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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Chief Justice Warren
delivered the opinion of the Court. .
This contempt of Congress case, stemming from investigations conducted by the House Committee on UnAmerican Activities, involves, among others, questions of whether the House Committee on Un-American Activities failed to comply with its rules and whether such a failure excused petitioner’s refusal to answer the Committee’s questions.
Petitioner Edward Yellin Was indicted in the Northern District of Indiana on five counts of willfully refusing to answer questions put to him by a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Un-American Activities (hereafter Committee) at a public hearing. He was convicted, under 2 U. S. C. § 192, of contempt of Congress on four counts. He was sentenced to four concurrent terms of imprisonment, each for one year, and fined $250. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. 287 F. 2d 292. Since the case presented constitutional questions of continúing importance, we granted certiorari. 368 U. S. 816. However, because of the view we take of the Committee’s action, which was at variance with its rules, we do not reach the constitutional questions raised.
The factual setting is for the most part not in dispute. The Committee was engaged, in 1958, in an investigation of so-called colonization by the Communist Party in basic industry. One of its inquiries focused upon the steel industry in Gary, Indiana, where petitioner was employed. Having information that petitioner was a Communist, the Committee decided to call Yellin and question him in a public rather than an executive session. The Committee then subpoenaed petitioner on January 23,1958. His attorney, Mr. Rabinowitz, sent a telegram to the Committee’s general counsel, Mr. Tavenner, on Thursdajr, February 6, 1958. The telegram asked for an executive session because "testimony needed for legislative . . . purposes can be secured in executive session without exposing witnesses to publicity.” Since the Committee and Mr. Tavenner had left Washington, D. C., for Gary, the telegram was answered by the Committee’s Staff Director. His reply read:
“Reurtel [Re your telegram?] requesting executive session in lieu of open session for Edward Yellin and Nicholas Busic. Your request denied.
“Richard Arens Staff Director”
According to Congressman Walter, the Chairman of the Committee, Mr. Arens did not have authority to take such action.
Petitioner’s counsel also sought to bring the matter to the Committee’s attention when it commenced its public' hearing the following Monday, February 10, 1958. His efforts to have the telegrams read into the record were cut short by Congressman Walter. Mr. Rabinowitz would not have been justified in continuing, since Committee rules permit counsel only to advise a witness, not to engage in oral argument with the Committee. Rule VII (B). In any event, Congressman Walter was not interested in discussing the content of the telegrams. From his sometimes conflicting testimony at trial, it appears he did not even know what the telegrams said. And though Congressman Walter said the Committee would consider in executive session whether to make the telegrams a part of the record, it appears that whatever action was taken was without knowledge of the telegrams’ contents.
“The Chairman. Do not. bother. You know the privileges given you by this committee. You have appeared before it often enough. You know as well as anybody.- Go ahead, Mr. Tavenner.”
It is against this background that the Committee’s failure to comply with its own rules must be judged. It has been long settled, of course, that rules of Congress and its committees are, judicially cognizable. Christoffel v. United States, 338 U. S. 84; United States v. Smith, 286 U. S. 6; United States v. Ballin, 144 U. S. 1. And a legislative committee has been held to observance of its rules, Christoffel v. United States, supra, just as, more frequently, executive agencies have been. See, e. g., Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U. S. 535; Service v. Dulles, 354 U. S. 363.
The particular Committee Rule involved, Rule IV, provides in part:
“IV — Executive and Public Hearings:
“A — Executive:
“(1) If a majority of the Committee or Subcommittee, duly appointed as provided by the rules of the House of Representatives, believes that the interrogation of a witness' in a public hearing might endanger national security or unjustly injure his reputation, or the reputation of other individuals, the Committee shall interrogate such witness in an Executive Session for the purpose of determining' the necessity or advisability of conducting such interrogation thereafter in a public hearing.
. . . .
“B — Public Hearings:
“(1) All other hearings shall be public.” (Emphasis added.)
The rule is quite explicit in requiring that injury to a witness’ reputation be considered, along with danger to the national security and injury to the reputation of third parties, in deciding whether to hold an executive session.
At the threshold we are met with the argument that Rule IV was written to provide guidance for the Committee alone and that it was not designed to confer upon witnesses the right to request an executive session and the right to have the Committee act, either upon that request or on its own, according to the standards set forth in the rule'. It seems clear, from the structure of the Committee’s rules and from the Committee’s practice, that such is not the case.
The rules are few in number and brief — all 17 take little more than six pages in the record. Yet throughout the rulés the dominant theme is definition of the witness’ rights and privileges. Rule II requires that the subject of any investigation be announced and that information sought be “relevant and germane to the subject.” Rule III requires, that witnesses be subpoenaed “a reasonably sufficient time in advance” to allow them a chance to prepare and employ counsel. Rule VI makes available to any witness a transcript of his testimony — though at his expense. Rule VII gives every witness the privilege of having counsel advise him during the héaring. Rule VIII givés a witness a reasonable time to get other counsel, if his original counsel is removed for failure to comply with the rules. Rule X makes detailed provision for those persons who have been named as subversive, Fascist, Communist, etc., by another witness. Such persons are given an opportunity to present rebuttal testimony and are to "be “accorded the same privileges as any other witness appearing before the Committee.” Rúle XIII permits any witness to keep out of the range of television cameras. Finally, Rule XVII requires that each witness “shall be furnished” a copy of the rules. All these work for the witness’ benefit. They show that the Committee has in a number of instances intended to assure a witness fair treatment, viz., the right to advice of counsel,; or protection from undue publicity, viz., the right not to be photographed by television cameras. Rule IV, in providing for an executive session when a public hearing might unjustly injure a witness’ reputation, has the same protective import. And if it is the witness who is being protected, the most logical person to have the right to enforce those protections is the witness himself.
The Committee’s practice reinforces this conclusion. Congressman Walter testified that the Committee “always” gave due consideration to requests for executive sessions. Weight should be given such a practice of the Committee in construing its rules, United States v. Smith, 286 U. S. 6, 33. That the Committee has entertained, and always does entertain, requests for executive sessions reinforces the conclusion that the Committee intended in Rule IV to give the individual witness a right to some consideration of his efforts to protect his reputation.
It must be acknowledged, of course, that Rule IV does not provide complete protection. The Committee may not be required by its rules to avoid even unjust injury to a witness’ reputation. Assuming that the Committee decides to hold an executive session, the Committee need do so only “for the purpose of determining the necessity or advisability of conducting such interrogation thereafter in a public hearing.” (Emphasis added.) By inclusion of the word “necessity” the rule may contemplate cases in which the Committee will proceed in a public hearing despite the risk or- even probability of injury to the witness’ reputation.
That petitioner may be questioned in public, even after an executive session has been held, does not mean, however, that the 'Committee is freed from considering possible injury to his reputation. The Committee has at least undertaken to consider a witness’ reputation and the efforts a witness makes to protect it, even though the Committee may in its discretion nevertheless decide thereafter to hold a public hearing. The Committee failed in two respects to carry out that undertaking in Yellin’s case.
First, it does not appear from Congressman Walter’s testimony that the Committee considered injury to the witness’ reputation when it decided against calling Yellin in executive, session:
“Q. [By Mr. Rabinowitz] The Committee does sometimes hold executive sessions, doesn’t it?
“A. [By Congressman Walter] Yes.
“Q. And what are the considerations which the Committee uses in determining whether to hold executive sessions?
“A. This is usually done when the Committee is fearful lest a witness will mention the name of somebody against whom there' is no sworn testimony, and in order to prevent the name of somebody being mentioned in public that we are not sure has been active .in the conspiracy, at least that there isn’t sworn testimony to that effect, we have an executive hearing;
“Q. Are those theonly circumstances under which executive hearings are held?
“A. I don’t know of any, other, except that where we are fearful that testimony might be adduced that could be harmful to the national defense. We are not so sure about the testimony of any of the witnesses.” (Emphasis added.). .
By Congressman Walter’s own admission, the Committee holds executive sessions in only two of the three instances specified in Rule IV, i. e., when there may be injury to the reputation of a third party or injury to the national security. Injury to the witness himself is not a factor. Consequently the initial Committee decision to question Yellin publicly, made before serving him with a subpoena, was made without following Rule IV.
Secondly, the Committee failed to act upon petitioner’s express request for an executive session. The Staff Director, who lacked the authority to do so, acted in the Committee’s stead. That petitioner addressed his request to the Committee’s counsel does not alter the case. The Committee did not specify in Rule IV to whom such requests should be addressed. But from other rules it maybe inferred that the general counsel is an appropriate addressee. In Rule IX, the Committee permits witnesses to file prepared or written statements for the record. The statements are' to be sent to the “counsel of the Committee.” Rule X makes provision for third parties who have been named as subversive, Fascist, Communist, etc., in a public hearing. A person, notified of having been named, who-feels that’his reputation has been adversely affected is directed to “[c]ommunicate with the counsel of the Committee.” As a footnote; to that rule, the Committee has said: “All witnesses are invited at any time to confer with Committee counsel or investigators for the Committee prior to hearings.” Also it should be noted that the Staff Director’s telegraphed response had the misleading appearance of authority and finality. The Chairman of the Committee should not now be. allowed to say that had petitioner disregarded the response he received from the Chairman’s staff and instead renewed his request to the Chairman, “this could not have happened” — especially when petitioner’s counsel tried to bring the matter to the attention of the Committee and was brusquely cut off.
Thus in two instances the Committee failed to exercise its discretion according to the standards which Yellin had a right to have considered. His position is similar to that of the petitioner in United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U. S. 260. Accardi had been ordered deported. Concededly the order was valid. However, Accardi applied to the Board of Immigration Appeals for suspension of the order. This, in the discretion of the Attorney General, was permitted by § 19 (c) of the Immigration Act of 1917, 39 Stat. 889, as amended, 8 TJ. S. C. (1946 ed., Supp. Y) § 155 (c). (The successor to that section in the 1952 Act is § 244, 66 Stat. 214, 8 TJ. S. C. § 1254.) The Attorney General had by regulation permitted the Board of Immigration Appeals to make final decisions upon applications for this discretionary relief, subject to certain exceptions not involved in Accardi’s case. Shortly before petitioner appealed to the Board, the Attorney General published a list of “unsavory characters,” including petitioner, who were to be deported. Accardi claimed that since the Board knew he was on the list, it did not exercise the full discretion the Attorney General had delegated to it. Its decision was predetermined.
This' Court held that the Board had failed to exercise its discretion though required to do so by the Attorney General’s regulations. Although the Court recognized that Accardi might'well lose, even if the Board ignored -the Attorney General’s list of unsavory characters, it nonetheless held that Accardi should at least have the chance given him by the regulations.
The same result should obtain in the case at bar. Yellin might not prevail, even if the Committee takes note of the risk of injury to his reputation or his request for an executive session. But he is at least entitled to have the Committee follow its rules and give him consideration according to the standards it has adopted in Rule IY.
At that point, however, the similarity to Accardi’s case ends. Petitioner has no traditional remedy, such as the writ of habeas corpus upon which Accardi relied, by which to redress the loss of his rights; If the Committee ignores his request for an executive session, it is highly improbable that petitioner could obtain an injunction against the Committee that would protect him from public exposure. See Pauling v. Eastland, 109 U. S. App. D. C. 342, 288 F. 2d 126, cert. denied, 364 U. S. 900. Nor is there an administrative remedy for petitioner to pursue, should the Committee fail to consider the risk of injury to his reputation. To answer the questions put to him publicly and then seek redress is'no answer. For one thing, his testimony will cause the injury he seeks to avoid; under pain of perjury, he cannot by artful dissimulation evade revealing the information he wishes to remain confidential. For another, he. has no opportunity to recover in damages, U. S. Const., Art. I, § 6; Kilbourn v. Thompson,. 103 U. S. 168, 201-205. Cf. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367, 377. Even the Fifth Amendment is not sufficient protection, since petitioner could say many things which would discredit him without subjecting himself to the risk of criminal prosecution-. The only avenue open is that which petitioner actually took. He refused to testify.
As a last obstacle, however, the Government argues that Yellin’s rights were forfeited by his failure to make, clear at the time he was questioned that his refusal to testify was based upon the Committee’s departure from Rule IV. Whatever the merits of the argument might be when immediately apparent deviations from Committee rules are involved, it has no application here. Yelliri was unable, at the time of his hearing, to tell from the actions of the Committee that his rights had been violated. So far as Yellin knew, the Staff Director acted as Congressman Walter’s agent, announcing the results of the Committee’s deliberations. And so far as he knew, the Committee, when it initially decided to hold a public hearing, did so in accordance with Rule IV. It was not until petitioner’s trial, when his attorney for the first time had an opportunity for searching examination, that it became apparent the Committee was violating its rules.
It may be assumed that if petitioner had expressly rested his refusal to answer upon a violation of Rule IV and the Committee nevertheless proceeded, he would be entitled to acquittal, were he able to prove his defense. Otherwise, if Yellin could be convicted of contempt of Congress notwithstanding the violation of Rule IV, he would be deprived of the only remedy he has for protect-. ing his reputation. Certainly the rights created by the Committee’s rules cannot be that illusory.
Of course, should Yellin have refused to answer in the mistaken but good-faith belief that his rights had been violated, his mistake of law would be no defense. Watkins v. United States, 354 U. S. 178,208; Sinclair v. United States, 279 U. S. 263, 299. But he would at least be entitled to submit the correctness of his belief to a-court of law.
Yellin should be permitted the same opportunity for judicial review when he discovers at trial that his rights have been violated. This is especially so when the Committee’s practice leads witnesses to misplaced reliance upon its rules. When reading a copy of the Committee’s rules, which must be distributed to every witness under Rule XVII, the witness’ reasonable expectation is that the Committee actually does what it purports to do, adhere to its own rules. To foreclose a defense based upon those rules, simply because the witness was deceived by the Committee’s appearance of regularity, is not fair. The Committee prepared the groundwork for prosecution in'Yellin’s case meticulously. It is not too exacting to require that the Committee be equally meticulous in obeying its own rules.
Reversed.
The constitutional questions upon which we need not pass are whether the Committee’s investigation infringed upon petitioner’s rights under the First Amendment and whether petitioner was convicted under an unconstitutionally vague statute. In addition, we do not discuss petitioner’s contention that the trial judge erred in excluding expert testimony about the factors which should be considered in determining petitioner’s rights under the First Amendment.
The Committee’s General Counsel had asked Mr. Yellin a few preliminary questions when Mr. Rabinowitz interrupted.
“Mr. Rabinowitz. Mr. Counsel [Mr. Tavenner], I wonder whether it would be possible to read into the record the exchange of telegrams between myself and the committee in connection with.the witness’s testimony. I would like to have it appear in the record.
“The Chairman. We will decide' whether it will be made á part of the record when the. executive session is Held. Go ahead.
“Mr. Rabinowitz. Mr. Chairman, I sent the telegrams because I wanted’them to appear. I do not care whether they appear publicly or not. I do want it to appear that that exchange of telegrams occurred. I did not do it just to increase the revenue of the telegram company.
“The Chairman. Well, whatever the reason was, whether it has been stated or otherwise, it will be considered in executive session.
“Mr. Rabinowitz. May I state—
Consider, for example, the following testimony of Congressman Walter:
“Q. [By Mr'. Rabinowitz] So that at the time I raised at this hearing the question of the telegrams, you didn’t know anything about any telegrams, and you weren’t sufficiently interested to find out what I wás talking about; is that right?
“A. [By Congressman Walter] Well, not exactly that, Mr. Rabinowitz. I was interested in knowing. I knew that you made an application for an executive session.
“Q. How did you know that?
“A. Well, the telegram; at least, that’s what you started to talk about.
“Q. You knew it at the time of the hearing?
“A. No. Isn’t that what you started to talk about?'
“Q. When did you first learn that I had made an application for aji executive session?
“A. 1 believe today. I never had seen these telegrams, actually. I heard you mention them, at least now my recollection is that I heard you mention them, but I haven’t seen them, until this minute.”
(Emphasis added.)
See also the following testimony:
“Q. [By Mr. Rabinowitz] Well, weren’t you interested in finding out what I was talking about?
“A. [By Congressman Walter] 1 knew what you were talking about. You were talking about a telegram that you say- you sent, and it was too late- then to raise any question that might have been raised by the telegram.”
Later Congressman Walter said:
“I'think the impression I got was that these were telegrams that were more or less in the nature of a request to postpone, without grounds, or whatever it was that Mr. Tavenner told me and the other members of the Committee; and I think that we were just not impressed by it.”
The following occurred during Mr. Rabinowitz’ direct examination of Congressman Walter:
“Q. Well, did you, or did you not, take it up in executive session as you said you would?
“A. I am not clear; I think that we probably did talk about making it a part of the record, and I think the conclusion was reached that it was not properly a part of the record already made.
“Q. Didn’t you testify, Congressman, just" a few minutes ago, while' you were on the stand, that the first you knew about the contents of the telegram was just now, when you got on the witness stand?
“A. That’s right.
“Q. So you discussed this-whole matter in executive session after the Gary hearings, without even knowing what the telegrams said?
“A. That’s about it.
“Q. And you reached the conclusion not to make them a part of the record without even knowing what was in them?
. “A. That’s right. ...”
Mr. Rabinowitz asked Congressman Walter:
“But it wasn’t worth the chance of calling him in executive session, to see what his position' would have been?
“A. I am sure that had you communicated this whole matter to the Committee before we left Washington so that we could have given it due consideration — we would have, and always do — we might have a different situation today.’’ (Emphasis added.)
Congressman Walter also said he was “sure this could not have happened, had you [Mr. Rabinowitz] addressed your telegram to me.”
Note also the following question by Mr. Rabinowitz and answer by Mr. Tavenner:
“Q. And does that rule [Rule IV] operate ever for the protection of a witness who is called?
“A. Certainly.”
Although, for reasons to be developed later, it does not appear that the Committee was following Rule IV in Yellin’s case, it seems clear that the Committee realized its public interrogation of Yellin would injure .his reputation. Congressman Walter testified, for example, that:
“A. . . . [T]he Committee already passed on thé question of whether or not we would hear Mr. Yellin at a session when the purpose of calling him was discussed, and it was decided then that the rule with respect to an executive session was not applicable because the investigator — and I might say it was Mr. Collins, a former F. B. I. agent, who developed this entire matter, and we were willing to accept his story with respect to the proposed testimony.
“Q. And what was his story?
“A. Well, his story was that the man was a known Communist; that he had been active in the international conspiracy, and that he had deceived his employer; and, furthermore, he came within the category of those people that we were experiencing a great deal of difficulty in finding out about with respect to the colonization.”
Mr. Tavenner also said he would not have recommended to the Committee that Yellin be heard in executive session “[bjecause we knew that he was a member of the Communist Party and he was in a position to , give the Committee information, if he wanted to.”
From the Committee’s knowledge, whether it be reliable or not, the Committee could only .have concluded' that Yellin’s reputation would suffer. Yet Congressman Walter said this was the kind of case in which a public hearing was appropriate.
Any suggestion that petitioner’s request was untimely cannot be accepted. For one thing, only 14 days intervened between-service of the subpoena upon petitioner and delivery of his request to the Committee’s offices in Washington. Also' it is of some significance that the Committee did not hold another witness at the Gary hearings, one Joseph Gyurko, to the strict standard of timeliness now urged. Gyurko had sent a telegram to the Committee’s offices in Washington about noon on Saturday, February 8, 1958. When Gyurko was called on Tuesday, February 11, he was given an executive hearing, even though Congressman Walter expressed the opinion that Gyurko had deliberately waited until after business hours on Saturday to send his request. Since the Committee did not evenhandedly deny executive sessions to all who made such eleventh hour requests, it is not in a fair position to plead the untimeliness of Yellin’s request.
Although, as a matter of due process, a witness is entitled to an explanation of the pertinency of a question, if he asks for it, it appears he may lose that right if he fails to make a timely objection. See Deutch v. United States, 367 U. S. 45.6, 468-469; Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U. S. 109, 123-124; Watkins v. United States, 354 U. S. 178, 214-215.
For other instances in which a witness’ defense has been rejected because he failed to make timely objection, see McPhaul v. United States, 364 U. S. 372, 379; United States v. Bryan, 339 U. S. 323, 332-333; Hartman v. United States, 290 F. 2d 460, 467.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
C
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Rehnquist
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondents in these cases obtained from the California Court of Appeal an extraordinary writ prohibiting the California Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control from enforcing an amendment to the State’s liquor statutes. That court held that because the conduct contemplated by the amendment was per se illegal under the Sherman Act, the statute on its face was invalid pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. 108 Cal. App. 3d 348, 166 Cal. Rptr. 563 (1980). We conclude that the California Court of Appeal was mistaken in its application of antitrust and pre-emption principles, and we reverse its judgment.
I
Alcoholic beverages may be brought into California from outside the State for delivery or use within the State only if the beverages are consigned to a licensed importer. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code Ann. § 23661 (West Supp. 1982). In 1979, the California Legislature amended the State’s alcoholic beverage control laws to provide that a “licensed importer shall not purchase or accept delivery of any brand of distilled spirits unless he is designated as an authorized importer of such brand by the brand owner or his authorized agent.” § 23672. This challenged statute, which was to become effective on January 1, 1980, is understandably referred to as a “designation statute.”
California apparently enacted its designation statute in response to the effects of Oklahoma’s alcoholic beverage laws. At the time, Oklahoma’s statutes were understood to require any distiller or brand owner selling its products to Oklahoma wholesalers to sell to all wholesalers on a nondiscriminatory basis. Because of the perceived extraterritorial effect of Oklahoma’s “open-wholesaling” statutes, a licensed California importer who was unable to obtain distilled spirits through the distiller’s established distribution system could obtain them from Oklahoma wholesalers. As a result, a distiller who desired to sell its products to Oklahoma wholesalers was unable to rely on contractual undertakings to determine which California wholesalers would handle its products. California’s designation statute, therefore, sought to close off the “Oklahoma connection” to California importers not authorized by the distiller to deal in its products.
Prior to the effective date of the designation statute, respondents, liquor importers who were benefiting from the “Oklahoma connection,” sought an extraordinary writ from the California Court of Appeal enjoining the enforcement of the designation statute. The Court of Appeal agreed with respondents that the designation statute on its face conflicted with § 1 of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 1. According to that court, the designation statute would result, in all cases, in a per se violation of the Sherman Act, because it “gives brand owners the unfettered power to restrain competition ... by merely deciding who may and who may not compete.” 108 Cal. App. 3d, at 356, 166 Cal. Rptr., at 569. The Court of Appeal distinguished Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U. S. 36 (1977), in which we held that vertical nonprice restraints are to be judged under the “rule of reason” rather than under a per se rule of illegality, on the ground that respondents did not attack the distiller’s decision to refuse to do business with them, but “the state provided authority of the distillers to prohibit them from trading with others.” 108 Cal. App. 3d, at 357, 166 Cal. Rptr., at 570.
The Supreme Court of California denied review. We granted certiorari, 454 U. S. 1080 (1981), and now reverse.
II
A
In determining whether the Sherman Act pre-empts a state statute, we apply principles similar to those which we employ in considering whether any state statute is preempted by a federal statute pursuant to the Supremacy Clause. As in the typical pre-emption case, the inquiry is whether there exists an irreconcilable conflict between the federal and state regulatory schemes. The existence of a hypothetical or potential conflict is insufficient to warrant the pre-emption of the state statute. A state regulatory scheme is not pre-empted by the federal antitrust laws simply because in a hypothetical situation a private party’s compliance with the statute might cause him to violate the antitrust laws. A state statute is not pre-empted by the federal antitrust laws simply because the state scheme might have an anticompetitive effect. See, e. g., New Motor Vehicle Bd. of Cal. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U. S. 96, 110-111 (1978); Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U. S. 117, 129-134 (1978); Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter, 384 U. S. 35, 45-46 (1966).
A party may successfully enjoin the enforcement of a state statute only if the statute on its face irreconcilably conflicts with federal antitrust policy. In California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U. S. 97 (1980), we examined a statute that required members of the California wine industry to file fair trade contracts or price schedules with the State, and provided that if a wine producer had not set prices through a fair trade contract, wholesalers must post a resale price schedule for that producer’s brands. We held that the statute facially conflicted with the Sherman Act because it mandated resale price maintenance, an activity that has long been regarded as a per se violation of the Sherman Act. Id., at 102-103; see Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U. S. 373, 407-409 (1911).
By contrast, in Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter, supra, we rejected a facial attack upon § 9 of New York’s Alcoholic Beverage Control Law, which required retailers and wholesalers to file monthly price schedules with the State Liquor Authority accompanied by an affirmation that the prices charged were no higher than the lowest price at which sales were made anywhere in the United States during the preceding month. Id., at 39-40. The Court found no clear repugnancy between §9 and the federal antitrust laws:
“The bare compilation, without more, of price information on sales to wholesalers and retailers to support the affirmations filed with the State Liquor Authority would not of itself violate the Sherman Act. Section 9 imposes no irresistible economic pressure on the appellants to violate the Sherman Act in order to comply with the requirements of § 9. On the contrary, § 9 appears firmly anchored to the assumption that the Sherman Act will deter any attempts by the appellants to preserve their New York price level by conspiring to raise the prices at which liquor is sold elsewhere in the country. . . .
“Although it is possible to envision circumstances under which price discriminations proscribed by the Robinson-Patman Act might be compelled by § 9, the existence of such potential conflicts is entirely too speculative in the present posture of this case . . . .” Id., at 45-46 (citations omitted).
Our decisions in this area instruct us, therefore, that a state statute, when considered in the abstract, may be condemned under the antitrust laws only if it mandates or authorizes conduct that necessarily constitutes a violation of the antitrust laws in all cases, or if it places irresistible pressure on a private party to violate the antitrust laws in order to comply with the statute. Such condemnation will follow under § 1 of the Sherman Act when the conduct contemplated by the statute is in all cases a per se violation. If the activity addressed by the statute does not fall into that category, and therefore must be analyzed under the rule of reason, the statute cannot be condemned in the abstract. Analysis under the rule of reason requires an examination of the circumstances underlying a particular economic practice, and therefore does not lend itself to a conclusion that a statute is facially inconsistent with federal antitrust laws.
It remains for us to determine whether a distiller’s invocation of the designation statute would be subject in all cases to a per se rule of illegality under the Sherman Act.
B
We held in GTE Sylvania that a manufacturer’s use of vertical nonprice restraints is not per se illegal. Because restraints on intrabrand competition may promote interbrand competition, we concluded that nonprice vertical restraints should be scrutinized under the rule of reason. 433 U. S., at 57-59. After our decision in GTE Sylvania, it cannot be said that every attempt by a manufacturer to restrain competition in its own products is illegal under the Sherman Act.
California’s designation statute merely enforces the distiller’s decision to restrain intrabrand competition. It permits the distiller to designate which wholesalers may import the distiller’s products into the State. It prevents an unauthorized wholesaler from obtaining the distiller’s products from outside the distiller’s established distribution chain. The designation statute does not require the distiller to impose vertical restraints of any kind; that is a matter for it to determine. The number of importers which may be designated by the distiller is not limited; the designated importer is not required to sell the imported brand to retailers within a specified area or from a specified location within the State.
It is irrelevant for our purposes that the distiller’s ability to restrict intrabrand competition in California has the imprimatur of a state statute. New Motor Vehicle Bd. of Cal. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U. S., at 110-111. The effect of the statute is simply to counteract the perceived extraterritorial effects of Oklahoma’s alcoholic beverage laws, which, as once understood, operated to deprive the distiller of control over its distribution system nationwide. Thus, California’s designation statute merely restored what Oklahoma had taken away: the distiller’s ability to determine which wholesalers may import its products into California.
In these respects, therefore, we find these cases to be much like Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter, 384 U. S. 35 (1966). As in Hostetter, upholding the validity of the designation statute will not insulate a distiller’s invocation of the statute from scrutiny under the Sherman Act. The manner in which a distiller utilizes the designation statute and the arrangements a distiller makes with its wholesalers will be subject to Sherman Act analysis under the rule of reason. There is no basis, however, - for condemning the statute itself by force of the Sherman Act.
III
Respondents seek to support the judgment of the Court of Appeal on three federal grounds not considered by the court below. None of these contentions have merit.
A
Respondents contend that the California designation statute is pre-empted by § 5(a) of the Federal Alcohol Administration Act, 49 Stat. 981, as amended, 27 U. S. C. § 205(a). Section 5(a) prohibits a distiller or wholesaler from establishing exclusive retail outlets. See S. Rep. No. 1215, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 6-7 (1935); H. R. Rep. No. 1542, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 10-11 (1935). In other words, §5(a) prohibits a distiller or wholesaler from requiring a retailer to buy only the distiller’s or wholesaler’s products to the exclusion of the products of other distillers or wholesalers. The statute does not prohibit a distiller from requiring its wholesalers to purchase the distiller’s products from the distiller itself rather than from a third party. California’s statute in no way requires exclusive retail outlets. By its terms, the designation statute does not even require exclusive wholesale arrangements. One might be able to hypothesize an arrangement enforced by the designation statute that might be prohibited by §5(a), but this is insufficient to invalidate a state statute pursuant to the Supremacy Clause. “To hold otherwise would be to ignore the teaching of this Court’s decisions which enjoin seeking out conflicts between state and federal regulation where none clearly exists.” Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U. S. 440, 446 (1960).
B
Respondents contend that the designation statute denies them due process of law. According to respondents, California has established a “second tier of private licensing over the state’s licensing process,” and therefore procedural due process protections apply with regard to the distiller’s designation decisions. Brief for Respondents 36.
We find this contention without merit. The designation statute merely enforces the distiller’s decision to deny permission to a California wholesaler to deal in the distiller’s products. We do not think that respondents possess any constitutionally protected liberty or property interest in obtaining the distiller’s permission. Thus, the Due Process Clause is not offended by the wholesaler’s inability to challenge the distiller’s decisionmaking. What respondents are really challenging is the California Legislature’s decision to give such a power to the distiller without establishing any criteria to govern the exercise of that power. The Due Process Clause does not authorize this Court to assess the wisdom of the California Legislature’s decision. See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U. S. 726, 729-732 (1963).
c
Finally, respondents contend that the designation statute violates the Equal Protection Clause because it discriminates between designated and nondesignated wholesalers. There can be little doubt but that the designation statute is rationally related to the statute’s legitimate purposes. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U. S. 456, 461-470 (1981). The designation statute enables the distiller to place restraints on intrabrand competition in order to foster inter-brand competition. It is not our province to determine whether or not California consumers would be better off had the California Legislature decided not to close off the “Oklahoma connection.” See Vance v. Bradley, 440 U. S. 93, 109 (1979).
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed, and these cases are remanded to that court for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Section 23672 is actually an amended version of a statute invalidated by the California Supreme Court in Rice v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd., 21 Cal. 3d 431, 579 P. 2d 476 (1978), because its minimum price system constituted resale price maintenance in violation of the Sherman Act. See California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U. S. 97, 100-102 (1980).
Okla. Stat., Tit. 37, §533 (1981).
The Oklahoma Supreme Court, however, has recently closed off the “Oklahoma connection” by holding that the open-wholesaling statute does not apply to alcoholic beverages destined for consumption in other States. Central Liquor Co. v. Oklahoma Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd., 640 P. 2d 1351 (1982). What made the “Oklahoma connection” particularly attractive to California wholesalers was that Oklahoma required distillers to sell to Oklahoma wholesalers at the lowest price charged for its products anywhere in the United States. See Okla. Stat., Tit. 37, §536.1 (1981). The demise of the “Oklahoma connection,” however, has no bearing on our disposition of the legal issues in these cases.
Although it did not phrase its conclusion in these terms, it is evident that the California Court of Appeal concluded that the designation statute was pre-empted by the Sherman Act. The court properly recognized that it had no jurisdiction to entertain a lawsuit brought pursuant to § 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U. S. C. § 15. 108 Cal. App. 3d 348, 354, n. 2, 166 Cal. Rptr. 563, 568, n. 2 (1980). Rather than seeking a private remedy against private parties, respondents in these cases sought to enjoin the enforcement of a state statute that they contend to be unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause in its every application. Indeed, because respondents brought this suit prior to the effective date of the statute, respondents did not, and could not, challenge any vertical restraints actually employed by a distiller pursuant to the statute. Instead, respondents challenge the statute on its face without consideration of particular circumstances.
Under established antitrust principles, per se rules of illegality are appropriate only when they apply to practices “ ‘which because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use.’” Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U. S. 36, 50 (1977), quoting Northern Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 356 U. S. 1, 5 (1958). It is not surprising, therefore, that a statute which requires practices per se illegal under the Sherman Act may be subject to a facial challenge under the Supremacy Clause.
As with the instant case, because the challenged statute had not as yet been put into effect, this Court in Hostetter was presented only with a facial challenge to its constitutionality.
This is merely another way of stating that the designation statute might have an anticompetitive effect when applied in concrete factual situations. See New Motor Vehicle Bd. of Cal. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U. S., at 110-111. We have explained, however, that this is insufficient to declare the statute itself void on its face.
It is certainly conceivable, however, that particular conduct pursuant to the statute might be subject to a challenge under one or more of the established per se rules of illegality.
Because of our resolution of the pre-emption issue, it is not necessary for us to consider whether the statute may be saved from invalidation under the doctrine of Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341 (1943), or under the Twenty-first Amendment.
Section 5(a) provides:
“It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in business as a distiller, brewer, rectifier, blender, or other producer, or as an importer or wholesaler, of distilled spirits, wine, or malt beverages, or as a bottler, or warehouseman and bottler, of distilled spirits, directly or indirectly or through an affiliate:
“(a) Exclusive outlet
“To require, by agreement or otherwise, that any retailer engaged in the sale of distilled spirits, wine, or malt beverages, purchase any such products from such person to the exclusion in whole or in part of distilled spirits, wine, or malt beverages sold or offered for sale by other persons in interstate or foreign commerce, if such requirement is made in the course of interstate or foreign commerce, or if such person engages in such practice to such an extent as substantially to restrain or prevent transactions in interstate or foreign commerce in any such products, or if the direct effect of such requirement is to prevent, deter, hinder, or restrict other persons from selling or offering for sale any such products to such retailer in interstate or foreign commerce.” 27 U. S. C. § 205(a).
See 27 CFR §§8.3, 8.11, 8.23 (1982).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
H
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
The motions to affirm are granted and the judgments are affirmed.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
C
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Marshall
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented in these cases is whether Congress violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment by requiring private railroads to reimburse the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) for rail travel privileges that Amtrak provides to the railroads’ employees and former employees, and their dependents.
I
A
From the middle of the 19th century, the railroad passenger coach played a significant and sometimes romantic role in American cultural and economic life. By the middle of this century, however, “this time-honored vehicle” threatened to “take its place in the transportation museum along with the stagecoach, the sidewheeler, and the steam locomotive.” Whereas in 1929 about 20,000 intercity trains operated in the. country, by 1946, there were only about 11,000 such passenger trains; by 1971, fewer than 500 passenger trains still operated. As cars, buses, and airplanes displaced the passenger railroads, those railroads that continued to provide passenger carriage incurred heavy and continuing losses. At the same time, as common carriers these railroads were bound to continue providing service until the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) or state regulatory authorities relieved them of this responsibility. Given the tremendous operating losses, many of the remaining handful of railroads operating passenger coaches sought ICC permission to discontinue passenger train service.
The Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 (Act or RPSA), 84 Stat. 1327, 45 U. S. C. §501 et seq. (1970 ed.), which took effect on May 1, 1971, was Congress’ effort to “revive the failing intercity passenger train industry and retain a high-quality rail passenger service for the Nation.” On concluding that a reorganized and restructured rail passenger system could be successful, Congress established the National Railroad Passenger Corporation, a private, for-profit corporation that has come to be known as Amtrak. The corporation is not “an agency or establishment” of the Government but is authorized by the Government to operate or contract for the operation of intercity rail passenger service. The Act outlined a procedure under which private railroads could obtain relief from their passenger-service obligations by transferring those responsibilities to Amtrak; the Act authorized the new corporation to enter into standardized contracts with the private railroads, under which a railroad would be relieved “of all [its] responsibilities as a common carrier of passengers by rail in intercity rail passenger service under [Subtitle IV of Title 49] or any State or other law relating to the provision of intercity passenger service.” 45 U. S. C. § 561(a)(1) (1970 ed.).
To obtain relief from their common carrier obligations, the railroads had to agree to several conditions. First, “[i]n consideration of being relieved of this responsibility,” a railroad was to pay Amtrak an amount equal to one-half of that railroad’s financial losses from intercity passenger service during 1969. § 561(a)(2). Participating railroads also were to provide Amtrak with the use of tracks, other facilities, and services at rates to be agreed upon by the parties or, in the event of disagreement, to be set by the ICC. §§561, 562. The Act also included a labor protection provision requiring the railroads to “provide fair and equitable arrangements to protect the interests of employees affected by discontinuances of intercity rail passenger service.” § 565(a). Participating railroads were required to enter into “protective arrangements” with their unions, in which the railroads promised to protect dislocated employees and to preserve employee benefits, including pension rights and fringe benefits. §§ 565(a) — (e).
Finally, in §301 of the Act, 45 U. S. C. §541 (1970 ed.), Congress “expressly reserved” its right to “repeal, alter or amend this Act at any time.”
All but five private railroads offering intercity passenger service took up the option provided by the Act and entered into contracts, known as “Basic Agreements,” with Amtrak. The participating railroads made the required payments to Amtrak and shed their intercity rail passenger obligations. On May 1, 1971, Amtrak began rail passenger service.
The Basic Agreements between the railroads and Amtrak mirrored the provisions of the Act. For example, §2.1 of each Basic Agreement, entitled “Relief from Responsibility,” relieved the signatory railroad “of its entire responsibility for the provision of Intercity Rail Passenger Service.” App. 13. The Agreements also required the railroads to make services, tracks, and facilities available and to protect employees who would be affected by a discontinuance of passenger service.
Section 7.5 of each Basic Agreement, entitled “Transportation Privileges,” spelled out the rights of the railroads and their employees to make use of Amtrak trains. The fifth paragraph, which concerned the rights of railroad employees to travel on Amtrak trains for free or at reduced fares, provided that “[transportation privileges, if any, with respect to business and personal travel of Railroad personnel shall be as determined by [Amtrak].” The paragraph did not specify which party was to bear the cost of the transportation.
Shortly after Amtrak began operation, considerable controversy arose over Amtrak’s decision to cut back employee pass privileges pursuant to the discretion accorded in this provision. The result of that controversy has given rise to this action, and we turn to consider the evolution of this dispute.
B
Since the 1880’s, railroad employees and retirees, and their dependents, have been able to ride passenger trains for free or at reduced rates. Before Amtrak assumed operation, the private railroads often permitted current and retired employees and their dependents to travel on the employees’ home lines for free or at reduced rates, and many railroads had reciprocal agreements permitting employees and dependents of other railroads to travel at reduced rates as well.
At the time Amtrak was created, between 1.4 million and 2 million rail-travel passes were outstanding. Exercising its discretion under §7.5 of the Basic Agreements, the corporation decided to confine pass privileges to employees of the railroads that operated trains for Amtrak, and to limit those privileges to half-rate fares. As a result, all railroad employees lost their pre-Amtrak access to. completely free transportation, and employees of some railroads lost their pass privileges entirely. Amtrak then was faced with vehement protests from the railroads, which continued to operate both freight trains and some passenger service, and which asserted that the withdrawal of free transportation privileges for their employees threatened to produce severe labor problems for them. The corporation thereafter restored some, but not all of the canceled privileges.
The railroads continued to protest vigorously the Amtrak decision to cut back pass-rider privileges. They also reaffirmed their concern about employee morale and the possibility of labor strikes if privileges were not restored. Congress responded to this problem in 1972 by amending the RPSA to restore free or reduced-rate transportation to all people who had enjoyed such privileges when Amtrak took over passenger rail service. Pub. L. 92-316, § 8, 86 Stat. 230-231. The new § 405(f) of the Act, 45 U. S. C. § 565(f) (1976 ed.) (1972 amendment), required Amtrak to assure, “to the maximum extent practicable,” that all employees and dependents who had received free or reduced-rate transportation before Amtrak began operation would continue to be eligible for such benefits. In their Committee Reports, both the Senate and the House emphasized that railroad employees should not lose their longstanding pass privileges — privileges they had earned through years of service — simply on account of the transfer of service to Amtrak. Amtrak implemented this amendment by permitting pass riders to travel free or at half fare depending on the length of an employee’s railroad employment, whether the employee was retired, and whether he was traveling on or off the rail lines of his home railroad. In addition, pass riders were eligible for travel on a space-available basis only; they were permitted to make reservations only 24 hours in advance on trains requiring reservations; and they were not permitted to use the passes on Amtrak’s special trains called Metroliners.
The 1972 amendment also required the railroads to pay for “such costs as may be incurred” by Amtrak in providing the pass privileges mandated by § 405(f). As the Senate Committee explained: “Because Congress is merely continuing pass policies which the railroads themselves developed, it would appear that the railroads and not Amtrak should bear the cost, if any.” S. Rep. No. 92-756, p. 11 (1972). The amendment did not specify how the costs were to be calculated but did provide that the ICC should resolve the issue if Amtrak and the railroads were unable to agree on the amount to be paid. The matter eventually was referred to the ICC, which set an interim reimbursement rate based on Amtrak’s incremental operating costs of providing the service — that is, based on the additional cost to Amtrak to transport the riders. The initial rate was $.00079 per passenger mile. This amount was to be offset by the revenue derived from the reduced-rate fares paid by pass riders riding pursuant to the 1972 amendment. The railroads also were to pay Amtrak for the administrative costs of the program. When the offset formula was applied, the revenue derived from the reduced-rate fares always exceeded the payments otherwise due from the railroads. As a result, the railroads reimbursed Amtrak solely for the pass program’s administrative costs. From 1972 to 1979, Amtrak collected from the railroads only administrative expenses amounting to about $500,000 per year.
In 1979, however, Congress decided that the ICC’s reimbursement rate resulted in inadequate compensation to Amtrak. Accordingly, in the Amtrak Reorganization Act of 1979, Pub. L. 96-73, §.120 (a), 93 Stat. 547 (Reorganization Act), Congress amended the § 405(f) pass-rider provision to require that the railroads prospectively reimburse Amtrak for pass-rider service at the rate of “25 percent of the systemwide average monthly yield per revenue passenger mile” — a rate that amounted to approximately one-fourth of the normal fare for ticket-buying passengers. The new rate was to remain in effect for two years.
At the same time, Congress also directed the Comptroller General to conduct a study and, “taking into account the value of the services being provided,” § 120(b), to make recommendations on the appropriate way to reimburse Amtrak for the cost of providing pass-rider transportation. In 1980, the General Accounting Office submitted a report to Congress that analyzed in detail two methods of reimbursement. GAO Report, App. 42-86. The report first considered reimbursing Amtrak for its incremental cost in providing the service, and second, for the value to the pass rider of the service being provided, which would be less than the fare charged a regular passenger, but which the report otherwise declined to quantify. Neither approach was necessarily the correct one, GAO decided: “Amtrak’s costs to provide transportation to pass riders are debatable, and we did not find adequate analytical evidence to support one position over another or to recommend a specific means to reimburse Amtrak.” Id., at 43. The report therefore concluded that the choice between the two cost reimbursement formulas was “a policy decision that the Congress should make,” id., at 80; instead of offering an answer, the report simply outlined the available options. Ibid.
After receiving the report, Congress again amended § 405(f) of the Act and provided that the 25-percent reimbursement requirement would remain in effect indefinitely. Pub. L. 97-35, 95 Stat. 697 (1981 amendment).
C
The cases we consider began in 1980 when five railroads, each of which had taken advantage of the RPSA and discontinued passenger service, filed suit against Amtrak in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois challenging the constitutionality of § 405(f) of the Act. They argued that the requirement that they reimburse Amtrak for the pass travel of their employees, former employees, and dependents violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
The railroads based this claim on four theories. First, they claimed they had a contractual right against the United States, derived from the RPSA and the Basic Agreements, to be free from the obligation to provide intercity rail passenger service. They asserted that § 405(f), which had been added to the Act in 1972, therefore impaired an obligation of the United States under this statutory contract because pass privileges constituted the “intercity rail passenger service,” from which the railroads had been relieved of their “entire responsibility” in the RPSA. Thus, since Congress had contracted in the RPSA to relieve the railroads of intercity rail passenger service, and the railroads had fulfilled their obligations under the contract, they had a right to be free from the responsibility to provide pass privileges. Congress, they claimed, was impairing its contractual obligation through passage of §405. Next, the railroads claimed that even if the Act itself were not a contractual obligation, the Basic Agreements, with identical “relief from responsibility” language, were such a contractual obligation of the United States; that obligation, the railroads asserted, was unconstitutionally impaired by the subsequent legislation. Third, they argued that, even if no contract existed between the United States and the railroads, the statutory requirement that the railroads pay Amtrak for allowing pass riders constituted a deprivation of property without due process. Finally, the railroads argued that, even if Congress might constitutionally require the railroads to reimburse Amtrak for the cost of the pass-rider program, the particular reimbursement formula set forth in the 1979 amendment exceeded the incremental cost to Amtrak of providing the service and therefore constituted a deprivation of property without due process. After the 1981 amendment was passed, the railroads amended their complaint to make their claims applicable to that amendment as well.
The railroads filed a motion for summary judgment, and Amtrak filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. The United States then intervened as a defendant under 28 U. S. C. § 2403 and filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. The District Court entered an order granting summary judgment in favor of Amtrak and the United States. 577 F. Supp. 1046 (1982). It concluded that the Act, as amended, did not constitute a contract between the United States and the railroads. It then assumed that the Basic Agreements were contracts between the United States and the railroads and held that § 405(f) did not impair that contract. The District Court found that the Agreements relieved the railroads of their responsibility to provide intercity rail service, but that by the railroads’ own admission they never had a legal or contractual responsibility to provide free or reduced rate transportation to employees and their families. The court also observed that the Basic Agreements gave to Amtrak the discretion to determine what pass privileges, if any, the railroad employees should have.
The District Court rejected the railroads’ argument that the requirement that they pay for their employees’ pass-rider privileges violated due process and ruled that the railroads had not overcome the firmly established presumption of constitutionality that attaches to legislative Acts “ ‘adjusting the burdens and benefits of economic life.’” Id., at 1052 (quoting Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U. S. 1, 15 (1976)). Because the legislation at issue was neither arbitrary nor irrational, the District Court concluded that the reimbursement requirement of §405 did not violate due process under the Turner Elkhorn standard.
Finally, the court rejected the railroads’ argument that Congress’ reimbursement formula violated due process by requiring the railroads to pay more than the incremental cost to Amtrak of transporting the pass riders. “Having determined that the Congress acted constitutionally in requiring the railroads to reimburse Amtrak for the pass rider service, this court will not second-guess the legislative branch on its selection of a particular mathematical formula for reimbursement, absent a showing that the formula was selected in an arbitrary or irrational manner.” 577 F. Supp., at 1055. The court then traced Congress’ decisionmaking process to demonstrate that the choice of reimbursement plans was a rational policy decision, particularly in light of the conclusion in the GAO Report that the reimbursement issue involved a policy choice for Congress.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. 723 F. 2d 1298 (1983). The Court of Appeals rejected most of the railroads’ arguments and held that the railroads could be compelled to reimburse Amtrak for the incremental cost of carrying the pass riders. The panel held, however, that the Basic Agreements provided the railroads with a contractual right to be free from having to “finance aspects of [Amtrak] operations that were once part of the railroads’ entire responsibility for the provision of intercity rail passenger service.” Id., at 1302. According to the Court of Appeals, because the reimbursement scheme in the 1979 amendment required the railroads to pay more than the incremental cost to Amtrak, these payments supported Amtrak’s general intercity rail passenger service operations, and the statute therefore impaired the railroads’ right to be free from the responsibility for providing intercity rail passenger service. The court ruled that this “windfall” to Amtrak violated the Due Process Clause, because it unreasonably and illegally impaired the rights of the railroads under the Basic Agreements.
Amtrak appealed to this Court under 28 U. S. C. § 1252, arguing that the reimbursement formula in § 405(f) is constitutional, and we noted probable jurisdiction. 469 U. S. 813 (1984). The railroads cross-appealed, contending that any reimbursement violates due process. We deferred ruling on whether jurisdiction over the cross-appeal was proper until consideration of the cases on the merits. Ibid.
1 — 1 1 — 1
The railroads argue that the RPSA and the Basic Agreements created a contractual obligation on the part of the United States not to reimpose any rail passenger service responsibilities on those railroads that entered into Basic Agreements, and that the pass-rider amendments to the Act unconstitutionally impair the “contract” into which the United States entered. Thus, the railroads conclude, the Court of Appeals correctly held that the 1979 and 1981 amendments substantially impaired their contractual rights and violated due process, but incorrectly ruled that the 1972 amendment, which required only that the railroads pay for the incremental cost to Amtrak of the pass riders, was constitutional. In making these arguments, the railroads argue first that the United States entered into a contractual relationship with the railroads, either through the RPSA or the Basic Agreements, and second that the scope of the contractual agreements encompassed reimbursement for pass-rider privileges. But, the railroads assert that, even if their contractual rights were only private ones with Amtrak, those private contractual agreements created a right to be free from paying for pass-rider privileges. They maintain that the 1979 and 1981 amendments, as well as the 1972 assessment of incremental costs, therefore unconstitutionally impaired those private contractual rights. We consider, and reject, each of these arguments in turn.
A
The first question we address is whether the RPSA constituted not merely a regulatory policy but also a contractual arrangement between the United States and the railroads that entered into Basic Agreements. For many decades, this Court has maintained that absent some clear indication that the legislature intends to bind itself contractually, the presumption is that “a law is not intended to create private contractual or vested rights but merely declares a policy to be pursued until the legislature shall ordain otherwise.” Dodge v. Board of Education, 302 U. S. 74, 79 (1937). See also Rector of Christ Church v. County of Philadelphia, 24 How. 300, 302 (1861) (“Such an interpretation is not to be favored”). This well-established presumption is grounded in the elementary proposition that the principal function of a legislature is not to make contracts, but to make laws that establish the policy of the state. Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U. S. 95, 104-105 (1938). Policies, unlike contracts, are inherently subject to revision and repeal, and to construe laws as contracts when the obligation is not clearly and unequivocally expressed would be to limit drastically the essential powers of a legislative body. Indeed, “ ‘[t]he continued existence of a government would be of no great value, if by implications and presumptions, it was disarmed of the powers necessary to accomplish the ends of its creation.’” Keefe v. Clark, 322 U. S. 393, 397 (1944) (quoting Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 420, 548 (1837)). Thus, the party asserting the creation of a contract must overcome this well-founded presumption, Dodge, supra, at 79, and we proceed cautiously both in identifying a contract within the language of a regulatory statute and in defining the contours of any contractual obligation.
In determining whether a particular statute gives rise to a contractual obligation, “it is of first importance to examine the language of the statute.” Dodge v. Board of Education, supra, at 78. See also Indiana ex rel Anderson v. Brand, supra, at 104 (“Where the claim is that the State’s policy embodied in a statute is to bind its instrumentalities by contract, the cardinal inquiry is as to the terms of the statute supposed to create such a contract”). “If it provides for the execution of a written contract on behalf of the state the case for an obligation binding upon the state is clear.” 302 U. S., at 78 (emphasis supplied). But absent “an adequate expression of an actual intent” of the State to bind itself, Wisconsin & Michigan R. Co. v. Powers, 191 U. S. 379, 386-387 (1903), this Court simply will not lightly construe that which is undoubtedly a scheme of public regulation to be, in addition, a private contract to which the State is a party.
The language of the RPSA discloses absolutely no congressional intention to have the United States enter into a private contractual arrangement with the railroads. By its terms, the Act does not create or speak of a contract between the United States and the railroads, and it does not in any respect provide for the execution of a written contract on behalf of the United States. Quite to the contrary, the Act expressly established the National Railroad Passenger Corporation as a nongovernmental entity, 45 U. S. C. §541, and it used the term “contract” not to define the relationship of the United States to the railroads, but instead that of the new, nongovernmental corporation to the railroads. The statute states clearly that “the Corporation is authorized to contract and, upon written request therefor from a railroad, shall tender a contract...,” 45 U. S. C. § 561(a), and that, “[u]pon its entering into a valid contract..., the railroad shall be relieved of all its responsibilities....” Ibid. We simply cannot agree with the railroads that the frequent usage in a statute of the language of contract, including the term “contract,” evidences an intent to bind the Federal Government contractually. Legislation outlining the terms on which private parties may execute contracts does not on its own constitute a statutory contract, but is instead an articulated policy that, like all policies, is subject to revision or repeal. Indeed, lest there be any doubt in these cases about Congress’ will, Congress “expressly reserved” its rights to “repeal, alter, or amend” the Act at any time. 45 U. S. C. §541. This is hardly the language of contract.
Moreover, the circumstances of the Act’s passage belie an intent to contract away governmental powers. Congress long had regulated the railroads and had compelled them through the ICC to continue unprofitable service and undertake new service. Indeed, the huge sums that the railroads insist they paid to Amtrak in “consideration” for the contractual right to be free from their passenger service obligations represented just one-half of the annual losses they suffered in one year under the prior regulatory scheme.
This atmosphere of pervasive prior regulation leads to several conclusions. For one, Congress would have struck a profoundly inequitable bargain if, in exchange for the equivalent of a half year’s losses, it had entered into a binding contract never to impose on the railroads — which would continue to operate their potentially profitable freight services — any rail passenger service obligations at all. Congress simply cannot be presumed to have nonchalantly shed this vitally important governmental power with so little concern for what it would receive in exchange. Cf. United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U. S. 1, 21-25 (1977) (considering reserved powers doctrine). Also, the pervasiveness of the prior regulation in this area suggests that absent some affirmative indication to the contrary, the railroads had no legitimate expectation that regulation would cease after 1971. Coupled with the statute’s express reservation of the power to repeal, the heavy and longstanding regulation of this area strongly cuts against any argument that the statute created binding contractual rights. Cf. Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U. S. 400, 413 (1983) (discussing implications of pervasive regulation for inquiry into substantial impairment of a contract).
The railroads argue nevertheless that the RPSA created a contractual obligation “closely analogous to the statutory covenant” at issue in United States Trust, “which this Court held to be a contractual obligation of a State subject to the Contract Clause.” Brief for Appellees in No. 83-1492, p. 18. Far from recognizing the similarity, we find that the statute at issue in United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey highlights the difference between the RPSA and a true statutory contract. In United States Trust, the Court held that New Jersey could not retroactively alter a statutory bond covenant relied upon by bond purchasers. The covenant in that case was a part of the bistate legislation authorizing the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey to acquire, construct, and operate the Hudson & Manhattan Railroad and the World Trade Center in New York City. The statute read in part: “The 2 States covenant and agree with each other and with the holders of any affected bonds, as hereinafter defined, that so long as any of such bonds remain outstanding and unpaid... neither the States nor the port authority nor any subsidiary corporation incorporated for any of the purposes of this act will apply any of the rentals, tolls, fares, fees, charges, revenues or reserves, which have been or shall be pledged in whole or in part as security for such bonds, for any railroad purposes whatsoever other than permitted purposes hereinafter set forth.” 1962 N. J. Laws, ch. 8, § 6; 1962 N. Y. Laws, ch. 209, § 6. Resort need not be had to a dictionary or case law to recognize the language of contract. The States explicitly bound themselves in a covenant not to take certain actions now or in the future, and the intent to make a contract was, as a result, not even contested in that case. Indeed, the Court, found that the States had drafted this language in an effort to invoke the constitutional protections of the Contract Clause as security against repeal.
To the contrary, here the statute does not contain a provision in which the United States “covenants] and agree[s]” with anyone to do anything, and in fact the United States expressly declined to offer assurances about future activity when it reserved the right to revoke or repeal the Act. We therefore are not persuaded by the railroads’ proffered analogy.
Because neither the language of the statute nor the circumstances surrounding its passage manifest any intent on the part of Congress to bind itself contractually to the railroads, we hold that the RPSA does not constitute a binding obligation of Congress.
B
We turn next to consider whether the Basic Agreements into which the railroads entered with Amtrak grant the railroads a contractual right against the United States to be free from all obligation to provide passenger service. While there can be no doubt that the Basic Agreements are contracts, they are contracts not between the railroads and the United States but simply between the railroads and the nongovernmental corporation, Amtrak. The United States was not a party to the Basic Agreements; by their terms, the agreements do not implicate the United States. The railroads do not point to any language in the RPSA authorizing Amtrak to bargain away any portion of Congress’ Commerce Clause power, or to act as the Government’s agent and confer upon the railroads the right to be free of any obligation to provide passenger service, assuming even that Congress could make that delegation. The District Court asserted that the Agreements might constitute contracts between the United States and the railroads because they granted the railroads relief from their passenger service obligations, and because only the United States actually could grant such relief. 577 F. Supp., at 1051. But a careful reading of the RPSA indicates that the Act, and not the Basic Agreements, actually removed that responsibility. Accordingly, we find unpersuasive the railroads’ efforts to demonstrate that the United States is contractually bound, either through the RPSA or the Basic Agreements, not to reimpose any rail passenger service obligations.
Because, as we have demonstrated, neither the Act nor the Basic Agreements created a contract between railroads and the United States, our focus shifts from a case in which we confront an alleged impairment, by the Government, of its own contractual obligations, to one in which we face an alleged legislative impairment of a private contractual right. We therefore have no need to consider whether an allegation of a governmental breach of its own contract warrants application of the more rigorous standard of review that the railroads urge us to apply. Instead, we turn to consider
whether the payment obligation in § 405(f) of the Act unconstitutionally impairs the private contractual rights of the railroads.
C
To prevail on a claim that federal economic legislation unconstitutionally impairs a private contractual right, the party complaining of unconstitutionality has the burden of demonstrating, first, that the statute alters contractual rights or obligations. See United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U. S., at 17-21. If an impairment is found, the reviewing court next determines whether the impairment is of constitutional dimension. If the alteration of contractual obligations is minimal, the inquiry may end at this stage, Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U. S. 234, 245 (1978); if the impairment is substantial, a court must look more closely at the legislation, ibid.; see also Energy Reserves Group, Inc., 459 U. S., at 411. When the contract is a private one, and when the impairing statute is a federal one, this next inquiry is especially limited, and the judicial scrutiny quite minimal. The party asserting a Fifth Amendment due process violation must overcome a presumption of constitutionality and “ ‘establish that the legislature has acted in an arbitrary and irrational way.’ ” Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation v. R. A. Gray & Co., 467 U. S. 717, 729 (1984) (quoting Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U. S., at 15).
The starting point for our inquiry is therefore whether the 1979 and 1981 pass-rider amendments impaired the private contractual rights that the railroads obtained under the Basic Agreements. We must first consider what rights vested in the railroads pursuant to the Basic Agreements and then examine the way in which the 1979 and 1981 amendments altered those rights.
The only right that the railroads obtained under the Basic Agreements was the right to be relieved of the pre-existing responsibilities they had as regulated common carriers. The RPSA expressly permitted the railroads to divest themselves of, and authorized Amtrak to assume, all the railroads’ “responsibilities as a common carrier of passengers by rail in intercity rail passenger service under [Subtitle IV of Title [9] or any State or other law relating to the provision of intercity rail passenger service.” 45 U. S. C. §561(a)(1) (1970 ed.) (emphasis added). In turn, the Basic Agreements relieved the railroads of their “entire responsibility for the provision of Intercity Rail Passenger Service.” §2.1, App. 13. Thus the statute and the Basic Agreements together relieved the railroads only of common carriage responsibilities they had by virtue of federal or state law. Moreover, Amtrak had no independent authority to relieve the railroads of obligations imposed by Congress, and it is readily apparent that Congress limited its relief to the previously imposed obligation to operate intercity rail passenger trains.
The railroads do not and could not allege that as common carriers they ever had the responsibility, by statute or regulation, to provide free passes or reduced fares for their employees and their dependents. Here, as in the lower courts, they describe the provision of passes as a “gratuitous undertaking, like providing a ‘Christmas turkey.’” 577 F. Supp., at 1051. It plainly is not consistent with the nature of relief provided the railroads under the Basic Agreements to include, within the scope of the contract, relief from the “gratuitous undertakings” of providing free and reduced-fare passes. Nor did the provision of free or half-fare passes become a “responsibility” within the meaning of the statute because some railroads, although not the parties here, did not simply offer the passes as noncontractual fringe benefits, but instead were required to provide passes pursuant to their collective-bargaining agreements. The Basic Agreements did not purport to relieve the railroads of their employee obligations under collective-bargaining agreements, and in fact the Act expressly required the railroads to continue to assume their responsibilities under collective-bargaining agreements. 45 U. S. C. § 565(b) (1970 ed.) (a railroad shall make provision for “the preservation of rights, privileges, and benefits (including continuation of pension rights and benefits) to such employees under existing collective-bargaining agreements”).
We therefore find that the Basic Agreements in no respect relieved the railroads of the “responsibility” to provide their employees with pass privileges, for no state or federal law imposed that “responsibility” on them, in connection with intercity rail passenger operations, when the contracts were executed. The Basic Agreements did not address this payment obligation but instead left the reimbursement issue completely open. It was not until after the Basic Agreements were signed, and Amtrak operations were under way, that Congress decided to impose new obligations on both parties to the agreements. We therefore conclude that § 405(f) in no respect altered, substantially or otherwise, the railroads’ existing contractual rights and duties.
D
The Court of Appeals concluded that, while the Basic Agreements might not expressly have relieved the railroads of the obligation to reimburse Amtrak for pass riders, they did relieve the railroads of all responsibility — both operational and financial — for intercity rail passenger service. 723 F. 2d, at 1302. But because the railroads were required by the 1979 and 1981 amendments to pay Amtrak more than its incremental costs, the court reasoned that some portion of the railroads’ payments might go to cover Amtrak’s operational expenses. In that way, the railroads would indirectly be providing the rail passenger service from which they were to have been contractually freed, and Congress’ decision to require such payments might therefore violate the railroads’ contractual right to be free of the responsibility to provide intercity rail service. The court then considered whether the impairment was unconstitutional and concluded that Amtrak had failed to meet
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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H
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Ginsburg
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case concerns the Expedited Funds Availability Act, 12 U. S. C. §§4001-4010, a 1987 law designed to accelerate the availability of funds to bank depositors and to improve the Nation’s check payment system. We confront a jurisdictional question regarding the Act’s civil liability provisions, in particular §§ 4010(a), (d), and (f): Is federal-court subject-matter jurisdiction under those provisions confined to suits initiated by bank customers against banks, as the Court of Appeals held, or do federal courts have jurisdiction, as well, over suits brought by one bank against another depository institution? We hold that the Act provides for federal-court jurisdiction not only in suits between customers and banks, but also in cases initiated by one bank against another bank.
I
Historically, the Nation’s check payment system has been controlled primarily by state law, particularly, in recent decades, by articles 3 and 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). Although federal regulations have long supplemented state law in this area, see most notably Regulation J, 12 CFR pt. 210 (1995), the UCC has supplied the basic legal framework for bank deposits and check collections. But despite UCC controls, the check-clearing process too often lagged, taking days or even weeks to complete. To protect themselves against the risk that a deposited check would be returned unpaid, banks typically placed lengthy “holds” on deposited funds. Bank customers, encountering long holds, complained that delayed access to deposited funds impeded the expeditious use of their checking accounts. See S. Rep. No. 100-19, pp. 25-26 (1987).
In 1987, Congress responded by passing the Expedited Funds Availability Act (EFA Act or Act), 101 Stat. 635, as amended, 12 U. S. C. §§ 4001-4010. The Act requires banks to make deposited funds available for withdrawal within specified time periods, subject to stated exceptions. See §§ 4002,4003. To reduce banks’ risk of nonpayment, the Act grants the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve Board or Board) broad authority to prescribe regulations expediting the collection and return of checks. § 4008. The Board and other banking agencies are authorized to enforce the Act’s provisions administratively, by issuing cease-and-desist orders and imposing other civil sanctions. See § 4009(a) (incorporating administrative enforcement provisions of 12 U. S. C. § 1818).
The Act’s final section contains civil liability provisions, which are the focus of this case. See §4010. Subsection 4010(a) addresses a bank’s liability to persons other than another depository institution. It provides, in pertinent part:
“Except as otherwise provided in this section, any depository institution which fails to comply with any requirement imposed under this chapter or any regulation prescribed under this chapter with respect to any person other than another depository institution is liable to such person in an amount equal to the sum of [a specified measure of damages].”
Subsection 4010(f) governs a bank’s liability to another bank for violation of the Act’s provisions. It states:
“The Board is authorized to impose on or allocate among depository institutions the risks of loss and liability in connection with any aspect of the [check] payment system .... Liability under this subsection shall not exceed the amount of the check giving rise to the loss or liability, and, where there is bad faith, other damages, if any, suffered as a proximate consequence of any act or omission giving rise to the loss or liability.”
Subsection 4010(d) provides for concurrent federal-court and state-court jurisdiction over civil liability suits:
“Any action under this section may be brought in any United States district court, or in any other court of competent jurisdiction, within one year after the date of the occurrence of the violation involved.”
The Federal Reserve Board has implemented the EFA Act through Regulation CC, 12 CFR pt. 229 (1995). Sub-part C of Regulation CC contains rules to expedite the collection and return of checks. It requires banks, among other things, to return checks “in an expeditious manner,” § 229.30(a); provide prompt notice of nonpayment of certain checks, § 229.33(a); and include in the notice the reason for nonpayment, § 229.33(b)(8). Section 229.38 states standards governing interbank liability. It instructs banks to “exercise ordinary care and act in good faith in complying with the requirements of [Subpart C],” and further prescribes (in relevant part): “A bank that fails to exercise ordinary care or act in good faith . . . may be liable to” other depository institutions. § 229.38(a). Section 229.38 repeats the jurisdictional provision Congress placed in 12 U. S. C. § 4010(d), i. e., the regulation provides for concurrent federal-court and state-court jurisdiction over “[a]ny action under this subpart.” 12 CFR § 229.38(g) (1995).
II
This controversy stems from an interbank dispute regarding a dishonored check. Petitioner Bank One Chicago sued respondent Midwest Bank & Trust Co. in Federal District Court, alleging that Midwest had failed to comply with its obligations under Regulation CC. The facts underlying the suit are uncontested. A customer of Bank One deposited a check for $64,294.27 drawn on an account at Midwest. Bank One forwarded the check through the Federal Reserve System for collection, but Midwest returned it unpaid because Bank One’s endorsement stamp was illegible. Bank One properly endorsed the check, resubmitted it for collection, and made the funds available to the Bank One customer. Midwest again returned the check unpaid, this time stating that the payor’s account lacked sufficient funds to cover the check. By then, however, Bank One’s customer had withdrawn most of the funds from its account. Bank One sought to recover the amount it paid out to its customer against funds that remain uncollected.
On cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court ruled for Bank One. That court centrally determined: “Midwest did not act with ordinary care [when it] returned] the check for guarantee of endorsement without first checking the sufficiency of the funds in support of the cheek.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 12. To satisfy the payor bank’s obligation under 12 CFR § 229.38(a) (1995), the court explained, Midwest should have notified Bank One of the insufficient funds problem the first time Midwest returned the check. By failing to do so, the court concluded, Midwest had caused Bank One to lose $43,912.06. The court accordingly entered judgment for Bank One in that amount. App. to Pet. for Cert. 15. Midwest appealed.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit did not reach the merits of the appeal. Instead, the appellate court raised at oral argument, on its own motion, a threshold question of subject-matter jurisdiction. After affording the parties an opportunity to file memoranda, the Court of Appeals vacated the judgment for Bank One and ordered the District Court to dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction. First Illinois Bank & Trust v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 30 F. 3d 64, 65 (1994).
Examining the civil liability provisions of 12 U. S. C. §4010, the Court of Appeals concluded that the EFA Act provides for federal-court jurisdiction only when a “person other than [a] depository institution” sues a “depository institution,” see 12 U. S. C. § 4010(a), i. e., principally, when a depositor sues a bank. 30 F. 3d, at 65. “Disputes such as [Bank One’s complaint against Midwest], between members of the Federal Reserve System,” the Seventh Circuit stated, “are to be handled administratively before the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System ... (or perhaps in state court).” Ibid. The court added, in response to a submission by the Federal Reserve Board: “Although the Board of Governors has informed us that no mechanism is currently available for administrative resolution of such [interbank] disputes, the Board’s differing interpretation of this statute cannot confer jurisdiction upon the Court.” Ibid.
We granted certiorari. 515 U. S. 1157 (1995). Satisfied that the District Court had adjudicatory authority in this case, we now reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Ill
The Court of Appeals and the parties advance diverse readings of 12 U. S. C. § 4010. According to the Seventh Circuit, § 4010 authorizes original federal-court jurisdiction only in actions between a bank and a person other than a bank. Subsection 4010(a) alone, in the Court of Appeals’ view, provides for rights immediately enforceable in federal court, and that subsection excludes interbank suits, for it applies only to “disputes between ‘any depository institution’ and ‘any person other than another depository institution.’” 30 F. 3d, at 65 (quoting § 4010(a)). Although § 4010(f) provides for interbank liability, the Court of Appeals read that subsection to authorize only administrative adjudication. In the Seventh Circuit’s words:
“The purpose of the [EFA] Act is to require banks to make funds available to depositors quickly. Thus the depositors have rights, enforceable in court, while the banks have obligations, which the Federal Reserve Board may establish by regulation and enforce in administrative proceedings.” Ibid.
The Court of Appeals did not say whether its reading of the statute encompassed an ultimate role for federal courts, as judicial reviewers of the Board’s administrative adjudications.
Midwest agrees with the Seventh Circuit that § 4010(a) alone describes court-enforceable EFA Act rights — rights that depositors can assert against banks. But unlike the Court of Appeals, Midwest is uncertain whether § 4010(f) authorizes administrative adjudication by the Federal Reserve Board. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 33-34. Remaining neutral on the Board’s competence as a forum for resolving controversies between private parties, Midwest urges that the issue before this Court “is not whether the Board may adjudicate the interbank dispute between petitioner and respondent,” but whether “the EFA Act confers on the federal district court jurisdiction to decide this dispute.” Brief for Respondent 23. In Midwest’s view, Congress intended interbank disputes to be resolved primarily in state rather than federal courts. Id., at 5-6.
Both Bank One and the United States, as amicus curiae, agree with Midwest that state courts have jurisdiction over interbank check payment disputes. But Bank One and the United States maintain that § 4010(f), by providing for interbank “liability” up to the amount of the check as well as “other damages” in certain cases, authorizes interbank actions for violations of liability regulations prescribed by the Federal Reserve Board. And they regard § 4010(d), which speaks of “[a]ny action under [§ 4010],” as instructing that suits under § 4010(f), as well as those under § 4010(a), “may be brought in any United States district court.”
We hold that the District Court, in the instant case, correctly comprehended its adjudicatory authority, and that the Court of Appeals erred when it ordered dismissal of the action for lack of jurisdiction. The language of § 4010, reinforced by the title of the provision and its drafting history, impel reading both subsections (a) and (f) as authorizing claims for relief enforceable in federal court as prescribed in subsection (d).
IV
Section 4010 is entitled “Civil liability”; its purpose is to afford private parties a claim for relief based on violations of the statute and its implementing regulations. Subsection (a) affords a claim for relief by making banks liable to “any person other than another depository institution.” It refers to both individual and class actions, and specifies the measure of damages recoverable in such actions. All agree that suits described in subsection (a) may be brought in federal court under § 4010(d).
Subsection (f) governs the area of liability not covered by subsection (a): banks’ liability inter se. It authorizes the Federal Reserve Board to “impose on or allocate among depository institutions the risks of loss and liability in connection with any aspect of the [check] payment system,” and states that “[liability under this subsection” shall be limited to the amount of the check, except in cases involving bad faith. In our view, subsection (f), like subsection (a), provides a statutory basis for claims for relief cognizable in federal court under § 4010(d). Both subsections impose civil liability for violation of the EFA Act and its implementing regulations. Though the two prescriptions are not parallel — most prominently, subsection (f) vests the Board with authority to establish the governing liability standards— they serve the same key purpose: Both permit recovery of damages caused by a regulated party’s failure to comply with the Act.
The drafting history of § 4010 casts some light on the discrete composition and separate placement of subsections (a) and (f). Under the versions of the statute originally passed by each House of Congress, subsection (a) encompassed actions between banks and persons other than banks, as well as interbank actions. The Conference Committee narrowed subsection (a) by excluding interbank actions, but simultaneously inserted, still under the section heading “Civil liability,” a new subsection (f). Compare H. R. Rep. No. 100-52, p. 10 (1987), and S. 790,, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., § 609(a) (1987), with H. R. C'onf. Rep. No. 100-261, pp. 105-106 (1987).
These changes reflect recognition that interbank disputes arising out of the check payment system may be more complex than those involving banks and depositors; such disputes, therefore, may warrant regulatory standards, set by an expert agency, to fill statutory interstices. Thus, in subsection (f), Congress delegated to the Federal Reserve Board authority to establish rules allocating among depository institutions “the risks of loss and liability” relating to the payment and collection of checks. 12 U. S. C. § 4010(f). Having conferred this authority on the Board, Congress sensibly consolidated in subsection (f) aspects of §4010 that relate to interbank disputes — liability limits as well as rule-making authority.
Congress no doubt intended rules regarding interbank losses and liability to be developed administratively. But nothing in § 4010(f)’s text suggests that Congress meant the Federal Reserve Board to function as both regulator and adjudicator in interbank controversies. Rather, subsections (f) and (d) fit a familiar pattern: agency regulates, court adjudicates. See, e. g., Securities Act of 1933, 15 U. S. C. §77j(c) (mandating compliance with disclosure requirements established by Securities and Exchange Commission); § 77k (creating right of action in “any court of competent jurisdiction” for violation of those requirements). As the United States persuasively contends: “Congress left it to the Board to determine the liability standards for losses in the inter-bank payment system because of the greater complexity of that subject, and not because Congress intended to create remedies that would be adjudicated in different fora.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 13.
We find implausible the Court of Appeals’ interpretation of §4010, under which interbank disputes would be “handled administratively” before the Federal Reserve Board. See 30 F. 3d, at 65. Our cases have not been quick to infer agency authority to adjudicate private claims. In Coit Independence Joint Venture v. FSLIC, 489 U. S. 561 (1989), for example, we held that the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) lacked statutory authority to adjudicate creditors’ claims against insolvent savings and loan associations. Id., at 572. We observed in Coit, after examining the relevant statutory provisions, that “when Congress meant to confer adjudicatory authority on FSLIC it did so explicitly and set forth the relevant procedures in considerable detail.” Id., at 574.
Similarly, in American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U. S. 219 (1995), we rejected American Airlines’ argument that Congress intended the Department of Transportation (DOT) to serve as the exclusive adjudicator of air carrier contract disputes. Id., at 230-232. We noted that the DOT had “neither the authority nor the apparatus required to superintend a contract dispute resolution regime,” id., at 232, and accordingly declined to “foist on the DOT work Congress has neither instructed nor funded the Department to do.” Id., at 234.
As in Coit and Wolens, we find no secure signal here that Congress intended to assign to the Federal Reserve Board responsibility for the adjudication of private claims. The EFA Act’s civil liability section, 12 U. S. C. § 4010, does not explicitly confer adjudicatory authority on the Board, nor “set forth the relevant procedures” for resolution of private disputes. See Coit, 489 U. S., at 574. Section 4010, we stress, contrasts conspicuously with statutes in which Congress has given the Board adjudicatory authority. See, e. g., Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 12 U. S. C. § 1843(c)(8) (authorizing Board to determine whether bank holding company may acquire shares in nonbanking entity); §1848 (providing for judicial review of such determinations); cf. Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U. S. C. § 18 (specifying detailed procedures governing adjudication of private disputes by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission).
Finally, we note that the interpretation of §4010 offered by Bank One and the United States is a sensible one. All check-related claims arising out of the same transaction may be brought in a single forum — either in federal court (which would have supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims, see 28 U. S. C. § 1367), or in state court. The reading of the statute proposed by the Seventh Circuit, in contrast, would yield an incoherent jurisdictional scheme. Bank-depositor claims would be adjudicated in one forum (state or federal court), while interbank claims under the EFA Act would originate in another (before the Federal Reserve Board). And interbank claims under state law would presumably have to be raised in a separate state-court proceeding. Even if the text of § 4010 could plausibly be read to create this decidedly inefficient jurisdictional scheme, we would hesitate to attribute such a design to Congress.
*. * *
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
The EFA Act applies to “depository institution[s],” as that term is defined in 12 U.S.C. § 461(b)(1)(A). See 12 U. S. C. §4001(12). For simplicity, we often use the term “bank” instead.
Midwest observes that UCC §4-103,2B U. L. A. §4-103 (1991), treats Federal Reserve Board regulations as “agreements” between participants in the check payment system; damages for violation of the terms of such agreements, Midwest further asserts, would be recoverable as a matter of state law. See, e. g., United Postal Savings Assn. v. Royal Bank Mid-County, 784 S. W. 2d 906 (Mo. App. 1990).
The Court of Appeals cited 12 U. S. C. § 4009(c)(1) as a potential source of the Board’s authority to adjudicate private disputes. First Illinois Bank & Trust v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 30 F. 3d 64, 65 (CA7 1994). But as the United States points out, that section merely authorizes the Board to use traditional administrative enforcement tools in securing compliance with the EFA Act. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 19. Section 4009(c) “does not create any mechanism for the adjudication of inter-bank civil liability claims.” Id., at 19-20.
Bank One and amicus New York Clearing House Association contend that 28 U. S. C. § 1331 provides an independent basis for federal-court jurisdiction here. Satisfied that Bank One properly relied on 12 U. S. C. §4010, we need not and do not pass on this contention.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
H
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sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam and Decree.
We heard oral argument upon the exceptions to the Report of the Special Master filed by the United States. 419 U. S. 814 (1974). We overrule the exceptions and adopt, and direct the entry of, the decree proposed by the Special Master except that, as agreed by the parties, paragraph No. 1 of the proposed decree is modified in form by revising the phrasing of the opening paragraph to read as follows:
“1. Subject to any federal regulatory authority that may extend to the Great Salt Lake or its shore-lands, the United States of America, its departments and agencies, are enjoined from asserting against the State of Utah any claim of right, title and interest:”
Further, Finding of Fact No. 10 is adjusted, as agreed by the parties, by inserting 4200.8 in lieu of 4200.2, and by inserting 396,000 in lieu of 325,000.
For the purpose of giving effect to the above, the following decree is hereby entered.
It is ordered, adjudged, and decreed that:
“1. Subject to any federal regulatory authority that may extend to the Great Salt Lake or its shore-lands, the United States of America, its departments and agencies, are enjoined from asserting against the State of Utah any claim of right, title and interest:
“(a) to any of the exposed shorelands situated between the edge of the waters of the Great Salt Lake on June 15, 1967, and the bed of the Lake on January 4, 1896, when Utah became a State, with the exception of any lands within the Bear River Migratory Bird Refuge and the Weber Basin federal reclamation project;
“(b) to the natural resources and living organisms in or beneath any of the exposed shorelands of the Great Salt Lake delineated in (a) above; and “(c) to the natural resources and living organisms either within the waters of the Great Salt Lake, or extracted therefrom, as delineated in (a) above.
“2. The State of Utah is not required to pay the United States, through the Secretary of the Interior, for the exposed shorelands, including any minerals, delineated in paragraph 1 above of this decree.
“3. There remains the question whether any lands within the meander line of the Great Salt Lake (as duly surveyed prior to or in accordance with section 1 of the Act of June 3, 1966, 80 Stat. 192), and conveyed by quitclaim deed to the State of Utah, in-eluded, any federally owned uplands above the bed of the Lake on the date of statehood (January 4, 1896) which the United States still owned prior to the conveyance to Utah. In the absence of agreement between the parties disposing of the above question or of the necessity for further proceedings with respect thereto, the Special Master is directed to hold such hearings, take such evidence, and conduct such proceedings with respect to that question as he deems appropriate and, in due course, to report his recommendations to the Court.
“4. The prayer of the United States of America in its answer to the State of Utah’s Complaint that this Court 'confirm, declare and establish that the United States is the owner of all right, title and interest in all of the lands described in Section 2 of the Act of June 3, 1966, 80 Stat. 192, as amended by the Act of August 23, 1966, 80 Stat. 349, and that the State of Utah is without any right, title or interest in such lands, save for the right to have these lands conveyed to it by the United States, and to pay for them, in accordance with the provisions of the Act of June 3, 1966, as amended,’ is denied.”
It is so ordered.
Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
As appears from p. 4 of the Special Master’s Report the parties have reserved their position with respect to this question.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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J
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Alito
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether a criminal defendant’s federal constitutional rights are violated by an evidence rule under which the defendant may not introduce proof of third-party guilt if the prosecution has introduced forensic evidence that, if believed, strongly supports a guilty verdict.
I
On the morning of December 3Í, 1989, 86-year-old Mary Stewart was beaten, raped, and robbed in her home. She later died of complications stemming from her injuries. Petitioner was convicted by a South Carolina jury of murder, first-degree criminal sexual conduct, first-degree burglary, and robbery, and he was sentenced to death. State v. Holmes, 320 S. C. 259, 262, 464 S. E. 2d 334, 336 (1995). The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed his convictions and sentence, and this Court denied certiorari. Ibid., cert. denied, 517 U. S. 1248 (1996). Upon state postconviction review, however, petitioner was granted a new trial. 361 S. C. 333, 335, n. 1, 605 S. E. 2d 19, 20, n. 1 (2004).
At the second trial, the prosecution relied heavily on the following forensic evidence:
“(1) [Petitioner’s] palm print was found just above the door knob on the interior side of the front door of the victim’s house; (2) fibers consistent with a black sweatshirt owned by [petitioner] were found on the victim’s bed sheets; (3) matching blue fibers were found on the victim’s pink nightgown and on [petitioner’s] blue jeans; (4) microscopically consistent fibers were found on the pink nightgown and on [petitioner’s] underwear; (5) [petitioner’s] underwear contained a mixture of DNA from two individuals, and 99.99% of the population other than [petitioner] and the victim were excluded as contributors to that mixture; and (6) [petitioner’s] tank top was found to contain a mixture of [petitioner’s] blood and the victim’s blood.” Id., at 343, 605 S. E. 2d, at 24.
In addition, the prosecution introduced evidence that petitioner had been seen near Stewart’s home within an hour of the time when, according to the prosecution’s evidence, the attack took place. Id., at 337-338, 343, 605 S. E. 2d, at 21, 24.
As a major part of his defense, petitioner attempted to undermine the State’s forensic evidence by suggesting that it had been contaminated and that certain law enforcement officers had engaged in a plot to frame him. Id., at 339, 605 S. E. 2d, at 22. Petitioner’s expert witnesses criticized the procedures used by the police in handling the fiber and DNA evidence and in collecting the fingerprint evidence. App. 299-311, 313-323. Another defense expert provided testimony that petitioner cited as supporting his claim that the palm print had been planted by the police. Id., at 326-327.
Petitioner also sought to introduce proof that another man, Jimmy McCaw White, had attacked Stewart. 361 S. C., at 340, 605 S. E. 2d, at 22. At .a pretrial hearing, petitioner proffered several witnesses who placed White in the victim’s neighborhood on the morning of the assault, as well as four other witnesses who testified that White had either acknowledged that petitioner was “‘innocent’” or had actually admitted to committing the crimes. Id., at 340-342, 605 S. E. 2d, at 22-23. One witness recounted that when he asked White about the “word ... on the street” that White was responsible for Stewart’s murder, White “put his head down and he raised his head back up and he said, well, you know I like older women.” App. 119. According to this witness, White added that “he did what they say he did” and that he had “no regrets about it at all.” Id., at 120. Another witness, who had been incarcerated with White, testified that White had admitted to assaulting Stewart, that a police officer had asked the witness to testify falsely against petitioner, and that employees of the prosecutor’s office, while soliciting the witness’ cooperation, had spoken of manufacturing evidence against petitioner. Id., at 38-50. White testified at the pretrial hearing and denied making the incriminating statements. 361 S. C., at 341-342, 605 S. E. 2d, at 23. He also provided an alibi for the time of the crime, but another witness refuted his alibi. Id., at 342, 605 S. E. 2d, at 23.
The trial court excluded petitioner’s third-party guilt evidence citing State v. Gregory, 198 S. C. 98, 16 S. E. 2d 532 (1941), which held that such evidence is admissible if it “‘raise[s] a reasonable inference or presumption as to [the defendant’s] own innocence’” but is not admissible if it merely “ ‘cast[s] a bare suspicion upon another’ ” or “ ‘raise[s] a conjectural inference as to the commission of the crime by another.’ ” App. 133-134 (quoting Gregory, supra, at 104, 16 S. E. 2d, at 534). On appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court found no error in the exclusion of petitioner’s third-party guilt evidence. Citing both Gregory and its later decision in State v. Gay, 343 S. C. 543, 541 S. E. 2d 541 (2001), the State Supreme Court held that “where there is strong evidence of an appellant’s guilt, especially where there is strong forensic evidence, the proffered evidence about a third party’s alleged guilt does not raise a reasonable inference as to the appellant’s own innocence.” 361 S. C., at 342-343, 605 S. E. 2d, at 24. Applying this standard, the court held that petitioner could not “overcome the forensic evidence against him to raise a reasonable inference of his own innocence.” Id., at 343, 605 S. E. 2d, at 24. We granted certiorari. 545 U. S. 1164 (2005).
II
“[Sjtate and federal rulemakers have broad latitude under the Constitution to establish rules excluding evidence from criminal trials.” United States v. Scheffer, 523 U. S. 303, 308 (1998); see also Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 683, 689-690 (1986); Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U. S. 422, 438, n. 6 (1983); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U. S. 284, 302-303 (1973); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U. S. 554, 564 (1967). This latitude, however, has limits. “Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation Clauses of the Sixth Amendment, the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants ‘a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.’ ” Crane, supra, at 690 (quoting California v. Trombetta, 467 U. S. 479, 485 (1984); citations omitted). This right is abridged by evidence rules that “infring[e] upon a weighty interest of the accused” and are “ ‘arbitrary’ or ‘disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve.’” Scheffer, supra, at 308 (quoting Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U. S. 44, 58, 56 (1987)).
This Court’s cases contain several illustrations of “arbitrary” rules, i. e., rules that excluded important defense evidence but that did not serve any legitimate interests. In Washington v. Texas, 388 U. S. 14 (1967), state statutes barred a person who had been charged as a participant in a crime from testifying in defense of another alleged participant unless the witness had been acquitted. As a result, when the defendant in Washington was tried for murder, he was precluded from calling as a witness a person who had been charged and previously convicted of committing the same murder. Holding that the defendant’s right to put on a defense had been violated, we noted that the rule embodied in the statutes could not “even be defended on the ground that it rationally sets apart a group of persons who are particularly likely to commit perjury” since the rule allowed an alleged participant to testify if he or she had been acquitted or was called by the prosecution. Id., at 22-23.
A similar constitutional violation occurred in Chambers v. Mississippi, supra. A murder defendant called as a witness a man named McDonald, who had previously confessed to the murder. When McDonald repudiated the confession on the stand, the defendant was denied permission to examine McDonald as an adverse witness based on the State’s “ ‘voucher’ rule,” which barred parties from impeaching their own witnesses. Id., at 294. In addition, because the state hearsay rule did not include an exception for statements against penal interest, the defendant was not permitted to introduce evidence that McDonald had made self-incriminating statements to three other persons. Noting that the State had not even attempted to “defend” or “explain [the] underlying rationale” of the “voucher rule,” id., at 297, this Court held that “the exclusion of [the evidence of McDonald’s out-of-court statements], coupled with the State’s refusal to permit [the defendant] to cross-examine McDonald, denied him a trial in accord with traditional and fundamental standards of due process,” id., at 302.
Another arbitrary rule was held unconstitutional in Crane v. Kentucky, supra. There, the defendant was prevented from attempting to show at trial that his confession was unreliable because of the circumstances under which it was obtained, and neither the State Supreme Court nor the prosecution “advanced any rational justification for the wholesale exclusion of this body of potentially exculpatory evidence.” Id., at 691.
In Rock v. Arkansas, supra, this Court held that a rule prohibiting hypnotically refreshed testimony was unconstitutional because “[wjholesale inadmissibility of a defendant’s testimony is an arbitrary restriction on the right to testify in the absence of clear evidence by the State repudiating the validity of all post-hypnosis recollections.” Id., at 61. By contrast, in Scheffer, supra, we held that a rule excluding all polygraph evidence did not abridge the right to present a defense because the rule “serve[d] several legitimate interests in the criminal trial process,” was “neither arbitrary nor disproportionate in promoting these ends,” and did not “implicate a sufficiently weighty interest of the defendant.” Id., at 309.
While the Constitution thus prohibits the exclusion of defense evidence under rules that serve no legitimate purpose or that are disproportionate to the ends that they are asserted to promote, well-established rules of evidence permit trial judges to exclude evidence if its probative value is outweighed by certain other factors such as unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or potential to mislead the jury. See, e. g., Fed. Rule Evid. 403; Uniform Rule of Evid. 45 (1953); ALI, Model Code of Evidence Rule 303 (1942); 3 J. Wigmore, Evidence §§ 1863, 1904 (1904). Plainly referring to rules of this type, we have stated that the Constitution permits judges “to exclude evidence that is ‘repetitive ..., only marginally relevant’ or poses an undue risk of ‘harassment, prejudice, [or] confusion of the issues.’” Crane, 476 U. S., at 689-690 (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U. S. 673, 679 (1986); ellipsis and brackets in original). See also Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U. S. 37, 42 (1996) (plurality opinion) (terming such rules “familiar and unquestionably constitutional”).
A specific application of this principle is found in rules regulating the admission of evidence proffered by criminal defendants to show that someone else committed the crime with which they are charged. See, e. g., 41 C. J. S., Homicide §216, pp. 56-58 (1991) (“Evidence tending to show the commission by another person of the crime charged may be introduced by accused when it is inconsistent with, and raises a reasonable doubt of, his own guilt; but frequently matters offered in evidence for this purpose are so remote and lack such connection with the crime that they are excluded”); 40A Am. Jur. 2d, Homicide §286, pp. 136-138 (1999) (“[T]he accused may introduce any legal evidence tending to prove that another person may have committed the crime with which the defendant is charged .... [Such evidence] may be excluded where it does not sufficiently connect the other person to the crime, as, for example, where the evidence is speculative or remote, or does not tend to prove or disprove a material fact in issue at the defendant’s trial” (footnotes omitted)). Such rules are widely accepted, and neither petitioner nor his amici challenge them here.
In Gregory, the South Carolina Supreme Court adopted and applied a rule apparently intended to be of this type, given the court’s references to the “applicable rule” from Corpus Juris and American Jurisprudence:
“ ‘[Ejvidence offered by accused as to the commission of the crime by another person must be limited to such facts as are inconsistent with his own guilt, and to such facts as raise a reasonable inference or presumption as to his own innocence; evidence which can have (no) other effect than to cast a bare suspicion upon another, or to raise a conjectural inference as to the commission of the crime by another, is not admissible. . . . [Bjefore such testimony can be received, there must be such proof of connection with it, such a train of facts or circumstances, as tends clearly to point out such other person as the guilty party.’” 198 S. C., at 104-105, 16 S. E. 2d, at 534-535 (quoting 16 C. J., Criminal Law §1085, p. 560 (1918), and 20 Am. Jur., Evidence §265, p. 254 (1939); footnotes omitted).
In Gay and this case, however, the South Carolina Supreme Court radically changed and extended the rule. In Gay, after recognizing the standard applied in Gregory, the court stated that “[i]n view of the strong evidence of appellant’s guilt — especially the forensic evidence— . . . the proffered evidence ... did not raise ‘a reasonable inference’ as to appellant’s own innocence.” 343 S. C., at 550, 541 S. E. 2d, at 545 (quoting Gregory, supra, at 104, 16 S. E. 2d, at 534, in turn quoting 16 C. J., § 1085, at 560). Similarly, in the present case, as noted, the State Supreme Court applied the rule that “where there is strong evidence of [a defendant’s] guilt, especially where there is strong forensic evidence, the proffered evidence about a third party’s alleged guilt” may (or perhaps must) be excluded. 361 S. C., at 342, 605 S. E. 2d, at 24.
Under this rule, the trial judge does not focus on the probative value or the potential adverse effects of admitting the defense evidence of third-party guilt. Instead, the critical inquiry concerns the strength of the prosecution’s case: If the prosecution’s case is strong enough, the evidence of third-party guilt is excluded even if that evidence, if viewed independently, would have great probative value and even if it would not pose an undue risk of harassment, prejudice, or confusion of the issues.
Furthermore, as applied in this case, the South Carolina Supreme Court’s rule seems to call for little, if any, examination of the credibility of the prosecution’s witnesses or the reliability of its evidence. Here, for example, the defense strenuously claimed that the prosecution’s forensic evidence was so unreliable (due to mishandling and a deliberate plot to frame petitioner) that the evidence should not have even been admitted. The South Carolina Supreme Court responded that these challenges did not entirely “eviscerate” the forensic evidence and that the defense challenges went to the weight and not to the admissibility of that evidence. Id., at 343, n. 8, 605 S. E. 2d, at 24, n. 8. Yet, in evaluating the prosecution’s forensic evidence and deeming it to be “strong” — and thereby justifying exclusion of petitioner’s third-party guilt evidence — the South Carolina Supreme Court made no mention of the defense challenges to the prosecution’s evidence.
Interpreted in this way, the rule applied by the State Supreme Court does not rationally serve the end that the Gregory rule and its analogues in other jurisdictions were designed to promote, i. e., to focus the trial on the central issues by excluding evidence that has only a very weak logical connection to the central issues. The rule applied in this case appears to be based on the following logic: Where (1) it is clear that only one person was involved in the commission of a particular crime and (2) there is strong evidence that the defendant was the perpetrator, it follows that evidence of third-party guilt must be weak. But this logic depends on an accurate evaluation of the prosecution’s proof, and the true strength of the prosecution’s proof cannot be assessed without considering challenges to the reliability of the prosecution’s evidence. Just because the prosecution’s evidence, if credited, would provide strong support for a guilty verdict, it does not follow that evidence of third-party guilt has only a weak logical connection to the central issues in the case. And where the credibility of the prosecution’s witnesses or the reliability of its evidence is not conceded, the strength of the prosecution’s case cannot be assessed without making the sort of factual findings that have traditionally been reserved for the trier of fact and that the South Carolina courts did not purport to make in this case.
The rule applied in this case is no more logical than its converse would be, i. e., a rule barring the prosecution from introducing evidence of a defendant’s guilt if the defendant is able to proffer, at a pretrial hearing, evidence that, if believed, strongly supports a verdict of not guilty. In the present case, for example, petitioner proffered evidence that, if believed, squarely proved that White, not petitioner, was the perpetrator. It would make no sense, however, to hold that this proffer precluded the prosecution from introducing its evidence, including the forensic evidence that, if credited, provided strong proof of petitioner’s guilt.
The point is that, by evaluating the strength of only one party’s evidence, no logical conclusion can be reached regarding the strength of contrary evidence offered by the other side to rebut or cast doubt. Because the rule applied by the State Supreme Court in this case did not heed this point, the rule is “arbitrary” in the sense that it does not rationally serve the end that the Gregory rule and other similar third-party guilt rules were designed to further. Nor has the State identified any other legitimate end that the rule serves. It follows that the rule applied in this case by the State Supreme Court violates a criminal defendant’s right to have ‘“a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.’” Crane, 476 U. S., at 690 (quoting Trombetta, 467 U. S., at 485).
Ill
For these reasons, we vacate the judgment of the South Carolina Supreme Court and remand the case for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
See, e. g., Smithart v. State, 988 P. 2d 583, 586-587 (Alaska 1999); Shields v. State, 357 Ark. 283, 287-288, 166 S. W. 3d 28, 32 (2004); People v. Hall, 41 Cal. 3d 826, 833, 718 P. 2d 99, 103-104 (1986) (en banc); People v. Mulligan, 193 Colo. 509, 517-518, 568 P. 2d 449, 456-457 (1977) (en banc); State v. West, 274 Conn. 605, 624-627, 877 A. 2d 787, 802-803 (2005); Winfield v. United States, 676 A. 2d 1 (D. C. 1996) (en bane); Klinect v. State, 269 Ga. 570, 573, 501 S. E. 2d 810, 813-814 (1998); State v. Rabellizsa, 79 Haw. 347, 350-351, 903 P. 2d 43, 46-47 (1995); People v. Fort, 248 Ill. App. 3d 301, 314, 618 N. E. 2d 445, 455 (1993); State v. Adams, 280 Kan. 494, 504-507, 124 P. 3d 19, 27-29 (2005); Beaty v. Commonwealth, 125 S. W. 3d 196, 207-208 (Ky. 2003); State v. Dechaine, 572 A. 2d 130, 134 (Me. 1990); Commonwealth v. Scott, 408 Mass. 811, 815-816, 564 N. E. 2d 370, 374-375 (1990); State v. Jones, 678 N. W. 2d 1, 16-17 (Minn. 2004) (en banc); Moore v. State, 179 Miss. 268, 274-275, 175 So. 183, 184 (1937); State v. Chaney, 967 S. W. 2d 47, 55 (Mo. 1998) (en banc); State v. Cotto, 182 N. J. 316, 332-333, 865 A. 2d 660, 669-670 (2005); Gore v. State, 2005 OK CR 14, ¶¶ 13-24, 119 P. 3d 1268, 1272-1276; State v. Gregory, 198 S. C. 98, 104-105, 16 S. E. 2d 532, 534-535 (1941); Wiley v. State, 74 S. W. 3d 399, 405-408 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); State v. Grega, 168 Vt. 363, 375, 721 A. 2d 445, 454 (1998); State v. Thomas, 150 Wash. 2d 821, 856-858, 83 P. 3d 970, 988 (2004) (en banc); State v. Parr, 207 W. Va. 469, 475, 534 S. E. 2d 23, 29 (2000) (per curiam); State v. Denny, 120 Wis. 2d 614, 622-625, 357 N. W. 2d 12, 16-17 (App. 1984).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
D
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Thomas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented by the petitioner in this case is whether a plaintiff must present direct evidence of age discrimination in order to obtain a mixed-motives jury instruction in a suit brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 81 Stat. 602, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 621 et seq. Because we hold that such a jury instruction is never proper in an ADEA case, we vacate the decision below.
I
Petitioner Jack Gross began working for respondent FBL Financial Group, Inc. (FBL), in 1971. As of 2001, Gross held the position of claims administration director. But in 2003, when he was 54 years old, Gross was reassigned to.the position of claims project coordinator. At that same time, FBL transferred many of Gross’ job responsibilities to a newly created position — claims administration manager. That position was given to Lisa Kheeskern, who had previously been supervised by Gross and who was then in her early forties. App. to Pet. for Cert. 15a, 23a (District Court opinion). Although Gross (in his new position) and Kheeskern received the same compensation, Gross considered the reassignment a demotion because of FBL’s reallocation of his former job responsibilities to Kheeskern.
In April 2004, Gross filed suit in District Court, alleging that his reassignment to the position of claims project coordinator violated the ADEA, which makes it unlawful for an employer to take adverse action against an employee “because of such individual’s age.” 29 U. S. C. § 623(a). The case proceeded to trial, where Gross introduced evidence suggesting that his reassignment was based at least in part on his age. FBL defended its decision on the grounds that Gross’ reassignment was part of a corporate restructuring and that Gross’ new position was better suited to his skills. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 23a (District Court opinion).
At the close of trial, and over FBL’s objections, the District Court instructed the jury that it must return a verdict for Gross if he proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that FBL “demoted [him] to claims projec[t] coordinator” and that his “age was a motivating factor” in FBL’s decision to demote him. App. 9-10. The jury was further instructed that Gross’ age would qualify as a “ ‘motivating factor,’ if [it] played a part or a role in [FBL]’s decision to demote [him].” Id., at 10. The jury was also instructed regarding FBL’s burden of proof. According to the District Court, the “verdict must be for [FBL]... if it has been proved by the preponderance of the evidence that [FBL] would have demoted [Gross] regardless of his age.” Ibid. The jury returned a verdict for Gross, awarding him $46,945 in lost compensation. Id., at 8.
FBL challenged the jury instructions on appeal. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that the jury had been incorrectly instructed under the standard established in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U. S. 228 (1989). See 526 F. 3d 356, 358 (2008). In Price Waterhouse, this Court addressed the proper allocation of the burden of persuasion in cases brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §2000e et seq., when an employee alleges that he suffered an adverse employment action because of both permissible and impermissible considerations — i. e., a “mixed-motives” case. 490 U. S., at 232, 244-247 (plurality opinion). The Price Waterhouse decision was splintered. Four Justices joined a plurality opinion, see id., at 231-258, Justices White and O’Con-nor separately concurred in the judgment, see id., at 258-261 (opinion of White, J.); id., at 261-279 (opinion of O’Connor, J.), and three Justices dissented, see id., at 279-295 (opinion of Kennedy, J.). Six Justices ultimately agreed that if a Title VII plaintiff shows that discrimination was a “motivating” or a “ ‘substantial’ ” factor in the employer’s action, the burden of persuasion should shift to the employer to show that it would have taken the same action regardless of that impermissible consideration. See id., at 258 (plurality opinion); id., at 259-260 (opinion of White, J.); id., at 276 (opinion of O’Connor, J.). Justice O’Connor further found that to shift the burden of persuasion to the employer, the employee must present “direct evidence that an illegitimate criterion was a substantial factor in the [employment] decision.” Ibid.
In accordance with Circuit precedent, the Court of Appeals identified Justice O’Connor’s opinion as controlling. See 526 F. 3d, at 359 (citing Erickson v. Farmland Industries, Inc., 271 F. 3d 718, 724 (CA8 2001)). Applying that standard, the Court of Appeals found that Gross needed to present “[d]irect evidence... sufficient to support a finding by a reasonable fact finder that an illegitimate criterion actually motivated the adverse employment action.” 526 F. 3d, at 359 (internal quotation marks omitted). In the Court of Appeals’ view, “direct evidence” is only that evidence that “show[s] a specific link between the alleged discriminatory animus and the challenged decision.” Ibid, (internal quotation marks omitted). Only upon a presentation of such evidence, the Court of Appeals held, should the burden shift to the employer “ ‘to convince the trier of fact that it is more likely than not that the decision would have been the same absent consideration of the illegitimate factor.’” Ibid. (quoting Price Waterhouse, supra, at 276 (opinion of O’Con-nor, J.)).
The Court of Appeals thus concluded that the District Court’s jury instructions were flawed because they allowed the burden to shift to FBL upon a presentation of a preponderance of any category of evidence showing that age was a motivating factor — not just “direct evidence” related to FBL’s alleged consideration of age. See 526 F. 3d, at 360. Because Gross conceded that he had not presented direct evidence of discrimination, the Court of Appeals held that the District Court should not have given the mixed-motives instruction. Ibid. Rather, Gross should have been held to the burden of persuasion applicable to typical, non-mixed-motives claims; the jury thus should have been instructed only to determine whether Gross had carried his burden of “proving] that age was the determining factor in FBL’s employment action.” See ibid.
We granted certiorari, 555 U. S. 1066 (2008), and now vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals.
II
The parties have asked us to decide whether a plaintiff must “present direct evidence of discrimination in order to obtain a mixed-motive instruction in a non-Title VII discrimination case.” Pet. for Cert. i. Before reaching this question, however, we must first determine whether the burden of persuasion ever shifts to the party defending an alleged mixed-motives discrimination claim brought under the ADEA. We hold that it does not.
A
Petitioner relies on this Court’s decisions construing Title VII for his interpretation of the ADEA. Because Title VII is materially different with respect to the relevant burden of persuasion, however, these decisions do not control our construction of the ADEA.
In Price Waterhouse, a plurality of the Court and two Justices concurring in the judgment determined that once a “plaintiff in a Title VII case proves that [the plaintiff’s membership in a protected class] played a motivating part in an employment decision, the defendant may avoid a finding of liability only by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same decision even if it had not taken [that factor] into account.” 490 U. S., at 258; see also id,., at 259-260 (opinion of White, J.); id., at 276 (opinion of O’Connor, J.). But as we explained in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U. S. 90, 94-95 (2003), Congress has since amended Title VII by explicitly authorizing discrimination claims in which an improper consideration was “a motivating factor” for an adverse employment decision. See 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2(m) (providing that “an unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice” (emphasis added)); § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (restricting the remedies available to plaintiffs proving violations of § 2000e-2(m)).
This Court has never held that this burden-shifting framework applies to ADEA claims. And, we decline to do so now. When conducting statutory interpretation, we “must be careful not to apply rules applicable under one statute to a different statute without careful and critical examination.” Federal Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U. S. 389, 393 (2008). Unlike Title VII, the ADEA’s text does not provide that a plaintiff may establish discrimination by showing that age was simply a motivating factor. Moreover, Congress neglected to add such a provision to the ADEA when it amended Title VII to add §§2000e-2(m) and 2000e-5(g)(2)(B), even though it contemporaneously amended the ADEA in several ways, see Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 115, 105 Stat. 1079; id., §302, at 1088.
We cannot ignore Congress’ decision to amend Title VII’s relevant provisions but not make similar changes to the ADEA. When Congress amends one statutory provision but not another, it is presumed to have acted intentionally. See EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U. S. 244, 256 (1991). Furthermore, as the Court has explained, “negative implications raised by disparate provisions are strongest” when the provisions were “considered simultaneously when the language raising the implication was inserted.” Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U. S. 320, 330 (1997). As a result, the Court’s interpretation of the ADEA is not governed by Title VII decisions such as Desert Palace and Price Waterhouse.
B
Our inquiry therefore must focus on the text of the ADEA to decide whether it authorizes a mixed-motives age discrimination claim. It does not. “Statutory construction must begin with the language employed by Congress and the assumption that the ordinary meaning of that language accurately expresses the legislative purpose.” Engine Mfrs. Assn. v. South Coast Air Quality Management Dist., 541 U. S. 246, 252 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). The ADEA provides, in relevant part, that “[i]t shall be unlawful for an employer... to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age.” 29 U. S. C. § 623(a)(1) (emphasis added).
The words “because of” mean “by reason of: on account of.” 1 Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 194 (1966); see also 1 Oxford English Dictionary 746 (1933) (defining “because of” to mean “[b]y reason of on account of ” (italics in original)); The Random House Dictionary of the English Language 132 (1966) (defining “because” to mean “by reason; on account”). Thus, the ordinary meaning of the ADEA’s requirement that an employer took adverse action “because of” age is that age was the “reason” that the employer decided to act. See Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U. S. 604, 610 (1993) (explaining that the claim “cannot succeed unless the employee’s protected trait actually played a role in [the employer’s decisionmaking] process and had a determinative influence on the outcome” (emphasis added)). To establish a disparate-treatment claim under the plain language of the ADEA, therefore, a plaintiff must prove that age was the “but-for” cause of the employer’s adverse decision. See Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indemnity Co., 553 U. S. 639, 653-654 (2008) (recognizing that the phrase, “by reason of,” requires at least a showing of “but for” causation (internal quotation marks omitted)); Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Burr, 551 U. S. 47, 63-64, and n. 14 (2007) (observing that “[i]n common talk, the phrase 'based on’ indicates a but-for causal relationship and thus a necessary logical condition” and that the statutory phrase, “based on,” has the same meaning as the phrase, “because of” (internal quotation marks omitted)); cf. W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts 265 (5th ed. 1984) (“An act or omission is not regarded as a cause of an event if the particular event would have occurred without it”).
It follows, then, that under § 623(a)(1), the plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion to establish that age was the “but-for” cause of the employer’s adverse action. Indeed, we have previously held that the burden is allocated in this manner in ADEA cases. See Kentucky Retirement Systems v. EEOC, 554 U.S. 135, 139-143, 148-150 (2008); Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U. S. 133, 141, 143 (2000). And nothing in the statute’s text indicates that Congress has carved out an exception to that rule for a subset of ADEA cases. Where the statutory text is “silent on the allocation of the burden of persuasion,” we “begin with the ordinary default rule that plaintiffs bear the risk of failing to prove their claims.” Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U. S. 49, 56 (2005); see also Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory, 554 U. S. 84, 92 (2008) (“Absent some reason to believe that Congress intended otherwise,... we will conclude that the burden of persuasion lies where it usually falls, upon the party seeking relief” (internal quotation marks omitted)). We have no warrant to depart from the general rule in this setting.
Hence, the burden of persuasion necessary to establish employer liability is the same in alleged mixed-motives cases as in any other ADEA disparate-treatment action. A plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence (which may be direct or circumstantial) that age was the “but-for” cause of the challenged employer decision. See Reeves, supra, at 141-143,147.
Ill
Finally, we reject petitioner’s contention that our interpretation of the ADEA is controlled by Price Waterhouse, which initially established that the burden of persuasion shifted in alleged mixed-motives Title VII claims. In any event, it is far from clear that the Court would have the same approach were it to consider the question today in the first instance. Cf. 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U. S. 247, 270 (2009) (declining to “introduc[e] a qualification into the ADEA that is not found in its text”); Meacham, supra, at 102 (explaining that the ADEA must be “read... the way Congress wrote it”).
Whatever the deficiencies of Price Waterhouse in retrospect, it has become evident in the years since that case was decided that its burden-shifting framework is difficult to apply. For example, in cases tried to a jury, courts have found it particularly difficult to craft an instruction to explain its burden-shifting framework. See, e.g., Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958 F. 2d 1176, 1179 (CA2 1992) (referring to “the murky water of shifting burdens in discrimination cases”); Visser v. Packer Engineering Associates, Inc., 924 F. 2d 655, 661 (CA7 1991) (en banc) (Flaum, J., dissenting) (“The difficulty judges have in formulating [burden-shifting] instructions and jurors have in applying them can be seen in the fact that jury verdicts in ADEA cases are supplanted by judgments notwithstanding the verdict or reversed on appeal more frequently than jury verdicts generally”). Thus, even if Price Waterhouse was doetrinally sound, the problems associated with its application have eliminated any perceivable benefit to extending its framework to ADEA claims. Cf. Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U. S. 36, 47 (1977) (reevaluating precedent that was subject to criticism and “continuing controversy and confusion”); Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S. 808, 839-844 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring).
IV
We hold that a plaintiff bringing a disparate-treatment. claim pursuant to the ADEA must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that age was the “but-for” cause of the challenged adverse employment action. The burden of persuasion does not shift to the employer to show that it would have taken the action regardless of age, even when a plaintiff has produced some evidence that age was one motivating factor in that decision. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Souter, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer join, dissenting.
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U. S. C. § 621 et seq., makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against any employee “because of” that individual’s age, § 623(a). The most natural reading of this statutory text prohibits adverse employment actions motivated in whole or in part by the age of the employee. The “but-for” causation standard endorsed by the.Court today was advanced in Justice Kennedy’s dissenting opinion in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U. S. 228, 279 (1989), a case construing identical language in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2(a)(l). Not only did the Court reject the but-for standard in that case, but so too did Congress when it amended Title VII in 1991. Given this unambiguous history, it is particularly inappropriate for the Court, on its own initiative, to adopt an interpretation of the causation requirement in the ADEA that differs from the established reading of Title VIL I disagree not only with the Court’s interpretation of the statute, but also with its decision to engage in unnecessary lawmaking. I would simply answer the question presented by the certiorari petition and hold that a plaintiff need not present direct evidence of age discrimination to obtain a mixed-motives instruction.
I
The Court asks whether a mixed-motives instruction is ever appropriate in an ADEA ease. As it acknowledges, this was not the question we granted certiorari to decide. Instead, the question arose for the first time in respondent’s brief, which asked us to “overrule Price Waterhouse with respect to its application to the ADEA.” Brief for Respondent 26 (boldface type deleted). In the usual course, this Court would not entertain such a request raised only in a merits brief: “ ‘We would normally expect notice of an intent to make so far-reaching an argument in the respondent’s opposition to a petition for certiorari, cf. this Court’s Rule 15.2, thereby assuring adequate preparation time for those likely affected and wishing to participate.’” Alabama v. Shelton, 585 U. S. 654, 660, n. 3 (2002) (quoting South Central Bell Telephone Co. v. Alabama, 526 U. S. 160, 171 (1999)). Yet the Court is unconcerned that the question it chooses to answer has not been briefed by the parties or interested amici curiae. Its failure to consider the views of the United States, which represents the agency charged with administering the ADEA, is especially irresponsible.
Unfortunately, the majority’s inattention to prudential Court practices is matched by its utter disregard of our precedent and Congress’ intent. The ADEA provides that “[i]t shall be unlawful for an employer... to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age.” 29 U. S. C. § 623(a)(1) (emphasis added). As we recognized in Price Waterhouse when we construed the identical “because of” language of Title VII, see 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (making it unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual... with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin” (emphasis added)), the most natural reading of the text proscribes adverse employment actions motivated in whole or in part by the age of the employee.
