. The Court offhandedly dismissed the defendants’ argument that “their status as ‘mere instrumentalities of a single manufacturing-merchandizing unit’ makes it impossible for them to have conspired in a manner forbidden by the Sherman Act.” Id., at 215. With only a citation to Yellow Cab and no further analysis, the Court stated that the
“suggestion runs counter to our past decisions that common ownership and control does not liberate corporations from the impact of the antitrust laws”
and stated that this rule was “especially applicable” when defendants “hold themselves out as competitors.” 340 U. S., at 215.
Unlike the Yellow Cab passage, this language does not pertain to corporations whose initial affiliation was itself unlawful. In straying beyond Yellow Cab, the Kiefer-Stewart Court failed to confront the anomalies an intra-enterprise doctrine entails. It is relevant nonetheless that, were the ease decided today, the same result probably could be justified on the ground that the subsidiaries conspired with wholesalers other than the plaintiff. An intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine thus would no longer be necessary to a finding of liability on the facts of Kiefer-Stewart.
Later cases invoking the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine do little more than cite Yellow Cab or Kiefer-Stewart, and in none of the cases was the doctrine necessary to the result reached. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U. S. 593 (1951), involved restrictive horizontal agreements between an American corporation and two foreign corporations in which it owned 30 and 50 percent interests respectively. The Timken Court cited Kiefer Stewart to show that “[t]he fact that there is common ownership or control of the contracting corporations does not liberate them from the impact of the antitrust laws.” 341 U. S., at 598. But the relevance of this statement is unclear. The American defendant in Timken did not own a majority interest in either of the foreign corporate conspirators and, as the District Court found, it did not control them. Moreover, as in Yellow Cab, there was evidence that the stock acquisitions were themselves designed to effectuate restrictive practices. The Court’s reliance on the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine was in no way necessary to the result.
The same is true of Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U. S. 134 (1968), which involved a conspiracy among a parent corporation and three subsidiaries to impose various illegal restrictions on plaintiff franchisees. The Court did suggest that, because the defendants
“availed themselves of the privilege of doing business through separate corporations, the fact of common ownership could not save them from any of the obligations that the law imposes on separate entities [citing Yellow Cab and Timken].” Id., at 141-142.
But the Court noted immediately thereafter that “[i]n any event” each plaintiff could “clearly” charge a combination between itself and the defendants or between the defendants and other franchise dealers. Ibid. Thus, for the same reason that a finding of liability in Kiefer-Stewart could today be justified without reference to the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine, see n. 9, supra, the doctrine was at most only an alternative holding in Perma Life Mufflers.
In short, while this Court has previously seemed to acquiesce in the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine, it has never explored or analyzed in detail the justifications for such a rule; the doctrine has played only a relatively minor role in the Court’s Sherman Act holdings.
III
Petitioners, joined by the United States as amicus curiae, urge us to repudiate the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine. The central criticism is that the doctrine gives undue significance to the fact that a subsidiary is separately incorporated and thereby treats as the concerted activity of two entities what is really unilateral behavior flowing from decisions of a single enterprise.
We limit our inquiry to the narrow issue squarely presented: whether a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary are capable of conspiring in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act. We do not consider under what circumstances, if any, a parent may be liable for conspiring with an affiliated corporation it does not completely own.
A
The Sherman Act contains a “basic distinction between concerted and independent action.” Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U. S. 752, 761 (1984). The conduct of a single firm is governed by § 2 alone and is unlawful only when it threatens actual monopolization. It is not enough that a single firm appears to “restrain trade” unreasonably, for even a vigorous competitor may leave that impression. For instance, an efficient firm may capture unsatisfied customers from an inefficient rival, whose own ability to compete may suffer as a result. This is the rule of the marketplace and is precisely the sort of competition that promotes the consumer interests that the Sherman Act aims to foster. In part because it is sometimes difficult to distinguish robust competition from conduct with long-run anticompetitive effects, Congress authorized Sherman Act scrutiny of single firms only when they pose a danger of monopolization. Judging unilateral conduct in this manner reduces the risk that the antitrust laws will dampen the competitive zeal of a single aggressive entrepreneur.
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, in contrast, reaches unreasonable restraints of trade effected by a "contract, combination... or conspiracy” between separate entities. It does not reach conduct that is “wholly unilateral.” Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U. S. 145, 149 (1968); accord, Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Corp., supra, at 761. Concerted activity subject to § 1 is judged more sternly than unilateral activity under §2. Certain agreements, such as horizontal price fixing and market allocation, are thought so inherently anti-competitive that each is illegal per se without inquiry into the harm it has actually caused. See generally Northern Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 356 U. S. 1, 5 (1958). Other combinations, such as mergers, joint ventures, and various vertical agreements, hold the promise of increasing a firm’s efficiency and enabling it to compete more effectively. Accordingly, such combinations are judged under a rule of reason, an inquiry into market power and market structure designed to assess the combination’s actual effect. See, e. g., Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U. S. 36 (1977); Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U. S. 231 (1918). Whatever form the inquiry takes, however, it is not necessary to prove that concerted activity threatens monopolization.
The reason Congress treated concerted behavior more strictly than unilateral behavior is readily appreciated. Concerted activity inherently is fraught with anticompetitive risk. It deprives the marketplace of the independent centers of decisionmaking that competition assumes and demands. In any conspiracy, two or more entities that previously pursued their own interests separately are combining to act as one for their common benefit. This not only reduces the diverse directions in which economic power is aimed but suddenly increases the economic power moving in one particular direction. Of course, such mergings of resources may well lead to efficiencies that benefit consumers, but their anticompetitive potential is sufficient to warrant scrutiny even in the absence of incipient monopoly.
B
The distinction between unilateral and concerted conduct is necessary for a proper understanding of the terms “contract, combination... or conspiracy” in § 1. Nothing in the literal meaning of those terms excludes coordinated conduct among officers or employees of the same company. But it is perfectly plain that an internal “agreement” to implement a single, unitary firm’s policies does not raise the antitrust dangers that § 1 was designed to police. The officers of a single firm are not separate economic actors pursuing separate economic interests, so agreements among them do not suddenly bring together economic power that was previously pursuing divergent goals. Coordination within a firm is as likely to result from an effort to compete as from an effort to stifle competition. In the marketplace, such coordination may be necessary if a business enterprise is to compete effectively. For these reasons, officers or employees of the same firm do not provide the plurality of actors imperative for a §1 conspiracy.
There is also general agreement that § 1 is not violated by the internally coordinated conduct of a corporation and one of its unincorporated divisions. Although this Court has not previously addressed the question, there can be little doubt that the operations of a corporate enterprise organized into divisions must be judged as the conduct of a single actor. The existence of an unincorporated division reflects no more than a firm’s decision to adopt an organizational division of labor. A division within a corporate structure pursues the common interests of the whole rather than interests separate from those of the corporation itself; a business enterprise establishes divisions to further its own interests in the most efficient manner. Because coordination between a corporation and its division does not represent a sudden joining of two independent sources of economic power previously pursuing separate interests, it is not an activity that warrants § 1 scrutiny.
Indeed, a rule that punished coordinated conduct simply because a corporation delegated certain responsibilities to autonomous units might well discourage corporations from creating divisions with their presumed benefits. This would serve no useful antitrust purpose but could well deprive consumers of the efficiencies that decentralized management may bring.
C
For similar reasons, the coordinated activity of a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary must be viewed as that of a single enterprise for purposes of § 1 of the Sherman Act. A parent and its wholly owned subsidiary have a complete unity of interest. Their objectives are common, not disparate; their general corporate actions are guided or determined not by two separate corporate consciousnesses, but one. They are not unlike a multiple team of horses drawing a vehicle under the control of a single driver. With or without a formal “agreement,” the subsidiary acts for the benefit of the parent, its sole shareholder. If a parent and a wholly owned subsidiary do “agree” to a course of action, there is no sudden joining of economic resources that had previously served different interests, and there is no justification for § 1 scrutiny.
Indeed, the very notion of an “agreement” in Sherman Act terms between a parent and a wholly owned subsidiary lacks meaning. A § 1 agreement may be found when “the conspirators had a unity of purpose or a common design and understanding, or a meeting of minds in an unlawful arrangement.” American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U. S. 781, 810 (1946). But in reality a parent and a wholly owned subsidiary always have a “unity of purpose or a common design.” They share a common purpose whether or not the parent keeps a tight rein over the subsidiary; the parent may assert full control at any moment if the subsidiary fails to act in the parent’s best interests.
The intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine looks to the form of an enterprise’s structure and ignores the reality. Antitrust liability should not depend on whether a corporate subunit is organized as an unincorporated division or a wholly owned subsidiary. A corporation has complete power to maintain a wholly owned subsidiary in either form. The economic, legal, or other considerations that lead corporate management to choose one structure over the other are not relevant to whether the enterprise’s conduct seriously threatens competition. Rather, a corporation may adopt the subsidiary form of organization for valid management and related purposes. Separate incorporation may improve management, avoid special tax problems arising from multistate operations, or serve other legitimate interests. Especially in view of the increasing complexity of corporate operations, a business enterprise should be free to structure itself in ways that serve efficiency of control, economy of operations, and other factors dictated by business judgment without increasing its exposure to antitrust liability. Because there is nothing inherently anticompetitive about a corporation’s decision to create a subsidiary, the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine “impose[s] grave legal consequences upon organizational distinctions that are of de minimis meaning and effect.” Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Winckler & Smith Citrus Products Co., 370 U. S. 19, 29 (1962).
If antitrust liability turned on the garb in which a corporate subunit was clothed, parent corporations would be encouraged to convert subsidiaries into unincorporated divisions. Indeed, this is precisely what the Seagram company did after this Court’s decision in Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U. S. 211 (1951). Such an incentive serves no valid antitrust goals but merely deprives consumers and producers of the benefits that the subsidiary form may yield.
The error of treating a corporate division differently from a wholly owned subsidiary is readily seen from the facts of this case. Regal was operated as an unincorporated division of Lear Siegler for four years before it became a wholly owned subsidiary of Copperweld. Nothing in this record indicates any meaningful difference between Regal’s operations as a division and its later operations as a separate corporation. Certainly nothing suggests that Regal was a greater threat to competition as a subsidiary of Copperweld than as a division of Lear Siegler. Under either arrangement, Regal might have acted to bar a new competitor from entering the market. In one case it could have relied on economic power from other quarters of the Lear Siegler corporation; instead it drew on the strength of its separately incorporated parent, Copperweld. Prom the standpoint of the antitrust laws, there is no reason to treat one more harshly than the other. As Chief Justice Hughes cautioned, “[idealities must dominate the judgment.” Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U. S., at 360.
D
Any reading of the Sherman Act that remains true to the Act’s distinction between unilateral and concerted conduct will necessarily disappoint those who find that distinction arbitrary. It cannot be denied that § l’s focus on concerted behavior leaves a “gap” in the Act’s proscription against unreasonable restraints of trade. See post, at 789. An unreasonable restraint of trade may be effected not only by two independent firms acting in concert; a single firm may restrain trade to precisely the same extent if it alone possesses the combined market power of those same two firms. Because the Sherman Act does not prohibit unreasonable restraints of trade as such — but only restraints effected by a contract, combination, or conspiracy — it leaves untouched a single firm’s anticompetitive conduct (short of threatened monopolization) that may be indistinguishable in economic effect from the conduct of two firms subject to § 1 liability.
“It is the unlawful combination, tested by the rules of common law and human experience, that is aimed at by this bill, and not the lawful and useful combination.” 21 Cong. Rec. 2457 (1890).
We have already noted that Congress left this “gap” for eminently sound reasons. Subjecting a single firm’s every action to judicial scrutiny for reasonableness would threaten to discourage the competitive enthusiasm that the antitrust laws seek to promote. See supra, at 767-769. Moreover, whatever the wisdom of the distinction, the Act’s plain language leaves no doubt that Congress made a purposeful choice to accord different treatment to unilateral and concerted conduct. Had Congress intended to outlaw unreasonable restraints of trade as such, § l’s requirement of a contract, combination, or conspiracy would be superfluous, as would the entirety of §2. Indeed, this Court has recognized that § 1 is limited to concerted conduct at least since the days of United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U. S. 300 (1919). Accord, post, at 789.
The appropriate inquiry in this case, therefore, is not whether the coordinated conduct of a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary may ever have anticompetitive effects, as the dissent suggests. Nor is it whether the term “conspiracy” will bear a literal construction that includes parent corporations and their wholly owned subsidiaries. For if these were the proper inquiries, a single firm’s conduct would be subject to § 1 scrutiny whenever the coordination of two employees was involved. Such a rule would obliterate the Act’s distinction between unilateral and concerted conduct, contrary to the clear intent of Congress as interpreted by the weight of judicial authority. See n. 15, supra. Rather, the appropriate inquiry requires us to explain the logic underlying Congress’ decision to exempt unilateral conduct from § 1 scrutiny, and to assess whether that logic similarly excludes the conduct of a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary. Unless we second-guess the judgment of Congress to limit § 1 to concerted conduct, we can only conclude that the coordinated behavior of a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary falls outside the reach of that provision.
Although we recognize that any “gap” the Sherman Act leaves is the sensible result of a purposeful policy decision by Congress, we also note that the size of any such gap is open to serious question. Any anticompetitive activities of corporations and their wholly owned subsidiaries meriting antitrust remedies may be policed adequately without resort to an intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine. A corporation’s initial acquisition of control will always be subject to scrutiny under § 1 of the Sherman Act and § 7 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731, 15 U. S. C. §18. Thereafter, the enterprise is fully subject to § 2 of the Sherman Act and § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 719, 15 U. S. C. §45. That these statutes are adequate to control dangerous anticompet-itive conduct is suggested by the fact that not a single holding of antitrust liability by this Court would today be different in the absence of an intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine. It is further suggested by the fact that the Federal Government, in its administration of the antitrust laws, no longer accepts the concept that a corporation and its wholly owned subsidiaries can “combine” or “conspire” under § l. Elimination of the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine with respect to corporations and their wholly owned subsidiaries will therefore not cripple antitrust enforcement. It will simply eliminate treble damages from private state tort suits masquerading as antitrust actions.
IV
We hold that Copperweld and its wholly owned subsidiary Regal are incapable of conspiring with each other for purposes of § 1 of the Sherman Act. To the extent that prior decisions of this Court are to the contrary, they are disapproved and overruled. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
It is so ordered.
Justice White took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
The chairman of the board and chief executive officer of both Copperweld and Regal, Phillip H. Smith, was also named as a defendant. In addition, respondents originally charged petitioners and Smith with an attempt to monopolize the market for structural steel tubing in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 2. Before trial respondent dismissed Smith as a defendant and dismissed its §2 monopolization count.
Petitioners counterclaimed on the ground that respondent and Grohne had used proprietary information belonging to Regal, had competed unfairly by hiring away key Regal personnel, and had interfered with prospective business relationships by filing the lawsuit on the eve of a large Copperweld debenture offering. At the close of the evidence, the court directed a verdict against petitioners on their counterclaims. The disposition of these claims is not at issue before this Court.
The jury was instructed to consider many different factors: for instance, whether Copperweld and Regal had separate management staffs, separate corporate officers, separate clients, separate records and bank accounts, separate corporate offices, autonomy in setting policy, and so on. The jury also was instructed to consider “any other facts that you find are relevant to a determination of whether or not Copperweld and Regal are separate and distinct companies.” App. to Pet. for Cert. B-9.
Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides in pertinent part:
“Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony.” 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 1.
Under the arrangements condemned in Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U. S. 197, 354 (1904) (plurality opinion), “all the stock [a railroad holding company] held or acquired in the constituent companies was acquired and held to be used in suppressing competition between those companies. It came into existence only for that purpose.” In Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1 (1911), and United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U. S. 106 (1911), the trust or holding company device brought together previously independent firms to lessen competition and achieve monopoly power. Although the Court in the latter case suggested that the contracts between affiliated companies, and not merely the original combination, could be viewed as the conspiracy, id., at 184, the Court left no doubt that “the combination in and of itself” was a restraint of trade and a monopolization, id., at 187.
Contrary to the dissent’s suggestion, post, at 779, 788, n. 18, our point is not that Yellow Cab found only the initial acquisition illegal; our point is that the illegality of the initial acquisition was a predicate for its holding that any postacquisition conduct violated the Act.
When discussing the fact that some of the affiliated Chicago operating companies did not compete to obtain exclusive transportation contracts held by another of the affiliated companies, the Court stated:
“[T]he fact that the competition restrained is that between affiliated corporations cannot serve to negative the statutory violation where, as here, the affiliation is assertedly one of the means of effectuating the illegal conspiracy not to compete.” 332 U. S., at 229 (emphasis added).
The passage quoted in text is soon followed by a cite to United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U. S. 173, 189 (1944). Crescent Amusement found violations of §§ 1 and 2 by film exhibitors affiliated (in most cases) by 50 percent ownership. The exhibitors used the monopoly power they possessed in certain towns to force film distributors to give them favorable terms in other towns. The Court found it unnecessary to view the distributors as part of the conspiracy, id., at 183, so the Court plainly viewed the affiliated entities themselves as the conspirators. The Crescent Amusement Court, however, in affirming an order of divestiture, noted that such a remedy was appropriate when “creation of the combination is itself the violation.” Id., at 189. This suggests that both Crescent Amusement and Yellow Cab, which cited the very page on which this passage appears, stand for a narrow rule based on the original illegality of the affiliation.
The dissent misconstrues a later passage in Crescent Amusement stating that divestiture need not be limited to those affiliates whose “acquisition was part of the fruits of the conspiracy,” 323 U. S., at 189. See post, at 780-781. This meant only that divestiture could apply to affiliates other than those who were driven out of business by the practices of the original conspirators and who were then acquired illegally to increase the combination’s monopoly power. See 323 U. S., at 181. It did not mean that affiliates acquired for lawful purposes were subject to divestiture.
Appalachian Coals does state that the key question is whether there is an unreasonable restraint of trade or an attempt to monopolize. “If there is, the combination cannot escape because it has chosen corporate form; and, if there is not, it is not to be condemned because of the absence of corporate integration.” 288 U. S., at 377. Appalachian Coals, however, validated a cooperative selling arrangement among independent entities. The statement that intracorporate relationships would be subject to liability under § 1 is thus dictum. The statement may also envision merely the limited rule in Yellow Cab pertaining to acquisitions that are themselves anticompetitive.
In two cases decided soon after Yellow Cab on facts similar to Crescent Amusement, see n. 6, supra, affiliated film exhibitors were found to have conspired in violation of § 1. Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States, 334 U. S. 110 (1948); United States v. Griffith, 334 U. S. 100 (1948). Griffith simply assumed that the companies were capable of conspiring with each other; Schine cited Yellow Cab and Crescent Amusement for the proposition, 334 U. S., at 116. In both cases, however, an intra-enterprise conspiracy holding was unnecessary not only because the Court found a §2 violation, but also because the affiliated exhibitors had conspired with independent film distributors. See ibid.; Griffith, supra, at 103. n.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | H | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Powell
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a class action involving allegations of racial discrimination in employment on the part of petitioners, the Gulf Oil Co. (Gulf) and one of the unions at its Port Arthur, Tex., refinery. We granted a writ of certiorari to determine the scope of a district court’s authority to limit communications from named plaintiffs and their counsel to prospective class members, during the pendency of a class action. We hold that in the circumstances of this case the District Court exceeded its authority under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
I
In April 1976, Gulf and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) entered into a conciliation agreement involving alleged discrimination against black and female employees at the Port Arthur refinery. Gulf agreed to cease various allegedly discriminatory practices, to undertake an affirmative-action program covering hiring and promotion, and to offer backpay to alleged victims of discrimination based on a set formula. Gulf began to send notices to the 643 employees eligible for backpay, stating the exact amount available to each person in return for execution within 30 days of a full release of all discrimination claims dating from the relevant time period.
Approximately one month after the signing of the conciliation agreement, on May 18, 1976, respondents filed this class action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, on behalf of all black present and former employees, and rejected applicants for employment, at the refinery. They alleged racial discrimination in employment and sought injunctive, declaratory, and monetary relief, based on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq., and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U. S. C. § 1981. The defendants named were Gulf and Local 4-23 of the Oil, Chemical, and Atomic Workers International Union. Plaintiffs’ counsel included three lawyers from the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund. Through this lawsuit, the named plaintiffs sought to vindicate the alleged rights of many of the employees who were receiving settlement offers from Gulf under the conciliation agreement.
On May 27, Gulf filed a motion in the District Court seeking an order limiting communications by parties and their counsel with class members. An accompanying brief described the EEOC conciliation agreement, asserting that 452 of the 643 employees entitled to backpay under that agreement had signed releases and been paid by the time the class action was filed. Gulf stated that after it was served in the case, it ceased sending backpay offers and release forms to class members. It then asserted that a lawyer for respondents, Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, had attended a meeting of 75 class members on May 22, where he had discussed the case and recommended that the employees not sign the releases sent under the conciliation agreement. Gulf added that Thibodeaux reportedly had advised employees to return checks they already had received, since they could receive at least double the amounts involved through the class action.
The court entered a temporary order prohibiting all communications concerning the case from parties or their counsel to potential or actual class members. The order listed several examples of communications that were covered, but stated that it was not limited to these examples. It was not based on any findings of fact.
On June 8, Gulf moved for a modification of the order that would allow it to continue mailings to class members, soliciting releases in exchange for the backpay amounts established under the conciliation agreement. Respondents filed a brief in opposition, arguing that the ban on their communications with class members violated the First Amendment. On June 11, the court heard oral argument, but took no evidence. Gulf then filed a supplemental memorandum proposing that the court adopt the language of "Sample Pretrial Order No. 15” in the Manual for Complex Litigation App. § 1.41. Respondents replied with another memorandum, accompanied by sworn affidavits of three lawyers. In these affidavits counsel stated that communications with class members were important in order to obtain needed information about the case and to inform the class members of their rights. Two affidavits stated that lawyers had attended the May 22 meeting with employees and discussed the issues in the case but neither advised against accepting the Gulf offer nor represented that the suit would produce twice the amount of backpay available through the conciliation agreement.
On June 22, another District Judge issued a modified order adopting Gulf’s proposal. This order imposed a complete ban on all communications concerning the class action between parties or their counsel and any actual or potential class member who was not a formal party, without the prior approval of the court. It gave examples of forbidden communications, including any solicitation of legal representation of potential or actual class members, and any statements “which may tend to misrepresent the status, purposes and effects of the class action” or “create impressions tending without cause, to reflect adversely on any party, any counsel, this Court, or the administration of justice.” The order exempted attorney-client communications initiated by the client, and communications in the regular course of business. It further stated that if any party or counsel “assert [ed] a constitutional right to communicate . . . without prior restraint,” and did so communicate, he should file with the court a copy or summary of the communication within five days. The order, finally, exempted communications from Gulf involving the conciliation agreement and its settlement process.
The court made no findings of fact and did not write an explanatory opinion. The only justification offered was a statement in the final paragraph of the order:
“It is Plaintiff’s [sic] contention that any such provisions as hereinbefore stated that limit communication with potential class members are constitutionally invalid, citing Rodgers v. United States Steel Corporation, 508 F. 2d 152 (3rd Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 420 U. S. 969 (1975). This Court finds that the Rodgers case is inapplicable, and that this order comports with the requisites set out in the Manual for Complex Litigation . . . which specifically exempts constitutionally protected communication when the substance of such communication is filed with the Court.”
On July 6, pursuant to the court’s order respondents submitted for court approval a proposed leaflet to be sent to the class members. This notice urged the class to talk to a lawyer before signing the releases sent by Gulf. It contained the names and addresses of respondents’ counsel and referred to this case. Respondents argued that the notice was constitutionally protected and necessary to the conduct of the lawsuit. Gulf opposed the motion. The court waited until August 10 to rule on this motion. On that date, 2 days after the expiration of the 45-day deadline established by the court for acceptance of the Gulf offer by class members, the court denied the motion in a one-sentence order containing no explanation. As a result, the named plaintiffs and their counsel were prevented from undertaking any communication with the class members prior to the deadline.
On appeal from a subsequent final order, respondents argued that the limitations on communications imposed by the District Court were beyond the power granted the court in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 (d) and were unconstitutional under the First Amendment. A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the District Court. 596 F. 2d 1249 (1979).
The panel majority reasoned that orders limiting communications are within the extensive powers of district courts in managing class litigation. It held that the District Court could easily have concluded that the need to limit communications outweighed any competing interests of respondents, especially since the order merely required prior approval of communications, rather than prohibiting them altogether. Id., at 1259-1261. Turning to respondents’ First Amendment argument, the majority held that the order was not a prior restraint because it exempted unapproved communications whenever the parties or their counsel asserted a constitutional privilege in good faith. The court also found no serious “chill” of protected speech. Id., at 1261-1262.
Judge Godbold wrote a dissenting opinion arguing that the order limiting communications was not “appropriate” within the meaning of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 (d) because the court did not make any finding of actual or imminent abuse. He reasoned that Gulf’s unsworn allegations of misconduct could not justify this order, and that a court could not impose such a limitation routinely in all class actions. Id., at 1267-1268. He added that it was improper in this context for the District Court to encourage compliance with the conciliation agreement through such an order. Id., at 1269-1270. Judge Godbold also found that the order violated respondents’ First Amendment rights. Id., at 1270-1275.
The Fifth Circuit granted a rehearing en banc, and reversed the panel decision concerning the order limiting communications. 619 F. 2d 459 (1980). A majority opinion joined by 13 judges held that the order was an unconstitutional prior restraint on expression accorded First Amendment protection. The court held that there was no sufficient particularized showing of need to justify such a restraint, that the restraint was overbroad, and that it was not accompanied by the requisite procedural safeguards. Id., at 466^478. Eight judges concurred specially on the theory that it was unnecessary to reach constitutional issues because the order was not based on adequate findings and therefore was not “appropriate” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 (d). Id., at 478, 481. One judge would have affirmed the District Court.
We granted a writ of certiorari to review the question whether the order limiting communications was constitutionally permissible. 449 U. S. 1033 (1980).
II
Rule 23 (d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides: “(d) ORDERS IN CONDUCT OF ACTIONS. In the conduct of actions to which this rule applies, the court may make appropriate orders: ... (3) imposing conditions on the representative parties or on intervenors . . . [and] (5) dealing with similar procedural matters.” As the concurring judges below recognized, 619 F. 2d, at 478, 481, prior to reaching any constitutional questions, federal courts must consider nonconstitutional grounds for decision. See Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandéis, J., concurring). As a result, in this case we first consider the authority of district courts under the Federal Rules to impose sweeping limitations on communications by named plaintiffs and their counsel to prospective class members.
More specifically, the question for decision is whether the limiting order entered in this case is consistent with the general policies embodied in Rule 23, which governs class actions in federal court. Class actions serve an important function in our system of civil justice. They present, however, opportunities for abuse as well as problems for courts and counsel in the management of cases. Because of the potential for abuse, a district court has' both the duty and the broad authority to exercise control over a class action and to enter appropriate orders governing the conduct of counsel and parties. But this discretion is not unlimited, and indeed is bounded by the relevant provisions of the Federal Rules. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U. S. 156 (1974). Moreover, petitioners concede, as they must, that exercises of this discretion are subject to appellate review. Brief for Petitioners 21, n. 15; see Eisen, supra; Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U. S. 340, 359 (1978).
In the present case, we are faced with the unquestionable assertion by respondents that the order created at least potential difficulties for them as they sought to vindicate the legal rights of a class of employees. The order interfered with their efforts to inform potential class members of the existence of this lawsuit, and may have been particularly injurious — not only to respondents but to the class as a whole — because the employees at that time were being pressed to decide whether to accept a backpay offer from Gulf that required them to sign a full release of all liability for discriminatory acts. In addition, the order made it more difficult for respondents, as the class representatives, to obtain information about the merits of the case from the persons they sought to represent.
Because of these potential problems, an order limiting communications between parties and potential class members should be based on a clear record and specific findings that reflect a weighing of the need for a limitation and the potential interference with the rights of the parties. Only such a determination can ensure that the court is furthering, rather than hindering, the policies embodied in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, especially Rule 23. In addition, such a weighing — identifying the potential abuses being addressed— should result in a carefully drawn order that limits speech as little as possible, consistent with the rights of the parties under the circumstances. As the court stated in Coles v. Marsh, 560 F. 2d 186, 189 (CA3), cert. denied, 434 U. S. 985 (1977):
“[T]o the extent that the district court is empowered . . . to restrict certain communications in order to prevent frustration of the policies of Rule 23, it may not exercise the power without a specific record showing by the moving party of the particular abuses by which it is threatened. Moreover, the district court must find that the showing provides a satisfactory basis for relief and that the relief sought would be consistent with the policies of Rule 23 giving explicit consideration to the narrowest possible relief which would protect the respective parties.”
Ill
In the present case, one looks in vain for any indication of a careful weighing of competing factors. Indeed, in this respect, the District Court failed to provide any record useful for appellate review. The court made neither factual findings nor legal arguments supporting the need for this sweeping restraint order. Instead, the court adopted in toto the order suggested by the Manual for Complex Litigation — on the apparent assumption that no particularized weighing of the circumstances of the case was necessary.
The result was an order requiring prior judicial approval of all communications, with the exception of cases where respondents chose to assert a constitutional right. Even then, respondents were required to preserve all communications for submission to the court within five days. The scope of this order is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that the court refused to permit mailing of the one notice respondents submitted for approval. See supra, at 96-97. This notice was intended to encourage employees to rely on the class action for relief, rather than accepting Gulfs offer. The court identified nothing in this notice that it thought was improper and indeed gave no reasons for its negative ruling.
We conclude that the imposition of the order was an abuse of discretion. The record reveals no grounds on which the District Court could have determined that it was necessary or appropriate to impose this order. Although we do not decide what standards are mandated by the First Amendment in this kind of case, we do observe that the order involved serious restraints on expression. This fact, at minimum, counsels caution on the part of a district court in drafting such an order, and attention to whether the restraint is justified by a likelihood of serious abuses.
We recognize the possibility of abuses in class-action litigation, and agree with petitioners that such abuses may implicate communications with potential class members. But the mere possibility of abuses does not justify routine adoption of a communications ban that interferes with the formation of a class or the prosecution of a class action in accordance with the Rules. There certainly is no justification for adopting verbatim the form of order recommended by the Manual for Complex Litigation, in the absence of a clear record and specific findings of need. Other, less burdensome remedies may be appropriate. Indeed, in many cases there will be no problem requiring remedies at all.
In the present case, for the reasons stated above, we hold that the District Court abused its discretion. Accordingly, the judgment below is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
The letter stated that “[b]ecause this offer is personal in nature, Gulf asks that you not discuss it with others.” It added, however, that those who did not understand the offer could request that a company official arrange an interview with a Government representative. Brief for United States et al. as Amici Curiae la.
Three of the named plaintiffs, Bernard, Brown, and Johnson, had filed individual charges before the EEOC in 1967. The Commission pursued conciliation efforts based on these charges until February 1975 when these three persons received letters stating that Gulf and the union no longer wished to entertain conciliation discussions. The letters stated that the three could request “right to sue” letters at any time, and'would have 90 days from the receipt of such letters to file suit under Title VII. Bernard and Brown received notices of right to sue from the Commission on June 11, 1976.
The conciliation agreement between Gulf and the EEOC was premised on a separate charge filed against Gulf by the Commission itself in 1968.
Two other attorneys also assisted in the representation.
The Manual, containing an important compilation of suggested procedures for handling complex federal cases, was published under the supervision of a distinguished group of federal judges. It is printed in full in Part 2 of 1 J. Moore, J. Lucas, H. Fink, D. Weckstein, & J. Wicker, Moore’s Federal Practice (1980).
In its proposed order, Gulf added language allowing it to continue paying backpay and obtaining releases under the conciliation agreement. It suggested that the Clerk of the Court should send a notice to class members informing them that they had 45 days in which to decide to accept the Gulf offer.
The June 22 order stated, in part:
“In this action, all parties hereto and their counsel are forbidden directly or indirectly, orally or in writing, to communicate concerning such action with any potential or actual class member not a formal party to the action without the consent and approval of the proposed communication and proposed addresses by order of this Court. Any such proposed communication shall be presented to this Court in writing with a designation of or description of all addressees and with a motion and proposed order for prior approval by this Court of the proposed communication. The communications forbidden by this order include, but are not limited to, (a) solicitation directly or indirectly of legal representation of potential and actual class members who are not formal parties to the class action; (b) solicitation of fees and expenses and agreements to pay fees and expenses from potential and actual class members who are not formal parties to the class action; (c) solicitation by formal parties to the class action of requests by class members to opt out in class actions under subparagraph (b)(3) of Rule 23, F. R. Civ. P.; and (d) communications from eoun-' sel or a party which may tend to misrepresent the status, purposes and effects of the class action, and of any actual or potential Court orders therein which may create impressions tending, without cause, to reflect adversely on any party, any counsel, this Court, or the administration of justice. The obligations and prohibitions of this order are not exclusive. All other ethical, legal and equitable obligations are unaffected by this order.
“This order does not forbid (1) communications between an attorney and his client or a prospective client, who has on the initiative of the client or prospective client consulted with, employed or proposed to employ the attorney, or (2) communications occurring in the regular course of business or in the performance of the duties of public oiflce or agency (such as the Attorney General) which do not have the effect of soliciting representation by counsel, or misrepresenting the status, purposes or effect of the action and orders therein.
“If any party or counsel for a party asserts a constitutional right to communicate with any member of the class without prior restraint and does so communicate pursuant to that asserted right, he shall within five days after such communication file with the Court a copy of such communication, if in writing, or an accurate and substantially complete summary of the communication if oral.”
This section of the order was drawn word-for-word from the Manual for Complex Litigation App. § 1.41. The order then went on to authorize Gulf to continue with the settlement process under the terms of the conciliation agreement, and to direct the Clerk of Court to send the notice described in n. 4, supra. A paragraph near the end of the order then reiterated the proscription on communications:
“(8) [It is ordered that] any further communication, either direct or indirect, oral or in writing (other than those permitted pursuant to paragraph (2) above) from the named parties, their representatives or counsel to the potential or actual class members not formal parties to this action is forbidden.”
The proposed notice stated:
“ATTENTION BLACK WORKERS OF GULF OIL
“The Company has asked you to sign a release. If you do, you may be giving up very important civil rights. It is important that you fully understand what you are getting in return for the release. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT YOU TALK TO A LAWYER BEFORE YOU SIGN. These lawyers will talk to you FOR FREE: [names and addresses of respondents’ counsel],
“These lawyers represent six of your fellow workers in a lawsuit titled Bernard v. Gvlf Oil Co., which was filed in Beaumont Federal Court on behalf of all of you. This suit seeks to correct fully the alleged discriminatory practices of Gulf.
“Even if you have already signed the release, talk to a lawyer. You may consult another attorney. If necessary, have him contact the above-named lawyers for more details. All discussions will be kept strictly confidential.
“AGAIN, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT YOU TALK TO A LAWYER. Whatever your decision might be, we will continue to vigorously prosecute this lawsuit in order to correct all the alleged discriminatory practices at Gulf Oil.”
This order had effected a substantial change in the procedure mandated by the conciliation agreement, which provided that “failure on the part of any member to respond within thirty days shall be interpreted as acceptance of back pay” (emphasis added). App. 59.
On January 11, 1977, the District Court granted summary judgment to petitioners, dismissing the complaint as untimely. On appeal, respondents argued that their claims had been presented in timely fashion. Both the Fifth Circuit panel, 596 F. 2d 1249, 1254H258 (1979), and the en banc court, 619 F. 2d 459, 463 (1980), held for respondents on this issue and therefore ordered a remand for further proceedings.
In holding that the order restricted protected speech, the court relied both on cases involving essentially political litigation, NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415 (1963); In re Primus, 436 U. S. 412 (1978), and on cases that may be closer to the present case, involving collective efforts to gain economic benefits accorded a specific group of persons under federal law, United Transportation Union v. Michigan Bar, 401 U. S. 576 (1971); Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Assn., 389 U. S. 217 (1967); Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia State Bar, 377 U. S. 1 (1964).
Rule 83 provides a more general authorization to district courts, stating that in “all cases not provided for by rule, the district courts may regulate their practice in any manner not inconsistent with these rules.”
Respondents in this case were performing the customary role of named plaintiffs, who seek to “vindieatfe] the rights of individuals who otherwise might not consider it worth the candle to embark on litigation in which the optimum result might be more than consumed by the cost.” Deposit Guaranty Nat. Bank v. Roper, 445 U. S. 326, 338 (1980). Rule 23 expresses “a policy in favor of having litigation in which common interests, or common questions of law or fact prevail, disposed of where feasible in a single lawsuit.” Rodgers v. United States Steel Corp., 508 F. 2d 152, 163 (CA3), cert. denied, 423 U. S. 832 (1975).
Although traditional concerns about “stirring up” litigation remain relevant in the class-action context, see n. 12, infra, such concerns were particularly misplaced here. Respondents were represented by lawyers from the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund — a nonprofit organization dedicated to the vindication of the legal rights of blacks and other citizens. See In re Primus, supra, at 422, 426-431 (distinguishing, with respect to First Amendment protections, between solicitation of clients intended to advance political objectives and solicitation of clients for pecuniary gain).
The class-action problems that have emerged since Rule 23 took its present form in 1966 have provoked a considerable amount of comment and discussion. See, e. g., Manual for Complex Litigation; Developments in the Law: Class Actions, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1318 (1976); Miller, Problems of Administering Judicial Relief in Class Actions under Federal Rule 23 (b) (3), 54 F. R. D. 501 (1972).-
The potential abuses associated with communications to class members are described in Waldo v. Lakeshore Estates, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 782 (ED La. 1977). That court referred, inter alia, to the “heightened susceptibilities of nonparty class members to solicitation amounting to barratry as well as the increased opportunities of the parties or counsel to 'drum up’ participation in the proceeding.” Id., at 790. The court added that “[ujnapproved communications to class members that misrepresent the status or effect of the pending action also have an obvious potential for confusion and/or adversely affecting the administration of justice.” Id., at 790-791. See also Manual for Complex Litigation App. § 1.41.
See generally Comment, Judicial Screening of Class Action Communications, 55 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 671, 699-704 (1980); Note, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1911, 1917-1920 (1975).
In Title VII, Congress expressed a preference for voluntary settlements of disputes through the conciliation process. E. g., Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U. S. 36, 44 (1974). But, as the en banc majority stated, it is not appropriate to promote such a policy by restricting information relevant to the employee’s choice:
“The choice between the lawsuit and accepting Gulf’s back pay offer and giving a general release was for each black employee to make. The court could not make it for him, nor should it have freighted his choice with an across-the-board ban that restricted his access to information and advice concerning the choice.” 619 F. 2d, at 477.
As noted infra, we do not reach the question of what requirements the First Amendment may impose in this context. FuE consideration of the constitutional issue should await a case with a fully developed record concerning possible abuses of the class-action device.
Cf. In re Halkin, 194 U. S. App. D. C. 257, 274, 598 F. 2d 176, 193 (1979) (“To establish 'good cause’ for a protective order under [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 26 (c), '[t]he courts have insisted on a particular and specific demonstration of fact, as distinguished from stereotyped and conclusory statements’ ”) (quoting 8 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure §2035, p. 265 (1970)).
The order contains a serious ambiguity concerning the response that the court could make if it found no merit in respondents’ assertion of a constitutional right with respect to a particular communication. Arguably, this “constitutional” exception was not a realistic option for respondents because they could be exposed to the risk of a contempt citation if the court determined that a communication submitted after-the-fact was not constitutionally protected. See 619 F. 2d, at 471 (referring to “the omissions and ambiguities of the order and possible differing constructions as to when, if at all, one is protected against contempt”). At the very least, parties or their counsel would be required to defend their good faith, at the risk of a contempt citation. Because of this fact, and the practical difficulties of the filing requirement, see id., at 470-471, this exception for constitutionally protected speech did little to narrow the scope of the limitation on speech imposed by the court.
We agree with the Court of Appeals’ refusal to give weight to Gulf’s unsworn allegations of misconduct on the part of respondents’ attorneys: “We can assume that the district court did not ground its order on a conclusion that the charges of misconduct made by Gulf were true. Nothing in its order indicates that it did, and, if it did, such a conclusion would have been procedurally improper and without evidentiary support. Rather the court appears to have acted upon the rationale of the Manual that the court has the power to enter a ban on communications in any actual or potential class action as a prophylactic measure against potential abuses envisioned by the Manual.” Id., at 466' (footnote omitted).
See n. 12, supra.
For example, an order requiring parties to file copies of nonprivi-leged communications to class members with the court may be appropriate in some circumstances.
In the conduct of a case, a court often finds it necessary to restrict the free expression of participants, including counsel, witnesses, and jurors. Our decision regarding the need for careful analysis of the particular circumstances is limited to the situation before us — involving a broad restraint on communication with class members. We also note that the rules of ethics properly impose restraints on some forms of expression. See, e. g., ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 7-104 (1980).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | I | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Thomas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case requires us to decide whether two federal law enforcement agents are immune from suit for allegedly arresting a suspect in retaliation for his political speech, when the agents had probable cause to arrest the suspect for committing a federal crime.
I
On June 16, 2006, Vice President Richard Cheney visited a shopping mall in Beaver Creek, Colorado. A Secret Service protective detail accompanied the Vice President. Petitioners Gus Reichle and Dan Doyle were members of that detail.
Respondent Steven Howards was also at the mall. He was. engaged in a cell phone conversation when he noticed the Vice President greeting members of the public. Agent Doyle overheard Howards say, during this conversation, “ ‘I’m going to ask [the Vice President] how many kids he’s killed today.’” Brief for Petitioners 4. Agent Doyle told two other agents what he had heard, and the three of them began monitoring Howards more closely.
Agent Doyle watched Howards enter the line to meet the Vice President. When Howards approached the Vice President, he told him that his “ ‘policies in Iraq are disgusting.’ ” Ibid. The Vice President simply thanked Howards and moved along, but Howards touched the Vice President’s shoulder as the Vice President departed. Howards then walked away.
Several agents observed Howards’ encounter with the Vice President. The agents determined that Agent Reichle, who coordinated the protective intelligence team responsible for interviewing individuals suspected of violating the law, should question Howards. Agent Reichle had not personally heard Howards’ comments or seen his contact with the Vice President, but Agent Doyle briefed Agent Reichle on what had happened.
Agent Reichle approached Howards, presented his badge and identified himself, and asked to speak with him. How-ards refused and attempted to walk away. At that point, Agent Reichle stepped in front of Howards and asked if he had assaulted the Vice President. Pointing his finger at Agent Reichle, Howards denied assaulting the Vice President and told Agent Reichle, “if you don’t want other people sharing their opinions, you should have him [the Vice President] avoid public places.” Howards v. McLaughlin, 634 F. 3d 1131,1137 (CA10 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). During this exchange, Agent Reichle also asked How-ards whether he had touched the Vice President. Howards falsely denied doing so. After confirming that Agent Doyle had indeed seen Howards touch the Vice President, Reichle arrested Howards.
The Secret Service transferred Howards to the custody of the local sheriff’s department. Howards was' charged by local officials with harassment in violation of state law. The charge was eventually dismissed.
I — i H-1
Howards brought this action in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado under Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, and Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971). Howards alleged that he was arrested and searched without probable cause, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Howards also alleged that he was arrested in retaliation for criticizing the Vice President, in violation of the First Amendment.
Petitioners Reichle and Doyle moved for summary judgment on the ground that they were entitled to qualified immunity. The District Court denied the motion. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 46-61. On interlocutory appeal, a divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. 634 F. 3d 1131.
The Court of Appeals held that petitioners enjoyed qualified immunity with respect to Howards’ Fourth Amendment claim. The court concluded that petitioners had probable cause to arrest Howards for making a materially false statement to a federal official in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1001 because he falsely denied touching the Vice President. 634 F. 3d, at 1142. Thus, the court concluded that neither How-ards’ arrest nor search incident to the arrest violated the Fourth Amendment. Id., at 1142-1143.
However, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners qualified immunity from Howards’ First Amendment claim. The court first determined that Howards had established a material factual dispute regarding whether petitioners were substantially motivated by Howards’ speech when they arrested him. Id., at 1144-1145. The court then rejected petitioners’ argument that, under this Court’s decision in Hartman v. Moore, 547 U. S. 250 (2006), probable cause to arrest defeats a First Amendment claim of retaliatory arrest. The court concluded that Hartman established such a rule only for retaliatory prosecution claims and, therefore, did not upset prior Tenth Circuit precedent clearly establishing that a retaliatory arrest violates the First Amendment even if supported by probable cause. 634 F. 3d, at 1148.
Judge Paul Kelly dissented from the court’s denial of qualified immunity. He would have held that when Howards was arrested, it was not clearly established that an arrest supported by probable cause could violate the First Amendment. In Judge Kelly’s view, Hartman called into serious question the Tenth Circuit’s prior precedent on retaliatory arrests. 634 F. 3d, at 1151. He noted that other Circuits had applied Hartman to retaliatory arrests and that there was a “strong argument” in favor of doing so. 634 F. 3d, at 1151-1152.
We granted certiorari on two questions: whether a First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim may lie despite the presence of probable cause to support the arrest, and whether clearly established law at the time of Howards’ arrest so held. See 565 U. S. 1078 (2011). If the answer to either question is “no,” then the agents are entitled to qualified immunity. We elect to address only the second question. We conclude that, at the time of Howards’ arrest, it was not clearly established that an arrest supported by probable cause could violate the First Amendment. We, therefore, reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals denying petitioners qualified immunity.
III
Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil damages liability unless the official violated a statutory or constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct. See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U. S. 731, 735 (2011). In Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U. S. 223, 236 (2009), we held that courts may grant qualified immunity on the ground that a purported right was not “clearly established” by prior case law, without resolving the often more difficult question whether the purported right exists at all. Id., at 227. This approach comports with our usual reluctance to decide constitutional questions unnecessarily. Id., at 241; see also Camreta v. Greene, 563 U. S. 692, 705-706 (2011); al-Kidd, 563 U. S., at 735.
To be clearly established, a right must be sufficiently, clear “that every 'reasonable official would-[have understood] that what he is doing violates that right/ ” Id., at 741 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U. S. 635, 640 (1987)). In other words, “existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” al-Kidd, supra, at 741. This “clearly established” standard protects the balance between vindication of constitutional rights and government officials’ effective performance of their duties by ensuring that officials can “ ‘reasonably . . . anticipate when their conduct may give rise to liability for damages.’ ” Anderson, supra, at 639 (quoting Davis v. Scherer, 468 U. S. 183, 195 (1984)).
The “clearly established” standard is not satisfied here. This Court has never recognized a First Amendment right to be free from a retaliatory arrest that is supported by probable cause; nor was such a right otherwise clearly established at the time of Howards’ arrest.
A
■ ■ Howards contends that our cases have “ ‘settled’ ” the rule that, “ ‘as a general matterf,] the First Amendment prohibits government officials from subjecting an individual to retaliatory actions’ ” for his speech. See Brief for Respondent 39 (quoting Hartman, supra, at 256). But we have previously explained that the right allegedly violated must be established, “ ‘not as a broad general proposition,’ ” Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U. S. 194, 198 (2004) (per curiam), but in a “particularized” sense so that the “contours” of the right are clear to a reasonable official, Anderson, supra, at 640. Here, the right in question is not the general right to be free from retaliation for one’s speech, but the more specific right to be free from a retaliatory arrest that is otherwise supported by probable cause. This Court has never held that there is such a right.
B
We next consider Tenth Circuit precedent. Assuming, arguendo, that controlling Court of Appeals’ authority could be a dispositive source of clearly established law in the circumstances of this case, the Tenth Circuit’s cases do not satisfy the “clearly established” standard here.
Relying on DeLoach v. Bevers, 922 F. 2d 618 (1990), and Poole v. County of Otero, 271 F. 3d 955 (2001), the Court of Appeals concluded that, at the time of Howards’ arrest, its precedent had clearly established the unlawfulness of an arrest in retaliation for the exercise of First Amendment rights, irrespective of probable cause. In DeLoach, a case involving both a retaliatory arrest and a retaliatory prosecution, the court held that “[a]n act taken in retaliation for the exercise of a constitutionally protected right is actionable under § 1983 even if the act, when taken for a different reason, would have been proper.” 922 F. 2d, at 620 (internal quotation marks omitted). In Poole, a subsequent retaliatory prosecution case, the court relied on DeLoach for the proposition that a plaintiff’s illegal conduct is “not relevant to his First Amendment claim.” 271 F. 3d, at 961.
The Court of Appeals acknowledged that Poole was abrogated by this Court’s subsequent decision in Hartman v. Moore, 547 U. S. 250, which held that a plaintiff cannot state a claim of retaliatory prosecution in violation of the First Amendment if the charges were supported by probable cause. But the Court of Appeals determined that Hartman’s no-probable-cause requirement did not extend to claims of retaliatory arrest and therefore did not disturb its prior precedent in DeLoach. Accordingly, the court concluded, “when Mr. Howards was arrested it was clearly established that an arrest made in retaliation of an individual’s First Amendment rights is unlawful, even if the arrest is supported by probable cause.” 634 F. 3d, at 1148.