In Price Waterhouse, we concluded that the words “ ‘because of’ such individual’s... sex... mean that gender must be irrelevant to employment decisions.” 490 U. S., at 240 (plurality opinion) (emphasis deleted); see also id., at 260 (White, J., concurring in judgment). To establish a violation of Title VII, we therefore held, a plaintiff had to prove that her sex was a motivating factor in an adverse employment decision. We recognized that the employer had an affirmative defense: It could avoid a finding of liability by proving that it would have made the same decision even if it had not taken the plaintiff’s sex into account. Id., at 244-245 (plurality opinion). But this affirmative defense did not alter the meaning of “because of.” As we made clear, when “an employer considers both gender and legitimate factors at the time of making a decision, that decision was ‘because of’ sex.” Id., at 241; see also id., at 260 (White, J., concurring in judgment). We readily rejected the dissent’s contrary assertion. “To construe the words ‘because of’ as colloquial shorthand for ‘but-for’ causation,” we said, “is to misunderstand them.” Id., at 240 (plurality opinion).
Today, however, the Court interprets the words “because of” in the ADEA “as colloquial shorthand for ‘but-for’ causation.” Ibid. That the Court is construing the ADEA rather than Title VII does not justify this departure from precedent. The relevant language in the two statutes is identical, and we have long recognized that our interpretations of Title VII’s language apply “with equal force in the context of age discrimination, for the substantive provisions of the ADEA ‘were derived in haec verba from Title VII.’” Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U. S. 111, 121 (1985) (quoting Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U. S. 575, 584 (1978)). See generally Northcross v. Board of Ed. of Memphis City Schools, 412 U. S. 427, 428 (1973) (per curiam). For this reason, Justice Kennedy’s dissent in Price Waterhouse assumed the plurality’s mixed-motives framework extended to the ADEA, see 490 U. S., at 292, and the Courts of Appeals to have considered the issue unanimously have applied Price Waterhouse to ADEA claims.
The Court nonetheless suggests that applying Price Waterhouse would be inconsistent with our ADEA precedents. In particular, the Court relies on our statement in Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U. S. 604, 610 (1993), that “[a disparate-treatment] claim ‘cannot succeed unless the employee’s protected trait actually played a role in [the employer’s decisionmaking] process and had a determinative influence on the outcome.’ ” Ante, at 176. The italicized phrase is at best inconclusive as to the meaning of the ADE A’s “because of” language, however, as other passages in Hazen Paper Co. demonstrate. We also stated, for instance, that the ADEA “requires the employer to ignore an employee’s age,” 507 U. S., at 612 (emphasis added), and noted that “[w]hen the employer’s decision is wholly motivated by factors other than age,” there is no violation, id., at 611 (emphasis altered). So too, we indicated the “possibility of dual liability under [the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974] and the ADEA where the decision to fire the employee was motivated both by the employee’s age and by his pension status,” id., at 613 — a classic mixed-motives scenario.
Moreover, both Hazen Paper Co. and Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U. S. 133 (2000), on which the majority also relies, support the conclusion that the ADEA should be interpreted consistently with Title VII. In those non-mixed-motives ADEA cases, the Court followed the standards set forth in non-mixed-motives Title VII cases including McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792 (1973), and Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U. S. 248 (1981). See, e. g., Reeves, 530 U. S., at 141-143; Hazen Paper Co., 507 U. S., at 610. This by no means indicates, as the majority reasons, that mixed-motives ADEA cases should follow those standards. Rather, it underscores that ADEA standards are generally understood to conform to Title VII standards.
II
The conclusion that “because of” an individual’s age means that age was a motivating factor in an employment decision is bolstered by Congress’ reaction to Price Waterhouse in the 1991 Civil Rights Act. As part of its response to “a number of recent decisions by the United States Supreme Court that sharply cut back on the scope and effectiveness of [civil rights] laws,” H. R. Rep. No. 102-40, pt. 2, p. 2 (1991) (hereinafter H. R. Rep.), Congress eliminated the affirmative defense to liability that Price Waterhouse had furnished employers and provided instead that an employer’s same-decision showing would limit only a plaintiff’s remedies. See § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). Importantly, however, Congress ratified Price Waterhouse’s interpretation of the plaintiff’s burden of proof, rejecting the dissent’s suggestion in that case that but-for causation was the proper standard. See §2000e-2(m) (“[A]n unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice”).
Because the 1991 Act amended only Title VII and not the ADEA with respect to mixed-motives claims, the Court reasonably declines to apply the amended provisions to the ADEA. But it proceeds to ignore the conclusion compelled by this interpretation of the Act: Price Waterhouse’s construction of “because of” remains the governing law for ADEA claims.
Our recent decision in Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U. S. 228,240 (2005), is precisely on point, as we considered in that case the effect of Congress’ failure to amend the disparate-impact provisions of the ADEA when it amended the corresponding Title VII provisions in the 1991 Act. Noting that “the relevant 1991 amendments expanded the coverage of Title VII [but] did not amend the ADEA or speak to the subject of age discrimination,” we held that “Wards Cove’s pre-1991 interpretation of Title VII’s identical language remains applicable to the ADEA.” Ibid, (discussing Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U. S. 642 (1989)); see also Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory, 554 U. S. 84, 98 (2008). If the Wards Cove disparate-impact framework that Congress flatly repudiated in the Title VII context continues to apply to ADEA claims, the mixed-motives framework that Congress substantially endorsed surely applies.
Curiously, the Court reaches the opposite conclusion, relying on Congress’ partial ratification of Price Waterhouse to argue against that case’s precedential value. It reasons that if the 1991 amendments do not apply to the ADEA, Price Waterhouse likewise must not apply because Congress effectively codified Price Waterhouse’s holding in the amendments. Ante, at 173-175. This does not follow. To the contrary, the fact that Congress endorsed this Court’s interpretation of the “because of” language in Price Water-house (even as it rejected the employer’s affirmative defense to liability) provides all the more reason to adhere to that decision’s motivating-factor test. Indeed, Congress emphasized in passing the 1991 Act that the motivating-factor test was consistent with its original intent in enacting Title VII. See, e. g., H. R. Rep., pt. 2, at 17 (“When enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress made clear that it intended to prohibit all invidious consideration of sex, race, color, religion, or national origin in employment decisions” (emphasis deleted)); id., at 2 (stating that the Act “reaffirm[ed] that any reliance on prejudice in making employment decisions is illegal”); see also H. R. Rep., pt. 1, at 45; S. Rep. No. 101-315, pp. 6, 22 (1990).
The 1991 amendments to Title VII also provide the answer to the majority’s argument that the mixed-motives approach has proved unworkable. Ante, at 179. Because Congress has codified a mixed-motives framework for Title VII cases — the vast majority of antidiscrimination lawsuits — the Court’s concerns about that framework are of no moment. Were the Court truly worried about difficulties faced by trial courts and juries, moreover, it would not reach today’s decision, which will further complicate every case in which a plaintiff raises both ADEA and Title VII claims.
The Court’s resurrection of the but-for causation standard is unwarranted. Price Waterhouse repudiated that standard 20 years ago, and Congress’ response to our decision further militates against the crabbed interpretation the Court adopts today. The answer to the question the Court has elected to take up — whether a mixed-motives jury instruction is ever proper in an ADEA case — is plainly yes.
Ill
Although the Court declines to address the question we granted certiorari to decide, I would answer that question by following our unanimous opinion in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U. S. 90 (2003). I would accordingly hold that a plaintiff need not present direct evidence of age discrimination to obtain a mixed-motives instruction.
The source of the direct-evidence debate is Justice O’Con-nor’s opinion concurring in the judgment in Price Water-house. Writing only for herself, Justice O’Connor argued that a plaintiff should be required to introduce “direct evidence” that her sex motivated the decision before the plurality’s mixed-motives framework would apply. 490 U. S., at 276. Many courts have treated Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Price Waterhouse as controlling for both Title VII and ADEA mixed-motives cases in light of our statement in Marks v. United States, 430 U. S. 188, 193 (1977), that “[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, The holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.’” Unlike the cases Marks addressed, however, Price Waterhouse garnered five votes for a single rationale: Justice White agreed with the plurality as to the motivating-factor test, see supra, at 182, n. 3; he disagreed only as to the type of evidence an employer was required to submit to prove that the same result would have occurred absent the unlawful motivation. Taking the plurality to demand objective evidence, he wrote separately to express his view that an employer’s credible testimony could suffice. 490 U. S., at 261. Because Justice White provided a fifth vote for the “rationale explaining the result” of the Price Waterhouse decision, Marks, 430 U. S., at 193, his concurrence is properly understood as controlling, and he, like the plurality, did not require the introduction of direct evidence.
Any questions raised by Price Waterhouse as to a direct-evidence requirement were settled by this Court’s unanimous decision in Desert Palace, in which we held that a plaintiff need not introduce direct evidence to meet her burden in a mixed-motives case under Title VII, as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991. In construing the language of § 2000e-2(m), we reasoned that the statute did not mention, much less require, a heightened showing through direct evidence and that “Congress has been unequivocal when imposing heightened proof requirements.” 539 U. S., at 99. The statute’s silence with respect to direct evidence, we held, meant that “we should not depart from the ‘[conventional rul[e] of civil litigation... [that] requires a plaintiff to prove his case by a preponderance of the evidence’,... using ‘direct or circumstantial evidence.’” Ibid, (quoting Price Waterhouse, 490 U. S., at 253 (plurality opinion), and Postal Service Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U. S. 711 (1983)). We also recognized the Court’s consistent acknowledgment of the utility of circumstantial evidence in discrimination cases.
Our analysis in Desert Palace applies with equal force to the ADEA. Cf. ante, at 178, n. 4. As with the 1991 amendments to Title VII, no language in the ADEA imposes a heightened direct-evidence requirement, and we have specifically recognized the utility of circumstantial evidence in ADEA cases. See Reeves, 530 U. S., at 147 (cited by Desert Palace, 539 U. S., at 99-100).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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B
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Stevens
delivered the opinion óf the Court.
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 (1991 Act or Act) creates a right to recover compensatory and punitive damages for certain violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See Rev. Stat. § 1977A(a), 42 U. S. C. § 1981a(a) (1988 ed., Supp. IV), as added by § 102 of the 1991 Act, Pub. L. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1072. The Act further provides that any party may demand a trial by jury if such damages are sought. We granted certiorari to decide whether these provisions apply to a Title VII case that was pending on appeal when the statute was enacted. We hold that they do not.
I
From September 4, 1984, through January 17, 1986, petitioner Barbara Landgraf was employed in the USI Film Products (USI) plant in Tyler, Texas. She worked the 11 p.m. to 7 a.m. shift operating a machine that produced plastic bags. A fellow employee named John Williams repeatedly harassed her with inappropriate remarks and physical contact. Petitioner’s complaints to her immediate supervisor brought her no relief, but when she reported the incidents to the personnel manager, he conducted an investigation, reprimanded Williams, and transferred him to another department. Four days later petitioner quit her job.
Petitioner filed a timely charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commission). The Commission determined that petitioner had likely been the victim of sexual harassment creating a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. §2000e et seq., but concluded that her employer had adequately remedied the violation. Accordingly, the Commission dismissed the charge and issued a notice of right to sue.
On July 21,1989, petitioner commenced this action against USI, its corporate owner, and that company’s successor in interest. After a bench trial, the District Court found that Williams had sexually harassed petitioner causing her to suffer mental anguish. However, the court concluded that she had not been constructively discharged. The court said:
“Although the harassment was serious enough to establish that a hostile work environment existed for Landgraf, it was not so severe that a reasonable person would have felt compelled to resign. This is particularly true in light of the fact that at the time Landgraf resigned from her job, USI had taken steps... to eliminate the hostile working environment arising from the sexual harassment. Landgraf voluntarily resigned from her employment with USI for reasons unrelated to the sexual harassment in question.” App. to Pet. for Cert. B-3-4.
Because the court found that petitioner’s employment was not terminated in violation of Title VII, she was not entitled to equitable relief, and because Title VII did not then authorize any other form of relief, the court dismissed her complaint.
On November 21,1991, while petitioner’s appeal was pending, the President signed into law the Civil Rights Act of 1991. The Court of Appeals rejected petitioner’s argument that her case should be remanded for a jury trial on damages pursuant to the 1991 Act. Its decision not to remand rested on the premise that “a court must ‘apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision, unless doing so would result in manifest injustice or there is statutory direction or legislative history to the contrary.’ Bradley [v. School Bd. of Richmond, 416 U. S. 696, 711 (1974)].” 968 F. 2d 427, 432 (CA5 1992). Commenting first on the provision for a jury trial in § 102(c), the court stated that requiring the defendant ‘‘to retry this case because of a statutory change enacted after the trial was completed would be an injustice and a waste of judicial resources. We apply procedural rules to pending cases, but we do not invalidate procedures followed before the new rule was adopted.” Id., at 432-433. The court then characterized the provision for compensatory and punitive damages in § 102 as ‘‘a seaehange in employer liability for Title VII violations” and concluded that it would be unjust to apply this kind of additional and unforeseeable obligation to conduct occurring before the effective date of the Act. Id., at 433. Finding no clear error in the District Court’s factual findings, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment for respondents.
We granted certiorari and set the case for argument with Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., post, p. 298. Our order limited argument to the question whether § 102 of the 1991 Act applies to cases pending when it became law. 507 U. S. 908 (1993). Accordingly, for purposes of our decision, we assume that the District Court and the Court of Appeals properly applied the law in effect at the time of the discriminatory conduct and that the relevant findings of fact were correct. We therefore assume that petitioner was the victim of sexual harassment violative of Title VII, but that the law did not then authorize any recovery of damages even though she was injured. We also assume, arguendo, that if the same conduct were to occur today, petitioner would be entitled to a jury trial and that the jury might find that she was constructively discharged, or that her mental anguish or other injuries would support an award of damages against her former employer. Thus, the controlling question is whether the Court of Appeals should have applied the law in effect at the time the discriminatory conduct occurred, or at the time of its decision in July 1992.
II
Petitioner’s primary submission is that the text of the 1991 Act requires that it be applied to cases pending on its enactment. Her argument, if accepted, would make the entire Act (with two narrow exceptions) applicable to conduct that occurred, and to cases that were filed, before the Act’s effective date. Although only § 102 is at issue in this case, we preface our analysis with a brief description of the scope of the 1991 Act.
The 1991 Act is in large part a response to a series of decisions of this Court interpreting the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1964. Section 3(4), 105 Stat. 1071, note following 42 U. S. C. § 1981, expressly identifies as one of the Act’s purposes “to respond to recent decisions of the Supreme Court by expanding the scope of relevant civil rights statutes in order to provide adequate protection to victims of discrimination.” That section, as well as a specific finding in §2(2), identifies Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U. S. 642 (1989), as a decision that gave rise to special concerns. Section 105 of the Act, entitled “Burden of Proof in Disparate Impact Cases,” is a direct response to Wards Cove.
Other sections of the Act were obviously drafted with “recent decisions of the Supreme Court” in mind. Thus, § 101 (which is at issue in Rivers, post, p. 298) amended the 1866 Civil Rights Act’s prohibition of racial discrimination in the “mak[ing] and enforce[ment] [of] contracts,” 42 U. S. C. § 1981 (1988 ed., Supp. IV), in response to Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U. S. 164 (1989); § 107 responds to Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U. S. 228 (1989), by setting forth standards applicable in “mixed motive” cases; § 108 responds to Martin v. Wilks, 490 U. S. 755 (1989), by prohibiting certain challenges to employment practices implementing consent decrees; § 109 responds to EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U. S. 244 (1991), by redefining the term “employee” as used in Title VII to include certain United States citizens working in foreign countries for United States employers; §112 responds to Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 490 U. S. 900 (1989), by expanding employees’ rights to challenge discriminatory seniority systems; § 113 responds to West Virginia Univ. Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, 499 U. S. 83 (1991), by providing that an award of attorney’s fees may include expert fees; and § 114 responds to Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U. S. 310 (1986), by allowing interest on judgments against the United States.
A number of important provisions in the Act, however, were not responses to Supreme Court decisions. For example, §106 enacts a new prohibition against adjusting test scores “on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin”; § 117 extends the coverage of Title VII to include the House of Representatives and certain employees of the Legislative Branch; and §§301-325 establish special procedures to protect Senate employees from discrimination. Among the provisions that did not directly respond to any Supreme Court decision is the one at issue in this case, §102.
Entitled “Damages in Cases of Intentional Discrimination,” § 102 provides in relevant part:
“(a) Right of Recovery.—
“(1) Civil Rights. — In an action brought by a complaining party under section 706 or 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U. S. C. 2000e-5) against a respondent who engaged in unlawful intentional discrimination (not an employment practice that is unlawful because of its disparate impact) prohibited under section 703, 704, or 717 of the Act (42 U. S. C. 2000e-2 or 2000e-3), and provided that the complaining party cannot recover under section 1977 of the Revised Statutes (42 U. S. C. 1981), the complaining party may recover compensatory and punitive damages... in addition to any relief authorized by section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, from the respondent.
“(c) Jury Trial. — If a complaining party seeks compensatory or punitive damages under this section—
“(1) any party may demand a trial by jury.”
Before the enactment of the 1991 Act, Title VII afforded only “equitable” remedies. The primary form of monetary relief available was backpay. Title VI I’s backpay remedy, modeled on that of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. § 160(c), is a “make-whole” remedy that resembles compensatory damages in some respects. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405, 418-422 (1975). However, the new compensatory damages provision of the 1991 Act is “in addition to,” and does not replace or duplicate, the back-pay remedy allowed under prior law. Indeed, to prevent double recovery, the 1991 Act provides that compensatory damages “shall not include backpay, interest on backpay, or any other type of relief authorized under section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.” § 102(b)(2).
Section 102 significantly expands the monetary relief potentially available to plaintiffs who would have been entitled to backpay under prior law. Before 1991, for example, monetary relief for a discriminatorily discharged employee generally included “only an amount equal to the wages the employee would have earned from the date of discharge to the date of reinstatement, along with lost fringe benefits such as vacation pay and pension benefits.” United States v. Burke, 504 U. S. 229, 239 (1992). Under § 102, however, a Title VII plaintiff who wins a backpay award may also seek compensatory damages for “future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary losses.” § 102(b)(3). In addition, when it is shown that the employer acted “with malice or with reckless indifference to the [plaintiff’s] federally protected rights,” § 102(b)(1), a plaintiff may recover punitive damages.
Section 102 also allows monetary relief for some forms of workplace discrimination that would not previously have justified any relief under Title VII. As this case illustrates, even if unlawful discrimination was proved, under prior law a Title VII plaintiff could not recover monetary relief unless the discrimination was also found to have some concrete effect on the plaintiff’s employment status, such as a denied promotion, a differential in compensation, or termination. See Burke, 504 U. S., at 240. (“[T]he circumscribed remedies available under Title VII [before the 1991 Act] stand in marked contrast not only to those available under traditional tort law, but under other federal anti-discrimination statutes, as well”). Section 102, however, allows a plaintiff to recover in circumstances in which there has been unlawful discrimination in the “terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,” 42 U. S. C. §2000e-2(a)(l), even though the discrimination did not involve a discharge or a loss of pay. In short, to further Title VII’s “central statutory purposes of eradicating discrimination throughout the economy and making persons whole for injuries suffered through past discrimination,” Albemarle Paper Co., 422 U. S., at 421, § 102 of the 1991 Act effects a major expansion in the relief available to victims of employment discrimination.
In 1990, a comprehensive civil rights bill passed both Houses of Congress. Although similar to the 1991 Act in many other respects, the 1990 bill differed in that it contained language expressly calling for application of many of its provisions, including the section providing for damages in cases of intentional employment discrimination, to cases arising before its (expected) enactment. The President vetoed the 1990 legislation, however, citing the bill’s “unfair retroactivity rules” as one reason for his disapproval. Congress narrowly failed to override the veto. See 136 Cong. Rec. S16589 (Oct. 24, 1990) (66 to 34 Senate vote in favor of override).
The absence of comparable language in the 1991 Act cannot realistically be attributed to oversight or to unawareness of the retroactivity issue. Rather, it seems likely that one of the compromises that made it possible to enact the 1991 version was an agreement not to include the kind of explicit retroactivity command found in the 1990 bill.
The omission of the elaborate retroactivity provision of the 1990 bill — which was by no means the only source of political controversy over that legislation — is not dispositive because it does not tell us precisely where the compromise was struck in the 1991 Act. The Legislature might, for example, have settled in 1991 on a less expansive form of retroactivity that, unlike the 1990 bill, did not reach cases already finally decided. See n. 8, supra. A decision to reach only cases still pending might explain Congress’ failure to provide in the 1991 Act, as it had in 1990, that certain sections would apply to proceedings pending on specific preenactment dates. Our first question, then, is whether the statutory text on which petitioner relies manifests an intent that the 1991 Act should be applied to cases that arose and went to trial before its enactment.
Ill
Petitioner’s textual argument relies on three provisions of the 1991 Act: §§ 402(a), 402(b), and 109(c). Section 402(a), the only provision of the Act that speaks directly to the question before us, states:
“Except as otherwise specifically provided, this Act and the amendments made by this Act shall take effect upon enactment.”
That language does not, by itself, resolve the question before us. A statement that a statute will become effective on a certain date does not even arguably suggest that it has any application to conduct that occurred at an earlier date. Petitioner does not argue otherwise. Rather, she contends that the introductory clause of § 402(a) would be superfluous unless it refers to §§ 402(b) and 109(e), which provide for prospective application in limited contexts.
The parties agree that § 402(b) was intended to exempt a single disparate impact lawsuit against the Wards Cove Packing Company. Section 402(b) provides:
“(b) Certain Disparate Impact Cases. — Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, nothing in this Act shall apply to any disparate impact case for which a complaint was filed before March 1, 1975, and for which an initial decision was rendered after October 30, 1983.”
Section 109(c), part of the section extending Title VII to overseas employers, states:
“(c) Application of Amendments — The amendments made by this section shall not apply with respect to conduct occurring before the date of the enactment of this Act.”
According to petitioner, these two subsections are the “other provisions” contemplated in the first clause of § 402(a), and together create a strong negative inference that all sections of the Act not specifically declared prospective apply to pending cases that arose before November 21, 1991.
Before addressing the particulars of petitioner’s argument, we observe that she places extraordinary weight on two comparatively minor and narrow provisions in a long and complex statute. Applying the entire Act to cases arising from preenactment conduct would have important consequences, including the possibility that trials completed before its enactment would need to be retried and the possibility that employers would be liable for punitive damages for conduct antedating the Act’s enactment. Purely prospective application, on the other hand, would prolong the life of a remedial scheme, and of judicial constructions of civil rights statutes, that Congress obviously found wanting. Given the high stakes of the retroactivity question, the broad coverage of the statute, and the prominent and specific retroactivity provisions in the 1990 bill, it would be surprising for Congress to have chosen to resolve that question through negative inferences drawn from two provisions of quite limited effect.
Petitioner, however, invokes the canon that a court should give effect to every provision of a statute and thus avoid redundancy among different provisions. See, e. g., Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Service, Inc., 486 U. S. 825, 837, and n. 11 (1988). Unless the word “otherwise” in § 402(a) refers to either § 402(b) or § 109(c), she contends, the first five words in § 402(a) are entirely superfluous. Moreover, relying on the canon “[ejxpressio unius est exclusio alterius,” see Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U. S. 163, 168 (1993), petitioner argues that because Congress provided specifically for' prospectivity in two places (§§ 109(c) and 402(b)), we should infer that it intended the opposite for the remainder of the statute.
Petitioner emphasizes that § 402(a) begins: “Except as otherwise specifically provided.” A scan of the statute for other “specific provisions” concerning effective dates reveals that §§ 402(b) and 109(c) are the most likely candidates. Since those provisions decree prospectivity, and since § 402(a) tells us that the specific provisions are exceptions, § 402(b) should be considered as prescribing a general rule of retroactivity. Petitioner’s argument has some force, but we find it most unlikely that Congress intended the introductory clause to carry the critically important meaning petitioner assigns it. Had Congress wished § 402(a) to have such a determinate meaning, it surely would have used language comparable to its reference to the predecessor Title VII damages provisions in the 1990 legislation: that the new provisions “shall apply to all proceedings pending on or commenced after the date of enactment of this Act.” S. 2104, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 15(a)(4) (1990).
It is entirely possible that Congress inserted the “otherwise specifically provided” language not because it understood the “takes effect” clause to establish a rule of retroactivity to which only two “other specific provisions” would be exceptions, but instead to assure that any specific timing provisions in the Act would prevail over the general “take effect on enactment” command. The drafters of a complicated piece of legislation containing more than 50 separate sections may well have inserted the “except as otherwise provided” language merely to avoid the risk of an inadvertent conflict in the statute. If the introductory clause of § 402(a) was intended to refer specifically to §§ 402(b), 109(c), or both, it is difficult to understand why the drafters chose the word “otherwise” rather than either or both of the appropriate section numbers.
We are also unpersuaded by petitioner’s argument that both §§ 402(b) and 109(c) merely duplicate the “take effect upon enactment” command of § 402(a) unless all other provisions, including the damages provisions of § 102, apply to pending cases. That argument depends on the assumption that all those other provisions must be treated uniformly for purposes of their application to pending cases based on preenactment conduct. That thesis, however, is by no means an inevitable one. It is entirely possible — indeed, highly probable — that, because it was unable to resolve the retroactivity issue with the clarity of the 1990 legislation, Congress viewed the matter as an open issue to be resolved by the courts. Our precedents on retroactivity left doubts about what default rule would apply in the absence of congressional guidance, and suggested that some provisions might apply to cases arising before enactment while others might not. Compare Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hospital, 488 U. S. 204 (1988), with Bradley v. School 13d. of Richmond, 416 U. S. 696 (1974). See also Bennett v. New Jersey, 470 U. S. 632 (1985). The only matters Congress did not leave to the courts were set out with specificity in §§ 109(c) and 402(b). Congressional doubt concerning judicial retro-activity doctrine, coupled with the likelihood that the routine “take effect upon enactment” language would require courts to fall back upon that doctrine, provide a plausible explanation for both §§ 402(b) and 109(c) that makes neither provision redundant.
Turning to the text of § 402(b), it seems unlikely that the introductory phrase (“Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act”) was meant to refer to the immediately preceding subsection. Since petitioner does not contend that any other provision speaks to the general effective date issue, the logic of her argument requires us to interpret that phrase to mean nothing more than “Notwithstanding § 402(a).” Petitioner’s textual argument assumes that the drafters selected the indefinite word “otherwise” in § 402(a) to identify two specific subsections and the even more indefinite term “any other provision” in § 402(b) to refer to nothing more than §402(b)’s next-door neighbor — § 402(a). Here again, petitioner’s statutory argument would require us to assume that Congress chose a surprisingly indirect route to convey an important and easily expressed message concerning the Act’s effect on pending cases.
The relevant legislative history of the 1991 Act reinforces our conclusion that §§ 402(a), 109(c), and 402(b) cannot bear the weight petitioner places upon them. The 1991 bill as originally introduced in the House contained explicit retroactivity provisions similar to those found in the 1990 bill. However, the Senate substitute that was agreed upon omitted those explicit retroactivity provisions. The legislative history discloses some frankly partisan statements about the meaning of the final effective date language, but those statements cannot plausibly be read as reflecting any general agreement. The history reveals no evidence that Members believed that an agreement had been tacitly struck on the controversial retroactivity issue, and little to suggest that Congress understood or intended the interplay of §§ 402(a), 402(b), and 109(c) to have the decisive effect petitioner assigns them. Instead, the history of the 1991 Act conveys the impression that legislators agreed to disagree about whether and to what extent the Act would apply to preenactment conduct.
Although the passage of the 1990 bill may indicate that a majority of the 1991 Congress also favored retroactive application, even the will of the majority does not become law unless it follows the path charted in Article I, §7, cl. 2, of the Constitution. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U. S. 919, 946-951 (1983). In the absence of the kind of unambiguous directive found in §15 of the 1990 bill, we must look elsewhere for guidance on whether § 102 applies to this case.
>
It is not uncommon to find “apparent tension ’ between different canons of statutory construction. As Professor Llewellyn famously illustrated, many of the traditional canons have equal opposites. In order to resolve the question left open by the 1991 Act, federal courts have labored to reconcile two seemingly contradictory statements found in our decisions concerning the effect of intervening changes in the law. Each statement is framed as a generally applicable rule for interpreting statutes that do not specify their temporal reach. The first is the rule that “a court is to apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision,” Bradley, 416 U. S., at 711. The second is the axiom that “[Retroactivity is not favored in the law,” and its interpretive corollary that “congressional enactments and administrative rules will not be construed to have retroactive effect unless their language requires this result.” Bowen, 488 U. S., at 208.
We have previously noted the “apparent tension” between those expressions. See Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U. S. 827, 837 (1990); see also Bennett, 470 U. S., at 639-640. We found it unnecessary in Kaiser to resolve that seeming conflict “because under either view, where the congressional intent is clear, it governs,” and the prejudgment interest statute at issue in that case evinced “clear congressional intent” that it was “not applicable to judgments entered before its effective date.” 499 U. S., at 837-838. In the case before us today, however, we have concluded that the 1991 Act does not evince any clear expression of intent on § 102’s application to cases arising before the Act’s enactment. We must, therefore, focus on the apparent tension between the rules we have espoused for handling similar problems in the absence of an instruction from Congress.
We begin by noting that there is no tension between the holdings in Bradley and Bowen, both of which were unanimous decisions. Relying on another unanimous decision— Thorpe v. Housing Authority of Durham, 393 U. S. 268 (1969) — we held in Bradley that a statute authorizing the award of attorney’s fees to successful civil rights plaintiffs applied in a case that was pending on appeal at the time the statute was enacted. Bowen held that the Department of Health and Human Services lacked statutory authority to promulgate a rule requiring private hospitals to refund Medicare payments for services rendered before promulgation of the rule. Our opinion in Bowen did not purport to overrule Bradley or to limit its reach. In this light, we turn to the “apparent tension” between the two canons mindful of another canon of unquestionable vitality, the “maxim not to be disregarded that general expressions, in every opinion, are to be taken in connection with the case in which those expressions are used.” Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 399 (1821).
A
As Justice Scalia has demonstrated, the presumption against retroactive legislation is deeply rooted in our jurisprudence, and embodies a legal doctrine centuries older than our Republic. Elementary considerations of fairness dictate that individuals should have an opportunity to know what the law is and to conform their conduct accordingly; settled expectations should not be lightly disrupted. For that reason, the “principle that the legal effect of conduct should ordinarily be assessed under the law that existed when the conduct took place has timeless and universal appeal.” Kaiser, 494 U. S., at 855 (Scalia, J., concurring). In a free, dynamic society, creativity in both commercial and artistic endeavors is fostered by a rule of law that gives people confidence about the legal consequences of their actions.
It is therefore not surprising that the antiretroactivity principle finds expression in several provisions of our Constitution. The Ex Post Facto Clause flatly prohibits retroactive application of penal legislation. Article I, § 10, cl. 1, prohibits States from passing another type of retroactive legislation, laws “impairing the Obligation of Contracts.” The Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause prevents the Legislature (and other government actors) from depriving private persons of vested property rights except for a “public use” and upon payment of “just compensation.” The prohibitions on “Bills of Attainder” in Art. I, §§ 9-10, prohibit legislatures from singling out disfavored persons and meting out summary punishment for past conduct. See, e. g., United States v. Brown, 381 U. S. 437, 456-462 (1965). The Due Process Clause also protects the interests in fair notice and repose that may be compromised by retroactive legislation; a justification sufficient to validate a statute’s prospective application under the Clause “may not suffice” to warrant its retroactive application. Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U. S. 1, 17 (1976).
These provisions demonstrate that retroactive statutes raise particular concerns. The Legislature’s unmatched powers allow it to sweep away settled expectations suddenly and without individualized consideration. Its responsivity to political pressures poses a risk that it may be tempted to use retroactive legislation as a means of retribution against unpopular groups or individuals. As Justice Marshall observed in his opinion for the Court in Weaver v. Graham, 450 U. S. 24 (1981), the Ex Post Facto Clause not only ensures that individuals have “fair warning” about the effect of criminal statutes, but also “restricts governmental power by restraining arbitrary and potentially vindictive legislation.” Id., at 28-29 (citations omitted).
The Constitution’s restrictions, of course, are of limited scope; Absent a violation of one of those specific provisions, the potential unfairness of retroactive civil legislation is not a sufficient reason for a court to fail to give a statute its intended scope. Retroactivity provisions often serve entirely benign and legitimate purposes, whether to respond to emergencies, to correct mistakes, to prevent circumvention of a new statute in the interval immediately preceding its passage, or simply to give comprehensive effect to a new law Congress considers salutary. However, a requirement that Congress first make its intention clear helps ensure that Congress itself has determined that the benefits of retroactivity outweigh the potential for disruption or unfairness.
While statutory retroactivity has long been disfavored, deciding when a statute operates “retroactively” is not always a simple or mechanical task. Sitting on Circuit, Justice Story offered an influential definition in Society for Propagation of the Gospel v. Wheeler, 22 F. Cas. 756 (No. 13,156) (CC NH 1814), a case construing a provision of the New Hampshire Constitution that broadly prohibits “retrospective” laws both criminal and civil. Justice Story first rejected the notion that the provision bars only explicitly retroactive legislation, i. e., “statutes... enacted to take effect from a time anterior to their passage.” Id., at 767. Such a construction, he concluded, would be “utterly subversive of all the objects” of the prohibition. Ibid. Instead, the ban on retrospective legislation embraced “all statutes, which, though operating only from their passage, affect vested rights and past transactions.” Ibid. “Upon principle, "Justice Story elaborated,
“every statute, which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability, in respect to transactions or considerations already past, must be deemed retrospective... Ibid. (citing Calder v. Bull, 3 Dali. 386 (1798), and Dash v. Van Kleeck, 1 Johns. 477 (N. Y. 1811)).
Though the formulas have varied, similar functional conceptions of legislative “retroactivity” have found voice in this Court’s decisions and elsewhere.
A statute does not operate “retrospectively” merely because it is applied in a case arising from conduct antedating the statute's enactment, see Republic Nat. Bank of Miami v. United States, 506 U. S. 80, 100 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment), or upsets expectations based in prior law. Rather, the court must ask whether the new provision attaches new legal consequences to events completed before its enactment. The conclusion that a particular rule operates “retroactively” comes at the end of a process of judgment concerning the nature and extent of the change in the law and the degree of connection between the operation of the new rule and a relevant past event. Any test of retroactivity will leave room for disagreement in hard cases, and is unlikely to classify the enormous variety of legal changes with perfect philosophical clarity. However, retroactivity is a matter on which judges tend to have “sound... instinct[s],” see Danforth v. Groton Water Co., 178 Mass. 472, 476, 59 N. E. 1033, 1034 (1901) (Holmes, J.), and familiar considerations of fair notice, reasonable reliance, and settled expectations offer sound guidance.
Since the early days of this Court, we have declined to give retroactive effect to statutes burdening private rights unless Congress had made clear its intent. Thus, in United States v. Heth, 3 Cranch 399 (1806), we refused to apply a federal statute reducing the commissions of customs collectors to collections commenced before the statute’s enactment because the statute lacked “clear, strong, and imperative” language requiring retroactive application, id., at 413 (opinion of Paterson, J.). The presumption against statutory retroactivity has consistently been explained by reference to the unfairness of imposing new burdens on persons after the fact. Indeed, at common law a contrary rule applied to statutes that merely removed a burden on private rights by repealing a penal provision (whether criminal or civil); such repeals were understood to preclude punishment for acts antedating the repeal. See, e. g., United States v. Chambers, 291 U. S. 217, 223-224 (1934); Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Dennis, 224 U. S. 503, 506 (1912); United States v. Tynen, 11 Wall. 88, 93-95 (1871); Norris v. Crocker, 13 How. 429, 440-441 (1852); Maryland ex rel. Washington Cty. v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 3 How. 534, 552 (1845); Yeaton v. United States, 5 Cranch 281, 284 (1809). But see 1 U. S. C. § 109 (repealing common-law rule).
The largest category of cases in which we have applied the presumption against statutory retroactivity has involved new provisions affecting contractual or property rights, matters in which predictability and stability are of prime importance. The presumption has not, however, been limited to such cases. At issue in Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U. S. 536 (1884), for example, was a provision of the “Chinese Restriction Act” of 1882 barring Chinese laborers from reentering the United States without a certificate prepared when they exited this country. We held that the statute did not bar the reentry of a laborer who had left the United States before the certification requirement
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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B
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Mr. Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Seven enlisted members of the United States Navy brought this class action in the District Court for the District of Columbia under the Tucker Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1346 (a)(2), alleging that their agreements to extend their enlistments, made at various times from 1968 to 1970, entitled each of them to payment of a re-enlistment bonus. The District Court ordered that the bonuses be paid, 365 F. Supp. 140 (1973), and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. 175 U. S. App. D. C. 32, 533 F. 2d 1167 (1976). We granted certiorari, 429 U. S. 997 (1976). We affirm.
I
From early in our history, Congress has provided by statute for payment of a re-enlistment bonus to members of the Armed Services who re-enlisted upon expiration of their term of service, or who agreed to extend their period of service before its expiration. Prior to the enactment of Pub. L. No. 89-132, 79 Stat. 547 (1965), this bonus was determined for an enlistee’s first re-enlistment or extension of enlistment by multiplying his monthly pay at the time of expiration of the initial period of service by the number of years specified in the re-enlistment agreement. See former 37 U. S. C. §§ 308 (a), (b).
The perceived defect of this system was that “it failed to vary the monetary incentive for reenlistment according to the needs of the armed services for personnel with particular skills.” 175 U. S. App. D. C., at 38, 533 F. 2d, at 1173. Consequently, Congress enacted former 37 U. S. C. § 308 (g), which authorized the services to provide, in addition to the Regular Re-enlistment Bonus (RRB) just described, a Variable Re-enlistment Bonus (VRB) to members of the Armed Services whose particular skills were in short supply. The VRB was to be a multiple, no greater than four, of the RRB.
This program was in effect when respondent Nicholas J. Larionoff enlisted in the Navy for four years on June 23, 1969. Shortly after his enlistment, Larionoff chose to participate in a Navy training program, completion of which would qualify him for the service rating “Communications Technician — Maintenance” (CTM). At that time, as Larionoff was aware the CTM rating was classified by Navy regulations as a “critical military skill,” whose holders were eligible upon re-enlistment or extension of enlistment for payment of a VRB in the amount of four times the RRB, the highest allowable rate. Before entering the training program, which entailed a six-year service obligation, Larionoff entered a written agreement to extend his enlistment “in consideration of the pay, allowances, and benefits which will accrue to me during -the continuance of my service.” Larionoff successfully completed the program and was advanced to the CTM rating, expecting to receive a VRB upon entering the period of his extended enlistment on June 23, 1973.
On March 24, 1972, however, the Navy announced that effective July 1, 1972, the CTM rating would no longer be considered a “critical military skill” eligible for a VRB. When Larionoff, through his congressional representatives, inquired into his continued eligibility for a VRB, he was informed that since the CTM rating was no longer listed, he would not receive the expected bonus. Accordingly, in March 1973, respondents filed this lawsuit, and in September of that year the District Court certified a class and granted summary judgment for respondents, ordering payment of the disputed VRB’s.
While the Government’s appeal of this order was pending in the Court of Appeals, Congress repealed the statutes authorizing both the RRB and the VRB, and substituted a new Selective Re-enlistment Bonus (SRB), effective June 1, 1974. Armed Forces Enlisted Personnel Bonus Revision Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 119, 37 U. S. C. § 308 (1970 ed., Supp. V). The Government concedes that this action had no effect on six of the named respondents; like Larionoff, they were scheduled to begin serving their extended enlistments prior to the effective date of the Act, and therefore should have received their VRB’s, if at all, while the program was still in effect. Respondent Johnnie S. Johnson, however, first enlisted in the Navy in August 1970, and did not begin serving his extended enlistment until August 1974. The Court of Appeals was thus confronted with two questions: (1) whether Larionoff and those in his position were entitled to receive VRB’s despite the Navy’s elimination of their rating from the eligible list in the period after their agreement to extend their enlistments but before they began serving those extensions; and (2) whether Johnson and others in his situation were entitled to receive VRB’s despite the repeal of the VRB program in the same period. The Court of Appeals held that both were entitled to receive VRB’s.
II
A
Both the Government and respondents recognize that “[a] soldier’s entitlement to pay is dependent upon statutory right,” Bell v. United States, 366 U. S. 393, 401 (1961), and that accordingly the rights of the affected service members must be determined by reference to the statutes and regulations governing the VRB, rather than to ordinary contract principles. In this case, the relevant statute, former 37 U. S. C. § 308 (g), provided:
“Under regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary of Defense,... a member who is designated as having a critical military skill and who is entitled to [an RRB] upon his first reenlistment may be paid an additional amount not more than four times the amount of [the RRB].”
The regulations governing individual eligibility were set forth in Department of Defense Instruction 1304.15, ¶ IV.B.1 (Sept. 3, 1970).
The Government contends that these eligibility criteria are to be applied as of the time the enlisted member completes service of his original enlistment and enters into the extended enlistment. This is a reasonable construction, since the statute requires that the VRB not be paid until that time. See n. 5, supra. At that time, it is argued, respondents did not satisfy two related criteria prescribed by ¶ V.B.l, although it is conceded they met the others. First, they were not then “serving... in a military specialty designated” as a critical military skill, ¶ V.B.l.a, since the CTM rating was by that time no longer so designated; second, they had not “[at-tainted] eligibility prior to the effective date of termination of awards” for the CTM rating. ][V.B.l.f.
The Government also relies upon the regulations governing the amount of the award to be received. Under Department of Defense Directive 1304.14, ¶ IV.F (Sept. 3, 1970):
“When a military skill is designated for reduction or termination of award an effective date for reduction or termination of awards shall be established and announced to the field at least 90 days in advance. All awards on or after that effective date in military skills designated for reduction of award level will be at the level effective that date and no new awards will be made on or after the effective date in military skills designated for termination of awards.” (Emphasis added.)
Similarly, Department of Defense Instruction 1304.15, supra, [[VI.A, stated:
“Members serving in a military specialty designated for reduction or termination of award under the provisions of subsection IV.F. of [Directive 1304.14, supra] will receive the award level effective on the date of- their reenlistment or extension of enlistment, except as provided in paragraph V.B.l.f. above.”
The Government argues that these regulations, read together, establish that respondents were entitled to receive only the VRB in effect for their service rating at the time the period of their original enlistment ended, and the extended enlistment began.
These regulations, as the Court of Appeals pointed out and the Government freely concedes, contain a number of ambiguities. See 175 U. S. App. D. C., at 40-42, 533 F. 2d, at 1175-1177. We need not tarry, however, over the various ambiguous terms and complex interrelations of the regulations. In construing administrative regulations, "the ultimate criterion is the administrative interpretation, which becomes of controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.” Bowles v. Seminole Rock Co., 325 U. S. 410, 414 (1945). See also INS v. Stanisic, 395 U. S. 62 (1969). The Government represents, and respondents do not seriously dispute, that throughout the period in which the VRB program was in effect, the Navy interpreted the Department of Defense regulations as entitling an enlisted member who.extends his enlistment to the VRB level, if any, in effect at the time he began to serve the extended enlistment. Since this interpretation is not plainly inconsistent with the wording of the regulations, we accept the Government’s reading of those regulations as correct.
B
This, however, does not end our inquiry. For regulations, in order to be valid, must be consistent with the statute under which they are promulgated. We are persuaded that insofar as they required that the amount of the VRB to be awarded to a service member who extended his enlistment was to be determined by reference to the award level in effect at the time he began to serve the extension, rather than at the time he agreed to it, the relevant regulations were contrary to the manifest purposes of Congress in enacting the VRB program, and hence invalid.
The legislative history of the VRB statute makes those congressional purposes crystal clear. As noted above, the re-enlistment bonus scheme in effect before 1965, which relied entirely on the RRB, was criticized for providing the same re-enlistment incentive to all members of the Armed Services, regardless of the need for their skills. The Defense Department desired greater flexibility in calibrating re-enlistment incentives to its manpower needs. The additional expenditures for the VRB were expected to save money in the long run, since payment of the higher re-enlistment bonus would enable the Armed Forces to retain highly skilled individuals whose training had required a considerable investment. Members of Congress in the floor debates clearly recognized the wisdom of offering such incentives.
The VRB was thus intended to induce selected service members to extend their period of service beyond their original enlistment. Of course, the general pay raise for the military included in the same Act was also intended to have a similar effect, by making a military career generally more attractive. But the VRB was expected to be a very specific sort of incentive, not only because it was aimed at a selected group of particularly desirable service members, but also because it offered an incentive “at just the time that it will be most effective, when an individual decides whether or not to reenlist.” Remarks of Rep. Nedzi, 111 Cong. Rec. 17201 (1965). The then Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara, made the same point to the House Armed Services Committee, in contrasting the VRB to “proficiency pay,” which provides increased pay to service members with critical skills:
“We believe a more efficient way to provide additional reenlistment incentives to selected first termers in especially high demand is by using a variable reenlistment bonus. Monetary rewards are thereby concentrated at the first reenlistment decision point, obtaining the greatest return per dollar spent on the retention of personnel.” Hearings on Military Pay Bills before the House Committee on Armed Services, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 2545 (June 7, 1965) (House Hearings). (Emphasis added.)
The then Assistant Secretary of Defense, Norman S. Paul, also distinguished the VRB from ordinary pay, stating that with the VRB the military hoped “to cure a separate specific problem by specific means, rather than overall pay.” Hearings on Military Pay Increase before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 41 (July 29, 1965) (Senate Hearings). The timing of the VRB was crucial to this intention:
“At the end of his first term of reenlistment [sic] he is trying to make up his mind whether to stay in the military. And we think that the added bonus may push him over the line into staying with us, which is what we want to see happening.” Id., at 40.
It is true that in discussing the VRB, Congress focused on the service member who reaches the end of his enlistment, and is faced with the decision “whether or not to reenlist.” (Emphasis added.) Remarks of Rep. Nedzi, supra. But, as Congress has recognized in providing that “[a] member of the [Armed Forces] who extends his enlistment... is entitled to the same pay and allowances as though he had reenlisted,” 37 U. S. C. § 906, precisely the same reasoning applies to the decision to extend enlistment as to the decision to re-enlist. In either case, the VRB could only be effective as a selective incentive to extension of service if at the time he made his decision the service member could count on receiving it if he elected to remain in the service.
This is very apparent when the VRB program is examined from the perspective of an individual who is at the point of deciding whether or not to extend an enlistment due to expire at some future date. At the time he makes this decision, he is aware that his rating or expected rating is classified as a critical military skill eligible for a VRB at a particular level. Under the plan as envisioned by Congress, and as applied by the- Navy in the case of re-enlistments, the incentive operates “at just the time it will be most effective,” because the service member knows that if he remains in the service, he will receive a VRB at the prescribed level. But under the contested regulations, the service member has no such reassurance. Whether or not his rating is eligible for a VRB now, it may not be at the future date on which his first enlistment expires. His “incentive” to extend his enlistment is the purely hypothetical possibility that he might receive a VRB if there is a personnel shortage in his skill on that date. On the other hand, if he nevertheless extends his enlistment, and if the VRB level for his rating is increased in the interval before his original term expires, he will receive a higher award than that which sufficed to induce his decision to remain in the service — from the standpoint of Congress' purposes, a totally gratuitous award.
The clear intention of Congress to enact a program that “concentrates monetary incentives at the first reenlistment decision point where the greatest returns per retention dollar can be expected,” Senate Hearings 26 (statement of Asst. Secy. Paul), could only be effectuated if the enlisted member at the decision point had some certainty about the incentive being offered. Instead, the challenged regulations provided for a virtual lottery. We therefore hold that insofar as the Defense Department regulations required that the amount of the VRB to be paid to a service member who was otherwise eligible to receive one be determined by the award level as of the time he began to serve his extended enlistment, they are in clear conflict with the congressional intention in enacting the VRB program, and hence invalid. Because Congress intended to provide at the re-enlistment decision point a promise of a reasonably certain and specific bonus for extending service in the Armed Forces, Larionoff and the members of his class are entitled, as the Court of Appeals held, to payment of VRB’s determined according to the award levels in effect at the time they agreed to extend their enlistments.
Ill
This brings us to the further question of respondent Johnson's entitlement to a VRB. At the time he agreed to extend his enlistment, the VRB program was in effect, and his CTM rating was classified as a critical military skill. Before he began serving the extended enlistment period, however, Congress repealed the RRB and VRB system, and substituted the new SRB. 88 Stat. 119, 37 U. S. C. § 308 (1970 ed., Supp. V). The Government contends that since the VRB had been abolished before Johnson became eligible to receive one, he is not entitled to receive a bonus. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument.
What we have said above as to Larionoff goes far toward answering this question. The intention of Congress in enacting the VRB was specifically to promise to those who extended their enlistments that a VRB award would be paid to them at the expiration of their original enlistment in return for their commitment to lengthen their period of service. When Johnson made that commitment, by entering an agreement to extend his enlistment, he, like Larionoff, became entitled to receive at some future date a VRB at the award level then in effect (provided that he met the other eligibility criteria). Thus, unless Congress intended, in repealing the VRB program in 1974, to divest Johnson of the rights he had already earned, and constitutionally could do so, the prospective repeal of the program could not affect his right to receive a VRB, even though the date on which the bonus was to be paid had not yet arrived.
Of course, if Congress had such an intent, serious constitutional questions would be presented. No one disputes that Congress may prospectively reduce the pay of members of the Armed Forces, even if that reduction deprived members of benefits they had expected to be able to earn. Cf. Bell v. United States, 366 U. S. 393 (1961); United States v. Dickerson, 310 U. S. 554 (1940). It is quite a different matter, however, for Congress to deprive a service member of pay due for services already performed, but still owing. In that case, the congressional action would appear in a different constitutional light. Cf. Lynch v. United States, 292 U. S. 571 (1934); Perry v. United States, 294 U. S. 330 (1935). In view of these problems, we would not lightly conclude, in the absence of a clear expression of congressional intent, that in amending 37 U. S. C. § 308 and establishing a new bonus system, Congress intended to affect the rights of those service members who had extended their enlistments and become entitled to receive VRB’s.
Nothing in the language of the 1974 Act or its legislative history expresses such aii intention. The Act makes no reference whatever to service members who have become entitled to payment of a VRB by extending their enlistments. There is no prohibition of further payments of VRB’s to those already entitled to them; the Act simply replaces the old § 308 with a new one that authorizes SRB’s rather than RRB’s and VRB’s. Nor does the legislative history express any intention to effect such a prohibition. No paramount power of the Congress or important national interest justifying interference with contractual entitlements is invoked.
The Courts of Appeals that have upheld the Government’s position have relied on two indications of a congressional intent to affect the rights of Johnson and his class. First, the 1974 Act expressly preserves the right of all service members on active duty as of the effective date of the Act to receive upon re-enlistment the RRB’s they would have been entitled to before passage of the Act. Pub. L. No. 93-277, § 3, 88 Stat. 121. The failure to include a similar saving clause as to VRB’s, it is argued, indicates that Congress intended to abolish them entirely. But the saving clause for RRB’s does not merely preserve them for those who had already extended their enlistments, but assures RRB’s upon re-enlistment to any service member then on active duty. The failure to enact a similar provision as to VRB’s indicates only that Congress did not intend that VRB’s be paid to those service members who re-enlisted after the effective date of the Act, and has no bearing on those who had already extended their enlistments and become entitled to VRB’s.
Second, reference is made to a portion of the Conference Report on the Act, indicating a congressional “understanding” that service members, like Johnson, who had already entered two-year extensions of enlistment could become eligible for an SRB by canceling the extension and replacing it with a four-year extension. H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 93-985, pp. 4-5 (1974). This, it is argued, indicates that Congress had considered the possible unfairness that eliminating the VRB could work on members such as Johnson, and felt that it had made sufficient provision for them by making them eligible, upon a further extension of their commitment, for an SRB. But the Report does not refer to the possible unfairness of eliminating the VRB payable to those service members with whom it deals; rather, it refers to the Navy’s concern that language in the legislative history might cast doubt on a commitment the Navy had made “to a man with a four-year enlistment and a two-year extension that he can cancel the two-year extension and reenlist for four years and receive a reenlistment bonus for the four-year reenlistment.” Id., at 4. The Report removes any doubts about the validity of that commitment. The only relevance of the Report to the problem before us is that it demonstrates that Congress was responsive to the “concern that the language of the bill might be interpreted to require it to abrogate an understanding” between the Armed Forces and enlistees, ibid., making it less rather than more likely that Congress intended the 1974 Act to abrogate Johnson’s entitlement to a VRB by implication.
Affirmed.
The Court of Appeals opinion traces the history of this policy from 1795 to the present. 175 U. S. App. D. C., at 37-38, and n. 16, 533 F. 2d, at 1172-1173, and n. 16.
Former 37 U. S. C. § 308 (g), 79 Stat. 547, provided as follows:
“(g) Under regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary of Defense, or the Secretary of the Treasury with respect to the Coast Guard when it is not operating as a service in the Navy, a member who is designated as having a critical military skill and who is entitled to a bonus computed under subsection (a) of this section upon his first reenlistment may be paid an additional amount not more than four times the amount of that bonus. The additional amount shall be paid in equal yearly installments in each year of the reenlistment period. However, in meritorious cases the additional amount may be paid in fewer installments if the Secretary concerned determines it to be in the best interest of the members. An amount paid under this subsection does not count against the limitation prescribed by subsection (c) of this section on the total amount that may be paid under this section.”
Under the Department of Defense regulations implementing the VRB program, multiples of one to four times the RRB were assigned depending on the relative urgency of the services’ need for particular skills, as measured by personnel shortages and the cost of training replacement personnel. Department of Defense Directive 1304.14, ¶¶ IV.D.1.a, b (Sept. 3, 1970); Department of Defense Instruction 1304.15, ¶¶ IV.D, V.A.1, 2 (Sept. 3, 1970).
Under 37 U. S. C. § 906, “[a] member of the [Armed Forces] who extends his enlistment... is entitled to the same pay and allowances as though he had reenlisted.”
Except as noted below with specific reference to respondent Johnnie S. Johnson, the facts relating to Larionoff are typical of those concerning the other named respondents.
Larionoff was informed of the existence of the VRB program, and its applicability to the CTM program, by a Navy “classifier” who interviewed him to determine what field within the service he should enter. Several of the other named respondents were also told of the existence of the VRB program, and in sóme instances the amount of the VRB they could expect to receive was calculated for them by Navy personnel, without any indication that the amount might be reduced. 175 U. S. App. D. C., at 35, 36, and nn. 6, 11, 533 F. 2d, at 1170, 1171, and nn. 6, 11. These facts, contained in affidavits filed by respondents, are undisputed; while an affidavit introduced by the Government states that “it is not the policy of the Department of the Navy to promise specific eligibility for Variable Reenlistment Bonus, nor is any official authorized to make such a promise in counselling with a prospective enlistee,” there is no dispute that in particular cases individual service members might, inadvertently or otherwise, be left with the impression that a VRB had been promised.
Under former 37 U. S. C. §308 (g), the VRB was paid “in equal yearly installments in each year of the reenlistment period.”
But see n. 23, infra.
Indeed, this is implicitly recognized in the contracts executed by the named respondents, which state that they agree to extend their enlistments “in consideration of the pay, allowances, and benefits which will accrue to me during the continuance of my service,” rather than stating any fixed compensation.
This regulation provided:
“B. Individual Eligibility for Receipt of Awards
“1. Variable Reenlistment Bonus. An enlisted member is eligible to receive, a Variable Reenlistment Bonus if he meets all the following conditions:
“a. Is qualified and serving on active duty in a military specialty designated under provisions of paragraph V.A.2. above for award of the Variable Reenlistment Bonus. Members paid a Variable Reenlistment Bonus shall continue to serve in the military specialty which qualified them for the bonus unless the Secretary of a Military Department determines that a waiver of this restriction is necessary in the interest of the Military Service concerned.
“b. Has completed at least 21 months of continuous active service other than active duty for training immediately prior to discharge, release from active duty, or extension of enlistment.
“e. Is serving in pay grade E-3 or higher.
“d. Reenlists in a regular component of the Military Service concerned within three (3) months (or within a lesser period if so prescribed by the Secretary of the Military Department concerned) after the date of his discharge or release from compulsory or voluntary active duty (other than for training), or extends his enlistment, so that the reenlistment or enlistment as extended provides a total period of continuous active service of not less than sixty-nine (69) months.
“(1) The reenlistment or extension of enlistment must be a first reenlistment or extension for which a reenlistment bonus is payable.
“(2) No reenlistment or extension accomplished for any purpose other than continued active service in the designated military specialty shall qualify a member for receipt of the Variable Reenlistment Bonus.
“(3) Continued active service in a designated military specialty shall include normal skill progression as defined in the respective Military Service classification manuals.
“e. Has not more than eight years of total active service at the time of reenlistment or extension of enlistment.
“f.‘ Attains eligibility prior to the effective date of termination of awards in any military specialty designated for termination of the award. Member must attain eligibility prior to the effective date of a reduction of award level to be eligible for the higher award level. Eligibility attained through any modification of an existing service obligation, including any early discharge granted pursuant to 10 U. S. C. 1171, must have been attained prior to the date the authority approving the modification was notified of the prospective termination or reduction of award in the military specialty.
“g. Meets such additional eligibility criteria as may be prescribed by the Secretary of the Military Department concerned.”
Instruction 1304.15 has been canceled by Department of Defense Instruction 1304.22 (June 1975).
Directive 1304.14 has been canceled by Department of Defense Directive 1304.21 (June 1975).
The reference is apparently to the last sentence of ¶ V.B.l.f, supra, n. 8, which provided: “Eligibility attained through any modification of an existing service obligation... must have been attained prior to the date the authority approving the modification was notified of the prospective termination or reduction of award...” The Court of Appeals interpreted this provision as intended to prevent service members from qualifying for a soon-to-be-reduced benefit level by agreeing to extend their enlistments in the interval between the announcement of the reduction in award level and the effective date of the change, and hence an implicit recognition that in the absence of such a provision service members in that position would be entitled to the higher benefit level. 175 U. S. App. D. C., at 41-42, 533 F. 2d, at 1176-1177. The Government argues, however,, that the purpose of ¶ V.B.l.f was to reach the much smaller group of service members who would be in a position both to agree to extend their enlistment and to begin serving the extension within the relevant period. Tr. of Oral Arg. 15-16.
This has apparently been the practice regardless of whether that level was higher or lower than that in effect when the service member agreed to extend his enlistment. Id., at 45.
“The power of an administrative officer or board to administer a federal statute and to prescribe rules and regulations to that end is... [only] the power to adopt regulations to carry into effect the will of Congress as expressed by the statute. A regulation which' does not do this, but operates to create a rule out of harmony with the statute, is a mere nullity.” Manhattan General Equip. Co. v. Commissioner, 297 U. S. 129, 134 (1936). See, e. g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U. S. 185, 213-214 (1976); Dixon v. United States, 381 U. S. 68, 74 (1965).
This argument was clearly raised in the briefs in the Court of Appeals, Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees (Cross-Appellants) 13, Larionoff v. United States, Nos. 74-1211 and 74-212, and in this Court, Brief for Respondents 15-18. We therefore do not regard the somewhat inconclusive colloquy at oral argument, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 29-33, as abandoning it.
H. R. Rep. No. 549, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 47 (1965); S. Rep. No. 544, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 14 (1965).
See, e. g., remarks of Rep. Morton, 111 Cong. Rec. 17206 (1965); remarks of Rep. Bennett, ibid.; remarks of Rep. Dole, id., at 17209; remarks of Sen. Russell, id., at 20034.
See, e. g., H. R. Rep. No. 549, supra, at 5-6; S. Rep. No. 544, supra, at 1-4.
The argument that the VRB would be particularly effective as an inducement to re-enlist because it would be provided at the “decision point” is a constant theme through the hearings, the committee reports, and the floor debates. See House Hearings 2545-2584 (statements of Secy. McNamara), 2671 (colloquy of Rep. Stratton and Gen. Greene); Senate Hearings 19 (statement of Secy. McNamara), 26, 40, 44 (statements of Asst. Secy. Paul); H. R. Rep. No. 549, supra, at 47; S. Rep. No. 544, supra, at 14; 111 Cong. Rec. 17201 (1965) (remarks of Rep. Nedzi).
Indeed, as the Court of Appeals pointed out, 175 U. S. App. D. C., at 43-44, n. 32, 533 F. 2d, at 1178-1179, n. 32, because the regulations governing the VRB program required the various services to undertake an annual review of the military specialties in which personnel shortages existed for the purpose of adjusting VRB award levels, Department of Defense Directive 1304.14, ¶ IV.F.1, the service member, by his very decision to extend his enlistment, would contribute to the likelihood that by the time his initial enlistment expired, his skill would no longer be in short supply and the VRB he had expected would therefore have been reduced or eliminated.
The effects of the challenged regulations would, of course, be less than clear to the service member deciding whether or not to extend his enlistment, and, given the complexity and ambiguity of the regulations, and the resulting possibility that they could be misconstrued by Navy recruiters as well as by the enlistees themselves, it would not be surprising if many service members, like some of the respondents here, see n. 4, supra, came to believe that by extending their enlistments they had acquired a vested right to a VRB. To the extent that such beliefs had been fostered, upholding the regulations would perpetrate a considerable injustice.
Of course, the enlisted service member agreeing to extend his enlistment could not have been entirely certain of the amount of his future VRB. First, the VRB was calculated according to a formula based on the amount of the RRB, which in turn depended on the re-enlistee’s basic pay upon entering the re-enlistment period. At the time he agreed to extend his enlistment, the service member could not have been sure what that amount would be; Congress could alter military pay scales, or the member might be promoted or demoted, and hence his pay might change, in the interval. Second, the VRB, by both statute and regulation, was not actually paid until the service member began serving his extended enlistment, and even then was ordinarily paid in yearly installments. If for some reason the enlistee did not complete service of his extension, remaining installments were not paid, and overpayments were recouped. Department of Defense Directive 1304.14, ¶ IV.G. Finally, receipt of any VRB at all depended on the service member’s completing the requirements for eligibility before expiration of the original enlistment. See Department of Defense Instruction 1304.15, ¶ IV.B.1, n. 8. Thus, the VRB as applied to service members extending their enlistments, as opposed to those re-enlisting, was always somewhat contingent. But there is a significant difference between this sort of contingency, which was inherent in the nature of the program and in any event involved marginal effects on the amount of the award or the occurrence of rather speculative events, and the sort of uncertainty the contested regulations inject into the program, which rendered the primary determinant of the VRB entirely unpredictable at the time the decision to extend enlistment was made.
The decision of the Court of Appeals on this point is in conflict with the decisions in Collins v.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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B
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
In this case, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed respondent William Fensterer’s conviction on the grounds that the admission of the opinion testimony of the prosecution’s expert witness, who was unable to recall the basis for his opinion, denied respondent his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him. 493 A. 2d 959 (1985). We conclude that the Delaware Supreme Court misconstrued the Confrontation Clause as interpreted by the decisions of this Court.
I
Respondent was convicted of murdering his fiancée, Stephanie Ann Swift. The State’s case was based on circumstantial evidence, and proceeded on the theory that respondent had strangled Swift with a cat leash. To establish that the cat leash was the murder weapon, the State sought to prove that two hairs found on the leash were similar to Swift’s hair, and that one of those hairs had been forcibly removed. To prove these theories, the State relied on the testimony of Special Agent Allen Robillard of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
At trial, Robillard testified that one of the hairs had been forcibly removed. He explained that, in his opinion, there are three methods of determining that a hair has forcibly been removed: (1) if the follicular tag is present on the hair, (2) if the root is elongated and misshaped, or (3) if a sheath of skin surrounds the root. However, Robillard went on to say that “ ‘I have reviewed my notes, and I have no specific knowledge as to the particular way that I determined the hair was forcibly removed other than the fact that one of those hairs was forcibly removed.”’ Id., at 963. On cross-examination, Agent Robillard was again unable to recall which method he had employed to determine that the hair had forcibly been removed. He also explained that what he meant by “forcibly removed” was no more than that the hair could have been removed by as little force as is entailed in “‘brushing your hand through your head or brushing your hair.’” Pet. for Cert. 7. The trial court overruled respondent’s objection that the admission of Robillard’s testimony precluded adequate cross-examination unless he could testify as to which of the three theories he relied upon, explaining that in its view this objection went to the weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility.
The defense offered its own expert in hair analysis, Dr. Peter DeForest, who agreed with Agent Robillard that the hairs were similar to Swift’s. Doctor DeForest testified that he had observed that one of the hairs had a follicular tag. He also testified that he had spoken by telephone with Robillard, who advised him that his conclusion of forcible removal was based on the presence of the follicular tag. App. to Pet. for Cert. D-2. Doctor DeForest then proceeded to challenge the premise of Robillard’s theory — that the presence of a follicular tag indicates forcible removal. According to Dr. DeForest, no adequate scientific study supported that premise, and a follicular tag could be attached to hairs that naturally fall out.
On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed respondent’s conviction on the authority of the Confrontation Clause. Noting that “[t]he primary interest secured by the Clause is the right of cross-examination,” 493 A. 2d, at 963, the court reasoned that “[effective cross-examination and discrediting of Agent Robillard’s opinion at a minimum required that he commit himself to the basis of his opinion.” Id., at 964 (footnote omitted). Absent such an acknowledgment of the basis of his opinion, the court believed that “defense counsel’s cross-examination of the Agent was nothing more than an exercise in futility.” Ibid. Since the court could not rule out the possibility that Robillard could have been “completely discredited” had he committed himself as to the theory on which his conclusion was based, it held that respondent “was denied his right to effectively cross-examine a key state witness.” Ibid. Accordingly, the court reversed without reaching respondent’s additional claim that Ro-billard’s testimony was inadmissible under the pertinent Delaware Rules of Evidence. We now reverse the Delaware Supreme Court’s holding that Agent Robillard’s inability to recall the method whereby he arrived at his opinion rendered the admission of that opinion violative of respondent’s rights under the Confrontation Clause.
1 — I
This Court’s Confrontation Clause cases fall into two broad categories: cases involving the admission of out-of-court statements and cases involving restrictions imposed by law or by the trial court on the scope of cross-examination. The first category reflects the Court’s longstanding recognition that the "literal right to ‘confront’ the witness at the time of trial . . . forms the core of the values furthered by the Confrontation Clause.” California v. Green, 399 U. S. 149, 157 (1970). Cases such as Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U. S. 56 (1980), and Dutton v. Evans, 400 U. S. 74 (1970), gave rise to Confrontation Clause issues “because hearsay evidence was admitted as substantive evidence against the defendants.” Tennessee v. Street, 471 U. S. 409, 413 (1985). Cf. Bruton v. United States, 391 U. S. 123 (1968).
The second category of cases is exemplified by Davis v. Alaska, 415 U. S. 308, 318 (1974), in which, although some cross-examination of a prosecution witness was allowed, the trial court did not permit defense counsel to “expose to the jury the facts from which jurors, as the sole triers of fact and credibility, could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.” As the Court stated in Davis, supra, at 315, “[confrontation means more than being allowed to confront the witness physically.” Consequently, in Davis, as in other cases involving trial court restrictions on the scope of cross-examination, the Court has recognized that Confrontation Clause questions will arise because such restrictions may “effectively . . . emasculate the right of cross-examination itself.” Smith v. Illinois, 390 U. S. 129, 131 (1968).
This case falls in neither category. It is outside the first category, because the State made no attempt to introduce an out-of-court statement by Agent Robillard for any purpose, let alone as hearsay. Therefore, the restrictions the Confrontation Clause places on “the range of admissible hearsay,” Roberts, supra, at 65, are not called into play.
The second category is also inapplicable here, for the trial court did not limit the scope or nature of defense counsel’s cross-examination in any way. The Court has recognized that “the cross-examiner is not only permitted to delve into the witness’ story to test the witness’ perceptions and memory, but [also] . . . allowed to impeach, i. e., discredit, the witness.” Davis, 415 U. S., at 316. But it does not follow that the right to cross-examine is denied by the State whenever the witness’ lapse of memory impedes one method of discrediting him. Quite obviously, an expert witness who cannot recall the basis for his opinion invites the jury to find that his opinion is as unreliable as his memory. That the defense might prefer the expert to embrace a particular theory, which it is prepared to refute with special vigor, is irrelevant. “ ‘The main and essential purpose of confrontation is to secure for the opponent the opportunity of cross-examination.’” Id., at 315-316 (quoting 5 J. Wigmore, Evidence §1395, p. 123 (3d ed. 1940) (emphasis in original)). Generally speaking, the Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish. See Roberts, 448 U. S., at 73, n. 12 (even where the only opportunity the defense has to cross-examine the declarant is at a preliminary hearing, except in “extraordinary cases” where defense counsel provided ineffective representation at the earlier proceeding, “no inquiry into ‘effectiveness’ is required”). This conclusion is confirmed by the fact that the assurances of reliability our cases have found in the right of cross-examination are fully satisfied in cases such as this one, notwithstanding the witness’ inability to recall the basis for his opinion: the factfinder can observe the witness’ demeanor under cross-examination, and the witness is testifying under oath and in the presence of the accused. See id., at 63, n. 6.
We need not decide whether there are circumstances in which a witness’ lapse of memory may so frustrate any opportunity for cross-examination that admission of the witness’ direct testimony violates the Confrontation Clause. In this case, defense counsel’s cross-examination of Agent Robillard demonstrated to the jury that Robillard could not even recall the theory on which his opinion was based. Moreover, through its own expert witness, the defense was able to suggest to the jury that Robillard had relied on a theory which the defense expert considered baseless. The Confrontation Clause certainly requires no more than this.
Although Green, supra, involved a witness who professed a lapse of memory on the stand, that case lends no support to respondent. In pertinent part, Green was a case in which a minor named Porter informed a police officer of a transaction in which he claimed Green supplied him with drugs. At trial, Porter professed to be unable to recall how he obtained the drugs. The prosecution then introduced Porter’s prior inconsistent statements as substantive evidence. Green, 399 U. S., at 152. This Court held that “the Confrontation Clause does not require excluding from evidence the prior statements of a witness who concedes making the statements, and who may be asked to defend or otherwise explain the inconsistency between his prior and his present version of the events in question, thus opening himself to full cross-examination at trial as to both stories.” Id., at 164. However, the Court also concluded that, in the posture of that case, it would be premature to reach the question “[wjhether Porter’s apparent lapse of memory so affected Green’s right to cross-examine as to make a critical difference in the application of the Confrontation Clause . . . .” Id., at 168. In this connection, the Court noted that even some who argue that “prior statements should be admissible as substantive evidence” believe that this rule should not apply to “the case of a witness who disclaims all present knowledge of the ultimate event,” because “in such a case the opportunities for testing the prior statement through cross-examination at trial may be significantly diminished.” Id., at 169, n. 18 (citations omitted).
We need not decide today the question raised but not resolved in Green. As Green’s, framing of that question indicates, the issue arises only where a “prior statement,” not itself subjected to cross-examination and the other safeguards of testimony at trial, is admitted as substantive evidence. Since there is no such out-of-court statement in this case, the adequacy of a later opportunity to cross-examine, as a substitute for cross-examination at the time the declaration was made, is not in question here.
Under the Court’s cases, then, Agent Robillard’s inability to recall on the stand the basis for his opinion presents none of the perils from which the Confrontation Clause protects defendants in criminal proceedings. The Confrontation Clause includes no guarantee that every "witness called by the prosecution will refrain from giving testimony that is marred by forgetfulness, confusion, or evasion. To the contrary, the Confrontation Clause is generally satisfied when the defense is given a full and fair opportunity to probe and expose these infirmities through cross-examination, thereby calling to the attention of the factfinder the reasons for giving scant weight to the witness’ testimony. Accordingly, we hold that the admission into evidence of Agent Robillard’s opinion did not offend the Confrontation Clause despite his inability to recall the basis for that opinion.
The Delaware Supreme Court also appears to have believed that the prosecution breached its “serious obligation not to obstruct a criminal defendant’s cross-examination of expert testimony,” 493 A. 2d, at 963, seemingly because the prosecution knew in advance that Agent Robillard would be unable to recall the basis for his opinion when he testified at trial. While we would agree that Robillard's testimony at the voir dire examination must be taken to have alerted both the prosecution and the defense to his lapse of memory, see App. to Brief in Opposition A-l, we do not think the prosecution was obliged to refrain from calling Robillard unless it could somehow refresh his recollection. Whether or not, under state law, Robillard’s opinion should have been admitted into evidence, nothing in the Federal Constitution forbids the conclusion reached by the trial court in this case: that the expert’s inability to recall the basis for his opinion went to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility. See United States v. Bastanipour, 697 F. 2d 170, 176-177 (CA7 1982), cert. denied, 460 U. S. 1091 (1983). That being so, the prosecution’s foreknowledge that its expert would be unable to give the precise basis for his opinion did not impose an obligation on it, as a matter of due process, to refrain from introducing the expert’s testimony unless the basis for that testimony could definitely be ascertained. We need not decide whether the introduction of an expert opinion with no basis could ever be so lacking in reliability, and so prejudicial, as to deny a defendant a fair trial. The testimony of Dr. DeForest, suggesting the actual basis for Robillard’s opinion and vigorously disputing its validity, utterly dispels any possibility of such a claim in this case.
The petition for certiorari is granted, the judgment of the Delaware Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Marshall dissents from this summary disposition, which has been ordered without affording the parties prior notice or an opportunity to file briefs on the merits. See Maggie v. Fulford, 462 U. S. 111, 120-121 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Wyrick v. Fields, 459 U. S. 42, 51-52 (1982) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Justice Blackmun would grant certiorari and give this case plenary consideration.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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A
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case addresses whether the Virginia state legislature's consideration of race in drawing new lines for 12 state legislative districts violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. After the 2010 census, some redistricting was required to ensure proper numerical apportionment for the Virginia House of Delegates. It is undisputed that the boundary lines for the 12 districts at issue were drawn with a goal of ensuring that each district would have a black voting-age population (BVAP) of at least 55%.
Certain voters challenged the new districts as unconstitutional racial gerrymanders. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, constituted as a three-judge district court, rejected the challenges as to each of the 12 districts. As to 11 of the districts, the District Court concluded that the voters had not shown, as this Court's precedent requires, "that race was the predominant factor motivating the legislature's decision to place a significant number of voters within or without a particular district." Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916, 115 S.Ct. 2475, 132 L.Ed.2d 762 (1995). The District Court held that race predominates only where there is an " 'actual conflict between traditional redistricting criteria and race,' " 141 F.Supp.3d 505, 524 (E.D.Va.2015), so it confined the predominance analysis to the portions of the new lines that appeared to deviate from traditional criteria, and found no violation. As to the remaining district, District 75, the District Court found that race did predominate. It concluded, however, that the lines were constitutional because the legislature's use of race was narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest. In particular, the District Court determined that the legislature had "good reasons to believe" that a 55% racial target was necessary in District 75 to avoid diminishing the ability of black voters to elect their preferred candidates, which at the time would have violated § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 575 U.S. ----, ----, 135 S.Ct. 1257, 1274, 191 L.Ed.2d 314 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted and emphasis deleted).
On appeal to this Court, the challengers contend that the District Court employed an incorrect legal standard for racial predominance and that the legislature lacked good reasons for its use of race in District 75. This Court now affirms as to District 75 and vacates and remands as to the remaining 11 districts.
I
After the 2010 census, the Virginia General Assembly set out to redraw the legislative districts for the State Senate and House of Delegates in time for the 2011 elections. In February 2011, the House Committee on Privileges and Elections adopted a resolution establishing criteria to guide the redistricting process. Among those criteria were traditional redistricting factors such as compactness, contiguity of territory, and respect for communities of interest. But above those traditional objectives, the committee gave priority to two other goals. First, in accordance with the principle of one person, one vote, the committee resolved that "[t]he population of each district shall be as nearly equal to the population of every other district as practicable," with any deviations falling "within plus-or-minus one percent." 141 F.Supp.3d, at 518. Second, the committee resolved that the new map must comply with the "protections against... unwarranted retrogression" contained in § 5 of the Voting Rights Act. Ibid. At the time, § 5 required covered jurisdictions, including Virginia, to preclear any change to a voting standard, practice, or procedure by showing federal authorities that the change would not have the purpose or effect of "diminishing the ability of [members of a minority group] to elect their preferred candidates of choice." § 5, 120 Stat. 580-581, 52 U.S.C. § 10304(b). After the redistricting process here was completed, this Court held that the coverage formula in § 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act no longer may be used to require preclearance under § 5. See Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. ----, ----, 133 S.Ct. 2612, 2631, 186 L.Ed.2d 651 (2013).
The committee's criteria presented potential problems for 12 House districts. Under § 5 as Congress amended it in 2005, "[a] plan leads to impermissible retrogression when, compared to the plan currently in effect (typically called a 'benchmark plan'), the new plan diminishes the number of districts in which minority groups can 'elect their preferred candidates of choice' (often called 'ability-to-elect' districts)." Harris v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Comm'n, 578 U.S. ----, ---- - ----, 136 S.Ct. 1301, 1307, 194 L.Ed.2d 497 (2016) (quoting 52 U.S.C. § 10304(b) ). The parties agree that the 12 districts at issue here, where minorities had constituted a majority of the voting-age population for many past elections, qualified as "ability-to-elect" districts. Most of the districts were underpopulated, however, so any new plan required moving significant numbers of new voters into these districts in order to comply with the principle of one person, one vote. Under the benchmark plan, the districts had BVAPs ranging from 62.7% down to 46.3%. Three districts had BVAPs below 55%.
Seeking to maintain minority voters' ability to elect their preferred candidates in these districts while complying with the one-person, one-vote criterion, legislators concluded that each of the 12 districts "needed to contain a BVAP of at least 55%." 141 F.Supp.3d, at 519. At trial, the parties disputed whether the 55% figure "was an aspiration or a target or a rule." Ibid. But they did not dispute "the most important question-whether [the 55%] figure was used in drawing the Challenged Districts." Ibid. The parties agreed, and the District Court found, "that the 55% BVAP figure was used in structuring the districts." Ibid. In the enacted plan all 12 districts contained a BVAP greater than 55%.
Who first suggested the 55% BVAP criterion and how the legislators agreed upon it was less clear from the evidence. See id., at 521 (describing the "[t]estimony on this question" as "a muddle"). In the end, the District Court found that the 55% criterion emerged from discussions among certain members of the House Black Caucus and the leader of the redistricting effort in the House, Delegate Chris Jones, "based largely on concerns pertaining to the re-election of Delegate Tyler in [District] 75." Id., at 522. The 55% figure "was then applied across the board to all twelve" districts. Ibid.
In April 2011, the General Assembly passed Delegate Jones' plan with broad support from both parties and members of the Black Caucus. One of only two dissenting members of the Black Caucus was Delegate Tyler of District 75, who objected solely on the ground that the 55.4% BVAP in her district was too low. In June 2011, the U.S. Department of Justice precleared the plan.
Three years later, before this suit was filed, a separate District Court struck down Virginia's third federal congressional district (not at issue here), based in part on the legislature's use of a 55% BVAP threshold. See Page v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 58 F.Supp.3d 533, 553 (E.D.Va.2014), vacated and remanded sub nom. Cantor v. Personhuballah, 575 U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 1699, 191 L.Ed.2d 671 (2015), judgt. entered sub nom. Page v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 2015 WL 3604029 (June 5, 2015), appeal dism'd sub nom. Wittman v. Personhuballah, 578 U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 1732, 195 L.Ed.2d 37 (2016). After that decision, 12 voters registered in the 12 districts here at issue filed this action challenging the district lines under the Equal Protection Clause. Because the claims "challeng[ed] the constitutionality of... the apportionment of [a] statewide legislative body," the case was heard by a three-judge District Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a). The Virginia House of Delegates and its Speaker, William Howell (together referred to hereinafter as the State), intervened and assumed responsibility for defending the plan, both before the District Court and now before this Court.
After a 4-day bench trial, a divided District Court ruled for the State. With respect to each challenged district, the court first assessed whether "racial considerations predominated over-or'subordinated'-traditional redistricting criteria." 141 F.Supp.3d, at 523. An essential premise of the majority opinion was that race does not predominate unless there is an "actual conflict between traditional redistricting criteria and race that leads to the subordination of the former." Id., at 524. To implement that standard, moreover, the court limited its inquiry into racial motive to those portions of the district lines that appeared to deviate from traditional criteria. The court thus "examine[d] those aspects of the [district] that appear[ed] to constitute 'deviations' from neutral criteria" to ascertain whether the deviations were attributable to race or to other considerations, "such as protection of incumbents." Id., at 533-534. Only if the court found a deviation attributable to race did it proceed to "determine whether racial considerations qualitatively subordinated all other non-racial districting criteria." Ibid. Under that analysis, the court found that race did not predominate in 11 of the 12 districts.
When it turned to District 75, the District Court found that race did predominate. The court reasoned that "[a]chieving a 55% BVAP floor required 'drastic maneuvering' that is reflected on the face of the district." Id., at 557. Applying strict scrutiny, the court held that compliance with § 5 was a compelling state interest and that the legislature's consideration of race in District 75 was narrowly tailored. As to narrow tailoring, the court explained that the State had "a strong basis in evidence" to believe that its actions were "reasonably necessary" to avoid retrogression. Id., at 548. In particular, the court found that Delegate Jones had considered "precisely the kinds of evidence that legislators are encouraged to use" in achieving compliance with § 5, including turnout rates, the district's large disenfranchised prison population, and voting patterns in the contested 2005 primary and general elections. Id., at 558.
Judge Keenan dissented as to all 12 districts. She concluded that the majority applied an incorrect understanding of racial predominance and that Delegate Jones' analysis of District 75 was too "general and conclusory." Id., at 578. This appeal followed, and probable jurisdiction was noted. 578 U.S. ---- (2016) ; see 28 U.S.C. § 1253.
II
Against the factual and procedural background set out above, it is now appropriate to consider the controlling legal principles in this case. The Equal Protection Clause prohibits a State, without sufficient justification, from "separat[ing] its citizens into different voting districts on the basis of race." Miller, 515 U.S., at 911, 115 S.Ct. 2475. The harms that flow from racial sorting "include being personally subjected to a racial classification as well as being represented by a legislator who believes his primary obligation is to represent only the members of a particular racial group." Alabama, 575 U.S., at ----, 135 S.Ct., at 1265 (alterations, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted). At the same time, courts must "exercise extraordinary caution in adjudicating claims that a State has drawn district lines on the basis of race." Miller, 515 U.S., at 916, 115 S.Ct. 2475. "Electoral districting is a most difficult subject for legislatures," requiring a delicate balancing of competing considerations. Id., at 915, 115 S.Ct. 2475. And "redistricting differs from other kinds of state decisionmaking in that the legislature always is aware of race when it draws district lines, just as it is aware of... a variety of other demographic factors." Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 646, 113 S.Ct. 2816, 125 L.Ed.2d 511 (1993) (Shaw I ).
In light of these considerations, this Court has held that a plaintiff alleging racial gerrymandering bears the burden "to show, either through circumstantial evidence of a district's shape and demographics or more direct evidence going to legislative purpose, that race was the predominant factor motivating the legislature's decision to place a significant number of voters within or without a particular district." Miller, 515 U.S. at 916, 115 S.Ct. 2475. To satisfy this burden, the plaintiff "must prove that the legislature subordinated traditional race-neutral districting principles... to racial considerations." Ibid. The challengers contend that, in finding that race did not predominate in 11 of the 12 districts, the District Court misapplied controlling law in two principal ways. This Court considers them in turn.
A
The challengers first argue that the District Court misunderstood the relevant precedents when it required the challengers to establish, as a prerequisite to showing racial predominance, an actual conflict between the enacted plan and traditional redistricting principles. The Court agrees with the challengers on this point.
A threshold requirement that the enacted plan must conflict with traditional principles might have been reconcilable with this Court's case law at an earlier time. In Shaw I, the Court recognized a claim of racial gerrymandering for the first time. See 509 U.S., at 652, 113 S.Ct. 2816. Certain language in Shaw I can be read to support requiring a challenger who alleges racial gerrymandering to show an actual conflict with traditional principles. The opinion stated, for example, that strict scrutiny applies to "redistricting legislation that is so bizarre on its face that it is unexplainable on grounds other than race." Id., at 644, 113 S.Ct. 2816 (internal quotation marks omitted). The opinion also stated that "reapportionment is one area in which appearances do matter." Id., at 647, 113 S.Ct. 2816.
The Court's opinion in Miller, however, clarified the racial predominance inquiry. In particular, it rejected the argument that, "regardless of the legislature's purposes, a plaintiff must demonstrate that a district's shape is so bizarre that it is unexplainable other than on the basis of race." 515 U.S., at 910-911, 115 S.Ct. 2475. The Court held to the contrary in language central to the instant case: "Shape is relevant not because bizarreness is a necessary element of the constitutional wrong or a threshold requirement of proof, but because it may be persuasive circumstantial evidence that race for its own sake, and not other districting principles, was the legislature's dominant and controlling rationale." Id., at 913, 115 S.Ct. 2475. Parties therefore "may rely on evidence other than bizarreness to establish race-based districting," and may show predominance "either through circumstantial evidence of a district's shape and demographics or more direct evidence going to legislative purpose." Id., at 913, 916, 115 S.Ct. 2475.
The Court addressed racial gerrymandering and traditional redistricting factors again in Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 116 S.Ct. 1894, 135 L.Ed.2d 207 (1996) (Shaw II ). The Court there rejected the view of one of the dissents that "strict scrutiny does not apply where a State'respects' or 'complies with traditional districting principles.' " Id., at 906, 116 S.Ct. 1894 (quoting id., at 931-932, 116 S.Ct. 1894 (Stevens, J., dissenting); alteration omitted). Race may predominate even when a reapportionment plan respects traditional principles, the Court explained, if "[r]ace was the criterion that, in the State's view, could not be compromised," and race-neutral considerations "came into play only after the race-based decision had been made." Id., at 907, 116 S.Ct. 1894.
The State's theory in this case is irreconcilable with Miller and Shaw II. The State insists, for example, that the harm from racial gerrymandering lies not in racial line-drawing per se but in grouping voters of the same race together when they otherwise lack shared interests. But "the constitutional violation" in racial gerrymandering cases stems from the "racial purpose of state action, not its stark manifestation." Miller, supra, at 913, 115 S.Ct. 2475. The Equal Protection Clause does not prohibit misshapen districts. It prohibits unjustified racial classifications.
The State contends further that race does not have a prohibited effect on a district's lines if the legislature could have drawn the same lines in accordance with traditional criteria. That argument parallels the District Court's reasoning that a reapportionment plan is not an express racial classification unless a racial purpose is apparent from the face of the plan based on the irregular nature of the lines themselves.
See 141 F.Supp.3d, at 524-526. This is incorrect. The racial predominance inquiry concerns the actual considerations that provided the essential basis for the lines drawn, not post hoc justifications the legislature in theory could have used but in reality did not.
Traditional redistricting principles, moreover, are numerous and malleable. The District Court here identified no fewer than 11 race-neutral redistricting factors a legislature could consider, some of which are "surprisingly ethereal" and "admi[t] of degrees." Id., at 535, 537. By deploying those factors in various combinations and permutations, a State could construct a plethora of potential maps that look consistent with traditional, race-neutral principles. But if race for its own sake is the overriding reason for choosing one map over others, race still may predominate.
For these reasons, a conflict or inconsistency between the enacted plan and traditional redistricting criteria is not a threshold requirement or a mandatory precondition in order for a challenger to establish a claim of racial gerrymandering. Of course, a conflict or inconsistency may be persuasive circumstantial evidence tending to show racial predomination, but there is no rule requiring challengers to present this kind of evidence in every case.
As a practical matter, in many cases, perhaps most cases, challengers will be unable to prove an unconstitutional racial gerrymander without evidence that the enacted plan conflicts with traditional redistricting criteria. In general, legislatures that engage in impermissible race-based redistricting will find it necessary to depart from traditional principles in order to do so. And, in the absence of a conflict with traditional principles, it may be difficult for challengers to find other evidence sufficient to show that race was the overriding factor causing neutral considerations to be cast aside. In fact, this Court to date has not affirmed a predominance finding, or remanded a case for a determination of predominance, without evidence that some district lines deviated from traditional principles. See Alabama, 575 U.S., at ----, 135 S.Ct., at 1265-1266 ; Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 547, 119 S.Ct. 1545, 143 L.Ed.2d 731 (1999) ; Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 962, 966, 974, 116 S.Ct. 1941, 135 L.Ed.2d 248 (1996) (plurality opinion); Shaw II, supra, at 905-906, 116 S.Ct. 1894 ; Miller, supra, at 917, 115 S.Ct. 2475 ; Shaw I, supra, at 635-636, 113 S.Ct. 2816. Yet the law responds to proper evidence and valid inferences in ever-changing circumstances, as it learns more about ways in which its commands are circumvented. So there may be cases where challengers will be able to establish racial predominance in the absence of an actual conflict by presenting direct evidence of the legislative purpose and intent or other compelling circumstantial evidence.
B
The challengers submit that the District Court erred further when it considered the legislature's racial motive only to the extent that the challengers identified deviations from traditional redistricting criteria that were attributable to race and not to some other factor. In the challengers' view, this approach foreclosed a holistic analysis of each district and led the District Court to give insufficient weight to the 55% BVAP target and other relevant evidence that race predominated. Again, this Court agrees.
As explained, showing a deviation from, or conflict with, traditional redistricting principles is not a necessary prerequisite to establishing racial predominance. Supra, at 799. But even where a challenger alleges a conflict, or succeeds in showing one, the court should not confine its analysis to the conflicting portions of the lines. That is because the basic unit of analysis for racial gerrymandering claims in general, and for the racial predominance inquiry in particular, is the district. Racial gerrymandering claims proceed "district-by-district." Alabama, 575 U.S., at ----, 135 S.Ct., at 1265. "We have consistently described a claim of racial gerrymandering as a claim that race was improperly used in the drawing of the boundaries of one or more specific electoral districts." Ibid. And Miller's basic predominance test scrutinizes the legislature's motivation for placing "a significant number of voters within or without a particular district." 515 U.S., at 916, 115 S.Ct. 2475. Courts evaluating racial predominance therefore should not divorce any portion of the lines-whatever their relationship to traditional principles-from the rest of the district.
This is not to suggest that courts evaluating racial gerrymandering claims may not consider evidence pertaining to an area that is larger or smaller than the district at issue. The Court has recognized that "[v]oters, of course, can present statewide evidence in order to prove racial gerrymandering in a particular district." Alabama, supra, at ----, 135 S.Ct., at 1265 (emphasis deleted). Districts share borders, after all, and a legislature may pursue a common redistricting policy toward multiple districts. Likewise, a legislature's race-based decisionmaking may be evident in a notable way in a particular part of a district. It follows that a court may consider evidence regarding certain portions of a district's lines, including portions that conflict with traditional redistricting principles.
The ultimate object of the inquiry, however, is the legislature's predominant motive for the design of the district as a whole. A court faced with a racial gerrymandering claim therefore must consider all of the lines of the district at issue; any explanation for a particular portion of the lines, moreover, must take account of the districtwide context. Concentrating on particular portions in isolation may obscure the significance of relevant districtwide evidence, such as stark splits in the racial composition of populations moved into and out of disparate parts of the district, or the use of an express racial target. A holistic analysis is necessary to give that kind of evidence its proper weight.
C
The challengers ask this Court not only to correct the District Court's racial predominance standard but also to apply that standard and conclude that race in fact did predominate in the 11 districts where the District Court held that it did not. For its part, the State asks the Court to hold that, even if race did predominate in these districts, the State's predominant use of race was narrowly tailored to the compelling interest in complying with § 5.
The Court declines these requests. "[O]urs is a court of final review and not first view." Department of Transportation v. Association of American Railroads, 575 U.S. ----, ----, 135 S.Ct. 1225, 1234, 191 L.Ed.2d 153 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). The District Court is best positioned to determine in the first instance the extent to which, under the proper standard, race directed the shape of these 11 districts. And if race did predominate, it is proper for the District Court to determine in the first instance whether strict scrutiny is satisfied. These matters are left for the District Court on remand.
III
The Court now turns to the arguments regarding District 75. Where a challenger succeeds in establishing racial predominance, the burden shifts to the State to "demonstrate that its districting legislation is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling interest." Miller, supra, at 920, 115 S.Ct. 2475. The District Court here determined that the State's predominant use of race in District 75 was narrowly tailored to achieve compliance with § 5. The challengers contest the finding of narrow tailoring, but they do not dispute that compliance with § 5 was a compelling interest at the relevant time. As in previous cases, therefore, the Court assumes, without deciding, that the State's interest in complying with the Voting Rights Act was compelling. E.g., Alabama, supra, at ---- - ----, 135 S.Ct., at 1272-1274 ; Shaw II, 517 U.S., at 915, 116 S.Ct. 1894.
Turning to narrow tailoring, the Court explained the contours of that requirement in Alabama. When a State justifies the predominant use of race in redistricting on the basis of the need to comply with the Voting Rights Act, "the narrow tailoring requirement insists only that the legislature have a strong basis in evidence in support of the (race-based) choice that it has made." 575 U.S., at ----, 135 S.Ct., at 1274 (internal quotation marks omitted). That standard does not require the State to show that its action was "actually... necessary" to avoid a statutory violation, so that, but for its use of race, the State would have lost in court. Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, the requisite strong basis in evidence exists when the legislature has "good reasons to believe" it must use race in order to satisfy the Voting Rights Act, "even if a court does not find that the actions were necessary for statutory compliance." Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted).
The Court now finds no error in the District Court's conclusion that the State had sufficient grounds to determine that the race-based calculus it employed in District 75 was necessary to avoid violating § 5. As explained, § 5 at the time barred Virginia from adopting any districting change that would "have the effect of diminishing the ability of [members of a minority group] to elect their preferred candidates of choice." 52 U.S.C. § 10304(b). Determining what minority population percentage will satisfy that standard is a difficult task requiring, in the view of the Department of Justice, a "functional analysis of the electoral behavior within the particular... election district." Guidance Concerning Redistricting Under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 7471 (2011).
Under the facts found by the District Court, the legislature performed that kind of functional analysis of District 75 when deciding upon the 55% BVAP target. Redrawing this district presented a difficult task, and the result reflected the good-faith efforts of Delegate Jones and his colleagues to achieve an informed bipartisan consensus. Delegate Jones met with Delegate Tyler "probably half a dozen times to configure her district" in order to avoid retrogression. 141 F.Supp.3d, at 558 (internal quotation marks omitted). He discussed the district with incumbents from other majority-minority districts. He also considered turnout rates, the results of the recent contested primary and general elections in 2005, and the district's large population of disenfranchised black prisoners. The challengers, moreover, do not dispute that District 75 was an ability-to-elect district, or that white and black voters in the area tend to vote as blocs. See id., at 557-559. In light of Delegate Jones' careful assessment of local conditions and structures, the State had a strong basis in evidence to believe a 55% BVAP floor was required to avoid retrogression.
The challengers' responses ask too much from state officials charged with the sensitive duty of reapportioning legislative districts. First, the challengers contest the sufficiency of the evidence showing that Delegate Jones in fact performed a functional analysis, in part because that analysis was not memorialized in writing. But the District Court's factual findings are reviewed only for clear error. See Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 242, 121 S.Ct. 1452, 149 L.Ed.2d 430 (2001). The findings regarding how the legislature arrived at the 55% BVAP target are well supported, and "we do not... require States engaged in redistricting to compile a comprehensive administrative record." Vera, 517 U.S., at 966, 116 S.Ct. 1941 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The challengers argue further that the drafters of the plan had insufficient evidence to justify a 55% BVAP floor. The 2005 elections were idiosyncratic, the challengers contend; moreover, demographic information about the prison in the district is absent from the record, and Delegate Tyler's perspective was influenced by a personal interest in reelection. That may have been so, and for those reasons, it is possible that, if the State had drawn District 75 with a BVAP below 55% and had sought judicial preclearance, a court would have found no § 5 violation. But that is not the question here. "The law cannot insist that a state legislature, when redistricting, determine precisely what percent minority population § 5 demands." Alabama, 575 U.S., at ----, 135 S.Ct., at 1273. The question is whether the State had "good reasons " to believe a 55% BVAP floor was necessary to avoid liability under § 5. Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). The State did have good reasons under these circumstances. Holding otherwise would afford state legislatures too little breathing room, leaving them "trapped between the competing hazards of liability" under the Voting Rights Act and the Equal Protection Clause. Vera, supra, at 977, 116 S.Ct. 1941 (internal quotation marks omitted).
As a final point, the challengers liken the 55% BVAP floor here to the "mechanically numerical view" of § 5 this Court rejected in Alabama. 575 U.S., at ----, 135 S.Ct., at 1273. But Alabama did not condemn the use of BVAP targets to comply with § 5 in every instance. Rather, this Court corrected the "misperception" that § 5 required a State to "maintai[n] the same population percentages in majority-minority districts as in the prior plan." Id., at ---- - ----, 135 S.Ct., at 1273. "[I]t would seem highly unlikely," the Court explained, that reducing a district's BVAP "from, say, 70% to 65% would have a significant impact on the black voters' ability to elect their preferred candidate." Id., at ----, 135 S.Ct., at 1273. Yet reducing the BVAP below 55% well might have that effect in some cases. The record here supports the legislature's conclusion that this was one instance where a 55% BVAP was necessary for black voters to have a functional working majority.
IV
The Court's holding in this case is controlled by precedent. The Court reaffirms the basic racial predominance analysis explained in Miller and Shaw II, and the basic narrow tailoring analysis explained in Alabama. The District Court's judgment as to District 75 is consistent with these principles. Applying these principles to the remaining 11 districts is entrusted to the District Court in the first instance.
The judgment of the District Court is affirmed in part and vacated in part. The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice ALITO, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
I join the opinion of the Court insofar as it upholds the constitutionality of District 75. Ante, at 800 - 802. The districting plan at issue here was adopted prior to our decision in Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. ----, 133 S.Ct. 2612, 186 L.Ed.2d 651 (2013), and therefore it is appropriate to apply the body of law in effect at that time. What is more, appellants have never contested the District Court's holding that compliance with § 5 of the Voting Rights Act was a compelling government interest for covered jurisdictions before our decision in Shelby County. See 141 F.Supp.3d 505, 545-547 (E.D.Va.2015).
I concur in the judgment of the Court insofar as it vacates and remands the judgment below with respect to all the remaining districts. Unlike the Court, however, I would hold that all these districts must satisfy strict scrutiny. See post, at 803 - 804 (THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part); see also League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 517, 126 S.Ct. 2594, 165 L.Ed.2d 609 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("[W]hen a legislature intentionally creates a majority-minority district, race is necessarily its predominant motivation and strict scrutiny is therefore triggered").
Justice THOMAS, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part.
Appellants contend that 12 of Virginia's state legislative districts are unconstitutional racial gerrymanders. The three-judge District Court rejected their challenge, holding that race was not the legislature's predominant motive in drawing 11 of the districts and that the remaining district survives strict scrutiny. I would reverse the District Court as to all 12 districts. I therefore concur in the judgment in part and dissent in part.
I
I concur in the Court's judgment reversing the District Court's decision to uphold 11 of the 12 districts at issue in this case-House Districts 63, 69, 70, 71, 74, 77, 80, 89, 90, 92, and 95. I do not agree, however, with the Court's decision to leave open the question whether race predominated in those districts and, thus, whether they are subject to strict scrutiny. Ante, at 800 - 801. Appellees (hereinafter State) concede that the legislature intentionally drew all 12 districts as majority-black districts. See, e.g., Brief for Appellees 1 ("[T]he legislature sought to achieve a [black voting-age population] of at least 55% in adjusting the lines of the 12 majority-minority districts"). That concession, in my view, mandates strict scrutiny
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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B
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Me. Chief Justice Buegek
delivered the opinion of the Court.
We granted certiorari to determine whether the courts of an asylum state may nullify the executive grant of extradition on the ground that the demanding state failed to show a factual basis for its charge supported by probable cause. 435 U. S. 967 (1978).
(1)
On December 18, 1975, Doran was arrested in Michigan and charged with receiving and concealing stolen property. Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.535 (1970). The charge rested on Doran’s possession of a stolen truck bearing California license plates, which he had driven from Arizona. Michigan notified Arizona authorities of Doran’s arrest and sent them a photograph of Doran taken on the day of his arrest. On January 7, 1976, a sworn complaint was filed with an Arizona Justice of the Peace, charging Doran with the theft of the described motor vehicle, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-661 to 13-663, 13-672 (A) (Supp. 1957-1977), or, alternatively, with theft by embezzlement, § 13-682 (Supp. 1957-1977). The Justice of the Peace issued an arrest warrant which stated that she had found “reasonable cause to believe that such offense(s) were committed and that [Doran] committed them . . . .”
While the Michigan charges were pending, Doran was arraigned in Michigan on January 12 as a fugitive. A magistrate extended Doran’s detention as a fugitive to provide time to receive the expected request for extradition from Arizona. On February 11 the Governor of Arizona issued a requisition for extradition. Attached to the requisition were the arrest warrant, two supporting affidavits, and the original complaint on which the charge was based. The Governor of Michigan issued a warrant for Doran’s arrest and his extradition was ordered.
Doran was arraigned on the Michigan warrant on March 29. He then petitioned the arraigning court for a writ of habeas corpus, contending that the extradition warrant was invalid because it did not comply with the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act. Mich Comp. Laws §§ 780.1 to 780.31 (1970). Cf. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-1301 to 13-1328 (Supp. 1957-1977). The court twice denied a writ of habeas corpus; the Michigan Court of Appeals denied an application for leave to appeal and dismissed Doran’s complaint for habeas corpus. People v. Doran, Nos. 28507 (May 4, 1976) and 30516 (Nov. 22, 1976). The Michigan Supreme Court, however, granted leave to appeal the denial of the first habeas corpus petition. People v. Doran, 397 Mich. 886 (1976). On review, the court reversed the trial court's order and mandated Doran’s immediate release. In re Doran, 401 Mich. 235, 258 N. W. 2d 406, rehearing denied, 402 Mich. 951 (1977).
(2)
The Michigan Supreme Court reasoned that because a significant impairment of liberty occurred whenever a person was arrested in one state and extradited to another that impairment must be preceded by a showing of probable cause to believe that the fugitive had committed a crime. In addition to relying on Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103 (1975), the court found support for its conclusion in § 3 of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, Mich. Comp. Laws § 780.3 (1970), which requires that an affidavit must “substantially charge” the fugitive with having committed a crime under the law of the demanding state. That court construed “substantially charge” to mean there must be a showing of probable cause.
The essence of the holding of the Supreme Court of Michigan is that the courts of an asylum state may review the action of the governor and in that process re-examine the factual basis for the finding of probable cause which accompanies the requisition from the demanding state. The court concluded:
“In the case at bar, there is no indictment or document reflecting a prior judicial determination of probable cause. The Arizona complaint and arrest warrant are both phrased in conclusory language which simply mirrors the language of the pertinent Arizona statutes. More importantly, the two supporting affidavits fail to set out facts which could justify a Fourth Amendment finding of probable cause for charging [Doran] with a crime.” 401 Mich., at 240-242, 258 N. W. 2d, at 408-409 (footnote omitted).
The Michigan court assumed that arrest warrants could be issued in Arizona without a preliminary showing of probable cause since this was said to happen often in Michigan. In that court’s view, neither the complaint which generated the Arizona charge, the affidavits in support of the Arizona arrest warrant, nor the recitals of the Arizona judicial officer set out sufficient facts to show probable cause. We disagree and we reverse.
(3)
We turn to the question of the power of the courts of an asylum state to review the finding of probable cause made by a judicial officer in the demanding state. Article IV, § 2, cl. 2, of the United States Constitution on the subject of extradition is clear and explicit:
“A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on Demand of the executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime.”
To implement this provision of the Constitution, see Innes v. Tobin, 240 U. S. 127, 131 (1916); Trigg v. Pennsylvania, 16 Pet. 639, 617 (1842), Congress has provided:
“Whenever the executive authority of any State or Territory demands any person as a fugitive from justice, of the executive authority of any State, District or Territory to which such person has fled, and produces a copy of an indictment found or an affidavit made before a magistrate of any State or Territory, charging the person demanded with having committed treason, felony, or other crime, certified as authentic by the governor or chief magistrate of the State or Territory from whence the person so charged has fled, the executive authority of the State, District or Territory to which such person has fled shall cause him to be arrested and secured, and notify the executive authority making such demand, or the agent of such authority appointed to receive the fugitive, and shall cause the fugitive to be delivered to such agent when he shall appear.” 18 U. S. C. § 3182 (emphasis added).
The Extradition Clause was intended to enable each state to bring offenders to trial as swiftly as possible in the state where the alleged offense was committed. Biddinger v. Commissioner of Police, 245 IT. S. 128, 132-133 (1917); Appleyard v. Massachusetts, 203 U. S. 222, 227 (1906). The purpose of the Clause was to preclude any state from becoming a sanctuary for fugitives from justice of another state and thus “balkanize” the administration of criminal justice among the several states. It articulated, in mandatory language, the concepts of comity and full faith and credit, found in the immediately preceding clause of Art. IV. The Extradition Clause, like the Commerce Clause, served important national objectives of a newly developing country striving to foster national unity. Compare Biddinger, supra, with McLeod v. Dilworth Co., 322 U. S. 327, 330 (1944). In the administration of justice, no less than in trade and commerce, national unity was thought to be served by de-emphasizing state lines for certain purposes, without impinging on essential state autonomy.
Interstate extradition was intended to be a summary and mandatory executive proceeding derived from the language of Art. IV, § 2, cl. 2, of the Constitution. Biddinger, supra, at 132; In re Strauss, 197 U. S. 324, 332 (1905); R. Hurd, A Treatise on the Right of Personal Liberty and the Writ of Habeas Corpus 598 (1858). The Clause never contemplated that the asylum state was to conduct the kind of preliminary inquiry traditionally intervening between the initial arrest and trial.
Near the turn of the century this Court, after acknowledging the possibility that persons may give false information to the police or prosecutors and that a prosecuting attorney may act “either wantonly or ignorantly,” concluded:
“While courts will always endeavor to see that no such attempted wrong is successful, on the other hand, care must be taken that the process of extradition be not so burdened as to make it practically valueless. It is but one step in securing the presence of the defendant in the court in which he may be tried, and in no manner determines the question of guilt.” In re Strauss, supra, at 332-333.
Whatever the scope of discretion vested in the governor of an asylum state, cf. Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66, 107 (1861), the courts of an asylum state are bound by Art. IV, § 2, cf. Compton v. Alabama, 214 U. S. 1, 8 (1909), by § 3182, and, where adopted, by the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act. A governor’s grant of extradition is prima facie evidence that the constitutional and statutory requirements have been met. Cf. Bassing v. Cady, 208 U. S. 386, 392 (1908). Once the governor has granted extradition, a court considering release on habeas corpus can do no more than decide (a) whether the extradition documents on their face are in order; (b) whether the petitioner has been charged with a crime in the demanding state; (c) whether the petitioner is the person named in the request for extradition; and (d) whether the petitioner is a fugitive. These are historic facts readily verifiable.
Under Arizona law, felony prosecutions may be commenced either by an indictment or by filing a complaint before a judicial officer. Ariz. Rule Crim. Proc. 2.2 (1973). The magistrate or justice of the peace before whom the criminal charge is filed must issue an arrest warrant if it is determined that there is reasonable cause to believe that an offense has been committed. The inquiry the judicial officer is required to make is directed at the traditional determination of reasonable grounds or probable cause. Erdman v. Superior Court, 102 Ariz. 524, 433 P. 2d 972 (1967); State v. Currier, 86 Ariz. 394, 347 P. 2d 29 (1959). Here the Justice of the Peace in Arizona, having the complaint at hand, issued the warrant for Doran’s arrest after concluding that there was “reasonable cause to believe that such offense(s) were committed and that the accused committed them.”
The Supreme Court of Michigan, however, held that the conclusion was deficient because it did not recite the factual basis for the determination made by the Arizona judicial officer. This holding finds no support in the record read in the light of the mandatory provisions of Art. IV, § 2, cl. 2, and Arizona law. Moreover it overlooks the “conclusory language” in which criminal charges are ordinarily cast whether by indictment or otherwise. Cf. Ex parte Reggel, 114 U. S. 642, 651 (1885).
Under Art. IV, § 2, the courts of the asylum state are bound to accept the demanding state’s judicial determination since the proceedings of the demanding state are clothed with the traditional presumption of regularity. In short, when a neutral judicial officer of the demanding state has determined that probable cause exists, the courts of the asylum state are without power to review the determination. Section 2, cl. 2, of Art. IV, its companion clause in § 1, and established principles of comity merge to support this conclusion. To allow plenary review in the asylum state of issues that can be fully litigated in the charging state would defeat the plain purposes of the summary and mandatory procedures authorized by Art. IV, § 2. See, e. g., Sweeney v. Woodall, 344 U. S. 86, 90 (1952); Marbles v. Creecy, 215 U. S. 63, 69-70 (1909); Pierce v. Creecy, 210 U. S. 387, 404-405 (1908).
We hold that once the governor of the asylum state has acted on a requisition for extradition based on the demanding state’s judicial determination that probable cause existed, no further judicial inquiry may be had on that issue in the asylum state.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Michigan Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
Michigan dismissed its criminal charges against Doran on February 9 in deference to the extradition on charges pending in Arizona.
At 'the time of his release, Doran had been in custody for 18 months in Michigan pending the extradition proceedings and his challenge to them. Doran’s counsel moved to dismiss certiorari in this Court on the ground of mootness due to her inability to locate him in Michigan. That motion is denied. Cf. Eagles v. United States ex rel. Samuels, 329 U. S. 304, 306-308 (1946).
In Gerstein we held that “the Fourth Amendment requires a judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended restraint of liberty following arrest.” 420 U. S., at 114. Because Arizona provided a judicial determination of probable cause for the arrest warrant, we need not decide whether the criminal charge on which extradition is requested must recite that it was based on a finding of probable cause.
These terms appear to derive from language in Munsey v. Clough, 196 U. S. 364, 373 (1905): “If it appear that the indictment substantially charges an offense for which the person may be returned to the State for trial, it is enough for this [extradition] proceeding.” See also Pearce v. Texas, 155 U. S. 311, 313 (1894); Uniform Criminal Extradition Act §3, 11 U. L. A. 93 (1974).
See, e. g., Kirkland, v. Preston, 128 U. S. App. D. C. 148, 385 F. 2d 670 (1967).
Section 3182 remains virtually unchanged from the original version enacted in 1793. 1 Stat. 302. See also Rev. Stat. § 5278; 18 U. S. C. §662 (1940 ed.).
The Arizona justice of the peace may, if necessary, subpoena additional witnesses before issuing a warrant. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 22-311 (1975); Ariz. Rules Crim. Proc. 2.4, 3.1, 3.2 (1973 and Supp. 1978-1979). The Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure require that on a finding of probable cause the judicial officer shall issue a warrant reciting the information on which it is based. Rules 3.1 and 3.2 (1973).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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A
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Harlan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
These cases stem from proceedings conducted by the Federal Communications Commission after requests by Midwest Television for relief under §§ 74.1107 and 74.1109 of the rules promulgated by the Commission for the regulation of community antenna television (CATV) systems. Midwest averred that respondents’ CATV systems transmitted the signals of Los Angeles broadcasting stations into the San Diego area, and thereby had, inconsistently with the public interest, adversely affected Midwest’s San Diego station. Midwest sought an appropriate order limiting the carriage of such signals by respondents’ systems. After consideration of the petition and of various responsive pleadings, the Commission restricted the expansion of respondents’ service in areas in which they had not operated on February 15, 1966, pending hearings to be conducted on the merits of Midwest’s complaints. 4 F. C. C. 2d 612. On petitions for review, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the Commission lacks authority under the Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1064, 47 U. S. C. § 151, to issue such an order. 378 F. 2d 118. We granted certiorari to consider this important question of regulatory authority. 389 U. S. 911. For reasons that follow, we reverse.
I.
CATV systems receive the signals of television broadcasting stations, amplify them, transmit them by cable or microwave, and ultimately distribute them by wire to the receivers of their subscribers. CATV systems characteristically do not produce their own programming, and do not recompense producers or broadcasters for use of the programming which they receive and redistribute. Unlike ordinary broadcasting stations, CATV systems commonly charge their subscribers installation and other fees.