We disagree. At the time of Howards’ arrest, Hartman’s impact on the Tenth Circuit’s precedent governing retaliatory arrests was far from clear. Although the facts of Hartman involved only a retaliatory prosecution, reasonable officers could have questioned whether the rule of Hartman also applied to arrests.
Hartman was decided against a legal backdrop that treated retaliatory arrest and prosecution claims similarly. Hartman resolved a split among the Courts of Appeals about the relevance of probable cause in retaliatory prosecution suits, but some of the conflicting Court of Appeals cases involved both an arrest and a prosecution that were alleged to be retaliation for the exercise of First Amendment rights. See 547 U. S., at 255-256, 259, n. 6 (citing Mozzochi v. Borden, 959 F. 2d 1174 (CA2 1992); Singer v. Fulton Cty. Sheriff, 63 F. 3d 110 (CA2 1995); Keenan v. Tejeda, 290 F. 3d 252 (CA5 2002); Wood v. Kesler, 323 F. 3d 872 (CA11 2003)). Those cases made no distinction between claims of retaliatory arrest and claims of retaliatory prosecution when considering the relevance of probable cause. See Mozzochi, supra, at 1179-1180; Singer, supra, at 120; Keenan, supra, at 260; Wood, supra, at 883. Indeed, the close relationship between retaliatory arrest and prosecution claims is well demonstrated by the Tenth Circuit’s own decision in DeLoach. DeLoach, too, involved allegations of both retaliatory arrest and retaliatory prosecution, and the Tenth Circuit analyzed the two claims as one. 922 F. 2d, at 620-621.
A reasonable official also could have interpreted Hartman's rationale to apply to retaliatory arrests. Hartman first observed that, in retaliatory prosecution cases, evidence showing whether there was probable cause for the charges would always be “available and apt to prove or disprove retaliatory causation.” 547 U. S., at 261. In this Court’s view, the presence of probable cause, while not a “guarantee” that retaliatory motive did not cause the prosecution, still precluded any prima facie inference that retaliatory motive was the but-for cause of the plaintiff’s injury. Id., at 265. This was especially true because, as Hartman next emphasized, retaliatory prosecution claims involve particularly attenuated causation between the defendant’s alleged retaliatory animus and the plaintiff’s injury. Id., at 259-261. In a retaliatory prosecution case, the key defendant is typically not the prosecutor who made the charging decision that injured the plaintiff, because prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity for their decisions to prosecute. Rather, the key defendant is the person who allegedly prompted the prosecutor’s decision. Thus, the intervening decision of the third-party prosecutor widens the causal gap between the defendant’s animus and the plaintiff’s injury. Id., at 261-263.
Like retaliatory prosecution cases, evidence of the presence or absence of probable cause for the arrest will be available in virtually every retaliatory arrest case. Such evidence could be thought similarly fatal to a plaintiff’s claim that animus caused his arrest, given that retaliatory arrest cases also present a tenuous causal connection between the defendant’s alleged animus and the plaintiff’s injury. An officer might bear animus toward the content of a suspect’s speech. But the officer may decide to arrest the suspect because his speech provides evidence of a crime or suggests a potential threat. See, e. g., Wayte v. United States, 470 U. S. 598, 612-613 (1985) (noting that letters of protest writ- , ten to the Selective Service, in which the author expressed disagreement with the draft, “provided strong, perhaps conclusive evidence of the nonregistrant’s intent not to comply — one of the elements of the offense” of willful failure to register for the draft). Like retaliatory prosecution cases, then, the connection between alleged animus and injury may be weakened in the arrest context by a police officer’s wholly legitimate consideration of speech.
To be sure, we do not suggest that Hartman’s rule in fact extends to arrests. Nor do we suggest that every aspect of Hartman’s rationale could apply to retaliatory arrests. Hartman concluded that the causal connection in retaliatory prosecution cases is attenuated because those cases necessarily involve the animus of one person and the injurious action of another, 547 U. S., at 262, but in many retaliatory arrest cases, it is the officer bearing the alleged animus who makes the injurious arrest. Moreover, Hartman noted that, in retaliatory prosecution cases, the causal connection between the defendant’s animus and the prosecutor’s decision is further weakened by the, “presumption of regularity accorded to prosecutorial decisionmaking.” Id., at 263. That presumption does hot apply here. Nonetheless, the fact remains that, for qualified immunity purposes, at the time of Howards’ arrest it was at least arguable that Hartman’s rule extended to retaliatory arrests.
Decisions from other Federal Courts of Appeals in the wake of Hartman support this assessment. Shortly before Howards’ arrest, the Sixth Circuit held that Hartman required a plaintiff alleging a retaliatory arrest to show that the defendant officer lacked probable cause. See Barnes v. Wright, 449 F. 3d 709, 720 (2006) (reasoning that the Hartman “rule sweeps broadly”). That court’s treatment of Hartman confirms that the inapplicability of Hartman to arrests would not have been clear to a reasonable officer when Howards was arrested. Moreover, since Howards’ arrest, additional Courts of Appeals have concluded that Hartman’s no-probable-cause requirement extends to retaliatory arrests. See, e. g., MeCabe v. Parker, 608 F. 3d 1068, 1075 (CA8 2010); Phillips v. Irvin, 222 Fed. Appx. 928, 929 (CA11 2007) (per curiam). As we have previously observed, “[i]f judges thus disagree on a constitutional question, it is unfair to subject police to money damages for picking the losing side of the controversy.” Wilson v. Layne, 526 U. S. 603, 618 (1999).
* * *
Hartman injected uncertainty into the law governing retaliatory arrests, particularly in light of Hartman’s rationale and the close relationship between retaliatory arrest and prosecution claims. This uncertainty was only confirmed by subsequent appellate decisions that disagreed over whether the reasoning in Hartman applied similarly to retaliatory arrests. Accordingly, when Howards was arrested it was not clearly established that an arrest supported by probable cause could give rise to a First Amendment violation. Petitioners Reichle and Doyle are thus entitled to qualified immunity.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
The parties dispute the manner of the touch. Howards described it as an openhanded pat, while several Secret Service agents described it as a forceful push. This dispute does not affect our analysis.
Howards named several Secret Service agents as defendants, but only Agents Reichle and Doyle are petitioners here. We address only those parts of the lower courts’ decisions that involve petitioners Reichle and Doyle.
Howards does not challenge the Court of Appeals’ probable-cause determination.
This Court has recognized an implied cause of action for damages against federal officials for Fourth Amendment violations. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971). We have never held that Bivens extends to First Amendment claims. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U. S. 662, 675 (2009) (assuming without deciding that a First Amendment free exercise claim is actionable under Bivens); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U. S. 367, 368 (1983) (refusing to extend Bivens to a First Amendment speech claim involving federal employment). We need not (and do not) decide here whether Bivens extends to First Amendment retaliatory arrest claims.
The Court of Appeals’ reliance on Whren v. United States, 517 U. S. 806 (1996), was misplaced. There, we held that a traffic stop supported by probable cause did not violate the Fourth Amendment regardless of the officer’s actual motivations, but we explained that the Equal Protection Clause would prohibit an officer from selectively enforcing the traffic laws based on race. Id., at 813. Citing Whren, the Court of Appeals noted that “[i]t is well established that an act which is lawful under the Fourth Amendment may still violate other provisions of the Constitution.” Howards v. McLaughlin, 634 F. 3d 1131, 1149, n. 15 (CA10 2011). But, again, we do not define clearly established law at such a “high level of generality.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U. S. 731, 742 (2011). Whren’s discussion of the Fourteenth Amendment does not indicate, much less “clearly establish,” that an arrest supported by probable cause could none-, theless violate the First Amendment.
Howards argues that petitioners violated his clearly established First Amendment right even if Hartman’s rule applies equally to retaliatory arrests. According to Howards, Hartman did not hold that a prosecution violates the First Amendment only when it is unsupported by probable cause. Rather, Howards argues, Hartman made probable cause relevant only to a plaintiff’s ability to recover damages for a First Amendment violation. See Brief for Respondent 37-41. We need not resolve whether Hartman is best read as defining the scope of the First Amendment right or as simply establishing a prerequisite for recovery. Nor need we decide whether that distinction matters. It suffices, for qualified immunity purposes, that the answer would not have been clear to a reasonable official when Howards was arrested.
Indeed, the Tenth Circuit itself has applied Hartman outside the context of retaliatory prosecution. See McBeth v. Himes, 698 F. 3d 708, 719 (2010) (requiring the absence of probable cause in the context of a claim alleging that government officials suspended a business license in retaliation for the exercise of First Amendment rights).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | B | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Douglas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case, which involves questions concerning the constitutionality of an Arizona Act requiring an oath from state employees, has been here before. We vacated the judgment of the Arizona Supreme Court which had sustained the oath (94 Ariz. 1, 381 P. 2d 554) and remanded the cause for reconsideration in light of Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U. S. 360. See 378 U. S. 127. On reconsideration the Supreme Court of Arizona reinstated the original judgment. 97 Ariz. 140, 397 P. 2d 944. The case is here on certiorari. 382 U. S. 810.
The oath reads in conventional fashion as follows:
“I, (type or print name) do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution and laws of the State of Arizona; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same, and defend them against all enemies, foreign and domestic, and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge the duties of the office of (name of office) according to the best of my ability, so help me God (or so I do affirm).”
The Legislature put a gloss on the oath by subjecting to a prosecution for perjury and for discharge from public office anyone who took the oath and who “knowingly and wilfully becomes or remains a member of the communist party of the United States or its successors or any of its subordinate organizations” or “any other organization” having for “one of its purposes” the overthrow of the government of Arizona or any of its political subdivisions where the employee had knowledge of the unlawful purpose. Petitioner, a teacher and a Quaker, decided she could not in good conscience take the oath, not knowing what it meant and not having any chance to get a hearing at which its precise scope and meaning could be determined. This suit for declaratory relief followed. On our remand the Arizona Supreme Court said that the gloss on the oath is “not afflicted” with the many uncertainties found potentially punishable in Baggett v. Bullitt, supra.
“Nor does it reach endorsements or support for Communist candidates for office nor a lawyer who represents the Communist Party, or its members, nor journalists who defend the Communist Party, its rights, or its members. Such conduct is neither an act nor in aid of an act attempting to overthrow the government by force and violence.
“It is our conclusion that the portions of the Arizona act here considered do not forbid or require conduct in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at the meaning and differ as to their application.” 97 Ariz., at 147, 397 P. 2d, at 948.
Mr. Justice Bernstein, in dissent, responded that the majority had failed to consider the so-called “membership clause” of the oath and accompanying statutory gloss:
“Let us consider a scientist, a teacher in one of our universities. He could not know whether membership is prohibited in an international scientific organization which includes members from neutralist nations and Communist bloc nations — the latter admittedly dedicated to the overthrow of our government and which control the organization — even though access to the scientific information of the organization is available only to its members.
“Though all might agree that the principal purpose of such an organization is scientific, the statute makes his membership a crime if any subordinate purpose is the overthrow of the state government. The vice of vagueness here is that the scientist cannot know whether membership in the organization will result in prosecution for a violation of § 38-231, subd. E or in honors from his university for the encyclopedic knowledge acquired in his field in part through his membership.” Id., at 147-148, 397 P. 2d, at 949.
We recognized in Scales v. United States, 367 U. S. 203, 229, that “quasi-political parties or other groups . . . may embrace both legal and illegal aims.” We noted that a “blanket prohibition of association with a group having both legal and illegal aims” would pose “a real danger that legitimate political expression or association would be impaired.” The statute with which we dealt in Scales, the so-called “membership clause” of the Smith Act (18 U. S. C. § 2385), was found not to suffer from this constitutional infirmity because, as the Court construed it, the statute reached only “active” membership (id., at 222) with the “specific intent” of assisting in achieving the unlawful ends of the organization (id., at 229-230). The importance of this limiting construction from a constitutional standpoint was emphasized in Noto v. United States, 367 U. S. 290, 299-300, decided the same day:
“[I]t should also be said that this element of the membership crime [the defendant’s ‘personal criminal purpose to bring about the overthrow of the Government by force and violence’], like its others, must be judged strictissimi juris, for otherwise there is a danger that one in sympathy with the legitimate aims of such an organization, but not specifically intending to accomplish them by resort to violence, might be punished for his adherence to lawful and constitutionally protected purposes, because of other and unprotected purposes which he does not necessarily share.”
Any lingering doubt that proscription of mere knowing membership, without any showing of “specific intent,” would run afoul of the Constitution was set at rest by our decision in Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U. S. 500. We dealt there with a statute which provided that no member of a Communist organization ordered by the Subversive Activities Control Board to register shall apply for or use a passport. We concluded that the statute would not permit a narrow reading of the sort we gave § 2385 in Scales. See 378 U. S., at 511, n. 9. The statute, as we read it, covered membership which was not accompanied by a specific intent to further the unlawful aims of the organization, and we held it unconstitutional.
The oath and accompanying statutory gloss challenged here suffer from an identical constitutional infirmity. One who subscribes to this Arizona oath and who is, or thereafter becomes, a knowing member of an organization which has as “one of its purposes” the violent overthrow of the government, is subject to immediate discharge and criminal penalties. Nothing in the oath, the statutory gloss, or the construction of the oath and statutes given by the Arizona Supreme Court, purports to exclude association by one who does not subscribe to the organization’s unlawful ends. Here as in Baggett v. Bullitt, supra, the “hazard of being prosecuted for knowing but guiltless behavior” (id., at 373) is a reality. People often label as “communist” ideas which they oppose; and they often make up our juries. “[P]rosecutors too are human.” Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, 368 U. S. 278, 287. Would a teacher be safe and secure in going to a Pugwash Conference? Would it be legal to join a seminar group predominantly Communist and therefore subject to control by those who are said to believe in the overthrow of the Government by force and violence? Juries might convict though the teacher did not subscribe to the wrongful aims of the organization. And there is apparently no machinery provided for getting clearance in advance.
Those who join an organization but do not share its unlawful purposes and who do not participate in its unlawful activities surely pose no threat, either as citizens or as public employees. Laws such as this which are not restricted in scope to those who join with the “specific intent” to further illegal action impose, in effect, a conclusive presumption that the member shares the unlawful aims of the organization. See Aptheker v. Secretary of State, supra, at 511. The unconstitutionality of this Act follows a fortiori from Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513, where we held that a State may not even place on an applicant for a tax exemption the burden of proving that he has not engaged in criminal advocacy.
This Act threatens the cherished freedom of association protected by the First Amendment, made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. Baggett v. Bullitt, supra; Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, supra. Cf. N. A. A. C. P. v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449, 460 et seq.; Gibson v. Florida Legislative Committee, 372 U. S. 539, 543-546. And, as a committee of the Arizona Legislature which urged adoption of this law itself recognized, public employees of character and integrity may well forgo their calling rather than risk prosecution for perjury or compromise their commitment to intellectual and political freedom:
“The communist trained in fraud and perjury has no qualms in taking any oath; the loyal citizen, conscious of history’s oppressions, may well wonder whether the medieval rack and torture wheel are next for the one who declines to take an involved negative oath as evidence that he is a True Believer.”
A statute touching those protected rights must be “narrowly drawn to define and punish specific conduct as constituting a clear and present danger to a substantial interest of the State.” Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 311. Legitimate legislative goals “cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved.” Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479, 488. And see Louisiana v. N. A. A. C. P., 366 U. S. 293, 296-297. As we said in N. A. A. C. P. v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 432-433:
“The objectionable quality of . . . overbreadth does not depend upon absence of fair notice to a criminally accused or upon unchanneled delegation of legislative powers, but upon the danger of tolerating, in the area of First Amendment freedoms, the existence of a penal statute susceptible of sweeping and improper application. . . . These freedoms are delicate and vulnerable,' as well as supremely precious in our society. The threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions. . . .”
A law which applies to membership without the “specific intent” to further the illegal aims of the organization infringes unnecessarily on protected freedoms. It rests on the doctrine of “guilt by association” which has no place here. See Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U. S. 118, 136; Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U. S. 232, 246. Such a law cannot stand.
Reversed.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. §38-231 (1965 Supp.).
Id., §E reads as follows:
“Any officer or employee as defined in this section having taken the form of oath or affirmation prescribed by this section, and knowingly or wilfully at the time of subscribing the oath or affirmation, or at any time thereafter during his term of office or employment, does commit or aid in the commission of any act to overthrow by force or violence the government of this state or of any of its political subdivisions, or advocates the overthrow by force or violence of the government of this state or of any of its political subdivisions, or during such term of office or employment knowingly and wilfully becomes or remains a member of the communist party of the United States or its successors or any of its subordinate organizations or any other organization having for one of its purposes the overthrow by force or violence of the government of the state of Arizona or any of its political subdivisions, and said officer or employee as defined in this section prior to becoming or remaining a member of such organization or organizations had knowledge of said unlawful purpose of said organization or organizations, shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof shall be subject to all the penalties for perjury; in addition, upon conviction under this section, the officer or employee shall be deemed discharged from said office or employment and shall not be entitled to any additional compensation or any other emoluments or benefits which may have been incident or appurtenant to said office or employment.”
Cf. Rowoldt v. Perfetto, 355 U. S. 115, 120; Gastelum-Quinones v. Kennedy, 374 U. S. 469.
The Pugwash Conferences, A Staff Analysis, Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Committee Print, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961); Rabinowitch, Pugwash — History and Outlook, 13 Bull. Atomic Sci. 243 (1957); Topchiev, Comments on Pugwash: From the East, 14 Bull. Atomic Sci. 118 (1958); Thirring, Comments on Pugwash: From the West, id,., at 121; Rabinowitch, The Stowe Conferences, 17 Bull. Atomic Sci. 382 (1961); Statement of International Pugwash Continuing Committee: Pugwash XIII, Bull. Atomic Sci. 43-45 (December 1964); Documents of Second Pugwash Conference of Nuclear Scientists (March 31-April 11, 1958).
Petitioner would, of course, have a hearing at a perjury trial, after the event. And one member of the Arizona Supreme Court felt that petitioner, having tenure, would be entitled to a hearing before she was discharged from her teaching position. See Elfbrandt v. Russell, 94 Ariz. 1, 17-18, 381 P. 2d 554, 565 (Bernstein, C. J., concurring). But even that is not authoritatively decided by the court; indeed, another opinion states this to be a minority view, 94 Ariz., at 18, 381 P. 2d, at 566 (separate opinion of Jennings, J.).
Report of the Judiciary Committee in Support of the Committee Amendment to H. B. 115, Journal of the Senate, 1st Reg. Sess., 25th Legislature of the State of Arizona, p. 424 (1961).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | C | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice White
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Illinois Department of Public Aid (IDPA) filed a lawsuit in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Ill., on October 30, 1974, against appellees Juan and Maria Hernandez, alleging that they had fraudulently concealed assets while applying for and receiving public assistance. Such conduct is a crime under Illinois law, Ill. Rev. Stat., c. 23, § 11-21 (1973). The IDPA, however, proceeded civilly and sought only return of the money alleged to have been wrongfully received. The IDPA simultaneously instituted an attachment proceeding against appellees’ property. Pursuant to the Illinois Attachment Act, Ill. Rev. Stat., c. 11 (1973) (Act), the IDPA filed an affidavit setting forth the nature and amount of the underlying claim and alleging that the appellees had obtained money from the IDPA by fraud. The writ of attachment was issued automatically by the clerk of the court upon receipt of this affidavit. The writ was then given to the sheriff who executed it, on November 5, 1974, on money belonging to appellees in a credit union. Appellees received notice of the attachment, freezing their money in the credit union, on November 8, 1974, when they received the writ, the complaint, and the affidavit in support of the writ. The writ indicated a return date for the attachment proceeding of November 18, 1974. Appellees appeared in court on November 18, 1974, and were informed that the matter would be continued until December 19, 1974. Appellees never filed an answer either to the attachment or to the underlying complaint. They did not seek a prompt hearing, nor did they attempt to quash the attachment on the ground that the procedures surrounding its issuance rendered it and the Act unconstitutional. Instead appellees filed the instant lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois on December 2, 1974, seeking, inter alia, return of the attached money. The federal complaint alleged that the appellees’ property had been attached pursuant to the Act and that the Act was unconstitutional in that it provided for the deprivation of debtors’ property without due process of law. Appellees as plaintiffs sought to represent a class of those “who have had or may have their property attached without notice or hearing upon the creditor’s mere allegation of fraudulent conduct pursuant to the Illinois Attachment Act.” App. 6-7. They named as defendants appellants Trainor and O’Malley, officials of the IDPA, and sought declaration of a' defendant class made up of all the court clerks in the Circuit Courts of Illinois, and of another defendant class of all sheriffs in Illinois. They sought an injunction against Trainor and O’Malley forbidding them to seek attachments under the Act and an injunction against the clerks and sheriffs forbidding them to issue or serve writs of attachment under the Act. Appellees also sought preliminary relief in the form of an order directing the Sheriff of Cook County to release the property which had been attached. Finally, appellees sought the convening of a three-judge court pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2284.
The District Court declined to rule on the request for preliminary relief because the parties had agreed that one-half of the money in the credit union would be returned. A three-judge court was convened. It certified the suit as a plaintiff and defendant class action as appellees had requested. App. 63. In an opinion dated December 19, 1975, almost one year after the return date of the attachment in state court, it declined to dismiss the case under the doctrine of Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971), and Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U. S. 592 (1975), stating:
“In Huffman, the State of Ohio proceeded under a statute which gave an exclusive right of action to the state. By contrast, the Illinois Attachment Act provides a cause of action for any person, public or private. It is mere happenstance that the State of Illinois was the petitioner in this attachment proceeding. It is likewise coincidental that the pending state proceedings may arguably be quasi-criminal in nature; under the Illinois Attachment Act, they need not be. These major distinctions preclude this Court from extending the principles of Younger, based on considerations of equity, comity and federalism, beyond the quasi-criminal situation set forth in Huffman.” Hernandez v. Danaher, 405 F. Supp. 757, 760 (1975).
Proceeding to the merits, it held §§ 1, 2, 2a, 6, 8, 10, and 14 of the Act to be “on [their face] patently violative of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” 405 F. Supp., at 762. It ordered the clerk of the court and the Sheriff of Cook County to return to appellees the rest of their attached property; it enjoined all clerks and all sheriffs from issuing or serving attachment writs pursuant to the Act and ordered them to release any currently held attached property to its owner; and it enjoined appellants Trainor and O’Malley from authorizing applications for attachment writs pursuant to the Act. App. 65-66. Appellants appealed to this Court under 28 U. S. C. § 1253, claiming that under Younger and Huffman principles the District Court should have dismissed the suit without passing on the constitionality of the Act and that the Act is in any event constitutional. Since we agree with appellants that Younger and Huffman principles do apply here, we do not reach their second claim.
Because our federal and state legal systems have overlapping jurisdiction and responsibilities, we have frequently inquired into the proper role of a federal court, in a case pending before it and otherwise within its jurisdiction, when litigation between the same parties and raising the same issues is or apparently soon will be pending in a state court. • More precisely, when a suit is filed in a federal court challenging the constitutionality of a state law under the Federal Constitution and seeking to have state officers enjoined from enforcing it, should the federal court proceed to judgment when it appears that the State has already instituted proceedings in the state court to enforce the challenged statute against the federal plaintiff and the latter could tender and have his federal claims decided in the state court?
Younger v. Harris, supra, and Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U. S. 66 (1971), addressed, these questions where the already pending state proceeding was a criminal prosecution and the federal plaintiff sought to invalidate the statute under which the state prosecution was brought. In these circumstances, the Court ruled that the Federal District Court should issue neither a declaratory judgment nor an injunction but should dismiss the case. The first justification the Court gave for this rule was simply the “basic doctrine of equity jurisprudence that courts of equity should not act, and particularly should not act to restrain a criminal prosecution, when the moving party has an adequate remedy at law and will not suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief.” Younger v. Harris, supra, at 43-44.
Beyond the accepted rule that equity will ordinarily not enjoin the prosecution of a crime, however, the Court voiced a “more vital consideration,” 401 U. S., at 44, namely, that in a Union where both the States and the Federal Government are sovereign entities, there are basic concerns of federalism which counsel against interference by federal courts, through injunctions or otherwise, with legitimate state functions, particularly with the operation of state courts. Relying on cases that declared that courts of equity should give “scrupulous regard [to] the rightful independence of state governments,” Beal v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 312 U. S. 45, 50 (1941), the Court held, that in this intergovernmental context, the two classic preconditions for the exercise of equity jurisdiction assumed new dimensions. Although the existence of an adequate remedy at law barring equitable relief normally would be determined by inquiring into the remedies available in the federal rather than in the state courts, Great Lakes Co. v. Huffman, 319 U. S. 293, 297 (1943), here the inquiry was to be broadened to focus on the remedies available in the pending state proceeding. “ 'The accused should first set up and rely upon his defense in the state courts, even though this involves a challenge of the validity of some statute, unless it plainly appears that this course would not afford adequate protection.’ ” Younger v. Harris, supra, at 45, quoting Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U. S. 240, 243-244 (1926). Dismissal of the federal suit “naturally presupposes the opportunity to raise and have timely decided by a competent state tribunal the federal issues involved.” Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U. S. 564, 577 (1973). “The policy of equitable restraint ... is founded on the premise that ordinarily a pending state prosecution provides the accused a fair and sufficient opportunity for vindication of federal constitutional rights.” Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U. S. 117, 124 (1975).
The Court also concluded that the other precondition for equitable relief — irreparable injury — would not be satisfied unless the threatened injury was both great and immediate. The burden of conducting a defense in the criminal prosecution was not sufficient to warrant interference by the federal courts with legitimate state efforts to enforce state laws; only extraordinary circumstances would suffice. As the Court later explained, to restrain a state proceeding that afforded an adequate vehicle for vindicating the federal plaintiff’s constitutional rights “would entail an unseemly failure to give effect to the principle that state courts have the solemn responsibility equally with the federal courts” to safeguard constitutional rights and would “reflec[t] negatively upon the state court’s ability” to do so. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 452, 460-461, 462 (1974). The State would be prevented not only from “effectuating its substantive policies, but also from continuing to perform the separate function of providing a forum competent to vindicate any constitutional objections interposed against those policies.” Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U. S., at 604.
Huffman involved the propriety of a federal injunction against the execution of a judgment entered in a pending state-court suit brought by the State to enforce a nuisance statute. Although the state suit was a civil rather than a criminal proceeding, Younger principles were held to require dismissal of the federal suit. Noting that the State was a party to the nuisance proceeding and that the nuisance statute was “in aid of and closely related to criminal statutes,” the Court concluded that a federal injunction would be “an offense to the State’s interest in the nuisance litigation [which] is likely to be every bit as great as it would be were this a criminal proceeding.” 420 U. S.,“ at 604. Thus, while the traditional maxim that equity will not enjoin a criminal prosecution strictly speaking did not apply to the nuisance proceeding in Huffman, the “ 'more vital consideration’ ” of comity, id., at 601, quoting Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S., at 44, counseled restraint as strongly in the context of the pending state civil enforcement action as in the context of a pending criminal proceeding. In these circumstances, it was proper that the federal court stay its hand.
We have recently applied the analysis of Huffman to proceedings similar to state civil enforcement actions — judicial contempt proceedings. Juidice v. Vail, 430 U. S. 327 (1977). The Court again stressed the “more vital consideration” of comity underlying the Younger doctrine and held that the state interest in vindicating the regular operation of its judicial system through the contempt process — whether that process was labeled civil, criminal, or quasi-criminal — was sufficiently important to preclude federal injunctive relief unless Younger standards were met.
These cases control here. An action against appellees was pending in state court when they filed their federal suit. The state action was a suit by the State to recover from appellees welfare payments that allegedly had been fraudulently obtained. The writ of attachment issued as part of that action. The District Court thought that Younger policies were irrelevant because suits to recover money and writs of attachment were available to private parties as well as the State; it was only because of the coincidence that the State was a party that the suit was “arguably” in aid of the criminal law. But the fact remains that the State was a party to the suit in its role of administering its public-assistance programs. Both the suit and the accompanying writ of attachment were brought to vindicate important state policies such as safeguarding the fiscal integrity of those programs. The state authorities also had the option of vindicating these policies through criminal prosecutions. See supra, at 435. Although, as in Juidice, the State’s interest here is “[pjerhaps . . . not quite as important as is the State’s interest in the enforcement of its criminal laws ... or even its interest in the maintenance of a quasi-criminal proceeding 430 U. S., at 335, the principles of Younger and Huffman are broad enough to apply to interference by a federal court with an ongoing civil enforcement action such as this, brought by the State in its sovereign capacity.
For a federal court to proceed with its case rather than to remit appellees to their remedies in a pending state enforcement suit would confront the State with a choice of engaging in duplicative litigation, thereby risking a temporary federal injunction, or of interrupting its enforcement proceedings pending decision of the federal court at some unknown time in the future. It would also foreclose the opportunity of the state court to construe the challenged statute in the face of the actual federal constitutional challenges that would also be pending for decision before it, a privilege not wholly shared by the federal courts. Of course, in the case before us the state statute was invalidated and a federal injunction prohibited state officers from using or enforcing the attachment statute for any purpose. The eviscerating impact on many state enforcement actions is readily apparent. This disruption of suits by the State in its sovereign capacity, when combined with the negative reflection' on the State’s ability to adjudicate federal claims that occurs whenever a federal court enjoins a pending state proceeding, leads us to the conclusion that the interests of comity and federalism on which Younger and Samuels v. Mackell primarily rest apply in full force here. The pendency of the state-court action called for restraint by the federal court and for the dismissal of appellees’ complaint unless extraordinary circumstances-were present warranting federal interference or unless their state remedies were inadequate to litigate their federal due process claim.
No extraordinary circumstances warranting equitable relief were present here. There is no suggestion that the pending state action was brought in bad faith or for the purpose of harassing appellees. It is urged that this case comes within the exception that we said in Younger might exist where a state statute is “ ‘flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions in every clause, sentence and paragraph, and in whatever manner and against whomever an effort might be made to apply it.’ ” 401 U. S., at 53-54, quoting Watson v. Buck, 313 U. S. 387, 402 (1941). Even if such a finding was made below, which'we doubt (see supra, at 439), it would not have been warranted in light of our cases. Compare North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U. S. 601 (1975), with Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U. S. 600 (1974).
As for whether appellees could have presented their federal due process challenge to the attachment statute in the pending state proceeding, that question, if presented below, was not addressed by the District Court, which placed its rejection of Younger and Huffman on broader grounds. The issue is heavily laden with local law, and we do not rule on it here in the first instance.
The grounds on which the District Court refused to apply the principles of Younger and Huffman were infirm; it was therefore error, on those grounds, to entertain the action on behalf of either the named or the unnamed plaintiffs and to reach the issue of the constitutionality of the Illinois attachment statute.
The judgment is therefore reversed, and the case is remanded to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Mr. Justice Stewart substantially agrees with the views expressed in the dissenting opinions of Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Stevens. Accordingly, he respectfully dissents from the opinion and judgment of the Court.
Under § 1 of the Act, a writ will issue only upon allegation in the affidavit of one of the following nine grounds:
“First: Where the debtor is not a resident of this State.
“Second: When the debtor conceals himself or stands in defiance of an officer, so that process cannot be served upon him.
“Third: Where the debtor has departed from this State with the intention of having his effects removed from this State.
“Fourth: Where the debtor is about to depart from this State with the intention of having his effects removed from this State.
“Fifth: Where the debtor is about to remove his property from this State to the injury of such creditor.
“Sixth: Where the debtor has within 2 years preceding the filing of the affidavit required, fraudulently conveyed or assigned his effects, or a part thereof, so as to hinder or delay his creditors.
“Seventh: Where the debtor has, within 2 years prior to the filing of such affidavit, fraudulently concealed or disposed of his property so as to hinder or delay his creditors.
“Eighth: Where the debtor is about fraudulently to conceal, assign, or otherwise dispose of his property or effects, so as to hinder or delay his creditors.
“Ninth: Where the debt sued for was fraudulently contracted on the part of the debtor: Provided, the statements of the debtor, his agent or attorney, which constitute the fraud, shall have been reduced to writing, and his signature attached thereto, by himself, agent or attorney.”
Under § 2 of the Act, in eases sounding in tort the writ is. not issued until a judge has examined the plaintiff under oath and determined that the damages suffered exceed the amount of the attachment.
Section 2 of the Act provides in part:
“2. Affidavit — Statement—Examination under oath. § 2. To entitle a creditor to such a writ of attachment, he or his agent or attorney shall make and file with the clerk of the circuit court, an affidavit setting forth the nature and amount of the claim, so far as practicable, after allowing all just credits and set-offs, and any one or more of the causes mentioned in section 1, and also stating the place of residence of the defendants, if known, and if not known, that upon diligent inquiry the affiant has not been able to ascertain the same together with a written statement, either embodied in such affidavit or separately in writing, executed by the attorney or attorneys representing the creditor, to the effect that the attachment action invoked by such affidavit does or does not sound in tort, also a designation of the return day for the summons to be issued in said action.”
Since the State was a party, the normal requirement that the plaintiff post a bond in an amount equal to twice the amount sued for, did not apply and no bond was posted. See § 4a of the Act.
Section 6 of the Act provides:
“The writ of attachment required in the preceding section shall be directed to the sheriff (and, for purpose only of service of summons, to any person authorized to serve writs of summons), or in case the sheriff is interested, or otherwise disqualified or prevented from acting, to the coroner of the county in which the suit is commenced, and shall be made returnable on a return day designated by the plaintiff, which day shall not be less than ten days or more than sixty days after its date.”
Section 27 of the Act provides:
“The defendant may answer, traversing the facts stated in the affidavit upon which the attachment issued, which answer shall be verified by affidavit; and if, upon the trial thereon, the issue shall be found for the plaintiff, the defendant may answer the complaint or file a motion directed thereto as in other cases, but if found for the defendant, the attachment shall be quashed, and the costs of the attachment shall be adjudged against the plaintiff, but the suit shall proceed to final judgment as though commenced by summons.”
Appellees argue that the sheriffs and clerks have .not perfected their appeals and that the IDPA officials cannot litigate in connection with their appeals the validity of the injunction directing the clerk of the court to return appellees’ property in the credit union. The argument is merit-less. The IDPA officials were parties below; the order directing the clerk to return the property attached for the benefit of IDPA affects their interests in a vital way; and their ability to obtain review of such an order cannot depend on whether the clerk — over whom IDPA has no control— chooses to perfect his appeal.
See Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U. S. 117, 124-125 (1975):
“Although the cost, anxiety, and inconvenience of having to defend against a single criminal prosecution alone do not constitute ‘irreparable injury’ in the ‘special legal sense of that term,’ [Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S.,] at 46, the Court in Younger left room for federal equitable intervention in a state criminal trial where there is a showing of ‘bad faith’ or ‘harassment’ by state officials responsible for the prosecution, id., at 54, where the state law to be applied in the criminal proceeding is ' “flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions,”’ id., at 53, or where there exist other ‘extraordinary circumstances in which the necessary irreparable injury can be shown even in the absence of the usual prerequisites of bad faith and harassment.’ Ibid. In the companion case of Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U. S. 82, the Court explained that ‘[o]nly in cases of proven harassment or prosecutions undertaken by state officials in bad faith without hope of obtaining a valid conviction and perhaps in other extraordinary circumstances where irreparable injury can be shown is federal injunctive relief against pending state prosecutions appropriate.’ Id., at 85. See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U. S. 225, 230-231.
“The policy of equitable restraint expressed in Younger v. Harris, in short, is founded on the premise that ordinarily a pending state prosecution provides the accused a fair and sufficient opportunity for vindication of federal constitutional rights. See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 452, 460. Only if ‘extraordinary circumstances’ render the state court incapable of fairly and fully adjudicating the federal issues before it, can there be any relaxation of the deference to be accorded to the state criminal process. The very nature of ‘extraordinary circumstances,’ of course, makes it impossible to anticipate and define every situation that might create a sufficient threat of such great, immediate, and irreparable injury as to warrant intervention in state criminal proceedings. [Footnote omitted.] But whatever else is required, such circumstances must be ‘extraordinary’ in the sense of creating an 'extraordinarily pressing need for immediate federal equitable relief, not merely in the sense of presenting a highly unusual factual situation.”
Title 28 U. S. C. §2283 provides that “[a] court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.” The section is not applicable here because this 42 U. S. C. § 1983 action is an express statutory exception to its application, Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U. S. 225 (1972); but it is significant for present purposes that the section does not discriminate between civil and criminal proceedings pending in state courts. Furthermore, 28 U. S. C. § 1341 provides that district courts shall not enjoin, suspend, or restrain the levy or collection of any tax under state law where there are adequate remedies available in state tribunals.
Prior cases in this Court that at the time counseled restraint in actions seeking to enjoin state officials from enforcing state statutes or implementing public policies, did not necessarily distinguish between the type of proceedings — civil or criminal- — pending or contemplated by state officers. Wilson v. Schnettler, 365 U. S. 381, 384-385 (1961); Allegheny County v. Mashuda Co., 360 U. S. 185, 189-190 (1959); Alabama Public Service Comm’n v. Southern R. Co., 341 U. S. 341, 349-350 (1951); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U. S. 315, 317-318 (1943); Great Lakes Co. v. Huffman, 319 U. S. 293, 297-298 (1943); Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co., 316 U. S. 491, 494-495 (1942); Watson v. Buck, 313 U. S. 387, 400-401 (1941); Beal v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 312 U. S. 45, 49-50 (1941); Spielman Motor Sales Co. v. Dodge, 295 U. S. 89, 95-97 (1935); Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U. S. 176, 185 (1935); Hawks v. Hamill, 288 U. S. 52, 60-61 (1933); Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U. S. 521, 525-526 (1932); Massachusetts State Grange v. Benton, 272 U. S. 525, 527 (1926); Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U. S. 240, 243 (1926).
As in Juidice v. Vail, 430 U. S. 327, 336 n. 13 (1977), we have no occasion to decide whether Younger principles apply to all civil litigation.
Appellees argue that the injunction issued below in no way interfered with a pending state case. They point to the fact that only the attachment proceeding was interfered with — the underlying fraud action may continue unimpeded — and claim that the attachment proceeding is not a court proceeding within the doctrine of Younger and Huffman. In this regard they rely on Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U. S. 538 (1972); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U. S. 67 (1972); and Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103 (1975). None of these cases control here.
In this case the attachment was issued by a court clerk and is very much a part of the underlying action for fraud. Moreover, the attachment in this case contained- a return date on which the parties were to appear in court and at which time the appellees would have had an opportunity to contest the validity of the attachment. Thus the attachment proceeding was “pending” in the state courts within the Younger and Huffman doctrine at the time of the federal suit.
The parties are in disagreement on this issue, the State squarely asserting, and the appellees denying, that the federal due process claim could have been presented and decided in the pending attachment proceeding. Mr. Justice Stevens, in dissent, offers additional reasons — not relied on by appellees and not addressed by the State — for concluding that the state suit did not offer an adequate forum for litigating the federal claim. We do not resolve these conflicting views.
Appellees have argued here that the relief granted in favor of other class members is not barred by Younger and Huffman because state cases were not pending against some of them. Since the class should never have been certified, we need not address this argument.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | I | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Chief Justice Warren
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Jesse Blackburn was tried in the Circuit Court of Colbert County, Alabama, on a charge of robbery, found guilty, and sentenced to 20 years’" imprisonment. By far the most damaging piece of evidence against him was his confession, which he persistently maintained had not been made voluntarily. The record seemed to provide substantial support for this contention, and we granted cer-tiorari because of a grave doubt whether the judgment could stand if measured against the mandate of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. 359 U. S. 1010. Plenary hearing has hardened this doubt into firm conviction: Jesse Blackburn has been deprived of his liberty without due process of law.
The crime with which Blackburn was charged was the robbery of a mobile store on April 19, 1948. By that date Blackburn, a 24-year-old Negro, had suffered a lengthy siege of mental illness. He had served in the armed forces during World War II, but had been discharged in 1944 as permanently .disabled by a psychosis. He" was thereupon placed in an institution and given medical treatment over extended periods until February 14, 1948, when he was released from a Veterans Administration hospital for a ten-day leave in the care of his sister. He failed to return to the hospital and consequently was discharged on May 24, 1948. The robbery of which he stands convicted occurred during this period of unauthorized absence from a mental ward. Blackburn’s medical records further disclose that from 1946 he was classified by the Veterans Administration as 100 percent “incompetent” and that at the time of his discharge from the hospital both his diagnosis of “schizor phrenic reaction, paranoid type” and his characterization as “incompetent” remained unchanged.
This does not by any means end the record of Blackburn’s history of mental illness. He was arrested shortly following the robbery, and some time after his confession on May 8, 1948, the Sheriff reported to the circuit judge that Blackburn had exhibited symptoms, of insanity. The judge thereupon had Blackburn examined by three physicians, and after receiving their report he concluded that there was “reasonable ground to believe that the defendant was insane either at the time of the commission of [the] offense or at the present time.” In accordance with the procedure prescribed by Alabama law, the judge then directed the Superintendent of the Alabama State Hospitals to convene a lunacy commission. When the commission unanimously declared Blackburn insane, the judge committed him to the Alabama State Hospital for the mentally ill until he should be “restored to his right mind.” Blackburn escaped from the hospital once, only to be apprehended on another charge, declared insane by a second Alabama circuit judge, and sent back to the hospital. Before his return he was examined by another set of doctors who diagnosed his mental condition as “Schizophrenic; reaction, paranoid type” and declared that he was “Insane, incompetent, and should be placed in [an]' insane hospital.” Except for this brief interlude, Blackburn remained in the hospital for over four years, from July 1948 to October 1952, at which time he was declared mentally competent to stand trial.
At his trial, Blackburn entered pleas of not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity. He testified that he could remember nothing about the alleged crime, the circumstances surrounding it, his arrest, his confession, his commitment to the State Hospital, or the early period of his treatment there. He denied the truth of the confession, but admitted that the signature on it appeared to be his. According to a 1944 Army medical report, one aspect of Blackburn’s illness was recurrent “complete amnesia concerning his behaviour.” .
When the prosecutor proposed to introduce Blackburn’s confession into evidence, his attorney objected, and the judge held a hearing to determine its admissibility. Blackburn’s counsel submitted to the judge the depositions of two of the three doctors who had served on the lunacy commission and who had observed Blackburn during his period of treatment at the State Hospital. These depositions incorporated copies of three significant documents. The first was the court order directing examination of Blackburn by a lunacy commission. This order mentioned Blackburn’s previous treatment in a mental ward and two of his prior commitments to mental institutions. The second paper was the lunacy commission’s report, in which three state-employed doctors, had expressed their opinion that Blackburn wás. insane both at the time of his admission to the hospital on July 29, 1948, and at the time of the robbery on April 19, 1948. Finally, the depositions set forth the order which permanently committed Blackburn to the State Hospital. In addition to attesting to the accuracy of these documents, the deponents set forth in detail their opinion of Blackburn’s mental condition. Dr; Harry S. Rowe, the Assistant Superintendent of the Hospital, who had worked since 1923 exclusively with psychopathic patients, stated that ás a member of the lunacy commission he had participated'in its • investigation and in the submission of its report. Dr. Rowe also said that he had interviewed Blackburn on many occasions since his commitment and that he not only still thought Blackburn had been insane on the date of the crime but also believed he “most probably [had been] insane and incompetent” on May 8, 1948,, when he had confessed. These opinions of Dr. Rowe were seconded by Dr. J. S. Tarwater, a psychiatrist who was Superintendent of the Alabama State Hospitals.
To counter this evidence, the prosecutor introduced the deposition of the third member of the lunacy commission, Dr. A. M. Richards, a general practitioner who had spent .the previous twelve years treating mental patients and who was a staff member of the State Hospital. The doctor’s answers to petitioner’s interrogatories were in harmony with the depositions of Drs. Tarwater and Rowe: Dr. Richards acknowledged that he had served on the lunacy commission, that he had signed the report, and that he had concurred in the finding that Blackburn had been insane on the date of the crime. He disclaimed having any other information of value, and notéd in response to a cross-interrogatory that Blackburn had been “up on the criminal ward and he was such a nuisance until I didn’t see him often.” In his answers to other cross-interrogatories, however, Dr. Richards executed an astonishing about-face by opining that Blackburn had been “normal” since he first saw him, that his mental condition was “normal” on the date of the crime and “good” on the date of the confession, and that he had never seen Blackburn suffer “psychotic episodes.” Even this portion of the deposition is not without incongruity, however, for Dr. Richards’ response ' to one cross-interrogatory was that he did not believe Blackburn had experienced lucid intervals.
Evidence concerning the circumstances surrounding the making of the confession was supplied by the Chief Deputy Sheriff. He testified that the interrogation had consumed “something like, maybe five or six hours” on May 8, 1948, and that no one' had threatened Blackburn in any way. The Chief Deputy, composed the statement in narrative form on the basis of Blackburn’s answers to the various questions asked by the officers, and Blackburn signed the confession two days later. When asked about Blackburn’s behavior, the witness responded that Blackburn had “answered like any normal person I have examined.” After the judge ruled that the confession would be admitted, but before it was actually admitted, the Chief Deputy described in somewhat greater detail— this time to the jury — the manner in which the confession had been obtained. It developed that the examination had begun at approximately one o’clock in the afternoon and had continued until ten or eleven o’clock that evening, with about an hour’s break for dinner. Thus it was established’that the quéstioning went on for eight or nine hours rather than five or six. Apparently most of the interrogation took place in closely confined quarters — a room about four by six or six by eight feet — in which as many ás three officers had at times been present with Blackburn. The Chief Deputy conceded that Blackburn said he had been a patient in a mental institution, but claimed that Blackburn also stated he .had been released, and avowed that Blackburn “talked sensible and give [sic] sensible answers,” was clear-eyed, and did not appear nervous.
Blackburn’s counsel again objected to admission of the statement, but the objection was overruled and the confession was submitted to the jury. After the Alabama Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment and held that the Fourteenth Amendment did not require exclusion of the confession, Blackburn petitioned this Court for cer-tiorari. Thus was the constitutional issue raised, decided,, and presented to' this Court for review.
After according all of the deference to the trial judge’s decision which is compatible with our duty to determine .constitutional questions, we are unable to escape the-conclusion that Blackburn’s confession can fairly be characterized only as involuntary. Consequently the conviction must be set aside, since this Court, in a line of decisions beginning in 1936 with Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278, and including cases by now too well known and too numerous to bear citation, has established the principle that the Fourteenth Amendment is grievously breached when an involuntary confession is obtained by state officers and introduced into evidence in a criminal prosecution which culminates in a conviction.
Since Chambers v. Florida, 309 U. S. 227, this Court has recognized that coercion can be mental as well as physical, and that the blood óf the accused is not the only hallmark of an unconstitutional inquisition. A number of cases have demonstrated, if demonstration were needed, that the efficiency of the rack and the thumbscrew can be matched, given the proper subject, by more sophisticated modes of “persuasion.” A prolonged interrogation of an accused who is ignorant of his rights and who has been cut off from the moral support of friends and relatives is not infrequently an effective technique of terror. Thus the range of inquiry in this type of case must be broad, and this Court.has insisted that the judgment in each instance be based upon consideration of “[t]he totality of the circumstances.” Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U. S. 191, 197.
It is also established that the Eourteenth Amendment forbids “fundamental unfairness in the use of evidence, whether true or false.” Lisenba v. California, 314 U. S. 219, 236. Consequently,'we have rejected the argument that introduction of an involuntary confession is immaterial where other evidence establishes guilt or corroborates the confession-. E. g., Spano v. New York, 360 U. S. 315, 324; Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U. S. 560, 567-568; Watts v. Indiana, 338 U. S. 49, 50, n. 2; Haley v. Ohio, 332 U. S. 596, 599. As important as it is that persons who have committed crimes be convicted, there are con-, siderations which transcend the question of güilt or innocence. Thus, in cases involving involuntary confessions, this Court enforces the strongly felt attitude of our society that important human values are sacrificed, where an agency of the government, in the course.of securing a conviction, wrings a confession out of an accused against his will. This insistence upon putting the government to the task of proving guilt by means other than inquisition was engendered by historical abuses which are quite familiar. See Chambers v. Florida, supra, at 235-238; Watts v. Indiana, supra, at 54-55.
But neither the likelihood that the confession is untrue nor the preservation of the individual’s freedom of will is the sole interest at stake. As we said just last Term, “The abhorrence of society to the use of involuntary confessions . . . also turns on the deep-rooted feeling that the police must obey the law while enforcing the law; that in the end life and liberty can be as much endangered from illegal-methods used to convict those thought to be criminals as from the actual criminals themselves.” Spano v. New York, supra, at 320-321. Thus a complex of values underlies the stricture against use by the state of confessions which, by way of convenient shorthand, this Court terms involuntary, and the role played by each in any situation varies according to the particular circumstances of the case.'
In the case at bar, the evidence indisputably establishes the strongest probability that Blackburn was insane and incompetent at the time he allegedly confessed. Surely in the present stage of our civilization a- most basic sense of justice is affronted by the spectacle of incarcerating a human being upon the basis of a statement he made while insane; and this judgment can without difficulty be articulated in terms of the unreliability of the confession, the lack of rational choice .of the accused, or simply a strong conviction that our system of law enforcement should not operate so as to take advantage of a person in this fashion. And when the other pertinent circumstances are considered — the eight- to nine-hour sustained interrogation in a tiny room which was upon occasion literally filled with police officers; the absence of Blackburn’s friends, relatives, or legal counsel; the composition of the confession by the Deputy Sheriff rather than by Blackburn — the chances, of the confession’s having been the product of a rational intellect and a free will become even more remote and the denial of due process even more egregious.
' It is, of course, quite true that we are dealing here with probabilities. It is possible, for example, that Blackburn confessed during a period of complete mental competence. Moreover, these probabilities are gauged in this instance primarily by the opinion evidence of medical experts. But this case is novel only in the sense that the evidence of insanity here is compelling, for this Court has in the past reversed convictions where psychiatric evidence revealed that the person who had confessed was “of low mentality, if not mentally ill,” Fikes v. Alabama, supra, at 196, or had a “history of emotional instability,” Spano v. New York, supra, at 322. And although facts such as youth and' lack of education are more easily ascertained than the imbalance of a human mind, we cannot say that this has any appreciable bearing upon the difficulty of the ultimate judgment as to the effect these various circumstances have upon independence of will, a judgment which must by its nature always be one of probabilities.
Of course, this case is no different from other involuntary confession cases in another respect — where there is a genuine conflict of evidence great reliance must be placed upon the finder of fact. It is- this proposition upon which respondent’s principal argument rests, for the trial judge’s decision is said to be inviolable because of an alleged conflict between the depositions of Dr. Richards on the one hand and Drs. Tarwater and Rowe on the other. We need not in this case consider the relevance of the fact that the trial judge, like ourselves, had no opportunity to witness the demeanor of these doctors. It is sufficient to observe that the deposition of Dr. Richards is in such hopeless internal conflict that it raises no genuine issue of fact. It would be unreasonable in the extreme to .base a determination upon those portions in which the doctor proclaimed Blackburn normal while ignoring those portions in which he judged Blackburn insane. Nor have we overlooked the testimony of the Chief Deputy that Blackburn “talked sensible,” was clear-eyed, and did not appear nervous. But without any evidence in the record indicating that these observed facts bore any relation to Blackburn’s disease or were symptoms of a remission of his illness, we are quite unable to conclude that such an inference .can be drawn. The Fourteenth Amendment would be an illusory safeguard indeed if testimony of this nature were, held to raise a “conflict” which would preclude appellate review of a case where the evidence of insanity is as compelling as it is here.
We take note also of respondent’s argument that our decision must be predicated solely upon the evidence introduced by defendant before admission of the confession. As we have • indicated, this evidence consisted of the depositions, the copies of the documents incorporated therein, and the testimony of the Chief Deputy. The other relevant evidence, which included the detailed medical record of Blackburn’s mental illness prior to his arrest, was introduced at a later stage of the trial. It is quite true .that Blackburn’s counsel, so far as the record shows, made no request that the judge reconsider his ruling on the basis of this additional data. The Alabama Court of Appeals decided that under these circumstances this further documentation of Blackburn’s insanity was not, under state law, material to the Fourteenth Amendment question.
Even if respondent’s argument were meritorious our decision would be the same, since the evidence introduced prior to admission of the confession was ample to establish its involuntariness. But we reject the notion that the scope of our review can be thus restricted. Where the involuntariness of a confession is conclusively demonstrated at any stage of a trial, the defendant is deprived of due process by entry of judgment of conviction without exclusion of the confession. An argument similar to respondent’s was disposed of in Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278, in the following words:
“That contention rests upon the failure of counsel for the accused, who had objected to the admissibility of the confessions-, to move for their exclusion after they had been- introduced and the fact of coercion had been proved. It is a contention which proceeds upon a misconception of the nature of petitioners’ ' complaint. That complaint is not of the commission of mere error, but of a.wrong so fundamental' that it made the whole proceeding a mere pretense of a trial and rendered the conviction and sentence wholly void. ... We are not concerned with a mere question of state practice, or whether counsel assigned to petitioners were competent or mistakenly assumed that their first-objections were sufficient. . . .
“In the instant case, the trial court was fully advised by the undisputed evidence of the way in which the confessions had been procured. The trial court knew that there was no other evidence upon which conviction and sentence could be based. Yet. it proceeded to permit conviction and to pronounce 'sentence. The conviction and sentence were void for want of the- essential elements of due process . . . Id., at 286-287. .
Just as in Brown, the evidence here clearly estáblishes that the confession most probably was not the product of any meaningful act of volition. Therefore, the use of this evidence to convict Blackburn transgressed the imperatives of fundamental justice which find their expression in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the judgment must be
Revérsed.
Mr. Justice Clark concurs in the result.
The only other adverse evidence of any significance tended to prove that Blackburn and two others had traveled to Alabama from Illinois around the date of the robbery; that they were driving a maroon Buick; and that the crime was committed by persons who drove a maroon Buick with an Illinois license plate.
Ala. Code, 1940, Tit. 15, § 425.
We later set forth in detail the opinions of the members of this • lunacy commission, Drs. Tarwater, Rowe, and Richards. As will appear, the evidence they supplied is of critical importance in this case.
The Alabama Court of Appeals wrote two opinions in this case. After the first, 38 Ala. App. 143, 88 So. 2d 199, and after the Alabama Supreme Court had denied certiorari, 264 Ala. 694, 88 So. 2d 205, we’granted certiorari, 352 U. S. 924, and later vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals because we were uncertain whether that court had passed upon the federal question. 354 U. S. 393. The Court of Appeals reaffirmed the judgment of conviction, 40 Ala. App. -, 109 So. 2d 736, and the Alabama Supreme Court again denied certiorari, 268 Ala. 699, 109 So. 2d 738. The case was then ripe for our review, and we granted certiorari once more. 359 U. S. 1010.
It is well established, of course, that although this Court will accord respect to the conclusions of the state courts in cases of this nature, we cannot escape the responsibility of scrutinizing the record ourselves. E. g., Spano v. New York, 360 U. S. 315, 316; Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U. S. 354, 358; Chambers v. Florida, 309 U. S. 227, 228-229.
E. g., Spano v. New York, 360 U. S. 315; Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U. S. 191; Watts v. Indiana, 338 U. S. 49; Turner v. Pennsylvania; 338 U. S. 62; Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U. S. 68; Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U. S. 143.
Lack of education is a factor frequently present in this type of case; and in Haley v. Ohio, supra, the fact that the accused was a 15-year-old youth weighed heavily in the Court’s judgment.
It is interesting to note that Blackburn’s medical records disclose that in 1944 he was given a diagnosis of “Psychosis, manic depressive, manic phase,” and yet was said to answer questions “relevantly and coherently.” Dr. Rowe stated that it was clear Blackburn “was suffering ■ from schizophrenia of the paranoic type. They . . . entertain delusions . . . .”
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | A | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
The petitioner, Mary Ann Turner, challenges the constitutionality of a provision of Utah law that makes pregnant women ineligible for unemployment benefits for a period extending from 12 weeks before the expected date of childbirth until a date six weeks after childbirth. Utah Code Ann. § 35-4^5 (h) (1) (1974).
The petitioner was separated involuntarily from her employment on November 3, 1972, for reasons unrelated to her pregnancy. In due course she applied for unemployment compensation and received benefits until March 11, 1973, 12 weeks prior to the expected date of the birth of her child. Relying upon § 35-4-5 (h) (1), the respondent Department of Employment Security ruled that she was disqualified from receiving any further payments after that date and until six weeks after the date of her child’s birth. Thereafter, Mrs. Turner worked intermittently as a temporary clerical employee. After exhausting all available administrative remedies, the petitioner appealed the respondents’ rulings to the Utah Supreme Court, claiming that the statutory provision deprived her of protections guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. The state court rejected her contentions, ruling that the provision violated no constitutional guarantee. 531 P. 2d 870. The petition for certiorari now before us brings the constitutional issues here.
The Utah unemployment compensation system grants benefits to persons who are unemployed and are available for employment. Utah Code Ann. § 35-4-4 (c) (1974). One provision of the statute makes a woman ineligible to receive benefits “during any week of unemployment when it is found by the commission that her total or partial unemployment is due to pregnancy.” § 35-4-5 (h)(2). In contrast to this requirement of an individualized determination of ineligibility, the challenged provision establishes a blanket disqualification during an 18-week period immediately preceding and following childbirth. § 35-4-5 (h)(1). The Utah Supreme Court’s opinion makes clear that the challenged ineligibility provision rests on a conclusive presumption that women are “unable to work” during the 18-week period because of pregnancy and childbirth. See 531 P. 2d, at 871.
The presumption of incapacity and unavailability for employment created by the challenged provision is virtually identical to the presumption found unconstitutional in Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U. S. 632. In LaFleur, the Court held that a school board's mandatory maternity leave rule which required a teacher to quit her job several months before the expected birth of her child and prohibited her return to work until three months after childbirth violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Noting that “freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause,” 414 U. S., at 639, the Court held that the Constitution required a more individualized approach to the question of the teacher's physical capacity to continue her employment during pregnancy and resume her duties after childbirth since “the ability of any particular pregnant woman to continue at work past any fixed time in her pregnancy is very much an individual matter.” Id., at 645.
It cannot be doubted that a substantial number of women are fully capable of working well into their last trimester of pregnancy and of resuming employment shortly after childbirth. In this very case Mrs. Turner was employed intermittently as a clerical worker for portions of the 18-week period during which she was conclusively presumed to be incapacitated. The Fourteenth Amendment requires that unemployment compensation boards no less than school boards must achieve legitimate state ends through more individualized means when basic human liberties are at stake. We conclude that the Utah unemployment compensation statute's incorporation of a conclusive presumption of incapacity during so long a period before and after childbirth is constitutionally invalid under the principles of the LaFleur case.
Accordingly, the writ of certiorari is granted, the judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded to the Supreme Court of Utah for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Biackmun would not summarily vacate the judgment of the Supreme Court of Utah. Instead, they would grant cer-tiorari and set the case for full briefing and oral argument.
Mr. Justice Rehnquist dissents.
The respondents contend that the challenged provision is a limitation on the coverage of the Utah unemployment compensation system and not a presumption of unavailability for employment based on pregnancy. This characterization of the statute, advanced in an attempt to analogize the provision to the law upheld in Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U. S. 484, conflicts with the respondents’ argument to the Utah Supreme Court. Before that court respondents claimed that “ ‘near term pregnancy is an endemic condition relating to employability.’ ” The Utah Supreme Court’s decision is premised on the impact of pregnancy on a woman’s ability to work. Its opinion makes no mention of coverage limitations or insurance principles central to Aiello. The construction of the statute by the State’s highest court thus undermines the respondents’ belated claim that the provision can be analogized to the law sustained in Aiello.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | B | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Breyer
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The two cases before us raise a single question. Can courts toll, for nonstatutory equitable reasons, the statutory time (and related amount) limitations for filing tax refund claims set forth in §6511 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986? We hold that they cannot.
These two cases present similar circumstances. In each case a taxpayer initially paid the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) several thousand dollars that he did not owe. In each case the taxpayer (or his representative) filed an administrative claim for refund several years after the relevant statutory time period for doing so had ended. In each case the taxpayer suffered a disability (senility or alcoholism), which, he said, explained why the delay was not his fault. And in each case he asked the court to extend the relevant statutory time period for an “equitable” reason, namely, the existence of a mental disability — a reason not mentioned in §6511, but which, we assume, would permit a court to toll the statutory limitations period if but only if, §6511 contains an implied “equitable tolling” exception. See 4 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1056 (2d ed. 1987 and Supp. 1996); see also Wolin v. Smith Barney, Inc., 88 F. 3d 847, 852 (CA7 1996) (defining equitable tolling).
In both cases, the Ninth Circuit read §6511 as if it did contain an implied exception that would permit “equitable tolling.” It then applied principles of equity to each case. It found those principles justified tolling the statutory time period. And it permitted the actions to proceed. 67 F. 3d 260 (1995); judgt. order reported at 70 F. 3d 120 (1995). All other Circuits that have considered the matter, however, have taken the opposite view. They have held that §6511 does not authorize equitable tolling. See Amoco Production Co. v. Newton Sheep Co., 85 F. 3d 1464 (CA10 1996); Lovett v. United States, 81 F. 3d 143 (CA Fed. 1996); Webb v. United States, 66 F. 3d 691 (CA4 1995); Oropallo v. United States, 994 F. 2d 25 (CA1 1993) (per curiam); and Vintilla v. United States, 931 F. 2d 1444 (CA11 1991). We granted certiorari to resolve this conflict. And we conclude that the latter Circuits are correct.
The taxpayers rest their claim for equitable tolling upon Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U. S. 89 (1990), a case in which this Court considered the timeliness of an employee’s lawsuit charging his Government employer with discrimination, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq. The Court found the lawsuit untimely, but nevertheless tolled the limitations period. It held that the “rule of equitable tolling” applies “to suits against the Government, in the same way that it is applicable” to Title VII suits against private employers. 498 U. S., at 94-95. The Court went on to say that the “same rebuttable presumption of equitable tolling applicable to suits against private defendants should also apply to suits against the United States.” Id., at 95-96.
The taxpayers, pointing to Irwin, argue that principles of equitable tolling would have applied had they sued private
defendants, e. g., had they sought restitution from private defendants for “Money Had and Received.” See C. Keigwin, Cases in Common Law Pleading 220 (2d ed. 1934). They add that given Irwin’s language, there must be a “presumption” that limitations periods in tax refund suits against the Government can be equitably tolled. And, they say, that “presumption,” while “rebuttable,” has not been rebutted. They conclude that, given Irwin, the Ninth Circuit correctly tolled the statutory period for “equitable” reasons.
In evaluating this argument, we are willing to assume, favorably to the taxpayers but only for argument’s sake, that a tax refund suit and a private suit for restitution are sufficiently similar to warrant asking Irwin’s negatively phrased question: Is there good reason to believe that Congress did not want the equitable tolling doctrine to apply? But see Flora v. United States, 362 U. S. 145, 153-154 (1960) (citing Curtis’s Administratrix v. Fiedler, 2 Black 461, 479 (1863)) (distinguishing common-law suit against the tax collector from action of assumpsit for money had and received); George Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose, 289 U. S. 373, 382-383 (1933); see also Plumb, Tax Refund Suits Against Collectors of Internal Revenue, 60 Harv. L. Rev. 685, 687 (1947) (describing collector suit as a fiction solely designed to bring the Government into court). We can travel no further, however, along Irwin’s road, for there are strong reasons for answer-Irwin’s question in the Government’s favor.
Section 6511 sets forth its time limitations in unusually emphatic form. Ordinarily limitations statutes use fairly simple language, which one can often plausibly read as containing an implied “equitable tolling” exception. See, e. g., 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-16(c) (requiring suit for employment discrimination to be filed “[w]ithin 90 days of receipt of notice of final [EEOC] action ... ”). But § 6511 uses language that is not simple. It sets forth its limitations in a highly detailed technical manner, that, linguistically speaking, cannot easily be read as containing implicit exceptions. Moreover, §6511 reiterates its limitations several times in several different ways. Section 6511 says, first, that a
“[c]laim for ... refund ... of any tax ... shall be filed by the taxpayer within 3 years from the time the return was filed or 2 years from the time the tax was paid, whichever of such periods expires the later, or if no return was filed . . . within 2 years from the time the tax was paid.” 26 U. S. C. §6511(a).
It then says that
“[n]o credit or refund shall be allowed or made after the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed . . . unless a claim for . . . refund is filed . . . within such period.” § 6511(b)(1).
It reiterates the point by imposing substantive limitations:
“If the claim was filed by the taxpayer during the 3-year period ... the amount of the credit or refund shall not exceed the portion of the tax paid within the period, immediately preceding the filing of the claim, equal to 3 years plus the period of any extension of time for filing the return. .. .” § 6511(b)(2)(A).
And
“[i]f the claim was not filed within such 3-year period, the amount of the credit or refund shall not exceed the portion of the tax paid during the 2 years immediately preceding the filing of the claim.” § 6511(b)(2)(B).
The Tax Code reemphasizes the point when it says that refunds that do not comply with these limitations “shall be considered erroneous,” §6514, and specifies procedures for the Government’s recovery of any such “erroneous” refund payment. §§ 6532(b), 7405. In addition, §6511 sets forth explicit exceptions to its basic time limits, and those very specific exceptions do not include “equitable tolling.” See § 6511(d) (establishing special time limit rules for refunds related to operating losses, credit self-employment taxes, worthless securities, and bad debts); see also United States v. Dalm, 494 U. S. 596, 610 (1990) (discussing mitigation provisions' set forth in 26 U. S. C. §§ 1311-1314); §507 of the Revenue Act of 1942, 56 Stat. 961 (temporarily tolling limitations period during wartime).
To read an “equitable tolling” provision into these provisions, one would have to assume an implied exception for tolling virtually every time a number appears. To do so would work a kind of linguistic havoc. Moreover, such an interpretation would require tolling, not only procedural limitations, but also substantive limitations on the amount of recovery — a kind of tolling for which we have found no direct precedent. Section 6511’s detail, its technical language, the iteration of the limitations in both procedural and substantive forms, and the explicit listing of exceptions, taken together, indicate to us that Congress did not intend courts to read other unmentioned, open-ended, “equitable” exceptions into the statute that it wrote. There are no counter-indications. Tax law, after all, is not normally characterized case-specific exceptions reflecting individualized equities.
The nature of the underlying subject matter — tax collection — underscores the linguistic point. The IRS processes more than 200 million tax returns each year. It issues more than 90 million refunds. See Dept, of Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, 1995 Data Book 8-9. To read an “equitable tolling” exception into §6511 could create serious administrative problems by forcing the IRS to respond to, and perhaps litigate, large numbers of late claims, accompanied by requests for “equitable tolling” which, upon close inspection, might turn out to lack sufficient equitable justification* See H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 356, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 41 (1926) (deleting provision excusing tax deficiencies in the estates of insane or deceased individuals because of difficulties involved in defining incompetence). The nature and potential magnitude of the administrative problem suggest that Congress decided to pay the price of occasional unfairness in individual cases (penalizing a taxpayer whose claim is unavoidably delayed) in order to maintain a more workable tax enforcement system. At the least it tells us that Congress would likely have wanted to decide explicitly whether, or just where and when, to expand the statute’s limitations periods, rather than delegate to the courts a generalized power to do so wherever a court concludes that equity so requires.
The taxpayers’ counterrebuttal consists primarily of an interesting historical analysis of the Internal Revenue Code’s tax refund provisions. They try to show that §6511’s specific, detailed language reflects congressional concern about matters not related to equitable tolling. They explain some language, for example, in terms of a congressional effort to stop taxpayers from keeping the refund period open indefinitely through the device of making a series of small tax payments. See S. Rep. No. 398, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 33 (1924). They explain other language as an effort to make the refund time period and the tax assessment period coextensive. See H. R. Rep. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., 52 (1942). Assuming all that is so, however, such congressional efforts still seem but a smaller part of a larger congressional objective: providing the Government with strong statutory “protection against stale demands.” Cf. United States v. Garbutt Oil Co., 302 U. S. 528, 533 (1938) (statute of limitations bars untimely amendment of claim for additional refund). Moreover, the history to which the taxpayers point reveals that §6511’s predecessor tax refund provisions, like §6511, contained highly detailed language with clear time limits. See, e. g., § 281(b) of the Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, 43 Stat. 301 (4-year limit on claims for overpayment of income, war-profits, or excess-profits tax and cap on refund amount); § 322(b) of the Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209,47 Stat. 242 (2-year limit for claim filing and corresponding limit on refund amount); Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 68A Stat. 808 (adopting current alternative time and amount limitations); see also §810 of the Revenue Act. of 1932, ch. 209, 47 Stat. 283 (imposing time and amount limits for estate tax refunds). And that history lacks any instance (but for the present cases) of equitable tolling. On balance, these historical considerations help the Government’s argument.
For these reasons, we conclude that Congress did not intend the “equitable tolling” doctrine to apply to §6511’s time limitations. The Ninth Circuit’s decisions are
Reversed.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | L | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Breyer
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Rules of Construction Act defines a “vessel” as including “every description of watercraft or other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on water.” 1 U. S. C. § 3. The question before us is whether petitioner’s floating home (which is not self-propelled) falls within the terms of that definition.
In answering that question we focus primarily upon the phrase “capable of being used.” This term encompasses “practical” possibilities, not “merely . . . theoretical” ones. Stewart v. Dutra Constr. Co., 543 U. S. 481, 496 (2005). We believe that a reasonable observer, looking to the home’s physical characteristics and activities, would not consider it to be designed to any practical degree for carrying people or things on water. And we consequently conclude that the floating home is not a “vessel.”
Í—i
In 2002 Fane Lozman, petitioner, bought a 60- by 12-foot floating home. App. 37, 71. The home consisted of a house-like .plywood structure with French doors on three sides. Id., at 38, 44. It contained a sitting room, bedroom, closet, bathroom, and kitchen, along with a stairway leading to a second level with office space. Id., at 45-66. An empty bilge space underneath the main floor kept it afloat. Id., at 38. (See Appendix, infra, for a photograph.) After buying the floating home, Lozman had it towed about 200 miles to North Bay Village, Florida, where he moored it and then twice more had it towed between nearby marinas. In 2006 Lozman had the home towed a further 70 miles to a marina owned by the city of Riviera Beach (City), respondent, where he kept it docked. Brief for Respondent 5.
After various disputes with Lozman and unsuccessful efforts to evict him from the marina, the City brought this federal admiralty lawsuit in rem against the floating home. It sought a maritime lien for dockage fees and damages for trespass. See Federal Maritime Lien Act, 46 U. S. C. §31342 (authorizing federal maritime lien against vessel to collect debts owed for the provision of “necessaries to a vessel”); 28 U. S. C. § 1333(1) (civil admiralty jurisdiction). See also Leon v. Galceran, 11 Wall. 185 (1871); The Rock Island Bridge, 6 Wall. 213, 215 (1867).
Lozman, acting pro se, asked the District Court to dismiss the suit on the ground that the court lacked admiralty jurisdiction. See 2 Record, Doc. 64. After summary judgment proceedings, the court found that the floating home was a “vessel” and concluded that admiralty jurisdiction was consequently proper. Pet. for Cert. 42a. The judge then conducted a bench trial on the merits and awarded the City $3,039.88 for dockage along with $1 in nominal damages for trespass. Id., at 49a.
On appeal the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Riviera Beach v. That Certain Unnamed Gray, Two-Story Vessel Approximately Fifty-Seven Feet in Length, 649 F. 3d 1259 (2011). It agreed with the District Court that the home was a “vessel.” In its view, the home was “capable” of movement over water and the owner’s subjective intent to remain moored “indefinitely” at a dock could not show the contrary. Id., at 1267-1269.
Lozman sought certiorari. In light of uncertainty among the Circuits about application of the term “capable” we granted his petition. Compare De La Rosa v. St. Charles Gaming Co., 474 F. 3d 185, 187 (CA5 2006) (structure is not a “vessel” where “physically,” but only “theoretically],” “capable of sailing,” and owner intends to moor it indefinitely as floating casino), with Board of Comm’rs of Orleans Levee Dist. v. M/V Belle of Orleans, 535 F. 3d 1299, 1311-1312 (CA11 2008) (structure is a “vessel” where capable of moving over water under tow, “albeit to her detriment,” despite intent to moor indefinitely). See also 649 F. 3d, at 1267 (rejecting views of Circuits that “‘focus on the intent of the shipowner’ ”).
HH
At the outset we consider one threshold matter. The District Court ordered the floating home sold to satisfy the City’s judgment. The City bought the home at public auction and subsequently had it destroyed. And, after the parties filed their merits briefs, we ordered further briefing on the question of mootness in light of the home’s destruction. 567 U. S. 962 (2012). The parties now have pointed out that, prior to the home’s sale, the District Court ordered the City to post a $25,000 bond “to secure Mr. Lozman’s value in the vessel.” 1 Record, Doc. 20, p. 2. The bond ensures that Lozman can obtain monetary relief if he ultimately prevails. We consequently agree with the parties that the case is not moot.
Ill
A
We focus primarily upon the statutory phrase “capable of being used ... as a means of transportation on water.” 1 U. S. C. § 3. The Court of Appeals found that the home was “capable” of transportation because it could float, it could proceed under tow, and its shore connections (power cable, water hose, rope lines) did not “ ‘rende[r]’ ” it “ ‘practically incapable of transportation or movement.’ ” 649 P. 3d, at 1266 (quoting Belle of Orleans, supra, at 1312, in turn quoting Stewart, supra, at 494). At least for argument’s sake we agree with the Court of Appeals about the last-mentioned point, namely, that Lozman’s shore connections did not “ ‘render’ ” the home “ ‘practically incapable of transportation.’ ” But unlike the Eleventh Circuit, we do not find these considerations (even when combined with the home’s other characteristics) sufficient to show that Lozman’s home was a “vessel.”
The Court of Appeals recognized that it had applied the. term “capable” broadly. 649 F. 3d, at 1266. Indeed, it pointed with approval to language in an earlier case, Burks v. American River Transp. Co., 679 F. 2d 69 (1982), in which the Fifth Circuit said:
“ ‘No doubt the three men in a tub would also fit within our definition, and one probably could make a convincing case for Jonah inside the whale.’” 649 F. 3d, at 1269 (quoting Burks, supra, at 75; brackets omitted).
But the Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation is too broad. Not every floating structure is a “vessel.” To state the obvious, a wooden washtub, a plastic dishpan, a swimming platform on pontoons, a large fishing net, a door taken off its hinges, or Pinocchio (when inside the whale) are not “vessels,” even if they are “artificial contrivance[s]” capable of floating, moving under tow, and incidentally carrying even a fair-sized item or two when they do so. Rather, the statute applies to an “artificial contrivance . . . capable of being used ... as a means of transportation on water.” 1 U. S. C. § 3 (emphasis added). “[TJransportation” involves the “conveyance (of things or persons) from one place to another.” 18 Oxford English Dictionary 424 (2d ed. 1989) (OED). Accord, N. Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language 1406 (C. Goodrich & N. Porter eds. 1873) (“[t]he act of transporting, carrying, or conveying from one place to another”). And we must apply this definition in a “practical,” not a “theoretical,” way. Stewart, 543 U. S., at 496. Consequently, in our view a structure does not fall within the scope of this statutory phrase unless a reasonable observer, looking to the home’s physical characteristics and activities, would consider it designed to a practical degree for carrying people or things over water.
B
Though our criterion is general, the facts of this case illustrate more specifically what we have in mind. But for the fact that it floats, nothing about Lozman’s home suggests that it was designed to any practical degree to transport persons or things over water. It had no rudder or other steering mechanism. 649 F. 3d, at 1269. Its hull was un-raked, ibid., and it had a rectangular bottom 10 inches below the water, Brief for Petitioner 27; App. 37. It had no special capacity to generate or store electricity but could obtain that utility only through ongoing connections with the land. Id., at 40. Its small rooms looked like ordinary nonmaritime living quarters. And those inside those rooms looked out upon the world, not through watertight portholes, but through French doors or ordinary windows. Id., at 44-66.
Although lack of self-propulsion is not dispositive, e. g., The Robert W. Parsons, 191 U. S. 17, 31 (1903), it may be a relevant physical characteristic. And Lozman’s home differs significantly from an ordinary houseboat in that it has no ability to propel itself. Cf. 33 CFR § 173.3 (2012) (“Houseboat means a motorized vessel . . . designed primarily for multi-purpose accommodation spaces with low freeboard and little or no foredeck or cockpit” (emphasis added)). Loz-man’s home was able to travel over water only by being towed. Prior to its arrest, that home’s travel by tow over water took place on only four occasions over a period of seven years. Supra, at 118. And when the home was towed a significant distance in 2006, the towing company had a second boat follow behind to prevent the home from swinging dangerously from side to side. App. 104.
The home has no other feature that might suggest a design to transport over water anything other than its own furnishings and related personal effects. In a word, we can find nothing about the home that could lead a reasonable observer to consider it designed to a practical degree for “transportation on water.”
C
Our view of the statute is consistent with its text, precedent, and relevant purposes. For one thing, the statute’s language, read naturally, lends itself to that interpretation. We concede that the statute uses the word “every,” referring to “every description of watercraft or other artificial contriv-anee.” 1 U. S. C. § 3 (emphasis added). But the term “contrivance” refers to “something contrived for, or employed in contriving to effect a purpose.” 3 OED 850 (def. 7). The term “craft” explains that purpose as “water carriage and transport.” Id., at 1104 (def. V(9)(&)) (defining “craft” as a “vesse[l] . . . for” that purpose). The addition of the word “water” to “craft,” yielding the term “watercraft,” emphasizes the point. And the next few words, “used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on water,” drive the point home.
For another thing, the bulk of precedent supports our conclusion. In Evansville & Bowling Green Packet Co. v. Chero Cola Bottling Co., 271 U. S. 19 (1926), the Court held that a wharfboat was not a “vessel.” The wharfboat floated next to a dock; it was used to transfer cargo from ship to dock and ship to ship; and it was connected to the dock with cables, utility lines, and a ramp. Id., at 21. At the same time, it was capable of being towed. And it was towed each winter to a harbor to avoid river ice. Id., at 20-21. The Court reasoned, that, despite the annual movement under tow, the wharfboat “was not used to carry freight from one place to another,” nor did it “encounter perils of navigation to which craft used for transportation are exposed.” Id., at 22. (See Appendix, infra, for photograph of a period wharfboat.)
The Court’s reasoning in Stewart also supports our conclusion. We there considered the application of the statutory definition to a dredge. 543 U. S., at 494. The dredge was “a massive floating platform” from which a suspended clamshell bucket would “removfe] silt from the ocean floor,” depositing it “onto one of two scows” floating alongside the dredge. Id., at 484. Like more traditional “seagoing vessels,” the dredge had, e. g., “a captain and crew, navigational lights, ballast tanks, and a crew dining area.” Ibid. Unlike more ordinary vessels, it could navigate only by “manipulating its anchors and cables” or by being towed. Ibid. Nonetheless it did move. In fact it moved over water “every couple of hours.” Id., at 485.
We held that the dredge was a “vessel.” We wrote that §3’s definition “merely codified the meaning that the term ‘vessel’ had acquired in general maritime law.” Id., at 490. We added that the question of the “watercraft’s use ‘as a means of transportation on water’ is . . . practical,” and not “merely . . . theoretical.” Id., at 496. And we pointed to cases holding that dredges ordinarily “served a waterborne transportation function,” namely, that “in performing their work they carried machinery, equipment, and crew over water.” Id., at 491-492 (citing, e. g., Butler v. Ellis, 45 F. 2d 951, 955 (CA4 1930)).
As the Court of Appeals pointed out, in Stewart we also wrote that §3 “does not require that a watercraft be used 'primarily for that [transportation] purpose,” 543 U. S., at 495; that a “watercraft need not be in motion to qualify as a vessel,” ibid.; and that a structure may qualify as a vessel even if attached—but not “permanently” attached—to the land or ocean floor, id., at 493-494. We did not take these statements, however, as implying a universal set of sufficient conditions for application of the definition. Rather, they say, and they mean, that the statutory definition may (or may not) apply—not that it automatically must apply—where a structure has some other primary purpose, where it is stationary at relevant times, and where it is attached—but not permanently attached—to land.
After all, a washtub is normally not a “vessel” though it does not have water transportation as its primary purpose, it may be stationary much of the time, and it might be attached—but not permanently attached—to land. More to the point, water transportation was not the primary purpose of either Stewart’s dredge or Evansville’s wharfboat; neither structure was “in motion” at relevant times; and both were sometimes attached (though not permanently attached) to the ocean bottom or to land. Nonetheless Stewart’s dredge fell within the statute’s definition while Evansville’s wharf-boat did not.
The basic difference, we believe, is that the dredge was regularly, but not primarily, used (and designed in part to be used) to transport workers and equipment over water while the wharfboat was not designed (to any practical degree) to serve a transportation function and did not do so. Compare Cope v. Vallette Dry Dock Co., 119 U. S. 625 (1887) (floating drydock not a “vessel” because permanently fixed to wharf), with Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U. S. 527, 535 (1995) (barge sometimes attached to river bottom to use as a work platform remains a “vessel” when “at other times it was used for transportation”). See also ibid, (citing Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Chicago, 3 F. 3d 225, 229 (CA7 1993) (“[A] craft is a ‘vessel’ if its purpose is to some reasonable degree ‘the transportation of passengers, cargo, or equipment from place to place across navigable waters’”)); Cope, supra, at 630 (describing “hopper-barge” as potentially a “vessel” because it is a “navigable structure^] used for the purpose of transportation”); cf. 1 S. Friedall, Benedict on Admiralty § 164, p. 10-6 (rev. 7th ed. 2012) (maritime jurisdiction proper if “the craft is a navigable structure intended for maritime transportation”).
Lower court cases also tend, on balance, to support our conclusion. See, e. g., Bernard v. Binnings Constr. Co., 741 F. 2d 824, 828, n. 13, 832, n. 25 (CA5 1984) (work punt lacking features objectively indicating a transportation function not a “vessel,” for “our decisions make clear that the mere capacity to float or move across navigable waters does not necessarily make a structure a vessel”); Ruddiman v. A Scow Platform, 38 F. 158 (SDNY 1889) (scow, though “capable of being towed . .. though not without some difficulty, from its clumsy structure” just a floating box, not a “vessel,” because “it was not designed or used for the purpose of navigation,” not engaged “in the transportation of persons or cargo,” and had “no motive power, no rudder, no sails”). See also 1 T. Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law § 3-6, p. 155 (5th ed. 2011) (courts have found that “floating dry-dock[s],” “floating platforms, barges, or rafts used for construction or repair of piers, docks, bridges, pipelines, and other” similar facilities are not “vessels”); E. Benedict, American Admiralty § 215, p. 116 (rev. 3d ed. 1898) (defining “vessel” as a “ ‘machine adapted to transportation over rivers, seas, and oceans’ ”).
We recognize that some lower court opinions can be read as endorsing the “anything that floats” approach. See Miami River Boat Yard, Inc. v. 60’ Houseboat, 390 F. 2d 596, 597 (CA5 1968) (so-called “houseboat” lacking self-propulsion); Sea Village Marina, LLC v. A 1980 Carlcraft Houseboat, No. 09-3292, 2009 WL 3379923, *5-*6 (D NJ, Oct. 19, 2009) (following Miami River Boat Yard)) Hudson Harbor 79th Street Boat Basin, Inc. v. Sea Casa, 469 F. Supp. 987, 989 (SDNY 1979) (same). Cf. Holmes v. Atlantic Sounding Co., 437 F. 3d 441 (CA5 2006) (floating dormitory); Summerlin v. Massman Constr. Co., 199 F. 2d 715 (CA4 1952) (derrick anchored in the river engaged in building a bridge is a vessel). For the reasons we have stated, we find such an approach inappropriate and inconsistent with our precedents.
Further, our examination of the purposes of major federal maritime statutes reveals little reason to classify floating homes as “vessels.” Admiralty law, for example, provides special attachment procedures lest a vessel avoid liability by sailing away. 46 U. S. C. §§31341-31343 (2006 ed. and Supp. IV). Liability statutes such as the Jones Act recognize that sailors face the special “‘perils of the sea.’” Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U. S. 347, 354, 373 (1995) (referring to “ ‘vessels] in navigation’ ”). Certain admiralty tort doctrines can encourage shipowners to engage in port-related commerce. E.g., 46 U. S. C. § 30505; Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. Cleveland, 409 U. S. 249, 269-270 (1972). And maritime safety statutes subject vessels to U. S. Coast Guard inspections. E.g., 46 U.S.C. § 3301.
Lozman, however, cannot easily escape liability by sailing away in his home. He faces no special sea dangers. He does not significantly engage in port-related commerce. And the Solicitor General tells us that to adopt a version of the “anything that floats” test would place unnecessary and undesirable inspection burdens upon the Coast Guard. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 29, n. 11.
Finally, our conclusion is consistent with state laws in States where floating homeowners have congregated in communities. See Brief for Seattle Floating Homes Association et al. as Amici Curiae 1 (Seattle Brief). A Washington State environmental statute, for example, defines a floating home (for regulatory purposes) as “a single-family dwelling unit constructed on a float, that is moored, anchored, or otherwise secured in waters, and is not a vessel, even though it may be capable of being towed.” Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 90.58.270(5)(b)(ii) (West Supp. 2012). A California statute defines a floating home (for tax purposes) as “a floating structure” that is “designed and built to be used, or is modified to be used, as a stationary waterborne residential dwelling,” and which (unlike a typical houseboat), has no independent power generation, and is dependent on shore utilities. Cal. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 18075.55(d) (West 2006). These States, we are told, treat structures that meet their “floating home” definitions like ordinary land-based homes rather than like vessels. Seattle Brief 2. Consistency of interpretation of related state and federal laws is a virtue in that it helps to create simplicity making the law easier to understand and to follow for lawyers and for nonlawyers alike. And that consideration here supports our conclusion.
D
The City and supporting amici make several important arguments that warrant our response. First, they argue against use of any purpose-based test lest we introduce into “vessel” determinations a subjective element—namely, the owner’s intent. That element, they say, is often “unverifiable” and too easily manipulated. Its introduction would “foment unpredictability and invite gamesmanship.” Brief for Respondent 33.
We agree with the City about the need to eliminate the consideration of evidence of subjective intent. But we cannot agree that the need requires abandonment of all criteria based on “purpose.” Cf. Stewart, 543 U. S., at 495 (discussing transportation purpose). Indeed, it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine the use of a human “contrivance” without some consideration of human purposes. At the same time, we have sought to avoid subjective elements, such as owner’s intent, by permitting consideration only of objective evidence of a waterborne transportation purpose. That is why we have referred to the views of a reasonable observer. Supra, at 118. And it is why we have looked to the physical attributes and behavior of the structure, as objective manifestations of any relevant purpose, and not to the subjective intent of the owner. Supra, at 121-122. We note that various admiralty treatises refer to the use of purpose-based tests without any suggestion that administration of those tests has introduced too much subjectivity into the vessel-determination process. 1 Friedall, Benedict on Admiralty § 164; 1 Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law § 3-6.
Second, the City, with support of amici, argues against the use of criteria that are too abstract, complex, or open-ended. Brief for Respondent 28-29. A court’s jurisdiction, e. g., admiralty jurisdiction, may turn .on application of the term “vessel.” And jurisdictional tests, often applied at the outset of a case, should be “as simple as possible.” Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U. S. 77, 80 (2010).
We agree with the last-mentioned sentiment. And we also understand that our approach is neither perfectly precise nor always determinative. Satisfaction of a design-based or purpose-related criterion, for example, is not always sufficient for application of the statutory word “vessel.” A craft whose physical characteristics and activities objectively evidence a waterborne transportation purpose or function may still be rendered a nonvessel by later physical alterations. For example, an owner might take a structure that is otherwise a vessel (even the Queen Mary) and connect it permanently to the land for use, say, as a hotel. See Stewart, supra, at 493-494. Further, changes over time may produce a new form, i.e., a newly designed structure—in which case it may be the new design that is relevant. See Kathriner v. Unisea, Inc., 975 F. 2d 657, 660 (CA9 1992) (floating processing plant was no longer a vessel where a “large opening [had been] cut into her hull”).
Nor is satisfaction of the criterion always a necessary condition, see Part IV, infra. It is conceivable that an owner might actually use a floating structure not designed to any practical degree for transportation as, say, a ferry boat, regularly transporting goods and persons over water.
Nonetheless, we believe the criterion we have used, taken together with our example of its application here, should offer guidance in a significant number of borderline cases where “capacity” to transport over water is in doubt. Moreover, borderline cases will always exist; they require a method for resolution; we believe the method we have used is workable; and, unlike, say, an “anything that floats” test, it is consistent with statutory text, purpose, and precedent. Nor do we believe that the dissent's approach would prove any more workable. For example, the dissent suggests a relevant distinction between an owner’s “clothes and personal effects” and “large appliances (like an oven or a refrigerator).” Post, at 140 (opinion of Sotomayor, J.). But a transportation function need not turn on the size of the items in question, and we believe the line between items being transported from place to place (e. g., cargo) and items that are mere appurtenances is the one more likely to be relevant. Cf. Benedict, American Admiralty §222, at 121 (“A ship is usually described as consisting of the ship, her tackle, apparel, and furniture
Finally, the dissent and the Solicitor General (as amicus for Lozman) argue that a remand is warranted for further factfinding. See post, at 143-144; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 29-31. But neither the City nor Lozman makes such a request. Brief for Respondent 18, 49, 52. And the only potentially relevant factual dispute the dissent points to is that the home suffered serious damage during a tow. Post, at 143. But this would add support to our ultimate conclusion that this floating home was not a vessel. We consequently see nothing to be gained by a remand.
IV
Although we have focused on the phrase “capable of being used” for transportation over water, the statute also includes as a “vessel” a structure that is actually “used” for that transportation. 1 U. S. C. § 3 (emphasis added). And the City argues that, irrespective of its design, Lozman's floating home was actually so used. Brief for Respondent 32. We are not persuaded by its argument.
We are willing to assume for argument’s sake that sometimes it is possible actually to use for water transportation a structure that is in no practical way designed for that purpose. See supra, at 129. But even so, the City cannot show the actual use for which it argues. Lozman’s floating home moved only under tow. Before its arrest, it moved significant distances only twice in seven years. And when it moved, it carried, not passengers or cargo, but at the very most (giving the benefit of any factual ambiguity to the City) only its own furnishings, its owner’s personal effects, and personnel present to ensure the home’s safety. 649 F. 3d, at 1268; Brief for Respondent 32; Tr. of Oral Arg. 37-38. This is far too little actual “use” to bring the floating home within the terms of the statute. See Evansville, 271 U. S., at 20-21 (wharfboat not a “vessel” even though “[e]ach winter” it “was towed to [a] harbor to protect it from ice”); see also Roper v. United States, 368 U. S. 20, 23 (1961) (“Unlike a barge, the S. S. Harry Lane was not moved in order to transport commodities from one location to another”). See also supra, at 122-127.
V
For these reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
It is so ordered.
[Appendix to opinion of the Court begins on p. 132.]
APPENDIX
Petitioner’s floating home. App. 69.
50- by 200-foot wharfboat in Evansville,. Indiana, on Nov. 13, 1918. H. R. Doe. No. 1521, 65th Cong., 3d Sess., Illustration No. 13 (1918).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | D | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
In resolving a church property dispute between appellants, representing the General Eldership, and appellees, two secessionist congregations, the Maryland Court of Appeals relied upon provisions of state statutory law governing the holding of property by religious corporations, upon language in the deeds conveying the properties in question to the local church corporations, upon the terms of the charters of the corporations, and upon provisions in the constitution of the General Eldership pertinent to the ownership and control of church property. 254 Md. 162, 254 A. 2d 162 (1969). Appellants argue primarily that the statute, as applied, deprived the General Elder-ship of property in violation of the First Amendment. Since, however, the Maryland court’s resolution of the dispute involved no inquiry into religious doctrine, appellees’ motion to dismiss is granted, and the appeal is dismissed for want of a substantial federal question.
It is so ordered.
Md. Ann. Code, Art. 23, §§256-270 (1966 Repl. Vol.).
The Maryland court reached the same decision in May 1968. 249 Md. 650, 241 A. 2d 691. This Court vacated and remanded the case “for further consideration in light of Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church 393 U. S. 528 (1969).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | I | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
In April 1976, respondent pleaded guilty in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California to an information charging him with one count of mail fraud in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1341. Respondent pleaded pursuant to a plea bargain whereby the Government agreed to recommend probation on condition that restitution be made. The District Court disregarded the recommendation and sentenced respondent to six years of treatment and supervision under the Youth Corrections Act, 18 U. S. C. § 5010(b). He was released on parole after serving 18 months of his sentence, but a warrant for his arrest because of parole violation was issued in 1978, and he was eventually taken into custody on that warrant in October 1981. A few days before his arrest on this warrant, he filed a motion under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(d) and 28 U. S. C. §2255 to withdraw his guilty plea or, in the alternative, to have his sentence vacated and be resentenced to the time already served. He claimed that the Government had failed to comply with its part of the plea bargain upon which his guilty plea was based.
The District Court that had received the guilty plea also heard respondent’s application for collateral relief, and denied it. The Court of Appeals by a divided vote reversed that judgment, holding that “when the government undertakes to recommend a sentence pursuant to a plea bargain, it has the duty to state its recommendation clearly to the sentencing judge and to express the justification for it.” 738 F. 2d 1001, 1002 (CA9 1984). There is some slight disagreement about the facts surrounding the terms of the plea bargain and its presentation to the District Court, a situation entirely understandable by reason of the lapse of more than five years between the entry of the guilty plea and the hearing on the request for collateral relief. The Court of Appeals had this view of the facts:
“Benchimol agreed to plead guilty. The government concedes that in exchange for the guilty plea it promised to recommend probation with restitution. However, at the sentencing hearing, the presentence report incorrectly stated that the government would stand silent. Benchimol’s counsel informed the court that the government instead recommended probation with restitution. The Assistant United States Attorney then stated: ‘That is an accurate representation.’” Ibid.
The Court of Appeals concluded that the Government had breached its plea bargain because, although the Assistant United States Attorney concurred with defense counsel’s statement that the Government recommended probation with restitution, it “made no effort to explain its reasons for agreeing to recommend a lenient sentence but rather left an impression with the court of less-than-enthusiastic support for leniency.” Ibid.
We think this holding misconceives the effect of the relevant rules and of the applicable case law. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e) provides an elaborate formula for the negotiation of plea bargains, which allows the attorney for the Government to agree to move for dismissal of other charges and to agree that a specific sentence is the appropriate disposition of the case. It also authorizes the Government attorney to make a recommendation for a particular sentence, or agree not to oppose the defendant’s request for such a sentence, with the understanding that such recommendation or request shall not be binding upon the court.
It may well be that the Government in a particular case might commit itself to “enthusiastically” make a particular recommendation to the court, and it may be that the Government in a particular case might agree to explain to the court the reasons for the Government’s making a particular recommendation. But respondent does not contend, nor did the Court of Appeals find, that the Government had in fact undertaken to do either of these things here. The Court of Appeals simply held that as a matter of law such an undertaking was to be implied from the Government’s agreement to recommend a particular sentence. But our view of Rule 11(e) is that it speaks in terms of what the parties in fact agree to, and does not suggest that such implied-in-law terms as were read into this agreement by the Court of Appeals have any place under the Rule.
The Court of Appeals relied on cases such as United States v. Grandinetti, 564 F. 2d 723 (CA5 1977), and United States v. Brown, 500 F. 2d 375 (CA4 1974), for the conclusion it reached with respect to the requirement of “enthusiasm,” but it appears to us that in each of these cases the Government attorney appearing personally in court at the time of the plea bargain expressed personal reservations about the agreement to which the Government had committed itself. This is quite a different proposition than an appellate determination from a transcript of the record made many years earlier that the Government attorney had “left an impression with the court of less-than-enthusiastic support for leniency.” When the Government agrees pursuant to Rule 11(e) to make a recommendation with respect to sentence, it must carry out its part of the bargain by making the promised recommendation; but even if Rule 11(e) allows bargaining about degrees of enthusiasm, there appears to have been none here.
Rule 11(e) may well contemplate agreement by the Government in a particular case to state to the court its reasons for making the recommendation which it agrees to make. The Government suggests that spreading on the record its reasons for agreement to a plea bargain in a particular case— for example, that it did not wish to devote scarce resources to a trial of this particular defendant, or that it wished to avoid calling the victim as a witness — would frequently harm, rather than help, the defendant’s quest for leniency. These may well be reasons why the defendant would not wish to exact such a commitment from the Government, but for purposes of this case it is enough that no such agreement was made in fact. Since Rule 11(e) speaks generally of the plea bargains that the parties make, it was error for the Court of Appeals to imply as a matter of law a term which the parties themselves did not agree upon.
For these reasons, we conclude that there was simply no default on the part of the Government in this case, to say nothing of a default remediable on collateral attack under 28 U. S. C. § 2255 or under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(d), as in effect before August 1, 1983. See Hill v. United States, 368 U. S. 424, 428 (1962). The petition for certiorari is accordingly granted, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Reversed.
Our summary reversals are not as one-sided as the dissent claims. See per curiam reversals in Smith v. Illinois, 469 U. S. 91 (1984); Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U. S. 17 (1984); Payne v. Virginia, 468 U. S. 1062 (1984).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | A | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Black
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Klor’s, Inc., operates a retail store on Mission Street, San Francisco, California; Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., a chain of department stores, operates one of its stores next door. The two stores compete in the sale of radios, television sets, refrigerators and other household appliances. Claiming that Broadway-Hale and 10 national manufacturers and their distributors have conspired to restrain and monopolize commerce in violation of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § §. 1, 2, Klor’s brought this action for treble damages and injunction in the United States District Court.