The CATV industry has grown rapidly since the establishment of the first commercial system in 1950. In the late 1950’s, some 50 new systems were established each year; by 1959, there were 550 “nationally known and identified” systems serving a total audience of 1,500,000 to 2,000,000 persons. It has been more recently estimated that “new systems are being founded at the rate of more than one per day, and... subscribers... signed on at the rate of 15,000 per month.” By late 1965, it was reported that there were 1,847 operating CATY systems, that 758 others were franchised but not yet in operation, and that there were 938 applications for additional franchises. The statistical evidence is incomplete, but, as the Commission has observed, “whatever the estimate, CATY growth is clearly explosive in nature.” Second Report and Order, 2 F. C. C. 2d 725, 738, n. 15.
CATV systems perform either or both of two functions. First, they may supplement broadcasting by facilitating satisfactory reception of local stations in adjacent areas in which such reception would not otherwise be possible; and second, they may transmit to subscribers the signals of distant stations entirely beyond the range of local antennae. As the number and size of CATV systems have increased, their principal function has more frequently become the importation of distant signals. In 1959, only 50 systems employed microwave relays, and the maximum distance over which signals were transmitted was 300 miles; by 1964, 250 systems used microwave, and the transmission distances sometimes exceeded 665 miles. First Report and Order, 38 F. C. C. 683, 709. There are evidently now plans “to carry the programing of New York City independent stations by cable to... upstate New York, to Philadelphia, and even as far as Dayton.” And see Chan nel 9 Syracuse, Inc. v. F. C. C., 128 U. S. App. D. C. 187, 385 F. 2d 969; Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc. v. F. C. C., 128 U. S. App. D. C. 197, 385 F. 2d 979. Thus, “while the CATV industry originated in sparsely settled areas and areas of adverse terrain... it is now spreading to metropolitan centers....” First Report and Order, supra, at 709. CATV systems, formerly no more than local auxiliaries to broadcasting, promise for the future to provide a national communications system, in which signals from selected broadcasting centers would be transmitted to metropolitan areas throughout the country.
The Commission has on various occasions attempted to assess the relationship between community antenna television systems and its conceded regulatory functions. In 1959, it completed an extended investigation of several auxiliary broadcasting services, including CATV. CATV and TV Repeater Services, 26 F. C. C. 403. Although it found that CATV is “related to interstate transmission,” the Commission reasoned that CATV systems are neither common carriers nor broadcasters, and therefore are within neither of the principal regulatory categories created by the Communications Act. Id., at 427-428. The Commission declared that it had not been given plenary authority over “any and all enterprises which happen to be connected with one of the many aspects of communications.” Id., at 429. It refused to premise regulation of CATV upon assertedly adverse consequences for broadcasting, because it could not “determine where the impact takes effect, although we recognize that it may well exist.” Id., at 431.
The Commission instead declared that it would forthwith seek appropriate legislation “to clarify the situation.” Id., at 438. Such legislation was introduced in the Senate in 1959, favorably reported, and debated on the Senate floor. The bill was, however, ultimately returned to committee.
Despite its inability to obtain amendatory legislation, the Commission has, since 1960, gradually asserted jurisdiction over CATV. It first placed restrictions upon the activities of common carrier microwave facilities that serve CATV systems. See Carter Mountain Transmission Corp., 32 F. C. C. 459, aff’d, 321 F. 2d 359. Finally, the Commission in 1962 conducted a rule-making proceeding in which it re-evaluated the significance of CATV for its. regulatory responsibilities. First Order and Report, supra. The proceeding was explicitly restricted to those systems that are served by microwave, but the Commission's conclusions plainly were more widely relevant. The Commission found that “the likelihood or probability of [CATV’s] adverse impact upon potential and existing service has become too substantial to be dismissed.” Id., at 713-714. It reasoned that the importation of distant signals into the service areas of local stations necessarily creates “substantial competition” for local broadcasting. Id., at 707. The Commission acknowledged that it could not “measure precisely the degree of... impact,” but found that “CATV competition can have a substantial negative effect upon station audience and revenues....” Id., at 710-711.
The Commission attempted to “accommodat[e]” the interests of CATV and of local broadcasting by the imposition of two rules. Id., at 713. First, CATV systems were required to transmit to their subscribers the signals of any station into whose service area they have brought competing signals. Second, CATV systems were forbidden to duplicate the programming of such local stations for periods of 15 days before and after a local broadcast. See generally First Report and Order, supra, at 719-730. These carriage and nonduplication rules were expected to “insur[e] many stations’ ability to maintain themselves as their areas’ outlets for highly popular network and other programs....” Id., at 715.
The Commission in 1965 issued additional notices of inquiry and proposed rule-making, by which it sought to determine whether all forms of CATV, including those served only by cable, could properly be regulated under the Communications Act. 1 F. C. C. 2d 453. After further hearings, the Commission held that the Act confers adequate regulatory authority over all CATV systems. Second Report and Order, supra, at 728-734. It promulgated revised rules, applicable both to cable and to microwave CATV systems, to govern the carriage of local signals and the nonduplication of local programming. Further, the Commission forbade the importation by CATV of distant signals into the 100 largest television markets, except insofar as such service was offered on February 15, 1966, unless the Commission has previously found that it “would be consistent with the public interest,” id., at 782; see generally id., at 781-785, “particularly the establishment and healthy maintenance of television broadcast service in the area,” 47 CFR § 74.1107 (c). Finally, the Commission created “summary, nonhearing procedures” for the disposition of applications for separate or additional relief. 2 F. C. C. 2d, at 764; 47 CFR § 74.1109. Thirteen days after the Commission’s adoption of the Second Report, Midwest initiated these proceedings by the submission of its petition for special relief.
II.
We must first emphasize that questions as to the validity of the specific rules promulgated by the Commission for the regulation of CATY are not now before the Court. The issues in these cases are only two: whether the Commission has authority under the Communications Act to regulate CATV systems, and, if it has, whether it has, in addition, authority to issue the prohibitory order here in question.
The Commission’s authority to regulate broadcasting and other communications is derived from the Communications Act of 1934, as amended. The Act’s provisions are explicitly applicable to “all interstate and foreign communication by wire or radio....” 47 U. S. C. § 152 (a). The Commission’s responsibilities are no more narrow: it is required to endeavor to “make available... to all the people of the United States a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio communication service....” 47 U. S. C. § 151. The Commission was expected to serve as the “single Government agency” with “unified jurisdiction” and “regulatory power over all forms of electrical communication, whether by telephone, telegraph, cable, or radio.” It was for this purpose given “broad authority.” As this Court emphasized in an earlier case, the Act’s terms, purposes, and history all indicate that Congress “formulated a unified and comprehensive regulatory system for the [broadcasting] industry.” F. C. C. v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U. S. 134, 137.
Respondents do not suggest that CATV systems are not within the term “communication by wire or radio.” Indeed, such communications are defined by the Act so as to encompass “the transmission of... signals, pictures, and sounds of all kinds,” whether by radio or cable, “including all instrumentalities, facilities, apparatus, and services (among other things, the receipt, forwarding, and delivery of communications) incidental to such transmission.” 47 U. S. C. §§ 153 (a), (b). These very general terms amply suffice to reach respondents' activities.
Nor can we doubt that CATV systems are engaged in interstate communication, even where, as here, the intercepted signals emanate from stations located within the same State in which the CATY system operates. We may take notice that television broadcasting consists in very large part of programming devised for, and distributed to, national audiences; respondents thus are ordinarily employed in the simultaneous retransmission of communications that have very often originated in other States. The stream of communication is essentially uninterrupted and properly indivisible. To categorize respondents’ activities as intrastate would disregard the character of the television industry, and serve merely to prevent the national regulation that “is not only appropriate but essential to the efficient use of radio facilities.” Federal Radio Comm’n v. Nelson Bros. Co., 289 U. S. 266, 279.
Nonetheless, respondents urge that the Communications Act, properly understood, does not permit the regulation of CATV systems. First, they emphasize that the Commission in 1969 and again in 1966 sought legislation that would have explicitly authorized such regulation, and that its efforts were unsuccessful. In the circumstances here, however, this cannot be dispositive. The Commission’s requests for legislation evidently reflected in each instance both its uncertainty as to the proper width of its authority and its understandable preference for more detailed policy guidance than the Communications Act now provides. We have recognized that administrative agencies should, in such situations, be encouraged to seek from Congress clarification of the pertinent statutory provisions. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U. S. 33, 47.
Nor can we obtain significant assistance from the various expressions of congressional opinion that followed the Commission’s requests. In the first place, the views of one Congress as to the construction of a statute adopted many years before by another Congress have “very little, if any, significance.” Rainwater v. United States, 356 U. S. 590, 593; United States v. Price, 361 U. S. 304, 313; Haynes v. United States, 390 U. S. 85, 87, n. 4. Further, it is far from clear that Congress believed, as it considered these requests for legislation, that the Commission did not already possess regulatory authority over CATV. In 1959, the proposed legislation was preceded by the Commission’s declarations that it “did not intend to regulate CATV,” and that it preferred to recommend the adoption of legislation that would impose specified requirements upon CATV systems. Congress may well have been more troubled by the Commission’s unwillingness to regulate than by any fears that it was unable to regulate. In 1966, the Commission informed Congress that it desired legislation in order to “confirm [its] jurisdiction and to establish such basic national policy as [Congress] deems appropriate.” H. R. Rep. No. 1635, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 16. In response, the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce said merely that it did not “either agree or disagree” with the jurisdictional conclusions of the Second Report, and that “the question of whether or not... the Commission has authority under present law to regulate CATV systems is for the courts to decide....” Id., at 9. In these circumstances, we cannot derive from the Commission’s requests for legislation anything of significant bearing on the construction question now before us.
Second, respondents urge that § 152 (a) does not independently confer regulatory authority upon the Commission, but instead merely prescribes the forms of communication to which the Act's other provisions may separately be made applicable. Respondents emphasize that the Commission does not contend either that CATY systems are common carriers, and thus within Title II of the Act, or that they are broadcasters, and thus within Title III. They conclude that CATV, with certain of the characteristics both of. broadcasting and of common carriers, but with all of the characteristics of neither, eludes altogether the Act’s grasp.
We cannot construe the Act so restrictively. Nothing in the language of § 152 (a), in the surrounding language, or in the Act’s history or purposes limits the Commission’s authority to those activities and forms of communication that are specifically described by the Act’s other provisions. The section itself states merely that the “provisions of [the Act] shall apply to all interstate and foreign communication by wire or radio....” Similarly, the legislative history indicates that the Commission was given “regulatory power over all forms of electrical communication....” S. Rep. No. 781, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 1. Certainly Congress could not in 1934 have foreseen the development of community antenna television systems, but it seems to us that it was precisely because Congress wished “to maintain, through appropriate administrative control, a grip on the dynamic aspects of radio transmission,” F. C. C. v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., supra, at 138, that it conferred upon the Commission a “unified jurisdiction” and “broad authority.” Thus, “ [underlying the whole [Communications Act] is recognition of the rapidly fluctuating factors characteristic of the evolution of broadcasting and of the corresponding requirement that the administrative process possess sufficient flexibility to adjust itself to these factors.” F. C. C. v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., supra, at 138. Congress in 1934 acted in a field that was demonstrably “both new and dynamic,” and it therefore gave the Commission “a comprehensive mandate,” with “not niggardly but expansive powers.” National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U. S. 190, 219. We have found no reason to believe that § 152 does not, as its terms suggest, confer regulatory authority over “all interstate... communication by wire or radio.”
Moreover, the Commission has reasonably concluded that regulatory authority over CATV is imperative if it is to perform with appropriate effectiveness certain of its other responsibilities. Congress has imposed upon the Commission the “obligation of providing a widely dispersed radio and television service,” with a “fair, efficient, and equitable distribution” of service among the “several States and communities.” 47 U. S. C. § 307 (b). The Commission has, for this and other purposes, been granted authority to allocate broadcasting zones or areas, and to provide regulations “as it may deem necessary” to prevent interference among the various stations. 47 U. S. C. §§ 303 (f), (h). The Commission has concluded, and Congress has agreed, that these obligations require for their satisfaction the creation of a system of local broadcasting stations, such that “all communities of appreciable size [will] have at least one television station as an outlet for local self-expression.” In turn, the Commission has held that an appropriate system of local broadcasting may be created only if two subsidiary goals are realized. First, significantly wider use must be made of the available ultra-high-frequency channels. Second, communities must be encouraged “to launch sound and adequate programs to utilize the television channels now reserved for educational purposes.” These subsidiary-goals have received the endorsement of Congress.
The Commission has reasonably found that the achievement of each of these purposes is “placed in jeopardy by the unregulated explosive growth of CATV.” H. R. Rep. No. 1635, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 7. Although CATV may in some circumstances make possible “the realization of some of the [Commission’s] most important goals,” First Report and Order, supra, at 699, its importation of distant signals into the service areas of local stations may also “destroy or seriously degrade the service offered by a television broadcaster,” id,., at 700, and thus ultimately deprive the public of the various benefits of a system of local broadcasting stations. In particular, the Commission feared that CATY might, by dividing the available audiences and revenues, significantly magnify the characteristically serious financial difficulties of TJHF and educational television broadcasters. The Commission acknowledged that it could not predict with certainty the consequences of unregulated CATV, but reasoned that its statutory responsibilities demand that it “plan in advance of foreseeable events, instead of waiting to react to them.” Id., at 701. We are aware that these consequences have been variously estimated, but must conclude that there is substantial evidence that the Commission cannot “discharge its overall responsibilities without authority ovér this important aspect of television service.” Staff of Senate Comm, on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., The Television Inquiry: The Problem of Television Service for Smaller Communities 19 (Comm. Print 1959).
The Commission has been charged with broad responsibilities for the orderly development of an appropriate system of local television broadcasting. The significance of its efforts can scarcely be exaggerated, for broadcasting is demonstrably a principal source of information and entertainment for a great part of the Nation’s population. The Commission has reasonably found that the successful performance of these duties demands prompt and efficacious regulation of community antenna television systems. We have elsewhere held.that we may not, “in the absence of compelling evidence that such was Congress’ intention... prohibit administrative action imperative for the achievement of an agency’s ultimate purposes.” Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U. S. 747, 780. Compare National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, supra, at 219-220; American Trucking Assns. v. United States, 344 U. S. 298, 311. There is no such evidence here, and we therefore hold that the Commission’s authority over “all interstate... communication by wire or radio” permits the regulation of CATV systems.
There is no need here to determine in detail the limits of the Commission’s authority to regulate CATV. It is enough to emphasize that the authority which we recognize today under § 152 (a) is restricted to that reasonably ancillary to the effective performance of the Commission’s various responsibilities for the regulation of television broadcasting. The Commission may, for these purposes, issue “such rules and regulations and prescribe such restrictions and conditions, not inconsistent with law,” as “public convenience, interest, or necessity requires.” 47 U. S. C. § 303 (r). We express no views as to the Commission’s authority, if any, to regulate CATV under any other circumstances or for any other purposes.
III.
We must next determine whether the Commission has authority under the Communications Act to issue the particular prohibitory order in question in these proceedings. In its Second Report and Order, supra, the Commission concluded that it should provide summary procedures for the disposition both of requests for special relief and of “complaints or disputes.” Id., at 764. It feared that if evidentiary hearings were in every situation mandatory they would prove “time consuming and burdensome” to the CATV systems and broadcasting stations involved. Ibid. The Commission considered that appropriate notice and opportunities for comment or objection must be given, and it declared that “additional procedures, such as oral argument, evidentiary hearing, or further written submissions” would be permitted "if they appear necessary or appropriate....” Ibid. See 47 CFR § 74.1109 (f). It was under the authority of these provisions that Midwest sought, and the Commission granted, temporary relief.
The Commission, after examination of various responsive pleadings but without prior hearings, ordered that respondents generally restrict their carriage of Los An-geles signals to areas served by them on February 15, 1966, pending hearings to determine whether the carriage of such signals into San Diego contravenes the public interest. The order does not prohibit the addition of new subscribers within areas served by respondents on February 15, 1966; it does not prevent service to other subscribers who began receiving service or who submitted an “accepted subscription request” between February 15, 1966, and the date of the Commission’s order; and it does not preclude the carriage of San Diego and Tijuana, Mexico, signals to subscribers in new areas of service. 4 F. C. C. 2d 612, 624-625. The order is thus designed simply to preserve the situation as it existed at the moment of its issuance.
Respondents urge that the Commission may issue prohibitory orders only under the authority of § 312 (b), by which the Commission is empowered to issue cease-and-desist orders. We shall assume that, consistent with the requirements of § 312 (c), cease-and-desist orders are proper only after hearing or waiver of the right to hearing. Nonetheless, the requirement does not invalidate the order issued in this case, for we have concluded that the provisions of §§312 (b), '(c) are inapplicable here. Section 312 (b) provides that a cease-and-desist order may issue only if the respondent “has violated or failed to observe” a provision of the Communications Act or a rule or regulation promulgated by the Commission under the Act’s authority. Respondents here were not found to have violated or to have failed to observe any such restriction; the question before the Commission was instead only whether an existing situation should be preserved pending a determination “whether respondents’ present or planned CATV operations are consistent with the public interest and what, if any, action should be taken by the Commission.” 4 F. C. C. 2d, at 626. The Commission’s order was thus not, in form or function, a cease-and-desist order that must issue under §§312 (b), (c).
The Commission has acknowledged that, in this area of rapid and significant change, there may be situations in which its generalized regulations are inadequate, and special or additional forms of relief are imperative. It has found that the present case may prove to be such a situation, and that the public interest demands “interim relief... limiting further expansion,” pending hearings to determine appropriate Commission action. Such orders do not exceed the Commission’s authority. This Court has recognized that “the administrative process [must] possess sufficient flexibility to adjust itself” to the “dynamic aspects of radio transmission,” F. C. C. v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., supra, at 138, and that it was precisely for that reason that Congress declined to “stereo-typ[e] the powers of the Commission to specific details....” National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, supra, at 219. And compare American Trucking Assns. v. United States, 344 U. S. 298, 311; R. A. Holman & Co. v. S. E. C., 112 U. S. App. D. C. 43, 47-48, 299 F. 2d 127, 131-132. Thus, the Commission has been explicitly authorized to issue “such orders, not inconsistent with this [Act], as may be necessary in the execution of its functions.” 47 U. S. C. § 154 (i). See also 47 U. S. C. § 303 (r). In these circumstances, we hold that the Commission’s order limiting further expansion of respondents’ service pending appropriate hearings did not exceed or abuse its authority under the Communications Act. And there is no claim that its procedure in this respect is in any way constitutionally infirm.
The judgments of the Court of Appeals are reversed, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. R ü s0 orderefL
Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases.
Midwest’s petition was premised upon its status as licensee of KFMB-TV, San Diego, California. It is evidently also the licensee of various other broadcasting stations. See Second Report and Order, 2 F. C. C. 2d 725, 739.
47 CFR § 74.1107 (a) provides that “[n]o CATV system operating in a community within the predicted Grade A contour of a television broadcast station in the 100 largest television markets shall extend the signal of a television broadcast station beyond the Grade B contour of that station, except upon a showing approved by the Commission that such extension would be consistent with the public interest, and specifically the establishment and healthy maintenance of television broadcast service in the area. Commission approval of a request to extend a signal in the foregoing circumstances will be granted where the Commission, after consideration of the request and all related materials in a full evidentiary hearing, determines that the requisite showing has been made. The market size shall be determined by the rating of the American Research Bureau, on the basis of the net weekly circulation for the most recent year.” San Diego is the Nation’s 54th largest television market. Midwest Television, Inc., 11 Pike & Fischer Radio Reg. 2d 273, 276.
47 CFR § 74.1109 creates “procedures applicable to petitions for waiver of the rules, additional or different requirements and rulings on complaints or disputes.” It provides that petitions for special relief “may be submitted informally, by letter, but shall be accompanied by an affidavit of service on any CATV system, station licensee, permittee, applicant, or other interested person who may be directly affected if the relief requested in the petition should be granted.” 47 CFR §74.1109 (b). Provisions are made for comments or opposition to the petition, and for rejoinders by the petitioner. 47 CFR §§74.1109 (d), (e). Finally, the Commission “may specify other procedures, such as oral argument, evidentiary hearing, or further written submissions directed to particular aspects, as it deems appropriate.” 47 CFR §74.1109 (f).
Midwest asserted that respondents’ importation of Los Angeles signals had fragmented the San Diego audience, that this would reduce the advertising revenues of local, stations, and that the ultimate consequence would be to terminate or to curtail the services provided in the San Diego area by local broadcasting stations. Respondents’ CATV systems now carry the signals of San Diego stations, but Midwest alleged that the quality of the signals, as they are carried by respondents, is materially degraded, and that this serves only to accentuate the fragmentation of the local audience.
February 15, 1966, is the date on which grandfather rights accrued under 47 CFR § 74.1107 (d). The initial decision of the hearing examiner, issued October 3, 1967, concluded that permanent restrictions on the expansion of respondents’ services were unwarranted. Midwest Television, Inc., 11 Pike & Fischer Radio Reg. 2d 273. The Commission has declined to terminate its interim restrictions pending consideration by the Commission of the examiner’s decision. Midwest Television, Inc., id., at 721.
The opinion of the Court of Appeals could be understood to hold either that the Commission may not, under the Communications Act, regulate CATV, or, more narrowly, that it may not issue the prohibitory order involved here. We take the court’s opinion, in fact, to have encompassed both positions.
We note that the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has concluded that the Communications Act permits the regulation of CATV systems. See Buckeye Cablevision, Inc. v. F. C. C., 128 U. S. App. D. C. 262, 387 F. 2d 220.
CATV systems are defined by the Commission for purposes of its rules as “any facility which... receives directly or indirectly over the air and amplifies or otherwise modifies the signals transmitting programs broadcast by one or more television stations and distributes such signals by wire or cable to subscribing members of the public who pay for such service, but such term shall not include (1) any such facility which serves fewer than 50 subscribers, or (2) any such facility which serves only the residents of one or more apartment dwellings under common ownership, control, or management, and commercial establishments located on the premises of such an apartment house.” 47 CFR §74.1101 (a).
There is, however, no technical reason wiry they may not. See Note, The Wire Mire: The FCC and CATV, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 366, 367. Indeed, the examiner was informed in this case that respondent Mission Cable TV “intends to commence program origination in the near future.” Midwest Television, Inc., supra, at 283.
The installation costs for CATV systems in 16 Connecticut communities were, for example, found to range from $31 to $147 per home. M. Seiden, An Economic Analysis of Community Antenna Television Systems and the Television Broadcasting Industry 24 (1965).
CATV systems were evidently first established on a noncommercial basis in 1949. H. R. Rep. No. 1635, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 5.
CATV and TV Repeater Services, 26 F. C. C. 403, 408; Note, The Wire Mire: The FCC and CATV, supra, at 368.
Note, The Wire Mire: The FCC and CATV, supra, at 368.
Second Report and Order, 2 F. C. C. 2d 725, 738. The franchises are granted by state or local regulatory agencies. It was reported in 1965 that two States, Connecticut and Nevada, regulate CATY systems, and that some 86% of the systems are subject at least to some local regulation. Seiden, supra, at 44-47. See Conn. Gen. St-at. Rev., Tit. 16, c. 289 (1958); Nev. Stat. 1967, c. 458.
The term "distant signal” has been given a specialized definition by the Commission, as a signal “which is extended or received beyond the Grade B contour of that station.” 47 CFR § 74.1101 (i). The Grade B contour is a line along which good reception may be expected 90% of the time at 50% of the locations. See 47 CFR §73.683 (a).
Note, The Wire Mire: The FCC and CATV, supra, at 368 (notes omitted).
It has thus been suggested that “a nationwide grid of wired CATV systems, interconnected by microwave frequencies and financed by subscriber fees, may one day offer a viable economic alternative to the advertiser-supported broadcast service.” Levin, New Technology and the Old Regulation in Radio Spectrum Management, 56 Am. Econ. Rev. 339, 341 (Proceedings, May 1966).
See S. 2653, 86th Cong., 1st Sess.
S. Rep. No. 923, 86th Cong., 1st Sess.
See 106 Cong. Rec. 10416-10436, 10520-10548.
Id., at 10547. The Commission in 1966 made additional efforts to obtain suitable modifications in the Communications Act. See n. 30, infra.
See generally First Report and Order, supra, at 716-719. The Commission held that a CATV system must, within the limits of its channel capacity, carry the signals of stations that place signals over the community served by the system. The stations are to be. given priority according to the strength of the signal available in the community, with the strongest signals given first priority. Exceptions are made for situations in which there would be substantial duplication or in which an independent or noncommercial station would be excluded. Id., at 717.
It must also be noted that the CATY systems involved in these cases evidently do not employ microwave. We intimate no views on what differences, if any, there might be in the scope of the Commission’s authority over microwave and nonmicrowave systems.
The phrase is taken from the message to Congress from President Roosevelt, dated February 26, 1934, in which he recommended the Commission’s creation. See H. R. Rep. No. 1850, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 1.
S. Rep. No. 781, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 1.
Ibid. The Committee also indicated that there was a “vital need” for such a commission, with jurisdiction “over all of these methods of communication.” Ibid.
The phrase is taken from President Roosevelt’s message to Congress. H. R. Rep. No. 1850, supra, at 1. The House Committee added that “the primary purpose of this bill [is] to create such a commission armed with adequate statutory powers to regulate all forms of communication....” Id., at 3.
Respondents assert only that this “is subject to considerable question.” Brief for Respondent Southwestern Cable Co. 24, n. 25. They rely chiefly upon the language of § 152 (b), which provides that nothing in the Act shall give the Commission jurisdiction over “carriers” that are engaged in interstate communication solely through physical connection, or connection by wire or radio, with the facilities of another carrier, if they are not directly or indirectly controlled by such other carrier. The terms and history of this provision, however, indicate that it was “merely a perfecting amendment” intended to “obviate any possible technical argument
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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H
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Douglas,
^delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner issued a complaint .charging respondent, a retail department store, with violations of the Fur Products Labeling Act, 6^*S$at. 175, 15 U. S. C. § 69. Violations, were found and a cease-and-desist order was issued. One of the principal violations found was that many of respondent’s retail sales were falsely “invoiced” in violation of § 3 of the Act. The term “invoice” is defined, in § 2 (f) as “a written account, memorandum, list, or catalog, which is issued in connection with any commercial dealing in fur products or furs, and describes the particulars of any fur products or furs, transported or delivered to a purchaser, consignee, factor, bailee, correspondent, or agent, or any other person who is engaged in dealing commercially in fur products or furs.” Section 5 (b) provides that a fur product or fur is falsely “invoiced” if it is not “invoiced” to show (a) the name of the animal that produced the fur; and, where applicable, that the product (b) contains used fur, (c) contains bleached, dyed, or otherwise artificially colored fur, (d) is composed in whole or substantial part of paws, tails, bellies, or waste fur; (e) the name and address of the person issuing the “invoice”; and (f) the country of origin of any imported furs.
The Commission found that respondent had violated the “invoice” provisions of the Act by failure to include in many of its retail sales slips of fur products, (a) its address, (b) whether the fur was bleached, dyed, or otherwise artificially colored, and (c) the correct name of the animal producing the fúr.
The Act in § 4 also provides that a fur product is mis-branded (1) if it is “falsely or deceptively labeled ... or identified,” (2) if there is not affixed a label setting forth substantially the same six items of information required for an “invoice,” or (3) if the label designates the animal that produced the fur by some name other than that prescribed in the Fur Products Name Guide. The Commission found that the labels on respondent’s fur products were false in numerous instances by reason of the failure to include information in three of the categories listed under the second part of § 4. It held, however, that there was no evidence that the labels were deficient in the other three categories of information. Nevertheless, it issued a cease-and-desist order against misbranding by failure to include in the labels the required six categories of information, all of which were listed.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals first eliminated the prohibitions relating to invoicing on the ground that a retail sales slip was not'an “invoice” within the meaning of the Act1; and second, it struck from the order the prohibition against misbranding through omission of the three categories as to which no violations were found. 254 F. 2d 18. The case is here on a petition for a writ of certiorari. 358 U. S. 812.
I.
First, as to invoicing. We start with an Act whose avowed purpose, inter alia, was to protect “consumers . . . against deception, . . . resulting from the misbranding, false or deceptive advertising, or false invoicing of fur products and furs.” S. Rep. No. 78, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., p. 1. The House Report also emphasizes that the bill was “designed to protect consumers and others from wide-spreád abuses” arising out of false and misleading matter in advertisements and otherwise'. H. R. Rep. No. 546, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., p. 1. The Title of the Act (which, though not limiting.the plain meaning of the text, is nonetheless a useful aid in resolving an ambiguity (see Maguire v. Commissioner, 313 U. S. 1, 9)), states that its purpose was to “protect consumers and others against . . . false invoicing of fur products and furs.” 65 Stat. 175. So we have an avowed purpose to protect retail purchasers against improper “invoicing.” We therefore should read § 2 (f) which contains the definition of “invoice” hospitably with that end in view. Section 2 (f) is not unambiguous. Yet we do not have here the problem of a penal statute that deserves strict construction. We deal with remedial legislation of a regulatory nature where our task is to fit, if possible, all parts into an harmonious whole. Black v. Magnolia Liquor Co., 355 U. S. 24, 26.
Section 2 (f) uses “invoice” to include a “written account” and “memorandum.” So far a retail sales slip is included. Section 2 (f) requires the “invoice” to be issued “in connection with any commercial dealing” in furs. A retail sale is plainly a “commercial dealing.” Section 2 (f) requires the invoice to be issued to .a “purchaser.” There again á customer of a retailer is a “purchaser.” The case for inclusion of a retail sales slip in “invoice,” as that term is used in the Act, would therefore seem to be complete. What turned the. Court of Appeals the other way was the last phrase in § 2 (f) — “or any other person who is engaged in dealing commercially in fur products or furs.” It held that “engaged in dealing commercially” modifies not only “any other person” but also all the other preceding terms in the subsection including “purchaser.” Cf. United States v. Standard Brewery, 251 U. S. 210, 218. That is a possible construction. We conclude, however, that this limiting clause is. to he applied only to the last antecedent. We think it would be a partial mutilation of this Act to construe it so that the “invoice” provisions were inapplicable to retail sales. In the first place, the language of § 2 (f) specifies in sweeping language the categories of persons for whose benefit the invoicing requirements were ■ imposed, viz., purchaser, consignee, factor, bailee, correspondent, or agent. Then as a general catch-all “any other person who. is engaged in dealing commercially in fur products or furs” was added. In the second place, only by construing “invoice” to include retail sales slips can the full protection of the Act be accorded consumers. We do not agree with the point stressed by respondent that the consumer’s protection is to be found solely in the label on the fur product and that invoices are required only at each antecedent step of delivery or transfer to a person dealing commercially in either furs or fur products. The advertising and mislabeling prohibitions in § 3 (b) of the Act are plainly applicable to retail sales. Yet the prohibition of false invoices is contained in the same clause. If we held that Congress, in spite of its desire to protect consumers, withheld from them the benefits of reliable invoices, we would have to read the clauses of § 3 distributively, making only some of them applicable to retail sales. That would be a refashioning of § 3, an undertaking more consonant with the task of a congressional committee than with judicial construction.
Moreover, fur product “labels,” we are advised, are not pieces of eloth sewn into garments but tags which the purchaser is likely to throw away after the purchase. The “invoice” is the only permanent record of the transaction that the retail purchaser has.' Its importance was emphasized by the Commission:
“Inasmuch as the invoice may serve as a documentary link connecting the sale of specific fur. products back through the retailer’s records with advertisements therefor, the application of the invoicing provisions of the Act to transactions between retailers and consumers represents a key implement for effective administration of the Act.”
The inclusion of retail sales slips in invoices has been the consistent administrative construction of the Act. This contemporaneous construction is entitled to great weight (United States v. American Trucking Assns., 310 U. S. 534, 549; Black v. Magnolia Liquor Co., supra; Federal Housing Adm’n v. Darlington, Inc., 358 U. S. 84, 90) even though it was applied in cases settled by consent rather than in litigation.
Finally respondent urges that a retailer’s sale is a local transaction not subject to the exercise by Congress of the commerce power. Misbranding a drug held for sale after shipment in interstate commerce was held to be' within the commerce power in United States v. Sullivan, 332 U. S. 689. That decision and its predecessors sanction what is done here.
■ We conclude that a retail sales slip is an “invoice” within the meaning of the Act and accordingly the'judgment of the Court of Appeals setting aside the part of the cease-and-desist order which requires this retailer to give a proper “invoice” to each purchaser is reversed.
II.
Second, as to false labeling. The Commission, as we have noted, found that respondent had committed numerous violations of three of the six disclosure requirements contained in § .4 (2) of the Act', noting that there was no evidence that it had not complied with the other three disclosure requirements of. § 4 (2). The cease-and-desist order of the Commission was however directed against “misbranding fur products by: 1. Failing to affix labels to fur products showing” each of the six categories of information required by § 4 (2). The Court of'Appeals struck from the order the prohibition with respect to the three categories as to which there was no. evidence of violation.
We do not believe the Commission abused the “wide discretion” that it has in a choice of a remedy “deemed adequate to cope with the unlawful practices” disclosed by the record. Jacob Siegel Co. v. Federal Trade Comm’n, 327 U. S. 608, 611. It is not limited to prohibiting “the illegal practice in the precise form” existing in the past. Federal Trade Comm’n v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U. S. 470, 473. This agency, lite others, may fashion its relief to restrain “other like or related unlawful acts.” Labor Board v. Express Pub. Co., 312 U. S. 426, 436. The practice outlawed by § 4 is “misbranding.” The disclosure required for.-a properly branded garment is specified. These disclosure requirements are so closely interrelated that the Commission might well conclude that a retailer who for example failed to disclose that the fur was ■bleached or dyed might well default when it came to disclosure of the fact that used fur was contained in the garment. One cannot generalize as to the proper scope .of the'sé orders. It depends on the facts of each case and a judgment as to the extent to which a particular violator should be fenced in. Here, as in Sherman Act decrees (Local 167 v. United States, 291 U. S. 293, 299; International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U. S. 392, 400-401; International Boxing Club v. United States, 358 U. S. 242, 253), the question of the extent to which related-activity should be enjoined is one of kind and degree. We sit only to determine if the trier of facts has exercised an allowable discretion. Where the episodes of misbranding have been so extensive and so substantial in number as they were here, we think it permissible for the Commission to conclude that like and related acts of misbranding should also be enjoined as a prophylactic and preventive measure.
Respondent objects to the wording of the cease-and-desist order saying it suggests that the store has sold garments contrary to the disclosure requirements not found to have been violated here. The Commission bows to'the suggestion that Part A, par. 1 of the cease-and-desist order be rephrased to enjoin “misbranding fur products by failing to -affix labels to fur products showing each element of information required by the Act.” We so order.
On this phase of the case the‘judgment of the Court of Appeals is also reversed, the cease-and-desist order to be rephrased as we- have indicated.
It'is so' ordered.
Section 3 provides in part:
“(a) The introduction, or manufacture for introduction, into commerce, or the sale, advertising or offering for sale in commerce, or the transportation or distribution in commerce, of any fur product which is misbranded or falsely or deceptively advertised or invoiced, within the meaning of this Act or the rules and regulations prescribed under section 8 (b), is unlawful and shall be an unfair method of competition, and an unfair and deceptive act or practice, in commerce under the Federal Trade Commission Act.
“(b) The manufacture for sale, sale, advertising, offering for sale, transportation or distribution, of any fur product which is made in whole or in part of fur which has been shipped and received in commerce, and which is misbranded or falsely or deceptively advertised or invoiced, within the meaning of this Act or the rules and regulations prescribed under section 8 (b), is unlawful and shall be an unfair method of competition, and an unfair and deceptive ac^ or practice, in commerce under the Federal Trade Commission Act.”
Section 4 provides:
“For the purposes of this Act, a fur product shall be considered to be misbranded—
“(1) if it is falsely or deceptively labeled or otherwise falsely or deceptively identified, or if the label contains any .form of misrepresentation or deception, directly or by implication, with respect to such fur product;
“(2) if "there is not affixed to the fur product a label showing in words and figures plainly legible—
“(A) the name or names (as set forth in the Fur Products Name Guide) of the animal or animals that produced the fur, and such qualifying statement as may be required pursuant to section 7 (c) of this Act;
“(B) that the fur product contains or is composed of used fur, when such is the fact;
“(C) that the fur product contains.-or is composed of bleached, dyed, or otherwise.artificially colored fur, when such is the fact;
“ (D) that the fur product is composed in whole- or in substantial .part of paws, tails, bellies, or waste fur, when such is the fact;
“ (E) the name, or other identification issued and registered by the Commission, of one or more of the persons who manufacture such fur product, for introduction into commerce, introduce it into commerce, sell it in commerce, advertise or offer it for sale in commerce, or transport-or distribute it in commerce;
“(F) the name of the country of origin of any imported furs used in the fur product; •
“(3) if the label required by paragraph (2) (A) of this section sets forth the name or names of - any animal or animals other than the name or names provided for in such paragraph.”
This is a register of the names of hair, fleece, and fur-bearing animals which § 7 of the Act requires the Commission to maintain.
Cf. United States v. Hughes, 116 F. 2d 613, 616; Puget Sound Electric R. Co. v. Benson, 253 F. 710, 711; 2 Sutherland, Statutory Construction (3d ed. 1943), §4921.
Note 1, supra.
See Ed Hamilton Furs, Inc., 51 F. T. C. 186. We are advised that since that case, decided in 1954, the Commission has issued 137 complaints charging violations of the Act involving false and deceptive retail invoicing. There are presently outstanding 110 ceaee-ánd-desist orders relating to retail invoicing. In 92 other cases furriers have agreed to discontinue false and deceptive retail invoicing.
See-note 2, supra.
The Commission found' 12 instances of failure to label the product with the correct name of the animal producing the fur, 15 instances of failure to disclose that the product was bleached, dyed or otherwise artificially colored, and' 58 instances of failure .to show the country of origin of imported furs. There were in addition 187 other, violations of the rules of the Commission which .provide additional labeling requirements and standards. See 16 CFR, Pi. 301-.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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H
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
We consider an application for a stay of execution that had been set for January 24, 1984, at 7 a. m., and a petition for writ of certiorari. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit granted a temporary stay until January 25, at 12 noon, to afford applicant an opportunity to apply to this Court for a stay of execution. At the same time, the Court of Appeals denied applicant’s request for issuance of a certificate of probable cause and his application for an indefinite stay of execution. The application and petition now before us were not filed until January 25, shortly after the expiration of the temporary stay. The State has filed an opposition to the pending application.
HH
Oñ August 27, 1976, a jury convicted applicant of first-degree murder. He was sentenced to death. The evidence upon which the conviction was based showed that applicant had planned the “contract murder” of a Tampa police officer, apparently to prevent the officer from testifying at a grand jury investigation of “Mob” activities.
On the first appeal, the Florida Supreme Court remanded for a hearing on the question whether the failure to disclose an attorney’s-fees arrangement between the State and one of the prosecution witnesses had violated applicant’s due process rights under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 (1963), and United States v. Agurs, 427 U. S. 97 (1976). Antone v. State, 365 So. 2d 777 (1978). The trial court found that there was no violation. On the second appeal, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. Antone v. State, 382 So. 2d 1205 (1980). This Court denied certiorari. 449 U. S. 913 (1980).
Applicant was also a party to an unsuccessful suit challenging the Florida Supreme Court’s use of extra-record materials in conducting proportionality review of death sentences. Brown v. Wainwright, 392 So. 2d 1327 (1981), cert. denied, 454 U. S. 1000 (1981). (This practice was also challenged in Ford v. Strickland, 696 F. 2d 804 (CA11), cert. denied, 464 U. S. 865 (1983); applicant was not a party to that litigation.)
On January 6,1982, applicant’s execution was set for February 5,1982. He then brought two motions for postconviction relief in state court. The motions raised a number of claims, including ineffective assistance of counsel, further Brady violations, and challenges to applicant’s arrest under Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573 (1980), and to the constitutionality of the death penalty statute, as well as various challenges to the selection of the jury and the trial proceedings. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied relief, and the Florida Supreme Court affirmed. Antone v. Strickland, 410 So. 2d 157 (1982).
On January 22, 1982, applicant filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the District Court for the Middle District of Florida. On January 29, 1982, after oral argument, the District Court denied the petition. The Court of Appeals granted a stay and remanded to the District Court for further consideration of applicant’s claims. On remand, the District Court again denied relief, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Antone v. Strickland, 706 F. 2d 1534 (CA11 1983). This Court denied certiorari on November 28, 1983, 464 U. S. 1003, and denied a petition for rehearing on January 9, 1984, 464 U. S. 1064.
II
On January 4, 1984, the Governor signed a warrant for the execution of applicant between noon Friday, January 20, and noon Friday, January 27. The execution was subsequently set for January 24, 1984, at 7 a. m.
On January 17, applicant filed a second motion for postcon-viction relief in the state courts, alleging ineffective assistance at the penalty stage of his trial and unconstitutionality of the Florida death penalty statute under Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586 (1978). The motion was denied. On Friday afternoon, January 20, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed, noting that these claims had been considered and rejected in applicant’s prior postconviction proceeding. Applicant also filed a “petition for extraordinary relief” in the Florida Supreme Court, questioning the propriety of that court’s use of extra-record materials in reviewing death sentences. The State Supreme Court denied the petition, again noting that applicant’s claim previously had been considered by the court in Brown v. Wainwright, supra, and by the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in Antone v. Strickland, supra.
Applicant then filed a second petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the District Court on January 20. Of the claims presented in that petition, applicant previously had raised in his first federal habeas petition the contentions that trial counsel was ineffective and that the State unjustifiably withheld testimony of a confidential informant. Nonetheless, applicant urged that these claims be reconsidered, as the press of time during the first set of collateral proceedings had denied his counsel a “full and fair opportunity” to develop the claims in the state and federal courts.
Applicant’s second habeas petition also contained several claims that purportedly had not been raised in his first federal habeas petition: (i) that the State violated Brady and Agurs by failing to disclose prior to trial that the chief prosecution witness had counsel whose fees were paid by the State, despite trial counsel’s discovery demand for “any material or information” relevant to the “credibility of the State’s witnesses”; (ii) that the “appearance of justice” was denied by the Florida Supreme Court’s consideration of applicant’s extra-record materials in deciding applicant’s direct appeal; (iii) that the statute under which applicant was sentenced unconstitutionally excluded nonstatutory mitigating factors from consideration, see Lockett v. Ohio, supra. These claims twice previously had been considered, as noted above, by the Florida Supreme Court.
After a hearing on January 23, the District Court denied a stay of execution, the petition for habeas corpus, and a certificate of probable cause. The court concluded that the “ends of justice” would not be served by reconsideration of the claims that had been raised on the first petition for habeas corpus. Further, the court expressed doubt that the claims that applicant described as “new” had not been substantially considered during the first federal habeas proceeding. It concluded, in any event, that applicant’s presentation of these claims on the present petition, insofar as they were new, constituted an abuse of the writ, see 28 U. S. C. § 2254 Rule 9(b), as applicant showed “inexcusable neglect” in not having raised these claims on the first petition.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals concluded in a per curiam opinion that the District Court was “correct” in dismissing applicant’s petition on the grounds that it presented successive claims and constituted an abuse of the writ. The Court of Appeals therefore denied a certificate of probable cause and a stay of execution pending an appeal on the merits of the habeas petition to that court. The Court of Appeals, however, granted a temporary stay until January 25, at 12 noon, to afford applicant an opportunity to apply to this Court for a stay of execution.
Applicant then submitted to the Court of Appeals a petition for rehearing, a suggestion for rehearing en banc, and an application for a stay pending rehearing. Applicant contended that the insufficient time allowed to his counsel to prepare the first habeas corpus petition violated applicant’s right to effective assistance in capital postconviction proceedings; that the inadequacy of counsel’s preparation in any event should be relevant to the question whether presentation of new claims constituted abuse of the writ; and that the District Court should have held an evidentiary hearing to inquire into the circumstances under which the first habeas petition was prepared. The Court of Appeals denied the petition for rehearing, the suggestion for rehearing en banc, and the application for stay, with none of the participating judges requesting a vote on the suggestion. Applicant then filed with this Court a petition for writ of certiorari and an application for stay pending consideration of the petition.
I — I > — I
Applicant’s petition for writ of certiorari repeats the claims that were presented to the Court of Appeals in applicant’s petition for rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc. Applicant urges that the lower courts should reconsider, after an evidentiary hearing and in light of the haste with which applicant’s first habeas petition was prepared, their findings as to applicant’s abuse of the writ. Like the Court of Appeals, we conclude that these findings do not warrant further review.
With respect to the grounds for relief that applicant presented to the District Court for the first time on his second habeas petition, we uphold the finding of the District Court and the Court of Appeals that presentation of these claims constitutes an abuse of the writ. As applicant had presented each of these claims to the state courts before the first petition for habeas was filed (and, indeed, the substance of these claims may have been presented in the first habeas petition), applicant hardly can contend that these claims were unknown to him at that time.
Nor has applicant shown any basis for disagreeing with the finding of the District Court and the Court of Appeals that the ends of justice would not be served by reconsideration of those claims previously presented on federal habeas. The federal and state courts carefully and repetitively have reviewed applicant’s challenges to his conviction and sentence. Upon consideration of the extensive papers filed with the Court, we find that none of these challenges warrants further review. Indeed, the grounds relied upon by applicant all appear to be meritless.
For these reasons, we deny the petition for writ of certio-rari and deny the application for a stay.
It is so ordered.
Applicant then filed a motion with the Court of Appeals suggesting a rehearing en banc and requesting a further stay. This motion and request were denied by the Court of Appeals on January 25.
Applicant lodged papers with this Court on January 20, while his petition for a writ of habeas corpus was pending before the District Court, but no formal filing for relief here occurred until today.
Applicant suggests that this haste denied him his right to counsel in posteonviction proceedings and refers us in particular to Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U. S. 600 (1974), and Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 (1932). Ross v. Moffitt held that the State has no obligation to provide counsel for discretionary direct review of a conviction either in the state courts or in this Court. Whether there is a right to counsel in repetitive collateral proceedings in capital cases is not presented here as applicant had counsel throughout the relevant proceedings. See n. 4, infra. We agree with the courts below that the circumstances under which the first petition for ha-beas. was considered do not require those courts to consider further the claims withheld from those petitions.
Applicant contends nonetheless that he could not have been expected to present these claims in his first federal habeas petition, as his present counsel was appointed when execution was imminent and therefore did not have time fully to familiarize himself with the case. This contention is not new, has been rejected by the courts below, and is meritless. The following sequence, however, is of interest: Applicant’s conviction became final upon affirmance by the Florida Supreme Court on March 27,1980, and this Court denied a petition for writ of certiorari to review the conviction on October 14, 1980. Applicant offers no explanation as to why he allowed almost two years to elapse between the affirmance of his conviction and the filing of his first motion for postconvietion relief in the state courts on January 15, 1982. Nor does applicant contend that he was denied counsel during that period. In fact, it appears that applicant continued to be represented throughout this period by his trial counsel. That counsel filed a motion to mitigate sentence that was acted upon on January 29, 1981, was listed as applicant’s counsel in the petition for writ of certiorari in Brown v. Wainwright, 392 So. 2d 1327 (1981) (filed on April 3, 1981), and represented applicant on his first postconvietion motion and the notice of appeal from denial of that motion in January 1982.
Finally, the lower courts’ consideration of the first federal habeas petition, in which applicant was represented by his present counsel, was not conducted under the pressure of imminent execution, as the Court of Appeals had stayed execution pending consideration of applicant’s first habeas petition.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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A
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In United States v. Sells Engineering, Inc., ante, p. 418, we decide today that in some circumstances the Government may obtain disclosure of grand jury materials for civil uses under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(3)(C)(i) (hereinafter sometimes referred to as (C)(i)). The question in this case is whether an Internal Revenue Service investigation to determine a taxpayer’s civil tax liability is “preliminar[y] to or in connection with a judicial proceeding” within the meaning of that Rule. We agree with the Court of Appeals that it is not.
In May 1976, a special grand jury began investigating certain commodity futures transactions on the Chicago Board of Trade. Respondent James E. Baggot became a target of the investigation. He was never indicted; instead, after interviews with IRS agents and plea negotiations with the Government, he pleaded guilty to two misdemeanor counts of violating the Commodity Exchange Act. The substance of Baggot’s crime was a scheme to use sham commodities transactions to create paper losses, which he deducted on his tax returns. A fraction of the “losses” was then recovered in cash kickbacks which were not reported as income.
About eight months after Baggot’s plea, the Government filed a (C)(i) motion for disclosure of grand jury transcripts and documents to the IRS, for its use in an audit to determine Baggot’s civil income tax liability. At first the District Court denied the request. After two renewed motions, however, the court granted disclosure. It held that some of the materials sought are not “matters occurring before the grand jury,” and therefore not subject to Rule 6(e)’s requirement of secrecy. With respect to the remainder of the materials, the court concluded that disclosure is not authorized by (C)(i) because the IRS’s proposed civil tax investigation is not “pre-liminar[y] to or in connection with a judicial proceeding.” Nevertheless, the court allowed disclosure under its “general supervisory powers over the grand jury.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 47a-48a.
The Court of Appeals reversed. In re Special February, 1975 Grand Jury (Baggot), 662 F. 2d 1232 (CA7 1981). It held that all the materials sought, with one possible exception, are “matters occurring before the grand jury” and therefore subject to Rule 6(e). It agreed with the District Court that no disclosure is available under (C)(i), but it held that the District Court erred in granting disclosure under “general supervisory powers.” It remanded the case for further consideration concerning the material that might not be “matters occurring before the grand jury.” The Government sought certiorari, limited to the question of whether the IRS’s civil tax audit is “preliminar[y] to or in connection with a judicial proceeding” under (C)(i). We granted certiorari. 457 U. S. 1131 (1982).
The IRS is charged with responsibility to determine the civil tax liability of taxpayers. To this end, it conducts examinations or audits of taxpayers’ returns and affairs. If, after the conclusion of the audit and any internal administrative appeals, the IRS concludes that the taxpayer owes a deficiency, it issues a formal notice of deficiency as prescribed by 26 U. S. C. § 6212 (1976 ed. and Supp. V). Upon receiving a notice of deficiency, the taxpayer has, broadly speaking, four options: (1) he can accept the IRS’s ruling and pay the amount of the deficiency; (2) he can petition the Tax Court for a redetermination of the deficiency; (3) he can pay the amount of the deficiency and, after exhausting an administrative claim, bring suit for a refund in the Claims Court or in district court; or (4) he can do nothing and await steps by the IRS or the Government to collect the tax. See generally 4 B. Bittker, Federal Taxation of Income, Estates and Gifts ¶¶ 111.5, 112.1, 115.1, 115.2, 115.7 (1981).
Certain propositions are common ground between the parties. Both sides, sensibly, understand the term “in connection with,” in (C)(i), to refer to a judicial proceeding already pending, while “preliminarily to” refers to one not yet initiated. The Government concedes that an IRS audit, including its informal internal appeal component, is not itself a “judicial proceeding” within the meaning of the Rule. Conversely, Baggot agrees that either a Tax Court petition for redetermination or a suit for refund would be a “judicial proceeding.” The issue, then, is whether disclosure for use in an IRS civil audit is “preliminar[y] to” a redetermination proceeding or a refund suit within the meaning of (C)(i). We conclude that it is not.
The provision in (C)(i) that disclosure may be made “preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding” is, on its face, an affirmative limitation on the availability of court-ordered disclosure of grand jury materials. In our previous cases under Rule 6(e), we have not had occasion to address this requirement in detail, focusing instead on the requirement that the moving party show particularized need for access to grand jury materials. See Sells, ante, at 442-446, and cases cited. The two requirements, though related in some ways, are independent prerequisites to (C)(i) disclosure. The particularized-need test is a criterion of degree; the “judicial proceeding” language of (C)(i) imposes an additional criterion governing the kind of need that must be shown. It reflects a judgment that not every beneficial purpose, or even every valid governmental purpose, is an appropriate reason for breaching grand jury secrecy. Rather, the Rule contemplates only uses related fairly directly to some identifiable litigation, pending or anticipated. Thus, it is not enough to show that some litigation may emerge from the matter in which the material is to be used, or even that litigation is factually likely to emerge. The focus is on the actual use to be made of the material. If the primary purpose of disclosure is not to assist in preparation or conduct of a judicial proceeding, disclosure under (C)(i) is not permitted. See United States v. Young, 494 F. Supp. 57, 60-61 (ED Tex. 1980).
It follows that disclosure is not appropriate for use in an IRS audit of civil tax liability, because the purpose of the audit is not to prepare for or conduct litigation, but to assess the amount of tax liability through administrative channels. Assuming, arguendo, that this audit will inevitably disclose a deficiency on Baggot’s part, see also n. 6, infra, there is no particular reason why that must lead to litigation, at least from the IRS’s point of view. The IRS’s decision is largely self-executing, in the sense that it has independent legal force of its own, without requiring prior validation or enforcement by a court. The IRS need never go into court to assess and collect the amount owed; it is empowered to collect the tax by nonjudicial means (such as levy on property or salary, 26 U. S. C. §§ 6331, 6332), without having to prove to a court the validity of the underlying tax liability. Of course, the matter may end up in court if Baggot chooses to take it there, but that possibility does not negate the fact that the primary use to which the IRS proposes to put the materials it seeks is an extrajudicial one — the assessment of a tax deficiency by the IRS. The Government takes countless actions that affected citizens are permitted to resist or challenge in court. The fact that judicial redress may be sought, without more, does not mean that the Government’s action is “preliminar[y] to a judicial proceeding.” Of course, it may often be loosely said that the Government is “preparing for litigation,” in the sense that frequently it will be wise for an agency to anticipate the chance that it may be called upon to defend its actions in court. That, however, is not alone enough to bring an administrative action within (C)(i). Where an agency’s action does not require resort to litigation to accomplish the agency’s present goal, the action is not preliminary to a judicial proceeding for purposes of (C)(i).
We need not decide whether an agency’s action would always be preliminary to litigation if it arose under an administrative scheme that does require resort to courts — one in which, for example, the agency, when it found a probable violation of law, was required to bring a civil suit or criminal prosecution to vindicate the law and obtain compliance. We also do not hold that the Government (or, for that matter, a private party who anticipates a suit or prosecution against him) may never obtain (C)(i) disclosure of grand jury materials any time the initiative for litigating lies elsewhere. Nor do we hold that such a party must always await the actual commencement of litigation before obtaining disclosure. In In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Miller Brewing Co., 687 F. 2d 1079 (CA7 1982), rehearing pending, for example, the IRS had closed its audit and issued a notice of deficiency, and the taxpayer had clearly expressed its intention to seek redeter-mination of the deficiency in the Tax Court. The same court that denied disclosure in this case correctly held in Miller Brewing that the IRS may seek (C)(i) disclosure. In such a case, the Government’s primary purpose is plainly to use the materials sought to defend the Tax Court litigation, rather than to conduct the administrative inquiry that preceded it. There may be other situations in which disclosure is proper; we need not canvass the possibilities here. In this case, however, it is clear that the IRS’s proposed use of the materials is to perform the nonlitigative function of assessing taxes rather than to prepare for or to conduct litigation. Hence, no disclosure is available under (C)(i).
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
7U. S. C. § 6c(a)(A).
Hence, we need not address in this case the knotty question of what, if any, sorts of proceedings other than garden-variety civil actions or criminal prosecutions might qualify as judicial proceedings under (C)(i). See generally, e. g., Bradley v. Fairfax, 634 F. 2d 1126, 1129 (CA8 1980); In re J. Ray McDermott & Co., 622 F. 2d 166, 170-171 (CA5 1980); In re Special February 1971 Grand Jury v. Conlisk, 490 F. 2d 894, 897 (CA7 1973); Doe v. Rosenberry, 255 F. 2d 118, 120 (CA2 1958).
Our decision is limited to the meaning of (C)(i). Other considerations may govern the construction of similar standards in other contexts (e. g., Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 26(b)(3) (“in anticipation of litigation or for trial”)).
The particularized-need test requires that the materials sought be “needed to avoid a possible injustice in another judicial proceeding” and that the moving party’s request be “structured to cover only material so needed.” Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U. S. 211, 222 (1979) (footnote omitted). See generally id., at 221-224; United States v. Sells Engineering, Inc., ante, at 442-446. These inquiries cannot even be made without consideration of the particulars of the judicial proceeding with respect to which disclosure is sought. See also the proposed new Rule 6(e)(3)(E), to take effect August 1, 1983.
The Government relies on a remark by Wayne LaFave (Reporter for the Advisory Committee on Rules) during congressional hearings leading to the 1977 amendment to Rule 6(e). See generally United States v. Sells Engineering, Inc., ante, at 436-442. In response to a question, LaFave agreed that a “tax hearing” would be considered a judicial proceeding for purposes of Rule 6(e). Hearings on Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 94 (1977). LaFave’s somewhat ambiguous reference to a “tax hearing,” however, cannot reasonably be taken to refer to an administrative audit. As LaFave explained earlier:
“[T]he cases say that the grand jury material cannot be turned over to an administrative agency for purely administrative proceedings, because that is not a judicial proceeding. But there are occasions when an administrative agency can show sufficient need with respect to pending judicial proceedings.” Id., at 86.
Indeed, if LaFave’s remark meant what the Government now takes it to mean, LaFave’s position would be inconsistent with the Government’s own position, which is that the audit is not itself a judicial proceeding but only preliminary to one.
In particular, we find it unnecessary to address the complex contentions of the parties as to the level of likelihood of litigation that must exist before an administrative action is preliminary to litigation. Baggot points out that the purpose of an audit is to determine whether or not he owes any tax deficiency. Thus, he argues, the occurrence of litigation is contingent not only on his decision to contest an assessment, see n. 7, infra, but on the outcome of the audit itself. He concludes that administrative investigations of this kind can never qualify as “preliminar[y] to a judicial proceeding,” since to posit a judicial proceeding is to prejudge the very question supposedly being decided in the investigation. See, e. g., United States v. Bates, 200 U. S. App. D. C. 296, 627 F. 2d 349 (1980); McDermott, 622 F. 2d, at 171; In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 309 F. 2d 440, 443-444 (CA3 1962). The Government counters that when the taxpayer has already pleaded guilty to a tax scam, the prospect of exoneration from civil liability is more theoretical than real. See, e. g., In re Judge Elmo B. Hunter’s Special Grand Jury Empaneled September 28, 1978, 667 F. 2d 724 (CA8 1981); see also Doe v. Rosenberry, 255 F. 2d, at 119-120. As a general matter, many an investigation, begun to determine whether there has been a violation of law, reaches a tentative affirmative conclusion on that question; at that point, the focus of the investigation commonly shifts to ascertaining the scope and details of the violation and building a case in support of any necessary enforcement action. We decline in this case to address how firm the agency’s decision to litigate must be before its investigation can be characterized as “preliminarfy] to a judicial proceeding,” or whether it can ever be so regarded before the conclusion of a formal preliminary administrative investigation.
We reject Baggot’s argument that litigation is a remote contingency because, if a deficiency is assessed against him, he may simply choose to pay it, or to negotiate some settlement with the Government. The Government correctly points out that settlement (including settlement by surrender) is almost always a possibility. If some chance of settlement were enough to disqualify a case from eligibility for (C)(i) disclosure, there would be nothing left of the “preliminarily to” language of the Rule. There may conceivably be instances in which the chances of litigation are so low that it cannot be considered a realistic possibility, but this case at least is not such an instance.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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A
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Stevens
delivered the opinion of the Court.
These cases raise two important questions concerning the jurisdiction of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC or Commission) over the transmission of electricity. First, if a public utility “unbundles” — i. e., separates — the cost of transmission from the cost of electrical energy when billing its retail customers, may FERC require the utility to transmit competitors’ electricity over its lines on the same terms that the utility applies to its own energy transmissions? Second, must FERC impose that requirement on utilities that continue to offer only “bundled” retail sales?
In Order No. 888, issued in 1996 with the stated purpose of “Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities,” FERC answered yes to the first question and no to the second. It based its answers on provisions of the Federal Power Act (FPA), as added by §213, 49 Stat. 847, and as amended, 16 U. S. C. §824 et seq., enacted in 1935. Whether or not the 1935 Congress foresaw the dramatic changes in the power industry that have occurred in recent decades, we are persuaded, as was the Court of Appeals, that FERC properly construed its statutory authority.
I
In 1935, when the FPA became law, most electricity was sold by vertically integrated utilities that had constructed their own power plants, transmission lines, and local delivery systems. Although there were some interconnections among utilities, most operated as separate, local monopolies subject to state or local regulation. Their sales were “bundled,” meaning that consumers paid a single charge that included both the cost of the electric energy and the cost of its delivery. Competition among utilities was not prevalent.
Prior to 1935, the States possessed broad authority to regulate public utilities, but this power was limited by our cases holding that the negative impact of the Commerce Clause prohibits state regulation that directly burdens interstate commerce. When confronted with an attempt by Rhode Island to regulate the rates charged by a Rhode Island plant selling electricity to a Massachusetts company, which resold the electricity to the city of Attleboro, Massachusetts, we invalidated the regulation because it imposed a “direct burden upon interstate commerce.” Public Util. Comm’n of R. I. v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U. S. 83, 89 (1927). Creating what has become known as the “Attleboro gap,” we held that this interstate transaction was not subject to regulation by either Rhode Island or Massachusetts, but only “by the exercise of the power vested in Congress.” Id., at 90.
When it enacted the FPA in 1935, Congress authorized federal regulation of electricity in areas beyond the reach of state power, such as the gap identified in Attleboro, but it also extended federal coverage to some areas that previously had been state regulated, see, e. g., id., at 87-88 (explaining, prior to the FPA’s enactment, that state regulations affecting interstate utility transactions were permissible if they did not directly burden interstate commerce). The FPA charged the Federal Power Commission (FPC), the predecessor of FERC, “to provide effective federal regulation of the expanding business of transmitting and selling electric power in interstate commerce.” Gulf States Util. Co. v. FPC, 411 U. S. 747, 758 (1973). Specifically, in § 201(b) of the FPA, Congress recognized the FPC’s jurisdiction as including “the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce” and “the sale of electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce.” 16 U. S. C. § 824(b). Furthermore, §205 of the FPA prohibited, among other things, unreasonable rates and undue discrimination “with respect to any transmission or sale subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission,” 16 U. S. C. §§824d(a)-(b), and §206 gave the FPC the power to correct such unlawful practices, 16 U. S. C. § 824e(a).
Since 1935, and especially beginning in the 1970’s and 1980’s, the number of electricity suppliers has increased dramatically. Technological advances have made it possible to generate electricity efficiently in different ways and in smaller plants. In addition, unlike the local power networks of the past, electricity is now delivered over three major networks, or “grids,” in the continental United States. Two of these grids — the “Eastern Interconnect” and the “Western Interconnect” — are connected to each other. It is only in Hawaii and Alaska and on the “Texas Interconnect”— which covers most of that State — that electricity is distributed entirely within a single State. In the rest of the country, any electricity that enters the grid immediately becomes a part of a vast pool of energy that is constantly moving in interstate commerce. As a result, it is now possible for power companies to transmit electric energy over long distances at a low cost. As FERC has explained, “the nature and magnitude of coordination transactions” have enabled utilities to operate more efficiently by transferring substantial amounts of electricity not only from plant to plant in one area, but also from region to region, as market conditions fluctuate. Order No. 888, at 31,641.
Despite these advances in technology that have increased the number of electricity providers and have made it possible for a “customer in Vermont [to] purchase electricity from an environmentally friendly power producer in California or a cogeneration facility in Oklahoma,” Transmission Access Policy Study Group v. FERC, 225 F. 3d 667, 681 (CADC 2000) (case below), public utilities retain ownership of the transmission lines that must be used by their competitors to deliver electric energy to wholesale and retail customers. The utilities’ control of transmission facilities gives them the power either to refuse to deliver energy produced by competitors or to deliver competitors’ power on terms and conditions less favorable than those they apply to their own transmissions. E. g., Order No. 888, at 31,643-31,644.
Congress has addressed these evolving conditions in the electricity market on two primary occasions since 1935. First, Congress enacted the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA), 92 Stat. 3117, 16 U. S. C. §2601 et seq., to promote the development of new generating facilities and to conserve the use of fossil fuels. Because the traditional utilities controlled the transmission lines and were reluctant to purchase power from “nontraditional facilities,” PURPA directed FERC to promulgate rules requiring utilities to purchase electricity from “qualifying cogeneration and small power production facilities.” FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 751 (1982); see 16 U.S.C. §824a-3(a).
Over a decade later, Congress enacted the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPAct), 106 Stat. 2776. This law authorized FERC to order individual utilities to provide transmission services to unaffiliated wholesale generators (i. e., to “wheel” power) on a case-by-case basis. See 16 U. S. C. §§ 824j-824k. Exercising its authority under the EPAct, FERC ordered a utility to “wheel” power for a complaining wholesale competitor 12 times, in 12 separate proceedings. Order No. 888, at 31,646. FERC soon concluded, however, that these individual proceedings were too costly and time consuming to provide an adequate remedy for undue discrimination throughout the market. Ibid.
Thus, in 1995, FERC initiated the rulemaking proceeding that led to the adoption of the order presently under review. FERC proposed a rule that would “require that public utilities owning and/or controlling facilities used for the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce have on file tariffs providing for nondiscriminatory open-access transmission services.” Notice of Proposed Rule-making, FERC Stats. & Regs., Proposed Regs., 1988-1999, ¶ 32,514, p. 33,047, 60 Fed. Reg. 17662 (hereinafter NPRM). The stated purpose of the proposed rule was “to encourage lower electricity rates by structuring an orderly transition to competitive bulk power markets.” NPRM 33,048. The NPRM stated:
“The key to competitive bulk power markets is opening up transmission services. Transmission is the vital link between sellers and buyers. To achieve the benefits of robust, competitive bulk power markets, all wholesale buyers and sellers must have equal access to the transmission grid. Otherwise, efficient trades cannot take place and ratepayers will bear unnecessary costs. Thus, market power through control of transmission is the single greatest impediment to competition. Unquestionably, this market power is still being used today, or can be used, discriminatorily to block competition.” Id., at 33,049.
Rather than grounding its legal authority in Congress’ more recent electricity legislation, FERC cited §§205-206 of the 1935 FPA — the provisions concerning FERC’s power to remedy unduly discriminatory practices — as providing the authority for its rulemaking. See 16 U. S. C. §§824d-824e.
In 1996, after receiving comments on the NPRM, FERC issued Order No. 888. It found that electric utilities were discriminating in the “bulk power markets,” in violation of § 205 of the FPA, by providing either inferior access to their transmission networks or no access at all to third-party wholesalers of power. Order No. 888, at 31,682-31,684. Invoking its authority under §206, it prescribed a remedy containing three parts that are presently relevant.
First, FERC ordered “functional unbundling” of wholesale generation and transmission services. Id., at 31,654. FERC defined “functional unbundling” as requiring each utility to state separate rates for its wholesale generation, transmission, and ancillary services, and to take transmission of its own wholesale sales and purchases under a single general tariff applicable equally to itself and to others.
Second, FERC imposed a similar open access requirement on unbundled retail transmissions in interstate commerce. Although the NPRM had not envisioned applying the open access requirements to retail transmissions, but rather “would have limited eligibility to wholesale transmission customers,” FERC ultimately concluded that it was “irrelevant to the Commission’s jurisdiction whether the customer receiving the unbundled transmission service in interstate commerce is a wholesale or retail customer.” Id., at 31,689. Thus, “if a public utility voluntarily offers unbundled retail access,” or if a State requires unbundled retail access, “the affected retail customer must obtain its unbundled transmission service under a non-discriminatory transmission tariff on file with the Commission.” Ibid.
Third, FERC rejected a proposal that the open access requirement should apply to “the transmission component of bundled retail sales.” Id., at 31,699. Although FERC noted that “the unbundling of retail transmission and generation... would be helpful in achieving comparability,” it concluded that such unbundling was not “necessary” and would raise “difficult jurisdictional issues” that could be “more appropriately considered” in other proceedings. Ibid.
In its analysis of the jurisdictional issues, FERC distinguished between transmissions and sales. It explained:
“[Our statutory jurisdiction] over sales of electric energy extends only to wholesale sales. However, when a retail transaction is broken into two products that are sold separately (perhaps by two different suppliers: an electric energy supplier and a transmission supplier), we believe the jurisdictional lines change. In this situation, the state clearly retains jurisdiction over the sale of power. However, the unbundled transmission service involves only the provision of ‘transmission in interstate commerce’ which, under the FPA, is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Commission. Therefore, when a bundled retail sale is unbundled and becomes separate transmission and power sales transactions, the resulting transmission transaction falls within the Federal sphere of regulation.” Id., at 31,781.
In 1997, in response to numerous petitions for rehearing and clarification, FERC issued Order No. 888-A, FERC Stats. & Regs., Regs. Preambles, July 1996-Dec. 2001, ¶ 31,048, p. 30,172,62 Fed. Reg. 12274. With respect to various challenges to its jurisdiction, FERC acknowledged that it did not have the “authority to order, sua sponte, open-access transmission services by public utilities,” but explained that § 206 of the FPA explicitly required it to remedy the undue discrimination that it had found. Order No. 888-A, at 30,202; see 16 U. S. C. §824e(a). FERC also rejected the argument that its failure to assert jurisdiction over bundled retail transmissions was inconsistent with its assertion of jurisdiction over unbundled retail transmissions. FERC repeated its explanation that it did not believe that regulation of bundled retail transmissions (i. e., the “functional unbundling” of retail transmissions) “was necessary,” and again stated that such unbundling would raise serious jurisdictional questions. Order No. 888-A, at 30,225. FERC did not, however, state that it had no power to regulate the transmission component of bundled retail sales. Id., at 30,225-30,226. Rather, FERC reiterated that States have jurisdiction over the retail sale of power, and stated that, as a result, “[o]ur assertion of jurisdiction... arises only if the [unbundled] retail transmission in interstate commerce by a public utility occurs voluntarily or as a result of a state retail program.” Id., at 30,226.
II
A number of petitions, for review of Order No. 888 were consolidated for hearing in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. After considering a host of objections, the Court of Appeals upheld most provisions of the order. Specifically, it affirmed FERC’s jurisdictional rulings that are at issue in the present cases. 225 F. 3d, at 681.
The Court of Appeals first explained that the open access requirements in the orders — for both retail and wholesale transmissions — were “premised not on individualized findings of discrimination by specific transmission providers, but on FERC’s identification of a fundamental systemic problem in the industry.” Id., at 683. It held that FERC’s factual determinations were reasonable and that §§205 and 206 of the FPA gave the Commission authority to prescribe a mar-ketwide remedy for a marketwide problem. Interpreting Circuit precedent — primarily cases involving the transmission of natural gas, e. g., Associated Gas Distributors v. FERC, 824 F. 2d 981 (CADC 1987) — the Court of Appeals concluded that even though FERC’s general authority to order open access was “limited,” the statute made an exception “where FERC finds undue discrimination.” 225 F. 3d, at 687-688.
In its discussion of “Federal Versus State Jurisdiction over Transmission Services,” id., at 690-696, the Court of Appeals also endorsed FERC’s reasoning. The Court of Appeals first addressed the complaints of the state regulatory commissions that Order No. 888 “went too far” by going beyond the regulation of wholesale transactions and “asserting] jurisdiction over all unbundled retail transmissions.” Id,, at 691,692. The Court of Appeals concluded that the plain language of §201 of the FPA, which this Court has construed broadly, supported FERC’s regulation of transmissions in interstate commerce that were part of unbundled retail sales, as §201 gives FERC jurisdiction over the “transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce.” 16 U. S. C. § 824(b)(1). Even if the FPA were ambiguous, the Court of Appeals explained that, given the technological complexities of the national grids, it would have deferred to the Commission’s interpretation of §201 “as giving it jurisdiction over both wholesale and retail transmissions.” 225 F. 3d, at 694.
The Court of Appeals next addressed the complaints of transmission-dependent producers and wholesalers that Order No. 888 did not “go far enough.” Id., at 692. The Court of Appeals was not persuaded that FERC’s assertion of jurisdiction over unbundled retail transmission required FERC to assert jurisdiction over bundled retail transmissions or to mandate unbundling of retail transmissions. Id., at 694. Noting that the FPA “clearly contemplates state jurisdiction over local distribution facilities and retail sales,” the Court of Appeals held:
“A regulator could reasonably construe transmissions bundled with generation and delivery services and sold to a consumer for a single charge as either transmission services in interstate commerce or as an integral component of a retail sale. Yet FERC has jurisdiction over one, while the states have jurisdiction over the other. FERC’s decision to characterize bundled transmissions as part of retail sales subject to state jurisdiction therefore represents a statutorily permissible policy choice to which we must also defer under Chevron [U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 842-843 (1984)].” Id., at 694-695.
Because of the importance of the proceeding, we granted both the petition of the State of New York et al. (collectively New York) questioning FERC’s assertion of jurisdiction over unbundled retail transmissions and the petition of Enron Power Marketing, Inc. (Enron), questioning FERC’s refusal to assert jurisdiction over bundled retail transmissions. 531 U. S. 1189 (2001). We address these two questions separately. At the outset, however, we note that no petitioner questions the validity of the order insofar as it applies to wholesale transactions: The parties dispute only the proper scope of FERC’s jurisdiction over retail transmissions. Furthermore, we are not confronted with any factual issues. Finally, we agree with FERC that transmissions on the interconnected national grids constitute transmissions in interstate commerce. See, e. g., FPC v. Florida Power & Light Co., 404 U. S. 453, 466-467 (1972); n. 5, supra.
Ill
The first question is whether FERC exceeded its jurisdiction by including unbundled retail transmissions within the scope of its open access requirements in Order No. 888. New York argues that FERC overstepped in this regard, and that such transmissions — because they are part of retail transactions — are properly the subject of state regulation. New York insists that the jurisdictional line between the States and FERC falls between the wholesale and retail markets.
As the Court of Appeals explained, however, the landscape of the electric industry has changed since the enactment of the FPA, when the electricity universe was “neatly divided into spheres of retail versus wholesale sales.” 225 F. 3d, at 691. As the Court of Appeals also explained, the plain language of the FPA readily supports FERC’s claim of jurisdiction. Section 201(b) of the FPA states that FERC’s jurisdiction includes “the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce” and “the sale of electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce.” 16 U. S. C. § 824(b). The unbundled retail transmissions targeted by FERC are indeed transmissions of “electric energy in interstate commerce,” because of the nature of the national grid. There is no language in the statute limiting FERC’s transmission jurisdiction to the wholesale market, although the statute does limit FERC’s sale jurisdiction to that at wholesale. See ibid.; cf. FPC v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 406 U. S. 621, 636 (1972) (interpreting similar provisions of the Natural Gas Act, 15 U. S. C. § 717(b), to mean that FPC jurisdiction “applies to interstate 'transportation’ regardless of whether the gas transported is ultimately sold retail or wholesale”).
In the face of this clear statutory language, New York advances three arguments in support of its submission that the statute draws a bright jurisdictional line between wholesale transactions and retail transactions. First, New York contends that the Court of Appeals applied an erroneous standard of review because it ignored the presumption against federal pre-emption of state law; second, New York claims that other statutory language and legislative history shows a congressional intent to safeguard pre-existing state regulation of the delivery of electricity to retail customers; and third, New York argues that FERC jurisdiction over retail transmissions would impede sound energy policy. These arguments are unpersuasive.
The Presumption against Pre-emption
Pre-emption of state law by federal law can raise two quite different legal questions. The Court has most often stated a “presumption against pre-emption” when a controversy concerned not the scope of the Federal Government’s authority to displace state action, but rather whether a given state authority conflicts with, and thus has been displaced by, the existence of Federal Government authority. See, e. g., Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 U. S. 707, 715 (1985) (citing cases); see also Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U. S. 470, 485 (1996); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U. S. 504, 518 (1992). In such a situation, the Court “‘start[s] with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded... unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.’ ” Hillsborough County, 471 U. S., at 715 (quoting Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U. S. 519, 525 (1977)). These are not such cases, however, because the question presented does not concern the validity of a conflicting state law or regulation.
The other context in which “pre-emption” arises concerns the rule “that a federal agency may pre-empt state law only when and if it is acting within the scope of its congressionally delegated authority[,]... [for] an agency literally has no power to act, let alone pre-empt the validly enacted legislation of a sovereign State, unless and until Congress confers power upon it.” Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U. S. 355, 374 (1986). This is the sort of case we confront here — defining the proper scope of the federal power. Such a case does not involve a “presumption against pre-emption,” as New York argues, but rather requires us to be certain that Congress has conferred authority on the agency. As we have explained, the best way to answer such a question— i. e., whether federal power may be exercised in an area of pre-existing state regulation — “is to examine the nature and scope of the authority granted by Congress to the agency.” Ibid. In other words, we must interpret the statute to determine whether Congress has given FERC the power to act as it has, and we do so without any presumption one way or the other.
As noted above, the text of the FPA gives FERC jurisdiction over the “transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce and... the sale of electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce.” 16 U. S. C. § 824(b). The references to “transmission” in commerce and “sale” at wholesale were made part of §201 of the statute when it was enacted in 1935. Subsections (c) and (d) of § 201 explain, respectively, the meaning of the terms “transmission” and “sale of electric energy at wholesale.” This statutory text thus unambiguously authorizes FERC to assert jurisdiction over two separate activities — transmitting and selling. It is true that FERC’s jurisdiction over the sale of power has been specifically confined to the wholesale market. However, FERC’s jurisdiction over electricity transmissions contains no such limitation. Because the FPA authorizes FERC’s jurisdiction over interstate transmissions, without regard to whether the transmissions are sold to a reseller or directly to a consumer, FERC’s exercise of this power is valid.
Legislative History
Attempting to discredit this straightforward analysis of the statutory language, New York calls our attention to numerous statements in the legislative history indicating that the 1935 Congress intended to do no more than close the “Attleboro gap,” by providing for federal regulation of wholesale, interstate electricity transactions that the Court had held to be beyond the reach of state authority in Attleboro, 273 U. S., at 89. To support this argument, and to demonstrate that the 1935 Congress did not intend to supplant any traditionally state-held jurisdiction, New York points to language added to the FPA in the course of the legislative process that evidences a clear intent to preserve state jurisdiction over local facilities. For example, § 201(a) provides that federal regulation is “to extend only to those matters which are not subject to regulation by the States.” 16 U. S. C. § 824(a). And § 201(b) states that FERC has no jurisdiction “over facilities used for the generation of electric energy or over facilities used in local distribution or only for the transmission of electric energy in intrastate commerce, or over facilities for the transmission of electric energy consumed wholly by the transmitter.” 16 U. S. C. § 824(b).
It is clear that the enactment of the FPA in 1935 closed the “Attleboro gap” by authorizing federal regulation of interstate, wholesale sales of electricity — the precise subject matter beyond the jurisdiction of the States in Attleboro. And it is true that the above-quoted language from § 201(a) concerning the States’ reserved powers is consistent with the view that the FPA was no more than a gap-closing statute. It is, however, perfectly clear that the original FPA did a good deal more than close the gap in state power identified in Attleboro. The FPA authorized federal regulation not only of wholesale sales that had been beyond the reach of state power, but also the regulation of wholesale sales that had been previously subject to state regulation. See, e. g., Attleboro, 273 U. S., at 85-86 (noting, prior to the enactment of the FPA, that States could regulate aspects of interstate wholesale sales, as long as such regulation did not directly burden interstate commerce). More importantly, as discussed above, the FPA authorized federal regulation of interstate transmissions as well as of interstate wholesale sales, and such transmissions were not of concern in Attle-boro. Thus, even if Attleboro catalyzed the enactment of the FPA, Attleboro does not define the outer limits of the statute’s coverage.
Furthermore, the portion of § 201(a) cited by New York concerning the preservation of existing state jurisdiction is actually consistent with Order No. 888, because unbundled interstate transmissions of electric energy have never been “subject to regulation by the States,” 16 U. S. C. § 824(a). Indeed, unbundled transmissions have been a recent development. As FERC explained, at the time that the FPA was enacted, transmissions were bundled with the energy itself, and electricity was delivered to both wholesale and retail customers as a complete, bundled package. Order No. 888, at 31,639. Thus, in 1935, there was neither state nor federal regulation of what did not exist.
Moreover, we have described the precise reserved state powers language in § 201(a) as a mere “ ‘policy declaration’ ” that “ ‘cannot nullify a clear and specific grant of jurisdiction, even if the particular grant seems inconsistent with the broadly expressed purpose.’” FPC v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 376 U. S. 205, 215 (1964) (quoting Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. FPC, 324 U. S. 515, 527 (1945)); see also United States v. Public Util. Comm’n of Cal., 345 U. S. 295, 311 (1953). Because the FPA contains such “a clear and specific grant of jurisdiction” to FERC over interstate transmissions, as discussed above, the prefatory language cited by New York does not undermine FERC’s jurisdiction.
New York is correct to point out that the legislative history is replete with statements describing Congress’ intent to preserve state jurisdiction over local facilities. The senti-. ment expressed in those statements is incorporated in the second sentence of § 201(b) of the FPA, as codified in 16 U. S. C. § 824(b), which provides:
“The Commission shall have jurisdiction over all facilities for such transmission or sale of electric energy, but shall not have jurisdiction, except as specifically provided in this subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter, over facilities used for the generation of electric energy or over facilities used in local distribution or only for the transmission of electric energy in intrastate commerce, or over facilities for the transmission of electric energy consumed wholly by the transmitter.”
Yet, Order No. 888 does not even arguably affect the States’ jurisdiction over three of these subjects: generation facilities, transmissions in intrastate commerce, or transmissions consumed by the transmitter. Order No. 888 does discuss local distribution facilities, and New York argues that, as a result, FERC has improperly invaded the States’ authority “over facilities used in local distribution,” 16 U. S. C. § 824(b). However, FERC has not attempted to control local distribution facilities through Order No. 888. To the contrary, FERC has made clear that it does not have jurisdiction over such facilities, Order No. 888, at 31,969, and has merely set forth a seven-factor test for identifying these facilities, without purporting to regulate them, id., at 31,770-31,771.
New York also correctly states that the legislative history demonstrates Congress’ interest in retaining state jurisdiction over retail sales. But again, FERC has carefully avoided assuming such jurisdiction, noting repeatedly that “the FPA does not give the Commission jurisdiction over sales of electric energy at retail.” Id., at 31,969. Because federal authority has been asserted only over unbundled transmissions, New York retains jurisdiction of the ultimate sale of the energy. And, as discussed below, FERC did not assert jurisdiction over bundled retail transmissions, leaving New York with control over even the transmission component of bundled retail sales.
Our evaluation of the extensive legislative history reviewed in New York’s brief is affected by the importance of the changes in the electricity industry that have occurred since the FPA was enacted in 1935. No party to these cases has presented evidence that Congress foresaw the industry’s transition from one of local, self-sufficient monopolies to one of nationwide competition and electricity transmission. Nor is there evidence that the 1935 Congress foresaw the possibility of unbundling electricity transmissions from sales. More importantly, there is no evidence that if Congress had foreseen the developments to which FERC has responded, Congress would have objected to FERC’s interpretation of the FPA. Whatever persuasive effect legislative history may have in other contexts, here it is not particularly helpful because of the interim developments in the electric industry. Thus, we are left with the statutory text as the clearest guidance. That text unquestionably supports FERC’s jurisdiction to order unbundling of wholesale transactions (which none of the parties before us questions), as well as to regulate the unbundled transmissions of electricity retailers.
Sound Energy Policy
New York argues that FERC jurisdiction over unbundled retail transmission will impede sound energy policy. Specifically, New York cites the States’ interest in overseeing the maintenance of transmission lines and the siting of new lines. It is difficult for us to evaluate the force of these arguments because New York has not separately analyzed the impact of the loss of control over unbundled retail transmissions, as opposed to the loss of control over retail transmissions generally, and FERC has only regulated unbundled transactions. Moreover, FERC has recognized that the States retain significant control over local matters even when retail transmissions are unbundled. See, e. g., Order No. 888, at 31,782, n. 543 (“Among other things, Congress left to the States authority to regulate generation and transmission siting”); id., at 31,782, n. 544 (“This Final Rule will not affect or encroach upon state authority in such traditional areas as the authority over local service issues, including reliability of local service; administration of integrated resource planning and utility buy-side and demand-side decisions, including DSM [demand-side management]; authority over utility generation and resource portfolios; and authority to impose nonbypassable distribution or retail stranded cost charges”). We do note that the Edison Electric Institute, which is a party to these cases, and which represents that its members own approximately 70% of the transmission facilities in the country, does not endorse New York’s objections to Order No. 888. And, regardless of their persuasiveness, the sort of policy arguments forwarded by New York are properly addressed to the Commission or to the Congress, not to this Court. E. g., Chemehuevi Tribe v. FPC, 420 U. S. 395, 423 (1975).
IV
Objecting to FERC’s order from the opposite direction, Enron argues that the FPA gives FERC the power to apply its open access remedy to bundled retail transmissions of electricity, and, given FERC’s findings of undue discrimination, that FERC had a duty to do so. In making this argument, Enron persistently claims that FERC held that it had no jurisdiction to grant the relief that Enron seeks. That assumption is incorrect: FERC chose not to assert such jurisdiction, but it did not hold itself powerless to claim jurisdiction. Indeed, FERC explicitly reserved decision on the jurisdictional issue that Enron claims FERC decided. See Order No. 888, at 31,699 (explaining that Enron’s position raises “numerous difficult jurisdictional issues that we believe are more appropriately considered when the Commission reviews unbundled retail transmission tariffs that may come before us in the context of a state retail wheeling program”). Absent Enron’s flawed assumption, FERC’s ruling is clearly acceptable.
As noted above, in both Order No. 888 and rehearing Order No. 888-A, FERC gave two reasons for refusing to extend its open access remedy to bundled retail transmissions. First, FERC explained that such relief was not “necessary.” Order No. 888, at 31,699; see also Order No. 888-A, at 30,225. Second, FERC noted that the regulation of bundled retail transmissions “raises numerous difficult jurisdictional issues” that did not need to be resolved in the present context. Order No. 888, at 31,699; see also Order No. 888-A, at 30,225-30,226. Both of these reasons provide valid support for FERC’s decision not to regulate bundled retail transmissions.
First, with respect to FERC’s determination that it was not “necessary” to include bundled retail transmissions in its remedy, it must be kept in mind exactly what it was that FERC sought to remedy in the first place: a problem with the wholesale power market. FERC’s findings, as Enron itself recognizes, concerned electric utilities’ use of their market power to “‘deny their wholesale customers access to competitively priced electric generation,’” thereby “‘denying] consumers the substantial benefits of lower electricity prices.’ ” Brief for Petitioner in No. 00-809, pp. 12-13 (quoting NPRM 33,052) (emphasis added). The title of Order No. 888 confirms FERC’s focus: “Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Biscriminatory Transmission Services....” Order No. 888, at 31,632 (emphasis added). Indeed, FERC has, from the outset, identified its goal as “facilitat[ing] competitive wholesale electric power markets.” NPRM 33,049 (emphasis added).
To remedy the wholesale discrimination it found, FERC chose to regulate all wholesale transmissions. It also regulated unbundled retail transmissions, as was within its power to do. See Part III, supra. However, merely because FERC believed that those steps were appropriate to remedy discrimination
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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I
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
CHIEF Justice Rehnquist
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner Walter L. Nixon, Jr., asks this Court to decide whether Senate Rule XI, which allows a committee of Senators to hear evidence against an individual who has been impeached and to report that evidence to the full Senate, violates the Impeachment Trial Clause, Art. I, §3, cl. 6. That Clause provides that the “Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments.” But before we reach the merits of such a claim, we must decide whether it is “justicia-ble,” that is, whether it is a claim that may be resolved by the courts. We conclude that it is not.
Nixon, a former Chief Judge of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, was convicted by a jury of two counts of making false statements before a federal grand jury and sentenced to prison. See United States v. Nixon, 816 F. 2d 1022 (CA6 1987). The grand jury investigation stemmed from reports that Nixon had accepted a gratuity from a Mississippi businessman in exchange for asking a local district attorney to halt the prosecution of the businessman’s son. Because Nixon refused to resign from his office as a United States District Judge, he continued to collect his judicial salary while serving out his prison sentence. See H. R. Rep. No. 101-36, p. 13 (1989).
On May 10, 1989, the House of Representatives adopted three articles of impeachment for high crimes and misdemeanors. The first two articles charged Nixon with giving false testimony before the grand jury and the third article charged him with bringing disrepute on the Federal Judiciary. See 135 Cong. Rec. H1811.
After the House presented the articles to the Senate, the Senate voted to invoke its own Impeachment Rule XI, under which the presiding officer appoints a committee of Senators to “receive evidence and take testimony.” Senate Impeachment Rule XI, reprinted in Senate Manual, S. Doc. No. 101-1, p. 186 (1989). The Senate committee held four days of hearings, during which 10 witnesses, including Nixon, testified. S. Rep. No. 101-164, p. 4 (1989). Pursuant to Rule XI, the committee presented the full Senate with a complete transcript of the proceeding and a Report stating the uncontested facts and summarizing the evidence on the contested facts. See id., at 3-4. Nixon and the House impeachment managers submitted extensive final briefs to the full Senate and delivered arguments from the Senate floor during the three hours set aside for oral argument in front of that body. Nixon himself gave a personal appeal, and several Senators posed questions directly to both parties. 135 Cong. Rec. S14493-14517 (Nov. 1, 1989). The Senate voted by more than the constitutionally required two-thirds majority to convict Nixon on the first two articles. Id., at S14635 (Nov. 3, 1989). The presiding officer then entered judgment removing Nixon from his office as United States District Judge.
Nixon thereafter commenced the present suit, arguing that Senate Rule XI violates the constitutional grant of authority to the Senate to “try” all impeachments because it prohibits the whole Senate from taking part in the eviden-tiary hearings. See Art. I, § 3, cl. 6. Nixon sought a declaratory judgment that his impeachment conviction was void and that his judicial salary and privileges should be reinstated. The District Court held that his claim was nonjusti-ciable, 744 F. Supp. 9 (DC 1990), and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit agreed. 290 U. S. App. D. C. 420, 938 F. 2d 239 (1991). We granted certiorari. 502 U. S. 1090 (1992).
A controversy is nonjusticiable — i. e., involves a political question — where there is “a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it . . . .” Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 217 (1962). But the courts must, in the first instance, interpret the text in question and determine whether and to what extent the issue is textually committed. See ibid.; Powell v. McCormack, 395 U. S. 486, 519 (1969). As the discussion that follows makes clear, the concept of a textual commitment to a coordinate political department is not completely separate from the concept of a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; the lack of judicially manageable standards may strengthen the con-elusion that there is a textually demonstrable commitment to a coordinate branch.
In this case, we must examine Art. I, §3, cl. 6, to determine the scope of authority conferred upon the Senate by the Framers regarding impeachment. It provides:
“The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members present.”
The language and structure of this Clause are revealing. The first sentence is a grant of authority to the Senate, and the word “sole” indicates that this authority is reposed in the Senate and nowhere else. The next two sentences specify requirements to which the Senate proceedings shall conform: The Senate shall be on oath or affirmation, a two-thirds vote is required to convict, and when the President is tried the Chief Justice shall preside.
Petitioner argues that the word “try” in the first sentence imposes by implication an additional requirement on the Senate in that the proceedings must be in the nature of a judicial trial. From there petitioner goes on to argue that this limitation precludes the Senate from delegating to a select committee the task of hearing the testimony of witnesses, as was done pursuant to Senate Rule XI. “ ‘[T]ry’ means more than simply Vote on’ or ‘review’ or ‘judge.’ In 1787 and today, trying a case means hearing the evidence, not scanning a cold record.” Brief for Petitioner 25. Petitioner concludes from this that courts may review whether or not the Senate “tried” him before convicting him.
There are several difficulties with this position which lead us ultimately to reject it. The word “try,” both in 1787 and later, has considerably broader meanings than those to which petitioner would limit it. Older dictionaries define try as “[t]o examine” or “[t]o examine as a judge.” See 2 S. Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language (1785). In more modern usage the term has various meanings. For example, try can mean “to examine or investigate judicially,” “to conduct the trial of,” or “to put to the test by experiment, investigation, or trial.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2457 (1971). Petitioner submits that “try,” as contained in T. Sheridan, Dictionary of the English Language (1796), means “to examine as a judge; to bring before a judicial tribunal.” Based on the variety of definitions, however, we cannot say that the Framers used the word “try” as an implied limitation on the method by which the Senate might proceed in trying impeachments. “As a rule the Constitution speaks in general terms, leaving Congress to deal with subsidiary matters of detail as the public interests and changing conditions may require . . . .” Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U. S. 368, 376 (1921).
The conclusion that the use of the word “try” in the first sentence of the Impeachment Trial Clause lacks sufficient precision to afford any judicially manageable standard of review of the Senate’s actions is fortified by the existence of the three very specific requirements that the Constitution does impose on the Senate when trying impeachments: The Members must be under oath, a two-thirds vote is required to convict, and the Chief Justice presides when the President is tried. These limitations are quite precise, and their nature suggests that the Framers did not intend to impose additional limitations on the form of the Senate proceedings by the use of the word “try” in the first sentence.
Petitioner devotes only two pages in his brief to negating the significance of the word “sole” in the first sentence of Clause 6. As noted above, that sentence provides that “[t]he Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments.” We think that the word “sole” is of considerable significance. Indeed, the word “sole” appears only one other time in the Constitution — with respect to the House of Representatives’ “sole Power of Impeachment.” Art. I, §2, cl. 5 (emphasis added). The commonsense meaning of the word “sole” is that the Senate alone shall have authority to determine whether an individual should be acquitted or convicted. The dictionary definition bears this out. “Sole” is defined as “having no companion,” “solitary,” “being the only one,” and “functioning ... independently and without assistance or interference.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2168 (1971). If the courts may review the actions of the Senate in order to determine whether that body “tried” an impeached official, it is difficult to see how the Senate would be “functioning . . . independently and without .assistance or interference.”
Nixon asserts that the word “sole” has no substantive meaning. To support this contention, he argues that the word is nothing more than a mere “cosmetic edit” added by. the Committee of Style after the delegates had approved the substance of the Impeachment Trial Clause. There are two difficulties with this argument. First, accepting as we must the proposition that the Committee of Style had no authority from the Convention to alter the meaning of the Clause, see 2 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, p. 553 (M. Far-rand ed. 1966) (hereinafter Farrand), we must presume that the Committee’s reorganization or rephrasing accurately captured what the Framers meant in their unadorned language. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U. S., at 538-539. That is, we must presume that the Committee did its job. This presumption is buttressed by the fact that the Constitutional Convention voted on, and accepted, the Committee of Style’s linguistic version. See 2 Farrand 663-667. We agree with the Government that “the word ‘sole’ is entitled to no less weight than any other word of the text, because the Committee revision perfected what ‘had been agreed to.’ ” Brief for Respondents 25. Second, carrying Nixon’s argument to its logical conclusion would constrain us to say that the second to last draft would govern in every instance where the Committee of Style added an arguably substantive word. Such a result is at odds with the fact that the Convention passed the Committee’s version, and with the well-established rule that the plain language of the enacted text is the best indicator of intent.
Petitioner also contends that the word “sole” should not bear on the question of justiciability because Art. II, § 2, cl. 1, of the Constitution grants the President pardon authority “except in Cases of Impeachment.” He argues that such a limitation on the President’s pardon power would not have been necessary if the Framers thought that the Senate alone had authority to deal with such questions. But the granting of a pardon is in no sense an overturning of a judgment of conviction by some other tribunal; it is “[a]n executive action that mitigates or sets aside punishment for a crime.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1113 (6th ed. 1990) (emphasis added). Authority in the Senate to determine procedures for trying an impeached official, unreviewable by the courts, is therefore not at all inconsistent with authority in the President to grant a pardon to the convicted official. The exception from the President’s pardon authority of cases of impeachment was a separate determination by the Framers that executive clemency should not be available in such cases.
Petitioner finally argues that even if significance be.attributed to the word “sole” in the first sentence of the Clause, the authority granted is to the Senate, and this means that “the Senate — not the courts, not a lay jury, not a Senate Committee — shall try impeachments.” Brief for Petitioner 42. It would be possible to read the first sentence of the Clause this way, but it is not a natural reading. Petitioner’s interpretation would bring into judicial purview not merely the sort of claim made by petitioner, but other similar claims based on the conclusion that the word “Senate” has imposed by implication limitations on procedures which the Senate might adopt. Such limitations would be inconsistent with the construction of the Clause as a whole, which, as we have noted, sets out three express limitations in separate sentences.
The history and contemporary understanding of the impeachment provisions support our reading of the constitutional language. The parties do not offer evidence of a single word in the history of the Constitutional Convention or in contemporary commentary that even alludes to the possibility of judicial review in the context of the impeachment powers. See 290 U. S. App. D. C., at 424, 938 F. 2d, at 243; R. Berger, Impeachment: The Constitutional Problems 116 (1973). This silence is quite meaningful in light of the several explicit references to the availability of judicial review as a check on the Legislature’s power with respect to bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, and statutes. See The Federalist No. 78, p. 524 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (“Limitations . . . can be preserved in practice no other way than through the medium of the courts of justice”).
The Framers labored over the question of where the impeachment power should lie. Significantly, in at least two considered scenarios the power was placed with the Federal Judiciary. See 1 Farrand 21-22 (Virginia Plan); id., at 244 (New Jersey Plan). Indeed, James Madison and the Committee of Detail proposed that the Supreme Court should have the power to determine impeachments. See 2 id., at 551 (Madison); id., at 178-179,186 (Committee of Detail). Despite these proposals, the Convention ultimately decided that the Senate would have “the sole Power to try all Impeachments.” Art. I, §3, cl. 6. According to Alexander Hamilton, the Senate was the “most fit depositary of this important trust” because its Members are representatives of the people. See The Federalist No. 65, p. 440 (J. Cooke ed. 1961). The Supreme Court was not the proper body because the Framers “doubted whether the members of that tribunal would, at all times, be endowed with so eminent a portion of fortitude as would be called for in the execution of so difficult a task” or whether the Court “would possess the degree of credit and authority” to carry out its judgment if it conflicted with the accusation brought by the Legislature — the people’s representative. See id., at 441. In addition, the Framers believed the Court was too small in number: “The awful discretion, which a court of impeachments must necessarily have, to doom to honor or to infamy the most confidential and the most distinguished characters of the community, forbids the commitment of the trust to a small number of persons.” Id., at 441-442.
There are two additional reasons why the Judiciary, and the Supreme Court in particular, were not chosen to have any role in impeachments. First, the Framers recognized that most likely there would be two sets of proceedings for individuals who commit impeachable offenses — the impeachment trial and a separate criminal trial. In fact, the Constitution explicitly provides for two separate proceedings. See Art. I, §3, cl. 7. The Framers deliberately separated the two forums to avoid raising the specter of bias and to ensure independent judgments:
“Would it be proper that the persons, who had disposed of his fame and his most valuable rights as a citizen in one trial, should in another trial, for the same offence, be also the disposers of his life and his fortune? Would there not be the greatest reason to apprehend, that error in the first sentence would be the parent of error in the second sentence? That the strong bias of one decision would be apt to overrule the influence of any new lights, which might be brought to vary the complexion of another decision?” The Federalist No. 65, p. 442 (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
Certainly judicial review of the Senate’s “trial” would introduce the same risk of bias as would participation in the trial itself.
Second, judicial review would be inconsistent with the Framers’ insistence that our system be one of checks and balances. In our constitutional system, impeachment was designed to be the only check on the Judicial Branch by the Legislature. On the topic of judicial accountability, Hamilton wrote:
“The precautions for their responsibility are comprised in the article respecting impeachments. They are liable to be impeached for mal-conduct by the house of representatives, and tried by the senate, and if convicted, may be dismissed from office and disqualified for holding any other. This is the only provision on the point, which is consistent with the necessary independence of the judicial character, and is the only one which we find in our own constitution in respect to our own judges.” Id., No. 79, at 532-533 (emphasis added).
Judicial involvement in impeachment proceedings, even if only for purposes of judicial review, is counterintuitive because it would eviscerate the “important constitutional check” placed on the Judiciary by the Framers. See id., No. 81, at 545. Nixon’s argument would place final reviewing authority with respect to impeachments in the hands of the same body that the impeachment process is meant to regulate.
Nevertheless, Nixon argues that judicial review is necessary in order to place a check on the Legislature. Nixon fears that if the Senate is given unreviewable authority to interpret the Impeachment Trial Clause, there is a grave risk that the Senate will usurp judicial power. The Framers anticipated this objection and created two constitutional safeguards to keep the Senate in check. The first safeguard is that the whole of the impeachment power is divided between the two legislative bodies, with the House given the right to accuse and the Senate given the right to judge. Id., No. 66, at 446. This split of authority “avoids the inconvenience of making the same persons both accusers and judges; and guards against the danger of persecution from the preva-lency of a factious spirit in either of those branches.” The second safeguard is the two-thirds supermajority vote requirement. Hamilton explained that “[a]s the concurrence of two-thirds of the senate will be requisite to a condemnation, the security to innocence, from this additional circumstance, will be as complete as itself can desire.” Ibid.
In addition to the textual commitment argument, we are persuaded that the lack of finality and the difficulty of fashioning relief counsel against justiciability. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S., at 210. We agree with the Court of Appeals that opening the door of judicial review to the procedures used by the Senate in trying impeachments would “expose the political life of the country to months, or perhaps years, of chaos.” 290 U. S. App. D. C., at 427, 938 F. 2d, at 246. This lack of finality would manifest itself most dramatically if the President were impeached. The legitimacy of any successor, and hence his effectiveness, would be impaired severely, not merely while the judicial process was running its course, but during any retrial that a differently constituted Senate might conduct if its first judgment of conviction were invalidated. Equally uncertain is the question of what relief a court may give other than simply setting aside the judgment of conviction. Could it order the reinstatement of a convicted federal judge, or order Congress to create an additional judgeship if the seat had been filled in the interim?
Petitioner finally contends that a holding of nonjusticiability cannot be reconciled with our opinion in Powell v. McCormack, 395 U. S. 486 (1969). The relevant issue in Powell was whether courts could review the House of Representatives’ conclusion that Powell was “unqualified” to sit as a Member because he had been accused of misappropriating public funds and abusing the process of the New York courts. We stated that the question of justiciability turned on whether the Constitution committed authority to the House to judge its Members’ qualifications, and if so, the extent of that commitment. Id., at 519, 521. Article I, § 5, provides that “Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members.” In turn, Art. I, §2, specifies three requirements for membership in the House: The candidate must be at least 25 years of age, a citizen of the United States for no less than seven years, and an inhabitant of the State he is chosen to represent. We held that, in light of the three requirements specified in the Constitution, the word “qualifications” — of which the House was to be the Judge — was of a precise, limited nature. Id., at 522; see also The Federalist No. 60, p. 409 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (“The qualifications of the persons who may choose or be chosen, as has been remarked upon another occasion, are defined and fixed in the constitution; and are unalterable by the legislature”) (emphasis added) (quoted in Powell, supra, at 539).
Our conclusion in Powell was based on the fixed meaning of “[qualifications” set forth in Art. I, § 2. The claim by the House that its power to “be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members” was a textual commitment of unreviewable authority was defeated by the existence of this separate provision specifying the only qualifications which might be imposed for House membership. The decision as to whether a Member satisfied these qualifications was placed with the House, but the decision as to what these qualifications consisted of was not.
In the case before us, there is no separate provision of the Constitution that could be defeated by allowing the Senate final authority to determine the meaning of the word “try” in the Impeachment Trial Clause. We agree with Nixon that courts possess power to review either legislative or executive action that transgresses identifiable textual limits. As we have made clear, “whether the action of [either the Legislative or Executive Branch] exceeds whatever authority has been committed, is itself a delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation, and is a responsibility of this Court as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution.” Baker v. Carr, supra, at 211; accord, Powell, supra, at 521. But we conclude, after exercising that delicate responsibility, that the word “try” in the Impeachment Trial Clause does not provide an identifiable textual limit on the authority which is committed to the Senate.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
Specifically, Rule XI provides:
“[I]n the trial of any impeachment the Presiding Officer of the Senate, if the Senate so orders, shall appoint a committee of Senators to receive evidence and take testimony at such times and places as the committee may determine, and for such purpose the committee so appointed and the chairman thereof, to be elected by the committee, shall (unless otherwise ordered by the Senate) exercise all the powers and functions conferred upon the Senate and the Presiding Officer of the Senate, respectively, under the rules of procedure and practice in the Senate when sitting on impeachment trials.
“Unless otherwise ordered by the Senate, the rules of procedure and practice in the Senate when sitting on impeachment trials shall govern the procedure and practice of the committee so appointed. The committee so appointed shall report to the Senate in writing a certified copy of the transcript of the proceedings and testimony had and given before such committee, and such report shall be received by the Senate and the evidence so received and the testimony so taken shall be considered to all intents and purposes, subject to the right of the Senate to determine competency, relevancy, and materiality, as having been received and taken before the Senate, but nothing herein shall prevent the Senate from sending for any witness and hearing his testimony in open Senate, or by order of the Senate having the entire trial in open Senate.”
Nixon contends that justiciability should not hang on the mere fact that the Judiciary’s interest may be implicated or affected by the legislative action in question. In support, he cites our decisions in Mistretta v. United States, 488 U. S. 361 (1989), and Morrison v. Olson, 487 U. S. 654 (1988). These cases do not advance his argument, however, since neither addressed the issue of justiciability. More importantly, neither case involved a situation in which judicial review would remove the only check placed on the Judicial Branch by the Framers.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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I
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
From the time petitioner Omaha National Bank sought approval from the Regional Administrator of National Banks of its drive-in/walk-in facility until after the en banc decision of the Court of Appeals, Nebraska law permitted a state-chartered bank to operate one “attached auxiliary teller office” and not more than two “detached auxiliary teller offices.” Neb. Rev. Stat. § 8-157 (2) (1974). The two types of “auxiliary teller offices” were defined in Nebraska Department of Banking Reg. § 8-157-01 (1970). The Court of Appeals found it “abundantly clear” that a state bank situated like Omaha National would not be permitted to operate the added facility, and ruled that under 12 U. S. C. § 36, see First Nat. Bank v. Dickinson, 396 U. S. 122, 135 (1969), the facility was a branch which the bank was not permitted to operate. 530 F. 2d 755, 762 (CA8 1976).
Since the en banc decision, § 8-157 (2) has been amended by Legislative Bill 763, approved by the Governor on March 11, 1976, to redefine “auxiliary teller” facilities which state banks may operate. It appearing that this amendment, which will become effective in July 1976, may have a substantial bearing on the outcome of this case, the petition for certiorari is granted, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration in light of Legislative Bill 763.
So ordered.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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I
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Ginsburg
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U. S. 304 (2002), this Court held that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of “cruel and unusual punishments” bars execution of mentally retarded offenders. Prior to Atkins, the Court had determined that mental retardation merited consideration as a mitigating factor, but did not bar imposition of the death penalty. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U. S. 302 (1989).
In 1992, nearly a decade before the Court’s decision in Atkins, respondent Michael Bies was tried and convicted in Ohio of the aggravated murder, kidnaping, and attempted rape of a ten-year-old boy. Instructed at the sentencing stage to weigh mitigating circumstances (including evidence of Bies’ mild to borderline mental retardation) against aggravating factors (including the brutality of the crime), the jury recommended a sentence of death, which the trial court imposed. Ohio’s appellate courts affirmed the conviction and sentence. The Ohio Supreme Court, in its 1996 opinion on direct review, observed that Bies’ “mild to borderline mental retardation merit[ed] some weight in mitigation,” but concluded that “the aggravating circumstances outweigh[ed] the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Bies, 74 Ohio St. 3d 320, 328, 658 N. E. 2d 754, 761-762.
After this Court decided Atkins, the Ohio trial court ordered a full hearing on the question of Bies’ mental capacity. The federal courts intervened, however, granting habeas relief to Bies, and ordering the vacation of his death sentence. Affirming the District Court’s judgment, the Sixth Circuit reasoned that the Ohio Supreme Court, in 1996, had definitively determined, as a matter of fact, Bies’ mental retardation. That finding, the Court of Appeals concluded, established Bies’ “legal entitlement to a life sentence.” Bies v. Bagley, 519 F. 3d 324, 334, n. 6 (2008). Therefore, the Sixth Circuit ruled, the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Federal Constitution barred any renewed inquiry into the matter of Bies’ mental state.
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. The Sixth Circuit, in common with the District Court, fundamentally misperceived the application of the Double Jeopardy Clause and its issue preclusion (collateral estoppel) component. First, Bies was not “twice put in jeopardy.” He was sentenced to death, and Ohio sought no further prosecution or punishment. Instead of “serial prosecutions by the government^] this case involves serial efforts by the defendant to vacate his capital sentence.” Bies v. Bagley, 535 F. 3d 520, 531-532 (CA6 2008) (Sutton, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). Further, mental retardation for purposes of Atkins, and mental retardation as one mitigator to be weighed against aggravators, are discrete issues. Most grave among the Sixth Circuit’s misunderstandings, issue preclusion is a plea available to prevailing parties. The doctrine bars relitigation of determinations necessary to the ultimate outcome of a prior proceeding. The Ohio courts’ recognition of Bies’ mental state as a mitigating factor was hardly essential to the death sentence he received. On the contrary, the retardation evidence cut against the final judgment. Issue preclusion, in short, does not transform final judgment losers, in civil or criminal proceedings, into partially prevailing parties.
I
For his part in brutally causing the death of a ten-year-old boy, Bies was convicted by an Ohio jury of attempted rape, kidnaping, and aggravated murder with three death penalty specifications. App. 85; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2929.04(A)(3), (7) (Lexis 2006).
At sentencing, Bies presented testimony from clinical psychiatrist Donna E. Winter, who had evaluated him at the court’s order during the guilt phase and again before the mitigation hearing. App. 191,202. Bies did not qualify for a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, Dr. Winter con-eluded, because he knew the difference between right and wrong at the time of the offense. Id., at 36, 51, 198-200. Bies’ IQ, she further reported, fell in the 65-75 range, id., at 211-212, indicating that he is “mildly mentally retarded to borderline mentally retarded,” id., at 20-21,32,199-200,213. Dr. Winter also observed: “[Bies] goes about the community, unassisted [and] carries out the activities of daily life fairly independently.” Id., at 199. The State responded to Bies’ mitigating evidence by emphasizing the brutality of the murder and the risk of Bies’ future dangerousness. Instructed to weigh the mitigating circumstances against aggravating factors, the jury recommended a death sentence, which the trial court imposed. Id., at 88-89.
The Ohio Court of Appeals and Supreme Court each independently reviewed the evidence and affirmed. Id., at 84-108; Bies, 74 Ohio St. 3d 320, 658 N. E. 2d 754. Neither court devoted detailed attention to the issue of retardation. Both concluded that Bies’ mild to borderline mental retardation merited “some weight” in mitigation, as did his youth and lack of a criminal record. App. 105-106; 74 Ohio St. 3d, at 328, 658 N. E. 2d, at 761. The aggravating circumstances, each court found, overwhelmed the mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. App. 106; 74 Ohio St. 3d, at 328, 658 N. E. 2d, at 762. We denied Bies’ petition for a writ of certiorari. Bies v. Ohio, 517 U. S. 1238 (1996).
Bies then filed a petition for state postconviction relief, contending for the first time that the Eighth Amendment to the Federal Constitution prohibits execution of a mentally retarded defendant. The trial court agreed that Bies was “mildly mentally retarded,” but concluded that, under then-governing Ohio precedent, “a mildly mentally retarded defendant may be [p]unished by execution.” App. 153. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment, id., at 175-176, and the Ohio Supreme Court dismissed Bies’ appeal without an opinion, State v. Bies, 87 Ohio St. 3d 1440, 719 N. E. 2d 4 (1999) (Table).
Bies next filed a federal habeas petition in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. Soon after that filing, this Court held, in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U. S., at 321, that the Eighth Amendment prohibits execution of mentally retarded offenders. Our opinion did not provide definitive procedural or substantive guides for determining when a person who claims mental retardation “will be so impaired as to fall within [Atkins’ compass].” We “le[ft] to the States the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction.” Id., at 317 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Ohio heeded Atkins’ call six months later in State v. Lott, 97 Ohio St. 3d 303, 2002-Ohio-6625, 779 N. E. 2d 1011 (per curiam). At an Atkins hearing, the Ohio Supreme Court held, a defendant must prove: “(1) significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, (2) significant limitations in two or more adaptive skills, such as communication, self-care, and self-direction, and (3) onset before the age of 18.” 97 Ohio St. 3d, at 305, 779 N. E. 2d, at 1014. “IQ tests,” the court stated, “are one of the many factors that need to be considered, [but] they alone are not sufficient to make a final determination [of retardation].” Ibid. The court also announced “a rebuttable presumption that a defendant is not mentally retarded if his or her IQ is above 70.” Ibid.