In,support of its claim Klor’s made the following allegations : George Klor started an appliance store some years before 1952 and has operated it ever since either individually or as Klor’s, Inc.' Kldr’s is as well equipped •as Broadway-Hale to handle all brands of appliances. Nevertheless, manufacturers and distributors of' such well-known brands as General Electric, RCA, Admiral, Zenith, Emerson and others have conspired among themselves and with Broadway-Hale either not to sell to Klor’s or to sell to it only at discriminatory prices and highly unfavorable terms. Broadway-Hale has used its “monopolistic” buying power to bring about this situation. The business of manufacturing, distributing and selling household appliances is in interstate commerce. The concerted refusal to deal with Klor’s has seriously handicapped its ability to compete and has .already caused it'a great loss of profits, goodwill, reputation and prestige.
The defendants did not dispute these allegations, but sought summary judgment and dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. They submitted unchallenged affidavits which showed that there were. hundreds of other household appliance retailers, some within a few blocks of Klor’s w;ho sold many competing brands of appliances, including those the, defendants refused to sell to Klor’s. From the allegations of the complaint, and from the affidavits supporting the motion for summary judgment, the District Court concluded that the controversy was a “purely private quarrel” between Klor’s and Broadway-Hale, which did not amount to a “public wrong proscribed by the [Sherman] Act.” On this ground the complaint was dismissed and summary judgment was entered for the defendants. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the summary judgment. 255 F. 2d 214. It stated that “a violation of the Sherman Act requires conduct of defendants by which the public is or conceivably may be ultimately injured.” 255 F. 2d, at 233. It held that here the required public injury was missing since “there was no charge or proof that by any act of defendants the price, quantity, or quality offered the public was affected, nor that there was any intent or purpose to effect a change in, or an influence oh, prices, quantity, or quality . . . .” Id., at 230. The holding, if correct, means that unless the opportunities for customers to buy in a competitive market are reduced, a group of powerful businessmen may act in concert to deprive a single merchant, like Klor, of the goods he needs to compete effectively. We granted certiorari to consider this important question in the administration of the Sherman Act. 358 U. S. 809.
We think Klor’s allegations clearly show one type of trade restraint and public harm the Sherman Act' forbids, and that defendants’ affidavits provide no defense to the charges. Section 1 of the Sherman Act makes illegal any contract, combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade, and § 2 forbids .any person or combination from monopolizing or attempting to monopolize any part of interstate commerce. In the landmark case of Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1, this Court read § 1 to prohibit those classes of contracts or acts which the common law had deemed to be undue restraints of trade and those which new times and economic conditions would make unreasonable. • Id., at 59-60. The Court construed § 2 as making “the prohibitions of the act all the more complete and perfect by embracing all attempts to reach the.end prohibited by the first section, that is, restraints of trade, by any attempt to monopolize, or monopolization thereof . . . .” Id., at 61. The effect of both sections, the Court said, was to adopt the common-law proscription of all “contracts or acts which it was considered had a monopolistic tendency . . .” and which interfered with the “natural flow” of an appreciable amount of interstate commerce. Id., at 57, 61; Eastern States Lumber Assn. v. United States, 234 U. S. 600, 609. The Court recognized that there were some agreements whose validity depended on the surrounding circumstances. It emphasized, however, that there were classes of restraints which from their “nature or character” were unduly restrictive, and hence forbidden by both the common law and the statute. 221 U. S., at 58, 65. As to these classes of restraints, the Court noted, Congress had detérmined its own criteria of public harm and it was not for the courts to decide whether in an individual case injury had actually occurred. Id.; at 63-68.
Group boycotts, or concerted refusals by traders to deal with other traders, have long been held to be in the forbidden category. They have not been saved by allegations that they were reasonable in the specific circumstances, nor by a failure to show that they “fixed or regulated prices, parcelled out or limited production, or brought about a deterioration in quality.” Fashion Originators’ Guild v. Federal Trade Comm’n, 312 U. S. 457, 466, 467-468. Cf. United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U. S. 392. Even when they operated to lower prices or temporarily to stimulate competition they were banned. For, as this Court said in Kiefer-Stewert Co. v. Seagram & Sons, 340 U. S. 211, 213, “such agreements, no less than those to fix minimum prices, cripple the freedom of traders and thereby restrain their ability to sell in accordance with their own judgment.” Cf. United States v. Patten, 226 U. S. 525, 542.
Plainly the allegations of this complaint disclose such a boycott. This is not a case of a single trader refusing to deal with another, nor even of a manufacturer and a dealer agreeing to an exclusive distributorship. Alleged in this complaint is a wide combination consisting of manufacturers, distributors and a retailer. This combination .takes from Klor’s its freedom to buy appliances in an open competitive market and drives it out of business as a dealer in the defendants’ products. It deprives the manufacturers and distributors of their freedom to sell to Klor’s at the same prices and conditions made available to Broadway-Hale, and in some instances forbids them from selling to it on any terms whatsoever. It interferes with the natural flow of interstate commerce. It clearly has, by its “nature” and “character,” a “monopolistic tendency.” As such it is not to be tolerated merely because the victim is just one merchant whose business is so small that his destruction makes little difference to the economy. Monopoly can as surely thrive by the elimination of such small businessmen, one at a time, as it can by driving them out in large groups. In recognition of this fact the Sherman Act has consistently been read to forbid all contracts and .combinations “which ‘tend to create a monopoly,’ ” whether “the tendency is a creeping one” or “one that proceeds at full gallop.” , International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U. S. 392, 396.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the cause, is remanded to the District Court for trial;
Reversed.
Mr! Justice Harlan, believing that the allegations of the complaint are sufficient to entitle the. petitioner to go to trial, and that the matters set forth in respondents’ affidavits are not necessarily sufficient to constitute a defense irrespective of what the petitioner may be able to prove at the trial, concurs in the result.
Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides; “Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal . . . .” Section 2 of the Act reads, “Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor . . . Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stát. 731, 15 U. S. C. § 15, states, “Any person who- shall be injured in his business or property by . reason of anything forbidden, in the antitrust laws may sue therefor . . . and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained. . . .”
The appliance manufacturers named in the complaint are: Admiral Corp., Emerson Radio and Phonograph Corp., General Electric Co., Olympic Radio and Television, Inc., Philco Corp., Rheem Manufacturing Co., Radio Corp. of America, Tappan Stove Co., Whirlpool Corp., Zenith Radio Corp.
See also United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U. S. 106, 179, where the Court noted that the statute forbade all “acts or contracts or agreements or combinations . . . which, either because of their inherent nature or effect or because of the evident purpose of the acts, etc., injuriously restrained trade . . . .”
See also United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U. S. 392, 395-401; Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U. S. 445, 453-454. In this regard the Sherman Act should be contrasted with § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act,. 38 Stat. 719, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 45 (b), which requires that the Commission find “that a proceeding by it . . . would be to .the interest of the public” before it issues a complaint for unfair competition. See Federal Trade Comm’n v. Klesner, 280 U. S. 19, 27. But cf. Fashion Originators’ Guild v. Federal Trade Comm’n, 312 U. S. 457, 466-467.
See, e. g., Eastern States Lumber Assn. v. United States, 234 U. S. 600; Binderup v. Pathe Exchange, Inc., 263 U. S. 291; Fashion Originators’ Guild v. Federal Trade Comm’n, 312 U. S. 457; Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, 340 U. S. 211, 214; Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U. S. 594, 625; Northern Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 356 U. S. 1, 5.
Compare United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U. S. 300, with United States v. Schrader’s Son, Inc., 252 U. S. 85; United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U. S. 707, 719-723; Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U. S. 143.
The court below relied heavily on Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U. S. 469, in reaching its conclusion. While some language in that case can be read as supporting the position that no restraint on trade is prohibited by § 1 of' the Sherman Act unless it has or is intended to have an effect on market prices, such statements must be considered in. the light of the fact that the defendant in that case was a labor union. The Court in Apex recognized that the Act is aimed primarily at combinations having commercial objectives and is applied only to a very limited extent to organizations, like labor unions, which normally have other objectives. See United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U. S. 219; Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 325 U. S. 797. Moreover, cases subsequent to Apex have made clear that an effect on prices is not essential to a Sherman Act violation. See, e. g., Fashion Originators’ Guild v. Federal Trade Comm’n, 312 U. S. 457, 466.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | H | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. Argued October 19, 1955. Decided October 24, 1955.
Per Curiam:
The Court is of opinion that the complaints do present a case and controversy. Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States, 307 U. S. 125. The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for consideration on the merits.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | I | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Blackmun
delivered the opinion of the Court.
We revisit in these cases an issue raised in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833 (1976). In that litigation, this Court, by a sharply divided vote, ruled that the Commerce Clause does not empower Congress to enforce the minimum-wage and overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) against the States “in areas of traditional governmental functions.” Id., at 852. Although National League of Cities supplied some examples of “traditional governmental functions,” it did not offer a general explanation of how a “traditional” function is to be distinguished from a “nontraditional” one. Since then, federal and state courts have struggled with the task, thus imposed, of identifying a traditional function for purposes of state immunity under the Commerce Clause.
In the present cases, a Federal District Court concluded that municipal ownership and operation of a mass-transit system is a traditional governmental function and thus, under National League of Cities, is exempt from the obligations imposed by the FLSA. Faced with the identical question, three Federal Courts of Appeals and one state appellate court have reached the opposite conclusion.
Our examination of this “function” standard applied in these and other cases over the last eight years now persuades us that the attempt to draw the boundaries of state regulatory immunity in terms of “traditional governmental function” is not only unworkable but is also inconsistent with established principles of federalism and, indeed, with those very federalism principles on which National League of Cities purported to rest. That case, accordingly, is overruled.
I
The history of public transportation in San Antonio, Tex., is characteristic of the history of local mass transit in the United States generally. Passenger transportation for hire within San Antonio originally was provided on a private basis by a local transportation company. In 1913, the Texas Legislature authorized the State’s municipalities to regulate vehicles providing carriage for hire. 1913 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 147, § 4, ¶ 12, now codified, as amended, as Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann., Art. 1175, §§ 20 and 21 (Vernon 1963). Two years later, San Antonio enacted an ordinance setting forth franchising, insurance, and safety requirements for passenger vehicles operated for hire. The city continued to rely on such publicly regulated private mass transit until 1959, when it purchased the privately owned San Antonio Transit Company and replaced it with a public authority known as the San Antonio Transit System (SATS). SATS operated until 1978, when the city transferred its facilities and equipment to appellee San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority (SAMTA), a public mass-transit authority organized on a countywide basis. See generally Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann., Art. 1118x (Vernon Supp. 1984). SAMTA currently is the major provider of transportation in the San Antonio metropolitan area; between 1978 and 1980 alone, its vehicles traveled over 26 million route miles and carried over 63 million passengers.
As did other localities, San Antonio reached the point where it came to look to the Federal Government for financial assistance in maintaining its public mass transit. SATS managed to meet its operating expenses and bond obligations for the first decade of its existence without federal or local financial aid. By 1970, however, its financial position had deteriorated to the point where federal subsidies were vital for its continued operation. SATS’ general manager that year testified before Congress that “if we do not receive substantial help from the Federal Government, San Antonio may... join the growing ranks of cities that have inferior [public] transportation or may end up with no [public] transportation at all.”
The principal federal program to which SATS and other mass-transit systems looked for relief was the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964 (UMTA), Pub. L. 88-365, 78 Stat. 302, as amended, 49 U. S. C. App. § 1601 et seq., which provides substantial federal assistance to urban mass-transit programs. See generally Jackson Transit Authority v. Transit Union, 457 U. S. 15 (1982). UMTA now authorizes the Department of Transportation to fund 75 percent of the capital outlays and up to 50 percent of the operating expenses of qualifying mass-transit programs. §§ 4(a), 5(d) and (e), 49 U. S. C. App. §§ 1603(a), 1604(d) and (e). SATS received its first UMTA subsidy, a $4.1 million capital grant, in December 1970. From then until February 1980, SATS and SAMTA received over $51 million in UMTA grants — more than $31 million in capital grants, over $20 million in operating assistance, and a minor amount in technical assistance. During SAMTA’s first two fiscal years, it received $12.5 million in UMTA operating grants, $26.8 million from sales taxes, and only $10.1 million from fares. Federal subsidies and local sales taxes currently account for about 75 percent of SAMTA’s operating expenses.
The present controversy concerns the extent to which SAMTA may be subjected to the minimum-wage and overtime requirements of the FLSA. When the FLSA was enacted in 1938, its wage and overtime provisions did not apply to local mass-transit employees or, indeed, to employees of state and local governments. §§ 3(d), 13(a)(9), 52 Stat. 1060, 1067. In 1961, Congress extended minimum-wage coverage to employees of any private mass-transit carrier whose annual gross revenue was not less than $1 million. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1961, §§ 2(c), 9, 75 Stat. 65, 71. Five years later, Congress extended FLSA coverage to state and local-government employees for the first time by withdrawing the minimum-wage and overtime exemptions from public hospitals, schools, and mass-transit carriers whose rates and services were subject to state regulation. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, §§ 102(a) and (b), 80 Stat. 831. At the same time, Congress eliminated the overtime exemption for all mass-transit employees other than drivers, operators, and conductors. § 206(c), 80 Stat. 836. The application of the FLSA to public schools and hospitals was ruled to be within Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U. S. 183 (1968).
The FLSA obligations of public mass-transit systems like SATS were expanded in 1974 when Congress provided for the progressive repeal of the surviving overtime exemption for mass-transit employees. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, § 21(b), 88 Stat. 68. Congress simultaneously brought the States and their subdivisions further within the ambit of the FLSA by extending FLSA coverage to virtually all state and local-government employees. §§ 6(a)(1) and (6), 88 Stat. 58, 60, 29 U. S. C. §§ 203(d) and (x). SATS complied with the FLSA’s overtime requirements until 1976, when this Court, in National League of Cities, overruled Maryland v. Wirtz, and held that the FLSA could not be applied constitutionally to the “traditional governmental functions” of state and local governments. Four months after National League of Cities was handed down, SATS informed its employees that the decision relieved SATS of its overtime obligations under the FLSA.
Matters rested there until September 17, 1979, when the Wage and Hour Administration of the Department of Labor issued an opinion that SAMTA’s operations “are not constitutionally immune from the application of the Fair Labor Standards Act” under National League of Cities. Opinion WH-499, 6 LRR 91:1138. On November 21 of that year, SAMTA filed this action against the Secretary of Labor in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. It sought a declaratory judgment that, contrary to the Wage and Hour Administration’s determination, National League of Cities precluded the application of the FLSA’s overtime requirements to SAMTA’s operations. The Secretary counterclaimed under 29 U. S. C. §217 for enforcement of the overtime and recordkéeping requirements of the FLSA. On the same day that SAMTA filed its action, appellant Garcia and several other SAMTA employees brought suit against SAMTA in the same District Court for overtime pay under the FLSA. Garcia v. SAMTA, Civil Action No. SA 79 CA 458. The District Court has stayed that action pending the outcome of these cases, but it allowed Garcia to intervene in the present litigation as a defendant in support of the Secretary. One month after SAMTA brought suit, the Department of Labor formally amended its FLSA interpretive regulations to provide that publicly owned local mass-transit systems are not entitled to immunity under National League of Cities. 44 Fed. Reg. 75630 (1979), codified as 29 CFR § 775.3(b)(3) (1984).
On November 17, 1981, the District Court granted SAMTA’s motion for summary judgment and denied the Secretary’s and Garcia’s cross-motion for partial summary judgment. Without further explanation, the District Court ruled that “local public mass transit systems (including [SAMTA]) constitute integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions” under National League of Cities. App. D to Juris. Statement in No. 82-1913, p. 24a. The Secretary and Garcia both appealed directly to this Court pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1252. During the pendency of those appeals, Transportation Union v. Long Island R. Co., 455 U. S. 678 (1982), was decided. In that case, the Court ruled that commuter rail service provided by the state-owned Long Island Rail Road did not constitute a “traditional governmental function” and hence did not enjoy constitutional immunity, under National League of Cities, from the requirements of the Railway Labor Act. Thereafter, it vacated the District Court’s judgment in the present cases and remanded them for further consideration in the light of Long Island. 457 U. S. 1102 (1982).
On remand, the District Court adhered to its original view and again entered judgment for SAMTA. 557 F. Supp. 445 (1983). The court looked first to what it regarded as the “historical reality” of state involvement in mass transit. It recognized that States not always had owned and operated mass-transit systems, but concluded that they had engaged in a longstanding pattern of public regulation, and that this regulatory tradition gave rise to an “inference of sovereignty.” Id., at 447-448. The court next looked to the record of federal involvement in the field and concluded that constitutional immunity would not result in an erosion of federal authority with respect to state-owned mass-transit systems, because many federal statutes themselves contain exemptions for States and thus make the withdrawal of federal regulatory power over public mass-transit systems a supervening federal policy. Id., at 448-450. Although the Federal Government’s authority over employee wages under the FLSA obviously would be eroded, Congress had not asserted any interest in the wages of public mass-transit employees until 1966 and hence had not established a longstanding federal interest in the field, in contrast to the century-old federal regulatory presence in the railroad industry found significant for the decision in Long Island. Finally, the court compared mass transit to the list of functions identified as constitutionally immune in National League of Cities and concluded that it did not differ from those functions in any material respect. The court stated: “If transit is to be distinguished from the exempt [National League of Cities] functions it will have to be by identifying a traditional state function in the same way pornography is sometimes identified: someone knows it when they see it, but they can’t describe it.” 557 F. Supp., at 453.
The Secretary and Garcia again took direct appeals from the District Court’s judgment. We noted probable jurisdiction. 464 U. S. 812 (1983). After initial argument, the cases were restored to our calendar for reargument, and the parties were requested to brief and argue the following additional question:
“Whether or not the principles of the Tenth Amendment as set forth in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833 (1976), should be reconsidered?” 468 U. S. 1213 (1984).
Reargument followed in due course.
II
Appellees have not argued that SAMTA is immune from regulation under the FLSA on the ground that it is a local transit system engaged in intrastate commercial activity. In a practical sense, SAMTA’s operations might well be characterized as “local.” Nonetheless, it long has been settled that Congress’ authority under the Commerce Clause extends to intrastate economic activities that affect interstate commerce. See, e. g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Recl. Assn., 452 U. S. 264, 276-277 (1981); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U. S. 241, 258 (1964); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U. S. 111, 125 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100 (1941). Were SAMTA a privately owned and operated enterprise, it could not credibly argue that Congress exceeded the bounds of its Commerce Clause powers in prescribing minimum wages and overtime rates for SAMTA’s employees. Any constitutional exemption from the requirements of the FLSA therefore must rest on SAMTA’s status as a governmental entity rather than on the “local” nature of its operations.
The prerequisites for governmental immunity under National League of Cities were summarized by this Court in Hodel, supra. Under that summary, four conditions must be satisfied before a state activity may be deemed immune from a particular federal regulation under the Commerce Clause. First, it is said that the federal statute at issue must regulate “the ‘States as States.’” Second, the statute must “address matters that are indisputably ‘attribute[s] of state sovereignty.’” Third, state compliance with the federal obligation must “directly impair [the States’] ability ‘to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions.’ ” Finally, the relation of state and federal interests must not be such that “the nature of the federal interest... justifies state submission.” 452 U. S., at 287-288, and n. 29, quoting National League of Cities, 426 U. S., at 845, 852, 854.
The controversy in the present cases has focused on the third Hodel requirement — that the challenged federal statute trench on “traditional governmental functions.” The District Court voiced a common concern: “Despite the abundance of adjectives, identifying which particular state functions are immune remains difficult.” 557 F. Supp., at 447. Just how troublesome the task has been is revealed by the results reached in other federal cases. Thus, courts have held that regulating ambulance services, Gold Cross Ambulance v. City of Kansas City, 538 F. Supp. 956, 967-969 (WD Mo. 1982), aff’d on other grounds, 705 F. 2d 1005 (CA8 1983), cert. pending, No. 83-138; licensing automobile drivers, United States v. Best, 573 F. 2d 1095, 1102-1103 (CA9 1978); operating a municipal airport, Amersbach v. City of Cleveland, 598 F. 2d 1033, 1037-1038 (CA6 1979); performing solid waste disposal, Hybud Equipment Corp. v. City of Akron, 654 F. 2d 1187, 1196 (CA6 1981); and operating a highway authority, Molina-Estrada v. Puerto Rico Highway Authority, 680 F. 2d 841, 845-846 (CA1 1982), are functions protected under National League of Cities. At the same time, courts have held that issuance of industrial development bonds, Woods v. Homes and Structures of Pittsburg, Kansas, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 1270, 1296-1297 (Kan. 1980); regulation of intrastate natural gas sales, Oklahoma ex rel. Derryberry v. FERC, 494 F. Supp. 636, 657 (WD Okla. 1980), aff’d, 661 F. 2d 832 (CA10 1981), cert. denied sub nom. Texas v. FERC, 457 U. S. 1105 (1982); regulation of traffic on public roads, Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 552 F. 2d 25, 38 (CA2), cert. denied, 434 U. S. 902 (1977); regulation of air transportation, Hughes Air Corp. v. Public Utilities Comm’n of Cal., 644 F. 2d 1334, 1340-1341 (CA9 1981); operation of a telephone system, Puerto Rico Tel. Co. v. FCC, 553 F. 2d 694, 700-701 (CA1 1977); leasing and sale of natural gas, Public Service Co. of N. C. v. FERC, 587 F. 2d 716, 721 (CA5), cert. denied sub nom. Louisiana v. FERC, 444 U. S. 879 (1979); operation of a mental health facility, Williams v. Eastside Mental Health Center, Inc., 669 F. 2d 671, 680-681 (CA11), cert. denied, 459 U. S. 976 (1982); and provision of in-house domestic services for the aged and handicapped, Bonnette v. California Health and Welfare Agency, 704 F. 2d 1465, 1472 (CA9 1983), are not entitled to immunity. We find it difficult, if not impossible, to identify an organizing principle that places each of the cases in the first group on one side of a line and each of the cases in the second group on the other side. The constitutional distinction between licensing drivers and regulating traffic, for example, or between operating a highway authority and operating a mental health facility, is elusive at best.
Thus far, this Court itself has made little headway in defining the scope of the governmental functions deemed protected under National League of Cities. In that case the Court set forth examples of protected and unprotected functions, see 426 U. S., at 851, 854, n. 18, but provided no explanation of how those examples were identified. The only other case in which the Court has had occasion to address the problem is Long Island. We there observed: “The determination of whether a federal law impairs a state’s authority with respect to ‘areas of traditional [state] functions’ may at times be a difficult one.” 455 U. S., at 684, quoting National League of Cities, 426 U. S., at 852. The accuracy of that statement is demonstrated by this Court’s own difficulties in Long Island in developing a workable standard for “traditional governmental functions.” We relied in large part there on “the historical reality that the operation of railroads is not among the functions traditionally performed by state and local governments,” but we simultaneously disavowed “a static historical view of state functions generally immune from federal regulation.” 455 U. S., at 686 (first emphasis added; second emphasis in original). We held that the inquiry into a particular function’s “traditional” nature was merely a means of determining whether the federal statute at issue unduly handicaps “basic state prerogatives,” id., at 686-687, but we did not offer an explanation of what makes one state function a “basic prerogative” and another function not basic. Finally, having disclaimed a rigid reliance on the historical pedigree of state involvement in a particular area, we nonetheless found it appropriate to emphasize the extended historical record of federal involvement in the field of rail transportation. Id., at 687-689.
Many constitutional standards involve “undoubte[d]... gray areas,” Fry v. United States, 421 U. S. 542, 558 (1975) (dissenting opinion), and, despite the difficulties that this Court and other courts have encountered so far, it normally might be fair to venture the assumption that case-by-case development would lead to a workable standard for determining whether a particular governmental function should be immune from federal regulation under the Commerce Clause. A further cautionary note is sounded, however, by the Court’s experience in the related field of state immunity from federal taxation. In South Carolina v. United States, 199 U. S. 437 (1905), the Court held for the first time that the state tax immunity recognized in Collector v. Day, 11 Wall. 113 (1871), extended only to the “ordinary” and “strictly governmental” instrumentalities of state governments and not to instrumentalities “used by the State in the carrying on of an ordinary private business.” 199 U. S., at 451, 461. While the Court applied the distinction outlined in South Carolina for the following 40 years, at no time during that period did the Court develop a consistent formulation of the kinds of governmental functions that were entitled to immunity. The Court identified the protected functions at various times as “essential,” “usual,” “traditional,” or “strictly governmental.” While “these differences in phraseology... must not be too literally contradistinguished,” Brush v. Commissioner, 300 U. S. 352, 362 (1937), they reflect an inability to specify precisely what aspects of a governmental function made it necessary to the “unimpaired existence” of the States. Collector v. Day, 11 Wall., at 127. Indeed, the Court ultimately chose “not, by an attempt to formulate any general test, [to] risk embarrassing the decision of cases [concerning] activities of a different kind which may arise in the future.” Brush v. Commissioner, 300 U. S., at 365.
If these tax-immunity cases had any common thread, it was in the attempt to distinguish between “governmental” and “proprietary” functions. To say that the distinction between “governmental” and “proprietary” proved to be stable, however, would be something of an overstatement. In 1911, for example, the Court declared that the provision of a municipal water supply “is no part of the essential governmental functions of a State.” Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107, 172. Twenty-six years later, without any intervening change in the applicable legal standards, the Court simply rejected its earlier position and decided that the provision of a municipal water supply was immune from federal taxation as an essential governmental function, even though municipal waterworks long had been operated for profit by private industry. Brush v. Commissioner, 300 U. S., at 370-373. At the same time that the Court was holding a municipal water supply to be immune from federal taxes, it had held that a state-run commuter rail system was not immune. Helvering v. Powers, 293 U. S. 214 (1934). Justice Black, in Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U. S. 405, 427 (1938), was moved to observe: “An implied constitutional distinction which taxes income of an officer of a state-operated transportation system and exempts income of the manager of a municipal water works system manifests the uncertainty created by the ‘essential’ and ‘non-essential’ test” (concurring opinion). It was this uncertainty and instability that led the Court shortly thereafter, in New York v. United States, 326 U. S. 572 (1946), unanimously to conclude that the distinction between “governmental” and “proprietary” functions was “untenable” and must be abandoned. See id., at 583 (opinion of Frankfurter, J., joined by Rutledge, J.); id., at 586 (Stone, C. J., concurring, joined by Reed, Murphy, and Burton, JJ.); id., at 590-596 (Douglas, J., dissenting, joined by Black, J.). See also Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U. S. 444, 457, and n. 14 (1978) (plurality opinion); Case v. Bowles, 327 U. S. 92, 101 (1946).
Even during the heyday of the governmental/proprietary distinction in intergovernmental tax-immunity doctrine the Court never explained the constitutional basis for that distinction. In South Carolina, it expressed its concern that unlimited state immunity from federal taxation would allow the States to undermine the Federal Government’s tax base by expanding into previously private sectors of the economy. See 199 U. S., at 454-455. Although the need to reconcile state and federal interests obviously demanded that state immunity have some limiting principle, the Court did not try to justify the particular result it reached; it simply concluded that a “line [must] be drawn,” id., at 456, and proceeded to draw that line. The Court’s elaborations in later cases, such as the assertion in Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U. S. 360, 369 (1934), that “[w]hen a state enters the market place seeking customers it divests itself of its quasi sovereignty pro tanto,” sound more of ipse dixit than reasoned explanation. This inability to give principled content to the distinction between “governmental” and “proprietary,” no less significantly than its unworkability, led the Court to abandon the distinction in New York v. United States.
The distinction the Court discarded as unworkable in the field of tax immunity has proved no more fruitful in the field of regulatory immunity under the Commerce Clause. Neither do any of the alternative standards that might be employed to distinguish between protected and unprotected governmental functions appear manageable. We rejected the possibility of making immunity turn on a purely historical standard of “tradition” in Long Island, and properly so. The most obvious defect of a historical approach to state immunity is that it prevents a court from accommodating changes in the historical functions of States, changes that have re-suited in a number of once-private functions like education being assumed by the States and their subdivisions. At the same time, the only apparent virtue of a rigorous historical standard, namely, its promise of a reasonably objective measure for state immunity, is illusory. Reliance on history as an organizing principle results in line-drawing of the most arbitrary sort; the genesis of state governmental functions stretches over a historical continuum from before the Revolution to the present, and courts would have to decide by fiat precisely how longstanding a pattern of state involvement had to be for federal regulatory authority to be defeated.
A nonhistorical standard for selecting immune governmental functions is likely to be just as unworkable as is a historical standard. The goal of identifying “uniquely” governmental functions, for example, has been rejected by the Court in the field of government tort liability in part because the notion of a “uniquely” governmental function is unmanageable. See Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U. S. 61, 64-68 (1955); see also Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 433 (1978) (dissenting opinion). Another possibility would be to confine immunity to “necessary” governmental services, that is, services that would be provided inadequately or not at all unless the government provided them. Cf. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S., at 172. The set of services that fits into this category, however, may well be negligible. The fact that an unregulated market produces less of some service than a State deems desirable! does not mean that the State itself must provide the service'; in most if not all cases, the State can “contract out” by hiring private firms to provide the service or simply by providing subsidies to existing suppliers. It also is open to question how well equipped courts are to make this kind of determination about the workings of economic markets.
We believe, however, that there is a more fundamental problem at work here, a problem that explains why the Court was never able to provide a basis for the governmental/proprietary distinction in the intergovernmental tax-immunity cases and why an attempt to draw similar distinctions with respect to federal regulatory authority under National League of Cities is unlikely to succeed regardless of how the distinctions are phrased. The problem is that neither the governmental/proprietary distinction nor any other.that purports to separate out important governmental functions can be faithful to the role of federalism in a democratic society. The essence of our federal system is that within the realm of authority left open to them under the Constitution, the States must be equally free to engage in any activity that their citizens choose for the common weal, no matter how unorthodox or unnecessary anyone else— including the judiciary — deems state involvement to be. Any rule of state immunity that looks to the “traditional,” “integral,” or “necessary” nature of governmental functions inevitably invites an unelected federal judiciary to make decisions about which state policies it favors and which ones it dislikes. “The science of government... is the science of experiment,” Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204, 226 (1821), and the States cannot serve as laboratories for social and economic experiment, see New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U. S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), if they must pay an added price when they meet the changing needs of their citizenry by taking up functions that an earlier day and a different society left in private hands. In the words of Justice Black:
“There is not, and there cannot be, any unchanging line of demarcation between essential and non-essential governmental functions. Many governmental functions of today have at some time in the past been nongovernmental. The genius of our government provides that, within the sphere of constitutional action, the people — acting not through the courts but through their elected legislative representatives — have the power to determine as conditions demand, what services and functions the public welfare requires.” Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U. S., at 427 (concurring opinion).
We therefore now reject, as unsound in principle and unworkable in practice, a rule of state immunity from federal regulation that turns on a judicial appraisal of whether a particular governmental function is “integral” or “traditional.” Any such rule leads to inconsistent results at the same time that it disserves principles of democratic self-governance, and it breeds inconsistency precisely because it is divorced from those principles. If there are to be limits on the Federal Government’s power to interfere with state functions — as undoubtedly there are — we must look elsewhere to find them. We accordingly return to the underlying issue that confronted this Court in National League of Cities — the manner in which the Constitution insulates States from the reach of Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause.
Ill
The central theme of National League of Cities was that the States occupy a special position in our constitutional system and that the scope of Congress’ authority under the Commerce Clause must reflect that position. Of course, the Commerce Clause by its specific language does not provide any special limitation on Congress’ actions with respect to the States. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U. S. 226, 248 (1983) (concurring opinion). It is equally true, however, that the text of the Constitution provides the beginning rather than the final answer to every inquiry into questions of federalism, for “[bjehind the words of the constitutional provisions are postulates which limit and control.” Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313, 322 (1934). National League of Cities reflected the general conviction that the Constitution precludes “the National Government [from] devouring] the essentials of state sovereignty.” Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U. S., at 205 (dissenting opinion). In order to be faithful to the underlying federal premises of the Constitution, courts must look for the “postulates which limit and control.”
What has proved problematic is not the perception that the Constitution’s federal structure imposes limitations on the Commerce Clause, but rather the nature and content of those limitations. One approach to defining the limits on Congress’ authority to regulate the States under the Commerce Clause is to identify certain underlying elements of political sovereignty that are deemed essential to the States’ “separate and independent existence.” Lane County v. Oregon, 7 Wall. 71, 76 (1869). This approach obviously underlay the Court’s use of the “traditional governmental function” concept in National League of Cities. It also has led to the separate requirement that the challenged federal statute “address matters that are indisputably ‘attribute^] of state sovereignty.’” Hodel, 452 U. S., at 288, quoting National League of Cities, 426 U. S., at 845. In National League of Cities itself, for example, the Court concluded that decisions by a State concerning the wages and hours of its employees are an “undoubted attribute of state sovereignty.” 426 U. S., at 845. The opinion did not explain what aspects of such decisions made them such an “undoubted attribute,” and the Court since then has remarked on the uncertain scope of the concept. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U. S., at 238, n. 11. The point of the inquiry, however, has remained to single out particular features of a State’s internal governance that are deemed to be intrinsic parts of state sovereignty.
We doubt that courts ultimately can identify principled constitutional limitations on the scope of Congress’ Commerce Clause powers over the States merely by relying on a priori definitions of state sovereignty. In part, this is because of the elusiveness of objective criteria for “fundamental” elements of state sovereignty, a problem we have witnessed in the search for “traditional governmental functions.” There is, however, a more fundamental reason: the sovereignty of the States is limited by the Constitution itself. A variety of sovereign powers, for example, are withdrawn from the States by Article I, § 10. Section 8 of the same Article works an equally sharp contraction of state sovereignty by authorizing Congress to exercise a wide range of legislative powers and (in conjunction with the Supremacy Clause of Article VI) to displace contrary state legislation. See Hodel, 452 U. S., at 290-292. By providing for final review of questions of federal law in this Court, Article III curtails the sovereign power of the States’judiciaries to make authoritative determinations of law. See Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304 (1816). Finally, the developed application, through the Fourteenth Amendment, of the greater part of the Bill of Rights to the States limits the sovereign authority that States otherwise would possess to legislate with respect to their citizens and to conduct their own affairs.
The States unquestionably do “retai[n] a significant measure of sovereign authority.” EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U. S., at 269 (Powell, J., dissenting). They do so, however, only to the extent that the Constitution has not divested them of their original powers and transferred those powers to the Federal Government. In the words of James Madison to the Members of the First Congress: “Interference with the power of the States was no constitutional criterion of the power of Congress. If the power was not given, Congress could not exercise it; if given, they might exercise it, although it should interfere with the laws, or
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | G | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Ginsburg
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This ease concerns the authority of one State’s court to order that a witness’ testimony shall not be heard in any court of the United States. In settlement of claims and counterclaims precipitated by the discharge of Ronald El-well, a former General Motors Corporation (GM) engineering analyst, GM paid Elwell an undisclosed sum of money, and the parties agreed to a permanent injunction. As stipulated by GM and Elwell and entered by a Michigan County Court, the injunction prohibited Elwell from “testifying, without the prior written consent of [GM], ... as ... a witness of any kind ... in any litigation already filed, or to be filed in the future, involving [GM] as an owner, seller, manufacturer and/or designer....” GM separately agreed, however, that if Elwell were ordered to testify by a court or other tribunal, such testimony would not be actionable as a violation of the Michigan court’s injunction or the GM-Elwell agreement.
After entry of the stipulated injunction in Michigan, El-well was subpoenaed to testify in a product liability action commenced in Missouri by plaintiffs who were not involved in the Michigan case. The question presented is whether the national full faith and credit command bars Elwell’s testimony in the Missouri ease. We hold that Elwell may testify in the Missouri action without offense to the full faith and credit requirement.
I
Two lawsuits, initiated by different parties in different States, gave rise to the full faith and credit issue before us. One suit involved a severed employment relationship, the other, a wrongful-death eomplaint. We describe each controversy in turn.
A
The Suit Between Elwell and General Motors
Ronald Elwell was a GM employee from 1959 until 1989. For 15 of those years, beginningin 1971, Elwell was assigned to the Engineering Analysis Group, which studied the performance of GM vehicles, most particularly vehicles involved in product liability litigation. Elwell’s studies and research concentrated on vehicular fires. He assisted in improving the performance of GM products by suggesting changes in fuel line designs. During the eourse of his employment, Elwell frequently aided GM lawyers engaged in defending GM against product liability actions. Beginning in 1987, the Elwell-GM employment relationship soured. GM and Elwell first negotiated an agreement under which Elwell would retire after serving as a GM consultant for two years. When the time came for Elwell to retire, however, disagreement again surfaced and continued into 1991.
In May 1991, plaintiffs in a product liability action pending in Georgia deposed Elwell. The Georgia case involved a GM pickup truck fuel tank that burst into flames just after a collision. During the deposition, and over the objection of counsel for GM, Elwell gave testimony that differed markedly from testimony he had given when serving as an in-house expert witness for GM. Specifically, Elwell had several times defended the safety and crashworthiness of the pickup’s fuel system. On deposition in the Georgia action, however, Elwell testified that the GM pickup truck fuel ’ system was inferior in comparison to competing products.
A month later, Elwell sued GM in a Michigan County Court, alleging wrongful discharge and other tort and contract claims. GM counterclaimed,, contending that Elwell had breached his fiduciary duty to GM by disclosing privileged and confidential information and misappropriating documents. In response to'GM’s motion for a preliminary injunction, and after a hearing, the Michigan trial court, on November 22,1991, enjoined Elwell from
“consulting or discussing with or disclosing to any person any of General Motors Corporation’s trade secrets[,] confidential information or matters of attorney-client work product relating in any manner to the subject matter of any products liability litigation whether already filed or [to be] filed in the future which Ronald Elwell received, had knowledge of, or was entrusted with during his employments with General Motors Corporation.” Elwell v. General Motors Corp., No. 91-115946NZ (Wayne Cty.) (Order Granting in Part, Denying in Part Injunctive Relief, pp. 1-2), App. 9-10.
In August 1992, GM and Elwell entered into a settlement under which Elwell received an undisclosed sum of money. The parties also stipulated to the entry of a permanent injunction and jointly filed with the Michigan court both the stipulation and- the agreed-upon injunction. The proposed permanent injunction contained two proscriptions. The first substantially repeated the terms of the preliminary injunction; the second comprehensively enjoined Elwell from
“testifying, without the prior written consent of General Motors Corporation, either upon deposition or at trial, as an expert witness, or as a witness of any kind, and from consulting with attorneys or their agents in any litigation already filed, or to be filed in the future, involving General Motors Corporation as an owner, seller, manufacturer and/or designer of the produet(s) in issue.” Order Dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint and Granting Permanent Injunction (Wayne Cty., Aug. 26, 1992), p. 2, App. 30.
To this encompassing bar, the consent injunction made an exception: “[This provision] shall not operate to interfere with the jurisdiction of the Court in ... Georgia [where the litigation involving the fuel tank was still pending].” Ibid. (emphasis added). No other noninterference provision appears in the stipulated decree. On August 26,1992, with no further hearing, the Michigan court entered the injunction precisely as tendered by the parties.
Although the stipulated injunction contained an exception only for the Georgia action then pending, Elwell and GM included in their separate settlement agreement a more general limitation. If a court or other tribunal ordered Elwell to testify, his testimony would “in no way” support a GM action for violation of the injunction or the settlement agreement:
“ ‘It is agreed that [Elwell’s] appearance and testimony, if any, at hearings on Motions to quash subpoena or at deposition or trial or other official proceeding, if the Court or other tribunal so orders, will in no way form a basis for an action in violation of the Permanent Injunction or this Agreement.’ ” Settlement Agreement, p. 10, as quoted in 86 F. 3d 811, 820, n. 11 (CA8 1996).
In the six years since the Elwell-GM settlement, Elwell has testified against GM both in Georgia (pursuant to the exception contained in the injunction) and in several other jurisdictions in which Elwell has been subpoenaed to testify.
B
The Suit Between the Bakers and General Motors
Having described the Elwell-GM employment termination litigation, we next summarize the wrongfiil-death complaint underlying this ease. The decedent, Beverly Garner, was a front-seat passenger in a 1985 Chevrolet S-10 Blazer involved in a February 1990 Missouri highway accident. The Blazer’s engine caught fire, and both driver and passenger died. In September 1991, Garner’s sons, Kenneth and Steven Baker, commenced a wrongful-death product liability action against GM in a Missouri state court. The Bakers alleged that a faulty fuel pump in the 1985 Blazer caused the engine fire that killed their mother. GM removed the case to federal court on the basis of the parties’ diverse citizenship. On the merits, GM asserted that the fuel pump was neither faulty nor the cause of the fire, and that collision impact injuries alone caused Garner’s death.
The Bakers sought both to depose Elwell and to call him as a witness at trial. GM objected to Elwell’s appearance as a deponent or trial witness on the ground that the Michigan injunction barred his testimony. In response, the Bakers urged that the Michigan injunction did not override a Missouri subpoena for Elwell’s testimony. The Bakers further noted that, under the Elwell-GM settlement agreement, El-well could testify if a court so ordered, and such testimony would not be actionable as a violation of the Michigan injunction.
After in camera review of the Michigan injunction and the settlement agreement, the Federal District Court in Missouri allowed the Bakers to depose Elwell and to call him as a witness at trial. Responding to GM’s objection, the District Court stated altérnative grounds for its ruling: (1) Michigan’s injunction need not be enforced because blocking Elwell’s testimony would violate Missouri’s “public policy,” which shielded from disclosure only privileged or otherwise confidential information; (2) just as the injunction could be modified in Michigan, so a court elsewhere could modify the decree.
At trial, Elwell testified in support of the Bakers’ claim that the alleged defect in the fuel pump system contributed to the postcollision fire. In addition, he identified and described a 1973 internal GM memorandum bearing on the risk of fuel-fed engine fires. Following trial, the jury awarded the Bakers $11.3 million in damages, and the District Court entered judgment on the jury’s verdict.
The United States Court reversed the District Court’s judgment, ruling, inter alia, that Elwell’s testimony should not have been admitted. 86 F. 3d 811 (1996). Assuming, arguendo, the existence of a public policy exception to the full faith and credit command, the Court of Appeals concluded that the District Court erroneously relied on Missouri’s policy favoring disclosure of relevant, nonprivileged information, see id., at 818-819, for Missouri has an “equally strong public policy in favor of full faith and credit,” id., at 819.
The Eighth Circuit also determined that the evidence was insufficient to show that the Michigan court would modify the injunction barring Elwell’s testimony. See id., at 819-820. The Court of Appeals observed that the Michigan court “has been asked on several occasions to modify the injunction, [but] has yet to do so,” and noted that, if the Michigan court did not intend to block Elwell’s testimony in cases like the Bakers’, “the injunction would . . . have been unnecessary.” Id., at 820.
We granted certiorari to decide whether the full faith and credit requirement stops the Bakers, who were not parties to the Michigan proceeding, from obtaining Elwell’s testimony in their Missouri wrongful-death action. 520 U. S. 1142 (1997).
H
A
The Constitution’s Full Faith and Credit Clause provides:
“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.” Art. IV, § 1.
Pursuant to that Clause, Congress has prescribed:
“Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so authenticated, shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken.” 28 U. S. C. § 1738.
The animating purpose of the full faith and credit command, as this Court explained in Milwaukee County v. M. E. White Co., 296 U. S. 268 (1935),
"was to alter the status of the several states as independent foreign sovereignties, each free to ignore obligations created under the laws or by the judicial proceedings of the others, and to make them integral parts of a single nation throughout which a remedy upon a just obligation might be demanded as of right, irrespective of the state of its origin.” Id., at 277.
See also Estin v, Estin, 334 U. S. 541, 546 (1948) (the Full Faith and Credit Clause "substituted a command for the earlier principles of comity and thus basically altered the status of the States as independent sovereigns”).
Our precedent differentiates the credit owed to laws (legislative measures and common law) and to judgments. “In numerous eases this Court has held that credit must be given to the judgment of another state although the forum would not be required to entertain the suit on which the judgment was founded.” Milwaukee County, 296 U. S., at 277. The Full Faith and Credit Clause does not compel “a state to substitute the statutes of other states for its own statutes dealing with a subject matter concerning which it is competent to legislate.” Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm’n, 306 U. S. 493, 501 (1939); see Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U. S. 797, 818-819 (1985). Regarding judgments, however, the full faith and credit obligation is exacting. A final judgment in one State, if rendered by a court with adjudicatory authority over the subject matter and persons governed by the judgment, qualifies for recognition throughout the land. For claim and issue preclusion (res judicata) purposes, in other words, the judgment of the rendering State gains nationwide force. See, e. g., Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Epstein, 516 U. S. 367, 373 (1996); Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U. S. 461, 485 (1982); see also Reese & Johnson, The Scope of Full Faith and Credit to Judgments, 49 Colum. L. Rev. 153 (1949).
A court may be guided by the forum State’s “public policy” in determining the law applicable to a controversy. See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U. S. 410, 421-424 (1979). But our decisions support no roving “public policy exception” to the full faith and credit due judgments. See Estin, 334 U. S., at 546 (Full Faith and Credit Clause “ordered submission... even to hostile policies reflected in the judgment of another State, because the practical operation of the federal system, which the Constitution designed, demanded it.”); Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U. S. 230, 237 (1908) (judgment of Missouri court entitled to fall faith and credit in Mississippi even if Missouri judgment rested on a misapprehension of Mississippi law). In assuming the existence of a ubiquitous "public policy exception” permitting one State to resist recognition of another State’s judgment, the District Court in the Bakers’ wrongful-death action, see supra, at 230, misread our precedent. “The full faith and credit clause is one of the provisions incorporated into the Constitution by its framers for the purpose of transforming an aggregation of independent, sovereign States into a nation.” Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U. S. 343, 355 (1948). We are “aware of [no] considerations of local policy or law which could rightly be deemed to impair the force and effect which the full faith and credit clause and the Act of Congress require to be given to [a money] judgment outside the state of its rendition.” Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U. S. 430, 438 (1943).
The Court has never placed equity faith and credit domain. Equity decrees for the payment of money have long been considered equivalent to judgments at law entitled to nationwide recognition. See, e. g., Barber v. Barber, 323 U. S. 77 (1944) (unconditional adjudication of petitioner’s right to recover a sum of money is entitled to full faith and credit); see also A. Ehrenzweig, Conflict of Laws § 51, p. 182 (rev. ed. 1962) (describing as “indefensible” the old doctrine that an equity decree, because it does not “merge” the claim into the judgment, does not qualify for recognition). We see no reason why the preclusive effects of an adjudication on parties and those “in privity” with them, i. e., claim preclusion and issue preclusion (res judicata and collateral estoppel), should differ depending solely upon the type of relief sought in a civil action. Cf. Barber, 323 U. S., at 87 (Jackson, J., concurring) (Pull Faith and Credit Clause and its implementing statute speak not of “judgments” but of “‘judicial proceedings’ without limitation”); Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 2 (providing for “one form of action to be known as ‘civil action,’ ” in lieu of discretely labeled actions at law and suits in equity).
Full faith and credit, however, does not mean that States must adopt the practices of other States regarding the time, manner, and mechanisms for enforcing judgments. Enforcement measures do not travel with the sister state judgment as preclusive effects do; such measures remain subject to the evenhanded control of forum law. See McElmoyle ex rel. Bailey v. Cohen, 13 Pet. 312, 325 (1839) (judgment may be enforced only as “laws [of enforcing forum] may permit”); see also Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 99 (1969) (“The local law of the forum determines the methods by which a judgment of another state is enforced.”).
Orders commanding action or inaction have been denied enforcement in a sister State when they purported to accomplish an official act within the exclusive province of that other State or interfered with litigation over which the ordering State had no authority. Thus, a sister State’s decree concerning land ownership in another State has been held ineffective to transfer title, see Fall v. Eastin, 215 U. S. 1 (1909), although such a decree may indeed preelusively adjudicate the rights and obligations running between the parties to the foreign litigation, see, e. g., Robertson v. Howard, 229 U. S. 254, 261 (1913) (“[I]t may not be doubted that a court of equity in one State in a proper case could compel a defendant before it to convey property situated in another State.”)- And antisuit injunctions regarding litigation elsewhere, even if compatible with due process as a direction constraining parties to the decree, see Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U. S. 107 (1890), in fact have not controlled the second court’s actions regarding litigation in that court. See, e. g., James v. Grand Trunk Western R. Co., 14 Ill. 2d 356, 372, 152 N. E. 2d 858, 867 (1958); see also E. Scoles & P. Hay, Conflict of Laws § 24.21, p. 981 (2d ed. 1992) (observing that antisuit injunction “does not address, and thus has no preclu-sive effect on, the merits of the litigation [in the second forum]”). Sanctions for violations of an injunction, in any event, are generally administered by the court that issued the injunction. See, e. g., Stiller v. Hardman, 324 F. 2d 626, 628 (CA2 1963) (nonrendition forum enforces monetary relief portion of a judgment but leaves enforcement of injunctive portion to rendition forum).
B
With these background principles in view, we turn to the dimensions of the order GM relies upon to stop Elwell’s testimony. Specifically, we take up the question: What matters did the Michigan injunction legitimately conclude?
As earlier recounted, see supra, at 228-229, the parties before the Michigan County Court, Elwell and GM, submitted an agreed-upon injunction, which the presiding judge signed. While no issue was joined, expressly litigated, and determined in the Michigan proceeding, that order is claim preclusive between Elwell and GM. Elwell’s claim for wrongful discharge and his related contract and tort claims have “merged in the judgment,” and he cannot sue again to recover more. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U. S. 322, 326, n. 5 (1979) (“Under the doctrine of res judicata, a judgment on the merits in a prior suit bars a second suit involving the same parties or their privies based on the same cause of action.”); see also Restatement (Second) of Judgments §17 (1980). Similarly, GM cannot sue Elwell elsewhere on the counterclaim GM asserted in Michigan. See id., § 23, Comment a, p. 194 (“A defendant who interposes a counterclaim is, in substance, a plaintiff, as far as the counterclaim is concerned, and the plaintiff is, in substance, a defendant.”).
Michigan’s judgment, however, cannot reach beyond the Elwell-GM controversy to control proceedings against GM brought in other States, by other parties, asserting claims the merits of which Michigan has not considered. Michigan has no power over those parties, and no basis for commanding them to become intervenors in the Elwell-GM dispute. See Martin v. Wilks, 490 U. S. 755, 761-763 (1989). Most essentially, Michigan lacks authority to control courts elsewhere by precluding them, in actions brought by strangers to the Michigan litigation, from determining for themselves what witnesses are competent to testify and what evidence is relevant and admissible in their search for the truth. See. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws §§ 137-139 (1969 and rev. 1988) (forum’s own law governs witness competence and grounds for excluding evidence); cf. Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. United States Dist. Court for Southern Dist. of Iowa, 482 U. S. 522, 544, n. 29 (1987) (foreign “blocking statute” barring disclosure of certain information “do[es] not deprive an American court of the power to order a party subject to its jurisdiction to produce [the information]”); United States v. First Nat. City Bank, 396 F. 2d 897 (CA2 1968) (New York bank may not refuse to produce records of its German branch, even though doing so might subject the bank to civil liability under German law).
As the District Court recognized, Michigan’s decree could operate against Elwell to preclude him from volunteering his testimony. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 26a-27a. But a Michigan court cannot, by entering the injunction to which Elwell and GM stipulated, dictate to a court in another jurisdiction that evidence relevant in the Bakers’ ease — a controversy to which Michigan is foreign — shall be inadmissible. This conclusion creates no general exception to the full faith and credit command, and surely does not permit a State to refuse to honor a sister state judgment based on the forum’s choice of law or policy preferences. Rather, we simply recognize that, just as the mechanisms for enforcing a judgment do not travel with the judgment itself for purposes of full faith and credit, see McElmoyle ex rel. Bailey v. Cohen, 13 Pet. 312 (1839); see also Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 99, and just as one State’s judgment cannot automatically transfer title to land in another State, see Fall v. Eastin, 215 U. S. 1 (1909), similarly the Michigan decree cannot determine evidentiary issues in a lawsuit brought by parties who were not subject to the jurisdiction of the Michigan court. Cf. United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 710 (1974) (“[EJxceptions to the demand for every man’s evidence are not lightly created nor expansively construed, for they are in derogation of the search for truth.”).
The language of the consent decree is informative in this regard. Excluding the then-pending Georgia action from the ban on testimony by Elwell without GM’s permission, the decree provides that it “shall not operate to interfere with the jurisdiction of the Court in . . . Georgia.” Elwell v. General Motors Corp., No. 91-115946NZ (Wayne Cty.) (Order Dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint and Granting Permanent Injunction, p. 2), App. 30 (emphasis added). But if the Michigan order, extended to the Georgia case, would have “interfer[ed] with the jurisdiction” of the Georgia court, Michigan’s ban would, in the same way, “interfere with the jurisdiction” of courts in other States in cases similar to the one pending in Georgia.
In line with its recognition of the interference potential of the consent decree, GM provided in the settlement agreement that, if another court ordered Elwell to testify, his testimony would “in no way” render him vulnerable to suit in Michigan for violation of the injunction or agreement. See 86 F. 3d, at 815, 820, n. 11. The Eighth Circuit regarded this settlement agreement provision as merely a concession by GM that “some courts might fail to extend full faith and credit to the [Michigan] injunction.” Ibid. As we have explained, however, Michigan’s power does not reach into a Missouri courtroom to displace the forum’s own determination whether to admit or exclude evidence relevant in the Bakers’ wrongful-death ease before it. In that light, we see no altruism in GM’s agreement not to institute contempt or breach-of-eontract proceedings against Elwell in Michigan for giving subpoenaed testimony elsewhere. Rather, we find it telling that GM ruled out resort to the court that entered the injunction, for injunctions are ordinarily enforced by the enjoining court, not by a surrogate tribunal. See supra, at 236.
In sum, Michigan has no authority to shield a witness from another jurisdiction’s subpoena power in a case involving persons and causes outside Michigan’s governance. Recognition, under full faith and credit, is owed to dispositions Michigan has authority to order. But a Michigan decree cannot command obedience elsewhere on a matter the Michigan court lacks authority to resolve. See Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U. S. 261, 282-283 (1980) (plurality opinion) (“Full faith and credit must be given to [a] determination that [a State’s tribunal] had the authority to make; but by a parity of reasoning, full faith and credit need not be given to determinations that it had no power to make.”).
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
A judge new to the case, not the judge who conducted a hearing at the preliminary injunction stage, presided at the settlement stage and entered the permanent injunction.
In conflict with the Eighth Circuit, many other lower courts have permitted Elwell to testify as to nonprivileged and non-trade-secret matters. See Addendum to Brief for Petitioners (citing cases).
Predating the Constitution, the Articles of Confederation contained a provision of the same order: “Full faith and credit shall be given in each of these States to the records, acts and judicial proceedings of the courts and magistrates of every other State.” Articles of Confederation, Art. IV. For a concise history of full faith and credit, see Jackson, Full Faith and Credit — The Lawyer’s Clause of the Constitution, 45 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1945).
The first Congress enacted the original full faith and credit statute in May 1790. See Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 122 (codified as amended at 28 U. S. C. § 1738) (“And the said records and judicial proceedings authenticated as aforesaid, shall have such faith and credit given to them in every court within the United States, as they have by law or usage in the courts of the state from whence the said records are or shall be taken.”). Although the text of the statute has been revised since then, the command for full faith and credit to judgments has remained constant.
“Res judicata” is the term traditionally used to describe two discrete effects: (1) what we now call claim preclusion (a valid final adjudication of a claim precludes a second action on that claim or any part of it), see Restatement (Second) of Judgments §§ 17-19 (1982); and (2) issue preclusion, long called “collateral estoppel” (an issue of fact or law, actually litigated and resolved by a valid final judgment, binds the parties in a subsequent action, whether on the same or a different claim), see id., §27. On use of the plain English terms claim and issue preclusion in lieu of res judicata and collateral estoppel, see Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Ed., 465 U. S. 75, 77, n. 1 (1984).
See also Paulsen & Sovem, “Public Policy” in the Conflict of Laws, 56 Colum. L. Rev. 969, 980-981 (1956) (noting traditional but dubious use of the term “public policy” to obscure “an assertion of the forum’s right to have its [own] law applied to the [controversy] because of the forum’s relationship to it”).
See supra, at 233, n, 5; 18 C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4467, p. 635 (1981) (Although “[a] second state need not directly enforce an injunction entered by another state . . . [it] may often be required to honor the issue preclusion effects of the first judgment.”).
Congress has provided for the interdistrict registration of federal-court judgments for the recovery of money or properly. 28 U. S. C. § 1963 (upon registration, the judgment “shall have the same effect as a judgment of the district court of the district where registered and may be enforced in like manner”). A similar interstate registration procedure is effective in most States, as a result of widespread adoption of the Revised Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, 13 U. L. A. 149 (1986). See id., at 13 (Supp. 1997) (Table) (listing adoptions in 44 States and the District of Columbia).
This Court has held it impermissible for a state court to enjoin a party from proceeding in a federal court, see Donovan v. Dallas, 377 U. S. 408 (1964), but has not yet ruled on the credit due to a state-court injunction barring a party from maintaining litigation in another State, see Ginsburg, Judgments in Search of Full Faith and Credit: The Last-in-Time Rule for Conflicting Judgments, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 798, 823 (1969); see also Reese, Full Faith and Credit to Foreign Equity Decrees, 42 Iowa L. Rev. 183, 198 (1957) (urging that, although this Court “has not yet had occasion to determine [the issue],.... full faith and credit does not require dismissal of an action whose prosecution has been enjoined,” for to hold otherwise “would mean in effect that the courts of one state can control what goes on in the courts of another”). State courts that have dealt with the question have, in the main, regarded antisuit injunctions as outside the full faith and credit ambit. See Ginsburg, 82 Harv. L. Rev., at 823, and n. 99; see also id., at 828-829 (“The current state of the law, permitting [an antisuit] injunction to issue but not compelling any deference outside the rendering state, may be the most reasonable compromise between . . . extreme alternatives,” i. e., “[a] general rule of respect for antisuit injunctions running between state courts,” or “a general rule denying the states authority to issue injunctions directed at proceedings in other states”).
GM emphasizes that a key factor warranting the injunction was El-well’s inability to assure that any testimony he might give would steer dear of knowledge he gained from protected confidential communications. See Brief for Respondent 28-29; see also id., at 32 (contending that Elwell’s testimony “is pervasively and uncontrollably leavened with General Motors’ privileged information”). Petitioners assert, and GM does not dispute, however, that at no point during Elwell’s testimony in the Bakers’ wrongful-death action did GM object to any question or answer on the grounds of attorney-client, attorney-work product, or trade secrets privilege. See Brief for Petitioners 9.
In no event, we have observed, can issue predusion be invoked against one who did not participate in the prior adjudication. See Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U. S. 313, 329 (1971); Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U. S. 32, 40 (1940). Thus, Justice Kennedy emphasizes the obvious in noting that the Michigan judgment has no predusive effect on the Bakers, for they were not parties to the Michigan litigation. See post, at 246-248. Such an observation misses the thrust of GM’s argument. GM readily acknowledges “the commonplace rule that a person may not be bound by a judgment in personam in a case to which he was not made a party.” Brief for Respondent 35. But, GM adds, the Michigan decree does not bind the Bakers; it binds Elwell only. Most fordbly, GM insists that the Bakers cannot object to the binding effect GM seeks for the Michigan judgment because the Bakers have no constitutionally protected interest in obtaining the testimony of a particular witness. See id., at 39 (“[T]he only party being ‘bound’ to the injunction is Elwell, and holding him to his legal obligations does not violate anyone’s due process rights.”). Given this argument, it is dear that issue predusion principles, standing alone, cannot resolve the controversy GM presents.
Justice Kennedy inexplicably reads into our decision a sweeping exception to full faith and credit based solely on “the integrity of Missouri’s judicial processes.” Post, at 246. The Michigan judgment is not entitled to full faith and credit, we have endeavored to make plain, because it impermissibly interferes with Missouri’s control of litigation brought by parties who were not before the Michigan court Thus, Justice Kennedy's hypothetical, see post, at 245-246, misses the mark. If the Bakers had been parties to the Michigan proceedings and had actually litigated the privileged character of Elwell’s testimony, the Bakers would of course be precluded from relitigating that issue in Missouri. See Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U. S. 351, 354 (1877) (“[D]etermination of a question directly involved in one action is conclusive as to that question in a second suit between the same parties-”); see also supra, at 233, n. 5.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | K | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice White
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Board of Estimate of the City of New York consists of three members elected city wide, plus the elected presidents of each of the city’s five boroughs. Because the boroughs have widely disparate populations — yet each has equal representation on the board — the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that this structure is inconsistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We affirm.
Appellees, residents and voters of Brooklyn, New York City’s most populous borough, commenced this action against the city in December 1981. They charged that the city’s charter sections that govern the composition of the Board of Estimate are inconsistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as construed and applied in various decisions of this Court dealing with districting and apportionment for the purpose of electing legislative bodies. The District Court dismissed the complaint, 551 F. Supp. 652 (EDNY 1982), on the ground that the board was not subject to the rule established by Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533 (1964), its companion cases, and its progeny, such as Abate v. Mundt, 403 U. S. 182 (1971), because in its view the board is a nonelective, nonlegislative body. The Court of Appeals reversed. 707 F. 2d 686 (CA2 1983). Because all eight officials on the board ultimately are selected by popular vote, the court concluded that the board’s selection process must comply with the so-called “one-person, one-vote” requirement of the reapportionment cases. The court remanded to the District Court to ascertain whether this compliance exists. Bifurcating the proceedings, the District Court determined first, that applying this Court’s methodology in Abate v. Mundt, supra, to the disparate borough populations produced a total deviation of 132.9% from voter equality among these electorates, 592 F. Supp. 1462 (EDNY 1984); and second, that the city’s several explanations for this range neither require nor justify the electoral scheme’s gross deviation from equal representation. 647 F. Supp. 1463 (EDNY 1986). The court thus found it unnecessary to hold that the deviation it identified was per se unconstitutional.
The Court of Appeals affirmed. 831 F. 2d 384 (CA2 1987). Tracing the imperative of each citizen’s equal power to elect representatives from Reynolds v. Sims to Abate v. Mundt and beyond, the court endorsed the District Court’s focus on population per representative. The court held that the presence of the citywide representatives did not warrant departure from the Abate approach and that the District Court’s finding of a 132% deviation was correct. Without deciding whether this gross deviation could ever be justified in light of the flexibility accorded to local governments in ordering their affairs, the Court of Appeals, agreeing with the District Court, held inadequate the city’s justifications for its departure from the equal protection requirement that elective legislative bodies be chosen from districts substantially equal in population, especially since alternative measures could address the city’s valid policy concerns and at the same time lessen the discrimination against voters in the more populous districts. We noted probable jurisdiction in both Nos. 87-1022 and 87-1112, 485 U. S. 986 (1988).
As an initial matter, we reject the city’s suggestion that because the Board of Estimate is a unique body wielding non-legislative powers, board membership elections are not subject to review under the prevailing reapportionment doctrine. The equal protection guarantee of “one-person, one-vote” extends not only to congressional districting plans, see Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U. S. 1 (1964), not only to state legislative districting, see Reynolds v. Sims, supra, but also to local government apportionment. Avery v. Midland County, 390 U. S. 474, 479-481 (1968); Abate v. Mundt, supra, at 185. Both state and local elections are subject to the general rule of- population equality between electoral districts. No distinction between authority exercised by state assemblies, and the general governmental powers delegated by these assemblies to local, elected officials, suffices to insulate the latter from the standard of substantial voter equality. See Avery v. Midland County, supra, at 481. This was confirmed in Hadley v. Junior College Dist. of Metropolitan Kansas City, 397 U. S. 50 (1970):
“[W]henever a state or local government decides to select persons by popular election to perform governmental functions, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that each qualified voter must be given an equal opportunity to participate in that election, and when members of an elected body are chosen from separate districts, each district must be established on a basis that will insure, as far as is practicable, that equal numbers of voters can vote for proportionally equal numbers of officials.” Id., at 56.
These cases are based on the propositions that in this country the people govern themselves through their elected representatives and that “each and every citizen has an inalienable right to full and effective participation in the political processes” of the legislative bodies of the Nation, State, or locality as the case may be. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S., at 565. Since “[m]ost citizens can achieve this participation only as qualified voters through the election of legislators to represent them,” full and effective participation requires “that each citizen have an equally effective voice in the election of members of his . . . legislature.” Ibid. As Daniel Webster once said, “the right to choose a representative is every man’s portion of sovereign power.” Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1, 30 (1849) (statement of counsel). Electoral systems should strive to make each citizen’s portion equal. If districts of widely unequal population elect an equal number of representatives, the voting power of each citizen in the larger constituencies is debased and the citizens in those districts have a smaller share of representation than do those in the smaller districts. Hence the Court has insisted that seats in legislative bodies be apportioned to districts of substantially equal populations. . Achieving “‘fair and effective representation of all citizens is . . . the basic aim of legislative apportionment,’ [Reynolds, supra], at 565-566; and [it is] for that reason that [Reynolds] insisted on substantial equality of populations among districts.” Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U. S. 735, 748 (1978).
That the members of New York City’s Board of Estimate trigger this constitutional safeguard is certain. All eight officials become members as a matter of law upon their various elections. New York City Charter §61 (1986). The mayor, the comptroller, and the president of the city council, who constitute the board’s citywide number, are elected by votes of the entire city electorate. Each of these three cast two votes, except that the mayor has no vote on the acceptance or modification of his budget proposal. Similarly, when residents of the city’s five boroughs — the Bronx, Brooklyn, Manhattan, Queens, and Richmond (Staten Island) — elect their respective borough presidents, the elections decide each borough’s representative on the board. These five members each have single votes on all board matters.
New York law assigns to the board a significant range of functions common to municipal governments. Fiscal responsibilities include calculating sewer and water rates, tax abatements, and property taxes on urban development projects. The board manages all city property; exercises plenary zoning authority; dispenses all franchises and leases on city property; fixes generally the salaries of all officers and persons compensated through city moneys; and grants all city contracts. This array of powers, which the board shares with no other part of the New York City government, are exercised through the aforementioned voting scheme: three citywide officials cast a total of six votes; their five borough counterparts, one vote each.
In addition, and of major significance, the board shares legislative functions with the city council with respect to modifying and approving the city’s capital and expense budgets. The mayor submits a proposed city budget to the board and city council, but does not participate in board decisions to adopt or alter the proposal. Approval or modification of the proposed budget requires agreement between the board and the city council. Board votes on budget matters, therefore, consist of four votes cast by two at-large members; and five, by the borough presidents.
This considerable authority to formulate the city’s budget, which last fiscal year surpassed $25 billion, as well as the board’s land use, franchise, and contracting powers over the city’s 7 million inhabitants, situate the board comfortably within the category of governmental bodies whose “powers are general enough and have sufficient impact throughout the district” to require that elections to the body comply with equal protection strictures. See Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U. S. at 54.
The city also erroneously implies that the board’s composition survives constitutional challenge because the citywide members cast a 6-to-5 majority of board votes and hence are in position to control the outcome of board actions. The at-large members, however, as the courts below observed, often do not vote together; and when they do not, the outcome is determined by the votes of the borough presidents, each having one vote. Two citywide members, with the help of the presidents of the two least populous boroughs, the Bronx and Staten Island, will prevail over a disagreeing coalition of the third citywide member and the presidents of the three boroughs that contain a large majority of the city’s population. Furthermore, because the mayor has no vote on budget issues, the city wide members alone cannot control board budgetary decisions.
The city’s primary argument is that the courts below erred in the methodology by which they determined whether, and to what extent, the method of electing the board members gives the voters in some boroughs more power than the voters in other boroughs. Specifically, the city focuses on the relative power of the voters in the various boroughs to affect board decisions, an approach which involves recognizing the weighted voting of the three citywide members.
As described by the Court of Appeals, 831 F. 2d, at 386, n. 2 (the city’s description is essentially the same, Brief for Municipal Appellants 35-36), the method urged by the city to determine an individual voter’s power to affect the outcome of a board vote first calculates the power of each member of the board to affect a board vote, and then calculates voters’ power to cast the determining vote in the election of that member. This method, termed the Banzhaf Index, applies as follows: 552 possible voting combinations exist in which any one member can affect the outcome of a board vote. Each borough president can cast the determining vote in 48 of these combinations (giving him a “voting power” of 8.7%), while each citywide member can determine the outcome in 104 of 552 combinations (18.8%). A citizen’s voting power through each representative is calculated by dividing the representative’s voting power by the square root of the population represented; a citizen’s total voting power thus aggregates his power through each of his four representatives — borough president, mayor, comptroller, and council president. Deviation from ideal voting power is then calculated by comparing this figure with the figure arrived at when one considers an electoral district of ideal population. Calculated in this manner, the maximum deviation in the voting power to control board outcomes is 30.8% on nonbudget matters, and, because of the mayor’s absence, a higher deviation on budget issues.
The Court of Appeals gave careful attention to and rejected this submission. We agree with the reasons given by the Court of Appeals that the population-based approach of our cases from Reynolds through Abate should not be put aside in this litigation. We note also that we have once before, although in a different context, declined to accept the approach now urged by the city. Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124 (1971). In that case we observed that the Banzhaf methodology “remains a theoretical one” and is unrealistic in not taking into account “any political or other factors which might affect the actual voting power of the residents, which might include party affiliation, race, previous voting characteristics or any other factors which go into the entire political voting situation.” Id., at 145-146.
The personal right to vote is a value in itself, and a citizen is, without more and without mathematically calculating his power to determine the outcome of an election, shortchanged if he may vote for only one representative when citizens in a neighboring district, of equal population, vote for two; or to put it another way, if he may vote for one representative and the voters in another district half the size also elect one representative. Even if a desired outcome is the motivating factor bringing voters to the polls, the Court of Appeals in this case considered the Banzhaf Index an unrealistic approach to determining whether citizens have an equal voice in electing their representatives because the approach tends to ignore partisanship, race, and voting habits or other characteristics having an impact on election outcomes.
The Court of Appeals also thought that the city’s approach was “seriously defective in the way it measures Board members’ power to determine the outcome of a Board vote.” 831 F. 2d, at 390. The difficulty was that this method did not reflect the way the board actually works in practice; rather, the method is a theoretical explanation of each board member’s power to affect the outcome of board actions. It may be that in terms of assuring fair and effective representation, the equal protection approach reflected in the Reynolds vJ Sims line of cases is itself imperfect, but it does assure thaü legislators will be elected by, and represent citizens in, dis-l tricts of substantially equal size. It does not attempt to inquire whether, in terms of how the legislature actually works in practice, the districts have equal power to affect a legislative outcome. This would be a difficult and ever-changing task, and its challenge is hardly met by a mathematical calculation that itself stops short of examining the actual day-today operations of the legislative body. The Court of Appeals in any event thought there was insufficient reason to depart from our prior cases, and we agree.
Having decided to follow the established method of resolving equal protection issues in districting and apportionment cases, the Court of Appeals then inquired whether the presence of at-large members on the board should be factored into the process of determining the deviation between the more and less populous boroughs. The court decided that they need not be taken into account because the at-large members and the borough presidents respond to different constituencies. The three at-large members obviously represent citywide interests; but, in the Court of Appeals’ judgment, the borough presidents represent and are responsive to their boroughs, yet each has one vote despite the dramatic inequalities in the boroughs’ populations. Consideration of the citywide members might be different, the court explained, “[i]f the at-large bloc was not simply a majority, but a majority such that it would always and necessarily control the governing body, and the district representatives play a decidedly subsidiary role . . . .” 831 F. 2d, at 389, n. 5. Like Judge Newman in concurrence, however, the court noted that this was decidedly not true of the board.
The Court of Appeals then focused on the five boroughs as single-member districts, electing five representatives to the board, each with a single vote. Applying the formula that we have utilized without exception since 1971, see Abate v. Mundt, 403 U. S., at 184 and n. 1; Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U. S., at 737; Brown v. Thomson, 462 U. S. 835 (1983), the Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court that the maximum percentage deviation from the ideal population is 132.9%.
We do not agree with the Court of Appeals’ approach. In calculating the deviation among districts, the relevant inquiry is whether “the vote of any citizen is approximately equal in weight to that of any other citizen,” Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S., at 579, the aim being to provide “fair and effective representation for all citizens,” id., at 565-566. Here the voters in each borough vote for the at-large members as well as their borough president, and they are also represented by those members. Hence in determining whether there is substantially equal voting power and representation, the citywide members are a major component in the calculation and should not be ignored.
Because of the approach followed by the District Court and the Court of Appeals, there was no judicial finding concerning the total deviation from the ideal that would be if the at-large members of the board are taken into account. In pleadings filed with the District Court, however, appellees indicated, and the city agreed, that the deviation would then be 78%. See App. 47, 206, 375-376. This deviation was confirmed at oral argument. Tr. of Oral Arg. 14-15, 39-40. And as to budget matters, when only two citywide members participate, the deviation would be somewhat larger. We accept for purposes of this case the figure agreed upon by the parties.
We note that no case of ours has indicated that a deviation of some 78% could ever be justified. See Brown v. Thomson, supra, at 846-847; Connor v. Finch, 431 U. S. 407, 410-420 (1977); Chapman v. Meier, 420 U. S. 1, 21-26 (1975); Mahan v. Howell, 410 U. S. 315, 329 (1973). At the very least, the local government seeking to support such a difference between electoral districts would bear a very difficult burden, and we are not prepared to differ with the holding of the courts below that this burden has not been carried. The city presents in this Court nothing that was not considered below, arguing chiefly that the board, as presently structured, is essential to the successful government of a regional entity, the City of New York. The board, it is said, accommodates natural and political boundaries as well as local interests. Furthermore, because the board has been effective it should not be disturbed. All of this, the city urges, is supported by the city’s history. The courts below, of course, are in a much better position than we to assess the weight of these arguments, and they concluded that the proffered governmental interests were either invalid or were not sufficient to justify a deviation of 132%, in part because the valid interests of the city could be served by alternative ways of constituting the board that would minimize the discrimination in voting power among the five boroughs. Their analysis is equally applicable to a 78% deviation, and we conclude that the city’s proffered governmental interests do not suffice to justify such a substantial departure from the one-person, one-vote ideal.
Accordingly the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
Appellants in No. 87-1022 are New York City, the city’s Board of Estimate, the board’s eight members, and intervenor-defendant Robert Stra-niere, a New York State Assembly member. Frank Ponterio, a resident of Staten Island, and an intervening defendant below, is the appellant in No. 87-1112.
Section 61 of the New York City Charter (1986) reads: “Membership. The mayor, the comptroller, the president of the council, and the presidents of the boroughs shall constitute the board of estimate.” Section 62 reads: “Voting in the Board, a. As members of the board of estimate, the mayor, the comptroller and the president of the council shall each be entitled to cast two votes, and the president of each borough shall be entitled to east one vote. b. Except as otherwise provided in this charter or by law, the board shall act by resolution adopted by a majority of the whole number of votes authorized to be cast by all the members of the board. . . . d. A quorum of the board shall consist of a sufficient number of members thereof to cast six votes, including at least two of the members authorized to east two votes each.” Section 120(d) provides that the mayor may not vote as a board member when the adoption or modification of his proposed budget is at issue.
The municipal appellants and intervenor-appellant Straniere served and filed notices of appeal on October 15, 1987, and November 6, 1987, respectively. Intervenor-appellant Ponterio served and filed his notice of appeal on December 16, 1987.
The District Court correctly observes that the board’s powers are set forth in the city charter, state legislation, and the New York City Administrative Code. Plaintiffs-appellees submitted to the District Court the following list of board powers:
“A. The Board of Estimate exclusively
“i. determines the use, development and improvement of property owned by the City;
“ii. approves standards, scopes and final designs of capitol [sic] projects for the City;
“iii. negotiates and enters into all contracts on behalf of the City;
“iv. negotiates and approves all franchises that are granted by the City;
“v. grants leases of City property and enters into leases of property for City use;
“vi. sets the rates for purchases of water from the City;
“vii. sets the charges for sewer services provided by the City;
“viii. approves or modifies all zoning decisions for the City; and
“ix. sets tax abatements.
“B. The Board of Estimate acting in conjunction with the New York City Council
“i. recommends and approves the expense budget of the City without the participation of the Mayor;
“ii. recommends and approves the capital budget of the City without the participation of the Mayor;
“iii. periodically modifies the budgets of the City;
“iv. confers with the City Council when agreement on the budget between the two bodies is not reached;
“v. overrides mayoral vetoes of budget items without the participation of the Mayor; and
“vi. holds hearings on budgetary matters.
“C. The Board of Estimate also
“i. administers the Bureau of Franchises;
“ii. administers the Bureau of the Secretary;
“iii. holds public hearings on any matter of City policy within its responsibilities whenever called upon to do so by the Mayor or in its discretion for the public interest;
“iv. holds hearings on tax abatements that are within the discretion of City administrative agencies; and
“v. makes recommendations to the Mayor or City Council in regard to any matter of City policy. ” Statement of Facts Pursuant to Local Rule 9(g) in No. 8-CV-3920 (EDNY), App. 44-46.
See also W. H. K. Communications Associations, Inc., The Structure, Powers, and Functions of New York City’s Board of Estimate (1973), App. 54 (Kramarsky Study).
Similarly, we reject appellant Ponterio’s submission, which disagrees with both the Court of Appeals and the city. Ponterio puts aside a citizens’ theoretical ability to cast a tie-breaking vote for their representative and focuses only on each borough representative’s tie-breaking power on the board. Brief for Appellant Ponterio in No. 87-1112, pp. 17-23. The formula suffers from the criticisms applicable to the Banzhaf Index generally. Ponterio’s argument in some ways is also inconsistent with our insistence that the equal protection analysis in this context focuses on representation of people,, not political or economic interests. See, e. g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 561, 562 (1964); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330, 336 (1972).
The Court of Appeals writes: “Though the appellant Board insists on referring to ‘an at-large majority voting bloc,’ in fact there is no such ‘bloc.’ Rather, this supposed ‘bloc’ consists of three persons having two votes each who are free to, and do, vote on different sides of various issues. Only if all three vote together are they bound to carry the day. Furthermore, on certain budget issues, on which the mayor does not vote, the at-large members cannot win a vote without the support of a borough president. It follows that there is no majority-at-large voting bloc bound to control the Board and that this case is far removed from the hypotheticals offered by the Board and Amicus Banzhaf.” 831 F. 2d, at 389, n. 5 (citation omitted).
That percentage is the sum of the percentage by which Brooklyn, the city’s most populous district (population 2,230,936), exceeds the ideal district population (1,414,206), and the percentage by which Staten Island, the least populous (352,151), falls below this ideal. Queens’ population was stipulated to be 1,891,325; Manhattan’s, 1,427,533; and the Bronx’s, I,169,115. The parties stipulated, therefore, that the city’s total population is 7,071,030. See App. to Juris. Statement in No. 87-1112, pp. 9-10, II.
Appellees point out that in Avery v. Midland County, 390 U. S. 474 (1968), we struck down a county apportionment scheme consisting of four district representatives and one at-large member without considering the effect of the at-large representative. In that case, however, we were not faced with the task of determining the disparity in voting power among districts of different population; the issue before the Court was whether our decision in Reynolds v. Sims, requiring that state legislatures be apportioned on the basis of population, applied as well to local government legislative bodies. 390 U. S., at 478-479. Nothing in Avery even remotely suggests that the impact of at-large representatives is to be ignored in determining whether an apportionment scheme violates the Equal Protection Clause.
At oral argument in this Court, the city conceded this point: “QUESTION: ... If we use the Abate method and took the three at-large officers and factored them into the analysis, what would the population deviation be? Or can we not determine that based on this record? Mr. ZIMROTH [counsel for the city]: It depends on how you factor them in. There’s one way of factoring them in which would divide the number of city-wide votes proportionately among all of the counties [sic], ... If you use that method, you come up with a number of 76 [sic] percent. . . . [T]hat’s the answer to your question. That’s the result you get if you use that methodology.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 14-15. Appellees’ counsel also stated that the deviation “came to 78 percent when you allocated that way.” Id., at 39-40. Although Ponterio rejected the 78% figure in the District Court, he did so only in reliance on his modified Banzhaf test. For reasons already stated, that reliance is misplaced.
We note also that we are not persuaded by arguments that explain the debasement of citizens’ constitutional right to equal franchise based on exigencies of history or convenience. See Reynolds, 377 U. S., at 579-580 (“Citizens, not history or economic interests, cast votes”); see also Maryland Committee for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U. S. 656, 675 (1964); Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Colorado General Assembly, 377 U. S. 713, 738 (1964).
We are not presented with the question of the constitutionality of the alternative board structures suggested by the District Court and the Court of Appeals.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | B | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
The parties to this case have informed us that the State of Texas has enacted the Political Funds Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1975, which will become effective on September 1, 1975. Section 11 of that Act substantially amends Art. 14.10 (b) (Supp. 1974-1975) of the Texas Election Code, the constitutionality of which is at issue in this appeal. Although the parties take the position that these amendments do not affect this case, we prefer to remand the case to the District Court for reconsideration in light of the recent amendments, rather “than render an unnecessary judgment on the validity of the constitutional views expressed by the District Court.” White v. Regester, ante, p. 935.
The judgment of the District Court is vacated. The case is remanded to that court for reconsideration in light of the new legislation and for dismissal if the case is or becomes moot.
So ordered.
Mr. Justice Douglas took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Tex. Const., Art. 3, § 39.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | I | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Chief Justice Vinson
announced the order of the Court and an opinion in which Mr. Justice Reed, Mr. Justice Burton and Mr. Justice Minton join.
Abraham J. Isserman, respondent herein, was attorney for several of the eleven defendants whose convictions were affirmed by this Court in Dennis v. United States, 341 U. S. 494 (1951). At the conclusion of the trial proceedings, the trial judge sentenced all six defense attorneys, including respondent, to jail for contempt. There was one charge of conspiracy by the defense attorneys to obstruct the trial and thirty-nine charges of specific acts of contempt, six of which related to the respondent. The Court of Appeals reversed as to the conspiracy charge but affirmed as to thirty-seven of the specific acts of contempt, including all six naming the respondent, United States v. Sacher, 182 F. 2d 416 (1950). Upon a limited grant of certiorari, this Court also affirmed, Sacher v. United States, 343 U. S. 1 (1952).
Respondent had been a member of the bar of New Jersey. Following the affirmance of the contempt sentence here, the Supreme Court of the State issued an order disbarring respondent.
We then issued a rule for the respondent to show good cause why he should not be disbarred here. This was done in accordance with Rule 2, par. 5, of this Court:
“Where it is shown to the court that any member of its bar has been disbarred from practice in any State, Territory, District, or Insular Possession, or has been guilty of conduct unbecoming a member of the bar of this court, he will be forthwith suspended from practice before this court, and unless, upon notice mailed to him at the address shown in the clerk’s records and to the clerk of the highest court of the State, Territory, District or Insular Possession, to which he belongs, he shows good cause to the contrary within forty days he will be disbarred.”
This Court (as well as the federal courts in general) does not conduct independent examinations for admission to its bar. To do so would be to duplicate needlessly the machinery established by the states whose function it has traditionally been to determine who shall stand to the bar. Rather our rules provide for eligibility in our bar of those admitted to practice for the past three years before the highest court of any state. The obvious premise of the rule is the confidence which this Court has in the bars maintained by the states of the Union. Respondent himself came to our bar upon presenting a certificate of his admission to the bar of the highest court of New Jersey, which now no longer finds him qualified for its bar.
Disbarment by a state does not automatically disbar members of our bar, but this Court will, in the absence of some grave reason to the contrary, follow the finding of the state that the character requisite for membership in the bar is lacking, Selling v. Radford, 243 U. S. 46 (1917). But we do not follow the rule used in some state courts that disbarment in a sister state is followed as a matter of comity.
The contemptuous acts have been catalogued elsewhere and need not be detailed here again. In the main, they consisted of repetitious and insolent objections and arguments after the trial judge made rulings and then ordered a halt to further argument on the points involved. As we observed in affirming the contempt sentences, such “. . . conduct has been condemned by every judge who has examined this record under a duty to review the facts.” Now we have additional judicial voices condemning such conduct — the unanimous opinion of the New Jersey Supreme Court, speaking through Chief Justice Vanderbilt.
Our rule puts the burden upon respondent to show good cause why he should not be disbarred. Let us examine the reasons advanced as meeting that burden. It is said that respondent has already been punished enough for his contempt and that to disbar him is excessive, vindictive punishment. Such an attitude misconceives the purpose of disbarment. There is no vested right in an individual to practice law. Rather there is a right in the Court to protect itself, and hence society, as an instrument of justice. That to the individual disbarred there is a loss of status is incidental to the purpose of the Court and cannot deter the Court from its duty to strike from its rolls one who has engaged in conduct inconsistent with the standard expected of officers of the Court. In so doing, we do not lay down a rule of disbarment for mere contempt; rather we have considered the basic nature of the actions which were contemptuous and their relationship to the functioning of the judiciary.
The absence of a conspiracy is given as a ground against disbarment. Nothing in our rules refers to conspiracy as a factor. To make it the turning point in this disbarment proceeding would be tantamount to our stating that recurring disobedience is not cause for disbarment unless accompanied by a conspiracy.
It is urged upon us that a period of suspension at most is appropriate, for the District Court for the Southern District of New York only saw fit to suspend respondent for two years. But that was before respondent was disbarred in New Jersey. It is premature to say what action may be taken by that court under its rules as a result of respondent’s disbarment in New Jersey.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey, in its nine-page opinion, devoted one sentence to noting that respondent had been convicted of statutory rape in 1925 and thereupon suspended from practice for a short period. That one sentence is followed by this language: “The controlling consideration in reaching a determination as to the measure of discipline, however, is respondent’s scandalous and inexcusable behaviour in seeking to bring the administration of justice into disrepute in a trial that lasted nine months.” It may be noted, however, that the files in the office of our Clerk show that the respondent did not disclose this conviction and suspension from practice in his application for admission to our bar, so that we did not sanction that conduct in granting him admission.
The order of the Court placed the burden upon respondent to show good cause why he should not be disbarred. In our judgment, he has failed to meet this test. An order disbarring him from practice in this Court should issue.
It is so ordered.
Mr. Justice Clark took no part in the consideration or decision in this proceeding.
Mr. Justice Jackson,
whom Mr. Justice Black, Mr. Justice Frankfurter and Mr. Justice Douglas join, delivered the following opinion.
This proceeding to disbar Abraham J. Isserman results from his being adjudged guilty of contemptuous conduct in the trial of United States v. Dennis, 183 F. 2d 201, 341 U. S. 494. The trial judge found that his contemptuous acts were pursuant to a conspiracy among counsel to obstruct justice and sentenced him, with others, to jail. But the Court of Appeals, while affirming the counts charging specific acts of contempt, reversed the conspiracy count. United States v. Sacher, 182 F. 2d 416. This Court limited its review to questions of law and affirmed. Sacher v. United States, 343 U. S. 1.
Disciplinary proceedings were instituted before the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, in which Isserman was given a full hearing, and again the conspiracy charge was not sustained. A period of suspension from practice at the bar of the court against which the contempt was committed was considered adequate to the offense. However, the courts of New Jersey have disbarred Isserman and under our rule he must be disbarred here unless he shows good cause to the contrary.
While we have expressed different views as to the merits of the contempt charges, and each adheres to his former expressions, we are agreed that there is good cause for withholding this Court’s decree of disbarment.
Primarily because of these contempts, the Supreme Court of New Jersey disbarred Isserman. It also considered his conviction in that State of statutory rape in 1925. At the time of conviction, however, the New Jersey courts found such extenuating circumstances that only a small fine and a temporary suspension from practice were deemed to make the punishment fit the crime. Five years after this conviction, this Court, asking no question which would have called for disclosure of the conviction, admitted Isserman to its bar, it appearing that he was then in good standing before the courts of New Jersey. Under these circumstances, we do not think we can now attach any weight to this dereliction.
We think this Court should not accept for itself a doctrine that conviction of contempt per se is ground for a disbarment. It formerly held, in an opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, that a lawyer should be admitted to this bar even though for contempt he had been disbarred by a federal district court action — . . one which the court do not mean to say was not done for sufficient cause, or that it is not one of a serious character; but this court does not consider itself authorised to punish here for contempts which may have been committed in that court.” Ex parte Tillinghast, 4 Pet. 108, 109. The remedy for courtroom contempt should be prompt and direct punishment proportioned to the offense. Isser-man has been severely punished. His penalty has included what is rare in the punishment of lawyers’ contempts — a substantial jail sentence.
We do not recall any previous instance, though not venturing to assert that there is none, where a lawyer has been disbarred by any court of the United States or of a state merely because he had been convicted of a contempt. But we do know of occasions when members of the bar have been found guilty of serious contempt without their standing at the bar being brought into question. It will sufficiently illustrate the point to refer to the tactics of counsel for the defense of William M. Tweed. Those eminent lawyers deliberately and in concert made an attack upon the qualifications of Presiding Judge Noah Davis, charging him with bias and prejudice. At the end of that trial, after he had pronounced sentence on Tweed, Judge Davis declared several defense counsel guilty of contempt. Not one of these lawyers, apparently, was subjected to disciplinary proceedings in consequence of that judgment. Among them were Elihu Root, later to become one of the most respected of American lawyer-statesmen, and Willard Bartlett, destined to become Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals. These two were excused from any penalty, beyond a lecture on their ethics, on the ground of youth and domination by their seniors — a rebuke perhaps more humiliating than a sentence. One of the seniors who participated in the contempt, and certainly one of its chief architects, was David Dudley Field. He later was elected president of the American Bar Association.
There has been hue and cry both for and against these lawyers for Communist defendants. There are those who think the respectability of the bar requires their expulsion. There are those who lament that any punishment of their conduct will so frighten the legal profession that it will not dare to discharge its duty to clients. We make common cause with neither. In defending the accused Communists, these .men were performing a legitimate function of the legal profession, which is under a duty to leave no man without a defender when he is charged with crime. In performing that duty, it has been adjudged that they went beyond bounds that are tolerable even in our adversary system. For this, Isserman has paid a heavy penalty.
If the purpose of disciplinary proceedings be correction of the delinquent, the courts defeat the purpose by ruining him whom they would reform. If the purpose be to deter others, disbarment is belated and superfluous, for what lawyer would not find deterrent enough in the jail sentence, the two-year suspension from the bar of the United States District Court, and the disapproval of his profession? If the disbarment rests, not on these specific proven offenses, but on atmospheric considerations of general undesirability and Communistic leanings or affiliation, these have not been charged and he has had no chance to meet them. We cannot take judicial notice of them. On the occasions when Isserman has been before this Court, or before an individual Justice, his conduct has been unexceptionable and his professional ability* considerable.
We would have a different case here if the record stood that Isserman, with others, entered into a deliberate conspiracy or plans to obstruct justice. But that charge has been found by the Court of Appeals to lack support in the evidence, and again in the disciplinary proceeding in District Court it was not found to be proven. What remains is a finding that he was guilty of several unplanned contumacious outbursts during a long and bitter trial.
Perhaps consciousness of our own short patience makes us unduly considerate of the failing tempers of others of our contentious craft. But to permanently and wholly deprive one of his profession at Isserman’s time of life, and after he has paid so dearly for his fault, impresses us as a severity which will serve no useful purpose for the bar, the court or the delinquent.
In re Isserman, 9 N. J. 269, 87 A. 2d 903 (1952).
Journal of the Supreme Court of the United States, June 2, 1952, p. 222.
Rule 2, par. 1:
“It shall be requisite to the admission of attorneys or counsellors to practice in this court, that they shall have been such for three years past in the highest court of a State, Territory, District, or Insular Possession, and that their private and professional characters shall appear to be good.”
In re Van Bever, 55 Ariz. 368, 101 P. 2d 790 (1940); In re Leverson, 195 Minn. 42, 261 N. W. 480 (1935); Copren v. State Bar, 64 Nev. 364, 183 P. 2d 833 (1947); In re Brown, 60 S. D. 628, 245 N. W. 824 (1932); State Board of Law Examiners v. Brown, 53 Wyo. 42, 77 P. 2d 626 (1938).
The contempt certificate in full is set forth in United States v. Sacher, 182 F. 2d 416, at 430 (1950).
Sacher v. United States, 343 U. S. 1, 13 (1952).
See Ex parte Tillinghast, 4 Pet. 108 (1830).
“The court shall make an order disbarring a member of the bar of this court (1) who has been convicted in any federal, state, or territorial court of an offense which is a felony in the jurisdiction of such conviction; or (2) who has been disbarred by any court of record, federal, state or territorial.” Rule 5 (b), District Court for the Southern District of New York.
In re Isserman, 9 N. J. 269, 279, 87 A. 2d 903, 907 (1952).
Ibid.
Rule 2, par. 2, and the application form for admission did not require information as to prior suspensions at the time Isserman was admitted. Such information is now required by Rule 2, par. 2.
Rule 2, par. 5, reads:
“Where it is shown to the court that any member of its bar has been disbarred from practice in any State, Territory, District, or Insular Possession, or has been guilty of conduct unbecoming a member of the bar of this court, he will be forthwith suspended from practice before this court, and unless, upon notice mailed to him at the address shown in the clerk’s records and to the clerk of the highest court of the State, Territory, District or Insular Possession, to which he belongs, he shows good cause to the contrary within forty days he will be disbarred.”
In re Isserman, 6 N. J. Misc. 146.
In the trial of John Peter Zenger, in 1735, the Supreme Court of Judicature for the Province of New-York disbarred two of his defense counsel for “having presumed (notwithstanding they were forewarned by the Court of their DISPLEASURE if they should do it) to sign” and file a document questioning legality of the Judges’ Commissions, which was adjudged to be a contempt for which they were peremptorily excluded from further practice and their names struck from the roll of attorneys. Rutherford, John Peter Zenger, 50; 17 How. St. Tr. 683, 686.
Jessup, Ehhu Root, 80-93.
Rogers, American Bar Leaders, 50.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | F | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Blackmun
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This Texas federal appeal and its Georgia companion, Doe v. Bolton, post, p. 179, present constitutional challenges to state criminal abortion legislation. The Texas statutes under attack here are typical of those that have been in effect in many States for approximately a century. The Georgia statutes, in contrast, have a modern cast and are a legislative product that, to an extent at least, obviously reflects the influences of recent attitudinal change, of advancing medical knowledge and techniques, and of new thinking about an old issue.
We forthwith acknowledge our awareness of the sensitive and emotional nature of the abortion controversy, of the vigorous opposing views, even among physicians, and of the deep and seemingly absolute convictions that the subject inspires. One’s philosophy, one’s experiences, one’s exposure to the raw edges of human existence, one’s religious training, one’s attitudes toward life and family and their values, and the moral standards one establishes and seeks to observe, are all likely to influence and to color one’s thinking and conclusions about abortion.
In addition, population growth, pollution, poverty, and racial overtones tend to complicate and not to simplify the problem.
Our task, of course, is to resolve the issue by constitutional measurement, free of emotion and of predilection. We seek earnestly to do this, and, because we do, we have inquired into, and in this opinion place some emphasis upon, medical and medical-legal history and what that history reveals about man’s attitudes toward the abortion procedure over the centuries. We bear in mind, too, Mr. Justice Holmes’ admonition in his now-vindicated dissent in Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45, 76 (1905):
“[The Constitution] is made for people of fundamentally differing views, and the accident of our finding certain opinions natural and familiar or novel and even shocking ought not to conclude our judgment upon the question whether statutes embodying them conflict with the Constitution of the United States.”
I
The Texas statutes that concern us here are Arts. 1191–1194 and 1196 of the State’s Penal Code. These make it a crime to “procure an abortion,” as therein defined, or to attempt one, except with respect to “an abortion procured or attempted by medical advice for the purpose of saving the life of the mother.” Similar statutes are in existence in a majority of the States.
Texas first enacted a criminal abortion statute in 1854. Texas Laws 1854, c. 49, § 1, set forth in 3 H. Gammel, Laws of Texas 1502 (1898). This was soon modified into language that has remained substantially unchanged to the present time. See Texas Penal Code of 1857, c. 7, Arts. 531-536; G. Paschal, Laws of Texas, Arts. 2192-2197 (1866); Texas Rev. Stat., c. 8, Arts. 536-541 (1879); Texas Rev. Crim. Stat., Arts. 1071-1076 (1911). The final article in each of these compilations provided the same exception, as does the present Article 1196, for an abortion by “medical advice for the purpose of saving the life of the mother.”
II
Jane Roe, a single woman who was residing m Dallas County, Texas, instituted this federal action in March 1970 against the District Attorney of the county. She sought a declaratory judgment that the Texas criminal abortion statutes were unconstitutional on their face, and an injunction restraining the defendant from enforcing the statutes.
Roe alleged that she was unmarried and pregnant; that she wished to terminate her pregnancy by an abortion “performed by a competent, licensed physician, under safe, clinical conditions”; that she was unable to get a “legal” abortion in Texas because her life did not appear to be threatened by the continuation of her pregnancy; and that she could not afford to travel to another jurisdiction in order to secure a legal abortion under safe conditions. She claimed that the Texas statutes were unconstitutionally vague and that they abridged her right of personal privacy, protected by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments. By an amendment to her complaint Roe purported to sue “on behalf of herself and all other women” similarly situated.
James Hubert Hallford, a licensed physician, sought and was granted leave to intervene in Roe’s action. In his complaint he alleged that he had been arrested previously for violations of the Texas abortion statutes and that two such prosecutions were pending against him. He described conditions of patients who came to him seeking abortions, and he claimed that for many cases he, as a physician, was unable to determine whether they fell within or outside the exception recognized by Article 1196. He alleged that, as a consequence, the statutes were vague and uncertain, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that they violated his own and his patients’ rights to privacy in the doctor-patient relationship and his own right to practice medicine, rights he claimed were guaranteed by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
John and Mary Doe, a married couple, filed a companion complaint to that of Roe. They also named the District Attorney as defendant, claimed like constitutional deprivations, and sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The Does alleged that they were a childless couple; that Mrs. Doe was suffering from a “neural-chemical” disorder; that her physician had “advised her to avoid pregnancy until such time as her condition has materially improved” (although a pregnancy at the present time would not present “a serious risk” to her life); that, pursuant to medical advice, she had discontinued use of birth control pills; and that if she should become pregnant, she would want to terminate the pregnancy by an abortion performed by a competent, licensed physician under safe, clinical conditions. By an amendment to their complaint, the Does purported to sue “on behalf of themselves and all couples similarly situated.”