The District Court stayed its proceedings on Bies’ federal habeas petition while Bies presented an Atkins claim to the state postconviction court. App. to Pet. for Cert. 83a. Bies there moved for summary judgment, arguing that the record established his mental retardation, and that the State was “precluded and estopped” from disputing it. Id., at 104a. The state court recognized that Atkins and Lott had materially changed the significance of a mental retardation finding. The court observed that mental retardation had not previously been established under the Atkins-Lott framework; given those precedent-setting decisions, the court concluded, “there is a serious issue as to Mr. Bies’ mental status.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 104a. Accordingly, the court denied summary judgment and ordered a full hearing on the Atkins claim.
Rather than proceeding with the hearing directed by the state court, Bies returned to the Federal District Court. He argued that the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, barred the State from relitigating the issue of his mental condition. App. to Pet. for Cert. 81a. The District Court granted the habeas petition and ordered vacation of Bies’ death sentence. Id., at 68a.
The Court of Appeals affirmed. 519 F. 3d, at 342. It concluded that Bies’ case was “controlled by” Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U. S. 436 (1970), which held that the doctrine of issue preclusion “is embodied in the Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy.” 519 F. 3d, at 332 (quoting 397 U. S., at 445). The Court of Appeals found all requirements for issue preclusion met in Bies’ case. It concluded, inter alia, that the Ohio Supreme Court, in resolving Bies’ direct appeal, had decided the issue of Bies’ mental retardation under the same standard later adopted in Lott. 519 F. 3d, at 336. Further, the Court of Appeals held, the state court’s recognition that Bies qualified as mentally retarded had been necessary to the judgment imposing the death sentence. “[Determining which mitigating factors are actually present,” the court reasoned, “is a necessary first step to determining whether those factors outweigh the aggravating circumstances.” Id., at 337.
The Court of Appeals denied the State’s petition for rehearing en banc. 535 F. 3d 520. Judge Clay, concurring, opined that Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U. S. 101 (2003), provided an additional, independent basis for affirmance. 535 F. 3d, at 523-524. Under that decision, he noted, jeopardy attaches, and relitigation is precluded, once a judge or jury has “acquitted” a capital defendant “by entering findings sufficient to establish legal entitlement to [a] life sentence.” Id., at 522 (quoting Sattazahn, 537 U. S., at 108-109). In Bies’ case, Judge Clay concluded, the Ohio courts’ determination of mental retardation “entitle[d]” Bies to a life sentence, and thus the Double Jeopardy Clause barred the State from disputing the issue of Bies’ mental retardation. 535 F. 3d, at 523-524.
Judge Sutton dissented from the denial of rehearing en banc. Sattazahn was inapposite, he maintained, because Bies was never “twice put in jeopardy.” 535 F. 3d, at 531 (internal quotation marks omitted). Nor, in Judge Sutton’s view, did Ashe support the panel’s decision, for issue preclusion did not come into play in Bies’ case. 535 F. 3d, at 532.
We granted certiorari, 555 U. S. 1131 (2009), and now reverse.
II
A
The alternative basis for decision offered at the rehearing stage in the Court of Appeals can be rejected without extensive explanation. The State did not “twice put [Bies] in jeopardy,” U. S. Const., Arndt. 5, in the core constitutional sense. “[T]he touchstone for double-jeopardy protection in capital-sentencing proceedings is whether there has been an ‘acquittal.’ ” Sattazahn, 537 U. S., at 109. Sattazahn offers Bies no aid. In that case, the defendant’s first capital jury had deadlocked at the penalty phase, and the court, as required by state law, entered a life sentence. Id., at 104-105. This Court held the Double Jeopardy Clause did not bar the State’s request for the death penalty at the defendant’s retrial, noting that “neither the judge nor the jury had acquitted the defendant in his first. .. proceeding by entering findings sufficient to establish legal entitlement to the life sentence.” Id., at 108-109 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, as in Sattazahn, there was no acquittal. Bies’ jury voted to impose the death penalty. At issue now is Bies’ “second run at vacating his death sentence,” 535 F. 3d, at 531 (Sutton, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc), not an effort by the State to retry him or to increase his punishment.
Nor did any state-court determination of Bies’ mental retardation “entitl[e]” him to a life sentence. Cf. id., at 523 (Clay, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc). At the time Bies was sentenced and on direct appeal, Penry, not Atkins, was this Court’s guiding decision. Under Penry, no single mitigator or aggravator was determinative of the judgment. Instead, the dispositive issue, correctly comprehended by the Ohio courts, was whether “the aggravating circumstances outweigh[ed] the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt.” Bies, 74 Ohio St. 3d, at 328, 658 N. E. 2d, at 762.
B
The Court of Appeals panel relied primarily on the doctrine of issue preclusion, recognized in Ashe to be “embodied in” the Double Jeopardy Clause. 397 U. S., at 445. Preclusion doctrine, however, does not bar a full airing of the issue whether Bies qualifies as mentally retarded under Atkins and Lott.
Issue preclusion bars successive litigation of “an issue of fact or law” that “is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and ... is essential to the judgment.” Restatement (Second) of Judgments §27 (1980) (hereinafter Restatement). If a judgment does not depend on a given determination, relitigation of that determination is not precluded. Id., §27, Comment h. In addition, even where the core requirements of issue preclusion are met, an exception to the general rule may apply when a “change in [the] applicable legal context” intervenes. Id., §28, Comment c.
As an initial matter, it is not clear from the spare statements of the Ohio appellate eourts that the issue of Bies’ mental retardation under the Lott test was actually determined at trial or during Bies’ direct appeal. No court found, for example, that Bies suffered “significant limitations in two or more adaptive skills.” Lott, 97 Ohio St. 3d, at 305, 779 N. E. 2d, at 1014. Nor did the State concede that Bies would succeed under Atkins and Lott, which had not then been decided.
More fundamental, it is clear that the courts’ statements regarding Bies’ mental capacity were not necessary to the judgments affirming his death sentence. A determination ranks as necessary or essential only when the final outcome hinges on it. See 18 C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure §4421, p. 543 (2d ed. 2002). “Far from being necessary to the judgment, the Ohio courts’ mental-retardation findings cut against it — making them quintessential^ the kinds of rulings not eligible for issue-preclusion treatment.” 535 F. 3d, at 533 (Sutton, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
In finding the state court’s determination “necessary to [the] judgment,” 519 F. 3d, at 342, the Court of Appeals panel reasoned that the Ohio courts determined Bies’ mental capacity pursuant to their “mandatory duty” to weigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Id., at 338. “[W]eighing [aggravators against mitigators],” the panel explained, “could not have occurred unless the court first determined what to place on either side of the scale.” Ibid. This reasoning conflates a determination necessary to the bottom-line judgment with a subsidiary finding that, standing alone, is not outcome determinative. Issue preclusion eannot transform Bies’ loss at the sentencing phase into a partial victory.
For the same reason, the Court of Appeals erred in its repeated reliance on the following passage in Ashe: “When an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit.” 519 F. 3d, at 331-333 (quoting 397 U. S., at 443). Bies’ case does not involve an “ultimate fact” of the kind our decision in Ashe addressed. There, the State sought to try Ashe for robbing a poker player even though a jury had already acquitted him of robbing a different player in the same poker game. The State’s second attempt was precluded, we held, because the first jury had based its verdict of acquittal upon a determination that Ashe was not one of the participants in the poker game robbery. Id., at 445. Bies, in contrast, was not acquitted — and, as already observed, determinations of his mental capacity were not necessary to the ultimate imposition of the death penalty.
Moreover, even if the core requirements for issue preclusion had been met, an exception to the doctrine’s application would be warranted due to this Court’s intervening decision in Atkins. Mental retardation as a mitigator and mental retardation under Atkins and Lott are discrete legal issues. The Atkins decision itself highlights one difference: “[R]eliance on mental retardation as a mitigating factor can be a two-edged sword that may enhance the likelihood that the aggravating factor of future dangerousness will be found by the jury.” 536 U. S., at 321. This reality explains why prosecutors, pre-Atkins, had little incentive vigorously to contest evidence of retardation. See App. 65 (excerpt from prosecutor’s closing argument describing as Bies’ “[c]hief characteristic” his “sensitivity to any kind of frustration and his rapid tendency to get enraged”); id., at 39-54 (cross-examination of Bies’ expert witness designed to emphasize Bies’ dangerousness to others). Because the change in law substantially altered the State’s incentive to contest Bies’ mental capacity, applying preclusion would not advance the equitable administration of the law. See Restatement §28, Comment c.
The federal courts’ intervention in this case derailed a state trial court proceeding “designed to determine whether Bies ha[s] a successful Atkins claim.” 535 F. 3d, at 534 (Sutton, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). Recourse first to Ohio’s courts is just what this Court envisioned in remitting to the States responsibility for implementing the Atkins decision. The State acknowledges that Bies is entitled to such recourse, but it rightly seeks a full and fair opportunity to contest his plea under the postsentencing precedents set in Atkins and Lott.
* * *
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
“[R]eplac[ing] a more confusing lexicon,” the term “issue preclusion,” in current usage, “encompasses the doctrines [earlier called] ‘collateral estoppel’ and ‘direct estoppel.’ ” Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U. S. 880, 892, n. 5 (2008).
This case, we note, is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. Bies plainly fails to qualify for relief under that Act: The Ohio courts’ decisions were not “contrary to, or ... an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,” 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d)(1), and were not “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding,” § 2254(d)(2). See also 535 F. 3d 520, 534 (CA6 2008) (Sutton, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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A
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented in this case is whether the disinterested directors of an investment company may terminate a stockholders’ derivative suit brought against other directors under the Investment Company and Investment Advisers Acts of 1940, 15 U. S. C. § 80a-1 et seq.; 15 U. S. C. § 80b-1 et seq. To decide that question, we must determine the appropriate roles of federal and state law in such a controversy.
Respondents, shareholders of Fundamental Investors, Inc., an investment company registered under the Investment Company Act, brought this derivative suit in February 1973 in the District Court for the Southern District of New York. The action was brought against several members of the company’s board of directors and its registered investment adviser, Anchor Corp. The complaint alleged that the defendants had violated their duties under the Investment Company Act (ICA), the Investment Advisers Act (IAA), and the common law in connection with the 1969 purchase by the corporation of $20 million in Penn Central Transportation Co. commercial paper. In response to the suit, Fundamental’s board of directors determined that the five of its members who were neither affiliated with the investment adviser nor defendants in the action would decide what position the company should take in the case. On the basis of outside counsel’s recommendation and their own investigation, the five, acting as a quorum pursuant to the company’s bylaws, concluded that continuation of the litigation was contrary to the best interests of the company and its shareholders and moved the District Court to dismiss the action.
The District Court held that under the so-called “business judgment rule,” a quorum of truly disinterested and independent directors has authority to terminate a derivative suit which they in good faith conclude is contrary to the company’s best interests. 404 F. Supp. 1172 (1975). After permitting discovery on the question of the directors’ independence, the District Court entered summary judgment against respondents, finding no evidence that the directors who voted to terminate the suit had acted other than independently and in good faith. 426 F. Supp. 844 (1977). The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, 567 F. 2d 1208, 1212 (1978), holding that as a consequence of the ICA, “disinterested directors of an investment company do not have the power to foreclose the continuation of nonfrivolous litigation brought by shareholders against majority directors for breach of their fiduciary duties.” We granted certiorari, 439 U. S. 816 (1978). We reverse.
I
A fundamental issue in this case is which law — state or federal — governs the power of the corporation’s disinterested directors to terminate this derivative suit. The first step in making that determination is to ascertain which law creates the cause of action alleged by the plaintiffs. Neither the ICA nor the IAA — the plaintiff’s two federal claims — expressly creates a private cause of action for violation of the sections relevant here. However, on the basis of District and Circuit precedent, the courts below assumed that an implied private right of action existed under each Act. Brown v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp. 207, 222-228 (SDNY), aff’d, 294 F. 2d 415 (CA2 1961) (en banc) (ICA); Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F. 2d 862 (CA2 1977) (IAA); Bolger v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 381 F. Supp. 260 (SDNY 1974) (IAA). The two courts also sanctioned the bringing of the suit in derivative form, apparently assuming that, as we held in J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U. S. 426, 432 (1964), “[t]o hold that derivative actions are not within the sweep of the [right] would ... be tantamount to a denial of private relief.” As petitioners never disputed the existence of private, derivative causes of action under the Acts, and as in this Court all agree that the question has not been put in issue, Brief for Petitioners 28; Brief for Respondents 15, we shall assume without deciding that respondents have implied, derivative causes of action under the ICA and IAA.
Since we proceed on the premise of the existence of a federal cause of action, it is clear that “our decision is not controlled by Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64,” and state law does not operate of its own force. Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Co., 317 U. S. 173, 176 (1942). See Board of Comm’rs v. United States, 308 U. S. 343, 349-350 (1939); Deitrick v. Greaney, 309 U. S. 190, 200 (1940); C. Wright, Federal Courts 284 (3d ed. 1976); Mishkin, The Variousness of “Federal Law”: Competence and Discretion in the Choice of National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. Pa. L. Rev. 797, 799-800 (1957); Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 489, 529 (1954); 2 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 971 (2d ed. 1961). Rather, “[w]hen a federal statute condemns an act as unlawful, the extent and nature of the legal consequences of the condemnation, though left by the statute to judicial determination, are nevertheless federal questions, the answers to which are to be derived from the statute and the federal policy which it has adopted.” Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Co., supra, at 176. See Tunstall v. Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 323 U. S. 210, 213 (1944); Board of Comm’rs v. United States, supra. Cf. United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U. S. 715, 726-727 (1979); Butner v. United States, 440 U. S. 48 (1979). Legal rules which impact significantly upon the effectuation of federal rights must, therefore, be treated as raising federal questions. See Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U. S. 584, 588 (1978) (statute of limitations) ; Auto Workers v. Hoosier Corp., 383 U. S. 696, 701 (1966) (same); J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, supra, at 435 (security for expenses statute); Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Co., supra, at 176 (rules of estoppel); Deitrick v. Greaney, supra, at 200 (affirmative defense to federal-claim). See generally Friendly, In Praise of Erie — and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 383, 408 (1964); Hill, State Procedural Law in Federal Nondiversity Litigation, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 66, 92-93 (1955). Thus, “the overriding federal law applicable here would, where the facts required, control the appropriateness of redress despite the provisions of state corporation law . . . J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, supra, at 434 (emphasis added).
II
The fact that “the scope of [respondents’] federal right is, of course, a federal question” does not, however, make state law irrelevant. De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U. S. 570, 580 (1956). Cf. United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., supra, at 727-728. It is true that in certain areas we have held that federal statutes authorize the federal courts to fashion a complete body of federal law. See Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U. S. 448, 451, 456-457 (1957). Corporation law, however, is not such an area.
A derivative suit is brought by shareholders to enforce a claim on behalf of the corporation. See Note, The Demand and Standing Requirements in Stockholder Derivative Actions, 44 U. Chi. L. Rev. 168 (1976). This case involves the question whether directors are authorized to determine that certain claims not be pursued on the corporation’s behalf. As we have said in the past, the first place one must look to determine the powers of corporate directors is in the relevant State’s corporation law. See Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U. S. 462, 479 (1977); Cort v. Ash, 422 U. S. 66, 84 (1975). “Corporations are creatures of state law,” ibid., and it is state law which is the font of corporate directors’ powers. By contrast, federal law in' this area is largely regulatory and prohibitory in nature — it often limits the exercise of directorial power, but only rarely creates it. Cf. Price v. Gurney, 324 U. S. 100, 107 (1945). In short, in this field congressional legislation is generally enacted against the background of existing state law; Congress has never indicated that the entire corpus of state corporation law is to be replaced simply because a plaintiff’s cause of action is based upon a federal statute. Cort v. Ash, supra; Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, supra. See United Copper Securities Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U. S. 261, 264 (1917). Cf. United States v. Yazell, 382 U. S. 341, 352-353 (1966) (state family law); De Sylva v. Ballentine, supra, at 580 (same); P. Bator, P. Mishkin, D. Shapiro, & H. Wechsler, The Federal Courts and The Federal System 470-471 (1973 ed.).
Federal regulation of investment companies and advisers is not fundamentally different in this respect. Mutual funds, like other corporations, are incorporated pursuant to state, not federal, law. Although the Court of Appeals found it significant that “nothing in . . . the legislation regulating investment companies and their advisers . . . suggests that.. . disinterested directors . . . have the power to terminate litigation brought by mutual fund stockholders . . . ,” 567 F. 2d, at 1210, such silence was to be expected. The ICA does not purport to be the source of authority for managerial power; rather, the Act functions primarily to “impos[e] controls and restrictions on the internal management of investment companies.” United States v. National Assn. of Securities Dealers, 422 U. S. 694, 705 n. 13 (1975) (emphasis added).
The ICA and IAA, therefore, do not require that federal law displace state laws governing the powers of directors unless the state laws permit action prohibited by the Acts, or unless “their application would be inconsistent with the federal policy underlying the cause of action . . . Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U. S. 454, 465 (1975). Cf. Robertson v. Wegmann, supra, at 590; Auto Workers v. Hoosier Corp., supra, at 706-707; Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Co., 317 U. S., at 176. Although “[a] state statute cannot be considered ‘inconsistent’ with federal law merely because the statute causes the plaintiff to lose the litigation,” Robertson v. Wegmann, supra, at 593, federal courts must be ever vigilant to insure that application of state law poses “no significant threat to any identifiable federal policy or interest . . . .” Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 384 U. S. 63, 68 (1966). See Auto Workers v. Hoosier Corp., supra, at 702. Cf. Brown v. Western R. Co. of Alabama, 338 U. S. 294, 298 (1949). And, of course, this means that “unreasonable,” Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., supra, at 70, or “specific aberrant or hostile state rules,” United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U. S. 580, 596 (1973), will not be applied. See, e. g., Levitt v. Johnson, 334 F. 2d 815, 819-820 (CA1 1964). The “consistency” test guarantees that “[n]othing that the state can do will be allowed to destroy the federal right,” Board of Comm’rs v. United States, 308 U. S., at 350, and yet relieves federal courts of the necessity to fashion an entire body of federal corporate law out of whole cloth.
Ill
The foregoing indicates that the threshold inquiry for a federal court in this case should have been to determine whether state law permitted Fundamental’s disinterested directors to terminate respondents’ suit. If so, the next inquiry should have been whether such a state rule was consistent with the policy of the ICA and IAA. Neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals decided the first question, apparently because neither considered state law particularly significant in determining the authority of the independent directors to terminate the action. And in that circumstance, neither court addressed the question of inconsistency between state and federal law. At least implicitly, however, the Court of Appeals did make a related determination. Its holding that nonfrivolous derivative suits may never be terminated makes manifest its view that no other rule — whether state or federal — would be consistent with the ICA. We disagree.
The Court of Appeals correctly noted, 567 F. 2d, at 1210-1211, that Congress was concerned about the potential for abuse inherent in the structure of investment companies. A mutual fund is a pool of assets, consisting primarily of portfolio securities, and belonging to the individual investors holding shares in the fund. Tannenbaum v. Zeller, 552 F. 2d 402, 405 (CA2 1977). Congress was concerned because
“[m]utual funds, with rare exception, are not operated by their own employees. Most funds are formed, sold, and managed by external organizations, [called ‘investment advisers,’] that are separately owned and operated. . .. The advisers select the funds’ investments and operate their businesses. . . .
“Since a typical fund is organized by its investment adviser which provides it with almost all management services . . . , a mutual fund cannot, as a practical matter sever its relationship with the adviser. Therefore, the forces of arm’s-length bargaining do not work in the mutual fund industry in the same manner as they do in other sectors of the American economy.” S. Rep. No. 91-184, p. 5 (1969).
As a consequence, “[t]he relationship between investment advisers and mutual funds is fraught with potential conflicts of interest,” Galfand v. Chestnutt Corp., 545 F. 2d 807, 808 (CA2 1976). See generally S. Rep. No. 91-184, supra, at 5; H. R. Rep. No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 9, 45-46, 64 (1966); H. R. Doc. No. 136, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., 2485-2490, 2569, 2579-2580, 2775 (1942); Hearings before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H. R. 10065, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 58-59 (1940); Securities and Exchange Commission, Report on Investment Trusts and Investment Companies, pt. 3, pp. 1-49 (1940); 15 U. S. C. § 80a-l (b) (findings and declaration of policy). Yet, while these potential conflicts may justify some restraints upon the unfettered discretion of even disinterested mutual fund directors, particularly in their transactions with the investment adviser, they hardly justify a flat rule that directors may never terminate nonfrivolous derivative actions involving co-directors. In fact, the evidence is overwhelming that Congress did not intend to require any such absolute rule.
The cornerstone of the ICA’s effort to control conflicts of interest within mutual funds is the requirement that at least 40% of a fund’s board be composed of independent outside directors. 15 U. S. C. §80a-10(a). As originally enacted, § 10 of the Act required that these 40% not be officers or employees of the company or “affiliated persons” of its adviser. 54 Stat. 806. In 1970, Congress amended the Act to strengthen further the independence of these directors, adding the stricter requirement that the outside directors not be “interested persons.” See 15 U. S. C. §§ 80a-10 (a), 80a-2 (a)(19). To these statútorily disinterested directors, the Act assigns a host of special responsibilities involving supervision of management and financial auditing. They have the duty to review and approve the contracts of the investment adviser and the principal underwriter, 15 U. S. C. § 80a-15 (c); the responsibility to appoint other disinterested directors to fill vacancies resulting from the assignment of the advisory contracts, 15 U. S. C. § 80a-16 (b); and are required to select the accountants who prepare the company’s Securities and Exchange Commission financial filings, 15 U. S. C. § 80a-31 (a).
Attention must be paid as well to what Congress did not do. Congress consciously chose to address the conflict-of-interest problem through the Act’s independent-directors section, rather than through more drastic remedies such as complete disaffiliation of the companies from their advisers or compulsory internalization of the management function. See Report of the SEC on the Public Policy Implications of Investment Company Growth, H. R. Rep. No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 147-148 (1966). Congress also decided not to incorporate into the 1940 Act a provision, proposed by the SEC, that would have forced investment companies to seek court approval before settling claims against “insiders” that could be the target of derivative suits. See S. 3580, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., §33 (a) (1940); Wolf v. Barkes, 348 F. 2d 994, 997 n. 4 (CA2 1965). And when Congress did intend to prevent board action from cutting off derivative suits, it said so expressly. Section 36 (b), 84 Stat. 1428, 15 U. S. C. § 80a-35 (b)(2), added to the Act in 1970, performs precisely this function for derivative suits charging breach of fiduciary duty with respect to adviser’s fees. No similar provision exists for derivative suits of the kind involved in this case.
Congress’ purpose in structuring the Act as it did is clear. It “was designed to place the unaffiliated directors in the role of 'independent watchdogs,’ ” Tannenbaum v. Zeller, 552 F. 2d, at 406, who would “furnish an independent check upon the management” of investment companies, Hearings on H. R. 10065 before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 109 (1940). This “watchdog” control was chosen in preference to the more direct controls on behavior exemplified by the options not adopted. Indeed, when by 1970 it appeared that the “affiliated person” provision of the 1940 Act might not be adequately restraining conflicts of interest, Congress turned not to direct controls, but rather to stiffening the requirement of independence as the way to “remedy the act’s deficiencies.” S. Rep. No. 91-184, pp. 32-33 (1969). Without question, “[t]he function of these provisions with respect to unaffiliated directors '[was] to supply an independent check on management and to provide a means for the representation of shareholder interests in investment company affairs.” Id., at 32.
In short, the structure and purpose of the ICA indicate that Congress entrusted to the independent directors of investment companies, exercising the authority granted to them by state law, the primary responsibility for looking after the interests of the funds’ shareholders. There may well be situations in which the independent directors could reasonably believe that the best interests of the shareholders call for a decision not to sue — as, for example, where the costs of litigation to the corporation outweigh any potential recovery. See Note, 47 Ford. L. Rev. 568, 580 (1979); Note, 44 U. Chi. L. Rev., at 196. See, e. g., Tannenbaum v. Zeller, supra, at 418; Cramer v. General Tel. & Electronics Corp., 582 F. 2d 259, 275 (CA3 1978). In such cases, it would certainly be consistent with the Act to allow the independent directors to terminate a suit, even though not frivolous. Indeed, it would have been paradoxical for Congress to have been willing to rely largely upon “watchdogs” to protect shareholder interests and yet, where the “watchdogs” have done precisely that, require that they be totally muzzled.
IV
We hold today that federal courts should apply state law governing the authority of independent directors to discontinue derivative suits to the extent such law is consistent with the policies of the ICA and IAA. Moreover, we hold that Congress did not require that States, or federal courts, absolutely forbid director termination of all nonfrivolous actions. However, since “[w]e did not grant certiorari to decide [a question of state law],” Butner v. United States, 440 U. S. 48, 51 (1979), and since neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals decided the point, the case is reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Butner v. United States; Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 384 U. S., at 72.
Reversed and remanded.
Mr. Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
§ 13 (a) (3), 54 Stat. 811, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 80a-13 (a) (3), and former § 36, 54 Stat. 841, 15 U. S. C. § 80a-35 (1964 ed.).
§ 206, 54 Stat. 852, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 80b-6.
The complaint alleged, inter alia, that “Anchor breached its statutory, contractual and common law fiduciary duties by relying exclusively upon the representations of Goldman, Sachs & Co. (a seller of commercial paper), rather than independently investigating the quality and safety of the Penn Central 270-day notes purchased by the Fund. It is further alleged that the defendant directors knew or should have known of Anchor’s failure to meet its responsibility; that they violated their . . . duties as corporate fiduciaries by acquiescing in Anchor’s omissions; that the financial condition of the Penn Central steadily worsened during the period from November 28, 1969 to June 21, 1970, the date that it filed for reorganization; and that during this period of decline all of the defendants failed to investigate and review the financial condition of the Penn Central and the quality and safety of its commercial paper.” 426 F. Supp. 844, 847 (1977).
The five were “disinterested” within the meaning of the ICA (see 567 F. 2d 1208, 1209 (CA2 1978)) which provides:
“No registered investment company shall have a board of directors more than 60 per centum of the members of which are persons who are interested persons of such registered company.” 15 U. S. C. § 80a-10 (a).
The definition of “interested person” is found at 15 U. S. C. § 80a-2 (a) (19). See n. 12, infra.
Of the remaining six directors, five were defendants in the Lasker suit, and one was a director of the investment adviser. 404 F. Supp. 1172, 1175 (1975).
The question whether a cause of action exists is not a question of jurisdiction, and therefore may be assumed without being decided. Cf. Mt. Healthy City Board of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274, 279 (1977) ; Bell v. Hood, 327 U. S. 678, 682 (1946). Other Courts of Appeals have agreed with the Second Circuit that the ICA and IAA create private causes of action. As to the ICA, see Moses v. Burgin, 445 E. 2d 369, 373 (CA1 1971); Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F. 2d 94, 103 (CA10 1968). See also Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F. 2d 792, 815 (CA5 1970); Taussig v. Wellington Fund, Inc., 313 F. 2d 472, 476 (CA3 1963). Compare Greater Iowa Corp. v. McLendon, 378 F. 2d 783, 793 (CA8 1967), with Brouh v. Managed Funds, Inc., 286 F. 2d 901 (CA8 1961), vacated as moot, 369 U. S. 424 (1962). As to the IAA, see Lewis v. Transamerica Corp., 575 F. 2d 237 (CA9), cert. granted sub nom. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 439 U. S. 952 (1978); Wilson v. First Houston Investment Corp., 566 F. 2d 1235 (CA5 1978).
This is not a situation where federal policy requires uniformity and, therefore, where the very application of varying state laws would itself be inconsistent with federal interests. In enacting the ICA and IAA, Congress did declare that “the activities of such companies, extending over many States, . . . make difficult, if not impossible, effective State regulation of such companies . . . 15 U. S. C. § 80a-1 (a) (5). But as long as private causes of action are available in federal courts for violation of the federal statutes, this enforcement problem is obviated. The real concern, therefore, is not that state laws be uniform, but rather that the laws applied in suits brought to enforce federal rights meet the standards necessary to insure that the “prohibition of [the] federal statute . . . not be set at naught,” Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Co., 317 U. S. 173, 176 (1942). The “consistency” requirement described in text guarantees that state laws failing to meet these standards will be precluded.
See 567 F. 2d 1208 (CA2 1978); 404 F. Supp. 1172 (SDNY 1975).
The Court of Appeals did not undertake any separate analysis of the policy behind the ICA’s companion statute, the IAA.
See also Tannenbaum v. Zeller, 552 F. 2d 402, 405 (CA2 1977); Radmer, Duties of the Directors of Investment Companies, 3 J. Corp. L. 61, 63 (1977); Note, 47 Ford. L. Rev. 568 (1979).
See, e. g., § 36 of the ICA, 54 Stat. 841, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 80a-35, and § 206 of the IAA, 54 Stat. 852, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 80b-6, imposing minimum standards on the behavior of investment company directors and advisers which presumably apply as much to their decisions regarding litigation as to the other decisions they may be called upon to make. See Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U. S. 462, 471 n. 11 (1977) (“Congress intended the Investment Advisers Act to establish federal fiduciary standards for investment advisers”); SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U. S. 180, 191-192 (1963); Cramer v. General Tel. & Electronics Corp., 582 F. 2d 259, 275 (CA3 1978); Tannenbaum v. Zeller, supra, at 418-419.
Under certain circumstances, independent directors must constitute a majority rather than 40% of the board. See 15 U. S. C. § 80a-10 (b).
Title 15 U. S. C. §80a-2 (a)(19) defines an “'interested person’ of another person . . . when used with respect to an investment company,” as
“(i) any affiliated person of such company,
“(ii) any member of the immediate family of any natural person who is an affiliated person of such company,
“(iii) any interested person of any investment adviser of or principal underwriter for such company,
“(iv) any person or partner or employee of any person who at any time since the beginning of the last two fiscal years of such company has acted as legal counsel for such company,
“(v) any broker or dealer registered under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or any affiliated person of such a broker or dealer, and
“(vi) any natural person whom the Commission by order shall have determined to be an interested person by reason of having had, at any time since the beginning of the last two fiscal years of such company, a material business or professional relationship with such company or with the principal executive officer of such company or with any other investment company having the same investment adviser or principal underwriter or with the principal executive officer of such other investment company.”
Title 15 U. S. C. § 80a-2 (a) (2) states that “ ‘[a]ffiliated company’ means a company which is an affiliated person,” and 15 U. S. C. § 80a-2 (a) (3) defines “ ‘affiliated person’ of another person” as
“(A) any person directly or indirectly owning, controlling, or holding with power to vote, 5 per centum or more of the outstanding voting securities of such other person; (B) any person 5 per centum or more of whose outstanding voting securities are directly or indirectly owned, controlled, or held with power to vote, by such other person; (C) any person directly or indirectly controlling, controlled by, or under common control with, such other person; (D) any officer, director, partner, copartner, or employee of such other person; (E) if such other person is an investment company, any investment adviser thereof or any member of an advisory board thereof; and (F) if such other person is an unincorporated investment company not having a board of directors, the depositor thereof.”
See also § 16 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U. S. C. § 78p (b), which authorizes shareholder suits to recover insider “short swing” profits on behalf of the company notwithstanding the decision of the board of directors not to sue.
See n. 12, supra.
As an adjunct to its main argument which rested upon the structure of the ICA, the Court of Appeals was also of the view that mutual fund directors can never be truly disinterested in suits involving their co-directors. 567 F. 2d, at 1212. While lack of impartiality may or may not be true as a matter of fact in individual cases, it is not a conclusion of law required by the ICA. Congress surely would not have entrusted such critical functions as approval of advisory contracts and selection of accountants to the statutorily disinterested directors had it shared the Court of Appeals’ view that such directors could never be “disinterested” where their codirectors or investment advisers were concerned. In fact, although it was speaking only of the statutory definition, Congress declared in the second section of the Act that “no person shall be deemed to be an interested person of an investment company solely by reason of . . . his being a member of its board of directors or advisory board . . . .” 15 U. S. C. § 80a-2 (a) (19). See also 15 U. S. C. § 80a-2 (a)(9) (“A natural person shall be presumed not to be a controlled person within the meaning of this subchapter”).
As an alternative ground in support of the judgment below, respondents urge that Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23.1 prohibits termination of this derivative action. That Rule states that a derivative action “shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court . . . .” However, as Judge Friendly noted with respect to former Rule 23 (c), those words apply only to voluntary settlements between derivative plaintiffs and defendants, and were intended to prevent plaintiffs from selling out their fellow shareholders. They do not apply where the plaintiffs’ action is involuntarily dismissed by a court, as occurred in this case. Wolf v. Barkes, 348 F. 2d 994, 996-997 (CA2 1965). The same is true of the identically worded Rule 23.1. See C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1839, pp. 427, 435, 436 (1972); 3B J. Moore, Federal Practice ¶23.1.24 [2], App. p. 23.1-131 (1978).
In this Court, the parties hotly dispute the content of the correct state rule. Compare Brief for Petitioners 36-38 with Brief for Respondents 35-39.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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H
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Scalia
delivered the opinion of the Court.
We consider the circumstances under which an employer may be held liable for employment discrimination based on the discriminatory animus of an employee who influenced, but did not make, the ultimate employment decision.
I
Petitioner Vincent Staub worked as an angiography technician for respondent Proctor Hospital until 2004, when he was fired. Staub and Proctor hotly dispute the facts surrounding the firing, but because a jury found for Staub in his claim of employment discrimination against Proctor, we describe the facts viewed in the light most favorable to him.
While employed by Proctor, Staub was a member of the United States Army Reserve, which required him to attend drill one weekend per month and to train full time for two to three weeks a year. Both Janice Mulally, Staub’s immediate supervisor, and Michael Korenchuk, Mulally’s supervisor, were hostile to Staub’s military obligations. Mulally scheduled Staub for additional shifts without notice so that he would “ ‘pa[y] back the department for everyone else having to bend over backwards to cover [his] schedule for the Reserves.’ ” 560 F. 3d 647, 652 (CA7 2009). She also informed Staub’s co-worker, Leslie Sweborg, that Staub’s “‘military duty had been a strain on the[] department,’” and asked Sweborg to help her “‘get rid of him.’” Ibid. Korenchuk referred to Staub’s military obligations as “‘a b[u]nch of smoking and joking and [a] waste of taxpayers[’] money.’” Ibid. He was also aware that Mulally was “‘out to get’” Staub. Ibid.
In January 2004, Mulally issued Staub a “Corrective Action” disciplinary warning for purportedly violating a company rule requiring him to stay in his work area whenever he was not working with a patient. The Corrective Action included a directive requiring Staub to report to Mulally or Korenchuk “‘when [he] ha[d] no patients and [the angio] cases [we]re complete[d].’” Id., at 653. According to Staub, Mulally’s justification for the Corrective Action was false for two reasons: First, the company rule invoked by Mulally did not exist; and second, even if it did, Staub did not violate it.
On April 2, 2004, Angie Day, Staub’s co-worker, complained to Linda Buck, Proctor’s vice president of human resources, and Garrett McGowan, Proctor’s chief operating officer, about Staub’s frequent unavailability and abruptness. McGowan directed Korenchuk and Buck to create a plan that would solve Staub’s “‘availability’ problems.” Id., at 654. But three weeks later, before they had time to do so, Koren-chuk informed Buck that Staub had left his desk without informing a supervisor, in violation of the January Corrective Action. Staub now contends this accusation was false: He had left Korenchuk a voice-mail notification that he was leaving Ms desk. Buck relied on Korenchuk’s accusation, however, and after reviewing Staub’s personnel file, she decided to fire him. The termination notice stated that Staub had ignored the directive issued in the January 2004 Corrective Action.
Staub challenged his firing through Proctor’s grievance process, claiming that Mulally had fabricated the allegation underlying the Corrective Action out of hostility toward his military obligations. Buck did not follow up with Mulally about this claim. After discussing the matter with another personnel officer, Buck adhered to her decision.
Staub sued Proctor under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994, 38 U. S. C. § 4301 et seq., claiming that Ms discharge was motivated by hostility to his obligations as a military reservist. His contention was not that Buck had any such hostility but that Mulally and Korenehuk did, and that their actions influenced Buck’s ultimate employment decision. A jury found that Staub’s “military status was a motivating factor in [Proctor’s] decision to discharge him,” App. 68a, and awarded $57,640 in damages.
The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that Proctor was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 560 F. 3d 647. The court observed that Staub had brought a “‘cat’s paw’ ease,” meamng that he sought to hold his employer liable for the animus of a supervisor who was not charged with making the ultimate employment decision. Id., at 655-656. It explained that under Seventh Circuit precedent, a “cat’s paw” case could not succeed unless the nondecisionmaker exercised such “ ‘singular influence’ ” over the decisionmaker that the decision to terminate was the product of “blind reliance.” Id., at 659. It then noted that “Buck looked beyond what Mulally and Korenchuk said,” relying in part on her conversation with Day and her review of Staub’s personnel file. Ibid. The court “admitted] that Buck’s investigation could have been more robust,” since it “failed to pursue Staub’s theory that Mulally fabricated the write-up.” Ibid. But the court said that the “ ‘singular influence’ ” rule “does not require the decisionmaker to be a paragon of independence”: “It is enough that the decisionmaker is not wholly dependent on a single source of information and conducts her own investigation into the facts relevant to the decision.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). Because the undisputed evidence established that Buck was not wholly dependent on the advice of Korenchuk and Mulally, the court held that Proctor was entitled to judgment. Ibid.
We granted certiorari. 559 U. S. 1066 (2010).
II
The Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA) provides in relevant part as follows:
“A person who is a member of... or has an obligation to perform service in a uniformed service shall not be denied initial employment, reemployment, retention in employment, promotion, or any benefit of employment by an employer on the basis of that membership, ... or obligation.” 38 U. S. C. § 4311(a).
It elaborates further:
“An employer shall be considered to have engaged in actions prohibited . . . under subsection (a), if the person’s membership ... is a motivating factor in the employer’s action, unless the employer can prove that the action would have been taken in the absence of such membership.” § 4311(c).
The statute is very similar to Title VII, which prohibits employment discrimination “because of . . . race, color, religion, sex, or national origin” and states that such discrimination is established when one of those factors “was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.” 42 U. S. C. §2000e-2(a), (m).
The central difficulty in this case is construing the phrase “motivating factor in the employer’s action.” When the company official who makes the decision to take an adverse employment action is personally acting out of hostility to the employee’s membership in or obligation to a uniformed service, a motivating factor obviously exists. The problem we confront arises when that official has no discriminatory animus but is influenced by previous company action that is the product of a like animus in someone else.
In approaching this question, we start from the premise that when Congress creates a federal tort it adopts the background of general tort law. See Burlington N. & S. F. R. Co. v. United States, 556 U. S. 599, 613-614 (2009); Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Burr, 551 U. S. 47, 68-69 (2007); Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U. S. 742, 764 (1998). Intentional torts such as this, “as distinguished from negligent or reckless torts[,] . . . generally require that the actor intend ‘the consequences’ of an act,’ not simply ‘the act itself.’” Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U. S. 57, 61-62 (1998).
Staub contends that the fact that an unfavorable entry on the plaintiff’s personnel record was caused to be put there, with discriminatory animus, by Mulally and Korenchuk, suffices to establish the tort, even if Mulally and Korenchuk did not intend to cause his dismissal. But discrimination was no part of Buck’s reason for the dismissal; and while Koren-chuk and Mulally acted with discriminatory animus, the act they committed — the mere making of the reports — was not a denial of “initial employment, reemployment, retention in employment, promotion, or any benefit of employment,” as liability under USERRA requires. If dismissal was not the object of Mulally’s and Korenchuk’s reports, it may have been their result, or even their foreseeable consequence, but that is not enough to render Mulally or Koren-chuk responsible.
Here, however, Staub is seeking to hold liable not Mulally and Korenehuk, but their employer. Perhaps, therefore, the discriminatory motive of one of the employer’s agents (Mu-lally or Korenehuk) can be aggregated with the act of another agent (Buck) to impose liability on Proctor. Again we consult general principles of law, agency law, which form the background against which federal tort laws are enacted. See Meyer v. Holley, 537 U. S. 280, 285 (2003); Burlington Industries, supra, at 754-755. Here, however, the answer is not so clear. The Restatement of Agency suggests that the malicious mental state of one agent cannot generally be combined with the harmful action of another agent to hold the principal liable for a tort that requires both. See Restatement (Second) of Agency §275, Illustration 4 (1957). Some of the cases involving federal torts apply that rule. See United States v. Science Applications Int’l Corp., 626 F. 3d 1257, 1273-1276 (CADC 2010); Chaney v. Dreyfus Service Corp., 595 F. 3d 219, 241 (CA5 2010); United States v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 566 F. 3d 1095, 1122 (CADC 2009). But another case involving a federal tort, and one involving a federal crime, hold to the contrary. See United States ex rel. Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 352 F. 3d 908, 918-919 (CA4 2003); United States v. Bank of New England, N. A., 821 F. 2d 844, 856 (CA1 1987). Ultimately, we think it unnecessary in this case to decide what the background rule of agency law may be, since the former line of authority is suggested by the governing text, which requires that discrimination be “a motivating factor” in the adverse action. When a decision to fire is made with no unlawful animus on the part of the firing agent, but partly on the basis of a report prompted (unbeknownst to that agent) by discrimination, discrimination might perhaps be called a “factor” or a “causal factor” in the decision; but it seems to us a considerable stretch to call it “a motivating factor.”
Proctor, on the other hand, contends that the employer is not hable unless the de facto decisionmaker (the technical decisionmaker or the agent for whom he is the “cat’s paw”) is motivated by discriminatory animus. This avoids the aggregation of animus and adverse action, but it seems to us not the only application of general tort law that can do so. Animus and responsibility for the adverse action can both be attributed to the earlier agent (here, Stauh’s supervisors) if the adverse action is the intended consequence of that agent’s discriminatory conduct. So long as the agent intends, for discriminatory reasons, that the adverse action occur, he has the scienter required to be liable under USERRA. And it is axiomatic under tort law that the exercise of judgment by the decisionmaker does not prevent the earlier agent’s action (and hence the earlier agent’s discriminatory animus) from being the proximate cause of the harm. Proximate cause requires only “some direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged,” and excludes only those “link[s] that [are] too remote, purely contingent, or indirect.” Hemi Group, LLC v. City of New York, 559 U. S. 1, 9 (2010) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). We do not think that the ultimate deci-sionmaker’s exercise of judgment automatically renders the link to the supervisor’s bias “remote” or “purely contingent.” The decisionmaker’s exercise of judgment is also a proximate cause of the employment decision, but it is common for injuries to have multiple proximate causes. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U. S. 692, 704 (2004). Nor can the ultimate decisionmaker’s judgment be deemed a superseding cause of the harm. A cause can be thought “superseding” only if it is a “cause of independent origin that was not foreseeable.” Exxon Co., U. S. A. v. Sofec, Inc., 517 U. S. 830, 837 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Moreover, the approach urged upon us by Proctor gives an unlikely meaning to a provision designed to prevent employer discrimination. An employer’s authority to reward, punish, or dismiss is often allocated among multiple agents. The one who makes the ultimate decision does so on the basis of performance assessments by other supervisors. Proctor’s view would have the improbable consequence that if an employer isolates a personnel official from an employee’s supervisors, vests the decision to take adverse employment actions in that official, and asks that official to review the employee’s personnel file before taking the adverse action, then the employer will be effectively shielded from discriminatory acts and recommendations of supervisors that were designed and intended to produce the adverse action. That seems to us an implausible meaning of the text, and one that is not compelled by its words.
Proctor suggests that even if the decisionmaker’s mere exercise of independent judgment does not suffice to negate the effect of the prior discrimination, at least the decision-maker’s independent investigation (and rejection) of the employee’s allegations of discriminatory animus ought to do so. We decline to adopt such a hard-and-fast rule. As we have already acknowledged, the requirement that the biased supervisor’s action be a causal factor of the ultimate employment action incorporates the traditional tort-law concept of proximate cause. See, e.g., Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U. S. 451, 457-458 (2006); Sosa, supra, at 703. Thus, if the employer’s investigation results in an adverse action for reasons unrelated to the supervisor’s original biased action (by the terms of USERRA it is the employer’s burden to establish that), then the employer will not be liable. But the supervisor’s biased report may remain a causal factor if the independent investigation takes it into account without determining that the adverse action was, apart from the supervisor’s recommendation, entirely justified. We are aware of no principle in tort or agency law under which an employer’s mere conduct of an independent investigation has a claim-preclusive effect. Nor do we think the independent investigation somehow relieves the employer of “fault.” The employer is at fault because one of its agents committed an action based on discriminatory animus that was intended to cause, and did in fact cause, an adverse employment decision.
Justice Alito claims that our failure to adopt a rule immunizing an employer who performs an independent investigation reflects a “stray[ing] from the statutory text.” Post, at 424 (opinion concurring in judgment). We do not understand this accusation. Since a supervisor is an agent of the employer, when he causes an adverse employment action the employer causes it; and when discrimination is a motivating factor in his doing so, it is a “motivating factor in the employer’s action,” precisely as the text requires. Justice Alito suggests that the employer should be held liable only when it “should be regarded as having delegated part of the decision-making power” to the biased supervisor. Post, at 425. But if the independent investigation relies on facts provided by the biased supervisor — as is necessary in any case of cat’s-paw liability — then the employer (either directly or through the ultimate decisionmaker) will have effectively delegated the factfinding portion of the investigation to the biased supervisor. Contrary to Justice Alito’s suggestion, the biased supervisor is not analogous to a witness at a bench trial. The mere witness is not an actor in the events that are the subject of the trial. The biased supervisor and the ultimate decisionmaker, however, acted as agents of the entity that the plaintiff seeks to hold liable; each of them possessed supervisory authority delegated by their employer and exercised it in the interest of their employer. In sum, we do not see how “fidelity to the statutory text,” ibid., requires the adoption of an independent-investigation defense that appears nowhere in the text. And we find both speculative and implausible Justice Alito’s prediction that our Nation’s employers will systematically disfavor members of the armed services in their hiring decisions to avoid the possibility of cat’s-paw liability, a policy that would violate USERRA in any event.
We therefore hold that if a supervisor performs an act motivated by antimilitary animus that is intended by the supervisor to cause an adverse employment action, and if that act is a proximate cause of the ultimate employment action, then the employer is liable under USERRA.
Ill
Applying our analysis to the facts of this case, it is clear that the Seventh Circuit’s judgment must be reversed. Both Mulally and Korenchuk were acting within the scope of their employment when they took the actions that allegedly caused Buck to fire Staub. A “reprimand ... for workplace failings” constitutes conduct within the scope of an agent’s employment. Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U. S. 775, 798-799 (1998). As the Seventh Circuit recognized, there was evidence that Mulally’s and Korenchuk’s actions were motivated by hostility toward Staub’s military obligations. There was also evidence that Mulally’s and Korenchuk’s actions were causal factors underlying Buck’s decision to fire Staub. Buck’s termination notice expressly stated that Staub was terminated because he had “ignored” the directive in the Corrective Action. Finally, there was evidence that both Mulally and Korenehuk had the specific intent to cause Staub to be terminated. Mulally stated she was trying to “ ‘get rid of’ ” Staub, and Korenehuk was aware that Mulally was “ ‘out to get’ ” Staub. Moreover, Korenehuk informed Buck, Proctor’s personnel officer responsible for terminating employees, of Staub’s alleged noncompliance with Mulally’s Corrective Action, and Buck fired Staub immediately thereafter; a reasonable jury could infer that Koren-chuk intended that Staub be fired. The Seventh Circuit therefore erred in holding that Proctor was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
It is less clear whether the jury’s verdict should be reinstated or whether Proctor is entitled to a new trial. The jury instruction did not hew precisely to the rule we adopt today; it required only that the jury find that “military status was a motivating factor in [Proctor’s] decision to discharge him.” App. 68a. Whether the variance between the instruction and our rule was harmless error or should mandate a new trial is a matter the Seventh Circuit may consider in the first instance.
* * *
The judgment of the Seventh Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
The term “cat’s paw” derives from a fable conceived by Aesop, put into verse by La Fontaine in 1679, and injected into United States employment discrimination law by Judge Posner in 1990. See Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F. 2d 398, 405 (CA7). In the fable, a monkey induces a eat by flattery to extract roasting chestnuts from the fire. After the eat has done so, burning its paws in the process, the monkey makes off with the chestnuts and leaves the cat with nothing. A coda to the fable (relevant only marginally, if at all, to employment law) observes that the eat is similar to princes who, flattered by the king, perform services on the king’s behalf and receive no reward.
Under the traditional doctrine of proximate canse, a tortfeasor is sometimes, but not always, liable when he intends to cause an adverse action and a different adverse action results. See Restatement (Second) of Torts §§435, 435B and Comment a (1963 and 1964). That issue is not presented in this case since the record contains no evidence that Mulally or Korenehuk intended any particular adverse action other than Staub’s termination.
Under traditional tort law, “ 'intent’... denote[s] that the actor desires to cause consequences of his act, or that he believes that the consequences are substantially certain to result from it.” Id., § 8A.
Needless to say, the employer would be liable only when the supervisor acts within the scope of his employment, or when the supervisor acts outside the scope of his employment and liability would be imputed to the employer under traditional agency principles. See Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U. S. 742, 758 (1998). We express no view as to whether the employer would be liable if a co-worker, rather than a supervisor, committed a discriminatory act that influenced the ultimate employment decision. We also observe that Staub took advantage of Proctor’s grievance process, and we express no view as to whether Proctor would have an affirmative defense if he did not. Cf. Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 542 U. S. 129, 148-149 (2004).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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B
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
On the night of June 10, 1965, two police officers of the City of Lorain, Ohio, left their assigned cruising district and drove to the premises at 1420-1422 Broadway because they “suspected a crime was being committed” there. This suspicion was founded upon tips from persons who had stopped the officers on the street. Petitioner is the owner of the building at 1420-1422 Broadway, which contains two unconnected units. No. 1420 consists of the ground floor and basement and houses a cigar shop and storeroom. No. 1422 is a second story suite of rooms. When the officers arrived at the premises at approximately 1 a. m., they noticed an unusually large number of cars parked in the vicinity. According to their testimony they met the petitioner outside the rear entrance to the upstairs suite, warned him that there had better be nothing illegal going on inside, and said they would return in half an hour.
When they did return 20 minutes later, a large number of cars were still parked near the building, and the officers observed several men entering the upstairs apartment. The officers then climbed the stairs, listened to the sound of voices within, and tried to look through the window and door. Unable to see inside, they walked through the back doorway unannounced. As they headed for the front of the apartment, the petitioner emerged from a front room and told the officers they could not enter. Through the door opened by the petitioner, one of the officers saw a dice game in progress. The officers entered the room, placed everyone present under arrest, and seized the table, chips, dice, and money which were being used in the game. Those arrested, including the petitioner, were taken to the police station. The police continued to search the apartment, and came across some keys which they thought might open the store and basement downstairs. Apparently because the officers “had information that there were all sorts of gaming devices downstairs,” the store and basement were also searched thoroughly, and various numbers game paraphernalia were discovered and seized.
Petitioner was convicted in the Municipal Court of Lorain of violating three ordinances which prohibit keeping a gambling place, exhibiting a gambling device, and possessing a numbers game. His motion to suppress all the evidence which had been seized at 1420-1422 Broadway was denied, the court ruling, upon the evidence above summarized, that the officers had “entered this public establishment and observed gambling being conducted openly and in full view.” On appeal to the Court of Common Pleas, the conviction for possession of the numbers game paraphernalia found in the lower unit of the building was reversed. The court held that since the petitioner had already been taken to the police station and booked, “the search of the storeroom in this case was too remote in time to have been incidental to the arrest.” The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions on the two remaining counts, and the Supreme Court of Ohio dismissed an appeal. Since we have concluded that the petitioner’s rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution were infringed by the entry of the police onto his premises, we grant certiorari and reverse. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643.
The finding of the Municipal Court that the petitioner’s apartment was a “public establishment” has no support in the record. While the cigar store was usually open, to the public during business hours, it was closed and dark at the time of the arrest. The upstairs suite was an entirely separate unit, with a different address and different entrances. The respondent’s suggestion that the officers were privileged to enter because the apartment “at that point had taken on, from the amount of people, a public appearance,” is untenable. The congregation of a large number of persons in a private home does not transform it into a public place open to the police.
Respondent argues that the entry into the apartment was justified as incidental to the arrest of the petitioner, who the officers had probable cause to believe was conducting an illegal game. The senior arresting officer, however, did not so view the matter, for he conceded that when he entered the apartment, he “had no evidence to make an arrest.” Nevertheless, it is argued, the officers could have entered to arrest the petitioner in view of the tips received from informers that evening and their own corroborating observations of the activities at the apartment. We cannot agree that the knowledge of the officers revealed by this record amounted to probable cause to believe that a crime was being committed. The testimony of one officer that the building was a “noted gambling joint” was stricken by the trial judge, and no further effort was made to show that either the petitioner or the apartment was at that time connected with illicit gambling operations. Nor did the respondent even attempt to establish that the informers were reliable. The officers identified these informers only as “people on the street” who were previously unknown to the officers and whose names they did not bother to ask because “there was no reason for it.” They did not relate what information they received from these nameless individuals other than that there were “all sorts of gaming devices downstairs.” (Emphasis supplied.)
We have held that the prosecution has not met its burden when an arresting officer “said no more than that someone (he did not say who) had told him something (he did not say what) about the petitioner.” Beck v. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89, 97. Even where a search warrant is obtained, the police must show a basis for the search beyond the mere fact of an assertion by an informer. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108. At least as much is required to support a search without a warrant. Beck v. Ohio, supra, at 96. Since the respondent did not meet the burden of showing probable cause in this case, the motion to suppress should have been granted.
The conviction is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice White would deny the petition for certiorari.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Douglas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner, a native-born citizen, is a physicist who has been connected with various federal projects and who has been associated as a teacher with several of our universities. In March 1954 he applied for a passport to enable him to travel to India in order to accept a position as research physicist at the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research, affiliated with the University of Bombay. In April 1954 the Director of the Passport Office advised him that his application was denied because the Department of State “feels that it would be contrary to the best interest of the United States to provide you passport facilities at this time.”
Petitioner conferred with an officer of the Passport Office and as a result of that conversation executed an affidavit which covered the wide range of matters inquired into and which stated in part:
“I am not now and I have never been a member of the Communist Party.
“With the possible exception of a casual and brief association with the work of the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee for. a few months in 1941 and in 1942 (all as related below); I am not now and have never been a member of any of the organizations designated on the Attorney General’s list (which I have carefully examined).
“I am not now engaged and I have never engaged in any activities which, so far as I know or at any time knew, support or supported the Communist movement.
“I wish to go abroad for the sole purpose of engaging in experimental research in physics at the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research in Bombay. I am not going abroad to engage in any activities which, so far as I know of can imagine, will in any way advance the Communist movement.”
The Director of the Passport Office wrote petitioner’s lawyer in reply that the Department had given careful consideration to the affidavit and added, “in view of certain factors of Mr. Dayton’s case which I am not at liberty to discuss with him, the Department must adhere to its previous decision that it would be contrary to the best interests of the United States to provide Mr. Dayton with passport facilities at this time.” Later the Director wrote again, saying:
“In arriving at its decision to refuse passport facilities to Mr. Dayton, the Department took into consideration his connection with the Science for Victory Committee and his association at that time with various communists. However, the determining factor in the case was Mr. Dayton’s association with persons suspected of being part of the Rosenberg espionage ring and his alleged presence at an apartment in New York which was allegedly used for microfilming material obtained for the use of a foreign government.”
Thereupon petitioner; pursuant to the Passport Regulations of the Secretary of State, as amended, 22 CFR § 51.1 et seq., filed a petition of appeal, with the Board of Passport Appeals. He also requested, pursuant to the Regulations, information from the Board of particulars concerning three items: (1) petitioner’s alleged “association with various communists”; (2) his “association with persons suspected of being part of the Rosenberg espionage ring”; and (3) his “alleged presence at an apartment in New York which was allegedly used for microfilming material obtained for the use of a foreign government.” The Board’s reply contained some, but very little, of the information requested; and it stated:
“The file contains information indicating that the applicant was present at 65 Morton Street, New York City in the summer of 1949 (July or August) and at Apartment 61, 65 Morton Street, New York City, during the month of January 1950. The applicant’s relationship, if any (past or present), with the following-named persons is considered pertinent to the Board’s review and consideration of the case: Marcel Scherer, Rose Segure, Sandra Collins, Frank Collins, Bernard Peters, Kurt Fritz, Karl Sitte, Louis S. Weiss, Alfred Sarant, and William Perl.”
A hearing was held at which witnesses for petitioner and for the State Department testified. Pursuant to the Regulations the Board announced, over petitioner’s protest, that it would consider “a confidential file composed of investigative reports from Government agencies” which petitioner would not be allowed to examine. Later petitioner was advised by the Acting Secretary of State that the Board had submitted its recommendation and that the Secretary, after “a review of the entire record and on the basis of all the evidence, including that contained in confidential reports of investigation,” had denied the application. The denial was rested specifically upon § 51.135 of the Regulations.
Petitioner then brought suit in the District Court for declaratory relief. The District Court entered summary judgment for the Secretary. The Court of Appeals reversed, 99 U. S. App. D. C. 47, 237 F. 2d 43, and remanded the case to the Secretary for reconsideration in the light of its earlier decision in Boudin v. Dulles, 98 U. S. App. D. C. 305, 235 F. 2d 532.
On remand the Secretary without further hearing denied the application under § 51.135 (c), saying that “the issuance of a passport would be contrary to the national interest.” The Secretary at this time filed a document called “Decision and Findings” which is reproduced as an Appendix to this opinion.
The District Court again granted summary judgment for the Secretary, 146 F. Supp. 876; and the Court of Appeals affirmed by a divided vote, 102 U. S. App. D. C. 372, 254 F. 2d 71. The case is here on a petition for a writ of certiorari. 355 U. S. 911.
The question most discussed in the briefs and on oral argument is whether the hearing accorded petitioner satisfied the requirements of due process. A majority of the Court thinks we need not reach that constitutional question, since on their face these findings show only a denial of a passport for reasons which we have today held to be impermissible. Kent v. Dulles, ante, p. 116. Whether there are undisclosed grounds adequate to sustain the Secretary’s action is not here for decision.
Reversed.
APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT.
Decision and Findings op the SecRetary op State in the Case op Weldon Bruce Dayton
I have examined the files of the Department of State concerning the passport application of Weldon Bruce Dayton, including the proceedings in the Passport Office and before the Board of Passport Appeals, including confidential security information, and have found and concluded as follows:
I.
a. I find that applicant was active in the Science for Victory Committee while at the University of California during 1943-44, serving as Chairman of the organization during much of that period. As Chairman he associated with Frank and Sandra Collins, and Rose Segure, who had been instrumental in organizing the said organization. This finding is based on information contained in the open record, including applicant’s own statements.
b. Confidential information contained in the files of the Department of State, constituting a part of the record considered by the Passport Office, the Board of Passport Appeals, and myself, indicates that the above-named organization was conceived and organized by Communist Party officials as a front for propaganda and espionage activities; and that Frank and Sandra Collins and Rose Segure were members of the Communist Party at the time of their association with applicant and the Science for Victory Committee.
II.
a. I find that during the period 1946-1950, at Ithaca, New York, applicant maintained a close association and relationship with one Alfred Sarant. At applicant’s invitation, Sarant and his wife lived in applicant’s home for a period of eight months in 1947-1948, pending the completion of the Sarant home next door to applicant’s home. Thereafter Dayton and Sarant were neighbors until July, 1950. On approximately July 18, 1950, Sarant became the subject of intensive interrogation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Approximately a week after the interrogation had begun Sarant departed from Ithaca and subsequently entered Mexico with applicant’s wife. This finding is based on information contained in the open record, including applicant’s own statements.
b. Confidential information contained in the files of the Department of State, constituting a part of the record considered by the Passport Office, the Board of Passport Appeals, and myself, establishes with respect to Alfred Sarant that he was an active member of the Communist Party; that he admitted said membership during the years 1943 and 1944; and that he was involved in the espionage apparatus of Julius Rosenberg.
III.
a. I find that the applicant was present during 1949 and 1950, on more than one occasion, in the apartment building at 65 Morton Street, New York City, in which Alfred Sarant was lessee of apartment 6-1. This finding is based on information contained in the open record.
b. Confidential information contained in the files of the Department of State, constituting a part of the record considered by the Passport Office, the Board of Passport Appeals, and myself, indicates that Sarant’s apartment at 65 Morton Street, New York City, was used by Julius Rosenberg and other members of his spy ring for the microfilming of classified United States Government documents which were ultimately transferred to a foreign power.
IV.
a. I find that since 1938 the applicant, an experienced physicist, has maintained a close association and relationship with one Bernard Peters; that Peters was responsible for the applicant’s offer of employment at the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research, Bombay, India; and that one of the primary stated purposes of the applicant’s proposed travel abroad is to work in close collaboration with Peters at the Tata Institute. This finding is based on information contained in the open record, including applicant’s own statements.
b. Confidential information contained in the files of the Department of State, constituting a part of the record considered by the Passport Office, the Board of Passport Appeals, and myself, indicates that Bernard Peters, who recently renounced his American citizenship, has held membership in the Communist Party outside of the United States; has engaged in numerous Communist activities both in this country and abroad; and is suspected of being a Communist espionage agent.
Y.
I have reason to believe, on the balance of all the evidence, that the applicant is going abroad to engage in activities which will advance the Communist movement for the purpose, knowingly and wilfully of advancing that movement. I have reached this conclusion on the basis of the foregoing findings together with the confidential information relating thereto, as well as other confidential information contained in the files of the Department of State, the disclosure of which might prejudice the conduct of United States foreign relations. I have also taken into consideration the serious doubts as to applicant’s general credibility raised by the applicant’s denial in the face of convincing contrary evidence, including the oral testimony of three apparently disinterested witnesses of ever having been present at 65 Morton Street. The passport application of Weldon Bruce Dayton is therefore denied under Section 51.135 (c) of the Passport Regulations (22 CFR §51.135 (c)), and because the issuance of a passport would be contrary to the national interest.
VI.
The confidential information referred to in paragraphs I (b), II (b), III (b) and IV (b) above relates to the internal security of the United States. The substance of this confidential information was disclosed to the applicant during the consideration of his passport application. To disclose publicly the sources and details of this information would, in my judgment, be detrimental to our national interest by compromising investigative sources and methods and seriously interfering with the ability of this Department and the Executive Branch to obtain reliable information affecting our internal security. Moreover, it would have an adverse effect upon our. ability to obtain and utilize information from sources abroad and interfere with our established relationships in the security and intelligence area; and might, with respect to information referred to in paragraph V, prejudice the interest of United States foreign relations.
Date: October 4, 1956.
The Passport Regulations of the Secretary of State, as amended, 22 CFR § 51.142, provide:
“At any stage of the proceedings in the Passport Division or before the Board, if it is deemed necessary, the applicant may be required, as a part of his application, to subscribe, under oath or affirmation, to a statement with respect to present or past membership in the Communist Party. If applicant states that he is a Communist, refusal of a passport in his ease will be without further proceedings.”
§ 51.138. “In the event of a decision adverse to the applicant, he shall be entitled to appeal his case to the Board of Passport Appeals provided for in § 51.139.”
§ 51.139. “There is hereby established within the Department of State a Board of Passport Appeals, hereinafter referred to as the Board, composed of not less than three officers of the Department to be designated by the Secretary of State. The Board shall act on all appeals under § 51.138. The Board shall adopt and make public its own rules of procedure, to be approved by the Secretary, which shall provide that its duties in any case may be performed by a panel of not less than three members acting by majority determination. The rules shall accord applicant the right to a hearing and to be represented by counsel, and shall accord applicant and each witness the right to inspect the transcript of his own testimony.”
§ 51.162. “The purpose of the hearing is to permit applicant to present all information relevant and material to the decision in his ease. Applicant may, at the time of filing his petition, address a request in writing to the Board for such additional information or explanation as may be necessary to the preparation of his case. In conformity with the relevant laws and regulations, the Board shall pass promptly and finally upon all such requests and shall advise applicant of its decision. The Board shall take whatever action it deems necessary to insure the applicant of a full and fair consideration of his case.”
Section 51.163 of the Regulations provides:
“The Passport file and any other pertinent Government files shall be considered as part of the evidence in each case without testimony or other formality as to admissibility. Such files may not be examined by the applicant, except the applicant may examine his application or any paper which he has submitted in connection with his application or appeal. The applicant may appear and testify in his own behalf, be represented by counsel subject to the provisions of § 51.161, present witnesses and offer other evidence in his own behalf. The applicant and all witnesses may be cross-examined by any member of the Board or its counsel. If any witness whom the applicant wishes to call is unable to appear personally, the Board may, in its discretion, accept an affidavit by him or order evidence to be taken by deposition. Such depositions may be taken before any person designated by the Board and such designee is hereby authorized to administer oaths or affirmations for the purpose of the depositions. The Board shall conduct the hearing proceedings in such manner as to protect from disclosure information affecting the national security or tending to disclose or compromise investigative sources or methods.”
Note 4, supra.
The Regulations in providing for that contingency state:
§ 51.170. “In determining whether there is a preponderance of evidence supporting the denial of a passport the Board shall consider the entire record, including the transcript of the hearing and such confidential information as it may have in its possession. The Board shall take into consideration the inability of the applicant to meet information of which he has not been advised, specifically or in detail, or to attack the credibility of confidential informants.”
That section provides:
“In order to promote the national interest by assuring that persons who support the world Communist movement of which the Communist Party is an integral unit may not, through use of United States passports, further the purposes of that movement, no passport, except one limited for direct and immediate return to the United States, shall be issued to:
“(a) Persons who are members of the Communist Party or who have recently terminated such membership under such circumstances as to warrant the conclusion — not otherwise rebutted by the evidence — that they continue to act in furtherance of the interests and under the discipline of the Communist Party;
“ (b) Persons, regardless of the formal state of their affiliation with the Communist Party, who engage in activities which support the Communist movement under such circumstances as to warrant the conclusion — not otherwise rebutted by the evidence — that they have engaged in such activities as a result of direction, domination, or control exercised over them by the Communist movement;
“(e) Persons, regardless of the formal state of their affiliation with the Communist Party, as to whom there is reason to believe, on the balance of all the evidence, that they are going abroad to engage in activities which will advance the Communist movement for the purpose, knowingly and wilfully of advancing that movement.”
Note 7, supra.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
C
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
In preparation for the 1985 Georgia Bar Examination, petitioners contracted to take a bar review course offered by respondent BRG of Georgia, Inc. (BRG). In this litigation they contend that the price of BRG’s course was enhanced by reason of an unlawful agreement between BRG and respondent Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Legal and Professional Publications (HBJ), the Nation’s largest provider of bar review materials and lecture services. The central issue is whether the 1980 agreement between respondents violated § 1 of the Sherman Act.
HBJ began offering a Georgia bar review course on a limited basis in 1976, and was in direct, and often intense, competition with BRG during the period from 1977 to 1979. BRG and HBJ were the two main providers of bar review courses in Georgia during this time period. In early 1980, they entered into an agreement that gave BRG an exclusive license to market HBJ’s material in Georgia and to use its trade name “Bar/Bri.” The parties agreed that HBJ would not compete with BRG in Georgia and that BRG would not compete with HBJ outside of Georgia. Under the agreement, HBJ received $100 per student enrolled by BRG and 40% of all revenues over $350. Immediately after the 1980 agreement, the price of BRG’s course was increased from $150 to over $400.
On petitioners’ motion for partial summary judgment as to the § 1 counts in the complaint and respondents’ motion for summary judgment, the District Court held that the agreement was lawful. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, with one judge dissenting, agreed with the District Court that per se unlawful horizontal price fixing required an explicit agreement on prices to be charged or that one party have the right to be consulted about the other’s prices. The Court of Appeals also agreed with the District Court that to prove a per se violation under a geographic market allocation theory, petitioners had to show that respondents had subdivided some relevant market in which they had previously competed. 874 F. 2d 1417 (1989). The Court of Appeals denied a petition for rehearing en banc that had been supported by the United States. 893 F. 2d 293 (1990).
In United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150 (1940), we held that an agreement among competitors to engage in a program of buying surplus gasoline on the spot market in order to prevent prices from falling sharply was unlawful, even though there was no direct agreement on the actual prices to be maintained. We explained that “[u]nder the Sherman Act a combination formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate or foreign commerce is illegal per se.” Id., at 223. See also Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U. S. 643 (1980) (per curiam); National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U. S. 679 (1978).
The revenue-sharing formula in the 1980 agreement between BRG and HBJ, coupled with the price increase that took place immediately after the parties agreed to cease competing with each other in 1980, indicates that this agreement was “formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising” the price of the bar review course. It was, therefore, plainly incorrect for the District Court to enter summary judgment in respondents’ favor. Moreover, it is equally clear that the District Court and the Court of Appeals erred when they as-,, sumed that an allocation of markets o.r submarkets by competitors is not unlawful unless the. market, in which the two previously competed is divided between them.
In United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U. S. 596 (1972), we held that agreements between competitors to allocate territories to minimize competition are .'illegal:
“One of the classic examples of a per se, violation of § 1 is an agreement between .competitors, at the same level of the market structure to allocate territories in orderTo minimize competition. .... This Court has-reiterated time and time again that ‘[hjorizontal territorial limitations . . . are naked restraints of trade, with no.purpose except stifling of competition.’.. Such limitations.are.per se violations of the Sherman Act.” Id., at 608 (citations omitted).
The defendants in Topeo had never competed- in-the-same market, but had simply agreed to allocate markets. Here, HBJ and BRG had previously competed in the Georgia market; under their allocation agreement. BRG received that market, while HBJ received-the remainder. pfnthe United States. Each agreed not to compete in the other,^ territories. Such agreements are anticompetitive regardless of whether the parties split a market within which both do business or whether they merely reserve one market for one and another for the other. Thus, the 1980 agreement between HBJ and BRG was unlawful on its face.
The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Souter took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209, as amended and set forth in 15 U. S. C. § 1, provides in relevant part:
“Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.”
We do not reach the other claims alleged in petitioners’ nine-count complaint, including violations of § 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U. S. C. § 2.
The 1980 agreement contained two provisions, one called a “Covenant Not to Compete” and the other called “Other Ventures.” The former required HBJ not to “directly or indirectly own, manage, operate, join, invest, control, or participate in or be connected as an officer, employee, partner, director, independent contractor or otherwise with any business which is operating or participating in the preparation of candidates for the Georgia State Bar Examination.” Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Attachment E, p. 10. The latter required BRG not to compete against HBJ in States in which HBJ currently operated outside the State of Georgia. Id., at 15.
In dissent, Judge Clark explained that in his view HBJ and BRG were capable of engaging in per se horizontal restraints because they had competed against each other and then had joined forces. He believed the District Court’s analysis was flawed because it had failed to recognize that the agreements could be price-fixing agreements even without explicit reference to price and because it had failed to recognize that allocation, rather than subdivision, of markets could also constitute a per se antitrust violation.
The United States, as amicus curiae, had urged the court to adopt the views of the dissent.
See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U. S. 242, 255 (1986) (“The evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor”).
See Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society, 457 U. S. 332, 344, n. 15 (1982) (“division of markets” is per se offense).
In 1982, in connection with the settlement of another lawsuit, respondents made certain changes in their arrangement. Because the District Court found that the 1980 agreement did not violate § 1 of the Sherman Act, it did not address whether the 1982 modified agreement constituted a withdrawal from, or abandonment of, the conspiracy. In United States v. Kissel, 218 U. S. 601 (1910), we held that antitrust conspiracies may continue in time beyond the original conspiratorial agreement until either the conspiracy’s objectives are abandoned or succeed. Id., at 608-609. Thus, it is an unsettled factual issue whether the conspiratorial objectives manifest in the 1980 agreement between HBJ and BRG have continued in spite of the 1982 modifications.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
H
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Douglas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Section 3 (b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 61 Stat. 139, 73 Stat. 542, 29 U. S. C. § 153 (b), authorizes the National Labor Relations Board to delegate to its regional directors the power to determine the unit appropriate for collective bargaining. The Board accordingly adopted rules delegating to its regional directors its powers to determine representation issues and defining the conditions when the Board will review the determination of a regional director.
On filing of a representation petition, §9 (c)(1) provides that a hearing shall be held to determine if a question of representation exists and, if so, the appropriate bargaining unit. If an election is directed and the union prevails, it is certified as the employees’ bargaining representative. An employer who contests the election, including the unit determination, can only obtain court review under § 10 after an unfair labor practice charge has been made against him by the Board for refusing to bargain collectively “with the representatives of his employees” as provided in § 8 (a) (5).
In that review, however, the determination of the bargaining unit by the regional director need not be reviewed by the Board. Whether the Board reviews the initial decision on the merits, see Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. NLRB, 313 U. S. 146, 162, or the employer fails to request review of the action of the regional director, or the Board denies a request for review, the Board has discretion to reopen the issue where newly discovered noncumulative evidence is available.
The United Steelworkers filed a petition requesting a representation election among the production and maintenance employees at petitioner’s Hyde Park, Massachusetts, plant. The regional director provided a hearing and the essential issues tendered concerned four individuals classified as “assistant foremen.” The question was whether they were employees and properly within the unit or supervisors as defined in § 2 (11) of the Act and therefore excluded. The regional director found that three were employees and ordered an election in a unit consisting of all the employees, including the three.
Petitioner filed a request with the Board to review the decision of the regional director that the three men in question were employees, contending that such determination was clearly erroneous. The Board denied petitioner’s request for review and an election was held. Thereafter the regional director certified the union as the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees. When petitioner refused to bargain, the union filed an unfair labor practice charge with the Board. The trial examiner found for the union and the Board affirmed. 175 N. L. R. B. No. 68.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration claiming the Board must review the regional director’s representation determination before issuing an unfair labor practice order based on it. Petitioner’s reliance was on Pepsi-Cola Co. v. NLRB, 409 F. 2d 676, decided by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The Board denied that motion, noting its disagreement with the Pepsi-Cola case.
The Court of Appeals enforced the Board’s order, 427 F. 2d 114, thus creating the conflict among the circuits which led us to grant the petition for certiorari. 400 U. S. 818.
Petitioner argues that plenary review by the Board of the regional director’s unit determination is necessary at some point. Historically, the representation issue once fully litigated in the representation proceeding could not be relitigated in an unfair labor practice proceeding. We so held in Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. NLRB, supra. That case, of course, was decided when the determination of the appropriate unit was made by the Board itself. In 1959, § 3 (b) was added. Senator Goldwater, a member of the Conference Committee explained its purpose:
“[Section 3 (b)] is a new provision, not in either the House or Senate bills, designed to expedite final disposition of cases by the Board, by turning over part of its caseload to its regional directors for final determination.
“Under this provision, the regional directors can exercise no authority in representation cases which is greater or not the same as the statutory powers of the Board with respect to such cases. In the handling of such cases, the regional directors are required to follow the lawful rules, regulations, procedures, and precedents of the Board and to act in all respects as the Board itself would act.
“This authority to delegate to the regional directors is designed, as indicated, to speed the work of the Board. . . .”
We take this statement to reflect the considered judgment of Congress that the regional directors have an expertise concerning unit determinations. Or perhaps Congress was primarily motivated by a desire to lighten the Board’s workload and speed up its processes. Its recent report shows that in fiscal year 1969, a total of 1,999 formal representation decisions were issued either directing elections or dismissing election petitions; 1,872 of these were rendered by regional directors, and 127 by the Board (100 on direct transfer from the regional directors for initial decision and 27 on grant of a request for review of the regional director’s decision).
But for the 1959 amendment the Board would have decided all of those cases.
Whatever the reason for the delegation, Congress has made a clear choice; and the fact that the Board has only discretionary review of the determination of the regional director creates no possible infirmity within the range of our imagination.
The fact that Congress in 1961 rejected a reorganization plan which would have delegated decisionmaking power in unfair labor practice cases to the hands of trial examiners subject to discretionary Board review has no bearing on the present problem. The choices Congress may make in deciding what delegation of authority is appropriate do not in the present context raise any semblance of a substantial question. For it is unmistakably plain here that by § 3 (b) Congress did allow the Board to make a delegation of its authority over determination of the appropriate bargaining unit to the regional director.
The Board’s rules make clear that the regional director is required to follow the same rules as the Board respecting factfinding. The regional director’s determination if adopted by the trial examiner in the unfair labor practice proceeding accompanies the case both to the Board and to the Court of Appeals. In the present case the Court of Appeals concluded that the Board’s order was supported “by substantial evidence.” Congress has required no greater showing than that.
Affirmed.
Sec. 3 (b) provides in relevant part:
“The Board is also authorized to delegate to its regional directors its powers under section 9 to determine the unit appropriate for the purpose of collective bargaining, to investigate and provide for hearings, and determine whether a question of representation exists, and to direct an election or take a secret ballot under subsection (c) or (e) of section 9 and certify the results thereof, except that upon the filing of a request therefor with the Board by any interested person, the Board may review any action of a regional director delegated to him under this paragraph, but such a review shall not, unless specifically ordered by the Board, operate as a stay of any action taken by the regional director. . . .”
The rules are contained in 29 CFR § 102.67. Subsections 102.67 (c), (d), and (f) state in relevant part:
“(c) The Board will grant a request for review only where compelling reasons exist therefor. Accordingly, a request for review may be granted only upon one or more of the following grounds:
“(1) That a substantial question of law or policy is raised because of (i) the absence of, or (ii) a departure from, officially reported Board precedent.
“(2) That the regional director’s decision on a substantial factual issue is clearly erroneous on the record and such error prejudicially affects the rights of a party.
“(3) That the conduct of the hearing or any ruling made in connection with the proceeding has resulted in prejudicial error.
“(4) That there are compelling reasons for reconsideration of an important Board rule or policy.
“(d) . . . With respect to paragraph (c)(2) of this section, and other grounds where appropriate, said request must contain a summary of all evidence or rulings bearing on the issues together with page citations from the transcript and a summary of argument. But such request may not raise any issue or allege any facts not timely presented to the regional director.”
“(f) . . . Failure to request review shall preclude such parties from relitigating, in any related subsequent unfair labor practice proceeding, any issue which was, or could have been, raised in the representation proceeding. Denial of a request for review shall constitute an affirmance of the regional director’s action which shall also preclude relitigating any such issues in any related subsequent unfair labor practice proceeding.”
See rules, supra, n. 2.
The Tenth Circuit is in accord with the First. See Meyer Dairy, Inc. v. NLRB, 429 F. 2d 697, 699-700.
105 Cong. Rec. 19770.
34th Annual Report, Table 3B, 201 (1970).
107 Cong. Rec. 10223, 12905-12932.
See rules, supra, n. 2.
29 CFR § 102.67 (b).
29 CFR §102.45 (a).
29 CFR § 101.14.
There is no different standard of review prescribed by the Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U. S. C. §706 (1964 ed., Supp. V). See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U. S. 474, 487.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
G
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sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Me. Justice Black
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The petitioner, Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division, United States Department of Labor, filed this action in a Federal District Court to enjoin alleged violations by the respondent railroad of §§15 (a) (2) and 15 (a) (5) of the Fair Labor Standards Act. 52 Stat. 1060, 1068. These sections require that minimum wages be paid to employees covered by the Act and that appropriate records be kept concerning their employment and pay. The railroad was charged with having violated the Act with regard to two types of alleged employees: First, persons in training to become yard and main line firemen, brakemen, and switchmen; second, others in training to become clerks, stenographers, callers, messengers, and other similar general miscellaneous workers. The District Court held that the first group were not “employees” and therefore were not covered by the Act. On this ground alone the injunction was denied as to them. It also denied relief as to the second group, clerks, etc., partly on this same ground. Another ground for denying relief as to the second group was the court’s finding that the railroad “for several years past has been complying with the Act as to them, and apparently intends in good faith to do so in the future.” 60 F. Supp. 1004, 1007-1008. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. 155 F. 2d 1016, one judge dissenting. We granted certiorari because of the importance of the questions decided. 329 U. S. 696.
The finding of the District Court that the railroad had been complying with the Act in good faith in its business relations with the trainee clerks, stenographers, etc. is not challenged. No argument is here made that this is not adequate support for denial of the relief granted as to this second group. Under these circumstances, we affirm the court’s action in denying an injunction to enjoin violations of the Act as to these trainees. We therefore do not reach the question as to whether this group as a whole or any of the persons in it were or were not employees under the Act.
The sole ground for denying relief as to the persons training to become firemen, brakemen, and switchmen was that they were not employees. The findings of fact here as to the training of these trainees are in all relevant respects practically identical with the findings of fact in Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., this day decided, ante, p. 148. These findings of fact are not challenged. For the reasons set out in that opinion we hold that the Circuit Court of Appeals was not in error in holding that the persons receiving training in order to become qualified for employment as firemen, brakemen, and switchmen, are not employees within the meaning of the Fair Labor Standards Act.
Affirmed.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
G
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Souter
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question here is whether Congress intended 18 U. S. C. § 3501 to discard, or merely to narrow, the rule in McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332 (1943), and Mallory v. United States, 354 U. S. 449 (1957), under which an arrested person’s confession is inadmissible if given after an unreasonable delay in bringing him before a judge. We hold that Congress meant to limit, not eliminate, McNabb-Mallory.
I
A
The common law obliged an arresting officer to bring his prisoner before a magistrate as soon as he reasonably could. See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U. S. 44, 61-62 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting). This “presentment” requirement tended to prevent secret detention and served to inform a suspect of the charges against him, and it was the law in nearly every American State and the National Government. See id., at 60-61; McNabb, supra, at 342, and n. 7.
McNabb v. United States raised the question of how to enforce a number of federal statutes codifying the presentment rule. 318 U. S., at 342 (citing, among others, 18 U. S. C. § 595 (1940 ed.), which provided that “ ‘[i]t shall be the duty of the marshal... who may arrest a person... to take the defendant before the nearest... judicial officer... for a hearing’”). There, federal agents flouted the requirement by interrogating several murder suspects for days before bringing them before a magistrate, and then only after they had given the confessions that convicted them. 318 U. S., at 334-338, 344-345.
On the defendants’ motions to exclude the confessions from evidence, we saw no need to reach any constitutional issue. Instead we invoked the supervisory power to establish and maintain “civilized standards of procedure and evidence” in federal courts, id., at 340, which we exercised for the sake of making good on the traditional obligation embodied in the federal presentment legislation. We saw both the statutes and the traditional rule as aimed not only at cheeking the likelihood of resort to the third degree but meant generally to “avoid all the evil implications of secret interrogation of persons accused of crime.” Id., at 344. We acknowledged that “Congress ha[d] not explicitly forbidden the use of evidence... procured” in derogation of the presentment obligation, id., at 345, but we realized that “permitting] such evidence to be made the basis of a conviction in the federal courts would stultify the policy which Congress ha[d] enacted into law,” ibid., and in the exercise of supervisory authority we held confessions inadmissible when obtained during unreasonable presentment delay.
Shortly after McNabb, the combined action of the Judicial Conference of the United States and Congress produced Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5(a), which pulled the several statutory presentment provisions together in one place. See Mallory, supra, at 452 (describing Rule 5(a) as “a compendious restatement, without substantive change, of several prior specific federal statutory provisions”). As first enacted, the rule told “[a]n officer making an arrest under a warrant issued upon a complaint or any person making an arrest without a warrant [to] take the arrested person without unnecessary delay before the nearest available commissioner or before any other nearby officer empowered to commit persons charged with offenses against the laws of the United States.” Fed. Rule Grim. Proc. 5(a) (1946). The rule remains much the same today: “A person making an arrest within the United States must take the defendant without unnecessary delay before a magistrate judge....” Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 5(a)(1)(A) (2007).
A case for applying McNabb and Rule 5(a) together soon arose in Upshaw v. United States, 335 U. S. 410 (1948). Despite the Government’s confession of error, the D. C. Circuit had thought McNabb’s exclusionary rule applied only to involuntary confessions obtained by coercion during the period of delay, 335 U. S., at 411-412, and so held the defendant’s voluntary confession admissible into evidence. This was error, and we reiterated the reasoning of a few years earlier. “In the McNabb case we held that the plain purpose of the requirement that prisoners should promptly be taken before committing magistrates was to check resort by officers to ‘secret interrogation of persons accused of crime.’ ” Id., at 412 (quoting McNabb, supra, at 344). Upshaw consequently emphasized that even voluntary confessions are inadmissible if given after an unreasonable delay in presentment. 335 U. S., at 413.
We applied Rule 5(a) again in Mallory v. United States, holding a confession given seven hours after arrest inadmissible for “unnecessary delay” in presenting the suspect to a magistrate, where the police questioned the suspect for hours “within the vicinity of numerous committing magistrates.” 354 U. S., at 455. Again, we repeated the reasons for the rule and explained, as we had before and have since, that delay for the purpose of interrogation is the epitome of “unnecessary delay.” Id., at 455-456; see also McLaughlin, supra, at 61 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“It was clear” at common law “that the only element bearing upon the reasonableness of delay was not such circumstances as the pressing need to conduct further investigation, but the arresting officer’s ability, once the prisoner had been secured, to reach a magistrate”); Upshaw, supra, at 414. Thus, the rule known simply as McNabb-Mallory “generally render[s] inadmissible confessions made during periods of detention that violat[e] the prompt presentment requirement of Rule 5(a).” United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U. S. 350, 354 (1994).
There the law remained until 1968, when Congress enacted 18 U. S. C. § 3501 in response to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), and to the application of McNabb-Mallory in some federal courts. Subsections (a) and (b) of §3501 were meant to eliminate Miranda. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U. S. 428, 435-437 (2000); infra, at 318. Subsection (a) provides that “[i]n any criminal prosecution brought by the United States..., a confession... shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given,” while subsection (b) lists several considerations for courts to address in assessing voluntariness. Subsection (c), which focused on McNabb-Mallory, see infra, at 318, provides that in any federal prosecution, “a confession made... by... a defendant therein, while such person was under arrest..., shall not be inadmissible solely because of delay in bringing such person before a magistrate judge... if such confession is found by the trial judge to have been made voluntarily... and if such confession was made... within six hours [of arrest]”; the 6-hour time limit is extended when further delay is “reasonable considering the means of transportation and the distance to be traveled to the nearest available [magistrate judge].”
The issue in this case is whether Congress intended § 3501(a) to sweep McNabb-Mallory’s exclusionary rule aside entirely, or merely meant § 3501(c) to provide immunization to voluntary confessions given within six hours of a suspect's arrest.
B
Petitioner Johnnie Corley was suspected of robbing a bank in Norristown, Pennsylvania. After federal agents learned that Corley was subject to arrest on an unrelated local matter, some federal and state officers went together to execute the state warrant on September 17,2003, and found him just as he was pulling out of a driveway in his ear. Corley nearly ran over one officer, then jumped out of the car, pushed the officer down, and ran. The agents gave chase and caught and arrested him for assaulting a federal officer. The arrest occurred about 8 a.m. 500 F. 3d 210, 212 (CA3 2007).
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents first kept Corley at a local police station while they questioned residents near the place he was captured. Around 11:45 a.m. they took him to a Philadelphia hospital to treat a minor cut on his hand that he got during the chase. At 3:30 p.m. the agents took him from the hospital to the Philadelphia FBI office and told him that he was a suspect in the Norristown bank robbery. Though the office was in the same building as the chambers of the nearest magistrate judges, the agents did not bring Corley before a magistrate judge, but questioned him instead, in hopes of getting a confession. App. 68-69, 83, 138-139.
The agents' repeated arguments sold Corley on the benefits of cooperating with the Government, and he signed a form waiving his Miranda rights. At 5:27 p.m., some 9.5 hours after his arrest, Corley began an oral confession that he robbed the bank, App. 62, and spoke on in this vein until about 6:30, when agents asked him to put it all in writing. Corley said he was tired and wanted a break, so the agents decided to hold him overnight and take the written statement the next morning. At 10:30 a.m. on September 18 they began the interrogation again, which ended when Corley signed a written confession. He was finally presented to a Magistrate Judge at 1:30 p.m. that day, 29.5 hours after his arrest. 500 F. 3d, at 212.
Corley was charged with armed bank robbery, 18 U. S. C. §§ 2113(a), (d), conspiracy to commit armed bank robbery, §371, and using a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, § 924(c). When he moved to suppress his oral and written confessions under Rule 5(a) and McNabb-Mallory, the District Court denied the motion, with the explanation that the time Corley was receiving medical treatment should be excluded from the delay, and that the oral confession was thus given within the 6-hour window of § 3501(e). Crim. No. 03-775 (ED Pa., May 10, 2004), App. 97. The District Court also held Corley’s written confession admissible, reasoning that “a break from interrogation requested by an arrestee who has already begun his confession does not constitute unreasonable delay under Rule 5(a).” Id., at 97-98. Corley was convicted of conspiracy and armed robbery but acquitted of using a firearm during a crime of violence. 500 F. 3d, at 212-213.
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the conviction, though its rationale for rejecting Corley’s Rule 5(a) argument was different from the District Court’s. The panel majority considered itself bound by Circuit precedent to the effect that § 3501 entirely abrogated the McNabb-Mallory rule and replaced it with a pure voluntariness test. See 500 F. 3d, at 212 (citing Government of Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 502 F. 2d 914 (CA3 1974)). As the majority saw it, if a district court found a confession voluntary after considering the points listed in § 3501(b), it would be admissible, regardless of whether delay in presentment was unnecessary or unreasonable. 500 F. 3d, at 217. Judge Sloviter read Gereau differently and dissented with an opinion that “§3501 does not displace Rule 5(a)” or abrogate McNabb-Mallory for presentment delays beyond six hours. 500 F. 3d, at 236.
We granted certiorari to resolve a division in the Courts of Appeals on the reach of §3501. 554 U. S. 945 (2008). Compare United States v. Glover, 104 F. 3d 1570, 1583 (CA10 1997) (§ 3501 entirely supplanted McNabb-Mallory); United States v. Christopher, 956 F. 2d 536, 538-539 (CA6 1991) (per curiam) (same), with United States v. Mansoori, 304 F. 3d 635, 660 (CA7 2002) (§ 3501 limited the McNabb-Mallory rule to periods more than six hours after arrest); United States v. Perez, 733 F. 2d 1026, 1031-1032 (CA2 1984) (same). We now vacate and remand.
II
The Government’s argument focuses on § 3501(a), which provides that any confession “shall be admissible in evidence” in federal court “if it is voluntarily given.” To the Government, subsection (a) means that once a district court looks to the considerations in § 3501(b) and finds a confession voluntary, in it comes; (a) entirely eliminates McNabbMallory with its bar to admitting even a voluntary confession if given during an unreasonable delay in presentment.
Corley argues that § 3501(a) was meant to overrule Miranda and nothing more, with no effect on McNabb-Mallory, which §3501 touches only in subsection (c). By providing that a confession “shall not be inadmissible solely because of delay” in presentment if “made voluntarily and... within six hours [of arrest],” subsection (c) leaves McNabb-Mallory inapplicable to confessions given within the six hours, but when a confession comes even later, the exclusionary rule applies and courts have to see whether the delay was unnecessary or unreasonable.
Corley has the better argument.
A
The fundamental problem with the Government’s reading of § 3501 is that it renders § 3501(c) nonsensical and superfluous. Subsection (c) provides that a confession “shall not be inadmissible solely because of delay” in presentment if the confession is “made voluntarily and... within six hours [of arrest].” If (a) really meant that any voluntary confession was admissible, as the Government contends, then (c) would add nothing; if a confession was “made voluntarily” it would be admissible, period, and never “inadmissible solely because of delay,” no matter whether the delay went beyond six hours. There is no way out of this, and the Government concedes it. Tr. of Oral Arg. 33 (“Congress never needed (c); (c) in the [Government's view was always superfluous”).
The Government’s reading is thus at odds with one of the most basic interpretive canons, that “‘[a] statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant....’” Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U. S. 88, 101 (2004) (quoting 2A N. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction §46.06, pp. 181-186 (rev. 6th ed. 2000); footnote omitted). The Government attempts to mitigate its problem by rewriting (c) into a clarifying, if not strictly necessary, provision: although Congress wrote that a confession “shall not be inadmissible solely because of delay” if the confession is “made voluntarily and... within six hours [of arrest],” the Government tells us that Congress actually meant that a confession “shall not be [involuntary] solely because of delay” if the confession is “[otherwise voluntary] and... [made] within six hours [of arrest].” Thus rewritten, (c) would coexist peacefully (albeit inelegantly) with (a), with (c) simply specifying a bright-line rule applying (a) to cases of delay: it would tell courts that delay alone does not make a confession involuntary unless the delay exceeds six hours.
To this proposal, “ ‘[t]he short answer is that Congress did not write the statute that way.’ ” Russello v. United States, 464 U. S. 16, 23 (1983) (quoting United States v. Naftalin, 441 U. S. 768, 773 (1979)). The Government may say that we can sensibly read “inadmissible” as “involuntary” because the words are “virtually synonymous... in this statutory context,” Brief for United States 23, but this is simply not so. To begin with, Congress used both terms in (c) itself, and “[w]e would not presume to ascribe this difference to a simple mistake in draftsmanship.” Russello, supra, at 23. And there is, in fact, every reason to believe that Congress used the distinct terms very deliberately. Subsection (c) specifies two criteria that must be satisfied to prevent a confession from being “inadmissible solely because of delay”: the confession must be “[1] made voluntarily and... [2] within six hours [of arrest].” Because voluntariness is thus only one of several criteria for admissibility under (c), “involuntary” and “inadmissible” plainly cannot be synonymous. What is more, the Government’s argument ignores the fact that under the McNabb-Mallory rule, which we presume Congress was aware of, Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, 699 (1979), “inadmissible” and “involuntary” mean different things. As we explained before and as the Government concedes, McNabb-Mallory makes even voluntary confessions inadmissible if given after an unreasonable delay in presentment, Upshaw, 335 U. S., at 413; Tr. of Oral Arg. 33 (“[I]t was well understood that McNabb-Mallory... excluded totally voluntary confessions”). So we cannot accept the Government’s attempt to confuse the critically distinct terms “involuntary” and “inadmissible” by rewriting (c) into a bright-line rule doing nothing more than applying (a).
Corley’s position, in contrast, gives effect to both (c) and (a), by reading (a) as overruling Miranda and (c) as qualifying McNabb-Mallory. The Government answers, however, that accepting Corley’s argument would result in a different problem: it would create a conflict between (c) and (a), since (a) provides that all voluntary confessions are admissible while Corley’s reading of (c) leaves some voluntary confessions inadmissible. But the Government’s counterargument falls short for two reasons. First, even if (a) is read to be at odds with (c), the conflict is resolved by recognizing that (a) is a broad directive while (c) aims only at McNabbMallory, and “a more specific statute will be given precedence over a more general one....” Busic v. United States, 446 U. S. 398, 406 (1980). Second, and more fundamentally, (a) cannot prudently be read to create a conflict with (c), not only because it would make (c) superfluous, as explained, but simply because reading (a) that way would create conflicts with so many other rules that the subsection cannot possibly be given its literal scope. Subsection (a) provides that “[i]n any criminal prosecution brought by the United States..., a confession... shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given,” and § 3501(e) defines “confession” as “any confession of guilt of any criminal offense or any self-incriminating statement made or given orally or in writing.” Thus, if the Government seriously urged a literal reading, (a) would mean that “[i]n any criminal prosecution brought by the United States..., [‘any self-incriminating statement’ with respect to ‘any criminal offense’]... shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given.” Thus would many a Rule of Evidence be overridden in case after case: a defendant’s self-incriminating statement to his lawyer would be admissible despite his insistence on attorney-client privilege; a fourth-hand hearsay statement the defendant allegedly made would come in; and a defendant’s confession to an entirely unrelated crime committed years earlier would be admissible without more. These are some of the absurdities of literalism that show that Congress could not have been writing in a literalistic frame of mind.
B
As it turns out, there is more than reductio ad absurdum and the antisuperfluousness canon to confirm that subsection (a) leaves McNabb-Mallory alone, for that is what legislative history says. In fact, the Government concedes that subsections (a) and (b) were aimed at Miranda, while subsection (c) was meant to modify the presentment exclusionary rule. Tr. of Oral Arg. 38 (“I will concede to you... that section (a) was considered to overrule Miranda[,] and subsection (c) was addressed to McNabb-Mallory”). The concession is unavoidable. The Senate, where § 3501 originated, split the provision into two parts: division 1 contained subsections (a) and (b), and division 2 contained subsection (c). 114 Cong. Rec. 14171 (1968). In the debate on the Senate floor immediately before voting on these proposals, several Senators, including the section’s prime sponsor, Senator McClellan, explained that division 1 “has to do with the Miranda decision,” while division 2 related to Mallory. 114 Cong. Rec. 14171-14172. This distinct intent was confirmed by the separate Senate votes adopting the two measures, division 1 by 55 to 29 and division 2 by 58 to 26, id., at 14171-14172, 14174-14175; if (a) did abrogate McNabb-Mallory, as the Government claims, then voting for division 2 would have been entirely superfluous, for the division 1 vote would already have done the job. That aside, a sponsor's statement to the full Senate carries considerable weight, and Senator McClellan’s explanation that division 1 was specifically addressed to Miranda confirms that (a) and (b) were never meant to reach far enough to abrogate other background evidentiary rules including McNabb-Mallory.
Further legislative history not only drives that point home, but conclusively shows an intent that subsection (c) limit McNabb-Mallory, not replace it. In its original draft, subsection (e) would indeed have done away with McNabb-Mallory completely, for the bill as first written would have provided that “[i]n any criminal prosecution by the United States..., a confession made or given by a person who is a defendant therein... shall not be inadmissible solely because of delay in bringing such person before a [magistrate judge] if such confession is... made voluntarily.” S. 917, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 44-45 (1968) (as reported by Senate Committee on the Judiciary); 114 Cong. Rec. 14172. The provision so conceived was resisted, however, by a number of Senators worried about allowing indefinite presentment delays. See, e. g., id., at 11740, 13990 (Sen. Tydings) (the provision would “permit Federal criminal suspects to be questioned indefinitely before they are presented to a committing magistrate”); id., at 12290 (Sen. Fong) (the provision “would open the doors to such practices as holding suspects incommunicado for an indefinite period”). After Senator Tydings proposed striking (c) from the bill altogether, id., at 13651 (Amendment No. 788), Senator Scott introduced the compromise of qualifying (c) with the words: “‘and if such confession was made or given by such person within six hours following his arrest or other detention,’” id., at 14184-14185 (Amendment No. 805). The amendment was intended to eonfine McNabb-Mallory to excluding only confessions given after more than six hours of delay, see 114 Cong. Rec. 14184 (remarks of Sen. Scott) (“My amendment provides that the period during which confessions may be received... shall in no case exceed 6 hours”), and it was explicitly modeled on the provision Congress had passed just months earlier to govern presentment practice in the District of Columbia, Title III of An Act Relating to Crime and Criminal Procedure in the District of Columbia (D. C. Crime Act), § 301(b), 81 Stat. 735-736, see, e.g., 114 Cong. Rec. 14184 (remarks of Sen. Scott) (“My amendment is an attempt to conform, as nearly as practicable, to title III of [the D. C. Crime Act]”). By the terms of that Act, “[a]ny statement, admission, or confession made by an arrested person within three hours immediately following his arrest shall not be excluded from evidence in the courts of the District of Columbia solely because of delay in presentment.” § 301(b), 81 Stat. 735-736. Given the clear intent that Title III modify but not eliminate McNabb-Mallory in the District of Columbia, see, e. g., S. Rep. No. 912, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 17-18 (1967), using it as a model plainly shows how Congress meant as much but no more in § 3501(c).
In sum, the legislative history strongly favors Corley’s reading. The Government points to nothing in this history supporting its view that (c) created a bright-line rule for applying (a) in cases with a presentment issue.
C
It also counts heavily against the position of the United States that it would leave the Rule 5 presentment requirement without any teeth, for as the Government again is forced to admit, if there is no McNabb-Mallory there is no apparent remedy for delay in presentment. Tr. of Oral Arg. 25. One might not care if the prompt presentment requirement were just some administrative nicety, but in fact the rule has always mattered in very practical ways and still does. As we said, it stretches back to the common law, when it was “one of the most important” protections “against unlawful arrest.” McLaughlin, 500 U. S., at 60-61 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Today presentment is the point at which the judge is required to take several key steps to foreclose Government overreaching: informing the defendant of the charges against him, his right to remain silent, his right to counsel, the availability of bail, and any right to a preliminary hearing; giving the defendant a chance to consult with counsel; and deciding between detention or release. Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 5(d); see also Rule 58(b)(2).
In a world without McNabb-Mallory, federal agents would be free to question suspects for extended periods before bringing them out in the open, and we have always known what custodial secrecy leads to. See McNabb, 318 U. S. 332. No one with any smattering of the history of 20th-century dictatorships needs a lecture on the subject, and we understand the need even within our own system to take care against going too far. “[Cjustodial police interrogation, by its very nature, isolates and pressures the individual,” Dick erson, 530 U. S., at 435, and there is mounting empirical evidence that these pressures can induce a frighteningly high percentage of people to confess to crimes they never committed, see, e. g., Drizin & Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA World, 82 N. C. L. Rev. 891, 906-907 (2004).
Justice Frankfurter’s point in McNabb is as fresh as ever: “The history of liberty has largely been the history of observance of procedural safeguards.” 318 U. S., at 347. McNabb-Mallory is one of them, and neither the text nor the history of § 3501 makes out a case that Congress meant to do away with it.
Ill
The Government’s fallback claim is that even if § 3501 preserved a limited version of McNabb-Mallory, Congress cut out the rule altogether by enacting Federal Rule of Evidence 402 in 1975. Act of Jan. 2, Pub. L. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926. So far as it might matter here, that rule provides that “[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority.” Id., at 1931. The Government says that McNabb-Mallory excludes relevant evidence in a way not “otherwise provided by” any of these four authorities, and so has fallen to the scythe.
The Government never raised this argument in the Third Circuit or the District Court, which would justify refusing to consider it here, but in any event it has no merit. The Advisory Committee’s Notes on Rule 402, which were before Congress when it enacted the Rules of Evidence and which we have relied on in the past to interpret the rules, Tome v. United States, 513 U. S. 150, 160 (1995) (plurality opinion), expressly identified McNabb-Mallory as a statutorily authorized rule that would survive Rule 402: “The Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure in some instances require the exclusion of relevant evidence. For example,... the effective enforcement of... Rule 5(a)... is held to require the exclusion of statements elicited during detention in violation thereof.” 28 U. S. C. App., pp. 325-326 (citing Mallory, 354 U. S. 449, and 18 U. S. C. § 3501(c)); see also Mallory, supra, at 451 (“Th[is] case calls for the proper application of Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure... ”). Indeed, the Government has previously conceded before this Court that Rule 402 preserved McNabb-Mallory. Brief for United States in United States v. Payner, O. T. 1979, No. 78-1729, p. 32, and n. 13 (saying that Rule 402 “left to the courts... questions concerning the propriety of excluding relevant evidence as a method of implementing the Constitution, a federal statute, or a statutorily authorized rule,” and citing McNabb-Mallory as an example). The Government was right the first time, and it would be bizarre to hold that Congress adopted Rule 402 with a purpose exactly opposite to what the Advisory Committee Notes said the rule would do.
IV
We hold that §3501 modified McNabb-Mallory without supplanting it. Under the rule as revised by § 3501(c), a district court with a suppression claim must find whether the defendant confessed within six hours of arrest (unless a longer delay was “reasonable considering the means of transportation and the distance to be traveled to the nearest available [magistrate judge]”). If the confession came within that period, it is admissible, subject to the other Rules of Evidence, so long as it was “made voluntarily and... the weight to be given [it] is left to the jury.” Ibid. If the confession occurred before presentment and beyond six hours, however, the court must decide whether delaying that long was unreasonable or unnecessary under the McNabb-Mallory cases, and if it was, the confession is to be suppressed.
In this case, the Third Circuit did not apply this rule and in consequence never conclusively determined whether Corley’s oral confession “should be treated as having been made within six hours of arrest,” as the District Court held. 500 F. 3d, at 220, n. 7. Nor did the Circuit consider the justifiability of any delay beyond six hours if the oral confession should be treated as given outside the 6-hour window; and it did not make this enquiry with respect to Corley’s written confession. We therefore vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for consideration of those issues in the first instance, consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Alito, with whom The Chief Justice, Justice & alia, and Justice Thomas join, dissenting.
Section 3501(a) of Title 18, United States Code, directly and unequivocally answers the question presented in this case. After petitioner was arrested by federal agents, he twice waived his Miranda rights and voluntarily confessed, first orally and later in writing, that he had participated in an armed bank robbery. He was then taken before a Magistrate Judge for an initial appearance. The question that we must decide is whether this voluntary confession may be suppressed on the ground that there was unnecessary delay in bringing petitioner before the Magistrate Judge. Unless the unambiguous language of § 3501(a) is ignored, petitioner’s confession may not be suppressed.
I
Section 3501(a) states: “In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States..., a confession... shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given.”
Applying “settled principles of statutory construction,” “we must first determine whether the statutory text is plain and unambiguous,” and “[i]f it is, we must apply the statute according to its terms.” Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U. S. 379, 387 (2009). Here, there is nothing ambiguous about the language of § 3501(a), and the Court does not claim otherwise. Although we normally presume that Congress “means in a statute what it says there,” Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U. S. 249, 253-254 (1992), the Court today concludes that § 3501(a) does not mean what it says and that a voluntary confession may be suppressed under the McNdbbMallory rule. This supervisory rule, which requires the suppression of a confession where there was unnecessary delay in bringing a federal criminal defendant before a judicial officer after arrest, was announced long before 18 U. S. C. § 3501(a) was adopted. According to the Court, this rule survived the enactment of § 3501(a) because Congress adopted that provision for the sole purpose of abrogating Miranda and apparently never realized that the provision’s broad language would also do away with the McNabbMallory rule. I disagree with the Court’s analysis and therefore respectfully dissent.
II
A
The Court’s first and most substantial argument invokes “the antisuperfluousness canon,” ante, at 317, under which a statute should be read, if possible, so that all of its provisions are given effect and none is superfluous. Ante, at 314-317. Section 3501(c) provides that a voluntary confession “shall not be inadmissible solely because of [the] delay” in bringing the defendant before a judicial officer if the defendant is brought before a judicial officer within six hours of arrest. If § 3501(a) means that a voluntary confession may never be excluded due to
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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A
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Blackmun
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The no-interest rule is to the effect that interest cannot be recovered in a suit against the Government in the absence of an express waiver of sovereign immunity from an award of interest. In this case, attorney’s fees as well as interest on those fees were awarded to a plaintiff who prevailed against petitioner Library of Congress in a suit brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §2000e et seq. We therefore must decide whether Congress, in enacting Title VII, expressly waived the Government’s immunity from interest.
H
Respondent Tommy Shaw is an employee of the Library of Congress. He is black. During 1976 and 1977, he filed three complaints with the Library’s Equal Employment Office alleging job-related racial discrimination. Following an investigation, Library officials rejected his complaints. Thereafter, respondent’s counsel pursued administrative relief and settlement negotiations, and eventually reached a settlement with the Library. The latter agreed to promote Shaw retroactively with backpay provided that the Comptroller General first determined that the Library had authority to do so in the absence of a specific finding of racial discrimination. The Comptroller General ruled that the Library, under the Back Pay Act, 5 U. S. C. §§5595, 5596, lacked that power; he did not address whether such relief was authorized under Title VII.
Respondent then filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, contending that Title VII authorized the Library to accord the relief specified in the settlement agreement. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court agreed with respondent that the Library had the power under Title VII to settle his claim by awarding him a retroactive promotion with backpay without a formal finding of discrimination. 479 F. Supp. 945 (1979). The Library therefore was authorized to promote Shaw with backpay, and to pay a reasonable attorney’s fee and costs pursuant to §706(k) of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U. S. C. §2000e-5(k). 479 F. Supp., at 949-950.
In a separate opinion calculating the attorney’s fee, the District Court began with a lodestar of $8,435, based on 99 hours of work at $85 per hour. App. to Pet. for Cert. 57a, 62a-66a. The court then reduced the lodestar by 20 percent to reflect the quality of counsel’s representation. Id., at 66a-67a. Finally, and significantly for present purposes, the court increased the adjusted lodestar by 30 percent to compensate counsel for the delay in receiving payment for the legal services rendered. Id., at 68a. The District Court, relying on Copeland v. Marshall, 206 U. S. App. D. C. 390, 403, 641 F. 2d 880, 893 (1980) (en banc), indicated that increasing an attorney’s fee award for delay is appropriate because the hourly rates used for the lodestar represent the prevailing rate for clients who typically pay their legal bills promptly, whereas court-awarded fees are normally received long after the legal services are rendered. An increase for delay is designed to compensate the attorney for the money he could have earned had he been paid earlier and invested the funds. The District Court concluded that the period of delay ran from the time the case should have ended, which it viewed as the latter part of 1978, until just after judgment.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. 241 U. S. App. D. C. 355, 747 F. 2d 1469 (1984). The court determined that, even though the adjustment was termed compensation for delay rather than interest, the no-interest rule applied because the two adjustments were functionally equivalent. The court went on to examine whether the Government expressly had waived its immunity from interest in Title VII. Section 706(k) of Title VII, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5(k), provides in relevant part:
“In any action or proceeding under this subchapter the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the [EEOC] or the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs, and the [EEOC] and the United States shall be liable for costs the same as a private person.” (Emphasis added.)
The Court of Appeals noted that in a Title VII suit against a private employer, interest on attorney’s fees may be recovered. 241 U. S. App. D. C., at 361, 747 F. 2d, at 1475. See, e. g., Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc., 670 F. 2d 760 (CA7 1982), cert. denied, 461 U. S. 956 (1983). Therefore, the Court of Appeals reasoned, in making the United States liable “the same as a private person,” Congress waived the United States’ immunity from interest. In the alternative, the Court of Appeals held that even if the “same as a private person” provision was not an express waiver, the District Court’s adjustment was proper; when a statute measures the liability of the United States by that of a private person, the “traditional rigor of the sovereign-immunity doctrine” is relaxed. 241 U. S. App. D. C., at 365, 747 F. 2d, at 1479.
Judge Ginsburg dissented. Id., at 371, 747 F. 2d, at 1485. She found no express waiver of immunity from interest, and declined to join what she considered to be a judicial termination of the no-interest rule. She viewed the increase for delay in this case as an award of interest, based on the manner and timing of its computation. She indicated, however, that use of current rather than historical hourly rates in order to compensate for delay, or use of historical rates that were based on expected delay, see Murray v. Weinberger, 239 U. S. App. D. C. 264, 741 F. 2d 1423 (1984), would not run afoul of the no-interest rule.
We granted certiorari to address the question whether the Court of Appeals’ decision conflicts with this Court’s repeated holdings that interest may not be awarded against the Government in the absence of express statutory or contractual consent. 474 U. S. 815 (1985).
rH hH
In the absence of express congressional consent to the award of interest separate from a general waiver of immunity to suit, the United States is immune from an interest award. This requirement of a separate waiver reflects the historical view that interest is an element of damages separate from damages on the substantive claim. C. McCormick, Law of Damages § 50, p. 205 (1935). Because interest was generally presumed not to be within the contemplation of the parties, common-law courts in England allowed interest by way of damages only when founded upon agreement of the parties. See De Havilland v. Bowerbank, 1 Camp. 50, 51, 170 Eng. Rep. 872, 873 (N. P. 1807); Calton v. Bragg, 15 East. 223, 226-227, 104 Eng. Rep. 828, 830 (K. B. 1812); H. McGregor, Mayne and McGregor On Damages 281 (1961). In turn, the agreement-basis of interest was adopted by American courts. See Reid v. Rensselaer Glass Factory, 3 Cow. 393 (N. Y. 1824) (reviewing treatment of interest in state courts); C. McCormick, Law of Damages § 51, p. 208 (1935). Gradually, in suits between private parties, the necessity of an agreement faded. See id., at 210.
The agreement requirement assumed special force when applied to claims for interest against the United States. As sovereign, the United States, in the absence of its consent, is immune from suit. See United States v. Sherwood, 312 U. S. 584 (1941). This basic rule of sovereign immunity, in conjunction with the requirement of an agreement to pay interest, gave rise to the rule that interest cannot be recovered unless the award of interest was affirmatively and separately contemplated by Congress. See, e. g., United States ex rel. Angarica v. Bayard, 127 U. S. 251, 260 (1888) (“The case, therefore, falls within the well-settled principle, that the United States are not liable to pay interest on claims against them, in the absence of express statutory provision to that effect”)- The purpose of the rule is to permit the Government to “occupy an apparently favored position,” United States v. Verdier, 164 U. S. 213, 219 (1896), by protecting it from claims for interest that would prevail against private parties. See 4 Op. Atty. Gen. 136, 137 (1842).