The two actions were consolidated and heard together by a duly convened three-judge district court. The suits thus presented the situations of the pregnant single woman, the childless couple, with the wife not pregnant, and the licensed practicing physician, all joining in the attack on the Texas criminal abortion statutes. Upon the filing of affidavits, motions were made for dismissal and for summary judgment. The court held that Roe and members of her class, and Dr. Hallford, had standing to sue and presented justiciable controversies, but that the Does had failed to allege facts sufficient to state a present controversy and did not have standing. It concluded that, with respect to the requests for a declaratory judgment, abstention was not warranted. On the merits, the District Court held that the “fundamental right of single women and married persons to choose whether to have children is protected by the Ninth Amendment, through the Fourteenth Amendment,” and that the Texas criminal abortion statutes were void on their face because they were both unconstitutionally vague and constituted an overbroad infringement of the plaintiffs’ Ninth Amendment rights. The court then held that abstention was warranted with respect to the requests for an injunction. It therefore dismissed the Does’ complaint, declared the abortion statutes void, and dismissed the application for injunctive relief. 314 F. Supp. 1217, 1225 (ND Tex. 1970).
The plaintiffs Roe and Doe and the intervenor Hallford, pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1253, have appealed to this Court from that part of the District Court’s judgment denying the injunction. The defendant District Attorney has purported to cross-appeal, pursuant to the same statute, from the court’s grant of declaratory relief to Roe and Hallford. Both sides also have taken protective appeals to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. That court ordered the appeals held in abeyance pending decision here. We postponed decision on jurisdiction to the hearing on the merits. 402 U. S. 941 (1971).
III
It might have been preferable if the defendant, pursuant to our Rule 20, had presented to us a petition for certiorari before judgment in the Court of Appeals with respect to the granting of the plaintiffs’ prayer for declaratory relief. Our decisions in Mitchell v. Donovan, 398 U. S. 427 (1970), and Gunn v. University Committee, 399 U. S. 383 (1970), are to the effect that § 1253 does not authorize an appeal to this Court from the grant or denial of declaratory relief alone. We conclude, nevertheless, that those decisions do not foreclose our review of both the injunctive and the declaratory aspects of a case of this kind when it is properly here, as this one is, on appeal under § 1253 from specific denial of injunctive relief, and the arguments as to both aspects are necessarily identical. See Carter v. Jury Comm’n, 396 U. S. 320 (1970); Florida Lime Growers v. Jacobsen, 362 U. S. 73, 80-81 (1960). It would be destructive of time and energy for all concerned were we to rule otherwise. Cf. Doe v. Bolton, post, p. 179.
IV
We are next confronted with issues of justiciability, standing, and abstention. Have Roe and the Does established that “personal stake in the outcome of the controversy,” Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 204 (1962), that insures that “the dispute sought to be adjudicated will be presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of judicial resolution,” Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83, 101 (1968), and Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S. 727, 732 (1972)? And what effect did the pendency of criminal abortion charges against Dr. Hallford in state court have upon the propriety of the federal court’s granting relief to him as a plaintiff-intervenor?
A. Jane Roe. Despite the use of the pseudonym, no suggestion is made that Roe is a fictitious person. For purposes of her case, we accept as true, and as established, her existence; her pregnant state, as of the inception of her suit in March 1970 and as late as May 21 of that year when she filed an alias affidavit with the District Court; and her inability to obtain a legal abortion in Texas.
Viewing Roe’s case as of the time of its filing and thereafter until as late as May, there can be little dispute that it then presented a case or controversy and that, wholly apart from the class aspects, she, as a pregnant single woman thwarted by the Texas criminal abortion laws, had standing to challenge those statutes. Abele v. Markle, 452 F. 2d 1121, 1125 (CA2 1971); Crossen v. Breckenridge, 446 F. 2d 833, 838-839 (CA6 1971); Poe v. Menghini, 339 F. Supp. 986, 990-991 (Kan. 1972). See Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33 (1915). Indeed, we do not read the appellee’s brief as really asserting anything to the contrary. The “logical nexus between the status asserted and the claim sought to be adjudicated,” Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S., at 102, and the necessary degree of contentiousness, Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U. S. 103 (1969), are both present.
The appellee notes, however, that the record does not disclose that Roe was pregnant at the time of the District Court hearing on May 22, 1970, or on the following June 17 when the court’s opinion and judgment were filed. And he suggests that Roe’s case must now be moot because she and all other members of her class are no longer subject to any 1970 pregnancy.
The usual rule in federal cases is that an actual controversy must exist at stages of appellate or certiorari review, and not simply at the date the action is initiated. United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U. S. 36 (1950) ; Golden v. Zwickler, supra; SEC v. Medical Committee for Human Rights, 404 U. S. 403 (1972).
But when, as here, pregnancy is a significant fact in the litigation, the normal 266-day human gestation period is so short that the pregnancy will come to term before the usual appellate process is complete. If that termination makes a case moot, pregnancy litigation seldom will survive much beyond the trial stage, and appellate review will be effectively denied. Our law should not be that rigid. Pregnancy often comes more than once to the same woman, and in the general population, if man is to survive, it will always be with us. Pregnancy provides a classic justification for a conclusion of nonmootness. It truly could be “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U. S. 498, 515 (1911). See Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U. S. 814, 816 (1969); Carroll v. Princess Anne, 393 U. S. 175, 178-179 (1968); United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U. S. 629, 632-633 (1953).
We, therefore, agree with the District Court that Jane Roe had standing to undertake this litigation, that she presented a justiciable controversy, and that the termination of her 1970 pregnancy has not rendered her case moot.
B. Dr. Hallford. The doctor’s position is different. He entered Roe’s litigation as a plaintiff-intervenor, alleging in his complaint that he:
“[I]n the past has been arrested for violating the Texas Abortion Laws and at the present time stands charged by indictment with violating said laws in the Criminal District Court of Dallas County, Texas to-wit: (1) The State of Texas vs. James H. Hallford, No. C-69-5307-IH, and (2) The State of Texas vs. James H. Hallford, No. C-69-2524-H. In both cases the defendant is charged with abortion....”
In his application for leave to intervene, the doctor made like representations as to the abortion charges pending in the state court. These representations were also repeated in the affidavit he executed and filed in support of his motion for summary judgment.
Dr. Hallford is, therefore, in the position of seeking, in a federal court, declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to the same statutes under which he stands charged in criminal prosecutions simultaneously pending in state court. Although he stated that he has been arrested in the past for violating the State’s abortion laws, he makes no allegation of any substantial and immediate threat to any federally protected right that cannot be asserted in his defense against the state prosecutions. Neither is there any allegation of harassment or bad-faith prosecution. In order to escape the rule articulated in the cases cited in the next paragraph of this opinion that, absent harassment and bad faith, a defendant in a pending state criminal case cannot affirmatively challenge in federal court the statutes under which the State is prosecuting him, Dr. Hallford seeks to distinguish his status as a present state defendant from his status as a “potential future defendant” and to assert only the latter for standing purposes here.
We see no merit in that distinction. Our decision in Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U. S. 66 (1971), compels the conclusion that the District Court erred when it granted declaratory relief to Dr. Hallford instead of refraining from so doing. The court, of course, was correct in refusing to grant injunctive relief to the doctor. The reasons supportive of that action, however, are those expressed in Samuels v. Mackell, supra, and in Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971); Boyle v. Landry, 401 U. S. 77 (1971); Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U. S. 82 (1971); and Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 U. S. 216 (1971). See also Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U. S. 479 (1965). We note, in passing, that Younger and its companion cases were decided after the three-judge District Court decision in this case.
Dr. Hallford’s complaint in intervention, therefore, is to be dismissed. He is remitted to his defenses in the state criminal proceedings against him. We reverse the judgment of the District Court insofar as it granted Dr. Hallford relief and failed to dismiss his complaint in intervention.
C. The Does. In view of our ruling as to Roe’s standing in her case, the issue of the Does’ standing in their case has little significance. The claims they assert are essentially the same as those of Roe, and they attack the same statutes. Nevertheless, we briefly note the Does’ posture.
Their pleadings present them as a childless married couple, the woman not being pregnant, who have no desire to have children at this time because of their having received medical advice that Mrs. Doe should avoid pregnancy, and for “other highly personal reasons.” But they “fear... they may face the prospect of becoming parents.” And if pregnancy ensues, they “would want to terminate” it by an abortion. They assert an inability to obtain an abortion legally in Texas and, consequently, the prospect of obtaining an illegal abortion there or of going outside Texas to some place where the procedure could be obtained legally and competently.
We thus have as plaintiffs a married couple who have, as their asserted immediate and present injury, only an alleged “detrimental effect upon [their] marital happiness” because they are forced to “the choice of refraining from normal sexual relations or of endangering Mary Doe’s health through a possible pregnancy.” Their claim is that sometime in the future Mrs. Doe might become pregnant because of possible failure of contraceptive measures, and at that time in the future she might want an abortion that might then be illegal under the Texas statutes.
This very phrasing of the Does’ position reveals its speculative character. Their alleged injury rests on possible future contraceptive failure, possible future pregnancy, possible future unpreparedness for parenthood, and possible future impairment of health. Any one or more of these several possibilities may not take place and all may not combine. In the Does’ estimation, these possibilities might have some real or imagined impact upon their marital happiness. But we are not prepared to say that the bare allegation of so indirect an injury is sufficient to present an actual case or controversy. Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S., at 41-42; Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U. S., at 109–110; Abele v. Markle, 452 F. 2d, at 1124-1125; Crossen v. Breckenridge, 446 F. 2d, at 839. The Does’ claim falls far short of those resolved otherwise in the cases that the Does urge upon us, namely, Investment Co. Institute v. Camp, 401 U. S. 617 (1971); Data Processing Service v. Camp, 397 U. S. 150 (1970); and Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97 (1968). See also Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33 (1915).
The Does therefore are not appropriate plaintiffs in this litigation. Their complaint was properly dismissed by the District Court, and we affirm that dismissal.
V
The principal thrust of appellant’s attack on the Texas statutes is that they improperly invade a right, said to be possessed by the pregnant woman, to choose to terminate her pregnancy. Appellant would discover this right in the concept of personal “liberty” embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause; or in personal, marital, familial, and sexual privacy said to be protected by the Bill of Rights or its penumbras, see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438 (1972); id., at 460 (White, J., concurring in result); or among those rights reserved to the people by the Ninth Amendment, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S., at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring). Before addressing this claim, we feel it desirable briefly to survey, in several aspects, the history of abortion, for such insight as that history may afford us, and then to examine the state purposes and interests behind the criminal abortion laws.
VI
It perhaps is not generally appreciated that the restrictive criminal abortion laws in effect in a majority of States today are of relatively recent vintage. Those laws, generally proscribing abortion or its attempt at any time during pregnancy except when necessary to preserve the pregnant woman’s life, are not of ancient or even of common-law origin. Instead, they derive from statutory changes effected, for the most part, in the latter half of the 19th century.
1. Ancient attitudes. These are not capable of precise determination. We are told that at the time of the Persian Empire abortifacients were known and that criminal abortions were severely punished. We are also told, however, that abortion was practiced in Greek times as well as in the Roman Era, and that “it was resorted to without scruple.” The Ephesian, Soranos, often described as the greatest of the ancient gynecologists, appears to have been generally opposed to Rome’s prevailing free-abortion practices. He found it necessary to think first of the life of the mother, and he resorted to abortion when, upon this standard, he felt the procedure advisable. Greek and Roman law afforded little protection to the unborn. If abortion was prosecuted in some places, it seems to have been based on a concept of a violation of the father’s right to his offspring. Ancient religion did not bar abortion.
2. The Hippocratic Oath. What then of the famous Oath that has stood so long as the ethical guide of the medical profession and that bears the name of the great Greek (460(?)-377(?) B. C.), who has been described as the Father of Medicine, the “wisest and the greatest practitioner of his art,” and the “most important and most complete medical personality of antiquity,” who dominated the medical schools of his time, and who typified the sum of the medical knowledge of the past? The Oath varies somewhat according to the particular translation, but in any translation the content is clear: “I will give no deadly medicine to anyone if asked, nor suggest any such counsel; and in like manner I will not give to a woman a pessary to produce abortion,” or “I will neither give a deadly drug to anybody if asked for it, nor will I make a suggestion to this effect. Similarly, I will not give to a woman an abortive remedy.”
Although the Oath is not mentioned in any of the principal briefs in this case or in Doe v. Bolton, post, p. 179, it represents the apex of the development of strict ethical concepts in medicine, and its influence endures to this day. Why did not the authority of Hippocrates dissuade abortion practice in his time and that of Rome? The late Dr. Edelstein provides us with a theory: The Oath was not uncontested even in Hippocrates' day; only the Pythagorean school of philosophers frowned upon the related act of suicide. Most Greek thinkers, on the other hand, commended abortion, at least prior to viability. See Plato, Republic, V, 461; Aristotle, Politics, VII, 1335b 25. For the Pythagoreans, however, it was a matter of dogma. For them the embryo was animate from the moment of conception, and abortion meant destruction of a living being. The abortion clause of the Oath, therefore, “echoes Pythagorean doctrines,” and “[i’jn no other stratum of Greek opinion were such views held or proposed in the same spirit of uncompromising austerity.”
Dr. Edelstein then concludes that the Oath originated in a group representing only a small segment of Greek opinion and that it certainly was not accepted by all ancient physicians. He points out that medical writings down to Galen (A. D. 130-200) “give evidence of the violation of almost every one of its injunctions.” But with the end of' antiquity a decided change took place. Resistance against suicide and against abortion became common. The Oath came to be popular. The emerging teachings of Christianity were in agreement with the Pythagorean ethic. The Oath “became the nucleus of all medical ethics” and “was applauded as the embodiment of truth.” Thus, suggests Dr. Edelstein, it is “a Pythagorean manifesto and not the expression of an absolute standard of medical conduct.”
This, it seems to us, is a satisfactory and acceptable explanation of the Hippocratic Oath's apparent rigidity. It enables us to understand, in historical context, a long-accepted and revered statement of medical ethics.
3. The common law. It is undisputed that at common law, abortion performed before “quickening”— the first recognizable movement of the fetus in útero, appearing usually from the 16th to the 18th week of pregnancy — was not an indictable offense. The absence of- a common-law crime for pre-quickening abortion appears to have developed from a confluence of earlier philosophical, theological, and civil and canon law concepts of when life begins. These disciplines variously approached the question in terms of the point at which the embryo or fetus became “formed” or recognizably human, or in terms of when a “person” came into being, that is, infused with a “soul” or “animated.” A loose consensus evolved in early English law that these events occurred at some point between conception and live birth. This was “mediate animation.” Although Christian theology and the canon law came to fix the point of animation at 40 days for a male and 80 days for a female, a view that persisted until the 19th century, there was otherwise little'agreement about the precise time of formation or animation. There was agreement, however, that prior to this point the fetus was to be regarded as part of the mother, and its destruction, therefore, was not homicide. Due to continued uncertainty about the precise time when animation occurred, to the lack of any empirical basis for the 40-80-day view, and perhaps to Aquinas' definition of movement as one of the two first principles of life, Bracton focused upon quickening as the critical point. The significance of quickening was echoed by later common-law scholars and found its way into the received common law in this country.
Whether abortion of a quick fetus was a felony at common law, or even a lesser crime, is still disputed. Bracton, writing early in the 13th century, thought it homicide. But the later and predominant view, following the great common-law scholars, has been that it was, at most, a lesser offense. In a frequently cited passage, Coke took the position that abortion of a woman “quick with childe” is “a great misprision, and no murder.” Blackstone followed, saying that while abortion after quickening had once been considered manslaughter (though not murder), “modern law” took a less severe view. A recent review of the common-law precedents argues, however, that those precedents contradict Coke and that even post-quickening abortion was never established as a common-law crime. This is of some importance because while most American courts ruled, in holding or dictum, that abortion of an unquickened fetus was not criminal under their received common law, others followed Coke in stating that abortion of a quick fetus was a “misprision,” a term they translated to mean “misdemeanor.” That their reliance on Coke on this aspect of the law was uncritical and, apparently in all the reported cases, dictum (due probably to the paucity of common-law prosecutions for post-quickening abortion), makes it now appear doubtful that abortion was ever firmly established as a common-law crime even with respect to the destruction of a quick fetus.
4. The English statutory law. England's first criminal abortion statute, Lord Ellenborough's Act, 43 Geo. 3, c. 58, came in 1803. It made abortion of a quick fetus, § 1, a capital crime, but in § 2 it provided lesser penalties for the felony of abortion before quickening, and thus preserved the “quickening” distinction. This contrast was continued in the general revision of 1828, 9 Geo. 4, c. 31, § 13. It disappeared, however, together with the death penalty, in 1837, 7 Will. 4 & 1 Viet., c. 85, § 6, and did not reappear in the Offenses Against the Person Act of 1861, 24 & 25 Viet., c. 100, § 59, that formed the core of English anti-abortion law until the liberalizing reforms of 1967. In 1929, the Infant Life (Preservation) Act, 19 & 20 Geo. 5, c. 34, came into being. Its emphasis was upon the destruction of “the life of a child capable of being born alive.” It made a willful act performed with the necessary intent a felony. It contained a proviso that one was not to be found guilty of the offense “unless it is proved that the act which caused the death of the child was not done in good faith for the purpose only of preserving the life of the mother.”
A seemingly notable development in the English law was the case of Rex v. Bourne, [1939] 1 K. B. 687. This case apparently answered in the affirmative the question whether an abortion necessary to preserve the life of the pregnant woman was excepted from the criminal penalties of the 1861 Act. In his instructions to the jury, Judge Macnaghten referred to the 1929 Act, and observed that that Act related to “the case where a child is killed by a wilful act at the time when it is being delivered in the ordinary course of nature.” Id:, at 691. He concluded that the 1861 Act’s use of the word “unlawfully,” imported the same meaning expressed by the specific proviso in the 1929 Act, even though there was no mention of preserving the mother’s life in the 1861 Act. He then construed the phrase “preserving the life of the mother” broadly, that is, “in a reasonable sense,” to include a serious and permanent threat to the mother’s health, and instructed the jury to acquit Dr. Bourne if it found he had acted in a good-faith belief that the abortion was necessary for this purpose. Id., at 693-694. The jury did acquit.
Recently, Parliament enacted a new abortion law. This is the Abortion Act of 1967, 15 & 16 Eliz. 2, c. 87. The Act permits a licensed physician to perform an abortion where two other licensed physicians agree (a) “that the continuance of the pregnancy would involve risk to the life of the pregnant woman, or of injury to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman or any existing children of her family, greater than if the pregnancy were terminated,” or (b) “that there is a substantial risk that if the child were born it would suffer from such physical or mental abnormalities as to be seriously handicapped.” The Act also provides that, in making this determination, “account may be taken of the pregnant woman’s actual or reasonably foreseeable environment.” It also permits a physician, without the concurrence of others, to terminate a pregnancy where he is of the good-faith opinion that the abortion “is immediately necessary to save the life or to prevent grave permanent injury to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman.”
5. The American law. In this country, the law in effect in all but a few States until mid-19th century was the pre-existing English common law. Connecticut, the first State to enact abortion legislation, adopted in 1821 that part of Lord Ellenborough’s Act that related to a woman “quick with child.” The death penalty was not imposed. Abortion before quickening was made a crime in that State only in I860. In 1828, New York enacted legislation that, in two respects, was to serve as a model for early anti-abortion statutes. First, while barring destruction of an unquickened fetus as well as a quick fetus, it made the former only a misdemeanor, but the latter second-degree manslaughter. Second, it incorporated a concept of therapeutic abortion by providing that an abortion was excused if it “shall have been necessary to preserve the life of such mother, or shall have been advised by two physicians to be necessary for such purpose.” By 1840, when Texas had received the common law, only eight American States had statutes dealing with abortion. It was not until after the War Between the States that legislation began generally to replace the common law. Most of these initial statutes dealt severely with abortion after quickening but were lenient with it before quickening. Most punished attempts equally with completed abortions. While many statutes included the exception for an abortion thought by one or more physicians to be necessary to save the mother’s life, that provision soon disappeared and the typical law required that the procedure actually be necessary for that purpose.
Gradually, in the middle and late 19th century the quickening distinction disappeared from the statutory law of most States and the degree of the offense and the penalties were increased. By the end of the 1950’s, a large majority of the jurisdictions banned abortion, however and whenever performed, unless done to save or preserve the life of the mother. The exceptions, Alabama and the District of Columbia, permitted abortion to preserve the mother’s health. Three States permitted abortions that were not “unlawfully” performed or that were not “without lawful justification,” leaving interpretation of those standards to the courts. In the past several years, however, a trend toward liberalization of abortion statutes has resulted in adoption, by about one-third of the States, of less stringent laws, most of them patterned after the ALI Model Penal Code, § 230.3, set forth as Appendix B to the opinion in Doe v. Bolton, post, p. 205.
It is thus apparent that at common law, at the time of the adoption of our Constitution, and throughout the major portion of the 19th century, abortion was viewed with less disfavor than under most American statutes currently in effect. Phrasing it another way, a woman enjoyed a substantially broader right to terminate a pregnancy than she does in most States today. At least with respect to the early stage of pregnancy, and very possibly without such a limitation, the opportunity to make this choice was present in this country well into the 19th century. Even later, the law continued for some time to treat less punitively an abortion procured in early pregnancy.
6. The position of the American Medical Association. The anti-abortion mood prevalent in this country in the late 19th century was shared by the medical profession. Indeed, the attitude of the profession may have played a significant role in the enactment of stringent criminal abortion legislation during that period.
An AMA Committee on Criminal Abortion was appointed in May 1857. It presented its report, 12 Trans, of the Am. Med. Assn. 73-78 (1859), to the Twelfth Annual Meeting. That report observed that the Committee had been appointed to investigate criminal abortion “with a view to its general suppression.” It deplored abortion and its frequency and it listed three causes of “this general demoralization”:
“The first of these causes is a wide-spread popular ignorance of the true character of the crime— a belief, even among mothers themselves, that the
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | E | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Marshall
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issue is whether a federal statute generally requiring federal firefighters to retire at age 55 establishes, as a matter of law, that age 55 is a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) for nonfederal firefighters within the meaning of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 81 Stat. 602, as amended, 29 U. S. C. §621 et seq. (ADEA or Act).
h — I
Congress enacted the ADEA “to promote employment of older persons based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment; [and] to help employers and workers find ways of meeting problems arising from the impact of age on employment.” 29 U. S. C. § 621(b). To this end, the Act today prohibits virtually all employers from discriminating on the basis of age against employees or applicants for employment who are between the ages of 40 and 70 by, for example, discharging them or requiring them to retire involuntarily. §§ 623(a), 631(a). The Act contains one general exception to this prohibition: when age is shown to be “a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular business,” § 623(f)(1), an employee may be terminated on the basis of his age before reaching age 70.
Since enacting the ADEA in 1967, Congress has amended its provisions several times. The ADEA originally did not apply to the Federal Government, to the States or their political subdivisions, or to employers with fewer than 25 employees, but in 1974 Congress extended coverage to Federal, State, and local Governments, and to employers with at least 20 workers. §§ 630(b), 633a. Also, while the Act initially covered employees only up to age 65, in 1978 Congress raised the maximum age to 70 for state, local, and private employees and eliminated the cap entirely for federal workers. Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, § 3(a), 92 Stat. 189, 29 U. S. C. § 631(b) (hereinafter 1978 Amendments).
The 1978 Amendments eliminated substantially all federal age limits on employment, but they left untouched several mandatory retirement provisions of the federal civil service statute applicable to specific federal occupations, including firefighters, air traffic controllers, and law enforcement officers, as well as mandatory retirement provisions applicable to the Foreign Service and the Central Intelligence Agency. Among the provisions that were left unaffected by the 1978 Amendments is 5 U. S. C. § 8335(b), which requires certain federal law enforcement officers and firefighters to retire at age 55 if they have sufficient years of service to qualify for a pension and their agency does not find that it is in the public interest to continue their employment. As a result, most federal firefighters must retire at age 55, despite the provisions of the ADEA. At issue here is the effect of this age limit for federal firefighters on the ADEA’s application to state and local firefighters.
A
Six firefighters brought this action in the District Court for the District of Maryland challenging the city of Baltimore’s municipal code provisions that establish for firefighters and police personnel a mandatory retirement age lower than 70. They claimed that these provisions violate the ADEA. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) subsequently intervened to support the six plaintiffs.
Until 1962, all Baltimore employees, including firefighters, were covered by the Employees Retirement System (ERS), which provided for mandatory retirement at age 70. App. 4. In 1962, the city established the Fire and Police Employee Retirement System (FPERS), which generally requires that all firefighting personnel below the rank of lieutenant retire at age 55. See FPERS, Baltimore City Code, Art. 22, § 34(a) 1-4 (1983); App. 3. Lieutenants and other higher ranking officers may work until age 65. Ibid. When the FPERS was implemented in 1962, special provision was made for personnel hired before 1962, who were given the option of remaining in the ERS or transferring to the FPERS under a special grandfather provision. Firefighters hired before 1962 who chose to remain in the ERS may continue to work until age 70 even today. See 515 F. Supp. 1287, 1297, n. 10 (Md. 1981). Firefighters hired before 1962 who are covered by the newer FPERS may work until age 60 or, in some limited circumstances, until age 65. Ibid. The plaintiffs here include five firefighters covered by this grandfather clause who are subject to retirement at age 60, and one firefighter hired after 1962, who is subject to retirement at age 55.
The city asserted as an affirmative defense that age is a BFOQ for the position of firefighter and that the mandatory retirement provision therefore was permissible under the ADEA. After a 6-day bench trial, at which each side presented expert and nonexpert testimony on the validity of the BFOQ defense, the District Court held that the city had failed to produce sufficient evidence to make out its BFOQ defense. The court considered both the particular condition of the plaintiff firefighters and the general operation of the Baltimore Fire Department, noting that “historically Baltimore firemen have always worked past [age 60] and even up to age seventy,” 515 F. Supp., at 1297. It then applied the two-pronged test developed by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F. 2d 224 (1976), and adopted by the Fourth Circuit. The trial court concluded that the city had shown neither that “there is a factual basis for [it] to believe that all or substantially all Baltimore City firefighters between the ages of sixty and sixty-five, other than officers, would be unable to perform their job safely and efficiently,” 515 F. Supp., at 1296, nor that “it is impossible or impractical to deal with firefighters between sixty and sixty-five on an individualized basis.” Ibid. The court therefore struck down the city’s mandatory retirement plan for firefighters.
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed. 731 F. 2d 209 (1984). The majority did not take issue with the District Court’s findings that the city had failed to prove that age was a BFOQ for firefighters. Instead, the court held that the city was entitled to the BFOQ defense as a matter of law. To reach that conclusion, the appellate court relied on language from this Court’s decision in EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U. S. 226 (1983), in which we upheld the constitutionality of Congress’ extension of the ADEA to state and local governments. In that decision we observed that the ADEA tests a State’s discretion to impose a mandatory retirement age “against a reasonable federal standard.” Id., at 240. The Court of Appeals undertook a “search for a ‘reasonable federal standard’ ” by which to test the asserted BFOQ; it found that standard in the federal civil service statute, 5 U. S. C. § 8335(b), which generally requires federal firefighters to retire at age 55. See n. 3, supra. The court held that, because Congress has selected age 55 as the retirement age for most federal firefighters, as a matter of law the same age constitutes a BFOQ for all state and local firefighters as well. Therefore, the court concluded, the city was not required to make any factual showing at trial as to its need for the mandatory retirement age.
Because this case presents serious questions about the administration of the ADEA, we granted certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals. 469 U. S. 1156 (1985). We now reverse.
B
EEOC v. Wyoming arose out of a lawsuit filed by a Wyoming state game warden who was required under state law to retire at age 55. He brought an action against the State and various of its officials claiming that its mandatory requirement violated the ADEA. The District Court held that the ADEA violated the Tenth Amendment insofar as it regulated Wyoming’s employment relationship with its game wardens and other law enforcement officers and dismissed the suit. In rejecting that argument, we explained that the ADEA did not unduly intrude into the exercise of governmental functions because it did not require employers to retain unfit employees, but only at most to make more individualized determinations about fitness. Moreover, we noted that, in light of the BFOQ defense, States might in fact remain free from the obligation even to make more individualized showings:
“Perhaps more important, appellees remain free under the ADEA to continue to do precisely what they are doing now, if they can demonstrate that age is a ‘bona fide occupational qualification’ for the job of game warden. . . . Thus, . . . even the State’s discretion to achieve its goals in the way it thinks best is not being overridden entirely, but is merely being tested against a reasonable federal standard.” 460 U. S., at 240 (emphasis in original).
We remanded to give Wyoming an opportunity to prove at trial that age 55 was in fact a BFOQ for Wyoming game wardens.
In this case, the Court of Appeals interpreted our use of the term “reasonable federal standard” in the quoted passage to mean that the question whether an age limit for nonfederal employees is permissible under the ADEA may be resolved simply by reference to a federal statute establishing a retirement age for a class of federal employees. It seized on the retirement provisions of the federal civil service statute, which require that federal firefighters retire at age 55. Then, without considering the intent underlying that provision, it held that, as a matter of law, age must therefore be a BFOQ for local firefighters.
The “reasonable federal standard” to which we referred in EEOC v. Wyoming, however, is the standard supplied by the ADEA itself — that is, whether the age limit is a BFOQ. By use of that phrase, we intended only to reaffirm that the BFOQ standard permits an employer to maintain a mandatory retirement age as long as the employer makes the requisite showing that age is a BFOQ. Nothing in the ADEA or our decision in Wyoming warrants the conclusion that a federal rule, not found in the ADEA, and by its terms applicable only to federal employees, necessarily authorizes a state or local government employer to maintain a mandatory retirement age as a matter of law. To make the fact that the Federal Government has imposed a mandatory age limit on its own firefighters automatically dispositive of the question whether the same age limit is appropriate for state and local officers, without in any way examining the provision, would extend the federal rule far beyond its scope. It would apply to state and local employees a statute applicable by its terms only to federal officers. The mere fact that some federal firefighters are required to cease work at age 55 does not provide an absolute defense to an ADEA action challenging state and local age limits for firefighters.
The Court of Appeals in this case failed to focus on the city’s factual showing and instead centered its attention on the federal retirement provisions of the United States Code. We would be remiss, in light of Congress’ indisputable intent to permit deviations from the mandate of the ADEA only in light of a particularized, factual showing, see H. R. Rep. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 7 (1967); Legislative History 80; S. Rep. No. 723, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 7 (1967); Legislative History 111, to permit nonfederal employers to circumvent this plan by mere citation to an unrelated statutory provision that is not even mentioned in the ADEA.
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The city, supported by several amici, argues for affirmance nonetheless. It asserts first that the federal civil service statute is not just a federal retirement provision unrelated to the ADEA but in fact establishes age as a BFOQ for federal firefighters based on factors that properly go into that determination under the ADEA, see Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, post, p. 400. Second, the city asserts, a congressional finding that age is a BFOQ for a certain occupation is dispositive of that determination with respect to non-federal employees in that occupation. We consider each of these contentions in turn.
A
We must first resolve whether the age-55 retirement for federal firefighters reflects a congressional determination that age 55 is a BFOQ within the meaning of the ADEA, as the city urges, or whether Congress established the mandatory retirement age based on an analysis different from that mandated by the BFOQ standard. On this question, the statute is silent. Section 8335(b), the federal civil service provision, does not by its terms or history evince an intent to cover nonfederal employees, or to limit the scope of the ADEA. Nor does the ADEA, which was passed later, cross-reference the civil service statute or in any way express a congressional desire to exempt any firefighters from the full effect of the Act’s reach. In other words, in the language of neither statute has Congress indicated that the civil service provision reflects anything more than a congressional decision that federal firefighters must retire, as a general matter, at the age of 55.
The history of the civil service provision, however, makes clear that the decision to retire certain federal employees at an early age was not based on BFOQs for the covered employment. This history demonstrates instead that Congress has acted to deal with the idiosyncratic problems of federal employees in the federal civil service. The Federal Government first introduced early retirement for certain employees in 1947 with passage of legislation 'permitting investigatory personnel of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to retire at age 50 at an enhanced annuity. Act of July 11, 1947, ch. 219, 61 Stat. 307. Congress in 1948 extended this program to anyone whose duties for at least 20 years were primarily the investigation, apprehension, or detention of persons suspected or convicted of federal criminal law violations, see Act of July 2, 1948, ch. 807, 62 Stat. 1221. In 1972, this voluntary retirement provision was further extended to federal firefighters. See Act of Aug. 14, 1972, Pub. L. 92-382, 86 Stat. 539.
The provision as initially passed was intended only to give certain employees the option to retire early. It was designed in part as an “added stimulus to morale in the Federal Bureau of Investigation . . . [to] stabilize the service of the Federal Bureau of Investigation into a career service. . . . [and to] act as an incentive to investigative personnel of the [FBI] to remain in the Federal service until a reasonable retirement age is reached.” S. Rep. No. 76, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 1-2 (1947). In addition, as then Attorney General Tom C. Clark explained, the Department of Justice sought to maintain the FBI “as a ‘young man’s service.’” He added that “men in their 60’s and 70’s, forced to remain in the service, faced with the rigors of arduous service demanded of special agents and others, [should not be] forced to carry on for lack of an adequate retirement plan to fit the needs of the FBI service.” Id., at 2.
In 1974, Congress amended the statute to provide that these same federal employees must retire at age 55 if they had completed 20 years of service, and it provided an enhanced annuity. As with the voluntary retirement scheme, one goal of the 1974 amendment was to maintain “relatively young, vigorous, and effective law enforcement and firefighting workforces.” H. R. Rep. No. 93-463, p. 2 (1973). The amendment also was designed to replace the existing provision, which was having an adverse impact on the quality of older federal employees, because “most of those who retire in their early fifties are the more alert and aggressive employees who have found desirable jobs outside of Government,” id., at 3; in contrast, the newer mandatory scheme would enable management to “retire, without stigma, one who suffers a loss of proficiency.” Retirement for Certain Hazardous Duty Personnel: Hearing on H. R. 6078 and H. R. 9281 before the Subcommittee on Compensation and Employment Benefits of the Senate Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 134 (1974) (testimony of Rep. Brasco, sponsor of House bill).
Congress undoubtedly sought in significant part to maintain a youthful work force and took steps through the civil service retirement provisions to make early retirement both attractive and financially rewarding. However, neither the language of the 1974 amendment nor its legislative history offers any indication why Congress wanted to maintain the image of a “young man’s service,” or why Congress thought that 55 was the proper cutoff age, or whether Congress believed that older employees in fact could not meet the demands of these occupations. Indeed, Congressmen who opposed the bill voiced their concern for the singling out of one group of employees for preferential treatment through enhanced annuities and early retirement, and did not even acknowledge that the exigencies of the job might have anything to do with Congress’ willingness to accord special treatment to a group of employees. H. R. Rep. No. 93-463, supra, at 20. Moreover, the allowance that firefighters who had not yet served for 20 years could remain in their jobs, see id., at 6, along with other exceptions to the general rule of retirement, casts serious doubt on any argument that Congress in fact believed that either the employee or the public would be jeopardized by the employment of older firefighters.
The absence of any indication that Congress established the age limit based on the demands of the occupation raises the possibility that the federal rule is merely “an example of the sort of age stereotyping without factual basis that was one of the primary targets of the reforms of the ADEA,” Brief for Petitioner in No. 84-710, p. 38, and surely belies any contention that the age limit is based on actual occupational qualifications. Without knowing whether Congress passed the statute based on factual support, legislative balancing of competing policy concerns, or stereotypical assumptions, we simply have no way to decipher whether it is consistent with the policies underlying the ADEA.
Congress’ treatment of the civil service provision when it extended the ADEA to federal employees in 1978 conclusively demonstrates that the retirement statute does not represent a congressional determination that age is an occupational qualification for federal firefighters. The decision to retain mandatory retirement provisions for certain federal employees resulted not from a finding that the provisions met the standards of the ADEA, but rather from an agreement to provide to the congressional Committees with jurisdiction over the retirement programs at issue the opportunity to review those provisions. Instead of delaying passage of the ADEA while those Committees studied the mandatory retirement provisions in light of the proposed ADEA, Congress decided to preserve the status quo with respect to the retirement program, pending further study. This express purpose definitively rules out any conclusion that Congress approved the retirement programs in light of the ADEA.
As first reported out of Committee in 1977, the 1978 Amendments to the ADEA removed all age limitations on federal employment, “notwithstanding any other provisions of Federal law relating to mandatory retirement requirements. ...” H. R. 5383, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 5 (1977); Legislative History 396. Representative Nix, Chairman of the House Post Office and Civil Service Committee, thereafter expressed concern that the “broad general language” of the proposed bill would repeal various statutory provisions within the primary jurisdiction of his Committee. See 123 Cong. Rec. 29003-29004 (1977) (letter to Rep. Perkins, Chairman of the House Committeee on Education and Labor); Legislative History 400-401. He suggested that his colleagues’ desire to expedite consideration of the bill could be accommodated through an amendment eliminating provisions of concern to his Committee. Ibid. This proposal met with approval, see ibid., and accordingly, Representative Spellman offered an amendment, on behalf of the House Post Office and Civil Service Committee, to retain the mandatory retirement provisions applicable to certain specific federal occupations, including law enforcement officials and firefighters. See 123 Cong. Rec. 29002 (1977) (statement of Rep. Hawkins); Legislative History 399. In so doing, Representative Spellman stated:
“I hasten to point out that this amendment does not indicate opposition perse [sic] to elimination of mandatory retirement for air traffic controllers, firefighters, and other specific occupations.
“However, since most of these mandatory retirement provisions are part of the liberalized retirement programs, our committee believes that such provisions should not be repealed until the individual retirement programs have been reexamined.” 123 Cong. Rec. 30556 (1977); Legislative History 415.
Similarly, Representative Pepper, a sponsor of the 1978 Amendments, made clear:
“For the record, Mr. Chairman, I should state what might appear to be obvious: That we in the House, in debating and passing this amendment, are making no judgment whatever on the desirability of retaining the ages now established by the various statutes affected for forced retirement. That judgment, I am sure, will be rendered when the committees involved bring subsequent legislation to the floor.” Ibid.
And again, Representative Hawkins, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Employment Opportunities of the House Committee on Education and Labor, stated that “[t]he sole purpose of this agreement is to afford the committees the opportunity to review these statutes.” Ibid. The mandatory retirement provisions were, accordingly, retained when the 1978 Amendments were enacted. See Pub. L. 95-256, § 5(c), 92 Stat. 191; see also H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-950, pp. 10 — 11 (1978); Legislative History 521-522.
In sum, almost four decades of legislative history establish that Congress at no time has indicated that the federal retirement age for federal firefighters is based on a determination that age 55 is a BFOQ within the meaning of the ADEA. Congress adopted what might well have been an arbitrarily designated retirement age in an era not concerned with the pervasive discrimination against the elderly that eventually gave rise to the ADEA. Thereafter, although Congress retained mandatory limitations in 1978, while questioning whether they continued to make good policy sense, it did so for the sake of expediency alone. On considering the language and history of the civil service provision, we find it quite possible that factors other than conclusive determinations of occupational qualifications might originally have led to passage of this federal rule, and that the reason for its retention after 1978 further undercuts any argument that Congress has determined that age is a BFOQ for federal firefighters.
In the absence of an indication that Congress in fact grounded the age limit on occupational qualifications, we will not presume that it did so intend. The myriad political purposes for which Congress might properly make decisions affecting federal employees, and that body’s uncontested authority to exempt federal employees from the requirements of federal regulatory statutes, simply do not permit the conclusion that Congress passed or retained this retirement provision because it reflects BFOQs. We therefore conclude that this civil service provision does not articulate a BFOQ for firefighters, that its presence in the United States Code is not relevant to the question of a BFOQ for firefighters, and that it would be error for a court, faced with a challenge under the ADEA to an age limit for firefighters, to give any weight, much less conclusive weight, to the federal retirement provision.
B
Were there evidence that Congress in fact determined that a class of federal employees must retire early based on the same considerations that support a finding of a BFOQ under the Act, the situation might differ. Of course, if Congress expressly extended the BFOQ to nonfederal occupations, that determination would be dispositive. But if it did not, the federal exemption nevertheless might be relevant to an appropriate employer when deciding whether to impose a mandatory retirement age, and to a district court engaged in reviewing an employer’s BFOQ defense. The evidence Congress has considered, and the conclusions it has drawn therefrom, might be admissible as evidence in judicial proceedings to determine the existence of a BFOQ for non-federal employees. The extent to which these factors are probative would, of course, vary depending at least on the congruity between the federal and nonfederal occupations at issue. Indeed,' the need to consider the actual tasks of the nonfederal employees and the circumstances of employment, in order to determine the extent to which congressional conclusions about federal employees in fact are relevant, would preclude the kind of wholesale reliance on the federal rule that the city suggests. See supra, at 362-363. Because in this case the evidence supports no such finding of congressional intent to establish a BFOQ, however, we decline to speculate on the manner in which a different federal rule might affect nonfederal employment.
f — I H-i J — (
We accordingly reverse the Court of Appeals’ holding that the federal retirement provision at issue in this case provides an absolute defense in an ADEA action. We remand to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Federal employees are covered in a separate section of the Act and are treated differently from nonfederal employees in various ways not relevant to this case. See 29 U. S. C. § 633a (extending antidiscrimination provisions to federal employees, but providing such employees a different remedy for violations); § 631 (establishing 70 as a permissible retirement age for all but federal employees, for whom there is no permissible cap). Cf. Vance v. Bradley, 440 U. S. 93 (1979) (lower retirement age for federal employees covered by Foreign Service retirement system does not violate equal protection).
See Senate Special Committee on Aging, Improving the Age Discrimination Law, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 14, 17-18 (Comm. Print 1973); EEOC, Legislative History of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 215, 231, 234-235 (1981) (hereinafter Legislative History).
The Act contains several minor exemptions not at issue here. See, e. g., 29 U. S. C. §§ 630(f), 631(c)(1). It additionally empowers the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to determine BFOQs for federal employees, 29 U. S. C. §633a(b), and also to establish general exemptions from the ADEA if it finds them to be reasonable and “necessary and proper in the public interest.” 29 U. S. C. § 628. In 1980, the EEOC examined the desirability of fixing a retirement age for local firefighters and concluded that such an exemption from the ADEA was not warranted. The Commission found that individual assessments of fitness would be feasible and that age alone would be a poor indicator of ability in this occupation. See App. 5-23.
Title 5 U. S. C. § 8335(b) provides:
“A law enforcement officer or a firefighter who is otherwise eligible for immediate retirement under section 8336(e) of this title shall be separated from the service on the last day of the month in which he becomes 55 years of age or completes 20 years of service if then over that age. The head of the agency, when in his judgment the public interest so requires, may exempt such an employee from automatic separation under this subsection until that employee becomes 60 years of age. The employing office shall notify the employee in writing of the date of separation at least 60 days in advance thereof. Action to separate the employee is not effective, without the consent of the employee, until the last day of the month in which the 60-day notice expires.”
The defendants were the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore and the Chairman and members of the Board of Trustees of the Fire and Police Employees Retirement System of the city of Baltimore. We refer to these defendants collectively as the “city.”
Plaintiffs did not argue that a retirement age of 65 would violate the ADEA but instead essentially sought the same retirement age applicable to lieutenants. The case therefore presented only the question whether mandatory retirement prior to age 65 violates the ADEA.
The District Court required the city to show (1) that the BFOQ it invokes “ ‘is reasonably necessary to the essence of its business’ of operating an efficient fire department within the City of Baltimore, and (2) that defendants have ‘reasonable cause, i. e., a factual basis for believing that all or substantially all persons within the class . . . would be unable to perform safely and efficiently the duties of the job involved, or that it is impossible or impractical to deal with persons over the age limit on an individualized basis.’” 515 F. Supp., at 1295 (quoting Arritt v. Grisell, 567 F. 2d 1267, 1271 (CA4 1977)).
Chief Judge Winter dissented. He rejected the panel’s conclusion that the civil service provision necessarily constituted a congressional determination that age 55 is a BFOQ for federal firefighters but asserted that even if it were a BFOQ for federal firefighters, that fact would not excuse the city from proving facts necessary to establish a BFOQ under 29 U. S. C. § 623(f)(1). Concluding that the District Court’s factual findings on the city’s proof were not clearly erroneous, he would have affirmed the District Court.
To this end, the lower courts have fashioned tests for finding a BFOQ that focus, first, on the individual employer’s need for an age limit, and, second, on the factual basis for his belief that all workers above a certain age are not qualified and on his proof that individual testing is highly impractical. We have today elaborated on the precise standard to be applied. Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, post, at 412-417.
Recently, legislation to exempt state and local firefighters and law enforcement officers from the ADEA has been introduced in both the Senate and the House of Representatives. See S. 698, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (introduced March 20, 1985); H. R. 1435, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (introduced March 6, 1985).
Congress, of course, may exempt federal employees from application of the ADEA and otherwise treat federal employees, whose employment relations it may directly supervise, differently from those of other employers, see, e. g., 26 U. S. C. § 3306(c)(6) (unemployment compensation not applicable to federal employees); 29 U. S. C. § 152(2) (exempting federal employees from labor relations legislation); indeed it has done so elsewhere in the ADEA. While Congress at first exempted federal employees from the reach of the Act, it now applies even more protective rules to older federal employees than it imposes on other employers. See 29 U. S. C. §§ 631(a), 631(b) (federal employees generally cannot be forced to retire at any age, while similarly situated nonfederal employees may be forced to retire at age 70). It might be that congressional findings leading to the conclusion that age is a BFOQ for a certain federal occupation would be of relevance to a judicial inquiry into age as a BFOQ for other employers, even absent express congressional direction on this point. See infra. But this relevance derives from a recognition that Congress might already have engaged in the same inquiry that a district court must make, and a district court might find congressionally gathered evidence useful and congressional factfinding persuasive. Contrary to the suggestion of the Court of Appeals, 731 F. 2d 209, 212-213 (CA4 1984), Congress is not always required to treat federal and nonfederal employees in the same way.
Thereafter, Representative Spellman’s Subcommittee held hearings on the retirement provisions of 5 U. S. C. § 8335(b) and heard testimony on the mandatory provision. Special Retirement Policies for Law Enforcement Officers and Firefighters: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Compensation and Employee Benefits of the House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); Hearings on H. R. 7945 before the Subcommittee on Compensation and Employee Benefits of the House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). The Subcommittee also considered a report of the General Accounting Office, which found that “[rjetirement policies that disregard difference in physical abilities and productive capacity are costly and wasteful.” Report to the House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service by the Comptroller General of the United States: Special Retirement Policy for Federal Law Enforcement and Firefighter Personnel Needs Reevaluation 10 (1977). The Subcommittee took no action to change the mandatory rules.
More recently, Congress has again been confronted with a Report suggesting that mandatory age limits for law enforcement personnel are unnecessary and wasteful. The Report, published by the House Select Committee on Aging, states that “it is impossible to justify mandatory retirement or maximum hiring age policies based on arguments of public safety or job-related performance.” Chairman, House Select Committee on Aging, The Myths and Realities of Age Limits for Law Enforcement and Firefighting Personnel, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., IV (Comm. Print 1984). Legislation also has been introduced in the House to eliminate mandatory retirement for all federal employees not currently covered by the ADEA, including firefighters. H. R. 1710, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (introduced March 25, 1985).
Nor do we have any reason to believe that, when the city imposed its mandatory retirement scheme in 1962, it was relying on a congressional determination of any kind. The history of the civil service provision up to that time reveals no congressional finding of an occupational qualification, and in fact in 1962 the congressional scheme remained completely voluntary. It was not until 1974 that Congress even rendered early retirement mandatory. Indeed, the city pointed out to the Court of Appeals that it instituted its mandatory retirement plan “more than a decade before the federal government did likewise.” Answer of Appellant City to Petition for Rehearing with Suggestion for Rehearing en Banc in No. 81-1965 (CA4), pp. 9-10.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | B | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Rehnquist
delivered the opinion of the Court.
We granted certiorari in this case, 419 U. S. 823 (1974), to review a judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit which required petitioner Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency to disapprove a portion of the implementation plan submitted to him by the State of Georgia pursuant to the Clean Air Amendments of 1970. The case presents an issue of statutory construction which is illuminated by the anatomy of the statute itself, by its legislative history, and by the history of congressional efforts to control air pollution.
I
Congress initially responded to the problem of air pollution by offering encouragement and assistance to the States. In 1955 the Surgeon General was authorized to study the problem of air pollution, to support research, training, and demonstration projects, and to provide technical assistance to state and local governments attempting to abate pollution. 69 Stat. 322. In 1960 Congress directed the Surgeon General to focus his attention on the health hazards resulting from motor vehicle emissions. Pub. L. 86-493, 74 Stat. 162. The Clean Air Act of 1963, 77 Stat. 392, authorized federal authorities to expand their research efforts, to make grants to state air pollution control agencies, and also to intervene directly to abate interstate pollution in limited circumstances. Amendments in 1965, § 101, 79 Stat. 992, and in 1966, 80 Stat. 954, broadened federal authority to control motor vehicle emissions and to make grants to state pollution control agencies.