For well over a century, this Court, executive agencies, and Congress itself consistently have recognized that federal statutes cannot be read to permit interest to run on a recovery against the United States unless Congress affirmatively mandates that result. The no-interest rule is expressly described as early as 1819, in an opinion letter from Attorney General William Wirt to the Secretary of the Treasury. Congress had enacted a private Act to reimburse a citizen for unspecified injuries. When the citizen sought interest, in addition to the damages authorized by Congress, Attorney General Wirt stated that there is “no reason ... to depart from the usual practice of the Treasury Department” of denying interest, and directed the citizen to seek relief from Congress. 1 Op. Atty. Gen. 268.
In creating the Court of Claims, Congress retained the Government’s immunity from awards of interest, permitting it only where expressly agreed to under contract or statute. Court of Claims Act, § 7, 12 Stat. 766 (current version at 28 U. S. C. § 2516(a)). Although the Act, by its terms, addresses only those cases brought in the Court of Claims, this Court repeatedly has made clear that the Act merely codifies the traditional legal rule regarding the immunity of the United States from interest. See, e. g., Tillson v. United States, 100 U. S. 43, 47 (1879); United States v. N. Y. Rayon Importing Co., 329 U. S. 654, 658 (1947); United States v. Tillamooks, 341 U. S. 48, 49 (1951). In cases not in the Court of Claims, this Court has reaffirmed the notion: “Apart from constitutional requirements, in the absence of specific provision by contract or statute, or ‘express consent ... by Congress,’ interest does not run on a claim against the United States.” United States v. Louisiana, 446 U. S. 253, 264-265 (1980), quoting Smyth v. United States, 302 U. S. 329, 353 (1937). See United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U. S. 371, 387, n. 17 (1980).
I — I HH }-H
Respondent acknowledges the longstanding no-interest rule, but argues that Congress, by § 706(k), waived the Government’s immunity from interest in making the United States liable “the same as a private person” for “costs,” including “a reasonable attorney’s fee.”
In analyzing whether Congress has waived the immunity of the United States, we must construe waivers strictly in favor of the sovereign, see McMahon v. United States, 342 U. S. 25, 27 (1951), and not enlarge the waiver “‘beyond what the language requires,”’ Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U. S. 680, 685-686 (1983), quoting Eastern Transportation Co. v. United States, 272 U. S. 675, 686 (1927). The no-interest rule provides an added gloss of strictness upon these usual rules.
“[T]here can be no consent by implication or by use of ambiguous language. Nor can an intent on the part of the framers of a statute or contract to permit the recovery of interest suffice where the intent is not translated into affirmative statutory or contractual terms. The consent necessary to waive the traditional immunity must be express, and it must be strictly construed.” United States v. N. Y. Rayon Importing Co., 329 U. S., at 659.
A
When Congress has intended to waive the United States’ immunity with respect to interest, it has done so expressly; thus, waivers of sovereign immunity to suit must be read against the backdrop of the no-interest rule. Yet respondent contends that by equating the United States’ liability to that of a private party, Congress waived the Government’s immunity from interest. We do not agree. See Boston Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 278 U. S. 41 (1928).
Title VII’s provision making the United States liable “the same as a private person” waives the Government’s immunity from attorney’s fees, but not interest. The statute, as well as its legislative history, contains no reference to interest. This congressional silence does not permit us to read the provision as the requisite waiver of the Government’s immunity with respect to interest.
When Congress enacted Title VII in 1964, and provided in §706(k), 42 U. S. C. §2000e-5(k), that the Government should be liable for attorney’s fees “the same as a private person,” it rendered the United States subject to liability only as a plaintiff for the fees of certain prevailing defendants. See Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U. S. 412 (1978). At its inception, thus, the provision was at most a very limited waiver of sovereign immunity, establishing that the United States is liable for the fees of prevailing defendants in the same circumstances as are private plaintiffs. It was not until 1972 that Congress waived the Government’s immunity under Title VII as a defendant, affording federal employees a right of action against the Government for its discriminatory acts as an employer. See §717, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-16(d). That § 706(k) already contained language equating the liability of the United States for attorney’s fees to that of a private person does not represent the requisite affirmative congressional choice to waive the no-interest rule; see also n. 5, supra.
Other statutes placing the United States in the same position as a private party also have been read narrowly to preserve certain immunities that the United States has enjoyed historically. In Laird v. Nelms, 406 U. S. 797 (1972), for example, the Court held that, although the Federal Tort Claims Act made the United States liable for the “negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government ... , if a private person, would be liable to the claimant,” 28 U. S. C. § 1346(b), the United States nonetheless was not liable for the entire range of conduct classified as tortious under state law. Cf. Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U. S. 156 (1981) (jury trials are available to private, but not to Government, employees under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act).
B
Nor do we find the requisite waiver of immunity from interest in the statutory requirement of awarding “reasonable” attorney’s fees. There is no basis for reading the term “reasonable” as the embodiment of a specific congressional choice to include interest as a component of attorney’s fees, particularly where the legislative history is silent. The Court consistently has refused to impute an intent to waive immunity from interest into the ambiguous use of a particular word or phrase in a statute. For example, interest has been ruled unavailable under statutes or.contracts directing the United States to pay the “amount equitably due.” See Tillson v. United States, 100 U. S., at 46. And the United States is not liable for interest under statutes and contracts requiring the payment of “just compensation,” United States v. Tillamooks, 341 U. S., at 49; United States v. Goltra, 312 U. S. 203 (1941), even though it long has been understood that the United States is required to pay interest where the Constitution mandates payment under the Just Compensation Clause. See Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. United States, 261 U. S. 299 (1923).
Respondent argues, however, that the policy reasons that motivated Congress to permit recovery of a reasonable attorney’s fee require reading the statute as a waiver of immunity from interest. But policy, no matter how compelling, is insufficient, standing alone, to waive this immunity:
“[T]he immunity of the United States from liability for interest is not to be waived by policy arguments of this nature. Courts lack the power to award interest against the United States on the basis of what they think is or is not sound policy.” United States v. N. Y. Rayon Importing Co., 329 U. S., at 663.
C
Finally, we note that the provision makes the United States liable for “costs,” and includes as an element of “costs” a reasonable attorney’s fee. Prejudgment interest, however, is considered as damages, not a component of “costs.” See 10 C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure §2664, pp. 159-160 (2d ed. 1983); 2 A. Sedgwick & G. Van Nest, Sedgwick on Damages 157-158 (7th ed. 1880). Indeed, the term “costs” has never been understood to include any interest component. See 28 U. S. C. §1920; see also Wright, Miller, & Kane, supra, §§2666 and 2670. A statute allowing costs, and within that category, attorney’s fees, does not provide the clear affirmative intent of Congress to waive the sovereign’s immunity.
>
In the alternative, respondent argues that the no-mterest rule does not prohibit the award of compensation for delay. But the force of the no-interest rule cannot be avoided simply by devising a new name for an old institution:
“[T]he character or nature of ‘interest’ cannot be changed by calling it ‘damages,’ ‘loss,’ ‘earned increment,’ ‘just compensation,’ ‘discount,’ ‘offset,’ or ‘penalty,’ or any other term, because it is still interest and the no-interest rule applies to it.” United States v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 207 Ct. Cl. 369, 389, 518 F. 2d 1309, 1322 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U. S. 911 (1976).
Respondent claims, however, that interest and delay represent more than mere semantic variations. Interest and a delay factor, according to respondent, have distinct purposes: the former compensates for loss in the use of money, while the latter compensates for loss in the value of money. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 30.
We are not persuaded. Interest and a delay factor share an identical function. They are designed to compensate for the belated receipt of money. The no-interest rule has been applied to prevent parties from holding the United States liable on claims grounded on the belated receipt of funds, even when characterized as compensation for delay. See United States v. Sherman, 98 U. S. 565, 568 (1879). Thus, whether the loss to be compensated by an increase in a fee award stems from an opportunity cost or from the effects of inflation, the increase is prohibited by the no-interest rule. See Saunders v. Clayton, 629 F. 2d 596, 598 (CA9 1980) (“In essence, the inflation factor adjustment is a disguised interest award”), cert. denied, 450 U. S. 980 (1981); Blake v. Califano, 200 U. S. App. D. C. 27, 31, and n. 9, 626 F. 2d 891, 895, and n. 9 (1980) (as a matter of economic theory, there may be a distinction between interest and a delay factor, but both are nonetheless prohibited by the no-interest rule); D. Dobbs, Remedies §3.5, p. 174 (1973) (prejudgment interest represents delay damages).
That interest and compensation for delay are functionally equivalent also is supported by Title VII decisions concerning private employers. Private-sector decisions, when they adjust for the time of payment, grant interest or a delay factor, but not both. See, e. g., Brown v. Gillette Co., 536 F. Supp. 113 (Mass. 1982); Black Gold, Ltd. v. Rockwool Industries, Inc., 529 F. Supp. 272 (Colo. 1981); Kennelly v. Lemoi, 529 F. Supp. 140 (RI 1981).
V
In making the Government liable as a defendant under Title VII, Congress effected a waiver of the Government’s immunity from suit, and from costs including reasonable attorney’s fees. Congress did not waive the Government’s traditional immunity from interest. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
The lodestar component of an attorney’s fee is the product of “the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U. S. 424, 433 (1983).
The institution of interest originated under Roman law as a penalty due from a debtor who delayed or defaulted in repayment of a loan. See Leadam, Interest and Usury, in 2 Palgrave’s Dictionary of Political Economy 432 (H. Higgs ed. 1925). The measure of the penalty due for the default or delay was id quod interest — that which is between — the difference between the creditor’s current position and what it would have been if the loan had been timely and fully repaid. See also W. Ashley, An Introduction to English Economic History and Theory 196 (1966); C. McCormick, Law of Damages § 51, pp. 207-208 (1935). Because interest was conceived of as a penalty, it was generally presumed not to be within the contemplation of the parties.
Prior to the creation of the Court of Claims, a citizen’s only means of obtaining recompense from the Government was by requesting individually tailored waivers of sovereign immunity, through private Acts of Congress. The administrative responsibility of hearing many of the claims was assigned to the Treasury Department. See W. Cowen, P. Nichols, & M. Bennett, The United States Court of Claims, Part II, p. 4 (1978). Accordingly, the earliest statements of the no-interest rule appear in opinion letters of Attorneys General in response to questions posed by the Comptroller of the Treasury concerning payment of interest where a private Act of Congress authorized the Treasury Department to pay damages, with no mention of interest on the damages. See generally Wiecek, The Origin of the United States Court of Claims, 20 Admin. L. Rev. 387 (1967).
Subsequent Attorneys General consistently reiterated the no-interest rule. See, e. g., 2 Op. Atty. Gen. 390, 392 (1830) (“[C]laims against the government. . . are not payable until demanded — and then without interest”); 3 Op. Atty. Gen. 635, 639 (1841) (“It is confidently believed, that in all the numerous acts of Congress for the liquidation and settlement of claims against the government, there is no instance in which interest has ever been allowed, except only where those acts have expressly directed or authorized its allowance”); 4 Op. Atty. Gen. 14, 15-16 (1842) (“I have no objection to admit, that as between individuals, the claim for interest in such a case would be an equitable and reasonable one. . . . But nothing is better established as a general rule than that the government is not to pay damages [in the form of interest] in such cases: a stern but necessary rule, adopted everywhere in the practice of government”); 4 Op. Atty. Gen. 286, 294 (1843) (“[U]nder the established usage of the Treasury Department, over and over again sanctioned by the opinions of the law officers of the government, the Secretary has no authority to allow [interest]”).
The “constitutional requirement” arises in a taking under the Fifth Amendment. To satisfy the constitutional mandate, “just compensation” includes a payment for interest. See, e. g., Smyth v. United States, 302 U. S., at 353-354; Albrecht v. United States, 329 U. S. 599, 605 (1947). The no-interest rule is similarly inapplicable where the Government has cast off the cloak of sovereignty and assumed the status of a private commercial enterprise. See, e. g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 267 U. S. 76, 79 (1925).
See, e. g., 28 U. S. C. §2411 (expressly authorizing prejudgment and postjudgment interest payable by the United States in tax-refund cases); 31 U. S. C. § 1304 (appropriating funds for interest on certain district court judgments); 26 U. S. C. § 7426(g) (providing for interest in cases of wrongful levy by Internal Revenue Service). In other statutes, Congress has reiterated the general rule that interest cannot be allowed against the United States absent express waiver. See, e. g., 28 U. S. C. § 2516(a) (interest available in the Claims Court only under contract or by statute expressly providing for payment thereof). Title 28 U. S. C. § 2674 provides that the United States is not liable for prejudgment interest on claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act. This unusual statutory exclusion was necessitated by the Federal Tort Claims Act’s specific reference to state law for the rules of decision, in order to make clear that the United States’ immunity from interest does not turn on state law.
When interest is awarded, as it was in this case, it is computed by multiplying a particular rate of interest by the amount of the award. An interest rate reflects not only the real opportunity cost of capital, but also the inflation rate. See R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 180 (3d ed. 1986). Thus, loss of value due to delay is an element of an interest adjustment.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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F
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice White
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this case, we are asked to determine if a municipality can ever be liable under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 for constitutional violations resulting from its failure to train municipal employees. We hold that, under certain circumstances, such liability is permitted by the statute.
I
In April 1978, respondent Geraldine Harris was arrested by officers of the Canton Police Department. Mrs. Harris was brought to the police station in a patrol wagon.
When she arrived at the station, Mrs. Harris was found sitting on the floor of the wagon. She was asked if she needed medical attention, and responded with an incoherent remark. After she was brought inside the station for processing, Mrs. Harris slumped to the floor on two occasions. Eventually, the police officers left Mrs. Harris lying on the floor to prevent her from falling again. No medical attention was ever summoned for Mrs. Harris. After about an hour, Mrs. Harris was released from custody, and taken by an ambulance (provided by her family) to a nearby hospital. There, Mrs. Harris was diagnosed as suffering from several emotional ailments; she was hospitalized for one week and received subsequent outpatient treatment for an additional year.
Some time later, Mrs. Harris commenced this action alleging many state-law and constitutional claims against the city of Canton and its officials. ■ Among these claims was one seeking to hold the city liable under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 for its violation of Mrs. Harris’ right, under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, to receive necessary medical attention while in police custody.
A jury trial was held on Mrs. Harris’ claims. Evidence was presented that indicated that, pursuant to a municipal regulation, shift commanders were authorized to determine, in their sole discretion, whether a detainee required medical care. Tr. 2-139 — 2-143. In addition, testimony also suggested that Canton shift commanders were not provided with any special training (beyond first-aid training) to make a determination as to when to summon medical care for an injured detainee. Ibid.; App. to Pet. for Cert. 4a.
At the close of the evidence, the District Court submitted the case to the jury, which rejected all of Mrs. Harris’ claims except one: her § 1983 claim against the city resulting from its failure to provide her with medical treatment while in custody. In rejecting the city’s subsequent motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the District Court explained the theory of liability as follows:
“The evidence construed in a manner most favorable to Mrs. Harris could be found by a jury to demonstrate that the City of Canton had a custom or policy of vesting complete authority with the police supervisor of when medical treatment would be administered to prisoners. Further, the jury could find from the evidence that the vesting of such carte blanche authority with the police supervisor without adequate training to recognize when medical treatment is needed was grossly negligent or so reckless that future police misconduct was almost inevitable or substantially certain to result.” Id., at 16a.
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed this aspect of the District Court’s analysis, holding that “a municipality is liable for failure to train its police force, [where] the plaintiff . . . prove[s] that the municipality acted recklessly, intentionally, or with gross negligence.” Id., at 5a. The Court of Appeals also stated that an additional prerequisite of this theory of liability was that the plaintiff must prove “that the lack of training was so reckless or grossly negligent that deprivations of persons’ constitutional rights were substantially certain to result.” Ibid. Thus, the Court of Appeals found that there had been no error in submitting Mrs. Harris’ “failure to train” claim to the jury. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment for respondent, and remanded this case for a new trial, because it found that certain aspects of the District Court’s jury instructions might have led the jury to believe that it could find against the city on a mere respondeat superior theory. Because the jury’s verdict did not state the basis on which it had ruled for Mrs. Harris on her § 1983 claim, a new trial was ordered.
The city petitioned for certiorari, arguing that the Sixth Circuit’s holding represented an impermissible broadening of municipal liability under § 1983. We granted the petition. 485 U. S. 933 (1988).
II
We first address respondent’s contention that the writ of certiorari should be dismissed as improvidently granted, because “petitioner failed to preserve for review the principal issues it now argues in this Court.” Brief for Respondent 5.
We think it clear enough that petitioner’s three “Questions Presented” in its petition for certiorari encompass the critical question before us in this case: Under what circumstances can inadequate training be found to be a “policy” that is actionable under § 1983? See Pet. for Cert. i. The petition itself addressed this issue directly, attacking the Sixth Circuit’s “failure to train” theory as inconsistent with this Court’s precedents. See id., at 8-12. It is also clear — as respondent conceded at argument, Tr. of Oral Arg. 34, 54— that her brief in opposition to our granting of certiorari did not raise the objection that petitioner had failed to press its claims on the courts below.
As to respondent’s contention that the claims made by petitioner here were not made in the same fashion below, that failure, if it occurred, does not affect our jurisdiction; and because respondent did not oppose our grant of review at that time based on her contention that these claims were not pressed below, we will not dismiss the writ as improvidently granted. “[T]he ‘decision to grant certiorari represents a commitment of scarce judicial resources with a view to deciding the merits ... of the questions presented in the petition.”’ St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U. S. 112, 120 (1988) (quoting Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U. S. 808, 816 (1985)). As we have expressly admonished litigants in respondent’s position: “Nonjurisdictional defects of this sort should be brought to our attention no later than in respondent’s brief in opposition to the petition for certiorari; if not, we consider it within our discretion to deem the defect waived.” Tuttle, supra, at 816.
It is true that petitioner’s litigation posture with respect to the questions presented here has not been consistent; most importantly, petitioner conceded below that “‘inadequate training’ [is] a means of establishing municipal liability under Section 1983.” Reply Brief for Petitioner 4, n. 3; see also Petition for Rehearing in No. 85-3314 (CA6), p. 1. However, at each stage in the proceedings below, petitioner contested any finding of liability on this ground, with objections of varying specificity. It opposed the District Court’s jury instructions on this issue, Tr. 4-369; claimed in its judgment notwithstanding verdict motion that there was “no evidence of a . . . policy or practice on the part of the City . . . [of] den[ying] medical treatment to prisoners,” Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding Verdict in No. C80-18-A (ND Ohio), p. 1; and argued to the Court of Appeals that there was no basis for finding a policy of denying medical treatment to prisoners in this case. See Brief for Appellant in No. 85-3314 (CA6), pp. 26-29. Indeed, petitioner specifically contended that the Sixth Circuit precedents that permitted inadequate training to be a basis for municipal liability on facts similar to these, see n. 3, supra, were in conflict with our decision in Tuttle. Brief for Appellant in No. 85-3314 (CA6), p. 29. These various presentations of the issues below might have been so inexact that we would have denied certiorari had this matter been brought to our attention at the appropriate stage in the proceedings. But they were at least adequate to yield a decision by the Sixth Circuit on the questions presented for our review now.
Here the Sixth Circuit held that where a plaintiff proves that a municipality, acting recklessly, intentionally, or with gross negligence, has failed to train its police force — resulting in a deprivation of constitutional rights that was “substantially certain to result”— § 1983 permits that municipality to be held liable for its actions. Petitioner’s petition for cer-tiorari challenged the soundness of that conclusion, and respondent did not inform us prior to the time that review was granted that petitioner had arguably conceded this point below. Consequently, we will not abstain from addressing the question before us.
Ill
In Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U. S. 658 (1978), we decided that a municipality can be found liable under § 1983 only where the municipality itself causes the constitutional violation at issue. Respondeat superior or vicarious liability will not attach under §1983. Id., at 694-695. “It is only when the ‘execution of the government’s policy or custom . . . inflicts the injury’ that the municipality may be held liable under § 1983.” Springfield v. Kibbe, 480 U. S. 257, 267 (1987) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Monell, supra, at 694).
Thus, our first inquiry in any case alleging municipal liability under § 1983 is the question whether there is a direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation. The inquiry is a difficult one; one that has left this Court deeply divided in a series of cases that have followed Monell; one that is the principal focus of our decision again today.
A
Based on the difficulty that this Court has had defining the contours of municipal liability in these circumstances, petitioner urges us to adopt the rule that a municipality can be found liable under § 1983 only where “the policy in question [is] itself unconstitutional.” Brief for Petitioner 15. Whether such a rule is a valid construction of § 1983 is a question the Court has left unresolved. See, e. g., St. Louis v. Praprotnik, supra, at 147 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment); Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, supra, at 824, n. 7. Under such an approach, the outcome here would be rather clear: we would have to reverse and remand the case with instructions that judgment be entered for petitioner. There can be little doubt that on its face the city’s policy regarding medical treatment for detainees is constitutional. The policy states that the city jailer “shall . . . have [a person needing medical care] taken to a hospital for medical treatment, with permission of his supervisor . . . App. 33. It is difficult to see what constitutional guarantees are violated by such a policy.
Nor, without more, would a city automatically be liable under § 1983 if one of its employees happened to apply the policy in an unconstitutional manner, for liability would then rest on respondeat superior. The claim in this case, however, is that if a concededly valid policy is unconstitutionally applied by a municipal eihployee, the city is liable if the employee has not been adequately trained and the constitutional wrong has been caused by that failure to train. For reasons explained below, we conclude, as have all the Courts of Appeáls that have addressed this issue, that there are limited circumstances in which an allegation of a “failure to train” can be the basis for liability under § 1983. Thus, we reject petitioner’s contention that only unconstitutional policies are actionable under the statute.
B
Though we agree with the court below that a city can be liable under § 1983 for inadequate training of its employees, we cannot agree that the District Court’s jury instructions on this issue were proper, for we conclude that the Court of Appeals provided an overly broad rule for when a municipality can be held liable under the “failure to train” theory. Unlike the question whether a municipality’s failure to train employees can ever be a basis for § 1983 liability — on which the Courts of Appeals have all agreed, see n. 6, supra,— there is substantial division among the lower courts as to what degree of fault must be evidenced by the municipality’s inaction before liability will be permitted. We hold today that the inadequacy of police training may serve as the basis for § 1983 liability only where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact. This rule is most consistent with our admonition in Monell, 436 U. S., at 694, and Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U. S. 312, 326 (1981), that a municipality can be liable under § 1983 only where its policies are the “moving force [behind] the constitutional violation.” Only where a municipality’s failure to train its employees in a relevant respect evidences a “deliberate indifference” to the rights of its inhabitants can such a shortcoming be properly thought of as a city “policy or custom” that is actionable under § 1983. As Justice Brennan’s opinion in Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U. S. 469, 483-484 (1986) (plurality) put it: “[MJunicipal liability under §1983 attaches where — and only where — a deliberate choice to follow a course of action is made from among various alternatives” by city policymakers. See also Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U. S., at 823 (opinion of Rehn-QUIST, J.). Only where a failure to train reflects a “deliberate” or “conscious” choice by a municipality — a “policy” as defined by our prior cases — can a city be liable for such a failure under § 1983.
Monell’s rule that a city is not liable under § 1983 unless a municipal policy causes a constitutional deprivation will not be satisfied by merely alleging that the existing training program for a class of employees, such as police officers, represents a policy for which the city is responsible. That much may be true. The issue in a case like this one, however, is whether that training program is adequate; and if it is not, the question becomes whether such inadequate training can justifiably be said to represent “city policy.” It may seem contrary to common sense to assert that a municipality will actually have a policy of not taking reasonable steps to train its employees. But it may happen that in light of the duties assigned to specific officers or employees the need for more or different training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the policymakers of the city can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need. In that event, the failure to provide proper training may fairly be said to represent a policy for which the city is responsible, and for which the city may be held liable if it actually causes injury.
In resolving the issue of a city’s liability, the focus must be on adequacy of the training program in relation to the tasks the particular officers must perform. That a particular officer may be unsatisfactorily trained will not alone suffice to fasten liability on the city, for the officer’s shortcomings may have resulted from factors other than a faulty training program. See Springfield v. Kibbe, 480 U. S., at 268 (O’Con-nor, J., dissenting); Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, supra, at 821 (opinion of Rehnquist, J.). It may be, for example, that an otherwise sound program has occasionally been negligently administered. Neither will it suffice to prove that an injury or accident could have been avoided if an officer had had better or more training, sufficient to equip him to avoid the particular injury-causing conduct. Such a claim could be made about almost any encounter resulting in injury, yet not condemn the adequacy of the program to enable officers to respond properly to the usual and recurring situations with which they must deal. And plainly, adequately trained officers occasionally make mistakes; the fact that they do says little about the training program or the legal basis for holding the city liable.
Moreover, for liability to attach in this circumstance the identified deficiency in a city’s training program must be closely related to the ultimate injury. Thus in the case at hand, respondent must still prove that the deficiency in training actually caused the police officers’ indifference to her medical needs. Would the injury have been avoided had the employee been trained under a program that was not deficient in the identified respect? Predicting how a hypothetically well-trained officer would have acted under the circumstances may not be an easy task for the factfinder, particularly since matters of judgment may be involved, and since officers who are well trained are not free from error and perhaps might react very much like the untrained officer in similar circumstances. But judge and jury, doing their respective jobs, will be adequate to the task.
To adopt lesser standards of fault and causation would open municipalities to unprecedented liability under § 1983. In virtually every instance where a person has had his or her constitutional rights violated by a city employee, a § 1983 plaintiff will be able to point to something the city “could have done” to prevent the unfortunate incident. See Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U. S., at 823 (opinion of Rehn-QUIST, J.). Thus, permitting cases against cities for their “failure to train” employees to go forward under § 1983 on a lesser standard of fault would result in de facto respondeat superior liability on municipalities —a result we rejected in Monell, 436 U. S., at 693-694. It would also engage the federal courts in an endless exercise of second-guessing municipal employee-training programs. This is an exercise we believe the federal courts are ill suited to undertake, as well as one that would implicate serious questions of federalism. Cf. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U. S. 362, 378-380 (1976).
Consequently, while claims such as respondent’s — alleging that the city's failure to provide training to municipal employees resulted in the constitutional deprivation she suffered— are cognizable under § 1983, they can only yield liability against a municipality where that city’s failure to train reflects deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of its inhabitants.
IV
The final question here is whether this case should be remanded for a new trial, or whether, as petitioner suggests, we should conclude that there are no possible grounds on which respondent can prevail. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 57-58. It is true that the evidence in the record now does not meet the standard of § 1983 liability we have set forth above. But, the standard of proof the District Court ultimately imposed on respondent (which was consistent with Sixth Circuit precedent) was a lesser one than the one we adopt today, see Tr. 4-389 — 4-390. Whether respondent should have an opportunity to prove her case under the “deliberate indifference” rule we have adopted is a matter for the Court of Appeals to deal with on remand.
V
Consequently, for the reasons given above, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Title 42 U. S. C. § 1983 provides, in relevant part, that:
“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. ...”
The city regulation in question provides that a police officer assigned to act as “jailer” at the city police station
“shall, when a prisoner is found to be unconscious or semi-unconscious, or when he or she is unable to explain his or her condition, or who complains of being ill, have such person taken to a hospital for medical treatment, with permission of his supervisor before admitting the person to City Jail.” App. 33.
In upholding Mrs. Harris’ “failure to train” claim, the Sixth Circuit relied on two of its previous decisions which had approved such a theory of municipal liability under § 1983. See Rymer v. Davis, 754 F. 2d 198, vacated and remanded sicb nom. Shepherdsville v. Rhymer, 473 U. S. 901, reinstated, 775 F. 2d 756, 757 (1985); Hays v. Jefferson County, 668 F. 2d 869, 874 (1982).
See, e. g., St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U. S. 112 (1988); Springfield v. Kibbe, 480 U. S. 257 (1987); Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U. S. 796 (1986); Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U. S. 808 (1985).
In this Court, in addition to suggesting that the city’s failure to train its officers amounted to a “policy” that resulted in the denial of medical care to detainees, respondent also contended the city had a “custom” of denying medical care to those detainees suffering from emotional or mental ailments. See Brief for Respondent 31-32; Tr. of Oral Arg. 38-39. As respondent described it in her brief, and at argument, this claim of an unconstitutional “custom” appears to be little more than a restatement of her “failure-to-train as policy” claim. See ibid.
However, to the extent that this claim poses a distinct basis for the city’s liability under § 1983, we decline to determine whether respondent’s contention that such a “custom” existed is an alternative ground for affirmance. The “custom” claim was not passed on by the Court of Appeals —nor does it appear to have been presented to that court as a distinct ground for its decision. See Brief of Appellee in No. 85-3314 (CA6), pp. 4-9, 11. Thus, we will not consider it here.
In addition to the Sixth Circuit decisions discussed in n. 3, supra, most of the other Courts of Appeals have held that a failure to train can create liability under §1983. See, e. g., Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F. 2d 1380, 1389-1391 (CA4 1987); Haynesworth v. Miller, 261 U. S. App. D. C. 66, 80-83, 820 F. 2d 1245, 1259-1262 (1987); Warren v. Lincoln, 816 F. 2d 1254, 1262-1263 (CA8 1987); Bergquist v. County of Cochise, 806 F. 2d 1364, 1369-1370 (CA9 1986); Wierstak v. Heffernan, 789 F. 2d 968, 974 (CA1 1986); Fiacco v. Rensselaer, 783 F. 2d 319, 326-327 (CA2 1986); Gilmere v. Atlanta, 774 F. 2d 1495, 1503-1504 (CA11 1985) (en banc); Rock v. McCoy, 763 F. 2d 394, 397-398 (CA10 1985); Languirand v. Hayden, 717 F. 2d 220, 227-228 (CA5 1983). Two other Courts of Appeals have stopped short of expressly embracing this rule, and have instead only implicitly endorsed it. See, e. g., Colburn v. Upper Darby Township, 838 F. 2d 663, 672-673 (CA3 1988); Lenard v. Argento, 699 F. 2d 874, 885-887 (CA7 1983).
In addition, six current Members of this Court have joined opinions in the past that have (at least implicitly) endorsed this theory of liability under § 1983. See Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, supra, at 829-831 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); Springfield v. Kibbe, supra, at 268-270 (O’Con-nor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C. J., and Powell and White, JJ., dissenting).
Some courts have held that a showing of “gross negligence” in a city’s failure to train its employees is adequate to make out a claim under § 1983. See, e. g., Bergquist v. County of Cochise, supra, at 1370; Herrera v. Valentine, 653 F. 2d 1220, 1224 (CA8 1981). But the more common rule is that a city must exhibit “deliberate indifference” towards the constitutional rights of persons in its domain before a § 1983 action for “failure to train” is permissible. See, e. g., Fiacco v. Rensselaer, supra, at 326; Patzner v. Burkett, 779 F. 2d 1363, 1367 (CA8 1985); Wellington v. Daniels, 717 F. 2d 932, 936 (CA4 1983); Languirand v. Hayden, supra, at 227.
The “deliberate indifference” standard we adopt for § 1983 “failure to train” claims does not turn upon the degree of fault (if any) that a plaintiff must show to make out an underlying claim of a constitutional violation. For example, this Court has never determined what degree of culpability must be shown before the particular constitutional deprivation asserted in this case — a denial of the due process right to medical care while in detention — is established. Indeed, in Revere v. Massachusetts General Hospital, 463 U. S. 239, 243-245 (1983), we reserved decision on the question whether something less than the Eighth Amendment’s “deliberate indifference” test may be applicable in claims by detainees asserting violations of their due process right to medical care while in custody.
We need not resolve here the question left open in Revere for two reasons. First, petitioner has conceded that, as the case comes to us, we must assume that respondent’s constitutional right to receive medical care was denied by city employees — whatever the nature of that right might be. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 8-9. Second, the proper standard for determining when a municipality will be liable under § 1983 for constitutional wrongs does not turn on any underlying culpability test that determines when such wrongs have occurred. Cf. Brief for Respondent 27.
The plurality opinion in Tuttle explained why this must be so:
“Obviously, if one retreats far enough from a constitutional violation some municipal ‘policy’ can be identified behind almost any . . . harm inflicted by a municipal official; for example, [a police officer] would never have killed Tuttle if Oklahoma City did not have a ‘policy’ of establishing a police force. But Monell must be taken to require proof of a city policy different in kind from this latter example before a claim can be sent to a jury on the theory that a particular violation was ‘caused’ by the municipal ‘policy.’” 471 U. S., at 823. Cf. also id., at 833, n. 9 (opinion of Brennan, J.).
For example, city policymakers know to a moral certainty that their police officers will be required to arrest fleeing felons. The city has armed its officers with firearms, in part to allow them to accomplish this task. Thus, the need to train officers in the constitutional limitations on the use of deadly force, see Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U. S. 1 (1985), can be said to be “so obvious,” that failure to do so could properly be characterized as “deliberate indifference” to constitutional rights.
It could also be that the police, in exercising their discretion, so often violate constitutional rights that the need for further training must have been plainly obvious to the city policymakers, who, nevertheless, are “deliberately indifferent” to the need.
The record indicates that city did train its officers and that its training included first-aid instruction. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 4a. Petitioner argues that it could not have been obvious to the city that such training was insufficient to administer the written policy, which was itself constitutional. This is a question to be resolved on remand. See Part IV, infra.
Respondent conceded as much at argument. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 50-51; cf. also Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, supra, at 831 (opinion of Brennan, J.).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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B
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Chief Justice Roberts
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Investment Advisers Act makes it illegal for investment advisers to defraud their clients, and authorizes the Securities and Exchange Commission to seek civil penalties from advisers who do so. Under the general statute of limitations for civil penalty actions, the SEC has five years to seek such penalties. The question is whether the five-year clock begins to tick when the fraud is complete or when the fraud is discovered.
I
A
Under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, it is unlawful for an investment adviser “to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud any client or prospective client” or “to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates as a fraud or deceit upon any client or prospective client.” 54 Stat. 852, as amended, 15 U. S. C. §§ 80b—6(1), (2). The SEC is authorized to bring enforcement actions against investment advisers who violate the Act, or individuals who aid and abet such violations. § 80b-9(d).
As part of such enforcement actions, the SEC may seek civil penalties, §§80b-9(e), (f) (2006 ed. and Supp. V), in which ease a five-year statute of limitations applies:
“Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, an action, suit or proceeding for the enforcement of any civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise, shall not be entertained unless commenced within five years from the date when the claim first accrued if, within the same period, the offender or the property is found within the United States in order that proper service may be made thereon.” 28 U. S. C. §2462.
This statute of limitations is not specific to the Investment Advisers Act, or even to securities law; it governs many penalty provisions throughout the U. S. Code. Its origins date back to at least 1839, and it took on its current form in 1948. See Act of Feb. 28, 1839, ch. 36, §4, 5 Stat. 322.
B
Gabelli Funds, LLC, is an investment adviser to a mutual fund formerly known as Gabelli Global Growth Fund (GGGF). Petitioner Bruce Alpert is Gabelli Funds’ chief operating officer, and petitioner Marc Gabelli used to be GGGF’s portfolio manager.
In 2008, the SEC brought a civil enforcement action against Alpert and Gabelli. According to the complaint, from 1999 until 2002 Alpert and Gabelli allowed one GGGP investor—Headstart Advisers, Ltd.—to engage in “market timing” in the fund.
As this Court has explained, “[m]arket timing is a trading strategy that exploits time delay in mutual funds’ daily valuation system.” Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 564 U. S. 135, 139, n. 1 (2011). Mutual funds are typically valued once a day, at the close of the New York Stock Exchange. Because funds often hold securities traded on different exchanges around the world, their reported valuation may be based on stale information. If a mutual fund’s reported valuation is artificially low compared to its real value, market timers will buy that day and sell the next to realize quick profits. Market timing is not illegal but can harm long-term investors in a fund. See id., at 139, and n. 1.
The SEC’s complaint alleged that Alpert and Gabelli permitted Headstart to engage in market timing in exchange for Headstart’s investment in a hedge fund run by Gabelli. According to the SEC, petitioners did not disclose Head-start’s market timing or the quid pro quo agreement, and instead banned others from engaging in market timing and made statements indicating that the practice would not be tolerated. The complaint stated that during the relevant period, Headstart earned rates of return of up to 185%, while “the rate of return for long-term investors in GGGF was no more than negative 24.1 percent.” App. 73.
The SEC alleged that Alpert and Gabelli aided and abetted violations of §§ 80b-6(l) and (2), and it sought civil penalties under §80b-9. Petitioners moved to dismiss, arguing in part that the claim for civil penalties was untimely. They invoked the five-year statute of limitations in § 2462, pointing out that the complaint alleged market timing up until August 2002 but was not filed until April 2008. The District Court agreed and dismissed the SEC’s civil penalty claim as time barred.
The Second Circuit reversed. It acknowledged that §2462 required an action for civil penalties to be brought within five years “from the date when the claim first accrued,” but accepted the SEC’s argument that because the underlying violations sounded in fraud, the “discovery rule” applied to the statute of limitations. As explained by the Second Circuit, “[u]nder the discovery rule, the statute of limitations for a particular claim does not accrue until that claim is discovered, or could have been discovered with reasonable diligence, by the plaintiff.” 653 F. 3d 49, 59 (2011). The court concluded that while “this rule does not govern the accrual of most claims,” it does govern the claims at issue here. Ibid. As the court explained, “for claims that sound in fraud a discovery rule is read into the relevant statute of limitation.” Id., at 60.
We granted certiorari. 567 U. S. 968 (2012).
HH
A
This case centers around the meaning of 28 U. S. C. § 2462: “an action ... for the enforcement of any civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture . . . shall not be entertained unless commenced within five years from the date when the claim first accrued.” Petitioners argue that a claim based on fraud accrues—and the five-year clock begins to tick—when a defendant’s allegedly fraudulent conduct occurs.
That is the most natural reading of the statute. “In common parlance a right accrues when it comes into existence . . . .” United States v. Lindsay, 346 U. S. 568, 569 (1954). Thus the “standard rule” is that a claim accrues “when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action.” Wallace v. Kato, 549 U. S. 384, 388 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also, e. g., Bay Area Laundry and Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal., 522 U. S. 192, 201 (1997); Clark v. Iowa City, 20 Wall. 583, 589 (1875). That rule has governed since the 1830’s when the predecessor to § 2462 was enacted. See, e. g., Bank of United States v. Daniel, 12 Pet. 32, 56 (1838); Evans v. Gee, 11 Pet. 80, 84 (1837). And that definition appears in dictionaries from the 19th century up until today. See, e. g., 1 A. Burrill, A Law Dictionary and Glossary 17 (1850) (“an action accrues when the plaintiff has a right to commence it”); Black's Law Dictionary 23 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “accrue” as “[t]o come into existence as an enforceable claim or right”).
This reading sets a fixed date when exposure to the specified Government enforcement efforts ends, advancing “the basic policies of all limitations provisions: repose, elimination of stale claims, and certainty about a plaintiff’s opportunity for recovery and a defendant’s potential liabilities.” Rotella v. Wood, 528 U. S. 549, 555 (2000). Statutes of limitations are intended to “promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared.” Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U. S. 342, 348-349 (1944). They provide “security and stability to human affairs.” Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U. S. 135, 139 (1879). We have deemed them “vital to the welfare of society,” ibid., and concluded that “even wrongdoers are entitled to assume that their sins may be forgotten,” Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U. S. 261, 271 (1985).
B
Notwithstanding these considerations, the Government argues that the discovery rule should apply instead. Under this rule, accrual is delayed “until the plaintiff has ‘discovered’” his cause of action. Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 559 U. S. 633, 644 (2010). The doctrine arose in 18th-century fraud cases as an “exception” to the standard rule, based on the recognition that “something different was needed in the case of fraud, where a defendant’s deceptive conduct may prevent a plaintiff from even knowing that he or she has been defrauded.” Ibid. This Court has held that “where a plaintiff has been injured by fraud and ‘remains in ignorance of it without any fault or want of diligence or care on his part, the bar of the statute does not begin to run until the fraud is discovered.’” Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U. S. 392, 397 (1946) (quoting Bailey v. Glover, 21 Wall. 342, 348 (1875)). And we have explained that “fraud is deemed to be discovered when, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, it could have been discovered.” Merck & Co., supra, at 645 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).
But we have never applied the discovery rule in this context, where the plaintiff is not a defrauded victim seeking recompense, but is instead the Government bringing an enforcement action for civil penalties. Despite the discovery rule’s centuries-old roots, the Government cites no lower court case before 2008 employing a fraud-based discovery rule in a Government enforcement action for civil penalties. See Brief for Respondent 23 (citing SEC v. Tambone, 550 F. 3d 106, 148-149 (CA1 2008); SEC v. Koenig, 557 F. 3d 736, 739 (CA7 2009)). When pressed at oral argument, the Government conceded that it was aware of no such case. Tr. of Oral Arg. 25. The Government was also unable to point to any example from the first 160 years after enactment of this statute of limitations where it had even asserted that the fraud discovery rule applied in such a context. Id., at 26-27 (citing only United States v. Maillard, 26 F. Cas. 1140, 1142 (No. 15,709) (SDNY 1871), a “fraudulent concealment” case, see n. 2, supra).
Instead the Government relies heavily on Exploration Co. v. United States, 247 U. S. 435 (1918), in an attempt to show that the discovery rule should benefit the Government to the same extent as private parties. See, e. g., Brief for Respondent 10-11, 16, 17, 33-34, 41-45. In that case, a company had fraudulently procured land from the United States, and the United States sued to undo the transaction. The company raised the statute of limitations as a defense, but this Court allowed the case to proceed, concluding that the rule “that statutes of limitations upon suits to set aside fraudulent transactions shall not begin to run until the discovery of the fraud” applied “in favor of the Government as well as a private individual.” Exploration Co., supra, at 449. But in Exploration Co., the Government was itself a victim; it had been defrauded and was suing to recover its loss. The Government was not bringing an enforcement action for penalties. Exploration Co. cannot save the Government’s case here.
There are good reasons why the fraud discovery rule has not been extended to Government enforcement actions for civil penalties. The discovery rule exists in part to preserve the claims of victims who do not know they are injured and who reasonably do not inquire as to any injury. Usually when a private party is injured, he is immediately aware of that injury and put on notice that his time to sue is running. But when the injury is self-concealing, private parties may be unaware that they have been harmed. Most of us do not live in a state of constant investigation; absent any reason to think we have been injured, we do not typically spend our days looking for evidence that we were lied to or defrauded. And the law does not require that we do so. Instead, courts have developed the discovery rule, providing that the statute of limitations in fraud cases should typically begin to run only when the injury is or reasonably could have been discovered.
The same conclusion does not follow for the Government in the context of enforcement actions for civil penalties. The SEC, for example, is not like an individual victim who relies on apparent injury to learn of a wrong. Rather, a central “mission” of the SEC is to “investigate] potential violations of the federal securities laws.” SEC, Enforcement Manual 1 (2012). Unlike the private party who has no reason to suspect fraud, the SEC’s very purpose is to root it out, and it has many legal tools at hand to aid in that pursuit. It can demand that securities brokers and dealers submit detailed trading information. Id., at 44. It can require investment advisers to turn over their comprehensive books and records at any time. 15 U. S. C. § 80b-4 (2006 ed. and Supp. Y). And even without filing suit, it can subpoena any documents and witnesses it deems relevant or material to an investigation. See §§77s(c), 78u(b), 80a-41(b), 80b-9(b) (2006 ed.).
The SEC is also authorized to pay monetary awards to whistleblowers, who provide information relating to violations of the securities laws. § 78u-6 (2006 ed., Supp. V). In addition, the SEC may offer “cooperation agreements” to violators to procure information about others in exchange for more lenient treatment. See Enforcement Manual, at 119-137. Charged with this mission and armed with these weapons, the SEC as enforcer is a far cry from the defrauded victim the discovery rule evolved to protect.
In a civil penalty action, the Government is not only a different kind of plaintiff, it seeks a different kind of relief. The discovery rule helps to ensure that the injured receive recompense. But this case involves penalties, which go beyond compensation, are intended to punish, and label defendants wrongdoers. See Meeker v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 236 U. S. 412, 423 (1915) (a penalty covered by the predecessor to §2462 is “something imposed in a punitive way for an infraction of a public law”); see also Tull v. United States, 481 U. S. 412, 422 (1987) (penalties are “intended to punish culpable individuals,” not “to extract compensation or restore the status quo”).
Chief Justice Marshall used particularly forceful language in emphasizing the importance of time limits on penalty actions, stating that it “would be utterly repugnant to the genius of our laws” if actions for penalties could “be brought at any distance of time.” Adams v. Woods, 2 Cranch 336, 342 (1805). Yet grafting the discovery rule onto §2462 would raise similar concerns. It would leave defendants exposed to Government enforcement action not only for five years after their misdeeds, but for an additional uncertain period into the future. Repose would hinge on speculation about what the Government knew, when it knew it, and when it should have known it. See Rotella, 528 U. S., at 554 (dispproving a rule that would have “extended the limitations period to many decades” because such a rule was “beyond any limit that Congress could have contemplated” and “would have thwarted the basic objective of repose underlying the very notion of a limitations period”).
Determining when the Government, as opposed to an individual, knew or reasonably should have known of a fraud presents particular challenges for the courts. Agencies often have hundreds of employees, dozens of offices, and several levels of leadership. In such a case, when does “the Government” know of a violation? Who is the relevant actor? Different agencies often have overlapping responsibilities; is the knowledge of one attributed to all?
In determining what a plaintiff should have known, we ask what facts “a reasonably diligent plaintiff would have discovered.” Merck & Co., 559 U. S., at 644. It is unclear whether and how courts should consider agency priorities and resource constraints in applying that test to Government enforcement actions. See 3M Co. v. Browner, 17 F. 3d 1453, 1461 (CADC 1994) (“An agency may experience problems in detecting statutory violations because its enforcement effort is not sufficiently funded; or because the agency has not devoted an adequate number of trained personnel to the task; or because the agency’s enforcement program is ill designed or inefficient; or because the nature of the statute makes it difficult to uncover violations; or because of some combination of these factors and others”). And in the midst of any inquiry as to what it knew when, the Government can be expected to assert various privileges, such as law enforcement, attorney-client, work product, or deliberative process, further complicating judicial attempts to apply the discovery rule. See, e. g., App. in No. 10-3581 (CA2), p. 147 (Government invoking such privileges in this case, in response to a request for documents relating to the SEC’s investigation of Headstart); see also Rotella, supra, at 559 (rejecting a rule in part due to “the controversy inherent in divining when a plaintiff should have discovered” a wrong).
To be sure, Congress has expressly required such inquiries in some statutes. But in many of those instances, the Government is itself an injured victim looking for recompense, not a prosecutor seeking penalties. See, e. g., 28 U. S. C. §§2415, 2416(c) (Government suits for money damages founded on contracts or torts). Moreover, statutes applying a discovery rule in the context of Government suits often couple that rule with an absolute provision for repose, which a judicially imposed discovery rule would lack. See, e. g., 21 U. S. C. § 335b(b)(3) (limiting certain Government civil penalty actions to “6 years after the date when facts material to the act are known or reasonably should have been known by the Secretary but in no event more than 10 years after the date the act took place”). And several statutes applying a discovery rule to the Government make some effort to identify the official whose knowledge is relevant. See 31 U. S. C. § 3731(b)(2) (relevant knowledge is that of “the official of the United States charged with responsibility to act in the circumstances”).
Applying a discovery rule to Government penalty actions is far more challenging than applying the rule to suits by defrauded victims, and we have no mandate from Congress to undertake that challenge here.
* * *
As we held long ago, the cases in which “a statute of limitation may be suspended by causes not mentioned in the statute itself. . . are very limited in character, and are to be admitted with great caution; otherwise the court would make the law instead of administering it.” Amy v. Watertown (No. 2), 130 U. S. 320, 324 (1889) (internal quotation marks omitted). Given the lack of textual, historical, or equitable reasons to graft a discovery rule onto the statute of limitations of § 2462, we decline to do so.
The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
The SEC also sought injunctive relief and disgorgement, claims-the District Court found timely on the ground that they were not subject to §2462. Those issues are not before us.
The court distinguished the discovery rule, which governs when a claim accrues, from doctrines that toll the running of an applicable limitations period when the defendant takes steps beyond the challenged conduct itself to conceal that conduct from the plaintiff. 653 F. 3d, at 59-60. The SEC abandoned any reliance on such doctrines below, and they are not before us. See Response and Reply Brief for SEC Appellant/Cross-Appellee in No. 10-3581 (CA2), p. 34 (“The Commission is not seeking application of the fraudulent concealment doctrine or other equitable tolling principles”).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
H
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Burton
delivered the opinion of the Court.
These cases were argued immediately following No. 548, Bridges v. United States, ante, p. 209. They concern the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act which we found inapplicable to the offenses stated in the Bridges indictment. These cases, however, involve different offenses and we hold the Suspension Act applicable to the instant indictments for offenses committed in 1945 and 1946 and we hold that the United States may thus prosecute them in 1952.
The principal questions here are: (1) whether the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act suspended the running of the general three-year statute of limitations as to violations of the false claims clause of the False Claims Act, and (2) if so, whether the indictments for such offenses, found in 1952, were timely. For the reasons hereafter stated, our answer to each question is in the affirmative.
These indictments were filed in 1952 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. The indictment in No. 634 charges appellee Grainger, in 16 counts, with having “unlawfully, knowingly, wilfully and fraudulently” presented for payment to the Commodity Credit Corporation, at various times in 1945, claims upon that corporation certifying that appel-lee had made certain purchases of wool at certain prices, knowing such claims “to be false, fictitious and fraudulent . . . .” It charges, further, that appellee knowingly and falsely certified to the Commodity Credit Corporation that he had paid higher prices for the wool than he actually did.
The indictment in No. 635 charges appellees Clavere and Kennedy, in 15 counts, with like offenses committed in 1946, including several claims based upon their false certifications of purchases of wool when they knew that they had made no such purchases.
The indictment in No. 636 charges appellees Clavere and Kennedy, in one count, with conspiring to make false, fictitious and fraudulent claims upon the Commodity Credit Corporation by making somewhat comparable claims in 1946 and 1947. A second count charges ap-pellees Clavere, Kennedy and Shapiro with engaging in a like conspiracy, with overt acts committed in 1946
Appellees moved to dismiss the indictments on the ground, among others, that each was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The District Court granted the motions and dismissed the indictments. That court’s unreported opinion concludes with the following statement:
“Accordingly, the Court holds that, as to all three indictments, the three-year statute of limitations fixed by 18 USC section 582 and its successor, 18 USC [Supp. V] section [3282], applies. Because the statute that the various defendants are charged with having violated or with having conspired to violate does not ‘denominate’ the acts proscribed therein as ‘frauds,’ or does not, in so many words, have as an ‘ingredient’ a ‘defrauding or an attempt to defraud the United States,’ neither the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act of 1942 nor its successor of 1948 can apply.”
The United States appealed directly to this Court, under 18 U. S. C. (Supp. V) § 3731.
1. The running of the general three-year statute of limitations was suspended by the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act as to violations, in 1945 and 1946, of the false claims clause of the False Claims Act.
A. While the offenses charged here are not spelled out in detail, they are sufficiently clear at least to show attempts to obtain payments from the Commodity Credit Corporation in amounts based upon knowingly false certifications to that corporation by the accused that certain purchases of wool had been made by him when he knew that no such purchases had been made by him or, at least, that no such purchases had been made by him at prices as high as those he certified that he paid. The offenses charged are, therefore, of a pecuniary nature and we are not required in these cases to pass upon the contention, discussed in the Bridges case, that, in order for the Suspension Act to apply to them, the offenses not only must involve defrauding the United States or an agency thereof, but they also must be of a pecuniary nature or of a nature concerning property.
B. The offenses with which we concern ourselves here are alleged to have occurred in 1945 or 1946. They, therefore, precede the President’s proclamation of December 31, 1946, which declared that the hostilities of World War II terminated on that day. The offenses thus come within the period to which the Suspension Act applies. United States v. Smith, 342 U. S. 225.
C. Fraud upon the United States is an essential ingredient of the offenses charged. The offenses charged in Cases No. 634 and No. 635 are violations of the false claims clause, as distinguished from the false statement clause, of the False Claims Act. Such false claims clause provides that—
“Whoever shall . . . present . . . for payment or approval, to . . . any corporation in which the United States of America is a stockholder, any claim upon or against the Government of the United States ... or any corporation in which the United States of America is a stockholder, knowing such claim to be false, fictitious, or fraudulent . . . shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.” 52 Stat. 197, 18 U. S. C. § 80, now 18 U. S. C. (Supp. V) § 287.
The indictments show that it is the false claims clause that is involved. And, what is more important to the issue here, the offense defined by that clause is the kind of offense at which the Suspension Act is directed.
The Suspension Act provides that—
“When the United States is at war the running of any statute of limitations applicable to any offense (1) involving fraud or attempted fraud against the United States or any agency thereof in any manner, whether by conspiracy or not . . . shall be suspended until three years after the termination of hostilities as proclaimed by the President or by a concurrent resolution of Congress.” 18 U. S. C. (Supp. V) § 3287.
In determining the kind of offenses to which that section applies, we have the benefit of the conclusion heretofore reached by this Court that such offenses are limited to those which include fraud as an essential ingredient. The next question is what constitutes the required fraud. Our problem is simpler than in the Bridges case and in those cases which involve violations of the false statement clause of the False Claims Act. In those cases there is a question whether the mere making of a false statement in the connection specified necessarily includes the ingredient of fraud required by the Suspension Act. In the instant cases that question is not involved because the offenses include more than that. The substantive offenses here charged include the making of claims upon the Government for payments induced by knowingly false representations — constituting violations of the false claims clause of the False Claims Act. The statement of the offenses here carries with it the charge of inducing or attempting to induce the payment of a claim for money or property involving the element of deceit that is the earmark of fraud. The false statement clause contains no such ingredient. The difference between the clauses is emphasized in the 1948 codification which has placed the former in § 287 and the latter in § 1001 of 18 U. S. C. (Supp. V).
We conclude that the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act has added time within which to prosecute the wartime frauds involved in violations of the false claims clause of the False Claims Act.
Appellees have placed emphasis also upon the following statement by Mr. Justice Roberts, speaking for the Court, in United States v. Scharton, 285 U. S. 518, 521-522:
“Moreover, the concluding clause of the section, though denominated a proviso, is an excepting clause and therefore to be narrowly construed. United States v. McElvain, 272 U. S. 633, 639. And as the section has to do with statutory crimes it is to be liberally interpreted in favor of repose, and ought not to be extended by construction to embrace so-called frauds not so denominated by the statutes creating offenses.”
Appellees argue that this language limits the Suspension Act not merely to those offenses in which fraud upon the United States is an essential ingredient, but to such of those offenses as Congress has “denominated” as “frauds” by using that very word or, at least, one of its derivatives.
We believe that Congress sought by its phrase “involving fraud ... in any manner” to make the Suspension Act applicable to offenses which are fairly identifiable as those in which fraud is an essential ingredient, by whatever words they be defined, and that Congress did not seek to limit its applicability to such of those identifiable offenses as also are labeled with a particular symbol. In the false claims clause of the False Claims Act, Congress met the requirement by identifying the offense as that of making “any claim upon . . . the United States . . . knowing such claim to be false, fictitious, or fraudulent . . . .” The combination of either falsity, fiction or fraud with the claim is enough. The same reasoning applies to a conspiracy to make false claims, as alleged in No. 636.
2. The Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act extended the time for finding the indictments through 1952.
A. The Suspension Act had the effect of extending through 1952 the time for the prosecution of the offenses to which it applied.
When enacted August 24, 1942, during the first year of World War II, it provided for the inception and expiration of its effect on existing statutes of limitations as follows:
“. . . the running of any existing statute of limitations applicable to offenses involving the defrauding or attempts to defraud the United States or any agency thereof, whether by conspiracy or not, and in any manner, and now indictable under any existing statutes, shall be suspended until June 30, 1945, or until such earlier time as the Congress by concurrent resolution, or the President, may designate. . . (Emphasis supplied.) 56 Stat. 747-748.
There is no doubt as to the meaning of the word “running” in that enactment. The running of any existing statute of limitations simply was to be suspended until June 30,1945 — that is, for about three years — unless such suspension was cut short by Congress or the President. The obvious purpose was to add about three years (or a shorter wartime period) to the time otherwise available for the prosecution of certain wartime frauds.
The present difficulty was introduced by the amendment of July 1,1944. It added not only specific language as to war contracts but it changed the expiration clause to read—
“The running of any existing statute of limitations applicable to any offense ... (1) involving defrauding . . . the United States ... or (2) committed in connection with the . . . performance . . . of any contract . . . related to the prosecution of the present war . . . shall be suspended until three years after the termination of hostilities in the present war as proclaimed by the President or by a concurrent resolution of the two Houses of Congress. . . .” (Emphasis supplied.) 58 Stat. 667.
The effect of this language, when read with the Act of 1942, is inescapable. The phrase as to “running of any-existing statute of limitations” remains precisely as it was in 1942, but the expiration date of the suspension is changed from June 30, 1945 (or an earlier date to be designated by Congress or the President), to a new date. The new date is not fixed as one to come three years later. It is made a movable date which can occur only three years after the date of the termination of hostilities as proclaimed by the President or Congress. Under the 1942 Act, the running of the general three-year statute was suspended for three years or less. Under the 1944 amendment, the running is just as clearly suspended until three years has expired after the termination of hostilities.
The precise language of the July 1, 1944, amendment was reenacted October 3, 1944, when a clause was added dealing with offenses connected with the handling of property under the Surplus Property Act of 1944, 58 Stat. 781. The language was then carried into 18 U. S. C. § 590a.
When the President, December 31, 1946, proclaimed the termination of hostilities of World War II, 3 CFR, 1946 Supp., 77-78, this automatically caused the resumption of the running of statutes of limitations on December 31, 1949. Accordingly, in relation to the instant offenses committed in 1945 and 1946, during the period of suspension, the general three-year limitation prescribed by 18 U. S. C. (Supp. Y) § 3282 began to run for the first time on January 1, 1950, and expired December 31, 1952.
United States v. Smith, 342 U. S. 225, held that the offenses to which the Suspension Act applied were only those actually committed before the termination of hostilities December 31, 1946. The length of the period for their prosecution was not there in controversy because the offenses occurred in 1947. That period, however, was mentioned either directly or by implication in the concurring and dissenting opinions published on behalf of a majority of the members of the Court. The following statement was made in the concurring opinion:
“These cases clearly illustrate that the suspension statute was not intended to and should not embrace offenses committed subsequent to December 31,1946. It applies only to offenses committed between August 25,1939, and December 31, 1946. For those offenses which occurred between the date of the 1942 Act and the cessation of hostilities, Congress’ intention was to give the Department of Justice six years from the latter date to investigate and prosecute. For those offenses which occurred before the date of the 1942 Act, Congress’ intention was to give the Department three years after the cessation of hostilities plus whatever portion of the regular three-year limitations’ period had not yet run when the 1942 Act was passed.” P. 231.
This issue was before the Court in No. 527, United States v. Klinger, which this day is affirmed by an evenly divided Court, 345 U. S. 979. In that case, however, there was presented not only this issue but also an issue as to whether the offense charged was one involving fraud of a pecuniary nature upon the United States.
B. The codification of the Criminal Code, June 25, 1948, effective September 1, 1948, did not change the situation. It repealed the Suspension Act, as amended October 3, 1944, by reference to it as § 28 of Chapter 479, 58 Stat. 781, and as 18 U; S. C. § 590a. 62 Stat. 862, 868. At the same time, Congress substantially reenacted the Suspension Act as 18 U. S. C. (Supp. V) § 3287. 62 Stat. 828. The appellees point out that the saving clause in § 21 of the Act of June 25, 1948, 62 Stat. 862, saves only substantive rights and liabilities then existing under the repealed sections. They suggest also that any extended periods of limitation resulting from the Suspension Act were thus repealed as of September 1, 1948, leaving applicable the general three-year statute of limitations which would terminate the period for prosecution September 1, 1951. We do not agree with that suggestion. The reenactment of the Suspension Act as § 3287, June 25, 1948, effective September 1, 1948, like the reenactment of the general three-year statute of limitations as § 3282, carried with it the purpose of the codification. That purpose makes §§3287 and 3282 applicable not merely prospectively to subsequent offenses, but forthwith to existing offenses in the same manner and with the same effect as if the reenacted provisions had remained continuously in effect in their substantially identical precodification form. Codification contemplates, implies and produces continuity of existing law in clarified form rather than its interruption.
The motions to dismiss the indictments should have been denied. The judgment of the District Court therefore is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
Mr. Justice Black, Mr. Justice Frankfurter and Mr. Justice Douglas, adopting the reasoning in the opinion of Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Klinger, 199 F. 2d 645, would affirm the District Court in dismissing these indictments.
Mr. Justice Jackson took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
This conclusion does not apply to any overt act alleged in No. 636 to have been committed in 1947. Any such act was committed after the President’s proclamation of the termination of hostilities December 31, 1946, 3 CFR, 1946 Supp., 77-78, and, therefore, after the period to which the Suspension Act applied. United States v. Smith, 342 U. S. 225.
The indictment in No. 636 is not explicit enough as to the overt acts set forth in paragraphs numbered 2, 3 and 4, under Count Two, to show that the issuance or endorsement of certain checks there described constituted an attempt to defraud the United States. The Suspension Act, accordingly, does not appear to be applicable to them. These items have not been separately discussed by the parties, and are mentioned here to avoid the application of our general conclusions to them in the absence of further consideration.
18 U.S.C. (Supp. V) §3287.
18 U. S. C. (Supp. V) § 3282.
§ 35 (A) of the Criminal Code, 52 Stat. 197, 18 U. S. C. § 80, now 18 U. S. C. (Supp. V) § 287.
Commodity Credit Corporation was a Delaware corporation in which the United States was a stockholder. In 1945 and 1946 it served as an agency of the United States in making loans or purchases in connection with the expansion of the production of many commodities. 15 U. S. C. §§ 713-713a-9; 1 CFR, 1938, 659-678. See also, Commodity Credit Corporation Charter Act of June 29, 1948, 62 Stat. 1070, as amended, 15 U. S. C. (Supp. V) §§ 714r-714o.
§ 37 of the Criminal Code, 35 Stat. 1096, 18 U. S. C. § 88, now 18 U. S. C. (Supp. V) § 371. See also, 52 Stat. 197, 18 U. S. C. § 83, now 18 U. S. C. (Supp. V) § 286.
See note 1, supra.
“An appeal may be taken by and on behalf of the United States from the district courts direct to. the Supreme Court of the United States in all criminal cases in the following instances:
“From a decision or judgment setting aside, or dismissing any indictment or information, or any count thereof, where such decision or judgment is based upon the invalidity or construction of the statute upon which the indictment or information is founded.
“From the decision or judgment sustaining a motion in bar, when the defendant has not been put in jeopardy. . . 18 U. S. C.
(Supp. V) § 3731.
In its notices of appeal, the United States said merely that it appealed from the several orders dismissing the respective indictments. In its combined statement of jurisdiction it relied upon its right to appeal from a judgment sustaining a motion in bar where the defendant has not been put in jeopardy. The Government, however, now suggests that its appeals are based upon the District Court’s construction of the statutes upon which the indictments are founded and it seeks to restrict us to the consideration of the District Court’s view of the relation between those statutes and the Suspension Act, without reference to the claim of appellees that the extension of time provided by the Suspension Act expired before the indictments were found. We treat the appeals as presenting both issues. See United States v. Borden Co., 308 U. S. 188; United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U. S. 304. See also, United States v. Hark, 320 U. S. 531, 536; United States v. Goldman, 277 U. S. 229, 236-237; United States v. Barber, 219 U. S. 72, 78; and United States v. Kissel, 218 U. S. 601, 606.
“Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, no person shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished for any offense, not capital, unless the indictment is found or the information is instituted within three years next after such offense shall have been committed.” 18 U. S. C. (Supp. V) § 3282.
“When the United States is at war the running of any statute of limitations applicable to any offense (1) involving fraud or attempted fraud against the United States or any agency thereof in any manner, whether by conspiracy or not, or (2) committed in connection with the acquisition, care, handling, custody, control or disposition of any real or personal property of the United .States, or (3) committed in connection with the negotiation, procurement, award, performance, payment for, interim financing, cancelation, or other termination or settlement, of any contract, subcontract, or purchase order which is connected with or related to the prosecution of the war, or with any disposition of termination inventory by any war contractor or Government agency, shall be suspended until three years after the termination of hostilities as proclaimed by the President or by a concurrent resolution of Congress.” 18 U. S. C. (Supp. V) § 3287.
The above Act originated in 1942 and was amplified in 1944. In 1945 and 1946, it contained substantially the terms shown above which went into effect September 1, 1948. 56 Stat. 747-748, 58 Stat. 667, 781, 18 U. S. C. § 590a.
52 Stat. 197, 18 U. S. C. §§ 80, 83, 84, 85. In the codification of 1948, § 80 was subdivided by placing its false claims clause in § 287, and its false statement clause in § 1001, of 18 U. S. C. (Supp. V). The special conspiracy clause, found in § 83, became § 286 in Supp. V.
3 CFR, 1946 Supp., 77-78.
United States v. Scharton, 285 U. S. 518; United States v. McElvain, 272 U. S. 633; United States v. Noveck, 271 U. S. 201.
The false statement clause of the False Claims Act, which was involved in Marzani v. United States, 83 U. S. App. D. C. 78, 168 F. 2d 133, affirmed by an equally divided Court, 335 U. S. 895, 336 U. S. 922, provides merely that “whoever shall . . . make . . . any false or fraudulent statements or representations ... in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States or of any corporation in which the United States of America is a stockholder . . . shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.” 52 Stat. 197, 18 U. S. C. § 80, now 18 U. S. C. (Supp. V) § 1001. Cases arising under that clause need not be discussed here and the references made in them to offenses arising generally under the False Claims Act should be read as referring to its false statement clause rather than to its false claims clause or to the Act as a whole.
18 U. S. C. (Supp. V) § 3287.
52 Stat. 197.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Stevens
announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion in which Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall, and Justice Blackmun join.
Petitioner was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. The principal question presented is whether the execution of that sentence would violate the constitutional prohibition against the infliction of “cruel and unusual punishments” because petitioner was only 15 years old at the time of his offense.
I
Because there is no claim that the punishment would be excessive if the crime had been committed by an adult, only a brief statement of facts is necessary. In concert with three older persons, petitioner actively participated in the brutal murder of his former brother-in-law in the early morning hours of January 23, 1983. The evidence disclosed that the victim had been shot twice, and that his throat, chest, and abdomen had been cut. He also had multiple bruises and a broken leg. His body had been chained to a concrete block and thrown into a river where it remained for almost four weeks. Each of the four participants was tried separately and each was sentenced to death.
Because petitioner was a “child” as a matter of Oklahoma law, thé District Attorney filed a statutory petition, see Okla. Stat., Tit. 10, § 1112(b) (1981), seeking an order finding “that said child is competent and had the mental capacity to know and appreciate the wrongfulness of his [conduct].” App. 4. After a hearing, the trial court concluded “that there are virtually no reasonable prospects for rehabilitation of William Wayne Thompson within the juvenile system and that William Wayne Thompson should be held accountable for his acts as if he were an adult and should be certified to stand trial as an adult.” Id., at 8 (emphasis in original).
At the guilt phase of petitioner’s trial, the prosecutor introduced three color photographs showing the condition of the victim’s body when it was removed from the river. Although the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the use of two of those photographs was error, it concluded that the error was harmless because the evidence of petitioner’s guilt was so convincing. However, the prosecutor had also used the photographs in his closing argument during the penalty phase. The Court of Criminal Appeals did not.consider whether this display was proper.
At the penalty phase of the trial, the prosecutor asked the jury to find two aggravating circumstances: that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel; and that there was a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society. The jury found the first, but not the second, and fixed petitioner’s punishment at death.
The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction and sentence, 724 P. 2d 780 (1986), citing its earlier opinion in Eddings v. State, 616 P. 2d 1159 (1980), rev’d on other grounds, 455 U. S. 104 (1982), for the proposition that “once a minor is certified to stand trial as an adult, he may also, without violating the Constitution, be punished as an adult.” 724 P. 2d, at 784. We granted certiorari to consider whether a sentence of death is cruel and unusual punishment for a crime committed by a 15-year-old child, as well as whether photographic evidence that a state court deems erroneously-admitted but harmless at the guilt phase nevertheless violates a capital defendant’s constitutional rights by virtue of its being considered at the penalty phase. 479 U. S. 1084 (1987).
II
The authors of the Eighth Amendment drafted a categorical prohibition against the infliction of cruel and unusual punishments, but they made no attempt to define the contours of that category. They delegated that task to future generations of judges who have been guided by the “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” Trop v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion) (Warren, C. J.). In performing that task the Court has reviewed the work product of state legislatures and sentencing juries, and has carefully considered the reasons why a civilized society may accept or reject the death penalty in certain types of cases. Thus, in confronting the question whether the youth of the defendant — more specifically, the fact that he was less than 16 years old at the time of his offense — is a sufficient reason for denying the State the power to sentence him to death, we first review relevant legislative enactments, then refer to jury determinations, and finally explain why these indicators of contemporary standards of decency confirm our judgment that such a young person is not capable of acting with the degree of culpability that can justify the ultimate penalty.
III
Justice Powell has repeatedly reminded us of the importance of “the experience of mankind, as well as the long history of our law, recognizing that there are differences which must be accommodated in determining the rights and duties of children as compared with those of adults. Examples of this distinction abound in our law: in contracts, in torts, in criminal law and procedure, in criminal sanctions and rehabilitation, and in the right to vote and to hold office.” Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S. 565, 590-591 (1975) (dissenting opinion). Oklahoma recognizes this basic distinction in a number of its statutes. Thus, a minor is not eligible to vote, to sit on a jury, to marry without parental consent, or to purchase alcohol or cigarettes. Like all other States, Oklahoma has developed a juvenile justice system in which most offenders under the age of 18 are not held criminally responsible. Its statutes do provide, however, that a 16- or 17-year-old charged with murder and other serious felonies shall be considered an adult. Other than the special certification procedure that was used to authorize petitioner’s trial in this case “as an adult,” apparently there are no Oklahoma statutes, either civil or criminal, that treat a person under 16 years of age as anything but a “child.”
The line between childhood and adulthood is drawn in different ways by various States. There is, however, complete or near unanimity among all 50 States and the District of Columbia in treating a person under 16 as a minor for several important purposes. In no State may a 15-year-old vote or serve on a jury. Further, in all but one State a 15-year-old may not drive without parental consent, and in all but four States a 15-year-old may not marry without parental consent. Additionally, in those States that have legislated on the subject, no one under age 16 may purchase pornographic materials (50 States), and in most States that have some form of legalized gambling, minors are not permitted to participate without parental consent (42 States). Most relevant, however, is the fact that all States have enacted legislation designating the maximum age for juvenile' court jurisdiction at no less than 16. All of this legislation is consistent with the experience of mankind, as well as the long history of our law, that the normal 15-year-old is not prepared to assume the full responsibilities of an adult.
Most state legislatures have not expressly confronted the question of establishing a minimum age for imposition of the death penalty."' In States, capital punishment is not authorized at all,-'' and in others capital punishment is authorized but no minimum age is expressly stated in the death penalty statute. One might argue on the basis of this body of legislation that there is no chronological age at which the imposition of the death penalty is unconstitutional and that our current standards of decency would still tolerate the execution of 10-year-old children. We think it self-evident that such an argument is unacceptable; indeed, no such argument has been advanced in this case. If, therefore, we accept the premise that some offenders are simply too young to be put to death, it is reasonable to put this group of statutes to one side because they do not focus on the question of where the chronological age line should be drawn. When we confine our attention to the 18 States that have expressly established a minimum age in their death penalty statutes, we find that all of them require that the defendant have attained at least the age of 16 at the time of the capital offense.
The conclusion that it would offend civilized standards of decency to execute a person who was less than 16 years old at the time of his or her offense is consistent with the views that have been expressed by respected professional organizations, by other nations that share our Anglo-American heritage, and by the leading members of the Western European community. Thus, the American Bar Association and the American Law Institute have formally expressed their opposition to the death penalty for juveniles. Although the death penalty has not been entirely abolished in the United Kingdom or New Zealand (it has been abolished in Australia, except in the State of New South Wales, where it is available for treason and piracy), in neither of those countries may a juvenile be executed. The death penalty has been abolished in West Germany, France, Portugal, The Netherlands, and all of the Scandinavian countries, and is available only for exceptional crimes such as treason in Canada, Italy, Spain, and Switzerland. Juvenile executions are also prohibited in the Soviet Union.
IV
The second societal factor the Court has examined in determining the acceptability of capital punishment to the American sensibility is the behavior of juries. In fact, the infrequent and haphazard handing out of death sentences by capital juries was a prime factor underlying our judgment in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238 (1972), that the death penalty, as then administered in unguided fashion, was unconstitutional.
While it is not known precisely how many persons have been executed during the 20th century for crimes committed under the age of 16, a scholar has recently compiled a table revealing this number to be between 18 and 20. All of these occurred during the first half of the century, with the last such execution taking place apparently in 1948. In the following year this Court observed that this “whole country has traveled far from the period in which the death sentence was an automatic and commonplace result of convictions....” Williams v. New York, 337 U. S. 241, 247 (1949). The road we have traveled during the past four decades — in which thousands of juries have tried murder cases — leads to the unambiguous conclusion that the imposition of the death penalty on a 15-year-old offender is now generally abhorrent to the conscience of the community.
Department of Justice statistics indicate that during the years 1982 through 1986 an average of over 16,000 persons were arrested for willful criminal homicide (murder and non-negligent manslaughter) each year. Of that group of 82,094 persons, 1,393 were sentenced to death. Only 5 of them, including the petitioner in this case, were less than 16 years old at the time of the offense. Statistics of this kind can, of course, be interpreted in different ways, but they do suggest that these five young offenders have received sentences that are “cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual.” Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S., at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring).
V
“Although the judgments of legislatures, juries, and prosecutors weigh heavily in the balance, it is for us ultimately to judge whether the Eighth Amendment permits imposition of the death penalty” on one such as petitioner who committed a. heinous murder when he was only 15 years old. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U. S. 782, 797 (1982). In making that judgment, we first ask whether the juvenile’s culpability should be measured by the same standard as that of an adult, and then consider whether the application of the death penalty to this class of offenders “measurably contributes” to the social purposes that are served by the death penalty. Id., at 798.
It is generally agreed “that punishment should be directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal defendant.” California v. Brown, 479 U. S. 538, 545 (1987) (O’CONNOR, J., concurring)..There is also broad agreement on the proposition that adolescents as a.class are less mature and responsible than adults. We stressed this difference in explaining the importance of treating the defendant’s youth as a mitigating factor in capital cases:
“But youth is more than a chronological fact. It is a time and condition of life when a person may be most susceptible to influence and to psychological damage. Our history is replete with laws and judicial recognition that minors, especially in their earlier years, generally are less mature and responsible than adults. Particularly ‘during the formative years of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment’ expected of adults. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U. S. 622, 635 (1979).” Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U. S. 104, 115-116 (1982) (footnotes omitted).
To add further emphasis to the special mitigating force of youth, Justice Powell quoted the following passage from the 1978 Report of the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Sentencing Policy Toward Young Offenders:
“ ‘[Ajdolescents, particularly in the early and middle teen years, are more vulnerable, more impulsive, and less self-disciplined than adults. Crimes committed by youths may be just as harmful to victims as those committed by older persons, but they deserve less punishment because adolescents may have less capacity to control their conduct and to think in long-range terms than adults. Moreover, youth crime as such is not exclusively the offender’s fault; offenses by the young also represent a failure of family, school, and the social system, which share responsibility for the development of America’s youth.’” 455 U. S., at 115, n. 11.
Thus, the Court has already endorsed the proposition that less culpability should attach to a crime committed by a juvenile than to a comparable crime committed by an adult. The basis for this conclusion is too obvious to require extended explanation. Inexperience, less education, and less intelligence make the teenager less able to evaluate the consequences of his or her conduct while at the same time he or she is much more apt to be motivated by mere emotion or peer pressure than is an adult. The reasons why juveniles are not trusted with the privileges and responsibilities of an adult also explain why their irresponsible conduct is not as morally reprehensible as that of an adult.
“The death penalty is said to serve two principal social purposes: retribution and deterrence of capital crimes by prospective offenders.” Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 183 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.). In Gregg we concluded that as “an expression of society’s moral outrage at particularly offensive conduct,” retribution was not “inconsistent with our respect for the dignity of men.” Ibid. Given the lesser culpability of the juvenile offender, the teenager’s capacity for growth, and society’s fiduciary obligations to its children, this conclusion is simply inapplicable to the execution of a 15-year-old offender.
For such a young offender, the deterrence rationale is equally unacceptable. The Department of Justice statistics indicate that about 98% of the arrests for willful homicide involved persons who were over 16 at the time of the offense. Thus, excluding younger persons from the class that is eligible for the death penalty will not diminish the deterrent value of capital punishment for the vast majority of potential offenders. And even with respect to those under 16 years of age, it is obvious that the potential deterrent value of the death sentence is insignificant for two reasons. The likelihood that the teenage offender has made the kind of cost-benefit analysis that attaches any weight to the possibility of execution is so remote as to be virtually nonexistent. And, even if one posits such a cold-blooded calculation by a 15-year-old, it is fanciful to believe that he would be deterred by the knowledge that a small number of persons his age have been executed during the 20th century. In short, we are not persuaded that the imposition of the death penalty for offenses committed by persons under 16 years of age has made, or can be expected to make, any measurable contribution to the goals that capital punishment is intended to achieve. It is, therefore, “nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering,” Coker v. Georgia, 433 U. S., at 592, and thus an unconstitutional punishment.
VI
Petitioner’s counsel and various amici curiae have asked us to “draw a line” that would prohibit the execution of any person who was under the age of 18 at the time of the offense. Our task today, however, is to decide the case before us; we do so by concluding that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the execution of a person who was under 16 years of age at the time of his or her offense.
The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded with instructions to enter an appropriate order vacating petitioner’s death sentence.
It is so ordered.
Justice Kennedy took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
APPENDICES
Appendix A
Right to Vote
The United States Constitution, Amendment 26, requires States to permit 18-year-olds to vote. No State has lowered its voting-age below 18. The following chart assembles the various provisions from state constitutions and statutes that' provide an 18-year-old voting age.
Ala. [No provisions beyond reference to U. S. Const., Amdt. 26]
Alaska Alaska Const., Art. V, SI
Ariz. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §16-121 (Supp. 1987)
Ark. Ark. Code Ann. § 7-8-401 (1987)
Cal. Cal. Const., Art. 2, §2
Colo. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 1-2-101 (1980)
Conn. Conn. Const., Art. 9; Conn. Gen. Stat. § 9-12 (Supp. 1988)
Del. Del. Code Ann., Tit. 15, S 1701 (1981)
D. C. D. C. Code § l-1311(b)(l) (1987)
Fla. Fla. Stat. §97.041 (1987)
Ga. Ga. Code Ann. §21-2-219 (1987)
Hawn Haw. Rev. Stat. §11-12 (1985)
Idaho Idaho Code § 34-402 (Supp. 1988)
III. Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 46, 3-l (1987)
Ind. Ind. Code § 3-7-1-1 (Supp. 1987)
Iowa Iowa Code § 47.4 (1987)
Kan. Kan. Const., Art. 5, §1
Ky. Kv. Const. § 145
La. La. Const.. Art. 1, §10; La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18:101(A) (West 1979)
Me. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 21A, § 111(2) (Supp. 1987-1988)
Md.'Md. Ann. Code, Art. 33. §3-4(b)(2) (1986)
Mass. Mass. Gen. Laws §51:1 (1986)
Mich. Mich. Comp. Laws §168.492 (1979)
Minn. Minn. Stat. §201.014 (1986)
Miss. Miss. Const., Art. 12, §241
Mo. Mo. Const., Art. VIII, §2
Mont. Mont. Const., Art. IV, §2; Mont. Code Ann. §13-1-111(1987)
Neb. Neb. Const., Art. VI, §1; Neb. Rev. Stat. §32-223 (1984)
Nev. Nev. Rev. Stat. §293.485 (1987)
N. H. N. H. Const., Pt. 1, Art. 11
N. J. N. J. Const., Art. 2, ¶3
N. M. [No provisions beyond reference to U. S. Const., Amdt. 26]
N. Y. N. Y. Elec. Law § 5-102 (McKinney 1978)
N. C. N. C. Gen. Stat. § 163-55 (1987)
N. D. N. D. Const., Art. II, §1
Ohio Ohio Const., Art. V, § 1; Ohio Rev.. Code Ann. §§3503.01, 3503.011 (1982)
Okla. Okla. Const., Art. 3, § 1
Ore. Ore. Const., Art. II, §2
Pa. Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 25, §2811 (Purdon Supp. 1988-1889)
R. I. R. I. Gen. Laws § 17-1-3 (Supp. 1987)
S. C. S. C. Code § 7-5-610 (Supp. 1987)
S. D. S. D. Const., Art. VII, §2; S. D. Codified Laws.§ 12-3-1 (1982)
Tenn. Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-2-102 (1985)
Tex. Tex. Elec. Code Ann. §11.002 (Supp. 1988)
Utah Utah Code Ann. §20-1-17 (1984)
Vt. Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17, §2121 (1982)
Va. Va. Const., Art. II, § 1
Wash. Wash. Const., Art. VI, §1, Amdt. 63
W. Va. W. Va. Code §3-1-3 (1987)
Wis. Wis. Const., Art. 3, §1; Wis. Stat. §§6.02,6.05 (1985-1986)
Wyo. Wyo. Stat. §22-l-102(k) (Supp. 1988)
Appendix B
Right to Serve on a Jury
In no State may anyone below the age of 18 serve on a jury. The following chart assembles the various state provisions relating to minimum age for jury service.
Ala. Ala. Code § 12-16-60(a)(l) (1986)
Alaska Alaska Stat. Ann. § 09.20.010(a)(3) (Supp. 1987)
Ariz. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 21-301(0) (Supp. 1987)
Ark. Ark. Code Ann. § 16-31-101 (1987)
Cal. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code Ann. § 198(a)(1) (West Supp. 1988)
Colo. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-71-109(2)(a) (1973)
Conn. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-217 (Supp. 1988)
Del. Del. Code Ann., Tit. 10, §4506(b)(1) (Supp. 1986)
D. C. D. C. Code § ll-1906(b)(l)(C) (Supp. 1988)
Fla. Fla. Stat. HO. 01 (1987)
Ga. Ga. Code Ann. § 15-12-40 (Supp. 1988)
Haw. Haw. Rev. Stat. §612-4 (1985)
Idaho Idaho Code § 2-209(2)(a) (Supp. 1988)
Ill. Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 78, ¶2 (1987)
Ind. Ind. Code § 33-4-5-2 (Supp. 1987)
Iowa Iowa Code §607A.4(l)(a) (1987)
Kan. Kan. Stat. Ann. §43-156 (1986)
Ky. Ky. Rev. Stat. §29A.080(2)(a) (1985)
La. La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 401(A)(2) (West Supp. 1988)
Me. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 14, §1211 (Supp. 1987-1988)
Md. Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. §8-104 (1984)
Mass. Mass. Gen. Laws §234:1 (1986)
Mich. Mich. Comp.'Laws § 600.1307a(l)(a) (Supp. 1988-1989)
Minn. Minn. Stat. § 593.41, subd. 2(2) (1986)
Miss. Miss. Code Ann. § 13-5-1 (1972)
Mo. Mo. Rev. Stat. §494.010 (1986)
Mont. Mont. Code Ann. §3-15-301 (1987)
Neb. Neb. Rev. Stat. §25-1601 (1985)
Nev. Nev. Rev. Stat. §6.010 (1987)
N. H. N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 500-A:3 (1983)
N. J. N. J. Stat. Ann. §9:17B-1 (West Supp. 1988)
N. M. N. M. Stat. Ann. §38-5-1 (1987)
N. Y. N. Y. Jud. Law §510(2) (McKinney Supp. 1988)
N. C. N. C. Gen. Stat. §9-3 (1986)
N. D. N. D. Cent. Code § 27-09.l-08(2)(b) (Supp. 1987)
Ohio Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2313.42 (1984)
Okla. Okla. Stat., Tit. 38, §28 (1981)
Ore. Ore. Rev. Stat. § 10.030(2)(c) (1987)
Pa. Pa. Cons. Stat. §4521 (1982)
R. I. R. I. Gen. Laws § 9-9-1 (1985)
S. C. S. C. Code § 14-7-130 (1987)
S. D. Codified Laws § 16-18-10 (1987) S. D.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 22-1-101 (1980) Tenn.
Tex. Govt. Code Ann. §62.102 (1988) Tex.
Utah Code Ann. §78-46-7(l)(b) (1987) Utah
Vt. Stat. Ann. — Administrative Orders and Rules: Qualification, List, Selection and Summoning of All Jurors — Rule 25 (1986) Vt.
Va. Code §8.01-337 (Supp. 1988) Va.
Wash. Rev. Code §2.36.070 (1987) Wash.
W. Va. Code § 52-l-8(b)(l) (Supp. 1988) W. Va.
Wis. Stat. §756.01 (1985-1986) Wis.
Wyo. Stat. § 1-11-101 (1988) Wyo.
Appendix C
Right to Drive Without Parental Consent
Most States have various provisions regulating driving age, from learner’s permits through driver’s licenses. In all States but one, 15-year-olds either may not drive, or may drive only with parental consent or accompaniment.
Ala. Ala. Code §32-6-7(1) (1983)
Alaska Alaska Stat. Ann. §28.15.071 (Supp. 1987)
Ariz. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 28-413(A)(l) (Supp. 1987)
Ark. Ark. Code Ann. §27-16-604(a)(l) (1987)
Cal. Cal. Veh. Code Ann. § 12507 (West 1987)
Colo. Colo. Rev. Stat. §42-2-107(1) (1984).
Conn. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-36 (1985)
Del. Del. Code Ann., Tit. 21, §2707 (1985)
D. C. D. C. Code §40-301 (1981)
Fla. Fla. Stat. §322.09 (1987)
Ga. Ga. Code Ann. §40-5-26 (1985)
Haw. Haw. Rev. Stat. §286-112 (1985)
Idaho Idaho Code §49-313 (Supp. 1987)
Ill. Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 95V», 6-103 (1987)
Ind. Ind. Code § 9-1-4-32 (1982)
Iowa Iowa Code § 321.177 (1987)
Kan. Kan. Stat. Ann. §8-237 (1982)
Ky. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §186.470 (1980)
La. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §32:407 (West Supp. 1988)
Me. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 29, §585 (Supp. 1987-1988)
Md. Md. Transp. Code Ann. § 16-103 (1987)
Mass. Mass. Gen. Laws §90:8 (1986)
Mich. Mich. Comp. Laws §257.308 (1979)
Minn. Minn. Stat. § 171.04 (1986)
Miss. Miss. Code Ann. § 63-1-23 (Supp. 1987)
Mo. Mo. Rev. Stat. §302.060 (Supp. 1987)
Mont. Mont. Code Ann. §61-5-105 (1987) (15-year-olds may drive without parental consent if they pass a driver’s education course)
Neb. Neb. Rev. Stat. §60-407 (1984)
Nev. Nev. Rev. Stat. §483.250 (1987)
N. H. N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §263:17 (Supp. 1987)
N. J. N. J. Stat. Ann. §39:3-10 (West Supp. 1988)
N. M. N. M. Stat. Ann. §66-5-11 (1984)
N. Y. N. Y. Veh. & Traf. Law §502(2) (McKinney 1986)
N. C. N. C. Gen. Stat. §20-11 (1983)
N. D. N. D. Cent. Code § 39-06-08 (1987)
Ohio Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §4507.07 (Supp. 1987)
Okla. Okla. Stat., Tit. 47, §6-107 (Supp. 1987)
Ore. Ore. Rev. Stat. §807.060 (1987)
Pa. Pa. Cons. Stat., § 1503 (1987)
R. I. R. I. Gen. Laws § 31-10-3 (Supp. 1987)
S. C. S. C. Code §56-1-100 (1976)
S. D. S. D. Codified Laws §32-12-6 (1984)
Tenn. Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-7-104 (Supp. 1987)
Tex. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann., Art. 6687b(4) (Vernon Supp. 1988)
Utah Utah Code Ann. §41-2-109 (Supp. 1987)
Vt. Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 23, §607 (1987)
Va. Va. Code §46.1-357 (Supp. 1988)
Wash. Wash. Rev. Code §46.20.031 (1987)
W. Va. W. Va. Code § 17B-2-3 (1986)
Wis. Wis. Stat. §343.15 (1985-1986)
Wyo. Wyo. Stat. §31-7-112 (Supp. 1988)
Appendix D
Right to Marry Without Parental Consent
In all States but four, 15-year-olds may not marry without parental consent.
Ala. Ala. Code § 30-1-5 (1983)
Alaska Alaska Stat. Ann. §25.05.171 (1983) (judge may permit minor to marry without parental consent, even in the face of parental opposition, in certain circumstances)
Anz. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25 — 102(A) (1976)
Ark. Ark. Code Ann. §9-11-102 (1987)
Cal. Cal. Civ. Code Ann. §4101 (West 1983)
Colo. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 14-2-106(l)(a)(I) (1987)
Conn. Conn. Gen. Stat. §46b-30 (1986)
Del. Del. Code Ann., Tit. 13, §123 (1981)
D. C. D. C. Code §30-111(1981)
Fla. Fla. Stat. §741.04 (1987)
Ga. Ga. Code Ann. § 19-3-37 (1982)
Haw. Haw. Rev. Stat. §572-2 (1985)
Idaho Idaho Code §32-202 (1983)
Ill. Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 40, 203(1) (1987)
Ind. Ind. Code §31-7-1-6 (Supp. 1987)
Iowa Iowa Code §595.2 (1987)
Kan. Kan. Stat. Ann. §23-106 (1981)
Ky. Ky. Rev. Stat. §402.210 (1984)
La. La. Civ. Code Ann., Art. 87 (West Supp. 1988) (minors not legally prohibited from marrying, even without parental consent, but marriage ceremony required); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §9:211 (West Supp. 1988) (official may not perform marriage ceremony in which a minor is a party without parental consent; comments to Civ. Code Ann., Art. 87, suggest that such a marriage is valid but that official may face sanctions)
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 19, §62 (Supp. 1987-1988) ct>
Md. Fam. Law Code Ann. §2-301 (1984) (either party under 16 may marry without parental consent if “the woman to be married... is pregnant or has given birth to a child”) a-
Mass. Mass. Gen. Laws §207:7 (1988)
Mich. Mich. Comp. Laws §551.103 (1988)
Minn. Minn. Stat. §517.02 (1986)
Miss. Miss. Code Ann. § 93-l-5(d) (Sup
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
A
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sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Clark
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issue here is the constitutionality, under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, of a New York statute which permits the banning of motion picture films on the ground that they are “sacrilegious.” That statute makes it unlawful “to exhibit, or to sell, lease or lend for exhibition at any place of amusement for pay or in connection with any business in the state of New York, any motion picture film or reel [with specified exceptions not relevant here], unless there is at the time in full force and effect a valid license or permit therefor of the education department . ...” The statute further provides:
“The director of the [motion picture] division [of the education department] or, when authorized by the regents, the officers of a local office or bureau shall cause to be promptly examined every motion picture film submitted to them as herein required, and unless such film or a part thereof is obscene, indecent, immoral, inhuman, sacrilegious, or is of such a character that its exhibition would tend to corrupt morals or incite to crime, shall issue a license therefor. If such director or, when so authorized, such officer shall not license any film submitted, he shall furnish to the applicant therefor a written report of the reasons for his refusal and a description of each rejected part of a film not rejected in toto.”
Appellant is a corporation engaged in the business of distributing motion pictures. It owns the exclusive rights to distribute throughout the United States a film produced in Italy entitled “The Miracle.” On November 30, 1950, after having examined the picture, the motion picture division of the New York education department, acting under the statute quoted above, issued to appellant a license authorizing exhibition of “The Miracle,” with English subtitles, as one part of a trilogy-called “Ways of Love.” Thereafter, for a period of approximately eight weeks, “Ways of Love” was exhibited publicly in a motion picture theater in New York City under an agreement between appellant and the owner of the theater whereby appellant received a stated percentage of the admission price.
During this period, the New York State Board of Regents, which by statute is made the head of the education department, received “hundreds of letters, telegrams, post cards, affidavits and other communications” both protesting against and defending the public exhibition of “The Miracle.” The Chancellor of the Board of Regents requested three members of the Board to view the picture and to make a report to the entire Board. After viewing the film, this committee reported to the Board that in its opinion there was basis for the claim that the picture was “sacrilegious.” Thereafter, on January 19, 1951, the Regents directed appellant to show cause, at a hearing to be held on January 30, why its license to show “The Miracle” should not be rescinded on that ground. Appellant appeared at this hearing, which was conducted by the same three-member committee of the Regénts which had previously viewed the picture, and challenged the jurisdiction of the committee and of the Regents to proceed with the case. With the consent of the committee, various interested persons and organizations submitted to it briefs and exhibits bearing upon the merits of the picture and upon the constitutional and statutory questions involved. On February 16, 1951, the Regents, after viewing “The Miracle,” determined that it was “sacrilegious” and for that reason ordered the Commissioner of Education to rescind appellant’s license to exhibit the picture. The Commissioner did so.
Appellant brought the present action in the New York courts to review the determination of the Regents. Among the claims advanced by appellant were (1) that the statute violates the Fourteenth Amendment as a prior restraint upon freedom of speech and of the press; (2) that it is invalid under the same Amendment as a violation of the guaranty of separate church and state and as a prohibition of the free exercise of religion; and, (3) that the term “sacrilegious” is so vague and indefinite as to offend due process. The Appellate Division rejected all of appellant’s contentions and upheld the Regents’ determination. 278 App. Div. 253, 104 N. Y. S. 2d 740. On appeal the New York Court of Appeals, two judges dissenting, affirmed the order of the Appellate Division. 303 N. Y. 242, 101 N. E. 2d 665. The case is here on appeal. 28 U. S. C. § 1257 (2).
As we view the case, we need consider only appellant’s contention that the New York statute is an unconstitutional abridgment of free speech and a free press. In Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm’n, 236 U. S. 230 (1915), a distributor of motion pictures sought to enjoin the enforcement of an Ohio statute which required the prior approval of a board of censors before any motion picture could be publicly exhibited in the state, and which directed the board to approve only such films as it adjudged to be “of a moral, educational or amusing and harmless character.” The statute was assailed in part as an unconstitutional abridgment of the freedom of the press guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The District Court rejected this contention, stating that the first eight Amendments were not a restriction on state action. 215 F. 138, 141 (D. C. N. D. Ohio 1914). On appeal to this Court, plaintiff in its brief abandoned this claim and contended merely that the statute in question violated the freedom of speech and publication guaranteed by the Constitution of Ohio. In affirming the decree of the District Court denying injunctive relief, this Court stated:
“It cannot be put out of view that the exhibition of moving pictures is a business pure and simple, originated and conducted for profit, like other spectacles, not to be regarded, nor intended to be regarded by the Ohio constitution, we think, as part of the press of the country or as organs of public opinion.”
In a series of decisions beginning with Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652 (1925), this Court held that the liberty of speech and of the press which the First Amendment guarantees against abridgment by the federal government is within the liberty safeguarded by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from invasion by state action. That principle has been followed and reaffirmed to the present day. Since this series of decisions came after the Mutual decision, the present case is the first to present squarely to us the question whether motion pictures are within the ambit of protection which the First Amendment, through the Fourteenth, secures to any form of “speech” or “the press.”
It cannot be doubted that motion pictures are a significant medium for the communication of ideas. They may affect public attitudes and behavior in a variety of ways, ranging from direct espousal of a political or social doctrine to the subtle shaping of thought which characterizes all artistic expression. The importance of motion pictures as an organ of public opinion is not lessened by the fact that they are designed to entertain as well as to inform. As was said in Winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 507, 510 (1948):
“The line between the informing and the entertaining is too elusive for the protection of that basic right [a free press]. Everyone is familiar with instances of propaganda through fiction. What is one man’s amusement, teaches another’s doctrine.”
It is urged that motion pictures do not fall within the First Amendment’s aegis because their production, distribution, and exhibition is a large-scale business conducted for private profit. We cannot agree. That books, newspapers, and magazines are published and sold for profit does not prevent them from being a form of expression whose liberty is safeguarded by the First Amendment. We fail to see why operation for profit should have any different effect in the case of motion pictures.
It is further urged that motion pictures possess a greater capacity for evil, particularly among the youth of a community, than other modes of expression. Even if one were to accept this hypothesis, it does not follow that motion pictures should be disqualified from First Amendment protection. If there be capacity for evil it may be relevant in determining the permissible scope of community control, but it does not authorize substantially unbridled censorship such as we have here.
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that expression by means of motion pictures is included within the free speech and free press guaranty of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. To the extent that language in the opinion in Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm’n, supra, is out of harmony with the views here set forth, we no longer adhere to it.
To hold that liberty of expression by means of motion pictures is guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, however, is not the end of our problem. It does not follow that the Constitution requires absolute freedom to exhibit every motion picture of every kind at all times and all places. That much is evident from the series of decisions of this Court with respect to other media of communication of ideas. Nor does it follow that motion pictures are necessarily subject to the precise rules governing any other particular method of expression. Each method tends to present its own peculiar problems. But the basic principles of freedom of speech and the press, like the First Amendment’s command, do not vary. Those principles, as they have frequently been enunciated by this Court, make freedom of expression the rule. There is no justification in this case for making an exception to that rule.
The statute involved here does not seek to punish, as a past offense, speech or writing falling within the permissible scope of subsequent punishment. On the contrary, New York requires that permission to communicate ideas be obtained in advance from state officials who judge the content of the words and pictures sought to be communicated. This Court recognized many years ago that such a previous restraint is a form of infringement upon freedom of expression to be especially condemned. Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U. S. 697 (1931). The Court there recounted the history which indicates that a major purpose of the First Amendment guaranty of a free press was to prevent prior restraints upon publication, although it was carefully pointed out that the liberty of the press is not limited to that protection. It was further stated that “the protection even as to previous restraint is not absolutely unlimited. But the limitation has been recognized only in exceptional cases.” Id., at 716. In the light of the First Amendment’s history and of the Near decision, the State has a heavy burden to demonstrate that the limitation challenged here presents such an exceptional case.
New York’s highest court says there is “nothing mysterious” about the statutory provision applied in this case: “It is simply this: that no religion, as that word is understood by the ordinary, reasonable person, shall be treated with contempt, mockery, scorn and ridicule . . . .” This is far from the kind of narrow exception to freedom of expression which a state may carve out to satisfy the adverse demands of other interests of society. In seeking to apply the broad and all-inclusive definition of “sacrilegious” given by the New York courts, the censor is set adrift upon a boundless sea amid a myriad of conflicting currents of religious views, with no charts but those provided by the most vocal and powerful orthodoxies. New York cannot vest such unlimited restraining control over motion pictures in a censor. Cf. Kunz v. New York, 340 U. S. 290 (1951). Under such a standard the most careful and tolerant censor would find it virtually impossible to avoid favoring one religion over another, and he would be subject to an inevitable tendency to ban the expression of unpopular sentiments sacred to a religious minority. Application of the “sacrilegious” test, in these or other respects, might raise substantial questions under the First Amendment’s guaranty of separate church and state with freedom of worship for all. However, from the standpoint of freedom of speech and the press, it is enough to point out that the state has no legitimate interest in protecting any or all religions from views distasteful to them which is sufficient to justify prior restraints upon the expression of those views. It is not the business of government in our nation to suppress real or imagined attacks upon a particular religious doctrine, whether they appear in publications, speeches, or motion pictures.
Since the term “sacrilegious” is the sole standard under attack here, it is not necessary for us to decide, for example, whether a state may censor motion pictures under a clearly drawn statute designed and applied to prevent the showing of obscene films. That is a very different question from the one now before us. We hold only that under the First and Fourteenth Amendments a state may not ban a film on the basis of a censor’s conclusion that it is “sacrilegious.”
Reversed.
McKinney's N. Y. Laws, 1947, Education Law, § 129.
Id., § 122.
The motion'picture division had previously issued a license for exhibition of “The Miracle” without English subtitles, but the film was never shown under that license.
McKinney’s N. Y. Laws, 1947, Education Law, § 101; see also N. Y. Const., Art. V, § 4.
Stipulation between appellant and appellee, R. 86.
The action was brought under Article 78 of the New York Civil Practice Act, Gilbert-Bliss N. Y. Civ. Prac., Vol. 6B, 1944, 1949 Supp., § 1283 et seq. See also McKinney’s N. Y. Laws, 1947, Education Law, § 124.
236 U. S., at 244.
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652, 666 (1925); Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359, 368 (1931); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U. S. 697, 707 (1931); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233, 244 (1936); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353, 364 (1937); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444, 450 (1938); Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147, 160 (1939).
See Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444, 452 (1938).
See Inglis, Freedom of the Movies (1947), 20-24; Klapper, The Effects of Mass Media (1950), passim; Note, Motion Pictures and the First Amendment, 60 Yale L. J. 696, 704-708 (1951), and sources cited therein.
See Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233 (1936); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516, 531 (1945).
See United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U. S. 131, 166 (1948): “We have no doubt that moving pictures, like newspapers and radio, are included in the press whose freedom is guaranteed by the First Amendment.” It is not without significance that talking pictures were first produced in 1926, eleven years after the Mutual decision. Hampton, A History of the Movies (1931), 382-383.
E. g., Feiner v. New York, 340 U. S. 315 (1951); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77 (1949); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568 (1942); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U. S. 569 (1941).
Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U. S. 697, 713-719 (1931); see also Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444, 451-452 (1938); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233, 245-250 (1936); Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U. S. 454, 462 (1907).
303 N. Y. 242, 258, 101 N. E. 2d 665, 672. At another point the Court of Appeals gave “sacrilegious” the following definition: “the act of violating or profaning anything sacred.” Id., at 255, 101 N. E. 2d at 670. The Court of Appeals also approved the Appellate Division’s interpretation: “As the court below said of the statute in question, ‘All it purports to do is to bar a visual caricature of religious beliefs held sacred by one sect or another ....’” Id., at 258, 101 N. E. 2d at 672. Judge Fuld, dissenting, concluded from all the statements in the majority opinion that “the basic criterion appears to be whether the film treats a religious theme in such a manner as to offend the religious beliefs of any group of persons. If the film does have that effect, and it is ‘offered as a form of entertainment,’ it apparently falls within the statutory ban regardless of the sincerity and good faith of the producer of the film, no matter how temperate the treatment of the theme, and no matter how unlikely a public disturbance or breach of the peace. The drastic nature of such a ban is highlighted by the fact that the film in question makes no direct attack on, or criticism of, any religious dogma or principle, and it is not claimed to be obscene, scurrilous, intemperate or abusive.” Id., at 271-272, 101 N. E. 2d at 680.
Cf. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 97 (1940); Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359, 369-370 (1931).
Cf. Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U. S. 268 (1951); Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558 (1948); Largent v. Texas, 318 U. S. 418 (1943); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444 (1938).
See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940).
See the following statement by Mr. Justice Roberts, speaking for a unanimous Court in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 310 (1940):
“In the realm of religious faith, and in that of political belief, sharp differences arise. In both fields the tenets of one man may seem the rankest error to his neighbor. To persuade others to his own point of view, the pleader, as we know, at times, resorts to exaggeration, to vilification of men who have been, or are, prominent in church or state, and even to false statement. But the people of this nation have ordained in the light of history, that, in spite of the probability of excesses and abuses, these liberties are, in the long view, essential to enlightened opinion and right conduct on the part of the citizens of a democracy.
“The essential characteristic of these liberties is, that under their shield many types of life, character, opinion and belief can develop unmolested and unobstructed. Nowhere is this shield more necessary than in our own country for a people composed of many races and of many creeds.”
In the Near case, this Court stated that “the primary requirements of decency may be enforced against obscene publications.” 283 U. S. 697, 716. In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568, 571-572 (1942), Mr. Justice Murphy stated for a unanimous Court: “There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or ‘fighting’ words — those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.” But see Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77, 82 (1949): “When ordinances undertake censorship of speech or religious practices before permitting their exercise, the Constitution forbids their enforcement.”
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
C
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
Angel Francisco Breard is scheduled to be executed by the Commonwealth of Virginia this evening at 9 p.m. Breard, a citizen of Paraguay, came to the United States in 1986, at the age of 20. In 1992, Breard was charged with the attempted rape and capital murder of Ruth Dickie. At his trial in 1993, the State presented overwhelming evidence of guilt, including semen found on Dickie’s body matching Breard’s DNA profile and hairs on Dickie’s body identical in all microscopic characteristics to hair samples taken from Breard. Breard chose to take the witness stand in his defense. During his testimony, Breard confessed to killing Dickie, but explained that he had only done so because of a Satanic curse placed on him by his father-in-law. Following a jury trial in the Circuit Court of Arlington County, Virginia, Breard was convicted of both charges and sentenced to death. On appeal, the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed Breard’s convictions and sentences, Breard v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 68, 445 S. E. 2d 670 (1994), and we denied certiorari, 513 U. S. 971 (1994). State collateral relief was subsequently denied as well.
Breard then filed a motion for habeas, relief under 28 U. S. C. §2254 in Federal District Court on August 20, 1996. In that motion, Breard argued for the first time that his convictions and sentences should be overturned because of alleged violations of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Vienna Convention), April 24, 1963, [1970] 21 U. S. T. 77, T. I. A. S. No. 6820, at the time of his arrest. Specifically, Breard alleged that the Vienna Convention was violated when the arresting authorities failed to inform him that, as a foreign national, he had the right to contact the Paraguayan Consulate. The District Court rejected this claim, concluding that Breard procedurally defaulted the claim when he failed to raise it in state court and that Breard could not demonstrate cause and prejudice for this default. Breard v. Netherland, 949 F. Supp. 1255, 1266 (ED Va. 1996). The Fourth Circuit affirmed. Breard v. Pruett, 134 F. 3d 615, 620 (1998). Breard has petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari.
In September 1996, the Republic of Paraguay, the Ambassador of Paraguay to the United States, and the Consul General of Paraguay to the United States (collectively Paraguay) brought suit in Federal District Court against certain Virginia officials, alleging that their separate rights under the Vienna Convention had been violated by the Commonwealth’s failure to inform Breard of his rights under the treaty and to inform the Paraguayan Consulate of Breard’s arrest, convictions, and sentences. In addition, the Consul General asserted a parallel claim under Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, alleging a denial of his rights under the Vienna Convention. The District Court concluded that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over these suits because Paraguay was not alleging a “continuing violation of federal law” and therefore could not bring its claims within the exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity established in Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908). Republic of Paraguay v. Allen, 949 F. Supp. 1269, 1272-1273 (ED Va. 1996). The Fourth Circuit affirmed on Eleventh Amendment grounds. Republic of Paraguay v. Allen, 134 F. 3d 622 (1998). Paraguay has also petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari.
On April 3, 1998, nearly five years after Breard’s convictions became final, the Republic of Paraguay instituted proceedings against the United States in the International Court of Justice (ICJ), alleging that the United States violated the Vienna Convention at the time of Breard’s arrest. On April 9, the ICJ noted jurisdiction and issued an order requesting that the United States “take all measures at its disposal to ensure that Angel Francisco Breard is not executed pending the final decision in these proceedings . . . .” The ICJ set a briefing schedule for this matter, with oral argument likely to be held this November. Breard then filed a petition for an original writ of habeas corpus and a stay application in this Court in order to “enforce” the ICJ’s order. Paraguay filed a motion for leave to file a bill of complaint in this Court, citing this Court’s original jurisdiction over eases “affecting Ambassadors ... and Consuls.” U. S. Const., Art. III, §2.
It is clear that Breard procedurally defaulted his claim, if any, under the ‘Vienna Convention by failing to raise that claim in the state courts. Nevertheless, in their petitions for certiorari, both Breard and Paraguay contend that Breard’s Vienna Convention claim may be heard in federal court because the Convention is the “supreme law of the land” and thus trumps the procedural default doctrine. Pet. for Cert. in No. 97-8214, pp. 15-18; Pet. for Cert, in No. 97-1390, p. 14, n. 8. This argument is plainly incorrect for two reasons.
First, while we should give respectful consideration to the interpretation of an international treaty rendered by an international court with jurisdiction to interpret such, it has been recognized in international law that, absent a clear and express statement to the contrary, the procedural rules of the forum State govern the implementation of the treaty in that State. See Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U. S. 717, 723 (1988); Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U. S. 694, 700 (1988); Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. United States Dist. Court for Southern Dist. of Iowa, 482 U. S. 522, 539 (1987). This proposition is embodied in the Vienna Convention itself, which provides that the rights expressed in the Convention “shall be exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiving State,” provided that “said laws and regulations must enable full effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights accorded under this Article are intended.” Article 36(2), [1970] 21 U. S. T., at 101. It is the rule in this country that assertions- of error in criminal proceedings must first be raised in state court in order to form the basis for relief in habeas. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S. 72 (1977). Claims not so raised are considered defaulted. Ibid. By not asserting his Vienna Convention claim in state court, Breard failed to exercise his rights under the Vienna Convention in conformity with the laws of the United States and the Commonwealth of Virginia. Having failed to do so, he cannot raise a claim of violation of those rights now on federal habeas review.
Second, although treaties are recognized by our Constitution as the supreme law of the land, that status is no less true of provisions of the Constitution itself, to which rules of procedural default apply. We have held “that an Act of Congress ... is on a full parity with a treaty, and that when a statute which is subsequent in time is inconsistent with a treaty, the statute to the extent of conflict renders the treaty null.” Reid v. Covert, 354 U. S. 1, 18 (1957) (plurality opinion); see also Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U. S. 190, 194 (1888) (holding that if a treaty and a federal statute conflict, “the one last in date will control the other”). The Vienna Convention — which arguably confers on an individual the right to consular assistance following arrest — has continuously been in effect since 1969. But in 1996, before Breard filed his habeas petition raising claims under the Vienna Convention, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), which provides that a habeas petitioner alleging that he is held in violation of “treaties of the United States” will, as a general rule, not be afforded an evidentiary hearing if he “has failed to develop the factual basis of [the] claim in State court proceedings.” 28 U. S. C. §§ 2254(a), (e)(2) (1994 ed., Supp. IV). Breard’s ability to obtain relief based on violations of the Vienna Convention is subject to this subsequently enacted rule, just as any claim arising under the United States Constitution would be. This rule prevents Breard from establishing that the violation of his Vienna Convention rights prejudiced him.' Without a hearing, Breard cannot establish how the Consul would have advised him, how the advice of his attorneys differed from the advice the Consul could have provided, and what factors he considered in electing to reject the plea bargain that the State offered him. That limitation, Breard also argues, is not justified because his Vienna Convention claims were so novel that he could not have discovered them any earlier. Assuming that were true, such novel claims would be barred on habeas review under Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288 (1989).
Even were Breard’s Vienna Convention claim properly raised and proved, it is extremely doubtful that the violation should result in the overturning of a final judgment of conviction without some showing that the violation had an effect on the trial. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U. S. 279 (1991). In this action, no such showing could even arguably be made. Breard decided not to plead guilty and to testify at his own trial contrary to the advice of his attorneys, who were likely far better able to explain the United States legal system to him than any consular official would have been. Breard’s asserted prejudice — that had the Vienna Convention been followed, he would have accepted the State’s offer to forgo the death penalty in return for a plea of guilty— is far more speculative than the claims of prejudice courts routinely reject in those cases where an inmate alleges that his plea of guilty was infected by attorney error. See, e. g., Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U. S. 52, 59 (1985).
As for Paraguay’s suits (both the original action and the case coming to us on petition for certiorari), neither the text nor the history of the Vienna Convention clearly provides a foreign nation a private right of action in United States courts to set aside a criminal conviction and sentence for violation of consular notification provisions. The Eleventh Amendment provides a separate reason why Paraguay’s suit might not succeed. That Amendment’s “fundamental principle” that “the States, in the absence of consent, are immune from suits brought against them ... by a foreign State” was enunciated in Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313, 329-330 (1934). Though Paraguay claims that its suit is within an exemption dealing with continuing consequences of past violations of federal rights, see Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U. S. 267 (1977), we do not agree. The failure to notify the Paraguayan Consul occurred long ago and has no continuing effect. The causal link present in Milliken is absent in this suit.
Insofar as the Consul General seeks to base his claims on § 1983, his suit is not cognizable. Section 1983 provides a cause of action to any "person within the jurisdiction” of the United States for the deprivation "of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” As an initial matter, it is clear that Paraguay is not authorized to bring suit under § 1983. Paraguay is not a “person” as that term is used in § 1983. See Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U. S. 693, 699 (1973); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, 323-324 (1966); cf. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U. S. 58 (1989). Nor is Paraguay “within the jurisdiction” of the United States. And since the Consul General is acting only in his official capacity, he has no greater ability to proceed under § 1983 than does the country he represents. Any rights that the Consul General might have by virtue of the Vienna Convention exist for the benefit of Paraguay, not for him as an individual.