The focus shifted somewhat in the Air Quality Act of 1967, 81 Stat. 485. It reiterated the premise of the earlier Clean Air Act “that the prevention and control of air pollution at its source is the primary responsibility of States and local governments.” Ibid. Its provisions, however, increased the federal role in the prevention of air pollution, by according federal authorities certain powers of supervision and enforcement. But the States generally retained wide latitude to determine both the air quality standards which they would meet and the period of time in which they would do so.
The response of the States to these manifestations of increasing congressional concern with air pollution was disappointing. Even by 1970, state planning and implementation under the Air Quality Act of 1967 had made little progress. Congress reacted by taking a stick to the States in the form of the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676, enacted on December 31 of that year. These Amendments sharply increased federal authority and responsibility in the continuing effort to combat air pollution. Nonetheless, the Amendments explicitly preserved the principle: “Each State shall have the primary responsibility for assuring air quality within the entire geographic area comprising such State....” § 107 (a) of the Clean Air Act, as added, 84 Stat. 1678,42 U. S. C. § 1857c-2 (a). The difference under the Amendments was that the States were no longer given any choice as to whether they would meet this responsibility. For the first time they were required to attain air quality of specified standards, and to do so within a specified period of time.
The Amendments directed that within 30 days of their enactment the Environmental Protection Agency should publish proposed regulations describing national quality standards for the “ambient air,” which is the statute’s term for the outdoor air used by the general public. After allowing 90 days for comments on the proposed standards, the Agency was then obliged to promulgate such standards. § 109 (a)(1) of the Clean Air Act, as added, 84 Stat. 1679, 42 U. S. C. § 1857c-4 (a)(1). The standards were to be of two general types: “primary” standards, which in the judgment of the Agency were “requisite to protect the public health,” §109 (b)(1), and “secondary” standards, those that in the judgment of the Agency were “requisite to protect the public welfare from any known or anticipated adverse effects associated with the presence of such air pollutant in the ambient air.” §109 (b)(2).
Within nine months after the Agency’s promulgation of primary and secondary air quality standards, each of the 50 States was required to submit to the Agency a plan designed to implement and maintain such standards within its boundaries. § 110 (a) (1) of the Clean Air Act, as added, 84 Stat. 1680, 42 U. S. C. § 1857c-5 (a)(1). The Agency was in turn required to approve each State’s plan within four months of the deadline for submission, if it had been adopted after public hearings and if it satisfied eight general conditions set forth in § 110 (a)(2). Probably the principal of these conditions, and the heart of the 1970 Amendments, is that the plan provide for the attainment of the national primary ambient air quality standards in the particular State “as expeditiously as practicable but... in no case later than three years from the date of approval of such plan.” § 110 (a) (2)(A). In providing for such attainment, a State’s plan must include “emission limitations, schedules, and timetables for compliance with such limitations”; it must also contain such other measures as may be necessary to insure both timely attainment and subsequent maintenance of national ambient air standards. § 110 (a)(2)(B).
Although the Agency itself was newly organized, the States looked, to it for guidance in formulating the plans they were required to submit. On April 7,1971 — scarcely three months after the enactment of the Clean Air Amendments — the Agency published proposed guidelines for the preparation, adoption, and submission of such plans. 36 Fed. Reg. 6680. After receiving numerous comments, including those from respondent Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (NRDC), it issued final guidelines on August 14, 1971, 36 Fed. Reg. 1586. See 40 CFR Part 51 (1974). The national standards themselves were timely promulgated on April 30, 1971, 36 Fed. Reg. 8186. See 40 CFR Part 50 (1974).
No one can doubt that Congress imposed upon the Agency and States a comprehensive planning task of the first magnitude which was to be accomplished in a relatively short time. In the case of the States, it was soon realized that in order to develop the requisite plans within the statutory nine-month deadline, efforts would have to be focused on determining the stringent emission limitations necessary to comply with national standards. This was true even though compliance with the standards would not be necessary until the attainment date, which normally would be three years after Agency approval of a plan. The issue then arose as to how these stringent limitations, which often could not be satisfied without substantial research and investment, should be applied during the period prior to that date.
One approach was that adopted by Florida, under which the plan’s emission limitations would not take effect until the attainment date. Under this approach, no source is subject to enforcement actions during the preattainment period, but all are put on notice of the limitations with which they must eventually comply. Since the Florida approach basically does not require preattainment date pollution reductions on the part of those sources which might be able to effect them, the Agency encouraged an alternative approach. Under it a State’s emission limitations would be immediately effective. The State, however, would have the authority to grant variances to particular sources which could not immediately comply with the stringent emission limitations necessary to meet the standards.
Georgia chose the Agency’s preferred approach. Its plan provided for immediately effective categorical emission limitations, but also incorporated a variance procedure whereby particular sources could obtain individually tailored relief from general requirements. This variance provision, Ga. Code Ann. § 88-912 (1971), was one of the bases upon which the Agency’s approval of the Georgia plan was successfully challenged by respondents in the Court of Appeals. It is the only aspect of that court’s decision as to which the Agency petitioned for certiorari.
II
The Agency’s approval of Georgia’s variance provision was based on its interpretation of § 110 (a)(3), which provides that the Agency shall approve any revision of an implementation plan which meets the §110 (a) (2) requirements applicable to an original plan. The Agency concluded that § 110 (a) (3) permits a State to grant individual variances from generally applicable emission standards, both before and after the attainment date, so long as the variance does not cause the plan to fail to comply with the requirements of § 110 (a)(2). Since that section requires, inter alia, that primary ambient air standards be attained by a particular date, it is of some consequence under this approach whether the period for which the variance is sought extends beyond that date. If it does not, the practical effect of treating such preattainment date variances as revisions is that they can be granted rather freely.
This interpretation of §110 (a) (3) was incorporated in the Agency’s original guidelines for implementation plans, 40 CFR §§ 51.6 (c), 51.32 (f) (1973). Although a spokesman for respondent NRDC had earlier stated that the Agency’s guideline in this regard “correctly provides that variances which do not threaten attainment of a national standard are to be considered revisions of the plan,” that organization later developed second thoughts on the matter. Its present position, in which it is joined by another environmental organization and by two individual respondents who reside in affected air quality control regions within the State of Georgia, is that variances, applicable to individual sources may be approved only if they meet the stringent procedural and substantive standards of § 110 (f). This section permits one-year “postponements” of any requirement of a plan, subject to conditions which will be discussed below.
The Court of Appeals agreed with respondents, and ordered the Agency to disapprove Georgia’s variance provision, although it did not specify which of the § 110 (a)(2) requirements were thereby violated. It held that while the revision authority of §110 (a)(3) was available for generally applicable changes of an implementation plan, the postponement provision of § 110 (f) was the only method by which individual sources could obtain relief from applicable emission limitations. In reaching this conclusion the court rejected petitioners’ suggestion that whether a proposed variance should be treated as a “revision” under § 110 (a)(3), or as a “postponement” under § 110 (f), depended on whether it would affect attainment of a national ambient air standard, rather than on whether it applied to one source or to many.
Other Circuits have also been confronted with this issue, and while none has adopted the Agency’s position, all have differed from the Fifth Circuit. The first case was Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 478 F. 2d 875 (CA1 1973). For reasons to be discussed, infra, at 91-94, the First Circuit rejected the revision authority as a basis for a variance procedure. It nonetheless concluded that prior to the three-year date for mandatory attainment of primary standards, a State could grant variances to sources which could not immediately meet applicable emission limitations. The court reasoned:
“We can see value in permitting a state to impose strict emission limitations now, subject to individual exemptions if practicability warrants; otherwise it may be forced to adopt less stringent limitations in order to accommodate those who, notwithstanding reasonable efforts, are as yet unable to comply.
“The Administrator sees his power to allow such exemption procedures as deriving from the'revision’ authority in § [110] (a)(3). We tend to view it more as a necessary adjunct to the statutory scheme, which anticipates greater flexibility during the preattainment period.” 478 F. 2d, at 887.
The First Circuit’s resolution, which has been described as “Solomonesque,” is not tied to any specific provision of the Clean Air Act. Rather, it is quite candidly a judicial creation providing flexibility which, according to its creators, Congress may be inferred to have intended to provide. Two other Circuits subsequently followed the First Circuit. Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 483 F. 2d 690, 693-694 (CA8 1973); Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 494 F. 2d 519, 523 (CA2 1974). Neither expanded on the First Circuit’s reasoning.
The Ninth Circuit has adopted a third approach to this question, in Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 507 F. 2d 905, 911-917 (1974). After considering legislative history, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Congress did not intend the postponement mechanism to be the exclusive source for variances. But the court also did not adopt the Agency’s view that variances could be authorized as § 110 (a) (3) revisions, although it did not explain its rejection of this interpretation. Rather, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the First Circuit that flexibility was “a necessary adjunct to the statutory scheme.” It explained:
“As long as a possible variance from a state plan will not preclude the attainment or maintenance of such standards, we discern no legislative intent to commit a state, in toto, to its initial plan, without any flexibility whatsoever.” 507 F. 2d, at 913.
The Ninth Circuit, however, rejected the First Circuit’s distinction between the preattainment and postattainment periods. It concluded that statutory support for flexibility was as strong after the attainment date as before, especially in light of the Act’s encouragement of the States to adopt plans even stricter than those required to attain national standards. The court thus adopted an approach which differs from the Agency’s, but which reaches the same result — authorization of variances on standards other than those required for § 110 (f) postponements, both before and after the attainment date, so long as the variance does not prevent timely attainment and subsequent maintenance of national ambient air standards.
After the Courts of Appeals for the First, Eighth, Fifth, and Second Circuits had spoken, but prior to the decision of the Ninth Circuit, the Agency modified its guidelines to comply with the then-unanimous rulings that after the attainment date the postponement provision was the only basis for obtaining a variance. 39 Fed. Reg. 34533-34535, adding 40 CFR §§ 51.11 (g), 51.15 (d) and revising § 51.32 (f). At the same time, the Agency formally disapproved variance provisions to the extent they authorized variances extending beyond attainment dates, unless the standards of § 110 (f) were met. 39 Fed. Reg. 34535, adding 40 CFR § 52.26.
Because the Agency has conformed its regulations to the decisions of the First, Eighth, and Second Circuits, this case on its facts is now limited to the validity of the Georgia variance provision insofar as it authorizes variances effective before Georgia’s attainment date, which is in July 1975. The Agency nonetheless has not abandoned its original view that the revision section authorizes variances which do not interfere with the attainment or maintenance of national ambient air standards. Moreover, the Agency is candid in admitting that should we base our decision on its interpretation of § 110 (a)(3), the decision would support the approval of implementation plans which provide for variances effective after the attainment date.
The disparity among the Courts of Appeals rather strongly indicates that the question does not admit of an easy answer. Without going so far as to hold that the Agency’s construction of the Act was the only one it permissibly could have adopted, we conclude that it was at the very least sufficiently reasonable that it should have been accepted by the reviewing courts.
Ill
Both of the sections in controversy are contained in § 110 of the amended Clean Air Act, which is entitled “Implementation Plans.” Section 110 (a) (3) provides in pertinent part:
“(A) The Administrator shall approve any revision of an implementation plan applicable to an air quality control region if he determines that it meets the requirement of paragraph (2) and has been adopted by the State after reasonable notice and public hearings.”
Section 110 (f) provides:
“(1) Prior to the date on which any stationary source or class of moving sources is required to comply with any requirement of an applicable implementation plan the Governor of the State to which such plan applies may apply to the Administrator to postpone the applicability of such requirement to such source (or class) for not more than one year. If the Administrator determines that—
“(A) good faith efforts have been made to comply with such requirement before such date,
“(B) such source (or class) is unable to comply with such requirement because the necessary technology or other alternative methods of control are not available or have not been available for a sufficient period of time,
“(C) any available alternative operating procedures and interim control measures have reduced or will reduce the impact of such source on public health, and
“ (D) the continued operation of such source is essential to national security or to the public health or welfare,
“then the Administrator shall grant a postponement of such requirement.”
As previously noted, respondents contend that “variances” applicable to individual sources — for example, a particular factory — may be approved only if they meet the stringent procedural and substantive standards set forth in § 110 (f). As is apparent from the text of § 110 (f), its postponements may be for no more than one year, may be granted only if application is made prior to the date of required compliance, arid must be supported by the Agency’s determination that the source’s continued operation “is essential to national security or to the public health or welfare.” Petitioners, on the other hand, rely on the revision authority of § 110 (a)(3) for the contention that a state plan may provide for an individual variance from generally applicable emission limitations so long as the variance does not cause the plan to fail to comply with the requirements of §110 (a)(2). Since a variance would normally implicate only the § 110 (a) (2) (A) requirement that plans provide for attainment and maintenance of national ambient air standards, treatment as revisions would result in variances being readily approved in two situations: first, where the variance does not defer compliance beyond the attainment date; and second, where the national standards have been attained and the variance is not so great that a plan incorporating it could not insure their continued maintenance. Moreover, a§110(a)(3) revision may be granted on the basis of hearings conducted by the State, whereas a § 110 (f) postponement is available only after the Agency itself conducts hearings.
There is thus considerable practical importance attached to the issue of whether variances are to be treated as revisions or as postponements, or for that matter, as the First Circuit would have it, as neither until the mandatory attainment date but as postponements thereafter. This practical importance reaches not merely the operator of a particular source who believes that circumstances justify his receiving a variance from categorical limitations. It also reaches the broader issue of whether Congress intended the States to retain any significant degree of control of the manner in which they attain and maintain national standards, at least once their initial plans have been approved or, under the First Circuit’s approach, once the mandatory attainment date has arrived. To explain our conclusion as to Congress’ intent, it is necessary that we consider the revision and postponement sections in the context of other provisions of the amended Clean Air Act, particularly those which distinguish between national ambient air standards and emission limitations.
As we have already noted, primary ambient air standards deal with the quality of outdoor air, and are fixed on a nationwide basis at levels which the Agency determines will protect the public health. It is attainment and maintenance of these national standards which § 110 (a) (2) (A) requires that state plans provide. In complying with this requirement a State’s plan must include “emission limitations,” which are regulations of the composition of substances emitted into the ambient air from such sources as power plants, service stations, and the like. They are the specific rules to which operators of pollution sources are subject, and which if enforced should result in ambient air which meets the national standards.
The Agency is plainly charged by the Act with the responsibility for setting the national ambient air standards. Just as plainly, however, it is relegated by the Act to a secondary role in the process of determining and enforcing the specific, source-by-source emission limitations which are necessary if the national standards it has set are to be met. Under § 110 (a)(2), the Agency is required to approve a state plan which provides for the timely attainment and subsequent maintenance of ambient air standards, and which also satisfies that section’s other general requirements. The Act gives the Agency no authority to question the wisdom of a State’s choices of emission limitations if they are part of a plan which satisfies the standards of § 110 (a)(2), and the Agency may devise and promulgate a specific plan of its own only if a State fails to submit an implementation plan which satisfies those standards. § 110 (c). Thus, so long as the ultimate effect of a State’s choice of emission limitations is compliance with the national standards for ambient air, the State is at liberty to adopt whatever mix of emission limitations it deems best suited to its particular situation.
This analysis of the Act’s division of responsibilities is not challenged by respondents insofar as it concerns the process of devising and promulgating an initial implementation plan. Respondents do, however, deny that the States have such latitude once the initial plan is approved. Yet the third paragraph of § 110 (a), and the one immediately following the paragraphs which specify that States shall file implementation plans and that the Agency shall approve them if they satisfy certain broad criteria, is the section which requires the Agency to “approve any revision of an implementation plan” if it “determines that it meets the requirements” of § 110 (a)(2). On its face, this provision applies to any revision, without regard either to its breadth of applicability, or to whether it is to be effective before or after the attainment date; rather, Agency approval is subject only to the condition that the revised plan satisfy the general requirements applicable to original implementation plans. Far from evincing congressional intent that the Agency assume control of a State’s emission limitations mix once its initial plan is approved, the revision section is to all appearances the mechanism by which the States may obtain approval of their developing policy choices as to the most practicable and desirable methods of restricting total emissions to a level which is consistent with the national ambient air standards.
In order to challenge this characterization of § 110 (a)(3), respondents principally rely on the contention that the postponement provision, § 110 (f), is the only mechanism by which exceptions to a plan’s requirements may be obtained, under any circumstances. Were this an accurate description of § 110 (f), we would agree that the revision authority does not have the broad application asserted by the Agency. Like the Ninth Circuit, however, we believe that § 110 (f) serves a function different from that of supervising state efforts to modify the initial mix of emission limitations by which they implement national standards.
In our view, § 110 (f) is a safety valve by which may be accorded, under certain carefully specified circumstances, exceptions to the national standards themselves. That this is its role is strongly suggested by the process by which it became a part of the Clean Air Act. The House version of the Amendment, H. R. 17255, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., contained no provisions for either postponements or, most significantly, mandatory deadlines for the attainment of national ambient air standards. The Senate bill, S. 4358, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., did contain both the three-year deadline, which now appears in §110 (a)(2), and the predecessor of the present §110 (f). That predecessor permitted the governor of a State to petition a three-judge district court for “relief from the effect” of expiration of the three-year deadline as to a region or persons, and provided for the grant of such relief upon a showing of conditions similar to those now appearing in § 110 (f). Under its language the postponement provision plainly applied only when deferral of a national deadline was sought.
The Conference Committee adopted the Senate’s general approach to the deadline issue. Its report states:
“The conference substitute follows the Senate. amendment in establishing deadlines for implementing primary ambient air quality standards but leaves the States free to establish a reasonable time period within which secondary ambient air quality standards will be implemented. The conference substitute modifies the Senate amendment in that it allows the Administrator to grant extensions for good causes shown upon application by the Governors.” H. R. Conf. Rep. No*91-1783, p. 45 (1970). (Emphasis added.)
Nowhere does the report suggest that other changes in the Senate’s proposed § 111 (f) were intended to dramatically broaden its reach, such that it would not merely be available to obtain deferral of the strict deadlines for compliance with national standards, but would also be the exclusive mechanism for any ameliorative modification of a plan, no matter how minor.
That the postponement provision was intended merely as a method of escape from the mandatory deadlines becomes even clearer when one considers the summary of the conference’s work which Senator Muskie presented to the Senate. The summary referred to a provision under which a single two-year extension of the deadline could be obtained were it shown to be necessary at the time a State’s initial plan was submitted. It then immediately discussed the postponement provision, as follows:
“A Governor may also apply for a postponement of the deadline if, when the deadline approaches, it is impossible for a source to meet a requirement under an implementation plan, interim control measures have reduced (or will reduce) the adverse health effects of the source, and the continued operation of the source is essential to national security or the public health or welfare of that State.” 116 Cong. Rec. 42384-42385. (Emphasis added.)
This limited view of the role of § 110 (f) is reinforced by comparison with the section which immediately precedes it in the statute, § 110 (e). This is the provision to which Senator Muskie’s summary was obviously referring when it stated that the three-year deadline could be extended for up to two years if proper application were made at the time a State first submitted its plan. Like i 110 (f), § 110 (e) is available only if an emission source is unable to comply with plan requirements because “the necessary technology or other alternatives are not available or will not be available soon enough to permit compliance.” Section 110 (e) also contains a requirement parallel to that of § 110 (f)(1)(C), that available alternative procedures and control measures have been considered and utilized. Unlike § 110 (f), however, § 110 (e) contains no requirement that “the continued operation of such source is essential to national security or to the public health or welfare.” Section 110 (e) thus permits a two-year extension on a showing considerably less stringent than that required for a § 110 (f) one-year postponement. This disparity is quite logical, however, because the relief under § 110 (e) is limited to an initial two-year period, whereas that under § 110 (f)- is available at any time, so long as application is made prior to the effective date of the relevant requirement.
On the other hand, the disparity between the standards of § 110 (e) and those of § 110 (f) would be inexplicable were § 110 (f) also the sole mechanism by which States could modify the particular emission limitations mix incorporated in their initial implementation plans, even though the desired modifications would have no impact on the attainment or maintenance of national standards. Respondents’ interpretation requires the anomalous conclusion that Congress, having stated its goal to be the attainment and maintenance of specified ambient air standards, nonetheless made it significantly more difficult for a State to modify an emission limitations mix which met those standards both before and after modification than for a State to obtain a two-year deferral in the attainment of the standards themselves. The interpretation suffers, therefore, not only from its contrariety to the revision authority which Congress provided, but also from its willingness to ascribe inconsistency to a carefully considered congressional enactment.
We believe that the foregoing analysis of the structure and legislative history of the Clean Air Amendments shows that Congress intended to impose national ambient air Standards to be attained within a specific period of time. It also shows that in §§ 110 (e) and (f) Congress carefully limited the circumstances in which timely attainment and subsequent maintenance of these standards could be compromised. We also believe that Congress, consistent with its declaration that “[e]ach State shall have the primary responsibility for assuring air quality” within its boundaries, § 107 (a), left to the States considerable latitude in determining specifically how the standards would be met. This discretion includes the continuing authority to revise choices about the mix of emission limitations. We therefore conclude that the Agency’s interpretation of §§110 (a)(3) and 110 (f) was “correct,” to the extent that it can be said with complete assurance that any particular interpretation of a complex statute such as this is the “correct” one. Given this conclusion, as well as the facts that the Agency is charged with administration of the Act, and that there has undoubtedly been reliance upon its interpretation by the States and other parties affected by the Act, we have no doubt whatever that its construction was sufficiently reasonable to preclude the Court of Appeals from substituting its judgment for that of the Agency. Udall v. Tollman, 380 U. S. 1, 16-18 (1965); McLaren v. Fleischer, 256 U. S. 477, 480-481 (1921). We are not persuaded to the contrary by any of the arguments advanced by respondents or by the Courts of Appeals whieh have rejected § 110 (a)(3) as authority for granting variances. To these various arguments we now turn.
IV
The principal basis on which the Fifth Circuit rejected the Agency’s view of the revision and postponement sections was its analysis of their language. The court focused first on the fact that § 110 (f) speaks in terms of “any stationary source,” and of the postponement of “any requirement of an applicable implementation plan.” (Emphasis added.) This language, according to the Fifth Circuit, belies the Agency’s contention that the postponement section is inapplicable to those variances which do not jeopardize the attainment or maintenance of national standards. The court went on to state, without citation or supporting reasoning:
“A revision is a change in a generally applicable requirement; a postponement or variance [is a] change in the application of a requirement to a particular party. The distinction between the two is familiar and clear.”' 489 F. 2d 390, 401.
We think that the Fifth Circuit has read more into §110(f), and more out of §110 (a)(3), than careful analysis can sustain. In the first place, the “any stationary source” and “any requirement” language of § 110 (f) serves only to define the matters with respect to which the governor of a State may apply for a postponement. The language does not, as the Fifth Circuit would have it, state that all sources desirous of any form of relief must rely solely on the postponement provision. While § 110 (f) makes its relief available to any source which can qualify for it, regardless of whether the relief would jeopardize national standards, the section does not even suggest that other forms of relief, having no impact on the national goal of achieving air quality standards, are not also available on appropriately less rigorous showings.
As for the Fifth Circuit’s observation that “a revision is a change in a generally applicable requirement,” whereas a “postponement or variance” deals with particular parties, we are not satisfied that the distinction is so “familiar and clear.” While a variance is generally thought to be of specific applicability, whether a revision is general or specific depends on what is being revised. In this instance, it is implementation plans which are being revised, and it is clear that such plans may be quite detailed, both as to sources and the remedial steps required of the sources. Not only does § 110 (a)(2)(B) specify that a plan shall include “emission limitations, schedules, and timetables for compliance,” but respondents themselves have urged that the very specific variances which have already been granted in Georgia should have been, and may still be, treated as “compliance schedules” contained within the original plan.
A further difficulty with the Fifth Circuit’s analysis of the language of §§ 110 (a)(3) and 110 (f) is that it entirely overlooks an obvious distinction between revisions and postponements. In normal usage, to “postpone” is to defer, whereas to “revise” is to remake or amend. In the implementation plan context, normal usage would suggest that a postponement is a deferral of the effective date of a requirement which remains a part of the applicable plan, whereas a revision is a change in the plan itself which deletes or modifies the requirement. If by revision a requirement of a plan is removed, then a person seeking relief from that requirement has no need to seek its postponement, and § 110 (f) is by its terms inapplicable. But if such a person cannot obtain a revision, because for example the plan as so revised would no longer insure timely attainment of the national standards, then under the Act he has no alternative but to comply or to obtain a postponement of the requirement’s effective date — if he can satisfy the stringent conditions of §110 (f). This distinction between the two is so straightforward, and so consistent with the structure and history of the Act, as discussed in Part III of this opinion, that we perceive no basis for the Fifth Circuit’s strained line of analysis.
The Fifth Circuit also relied on the “technology forcing” nature of the Clean Air Amendments of 1970. It reasoned that because the statute was intended to force technology to meet specified, scheduled standards, it was essential to insure that commitments made at the planning stage could not be readily abandoned when the time for compliance arrived. According to the Fifth Circuit, § 110 (f) “is the device Congress chose to assure this.” 489 F. 2d, at 401. Clearly § 110 (f) does present a formidable hurdle for those proposed departures from earlier commitments which are in fact subject to its stringent conditions. What the Fifth Circuit failed to consider, however, is that so long as the national standards are being attained and maintained, there is no basis in the present Clean Air Act for forcing further technological developments. Agency review assures that variances granted under § 110 (a) (3) will b.e consistent with the § 110 (a) (2) (A) requirement that the national standards be attained as expeditiously as practicable and maintained thereafter. Thus § 110(a)(3) variances ex hypothesi do not jeopardize national standards, and the technology-forcing character of the Amendments is no reason at all for judging them under the provisions of § 110 (f).
The First Circuit also rejected the Agency’s contention that variances could be handled under the revision procedure, supra, at 72-73, but it did so for reasons different from those relied upon by the Fifth Circuit. It stated:
“Had Congress meant [§ 110 (f)] to be followed only if a polluter, besides violating objective state requirements, was shown to be preventing maintenance of a national standard, it would have said so. To allow a polluter to raise and perhaps litigate that issue is to invite protracted delay. The factual question could have endless refinements: is it the individual variance-seeker or others whose pollution is preventing maintenance of standards? See e. g., Getty Oil Company v. Ruckelshaus, 342 F. Supp. 1006 (D. Del. 1972), remanded with directions, 467 F. 2d 349 (3rd Cir. 1972),... where Getty raised this issue in various forums.” 478 F. 2d, at 886.
Respondents also stress this argument: treating variances
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | H | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Scalia
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether defense counsel’s agreement to a trial date outside the time period required by Article III of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers bars the defendant from seeking dismissal because trial did not occur within that period.
I
The Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) is a compact entered into by 48 States, the United States, and the District of Columbia to establish procedures for resolution of one State’s outstanding charges against a prisoner of another State. See N. Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 580.20 (McKinney 1995); 18 U. S. C. App. § 2; 11A U. L. A. 48 (1995) (listing jurisdictions). As “a eongressionally sanctioned interstate compact” within the Compact Clause of the United States Constitution, Art. I, § 10, cl. 8, the IAD is a federal law subject to federal construction. Carchman v. Nash, 473 U. S. 716, 719 (1985); Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U. S. 433, 442 (1981).
A State seeking to bring charges against a prisoner in another State’s custody begins the process by filing a detainer, which is a request by the State’s criminal justice agency that the institution in which the prisoner is housed hold the prisoner for the agency or notify the agency when release is imminent. Fex v. Michigan, 507 U. S. 43, 44 (1993). After a detainer has been lodged against him, a prisoner may file a “request for a final disposition to be made of the indictment, information, or complaint.” Art. 111(a). Upon such a request, the prisoner “shall be brought to trial within one hundred eighty days,” “provided that for good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance.” Ibid. Resolution of the charges can also be triggered by the charging jurisdiction, which may request temporary custody of the prisoner for that purpose. Art. IV(a). In such a ease, “trial shall be commenced within one hundred twenty days of the arrival of the prisoner in the receiving state,” subject again to continuances for good cause shown in open court. Art. IV(c). If a defendant is not brought to trial within the applicable statutory period, the LAD requires that the indictment be dismissed with prejudice. Art. V(e).
In this case, New York lodged a detainer against respondent, who was a prisoner in Ohio. Respondent signed a request for disposition of the detainer pursuant to Article III of the IAD, and was returned to New York to face murder and robbery charges. Defense counsel filed several motions, which, it is uncontested, tolled the time limits during their pendency.
On January 9, 1995, the prosecutor and defense counsel appeared in court to set a trial date. The following colloquy ensued:
“[Prosecutor]: Your Honor, [the regular attorney] from our office is engaged in a trial today. He told me that the Court was to set a trial date today. I believe the Court may have preliminarily discussed a May 1st date, and [the regular attorney] says that would fit in his calendar.
“The Court: How is that with the defense counsel?
“[Defense Counsel]: That will be fine, Your Honor.” 164 Misc. 2d 1032, 1035, 627 N. Y. S. 2d 234, 236 (Cty. Ct., Monroe County 1995).
The court scheduled trial to begin on May 1.
On April 17, 1995, respondent moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the LAD’s time limit had expired. The trial court found that as of January 9, 1995, when the trial date was set, 167 nonexcludable days had elapsed, so that if the subsequent time period was chargeable to the State, the 180-day time period had indeed expired. However, the trial court concluded that “[d]efense counsel’s explicit agreement to the trial date set beyond the 180 day statutory period constituted a waiver or abandonment of defendant’s rights under the IAD.” Id., at 1036, 627 N. Y. S. 2d, at 237. Accordingly, the court denied respondent’s motion to dismiss.
Respondent was subsequently convicted, following a jury trial, of murder in the second degree and robbery in the first degree. On appeal, respondent argued that the trial court erred in declining to dismiss the indictment for lack of a timely trial under the IAD. The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, affirmed the decision of the trial court. 244 App. Div. 2d 927, 668 N. Y. S. 2d 126 (1997). The New York Court of Appeals, however, reversed and ordered that the indictment against respondent be dismissed; defense counsel’s agreement to a later trial date, it held, did not waive respondent’s speedy trial rights under the IAD. 92 N. Y. 2d 406, 704 N. E. 2d 542 (1998). We granted certiorari. 526 U. S. 1111 (1999).
II
No provision of the IAD prescribes the effect of a defendant’s assent to delay on the applicable time limits. We have, however, “in the context of a broad array of constitutional and statutory provisions,” articulated a general rule that presumes the availability of waiver, United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U. S. 196, 200-201 (1995), and we have recognized that “[t]he most basic rights of criminal defendants are .. . subject to waiver,” Peretz v. United States, 501 U. S. 923, 936 (1991). In accordance with these principles, courts have agreed that a defendant may, at least under some circumstances, waive his right to object to a given delay under the IAD, although they have disagreed on what is necessary to effect a waiver. See, e. g., People v. Jones, 197 Mich. App. 76, 80, 495 N. W. 2d 159, 160 (1992) (waiver if prisoner “either expressly or impliedly, agrees or requests to be treated in a manner contrary to the terms of the IAD”); Brown v. Wolff, 706 F. 2d 902, 907 (CA9 1983) (waiver if prisoner “affirmatively requests to be treated in a manner contrary to the procedures prescribed by the IAD”); Drescher v. Superior Ct., 218 Cal. App. 3d 1140, 1148, 267 Cal. Rptr. 661, 666 (1990) (waiver if there is a “showing of record that the defendant or his attorney freely acquiesced in a trial date beyond the speedy trial period” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
What suffices for waiver depends on the nature of the right at issue. “[Wjhether the defendant must participate personally in the waiver; whether certain procedures are required for waiver; and whether the defendant’s choice must be particularly informed or voluntary, all depend on the right at stake.” United States v. Olano, 507 U. S. 725, 733 (1993). For certain fundamental rights, the defendant must personally make an informed waiver. See, e. g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 464-465 (1938) (right to counsel); Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U. S. 1, 7-8 (1966) (right to plead not guilty). For other rights, however, waiver may be effected by action of counsel. “Although there are basic rights that the attorney cannot waive without the fully informed and publicly acknowledged consent of the client, the lawyer has — and must have — full authority to manage the conduct of the trial.” Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U. S. 400, 417-418 (1988). As to many decisions pertaining to the conduct of the trial, the defendant is “deemed bound by the acts of his lawyer-agent and is considered to have ‘notice of all facts, notice of which can be charged upon the attorney.’ ” Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U. S. 626, 634 (1962) (quoting Smith v. Ayer, 101 U. S. 320, 326 (1880)). Thus, decisions by counsel are generally given effect as to what arguments to pursue, see Jones v. Barnes, 463 U. S. 745, 751 (1983), what evidentiary objections to raise, see Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U. S. 443, 451 (1965), and what agreements to conclude regarding the admission of evidence, see United States v. McGill, 11 F. 3d 223, 226-227 (CA1 1993). Absent a demonstration of ineffectiveness, counsel’s word on such matters is the last.
Scheduling matters are plainly among those for which agreement by counsel generally controls. This case does not involve a purported prospective waiver of all protection of the IAD’s time limits or of the IAD generally, but merely agreement to a specified delay in trial. When that subject is under consideration, only counsel is in a position to assess the benefit or detriment of the delay to the defendant’s case. Likewise, only counsel is in a position to assess whether the defense would even be prepared to proceed any earlier. Requiring express assent from the defendant himself for such routine and often repetitive scheduling determinations would consume time to no apparent purpose. The text of the IAD, moreover, confirms what the reason of the matter suggests: In allowing the court to grant “good-cause continuances” when either “prisoner or his counsel” is present, it contemplates that scheduling questions may be left to counsel. Art. 111(a) (emphasis added).
Respondent offers two arguments for affirmance, both of which go primarily to the propriety of allowing waiver of any sort, not to the specifics of the waiver here. First, he argues that by explicitly providing for the grant of “good-cause continuances,” the IAD seeks to limit the situations in which delay is permitted, and that permitting other extensions of the time period would override those limitations. It is of course true that waiver is not appropriate when it is inconsistent with the provision creating the right sought to be secured. E. g., Crosby v. United States, 506 U. S. 255, 258-259 (1993); Smith v. United States, 360 U. S. 1, 9 (1959). That is not, however, the situation here. To be sure, the “necessary or reasonable continuance” provision is, by clear implication, the sole means by which the prosecution can obtain an extension of the time limits over the defendant’s objection. But the specification in that provision that the “prisoner or his counsel” must be present suggests that it is directed primarily, if not indeed exclusively, to prosecution requests that have not explicitly been agreed to by the defense. As applied to, agreed-upon extensions, we think its negative implication is dubious — and certainly not clear enough to constitute the “affirmative indication” required to overcome the ordinary presumption that waiver is available. Mezzanatto, supra, at 201.
Second, respondent argues that the IAD benefits not only the defendant but society generally, and that the defendant may not waive society’s rights. It is true that a “right conferred on a private party, but affecting the public interest, may not be waived or released if such waiver or release contravenes the statutory policy” Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U. S. 697, 704 (1945) (emphasis added). The conditional clause is essential, however: It is not true that any private right that also benefits society cannot be waived. In general, “[i]n an adversary system of criminal justice, the public interest in the administration of justice is protected by the participants in the litigation.” Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U. S. 368, 383 (1979). We allow waiver of numerous constitutional protections for criminal defendants that also serve broader social interests. See, e. g., Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U. S. 269, 275 (1942) (waiver of right to jury trial); Johnson, 304 U. S., at 464 (waiver of right to counsel).
Society may well enjoy some benefit from the IAD’s time limits: Delay can lead to a less accurate outcome as witnesses become unavailable and memories fade. See, e. g., Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 40, 56-57 (1968). On the other hand, some social interests served by prompt trial are less relevant here than elsewhere. For example, because the would-be defendant is already incarcerated in another jurisdiction, society’s interests in assuring the defendant’s presence at trial and in preventing further criminal activity (or avoiding the costs of pretrial detention) are simply not at issue. Cf. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U. S. 514, 519 (1972). In any case, it cannot be argued that society’s interest in the prompt resolution of outstanding charges is so central to the IAD that it is part of the unalterable “statutory policy,” Brooklyn Savings Bank, supra, at 704. In fact, the time limits do not apply at all unless either the prisoner or the receiving State files a request. Thus, the IAD “eontemplate[s] a de~ gree of party control that is consonant with the background presumption of waivability.” Mezzanatto, 513 U. S., at 206.
Finally, respondent argues that even if waiver of the IAD’s time limits is possible, it can be effected only by affirmative conduct not present here. The New York Court of Appeals adopted a similar view, stating that the speedy trial rights guaranteed by the IAD may be waived either “explicitly or by an affirmative request for treatment that is contrary to or inconsistent with those speedy trial rights.” 92 N. Y. 2d, at 411, 704 N. E. 2d, at 545. The court concluded that defense counsel’s agreement to the trial date here was not an “affirmative request” and therefore did not constitute a waiver. Id., at 412, 704 N. E. 2d, at 546. We agree with the State that this makes dismissal of the indictment turn on a hyperteehnical distinction that should play no part. As illustrated by this case, such an approach would enable defendants to escape justice by willingly accepting treatment inconsistent with the IAD’s time limits, and then recanting later on. Nothing in the IAD requires or even suggests a distinction between waiver proposed and waiver agreed to. In light of its potential for abuse — and given the harsh remedy of dismissal with prejudice — we decline to adopt it.
* * *
The judgment of the New York Court of Appeals is reversed.
It is so ordered.
It was suggested at oral argument that agreement in open court to a trial date outside the allowable time period can itself be viewed as a “necessary or reasonable continuance” for “good cause shown in open court.” Although an agreed-upon trial date might sometimes merit this description, it is far from clear that it always does so, or that it does so here. Because we find waiver, we do not consider under what circumstances an agreed-upon delay could fit within the good-cause provision.
This feature, among others, makes respondent’s analogy to the federal Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U. S. C. §3161 et seq., inapt. The time limits of the Speedy Trial Act begin to run automatically rather than upon request, §§ 3161(a), (b); dismissal may sometimes be without prejudice, §§ 3162(a)(1), (2), United States v. Taylor, 487 U. S. 326, 332-333 (1988); and waiver is expressly allowed in certain limited circumstances, 18 U. S. C. § 3162(a)(2). In any event, the question of waiver under the Speedy Trial Act is not before us today, and we express no view on the subject.
In concluding that objection to a specified delay may be waived, we are mindful that the sending State may have interests distinct from those of the prisoner and the receiving State. This case does not involve any objection from the sending State, and we do not address what recourse the sending State might have under the IAD when the receiving State and prisoner agree to, and the court allows, an inordinate delay. Cf. Article V(e) (“At the earliest practicable time consonant with the purposes of this agreement, the prisoner shall be returned to the sending State”).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | A | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Souter
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This murder case comes before us for the third time, to review a determination by the Supreme Court of South Carolina that instructions allowing the jury to apply unconstitutional presumptions were harmless error. We hold that the State Supreme Court employed a deficient standard of review, find that the errors were not harmless, and reverse.
I
A
Petitioner, Dale Robert Yates, and an accomplice, Henry Davis, robbed a country store in Greenville County, South Carolina. After shooting and wounding the proprietor, petitioner fled. Davis then killed a woman before he was shot to death by the proprietor. Petitioner was arrested soon after the robbery and charged with multiple felonies. Although he killed no one, the State prosecuted him for murder as an accomplice.
The trial record shows that for some time petitioner and Davis had planned to commit a robbery and selected T. P. Wood’s Store in Greenville as an easy target. After parking Davis’ car outside, they entered the store, petitioner armed with a handgun and Davis with a knife. They found no one inside except the proprietor, Willie Wood, who was standing behind the counter. Petitioner and Davis brandished their weapons, and petitioner ordered Wood to give them all the money in the cash register. When Wood hesitated, Davis repeated the demand. Wood gave Davis approximately $3,000 in cash. Davis handed the money to petitioner and ordered Wood to lie across the counter. Wood, who had a pistol beneath his jacket, refused and stepped back from the counter with his hands down at his side. Petitioner meanwhile was backing away from the counter toward the entrance to the store, with his gun pointed at Wood. Davis told him to shoot. Wood raised his hands as if to protect himself, whereupon petitioner fired twice. One bullet pierced Wood’s left hand and tore a flesh wound in his chest, but the other shot missed. Petitioner then screamed, “Let’s go,” and ran out with the money. App. 57. He jumped into Davis’ car on the passenger side and waited. When Davis failed to emerge, petitioner moved across the seat and drove off.
Inside the store, Wood, though wounded, ran around the counter pursued by Davis, who jumped on his back. As the two struggled, Wood’s mother, Helen Wood, emerged from an adjacent office. She screamed when she saw the scuffle and ran toward the two men to help her son. Wood testified that his mother “reached her left arm around and grabbed [Davis]. So, all three of us stumbled around the counter, out in the aisle.” Id., at 19. During the struggle, Mrs. Wood was stabbed once in the chest and died at the scene within minutes. Wood managed to remove the pistol from under his jacket and fire five shots at Davis, killing him instantly.
The police arrested petitioner a short while later and charged him as an accomplice to the murder of Mrs. Wood. Under South Carolina law, “where two persons combine to commit an unlawful act, and in execution of the criminal act, a homicide is committed by one of the actors as a probable or natural consequence of those acts [sic], all present participating in the unlawful act are as guilty as the one who committed the fatal act.” State v. Johnson, 291 S. C. 127, 129, 352 S. E. 2d 480, 482 (1987). Petitioner’s primary defense to the murder charge was that Mrs. Wood’s death was not the probable or natural consequence of the robbery he had planned with Davis. Petitioner testified that he had brought a weapon with him only to induce the store owner to empty the cash register, and that neither he nor Davis intended to kill anyone during the robbery. App. 37, 42-44, 49, 77-78.
The prosecution’s case for murder rested on petitioner’s agreement with Davis to commit an armed robbery. From this the State argued they had planned to kill any witnesses at the scene, and had thereby rendered homicide a probable or natural result of the robbery, in satisfaction of the requirement for accomplice liability. In his closing argument to the jury, the prosecutor asserted that petitioner and Davis had planned to rob without leaving “any witnesses in the store.” They entered the store “with the idea of stabbing the proprietor to death; a quiet killing, with [petitioner’s] pistol as a backup.” As a result of this agreement, the prosecutor concluded, “[i]t makes no difference who actually struck the fatal blow, the hand of one is the hand of all.” Id., at 89. The prosecutor also addressed the required element of malice. “Mr. Yates,” he argued, “is equally guilty. The malice required was in his heart,” making him guilty of murder even though he did not actually kill the victim. Id., at 83.
The trial judge charged the jury that murder under South Carolina law “is the unlawful killing of any human being with malice aforethought either express or implied.” Id., at 95. The judge continued:
“In order to convict one of murder, the State must not only prove the killing of the deceased by the Defendant, but that it was done with malice aforethought, and such proof must be beyond any reasonable doubt. Malice is defined in the law of homicide as a technical term, which imports wickedness and excludes any just cause or excuse for your action. It is something which springs from wickedness, from depravity, from a depraved spirit, from a heart devoid of social duty, and fatally bent on creating mischief. The words ‘express’ or ‘implied’ do not mean different kinds of malice, but they mean different ways in which the only kind of malice known to the law may be áhown.
“Malice may be expressed as where previous threats of vengeance have been made or is where someone lies in wait for someone else to come by so that they might attack them, or any other circumstances which show directly that an intent to kill was really and actually entertained.
“Malice may also be implied as where, although no expressed intention to kill was proved by direct evidence, it is indirectly and necessarily inferred from facts and circumstances which are, themselves, proved. Malice is implied or presumed by the law from the willful, deliberate, and intentional doing of an unlawful act without any just cause or excuse. In its general signification, malice means the doing of a wrongful act, intentionally, without justification or excuse.
“I tell you, however, that if the facts proven are sufficient to raise a presumption of malice, that presumption is rebuttable, that is, it is not conclusive on you, but it is rebuttable by the rest of the evidence. I tell you, also, that malice is implied or presumed from the use of a deadly weapon. I further tell you that when the circumstances surrounding the use of that deadly weapon have been put in evidence and testified to, the presumption is removed. And it ultimately remains the responsibility for you, ladies and gentlemen, under all the evidence to make a determination as to whether malice existed in the mind and heart of the killer at the time the fatal blow was struck.” Id., at 96-97.
The judge went on to instruct the jury on the theory of accomplice liability. The jury returned guilty verdicts on the murder charge and on all the other counts in the indictment. The Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed the conviction, and we denied certiorari. State v. Yates, 280 S. C. 29, 310 S. E. 2d 805 (1982), cert. denied, 462 U. S. 1124 (1983).
B
Petitioner thereafter sought a writ of habeas corpus from the State Supreme Court, asserting that the jury charge “that malice is implied or presumed from the use of a deadly weapon” was an unconstitutional burden-shifting instruction both under state precedent, State v. Elmore, 279 S. C. 417, 308 S. E. 2d 781 (1983), and under our decision in Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U. S. 510 (1979). While the state habeas petition was pending, we delivered another opinion on unconstitutional burden-shifting jury instructions, Francis v. Franklin, 471U. S. 307 (1985). Although petitioner brought this decision to the attention of the state court, it denied relief without opinion, and petitioner sought certiorari here. We granted the writ, vacated the judgment of the Supreme Court of South Carolina, and remanded the case for further consideration in light of Francis. Yates v. Aiken, 474 U. S. 896 (1985).
On remand, the State Supreme Court found the jury instruction unconstitutional, but denied relief on the ground that its decision in State v. Elmore, supra, was not to be applied retroactively. Petitioner again sought review here, and again we granted certiorari, Yates v. Aiken, 480 U. S. 945 (1987), out of concern that the State Supreme Court had not complied with the mandate to reconsider its earlier decision in light of Francis v. Franklin, supra. Yates v. Aiken, 484 U. S. 211, 214 (1988). In an opinion by Justice Stevens, we unanimously held the state court had erred in failing to consider the retroactive application of Francis. We then addressed that question and held that Francis was merely an application of the principle settled by our prior decision in Sandstrom v. Montana, supra, and should, for that reason, be applied retroactively in petitioner’s habeas proceeding. We accordingly reversed the judgment of the State Supreme Court and remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with our opinion. Yates v. Aiken, 484 U. S., at 218.
On the second remand, the Supreme Court of South Carolina stated that it was “[a]cquiescing in the conclusion that the trial judge’s charge on implied malice constituted an improper mandatory presumption.” State v. Yates, 301 S. C. 214, 216-217, 391 S. E. 2d 530, 531 (1989). On reviewing the record, the court found “two erroneous charges regarding implied malice. First, the trial judge charged the ‘willful, deliberate, and intentional doing of an unlawful act without any just cause or excuse’ [implied malice]. Second, he charged, ‘malice is implied or presumed from the use of a deadly weapon’....” Id., at 218, 391 S. E. 2d, at 532.
Despite this determination that two jury instructions were unconstitutional, the State Supreme Court again denied relief after a majority of three justices found the instructions to have been harmless error. The court described its enquiry as one to determine “whether it is beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have found it unnecessary to rely on the erroneous mandatory presumption regarding the element of malice.” Ibid. The court then stated that on “the facts of this case, as charged by the trial judge, the element of malice relied on by the State is that of the killer, Henry Davis.” Id., at 219, 391 S. E. 2d, at 532. Reviewing the facts, the court stated that “Davis lunged at Mrs. Wood with his knife [and] Mrs. Wood fell to the floor from knife wounds in her chest and died within moments.” Id., at 217, 391 S. E. 2d, at 531 (emphasis added). The court described the crime as “Henry Davis’ brutal multiple stabbing of Mrs. Wood,” and held “beyond a reasonable doubt [that] the jury would have found it unnecessary to rely on either erroneous mandatory presumption in concluding that Davis acted with malice in killing Mrs. Wood.” Id., at 219, 391 S. E. 2d, at 532 (emphasis supplied). The state court gave no citation to the record for its description of Mrs. Wood’s death as resulting from a multiple stabbing and multiple wounds.
The remaining two justices on the State Supreme Court dissented. After first expressing doubt that this Court’s mandate authorized them to review for harmless error, id., at 222, 391 S. E. 2d, at 534, the dissenters disagreed that the erroneous jury instructions were harmless. They found that the trial judge “failed to articulate that the jury must find the killer acted with malicious intent.” Following this error, “the jury could have mistakenly inferred from the confusing instructions that the intent required in order to prove murder was that of Yates because he carried a gun. The unconstitutional instruction which allowed the jury to presume intent... would have eclipsed Yates’ defense of withdrawal, and prejudiced his right to a fair trial.” Id., at 222-223, 391 S. E. 2d, at 534-535.
Because the Supreme Court of South Carolina appeared to have applied the wrong standard for determining whether the challenged instructions were harmless error, and to have misread the record to which the standard was applied, we granted certiorari to review this case a third time. 498 U. S. 809 (1990).