It is unfortunate that this matter comes before us while proceedings are pending before the ICJ that might have been brought to that court earlier. Nonetheless, this Court must decide questions presented to it on the basis of law. The Executive Branch, on the other hand, in exercising its authority over foreign relations may, and in this case did, utilize diplomatic discussion with Paraguay. Last night the Secretary of State sent a letter to the Governor of Virginia requesting that he stay Breard’s execution. If the Governor wishes to wait for the decision of the ICJ, that is his prerogative. But nothing in our existing case law allows us to make that choice for him.
For the foregoing reasons, we deny the petition for an original writ of habeas corpus, the motion for leave to file a bill of complaint, the petitions for certiorari, and the accompanying stay applications filed by Breard and Paraguay.
Statement of Justice Soutee.
I agree with the Court that the lack of any reasonably arguable causal connection between the alleged treaty violations and Breard’s convictions and sentences disentitle him to relief on any theory offered. Moreover, I have substantial doubts that either Paraguay or any official acting for it is a “person” within the meaning of 42 U. S. C. § 1983 and that the Vienna Convention is enforceable in any judicial proceeding now underway. For these reasons, I believe the stay requests should be denied, with the result that Paraguay’s claims will be mooted. Accordingly, I have voted to deny Paraguay’s and Breard’s respective petitions for certio-rari (Nos. 97-1390 and 97-8214), Paraguay’s motion for leave to file a bill of complaint (No. 125, Orig.), Breard’s application for an original writ of habeas corpus (No. 97-8660), and the associated requests for a stay of execution.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
A
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice White
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Ever since the Nome gold rush of 1899 to 1901, the Seward Peninsula in western Alaska has been a focus of attempts to gain control over the region’s natural riches. See In re McKenzie, 180 U. S. 536 (1901). The city of Nome sprang to life almost overnight, with some 20,000 gold seekers arriving by vessel in the summer of 1900 when the spring thaw opened up seaward passage. Since that time, Nome has never been linked to interior Alaska by road — travelers and traders must arrive by air, sea, or dog sled. This heavy reliance on seaward traffic, and the lack of a natural port in the region, inspired Nome in the early 1980’s to develop plans to construct port facilities, including a causeway with road, a breakwater, and an offshore terminal area, extending into Norton Sound. The implications of this construction for the federal-state offshore boundary lie at the heart of this lawsuit, which comes to us on a bill of complaint filed by the United States. The question presented is whether the Secretary of the Army may decline to issue a permit to build an artificial addition to the coastline unless Alaska agrees that the construction will be deemed not to alter the location of the federal-state boundary.
I
On August 25, 1982, the city of Nome applied for a federal permit to build port facilities with the Alaska District Corps of Engineers of the United States Department of the Army under § 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899 (RHA), 30 Stat. 1151, 33 U. S. C. §403, and §404 of the Clean Water Act, 86 Stat. 884, as amended, 33 U. S. C. § 1344. The Corps issued a Public Notice of Application for Permit on October 20, 1982, and invited interested persons to comment on whether the permit should be granted. On November 22, 1982, a division of the United States Department of the Interior filed an objection to the issuance of a Department of the Army permit on the ground that Nome’s construction of these port facilities would cause an “artificial accretion to the legal coast line.” Joint Stipulation of Facts 2. It requested that the Corps require Alaska to waive any future claims pursuant to the Submerged Lands Act (SLA), 67 Stat. 29, as amended, 43 U. S. C. § 1301 et seq., that might arise from a seaward extension of Alaska’s coastline caused by the building of these facilities. The Solicitor of the Interior Department issued an opinion to the same effect, stating that the Nome project would “‘move Alaska’s coastline or baseline seaward of its present location’ ” and that “ ‘[fjederal mineral leasing offshore Alaska would be affected because the state-federal boundary, as well as international boundaries, are measured from the coastline or baseline.’ ” Joint Stipulation of Facts 2-3. Accordingly, the Solicitor recommended that “ ‘approval of the permit application be conditioned upon Alaska executing an agreement or a quit claim deed preserving the coastline and the state-federal boundary.’ ” Id., at 3.
On July 1,1983, the Corps transmitted the Solicitor’s letter to the Alaska Department of Natural Resources and advised the State that the federal permit would not be issued until a “‘waiver or quit claim deed has been issued preserving the coastline and the State-Federal boundary.’ ” Ibid. The Alaska Department of Natural Resources responded on May 9, 1984, by submitting a conditional disclaimer of rights to additional submerged lands that could be claimed by the State as a result of the construction of the Nome port facility. This disclaimer provided that Alaska reserved its right to the accreted submerged lands pending a decision by a court of competent jurisdiction that the federal officials lacked the authority to compel a disclaimer of sovereignty as a condition of permit issuance. After being advised by the Department of Justice that this disclaimer was satisfactory, the Corps completed the permitting process and issued the permit.
On March 11, 1988, the Minerals Management Service of the Interior Department published a “Request for Comments and Nominations for a Lease Sale in Norton Sound and Notice of Intent to Prepare an Environmental Impact Statement,” which solicited public comment on the Minerals Management Service’s proposed lease sale for minerals, such as gold, near Nome in Norton Sound. Id., at 5. Alaska submitted comments the following month, alleging that the proposed Norton Sound Lease Sale involved submerged lands subject to its Nome project disclaimer and announcing its intention to file a suit challenging the Corps’ authority to require a waiver of rights to submerged lands. The State requested that the Minerals Management Service delete from the proposed lease sale the approximately 730 acres in dispute from the Nome project.
The United States then sought leave of this Court to commence this action, which we granted on April 1, 1991. 499 U. S. 946. The two parties entered into an agreement pursuant to §7 of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), 43 U. S. C. §1336, and Alaska Stat. Ann. §38.05.137 (1989), to direct revenues from the disputed acreage into an escrow account that would then be paid to the prevailing party. The United States and Alaska both filed motions for summary judgment, which we now consider.
I — I
Our principles for evaluating agency interpretations of congressional statutes are by now well settled. Generally, when reviewing an agency’s construction of a statute administered by that agency, we first determine “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.” Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 842 (1984). Should the statute be silent or ambiguous on the direct question posed, we must then decide whether the “agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Id., at 843. In applying these principles, we examine in turn the language of § 10 of the RHA, the decisions of this Court interpreting it, and the longstanding construction of the Corps in fulfilling Congress’ mandate.
A
Section 10 of the RHA provides in pertinent part:
“The creation of any obstruction not affirmatively authorized by Congress, to the navigable capacity of any of the waters of the United States is prohibited; and it shall not be lawful to build or commence the building of any... structures in any... water of the United- States... except on plans recommended by the Chief of Engineers and authorized by the Secretary of the Army; and it shall not be lawful to excavate or fill, or in any manner to alter or modify the course, location, condition, or capacity of, any port, roadstead, haven, harbor, canal, lake, harbor or refuge... unless the work has been recommended by the Chief of Engineers and authorized by the Secretary of the Army prior to beginning the same.” 33 U. S. C. §403.
The language of this provision is quite broad. It flatly prohibits the “creation of any obstruction” to navigable capacity that Congress itself has not authorized, and it bans construction of any structure in any water of the United States “except on plans recommended by the Chief of Engineers and authorized by the Secretary of the Army.” Ibid. The statute itself contains no criteria by which the Secretary is to make an authorization decision; on its face, the provision appears to give the Secretary unlimited discretion to grant or deny a permit for construction of a structure such as the one at issue in this case. The Reports of the Senate and House Committees charged with making recommendations on the Act contain no hint of whether the drafters sought to vest in the Secretary the apparently unbridled authority the plain language of the statute seems to suggest. See H. R. Rep. No. 1826, 55th Cong., 3d Sess. (1899); S. Rep. No. 1686, 55th Cong., 3d Sess. (1899).
The statutory antecedents of this provision similarly offer little insight into Congress’ intent. The precursors to § 10 of the 1899 Act were §§7 and 10 of the 1890 River and Harbor Appropriation Act, Act of Sept. 19, 1890, 26 Stat. 464-465. Section 10 prohibited creation of “any obstruction, not affirmatively authorized by law, to the navigable capacity of any waters, in respect of which the United States has jurisdiction,” and § 7 made unlawful the building of any “wharf, pier,... or structure of any kind outside established harbor-lines... without the permission of the Secretary of War.” Ibid. Congress slightly amended the statute in 1892 to add a prohibition on any construction that would “in any manner... alter or modify the course, location, condition or capacity of any port, roadstead, haven, harbor, harbor of refuge, or inclosure... unless approved and authorized by the Secretary of War.” 1892 Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act, Act of July 13,1892, §3, 27 Stat. 110. This statute reflected the reality that Congress could not itself attend to each such project individually, as it had from the earliest days of the Republic. As the House Report accompanying this law observed: “The most important feature of the bill now presented is the extent it goes in authorizing the Secretary of War to make contracts for the completion of some of the more important works of river and harbor improvement.” H. R. Rep. No. 967, 52d Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1892). “The departure from the old driblet system of appropriations,” the House Report continued, “was found to work so well that your committee determined to apply it on a larger scale than in the last act.” Ibid. See also S. Rep. No. 666, 52d Cong., 1st Sess., 4-5 (1892). By the time Congress passed the 1899 Act, therefore, the idea of delegating authority to the Secretary was well established even if the explanations for the broad language employed by Congress to carry out such a directive were sparse.
B
The substance of the RHA has been unchanged since its enactment, and the Court has had only a few occasions to decide whether to construe it broadly or narrowly. In one such case, for example, the Court considered whether to issue a writ of mandamus to order the Secretary of War and the Chief of Engineers to grant a permit to build a wharf in navigable waters. United States ex rel. Greathouse v. Dern, 289 U. S. 352 (1933). Although it was stipulated that the project would not interfere with navigability, the Secretary nevertheless denied the permit on the ground that the wharf would impede plans developed by the United States to create a means of access to the proposed George Washington Memorial Parkway along the Potomac River in northern Virginia. Id., at 355. The permit applicant argued that the Secretary’s refusal to grant it was contrary to law on the theory that RHA § 10 authorized consideration only of the proposed construction’s effects on navigation. In refusing to issue the writ of mandamus under equitable principles, the Court noted that petitioners’ argument could be accepted “only if several doubtful questions are resolved in [petitioners’] favor,” one of which was “whether a mandatory duty is imposed upon the Secretary of War by § 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act to authorize the construction of the proposed wharf if he is satisfied that it will not interfere with navigation.” Id., at 357.
Nor has such a broad interpretation of the RHA been exceptional. In United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U. S. 482, 491 (1960), the Court observed: “We read the 1899 Act charitably in light of the purpose to be served. The philosophy of the statement of Mr. Justice Holmes in New Jersey v. New York, 283 U. S. 336, 342 [1931], that A river is more than an amenity, it is a treasure,’ forbids a narrow, cramped reading of either § 13 or of § 10.” And as we stated in a later case: “Despite some difficulties with the wording of the Act, we have consistently found its coverage to be broad. And we have found that a principal beneficiary of the Act, if not the principal beneficiary, is the Government itself.” Wyandotte Transportation Co. v. United States, 389 U. S. 191, 201 (1967) (citations omitted).
In United States v. Pennsylvania Industrial Chemical Corp., 411 U. S. 655 (1973), we applied this broad approach to the RHA in a somewhat analogous situation under a provision enacted contemporaneously with § 10. RHA § 13 provides that the Secretary of the Army “may permit the deposit” of refuse matter “whenever in the judgment of the Chief of Engineers anchorage and navigation will not be injured thereby.” 33 U. S. C. § 407. The case presented the question whether the statute required the Secretary to allow such discharges where they had no effect on navigation. We held that the statute should not be so construed. In reaching this conclusion, we observed that “even in a situation where the Chief of Engineers concedes that a certain deposit will not injure anchorage and navigation, the Secretary need not necessarily permit the deposit, for the proviso makes the Secretary’s authority discretionary — i. e., it provides that the Secretary ‘may permit’ the deposit.” 411 U. S., at 662. We further noted that § 13 “contains no criteria to be followed by the Secretary in issuing such permits,” id., at 668, and rejected the argument that the agency’s statutory authority should be construed narrowly.
In our view, § 10 should be construed with similar breadth. Without specifying the factors to be considered, § 10 provides that “it shall not be lawful to build or commence the building” of any structure in navigable waters of the United States “except on plans recommended by the Chief of Engineers and authorized by the Secretary of the Army.” 33 U. S. C. § 403 (emphasis added). In light of our holding in Pennsylvania Chemical Corp. that the Secretary’s discretion under § 13 was not limited to considering the effect of a refuse deposit on navigation, it logically follows that the Secretary’s authority is not confined solely to considerations of navigation in deciding whether to issue a permit under §10.
C
We now examine the administrative interpretation of § 10 down through the years with respect to the range of discretion extended to the Corps and the Secretary. An opinion by Attorney General George W. Wickersham in 1909, for example, denied the Secretary of War and the Chief of Engineers the authority to decide whether to issue a permit under RHA § 10 after “consideration of] questions relating to other interests than those having to do with the navigation of the waters.” 27 Op. Atty. Gen. 284, 288.
This narrow view of the Secretary’s authority persisted within the agency for many decades. “Until 1968,” according to one document produced by the Corps of Engineers, “the Corps administered the 1899 Act regulatory program only to protect navigation and the navigable capacity of the nation’s waters.” 42 Fed. Reg. 37122 (1977). In 1968, the regulations were amended so that the general policy guidance for permit issuance included consideration of “the effects of permitted activities on the public interest including effects upon water quality, recreation, fish and wildlife, pollution, our natural resources, as well as the effects on navigation.” 33 CFR § 209.330(a).
Yet even after the Corps adopted this more expansive reading, which the language of the statute and our decisions interpreting it plainly authorized, the House Committee on Government Operations nevertheless concluded that the Corps in practice was still not interpreting its statutory authority broadly enough. See H. R. Rep. No. 91-917, p. 6 (1970). The Committee was of the view that the Corps’ earlier “restricted view of the 1899 act... was not required by the law.” Id., at 2. The Report summarized our holdings to the effect that the statutory language of RHA § 10 should be interpreted generously, id., at 2-4, and commended the Corps “for recognizing [in 1968] its broader responsibilities” pursuant to its permitting authority under the RHA, id., at 5. The Committee emphasized that the Corps “should instruct its district engineers... to increase their emphasis on how the work will affect all aspects of the public interest, including not only navigation but also conservation of natural resources, fish and wildlife, air and water quality, esthetics, scenic view, historic sites, ecology, and other public interest aspects of the waterway.” Id., at 6 (emphasis added). The Corps did not react to this “advice” until after the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F. 2d 199 (1970). There the court upheld the Corps’ consideration of environmental factors in its permitting decision even though the project would not interfere with navigation, flood control, or power production. After this decision, the Corps began the long process of changing its regulations governing permit application evaluations. See 42 Fed. Reg. 37122 (1977) (describing historical background of the agency’s practice). In 1976, the Corps issued regulations interpreting its statutory authority as empowering it to take into account a full range of economic, social, and environmental factors. See 33 CFR § 209.120(f)(1).
The regulations at issue in this lawsuit, therefore, reflect a broad interpretation of agency power under § 10 that was consistent with the language used by Congress and was well settled by this Court and the Army Corps of Engineers. With respect to the breadth of the Corps’ public interest review, these regulations are substantially the same as those adopted in 1976 and provide:
“(a) Public Interest Review. (1) The decision whether to issue a permit will be based on an evaluation of the probable impacts, including cumulative impacts, of the proposed activity and its intended use on the public interest. Evaluation of the probable impact which the proposed activity may have on the public interest requires a careful weighing of all those factors which become relevant in each particular case. The benefits which reasonably may be expected to accrue from the proposal must be balanced against its reasonably foreseeable detriments. The decision whether to authorize a proposal, and if so, the conditions under which it will be allowed to occur, are therefore determined by the outcome of this general balancing process. That decision should reflect the national concern for both protection and utilization of important resources. All factors which may be relevant to the proposal must be considered including the cumulative effects thereof: among those are conservation, economics, aesthetics, general environmental concerns, wetlands, historic properties, fish and wildlife values, flood hazards, floodplain values, land use, navigation, shore erosion and accretion, recreation, water supply and conservation, water quality, energy needs, safety, food and fiber production, mineral needs, considerations of property ownership and, in general, the needs and welfare of the people.” 33 CFR § 320.4(a)(1) (1991).
These regulations guide the Secretary’s consideration of “public interest” factors to evaluate in determining whether to issue a permit under §10 of the RHA. To the extent Alaska contends that these regulations are invalid because they authorize the Secretary to consider a wider range of factors than just the effects of a project on navigability, we reject this position. The State’s reading of the Secretary’s regulatory authority in this respect is inconsistent with the statute’s language, our cases interpreting it, and the agency’s practice since the late 1960’s.
III
Alaska appears to concede some ground by acknowledging that the Secretary may not be limited solely to issues of navigability in considering whether to issue a § 10 permit. The State in effect contends that, even if the statute authorizes consideration of factors other than just navigability, the regulations authorizing consideration of a project’s consequences on the federal-state boundary exceed the Secretary’s statutory mandate. The regulation at issue provides in pertinent part as follows:
“(f) Effects on limits of the territorial sea. Structures or work affecting coastal waters may modify the coast line or base line from which the territorial sea is measured for purposes of the Submerged Lands Act and international law.... Applications for structures or work affecting coastal waters will therefore be reviewed specifically to determine whether the coast line or base line might be altered. If it is determined that such a change might occur, coordination with the Attorney General and the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior is required before final action is taken. The district engineer will... request [the Solicitor’s] comments concerning the effects of the proposed work on the outer continental rights of the United States.... The decision on the application will be made by the Secretary of the Army after coordination with the Attorney General.” 33 CFR §320.4 (1991).
Alaska advances several arguments why such concerns exceed the scope of the Secretary’s authority. We address each in turn.
A
Alaska’s first argument proceeds from the premise that the SLA trumps the RHA for purposes of determining whether the Secretary may condition issuance of a permit on the State’s disclaimer of sovereignty over the accreted submerged lands. The SLA establishes that a coastal State’s boundary extends seaward “to a line three geographical miles distant from its coast line.” 43 U. S. C. § 1312. The seaward boundary of state-owned lands is measured from a base line that is subject to change from natural and artificial alterations. See United States v. California, 381 U. S. 139, 176-177 (1965); United States v. Louisiana (Louisiana Boundary Case), 394 U. S. 11, 40, n. 48 (1969). In applying these rules, Alaska asserts that because the SLA extends a State’s boundary seaward three miles from its coastline and because our decisions have authorized artificial additions to affect determinations of the base line, the Army cannot by agency fiat override the will of Congress, as interpreted by our Court. Cf. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U. S. 355, 376 (1986). According to Alaska, federalism interests should preclude our finding that the RHA confers power on the Secretary to condition issuance of a §10 construction permit on the disclaimer of a change in the preproject federal-state boundary. See Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U. S. 60 (1962).
The United States responds that Congress has already given the requisite authority to the agency through enactment of the RHA, and that the Secretary appropriately complied with that statute. In the Federal Government’s view, the RHA sets out an absolute prohibition on construction of “any obstruction” in navigable waters, 33 U. S. C. § 403, and vests discretion in the Secretary of the Army to grant exceptions on a case-by-case basis when a structure is recommended by the Army Corps of Engineers. The United States maintains that the Secretary has the discretion to identify relevant considerations for issuing or denying a permit. Cf. Jay v. Boyd, 351 U. S. 345, 353-354 (1956).
We find the United States’ argument to be the more persuasive one. Contrary to Alaska’s position, the agency here is not usurping authority. The Secretary is making no effort to alter the existing rights of a State to sovereignty over submerged lands within three miles of the coastline. The SLA makes this guarantee and nothing in the Corps’ practice, as exercised in this case, alters this right. What the Corps is doing, and what we find a reasonable exercise of agency authority, is to determine whether an artificial addition to the coastline will increase the State’s control over submerged lands to the detriment of the United States’ legitimate interests. If the Secretary so finds, nothing in the SLA prohibits this fact from consideration as part of the “public interest” review process under RHA § 10. Were we to accept Alaska’s position, the Federal Government’s interests in submerged lands outside the State’s zone of control would conceivably become hostage to a State’s plans to add artificial additions to its coastline. And if Alaska’s reading of the applicable law were followed to its logical extreme, the United States would be powerless to protect its interests in submerged lands if a State were to build an artificial addition to the coastline for the sole purpose of gaining sovereignty over submerged lands within the United States’ zone, so long as the project did not affect navigability or cause pollution. Alaska points us to nothing in the SLA or to its legislative history that mandates such a result.
It is important to note that neither the SLA itself, nor any of its legislative history, addresses the question of how artificial additions to the coastline affect the 3-mile limit, as we observed in United States v. California, 381 U. S. 139, 176, and n. 50 (1965). In that case, however, we did hold that international law recognized the seaward expansion of sovereignty through artificial additions to the coastline. Id., at 177. But we also stated that “the Special Master recognized that the United States, through its control over navigable waters, had power to protect its interests from encroachment by unwarranted artificial structures, and that the effect of any future changes could thus be the subject of agreement between the parties.” Id., at 176. Alaska suggests that this language should not be read to vest power in the Secretary to condition permits on sovereignty disclaimers because the Special Master’s report cited by the Court was written prior to enactment of the SLA. Brief for Alaska 26 (citing California, supra, at 143). This contention fails to persuade us, however, because we have already noted that the SLA did not specifically address artificial changes to the coastline, and because our opinion in California sanctioned the mechanism exercised by the Secretary in this case: “Arguments based on the inequity to the United States of allowing California to effect changes in the boundary between federal and state submerged lands by making future artificial changes in the coastline are met, as the Special Master pointed out, by the ability of the United States to protect itself through its power over navigable waters.” 381 U. S., at 177. Such “power over navigable waters” would be meaningless indeed if we were to accept Alaska’s view that RHA § 10 permitted the United States to exercise it only when the State’s project affected navigability or caused pollution.
B
Alaska next contends that our decisions do not permit the Secretary to consider changes in federal-state boundaries as part of the § 10 “public interest” review process. First, the State suggests that such consideration would conflict with our decision in California, supra, at 176-177. In that case we adopted the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U. S. T. 1607, T. I. A. S. No. 5639, for purposes of the SLA, explaining that such a result would establish “a single coastline for both the administration of the Submerged Lands Act and the conduct of our future international relations (barring an unexpected change in the rules established by the Convention).” 381 U. S., at 165. Because construction of an artificial port facility will, in certain circumstances, cause a change in the United States’ international seaward boundary, Alaska contends that the goal of a “single” coastline will be frustrated if we permit the Secretary to establish, in effect, one boundary for international purposes and a different one for domestic purposes.
As the United States maintains, however, our decision in California did not specify a “goal” of achieving a “single” coastline. Rather, our purpose was to give the SLA a “definiteness and stability.” Such aims, of course, can be achieved without creating perfect symmetry between the Convention and the Act. Stability in a boundary line is achieved when the Secretary decides whether a State must disclaim its rights to accreted submerged lands caused by artificial additions just as surely as it is with ordinary coastline determinations occasioned by natural changes. The State intimates that problems relating to fishing, salvage operations, and criminal jurisdiction will result from “Unstable and unpredictable administrative rules [that] will create confusion in many areas.” Reply Brief for Alaska 6. Such speculative concerns, however, arise only when the 3-mile boundary itself is indefinite. But uncertainty in cases such as this one surely ends when the State disclaims its sovereignty over accreted submerged lands. The 3-mile boundary remains the same. And in those circumstances in which the Secretary does not require a disclaimer and the 3-mile federal-state boundary extends from the new base line, presumably should there arise any of the federal-state problems Alaska identifies, changes in nautical maps could readily be amended to reflect such changes. Nothing in the parties’ lodgings with the Court suggests why fishermen and other sailors who rely on such charts will suffer prejudice by the rule we announce today.
Accordingly, we find no merit in Alaska’s argument that, in conducting the permit review process under RHA § 10, the Secretary cannot consider a project’s effects on the federal-state boundary.
IV
Finally, Alaska maintains that even if the regulations are authorized by the RHA, the Secretary’s actions were not consistent with those regulations. The State argues that nothing in the applicable regulations authorizes the Army Corps of Engineers to force a coastal State to abdicate rights to submerged lands as a condition to issuance of a permit for construction of a shoreline project. Alaska suggests that “the regulation addresses activities on submerged lands, not the property interests in the submerged lands.” Brief for Alaska 28. Nor can the Secretary derive authority to condition disclaimers on interagency coordination responsibilities, according to the State, because 33 CFR § 320.4(g)(6) (1991) states specifically that “dispute[s] over property ownership will not be a factor in the Corps’ public interest decision.” Alaska further posits that the regulations at § 320.4(a)(1), which include numerous factors to be evaluated in balancing the public interest, do not make reference to the United States’ property interests.
As our analysis in Parts III-A and III-B suggests, we do not find this argument persuasive. The regulations indicate that the Corps may include in its evaluation the “effects of the proposed work on the outer continental rights of the United States.” 33 CFR § 320.4(f) (1991). It is untenable to maintain that the legitimate property interests of the United States fall outside the relevant criteria for a decision that requires the Secretary to determine whether issuance of a permit would affect the “public interest.” The regulations at § 320.4(g)(6), upon which Alaska places some weight, clearly do not speak to property disputes of the type at issue here. Moreover, we are unpersuaded by Alaska’s contention that the authority to require disclaimers cannot be inferred from the regulatory scheme. It would make little sense, and be inconsistent with Congress’ intent, to hold that the Corps legitimately may prohibit construction of a port facility, and yet to deny it the authority to seek the less drastic alternative of conditioning issuance of a permit on the State’s disclaimer of rights to accreted submerged lands.
Alaska also makes various challenges to the administrative procedures followed in this case, and especially to the alleged shortcoming of the Secretary in not formalizing the authority to condition disclaimers of sovereignty in the permit-issuance process. The “policy” followed in this case, however, is not contrary to law simply because of its specific omission from the regulations. See United States v. Gaubert, 499 U. S. 315, 324 (1991) (observing that some agencies “establish policy on a case-by-case basis, whether through adjudicatory proceedings or through administration of agency programs”). Certainly the Corps communicated its intention openly to the appropriate state officials, and therefore did not force Alaska “ ‘to litigate with agencies on the basis of secret laws.’” Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U. S. 1, 9 (1974) (quoting the case below, 151 U. S. App. D. C. 174, 181, 466 F. 2d 345, 352 (1972)). See Joint Stipulation of Facts 24a-25a. The United States avers that such disclaimers have been requested on a case-by-case basis since 1970 and that “Alaska fails to explain why the Corps’ approach is improper or what specific advantages would result from identifying the option through a formal regulation.” Brief for United States in Opposition 16.
We cannot say that in this case the Corps acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner. It notified state officials promptly that the Solicitor of the Interior Department objected to issuance of the permit; it specified a curative option that could be pursued; and it afforded Alaska ample time to consider the disclaimer, to consult with federal officials, and then to draft the disclaimer. See Joint Stipulation of Facts 2-7, App. to Joint Stipulation of Facts lla-16a, 17a-19a, 20a-21a, 22a-23a, 24a, 26a-31a. Nor can Alaska contend that it lacked notice, since the disclaimer it filed in this case is similar in form to those which it has filed in past § 10 permit proceedings. See Joint Lodging of Permits and Disclaimers. We conclude that the Corps’ actions in this case were neither arbitrary nor capricious.
V
Accordingly, we hold that the Secretary of the Army acted within his discretion in conditioning approval of the Nome port facilities construction permit on a disclaimer by Alaska of a change in the federal-state boundary that might be caused by the Nome project. The United States’ motion for summary judgment is granted, and Alaska’s motion for summary judgment is denied.
It is so ordered.
This recitation of the facts is drawn from the Joint Stipulation of Facts filed with the Court on September 6, 1991.
This disclaimer provides in pertinent part:
“1. Subject to paragraph 4 below, the State of Alaska agrees that the coast line and the boundaries of the State of Alaska are not to be deemed to be in any way affected by the construction, maintenance, or operations of the Nome port facility. This document should be construed as a binding disclaimer by the State of Alaska to the effect that the state does not, and will not, treat the Nome port development as extending its coast line for purposes of the Submerged Lands Act, again subject to paragraph 4 below.
“2. This disclaimer is executed solely for the purpose of complying with the conditions recommended by the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior and the Attorney General and maintains the status quo of the baseline and the state-federal boundary. It does not affect property or claims to which Alaska is now entitled. It is not an admission by the State of Alaska or by the United States as to the present location of the shoreline, coast line, or the boundaries of the State of Alaska, and is without prejudice to any contention that any party may now or hereafter make regarding such present location.
“3. This disclaimer is entered without prejudice to Alaska’s right to file an appropriate action leading to a determination whether the Corps of Engineers has the legal authority to require such a disclaimer before issuing a permit for a project which might affect the coast line.
“4. This disclaimer becomes ineffective and without force and effect upon a final determination by a court of competent jurisdiction in any appropriate action that the Corps of Engineers does not have the legal authority to require such a disclaimer before issuing a permit for a project which might affect the coast line.” Joint Stipulation of Facts 3-4.
The Department of the Army permit was later modified to reflect changes in the project. See id., at 5. These changes are not relevant to the legal issues presented in this case.
Although the bidding period closed without receipt of any bids, both sides agree that a live controversy exists in light of
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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J
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Me. Justice Stewaet
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The respondent, Kenneth Donaldson, was civilly committed to confinement as a mental patient in the Florida State Hospital at Chattahoochee in January 1957. He was kept in custody there against his will for nearly 15 years. The petitioner, Dr. J. B. O’Connor, was the hospital’s superintendent during most of this period. Throughout his confinement Donaldson repeatedly, but unsuccessfully, demanded his release, claiming that he was dangerous to no one, that he was not mentally ill, and that, at any rate, the hospital was not providing treatment for his supposed illness. Finally, in February 1971, Donaldson brought this lawsuit under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida, alleging that O’Connor, and other members of the hospital staff named as defendants, had intentionally and maliciously deprived him of his constitutional right to liberty. After a four-day trial, the jury returned a verdict assessing both compensatory and punitive damages against O’Connor and a codefendant. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment, 493 F. 2d 507. We granted O’Connor’s petition for certiorari, 419 U. S. 894, because of the important constitutional questions seemingly presented.
I
Donaldson’s commitment was initiated by his father, who thought that his son was suffering from “delusions.” After hearings before a county judge of Pinellas County, Fla., Donaldson was found to be suffering from “paranoid schizophrenia” and was committed for “care, maintenance, and treatment” pursuant to Florida statutory provisions that have since been repealed. The state law was less than clear in specifying the grounds necessary for commitment, and the record is scanty as to Donaldson’s condition at the time of the judicial hearing. These matters are, however, irrelevant, for this case involves no challenge to the initial commitment, but is focused, instead, upon the nearly 15 years of confinement that followed.
The evidence sit the trial showed that the hospital staff had the power to release a patient, not dangerous to himself or others, even if he remained mentally ill and had been lawfully committed. Despite many requests, O’Connor refused to allow that power to be exercised in Donaldson’s case. At the trial, O’Connor indicated that he had believed that Donaldson would have been unable to make a “successful adjustment outside the institution,” but could not recall the basis for that conclusion. O’Connor retired as superintendent shortly before this suit was filed. A few months thereafter, and before the trial, Donaldson secured his release and a judicial restoration of competency, with the support of the hospital staff.
The testimony at the trial demonstrated, without contradiction, that Donaldson had posed no danger to others during his long confinement, or indeed at any point in his life. O’Connor himself conceded that he had no personal or secondhand knowledge that Donaldson had ever committed a dangerous act. There was no evidence that Donaldson had ever been suicidal or been thought likely to inflict injury upon himself. One of O’Connor’s codefendants acknowledged that Donaldson could have earned his own living outside the hospital. He had done so for some 14 years before his commitment, and immediately upon his release he secured a responsible job in hotel administration.
Furthermore, Donaldson’s frequent requests for release had been supported by responsible persons willing to provide him any care he might need on release. In 1963, for example, a representative of Helping Hands, Inc., a halfway house for mental patients, wrote O’Connor asking him to release Donaldson to its care. The request was accompanied by a supporting letter from the Minneapolis Clinic of Psychiatry and Neurology, which a codefendant conceded was a “good clinic.” O’Connor rejected the offer, replying that Donaldson could be released only to his parents. That rule was apparently of O’Connor’s own making. At the time, Donaldson was 55 years old, and, as O’Connor knew, Donaldson’s parents were too elderly and infirm to take responsibility for him. Moreover, in his continuing correspondence with Donaldson’s parents, O’Connor never informed them of the Helping Hands offer. In addition, on four separate occasions between 1964 and 1968, John Lembcke, a college classmate of Donaldson’s and a longtime family friend, asked O’Connor to release Donaldson to his care. On each occasion O’Connor refused. The record shows that Lembcke was a serious and responsible person, who was willing and able to assume responsibility for Donaldson’s welfare.
The evidence showed that Donaldson’s confinement was a simple regime of enforced custodial care, not a program designed to alleviate or cure his supposed illness. Numerous witnesses, including one of O’Connor’s codefendants, testified that Donaldson had received nothing but custodial care while at the hospital. O’Connor described Donaldson’s treatment as “milieu therapy.” But witnesses from the hospital staff conceded that, in the context of this case, “milieu therapy” was a euphemism for confinement in the “milieu” of a mental hospital. For substantial periods, Donaldson was simply kept in a large room that housed 60 patients, many of whom were under criminal commitment. Donaldson’s requests for ground privileges, occupational training, and an opportunity to discuss his case with O’Connor or other staff members were repeatedly denied.
At the trial, O’Connor’s principal defense was that he had acted in good faith and was therefore immune from any liability for monetary damages. His position, in short, was that state law, which he had believed valid, had authorized indefinite custodial confinement of the “sick,” even if they were not given treatment and their release could harm no one.
The trial judge instructed the members of the jury that they should find that O’Connor had violated Donaldson’s constitutional right to liberty if they found that he had
“confined [Donaldson] against his will, knowing that he was not mentally ill or dangerous or knowing that if mentally ill he was not receiving treatment for his alleged mental illness.
“Now, the purpose of involuntary hospitalization is treatment and not mere custodial care or punishment if a patient is not a danger to himself or others. Without such treatment there is no justification from a constitutional stand-point for continued confinement unless you should also find that [Donaldson] was dangerous to either himself or others.”
The trial judge further instructed the jury that O’Con-nor was immune from damages if he
“reasonably believed in good faith that detention of [Donaldson] was proper for the length of time he was so confined ....
“However, mere good intentions which do not give rise to a reasonable belief that detention is lawfully required cannot justify [Donaldson’s] confinement in the Florida State Hospital.”
The jury returned a verdict for Donaldson against O’Connor and a codefendant, and awarded damages of $38,500, including $10,000 in punitive damages.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the District Court in a broad opinion dealing with “the far-reaching question whether the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right to treatment to persons involuntarily civilly committed to state mental hospitals.” 493 F. 2d, at 509. The appellate court held that when, as in Donaldson’s case, the rationale for confinement is that the patient is in need of treatment, the Constitution requires that minimally adequate treatment in fact be provided. Id., at 521. The court further expressed the view that, regardless of the grounds for involuntary civil commitment, a person confined against his will at a state mental institution has “a constitutional right to receive such individual treatment as will give him a reasonable opportunity to be cured or to improve his mental condition.” Id., at 520. Conversely, the court’s opinion implied that it is constitutionally permissible for a State to confine a mentally ill person against his will in order to treat his illness, regardless of whether his illness renders him dangerous to himself or others. See id., at 522-527.
II
We have concluded that the difficult issues of constitutional law dealt with by the Court of Appeals are not presented by this case in its present posture. Specifically, there is no reason now to decide whether mentally ill persons dangerous to themselves or to others have a right to treatment upon compulsory confinement by the State, or whether the State may compulsorily confine a nondangerous, mentally ill individual for the purpose of treatment. As we view it, this case raises a single, relatively simple, but nonetheless important question concerning every man’s constitutional right to liberty.
The jury found that Donaldson was neither dangerous to himself nor dangerous to others, and also found that, if mentally ill, Donaldson had not received treatment. That verdict, based on abundant evidénce, makes the issue before the Court a narrow one. We need not decide whether, when, or by what procedures, a mentally ill person may be confined by the State on any of the grounds which, under contemporary statutes, are generally advanced to justify involuntary confinement of such a person — to prevent injury to the public, to ensure his own survival or safety, or to alleviate or cure his illness. See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U. S. 715, 736-737; Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U. S. 504, 509. For the jury found that none of the above grounds for continued confinement was present in Donaldson’s case.
Given the jury’s findings, what was left as justification for keeping Donaldson in continued confinement? The fact that state law may have authorized confinement of the harmless mentally ill does not itself establish a constitutionally adequate purpose for the confinement. See Jackson v. Indiana, supra, at 720-723; McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 407 U. S. 245, 248-250. Nor is it enough that Donaldson’s original confinement was founded upon a constitutionally adequate basis, if in fact it was, because even if his involuntary confinement was initially permissible, it could not constitutionally continue after that basis no longer existed. Jackson v. Indiana, supra, at 738; McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution, supra.
A finding of “mental illness” alone cannot justify a State’s locking a person up against his will and keeping him indefinitely in simple custodial confinement. Assuming that that term can be given a reasonably precise content and that the “mentally ill” can be identified with reasonable accuracy, there is still no constitutional basis for confining such persons involuntarily if they are dangerous to no one and can live safely in freedom.
May the State confine the mentally ill merely to ensure them a living standard superior to that they enjoy in the private community? That the State has a proper interest in providing care and assistance to the unfortunate goes without saying. But the mere presence of mental illness does not disqualify a person from preferring his home to the comforts of an institution. Moreover, while the State may arguably confine a person to save him from harm, incarceration is rarely if ever a necessary condition for raising the living standards of those capable of surviving safely in freedom, on their own or with the help of family or friends. See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479, 488-490.
May the State fence in the harmless mentally ill solely to save its citizens from exposure to those whose ways are different? One might as well ask if the State, to avoid public unease, could incarcerate all who are physically unattractive or socially eccentric. Mere public intolerance or animosity cannot constitutionally justify the deprivation of a person’s physical liberty. See, e. g., Cohen v. California, 403 U. S. 15, 24-26; Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U. S. 611, 615; Street v. New York, 394 U. S. 576, 592; cf. U. S. Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U. S. 528, 534.
In short, a State cannot constitutionally confine without more a nondangerous individual who is capable of surviving safely in freedom by himself or with the help of willing and responsible family members or friends. Since the jury found, upon ample evidence, that O’Con-nor, as an agent of the State, knowingly did so confine Donaldson, it properly concluded that O’Connor violated Donaldson’s constitutional right to freedom.
Ill
O’Connor contends that in any event he should not be held personally liable for monetary damages because his decisions were made in “good faith.” Specifically, O’Connor argues that he was acting pursuant to state law which, he believed, authorized confinement of the mentally ill even when their release would not compromise their safety or constitute a danger to others, and that he could not reasonably have been expected to know that the state law as he understood it was constitutionally invalid. A proposed instruction to this effect was rejected by the District Court.
The District Court did instruct the jury, without objection, that monetary damages could not be assessed against O’Connor if he had believed reasonably and in good faith that Donaldson’s continued confinement was “proper,” and that punitive damages could be awarded only if O’Connor had acted “maliciously or wantonly or oppressively.” The Court of Appeals approved those instructions. But that court did not consider whether it was error for the trial judge to refuse the additional instruction concerning O’Connor’s claimed reliance on state law as authorization for Donaldson’s continued confinement. Further, neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals acted with the benefit of this Court’s most recent decision on the scope of the qualified immunity possessed by state officials under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U. S. 308.
Under that decision, the relevant question for the jury is whether O’Connor “knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took within his sphere of official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of [Donaldson], or if he took the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury to [Donaldson].” Id., at 322. See also Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232, 247-248; Wood v. Strickland, supra, at 330 (opinion of Powell, J.). For purposes of this question, an official has, of course, no duty to anticipate unforeseeable constitutional developments. Wood v. Strickland, supra, at 322.
Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to enable that court to consider, in light of Wood v. Strickland, whether the District Judge’s failure to instruct with regard to the effect of O’Connor’s claimed reliance on state law rendered inadequate the instructions as to O’Connor’s liability for compensatory and punitive damages.
It is so ordered.
Donaldson’s original complaint was filed as a class action on behalf of himself and all of his fellow patients in an entire department of the Florida State Hospital at Chattahoochee. In addition to a damages claim, Donaldson’s complaint also asked for habeas corpus relief ordering his release, as well as the release of all members of the class. Donaldson further sought declaratory and injunctive relief requiring the hospital to provide adequate psychiatric treatment.
After Donaldson’s release and after the District Court dismissed the action as a class suit, Donaldson filed an amended complaint, repeating his claim for compensatory and punitive damages. Although the amended complaint retained the prayer for declaratory and injunctive relief, that request was eliminated from the case prior to trial. See 493 F. 2d 507, 512-513.
The judicial commitment proceedings were pursuant to § 394.22 (11) of the State Public Health Code, which provided:
“Whenever any person who has been adjudged mentally incompetent requires confinement or restraint to prevent self-injury or violence to others, the said judge shall direct that such person be forthwith delivered to a superintendent of a Florida state hospital, for the mentally ill, after admission has been authorized under regulations approved by the board of commissioners of state institutions, for care, maintenance, and treatment, as provided in sections 394.09, 394.24, 394.25, 394.26 and 394.27, or make such other disposition of him as he may be permitted by law Fla. Laws 1955— 1956 Extra. Sess., c. 31403, § 1, p. 62.
Donaldson had been adjudged “incompetent” several days earlier under §394.22 (1), which provided for such a finding as to any person who was
“incompetent by reason of mental illness, sickness, drunkenness, excessive use of drugs, insanity, or other mental or physical condition, so that he is incapable of caring for himself or managing his property, or is likely to dissipate or lose his property or become the victim of designing persons, or inflict harm on himself or others Fla. Gen. Laws 1955, c. 29909, § 3, p. 831.
It would appear that § 394.22 (11) (a) contemplated that involuntary commitment would be imposed only on those “incompetent” persons who “require [d] confinement or restraint to prevent self-injury or violence to others.” But this is not certain, for § 394.22 (11) (c) provided that the judge could adjudicate the person a “harmless incompetent” and release him to a guardian upon a finding that he did “not require confinement or restraint to prevent self-injury or violence to others and that treatment in the Florida State Hospital is unnecessary or would be without benefit to such person Fla. Gen. Laws 1955, c. 29909, § 3, p. 835 (emphasis added). In this regard, it is noteworthy that Donaldson’s “Order for Delivery of Mentally Incompetent” to the Florida State Hospital provided that he required “confinement or restraint to prevent self-injury or violence to others, or to insure proper treatment.” (Emphasis added.) At any rate, the Florida commitment statute provided no judicial procedure whereby one still incompetent could secure his release on the ground that he was no longer dangerous to himself or others.
Whether the Florida statute provided a “right to treatment” for involuntarily committed patients is also open to dispute. Under §394.22 (11) (a), commitment “to prevent self-injury or violence to others” was “for care, maintenance, and treatment.” Recently Florida has totally revamped its civil commitment law and now provides a statutory right to receive individual medical treatment. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 394.459 (1973).
The sole statutory procedure for release required a judicial reinstatement of a patient’s “mental competency.” Public Health Code §§ 394.22 (15) and (16), Fla. Gen. Laws 1955, c. 29909, § 3, pp. 838-841. But this procedure could be initiated by the hospital staff. Indeed, it was at the staff’s initiative that Donaldson was finally restored to competency, and liberty, almost immediately after O’Connor retired from the superintendency.
In addition, witnesses testified that the hospital had always had its own procedure for releasing patients — for “trial visits,” “home visits,” “furloughs,” or “out of state discharges” — even though the patients had not been judicially restored to competency. Those conditional releases often became permanent, and the hospital merely closed its books on the patient. O’Connor did not deny at trial that he had the power to release patients; he conceded that it was his “duty” as superintendent of the hospital “to determine whether that patient having once reached the hospital was in such condition as to request that he be considered for release from the hospital.”
There was some evidence that Donaldson, who is a Christian Scientist, on occasion refused to take medication. The trial judge instructed the jury not to award damages for any period of confinement during which Donaldson had declined treatment.
At the close of Donaldson’s case in chief, O’Connor moved for a directed verdict on the ground that state law at the time of Donaldson’s confinement authorized institutionalization of the mentally ill even if they posed no danger to themselves or others. This motion was denied. At the close of all the evidence, O’Connor asked that the jury be instructed that "if defendants acted pursuant to a statute which was not declared unconstitutional at the time, they cannot be held accountable for such action.” The District Court declined to give this requested instruction.
The District Court defined treatment as follows:
“You are instructed that a person who is involuntarily civilly committed to a mental hospital does have a constitutional right to receive such treatment as will give him a realistic opportunity to be cured or to improve his mental condition.” (Emphasis added.)
O’Connor argues that this statement suggests that a mental patient has a right to treatment even if confined by reason of dangerousness to himself or others. But this is to take the above paragraph out of context, for it is bracketed by paragraphs making clear the trial judge’s theory that treatment is constitutionally required only if mental illness alone, rather than danger to self or others, is the reason for confinement. If O’Connor had thought the instructions ambiguous on this point, he could have objected to them and requested a clarification. He did not do so. We accordingly have no occasion here to decide whether persons committed on grounds of dangerousness enjoy a “right to treatment.”
In pertinent part, the instructions read as follows:
“The Plaintiff claims in brief that throughout the period of his hospitalization he was not mentally ill or dangerous to himself or others, and claims further that if he was mentally ill, or if Defendants believed he was mentally ill, Defendants withheld from him the treatment necessary to improve his mental condition. '
“The Defendants claim, in brief, that Plaintiff’s detention was legal and proper, or if his detention was not legal and proper, it was the result of mistake, without malicious intent.
“In order to prove his claim under the Civil Rights Act, the burden is upon the Plaintiff in this case to establish by a preponderance of the evidence in this case the following facts:
“That the Defendants confined Plaintiff against his will, knowing that he was not mentally ill or dangerous or knowing that if mentally ill he was not receiving treatment for his alleged mental illness.
“[T]hat the Defendants’ acts and conduct deprived the Plaintiff of his Federal Constitutional right not to be denied or deprived of his liberty without due process of law as that phrase is defined and explained in these instructions ....
“You are instructed that a person who is involuntarily civilly committed to a mental hospital does have a constitutional right to receive such treatment as will give him a realistic opportunity to be cured or to improve his mental condition.
“Now, the purpose of involuntary hospitalization is treatment and not mere custodial care or punishment if a patient is not a danger to himself or others. Without such treatment there is no justification from a constitutional stand-point for continued confinement unless you should also find that the Plaintiff was dangerous either to himself or others.”
The trial judge had instructed that punitive damages should be awarded only if “the act or omission of the Defendant or Defendants which proximately caused injury to the Plaintiff was maliciously or wantonly or oppressively done.”
Given the jury instructions, see n. 6 supra, it is possible that the jury went so far as to find that O’Connor knew not only that Donaldson was harmless to himself and others but also that he was not mentally ill at all. If it so found, the jury was permitted by the instructions to rule against O’Connor regardless of the nature of the “treatment” provided. If we were to construe the jury’s verdict in that fashion, there would remain no substantial issue in this case: That a wholly sane and innocent person has a constitutional right not to be physically confined by the State when his freedom will pose a danger neither to himself nor to others cannot be seriously doubted.
The judge’s instructions used the phrase “dangerous to himself.” Of course, even if there is no foreseeable risk of self-injury or suicide, a person is literally “dangerous to himself” if for physical or other reasons he is helpless to avoid the hazards of freedom either through his own efforts or with the aid of willing family members or friends. While it might be argued that the judge’s instructions could have been more detailed on this point, O’Connor raised no objection to them, presumably because the evidence clearly showed that Donaldson was not “dangerous to himself” however broadly that phrase might be defined.
O’Connor argues that, despite the jury’s verdict, the Court must assume that Donaldson was receiving treatment sufficient to justify his confinement, because the adequacy of treatment is a “nonjusticiable” question that must be left to the discretion of the psychiatric profession. That argument is unpersuasive. Where “treatment” is the sole asserted ground for depriving a person of liberty, it is plainly unacceptable to suggest that the courts are powerless to determine whether the asserted ground is present. See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U. S. 715. Neither party objected to the jury instruction defining treatment. There is, accordingly, no occasion in this case to decide whether the provision of treatment, standing alone, can ever constitutionally justify involuntary confinement or, if it can, how much or what kind of treatment would suffice for that purpose. In its present posture this case involves not involuntary treatment but simply involuntary custodial confinement.
See n. 5, supra. During his years of confinement, Donaldson unsuccessfully petitioned the state and federal courts for release from the Florida State Hospital on a number of occasions. None of these claims was ever resolved on its merits, and no evidentiary hearings were ever held. O’Connor has not contended that he relied on these unsuccessful court actions as an independent intervening reason for continuing Donaldson’s confinement, and no instructions on this score were requested.
Upon remand, the Court of Appeals is to consider only the question whether O’Connor is to be held liable for monetary damages for violating Donaldson’s constitutional right to liberty. The jury found, on substantial evidence and under adequate instructions, that O’Connor deprived Donaldson, who was dangerous neither to himself nor to others and was provided no treatment, of the constitutional right to liberty. Cf. n. 8, supra. That finding needs no further consideration. If the Court of Appeals holds that a remand to the District Court is necessary, the only issue to be determined in that court will be whether O’Connor is immune from liability for monetary damages.
Of necessity our decision vacating the judgment of the Court of Appeals deprives that court’s opinion of precedential effect, leaving this Court’s opinion and judgment as the sole law of the case. See United States v. Munsingwear, 340 U. S. 36.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
D
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Douglas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
One Holder, a member of respondent unions, filed with the National Labor Relations Board an unfair labor practice charge, alleging that Local 22 had violated § 8 (b)(1)(A) of the National Labor Relations Act, 61 Stat. 141, 29 U. S. C. § 158 (b)(1)(A), by causing his employer to discriminate against him because he had engaged in protected activity with respect to his employment. The filing of this charge followed an accusation by Holder to Local 22 that its president had violated the constitution of the International. The local decided in favor of its president; but Holder did not pursue the intra-union appeals procedure that was available to him and filed the unfair labor practice charge instead, based on the same alleged violations by the president.
Section 5 of Article V of the constitution of the International Union, which was binding on Local 22, contained the following provision relative to grievances of union members:
“Every member . . . considering himself . . . aggrieved by any action of this Union, the [General Executive Board], a National Officer, a Local or other subdivision of this Union shall exhaust all remedies and appeals within the Union, provided by this Constitution, before he shall resort to any court or other tribunal outside of the Union.”
While Holder’s charge was pending before the Board, Local 22 lodged a complaint in internal union proceedings against Holder alleging he had violated § 5 of Article Y of the International’s constitution by filing his charge with the Board before he had exhausted his internal remedies. After a hearing before Local 22, Holder was found guilty and expelled from both respondent unions. He then appealed to the General Executive Board of the International which affirmed the local’s action on October 7, 1964.
On October 28, 1964, Holder filed a second charge with the Board, claiming his expulsion for filing the first charge was unlawful. That charge is the basis of the instant case.
A complaint issued; and the Board found that the respondent unions had violated §8 (b)(1)(A) of the Act by expelling Holder for filing a charge with the Board without first having exhausted the intra-union procedures. 159 N. L. R. B. 1065. It issued a remedial order, which the Court of Appeals refused to enforce. 379 F. 2d 702. The case is here on writ of certiorari. 389 U. S. 1034.
The important question is whether consistent with the applicable federal statutes a union may penalize one of its members for seeking the aid of the Board without exhausting all internal union remedies. There is a threshold question, however, concerning the adequacy of Holder’s first or original charge to the Board against respondents. Holder charged discrimination practiced against him because, to use the words of the Regional Director as he paraphrased the charge in the complaint, Holder had engaged “in certain protected activity” of an unspecified nature “with respect to his employment.” It is pointed out that § 8 (b)(1)(A) protects only “the exercise of rights guaranteed by section 7”; and that § 7 “says nothing about any right to file charges with the Board.” 379 F. 2d, at 706. That, however, is not the issue. The charge by Holder that he was discriminated against because he had engaged “in certain protected activity” was a sufficent way to allege an impairment of § 7 rights. “The charge is not proof. It merely sets in motion the machinery of an inquiry.” NLRB v. Indiana & Michigan Electric Co., 318 U. S. 9, 18. Moreover, no issue' was raised before the Board concerning the nature of the “protected activity.” The answer of respondents insofar as the original charge is concerned said only that the charge made by Holder to the Board was based upon precisely the same facts as those on which his internal union charges against the president of the Local had been based. We must, therefore, assume that the initial charge was one within the ambit of § 7 and so plainly within it that no party undertook to question it.
The main issue in the case is whether Holder could be expelled for filing the charge with the Board without first having exhausted “all remedies and appeals within the Union” as provided in § 5 of Article V of the constitution, already quoted.
Section 8(b)(1)(A) in its proviso preserves to a union “the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein.”
The Court of Appeals concluded that while this proviso would not permit a union to expel a member because he filed an unfair labor practice charge against the union, it permits a rule which gives the union “a fair opportunity to correct its own wrong before the injured member should have recourse to the Board.” 379 F. 2d, at 707.
We held in NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U. S. 175, that § 8 (b)(1)(A) does not prevent a union from imposing fines on members who cross a picket line created to implement an authorized strike. The strike, we said, “is the ultimate weapon in labor’s arsenal for achieving agreement upon its terms” and the power to fine or expel a strikebreaker “ 'is essential if the union is to be an effective bargaining agent.’ ” Id., at 181.
Thus §8 (b)(1)(A) assures a union freedom of self-regulation where its legitimate internal affairs are concerned. But where a union rule penalizes a member for filing an unfair labor practice charge with the Board, other considerations of public policy come into play.
Section 10 (b) of the Act, 61 Stat. 146, 29 U. S. C. § 160 (b), forbids issuance of a complaint based on conduct occurring more than six months prior to filing of the charge — a provision promoting promptness. A proceeding by the Board is not to adjudicate private rights but to effectuate a public policy. The Board cannot initiate its own proceedings; implementation of the Act is dependent “upon the initiative of individual persons.” Nash v. Florida Industrial Comm’n, 389 U. S. 235, 238. The policy of keeping people “completely free from coercion,” ibid., against making complaints to the Board is therefore important in the functioning of the Act as an organic whole. A restriction such as we find in § 5 of Article V of the International’s constitution is contrary to that policy, as it is applied here. A healthy interplay of the forces governed and protected by the Act means that there should be as great a freedom to ask the Board for relief as there is to petition any other department of government for a redress of grievances. Any coercion used to discourage, retard, or defeat that access is beyond the legitimate interests of a labor organization. That was the philosophy of the Board in the Skura case, Local 138, International Union of Operating Engineers, 148 N. L. R. B. 679; and we agree that the overriding public interest makes unimpeded access to the Board the only healthy alternative, except and unless plainly internal affairs of the union are involved.
In the present case a whole complex of public policy-issues was raised by Holder’s original charge. It implicated not only the union but the employer. The employer might also have been made a party and comprehensive and coordinated remedies provided. Those issues cannot be fully explored in an internal union proceeding. There cannot be any justification to make the public processes wait until the union member exhausts internal procedures plainly inadequate to deal with all phases of the complex problem concerning employer, union, and employee member. If the member becomes exhausted, instead of the remedies, the issues of public policy are never reached and an airing of the grievance never had. The Court of Appeals recognized that this might be the consequence and said that resort to an intra-union remedy would not be required if it “would impose unreasonable delay or hardship upon the complainant.” 379 F. 2d, at 707.
The difficulty is that a member would have to guess what a court ultimately would hold. If he guessed wrong and filed the charge with the Board without exhausting internal union procedures, he would have no recourse against the discipline of the union. That risk alone is likely to chill the exercise of a member’s right to a Board remedy and induce him to forgo his grievance or pursue a futile union procedure. That is the judgment of the Board; and we think it comports with the policy of the Act. That is to say, the proviso in § 8 (b)(1)(A) that unions may design their own rules respecting “the acquisition or retention of membership” is not so broad as to give the union power to penalize a member who invokes the protection of the Act for a matter that is in the public domain and beyond the internal affairs of the union.
The Court of Appeals found, support for its contrary position in § 101 (a) (4) of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959. 73 Stat. 522, 29 U. S. C. §411 (a)(4). While that provision prohibits a union from limiting the right of a member to institute an action in any court or in a proceeding before any administrative agency, it provides that a member “may be required to exhaust reasonable hearing procedures” “not to exceed a four-month lapse of time.”
We conclude that “may be required” is not a grant of authority to unions more firmly to police their members but a statement of policy that the public tribunals whose aid is invoked may in their discretion stay their hands for four months, while the aggrieved person seeks relief within the union. We read it, in other words, as installing in this labor field a regime comparable to that which prevails in other areas of law before the federal courts, which often stay their hands while a litigant seeks administrative relief before the appropriate agency.
The legislative history is not very illuminating. Some members of the House who spoke indicated that there was room for judicial discretion whether to remit the member to available internal union remedies. In the Senate the fear was expressed that the new section would give unions power to punish their members for filing charges with the Board prior to exhaustion of their internal remedies. In the Senate the continuance of union grievance procedures under the new section was emphasized. It was indeed expressly stated by Senator John F. Kennedy reporting from the Conference Committee:
“The 4-month limitation in the House bill also relates to restrictions imposed by unions rather than the rules of judicial administration or the action of Government agencies.”
Yet it plainly appears from those speaking for the Conference Report that a member was to be permitted to complain to the Board even before the end of the four-month period. Congressman Griffin reported:
“[T]he proviso was not intended to limit in any way the right of a union member under the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, as amended, to file unfair labor practice charges against a union, or the right of the NLRB to entertain such charges, even though a 4-month period may not have elapsed.”
And on the Senate side, Senator Kennedy said that the proviso was not intended “to invalidate the considerable body of State and Federal court decisions of many years standing which require, nr do not require, the exhaustion of internal remedies prior to court intervention depending upon the reasonableness of such requirements in terms of the facts and circumstances of a particular case.” (Emphasis added.) Nor, he said, was it intended to prohibit “the National Labor Relations Board . . . from entertaining charges by a member against a labor organization even though 4 months has not elapsed.”
We conclude that unions were authorized to have hearing procedures for processing grievances of members, provided those procedures did not consume more than four months of time; but that a court or agency might consider whether a particular procedure was “reasonable” and entertain the complaint even though those procedures had not been “exhausted.” We also conclude, for reasons stated earlier in this opinion, that where the complaint or grievance does not concern an internal union matter, but touches a part of the public domain covered by the Act, failure to resort to any intra-union grievance procedure is not ground for expulsion from a union. We hold that the Board properly entertained the complaint of Holder and that its order should be enforced.
Reversed.
Section 8 (b) provides in part: “It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents—
“(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7: Provided, That this paragraph shall not impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein . . . .”
Section 7, 61 Stat. 140, 29 U. S. C. § 157, contains the following guarantee of rights: “Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 8 (a) (3).”
This charge, filed with the Board February 28, 1964, was directed solely against respondent International Union and alleged that:
"On or about October 8, 196 [3], the above named labor organization caused the United States Lines [employer] to discriminate against Edwin D. Holder because he engaged in concerted activities with respect to the conditions of his employment.
“By these and other acts, the above named labor organization has interfered with, restrained and coerced, and continues to interfere with, restrain and coerce the Company’s employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.”
By letter of May 20, 1964, the Regional Director informed Holder that this charge was dismissed.
N. 1, supra.
These remedies are provided for in § 3 of Article V of the constitution:
“No Union member in good standing in any Local may be suspended or expelled or otherwise disciplined or penalized without a fair and open trial, of which reasonable notice shall be given the accused member, before the Trial Board of the Local Union . . . . The accused member or members or the accusers may appeal the decision of the local Union’s Executive Board to the regular meeting of the General Membership of the Local Union next following the meeting of the Executive Board at which the decision was rendered, and within thirty (30) days after the membership’s decision may appeal to the General Executive Board. The General Executive Board shall, after reasonable notice to the appellant of the time and place of hearing, hold a fair and open hearing on such appeal and, not later than 130 days after the first regular meeting of the General Executive Board following receipt of the appeal at the National Office, and in any event not later than the first day of the National Convention, shall render its decision affirming, overruling, or modifying either the findings of guilt or innocence, or the penalty imposed. Both the accused and the accuser shall have the right to file an appeal to the next National Convention by sending such appeal to the National Office of this Union by registered mail not later than thirty days after the decision by the General Executive Board.”
Although Holder did not take any internal appeal from the local’s original adverse decision on his charge to it against the president, he did appeal his expulsion to the General Executive Board of the International, which affirmed.
N. 1, supra.
See Cox, Internal Affairs of Labor Unions under the Labor Reform Act of 1959, 58 Mich. L. Rev. 819, 839 (1960); Summers, Legal Limitations in Union Discipline, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 1049, 1067-1068 (1951); Summers, The Usefulness of Law in Achieving Union Democracy, 48 Am. Econ. Rev. 44, 47 (May 1958).
Section 101 (a)(4) provides: “No labor organization shall limit the right of any member thereof to institute an action in any court, or in a proceeding before any administrative agency ... or the right of any member of a labor organization to appear as a witness in any judicial, administrative, or legislative proceeding, or to petition any legislature or to communicate with any legislator: Provided, That any such member may be required to exhaust reasonable hearing procedures (but not to exceed a four-month lapse of time) within such organization, before instituting legal or administrative proceedings . . . .”
See Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U. S. 41; compare Railroad Comm’n v. Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496. The requirement of exhaustion is a matter within the sound discretion of the courts. See, e. g., McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional, 372 U. S. 10, 16-17. And see Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U. S. 184, 188-189; California Comm’n v. United States, 355 U. S. 534, 539-540. Exhaustion is not required when the administrative remedies are inadequate. Greene v. United States, 376 U. S. 149; McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U. S. 668. See generally 3 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise §20.07 (1958). When the complaint, as in the instant case, raises a matter that is in the public domain and beyond the internal affairs of the union, the union’s internal procedures are, as previously explained, plainly inadequate.
105 Cong. Rec. 15835 (McConnack); id., at 15689-15690 (O’Hara); id., at 15563 (Foley).
105 Cong. Rec. 10095 (Goldwater).
105 Cong. Rec. 17899 (John F. Kennedy).
105 Cong. Rec. 17899.
105 Cong. Rec. 18152.
105 Cong. Reo. 17899.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
G
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Ginsburg
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents an issue of statutory construction— whether the fiduciary standards stated in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) govern an insurance company’s conduct in relation to certain annuity contracts. Fiduciary status under ERISA generally attends the management of “plan assets.” The statute, however, contains no comprehensive definition of “plan assets.” Our task in this case is to determine the bounds of a statutory exclusion from “plan asset” categorization, an exclusion Congress prescribed for “guaranteed benefit policies].”
The question before us arises in the context of a contract between defendant-petitioner John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company (Hancock) and plaintiff-respondent Harris Trust and Savings Bank (Harris), current trustee of a Sperry Rand Corporation Retirement Plan. Pursuant to its contract with Harris, Hancock receives deposits from the Sperry Plan. Harris asserts that Hancock is managing “plan assets,” and therefore bears fiduciary responsibility. Hancock maintains that its undertaking fits within the statutory exclusion for “guaranteed benefit policies].” “Guaranteed benefit policy” is not a trade term originating in the insurance industry; it is a statutory invention placed in ERISA and there defined as an insurance policy or contract that “provides for benefits the amount of which is guaranteed by the insurer.” 88 Stat. 875, 29 U. S. C. § 1101(b)(2)(B).
The contract in suit is of a kind known in the trade as a “deposit administration contract” or “participating group annuity.” Under a contract of this type, deposits to secure retiree benefits are not immediately applied to the purchase of annuities; instead, the deposits are commingled with the insurer’s general corporate assets, and deposit account balances reflect the insurer’s overall investment experience. During the life of the contract, however, amounts credited to the deposit account may be converted into a stream of guaranteed benefits for individual retirees.
We granted certiorari, 507 U. S. 983 (1993), to resolve a split among Courts of Appeals regarding the applicability of the guaranteed benefit policy exclusion to annuity contracts of the kind just described. The Second Circuit in the case we review held that the guaranteed benefit policy exclusion did not cover funds administered by Hancock that bear no fixed rate of return and have not yet been converted into guaranteed benefits. 970 F. 2d 1138,1143-1144 (1992). We agree with the Second Circuit that ERISA’s fiduciary obligations bind Hancock in its management of such funds, and accordingly affirm that court’s judgment.
I
The parties refer to the contract at issue as Group Annuity Contract No. 50 (GAC 50). Initially, GAC 50 was a simple deferred annuity contract under which Sperry purchased from Hancock individual deferred annuities, at rates fixed by the contract, for employees eligible under the Sperry Retirement Plan.
Since its origination in 1941, however, GAC 50 has been transformed by amendments. By the time this litigation commenced, the contract included the following features. Assets and liabilities under GAC 50 were recorded (for bookkeeping purposes) in two accounts — the “Pension Administration Fund” recorded assets, and the “Liabilities of the Fund,” liabilities. GAC 50 assets were not segregated, however; they were part of Hancock’s pool of corporate funds, or general account, out of which Hancock pays its costs of operation and satisfies its obligations to policyholders and other creditors. See Agreed Statement of Facts ¶¶ 11-19, App. 85-86; Brief for Petitioner 7-9; see also McGill & Grubbs 492 (describing general accounts); id., at 552 (describing asset allocation under deposit administration contracts). Hancock agreed to allocate to GAC 50’s Pension Administration Fund a pro rata portion of the investment gains and losses attributable to Hancock’s general account assets, Agreed Statement of Facts ¶ 11, App. 85, and also guaranteed that the Pension Administration Fund would not fall below its January 1, 1968, level, Agreed Statement of Facts ¶ 27, id., at 88.
GAC 50 provided for conversion of the Pension Administration Fund into retirement benefits for Sperry employees in this way. Upon request of the Sperry Plan Administrator, Hancock would guarantee full payment of all benefits to which a designated Sperry retiree was entitled; attendant liability would then be recorded by adding an amount, set by Hancock, to the Liabilities of the Fund. In the event that the added liability caused GAC 50’s “Minimum Operating Level” — the Liabilities of the Fund plus a contingency cushion of five percent — to exceed the amount accumulated in the Pension Administration Fund, the “active” or “accumulation” phase of the contract would terminate automatically. In that event, Hancock would purchase annuities at rates stated in the contract to cover all benefits previously guaranteed by Hancock under GAC 50, and the contract itself would convert back to a simple deferred annuity contract. Agreed Statement of Facts ¶¶33, 36-37, 42, id., at 89-91.
As GAC 50 was administered, amounts recorded in the Pension Administration Fund were used to provide retirement benefits to Sperry employees in other ways. In this connection, the parties use the term “free funds” to describe the excess in the Pension Administration Fund over the Minimum Operating Level (105 percent of the amount needed to provide guaranteed benefits). In 1977, Sperry Plan trustee Harris obtained the right to direct Hancock to use the free funds to pay “nonguaranteed benefits” to retirees. These benefits were provided monthly on a pay-as-you-go basis; they were nonguaranteed in the sense that Hancock was obligated to make payments only out of free funds, i. e., only when the balance in the Pension Administration Fund exceeded the Minimum Operating Level.
Additionally, in 1979 and again in 1981, Hancock permitted Harris to transfer portions of the free funds pursuant to “rollover” procedures. Agreed Statement of Facts ¶ 78, id., at 96. Finally, in 1988, a contract amendment allowed Harris to transfer over $50 million from the Pension Administration Fund without triggering the contract’s “asset liquidation adjustment,” a mechanism for converting the book value of the transferred assets to market value.
While Harris in fact used these various methods to effect withdrawals from the Pension Administration Fund, Hancock maintains that only the original method — conversion of the Pension Administration Fund into guaranteed benefits— is currently within the scope of Harris’ contract rights. In May 1982, Hancock gave notice that it would no longer make nonguaranteed benefit payments. Agreed Statement of Facts ¶¶ 82-87, id., at 97-98. And since 1981 Hancock has refused all requests by Harris to make transfers using “rollover” procedures. Agreed Statement of Facts ¶79, id., at 96.
Harris last exercised its right to convert Pension Administration Fund accumulations into guaranteed benefits in 1977. Agreed Statement of Facts ¶ 81, id., at 97. Harris contends, and Hancock denies, that the conversion price has been inflated by incorporation of artificially low interest rate assumptions.
One means remains by which Harris may gain access to GAC 50’s free funds. Harris can demand transfer of those funds in their entirety out of the Pension Administration Fund. Harris has not taken that course because it entails an asset liquidation adjustment Harris regards as undervaluing the plan’s share of Hancock’s general account. In sum, nothing was removed from the Pension Administration Fund or converted into guaranteed benefits between June 1982 and 1988. During that period the free funds increased dramatically as a result of Hancock’s continuing positive investment experience, the allocation of a portion of that experience to the Pension Administration Fund, and the absence of any offsetting increase in the Liabilities of the Fund for additional guaranteed benefits.
Harris commenced this action in July 1983, contending, inter alia, that Hancock breached its fiduciary obligations under ERISA by denying Harris any realistic means to make use of GAC 50’s free funds. Hancock responded that ERISA’s fiduciary standards do not apply because GAC 50, in its entirety, “provides for benefits the amount of which is guaranteed by the insurer” within the meaning of the “guaranteed benefit policy” exclusion accorded by 29 U. S. C. § 1101(b)(2)(B).
In September 1989, the District Court granted Hancock’s motion for summary judgment on Harris’ ERISA claims, holding that Hancock was not an ERISA fiduciary with respect to any portion of GAC 50. 722 F. Supp. 998 (SDNY 1989). The District Court thereafter dismissed Harris’ remaining contract and tort claims. See 767 F. Supp. 1269 (1991). On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed in part. The Court of Appeals determined that although Hancock “provides guarantees with respect to one portion of the benefits derived from [GAC 50], it does not do so at all times with respect to all the benefits derived from the other, or free funds, portion” of the contract. 970 F. 2d, at 1143. The free funds “were not converted to fixed, guaranteed obligations but instead were subject to fluctuation based on the insurer’s investment performance.” Id., at 1144. With respect to those free funds, the Second Circuit concluded, Hancock “provides no guarantee of benefit payments or fixed rates of return.” Ibid. The Court of Appeals accordingly ruled that ERISA’s fiduciary standards govern Hancock’s management of the free funds, and it instructed the District Court to determine whether those standards had been satisfied. Ibid.
II
A
Is Hancock a fiduciary with respect to any of the funds it administers under GAC 50? To answer that question, we examine first the language of the governing statute, guided not by “a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look[ing] to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy.” Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U. S. 41, 51 (1987), quoting Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U. S. 36, 43 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). The obligations of an ERISA fiduciary are described in 29 U. S. C. § 1104(a)(1): A fiduciary must discharge its duties with respect to a plan
“solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries and—
“(A) for the exclusive purpose of:
“(i) providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries....”
A person is a fiduciary with respect to an employee benefit plan
“to the extent (i) he exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting management of such plan or exercises any authority or control respecting management or disposition of its assets....” 29 U. S. C. § 1002(21)(A) (emphasis added).
The “assets” of a plan are undefined except by exclusion in § 1101(b)(2), which reads in relevant part:
“In the case of a plan to which a guaranteed benefit policy is issued by an insurer, the assets of such plan shall be deemed to include such policy, but shall not, solely by reason of the issuance of such policy, be deemed to include any assets of such insurer.”
A “guaranteed benefit policy,” in turn, is defined as
“an insurance policy or contract to the extent that such policy or contract provides for benefits the amount of which is guaranteed by the insurer. Such term includes any surplus in a separate account, but excludes any other portion of a separate account.” § 1101(b)(2)(B).
Although these provisions are not mellifluous, read as a whole their import is reasonably clear. To help fulfill ERISA’s broadly protective purposes, Congress commodiously imposed fiduciary standards on persons whose actions affect the amount of benefits retirement plan participants will receive. See 29 U. S. C. § 1002(21)(A) (defining as a fiduciary any person who “exercises any authority or control respecting management or disposition of [a plan’s] assets”); H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1280, p. 296 (1974) (the “fiduciary responsibility rules generally apply to all employee benefit plans... in or affecting interstate commerce”). The guaranteed benefit policy exclusion from ERISA’s fiduciary regime is markedly confined: The deposits over which Hancock is exercising authority or control under GAC 50 must have been obtained “solely” by reason of the issuance of “an insurance policy or contract” that provides for benefits “the amount of which is guaranteed,” and even then it is only “to the extent” that GAC 50 provides for such benefits that the § 1101(b)(2)(B) exemption applies.
In contrast, elsewhere in the statute Congress spoke without qualification. For example, Congress exempted from the definition of plan assets “any security” issued to a plan by a registered investment company. 29 U. S. C. § 1101(b)(1) (emphasis added). Similarly, Congress exempted “any assets of... an insurance company or any assets of a plan which are held by... an insurance company” from the requirement that plan assets be held in trust. § 1103(b)(2) (emphasis added). Notably, the guaranteed benefit policy exemption is not available to “any” insurance contract that provides for guaranteed benefits but only “to the extent that” the contract does so. See Comment, Insurers Beware: General Account Activities May Subject Insurance Companies to ERISA’s Fiduciary Obligations, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 803, 833-834 (1994). Thus, even were we not inclined, generally, to tight reading of exemptions from comprehensive schemes of this kind, see, e. g., Commissioner v. Clark, 489 U. S. 726, 739-740 (1989) (when a general policy is qualified by an exception, the Court “usually read[s] the exception narrowly in order to preserve the primary operation of the [policy]”), A. H. Phillips, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U. S. 490, 493 (1945) (cautioning against extending exemptions “to other than those plainly and unmistakably within its terms”), Congress has specifically instructed, by the words of limitation it used, that we closely contain the guaranteed benefit policy exclusion.
B
Hancock, joined by some amici, raises a threshold objection. ERISA’s fiduciary standards cannot govern an insurer’s administration of general account contracts, Hancock asserts, for that would pose irreconcilable conflicts between state and federal regulatory regimes. ERISA requires fiduciaries to act “solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries and... for the exclusive purpose of... providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries.” 29 U. S. C. § 1104(a) (emphasis added). State law, however, requires an insurer, in managing general account assets, “to consider the interests of all of its contractholders, creditors and shareholders,” and to “maintain equity among its various constituencies.” Goldberg & Altman 477. To head off conflicts, Hancock contends, ERISA must yield, because Congress reserved to the States primary responsibility for regulation of the insurance industry. We are satisfied that Congress did not order the unqualified deferral to state law that Hancock both advocates and attributes to the federal lawmakers. Instead, we hold, ERISA leaves room for complementary or dual federal and state regulation, and calls for federal supremacy when the two regimes cannot be harmonized or accommodated.
To support its contention, Hancock refers first to the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 59 Stat. 33, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 1011 et seq., which provides:
“The business of insurance, and every person engaged therein, shall be subject to the laws of the several States which relate to the regulation... of such business.” 15 U.S. C. § 1012(a).
“No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair or supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance... unless such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance....” § 1012(b).
But as the United States points out, “ERISA, both in general and in the guaranteed benefit policy provision in particular, obviously and specifically relates to the business of insurance.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 23, n. 13. Thus, the McCarran-Ferguson Act does not surrender regulation exclusively to the States so as to preclude the application of ERISA to an insurer’s actions under a general account contract. See ibid.
More problematic are two clauses in ERISA itself, one broadly providing for preemption of state law, the other preserving, or saving from preemption, state laws regulating insurance. ERISA’s encompassing preemption clause directs that the statute “shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan.” 29 U. S. C. § 1144(a). The “saving clause,” however, instructs that ERISA “shall [not] be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State which regulates insurance, banking, or securities.” § 1144(b)(2)(A). State laws concerning an insurer’s management of general account assets can “relate to [an] employee benefit plan” and thus fall under the preemption clause, but they are also, in the words of the saving clause, laws “which regulat[e] insurance.”
ERISA’s preemption and saving clauses “ ‘are not a model of legislative drafting,’ ” Pilot Life, 481 U. S., at 46, quoting Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U. S. 724, 739 (1985), and the legislative history of these provisions is sparse,, see id., at 745-746. In accord with the District Court in this case, however, see 722 F. Supp., at 1003-1004, we discern no solid basis for believing that Congress, when it designed ERISA, intended fundamentally to alter traditional preemption analysis. State law governing insurance generally is not displaced, but “where [that] law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of Congress,” federal preemption occurs. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U. S. 238, 248 (1984).
We note in this regard that even Hancock does not ascribe a discrete office to the “saving clause” but instead asserts that the clause “reaffirm[s] the McCarran-Ferguson Act’s reservation of the business of insurance to the States.” Brief for Petitioner 31; see Metropolitan Life, 471 U. S., at 744, n. 21 (saving clause “appears to have been designed to preserve the McCarran-Ferguson Act’s reservation of the business of insurance to the States”; saving clause and McCarran-Ferguson Act “serve the same federal policy and utilize similar language”). As the United States recognizes, “dual regulation under ERISA and state law is not an impossibility^] [mjany requirements are complementary, and in the case of a direct conflict, federal supremacy principles require that state law yield.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 23, n. 13.
In resisting the argument that, with respect to general account contracts, state law, not federal law, is preemptive, we are mindful that Congress had before it, but failed to pass, just such a scheme. The Senate’s proposed version of ERISA would have excluded all general account assets from the reach of the fiduciary rules. Instead of enacting the Senate draft, which would indeed have “settled [insurance industry] expectations,” see post, at 111, Congress adopted an exemption containing words of limitation. We are directed by those words, and not by the discarded draft. Cf. Russello v. United States, 464 U. S. 16, 23-24 (1983) (when Congress deletes limiting language, “it may be presumed that the limitation was not intended”).
Persuaded that a plan’s deposits are not shielded from the reach of ERISA’s fiduciary prescriptions solely by virtue of their placement in an insurer’s general account, we proceed to the question the Second Circuit decided: Is Hancock an ERISA fiduciary with respect to the free funds it holds under GAC 50?
C
To determine GAC 50’s qualification for ERISA’s guaranteed benefit policy exclusion, we follow the Seventh Circuit’s lead, see Peoria Union Stock Yards Co. Retirement Plan v. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., 698 F. 2d 320, 324-327 (1983), and seek guidance from this Court’s decisions construing the insurance policy exemption ordered in the Securities Act of 1933. See 48 Stat. 75, 15 U. S. C. §77c(a)(8) (excluding from the reach of the Securities Act “[a]ny insurance or endowment policy or annuity contract or optional annuity contract”).
In SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. of America, 359 U. S. 65 (1959), we observed that “the concept of ‘insurance’ involves some investment risk-taking on the part of the company,” and “a guarantee that at least some fraction of the benefits will be payable in fixed amounts.” Id., at 71. A variable annuity, we held, is not an “insurance policy” within the meaning of the statutory exemption because the contract’s entire investment risk remains with the policyholder inasmuch as “benefit payments vary with the success of the [insurer’s] investment policy,” id., at 69, and may be “greater or less, depending on the wisdom of [that] policy,” id., at 70.
Thereafter, in SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U. S. 202 (1967), we held that an annuity contract could be considered a nonexempt investment contract during the contract’s accumulation phase, and an exempt insurance contract once contractually guaranteed fixed payouts began. Under the contract there at issue, the policyholder paid fixed monthly premiums which the issuer placed in a fund — called the “Flexible Fund” — invested by the issuer primarily in common stocks. At contract maturity the policyholder could either withdraw the cash value of his proportionate share of the fund (which the issuer guaranteed would not fall below a specified value), or convert to a fixed-benefit annuity, with payment amounts determined by the cash value of the policy. During the accumulation phase, the fund from which the policyholder would ultimately receive benefits fluctuated in value according to the insurer’s investment results; because the “insurer promises to serve as an investment agency and allow the policyholder to share in its investment experience,” id., at 208, this phase of the contract was serving primarily an investment, rather than an insurance, function, ibid.
The same approach — division of the contract into its component parts and examination of risk allocation in each component — appears well suited to the matter at hand because ERISA instructs that the § 1101(b)(2)(B) exemption applies only “to the extent that” á policy or contract provides for “benefits the amount of which is guaranteed.” Analyzing GAC 50 this way, we find that the contract fits the statutory exclusion only in part.
This much is not in dispute. During the contract’s active, accumulation phase, any benefits payable by Hancock for which entries actually have been made in the Liabilities of the Fund fit squarely within the “guaranteed” category. Furthermore, if the active phase of the contract were to end, all benefits thereafter payable under the contract would be guaranteed in amount. To this extent also, GAC 50 “provides for benefits the amount of which is guaranteed.”
We turn, then, to the nub of the controversy, Hancock’s responsibility for administration of the free funds during GAC 50’s active phase. Between 1977 and 1982, we note first, GAC 50 furnished retirement benefits expressly called “nonguaranteed”; those benefits, it is undisputed, entailed no “amount... guaranteed by the insurer.” 29 U. S. C. § 1101(b)(2)(B); see supra, at 92. To that extent, GAC 50 does not fall within the statutory exemption. But the non-guaranteed benefit option is not the only misfit.
GAC 50, in key respects, is similar to the Flexible Fund contract examined in United Benefit. In that case, as in this one, the contract’s aggregate value depended upon the insurer’s success as an investment manager. Under both contracts, until the occurrence of a triggering event — contract maturity in the Flexible Fund case, Harris’ exercise of its conversion option in the case of GAC 50 — the investment risk is borne primarily by the contractholder. Confronting a contract bearing similar features, the Seventh Circuit stated:
“The pension trustees did not buy an insurance contract with a fixed payout; they turned over the assets of the pension plan to [the insurer] to manage with full investment discretion, subject only to a modest income guaranty. If the pension plan had hired an investment advisor and given him authority to buy and sell securities at his discretion for the plan’s account, the advisor would be a fiduciary within the meaning of [ERISA], and that is essentially what the trustees did during the accumulation phase of th[is] contract... Peoria Union, 698 F. 2d, at 327.
In the Second Circuit’s words, “[t]o the extent that [Hancock] engages in the discretionary management of assets attributable to that phase of the contract which provides no guarantee of benefit payments or fixed rates of return, it seems to us that [Hancock] should be subject to fiduciary responsibility.” 970 F. 2d, at 1144.
Hancock urges that to the full extent of the free funds— and hence, to the full extent of the contract — GAC 50 “provides for” benefits the amount of which is guaranteed, inasmuch as “Harris Trust... has the right... to use any ‘free funds’ to purchase future guaranteed benefits under the contract, in addition to benefits previously guaranteed.” Brief for Petitioner 26; see also Mack Boring & Parts v. Meeker Sharkey Moffitt, Actuarial Consultants of New Jersey, 930 F. 2d 267, 273 (CA3 1991) (statute’s use of phrase “provides for” does not require that the benefits contracted for be delivered immediately; it is enough that the contract provides for guaranteed benefits “at some finite point in the future”).
Logically pursued, Hancock’s reading of the statute would exempt from ERISA’s fiduciary regime any contract, in its entirety, so long as the funds held thereunder could be used at some point in the future to purchase some amount of guaranteed benefits. But Congress did not say a contract is exempt “if” it provides for guaranteed benefits; it said a contract is exempt only “to the extent” it so provides. Using these words of limitation, Congress apparently recognized that contracts may provide to some extent for something other than guaranteed benefits, and expressly declared the exemption unavailable to that extent.
Tellingly with respect to GAC 50, the Pension Administration Fund is guaranteed only against a decline below its January 1, 1968, level. See supra, at 91. Harris thus bears a substantial portion of the risk as to fluctuations in the free funds, and there is not even the “modest income guaranty” the Seventh Circuit found insufficient in Peoria Union. 698 F. 2d, at 327. Furthermore, Hancock has the authority to set the price at which free funds are convertible into guaranteed benefits. See supra, at 92, n. 3. In combination, these features provide no genuine guarantee of the amount of benefits that plan participants will receive in the future.
It is true but irrelevant, Hancock pleads, that GAC 50 provides no guaranteed return to the plan, for ERISA uniformly uses the word “benefits” to refer exclusively to payments to plan participants or beneficiaries, not payments to plans. Brief for Petitioner 25; see also Mack Boring, 930 F. 2d, at 273 (“benefits” refers only to payments to participants or beneficiaries; payments to plan sponsors can be variable without defeating guaranteed benefit exclusion); Goldberg & Altman 482. This confinement of the word “benefits,” however, perfectly fits the tight compass of the exclusion. A contract component that provides for something other than guaranteed payments to plan participants or beneficiaries— e. g., a guaranteed return to the plan — does not, without more, provide for guaranteed benefits and thus does not fall within the statutory exclusion. Moreover, the guaranteed benefit policy exclusion requires a guarantee of the amount of benefits to be provided; with no guaranteed investment return to the plan, and no guarantee regarding conversion price, plan participants are undeniably at risk inasmuch as the future amount of benefits — payments to participants and beneficiaries — attributable to the free funds can fall to zero. But see post, at 117, n. 4 (contending that the plan’s guarantee renders immaterial the absence of a guarantee by the insurer). A contract of that order does not meet the statutory prescription.
In sum, we hold that to determine whether a contract qualifies as a guaranteed benefit policy, each component of the contract bears examination. A component fits within the guaranteed benefit policy exclusion only if it allocates investment risk to the insurer. Such an allocation is present when the insurer provides a genuine guarantee of an aggregate amount of benefits payable to retirement plan participants and their beneficiaries. As to a contract’s “free funds” — funds in excess of those that have been converted into guaranteed benefits — these indicators are key: the insurer’s guarantee of a reasonable rate of return on those funds and the provision of a mechanism to convert the funds into guaranteed benefits at rates set by the contract. While another contract, with a different mix of features, might satisfy these requirements, GAC 50 does not. Indeed, Hancock provided no real guarantee that benefits in any amount would be payable from the free funds. We therefore conclude, as did the Second Circuit, that the free funds are “plan assets,” and that Hancock’s actions in regard to their management and disposition must be judged against ERISA’s fiduciary standards.
Ill
One other contention pressed by Hancock and amici deserves consideration. Hancock, supported by the United States, asserts that the Department of Labor has adhered consistently to the view that ERISA’s fiduciary obligations do not apply in relation to assets held by an insurer in its general account under contracts like GAC 50. Hancock urges us to follow this view based on “‘the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.’” Brief for Petitioner 39, quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134, 140 (1944); see also Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 843-844 (1984).
Hancock and the United States place primary reliance on an early interpretive bulletin in which the Department of Labor stated:
“If an insurance company issues a contract or policy of insurance to a plan and places the consideration for such contract or policy in its general asset account, the assets in such account shall not be considered to be plan assets. Therefore, a subsequent transaction involving the general asset account between a party in interest and the insurance company will not, solely because the plan has been issued such a contract or policy of insurance, be a prohibited transaction.” Interpretive Bulletin 75-2, 40 Fed. Reg. 31598 (1975), 29 CFR § 2509.75-2(b) (1992).
If this passage squarely addressed the question we confront, namely, whether ERISA’s fiduciary standards apply to assets held under participating annuity contracts like GAC 50, we would indeed have a clear statement of the Department’s view on the matter at issue. But, as the second sentence of the quoted passage shows, the question addressed in Interpretivé Bulletin 75-2 was “whether a party in interest has engaged in a prohibited transaction [under 29 U. S. C. § 1106] with an employee benefit plan.” §2509.75-2. The Department did not mention, let alone elaborate on, any grounding for Interpretive Bulletin 75-2 in §1101’s guaranteed benefit policy exemption, nor did the Bulletin speak of the application of its pronouncement, if any, to ERISA’s fiduciary duty prescriptions.
The Department asserts the absence of any textual basis for the view, adopted by the Second Circuit, that “certain assets [can be considered] plan assets for general fiduciary duty purposes but not for prohibited transaction purposes,” 970 F. 2d, at 1145, and, accordingly, no reason to suppose that Interpretive Bulletin 75-2’s statement regarding plan assets would not apply in both contexts. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 26-27. Nothing in Interpretive Bulletin 75-2 or 29 CFR §2509.75-2 (1992), however, sets forth that position, or otherwise alerts the reader that more than the prohibited transaction exemption was then subject to the Department’s scrutiny. Had the Department intended Interpretive Bulletin 75-2 to apply to the guaranteed benefit policy exclusion, it would have had to explain how an unqualified exclusion for an insurer’s general asset account can be reconciled with Congress’ choice of a more limited (“to the extent that”) formulation. Its silence in that regard is an additional indication that the 1975 pronouncement did not originally have the scope the Department now attributes to it.
We note, too, that the United States was unable to comply with the Second Circuit’s request for its assistance in this very case; the Department of Labor informed the. Court of Appeals, after requesting and receiving a substantial extension of time, that “ ‘the need to fully consider all of the implications of these issues within the Department precludes our providing the Court with a brief within a foreseeable time frame.’” 970 F. 2d, at 1141. We recognize the difficulties the Department faced, given the complexity of ERISA and the constant evolution of insurance contract practices as reflected in this case. Our point is simply that, as of 1992, the Department apparently had no firm position it was prepared to communicate.
We need not grapple here with the difficult question of the deference due an agency view first precisely stated in a brief supporting a petitioner. Cf. Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U. S. 469, 476 (1992) (“If the Director asked us to defer to his new statutory interpretation, this case might present a difficult question regarding whether and under what circumstances deference is due to an interpretation formulated during litigation.”) (emphasis in original). It suffices to recall, once again, Congress’ words of limitation. The Legislature provided an exemption “to the extent that” a contract provides for guaranteed benefits. By reading the words “to the extent” to mean nothing more than “if,” the Department has exceeded the scope of available ambiguity. See Public Employees Retirement System of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U. S. 158, 171 (1989) (“no deference is due to agency interpretations at odds with the plain language of the statute itself”). We therefore cannot accept current pleas for the deference described in Skidmore or Chevron.
The Department of Labor recognizes that ranking free funds as “
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
H
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Breyer
delivered the opinion of the Court.
A federal civil-commitment statute authorizes the Department of Justice to detain a mentally ill, sexually dangerous federal prisoner beyond the date the prisoner would otherwise be released. 18 U. S. C. § 4248. We have previously examined similar statutes enacted under state law to determine whether they violate the Due Process Clause. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U. S. 346, 356-358 (1997); Kansas v. Crane, 534 U. S. 407 (2002). But this case presents a different question. Here we ask whether the Federal Government has the authority under Article I of the Constitution to enact this federal civil-commitment program or whether its doing so falls beyond the reach of a government “of enumerated powers.” McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 405 (1819). We conclude that the Constitution grants Congress the authority to enact §4248 as “necessary and proper for carrying into Execution” the powers “vested by” the “Constitution in the Government of the United States.” Art. I, §8, cl. 18.
I
The federal statute before us allows a district court to order the civil commitment of an individual who is currently “in the custody of the [Federal] Bureau of Prisons,” §4248, if that individual (1) has previously “engaged or attempted to engage in sexually violent conduct or child molestation,” (2) currently “suffers from a serious mental illness, abnormality, or disorder,” and (3) “as a result of” that mental illness, abnormality, or disorder is “sexually dangerous to others,” in that “he would have serious difficulty in refraining from sexually violent conduct or child molestation if released,” §§ 4247(a)(5)-(6).
In order to detain such a person, the Government (acting through the Department of Justice) must certify to a federal district judge that the prisoner meets the conditions just described, i. e., that he has engaged in sexually violent activity or child molestation in the past and that he suffers from a mental illness that makes him correspondingly dangerous to others. § 4248(a). When such a certification is filed, the statute automatically stays the individual’s release from prison, ibid., thereby giving the Government an opportunity to prove its claims at a hearing through psychiatric (or other) evidence, §§4247(bMc), 4248(b). The statute provides that the prisoner “shall be represented by counsel” and shall have “an opportunity” at the hearing “to testify, to present evidence, to subpoena witnesses on his behalf, and to confront and cross-examine” the Government’s witnesses. §§ 4247(d), 4248(c).
If the Government proves its claims by “clear and convincing evidence,” the court will order the prisoner’s continued commitment in “the custody of the Attorney General,” who must “make all reasonable efforts to cause” the State where that person was tried, or the State where he is domiciled, to “assume responsibility for his custody, care, and treatment.” § 4248(d); cf. Sullivan v. Freeman, 944 F. 2d 334, 337 (CA7 1991). If either State is willing to assume that responsibility, the Attorney General “shall release” the individual “to the appropriate official” of that State. § 4248(d). But if, “notwithstanding such efforts, neither such State will assume such responsibility,” then “the Attorney General shall place the person for treatment in a suitable [federal] facility.” Ibid.; cf. § 4247(i)(A).
Confinement in the federal facility will last until either (1) the person’s mental condition improves to the point where he is no longer dangerous (with or without appropriate ongoing treatment), in which case he will be released; or (2) a State assumes responsibility for his custody, care, and treatment, in which case he will be transferred to the custody of that State. §§4248(d)(l)-(2). The statute establishes a system for ongoing psychiatric and judicial review of the individual’s case, including judicial hearings at the request of the confined person at 6-month intervals. §§ 4247(e)(1)(B), (h).
In November and December 2006, the Government instituted proceedings in the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina against the five respondents in this case. Three of the five had previously pleaded guilty in federal court to possession of child pornography, see 507 F. Supp. 2d 522, 526, and n. 2 (2007); §2252A(a), and a fourth had pleaded guilty to sexual abuse of a minor, see United States v. Vigil, No. 1:99CR00509-001 (D NM, Jan. 26, 2000); §§ 1153,2243(a). With respect to each of them, the Government claimed that the respondent was about to be released from federal prison, that he had engaged in sexually violent conduct or child molestation in the past, and that he suffered from a mental illness that made him sexually dangerous to others. App. 38-40, 44-52. During that same time period, the Government instituted similar proceedings against the fifth respondent, who had been charged in federal court with aggravated sexual abuse of a minor, but was found mentally incompetent to stand trial. See id., at 41-43; United States v. Catron, No. 04-778 (D Ariz., Mar. 27, 2006); § 4241(d).
Each of the five respondents moved to dismiss the civil-commitment proceeding on constitutional grounds. They claimed that the commitment proceeding is, in fact, criminal, not civil, in nature and consequently that it violates the Double Jeopardy Clause, the Ex Post Facto Clause, and the Sixth and Eighth Amendments. 507 F. Supp. 2d, at 528. They claimed that the statute denies them substantive due process and equal protection of the laws. Ibid. They claimed that it violates their procedural due process rights by allowing a showing of sexual dangerousness to be made by clear and convincing evidence, instead of by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Ibid. And, finally, they claimed that, in enacting the statute, Congress exceeded the powers granted to it by Article I, § 8, of the Constitution, including those granted by the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause. 507 F. Supp. 2d, at 528-529.
The District Court, accepting two of the respondents’ claims, granted their motion to dismiss. It agreed with respondents that the Constitution requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt, id., at 551-559 (citing In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358 (1970)), and it agreed that, in enacting the statute, Congress exceeded its Article I legislative powers, 507 F. Supp. 2d, at 530-551. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld the dismissal on this latter, legislative-power ground. 551 F. 3d 274, 278-284 (2009). It did not decide the standard-of-proof question, nor did it address any of respondents’ other constitutional challenges. Id., at 276, n. 1.
The Government sought certiorari, and we granted its request, limited to the question of Congress’ authority under Article I, §8, of the Constitution. Pet. for Cert. i. Since then, two other Courts of Appeals have considered that same question, each deciding it in the Government’s favor, thereby creating a split of authority among the Circuits. See United States v. Volungus, 595 F. 3d 1 (CA1 2010); United States v. Tom, 565 F. 3d 497 (CA8 2009).
II
The question presented is whether the Necessary and Proper Clause, Art. I, §8, cl. 18, grants Congress authority sufficient to enact the statute before us. In resolving that question, we assume, but we do not decide, that other provisions of the Constitution — such as the Due Process Clause— do not prohibit civil commitment in these circumstances. Cf. Hendricks, 521 U. S. 346; Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S. 418 (1979). In other words, we assume for argument’s sake that the Federal Constitution would permit a State to enact this statute, and we ask solely whether the Federal Government, exercising its enumerated powers, may enact such a statute as well. On that assumption, we conclude that the Constitution grants Congress legislative power sufficient to enact § 4248. We base this conclusion on ñve considerations, taken together.
First, the Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress broad authority to enact federal legislation. Nearly 200 years ago, this Court stated that the Federal “[Government is acknowledged by all to be one of enumerated powers,” McCulloch, 4 Wheat., at 405, which means that “[e]very law enacted by Congress must be based on one or more of” those powers, United States v. Morrison, 529 U. S. 598, 607 (2000). But, at the same time, “a government, entrusted with such” powers “must also be entrusted with ample means for their execution.” McCulloch, 4 Wheat., at 408. Accordingly, the Necessary and Proper Clause makes clear that the Constitution’s grants of specific federal legislative authority are accompanied by broad power to enact laws that are “convenient, or useful” or “conducive” to the authority’s “beneficial exercise.” Id., at 413, 418; see also id., at 421 (“[Congress can] legislate on that vast mass of incidental powers which must be involved in the constitution... ”). Chief Justice Marshall emphasized that the word “necessary” does not mean “absolutely necessary.” Id., at 413-415 (emphasis deleted); Jinks v. Richland County, 538 U. S. 456, 462 (2003) C‘[W]e long ago rejected the view that the Necessary and Proper Clause demands that an Act of Congress be ‘ “absolutely necessary” ’ to the exercise of an enumerated power”). In language that has come to define the scope of the Necessary and Proper Clause, he wrote:
“Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.” McCulloch, supra, at 421.
We have since made clear that, in determining whether the Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress the legislative authority to enact a particular federal statute, we look to see whether the statute constitutes a means that is rationally related to the implementation of a constitutionally enumerated power. Sabri v. United States, 541 U. S. 600, 605 (2004) (using term “means-ends rationality” to describe the necessary relationship); ibid, (upholding Congress’ “authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause” to enact a criminal statute in furtherance of the federal power granted by the Spending Clause); see Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U. S. 1, 22 (2005) (holding that because “Congress had a rational basis” for concluding that a statute implements Commerce Clause power, the statute falls within the scope of congressional “authority to ‘make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper’ to ‘regulate Commerce... among the several States’” (ellipsis in original)); see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U. S. 549, 557 (1995); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U. S. 264, 276 (1981).
Of course, as Chief Justice Marshall stated, a federal statute, in addition to being authorized by Art. I, §8, must also “not [be] prohibited” by the Constitution. McCulloch, supra, at 421. But as we have already stated, the present statute’s validity under provisions of the Constitution other than the Necessary and Proper Clause is an issue that is not before us. Under the question presented, the relevant inquiry is simply “whether the means chosen are ‘reasonably adapted’ to the attainment of a legitimate end under the commerce power” or under other powers that the Constitution grants Congress the authority to implement. Gonzales, supra, at 37 (Scaua, J., concurring in judgment) (quoting United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100, 121 (1941)).
We have also recognized that the Constitution “ad-dresse[s]” the “choice of means”
“primarily... to the judgment of Congress. If it can be seen that the means adopted are really calculated to attain the end, the degree of their necessity, the extent to which they conduce to the end, the closeness of the relationship between the means adopted and the end to be attained, are matters for congressional determination alone.” Burroughs v. United States, 290 U. S. 534, 547-548 (1934).
See also Lottery Case, 188 U. S. 321, 355 (1903) (“[T]he Constitution... leaves to Congress a large discretion as to the means that may be employed in executing a given power”); Morrison, supra, at 607 (applying a “presumption of constitutionality” when examining the scope of congressional power); McCulloch, supra, at 410, 421.
Thus, the Constitution, which nowhere speaks explicitly about the creation of federal crimes beyond those related to “counterfeiting,” “[tjreason,” or “Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas” or “against the Law of Nations,” Art. I, §8, els. 6, 10; Art. Ill, §3, nonetheless grants Congress broad authority to create such crimes. See McCulloch, 4 Wheat., at 416 (“All admit that the government may, legitimately, punish any violation of its laws; and yet, this is not among the enumerated powers of Congress”); see also United States v. Fox, 95 U. S. 670, 672 (1878). And Congress routinely exercises its authority to enact criminal laws in furtherance of, for example, its enumerated powers to regulate interstate and foreign commerce, to enforce civil rights, to spend funds for the general welfare, to establish federal courts, to establish post offices, to regulate bankruptcy, to regulate naturalization, and so forth.. Art. I, § 8, els. 1, 3, 4, 7, 9; Arndts. 13-15. See, e. g., Lottery Case, supra (upholding criminal statute enacted in furtherance of the Commerce Clause); Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U. S. 651 (1884) (upholding Congress' authority to enact Rev. Stat. §5508, currently 18 U. S. C. § 241 (criminalizing civil-rights violations) and Rev. Stat. § 5520, currently 42 U. S. C. § l'973j (criminalizing voting-rights violations) in furtherance of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments); Sabri, supra (upholding criminal statute enacted in furtherance of the Spending Clause); Jinks, supra, at 462, n. 2 (describing perjury and witness tampering as federal crimes enacted in furtherance of the power to constitute federal tribunals (citing McCulloch, supra, at 417)); see also 18 U. S. C. § 1691 et seq. (postal crimes); § 151 et seq. (bankruptcy crimes); 8 U. S. C. §§ 1324-1328 (immigration crimes).
Similarly, Congress, in order to help ensure the enforcement of federal criminal laws enacted in furtherance of its enumerated powers, “can cause a prison to be erected at any place within the jurisdiction of the United States, and direct that all persons sentenced to imprisonment under the laws of the United States shall be confined there.” Ex parte Karstendick, 93 U. S. 396, 400 (1876). Moreover, Congress, having established a prison system, can enact laws that seek to ensure that system's safe and responsible administration by, for example, requiring prisoners to receive medical care and educational training, see, e. g., 18 U. S. C. §§ 4005-4006; § 4042(a)(3), and can also ensure the safety of the prisoners, prison workers and visitors, and those in surrounding communities by, for example, creating further criminal laws governing entry, exit, and smuggling, and by employing prison guards to ensure discipline and security, see, e.g., § 1791 (prohibiting smuggling contraband); §751 et seq. (prohibiting escape and abetting thereof); 28 CFR § 541.10 et seq. (2009) (inmate discipline).
Neither Congress’ power to criminalize conduct, nor its power to imprison individuals who engage in that conduct, nor its power to enact laws governing prisons and prisoners, is explicitly mentioned in the Constitution. But Congress nonetheless possesses broad authority to do each of those things in the eourse of “carrying into Execution” the enumerated powers “vested by” the “Constitution in the Government of the United States,” Art. I, §8, cl. 18 — authority granted by the Necessary and Proper Clause.
Second, the civil-commitment statute before us constitutes a modest addition to a set of federal prison-related mental-health statutes that have existed for many decades. We recognize that even a longstanding history of related federal action does not demonstrate a statute’s constitutionality. See, e. g., Walz v. Tax Comm’n of City of New York, 397 U. S. 664, 678 (1970) (“[N]o one acquires a vested or protected right in violation of the Constitution by long use... ”); cf. Morrison, 529 U. S., at 612-614 (legislative history is neither necessary nor sufficient with respect to Art. I analysis). A history of involvement, however, can nonetheless be “helpful in reviewing the substance of a congressional statutory scheme,” Gonzales, 545 U. S., at 21; Walz, supra, at 678, and, in particular, the reasonableness of the relation between the new statute and pre-existing federal interests.
Here, Congress has long been involved in the delivery of mental-health care to federal prisoners, and has long provided for their civil commitment. In 1855, it established Saint Elizabeth’s Hospital in the District of Columbia to provide treatment to “the insane of the army and navy... and of the District of Columbia.” Act of Mar. 3, 1855, 10 Stat. 682; 39 Stat. 309. In 1857, it provided for confinement at Saint Elizabeth’s of any person within the District of Columbia who had been “charged with [a] crime” and who was “insane” or later became “insane during the continuance of his or her sentence in the United States penitentiary.” Act of Feb. 7,1857, §§5-6,11 Stat. 158; see 17 Op. Atty. Gen. 211, 212-213 (1881). In 1874, expanding the geographic scope of its statutes, Congress provided for civil commitment in federal facilities (or in state facilities if a State so agreed) of “all persons who have been or shall be convicted of any offense in any court of the United States” and who are or “shall become” insane “during the term of their imprisonment.” Act of June 23,1874, eh. 465,18 Stat. 251 (emphasis added). And in 1882, Congress provided for similar commitment of those “charged” with federal offenses who become “insane” while in the “custody” of the United States. Act of Aug. 7, 1882, 22 Stat. 330 (emphasis added). Thus, over the span of three decades, Congress created a national, federal civil-commitment program under which any person who was either charged with or convicted of any federal offense in any federal court could be confined in a federal mental institution.
These statutes did not raise the question presented here, for they all provided that commitment in a federal hospital would end upon the completion of the relevant “terms” of federal “imprisonment” as set forth in the underlying criminal sentence or statute. §§2-3,18 Stat. 252; see 35 Op. Atty. Gen. 366, 368 (1927); cf. 30 Op. Atty. Gen. 569, 571 (1916). But in the mid-1940’s that proviso was eliminated.
In 1945, the Judicial Conference of the United States proposed legislative reforms of the federal civil-commitment system. The Judicial Conference based its proposals upon what this Court has described as a “long study by a conspicuously able committee” (chaired by Judge Calvert Magruder and whose members includéd Judge Learned Hand), involving consultation “with federal district and circuit judges” across the country as well as with the Department of Justice. Greenwood v. United States, 350 U. S. 366, 373 (1956); Greenwood v. United States, 219 F. 2d 376, 380-384 (CA8 1955) (describing the committee’s work). The committee studied, among other things, the “serious problem faced by the Bureau of Prisons, namely, what to do with insane criminals upon the expiration of their terms of confinement, where it would be dangerous to turn them loose upon society and where no state will assume responsibility for their custody.” Judicial Conference, Report of Committee To Study Treatment Accorded by Federal Courts to Insane Persons Charged With Crime 11 (1945) (hereinafter Committee Report), App. 73. The committee provided examples of instances in which the Bureau of Prisons had struggled with the problem of “ ‘paranoid’ ” and “ ‘threatening’ ” individuals whom no State would accept. Id., at 9, App. 71. And it noted that, in the Bureau’s “[ejxperience,” States would not accept an “appreciable number” of “mental[ly] incompetent” individuals “nearing expiration” of their prison terms, because of their “lack of legal residence in any State,” even though those individuals “ought not... be at large because they constitute a menace to public safety.” H. R. Rep. No. 1319, 81st Cong, 1st Sess., 2 (1949) (statement of James V. Bennett, Director); see also Letter from Bennett to Judge Magruder, attachment to Committee Report, App. 83-88. The committee, hence the Judicial Conference, therefore recommended that Congress enact “some provision of law authorizing the continued confinement of such persons after their sentences expired.” Committee Report 11, App. 73; see also Report of the Judicial Conference of Senior Circuit Judges 13 (1945).
Between 1948 and 1949, following its receipt of the Judicial Conference report, Congress modified the law. See Act of June 25,1948,62 Stat. 855,18 U. S. C. §§4241-4243 (1952 ed.); Act of Sept. 7, 1949, 63 Stat. 686, 18 U. S. C. §§4244-4248. It provided for the civil commitment of individuals who are, or who become, mentally incompetent at any time after their arrest and before the expiration of their federal sentence, §§4241, 4244, 4247-4248; and it set forth various procedural safeguards, §§4242, 4246, 4247. With respect to an individual whose prison term is about to expire, it specified the following:
“Whenever the Director of the Bureau of Prisons shall certify that a prisoner whose sentence is about to expire has been examined [and]... in the judgment of the Director and the board of examiners the prisoner is insane or mentally incompetent, and... if released he will probably endanger the safety of the officers, the property, or other interests of the United States, and that suitable arrangements for the custody and care of the prisoner are not otherwise available, the Attorney General shall transmit the certificate to... the court for the district in which the prisoner is confined. Whereupon the court shall cause the prisoner to be examined... and shall... hold a hearing.... If upon such hearing the court shall determine that the conditions specified above exist, the court may commit the prisoner to the custody of the Attorney General or his authorized representative.” §4247.
The precondition that the mentally ill individual’s release would “probably endanger the safety of the officers, the property, or other interests of the United States” was uniformly interpreted by the Judiciary to mean that his “release would endanger the safety of persons, property or the public interest in general — not merely the interests peculiar to the United States as such.” United States v. Curry, 410 F. 2d 1372, 1374 (CA4 1969); see also Royal v. United States, 274 F. 2d 846, 851-852 (CA10 1960).
In 1984, Congress modified these basic statutes. See Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984, 98 Stat. 2057,18 U. S. C. §§ 4241-4247 (2006 ed.). As relevant here, it altered the provision just discussed, regarding the prisoner’s danger to the “interests of the United States,” to conform more closely to the then-existing judicial interpretation of that language, i. e., it altered the language so as to authorize (explicitly) civil commitment if, in addition to the other conditions, the prisoner’s “release would create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious damage to the property of another.” § 4246(d).
Congress also elaborated upon the required condition “that suitable arrangements... are not otherwise available” by directing the Attorney General to seek alternative placement in state facilities, as we have set forth above. See ibid.; supra, at 130-131. With these modifications, the statutes continue to authorize the civil commitment of individuals who are both mentally ill and dangerous, once they have been charged with, or convicted of, a federal crime. §§ 4241(d), 4246; see also § 4243(d). They continue to provide for the continued civil commitment of those individuals when they are “due for release” from federal custody because their “sentence is about to expire.” § 4246. And, as we have previously set forth, they establish various procedural and other requirements. E. g., § 4247.
In 2006, Congress enacted the particular statute before us. § 302,120 Stat. 619,18 U. S. C. § 4248. It differs from earlier statutes in that it focuses directly upon persons who, due to a mental illness, are sexually dangerous. Notably, many of these individuals were likely already subject to civil commitment under §4246, which, since 1949, has authorized the postsentence detention of federal prisoners who suffer from a mental illness and who are thereby dangerous (whether sexually or otherwise). But cf. H. R. Rep. No. 109-218, pt. 1, p. 29 (2005). Aside from its specific focus on sexually dangerous persons, §4248 is similar to the provisions first enacted in 1949. Cf. §4246. In that respect, it is a modest addition to a longstanding federal statutory framework, which has been in place since 1855.
Third, Congress reasonably extended its longstanding civil-commitment system to cover mentally ill and sexually dangerous persons who are already in federal custody, even if doing so detains them beyond the termination of their criminal sentence. For one thing, the Federal Government is the custodian of its prisoners. As federal custodian, it has the constitutional power to act in order to protect nearby (and other) communities from the danger federal prisoners may pose. Cf. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U. S. 307, 320 (1982) (“In operating an institution such as.[a prison system], there are occasions in which it is necessary for the State to restrain the movement of residents — for example, to protect them as well as others from violence” (emphasis added)). Indeed, at common law, one “who takes charge of a third person” is “under a duty to exercise reasonable care to control” that person to prevent him from causing reasonably foreseeable “bodily harm to others.” 2 Restatement (Second) of Torts §319, p. 129 (1963-1964); see Volungus, 595 F. 3d, at 7-8 (citing cases); see also United States v. S. A., 129 F. 3d 995, 999 (CA8 1997) (“[Congress enacted §4246] to avert the public danger likely to ensue from the release of mentally ill and dangerous detainees”). If a federal prisoner is infected with a communicable disease that threatens others, surely it would be “necessary and proper” for the Federal Government to take action, pursuant to its role as federal custodian, to refuse (at least until the threat diminishes) to release that individual among the general public, where he might infect others (even if not threatening an interstate epidemic, cf. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3). And if confinement of such an individual is a “necessary and proper” thing to do, then how could it not be similarly “necessary and proper” to confine an individual whose mental illness threatens others to the same degree?