II
A
This Court held in Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U. S., at 513, 524, that a jury instruction stating that “ ‘the law presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts’ ” violated the requirement of the Due Process Clause that the prosecution prove each element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358 (1970). We applied this principle in Francis v. Franklin, 471 U. S. 307 (1985), to instructions that the “‘acts of a person of sound mind and discretion are presumed to be the product of the person’s will’ and that a person ‘is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his acts.’” Id., at 316 (emphasis omitted). Although the jury had been told that these presumptions were rebuttable, we held them to be as pernicious in this context as conclusive presumptions because they shifted the burden of proof on intent to the de-. fendant. Id., at 316-318.
In charging the jurors on the issue of malice in this case, the trial judge instructed them on two mandatory presumptions, each of which the Supreme Court of South Carolina has since held to be unconstitutional under Sandstrom and Francis. The jury was told that “malice is implied or presumed” from the “willful, deliberate, and intentional doing of an unlawful act” and from the “use of a deadly weapon.” App. 96. With respect to the unlawful act presumption, the jury was told that the “presumption is rebuttable, that is, it is not conclusive on you, but it is rebuttable by the rest of the evidence.” Ibid. Following the description of the deadly weapon presumption, the jurors were told that it was their responsibility “under all the evidence to make a determination as to whether malice existed in the mind and heart of the killer.” Ibid.
We think a reasonable juror would have understood the unlawful act presumption to mean that upon introduction of evidence tending to rebut malice, the jury should consider all evidence bearing on the issue of malice, together with the presumption, which would still retain some probative significance. A reasonable juror would have understood the deadly weapon presumption to mean that its probative force should be considered along with all other evidence tending to prove or disprove malice. Although the presumptions were rebuttable in these ways, the mandate to apply them remained, as did their tendency to shift the burden of proof on malice from the prosecution to petitioner. Respondents do not challenge the conclusion of the Supreme Court of South Carolina that each presumption violated Sandstrom and Francis, and the constitutionality of neither one is in issue.
B
Having concluded that the instructions were constitutionally erroneous, the Supreme Court of South Carolina correctly treated them as subject to further review for harmless error, consistently with Rose v. Clark, 478 U. S. 570, 582 (1986), in which we held that the taint of an unconstitutional burden-shifting jury instruction may be harmless, citing Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18 (1967). The Chap man test is whether it appears “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” Id., at 24; see ibid, (requirement that harmlessness of federal constitutional error be clear beyond reasonable doubt embodies standard requiring reversal if “ ‘there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction’ ”) (quoting Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U. S. 85, 86-87 (1963)); Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U. S. 279, 296 (1991) (confession is harmless error if it “did not contribute to [the defendant’s] conviction”); Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U. S. 673, 681 (1986) (Chapman excuses errors that were “ ‘harmless’ in terms of their effect on the factfinding process at trial”).
To say that an error did not “contribute” to the ensuing verdict is not, of course, to say that the jury was totally unaware of that feature of the trial later held to have been erroneous. When, for example, a trial court has instructed a jury to apply an unconstitutional presumption, a reviewing court can hardly infer that the jurors failed to consider it, a conclusion that would be factually untenable in most cases, and would run counter to a sound presumption of appellate practice, that jurors are reasonable and generally follow the instructions they are given. See Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U. S. 200, 211 (1987) (“The rule that juries are presumed to follow their instructions is a pragmatic one, rooted less in the absolute certitude that the presumption is true than in the belief that it represents a reasonable practical accommodation of the interests of the state and the defendant”).
To say that an error did not contribute to the verdict is, rather, to find that error unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered on the issue in question, as revealed in the record. Thus, to say that an instruction to apply an unconstitutional presumption did not contribute to the verdict is to make a judgment about the significance of the presumption to reasonable jurors, when measured against the other evidence considered by those jurors independently of the presumption.
Before reaching such a judgment, a court must take two quite distinct steps. First, it must ask what evidence the jury actually considered in reaching its verdict. If, for example, the fact presumed is necessary to support the verdict, a reviewing court must ask what evidence the jury considered as tending to prove or disprove that fact. Did the jury look at only the predicate facts, or did it consider other evidence bearing on the fact subject to the presumption? In answering this question, a court does not conduct a subjective enquiry into the jurors’ minds. The answer must come, instead, from analysis of the instructions given to the jurors and from application of that customary presumption that jurors follow instructions and, specifically, that they consider relevant evidence on a point in issue when they are told that they may do so.
Once a court has made the first enquiry into the evidence considered by the jury, it must then weigh the probative force of that evidence as against the probative force of the presumption standing alone. To satisfy Chapman’s reasonable-doubt standard, it will not be enough that the jury considered evidence from which it could have come to the verdict without reliance on the presumption. Rather, the issue under Chapman is whether the jury actually rested its verdict on evidence establishing the presumed fact beyond a reasonable doubt, independently of the presumption. Since that enquiry cannot be a subjective one into the jurors’ minds, a court must approach it by asking whether the force of the evidence presumably considered by the jury in accordance with the instructions is so overwhelming as to leave it beyond a reasonable doubt that the verdict resting on that evidence would have been the same in the absence of the presumption. It is only when the effect of the presumption is comparatively minimal to this degree that it can be said, in Chapman’s words, that the presumption did not contribute to the verdict rendered.
Because application of the harmless-error test to an erroneous presumption thus requires an identification and evaluation of the evidence considered by the jury in addition to the presumption itself, we need to say a word about an assumption made in many opinions applying the Chapman rule, which state that the harmlessness of an error is to be judged after a review of the entire record. See, e. g., Delaware v. Van Arsdall, supra, at 681 (“[A]n otherwise valid conviction should not be set aside if the reviewing court may confidently say, on the whole record, that the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”); United States v. Hasting, 461 U. S. 499, 609, n. 7 (1983) (“Chapman mandates consideration of the entire record prior to reversing a conviction for constitutional errors that may be harmless”). That assumption is simply that the jury considered all the evidence bearing on the issue in question before it made the findings on which the verdict rested. If, on the contrary, that assumption were incorrect, an examination of the entire record would not permit any sound conclusion to be drawn about the significance of the error to the jury in reaching the verdict. This point must always be kept in mind when reviewing erroneous presumptions for harmless error, because the terms of some presumptions so narrow the jury’s focus as to leave it questionable that a reasonable juror would look to anything but the evidence establishing the predicate fact in order to infer the fact presumed. When applying a harmless-error analysis in presumption cases, therefore, it is crucial to ascertain from the trial court’s instructions that the jurors, as reasonable persons, would have considered the entire trial record, before looking to that record to assess the significance of the erroneous presumption.
C
The Supreme Court of South Carolina failed to apply the proper harmless-error standard to the rebuttable presumptions at issue in this case. As a threshold matter, the State Supreme Court did not undertake any explicit analysis to support its view of the scope of the record to be considered in applying Chapman. It is even more significant, however, that the state court did not apply the test that Chapman formulated. Instead, the court employed language taken out of context from Rose v. Clark, 478 U. S. 570 (1986), and sought merely to determine whether it was beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury “would have found it unnecessary to rely” on the unconstitutional presumptions.
Enquiry about the necessity for reliance, however, does not satisfy all of Chapman’s concerns. It can tell us that the verdict could have been the same without the presumptions, when there was evidence sufficient to support the verdict independently of the presumptions’ effect. But the enquiry will not tell us whether the jury’s verdict did rest on that evidence as well as on the presumptions, or whether that evidence was of such compelling force as to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the presumptions must have made no difference in reaching the verdict obtained. Because the State Supreme Court’s standard of review apparently did not take these latter two issues into consideration, reversal is required.
Ill
Although our usual practice in cases like this is to reverse and remand for a new determination under the correct standard, we have the authority to make our own assessment of the harmlessness of a constitutional error in the first instance. See Rose v. Clark, supra, at 584. Because this case has already been remanded twice, once for harmless-error analysis, we think we would serve judicial economy best by proceeding now to determine whether the burden-shifting jury instructions were harmless.
We begin by turning to the State’s domestic law of accomplice murder and the elements it entails. The State Supreme Court decided that the trial judge “correctly and precisely” charged the jury on “the common law rule of murder,” which required proof of malice. State v. Yates, 280 S. C., at 38, 310 S. E. 2d, at 810. Petitioner was charged as an accomplice to the alleged murder of Mrs. Wood by Davis, and the state court determined that on “the facts of this case, as charged by the trial judge, the element of malice relied on by the State is that of the killer, Henry Davis.” 301 S. C., at 219, 391 S. E. 2d, at 532.
In light of the fact that the Supreme Court of South Carolina has approved the trial judge’s jury instructions, we will accept his charge on malice as the proper statement of South Carolina law on the subject. The trial judge told the jury that malice is the equivalent of an “intention to kill,” without legal justification or excuse. There is no question that either presumption on malice could have been employed by the jury in reaching its verdict. The evidence showed clearly that Davis used a deadly weapon, a knife, and intended to commit, and did commit, an unlawful act without legal justification, not only armed robbery, but the killing itself.
The first step in determining whether these instructions contributed to the jury’s verdict is to determine what evidence the jury considered on the issue of intent, independently of the presumptions themselves. The record reveals some evidence rebutting malice, including petitioner’s testimony that neither he nor Davis intended to kill anyone. This left the jury free to look beyond the unlawful act presumption and to consider all the evidence on malice. The jury can reasonably be expected to have done so. Likewise, under the deadly weapon presumption, as we have construed it, the jury was instructed to consider all the evidence, not just the presumption itself. Since we can thus infer with confidence that the jury considered all the evidence tending to prove or disprove Davis’ intent to kill, it is correct simply to follow the general rule of the post-Chapman cases that the whole record be reviewed in assessing the significance of the errors.
An examination of the entire record reveals that, as to Willie Wood, there was clear evidence of Davis’ intent to kill: Instead of leaving the store when he could have, Davis pursued Wood with a deadly weapon in his hand and attacked Wood by jumping on his back. This evidence was enhanced by the fact that Davis had at least two reasons to kill Wood. He could have thought it necessary to avoid being himself killed or injured by Wood, and he also could have thought it necessary to avoid being identified by Wood to the police.
As probative as this was of Davis’ intent to kill Wood, however, there was nothing in the instructions that allowed the jurors to consider this evidence in assessing Davis’ intent to kill Wood’s mother. Application of a theory of transferred intent would, of course, have allowed the jury to equate Davis’ malice in accosting Willie Wood with malice in the killing of Mrs. Wood. See 2 C. Torcia, Wharton’s Criminal Law § 144 (14th ed. 1979) (“Under the common-law doctrine of transferred intent, a defendant, who intends to kill one person but instead kills a bystander, is deemed the author of whatever kind of homicide would have been committed had he killed the intended victim”); American Law Institute, Model Penal Code §2.03(2) (1985). But the jury was not charged on a theory of transferred intent, and we are therefore barred from treating evidence of intent to kill Wood as underlying the necessary finding of intent to' kill Wood’s mother.
The evidence of Davis’ intent to kill Mrs. Wood is far less clear. The prosecution argued that petitioner and Davis entered the store with the intention of killing any witnesses they found inside, and while this inference from the evidence was undoubtedly permissible, it was not compelled as a rational necessity. Petitioner testified that neither he nor Davis had planned to kill anyone, and the record shows that petitioner left the store not knowing whether he had, in fact, killed Willie Wood. Petitioner further testified that he heard a woman scream as he left the store, yet the evidence is clear that he made no effort to return and kill her. App. 57, 61. Hence, the jury could have taken petitioner’s behavior as confirming his claim that he and Davis had not originally planned to kill anyone whom they might find inside the store.
Nor do the specific circumstances of Mrs. Wood’s death reveal anything clear about Davis’ intent toward her. The Supreme Court of South Carolina, to be sure, viewed the record as showing that Davis directed his attention specifically to Mrs. Wood, and attacked her with a repetitiveness ruling out the possibility of inadvertence. The state court’s majority described Davis as having “lunged at Mrs. Wood with his knife” and inflicted “wounds” to her chest during a “brutal multiple stabbing.” 301 S. C., at 217-219, 391 S. E. 2d, at 531-532.
The state court’s description of the evidence as tending to prove Davis’ malice is not, however, supported by the record. The only eyewitness to the homicide, Willie Wood, testified that it was Mrs. Wood who ran into the store and “reached her left arm around and grabbed” Davis, after which “the three of [them] stumbled around the counter, out in the aisle.” There was no other testimony on how Mrs. Wood encountered Davis. The pathologist who performed an autopsy on Mrs. Wood testified that she died of a single wound to the chest and that “[t]here were no other wounds that I noted on the external surface of the body.” App. 32. There was no other testimony or physical evidence that Mrs. Wood suffered any wounds beyond the fatal one to her chest. The record thus does not support the state court’s assertion that Davis “lunged” at Mrs. Wood, or its description of Mrs. Wood’s “wounds” as resulting from a “multiple stabbing.” The prosecutor in his summation even conceded that “it appeared [Mrs. Wood] tried to grab Mr. Davis.” Id., at 88. The most that can be said with certainty is that Mrs. Wood joined the struggle between Davis and Wood and was stabbed during the course of it. She could have been killed inadvertently by Davis, and we cannot rule out that possibility beyond a reasonable doubt.
In sum, the evidentiary record simply is not clear on Davis’ intent to kill the victim. Without more, we could not infer beyond a reasonable doubt that the presumptions did not contribute to the jury’s finding of Davis’ intent to kill Mrs. Wood and to the ensuing verdict of petitioner’s guilt as Davis’ accomplice.
IV
The burden-shifting jury instructions found to have been erroneous in this case may not be excused as harmless error. The judgment of the Supreme Court of South Carolina is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Blackmun joins all but Part III of this opinion.
Petitioner was indicted for murder, armed robbery, assault and battery with intent to kill, and conspiracy.
The State relied on a theory of accomplice liability because South Carolina does not have a felony-murder statute.
The pathologist who performed an autopsy on Mrs. Wood testified that the cause of her death was “a penetrating wound of the chest that was narrow and penetrated the full thickness of the chest by probe examination. There were -no other wounds that I noted on the external surface of the body.” App. 32.
Petitioner's second defense was that he had withdrawn from his agreement to commit the robbery when he shouted to Davis, “Let’s go,” and ran out of the store. Having allegedly withdrawn from the robbery scheme, petitioner contended that he was not liable for the subsequent homicide by his former accomplice.
In this case, petitioner challenges only his murder conviction. Brief for Petitioner 10, n. 5.
The presumption on the use of a deadly weapon in this case was qualified with the instruction that “when the circumstances surrounding the use of that deadly weapon have been put in evidence and testified to, the presumption is removed.” App. 96. This instruction confuses more than it clarifies. The jury could not presume malice under this rule without evidence that a deadly weapon was used. That evidence included a description of the melee in which the stabbing occurred. Yet the jury was told that once such evidence was introduced, the presumption vanished. As a reasonable juror would have understood the instruction, it was inherently contradictory. We think such a juror would have felt obliged to give the presumption some application and accordingly find its “bursting bubble” clause insufficient to correct the error of presuming malice from the use of a deadly weapon. See Francis v. Franklin, 471 U. S. 307, 322 (1985) (“Language that merely contradicts and does not explain a constitutionally infirm instruction will not suffice to absolve the infirmity”).
A mandatory presumption, even though rebuttable, is different from a permissive presumption, which “does not require... the trier of fact to infer the elemental fact from proof by the prosecutor of the basic one and... places no burden of any kind on the defendant.” Ulster County Court v. Allen, 442 U. S. 140, 157 (1979). A permissive presumption merely allows an inference to be drawn and is constitutional so long as the inference would not be irrational. See Francis v. Franklin, supra, at 314-315.
In his opinion concurring in the judgment in Carella v. California, 491 U. S. 263, 267 (1989), Justice Scalia noted that the majority opinion in Rose v. Clark, 478 U. S. 570 (1986), is not entirely consistent in its articulation of the harmless-error standard to be applied to rebuttable presumptions. In fact, the opinion in Rose does contain language that, when taken out of context, suggests standards that are both more restrictive and less restrictive than the standard for reviewing rebuttable presumptions that we apply today. Compare id., at 580-581 (“In many cases, the predicate facts conclusively establish intent, so that no rational jury could find that the defendant committed the relevant criminal act but did not intend to cause injury”) (emphasis in original), with id., at 579 (rebuttable presumption is harmless error “[w]here a reviewing court can find that the record developed at trial establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt”). The first statement, by its own terms, would not reflect the appropriate enquiry in every rebuttable presumption case; the second, in isolation, would not be correct, as our opinion today explains.
If the presumed fact is not itself necessary for the verdict, but only one of a variety of facts sufficient to prove a necessary element, the reviewing court should identify not only the evidence considered for the fact subject to the presumption, but also the evidence for alternative facts sufficient to prove the element.
For reviewing the effect of a conclusive presumption, a restrictive analysis has been proposed that would focus only on the predicate facts to be relied on under the presumption and would require a court to determine whether they “are so closely related to the ultimate fact to be presumed that no rational jury could find those facts without also finding that ultimate fact.” Carella v. California, 491 U. S., at 271 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). The error is harmless in this situation because it is beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury found the facts necessary to support the conviction. Ibid. Application of this narrow focus is urged, because the terms of a conclusive presumption tend to deter a jury from considering any evidence for the presumed fact beyond the predicate evidence; indeed, to do so would be a waste of the jury’s time and contrary to its instructions. See Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U. S. 510, 526, n. 13 (1979). The same may be true when a mandatory rebuttable presumption is applied in a case with no rebutting evidence, rendering the presumption conclusive in its operation.
The Court's opinion in Rose v. Clark, 478 U. S., at 583, quotes from the dissent in Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U. S. 73, 97, n. 5 (1983) (opinion of Powell, J.), in such a way as to suggest that a reviewing court must determine only whether “the jury would have found it
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | A | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Chief Justice Rehnquist
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner was a joint owner, with her husband, of an automobile in which her husband engaged in sexual activity with a prostitute. A Michigan court ordered the automobile forfeited as a public nuisance, with no offset for her interest, notwithstanding her lack of knowledge of her husband’s activity. We hold that the Michigan court order did not offend the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Detroit police arrested John Bennis after observing him engaged in a sexual act with a prostitute in the automobile while it was parked on a Detroit city street. Bennis was convicted of gross indecency. The State then sued both Bennis and his wife, petitioner Tina B. Bennis, to have the car declared a public nuisance and abated as such under §§600.3801 and 600.3825 of Michigan’s Compiled Laws.
Petitioner defended against the abatement of her interest in the car on the ground that, when she entrusted her husband to use the car, she did not know that he would use it to violate Michigan’s indecency law. The Wayne County Circuit Court rejected this argument, declared the car a public nuisance, and ordered the car’s abatement. In reaching this disposition, the trial court judge recognized the remedial discretion he had under Michigan’s case law. App. 21. He took into account the couple’s ownership of “another automobile,” so they would not be left “without transportation.” Id., at 25. He also mentioned his authority to order the payment of one-half of the sale proceeds, after the deduction of costs, to “the innocent co-title holder.” Id., at 21. He declined to order such a division of sale proceeds in this case because of the age and value of the car (an 11-year-old Pontiac sedan recently purchased by John and Tina Bennis for $600); he commented in this regard: “[T]here’s practically nothing left minus costs in a situation such as this.” Id., at 25.
- The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed, holding that regardless of the language of Michigan Compiled Law § 600.3815(2), Michigan Supreme Court precedent interpreting this section prevented the State from abating petitioner’s interest absent proof that she knew to what end the car would be used. Alternatively, the intermediate appellate court ruled that the conduct in question did not qualify as a public nuisance because only one occurrence was shown and there was no evidence of payment for the sexual act. 200 Mich. App. 670, 504 N. W. 2d 731 (1993).
The Michigan Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the abatement in its entirety. 447 Mich. 719, 527 N. W. 2d 483 (1994). It concluded as a matter of state law that the episode in the Bennis vehicle was an abatable nuisance. Rejecting the Court of Appeals’ interpretation of § 600.3815(2), the court then announced that, in order to abate an owner’s interest in a vehicle, Michigan does not need to prove that the owner knew or agreed that her vehicle would be used in a manner proscribed by § 600.3801 when she entrusted it to another user. Id., at 737, 527 N. W. 2d, at 492. The court next addressed petitioner’s federal constitutional challenges to the State’s abatement scheme: The court assumed that petitioner did not know of or consent to the misuse of the Bennis car, and concluded in light of our decisions in Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U. S. 465 (1926), and Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U. S. 663 (1974), that Michigan’s failure to provide an innocent-owner defense was “without constitutional consequence.” 447 Mich., at 740-741, 527 N. W. 2d, at 493-494. The Michigan Supreme Court specifically noted that, in its view, an owner’s interest may not be abated when “a vehicle is used without the owner’s consent.” Id., at 742, n. 36, 527 N. W. 2d, at 495, n. 36. Furthermore, the court confirmed the trial court’s description of the nuisance abatement proceeding as an “equitable action,” and considered it “critical” that the trial judge so comprehended the statute. Id., at 742, 527 N. W. 2d, at 495.
We granted certiorari in order to determine whether Michigan’s abatement scheme has deprived petitioner of her interest in the forfeited car without due process, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, or has taken her interest for public use without compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment as incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment. 515 U. S. 1121 (1995). We affirm.
The gravamen of petitioner’s due process claim is not that she was denied notice or an opportunity to contest the abatement of her car; she was accorded both. Cf. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U. S. 43 (1993). Rather, she claims she was entitled to contest the abatement by showing she did not know her husband would use it to violate Michigan’s indecency law. But a long and unbroken line of cases holds that an owner’s interest in property may be forfeited by reason of the use to which the property is put even though the owner did not know that it was to be put to such use.
Our earliest opinion to this effect is Justice Story’s opinion for the Court in The Palmyra, 12 Wheat. 1 (1827). The Palmyra, which had been commissioned as a privateer by the King of Spain and had attacked a United States vessel, was captured by a United States warship and brought into Charleston, South Carolina, for adjudication. Id., at 8. On the Government’s appeal from the Circuit Court’s acquittal of the vessel, it was contended by the owner that the vessel could not be forfeited until he was convicted for the priva-teering. The Court rejected this contention, explaining: “The thing is here primarily considered as the offender, or rather the offence is attached primarily to the thing.” Id., at 14. In another admiralty forfeiture decision 17 years later, Justice Story wrote for the Court that in in rem admiralty proceedings “the acts of the master and crew . . . bind the interest of the owner of the ship, whether he be innocent or guilty; and he impliedly submits to whatever the law denounces as a forfeiture attached to the ship by reason of their unlawful or wanton wrongs.” Harmony v. United States, 2 How. 210, 234 (1844) (emphasis added).
In Dobbins’s Distillery v. United States, 96 U. S. 395, 401 (1878), this Court upheld the forfeiture of property used by a lessee in fraudulently avoiding federal alcohol taxes, observing: “Cases often arise where the property of the owner is forfeited on account of the fraud, neglect, or misconduct of those intrusted with its possession, care, and custody, even when the owner is otherwise without fault . . . and it has always been held . . . that the acts of [the possessors] bind the interest of the owner . . . whether he be innocent or guilty.”
In Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U. S. 465 (1926), this Court upheld the forfeiture of a purchaser’s interest in a car misused by the seller. Van Oster purchased an automobile from a dealer but agreed that the dealer might retain possession for use in its business. The dealer allowed an associate to use the automobile, and the associate used it for the illegal transportation of intoxicating liquor. Id., at 465-466. The State brought a forfeiture action pursuant to a Kansas statute, and Van Oster defended on the ground that the transportation of the liquor in the car was without her knowledge or authority. This Court rejected Van Oster’s claim:
“It is not unknown or indeed uncommon for the law to visit upon the owner of property the unpleasant consequences of the unauthorized action of one to whom he has entrusted it. Much of the jurisdiction in admiralty, so much of the statute and common law of liens as enables a mere bailee to subject the bailed property to a lien, the power of a vendor of chattels in possession to sell and convey good title to a stranger, are familiar examples____They suggest that certain uses of property may be regarded as so undesirable that the owner surrenders his control at his peril. . . .
“It has long been settled that statutory forfeitures of property entrusted by the innocent owner or lienor to another who uses it in violation of the revenue laws of the United States is not a violation of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.” Id., at 467-468.
The Van Oster Court relied on J. W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U. S. 505 (1921), in which the Court upheld the forfeiture of a seller’s interest in a car misused by the purchaser. The automobile was forfeited after the purchaser transported bootleg distilled spirits in it, and the selling dealership lost the title retained as security for unpaid purchase money. Id., at 508-509. The Court discussed the arguments for and against allowing the forfeiture of the interest of an owner who was “without guilt,” id., at 510, and concluded that “whether the reason for [the challenged forfeiture scheme] be artificial or real, it is too firmly fixed in the punitive and remedial jurisprudence of the country to be now displaced,” id., at 511.
In Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U. S. 663 (1974), the most recent decision on point, the Court reviewed the same cases discussed above, and concluded that “the innocence of the owner of property subject to forfeiture has almost uniformly been rejected as a defense.” Id., at 683.. Petitioner is in the same position as the various owners involved in the forfeiture cases beginning with The Palmyra in 1827. She did not know that her car would be used in an illegal activity that would subject it to forfeiture. But under these cases the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not protect her interest against forfeiture by the government.
Petitioner relies on a passage from Calero-Toledo, that “it would be difficult to reject the constitutional claim of... an owner who proved not only that he was uninvolved in and unaware of the wrongful activity, but also that he had done all that reasonably could be expected to prevent the proscribed use of his property.” 416 U. S., at 689. But she concedes that this comment was obiter dictum, and “[i]t is to the holdings of our cases, rather than their dicta, that we must attend.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U. S. 375, 379 (1994). And the holding of Calero-Toledo on this point was that the interest of a yacht rental company in one of its leased yachts could be forfeited because of its use for transportation of controlled substances, even though the company was “ ‘in no way . . . involved in the criminal enterprise carried on by [the] lessee’ and ‘had no knowledge that its property was being used in connection with or in violation of [Puerto Rican Law].’” 416 U. S., at 668. Petitioner has made no showing beyond that here.
Justice Stevens’ dissent argues that our cases treat contraband differently from instrumentalities used to convey contraband, like cars: Objects in the former class are forfeit-able “however blameless or unknowing their owners may be,” post, at 459, but with respect to an instrumentality in the latter class, an owner’s innocence is no defense only to the “principal use being made of that property,” post, at 461. However, this Court’s precedent has never made the due process inquiry depend on whether the use for which the instrumentality was forfeited was the principal use. If it had, perhaps cases like Calero-Toledo, in which Justice Douglas noted in dissent that there was no showing that the “yacht had been notoriously used in smuggling drugs ... and so far as we know only one marihuana cigarette was found on the yacht,” 416 U. S., at 693 (opinion dissenting in part), might have been decided differently.
The dissent also suggests that The Palmyra line of cases “would justify the confiscation of an ocean liner just because one of its passengers sinned while on board.” Post, at 462. None of pur cases have held that an ocean liner may be confiscated because of the activities of one passenger. We said in Goldsmith-Grant, and we repeat here, that “[w]hen such application shall be made it will be time enough to pronounce upon it.” 254 U. S., at 512.
Notwithstanding this well-established authority rejecting the innocent-owner defense, petitioner argues that we should in effect overrule it by importing a culpability requirement from cases having at best a tangential relation to the “innocent owner” doctrine in forfeiture cases. She cites Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U. S. 71 (1992), for the proposition that a criminal defendant may not be punished for a crime if he is found to be not guilty. She also argues that our holding in Austin v. United States, 509 U. S. 602 (1993), that the Excessive Fines Clause limits the scope of civil forfeiture judgments, “would be difficult to reconcile with any rule allowing truly innocent persons to be punished by civil forfeiture.” Brief for Petitioner 18-19, n. 12.
In Foucha the Court held that a defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity in a criminal trial could not be thereafter confined indefinitely by the State without a showing that he was either dangerous or mentally ill. Petitioner argues that our statement that in those circumstances a State has no “punitive interest” which would justify continued detention, 504 U. S., at 80, requires that Michigan demonstrate a punitive interest in depriving her of her interest in the forfeited car. But, putting aside the extent to which a forfeiture proceeding is “punishment” in the first place, Foucha did not purport to discuss, let alone overrule, The Palmyra line of cases.
In Austin, the Court held that because “forfeiture serves, at least in part, to punish the owner,” forfeiture proceedings are subject to the limitations of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against excessive fines. 509 U. S., at 618. There was no occasion in that case to deal with the validity of the “innocent-owner defense,” other than to point out that if a forfeiture statute allows such a defense, the defense is additional evidence that the statute itself is “punitive” in motive. Id., at 617-618. In this case, however, Michigan’s Supreme Court emphasized with respect to the forfeiture proceeding at issue: “It is not contested that this is an equitable action,” in which the trial judge has discretion to consider “alternatives [to] abating the entire interest in the vehicle.” 447 Mich., at 742, 527 N. W. 2d, at 495.
In any event, for the reasons pointed out in Calero-Toledo and Van Oster, forfeiture also serves a deterrent purpose distinct from any punitive purpose. Forfeiture of property prevents illegal uses “both by preventing further illicit use of the [property] and by imposing an economic penalty, thereby rendering illegal behavior unprofitable.” Calero-Toledo, supra, at 687. This deterrent mechanism is hardly unique to forfeiture. For instance, because Michigan also deters dangerous driving by making a motor vehicle owner liable for the negligent operation of the vehicle by a driver who had the owner’s consent to use it, petitioner was also potentially liable for her husband’s use of the car in violation of Michigan negligence law. Mich. Comp. Laws §257.401 (1979). “The law thus builds a secondary defense against a forbidden use and precludes evasions by dispensing with the necessity of judicial inquiry as to collusion between the wrongdoer and the alleged innocent owner.” Van Oster, 272 U. S., at 467-468.
Petitioner also claims that the forfeiture in this case was a taking of private property for public use in violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. But if the forfeiture proceeding here in question did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, the property in the automobile was transferred by virtue of that proceeding from petitioner to the State. The government may not be required to compensate an owner for property which it has already lawfully acquired under the exercise of governmental authority other than the power of eminent domain. United States v. Fuller, 409 U. S. 488, 492 (1973); see United States v. Rands, 389 U. S. 121, 125 (1967).
At bottom, petitioner’s claims depend on an argument that the Michigan forfeiture statute is unfair because it relieves prosecutors from the burden of separating co-owners who are complicit in the wrongful use of property from innocent co-owners. This argument, in the abstract, has considerable appeal, as we acknowledged in Goldsmith-Grant, 254 U. S., at 510. Its force is reduced in the instant case, however, by the Michigan Supreme Court’s confirmation of the trial court’s remedial discretion, see supra, at 446, and petitioner’s recognition that Michigan may forfeit her and her husband’s car whether or not she is entitled to an offset for her interest in it, Tr. of Oral Arg. 7, 9.
We conclude today, as we concluded 75 years ago, that the cases authorizing actions of the kind at issue are “too firmly fixed in the punitive and remedial jurisprudence of the country to be now displaced.” Goldsmith-Grant, supra, at 511. The State here sought to deter illegal activity that contributes to neighborhood deterioration and unsafe streets. The Bennis automobile, it is conceded, facilitated and was used in criminal activity. Both the trial court and the Michigan Supreme Court followed our longstanding practice, and the judgment of the Supreme Court of Michigan is therefore
Affirmed.
Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.338b (1979).
Section 600.3801 states in pertinent part:
“Any building, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or place used for the purpose of lewdness, assignation or prostitution or gambling, or used by, or kept for the use of prostitutes or other disorderly persons, , . is declared a nuisance, . . . and all. . . nuisances shall be enjoined and abated as provided in this act and as provided in the court rules. Any person or his or her servant, agent, or employee who owns, leases, conducts, or maintains any building, vehicle, or place used for any of the purposes or acts set forth in this section is guilty of a nuisance.” Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §600.3801 (West Supp. 1995).
Section 600.3825 states in pertinent part:
“(1) Order of abatement. If the existence of the nuisance is established in an action as provided in this chapter, an order of abatement shall be entered as a part of the judgment in the case, which order shall direct the removal from the building or place of all furniture, fixtures and contents therein and shall direct the sale thereof in the manner provided for the sale of chattels under execution ....
“(2) Vehicles, sale. Any vehicle, boat, or aircraft found by the court to be a nuisance within the meaning of this chapter, is subject to the same order and judgment as any furniture, fixtures and contents as herein provided.
“(&) Sale of personalty, costs, liens, balance to state treasurer. Upon the sale of any furniture, fixtures, contents, vehicle, boat or aircraft as provided in this section, the officer executing the order of the court shall, after deducting the expenses of keeping such property and costs of such sale, pay all liens according to their priorities . . . , and shall pay the balance to the state treasurer to be credited to the general fund of the state.. ..” Mich. Comp. Laws §600.3825 (1979).
“Proof of knowledge of the existence of the nuisance on the part of the defendants or any of them, is not required.” Mich. Comp. Laws §600.3815(2) (1979).
In Austin v. United States, 509 U. S. 602, 617 (1993), the Court observed that J. W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U. S. 505 (1921), “expressly reserved the question whether the [guilty-property] fiction could be employed to forfeit the property of a truly innocent owner.” This observation is quite mistaken. The Goldsmith-Grant Court expressly reserved opinion “as to whether the section can be extended to property stolen from the owner or otherwise taken from him without his privity or consent.” Id., at 512 (emphases added). In other words, the Goldsmith-Grant Court drew the very same distinction made by the Michigan Supreme Court in this case: “the distinction between the situation in which a vehicle is used without the owner’s consent,” and one in which, “although the owner consented to [another person’s] use, [the vehicle] is used in a manner to which the owner did not consent.” 447 Mich., at 742, n. 36, 527 N. W. 2d, at 495, n. 36. Because John Bennis co-owned the car at issue, petitioner cannot claim she was in the former situation.
The dissent, post, at 466-468, and n. 12, quoting Peisch v. Ware, 4 Cranch 347, 364 (1808), seeks to enlarge the reservation in Goldsmith-Grant into a general principle that “ ‘a forfeiture can only be applied to those cases in which the means that are prescribed for the prevention of a forfeiture may be employed.’” But Peisch was dealing with the same question reserved in Goldsmith-Grant, not any broader proposition: “If, by private theft, or open robbery, without any fault on his part, [an owner’s] property should be invaded, . . . the law cannot be understood to punish him with the forfeiture of that property.” 4 Cranch, at 364.
U. S. Const., Amdt. 8.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | D | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Rehnquist
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In 1978 respondent Sergio Mendoza, a Filipino national, filed a petition for naturalization under a statute which by its terms had expired 32 years earlier. Respondent’s claim for naturalization was based on the assertion that the Government’s administration of the Nationality Act denied him due process of law. Neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ever reached the merits of his claim, because they held that the Government was collaterally estopped from litigating that constitutional issue in view of an earlier decision against the Government in a case brought by other Filipino nationals in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. We hold that the United States may not be collaterally estopped on an issue such as this, adjudicated against it in an earlier lawsuit brought by a different party. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
The facts bearing on respondent’s claim to naturalization are not in dispute. In 1942 Congress amended the Nationality Act, § 701 of which provided that noncitizens who served honorably in the Armed Forces of the United States during World War II were exempt from some of the usual requirements for nationality. In particular, such veterans were exempt from the requirement of residency within the United States and literacy in the English language. Congress later provided by amendment that all naturalization petitions seeking to come under § 701 must be filed by December 31, 1946. Act of Dec. 28, 1945, § 202(c), 59 Stat. 658. Section 702 of the Act provided for the overseas naturalization of aliens in active service who were eligible for naturalization under § 701 but who were not within the jurisdiction of any court authorized to naturalize aliens. In order to implement that provision, the Immigration and Naturalization Service from 1943 to 1946 sent representatives abroad to naturalize eligible alien servicemen.
Respondent Mendoza served as a doctor in the Philippine Commonwealth Army from 1941 until his discharge in 1946. Because Japanese occupation of the Philippines had made naturalization of alien servicemen there impossible before the liberation of the Islands, the INS did not designate a representative to naturalize eligible servicemen there until 1945. Because of concerns expressed by the Philippine Government to the United States, however, to the effect that large numbers of Filipinos would be naturalized and would immigrate to the United States just as the Philippines gained their independence, the Attorney General subsequently revoked the naturalization authority of the INS representative. Thus all naturalizations in the Philippines were halted for a 9-month period from late October 1945 until a new INS representative was appointed in August 1946.
Respondent’s claim for naturalization is based on the contention that that conduct of the Government deprived him of due process of law in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, because he was present in the Philippines during part, but not all, of the 9-month period during which there was no authorized INS representative there. The naturalization examiner recommended denial of Mendoza’s petition, but the District Court granted the petition without reaching the merits of Mendoza’s constitutional claim. The District Court concluded that the Government could not relitigate the due process issue because that issue had already been decided against the Government in In re Naturalization of 68 Filipino War Veterans, 406 F. Supp. 931 (ND Cal. 1975) (hereinafter 68 Filipinos), a decision which the Government had not appealed.
Noting that the doctrine of nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel has been conditionally approved by this Court in Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U. S. 322 (1979), the Court of Appeals concluded that the District Court had not abused its discretion in applying that doctrine against the United States in this case. 672 F. 2d 1320, 1322 (1982). The Court of Appeals rejected the Government’s argument that Parklane Hosiery should be limited to private litigants. Although it acknowledged that the Government is often involved in litigating issues of national significance where conservation of judicial resources is less important than “getting a second opinion,” it concluded that litigation concerning the rights of Filipino war veterans was not such a case. 672 F. 2d, at 1329-1330. For the reasons which follow, we agree with the Government that Parklane Hosiery's approval of nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel is not to be extended to the United States.
Under the judicially developed doctrine of collateral estop-pel, once a court has decided an issue of fact or law necessary to its judgment, that decision is conclusive in a subsequent suit based on a different cause of action involving a party to the prior litigation. Montana v. United States, 440 U. S. 147, 153 (1979). Collateral estoppel, like the related doctrine of res judicata, serves to “relieve parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial resources, and, by preventing inconsistent decisions, encourage reliance on adjudication.” Allen v. McCurry, 449 U. S. 90, 94 (1980). In furtherance of those policies, this Court in recent years has broadened the scope of the doctrine of collateral estoppel beyond its common-law limits. Ibid. It has done so by abandoning the requirement of mutuality of parties, Blonder - Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U. S. 313 (1971), and by conditionally approving the “offensive” use of collateral estoppel by a nonparty to a prior lawsuit. Parklane Hosiery, supra.
In Standefer v. United States, 447 U. S. 10, 24 (1980), however, we emphasized the fact that Blonder-Tongue and Parklane Hosiery involved disputes over private rights between private litigants. We noted that “[i]n such cases, no significant harm flows from enforcing a rule that affords a litigant only one full and fair opportunity to litigate an issue, and [that] there is no sound reason for burdening the courts with repetitive litigation.” 447 U. S., at 24. Here, as in Montana v. United States, supra, the party against whom the estoppel is sought is the United States; but here, unlike in Montana, the party who seeks to preclude the Government from relitigating the issue was not a party to the earlier litigation.
We have long recognized that “the Government is not in a position identical to that of a private litigant,” INS v. Hibi, 414 U. S. 5, 8 (1973) (per curiam), both because of the geographic breadth of Government litigation and also, most importantly, because of the nature of the issues the Government litigates. It is not open to serious dispute that the Government is a party to a far greater number of cases on a nationwide basis than even the most litigious private entity; in 1982, the United States was a party to more than 75,000 of the 206, 193 filings in the United States District Courts. Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Annual Report of the Director 98 (1982). In the same year the United States was a party to just under 30% of the civil cases appealed from the District Courts to the Court of Appeals. Id., at 79, 82. Government litigation frequently involves legal questions of substantial public importance; indeed, because the proscriptions of the United States Constitution are so generally directed at governmental action, many constitutional questions can arise only in the context of litigation to which the Government is a party. Because of those facts the Government is more likely than any private party to be involved in lawsuits against different parties which nonetheless involve the same legal issues.
A rule allowing nonmutual collateral estoppel against the Government in such cases would substantially thwart the development of important questions of law by freezing the first final decision rendered on a particular legal issue. Allowing only one final adjudication would deprive this Court of the benefit it receives from permitting several courts of appeals to explore a difficult question before this Court grants certiorari. See E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U. S. 112, 135, n. 26 (1977); see also Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U. S. 682, 702 (1979). Indeed, if nonmutual estoppel were routinely applied against the Government, this Court would have to revise its practice of waiting for a conflict to develop before granting the Government’s petitions for certiorari. See this Court’s Rule 17.1.
The Solicitor General’s policy for determining when to appeal an adverse decision would also require substantial revision. The Court of Appeals faulted the Government in this caseN for failing to appeal a decision that it now contends is erroneous. 672 F. 2d, at 1326-1327. But the Government’s litigation conduct in a case is apt to differ from that of a private litigant. Unlike a private litigant who generally does not forgo an appeal if he believes that he can prevail, the Solicitor General considers a variety of factors, such as the limited resources of the Government and the crowded dockets of the courts, before authorizing an appeal. Brief for United States 30-31. The application of nonmutual estoppel against the Government would force the Solicitor General to abandon those prudential concerns and to appeal every adverse decision in order to avoid foreclosing further review.
In addition to those institutional concerns traditionally considered by the Solicitor General, the panoply of important public issues raised in governmental litigation may quite properly lead successive administrations of the Executive Branch to take differing positions with respect to the resolution of-a particular issue. While the Executive Branch must of course defer to the Judicial Branch for final resolution of questions of constitutional law, the former nonetheless controls the progress of Government litigation through the federal courts. It would be idle to pretend that the conduct of Government litigation in all its myriad features, from the decision to file a complaint in the United States district court to the decision to petition for certiorari to review a judgment of the court of appeals, is a wholly mechanical procedure which involves no policy choices whatever.
For example, in recommending to the Solicitor General in 1977 that the Government’s appeal in 68 Filipinos be withdrawn, newly appointed INS Commissioner''Castillo commented that such a course “would be in keeping with the policy of the [new] Administration,” described as “a course of compassion and amnesty.” Brief for United States 11. But for the very reason that such policy choices are made by one administration, and often reevaluated by another administration, courts should be careful when they seek to apply expanding rules of collateral estoppel to Government litigation. The Government of course may not now undo the consequences of its decision not to appeal the District Court judgment in the 68 Filipinos case; it is bound by that judgment under the principles of res judicata. But we now hold that it is not further bound in a case involving a litigant who was not a party to the earlier litigation.
The Court of Appeals did not endorse a routine application of nonmutual collateral estoppel against the Government, because it recognized that the Government does litigate issues of far-reaching national significance which in some cases, it concluded, might warrant relitigation. But in this case it found no “record evidence” indicating that there was a “crucial need” in the administration of the immigration laws for a redetermination of the due process question decided in 68 Filipinos and presented again in this case. 672 F. 2d, at 1329-1330. The Court of Appeals did not make clear what sort of “record evidence” would have satisfied it that there was a “crucial need” for redetermination of the question in this case, but we pretermit further discussion of that approach; we believe that the standard announced by the Court of Appeals for determining when relitigation of a legal issue is to be permitted is so wholly subjective that it affords no guidance to the courts or to the Government. Such a standard leaves the Government at sea because it cannot possibly anticipate, in determining whether or not to appeal an adverse decision, whether a court will bar relitigation of the issue in a later case. By the time a court makes its subjective determination that an issue cannot be relitigated, the Government’s appeal of the prior ruling of course would be untimely.
We hold, therefore, that nonmutual offensive collateral es-toppel simply does not apply against the Government in such a way as to preclude relitigation of issues such as those involved in this case. The conduct of Government litigation in the courts of the United States is sufficiently different from the conduct of private civil litigation in those courts so that what might otherwise be economy interests underlying a broad application of collateral estoppel are outweighed by the constraints which peculiarly affect the Government. We think that our conclusion will better allow thorough development of legal doctrine by allowing litigation in multiple forums. Indeed, a contrary result might disserve the economy interests in whose name estoppel is advanced by requiring the Government to abandon virtually any exercise of discretion in seeking to review judgments unfavorable to it. The doctrine of res judicata, of course, prevents the Government from relitigating the same cause of action against the parties to a prior decision, but beyond that point principles of nonmutual collateral estoppel give way to the policies just stated.
Our holding in this case is consistent with each of our prior holdings to which the parties have called our attention, and which we reaffirm. Today in a companion case we hold that the Government may be estopped under certain circumstances from relitigating a question when the parties to the two lawsuits are the same. United States v. Stauffer Chemical Co., post, p. 165; see also Montana v. United States, 440 U. S. 147 (1979); United States v. Moser, 266 U. S. 236 (1924). None of those cases, however, involve the effort of a party to estop the Government in the absence of mutuality.
The concerns underlying our disapproval of collateral es-toppel against the Government are for the most part inapplicable where mutuality is present, as in Stauffer Chemical, Montana, and Moser. The application of an estoppel when the Government is litigating the same issue with the same party avoids the problem of freezing the development of the law because the Government is still free to litigate that issue in the future with some other party. And, where the parties are the same, estopping the Government spares a party that has already prevailed once from having to relitigate — a function it would not serve in the present circumstances. We accordingly hold that the Court of Appeals was wrong in applying nonmutual collateral estoppel against the Government in this case. Its judgment is therefore
Reversed.
Mendoza sought naturalization pursuant to §§ 701-705 of the Nationality Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 1137, added by the Second War Powers Act, 1942, 56 Stat. 182, as amended, 8 U. S. C. §§1001-1005 (1940 ed., Supp. V).
In 68 Filipinos, the District Court considered the naturalization petitions of 68 Filipino World War II veterans filed pursuant to §§ 701-702 of the Nationality Act. Fifty-three of those veterans, whom the District Court designated as Category II veterans, like Mendoza, had made no effort to become naturalized before the expiration of the statutory provisions. Like Mendoza, they claimed that the failure of the United States to station an INS representative in the Philippines for the entire period of time in which rights under § 702 were available to them discriminated against Filipinos as a class. Rejecting the Government’s arguments that INS v. Hibi, 414 U. S. 5 (1973) (per curiam), was controlling, that the issue was nonjusticiable, and that petitioners were not protected by the Federal Constitution during the period at issue, the court applied strict scrutiny to petitioners’ claim and held that the Government had not offered sufficient justification for its conduct. 406 F. Supp., at 940-951.
Although the Government initially docketed an appeal from that decision, the Court of Appeals granted the Government’s motion to withdraw the appeal on November 30, 1977. The Government made that motion after a new administration and a new INS Commissioner had taken office. Eventually the Government reevaluated its position and decided to take appeals from all orders granting naturalization to so-called Category II petitioners, with the exception of orders granting naturalization to petitioners who filed petitions prior to the withdrawal of the appeal in 68 Filipinos. Brief for United States 11-12, and n. 13; Olegario v. United States, 629 F. 2d 204, 214 (CA2 1980), cert. denied, 450 U. S. 980 (1981). Mendoza’s petition for naturalization was filed after the Government withdrew its appeal in 68 Filipinos.
Under res judicata, a final judgment on the merits bars further claims by parties or their privies on the same cause of action. Montana v. United States, 440 U. S., at 153; Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U. S. 322, 326, n. 5 (1979). The Restatement of Judgments speaks of res judi-cata as “claim preclusion” and of collateral estoppel as “issue preclusion.” Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 (1982).
Offensive use of collateral estoppel occurs when a plaintiff seeks to foreclose a defendant from relitigating an issue the defendant has previously litigated unsuccessfully in another action against the same or a different party. Defensive use of collateral estoppel occurs when a defendant seeks to prevent a plaintiff from relitigating an issue the plaintiff has previously litigated unsuccessfully in another action against the same or a different party. Parklane Hosiery, supra, at 326, n. 4.
In Montana we held that the Government was estopped from relitigat-ing in federal court the constitutionality of Montana’s gross receipts tax on contractors of public construction firms. That issue had previously been litigated in state court by an individual contractor whose litigation had been totally financed and controlled by the Federal Government. Montana v. United States, supra, at 151, 155; see n. 9, infra.
The Attorney General has delegated discretionary authority to the Solicitor General to determine when to appeal from a judgment adverse to the interests of the United States. 28 CFR § 0.20(b) (1983).
The Government does not base its argument on the exception to the doctrine of collateral estoppel for “unmixed questions of law” arising in “successive actions involving unrelated subject matter.” Montana v. United States, 440 U. S., at 162; see United States v. Stauffer Chemical Co., post, p. 165; United States v. Moser, 266 U. S. 236, 242 (1924). Our holding in no way depends on that exception.
In Nevada v. United States, 463 U. S. 110 (1983), we applied principles of res judicata against the United States as to one class of claimants who had not been parties to an earlier adjudication, id., at 143-144, but we recognized that this result obtained in the unique context of “a comprehensive adjudication of water rights intended to settle once and for all the question of how much of the Truckee River each of the litigants was entitled to.” Id., at 143.
In Montana an individual contractor brought an initial action to challenge Montana’s gross receipts tax in state court, and the Federal Government brought a second action in federal court raising the same challenge. The Government totally controlled and financed the state-court action; thus for all practical purposes, there was mutuality of parties in the two cases. “[T]he United States plainly had a sufficient ‘laboring oar’ in the conduct of the state-court litigation,” 440 U. S., at 155, to be constituted a “party” in all but a technical sense.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | I | sc_issuearea |
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