Moreover, § 4248 is “reasonably adapted,” Darby, 312 U. S., at 121, to Congress’ power to act as a responsible federal custodian (a power that rests, in turn, upon federal criminal statutes that legitimately seek to implement constitutionally enumerated authority, see supra, at 135-136). Congress could have reasonably concluded that federal inmates who suffer from a mental illness that causes them to “have serious difficulty in refraining from sexually violent conduct,” § 4247(a)(6), would pose an especially high danger to the public if released. Cf. H. R. Rep. No. 109-218, at 22-23. And Congress could also have reasonably concluded (as detailed in the Judicial Conference’s report) that a reasonable number of such individuals would likely not be detained by the States if released from federal custody, in part because the Federal Government itself severed their claim to “legal residence in any State” by incarcerating them in remote federal prisons. H. R. Rep. No. 1319, at 2; Committee Report 7-11, App. 69-75; cf. post, at 154 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment). Here Congress’ desire to address the specific challenges identified in the Reports cited above, taken together with its responsibilities as a federal custodian, supports the conclusion that § 4248 satisfies “review for means-end rationality,” i. e., that it satisfies the Constitution’s insistence that a federal statute represent a rational means for implementing a constitutional grant of legislative authority. Sabri, 541 U. S., at 605 (citing McCulloch, 4 Wheat. 316). See Jinks, 538 U. S., at 462-463 (opinion for the Court by Scalia, J.) (holding that a statute is authorized by the Necessary and Proper Clause when it “provides an alternative to [otherwise] unsatisfactory options” that are “obviously inefficient”).
Fourth, the statute properly accounts for state interests. Respondents and the dissent contend that §4248 violates the Tenth Amendment because it “invades the province of state sovereignty” in an area typically left to state control. New York v. United States, 505 U. S. 144, 155 (1992); see Brief for Respondents 35-47; post, at 164-165, 176-180 (Thomas, J., dissenting). See also Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U. S. 715, 736 (1972) (“The States have traditionally exercised broad power to commit persons found to be mentally ill”). But the Tenth Amendment’s text is clear: “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” (Emphasis added.) The powers “delegated to the United States by the Constitution” include those specifically enumerated powers listed in Article I along with the implementation authority granted by the Necessary and Proper Clause. Virtually by definition, these powers are not powers that the Constitution “reserved to the States.” See New York, supra, at 156,159 (“If a power is delegated to Congress in the Constitution, the Tenth Amendment expressly disclaims any reservation of that power to the States....” “In the end... it makes no difference whether one views the question at issue in these cases as one of ascertaining the limits of the power delegated to the Federal Government under the affirmative provisions of the Constitution or one of discerning the core of sovereignty retained by the States under the Tenth Amendment”); Darby, supra, at 123-124; see also Hodel, 452 U. S., at 276-277, 281; Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U. S. 183, 195-196 (1968); Lambert v. Yellowley, 272 U. S. 581, 596 (1926).
Nor does this statute invade state sovereignty or otherwise improperly limit the scope of “powers that remain with the States.” Post, at 164 (Thomas, J., dissenting). To the contrary, it requires accommodation of state interests: The Attorney General must inform the State in which the federal prisoner “is domiciled or was tried” that he is detaining someone with respect to whom those States may wish to assert their authority, and he must encourage those States to assume custody of the individual. § 4248(d). He must also immediately “release” that person “to the appropriate official of” either State “if such State will assume [such] responsibility.” Ibid. And either State has the right, at any time, to assert its authority over the individual, which will prompt the individual’s immediate transfer to state custody. § 4248(d)(1). Respondents contend that the States are nonetheless “powerless to prevent the detention of their citizens under § 4248, even if detention is contrary to the States’ policy choices.” Brief for Respondents 11 (emphasis added). But that is not the most natural reading of the statute, see §§4248(d)(l)-(e), and the Solicitor General acknowledges that “the Federal Government would have no appropriate role” with respect to an individual covered by the statute once “the transfer to State responsibility and State control has occurred.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 9.
In Greenwood, 350 U. S. 366, the Court rejected a challenge to the current statute’s predecessor — i. e., to the 1949 statute we described above, supra, at 140-141. The petitioners in that case claimed, like the respondents here, that the statute improperly interfered with state sovereignty. See Brief for Petitioner in Greenwood v. United States, O. T. 1955, No. 460, pp. 2, 18-29. But the Court rejected that argument. See Greenwood, supra, at 375-376. And the version of the statute at issue in Greenwood was less protective of
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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J
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Kennedy
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Two questions relating to a criminal defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination are presented to us. The first is whether, in the federal criminal system, a guilty plea waives the privilege in the sentencing phase of the case, either as a result of the colloquy preceding the plea or by operation of law when the plea is entered. We hold the plea is not a waiver of the privilege at sentencing. The second question is whether, in determining facts about the crime which bear upon the severity of the sentence, a trial court may draw an adverse inference from the defendant’s silence. We hold a sentencing court may not draw the adverse inference.
1 — 4
Petitioner Amanda Mitchell and 22 other defendants were indicted for offenses arising from a conspiracy to distribute cocaine in Allentown, Pennsylvania, from 1989 to 1994. According to the indictment, the leader of the conspiracy, Harry Riddick, obtained large quantities of cocaine and resold the drug through couriers and street sellers, including petitioner. Petitioner was charged with one count of conspiring to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine, in violation of 21 U. S. C. §846, and with three counts of distributing cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school or playground, in violation of § 860(a). In 1995, without any plea agreement, petitioner pleaded guilty to all four counts. She reserved the right to contest the drug quantity attributable to her under the conspiracy count, and the District Court advised her the drug quantity would be determined at her sentencing hearing.
Before accepting the plea, the District Court made the inquiries required by Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Informing petitioner of the penalties for her offenses, the District Judge advised her, “the range of punishment here is very complex because we don’t know how much cocaine the Government’s going to be able to show you were involved in.” App. 39. The judge told petitioner she faced a mandatory minimum of one year in prison under § 860 for distributing cocaine near a sehool or playground. She also faced “serious punishment depending on the quantity involved” for the conspiracy, with a mandatory minimum of 10 years in prison under §841 if she could be held responsible for at least 5 kilograms but less than 15 kilograms of cocaine. Id., at 42. By pleading guilty, the District Court explained, petitioner would waive various rights, including "the right at trial to remain silent under the Fifth Amendment.” Id., at 45.
After the Government explained charges, the judge, having put petitioner under oath, asked her, “Did you do that?” Petitioner answered, "Some of it.” Id., at 47. She indicated that, although present for one of the transactions charged as a substantive cocaine distribution count, she had not herself delivered the cocaine to the customer. The Government maintained she was liable nevertheless as an aider and abettor of the delivery by another courier. After discussion with her counsel, petitioner reaffirmed her intention to plead guilty to all the charges. The District Court noted she might have a defense to one count on the theory that she was present but did not aid or abet the transaction. Petitioner again confirmed her intention to plead guilty, and the District Court accepted the plea.
In 1996, to trial. Three other codefendants had pleaded guilty and agreed to cooperate with the Government. They testified petitioner was a regular seller for ringleader Riddick. At petitioner’s sentencing hearing, the three adopted their trial testimony, and one of them furnished additional information on the amount of cocaine petitioner sold. According to him, petitioner worked two to three times a week, selling llA to 2 ounces of cocaine a day, from April 1992 to August 1992. Then, from August 1992 to December 1998 she worked three to five times a week, and from January 1994 to March 1994 she was one of those in charge of cocaine distribution for Riddick. On cross-examination, the codefendant conceded he had not seen petitioner on a regular basis during the relevant period.
Both petitioner and mony by one Alvitta Mack, who had made a series of drug buys under the supervision of law enforcement agents, including three purchases from petitioner totaling two ounces of cocaine in 1992. Petitioner put on no evidence at sentencing, nor did she testify to rebut the Government’s evidence about drug quantity. Her counsel argued, however, that the three documented sales to Mack constituted the only evidence of sufficient reliability to be credited in determining the quantity of cocaine attributable to her for sentencing purposes.
After this testimony at the sentencing hearing the District Court ruled that, as a consequence of her guilty plea, petitioner had no right to remain silent with respect to the details of her crimes. The court found credible the testimony indicating petitioner had been a drug courier on a regular basis. Sales of VA to 2 ounces twiee a week for a year and a half put her over the 5-kilogram threshold, thus mandating a minimum sentence of 10 years. “One of the things” persuading the court to rely on the testimony of the codefend-ants was petitioner’s “not testifying to the contrary.” Id., at 95.
The District Judge told petitioner:
“ T held it against you that you didn’t come forward today and tell me that you really only did this a couple of times. . . . I’m taking the position that you should come forward and explain your side of this issue.
counsel’s taking the position that you have a Fifth Amendment right not to.... If he’s — if it’s determined by a higher Court that he’s right in that regard, I would be willing to bring you back for resentencing. And if you — if—and then I might take a closer look at the [codefendants’3 testimony.’ ” Id., at 98-99.
The District Court sentenced petitioner to the statutory minimum of 10 years of imprisonment, 6 years of supervised release, and a special assessment of $200.
for the Third Circuit affirmed the sentence. 122 F. 3d 185 (1997). According to the Court of Appeals: “By voluntarily and knowingly pleading guilty to the offense Mitchell waived her Fifth Amendment privilege.” Id., at 189. The court acknowledged other Circuits have held a witness can “claim the Fifth Amendment privilege if his or her testimony might be used to enhance his or her sentence,” id., at 190 (citing United States v. Garcia, 78 F. 3d 1457, 1463, and n. 8 (CA10), cert. denied, 517 U. S. 1239 (1996)), but it said this rule “does not withstand analysis,” 122 F. 3d, at 191. The court thought it would be illogical to “fragment the sentencing process,” retaining the privilege against self-incrimination as to one or more components of the crime while waiving it as to others. Ibid. Petitioner’s reservation of the right to contest the amount of drugs attributable to her did not change the court’s analysis. In the Court of Appeals’ view:
“Mitchell opened herself up to the full range of possible sentences for distributing cocaine when she was told during her plea colloquy that the penalty for conspiring to distribute cocaine had a maximum of life imprisonment. While her reservation may have put the government to its proof as to the amount of drugs, her declination to testify on that issue could properly be held against her.” Ibid.
The court acknowledged a defendant may plead guilty and retain the privilege with respect to other crimes, but it observed: “Mitchell does not claim that she could be implicated in other crimes by testifying at her sentencing hearing, nor could she be retried by the state for the same offense.” Ibid, (citing 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 111 (1998), a statute that bars, with certain exceptions, a state prosecution following a federal conviction based on the same conduct).
Judge Michel concurred, reasoning that any error District Court in drawing an adverse factual inference from petitioner’s silence was harmless because “the evidence amply supported [the judge’s] finding on quantity” even without consideration of petitioner’s failure to testify. 122 F. 3d, at 192.
Other Circuits to have confronted the issue have held that a defendant retains the privilege at sentencing. See, e. g., United States v. Kuku, 129 F. 3d 1435, 1437-1438 (CA11 1997); United States v. Garcia, 78 F. 3d 1457, 1463 (CA10 1996); United States v. De La Cruz, 996 F. 2d 1307, 1312-1313 (CA1 1993); United States v. Hernandez, 962 F. 2d 1152, 1161 (CA5 1992); Bank One of Cleveland, N. A. v. Abbe, 916 F. 2d 1067, 1075-1076 (CA6 1990); United States v. Lugg, 892 F. 2d 101, 102-103 (CADG 1989); United States v. Paris, 827 F. 2d 395, 398-399 (CA9 1987). We granted certiorari to resolve the apparent Circuit conflict created by the Court of Appeals’ decision, 524 U. S. 925 (1998), and we now reverse.
II
The Government maintains that petitioner’s guilty plea was a waiver of the privilege against compelled self-incrimination with respect to all the crimes comprehended in the plea. We hold otherwise and rule that petitioner retained the privilege at her sentencing hearing.
A
established that a witness, in a single proceeding, may not testify voluntarily about a subject and then invoke the privilege against self-incrimination when questioned about the details. See Rogers v. United States, 340 U. S. 367, 373 (1951). The privilege is waived for the matters to which the witness testifies, and the scope of the “waiver is determined by the scope of relevant cross-examination,” Brown v. United States, 356 U. S. 148, 154-155 (1958). “The witness himself, certainly if he is a party, determines the area of disclosure and therefore of inquiry,” id., at 155. Nice questions will arise, of course, about the extent of the initial testimony and whether the ensuing questions are comprehended within its scope, but for now it suffices to note the general rule.
The justifications context are evident: A witness may not pick and choose what aspects of a particular subject to discuss without casting doubt on the trustworthiness of the statements and diminishing the integrity of the factual inquiry. As noted in Rogers, a contrary rule “would open the way to distortion of facts by permitting a witness to select any stopping place in the testimony,” 340 U. S., at 371. It would, as we said in Brown, “make of the Fifth Amendment not only a humane safeguard against judicially coerced self-disclosure but a positive invitation to mutilate the truth a party offers to tell,” 356 U. S., at 156. The illogic of allowing a witness to offer only self-selected testimony should be obvious even to the witness, so there is no unfairness in allowing cross-examination when testimony is given without invoking the privilege.
We may assume for purposes petitioner had pleaded not guilty and, having taken the stand at a trial, testified she did “some of it,” she could have been cross-examined on the frequency of her drug deliveries and the quantity of cocaine involved. The concerns which justify the cross-examination when the defendant testifies are absent at a plea colloquy, however. The purpose of a plea colloquy is to protect the defendant from an unintelligent or involuntary plea. The Government would turn this constitutional shield into a prosecutorial sword by having the defendant relinquish all rights against compelled self-incrimination upon entry of a guilty plea, including the right to remain silent at sentencing.
no the plea colloquy should entail such an extensive waiver of the privilege. Unlike the defendant taking the stand, who “cannot reasonably claim that the Fifth Amendment gives him ... an immunity from cross-examination on the matters he has himself put in dispute,” id., at 155-156, the defendant who pleads guilty puts nothing in dispute regarding the essentials of the offense. Rather, the defendant takes those matters out of dispute, often by making a joint statement with the prosecution or confirming the prosecution’s version of the facts. Under these circumstances, there is little danger that the court will be misled by selective disclosure. In this respect a guilty plea is more like an offer to stipulate than a decision to take the stand. Here, petitioner’s statement that she had done “some of” the proffered conduct did not pose a threat to the integrity of factfinding proceedings, for the purpose of the District Court’s inquiry was simply to ensure that petitioner understood the charges and that there was a factual basis for the Government’s case.
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, which governs pleas, contemplate the broad waiver the Government envisions. Rule 11 directs the district court, before accepting a guilty plea, to ascertain the defendant understands he or she is giving up “the right to be tried by a jury and at that trial . . . the right against compelled self-incrimination.” Rule 11(c)(3). The transcript of the plea colloquy in this case discloses that the District Court took care to comply with this and the other provisions of Rule 11. The District Court correctly instructed petitioner: “You have the right at trial to remain silent under the Fifth Amendment, or at your option, you can take the stand and tell the jury your side of this controversy.... If you plead guilty, all of those rights are gone.” App. 45.
nor Court’s explication of it indicates that the defendant consents to take the stand in the sentencing phase or to suffer adverse consequences from declining to do so. Both the Rule and the District Court’s admonition were to the effect that by entry of the plea petitioner would surrender the right “at trial” to invoke the privilege. As there was to be no trial, the warning would not have brought home to petitioner that she was also waiving the right to self-incrimination at sentencing. The purpose of Rule 11 is to inform the defendant of what she loses by forgoing the trial, not to elicit a waiver of the privilege for proceedings still to follow. A waiver of a right to trial with its attendant privileges is not a waiver of the privileges which exist beyond the confines of the trial.
Of course, a court may factual basis for a plea by “questioning] the defendant under oath, on the record, and in the presence of counsel about the offense to which the defendant has pleaded.” Rule 11(c)(5). We do not question the authority of a district court to make whatever inquiry it deems necessary in its sound discretion to assure itself the defendant is not being pressured to offer a plea for which there is no factual basis. A defendant who withholds information by invoking the privilege against self-incrimination at a plea colloquy runs the risk the district court will find the factual basis inadequate. At least once the plea has been accepted, statements or admissions made during the preceding plea colloquy are later admissible against the defendant, as is the plea itself. A statement admissible against a defendant, however, is not necessarily a waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination. Rule 11 does not prevent the defendant from relying upon the privilege at sentencing.
Treating a guilty plea as a sentencing would be a grave encroachment on the rights of defendants. At oral argument, we asked counsel for the United States whether, on the facts of this ease, if the Government had no reliable evidence of the amount of drugs involved, the prosecutor “could say, well, we can’t prove it, but we’d like to put her on the stand and cross-examine her and see if we can’t get her to admit it.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 45. Counsel answered: “[T]he waiver analysis that we have put forward suggests that at least as to the facts surrounding the conspiracy to which she admitted, the Government could do that.” Ibid. Over 90% of federal criminal defendants whose cases are not dismissed enter pleas of guilty or nolo contendere. U. S. Dept, of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 1996, p. 448 (24th ed. 1997). Were we to accept the Government’s position, prosecutors could indict without specifying the quantity of drugs involved, obtain a guilty plea, and then put the defendant on the stand at sentencing to fill in the drug quantity. The result would be to enlist the defendant as an instrument in his or her own condemnation, undermining the long tradition and vital principle that criminal proceedings rely on accusations proved by the Government, not on inquisitions conducted to enhance its own prosecutorial power. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U. S. 534, 541 (1961) (“[0]urs is an accusator-ial and not an inquisitorial system”).
that either petitioner’s guilty plea or her statements at the plea colloquy functioned as a waiver of her right to remain silent at sentencing.
B
The centerpiece of the Third Circuit’s opinion is the idea that the entry of the guilty plea completes the incrimination of the defendant, thus extinguishing the privilege. Where a sentence has yet to be imposed, however, this Court has already rejected the proposition that “ ‘incrimination is complete once guilt has been adjudicated,’ ” Estelle v. Smith, 451 U. S. 454, 462 (1981), and we reject it again today.
Appeals cited Wigmore on Evidence for the proposition that upon conviction ‘“criminality ceases; and with criminality the privilege.’” 122 F. 3d, at 191 (citing 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence §2279, p. 481 (J. McNaughton rev. 1961)). The passage relied upon does not support the Third Circuit’s narrow view of the privilege. The full passage is as follows: “Legal criminality consists in liability to the law’s punishment. When that liability is removed, criminality ceases; and with the criminality the privilege.” Ibid. It could be argued that liability for punishment continues until sentence has been imposed, and so does the privilege. Even if the Court of Appeals’ interpretation of the treatise were correct, however, and it means the privilege ceases upon conviction but before sentencing, we would respond that the suggested rule is simply wrong. A later supplement to the treatise, indeed, states the proper rule that, “[although the witness has pleaded guilty to a crime charged but has not been sentenced, his constitutional privilege remains unimpaired.” J. Wigmore, Evidence §2279, p. 991, n. 1 (A. Best ed. Supp. 1998).
It is true, as a general rule, that further incrimination, there is no basis for the assertion of the privilege. We conclude that principle applies to eases in which the sentence has been fixed and the judgment of conviction has become final. See, e.g., Reina v. United States, 364 U. S. 507, 518 (1960). If no adverse consequences can be visited upon the convicted person by reason of further testimony, then there is no further incrimination to be feared.
Where the sentence may have a legitimate fear of adverse consequences from further testimony. As the Court stated in Estelle: “Any effort by the State to compel [the defendant] to testify against his will at the sentencing hearing clearly would contravene the Fifth Amendment.” 451 U. S., at 463. Estelle was a capital case, but we find no reason not to apply the principle to noncapital sentencing hearings as well. “The essence of this basic constitutional principle is ‘the requirement that the State which proposes to convict and punish an individual produce the evidence against him by the independent labor of its officers, not by the simple, cruel expedient of forcing it from his own lips.’ ” Id., at 462 (emphasis in original) (quoting Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U. S. 568, 581-582 (1961)). The Government itself makes the implicit concession that the acceptance of a guilty plea does not eliminate the possibility of further incrimination. In its brief to the Court, the Government acknowledges that a defendant who awaits sentencing after having pleaded guilty may assert the privilege against self-incrimination if called as a witness in the trial of a codefendant, in part because of the danger of responding “to questions that might have an adverse impact on his sentence or on his prosecution for other crimes.” Brief for United States 31.
by its terms prevents a person from being “compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U. S. Const., Arndt. 5. To maintain that sentencing proceedings are not part of “any criminal ease” is contrary to the law and to common sense. As to the law, under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a court must impose sentence before a judgment of conviction can issue. See Rule 32(d)(1) (“A judgment of conviction must set forth the plea... and the sentence”); cf. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U. S. 128, 134 (1967). As to common sense, it appears that in this case, as is often true in the criminal justice system, the defendant was less concerned with the proof of her guilt or innocence than with the severity of her punishment. Petitioner faced imprisonment from one year upwards to life, depending on the circumstances of the crime. To say that she had no right to remain silent but instead could be compelled to cooperate in the deprivation of her liberty would ignore the Fifth Amendment privilege at the precise stage where, from her point of view, it was most important. Our rule is applicable whether or not the sentencing hearing is deemed a proceeding separate from the Rule 11 hearing, an issue we need not resolve.
Ill
The Government suggests in a footnote that even if petitioner retained an unwaived privilege against self-incrimination in the sentencing phase of her case, the District Court was entitled, based on her silence, to draw an adverse inference with regard to the amount of drugs attributable to her. Brief for United States 31-32, n. 18. The normal rule in a criminal case is that no negative inference from the defendant’s failure to testify is permitted. Griffin v. California, 380 U. S. 609,614 (1965). We decline to adopt an exception for the sentencing phase of a criminal ease with regard to factual determinations respecting the circumstances. and details of the crime.
This Fifth Amendment does not forbid adverse inferences against parties to civil actions when they refuse to testify in response to probative evidence offered against them,” Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U. S. 308, 318 (1976), at least where refusal to waive the privilege does not lead “automatically and without more to [the] imposition of sanctions,” Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U. S. 801, 808, n. 5 (1977). In ordinary civil eases, the party confronted with the invocation of the privilege by the opposing side has no capacity to avoid it, say, by offering immunity from prosecution. The rule allowing invocation of the privilege, though at the risk of suffering an adverse inference or even a default, accommodates the right not to be a witness against oneself while still permitting civil litigation to proceed. Another reason for treating civil and criminal eases differently is that “the stakes are higher” in criminal eases, where liberty or even life may be at stake, and where the government’s “sole interest is to convict.” Baxter, 425 U. S., at 318-319.
Baxter itself which, as the Court noted, “are not criminal proceedings” and “involve the correctional process and important state interests other than conviction for crime.” Id., at 316, 319. Cf. Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard, 523 U. S. 272 (1998) (adverse inference permissible from silence in clemency proceeding, a nonjudicial postconviction process which is not part of the criminal case). Unlike a prison disciplinary proceeding, a sentencing hearing is part of the criminal case — the explicit concern of the self-incrimination privilege. In accordance with the text of the Fifth Amendment, we must accord the privilege the same protection in the sentencing phase of “any criminal case” as that which is due in the trial phase of the same ease, see Griffin, supra.
concerns mandate the rule against negative inferences at a criminal trial apply with equal force at sentencing. Without question, the stakes are high: Here, the inference drawn by the District Court from petitioner’s silence may have resulted in decades of added imprisonment. The Government often has a motive to demand a severe sentence, so the central purpose of the privilege — to protect a defendant from being the unwilling instrument of his or her own condemnation — remains of vital importance.
today is a product of existing precedent, not only Griffin but also by Estelle v. Smith, in which the Court could “discern no basis to distinguish between the guilt and penalty phases of respondent’s capital murder trial so far as the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege is concerned.” 451 U. S., at 462-463. Although Estelle was a capital case, its reasoning applies with full force here, where the Government seeks to use petitioner’s silence to infer commission of disputed criminal acts. See supra, at 326. To say that an adverse factual inference may be drawn from silence at a sentencing hearing held to determine the specifics of the crime is to confine Griffin by ignoring Estelle. We are unwilling to truncate our precedents in this way.
from a defendant’s silence in criminal proceedings, including sentencing, is of proven utility. Some years ago the Court expressed concern that “[t]oo many, even those who should be better advised, view this privilege as a shelter for wrongdoers. They too readily assume that those who invoke it are either guilty of crime or commit perjury in claiming the privilege.” Ullmann v. United States, 350 U. S. 422, 426 (1956). Later, it quoted with apparent approval Wigmore’s observation that “ ‘[t]he layman’s natural first suggestion would probably be that the resort to privilege in each instance is a clear eonfession of crime,’ ” Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U. S. 333, 340, n. 10 (1978) (quoting 8 Wigmore, Evidence §2272, at 426). It is far from clear that citizens, and jurors, remain today so skeptical of the principle or are often willing to ignore the prohibition against adverse inferences from silence. Principles once unsettled can find general and wide acceptance in the legal culture, and there can be little doubt that the rule prohibiting an inference of guilt from a defendant’s rightful silence has become an essential feature of our legal tradition. This process began even before Griffin. When Griffin was being considered by this Court, some 44 States did not allow a prosecutor to invite the jury to make an adverse inference from the defendant’s refusal to testify at trial. See Griffin, swpra, at 611, n. 3. The rule against adverse inferences is a vital instrument for teaching that the question in a criminal case is not whether the defendant committed the acts of which he is accused. The question is whether the Government has carried its burden to prove its allegations while respecting the defendant’s individual rights. The Government retains the burden of proving facts relevant to the crime at the sentencing phase and cannot enlist the defendant in this process at the expense of the self-incrimination privilege. Whether silence bears upon the determination of a lack of remorse, or upon acceptance of responsibility for purposes of the downward adjustment provided in §3E1.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines (1998), is a separate question. It is not before us, and we express no view on it.
By holding petitioner’s silence against her in determining the facts of the offense at the sentencing hearing, the District Court imposed an impermissible burden on the exercise of the constitutional right against compelled self-incrimination. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is s
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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A
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Powell
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The State of New York requires retailers to charge at least 112 percent of the “posted” wholesale price for liquor, but permits wholesalers to sell to retailers at less than the “posted” price. The question presented is whether this pricing system is valid under either the state-action exemption from the antitrust laws or the Twenty-first Amendment.
hH
<C
Wholesalers of liquor in the State of New York must file, or “post,” monthly price schedules with the State Liquor Authority (SLA). N. Y. Aleo. Bev. Cont. Law (ABC Law) §101-b (McKinney 1970 and Supp. 1986). The schedules must report, “with respect to each item,” “the bottle and case price to retailers.” § 101-b(3)(b). The ABC Law itself does not require that the posted case price of an item bear any relation to its posted bottle price. The SLA, however, has promulgated a rule stating that for cases containing 48 or fewer bottles, the posted bottle price multiplied by the number of bottles in a case must exceed the posted case price by a “breakage” surcharge of $1.92. SLA Rule 16.4(e), 9 NYCRR § 65.4(e) (1980).
Retailers of liquor may not sell below “cost.” ABC Law, § 101-bb(2). The statute defines “cost” as “the price of such item of liquor to the retailer plus twelve percentum of such price.” § 101-bb(2)(b). “Price,” in turn, is defined as the posted bottle price in effect at the time the retailer sells or offers to sell the item. Ibid. Although the statute defines retail cost in terms of the wholesaler’s posted bottle price, retailers generally purchase liquor by the case. The SLA expressly has authorized wholesalers to reduce, or “post off,” the case price of an item without reducing the posted bottle price of the item. SLA Bulletin 471 (June 29, 1973). By reducing the case price without reducing the bottle price, wholesalers can compel retailers to charge more than 112 percent of the actual wholesale cost. Similarly, because § 101-bb(2)(b) defines “cost!’ in terms of the posted bottle price in effect when the retailer sells or offers to sell the item, wholesalers can sell retailers large quantities in a month when prices are low and then require the retailers to sell at an abnormally high markup by raising the bottle price in succeeding months. The New York retail pricing system thus permits wholesalers to set retail prices, and retail markups, without regard to actual retail costs. New York wholesalers advertise in trade publications that their “post offs” will guarantee retailers large markups, sometimes in excess of 30 percent. App. 32-35. Wholesalers also advertise that buying large quantities while wholesale prices are low will result in extra retail profits after wholesale prices are raised. App. to Juris. Statement 101 A. The effect of this complex of statutory provisions and regulations is to permit wholesalers to maintain retail prices at artificially high levels.
B
Appellant 324 Liquor Corporation sold two bottles of liquor to SLA investigators in June 1981 for less than 112 percent of the posted bottle price. Because the wholesalers had “posted off” their June 1981 case prices without reducing the posted bottle prices, appellant’s retail prices represented an 18 percent markup over its actual wholesale cost. As a result of this violation, appellant’s license was suspended for 10 days and it forfeited a $1,000 bond. Appellant sought relief from the penalties on the ground that § 101-bb violates § 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U. S. C. § 1. A New York Supreme Court denied the petition. 323 Liquor Corp. v. McLaughlin, 119 Misc. 2d 746, 464 N. Y. S. 2d 355 (1983). The Appellate Division reversed. 324 Liquor Corp. v. McLaughlin, 102 App. Div. 2d 607, 478 N. Y. S. 2d 615 (1984). The New York Court of Appeals upheld the validity of § 101-bb and reinstated the penalties. J. A. J. Liquor Store, Inc. v. New York State Liquor Authority, 64 N. Y. 2d 504, 479 N. E. 2d 779 (1985). The Court of Appeals held that § 101-bb is not immune under the state-action doctrine of Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341 (1943), because the State does not actively supervise the resale price maintenance system. The court nevertheless concluded that the statute is a proper exercise of powers reserved to the State by the Twenty-first Amendment, because “the State interest in protecting retailers which underlies [the statute] is of sufficient magnitude to override the Federal policy expressed in the antitrust laws.” J. A. J. Liquor Store, Inc. v. New York State Liquor Authority, supra, at 522, 479 N. E. 2d, at 789. We noted probable jurisdiction, 475 U. S. 1080 (1986), and we now reverse.
t — i
In California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U. S. 97 (1980), we invalidated a California statute requiring all producers, wholesalers, and rectifiers of wine to file fair trade contracts or price schedules with the State. Midcal establishes the framework for our analysis of New York’s liquor pricing system.
A
The “threshold question,” in this case as in Midcal, is whether the State’s pricing system is inconsistent with the antitrust laws. Id., at 102. Section 101-bb imposes a regime of resale price maintenance on all New York liquor retailers. Resale price maintenance has been a per se violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act “since the early years of national antitrust enforcement.” Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U. S. 752, 761 (1984). See Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co,, 220 U. S. 373, 404-409 (1911). Our recent decisions recognize the possibility that a vertical restraint imposed by a single manufacturer or wholesaler may stimulate interbrand competition even as. it reduces intrabrand competition. Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U. S. 36, 51-52 (1977). Accordingly, we have held that concerted nonprice restrictions imposed by a single manufacturer are to be judged under the rule of reason. Id., at 59. We also have held that a single manufacturer may announce resale prices in advance and refuse to deal with those who fail to comply. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., supra, at 761; United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U. S. 300, 307 (1919). Neither of these qualifications to the per se rule applies in this case. Section 101-bb directly restricts retail prices, and retailers are subject to penalties for failure to adhere to the resale price schedules. The New York statute, moreover, applies to all wholesalers and retailers of liquor. We have noted that industrywide resale price maintenance also may facilitate cartelization. Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., supra, at 51, n. 18. Mandatory industrywide resale price fixing is virtually certain to reduce interbrand competition as well as intrabrand competition, because it prevents manufacturers and wholesalers from allowing or requiring retail price competition. The New York statute specifically forbids retailers from reducing the minimum prices set by wholesalers.
The antitrust violation in this case is essentially similar to the violation in Midcal. It is true that the wholesalers in Midcal were required to adhere to a single fair trade contract or price schedule for each geographical area. 445 U. S., at 99-100. Midcal therefore involved horizontal as well as vertical price fixing. Although the horizontal restraint in Midcal may have provided an additional reason for invalidating the statute, our decision in Midcal rested on the “vertical control” of wine producers, who held “the power to prevent price competition by dictating the prices charged by wholesalers.” Id., at 103. As we explained in Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U. S. 654 (1982), the California statute was invalidated because “it mandated resale price maintenance, an activity that has long been regarded as a per se violation of the Sherman Act.” Id., at 659-660 (emphasis in original; footnote omitted). We hold that ABC Law § 101-bb is inconsistent with § 1 of the Sherman Act.
B
In Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341 (1943), the Court held that the Sherman Act does not apply “to the anticompetitive conduct of a State acting through its legislature.” Hallie v. Eau Claire, 471 U. S. 34, 38 (1985). Parker v. Brown rests on principles of federalism and state sovereignty. Under those principles, “an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state’s control over its officers and agents is not lightly to be attributed to Congress.” Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S., at 351. At the same time, “a state does not give immunity to those who violate the Sherman Act by authorizing them to violate it, or by declaring that their action is lawful.” Ibid. Our decisions have established a two-part test for determining immunity under Parker v. Brown. “First, the challenged restraint must be ‘one clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy’; second, the policy must be ‘actively supervised’ by the State itself.” California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., supra, at 105 (quoting Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 410 (1978) (plurality opinion)). New York’s liquor-pricing system meets the first requirement. The state legislature clearly has adopted a policy of resale price maintenance. Just as clearly, however, New York’s liquor-pricing system is not actively supervised by the State. As in Midcal, the State “simply authorizes price setting and enforces the prices established by private parties.” 445 U. S., at 105. New York “neither establishes prices nor reviews the reasonableness of the price schedules.” Ibid. New York “does not monitor market conditions or engage in any ‘pointed reexamination’ of the program.” Id., at 106 (quoting Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U. S. 350, 362 (1977)). Each wholesaler sets its own “posted” prices; the State does not control month-to-month variations in posted prices. Nor does the State supervise the wholesaler’s decision to “post off,” the amount of the “post off,” the corresponding decrease, if any, in the bottle price, or the frequency with which a wholesaler posts off. The State has displaced competition among liquor retailers without substituting an adequate system of regulation. “The national policy in favor of competition cannot be thwarted by casting such a gauzy cloak of state involvement over what is essentially a private price-fixing arrangement.” 445 U. S., at 106.
y — i ) — i i — t
Section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment reserves to the States the power to regulate, or prohibit entirely, the transportation or importation of intoxicating liquor within their borders. Section 2 “grants the States virtually complete control over whether to permit importation or sale of liquor and how to structure the liquor distribution system.” Mid-cal, 445 U. S., at 110. The States’ Twenty-first Amendment powers, though broad, are circumscribed by other provisions of the Constitution. See Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc., 459 U. S. 116, 122, n. 5 (1982) (Establishment Clause); Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190, 204-209 (1976) (Equal Protection Clause); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U. S. 433, 436 (1971) (procedural due process); Department of Revenue v. James Beam Co., 377 U. S. 341, 345-346 (1964) (Export-Import Clause). Although §2 directly qualifies the federal commerce power, the Court has rejected the view “that the Twenty-first Amendment has somehow operated to ‘repeal’ the Commerce Clause wherever regulation of intoxicating liquors is concerned.” Hostetter v. Idlewild Liquor Corp., 377 U. S. 324, 331-332 (1964). Instead, the Court has engaged in a “pragmatic effort to harmonize state and federal powers.” Midcal, supra, at 109. The question in each case is “whether the interests implicated by a state regulation are so closely related to the powers reserved by the Twenty-first Amendment that the regulation may prevail, notwithstanding that its requirements directly conflict with express federal policies.” Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U. S. 691, 714 (1984).
A
The New York Court of Appeals concluded that § 101-bb “was expressly designed to preserve competition in New York’s retail liquor industry by stabilizing the retail market and protecting the economic position of small liquor retailers.” J. A. J. Liquor Store, Inc. v. New York State Liquor Authority, 64 N. Y. 2d, at 520, 479 N. E. 2d, at 788. The Court of Appeals traced the recent history of the State’s regulation of retail liquor prices. In early 1964, the Moreland Commission completed an extensive study of the state laws governing the sale and distribution of alcoholic beverages. New York State Moreland Comm’n on the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law, Report and Recommendations Nos. 1-3 (1964). “The Commission’s major findings were that New York consumers suffered from serious price discrimination when compared to liquor consumers in other States and that a severe lack of competition existed in the New York retail market.” J. A. J. Liquor Store, Inc. v. New York State Liquor Authority, supra, at 519, 479 N. E. 2d, at 787. The New York Legislature responded in 1964 by enacting sweeping changes in the ABC Law primarily intended to promote price competition among liquor retailers. Ibid. The 1964 version of § 101-bb prohibited retail sales below cost and defined cost as the bottle price in effect when the retailer sells or offers to sell the item. ABC Law § 101-bb (McKinney 1970). During the years between 1964 and 1971, the number of liquor stores in New York declined. The State Senate Excise Committee investigated the decline and concluded that “the mass of small retailers are unable to compete with the large volume outlets that have emerged.” New York State Legislature, Senate Excise Committee, Final Report 29-30 (Mar. 5, 1971). In 1971 the legislature enacted the current version of ABC Law § 101-bb to “protec[t] the economic position of small liquor retailers.” J. A. J. Liquor Store, Inc. v. New York State Liquor Authority, supra, at 520, 479 N. E. 2d, at 788.
We agree with the New York Court of Appeals that the purpose of the 12-percent minimum markup is to protect small retailers. We have noted that the 12-percent markup is imposed on the “posted bottle price,” a price that may differ from the actual wholesale price paid by the retailer. See supra, at 339-340. There is no indication in the statute or its legislative history, however, that the purpose of defining cost as “posted bottle price” was to protect small retailers. The New York Legislature first defined cost in terms of posted bottle price in the 1964 amendments to the ABC Law. The purpose of those amendments, as the New York Court of Appeals found, was to increase price competition among liquor retailers. The 1971 amendments simply retained bottle price as the basis of the statutory definition of cost and added 12 percent to reflect the retailer’s overhead and operating expenses. Indeed, the legislative Committee that considered the 1971 amendments concluded that the bottle price definition of cost put small retailers at a slight disadvantage. The Committee noted that “[t]he present definition of ‘cost’ [as] scheduled bottle cost to the retailer does afford some margin of profit to large retailers in particular, and, to a lesser extent, to all retailers who can afford to buy by the case.” New York State Senate Excise Committee, Final Report, supra, at 8-9. The Committee suggested that “consideration be accorded to... [r]evision or elimination of... ‘post offs’ practices that appear to afford discriminatory advantages to possession of great purchasing power.” Id., at 41. The Committee did not recommend an amendment to this effect because it considered the matter “outside the scope of the directive given to this Committee.” Ibid.
In Midcal, we found nothing in the record to suggest that California’s wine-pricing system actually helped sustain small retailers. 445 U. S., at 113. Similarly, in this case the New York Court of Appeals cited no legislative or other findings that either the minimum markup requirement or the “bottle price” definition of cost has been effective in preserving small retail establishments, and made no findings of its own. Our Midcal opinion cites evidence that States with “fair trade laws” not unlike ABC Law § 101-bb actually had higher rates of firm failure, and slower rates of growth of small retail stores, than free trade States in the years between 1956 and 1972. 445 U. S., at 113 (citing S. Rep. No. 94-466, p. 3 (1975)). The only relevant evidence in the record indicates that the number of retail liquor outlets in New York continued to decline between 1970 and 1979. App. to Juris Statement 99A. We are unwilling to assume on the basis of this record that § 101-bb has the effect of protecting small retailers.
In this case, as in Midcal, the State’s unsubstantiated interest in protecting small retailers “simply [is] not of the same stature as the goals of the Sherman Act.” 445 U. S., at 114. New York’s resale price maintenance system directly conflicts with the “familiar and substantial” federal interest in enforcement of the antitrust laws. Id., at 110. “Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular... are as important to the preservation of economic freedom and our free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms.” United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U. S. 596, 610 (1972). We therefore conclude that the State’s asserted interest in protecting small retailers does not suffice to afford immunity from the Sherman Act.
B
Appellees finally argue that § 101-bb furthers the State’s interest in promoting temperance. Brief for Appellees 39-44. One would hardly suggest that the New York Legislature set out to promote temperance by increasing the number of retail outlets for liquor. Rather, appellees argue that New York’s pricing system has the effect of raising retail prices, and that higher prices decrease consumption of liquor. The New York Court of Appeals did not find that the statute was intended to promote temperance, or that it does so. On the contrary, that court cited the conclusion of the Moreland Commission that higher prices do not decrease consumption of liquor. J. A. J. Liquor Store, Inc. v. New York State Liquor Authority, 64 N. Y. 2d, at 521, n. 2, 479 N. E. 2d, at 788, n. 2 (citing Moreland Comm’n Report No. 1, at 3, 17). Of course, we are not bound by findings of the Court of Appeals that undercut powers reserved by the Twenty-first Amendment. Midcal, supra, at 111; Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U. S. 652, 659 (1945). We nevertheless accord “great weight to the views of the State’s highest court” on state-law matters, Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U. S. 95, 100 (1938), and customarily accept the factual findings of state courts in the absence of exceptional circumstances. Midcal, supra, at 111-112. Our review of the record discloses no such exceptional circumstances in this case. We therefore do not reach the question whether New York’s liquor-pricing system could be upheld as an exercise of the State’s power to promote temperance.
I — I <1
We conclude that the Twenty-first Amendment provides no immunity for New York’s authorization of private, unsupervised price fixing by liquor wholesalers. We therefore reverse the judgment of the New York Court of Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Section 101 — b(3)(b) provides, in part:
“No brand of liquor or wine shall be sold to or purchased by a retailer unless a schedule, as provided by this section, is filed with the liquor authority, and is then in effect. Such schedule shall be in writing duly verified, and filed in the number of copies and form as required by the authority, and shall contain, with respect to each item, the exact brand or trade name, capacity of package, nature of contents, age and proof where stated on the label, the number of bottles contained in each case, the bottle and case price to retailers, the net bottle and case price paid by the seller, which prices, in each instance, shall be individual for each item and not in ‘combination’ with any other item, the discounts for quantity, if any, and the discounts for time of payment, if any. Such brand of liquor or wine shall not be sold to retailers except at the price and discounts then in effect unless prior written permission of the authority is granted for good cause shown and for reasons not inconsistent with the purpose of this chapter. Such schedule shall be filed by each manufacturer selling such brand to retailers and by each wholesaler selling such brand to retailers.”
Rule 16.4(e), 9 NYCRR § 65.4(e) (1980), provides:
“For each item of liquor listed in the schedule of liquor prices to retailers there shall be posted a bottle and a case price. The bottle price multiplied by number of containers in the case must exceed the case price by approximately $1.92 for any case of 48 or fewer containers. The figure is to be reached by adding $1.92 to the case price, dividing by the number of containers in the case, and rounding to the nearest cent. Where more than 48 containers are packed in a case, bottle price shall be computed by dividing the case price by the number of containers in the case, rounding to the nearest cent, and adding one cent. Variations will not be permitted without approval of the authority.”
Section 101-bb(2) provides, in part:
“No licensee authorized to sell liquor at retail for off-premises consumption shall sell, offer to sell, solicit an order for or advertise any item of liquor at a price which is less than cost. As used in this section, the term:
“(b) 'cost' shall mean the price of such item of liquor to the retailer plus twelve percentum of such price, which is declared as a matter of legislative determination to represent the average minimum overhead necessarily incurred in connection with the sale by the retailer of such item of liquor. As used in this paragraph (b) the term “price” shall mean the bottle price to retailers, before any discounts, contained in the applicable schedule filed with the liquor authority pursuant to section one hundred one-b of this chapter by a manufacturer or wholesaler from whom the retailer purchases liquor and which is in effect at the time the retailer sells or offers to sell such item of liquor; except, that where no applicable schedule is in effect the bottle price of the item of liquor shall be computed as the appropriate fraction of the case price of such item, before any discounts, most recently invoiced to the retailer.”
Bulletin 471 provides, in part:
“Case prices may be posted off for any given month, or months, without an accompanying reduction in bottle prices. The wholesaler is given these choices during the period of a post-off:
“1. May elect not to reduce the bottle price, in which case the legal bottle price will be the base for the 12% retail mark-up.
“2. May reduce the bottle price to conform with the post-off case price, consistent with Rule 16.4(e), in which ease the reduced bottle price will be the base for the 12% mark-up.
“3. May adopt a bottle price any where between the extremes authorized under ‘1’ and ‘2’ above, in which case the reduced bottle price will be the base for the 12% mark-up.
“Wholesalers of liquor will note that pursuant to these changes no control is placed on the number of consecutive months during which post-offs may be scheduled.”
The Court of Appeals suggested that the liquor-pricing system prevents “temporary price reductions... threatening to drive small retailers out of business and consolidating control of the market in the hands of a relatively few mass distributors who could then dictate prices to the ultimate injury of consumers....” J. A. J. Liquor Store, Inc. v. New York State Liquor Authority, 64 N. Y. 2d 504, 520, 479 N. E. 2d 779, 788 (1985). In Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U. S. 574 (1986), we recognized that predatory pricing schemes are “rarely tried, and even more rarely successful.” Id., at 589. In this case, the possibility of success is practically nonexistent, because liquor retailers are limited to a single outlet. ABC Law §63.5 (McKinney 1970). In any event, § 101-bb forbids not only predatory pricing, but all price competition among retailers.
A simple “minimum markup” statute requiring retailers to charge 112 percent of their actual wholesale cost may satisfy the “active supervision” requirement, and so be exempt from the antitrust laws under Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341 (1943). See Morgan v. Division of Liquor Control, Conn. Dept. of Business Regulation, 664 F. 2d 353 (CA21981) (upholding a simple markup statute). Section 101-bb, however, is not a simple minimum markup statute because it imposes a markup on the “posted bottle price,” a price that may greatly exceed what the retailer actually paid for the liquor. As we have explained, supra, at 339-340, Bulletin 471 permits wholesalers to reduce the case price — the price actually paid by most retailers — without reducing the bottle price. The New York Court of Appeals expressly held that Bulletin 471 “is consistent with Alcoholic Beverage Control Law § 101-b(3) which does not mandate any price ratio between scheduled case and bottle prices.” J. A. J. Liquor Store, Inc. v. New York State Liquor Authority, supra, at 523, 479 N. E. 2d, at 790. We may not “construe a state statute contrary to the construction given it by the highest court of a State.” O’Brien v. Skinner, 414 U. S. 524, 531 (1974). Appellees nevertheless argue that invalidation of Bulletin 471 does not require invalidation of § 101-bb. Appellees contend that § 101-bb does not prevent the SLA from establishing a relationship between case price and bottle price; indeed, Rule 16.4(e) establishes such a relationship. Brief for Appellees 24-25, n. 37. Invalidation of Bulletin 471 alone, however, would not prevent wholesalers from selling large quantities at low prices in one month, and then requiring retailers to charge abnormally high markups by raising bottle prices in subsequent months. See supra, at 340. We cannot accept appellees’ suggestion that such unsupervised price fixing should be tolerated as a reasonable accounting method or as a hedge against inflation. See App. to Juris. Statement 101A (advertising a guaranteed 31.3 percent markup on liquor purchased in August 1984 and sold in September 1984). We thus have no occasion to consider whether a simple minimum markup statute would be entitled to antitrust immunity under Parker v. Brown.
Some States completely control the distribution of liquor within their boundaries. E. g., Va. Code §§4-15, 4-28 (1983). Such comprehensive regulation is immune under Parker v. Broion because the State substitutes its own power for “unfettered business freedom.” See New Motor Vehicle Bd. of Cal. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U. S. 96, 109 (1978).
In a concurring opinion, Judge Jasen argued that the State actively supervises the liquor-pricing system. J. A. J. Liquor Store, Inc. v. New York State Liquor Authority, supra, at 526-529, 479 N. E. 2d, at 792-794. Judge Jasen noted that the SLA can respond to market conditions by permitting individual wholesalers to depart from their posted prices, ABC Law § 101 — b(3)(b), and by permitting individual retailers to sell below the statutory definition of “cost,” § 101-bb(3), “for good cause shown.” Bulletin 471 itself was issued by the SLA in response to market conditions. Moreover, the state legislature frequently considers proposals to alter the liquor-pricing system. Neither the “monitoring” by the SLA, nor the periodic reexaminations by the state legislature, exerts any significant control over retail liquor prices or markups. Thus, the State’s involvement does not satisfy the second requirement of Midcal.
The same considerations lead us to reject appellees’ contention that there is no “contract, combination..., or conspiracy, in restraint of trade.” 15 U. S. C. § 1. Where “private actors are... granted ‘a degree of private regulatory power’... the regulatory scheme may be attacked under § 1” as a “hybrid” restraint. Fisher v. Berkeley, 475 U. S. 260, 268 (1986) (quoting Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U. S. 654, 666, n. 1 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment)). See Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U. S. 384 (1961). Our decisions reflect the principle that the federal antitrust laws pre-empt state laws authorizing or compelling private parties to engage in anticompetitive behavior. See also Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U. S. 197, 346-346 (1904) (plurality opinion); 1 P. Areeda & D. Turner, Antitrust Law ¶209, pp. 60-62 (1978). That principle squarely governs this case.
Section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment provides: “The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.”
The dissenting opinion concedes that “neither the House of Representatives nor the state ratifying conventions deliberated long on the powers conferred on the States by § 2.” Post, at 353. It nevertheless maintains that the Senate debates “clearly demonstrate an intent to confer on States complete and exclusive control over the commerce of liquor.” Post, at 354. We find no such clear demonstration of congressional intent. It is true that Senator Blaine, the Senate sponsor of the Amendment, at one point stated that the purpose of § 2 was “to restore to the States... absolute control in effect over interstate commerce affecting intoxicating liquors... 76 Cong. Rec. 4143 (1933). At another point, however, Senator Blaine appeared to advance a narrower interpretation: “So, to assure the so-called dry States against the importation of intoxicating liquor into those States, it is proposed to write permanently into the Constitution a prohibition along that line.” Id., at 4141.
The dissent also maintains that the behavior of the States following ratification supports the view that States have power to enact laws governing the pricing of liquor free of the strictures of federal antitrust policy. One commentator is quoted as saying that the States adopted “ ‘bold and drastic experiments’” in price control. Post, at 357, quoting De Ganahl, Trade Practice and Price Control in the Alcoholic Beverage Industry, 7 Law & Contemp. Prob. 665, 680 (1940). In the next paragraph, however, this writer states that “[b]eeause the experiments came at a time when neither the fair-trade law nor the constitutional law on liquor was settled... there is uncertainty as to the validity of much of this legislation.” Ibid. When the Twenty-first Amendment was adopted, it was far from clear that the federal commerce power extended to intrastate retail sales of liquor. See A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, 542-548 (1935) (holding that the commerce power does not extend to intrastate sales of poultry, even when the poultry has been shipped across state lines). The Miller-Tydings Fair Trade Act of 1937, 50 Stat. 693, moreover, permitted States to authorize agreements prescribing prices for the resale of specified commodities, including liquor. Even after the passage of the Miller-Tydings Act, price control laws were not as universally popular as the dissent implies. In 1940, for example, only 18 of the 45 “wet” States had price stabilization provisions written into their alcoholic beverage statutes, De Ganahl, supra, at 680, while in 17 States the State itself monopolized sales of liquor, Shipman, State Administrative Machinery for Liquor Control, 7 Law & Contemp. Prob. 600, 601, n. 5 (1940).
There is no indication that the purpose of Bulletin 471 is to protect small retailers. The Bulletin states that its purpose is to prevent “a situation during post-off periods which resulted in what became known as a ‘two bottle’ price.” App. to Juris. Statement 71A. Although there is no precise explanation of “two bottle pricing” in the record, the caption of Bulletin 471 is “Unlawful Discrimination and Price Scheduling — Bottle Price During Post-Down.” Ibid. This suggests that the SLA was concerned with ensuring that wholesalers charge the same price to all retailers, and not with the relationship between the retailer’s actual cost and the required markup.
We have no occasion in this case to consider whether the State’s interest in protecting small retailers ever could prevail against the federal interest in enforcement of the antitrust laws.
It is far from certain that the New York Legislature intended to promote temperance, or that the retail price maintenance system actually decreases consumption. Section 101-bb, like other sections of the ABC Law, recites that it
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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H
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
In 1997, the United Kingdom (U.K.) imposed a one-time "windfall tax" on 32 U.K. companies privatized between 1984 and 1996. This case addresses whether that tax is creditable for U.S. tax purposes. Internal Revenue Code § 901(b)(1) states that any "income, war profits, and excess profits taxes" paid overseas are creditable against U.S. income taxes. 26 U.S.C. § 901(b)(1). Treasury Regulations interpret this section to mean that a foreign tax is creditable if its "predominant character" "is that of an income tax in the U.S. sense." Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2(a)(1)(ii), 26 C.F.R. § 1.901-2(a)(1) (1992). Consistent with precedent and the Tax Court's analysis below, we apply the predominant character test using a commonsense approach that considers the substantive effect of the tax. Under this approach, we hold that the U.K. tax is creditable under § 901 and reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
I
A
During the 1980's and 1990's, the U.K.'s Conservative Party controlled Parliament and privatized a number of government-owned companies. These companies were sold to private parties through an initial sale of shares, known as a "flotation." As part of privatization, many companies were required to continue providing services at the same rates they had offered under government control for a fixed period, typically their first four years of private operation. As a result, the companies could only increase profits during this period by operating more efficiently. Responding to market incentives, many of the companies became dramatically more efficient and earned substantial profits in the process.
The U.K.'s Labour Party, which had unsuccessfully opposed privatization, used the companies' profitability as a campaign issue against the Conservative Party. In part because of campaign promises to tax what it characterized as undue profits, the Labour Party defeated the Conservative Party at the polls in 1997. Prior to coming to power, Labour Party leaders hired accounting firm Arthur Andersen to structure a tax that would capture excess, or "windfall," profits earned during the initial years in which the companies were prohibited from increasing rates. Parliament eventually adopted the tax, which applied only to the regulated companies that were prohibited from raising their rates. See Finance (No. 2) Act, 1997, ch. 58, pt. I, cls. 1 and 2(5) (Eng.) (U.K. Windfall Tax Act). It imposed a 23 percent tax on any "windfall" earned by such companies. Id., cl. 1(2). A separate schedule "se[t] out how to quantify the windfall from which a company was benefitting." Id., cl. 1(3). See id., sched. 1.
In the proceedings below, the parties stipulated that the following formula summarizes the tax imposed by the Labour Party:
P Tax = 23% [(365 × (-) × 9) - FV] D
D equals the number of days a company was subject to rate regulation (also known as the "initial period"), P equals the total profits earned during the initial period, and FV equals the flotation value, or market capitalization value after sale. For 27 of the 32 companies subject to the tax, the number of days in the initial period was 1,461 days (or four years). Of the remaining five companies, one had no tax liability because it did not earn any windfall profits. Three had initial periods close to four years (1,463, 1,456, and 1,380 days). The last was privatized shortly before the Labour Party took power and had an initial period of only 316 days.
The number 9 in the formula was characterized as a price-to-earnings ratio and was selected because it represented the lowest average price-to-earnings ratio of the 32 companies subject to the tax during the relevant period. See id., sched. 1, § 1, cl. 2(3); Brief for Respondent 7. The statute expressly set its value, and that value was the same for all companies. U.K. Windfall Tax Act, sched. 1, § 1, cl. 2(3). The only variables that changed in the windfall tax formula for all the companies were profits (P) and flotation value (FV); the initial period (D) varied for only a few of the companies subject to the tax. The Labour government asserted that the term [365 x (P/D) x 9] represented what the flotation value should have been given the assumed price-to-earnings ratio of 9. Thus, it claimed (and the Commissioner here reiterates) that the tax was simply a 23 percent tax on the difference between what the companies' flotation values should have been and what they actually were.
B
Petitioner PPL Corporation (PPL) was an owner, through a number of subsidiaries, of 25 percent of South Western Electricity plc, 1 of 12 government-owned electric companies that were privatized in 1990 and that were subject to the tax. See 135 T.C. 304, 307, App. (2010) (diagram of PPL corporate structure in 1997). South Western Electricity's total U.K. windfall tax burden was £90,419,265. In its 1997 federal income-tax return, PPL claimed a credit under § 901 for its share of the bill. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Commissioner) rejected the claim, but the Tax Court held that the U.K. windfall tax was creditable for U.S. tax purposes under § 901. See id., at 342. The Third Circuit reversed. 665 F.3d 60, 68 (2011). We granted certiorari, 568 U.S. ----, 133 S.Ct. 571, 184 L.Ed.2d 338 (2012), to resolve a Circuit split concerning the windfall tax's creditability under § 901. Compare 665 F.3d, at 68, with Entergy Corp. & Affiliated Subsidiaries v. Commissioner, 683 F.3d 233, 239 (C.A.5 2012).
II
Internal Revenue Code § 901(b)(1) provides that "[i]n the case of ... a domestic corporation, the amount of any income, war profits, and excess profits taxes paid or accrued during the taxable year to any foreign country or to any possession of the United States" shall be creditable. Under relevant Treasury Regulations, "[a] foreign levy is an income tax if and only if ... [t]he predominant character of that tax is that of an income tax in the U.S. sense." 26 C.F.R. § 1.901-2(a)(1). The parties agree that Treasury Regulation § 1.901-2 applies to this case. That regulation codifies longstanding doctrine dating back to Biddle v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 573, 578-579, 58 S.Ct. 379, 82 L.Ed. 431 (1938), and provides the relevant legal standard.
The regulation establishes several principles relevant to our inquiry. First, the "predominant character" of a tax, or the normal manner in which a tax applies, is controlling.
See id., at 579, 58 S.Ct. 379 ("We are here concerned only with the 'standard' or normal tax"). Under this principle, a foreign tax that operates as an income, war profits, or excess profits tax in most instances is creditable, even if it may affect a handful of taxpayers differently. Creditability is an all or nothing proposition. As the Treasury Regulations confirm, "a tax either is or is not an income tax, in its entirety, for all persons subject to the tax." 26 C.F.R. § 1.901-2(a)(1).
Second, the way a foreign government characterizes its tax is not dispositive with respect to the U.S. creditability analysis. See § 1.901-2(a)(1)(ii) (foreign tax creditable if predominantly "an income tax in the U.S. sense"). In Biddle, the Court considered the creditability of certain U.K. taxes on stock dividends under the substantively identical predecessor to § 901. The Court recognized that "there is nothing in [the statute's] language to suggest that in allowing the credit for foreign tax payments, a shifting standard was adopted by reference to foreign characterizations and classifications of tax legislation." 302 U.S., at 578-579, 58 S.Ct. 379. See also United States v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 493 U.S. 132, 145, 110 S.Ct. 462, 107 L.Ed.2d 449 (1989) (noting in interpreting 26 U.S.C. § 902 that Biddle is particularly applicable "where a contrary interpretation would leave" tax interpretation "to the varying tax policies of foreign tax authorities"); Heiner v. Mellon, 304 U.S. 271, 279, and n. 7, 58 S.Ct. 926, 82 L.Ed. 1337 (1938) (state-law definitions generally not controlling in federal tax context). Instead of the foreign government's characterization of the tax, the crucial inquiry is the tax's economic effect. See Biddle,supra, at 579, 58 S.Ct. 379 (inquiry is "whether [a tax] is the substantial equivalent of payment of the tax as those terms are used in our own statute"). In other words, foreign tax creditability depends on whether the tax, if enacted in the U.S., would be an income, war profits, or excess profits tax.
Giving further form to these principles, Treasury Regulation § 1.901-2(a)(3)(i) explains that a foreign tax's predominant character is that of a U.S. income tax "[i]f ... the foreign tax is likely to reach net gain in the normal circumstances in which it applies." The regulation then sets forth three tests for assessing whether a foreign tax reaches net gain. A tax does so if, "judged on the basis of its predominant character, [it] satisfies each of the realization, gross receipts, and net income requirements set forth in paragraphs (b)(2), (b)(3) and (b)(4), respectively, of this section." § 1.901-2(b)(1). The tests indicate that net gain (also referred to as net income) consists of realized gross receipts reduced by significant costs and expenses attributable to such gross receipts. A foreign tax that reaches net income, or profits, is creditable.
III
A
It is undisputed that net income is a component of the U.K.'s "windfall tax"
formula. See Brief for Respondent 23 ("The windfall tax takes into account a company's profits during its four-year initial period"). Indeed, annual profit is a variable in the tax formula. U.K. Windfall Tax Act, sched. 1, § 1, cls. 2(2) and 5. It is also undisputed that there is no meaningful difference for our purposes in the accounting principles by which the U.K. and the U.S. calculate profits. See Brief for Petitioners 47. The disagreement instead centers on how to characterize the tax formula the Labour Party adopted.
The Third Circuit, following the Commissioner's lead, believed it could look no further than the tax formula that the Parliament enacted and the way in which the Labour government characterized it. Under that view, the windfall tax must be considered a tax on the difference between a company's flotation value (the total amount investors paid for the company when the government sold it) and an imputed "profit-making value," defined as a company's "average annual profit during its 'initial period' ... times 9, the assumed price-to-earnings ratio." 665 F.3d, at 65. So characterized, the tax captures a portion of the difference between the price at which each company was sold and the price at which the Labour government believed each company should have been sold given the actual profits earned during the initial period. Relying on this characterization, the Third Circuit believed the windfall tax failed at least the Treasury Regulation's realization and gross receipts tests because it reached some artificial form of valuation instead of profits. See id., at 67, and n. 3.
In contrast, PPL's position is that the substance of the windfall tax is that of an income tax in the U.S. sense. While recognizing that the tax ostensibly is based on the difference between two values, it argues that every "variable" in the windfall tax formula except for profits and flotation value is fixed (at least with regard to 27 of the 32 companies). PPL emphasizes that the only way the Labour government was able to calculate the imputed "profit-making value" at which it claimed companies should have been privatized was by looking after the fact at the actual profits earned by each company. In PPL's view, it matters not how the U.K. chose to arrange the formula or what it claimed to be taxing, because a tax based on profits above some threshold is an excess profits tax, regardless of how it is mathematically arranged or what labels foreign law places on it. PPL, thus, contends that the windfall taxes it paid meet the Treasury Regulation's tests and are creditable under § 901.
We agree with PPL and conclude that the predominant character of the windfall tax is that of an excess profits tax, a category of income tax in the U.S. sense. It is important to note that the Labour government's conception of "profit-making value" as a backward-looking analysis of historic profits is not a recognized valuation method; instead, it is a fictitious value calculated using an imputed price-to-earnings ratio. At trial, one of PPL's expert witnesses explained that " '9 is not an accurate P/E multiple, and it is not applied to current or expected future earnings.' " 135 T. C., at 326, n. 17 (quoting testimony). Instead, the windfall tax is a tax on realized net income disguised as a tax on the difference between two values, one of which is completely fictitious. See App. 251, Report ¶ 1.7 ("[T]he value in profit making terms described in the wording of the act ... is not a real value: it is rather a construct based on realised profits that would not have been known at the date of privatisation").
The substance of the windfall tax confirms the accuracy of this observation. As already noted, the parties stipulated that the windfall tax could be calculated as follows:
P Tax = 23% [(365 × (-) × 9) - FV] D
This formula can be rearranged algebraically to the following formula, which is mathematically and substantively identical:
(365 × 9 × 23%) D Tax = [---------------] × {P - [FV × ---------]} D (365 × 9)
The next step is to substitute the actual number of days for D. For 27 of the 32 companies subject to the windfall tax, the number of days was identical, 1,461 (or four years). Inserting that amount for D in the formula yields the following:
(365 × 9 × 23%) 1,461 Tax = [---------------] × {P - [FV × ---------]} 1,461 (365 × 9)
Simplifying the formula by multiplying and dividing numbers reduces the formula to:
FV Tax = 51.71% × [P - (--) × 4.0027] 9
As noted, FV represents the value at which each company was privatized. FV is then divided by 9, the arbitrary "price-to-earnings ratio" applied to every company. The economic effect is to convert flotation value into the profits a company should have earned given the assumed price-to-earnings ratio. See 135 T. C., at 327 (" 'In effect, the way the tax works is to say that the amount of profits you're allowed in any year before you're subject to tax is equal to one-ninth of the flotation price. After that, profits are deemed excess, and there is a tax' " (quoting testimony from the treasurer of South Western Electricity plc)). The annual profits are then multiplied by 4.0027, giving the total "acceptable" profits (as opposed to windfall profit) that each company's flotation value entitled it to earn during the initial period given the artificial price-to-earnings ratio of 9. This fictitious amount is finally subtracted from actual profits, yielding the excess profits, which were taxed at an effective rate of 51.71 percent.
The rearranged tax formula demonstrates that the windfall tax is economically equivalent to the difference between the profits each company actually earned and the amount the Labour government believed it should have earned given its flotation value. For the 27 companies that had 1,461-day initial periods, the U.K. tax formula's substantive effect was to impose a 51.71 percent tax on all profits earned above a threshold. That is a classic excess profits tax. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 3, 1917, ch. 159, Tit. II, § 201, 39 Stat. 1000 (8 percent tax imposed on excess profits exceeding the sum of $5,000 plus 8 percent of invested capital).
Of course, other algebraic reformulations of the windfall tax equation are possible. See 665 F.3d, at 66; Brief for Anne Alstott et al. as Amici Curiae 21-23 (Alstott Brief). The point of the reformulation is not that it yields a particular percentage (51.75 percent for most of the companies). Rather, the algebraic reformulations illustrate the economic substance of the tax and its interrelationship with net income.
The Commissioner argues that any algebraic rearrangement is improper, asserting that U.S. courts must take the foreign tax rate as written and accept whatever tax base the foreign tax purports to adopt. Brief for Respondent 28. As a result, the Commissioner claims that the analysis begins and ends with the Labour government's choice to characterize its tax base as the difference between "profit-making value" and flotation value. Such a rigid construction is unwarranted. It cannot be squared with the black-letter principle that "tax law deals in economic realities, not legal abstractions." Commissioner v. Southwest Exploration Co., 350 U.S. 308, 315, 76 S.Ct. 395, 100 L.Ed. 347 (1956). Given the artificiality of the U.K.'s method of calculating purported "value," we follow substance over form and recognize that the windfall tax is nothing more than a tax on actual profits above a threshold.
B
We find the Commissioner's other arguments unpersuasive as well. First, the Commissioner attempts to buttress the argument that the windfall tax is a tax on value by noting that some U.S. gift and estate taxes use actual, past profits to estimate value. Brief for Respondent 17-18 (citing 26 C.F.R. § 20.2031-3 (2012) and 26 U.S.C. § 2032A ). This argument misses the point. In the case of valuation for gift and estate taxes, past income may be used to estimate future income streams. But, it is future revenue-earning potential, reduced to market value, that is subject to taxation. The windfall profits tax, by contrast, undisputedly taxed past, realized net income alone.
The Commissioner contends that the U.K. was not trying to establish valuation as of the 1997 date on which the windfall tax was enacted but instead was attempting to derive a proper flotation valuation as of each company's flotation date. Brief for Respondent 21. The Commissioner asserts that there was no need to estimate future income (as in the case of the gift or estate recipient) because actual revenue numbers for the privatized companies were available. Ibid. That argument also misses the mark. It is true, of course, that the companies might have been privatized at higher flotation values had the government recognized how efficient-and thus how profitable-the companies would become. But, the windfall tax requires an underlying concept of value (based on actual ex post earnings) that would be alien to any valuer. Taxing actual, realized net income in hindsight is not the same as considering past income for purposes of estimating future earning potential.
The Commissioner's reliance on Example 3 to the Treasury Regulation's gross receipts test is also misplaced. Id., at 37-38; 26 C.F.R. § 1.901-2(b)(3)(ii), Ex. 3. That example posits a petroleum tax in which "gross receipts from extraction income are deemed to equal 105 percent of the fair market value of petroleum extracted. This computation is designed to produce an amount that is greater than the fair market value of actual gross receipts."Ibid. Under the example, a tax based on inflated gross receipts is not creditable.
The Third Circuit believed that the same type of algebraic rearrangement used above could also be used to rearrange a tax imposed on Example 3. It hypothesized:
"Say that the tax rate on the hypothetical extraction tax is 20%. It is true that a 20% tax on 105% of receipts is mathematically equivalent to a 21% tax on 100% of receipts, the latter of which would satisfy the gross receipts requirement. PPL proposes that we make the same move here, increasing the tax rate from 23% to 51.75% so that there is no multiple of receipts in the tax base. But if the regulation allowed us to do that, the example would be a nullity. Any tax on a multiple of receipts or profits could satisfy the gross receipts requirement, because we could reduce the starting point of its tax base to 100% of gross receipts by imagining a higher tax rate." 665 F.3d, at 67.
The Commissioner reiterates the Third Circuit's argument. Brief for Respondent 37-38.
There are three basic problems with this approach. As the Fifth Circuit correctly recognized, there is a difference between imputed and actual receipts. "Example 3 hypothesizes a tax on the extraction of petroleum where the income value of the petroleum is deemed to be ... deliberately greater than actual gross receipts." Entergy Corp., 683 F.3d, at 238. In contrast, the windfall tax depends on actual figures. Ibid. ("There was no need to calculate imputed gross receipts; gross receipts were actually known"). Example 3 simply addresses a different foreign taxation issue.
The argument also incorrectly equates imputed gross receipts under Example 3 with net income . See 665 F.3d, at 67 ("[a]ny tax on a multiple of receipts or profits"). As noted, a tax is creditable only if it applies to realized gross receipts reduced by significant costs and expenses attributable to such gross receipts . 26 C.F.R. § 1.901-2(b)(4)(i). A tax based solely on gross receipts (like the Third Circuit's analysis) would be noncreditable because it would fail the Treasury Regulation's net income requirement.
Finally, even if expenses were subtracted from imputed gross receipts before a tax was imposed, the effect of inflating only gross receipts would be to inflate revenue while holding expenses (the other component of net income) constant. A tax imposed on inflated income minus actual expenses is not the same as a tax on net income.
For these reasons, a tax based on imputed gross receipts is not creditable. But, as the Fifth Circuit explained in rejecting the Third Circuit's analysis, Example 3 is "facially irrelevant" to the analysis of the U.K. windfall tax, which is based on true net income. Entergy Corp., supra, at 238.
The economic substance of the U.K. windfall tax is that of a U.S. income tax. The tax is based on net income, and the fact that the Labour government chose to characterize it as a tax on the difference between two values is not dispositive under Treasury Regulation § 1.901-2. Therefore, the tax is creditable under § 901.
The judgment of the Third Circuit is reversed.
It is so ordered.
A price-to-earnings ratio "is defined as the stock price divided by annual earnings per share. It is typically calculated by dividing the current stock price by the sum of the previous four quarters of earnings." 3 New Palgrave Dictionary of Money & Finance 176 (1992).
Prior to enactment of what is now § 901, income earned overseas was subject to taxes not only in the foreign country but also in the United States. See Burnet v. Chicago Portrait Co., 285 U.S. 1, 7, 52 S.Ct. 275, 76 L.Ed. 587 (1932). The relevant text making "income, war-profits and excess-profits taxes" creditable has not changed since 1918. See Revenue Act of 1918, §§ 222(a)(1), 238(a), 40 Stat. 1073, 1080.
The relevant provisions provide as follows:
"A foreign tax satisfies the realization requirement if, judged on the basis of its predominant character, it is imposed-(A) Upon or subsequent to the occurrence of events ('realization events') that would result in the realization of income under the income tax provisions of the Internal Revenue Code." 26 C.F.R. § 1.901-2(b)(2)(i).
"A foreign tax satisfies the gross receipts requirement if, judged on the basis of its predominant character, it is imposed on the basis of-(A) Gross receipts; or (B) Gross receipts computed under a method that is likely to produce an amount that is not greater than fair market value." § 1.901-2(b)(3)(i).
"A foreign tax satisfies the net income requirement if, judged on the basis of its predominant character, the base of the tax is computed by reducing gross receipts ... to permit-(A) Recovery of the significant costs and expenses (including significant capital expenditures) attributable, under reasonable principles, to such gross receipts; or (B) Recovery of such significant costs and expenses computed under a method that is likely to produce an amount that approximates, or is greater than, recovery of such significant costs and expenses."§ 1.901-2(b)(4)(i).
The rearrangement requires only basic algebraic manipulation. First, because order of operations does not matter for multiplication and division, the formula is rearranged to the following:
P Tax = 23% [(365 × 9 × (-)) - FV] D (365 × 9) Next, everything outside the brackets is multiplied by [---------], and D D everything inside the brackets is multiplied by the inverse, [---------]. (365 × 9) The effect is the same as multiplication by the number one (since (365 × 9) D {[---------] × [---------]} = 1). That multiplication yields the formula in the D (365 × 9) text.
Mathematically, the Third Circuit's hypothetical was incomplete. It should have been:
20% [ 105% (Gross Receipts) − Expenses ] = Tax
But 105% of gross receipts minus expenses is not net income. Thus, the 20% tax is not a tax on net income and is not creditable.
An amici brief argues that because two companies had initial periods substantially shorter than four years, the predominant character of the U.K. windfall tax was not a tax on income in the U.S. sense. See Alstott Brief 29 (discussing Railtrack Group plc and British Energy plc). The argument amounts to a claim that two outliers changed the predominant character of the U.K. tax. See 135 T.C. 304, 340, n. 33 (2010) (rejecting this view).
The Commissioner admitted at oral argument that it did not preserve this argument, a fact reflected in its briefing before this Court and in the Third Circuit. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 35-36; Opening Brief for Appellant and Reply Brief for Appellant in No. 11-1069(CA3). We therefore express no view on its merits.
* * *
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
L
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
The motion of the Federal Republic of Germany et al. (plaintiffs) for leave to file a bill of complaint and the motion for preliminary injunction against the United States of America and Jane Dee Hull, Governor of the State of Arizona, both raised under this Court’s original jurisdiction, are denied. Plaintiffs’ motion to dispense with printing requirements is granted. Plaintiffs seek, among other relief, enforcement of an order issued this afternoon by the International Court of Justice, on its own motion and with no opportunity for the United States to respond, directing the United States to prevent Arizona’s scheduled execution of Walter LaGrand. Plaintiffs assert that LaGrand holds German citizenship. With regard to the action against the United States, which relies on the ex parte order of the International Court of Justice, there are imposing threshold barriers. First, it appears that the United States has not waived its sovereign immunity. Second, it is doubtful that Art. Ill, § 2, cl. 2, provides an anchor for an action to prevent execution of a German citizen who is not an ambassador or consul. With respect to the action against the State of Arizona, as in Breard v. Greene, 523 U. S. 371, 377 (1998) (per curiam), a foreign government’s ability here to assert a claim against a State is without evident support in the Vienna Convention and in probable contravention of Eleventh Amendment principles. This action was filed within only two hours of a scheduled execution that was ordered on January 15,1999, based upon a sentence imposed by Arizona in 1984, about which the Federal Republic of Germany learned in 1992. Given the tardiness of the pleas and the jurisdictional barriers they implicate, we decline to exercise our original jurisdiction.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
I
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice White
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This action involves the prosecution of petitioner Gray, a former public official of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, and petitioner McNally, a private individual, for alleged violation of the federal mail fraud statute, 18 U. S. C. § 1341. The prosecution’s principal theory of the case, which was accepted by the courts below, was that petitioners’ participation in a self-dealing patronage scheme defrauded the citizens and government of Kentucky of certain “intangible rights,” such as the right to have the Commonwealth’s affairs conducted honestly. We must consider whether the jury charge permitted a conviction for conduct not within the scope of the mail fraud statute.
We accept for the sake of argument the Government’s view of the evidence, as follows. Petitioners and a third individual, Howard P. “Sonny” Hunt, were politically active in the Democratic Party in the Commonwealth of Kentucky during the 1970’s. After Democrat Julian Carroll was elected Governor of Kentucky in 1974, Hunt was made chairman of the state Democratic Party and given de facto control over selecting the insurance agencies from which the Commonwealth would purchase its policies. In 1975, the Wombwell Insurance Company of Lexington, Kentucky (Wombwell), which since 1971 had acted as the Commonwealth’s agent for securing a workmen’s compensation policy, agreed with Hunt that in exchange for a continued agency relationship it would share any resulting commissions in excess of $50,000 a year with other insurance agencies specified by him. The commissions in question were paid to Wombwell by the large insurance companies from which it secured coverage for the Commonwealth.
From 1975 to 1979, Wombwell tunneled $851,000 in commissions to 21 separate insurance agencies designated by Hunt. Among the recipients of these payments was Seton Investments, Inc. (Seton), a company controlled by Hunt and petitioner Gray and nominally owned and operated by petitioner McNally.
Gray served as Secretary of Public Protection and Regulation from 1976 to 1978 and also as Secretary of the Governor’s Cabinet from 1977 to 1979. Prior to his 1976 appointment, he and Hunt established Seton for the sole purpose of sharing in the commissions distributed by Wombwell. Wombwell paid some $200,000 to Seton between 1975 and 1979, and the money was used to benefit Gray and Hunt. Pursuant to Hunt’s direction, Wombwell also made excess commission payments to the Snodgrass Insurance Agency, which in turn gave the money to McNally.
On account of the foregoing activities, Hunt was charged with and pleaded guilty to mail and tax fraud and was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment. Petitioners were charged with one count of conspiracy and seven counts of mail fraud, six of which were dismissed before trial. The remaining mail fraud count was based on the mailing of a commission check to Wombwell by the insurance company from which it had secured coverage for the State. This count alleged that petitioners had devised a scheme (1) to defraud the citizens and government of Kentucky of their right to have the Commonwealth’s affairs conducted honestly, and (2) to obtain, directly and indirectly, money and other things of value by means of false pretenses and the concealment of material facts. The conspiracy count alleged that petitioners had (1) conspired to violate the mail fraud statute through the scheme just described and (2) conspired to defraud the United States by obstructing the collection of federal taxes.
After informing the jury of the charges in the indictment, the District Court instructed that the scheme to defraud the citizens of Kentucky and to obtain money by false pretenses and concealment could be made out by either of two sets of findings: (1) that Hunt had de facto control over the award of the workmen’s compensation insurance contract to Womb-well from 1975 to 1979; that he directed payments of commissions from this contract to Seton, an entity in which he had an ownership interest, without disclosing that interest to persons in state government whose actions or deliberations could have been affected by the disclosure; and that petitioners, or either of them, aided and abetted Hunt in that scheme; or (2) that Gray, in either of his appointed positions, had supervisory authority regarding the Commonwealth’s workmen’s compensation insurance at a time when Seton received commissions; that Gray had an ownership interest in Seton and did not disclose that interest to persons in state government whose actions or deliberations could have been affected by that disclosure; and that McNally aided and abetted Gray (the latter finding going only to McNally’s guilt).
The jury convicted petitioners on both the mail fraud and conspiracy counts, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions. 790 F. 2d 1290 (CA6 1986). In affirming the substantive mail fraud conviction, the court relied on a line of decisions from the Courts of Appeals holding that the mail fraud statute proscribes schemes to defraud citizens of their intangible rights to honest and impartial government. See, e. g., United States v. Mandel, 591 F. 2d 1347 (CA4 1979), aff’d in relevant part, 602 F. 2d 653 (en banc), cert. denied, 445 U. S. 961 (1980). Under these cases, a public official owes a fiduciary duty to the public, and misuse of his office for private gain is a fraud. Also, an individual without formal office may be held to be a public fiduciary if others rely on him “‘because of a special relationship in the government’ ” and he in fact makes governmental decisions. 790 F. 2d, at 1296 (quoting United States v. Margiotta, 688 F. 2d 108, 122 (CA2 1982), cert. denied, 461 U. S. 913 (1983)). The Court of Appeals held that Hunt was such a fiduciary because he “substantially participated in governmental affairs and exercised significant, if not exclusive, control over awarding the workmen’s compensation insurance contract to Wombwell and the payment of monetary kickbacks to Seton.” 790 F. 2d, at 1296.
We granted certiorari, 479 U. S. 1005 (1986), and now reverse.
The mail fraud statute clearly protects property rights, but does not refer to the intangible right of the citizenry to good government. As first enacted in 1872, as part of a recodification of the postal laws, the statute contained a general proscription against using the mails to initiate correspondence in furtherance of “any scheme or artifice to defraud.” The sponsor of the recodification stated, in apparent reference to the antifraud provision, that measures were needed “to prevent the frauds which are mostly gotten up in the large cities ... by thieves, forgers, and rapscallions generally, for the purpose of deceiving and fleecing the innocent people in the country.” Insofar as the sparse legislative history reveals anything, it indicates that the original impetus behind the mail fraud statute was to protect the people from schemes to deprive them of their money or property.
Durland v. United States, 161 U. S. 306 (1896), the first case in which this Court construed the meaning of the phrase “any scheme or artifice to defraud,” held that the phrase is to be interpreted broadly insofar as property rights are concerned, but did not indicate that the statute had a more extensive reach. The Court rejected the argument that “the statute reaches only such cases as, at common law, would come within the definition of ‘false pretences/ in order to make out which there must be a misrepresentation as to some existing fact and not a mere promise as to the future.” Id., at 312. Instead, it construed the statute to “includ[e] everything designed to defraud by representations as to the past or present, or suggestions and promises as to the future.” Id., at 313. Accordingly, the defendant’s use of the mails to sell bonds which he did not intend to honor was within the statute. The Court explained that “[i]t was with the purpose of protecting the public against all such intentional efforts to despoil, and to prevent the post office from being used to carry them into effect, that this statute was passed . . . .” Id., at 314.
Congress codified the holding of Durland in 1909, and in doing so gave further indication that the statute’s purpose is protecting property rights. The amendment added the words “or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises” after the original phrase “any scheme or artifice to defraud.” Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 215, 35 Stat. 1130. The new language is based on the statement in Durland, that the statute reaches “everything designed to defraud by representations as to the past or present, or suggestions and promises as to the future.” 161 U. S., at 313. However, instead of the phrase “everything designed to defraud” Congress used the words “[any scheme or artifice] for obtaining money or property.”
After 1909, therefore, the mail fraud statute criminalized schemes or artifices “to defraud” or “for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representation, or promises . . . .” Because the two phrases identifying the proscribed schemes appear in the disjunctive, it is arguable that they are to be construed independently and that the money-or-property requirement of the latter phrase does not limit schemes to defraud to those aimed at causing deprivation of money or property. This is the approach that has been taken by each of the Courts of Appeals that has addressed the issue: schemes to defraud include those designed to deprive individuals, the people, or the government of intangible rights, such as the right to have public officials perform their duties honestly. See, e. g., United States v. Clapps, 732 F. 2d 1148, 1152 (CA3 1984); United States v. States, 488 F. 2d 761, 764 (CA8 1973).
As the Court long ago stated, however, the words “to defraud” commonly refer “to wronging one in his property rights by dishonest methods or schemes,” and “usually signify the deprivation of something of value by trick, deceit, chicane or overreaching.” Hammerschmidt v. United States, 265 U. S. 182, 188 (1924). The codification of the holding in Durland in 1909 does not indicate that Congress was departing from this common understanding. As we see it, adding the second phrase simply made it unmistakable that the statute reached false promises and misrepresentations as to the future as well as other frauds involving money or property.
We believe that Congress’ intent in passing the mail fraud statute was to prevent the use of the mails in furtherance of such schemes. The Court has often stated that when there are two rational readings of a criminal statute, one harsher than the other, we are to choose the harsher only when Congress has spoken in clear and definite language. United States v. Bass, 404 U. S. 336, 347 (1971); United States v. Universal C. I. T. Credit Corp., 344 U. S. 218, 221-222 (1952). See also Rewis v. United States, 401 U. S. 808, 812 (1971). As the Court said in a mail fraud case years ago: “There are no constructive offenses; and before one can be punished, it must be shown that his case is plainly within the statute.” Fasulo v. United States, 272 U. S. 620, 629 (1926). Rather than construe the statute in a manner that leaves its outer boundaries ambiguous and involves the Federal Government in setting standards of disclosure and good government for local and state officials, we read § 1341 as limited in scope to the protection of property rights. If Congress desires to go further, it must speak more clearly than it has.
For purposes of this action, we assume that Hunt, as well as Gray, was a state officer. The issue is thus whether a state officer violates the mail fraud statute if he chooses an insurance agent to provide insurance for the State but specifies that the agent must share its commissions with other named insurance agencies, in one of which the officer has an ownership interest and hence profits when his agency receives part of the commissions. We note that as the action comes to us, there was no charge and the jury was not required to find that the Commonwealth itself was defrauded of any money or property. It was not charged that in the absence of the alleged scheme the Commonwealth would have paid a lower premium or secured better insurance. Hunt and Gray received part of the commissions but those commissions were not the Commonwealth’s money. Nor was the jury charged that to convict it must find that the Commonwealth was deprived of control over how its money was spent. Indeed, the premium for insurance would have been paid to some agency, and what Hunt and Gray did was to assert control that the Commonwealth might not otherwise have made over the commissions paid by the insurance company to its agent. Although the Government now relies in part on the assertion that petitioners obtained property by means of false representations to Wombwell, Brief'for United States 20-21, n. 17, there was nothing in the jury charge that required such a finding. We hold, therefore, that the jury instruction on the substantive mail fraud count permitted a conviction for conduct not within the reach of § 1341.
The Government concedes that if petitioners’ substantive mail fraud convictions are reversed their conspiracy convictions should also be reversed. Id., at 36, n. 28.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Section 1341 provides in pertinent part:
“Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, ... for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so to do, [uses the mails or causes them to be used], shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.”
The six counts dismissed were based on the mailing of Seton’s tax returns. The Court of Appeals held that mailings required by law cannot be made the basis for liability under § 1341 unless the documents are themselves false, see Parr v. United States, 363 U. S. 370 (1960), and that the six counts were properly dismissed since the indictment did not allege that Seton’s tax returns were false. The Government has not sought review of this holding.
The mail fraud count also alleged that petitioners’ fraudulent scheme had the purpose of defrauding the citizens and government of Kentucky of their right to be made aware of all relevant facts when selecting an insurance agent to write the Commonwealth’s workmen’s compensation insurance policy. The District Court did not instruct on this purpose, holding that it was subsumed in the purpose to deny the right to honest government.
The instruction summarized the charges as follows:
“Count 4 of the Indictment charges in part that the defendants devised a scheme or artifice to:
“(a)(1) defraud the citizens of the Commonwealth of Kentucky and its governmental departments, agencies, officials and employees of their right to have the Commonwealth’s business and its affairs conducted honestly, impartially, free from corruption, bias, dishonesty, deceit, official misconduct, and fraud; and,
“(2) obtain (directly and indirectly) money and other things of value, by means of false and fraudulent pretenses, representations, and promises, and the concealment of facts.
“And for the purpose of executing the aforesaid scheme, the defendants, James E. Gray and Charles J. McNally, and Howard P. ‘Sonny’ Hunt, Jr., and others, did place and cause to be placed in a post office or authorized deposit for mail matter, matters and things to be sent and delivered by the Postal Service, and did take and receive and cause to be taken and received therefrom such matters and things and did knowingly cause to be delivered thereon and at the place at which it was directed to be delivered by the person to whom it was addressed, matters and things.
“(b) Defraud the United States by impeding, impairing, and obstructing and defeating the lawful governmental functions of the Internal Revenue Service of the Treasury Department of the United States of America in the ascertainment, computation, assessment and collection of federal taxes.” Brief for United States 9-10, n. 8.
The Government concedes that it was error for the District Court to include the instruction on tax fraud in the substantive mail fraud instruction, see id., at 11, n. 9, but the effect of that error is not now at issue.
Cong. Globe, 41st Cong., 3d Sess., 35 (1870) (remarks of Rep. Farnsworth). These remarks were made during the debate on H. R. 2295, the recodification legislation introduced during the 41st Congress. Representative Farnsworth proceeded to describe a scheme whereby the mail was used to solicit the purchase by greedy and unwary persons of counterfeit bills, which were never delivered.
The recodification bill was not passed by the 41st Congress, but was reintroduced and passed by the 42d Congress with the antifraud section intact. Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, §§ 149 and 301, 17 Stat. 302 and 323.
Prior to Durland Congress had amended the statute to add language expressly reaching schemes of the period, many of the same nature as those mentioned by Representative Farnsworth in 1870, see n. 5, supra, dealing or pretending to deal in counterfeit currency under such names as “green coin” or “green cigars.” Act of Mar. 2, 1889, ch. 393, § 1, 25 Stat. 873. The addition of this language appears to have been nothing more than a reconfirmation of the statute’s original purpose in the face of some disagreement among the lower federal courts as to whether the statute should be broadly or narrowly read. See Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute, 18 Duquesne L. Rev. 771, 790-799, 808-809 (1980). Some of the language added in 1889 was removed in 1948 in an amendment (Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, § 1341, 62 Stat. 763) designed to remove surplus-age without changing the meaning of the statute. See H. R. Rep. No. 304, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., A100 (1947). Post-1948 amendments to the statute have been technical in nature. The last substantive amendment of the statute, then, was the codification of the holding of Durland, and other changes not relevant here, in 1909.
The new language was suggested in the Report of the Commission to Revise and Codify the Criminal and Penal Laws of the United States, which cited Durland in the margin of its Report. See S. Doc. No. 68, 57th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, 63, 64 (1901). The sponsor of the 1909 legislation did not address the significance of the new language, stating that it was self-explanatory. 42 Cong. Rec. 1026 (1908) (remarks of Sen. Heyburn).
Hammerschmidt concerned the scope of the predecessor of 18 U. S. C. § 371, which makes criminal any conspiracy “to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose.” Hammer schmidt indicates, in regard to that statute, that while “[t]o conspire to defraud the United States means primarily to cheat the Government out of property or money, ... it also means to interfere with or obstruct one of its lawful governmental functions by deceit, craft or trickery, or at least by means that are dishonest.” 265 U. S., at 188. Other cases have held that § 371 reaches conspiracies other than those directed at property interests. See, e. g., Haas v. Henkel, 216 U. S. 462, 480 (1910) (predecessor of § 371 reaches conspiracy to defraud the Government by bribing a Government official to make an advance disclosure of a cotton crop report); Glasser v. United States, 315 U. S. 60 (1942) (predecessor of § 371 reaches conspiracy to defraud the United States by bribing a United States attorney). However, we believe that this broad construction of § 371 is based on a consideration not applicable to the mail fraud statute.
In Curley v. United States, 130 F. 1 (CA1 1904), cited with approval in Haas v. Henkel, supra, the court stated: “Quite likely the word ‘defraud,’ as ordinarily used in the common law, and as used in English statutes and in the statutes of our states, enacted with the object of protecting property and property rights of communities and individuals, as well as of municipal governments, which exist largely for the purpose of administering local financial affairs, has reference to frauds relating to money and property.” 130 F., at 6-7. The court concluded, however, that “[a] statute which. . . has for its object the protection of the individual property rights of the members of the civic body, is one thing; a statute which has for its object the protection and welfare of the government alone, which exists for the purpose of administering itself in the interests of the public, [is] quite another.” Id., at 7. Section 371 is a statute aimed at protecting the Federal Government alone; however, the mail fraud statute, as we have indicated, had its origin in the desire to protect individual property rights, and any benefit which the Government derives from the statute must be limited to the Government’s interests as property holder.
Justice Stevens would affirm the convictions even though it was not charged that requiring the Wombwell agency to share commissions violated state law. We should assume that it did not. For the same reason we should assume that it was not illegal under state law for Hunt and Gray to own one of the agencies sharing in the commissions and hence to profit from the arrangement, whether or not they disclosed it to others in the state government. It is worth observing as well that it was not alleged that the mail fraud statute would have been violated had Hunt and Gray reported to state officials the fact of their financial gain. The violation asserted is the failure to disclose their financial interest, even if state law did not require it, to other persons in the state government whose actions could have been affected by the disclosure. It was in this way that the indictment charged that the people of Kentucky had been deprived of their right to have the Commonwealth’s affairs conducted honestly.
It may well be that Congress could criminalize using the mails to further a state officer’s efforts to profit from governmental decisions he is empowered to make or over which he has some supervisory authority, even if there is no state law proscribing his profiteering or even if state law expressly authorized it. But if state law expressly permitted or did not forbid a state officer such as Gray to have an ownership interest in an insurance agency handling the State’s insurance, it would take a much clearer indication than the mail fraud statute evidences to convince us that having and concealing such an interest defrauds the State and is forbidden under federal law.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
H
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Thomas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Section 113(f)(1) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) allows persons who have undertaken efforts to clean up properties contaminated by hazardous substances to seek contribution from other parties liable under CERCLA. Section 113(f)(1) specifies that a party may obtain contribution “during or following any civil action” under CERCLA §106 or § 107(a). The issue we must decide is whether a private party who has not been sued under § 106 or § 107(a) may nevertheless obtain contribution under § 113(f)(1) from other liable parties. We hold that it may not.
I
Under CERCLA, 94 Stat. 2767, the Federal Government may clean up a contaminated area itself, see § 104, or it may compel responsible parties to perform the cleanup, see § 106(a). See Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U. S. 809, 814 (1994). In either case, the Government may re-* cover its response costs under § 107, 42 U. S. C. § 9607 (2000 ed. and Supp. I), the “cost recovery” section of CERCLA. Section 107(a) lists four classes of potentially responsible persons (PRPs) and provides that they “shall be liable” for, among other things, “all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States Government... not inconsistent with the national contingency plan.” § 107(a)(4)(A). Section 107(a) further provides that PRPs shall be liable for “any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person consistent with the national contingency plan.” § 107(a)(4)(B).
After CERCLA’s enactment in 1980, litigation arose over whether § 107, in addition to allowing the Government and certain private parties to recover costs from PRPs, also allowed a PRP that had incurred response costs to recover costs from other PRPs. More specifically, the question was whether a private party that had incurred response costs, but that had done so voluntarily and was not itself subject to suit, had a cause of action for cost recovery against other PRPs. Various courts held that § 107(a)(4)(B) and its predecessors authorized such a cause of action. See, e. g., Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco, Inc., 792 F. 2d 887, 890-892 (CA9 1986); Walls v. Waste Resource Corp., 761 F. 2d 311, 317-318 (CA6 1985); Philadelphia v. Stepan Chemical Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1140-1143 (ED Pa. 1982).
After CERCLA’s passage, litigation also ensued over the separate question whether a private entity that had been sued in a cost recovery action (by the Government or by another PRP) could obtain contribution from other PRPs. As originally enacted in 1980, CERCLA contained no provision expressly providing for a right of action for contribution. A number of District Courts nonetheless held that, although CERCLA did not mention the word “contribution,” such a right arose either impliedly from provisions of the statute, or as a matter of federal common law. See, e. g., United States v. New Castle County, 642 F. Supp. 1258, 1263-1269 (Del. 1986) (contribution right arises under federal common law); Colorado v. ASARCO, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 1484, 1486-1493 (Colo. 1985) (same); Wehner v. Syntex Agribusiness, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 27, 31 (ED Mo. 1985) (contribution right is implied from § 107(e)(2)). That conclusion was debatable in light of two decisions of this Court that refused to recognize implied or common-law rights to contribution in other federal statutes. See Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U. S. 630, 638-647 (1981) (refusing to recognize implied or common-law right to contribution in the Sherman Act or the Clayton Act); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers, 451 U. S. 77, 90-99 (1981) (refusing to recognize implied or common-law right to contribution in the Equal Pay Act of 1963 or Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
Congress subsequently amended CERCLA in the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), 100 Stat. 1613, to provide an express cause of action for contribution, codified as CERCLA § 113(f)(1):
“Any person may seek contribution from any other person who is liable or potentially liable under section 9607(a) of this title, during or following any civil action under section 9606 of this title or under section 9607(a) of this title. Such claims shall be brought in accordance with this section and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and shall be governed by Federal law. In resolving contribution claims, the court may allocate response costs among liable parties using such equitable factors as the court determines are appropriate. Nothing in this subsection shall diminish the right of any person to bring an action for contribution in the absence of a civil action under section 9606 of this title or section 9607 of this title.” Id., at 1647, as codified in 42 U. S. C. § 9613(f)(1).
SARA also created a separate express right of contribution, § 113(f)(3)(B), for “[a] person who has resolved its liability to the United States or a State for some or all of a response action or for some or all of the costs of such action in an administrative or judicially approved settlement.” In short, after SARA, CERCLA provided for a right to cost recovery in certain circumstances, § 107(a), and separate rights to contribution in other circumstances, §§ 113(f)(1), 113(f)(3)(B).
II
This case concerns four contaminated aircraft engine maintenance sites in Texas. Cooper Industries, Inc., owned and operated those sites until 1981, when it sold them to Aviail Services, Inc. Aviall operated the four sites for a number of years. Ultimately, Aviall discovered that both it and Cooper had contaminated the facilities when petroleum and other hazardous substances leaked into the ground and ground water through underground storage tanks and spills.
Aviall notified the Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission (Commission) of the contamination. The Commission informed Aviall that it was violating state environmental laws, directed Aviall to clean up the site, and threatened to pursue an enforcement action if Aviall failed to undertake remediation. Neither the Commission nor the EPA, however, took judicial or administrative measures to compel cleanup.
Aviall cleaned up the properties under the State’s supervision, beginning in 1984. Aviall sold the properties to a third party in 1995 and 1996, but remains contractually responsible for the cleanup. Aviall has incurred approximately $5 million in cleanup costs; the total costs may be even greater. In August 1997, Aviall filed this action against Cooper in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, seeking to recover cleanup costs. The original complaint asserted a claim for cost recovery under CERCLA § 107(a), a separate claim for contribution under CERCLA § 113(f)(1), and state-law claims. Aviall later amended the complaint, combining its two CERCLA claims into a single, joint CERCLA claim. That claim alleged that, pursuant to § 113(f)(1), Aviall was entitled to seek contribution from Cooper, as a PRP under § 107(a), for response costs and other liability Aviall incurred in connection with the Texas facilities. Aviall continued to assert state-law claims as well.
Both parties moved for summary judgment, and the District Court granted Cooper’s motion. The court held that Aviall, having abandoned its § 107 claim, sought contribution only under § 113(f)(1). The court held that § 113(f)(1) relief was unavailable to Aviall because it had not been sued under CERCLA § 106 or § 107. Having dismissed Aviall’s federal claim, the court declined to exercise jurisdiction over the state-law claims.
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. 263 F. 3d 134 (2001). The majority, relying principally on the “during or. following” language in the first sentence of § 113(f)(1), held that “a PRP seeking contribution from other PRPs under § 113(f)(1) must have a pending or adjudged § 106 administrative order or § 107(a) cost recovery action against it.” Id., at 145. The dissent reasoned that the final sentence of § 113(f)(1), the saving clause, clarified that the federal common-law right to contribution survived the enactment of § 113(f)(1), even absent a §106 or § 107(a) civil action. Id., at 148-150 (opinion of Wiener, J.).
On rehearing en banc, the Fifth Circuit reversed by a divided vote, holding that § 113(f)(1) allows a PRP to obtain contribution from other PRPs regardless of whether the PRP has been sued under §106 or §107. 312 F. 3d 677 (2002). The court held that “[sjection 113(f)(1) authorizes suits against PRPs in both its first and last sentence^] which states without qualification that ‘nothing’ in the section shall ‘diminish’ any person’s right to bring a contribution action in the absence of a section 106 or section 107(a) action.” Id., at 681. The court reasoned in part that “may” in § 113(f)(1) did not mean “may only.” Id., at 686-687. Three members of the en banc court dissented for essentially the reasons given by the panel majority. Id., at 691-693 (opinion of Garza, J.). We granted certiorari, 540 U. S. 1099 (2004), and now reverse.
Ill
A
Section 113(f)(1) does not authorize Aviall’s suit. The first sentence, the enabling clause that establishes the right of contribution, provides: “Any person may seek contribution . . . during or following any civil action under section 9606 of this title or under section 9607(a) of this title,” 42 U. S. C. § 9613(f)(1) (emphasis added). The natural meaning of this sentence is that contribution may only be sought subject to the specified conditions, namely, “during or following” a specified civil action.
Aviall answers that “may” should be read permissively, such that “during or following” a civil action is one, but not the exclusive, instance in which a person may seek contribution. We disagree. First, as just noted, the natural meaning of “may” in the context of the enabling clause is that it authorizes certain contribution actions — ones that satisfy the subsequent specified condition — and no others.
Second, and relatedly, if § 113(f)(1) were read to authorize contribution actions at any time, regardless of the existence of a § 106 or § 107(a) civil action, then Congress need not have included the explicit “during or following” condition. In other words, Aviall’s reading would render part of the statute entirely superfluous, something we are loath to do. See, e. g., Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U. S. 88, 101 (2004). Likewise, if § 113(f)(1) authorizes contribution actions at any time, § 113(f)(3)(B), which permits contribution actions after settlement, is equally superfluous. There is no reason why Congress would bother to specify conditions under which a person may bring a contribution claim, and at the same time allow contribution actions absent those conditions.
The last sentence of § 113(f)(1), the saving clause, does not change our conclusion. That sentence provides: “Nothing in this subsection shall diminish the right of any person to bring an action for contribution in the absence of a civil action under section 9606 of this title or section 9607 of this title.” 42 U. S. C. § 9613(f)(1). The sole function of the sentence is to clarify that § 113(f)(1) does nothing to “diminish” any cause(s) of action for contribution that may exist independently of § 113(f)(1). In other words, the sentence rebuts any presumption that the express right of contribution provided by the enabling clause is the exclusive cause of action for contribution available to a PRP. The sentence, however, does not itself establish a cause of action; nor does it expand § 113(f)(1) to authorize contribution actions not brought “during or following” a § 106 or § 107(a) civil action; nor does it specify what causes of action for contribution, if any, exist outside § 113(f)(1). Reading the saving clause to authorize § 113(f)(1) contribution actions not just “during or following” a civil action, but also before such an action, would again violate the settled rule that we must, if possible, construe a statute to give every word some operative effect. See United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U. S. 30, 35-36 (1992).
Our conclusion follows not simply from § 113(f)(1) itself, but also from the whole of § 113. As noted above, § 113 provides two express avenues for contribution: § 113(f)(1) (“during or following” specified civil actions) and § 113(f)(3)(B) (after an administrative or judicially approved settlement that resolves liability to the United States or a State). Section 113(g)(3) then provides two corresponding 3-year limitations periods for contribution actions, one beginning at the date of judgment, § 113(g)(3)(A), and one beginning at the date of settlement, § 113(g)(3)(B). Notably absent from § 113(g)(3) is any provision for starting the limitations period if a judgment or settlement never occurs, as is the case with a purely voluntary cleanup. The lack of such a provision supports the conclusion that, to assert a contribution claim under § 113(f), a party must satisfy the conditions of either § 113(f)(1) or § 113(f)(3)(B).
Each side insists that the purpose of CERCLA bolsters its reading of § 113(f)(1). Given the clear meaning of the text, there is no need to resolve this dispute or to consult the purpose of CERCLA at all. As we have said: “[I]t is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by which we are governed.” On- cale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U. S. 75, 79 (1998). Section 113(f)(1), 100 Stat. 1647, authorizes contribution claims only “during or following” a civil action under § 106 or § 107(a), and it is undisputed that Aviall has never been subject to such an action. Aviall therefore has no § 113(f)(1) claim.
B
Aviall and amicus Lockheed Martin contend that, in the alternative to an action for contribution under § 113(f)(1), Aviall may recover costs under § 107(a)(4)(B) even though it is a PRP. The dissent would have us so hold. We decline to address the issue. Neither the District Court, nor the Fifth Circuit panel, nor the Fifth Circuit sitting en banc considered AvialPs § 107 claim. In fact, as noted above, Aviall included separate § 107 and § 113 claims in its original complaint, but then asserted a “combined” § 107/§ 113 claim in its amended complaint. The District Court took this consolidated claim to mean that Aviall was relying on § 107 “not as an independent cause of action,” but only “to the extent necessary to maintain a viable § 113(f)(1) contribution claim.” Civ. Action No. 3:97-CV-1926-D (ND Tex., Jan. 13, 2000), App. to Pet. for Cert. 94a, n. 2. Consequently the court saw no need to address any freestanding § 107 claim. The Fifth Circuit panel likewise concluded that Aviall no longer advanced a stand-alone §107 claim. 263 F. 3d, at 137, n. 2. The en banc court found it unnecessary to decide whether Aviall had waived the § 107 claim, because it held that Aviall could rely instead on § 113. 312 F. 3d, at 685, n. 15. Thus, the court did not address the waiver issue, let alone the merits of the § 107 claim.
“We ordinarily do not decide in the first instance issues not decided below.” Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Mineta, 534 U. S. 103, 109 (2001) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). Although we have deviated from this rule in exceptional circumstances, United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U. S. 544, 551-552, n. 5 (1980), the circumstances here cut against resolving the §107 claim. Both the question whether Aviall has waived this claim and the underlying § 107 question (if it is not waived) may depend in part on the relationship between §§ 107 and 113. That relationship is a significant issue in its own right. It is also well beyond the scope of the briefing and, indeed, the question presented, which asks simply whether a private party “may bring an action seeking contribution pursuant to CERCLA Section 113(f)(1).” Pet. for Cert. i. The § 107 claim and the preliminary waiver question merit full consideration by the courts below.
Furthermore, the parties cite numerous decisions of the Courts of Appeals as holding that a private party that is itself a PRP may not pursue a § 107(a) action against other PRPs for joint and several liability. See, e. g., Bedford Affiliates v. Sills, 156 F. 3d 416, 423-424 (CA2 1998); Centerior Serv. Co. v. Acme Scrap Iron & Metal Corp., 153 F. 3d 344, 349-356 (CA6 1998); Pneumo Abex Corp. v. High Point, T. & D. R. Co., 142 F. 3d 769, 776 (CA4 1998); Pinal Creek Group v. Newmont Mining Corp., 118 F. 3d 1298, 1301-1306 (CA9 1997); New Castle County v. Halliburton NUS Corp., 111 F. 3d 1116, 1120-1124 (CA3 1997); Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments, 94 F. 3d 1489, 1496, and n. 7 (CA11 1996); United States v. Colorado & E. R. Co., 50 F. 3d 1530, 1534-1536 (CA10 1995); United Technologies Corp. v. Browning-Ferris Industries, 33 F. 3d 96, 98-103 (CA1 1994). To hold here that Aviall may pursue a § 107 action, we would have to consider whether these decisions are correct, an issue that Aviall has flagged but not briefed. And we might have to consider other issues, also not briefed, such as whether Aviall, which seeks to recover the share of its cleanup costs fairly chargeable to Cooper, may pursue a § 107 cost recovery action for some form of liability other than joint and several. We think it more prudent to withhold judgment on these matters.
In view of the importance of the § 107 issue and the absence of briefing and decisions by the courts below, we are not prepared — as the dissent would have it — to resolve the § 107 question solely on the basis of dictum in Key Tronic. We held there that certain attorney’s fees were not “ ‘necessary costs of response’ ” within the meaning of § 107(a)(4)(B). 511 U. S., at 818-821. But we did not address, the relevance, if any, of Key Tronic’s status as a PRP or confront the relationship between §§ 107 and 113. In discussing § 107, we did not even classify it precisely as a right of cost recovery or a right of contribution, as the dissent’s descriptions of the decision reveal. Post, at 172 (opinion of Ginsburg, J.) (describing Key Tronic as recognizing a right to “ ‘seek recovery of cleanup costs’” (quoting 511 U. S., at 818), but in the following paragraph saying that Key Tronic identified a “right to contribution”). “Questions which merely lurk in the record, neither brought to the attention of the court nor ruled upon, are not to be considered as having been so decided as to constitute precedents.” Webster v. Fall, 266 U. S. 507, 511 (1925). Aviall itself recognizes the need for fuller examination of the § 107 claim; it has simply requested that we remand for consideration of that claim, not that we resolve the claim in the first instance.
C
In addition to leaving open whether Aviall may seek cost recovery under § 107, Part III-B, supra, we decline to decide whether Aviall has an implied right to contribution under § 107. Portions of the Fifth Circuit’s opinion below might be taken to endorse the latter cause of action, 312 F. 3d, at 687; others appear to reserve the question whether such a cause of action exists, id., at 685, n. 15. To the extent that Aviall chooses to frame its § 107 claim on remand as an implied right of contribution (as opposed to a right of cost recovery), we note that this Court has visited the subject of implied rights of contribution before. See Texas Industries, 451 U. S., at 638-647; Northwest Airlines, 451 U. S., at 90-99. We also note that, in enacting § 113(f)(1), Congress explicitly recognized a particular set (claims “during or following” the specified civil actions) of the contribution rights previously implied by courts from provisions of CERCLA and the common law. Cf. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U. S. 11, 19 (1979). Nonetheless, we need not and do not decide today whether any judicially implied right of contribution survived the passage of SARA.
* * *
We hold only that § 113(f)(1) does not support Aviall’s suit. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Fifth Circuit and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Section 113(f)(1) is codified at 42 U. S. C. § 9613(f)(1). We refer throughout, for the most part, to sections of CERCLA rather than the U. S. Code.
The national contingency plan specifies procedures for preparing and responding to contaminations and was promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) pursuant to CERCLA § 105, 42 U. S. C. § 9605 (2000 ed. and Supp. I). The plan is codified at 40 CFR pt. 300 (2004).
In Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U. S. 809 (1994), we observed that §§ 107 and 113 created “similar and somewhat overlapping” remedies. Id., at 816. The cost recovery remedy of § 107(a)(4)(B) and the contribution remedy of § 113(f)(1) are similar at a general level in that they both allow private parties to recoup costs from other private parties. But the two remedies are clearly distinct.
Aviall asserts that it framed its claim in the manner compelled by Fifth Circuit precedent holding that a §113 claim is a type of §107 claim. Geraghty & Miller, Inc. v. Conoco Inc., 234 F. 3d 917, 924 (2000); see also, e. g., Centerior Serv. Co. v. Acme Scrap Iron & Metal Corp., 153 F. 3d 344, 349-353 (CA6 1998); Sun Co., Inc. v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 124 F. 3d 1187, 1191 (CA10 1997); Pinal Creek Group v. Newmont Mining Corp., 118 F. 3d 1298, 1301-1302 (CA9 1997).
Neither has Aviall been subject to an administrative order under § 106; thus, we need not decide whether such an order would qualify as a “civil action under section 9606 ... or under section 9607(a)” of CERCLA. 42 U. S. C. § 9613(f)(1).
As noted above, we do not address whether a § 107 cost recovery action by Aviall (if not waived) may seek some form of liability other than joint and several.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
H
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Marshall
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented in this case is whether the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) must comply with the “John Doe” summons procedures of § 7609(f) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U. S. C. § 7609(f), when it serves a summons on a named taxpayer for the dual purpose of investigating both the tax liability of that taxpayer and the tax liabilities of other, unnamed parties.
I
Petitioner Tiffany Fine Arts, Inc., is a holding company for various subsidiaries that promote tax shelters. On October 6,1981, Revenue Agent Joel Lewis issued four summonses to Tiffany, pursuant to 26 U. S. C. § 7602(a). This provision empowers the IRS to serve a summons on any person, without prior judicial approval, if the information sought is necessary to ascertain that person’s tax liability. The summonses requested Tiffany’s financial statements for the fiscal years ending October 31,1979, and October 31, 1980, as well as a list of the names, addresses, Social Security numbers, and employer identification numbers of persons who had acquired from Tiffany licenses to distribute a medical device known as the “Pedi-Pulsor.” Tiffany refused to comply with the summonses, and the Government then brought an enforcement action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, pursuant to 26 U. S. C. §§ 7402(b) and 7604(a).
Tiffany opposed enforcement, principally on the ground that the IRS’s request for the names of the licensees indicated clearly that the IRS’s “primary purpose” was to audit the Pedi-Pulsor licensees, not Tiffany itself. Tiffany offered to produce records in which the names of the licensees were redacted. It took the position that, if the IRS were truly interested in only Tiffany’s liability, the redacted records would be sufficient for an adequate investigation.
According to Tiffany, if the IRS wanted to go further and obtain the names of all the licensees, it could not proceed solely under § 7602, but would have to comply also with the requirements of § 7609(f), which applies to John Doe summonses. Under § 7609(f), the IRS cannot serve a summons seeking information on the tax liabilities of unnamed taxpayers without obtaining prior judicial approval at an ex parte proceeding.
The IRS rejected Tiffany’s offer of redacted documents. In an affidavit filed in support of the Government’s enforcement petition, Revenue Agent Lewis asserted:
“I am conducting an investigation, one purpose of which is to ascertain the correctness of the consolidated income tax returns filed by [Tiffany] for the fiscal years ending October 31, 1979, and October 31, 1980. One aspect of my investigation into the correctness of Tiffany’s consolidated corporate income tax returns concerns possible underreporting of income received and questionable business deductions claimed by Tiffany and its subsidiaries.” App. 14a.
In a supplemental affidavit, Agent Lewis conceded that “[i]t is certainly possible that once the individual [Pedi-Pulsor] licensees are identified further inquiry will be made into whether they correctly reported their income tax liabilities.” Id., at 24a. He reasserted, however, that one purpose of his investigation was to audit Tiffany; in particular, he sought to ascertain whether Tiffany had failed to report recourse and nonrecourse notes provided to Tiffany by the Pedi-Pulsor licensees. According to Lewis, the investigation of Tiffany could not be performed properly with redacted documents.
The District Court found that the IRS had made a sufficient showing of its interest in auditing Tiffany’s returns and enforced the summonses. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. 718 F. 2d 7 (1983). It held that the John Doe provisions of § 7609(f) apply only when “the IRS issue[s] a summons to an identifiable party in whom it ha[s] no interest in order to investigate the potential tax liabilities of unnamed third parties.” Id., at 13. Given the District Court’s finding that one purpose of the summonses was to investigate Tiffany, § 7609(f) was not relevant here “even assuming that the summonses . . . were issued to Tiffany partly for the purpose of investigating Tiffany’s customers.” Id., at 13-14.
The Federal Courts of Appeals are divided on the scope of § 7609(f). The Eighth and Eleventh Circuits, like the Second Circuit in this case, have held that the IRS need not comply with § 7609(f) when it seeks information on unnamed third parties as long as one purpose of the summons is to carry out a legitimate investigation of the named summoned party. See United States v. Barter Systems, Inc., 694 F. 2d 163 (CA8 1982); United States v. Gottlieb, 712 F. 2d 1363 (CA11 1983). In contrast, the Sixth Circuit has taken the opposite position, holding that the IRS must comply with § 7609(f) whenever it seeks information on unnamed third parties— even in cases in which one of the purposes of the IRS is to investigate the named recipient of the summons. United States v. Thompson, 701 F. 2d 1175 (1983). We granted certiorari to resolve this conflict. 466 U. S. 925 (1984). We affirm.
II
Congress enacted §7609 in response to two decisions in which we gave a broad construction to the IRS’s general summons power under § 7602(a). It is therefore useful to review those cases before embarking on an analysis of the statutory provision.
In Donaldson v. United States, 400 U. S. 517 (1971), the IRS issued to an employer a § 7602 summons seeking records prepared by the employer that would be relevant to an investigation of the tax liability of one of its employees. The employee obtained a preliminary injunction restraining his employer from complying with the summons. The Government then moved for enforcement. In response, the employer stated that it would have complied with the summons “‘were it not for’ the preliminary injunction.” Id., at 521. The employee, however, filed motions to intervene in the proceedings, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2), in order to oppose enforcement. He stated that he had an interest in the outcome of the enforcement action and that this interest would not be adequately represented by his employer. We held that the employee’s interest was not legally protectible and affirmed the denial of the employee’s motions for intervention.
Four years later, we decided United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U. S. 141 (1975). In Bisceglia, the IRS issued to a bank a § 7602 summons for the purpose of identifying an unnamed individual who had deposited a large amount of money in severely deteriorated bills. The bills appeared to have been stored for a long period of time under abnormal conditions, and the IRS suspected that they had been hidden to avoid taxes. Although we recognized the danger that the IRS might use its §7602 summons power to “conduct ‘fishing expeditions’ into the private affairs of bank depositors,” id., at 150-151, we concluded that, on the facts of the case, the IRS had not abused its power. Thus, we held that the summons was enforceable.
Section 7609, the provision at issue in this case, was clearly a response to these decisions. Both the Senate and the House Reports accompanying the bill that became §7609 focused exclusively on the problem of “third-party summonses” — that is, summonses served on a party that, like the employer in Donaldson and the bank in Bisceglia, is not the taxpayer under investigation. S. Rep. No. 94-938, p. 368 (1976); H. R. Rep. No. 94-658, p. 306 (1975). In fact, Donaldson and Bisceglia were the only two cases cited in the texts of the Reports.
Referring to Donaldson, the House Report noted that, under the then-existing law, “there is no legal requirement that the taxpayer (or other party) to whose business or transactions the summoned records relate be informed that a third-party summons has been served.” H. R. Rep. No. 94-658, at 306-307; see also S. Rep. No. 94-938, at 368. Referring to Bisceglia, both Reports stated:
“In certain cases, where the [IRS] has reason to believe that certain transactions have occurred which may affect the tax liability of some taxpayer, but is unable for some reason to determine the specific taxpayer who may be involved, the [IRS] may serve a so-called ‘John Doe’ summons, which means that books and records relating to certain transactions are requested, although the name of the taxpayer is not specified.” S. Rep. No. 94-938, at 368; H. R. Rep. No. 94-658, at 306.
Both Reports asserted that the standards enunciated in Donaldson and Bisceglia might “unreasonably infringe on the civil rights of taxpayers, including the right to privacy.” S. Rep. No. 94-938, at 368; H. R. Rep. No. 94-658, at 307. Section 7609 stems from this concern. To deal with the problem of a third-party summons in a case in which the IRS knows the identity of the taxpayer being investigated, Congress enacted §§ 7609(a) and (b); these subsections require that the IRS give notice of the summons to that taxpayer, and give the taxpayer the right “to intervene in any proceeding with respect to the enforcement of such summons.” In this provision, Congress modified the result reached in Donaldson.
In the case of a John Doe summons, where the IRS does not know the identity of the taxpayer under investigation, advance notice to that taxpayer is, of course, not possible. As a substitute for the procedures of §§ 7609(a). and (b), Congress enacted § 7609(f), which provides:
“Any summons . . . which does not identify the person with respect to whose liability the summons is issued may be served only after a court proceeding in which the Secretary establishes that—
“(1) the summons relates to the investigation of a particular person or ascertainable group or class of persons,
“(2) there is a reasonable basis for believing that such person or group or class of persons may fail or may have failed to comply with any provision of any internal revenue law, and
“(3) the information sought to be obtained from the examination of the records (and the identity of the person or persons with respect to whose liability the summons is issued) is not readily available from other sources” (emphasis added).
See also § 7609(h)(2) (providing that these determinations be made ex parte, solely on the basis of the IRS’s petition and supporting affidavits). Section § 7609(f) was a response to concerns that our decision in Bisceglia did not provide sufficient restraints, in the John Doe context, on the IRS’s exercise of its summons power. See In re Tax Liabilities of John Does, 671 F. 2d 977, 979 (CA6 1982). With this background in mind, we turn to consider the application of the provision to the facts of this case.
Ill
The legal issue here is starkly posed. The District Court found as a matter of fact — and the Court of Appeals affirmed — that the IRS was pursuing a legitimate investigation of Tiffany’s tax liability. At the same time, the Court of Appeals assumed, and the Government does not dispute, that the IRS also intended to investigate the tax liabilities of the unnamed Pedi-Pulsor licensees. The question before us, then, is whether the IRS must comply with § 7609(f) in the case of such dual purpose summonses.
This Court has recognized that there is “a formidable line of precedent construing congressional intent to uphold the claimed enforcement authority of the [IRS] if [this] authority is necessary for the effective enforcement of the revenue laws and is not undercut by contrary legislative purposes.” United States v. Euge, 444 U. S. 707, 715-716 (1980). Just last Term, we reemphasized that “restrictions upon the IRS summons power should be avoided ‘absent unambiguous directions from Congress.’ ” United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U. S. 805, 816 (1984) (quoting United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U. S., at 150). Thus we examine whether the statute and legislative history indicate that Congress expressly considered the problem presented here, and attempt to discern the congressional purposes in enacting § 7609(f).
A
We find that the language of the statute is of little direct help in determining how to treat dual purpose summonses. By their terms, the John Doe provisions of § 7609(f) apply to a summons “which does not identify the person with respect to whose liability the summons is issued.” Tiffany argues that the term “person” in the statute must be read as “person” or “persons.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 6. It then contends that, because the Pedi-Pulsor licensees are persons not identified in the summonses, § 7609(f) literally applies. See United States v. Thompson, 701 F. 2d, at 1178-1179.
The Government’s construction is diametrically at odds with Tiffany’s:
“Section 7609(f) by its terms applies only if a summons ‘does not identify the person with respect to whose liability [it] is issued.’ That simply is not the case here. The summonses enforced by the district court explicitly were issued ‘[i]n the matter of the tax liability of Tiffany Fine Arts Inc. & Subsidiaries.’” Brief for United States 13.
See United States v. Barter Systems, Inc., 694 F. 2d, at 168.
The task that the parties ask us to engage in is to determine whether the statutory reference to “the person” should be read as “every person” or whether it should be read as “at least one person.” We are reluctant, on the basis of the statutory language alone, to reach even a tentative conclusion about the scope of § 7609(f). Neither construction strikes us as clearly compelling.
Turning our attention to the legislative history, we note that the facts of this case are different from those of Donaldson and Bisceglia in one important respect: The summonses here were served on a party that was itself under IRS investigation. Congress did not address this situation in 1976 when it enacted the John Doe provisions. The Reports contain no mention of a summons issued for the dual purpose of investigating both the tax liability of the summoned party and the tax liabilities of unnamed parties. They focus exclusively on summonses issued to parties not themselves under investigation. We conclude that Congress did not expressly consider the problem of dual purpose summonses.
B
We, therefore, turn to consider whether dual purpose summonses give rise to the same concerns that prompted Congress to enact § 7609(f). The Reports discuss only one specific congressional worry: that the party receiving a summons would not have a sufficient interest in protecting the privacy of the records if that party was not itself a target of the summons. S. Rep. No. 94-938, at 368-369; H. R. Rep. No. 94-658, at 307. Such a taxpayer might have little incentive to oppose enforcement vigorously. Then, with no real adversary, the IRS could use its summons power to engage in “fishing expeditions” that might unnecessarily trample upon taxpayer privacy. S. Rep. No. 94-938, at 373; H. R. Rep. No. 94-658, at 311. Congress determined that when the IRS uses its summons power not to conduct a legitimate investigation of an ascertainable target, but instead to look around for targets to investigate, the privacy rights of taxpayers are infringed unjustifiably. See S. Rep. No. 94-938, at 368; H. R. Rep. No. 94-658, at 307.
In response to this concern, §§ 7609(a) and (b) gave the real parties in interest — those actually being investigated — the right to intervene in the enforcement proceedings. Similarly, the John Doe requirements of § 7609(f) were adopted as a substitute for the procedures of §§ 7609(a) and (b). In effect, in the John Doe context, the court takes the place of the affected taxpayer under §§ 7609(a) and (b) and exerts a restraining influence on the IRS. However, § 7609(f) provides no opportunity for the unnamed taxpayers to assert any “personal defenses,” such as attorney-client or Fifth Amendment privileges that might be asserted under §§ 7609(a) and (b). See H. R. Rep. No. 94-658, at 309; see also S. Rep. No. 94-938, at 370. What § 7609(f) does is to provide some guarantee that the information that the IRS seeks through a summons is relevant to a legitimate investigation, albeit that of an unknown taxpayer.
When, as in this case, the summoned party is itself under investigation, the interests at stake are very different. First, by definition, the IRS is not engaged in a “fishing expedition” when it seeks information relevant to a legitimate investigation of a particular taxpayer. In such cases, any incidental effect on the privacy rights of unnamed taxpayers is justified by the IRS’s interest in enforcing the tax laws. More importantly, the summoned party will have a direct incentive to oppose enforcement. In such circumstances, the vigilance and self-interest of the summoned party — complemented by its right to resist enforcement— will provide some assurance that the IRS will not strike out arbitrarily or seek irrelevant materials. See, e. g., United States v. Powell, 379 U. S. 48, 57-58 (1964) (“[The IRS] must show that the investigation will be conducted pursuant to a legitimate purpose, that the inquiry may be relevant to the purpose, that the information sought is not already within the [IRS’s] possession, and that the administrative steps required by the Code have been followed”). Here, for example, Tiffany argued vigorously — albeit unsuccessfully— against enforcement of the summonses.
This is not to say, of course, that as long as the summoned party is under investigation, the IRS will be guaranteed an adversary. It is possible that the summoned party, even if it is itself being investigated, will not oppose enforcement, and that as a result the IRS might obtain some information that is relevant only to the liabilities of unnamed taxpayers. We recognize that the privacy rights of the unnamed taxpayers might then be unnecessarily trampled upon. Congress, however, did not seek to ensure that the IRS have an adversary in all summons proceedings. All that it did was require that a party with a real interest in the investigation — or the district court in the John Doe context — have standing to challenge the IRS’s exercise of its summons authority. It is not up to us, in construing the scope of this authority, to identify a problem that did not trouble Congress, or to attempt to correct it. We therefore conclude that, where the summoned party is itself being investigated, that party’s self-interest provides sufficient protection against the evils that Congress sought to remedy when it enacted § 7609(f).
We reject Tiffany’s argument that, under the decision below, the IRS can circumvent the requirements of § 7609(f) merely by stating that the summoned party is under investigation. We do not find that argument persuasive for two reasons. First, in such a case, the summoned party would still have a sufficient interest in opposing enforcement, as it would have no way of ascertaining that the IRS was not in fact seeking to investigate it. This party would be an interested adversary, and the concerns to which § 7609(f) was addressed would thus be significantly attenuated. More importantly, if the district court finds in the enforcement proceeding that the IRS does not in fact intend to investigate the summoned party, or that some of the records requested are not relevant to a legitimate investigation of the summoned party, the IRS could not obtain all the information it sought unless it complied with § 7609(f).
Our conclusion that the congressional concerns are adequately met without resort to § 7609(f) when the summoned party is itself under investigation should not be read to imply that the IRS can obtain from that party, without complying with § 7609(f), information that is relevant only to the investigation of unnamed taxpayers. In order to obtain such information, the IRS would have to satisfy the requirements of § 7609(f). Therefore, when the IRS does not comply with § 7609(f), the focus must be on whether the information sought is relevant to the investigation of the summoned party. Thus, we discuss next whether the names of the Pedi-Pulsor licensees were relevant to an investigation of Tiffany’s tax liability.
C
During the enforcement proceedings, Tiffany argued that it was possible to perform an investigation of its tax liability without resort to the names of all the Pedi-Pulsor licensees. We have never held, however, that the IRS must conduct its investigations in the least intrusive way possible. Instead, the standard is one of relevance. See United States v. Powell, supra, at 57. The Government argues persuasively that contact with the licensees might be necessary to verify that the transactions reported by Tiffany actually occurred. In fact, Tiffany itself acknowledged the relevance of the requested information, as it offered the IRS the names of certain licensees: “They might want to check a number of them at random, and this we are willing to do because we understand that they are entitled to review [Tiffany’s] books.” App. 35. Tiffany refused, however, to provide all of the names, as it did not think that in the course of its investigation of Tiffany, the IRS would want to audit “50 out of 50 or 150 out of 150 participants.” Ibid.
On the record before us, we agree with the Government that the names of the licensees “may be relevant” to the legitimate investigation of Tiffany. United States v. Powell, supra, at 57. The decision of how many, and which, licensees to contact is one for the IRS — not Tiffany — to make. Having already found that Congress provided no “unambiguous direction” on the question whether the IRS needs to comply with § 7609(f) in the case of dual purpose summonses, and that the IRS’s failure to comply with these requirements when serving such summonses does not undermine the goals that Congress sought to promote through § 7609(f), we conclude that the summonses here were properly enforced.
IV
We hold that where, pursuant to §7602, the IRS serves a summons on a known taxpayer with the dual purpose of investigating both the tax liability of that taxpayer and the tax liabilities of unnamed parties, it need not comply with the requirements for John Doe summonses set out in § 7609(f), as long as all the information sought is relevant to a legitimate investigation of the summoned taxpayer. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore affirmed.
It is so ordered.
The other petitioners are subsidiaries of Tiffany Fine Arts, Inc. Throughout this opinion, we refer to petitioners collectively as “Tiffany.”
This section provides:
“For the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any return, making a return where none has been made, determining the liability of any person for any internal revenue tax or the liability at law or in equity of any transferee or fiduciary of any person in respect to any internal revenue tax, or collecting any such liability, the Secretary or his delegate is authorized—
“(1) To examine any books, papers, records, or other data which may be relevant or material to such inquiry;
“(2) To summon the person liable for tax or required to perform the act, or any officer or employee of such person, or any person having possession, custody, or care of books of account containing entries relating to the business of the person liable for tax or required to perform the act, or any other person the Secretary [or his delegate] may deem proper, to appear before the Secretary [or his delegate] at a time and place named in the summons and to produce such books, papers, records, or other data, and to give such testimony, under oath, as may be relevant or material to such inquiry; and
“(3) To take such testimony of the person concerned, under oath, as may be relevant or material to such inquiry.”
According to Tiffany’s president, “the Pedi-Pulsor, is designed to permit bed ridden patients to prevent deep vein thrombosis through leg movement assisted by the Pedi-Pulsor.” Affidavit in Opposition to Order to Show Cause, App. 16-17.
Two of the summonses also requested production of the list of clients who acquired lithographs from Tiffany. After ascertaining that Tiffany did not in fact market lithographs, the IRS dropped its request for this information.
“A ‘John Doe’ summons is, in essence, a direction to a third party to surrender information concerning taxpayers whose identity is currently unknown to the IRS.” In re Tax Liabilities of John Does, 671 F. 2d 977, 978 (CA6 1982).
Tiffany devotes considerable energy to arguing that “the summonses were issued principally with respect to the tax liabilities of Tiffany’s clients.” Brief for Petitioners 11. Under our holding in this case, it is irrelevant whether this was the IRS’s primary or secondary purpose; all that matters is that the IRS was pursuing a legitimate investigation of Tiffany. In any event, “this Court has frequently noted its reluctance to disturb findings of fact concurred in by two lower courts.” Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U. S. 613, 623 (1982). See Blau v. Lehman, 368 U. S. 403, 408-409 (1962). On the record before us, we see no reason to upset the finding below.
Amici First Western Government Securities and Samuels, Kramer & Co. argue that the Reports refer to a case in which the summoned party was itself under investigation. The summons referred to in the example cited by amici was issued “to obtain the names of corporate shareholders involved in a taxable reorganization which had been characterized by the corporation (in a letter to its shareholders) as a nontaxable transaction.” S. Rep. No. 94-938, p. 373 (1976); H. R. Rep. No. 94-658, p. 311 (1975). According to amici, in such a case the corporation itself must have been under investigation.
The Reports do not indicate, however, the name of the case. Nor do they indicate whether the summons was issued to the corporation, or whether the IRS was in fact interested in the corporate tax liability. Amici do not tell us to which actual case the Reports referred. The Government, in contrast, states that the example in question could have referred to only one reported case: United States v. Armour, 376 F. Supp. 318 (Conn. 1974). In that case, the IRS issued summonses to bank officials in order to learn the names of shareholders for whom the bank held shares.
Given the scarcity of facts provided with the example, we simply cannot tell whether a dual purpose summons was involved. Moreover, even if we found a case that was consistent with amici’s reading of the example, we would have no way of knowing whether Congress was referring to that case rather than to Armour. We are therefore disinclined to place great weight on the argument advanced by amici.
We also find that it was well within the District Court’s discretion to conclude, after reviewing the submissions of the parties and holding oral argument, that an evidentiary hearing on the question of enforcement was unnecessary. See United States v. Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., 572 F. 2d 36, 42-43, n. 9 (CA2), cert. denied sub nom. Keech v. United States, 439 U. S. 822 (1978). As we stated in Donaldson v. United States, 400 U. S. 517, 527 (1971), “the burden of showing an abuse of the court’s process is on the taxpayer.” Even if factually true, the central argument raised by Tiffany before the District Court — that the IRS’s primary, but not sole, interest was to investigate the licensees — did not provide a basis for quashing the summonses.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
L
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice White
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Appellant seeks reversal of his conviction for refusing to permit a representative of the City of Seattle Fire Department to enter and inspect appellant’s locked commercial warehouse without a warrant and without probable cause to believe that a violation of any municipal ordinance existed therein. The inspection was conducted as part of a routine, periodic city-wide canvass to obtain compliance with Seattle’s Fire Code. City of Seattle Ordinance No. 87870, c. 8.01. After he refused the inspector access, appellant was arrested and charged with violating § 8.01.050 of the Code:
“Inspection of building and premises. It shall be the duty of the Fire Chief to inspect and he may enter all buildings and premises, except the interiors of dwellings, as often as may be necessary for the purpose of ascertaining and causing to be corrected any conditions liable to cause fire, or any violations of the provisions of this Title, and of any other ordinance concerning fire hazards.”
Appellant was convicted and given a suspended fine of $100 despite his claim that § 8.01.050, if interpreted to authorize this warrantless inspection of his warehouse, would violate his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. We noted probable jurisdiction and set this case for argument with Camara v. Municipal Court, ante, p. 523. 385 U. S. 808. We find the principles enunciated in the Camara opinion applicable here and therefore we reverse.
In Camara, we held that the Fourth Amendment bars prosecution of a person who has refused to permit a warrantless code-enforcement inspection of his personal residence. The only question which this case presents is whether Camara applies to similar inspections of commercial structures which are not used as private residences. The Supreme Court of Washington, in affirming appellant’s conviction, suggested that this Court “has applied different standards of reasonableness to searches of dwellings than to places of business,” citing Davis v. United States, 328 U. S. 582. The Washington court held, and appellee here argues, that § 8.01.050, which excludes “the interiors of dwellings,” establishes a reasonable scheme for the warrantless inspection of commercial premises pursuant to the Seattle Fire Code.
In Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U. S. 344; Amos v. United States, 255 U. S. 313; and Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U. S. 385, this Court refused to uphold otherwise unreasonable criminal investigative searches merely because commercial rather than residential premises were the object of the police intrusions. Likewise, we see no justification for so relaxing Fourth Amendment safeguards where the official inspection is intended to aid enforcement of laws prescribing minimum physical standards for commercial premises. As we explained in Camara, a search of private houses is presumptively unreasonable if conducted without a warrant. The businessman, like the occupant of a residence, has a constitutional right to go about his business free from unreasonable official entries upon his private commercial property. The businessman, too, has that right placed in jeopardy if the decision to enter and inspect for violation of regulatory laws can be made and enforced by the inspector in the field without official authority evidenced by a warrant.
As governmental regulation of business enterprise has mushroomed in recent years, the need for effective investigative techniques to achieve the aims of such regulation has been the subject of substantial comment and legislation. Official entry upon commercial property is a technique commonly adopted by administrative agencies at all levels of government to enforce a variety of regulatory laws; thus, entry may permit inspection of the structure in which a business is housed, as in this case, or inspection of business products, or a perusal of financial books and records. This Court has not had occasion to consider the Fourth Amendment’s relation to this broad range of investigations. However, we have dealt with the Fourth Amendment issues raised by another common investigative technique, the administrative subpoena of corporate books and records. We find strong support in these subpoena cases for our conclusion that warrants are a necessary and a tolerable limitation on the right to enter upon and inspect commercial premises.
It is now settled that, when an administrative agency subpoenas corporate books or records, the Fourth Amendment requires that the subpoena be sufficiently limited in scope, relevant in purpose, and specific in directive so that compliance will not be unreasonably burdensome. The agency has the right to conduct all reasonable inspections of such documents which are contemplated by statute, but it must delimit the confines of a search by designating the needed documents in a formal subpoena. In addition, while the demand to inspect may be issued by the agency, in the form of an administrative subpoena, it may not be made and enforced by the inspector in the field, and the subpoenaed party may obtain judicial review of the reasonableness of the demand prior to suffering penalties for refusing to comply.
It is these rather minimal limitations on administrative action which we think are constitutionally required in the case of investigative entry upon commercial establishments. The agency’s particular demand for access will of course be measured, in terms of probable cause to issue a warrant, against a flexible standard of reasonableness that takes into account the public need for effective enforcement of the particular regulation involved. But the decision to enter and inspect will not be the product of the unreviewed discretion of the enforcement officer in the field. Given the analogous investigative functions performed by the administrative subpoena and the demand for entry, we find untenable the proposition that the subpoena, which has been termed a “constructive” search, Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U. S. 186, 202, is subject to Fourth Amendment limitations which do not apply to actual searches and inspections of commercial premises.
We therefore conclude that administrative entry, without consent, upon the portions of commercial premises which are not open to the public may only be compelled through prosecution or physical force within the framework of a warrant procedure. We do not in any way imply that business premises may not reasonably be inspected in many more situations than private homes, nor do we question such accepted regulatory techniques as licensing programs which require inspections prior to operating a business or marketing a product. Any constitutional challenge to such programs can only be resolved, as many have been in the past, on a case-by-case basis under the general Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness. We hold only that the basic component of a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment — that it not be enforced without a suitable warrant procedure — is applicable in this context, as in others, to business as well as to residential premises. Therefore, appellant may not be prosecuted for exercising his constitutional right to insist that the fire inspector obtain a warrant authorizing entry upon appellant’s locked warehouse.
Reversed.
Conviction and sentence were pursuant to §8.01.140 of the Fire Code:
“PeNALtt. Anyone violating or failing to comply with any provision of this Title or lawful order of the Fire Chief pursuant hereto shall upon conviction thereof be punishable by a fine not to exceed Three Hundred Dollars ($300.00), or imprisonment in the City Jail for a period not to exceed ninety (90) days, or by both such fine and imprisonment, and each day of violation shall constitute a separate offense.”
“Dwelling” is defined in the Code as “a building occupied exclusively for residential purposes and having not more than two (2) dwelling units.” Such dwellings are subject to the substantive provisions of the Code, but the Fire Chief’s right to enter such premises is limited to times “when he has reasonable cause to believe a violation of the provisions of this Title exists therein.” § 8.01.040. This provision also lacks a warrant procedure.
See Antitrust Civil Process Act of 1962, 76 Stat. 548, 15 U. S. C. §§ 1311-1314; H. R. Rep. No. 708, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953) (reporting the “factory inspection” amendments to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 67 Stat. 476, 21 U. S. C. § 374); Davis, The Administrative Power of Investigation, 56 Yale L. J. 1111; Handler, The Constitutionality of Investigations by the Federal Trade Commission, I & II, 28 Col. L. Rev. 708, 905; Schwartz, Crucial Areas in Administrative Law, 34 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 401, 425-430; Note, Constitutional Aspects of Federal Tax Investigations, 57 Col. L. Rev. 676.
In United States v. Cardiff, 344 U. S. 174, this Court held that the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act did not compel that consent be given to warrantless inspections of establishments covered by the Act. (As a result, the statute was subsequent^ amended, see n. 3, supra.) See also Federal Trade Comm’n v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U. S. 298.
See United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U. S. 632; Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U. S. 186; United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U. S. 707; Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43. See generally 1 Davis, Administrative Law §§3.05-3.06 (1958).
We do not decide whether warrants to inspect business premises may be issued only after access is refused; since surprise may often be a crucial aspect of routine inspections of business establishments, the reasonableness of warrants issued in advance of inspection will necessarily vary with the nature of the regulation involved and may differ from standards applicable to private homes.
Davis v. United States, 328 U. S. 582, relied upon by the Supreme Court of Washington, held only that government officials could demand access to business premises and, upon obtaining consent to search, could seize gasoline ration coupons issued by the Government and illegally possessed by the petitioner. Davis thus involved the reasonableness of a particular search of business premises but did not involve a search warrant issue.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Me. Justice Reed
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Alien Property Custodian on November 17, 1942, executed Vesting Order No. 370. This order was issued under the authority of the Trading with the Enemy Act, 40 Stat. 411, as amended, and Executive Order No. 9095, as amended, and in terms vested the property therein described in the Alien Property Custodian in the interest and for the benefit of the United States. The order found the property to belong to a national of Germany. The property covered by the order was two blocks of stock — one common, one preferred — in the Silesian American Corporation, a Delaware corporation, hereinafter called Silesian. The stock, prior to August 31, 1939, stood in the stock book of Silesian in the name of Non Ferrum Gesellschaft zur Finanzierung von Unternehmungen des Bergbaues und der Industrie der Nichteisenmetalle, Zurich, Switzerland, a Swiss corporation, hereinafter referred to as the Non Ferrum Company. Non Ferrum, it was determined by the Custodian’s order, held the stock for the benefit of Bergwerksgesellschaft Georg von Giesche’s Erben, a German corporation. The certificates, it is asserted, had been deposited as security for loans with a group of banks, all of which apparently were chartered by Switzerland and are hereinafter referred to as the Swiss Banks.
To carry out the purpose of his vesting order, the Custodian directed Silesian to cancel on its books the outstanding Non Ferrum certificates, above referred to, and to issue in lieu thereof new certificates to the Custodian. This controversy revolves around the objection of Silesian so to act because the Custodian did not have physical possession of the pledged Non Ferrum certificates so as to be able to surrender them for cancellation, as the corporation’s by-laws required. Silesian feared liability to the holders of the Non Ferrum certificates for issuing other certificates in such circumstances.
Silesian had been a debtor under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act since July 30, 1941. It therefore asked the Bankruptcy Court for instructions as to its compliance with the Custodian’s direction. The other petitioner here, Silesian Holding Company, a Delaware corporation also, appeared and throughout has remained as a party to this litigation. It is the majority stockholder of Silesian but claims no different or other interest in the issue than Silesian. For the purpose of this case, it may and will be treated as having no more interest in the issue than Silesian has. The Swiss Banks asked the Reorganization Court to give instructions to the Debtor that no new shares be issued until the controversy between the Swiss Banks and the Custodian could be “fully, firmly and finally adjudicated.” This prayer was based on a verified answer to Silesian’s request for instruction, which answer alleged that the “Swiss Banks were the owners of the 'Non Fer-rum’ stock.” The Swiss Banks notified Silesian that any issue of new certificates representing the Non Ferrum stock, with or without court direction, would be at Silesian’s risk. Affidavits supporting the objection of the Swiss Banks to instructions to Silesian to issue the new certificates to the Custodian were filed with the District Court. These affidavits declared the Non Ferrum stock was pledged, prior to 1938, to groups of Swiss banks. It is not clear whether they are the same institutions that are named in the answer of the Swiss Banks to the Debtor’s request for instructions. For the purpose of this case, we assume that the groups are identical.
The District Court instructed the debtor to issue new certificates to the Alien Property Custodian. The court said:
“The vesting order of the Custodian found that the stock was held for the benefit of an enemy. The statutory discharge from liability, § 5b or § 7e, [Trading with the Enemy Act] protects the debtor corporation and relieves it of doubt in the premises.”
The court added:
“Whatever may be the interests or rights of the Swiss banks, they cannot be considered here. Hearsay statements, unsupported by documents, allege that these banks are pledgees of the stock. These statements create no issue for our consideration. The banks are parties herein only to the extent that they have been recognized in the reorganization proceeding as possible owners of a claimed interest which they have never been called upon to prove. They are not here because of any action taken against them or any recognition given them by the Custodian or even by reason of any established interest in the stock.”
No appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals was taken by the Swiss Banks. They do not appear here as parties to this writ of certiorari or otherwise. We therefore express no opinion as to the effect of the order and decision of the District Court upon the claims of the Swiss Banks as pledgees of the Non Ferrum stock. See SilesianAmerican Corporation v. Markham, 156 F. 2d 793, 795.
An appeal was taken to the Circuit Court of Appeals by Silesian. That court affirmed the order of the Bankruptcy Court. We first denied a petition for certiorari and then granted it so that this case might be considered in relation to other issues, thereafter presented here, in connection with the administration of the Trading with the Enemy Act. 329 U. S. 730 and 330 U. S. 852; Clark v. Uebersee Finanz-Korporation, 330 U. S. 813.
It was held by the Circuit Court of Appeals that Silesian had no “standing vicariously” to assert the interests of its shareholders. We agree. Silesian has no legal interest in the issue as to the ownership of its stock. It follows that Silesian has no standing to represent the interests of the pledgees of the Non Ferrum shares, if that is the present position of those shares. See Anderson Nat. Bank v. Luckett, 321 U. S. 233, 242. This reduces petitioners’ objection to the order directing the issue of new certificates in favor of the Custodian for the Non Ferrum stock to the claim that the sections of the Trading with the Enemy Act under which the Custodian acted are invalid as applied to Silesian in these circumstances. If the provisions do not authorize the order and direction, Silesian, over its own objections, cannot be compelled to obey.
The Custodian vested the stock in himself by virtue of the Trading with the Enemy Act, as amended by the First War Powers Act of 1941, including, of course, § 5 (b) (l), and Executive Order No. 9095, C. F. R. Cuna. Supp. 1121, as amended 1174. This property was vested during war. There is no doubt but that under the war power, as heretofore interpreted by this Court, the United States, acting under a statute, may vest in itself the property of a national of an enemy nation. Unquestionably to wage war successfully, the United States may confiscate enemy property. United States v. Chemical Foundation, 272 U. S. 1, 11. Nor can there, we think, be any doubt that any property in this country of any alien may be summarily reduced to possession by the United States in furtherance of the war effort. Every resource within the ambit of sovereign power is subject to use for the national defense. This section was amended during war to cover the taking of alien property. It is limited to a war or a declared emergency period. While a natural hesitancy exists against so interpreting the war power clause as to expand its scope to cover incidents not intimately connected with war, we think reasonable preparation for the storm of war is a proper exercise of the war power. This seizure of alien property, in a time of emergency, is of that character. We need not consider whether the general welfare clause could be a source of congressional power over alien property. This taking may be done as a means of avoiding the use of the property to draw earnings or wealth out of this country to territory where it may more likely be used to assist the enemy than if it remains in the hands of this government. Or the commandeered property of a friendly alien may be used to prosecute the war. The problems of compensation may await the judicial process. Central Union Trust Co. v. Garvan, 254 U. S. 554, 567-68. War brooks no delay. The Constitution imposes none.
The section, 5 (b) (1), and Executive Order under which the Custodian acted authorized the vesting in him by his order of the property of a foreign national. This description covered stock ownership of a foreign national in Silesian. The fact that the certificates did not come into the hands of the Custodian is immaterial. They are evidences of the property right of the foreign national in Silesian that is subject to be vested in the Custodian by the Act. See Great Northern R. Co. v. Sutherland, 273 U. S. 182. Section 5 (b) (1) specifically states, “and such designated agency or person may perform any and all acts incident to the accomplishment or furtherance of these purposes.” See note 2 above. Since the Custodian was authorized to vest and to sell the property by § 5, we think that the power to require the issue of new certificates was incidental to that authority. As one purpose of § 5 (b) (1) was to authorize the seizure of the interests of foreign nationals in domestic corporations so that such interest could be used or sold, such authority to participate in management or to transfer the stock interests would be frustrated if customary evidences of the ownership could not be required from the corporation. The power of the Custodian to demand the certificates is plain. The correlative duty to obey the order equally so, if the effect of obedience does not do violence to other valid requirements of the statute or make Silesian liable to bona fide holders of the old stock.
Silesian in specific terms is protected from any liability to bona fide holders such as Non Ferrum or the Swiss Banks by reason of any infirmity in the Custodian’s vesting order or his direction to Silesian to issue new certificates for the Non Ferrum stock. The applicable language of § 7 (e) of the Trading with the Enemy Act, 40 Stat. 418, and § 5 (b) (2), as amended, 55 Stat. 839-40, are set out in the margin. But Silesian argues that protection cannot follow from an order contrary to the Trading with the Enemy Act. The order to issue the new certificates is said to be unauthorized because it allows the property of friendly alien pledgees, the Swiss Banks, to be taken contrary to § 8 (a). Section 8 (a) is said to be a limitation on the Custodian’s power to seize property pledged to “any person not an enemy or ally of enemy.” It is suggested that if § 7 (e) or § 5 (b) (2) is interpreted to require Silesian to carry out the Custodian’s direction, even though this seizure is contrary to § 8 (a), a way has been found to “coerce an interested party [Silesian] into compliance with his [the Custodian’s] unlawful actions.” The answer to this contention is made by the Circuit Court of Appeals. It makes unnecessary any discussion of the protection afforded Silesian by § 7 (e) and § 5 (b) (2) from the claims of a pledge of stock exempted by statute from seizure. 156 F. 2d at 797. When § 5 (b) (1) was enacted as an amendment in the First War Powers Act of 1941, it authorized the taking of any property or interest therein of any foreign national. This broadening of the scope of the Custodian’s power to vest so as to include interests of friendly aliens in property includes the power to vest the interest which friendly aliens have from pledges. As the Circuit Court of Appeals said, p. 797:
“Any other interpretation of the section would make the pledges of friendly aliens a wholly irrational exception to the general purpose to subject all alien interests to seizure.”
Therefore, as we hold that § 5 (b) (1) rendered § 8 (a) inapplicable to the property of friendly aliens, the order of the Custodian was valid and Silesian’s objection disappears.
Finally there is the argument that Silesian cannot be compelled to issue the new certificates because the friendly aliens who claim interests in the Non Ferrum stock may not succeed in recovering the just compensation for the taking. See Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U. S. 481, 489. The Constitution guarantees to friendly aliens the right to just compensation for the requisitioning of their property by the United States. Russian Fleet v. United States, supra. We must assume that the United States will meet its obligations under the Constitution. Consequently, friendly aliens will be compensated for any property taken and Silesian is protected by the exculpatory clauses of the Act from any claim from its alien stockholders.
Judgment affirmed.
The Chief Justice took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
They are Union Bank of Switzerland, La Roche & Company, Banque Cantónale de Berne, and Aktiengesellschaft Leu & Company.
Trading with the Enemy Act, 40 Stat. 411, as amended by the First War Powers Act of 1941, 55 Stat. 839, § 5 (b) (1):
“During the time of war or during any other period of national emergency declared by the President, the President may, through any agency that he may designate, or otherwise, and under such rules and regulations as he may prescribe, by means of instructions, licenses, or otherwise—
“(B) investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest,
by any person, or with respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States; and any property or interest of any foreign country or national thereof shall vest, when, as, and upon the terms, directed by the President, in such agency or person as may be designated from time to time by the President, and upon such terms and conditions as the President may prescribe such interest or property shall be held, used, administered, liquidated, sold, or otherwise dealt with in the interest of and for the benefit of the United States, and such designated agency or person may perform any and all acts incident to the accomplishment or furtherance of these purposes; . . . .”
Art. I, §8, cl. 11.
Compare with the statement below: “The power of Congress to seize and confiscate enemy property rests upon Art. 1, § 8, Clause 11 of the Constitution. Stoehr v. Wallace, supra, 255 U. S. at page 242 . . . ; United States v. Chemical Foundation, Inc., 272 U. S. 1, 11 ... . Whether it exists at international law may be doubted; but nobody contends that the war power of Congress includes the seizure of the property of friendly aliens. The amendment of § 5 (b) must therefore rest upon some other power of Congress, not only for that reason, but because the amendment itself was expressly not limited to time of war (although it was in fact passed flagrante bello) but was to go into effect upon any ‘national emergency declared.’ It can rest upon Art. 1, § 8, Clause 1: i. e. upon the power ‘to provide for the common Defence and general Welfare’; indeed, so far as we can see, the debtor does not challenge the power itself, but its exercise. It complains that the amendment delegates an unrestricted discretion to the President, and does not provide ‘just compensation’ for seizures.” 156 F. 2d 793, 796.
40 Stat. 418, § 7 (e):
“No person shall be held liable in any court for or in respect to anything done or omitted in pursuance of any order, rule, or regulation made by the President under the authority of this Act.”
55 Stat. 840, § 5 (b) (2):
“Any payment, conveyance, transfer, assignment, or delivery of property or interest therein, made to or for the account of the United States, or as otherwise directed, pursuant to this subdivision or any rule, regulation, instruction, or direction issued hereunder shall to the extent thereof be a full acquittance and discharge for all purposes of the obligation of the person making the same; and no person shall be held liable in any court for or in respect to anything done or omitted in good faith in connection with the administration of, or in pursuance of and in reliance on, this subdivision, or any rule, regulation, instruction, or direction issued hereunder.”
40 Stat. 418-19, § 8 (a):
“That any person not an enemy or ally of enemy holding a lawful mortgage, pledge, or lien, or other right in the nature of security in property of an enemy or ally of enemy which, by law or by the terms of the instrument creating such mortgage, pledge, or lien, or right, may be disposed of on notice or presentation or demand . . . may continue to hold said property, and, after default, may dispose of the property .... Provided further, That if, on any such disposition of property, a surplus shall remain after the satisfaction of the mortgage, pledge, lien, or other right in the nature of security, notice of that fact shall be given to the President pursuant to such rules and regulations as he may prescribe, and such surplus shall be held subject to his further order.”
The Circuit Court of Appeals said: “Thus it can be argued with much force that, unless some provision can be found by which he may secure compensation, § 5 (b) is unconstitutional; and, if so, it would at best be doubtful whether the protection given by subsection (2) would be valid.” 156 F. 2d 793, 797.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
D
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
The respondent was convicted of murder in a Georgia Superior Court. His sentencing jury found the following statutory aggravating circumstances:
“(1) that the offense of murder was committed by a person with a prior record of conviction of a capital felony, Code Ann. §27-2534.1(b)(1); (2) that the murder was committed by a person who has a substantial history of serious assaultive criminal convictions, Code Ann. §27-2534.1(b)(1), supra; and, (3) that the offense of murder was committed by a person who had escaped from the lawful custody of a peace officer or a place of lawful confinement, Code Ann. §27-2534.1(b)(9).” Stephens v. Hopper, 241 Ga. 596, 597-598, 247 S. E. 2d 92, 94, cert. denied, 439 U. S. 991 (1978).
The jury imposed the death penalty. On direct appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. Stephens v. State, 237 Ga. 259, 227 S. E. 2d 261, cert. denied, 429 U. S. 986 (1976). On the authority of Arnold v. State, 236 Ga. 534, 224 S. E. 2d 386 (1976), it set aside the second statutory aggravating circumstance found by the jury. It upheld the death sentence, however, on the ground that in Arnold “that was the sole aggravating circumstance found by the jury,” whereas in the case under review “the evidence supports the jury’s findings of the other statutory aggravating circumstances, and consequently the sentence is not impaired.” 237 Ga., at 261-262, 227 S. E. 2d, at 263.
After exhausting his state postconviction remedies, Stephens v. Hopper, supra, the respondent applied for a writ of habeas corpus in Federal District Court. Relief was denied by that court, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit “reverse[d] the district court’s denial of habeas corpus relief insofar as it le[ft] standing the [respondent’s] death sentence, and . . . remanded for further proceedings.” 631 F. 2d 397, 407 (1980), modified, 648 F. 2d 446 (1981). We granted the petition for certiorari. 454 U. S. 814.
In Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153 (1976), we upheld the Georgia death penalty statute because the standards and procedures set forth therein promised to alleviate to a significant degree the concern of Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238 (1972), that the death penalty not be imposed capriciously or in a freakish manner. We recognized that the constitutionality of Georgia death sentences ultimately would depend on the Georgia Supreme Court’s construing the statute and reviewing capital sentences consistently with this concern. See 428 U. S., at 198, 201-206 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.); id., at 211-212, 222-224 (White, J., concurring in judgment). Our review of the statute did not lead us to examine all of its nuances. It was only after the state law relating to capital sentencing was clarified in concrete cases that we confronted and addressed more specific constitutional challenges in Coker v. Georgia, 433 U. S. 584 (1977), Presnell v. Georgia, 439 U. S. 14 (1978), Green v. Georgia, 442 U. S. 95 (1979), and Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U. S. 420 (1980).
Today, we are asked to decide whether a reviewing court constitutionally may sustain a death sentence as long as at least one of a plurality of statutory aggravating circumstances found by the jury is valid and supported by the evidence. The Georgia Supreme Court consistently has asserted that authority. Its construction of state law is clear: “Where two or more statutory aggravating circumstances are found by the jury, the failure of one circumstance does not so taint the proceedings as to invalidate the other aggravating circumstance found and the sentence of death based thereon.” Gates v. State, 244 Ga. 587, 599, 261 S. E. 2d 349, 358 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U. S. 938 (1980).
Despite the clarity of the state rule we are asked to review, there is considerable uncertainty about the state-law premises of that rule. The Georgia Supreme Court has never explained the rationale for its position. It may be that implicit in the rule is a determination that multiple findings of statutory aggravating circumstances are superfluous, or a determination that the reviewing court may assume the role of the jury when the sentencing jury recommended the death penalty under legally erroneous instructions. In this Court, the Georgia Attorney General offered as his understanding the following construction of state law: The jury must first find whether one or more statutory aggravating circumstances have been established beyond a reasonable doubt. The existence of one or more aggravating circumstances is a threshold finding that authorizes the jury to consider imposing the death penalty; it serves as a bridge that takes the jury from the general class of all murders to the narrower class of offenses the state legislature has determined warrant the death penalty. After making the finding that the death penalty is a possible punishment, the jury then makes a separate finding whether the death penalty should be imposed. It bases this finding “not upon the statutory aggravating circumstances but upon all the evidence before the jury in aggravation and mitigation of punishment which ha[s] been introduced at both phases of the trial.” Brief for Petitioner 13.
In view of the foregoing uncertainty, it would be premature to decide whether such determinations, or any of the others we might conceive as a basis for the Georgia Supreme Court’s position, might undermine the confidence we expressed in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153 (1976), that the Georgia capital-sentencing system, as we understood it then, would avoid the arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty and would otherwise pass constitutional muster. Suffice it to say that the state-law premises of the Georgia Supreme Court’s conclusion of state law are relevant to the constitutional issue at hand.
The Georgia Supreme Court under certain circumstances will decide questions of state law upon certification from this Court. See Ga. Code §24-4536 (Supp. 1980). We invoke that statute to certify the following question: What are the premises of state law that support the conclusion that the death sentence in this case is not impaired by the invalidity of one of the statutory aggravating circumstances found by the jury?
The Clerk of this Court is directed to transmit this certificate, signed by The Chief Justice and under the official seal of the Court, as well as the briefs and record filed with the Court, to the Supreme Court of Georgia, and simultaneously to transmit copies of the certificate to the attorneys for the respective parties.
It is so ordered.
The trial judge instructed the sentencing jury as follows:
“Gentlemen of the Jury, the defendant in this case has been found guilty at your hands of the offense of Murder, and it is your duty to make certain determinations with respect to the penalty to be imposed as punishment for that offense. Now in arriving at your determinations in this regard you are authorized to consider all of the evidence received in court throughout the trial before you. You are further authorized to consider all facts and circumstances presented in extinuation [sic], mitigation and aggravation of punishment as well as such arguments as have been presented for the State and for the Defense. Under the law of this State every person guilty of Murder shall be punished by death or by imprisonment for life, the sentence to be fixed by the jury trying the case. In all cases of Murder for which the death penalty may be authorized the jury shall consider any mitigating circumstances or aggravating circumstances authorized by law. You may consider any of the following statutory aggravating circumstances which you find are supported by the evidence. One, the offense of Murder was committed by a person with a prior record of conviction for a Capital felony, or the offense of Murder was committed by a person who has a substantial history of serious assaultive criminal convictions. Two, the offense of Murder was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind or an aggravated battery to the victim. Three, the offense of Murder was committed by a person who has escaped from the lawful custody of a peace officer or place of lawful confinement. These possible statutory circumstances are stated in writing and will be out with you during your deliberations on the sentencing phase of this case. They are in writing here, and I shall send this out with you. If the jury verdict on sentencing fixes punishment at death by electrocution you shall designate in writing, signed by the foreman, the aggravating circumstances or circumstance which you found to have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Unless one or more of these statutory aggravating circumstances are proven beyond a reasonable doubt you will not be authorized to fix punishment at death. If you fix punishment at death by electrocution you would recite in the exact words which I have given you the one or more circumstances you found to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. You would so state in your verdict, and after reciting this you would state, We fix punishment at death. On the other hand, if you recommend mercy for the defendant this will result in imprisonment for life of the defendant. In such case it would not be necessary for you to recite any mitigating or aggravating circumstances as you may find, and you would simply state in your verdict, We fix punishment at life in prison. Now, whatever your verdict may be with respect to the responsibility you have regarding sentencing please write these out, Mr. Foreman, immediately below the previous verdict you have rendered. Be sure that it is dated and that it bears your signature as foreman. Once again when you have arrived at your verdict on the sentencing phase of the case let us know. We will then receive the verdict from you and have it published here in open court. Please retire now and consider the sentence in this case.” App. 18-19.
See Stevens v. State, 247 Ga. 698, 709, 278 S. E. 2d 398, 407 (1981); Green v. State, 246 Ga. 598, 606, 272 S. E. 2d 475, 485 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U. S. 936 (1981); Hamilton v. State, 246 Ga. 264, n. 1, 271 S. E. 2d 173, 174, n. 1 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U. S. 1103 (1981); Brooks v. State, 246 Ga. 262, 263, 271 S. E. 2d 172 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U. S. 921 (1981); Collins v. State, 246 Ga. 261, 262, 271 S. E. 2d 352, 354 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U. S. 1103 (1981); Dampier v. State, 245 Ga. 882, 883, n. 1, 268 S. E. 2d 349, 350, n. 1, cert. denied, 449 U. S. 938 (1980); Burger v. State, 245 Ga. 458, 461-462, 265 S. E. 2d 796, 799-800, cert. denied, 446 U. S. 988 (1980); Gates v. State, 244 Ga. 587, 599, 261 S. E. 2d 349, 358 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U. S. 938 (1980); Stephens v. State, 237 Ga. 259, 261-262, 227 S. E. 2d 261, 263, cert. denied, 429 U. S. 986 (1976).
Last Term, Members of this Court expressed different assumptions about the meaning — and the constitutionality — of the Georgia Supreme Court’s position. In Drake v. Zant, 449 U. S. 999 (1980), the Court declined to grant certiorari and vacate the judgments in two Georgia cases in which the death sentences — premised in part on the (b)(7) aggravating circumstance — were imposed prior to our decision in Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U. S. 420 (1980). Justice Stevens, concurring in the disposition, expressed the opinion that the Georgia Supreme Court’s position was so clear that there was no need to remand the cases for reconsideration in light of Godfrey. 449 U. S., at 1000. Dissenting from the denial of certiorari, Justice Stewart stated that if one aggravating circumstance found by the jury “could not constitutionally justify the death sentence, Georgia law would prohibit a further finding that the error was harmless simply because of the existence of the other aggravating circumstance.” Id., at 1001. He believed that the Georgia Supreme Court’s position on the issue was inconsistent with the Georgia capital punishment scheme because “only the trial judge or jury can know and determine what to do when upon appellate review it has been concluded that a particular aggravating circumstance should not have been considered in sentencing the defendant to death.” Ibid. Justice White, also dissenting, would have remanded for reconsideration in light of Godfrey, a disposition that “would allow the Georgia Supreme Court in the first instance to determine whether the death penalty should be sustained without regard to the validity of the Godfrey circumstance.” 449 U. S., at 1002. He did “not understand the Georgia cases ... to hold either that the Georgia Supreme Court is without power to set aside a death penalty if it sustains only one of the aggravating circumstances found by the jury or that, although the court has that power, it invariably will not disturb the death penalty in such situations.” Ibid.
“When it shall appear to the Supreme Court of the United States . . . that there are involved in any proceeding before it questions or propositions of the laws of this State which are determinative of said cause and there are no clear controlling precedents in the appellate court decisions of this State, such Federal appellate court may certify such questions or propositions of the laws of Georgia to this court for instructions concerning such questions or propositions.”
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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A
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals of the State of Maryland the effect of which is to deny the appellant a place on the ballot for a municipal election in the City of Baltimore on the ground that she has refuséd to file an affidavit required by state law. Md. Laws 1949, c. 86, § 15. -Md.-, 78 A. 2d 660. The scope of the state law was passed on in Shub v. Simpson, - Md. -, 76 A. 2d 332. We read this decision to hold that to obtain a place on a Maryland ballot a candidate need only make oath that he is not a person who is engaged “in one way or another in the attempt to overthrow the government by force or violence,” and that he is not knowingly a member of an organization engaged in such an attempt. -Md. at-, 76 A. 2d at 338. At the bar of this Court the Attorney General of the State of Maryland declared that he would advise the proper authorities to accept an affidavit in these terms as satisfying in full the statutory requirement. Under these circumstances and with this understanding, the judgment of the Maryland Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
Mr. Justice Reed concurs in the result.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
C
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Me. Justice White
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In 1960, the corporate respondent, Erie Lackawanna Railroad Company, was formed by the merger of the Erie Railroad and the Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Railroad. Thereafter, the individual respondents, former employees of the Delaware Lackawanna, continued as employees of the Erie Lackawanna until 1962, when they were furloughed; after the 1962 furlough, the respondent employees were never recalled by the railroad. Deeming the furlough a final discharge, the individual respondents brought suit in the District Court for the Western District of New York against the Erie Lacka-wanna and against the International Brotherhood of Firemen and Oilers, subordinate organizations within the union, and local and national officers of the union. The allegations were that the railroad had wrongfully discharged the plaintiffs in violation of § 5 et seq. of the Interstate Commerce Act, 24 Stat. 380, as amended, 49 U. S. C. § 5 et seq., the Railway Labor Act, 44 Stat. 577, as amended, 45 U. S. C. § 151 et seq., and the agreement between the Erie Lackawanna and its employees entered into to implement the 1960 merger of the Erie and the Delaware Lackawanna; and that the union defendants had been “guilty of gross nonfeasance and hostile discrimination” in arbitrarily and capriciously refusing to process the claims of plaintiffs, who had “been replaced by ‘pre-merger’ employees of the Erie Railroad.” Damages in the sum of $160,000 were sought against the railroad, the union defendants, or both. The District Court dismissed the complaint against the railroad for failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the Railway-Labor Act and for lack of diversity jurisdiction; the court dismissed the complaint against the union because the complaint failed adequately to allege a breach of duty and because the employees could have processed their own grievances.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the District Court’s decision with respect to the action against the union defendants. O’Mara v. Erie Lackawanna R. Co., 407 F. 2d 674 (1969). The Court of Appeals held that the complaint was adequate to allege a breach by the union of its duty of fair representation subject to vindication in the District Court without resort to administrative remedies. Dismissal of the complaint against the railroad was affirmed; but on remand the individual respondents were to be granted leave to maintain their action against the railroad if they should choose to amend their complaint to allege that the employer was somehow implicated in the union’s discrimination.
We granted certiorari, 396 U. S. 814 (1969), and we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Although the complaint was not as specific with regard to union discrimination as might have been desirable, we deem the complaint against the union sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. As the Court of Appeals indicated, “where the courts are called upon to fulfill their role as the primary guardians of the duty of fair representation,” complaints should be construed to avoid dismissals and the plaintiff at the very least “should be given the opportunity to file supplemental pleadings unless it appears 'beyond doubt’ that he cannot state a good cause of action.” 407 F. 2d, at 679. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U. S. 41, 45-46 (1957). And surely it is beyond cavil that a suit against the union for breach of its duty of fair representation is not within the jurisdiction of the National Railroad Adjustment Board or subject to the ordinary rule that administrative remedies should be exhausted before resort to the courts. Glover v. St. Louis-S. F. R. Co., 393 U. S. 324 (1969); Conley v. Gibson, supra. The claim against the union defendants for the breach of their duty of fair representation is a discrete claim quite apart from the right of individual employees expressly extended to them under the Railway Labor Act to pursue their employer before the Adjustment Board.
Neither the individual respondents nor the railroad sought review here of the Court of Appeals’ judgment insofar as it sustained the dismissal of the complaint against the railroad absent allegations implicating the railroad in the union’s claimed breach of duty. The petitioning union defendants, however, challenge this aspect of the Court of Appeals’ decision, insisting that they may not be sued alone for breach of duty when the damage to employees had its roots in their discharge by the railroad prior to the union’s alleged refusal to process grievances. Apparently fearing that if sued alone they may be forced to pay damages for which the employer is wholly or partly responsible, the petitioners claim error in the Court of Appeals’ affirmance of the dismissal of the suit against the railroad. These fears are groundless. The Court of Appeals permitted the railroad to be made a party to the suit if it is properly alleged that the discharge was a consequence of the union’s discriminatory conduct or that the employer was in any other way implicated in the union’s alleged discriminatory action. If these allegations are not made and the employer is not a party defendant, judgment against petitioners can in any event be had only for those damages that flowed from their own conduct. Assuming a wrongful discharge by the employer independent of any discriminatory conduct by the union and a subsequent discriminatory refusal by the union to process grievances based on the discharge, damages against the union for loss of employment are unrecoverable except to the extent that its refusal to handle the grievances added to the difficulty and expense of collecting from the employer. If both the union and the employer have independently caused damage to employees, the union cannot complain if separate actions are brought against it and the employer for the portion of the total damages caused by each.
Since the petitioning union defendants will not be materially prejudiced by the possible absence of the respondent railroad as a codefendant at trial and since neither the railroad nor the aggrieved employees sought review of the Court of Appeals’ judgment, we have no occasion to consider whether under federal law, which governs in cases like these, the employer may always be sued with the union when a single series of events gives rise to claims against the employer for breach of contract and against the union for breach of the duty of fair representation or whether, as the Court of Appeals held, when there are no allegations tying union and employer together, the union is suable in the District Court for breach of duty but resort must be had to the Adjustment Board for a remedy against the employer.
Affirmed.
The Chief Justice would dismiss the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.
Section 3 First (i) of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U. S. C. § 153 First (i), authorizes reference to the Adjustment Board of disputes “between an employee or group of employees and a carrier or carriers growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions . . . .” Section 3 First (j) of the Act, 45 U. S. C. § 153 First (j), provides that “[pjarties may be heard either in person, by counsel, or by other representatives, as they may respectively elect . . . .” The individual employee’s rights to participate in the processing of his grievances “are statutory rights, which he may exercise independently or authorize the union to exercise in his behalf.” Elgin, J. & E. R. Co. v. Burley, 325 U. S. 711, 740 n. 39 (1945), adhered to on rehearing, 327 U. S. 661 (1946).
See Glover v. St. Louis-S. F. R. Co., 393 U. S. 324 (1969); Cunningham v. Erie R. Co., 266 F. 2d 411 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1959); Richardson v. Texas & N. O. R. Co., 242 F. 2d 230 (C. A. 5th Cir. 1957). See also Ferro v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 296 F. 2d 847 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1961).
See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U. S. 171, 196-198 (1967).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
G
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Citriam.
The motions for leave to proceed in forma pauperis in No. 1095, Misc., and No. 1700, Misc., are granted and the petitions for writs of certiorari in all three cases are granted. Without reaching the petitioners’ other claims, the judgments are vacated and the cases remanded for reconsideration in the light of Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U. S. 510.
Mr. Justice Harlan dissents for the reasons stated in Mr. Justice Black’s dissenting opinion in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U. S. 510, 532.
Mr. Justice White dissents for the reasons stated in his dissenting opinion in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U. S. 510, 540.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Thomas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Scott Lynn Pinholster and two accomplices broke into a house in the middle of the night and brutally beat and stabbed to death two men who happened to interrupt the burglary. A jury convicted Pinholster of first-degree murder, and he was sentenced to death.
After the California Supreme Court twice unanimously denied Pinholster habeas relief, a Federal District Court held an evidentiary hearing and granted Pinholster habeas relief under 28 U. S. C. §2254. The District Court concluded that Pinholster’s trial counsel had been constitutionally ineffective at the penalty phase of trial. Sitting en banc, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Pinholster v. Ayers, 590 F. 3d 651 (2009). Considering the new evidence adduced in the District Court hearing, the Court of Appeals held that the California Supreme Court’s decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law.” § 2254(d)(1).
We granted certiorari and now reverse.
I
A
On the evening of January 8,1982, Pinholster solicited Art Corona and Paul David Brown to help him rob Michael Kumar, a local drug dealer. On the way, they stopped at Lisa Tapar’s house, where Pinholster put his buck knife through her front door and scratched a swastika into her car after she refused to talk to him. The three men, who were all armed with buck knives, found no one at Kumar’s house, broke in, and began ransacking the home. They came across only a small amount of marijuana before Kumar’s friends, Thomas Johnson and Robert Beckett, arrived and shouted that they were calling the police.
Pinholster and his accomplices tried to escape through the rear door, but Johnson blocked their path. Pinholster backed Johnson onto the patio, demanding drugs and money and repeatedly striking him in the chest. Johnson dropped his wallet on the ground and stopped resisting. Beckett then came around the corner, and Pinholster attacked him, too, stabbing him repeatedly in the chest. Pinholster forced Beckett to the ground, took both men’s wallets, and began kicking Beckett in the head. Meanwhile, Brown stabbed Johnson in the chest, “ ‘bury[ing] his knife to the hilt.’ ” 35 Reporter’s Tr. 4947 (hereinafter Tr.). Johnson and Beckett died of their wounds.
Corona drove the three men to Pinholster’s apartment. While in the car, Pinholster and Brown exulted, “‘We got ’em, man, we got ’em good.’ ” Ibid. At the apartment, Pin-holster washed his knife, and the three split the proceeds of the robbery: $23 and one quarter-ounce of marijuana. Although Pinholster instructed Corona to “lay low,” Corona turned himself in to the police two weeks later. Id., at 4955. Pinholster was arrested shortly thereafter and threatened to kill Corona if he did not keep quiet about the burglary and murders. Corona later became the State’s primary witness. The prosecution brought numerous charges against Pinholster, including two counts of first-degree murder.
B
The California trial court appointed Harry Brainard and Wilbur Dettmar to defend Pinholster on charges of first-degree murder, robbery, and burglary. Before their appointment, Pinholster had rejected other attorneys and insisted on representing himself. During that time, the State had mailed Pinholster a letter in jail informing him that the prosecution planned to offer aggravating evidence during the penalty phase of trial to support a sentence of death.
The guilt phase of the trial began on February 28, 1984. Pinholster testified on his own behalf and presented an alibi defense. He claimed that he had broken into Kumar’s house alone at around 8 p.m. on January 8, 1982, and had stolen marijuana but denied killing anyone. Pinholster asserted that later that night around 1 a.m., while he was elsewhere, Corona went to Kumar’s house to steal more drugs and did not return for three hours. Pinholster told the jury that he was a “professional robber,” not a murderer. 43 id., at 6204. He boasted of committing hundreds of robberies over the previous six years but insisted that he always used a gun, never a knife. The jury convicted Pinholster on both counts of first-degree murder.
Before the penalty phase, Brainard and Dettmar moved to exclude any aggravating evidence on the ground that the prosecution had failed to provide notice of the evidence to be introduced, as required by Cal. Penal Code Ann. §190.3 (West 2008). At a hearing on April 24, Dettmar argued that, in reliance on the lack of notice, he was “not presently prepared to offer anything by way of mitigation.” 52 Tr. 7250. He acknowledged, however, that the prosecutor “possibly ha[d] met the [notice] requirement.” Ibid. The trial court asked whether a continuance might be helpful, but Dettmar declined, explaining that he could not think of a mitigation witness other than Pinholster’s mother and that additional time would not “make a great deal of difference.” Id., at 7257-7258. Three days later, after hearing testimony, the court found that Pinholster had received notice while representing himself and denied the motion to exclude.
The penalty phase was held before the same jury that had convicted Pinholster. The prosecution produced eight witnesses, who testified about Pinholster’s history of threatening and violent behavior, including resisting arrest and assaulting police officers, involvement with juvenile gangs, and a substantial prison disciplinary record. Defense counsel called only Pinholster’s mother, Burnice Brashear. She gave an account of Pinholster’s troubled childhood and adolescent years, discussed Pinholster’s siblings, and described Pinholster as “a perfect gentleman at home.” Id., at 7405. Defense counsel did not call a psychiatrist, though they had consulted Dr. John Stalberg at least six weeks earlier. Dr. Stalberg noted Pinholster’s “psychopathic personality traits,” diagnosed him with antisocial personality disorder, and concluded that he “was not under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance” at the time of the murders. App. 131.
After 2k days of deliberation, the jury unanimously voted for death on each of the two murder counts. On mandatory appeal, the California Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. People v. Pinholster, 1 Cal. 4th 865, 824 P. 2d 571 (1992).
C
In August 1993, Pinholster filed his first state habeas petition. Represented by new counsel, Pinholster alleged, inter alia, ineffective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase of his trial. He alleged that Brainard and Dettmar had failed to adequately investigate and present mitigating evidence, including evidence of mental disorders. Pinholster supported this claim with school, medical, and legal records, as well as declarations from family members, Brainard, and Dr. George Woods, a psychiatrist who diagnosed Pinholster with bipolar mood disorder and seizure disorders. Dr. Woods criticized Dr. Stalberg’s report as incompetent, unreliable, and inaccurate. The California Supreme Court unanimously and summarily denied Pinholster’s penalty-phase ineffective-assistance claim “on the substantive ground that it is without merit.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 302.
Pinholster filed a federal habeas petition in April 1997. He reiterated his previous allegations about penalty-phase ineffective assistance and also added new allegations that his trial counsel had failed to furnish Dr. Stalberg with adequate background materials. In support of the new allegations, Dr. Stalberg provided a declaration stating that in 1984, Pin-holster's trial counsel had provided him with only some police reports and a 1978 probation report. Dr. Stalberg explained that, had he known about the material that had since been gathered by Pinholster’s habeas counsel, he would have conducted “further inquiry” before concluding that Pinholster suffered only from a personality disorder. App. to Brief in Opposition 219. He noted that Pinholster’s school records showed evidence of “some degree of brain damage.” Ibid. Dr. Stalberg did not, however, retract his earlier diagnosis. The parties stipulated that this declaration had never been submitted to the California Supreme Court, and the federal petition was held in abeyance to allow Pinholster to go back to state court.
In August 1997, Pinholster filed his second state habeas petition, this time including Dr. Stalberg’s declaration and requesting judicial notice of the documents previously submitted in support of his first state habeas petition. His allegations of penalty-phase ineffective assistance of counsel mirrored those in his federal habeas petition. The California Supreme Court again unanimously and summarily denied the petition “on the substantive ground that it is without merit.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 300.
Having presented Dr. Stalberg’s declaration to the state court, Pinholster returned to the District Court. In November 1997, he filed an amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus. His allegations of penalty-phase ineffective assistance of counsel were identical to those in his second state habeas petition. Both parties moved for summary judgment, and Pinholster also moved, in the alternative, for an evidentiary hearing.
The District Court concluded that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 110 Stat. 1214, did not apply and granted an evidentiary hearing. Before the hearing, the State deposed Dr. Stalberg, who stated that none of the new material he reviewed altered his original diagnosis. Dr. Stalberg disagreed with Dr. Woods’ conclusion that Pinholster suffers from bipolar disorder. Pin-holster did not call Dr. Stalberg to testify at the hearing. He presented two new medical experts: Dr. Sophia Vinogradov, a psychiatrist who diagnosed Pinholster with organic personality syndrome and ruled out antisocial personality disorder, and Dr. Donald Olson, a pediatric neurologist who suggested that Pinholster suffers from partial epilepsy and brain injury. The State called Dr. F. David Rudniek, a psychiatrist who, like Dr. Stalberg, diagnosed Pinholster with antisocial personality disorder and rejected any diagnosis of bipolar disorder.
D
The District Court granted habeas relief. Applying preAEDPA standards, the court granted the habeas petition “for inadequacy of counsel by failure to investigate and present mitigation evidence at the penalty hearing.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 262. After Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U. S. 202 (2003), clarified that AEDPA applies to cases like Pinholster’s, the court amended its order but did not alter its conclusion. Over a dissent, a panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. Pinholster v. Ayers, 525 F. 3d 742 (2008).
On rehearing en banc, the Court of Appeals vacated the panel opinion and affirmed the District Court’s grant of habeas relief. The en banc court held that the District Court’s evidentiary hearing was not barred by 28 U. S. C. § 2254(e)(2). The court then determined that new evidence from the hearing could be considered in assessing whether the California Supreme Court’s decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law” under § 2254(d)(1). See 590 F. 3d, at 666 (“Congress did not intend to restrict the inquiry under § 2254(d)(1) only to the evidence introduced in the state habeas court”). Taking the District Court evidence into account, the en banc court determined that the California Supreme Court unreasonably applied Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (1984), in denying Pinholster’s claim of penalty-phase ineffective assistance of counsel.
Three judges dissented and rejected the majority’s conclusion that the District Court hearing was not barred by § 2254(e)(2). 590 F. 3d, at 689 (opinion of Kozinski, C. J.) (characterizing Pinholster’s efforts as “habeas-bysandbagging”). Limiting its review to the state-court record, the dissent concluded that the California Supreme Court did not unreasonably apply Strickland. 590 F. 3d, at 691-723.
We granted certiorari to resolve two questions. 560 U. S. 964 (2010). First, whether review under § 2254(d)(1) permits consideration of evidence introduced in an evidentiary hearing before the federal habeas court. Second, whether the Court of Appeals properly granted Pinholster habeas relief on his claim of penalty-phase ineffective assistance of counsel.
II
We first consider the scope of the record for a § 2254(d)(1) inquiry. The State argues that review is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits. Pinholster contends that evidence presented to the federal habeas court may also be considered. We agree with the State.
A
As amended by AEDPA, 28 U. S. C. § 2254 sets several limits on the power of a federal court to grant an application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a state prisoner. Section 2254(a) permits a federal court to entertain only those applications alleging that a person is in state custody “in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” Sections 2254(b) and (c) provide that a federal court may not grant such applications unless, with certain exceptions, the applicant has exhausted state remedies.
If an application includes a claim that has been “adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings,” § 2254(d), an additional restriction applies. Under § 2254(d), that application “shall not be granted with respect to [such a] claim... unless the adjudication of the claim”:
“(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
“(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the faets in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”
This is a “difficult to meet,” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U. S. 86, 102 (2011), and “highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings, which demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt,” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U. S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The petitioner carries the burden of proof. Id., at 25.
We now hold that review under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits. Section 2254(d)(1) refers, in the past tense, to a state-court adjudication that “resulted in” a decision that was contrary to, or “involved” an unreasonable application of, established law. This backward-looking language requires an examination of the state-court decision at the time it was made. It follows that the record under review is limited to the record in existence at that same time— i. e., the record before the state court.
This understanding of the text is compelled by “the broader context of the statute as a whole,” which demonstrates Congress’ intent to channel prisoners’ claims first to the state courts. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U. S. 337, 341 (1997). “The federal habeas scheme leaves primary responsibility with the state courts....” Visciotti, supra, at 27. Section 2254(b) requires that prisoners must ordinarily exhaust state remedies before filing for federal habeas relief. It would be contrary to that purpose to allow a petitioner to overcome an adverse state-court decision with new evidence introduced in a federal habeas court and reviewed by that court in the first instance effectively de novo.
Limiting § 2254(d)(1) review to the state-court record is consistent with our precedents interpreting that statutory provision. Our cases emphasize that review under § 2254(d)(1) focuses on what a state court knew and did. State-court decisions are measured against this Court’s precedents as of “the time the state court renders its decision.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U. S. 63, 71-72 (2003). To determine whether a particular decision is “contrary to” then-established law, a federal court must consider whether the decision “applies a rule that contradicts [such] law” and how the decision “confronts [the] set of facts” that were before the state court. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 362, 405, 406 (2000) (Terry Williams). If the state-court decision “identifies the correct governing legal principle” in existence at the time, a federal court must assess whether the decision “unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id., at 413. It would be strange to ask federal courts to analyze whether a state court’s adjudication resulted in a decision that unreasonably applied federal law to facts not before the state court.
Our recent decision in Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U. S. 465 (2007), is consistent as well with our holding here. We explained that “[bjecause the deferential standards prescribed by §2254 control whether to grant habeas relief, a federal court must take into account those standards in deciding whether an evidentiary hearing is appropriate.” Id., at 474. In practical effect, we went on to note, this means that when the state-court record “precludes habeas relief” under the limitations of § 2254(d), a district court is “not required to hold an evidentiary hearing.” Id., at 474 (citing with approval the Ninth Circuit’s recognition that “an evidentiary hearing is not required on issues that can be resolved by reference to the state court record” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
The Court of Appeals wrongly interpreted Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 420 (2000) (Michael Williams), as supporting the contrary view. The question there was whether the lower court had correctly determined that § 2254(e)(2) barred the petitioner’s request for a federal evidentiary hearing. Michael Williams did not concern whether evidence introduced in such a hearing could be considered under § 2254(d)(1). In fact, only one claim at issue in that case was even subject to § 2254(d); the rest had not been adjudicated on the merits in state-court proceedings. See id., at 429 (“Petitioner did not develop, or raise, his claims... until he filed his federal habeas petition”).
If anything, the decision in Michael Williams supports our holding. The lower court in that case had determined that the one claim subject to § 2254(d)(1) did not satisfy that statutory requirement. In light of that ruling, this Court concluded that it was “unnecessary to reach the question whether § 2254(e)(2) would permit a [federal] hearing on th[at] claim.” Id., at 444. That conclusion is fully consistent with our holding that evidence later introduced in federal court is irrelevant to § 2254(d)(1) review.
The Court of Appeals’ reliance on Holland v. Jackson, 542 U. S. 649 (2004) (per curiam), was also mistaken. In Holland, we initially stated that “whether a state court’s decision was unreasonable [under § 2254(d)(1)] must be assessed in light of the record the court had before it.” Id., at 652. We then went on to assume for the sake of argument what some Courts of Appeals had held — that § 2254(d)(1), despite its mandatory language, simply does not apply when a federal habeas court has admitted new evidence that supports a claim previously adjudicated in state court. Id., at 653. There was no reason to decide that question because regardless, the hearing should have been barred by § 2254(e)(2). Today, we reject that assumption and hold that evidence introduced in federal court has no bearing on § 2254(d)(1) review. If a claim has been adjudicated on the merits by a state court, a federal habeas petitioner must overcome the limitation of § 2254(d)(1) on the record that was before that state court.
B
Pinholster’s contention that our holding renders § 2254(e)(2) superfluous is incorrect. Section 2254(e)(2) imposes a limitation on the discretion of federal habeas courts to take new evidence in an evidentiary hearing. See Landrigan, supra, at 473 (noting that district courts, under AEDPA, generally retain the discretion to grant an evidentiary hearing). Like § 2254(d)(1), it carries out “AEDPA’s goal of promoting comity, finality, and federalism by giving state courts the first opportunity to review [a] claim, and to correct any constitutional violation in the first instance.” Jimenez v. Quarterman, 555 U. S. 113, 121 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Section 2254(e)(2) continues to have force where § 2254(d)(1) does not bar federal habeas relief. For example, not all federal habeas claims by state prisoners fall within the scope of § 2254(d), which applies only to claims “adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings.” At a minimum, therefore, § 2254(e)(2) still restricts the discretion of federal habeas courts to consider new evidence when deciding claims that were not adjudicated on the merits in state court. See, e. g., Michael Williams, 529 U. S., at 427-429.
Although state prisoners may sometimes submit new evidence in federal court, AEDPA’s statutory scheme is designed to strongly discourage them from doing so. Provisions like §§ 2254(d)(1) and (e)(2) ensure that “[fjederal courts sitting in habeas are not an alternative forum for trying facts and issues which a prisoner made insufficient effort to pursue in state proceedings.” Id., at 437; see also Richter, 562 U. S., at 103 (“Section 2254(d) is part of the basic structure of federal habeas jurisdiction, designed to confirm that state courts are the principal forum for asserting constitutional challenges to state convictions”); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S. 72, 90 (1977) (“[T]he state trial on the merits [should be] the ‘main event/ so to speak, rather than a ‘tryout on the road’ for what will later be the determinative federal habeas hearing”).
C
Accordingly, we conclude that the Court of Appeals erred in considering the District Court evidence in its review under § 2254(d)(1). Although we might-ordinarily remand for a properly limited review, the Court of Appeals also ruled, in the alternative, that Pinholster merited habeas relief even on the state-court record alone. 590 F. 3d, at 669. Remand is therefore inappropriate, and we turn next to a review of the state-court record.
Ill
The Court of Appeals’ alternative holding was also erroneous. Pinholster has failed to demonstrate that the California Supreme Court unreasonably applied clearly established federal law to his penalty-phase ineffective-assistance claim on the state-court record. Section 2254(d) prohibits habeas relief.
A
Section 2254(d) applies to Pinholster’s claim because that claim was adjudicated on the merits in state-court proceedings. No party disputes that Pinholster’s federal petition alleges an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim that had been included in both of Pinholster’s state habeas petitions. The California Supreme Court denied each of those petitions “on the substantive ground that it is without merit.”
Section 2254(d) applies even where there has been a summary denial. See Richter, 562 U. S., at 98. In these circumstances, Pinholster can satisfy the “unreasonable application” prong of § 2254(d)(1) only by showing that “there was no reasonable basis” for the California Supreme Court’s decision. Id., at 98. “[A] habeas court must determine what arguments or theories... could have supporte[d] the state court’s decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of this Court.” Id., at 102. After a thorough review of the state-court record, we conclude that Pinholster has failed to meet that high threshold.
B
There is no dispute that the clearly established federal law here is Strickland v. Washington. In Strickland, this Court made clear that “the purpose of the effective assistance guarantee of the Sixth Amendment is not to improve the quality of legal representation... [but] simply to ensure that criminal defendants receive a fair trial.” 466 U. S., at 689. Thus, “[t]he benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.” Id., at 686 (emphasis added). The Court acknowledged that “[t]here are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case,” and that “[e]ven the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way.” Id., at 689.
Recognizing the “tempt[ation] for a defendant to second-guess counsel’s assistance after conviction or adverse sentence,” ibid., the Court established that counsel should be “strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment,” id., at 690. To overcome that presumption, a defendant must show that counsel failed to act “reasonably] considering all the circumstances.” Id., at 688. The Court cautioned that “[t]he availability of intrusive post-trial inquiry into attorney performance or of detailed guidelines for its evaluation would encourage the proliferation of ineffectiveness challenges.” Id., at 690.
The Court also required that defendants prove prejudice. Id., at 691-692. “The defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id., at 694. “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Ibid. That requires a “substantial,” not just “conceivable,” likelihood of a different result. Richter, supra, at 112.
Our review of the California Supreme Court’s decision is thus “doubly deferential.” Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U. S. 111, 123 (2009) (citing Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U. S. 1, 5-6 (2003) (per curiam)). We take a “highly deferential” look at counsel’s performance, Strickland, supra, at 689, through the “deferential lens of § 2254(d),” Mirzayance, supra, at 121, n. 2. Pinholster must demonstrate that it was necessarily unreasonable for the California Supreme Court to conclude: (1) that he had not overcome the strong presumption of competence; and (2) that he had failed to undermine confidence in the jury’s sentence of death.
C
1
Pinholster has not shown that the California Supreme Court’s decision that he could not demonstrate deficient performance by his trial counsel necessarily involved an unreasonable application of federal law. In arguing to the state court that his counsel performed deficiently, Pinholster contended that they should have pursued and presented additional evidence about: his family members and their criminal, mental, and substance abuse problems; his schooling; and his medical and mental health history, including his epileptic disorder. To support his allegation that his trial counsel had “no reasonable tactical basis” for the approach they took, Pinholster relied on statements his counsel made at trial. App. to Brief in Opposition 143. When arguing the motion to exclude the State’s aggravating evidence at the penalty phase for failure to comply with Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 190.3, Dettmar, one of Pinholster’s counsel, contended that because the State did not provide notice, he “[was] not presently prepared to offer anything by way of mitigation,” 52 Tr. 7250. In response to the trial court’s inquiry as to whether a continuance might be helpful, Dettmar noted that the only mitigation witness he could think of was Pinholster’s mother. Additional time, Dettmar stated, would not “make a great deal of difference.” Id., at 7257-7258.
We begin with the premise that “under the circumstances, the.challenged action[s] might be considered sound trial strategy.” Strickland, supra, at 689 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court of Appeals dissent described one possible strategy:
“[Pinholster’s attorneys] were fully aware that they would have to deal with mitigation sometime during the course of the trial, did spend considerable time and effort investigating avenues for mitigationf,] and made a reasoned professional judgment that the best way to serve their client would be to rely on the fact that they never got [the required §190.3] notice and hope the judge would bar the state from putting on their aggravation witnesses.” 590 F. 3d, at 701-702 (opinion of Kozinski, C. J.).
Further, if their motion was denied, counsel were prepared to present only Pinholster’s mother in the penalty phase to create sympathy not for Pinholster, but for his mother. After all, the “‘family sympathy’” mitigation defense was known to the defense bar in California at the time and had been used by other attorneys. Id., at 707. Rather than displaying neglect, we presume that Dettmar’s arguments were part of this trial strategy. See Gentry, supra, at 8 (“[T]here is a strong presumption that [counsel took certain actions] for tactical reasons rather than through sheer neglect” (citing Strickland, supra, at 690)).
The state-court record supports the idea that Pinholster’s counsel acted strategically to get the prosecution’s aggravation witnesses excluded for lack of notice, and if that failed, to put on Pinholster’s mother. Other statements made during the argument regarding the motion to exclude suggest that defense counsel were trying to take advantage of a legal technicality and were not truly surprised. Brainard and Dettmar acknowledged that the prosecutor had invited them on numerous occasions to review Pinholster’s state prison file but argued that such an invitation did not meet with the “strict demands” of § 190.3. 52 Tr. 7260. Dettmar admitted that the prosecutor, “being as thorough as she is, possibly ha[d] met the requirement.” Id., at 7250. But if so, he wanted her “to make that representation to the court.” Ibid.
Timesheets indicate that Pinholster’s trial counsel investigated mitigating evidence. Long before the guilty verdict, Dettmar talked with Pinholster’s mother and contacted a psychiatrist. On February 26, two months before the penalty phase started, he billed six hours for “[preparation argument, death penalty phase.” See Clerk’s Tr. 864. Brainard, who merely assisted Dettmar for the penalty phase, researched epilepsy and also interviewed Pinholster’s mother. We know that Brainard likely.spent additional time, not reflected in these entries, preparing Pinholster’s brother, Terry, who provided some mitigation testimony about Pinholster’s background during the guilt phase. Infra, at 200.
The record also shows that Pinholster’s counsel confronted a challenging penalty phase with an unsympathetic client, which limited their feasible mitigation strategies. By the end of the guilt phase, the jury had observed Pinholster “glor[y]” in “his criminal disposition” and “hundreds of robberies.” Pinholster, 1 Cal. 4th, at 945, 907,824 P. 2d, at 611, 584. During his cross-examination, Pinholster laughed or smirked when he told the jury that his “occupation” was “a crook,” when he was asked whether he had threatened a potential witness, and when he described thwarting police efforts to recover a gun he had once used. 44 Tr. 6225. He bragged about being a “professional robber.” 43 id., at 6204. To support his defense, Pinholster claimed that he used only guns — not knives — to commit his crimes. But during cross-examination, Pinholster admitted that he had previously been convicted of using a knife in a kidnaping. Pin-holster also said he was a white supremacist and that he frequently carved swastikas into other people’s property as “a sideline to robbery.” 44 id., at 6246.
Trial counsel’s psychiatric expert, Dr. Stalberg, had concluded that Pinholster showed no significant signs or symptoms of mental disorder or defect other than his “psychopathic personality traits.” App. 131. Dr. Stalberg was aware of Pinholster’s hyperactivity as a youngster, hospitalization at age 14 for incorrigibility, alleged epileptic disorder, and history of drug dependency. Nevertheless, Dr. Stalberg told counsel that Pinholster did not appear to suffer from brain damage, was not significantly intoxicated or impaired on the night in question, and did not have an impaired ability to appreciate the criminality of his conduct.
Given these impediments, it would have been a reasonable penalty-phase strategy to focus on evoking sympathy for Pinholster’s mother. In fact, such a family-sympathy defense is precisely how the State understood defense counsel’s strategy. The prosecutor carefully opened her cross-examination of Pinholster’s mother with, “I hope you understand I don’t enjoy cross-examining a mother of anybody.” 52 Tr. 7407. And in her closing argument, the prosecutor attempted to undercut defense counsel’s strategy by pointing out, “Even the most heinous person born, even Adolph Hitler[,] probably had a mother who loved him.” 53 id., at 7452.
Pinholster’s only response to this evidence is a series of declarations from Brainard submitted with Pinholster’s first state habeas petition, seven years after the trial. Brainard declares that he has “no recollection” of interviewing any family members (other than Pinholster’s mother) regarding penalty-phase testimony, of attempting to secure Pinholster’s school or medical records, or of interviewing any former teachers or counselors. Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus in No. S004616 (Cal.), Exh. 3. Brainard also declares that Dettmar was primarily responsible for mental health issues in the case, but he has “no recollection” of Dettmar ever having secured Pinholster’s medical records. Id., Exh. 2. Dettmar neither confirmed nor denied Brainard’s statements, as he had died by the time of the first state habeas petition. 590 F. 3d, at 700 (Kozinski, C. J., dissenting).
In sum, Brainard and Dettmar made statements suggesting that they were not surprised that
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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A
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question here is whether federal magistrates are authorized to conduct evidentiary hearings in federal habeas corpus cases. In 1968, Congress enacted the Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U. S. C. §§ 631-639, to upgrade and expand the former United States commissioner system. The Act authorizes magistrates to exercise all powers formerly exercised by United States commissioners, and also, as a means of relieving the caseload burden of the federal district judges, empowers magistrates to try minor offenses when all parties consent, and to perform such additional duties assigned by the district court as are “not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.” Pursuant to the Act, the Judges of the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky amended Local Rule 16 of that court to provide:
“In addition to submitting such other reports and recommendations as may be required concerning petitions for writs of habeas corpus from state prisoners the full-time Magistrate is directed to schedule and hear evidentiary matters deemed by the Magistrate to be necessary and proper in the determination of each such petition, and to report thereon with an appropriate recommendation for the disposition thereof to the District Judge having jurisdiction of the case. The Magistrate shall cause the testimony of such hearing to be recorded on suitable electronic sound recording equipment. He shall submit his proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the proper Judge for his consideration, copies of which shall be provided at that time to the petitioner and respondent, and the Magistrate shall expeditiously transmit the proceedings, including the recording of the testimony, to the proper District Judge. Upon written request of either party, filed within ten days from the date such is so transmitted to the District Judge having jurisdiction thereof, the District Judge shall proceed to hear the recording of the testimony given at the evidentiary hearing and give it de novo consideration.”
Respondent is a state prisoner whose petition for federal habeas corpus relief was assigned by the District Court to a full-time Magistrate for processing under the rule. The part of the rule challenged here is that which directs the full-time magistrate “to schedule and hear evidentiary matters [to be electronically recorded] deemed by the Magistrate to be necessary and proper in the determination of . . . such petition, and to report thereon with an appropriate recommendation for the disposition thereof to the District Judge [who] . . . [u]pon . . . request. . . shall proceed to hear the recording of the testimony . . . and give it de novo consideration.” The question is whether this portion of the rule is invalid because “inconsistent with the . . . laws of the United States” within the meaning of the Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U. S. C. § 636.(b), or because § 636 (b) itself should be construed to preclude district courts from assigning such duties to magistrates.
I
Respondent, Carl James Wedding, is a prisoner in the Kentucky State Penitentiary serving a life sentence imposed in 1949 by the Webster Circuit Court, Commonwealth of Kentucky, after a plea of guilty to a charge of willful murder. Wedding filed this petition for habeas corpus in 1971. After the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the initial dismissal of his petition, 456 F. 2d 245 (1972), and remanded for an evidentiary hearing, the District Court invoked Local Rule 16 and assigned the case to a full-time Magistrate to hold the hearing. Wedding promptly moved that the Magistrate be disqualified and the hearing be reassigned to a District Judge, on the ground that the Federal Magistrates Act did not authorize district courts to assign to magistrates the duty to hold habeas corpus evidentiary hearings. When the District Court denied the motion, the Magistrate proceeded with the hearing, and electronically recorded all testimonial evidence as required by Local Rule 16. Thereafter, the Magistrate transmitted the recording of the testimony to the District Judge and submitted written findings of fact and conclusions of law recommending that the petition be dismissed.
Wedding moved that the District Court give the matter a de novo hearing. The District Judge's response was to listen, as authorized by Local Rule 16, to the recording of the hearing before the Magistrate. On this basis and the Magistrate's findings and conclusions, the District Court entered an order dismissing respondent’s petition.
On appeal, Wedding renewed his challenge to Local Rule 16, relying upon Holiday v. Johnston, 313 U. S. 342 (1941). Holiday was also a federal habeas corpus case. There, after determining that the petition for writ of habeas corpus alleged facts which, if proved, would entitle the petitioner to relief, the District Judge issued a writ compelling the respondent to produce the petitioner before a designated United States Commissioner. The Commissioner held an evidentiary hearing at which the petitioner testified and the respondent submitted the depositions of two witnesses. On the basis of the evidence received, the Commissioner made findings of fact and stated conclusions of law recommending that the writ be denied. After hearing oral argument on the Commissioner's report, the District Judge entered an order discharging the writ.
This Court reversed, holding that the factfinding procedure employed failed to conform to Congress' express command in the Habeas Corpus Act that “[t]he court, or justice, or judge shall proceed in a summary way to determine the facts of the case, by hearing the testimony and arguments, and thereupon to dispose of the party as law and justice require.” Rev. Stat. § 761, 28 U. S. C. §461 (1940 ed.) (emphasis added). The Court held that the statute plainly accords a prisoner the right of testifying before a judge, stating:
“One of the essential elements of the determination of the crucial facts is the weighing and appraising of the testimony. Plainly it was intended that the prisoner might invoke the exercise of this appraisal by the judge himself. We cannot say that an appraisal of the truth of the prisoner’s oral testimony by a master or commissioner is, in the light of the purpose and object of the proceeding, the equivalent of the judge’s own exercise of the function of the trier of the facts.
“The District Judge should himself have heard the prisoner’s testimony and, in the light of it and the other testimony, himself have found the facts and based his disposition of the cause upon his findings.” Holiday v. Johnston, supra, at 352, 353-354.
Wedding contended that neither the text nor legislative history of the Federal Magistrates Act evidences a congressional intent to overrule Holiday. The Court of Appeals agreed and accordingly “vacate[d] the judgment of dismissal and remand [ed] the case with instructions that the [District] Court itself hold an evidentiary hearing on [Wedding’s] constitutional claims.” 483 F. 2d 1131, 1137 (CA6 1973). We granted certiorari, 414 U. S. 1157 (1974). We affirm.
II
Under our constitutional framework, the “great constitutional privilege” of habeas corpus, Ex parte Bollman 4 Cranch 75, 95 (1807) (Marshall, C. J.), has historically provided “a prompt and efficacious remedy for whatever society deems to be intolerable restraints. Its root principle is that in a civilized society, government must always be accountable to the judiciary for a man’s imprisonment: if the imprisonment cannot be shown to conform with the fundamental requirements of law, the individual is entitled to his immediate release.” Fay v. Noia,, 372 U. S. 391, 401-402 (1963). More often than not, claims of unconstitutional detention turn upon the resolution of contested issues of fact. Accordingly, since the Judiciary Act of February 5, 1867, c. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385, Congress has expressly vested plenary power in the federal courts “for taking testimony and trying the facts anew in habeas hearings . ...” Fay v. Noia, supra, at 416. See also Townsend v. Sain, 372 U. S. 293, 312 (1963).
In connection with the 1948 revision and recodification of the Judicial Code, Rev. Stat. § 761, construed in Holiday, and other procedural provisions of the Habeas Corpus Act were consolidated into 28 U. S. C. § 2243. The pertinent portion covering habeas corpus evidentiary hearings provides that “[t]he court shall summarily hear and determine the facts, and dispose of the matter as law and justice require.” The Revisers thus deleted some words from Rev. Stat. § 761, but the Revisers’ Notes accompanying § 2243, together with the reports of the Committee of the Judiciary of the Senate, and of the House, make abundantly clear that the word changes and omissions in Rev. Stat. § 761 were intended only as changes in form.
Accordingly, the construction of § 2243 has been that given § 761 in Holiday. United States v. Hayman, 342 U. S. 205, 213 n. 16 (1952); Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S. 443, 462-463 (1953). The Court held in the latter case:
“A federal judge on a habeas corpus application is required to ‘summarily hear and determine the facts, and dispose of the matter as law and justice require,’ 28 U. S. C. § 2243. This has long been the law. R. S. § 761, old 28 U. S. C. § 461.” Ibid, (emphasis added).
Ill
Our inquiry is thus narrowed to the question whether the Federal Magistrates Act changed the requirement of § 2243 that federal judges personally conduct habeas corpus evidentiary hearings. Certainly nothing in the text or legislative history of the Magistrates Act suggests that Congress meant to change that requirement. Rather, both text and legislative history plainly reveal a congressional determination to retain the requirement. For, although the Act gives district judges broad authority to assign a wide range of duties to magistrates, Congress carefully circumscribed the permissible scope of assignment to only “such additional duties as are not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.” 28 U. S. C. § 636 (b) (emphasis added). And in defining assignable duties, Congress decreed that the duty of holding evidentiary hearings was not assignable. This clearly emerges from the legislative history of subsection (3) of § 636 (b), which provides:
“(3) preliminary review of applications for post-trial relief made by individuals convicted of criminal offenses, and submission of a report and recommendations to facilitate the decision of the district judge having jurisdiction over the case as to whether there should be a hearing.” (Emphasis added.)
That legislative history reveals that the Judicial Conference of the United States objected to successive phrasings of subsection (b) (3) until it was phrased to make clear that the authority given district courts to assign duties to magistrates did not include authority to hold evi-dentiary hearings on applications for posttrial relief. The original draft of the subsection had proposed that magistrates’ duties include
“(3) preliminary consideration of applications for post-trial relief made by individuals convicted of criminal offenses.”
But because that language was susceptible of the interpretation that magistrates might conduct evidentiary hearings, the Judicial Conference of the United States objected to it. Accordingly, the subsection was rewritten to provide for
“(3) preliminary review of applications for post-trial relief made by individuals convicted of criminal offenses, and submission of a report and recommendations to facilitate the decision of the district judge having jurisdiction over the case ...
The Committee on the Administration of the Criminal Law of the Judicial Conference objected that the revision did not “make it clear that it is the judge’s responsibility to make the ultimate decisions and to hold hearings on such applications, rather than that of the magistrate.” The Committee therefore recommended the addition of the phrase “as to whether there should be a hearing” immediately following the word “case.” The proposed addition was made, and subsection (b) (3) in its present form was enacted. Thus, although § 636 (b) provides that “additional duties authorized by rule may include, but are not restricted to,” duties defined in subsection (b) (3), the legislative history of the subsection compels the conclusion that Congress made a deliberate choice to preclude district courts from assigning magistrates the duty to hold evidentiary hearings.
We conclude that, since § 2243 requires that the District Judge personally hold evidentiary hearings in federal habeas corpus cases, Local Rule 16, insofar as it authorizes the full-time magistrate to hold such hearings, is invalid because it is “inconsistent with the . . . laws of the United States” under §636 (b). We conclude further that the Rule is to that extent invalid because, as we construe § 636 (b), that section itself precludes district judges from assigning magistrates the duty of conducting evidentiary hearings. Review by magistrates of applications for post-trial relief is thus limited to review for the purpose of proposing, not holding, eviden-tiary hearings. In connection with the preliminary review whether or not to propose that the district judge hold an evidentiary hearing, we agree that magistrates may receive the state court record and all affidavits, stipulations, and other documents submitted by the parties. Magistrates are prohibited only from conducting the actual evidentiary hearings.
The invalidity of Local Rule 16 is not cured by its provision that the “District Judge shall proceed to hear the recording of the testimony given at the evidentiary hearing and give it de novo consideration.” Holiday reasoned that the command of § 761, now § 2243, was designed by Congress in recognition that “[o]ne of the essential elements of the determination of the crucial facts is the weighing and appraising of the testimony.” 313 U. S., at 352. “To experienced lawyers it is commonplace that the outcome of a lawsuit — and hence the vindication of legal rights — depends more often on how the factfinder appraises the facts than on a disputed construction of a statute or interpretation of a line of precedents. Thus the procedures by which the facts of the case are determined assume an importance fully as great as the validity of the substantive rule of law to be applied.” Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513, 520 (1958). Congress, Holiday held, “[p]lainly . . . intended that the prisoner might invoke . . . appraisal by the judge himself.” In that circumstance, we “cannot say that an appraisal of the truth of the prisoner’s oral testimony” based on listening to a recording of it, “is, in the light of the purpose and object of the proceeding, the equivalent of the judge’s own exercise of the function of the trier of the facts.” 313 U. S., at 352.
Affirmed.
Commissioners had been empowered by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to give oaths (Rule 3); issue arrest warrants (Rule 4); conduct preliminary examinations of arrestees (Rule 5); issue subpoenas (Rule 17); issue warrants of removal to another district (Rule 40); and release defendants on bail (Rule 46). In addition, commissioners were authorized to try persons accused of petty offenses (defined by 18 U. S. C. § 1 (3) as crimes for which the penalty does not exceed imprisonment for six months or a fine of not more than $500 or both) committed within the confines of federal enclaves, 62 Stat. 830. In civil cases commissioners were limited to administering oaths and taking bail, acknowledgments, affidavits, and depositions. 62 Stat. 917.
Unlike the more restricted criminal trial jurisdiction of the former commissioners, see n. 1, supra, the authority of magistrates extends to minor offenses committed anywhere within the judicial district and includes crimes punishable by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or a fine of not more than $1,000, or both.
The Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U. S. C. § 636 (b), provides:
“(b) Any district court of the United States, by the concurrence of a majority of all the judges of such district court, may establish rules pursuant to which any full-time United States magistrate, or, where there is no full-time magistrate reasonably available, any part-time magistrate specially designated by the court, may be assigned within the territorial jurisdiction of such court such additional duties as are not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States. The additional duties authorized by rule may include, but are not restricted to—
“Í1) service as a special master in an appropriate civil action pursuant to the applicable provisions of this title and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States district courts;
“(2) assistance to a district judge in the conduct of pretrial or discovery proceedings in civil or criminal actions; and
“(3) preliminary review of applications for posttrial relief made by individuals convicted of criminal offenses, and submission of a report and recommendations to facilitate the decision of the district judge having jurisdiction over the case as to whether there should be a hearing.”
We thus agree with the Court of Appeals that this case does not require resolution of the question whether Congress constitutionally may enact legislation vesting authority, pursuant to rule or order of court, in magistrates to hold evidentiary hearings on habeas corpus petitions. We indicate no views as to the validity of investing such authority in a magistrate or other officer “outside the pale of Article III of the Constitution.” 483 F. 2d 1131, 1133 n. 1 (CA6 1973).
The relevant portion of the Judiciary Act of February 5, 1867, c. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385, provides that the “court or judge shall proceed in a summary way to determine the facts of the case, by hearing testimony and the arguments of the parties interested, and if it shall appear that the petitioner is deprived of his or her liberty in contravention of the constitution or laws of the United States, he or she shall forthwith be discharged and set at liberty.”
62 Stat. 869.
S. Rep. No. 1559, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1948).
H. R. Rep. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., A178 (1947).
See also J. Moore, Commentary on the U. S. Judicial Code 436 n. 78 (1949); Payne v. Wingo, 442 F. 2d 1192, 1194 (CA6 1971).
Had any substantive change in the meaning of Rev. Stat. § 761, as construed in Holiday v. Johnston, been intended, the Revisers’ Notes would have called attention to the change. William W. Barron, the Chief Reviser of the Code, explained: “[N]o changes of law or policy will be presumed from changes of language in revision unless an intent to make such changes is clearly expressed. Mere changes of phraseology indicate no intent to work a change of meaning but merely an effort to state in clear and simpler terms the original meaning of the statute revised.” Barron, The Judicial Code 1948 Revision, 8 F. R. D. 439, 445-446. See also S. Rep. No. 1559, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1948); H. R. Rep. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 7 (1947).
A full discussion of the legislative history of the Federal Magistrates Act will be found in TPO, Inc. v. McMillen, 460 F. 2d 348 (CA7 1972).
Where Congress gave magistrates authority to conduct hearings, the authority was express and circumscribed with procedural safeguards. Thus 28 U. S. C. § 636 (a) (3) gives magistrates jurisdiction to conduct trials for minor offenses, but 18 U. S. C. § 3401 provides that any person charged with a minor offense may elect to be tried by a district judge. Title 28 U. S. C. § 636 (b) (1) authorizes magistrates to serve as special masters — which frequently involves the conduct of hearings — but makes that service subject to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which include the restrictions of Rule 53 (b) that “reference to a master shall be the exception and not the rule.” See Note, Developments in the Law — Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 1038,1189 n. 229 (1970).
S. 3475, Federal Magistrates Act of 1966, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
See the Report of the Committee on the Administration of the Criminal Law, adopted by the Judicial Conference in September 1966, reprinted in the Hearings on S. 3475 and S. 945 before the Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) and 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), pp. 241j, 241n.
See the Report of the Committee on the Administration of the Criminal Law, adopted by the Judicial Conference in March 1967, reprinted in the Hearings on S. 3475 and S. 945 before the Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) and 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), pp. 244, 245.
Ibid.
S. 945, Federal Magistrates Act of 1967, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
See Shapiro, Federal Habeas Corpus: A Study in Massachusetts, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 321, 364r-365 (1973); Note, Developments in the Law — Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 1038, 1188-1189 (1970).
“A qualified, experienced magistrate will, it is hoped, acquire an expertise in examining these [post-conviction review] applications and summarizing their important contents for the district judge, thereby facilitating his decisions. Law clerks are presently charged with this responsibility by many judges, but judges have noted that the normal 1-year clerkship does not afford law clerks the time or experience necessary to attain real efficiency in handling such applications.” S. Rep. No. 371, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 26 (1967).
To the extent that O’Shea v. United, States, 491 F. 2d 774 (CA1 1974), and Noorlander v. Ciccone, 489 F. 2d 642 (CA8 1973), suggest that magistrates may also accept oral testimony, provided that each party has the right to a de novo hearing before the district judge, we disagree. Such a procedure is precluded by both § 2243 and §636 (b).
Since under § 636 (b) district judges may call upon magistrates to relieve them of most other details of the processing of habeas corpus applications, it does not appear that judges will be significantly overburdened by the requirement that they personally conduct evidentiary hearings. Indeed, data from the Administrative Office of the United States Courts indicate that very few habeas corpus cases ever reach the evidentiary hearing stage. In 1973, of the 10,800 prisoner petitions filed for habeas corpus or as 28 U. S. C. § 2255 motions to vacate sentence, less than 5%, or approximately 530, necessitated evidentiary hearings. See Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of United States Courts, Table C-2, p. 325, Table C-8, p. 383 (1973). When hearings were required, 88% were completed in one day or less. Id., at 383. Thus, among the 400 District Judges, the burden of evidentiary hearings averages less than 1.5 hearing days per judge per year. To the extent that the 80 active Senior District Judges also participate in habeas corpus cases, the hearing burden upon each district judge is further reduced.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Scalia
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioners W. T. and Maryanne Grimes Langley seek reversal of a decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit granting the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) summary judgment on its claim for payment of a promissory note signed by petitioners. 792 F. 2d 541 (1986). The Fifth Circuit rejected petitioners’ contention that a defense of misrepresentation of existing facts is not barred by 12 U. S. C. § 1823(e) because such a representation is not an “agreement” under that section. We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict in the Courts of Appeals. 479 U. S. 1028 (1987). Compare Gunter v. Hutcheson, 674 F. 2d 862, 867 (CA11), cert. denied, 459 U. S. 826 (1982); FDIC v. Hatmaker, 756 F. 2d 34, 37 (CA6 1985) (dictum).
I
The Langleys purchased land in Pointe Coupee Parish, Louisiana, in 1980. To finance the purchase, they borrowed $450,000 from Planters Trust & Savings Bank of Opelousas, Louisiana, a bank insured by the FDIC. In consideration for the loan, they executed a note, a collateral mortgage, and personal guarantees. The note was renewed several times, the last renewal being in March 1982, for the principal amount of $468,124.41.
In October 1983, after the Langleys had failed to pay the first installment due on the last renewal of the note, Planters brought the present suit for principal and interest in a Louisiana state trial court. The Langleys removed the suit, on grounds of diversity, to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana, where it was consolidated with a suit by the Langleys seeking more than $5 million in damages from Planters and others. The Langleys alleged as one of the grounds of complaint in their own suit, and as a defense against Planters’ claim in the present suit, that the 1980 land purchase and the notes had been procured by misrepresentations. In particular, they alleged that the notes had been procured by the bank’s misrepresentations that the property conveyed in the land purchase consisted of 1,628.4 acres, when in fact it consisted of only 1,522, that the property included 400 mineral acres, when in fact it contained only 75, and that there were no outstanding mineral leases on the property, when in fact there were. No reference to these representations appears in the documents executed by the Langleys, in the bank’s records, or in the minutes of the bank’s board of directors or loan committee.
In April 1984, the FDIC conducted an examination of Planters during which it learned of the substance of the lawsuits with the Langleys, including the allegations of Planters’ misrepresentations. On May 18, 1984, the Commissioner of Financial Institutions for the State of Louisiana closed Planters because of its unsound condition and appointed the FDIC as receiver. The FDIC thereupon undertook the financing of a purchase and assumption transaction pursuant to 12 U. S. C. § 1823(c)(2), in which all the deposit liabilities and most of the assets of Planters were assumed by another FDIC-insured bank in the community. Because the amount of the liabilities greatly exceeded the value of the assets, the FDIC paid the assuming bank $36,992,000, in consideration for which the FDIC received, inter alia, the Langleys’ March 1982 note.
In October 1984, the FDIC was substituted as a plaintiff in this lawsuit, and moved for summary judgment on its claim. The District Court granted the motion, 615 F. Supp. 749 (WD La. 1985), and was sustained on appeal. The Fifth Circuit held that the word “agreement” in 12 U. S. C. § 1823(e) encompassed the kinds of material terms or warranties asserted by the Langleys in their misrepresentation defenses and, because the requirements of § 1823(e) were not met, those defenses were barred. 792 F. 2d, at 545-546. We granted the Langleys’ petition for certiorari on the issue whether, in an action brought by the FDIC in its corporate capacity for payment of a note, § 1823(e) bars the defense that the note was procured by fraud in the inducement even when the fraud did not take the form of an express promise.
II
The Federal Deposit Insurance Act of 1950, § 13(e), 64 Stat. 889, as amended, 12 U. S. C. § 1823(e), provides:
“No agreement which tends to diminish or defeat the right, title or interest of the Corporation [FDIC] in any asset acquired by it under this section, either as security for a loan or by purchase, shall be valid against the Corporation unless such agreement (1) shall be in writing, (2) shall have been executed by the bank and the person or persons claiming an adverse interest thereunder, including the obligor, contemporaneously with the acquisition of the asset by the bank, (3) shall have been approved by the board of directors of the bank or its loan committee, which approval shall be reflected in the minutes of said board or committee, and (4) shall have been, continuously, from the time of its execution, an official record of the bank.”
A
Petitioners’ principal contention is that the word “agreement” in the foregoing provision encompasses only an express promise to perform an act in the future. We do not agree.
As a matter of contractual analysis, the essence of petitioners’ defense against the note is that the bank made certain warranties regarding the land, the truthfulness of which was a condition to performance of their obligation to repay the loan. See 1 A. Corbin, Contracts §14, p. 31 (1963) (“[T]ruth [of the warranty] is a condition precedent to the duty of the other party”); accord, 5 S. Williston, Contracts § 673, pp. 168-171 (3d ed. 1961); J. Murray, Contracts § 136, pp. 275-276 (2d rev. ed. 1974). As used in commercial and contract law, the term “agreement” often has “a wider meaning than . . . promise,” Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 3, Comment a (1981), and embraces such a condition upon performance. The Uniform Commercial Code, for example, defines agreement as “the bargain of the parties in fact as found in their language or by implication from other circumstances ____” U. C. C. § 1-201(3), 1 U. L. A. 44 (1976). Quite obviously, the parties’ bargain cannot be reflected without including the conditions upon their performance, one of the two principal elements of which contracts are constructed. Cf. E. Farnsworth, Contracts §8.2, p. 537 (1982) (“[P]romises, which impose duties, and conditions, which make duties conditional, are the main components of agreements”). It seems to us that this common meaning of the word “agreement” must be assigned to its usage in § 1823(e) if that section is to fulfill its intended purposes.
One purpose of § 1823(e) is to allow federal and state bank examiners to rely on a bank’s records in evaluating the worth of the bank’s assets. Such evaluations are necessary when a bank is examined for fiscal soundness by state or federal authorities, see 12 U. S. C. §§ 1817(a)(2), 1820(b), and when the FDIC is deciding whether to liquidate a failed bank, see § 1821(d), or to provide financing for purchase of its assets (and assumption of its liabilities) by another bank, see §§ 1823(c)(2), (c)(4)(A). The last kind of evaluation, in particular, must be made “with great speed, usually overnight, in order to preserve the going concern value of the failed bank and avoid an interruption in banking services.” Gunter v. Hutcheson, 674 F. 2d, at 865. Neither the FDIC nor state banking authorities would be able to make reliable evaluations if bank records contained seemingly unqualified notes that are in fact subject to undisclosed conditions.
A second purpose of § 1828(e) is implicit in its requirement that the “agreement” not merely be on file in the bank’s records at the time of an examination, but also have been executed and become a bank record “contemporaneously” with the making of the note and have been approved by officially recorded action of the bank’s board or loan committee. These latter requirements ensure mature consideration of unusual loan transactions by senior bank officials, and prevent fraudulent insertion of new terms, with the collusion of bank employees, when a bank appears headed for failure. Neither purpose can be adequately fulfilled if an element of a loan agreement so fundamental as a condition upon the obligation to repay is excluded from the meaning of “agreement.”
That “agreement” in § 1823(e) covers more than promises to perform acts in the future is confirmed by examination of the leading case in this area prior to enactment of § 1823(e) in 1950. In D’Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U. S. 447 (1942), the FDIC acquired a note in a purchase and assumption transaction. The maker asserted a defense of failure of consideration (that is, the failure to perform a promise that was a condition precedent to the maker’s performance), based on an undisclosed agreement between it and the failed bank that the note would not be called for payment. The Court held that this “secret agreement” could not be a defense to suit by the FDIC because it would tend to deceive the banking authorities. Id., at 460. The Court stated that when the maker “lent himself to a scheme or arrangement whereby the banking authority . . . was likely to be misled,” that scheme or arrangement could not be the basis for a defense against the FDIC. Ibid, (emphasis added). We can safely assume that Congress did not mean “agreement” in § 1823(e) to be interpreted so much more narrowly than its permissible meaning as to disserve the principle of the leading case applying that term to FDIC-acquired notes. Certainly, one who signs a facially unqualified note subject to an unwritten and unrecorded condition upon its repayment has lent himself to a scheme or arrangement that is likely to mislead the banking authorities, whether the condition consists of performance of a counterpromise (as in D’Oench, Duhme) or of the truthfulness of a warranted fact.
B
Petitioners’ fallback position is that even if a misrepresentation concerning an existing fact can sometimes constitute an agreement covered by § 1823(e), it at least does not do so when the misrepresentation was fraudulent and the FDIC had knowledge of the asserted defense at the time it acquired the note. We conclude, however, that neither fraud in the inducement nor knowledge by the FDIC is relevant to the section’s application.
No conceivable reading of the word “agreement” in § 1823(e) could cause it to cover a representation or warranty that is bona fide but to exclude one that is fraudulent. Petitioners effectively acknowledge this when they concede that the fraudulent nature of a promise would not cause it to lose its status as an “agreement.” See supra, at 89, n. 1. The presence of fraud could be relevant, however, to another requirement of § 1823(e), namely, the requirement that the agreement in question “ten[d] to diminish or defeat the right, title or interest” of the FDIC in the asset.
Respondent conceded at oral argument that the real defense of fraud in the factum — that is, the sort of fraud that procures a party’s signature to an instrument without knowledge of its true nature or contents, see U. C. C. § 3-305(2)(c), Comment 7, 2 U. L. A. 241 (1977) — would take the instrument out of § 1823(e), because it would render the instrument entirely void, see Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 163 and Comments a, c; Farnsworth § 4.10, at 235, thus leaving no “right, title or interest” that could be “diminish[ed] or defeat[ed].” See Tr. of Oral Arg. 24-25, 27-30. Petitioners have never contended, however, nor could they have successfully, that the alleged misrepresentations about acreage or mineral interests constituted fraud in the factum. It is clear that they would constitute only fraud in the inducement, which renders the note voidable but not void. See U. C. C. §3-201(1), 2 U. L. A. 127; Restatement (Second) of Contracts §163, Comment c; Farnsworth §4.10, at 235-236. The bank therefore had and could transfer to the FDIC voidable title, which is enough to constitute “title or interest” in the note. This conclusion is not only textually compelled, but produces the only result in accord with the purposes of the statute. If voidable title were not an “interest” under § 1823(e), the FDIC would be subject not only to undisclosed fraud defenses but also to a wide range of other undisclosed defenses that make a contract voidable, such as certain kinds of mistakes and innocent but material misrepresentations. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§152-153, 164.
Finally, knowledge of the misrepresentation by the FDIC prior to its acquisition of the note is not relevant to whether § 1823(e) applies. Nothing in the text would support the suggestion that it is: An agreement is an agreement whether or not the FDIC knows of it; and a voidable interest is transferable whether or not the transferee knows of the misrepresentation or fraud that produces the voidability. See Farnsworth §11.8, at 780-781; cf. U. C. C. §3-201(1), 2 U. L. A. 127. Petitioners are really urging us to engraft an equitable exception upon the plain terms of the statute. Even if we had the power to do so, the equities petitioners invoke are not the equities the statute regards as predominant. While the borrower who has relied upon an erroneous or even fraudulent unrecorded representation has some claim to consideration, so do those who are harmed by his failure to protect himself by assuring that his agreement is approved and recorded in accordance with the statute. Harm to the FDIC (and those who rely upon the solvency of its fund) is not avoided by knowledge at the time of acquiring the note. The FDIC is an insurer of the bank, and is liable for the depositors’ insured losses whether or not it decides to acquire the note. Cf. 12 U. S. C. § 1821(f). The harm to the FDIC caused by the failure to record occurs no later than the time at which it conducts its first bank examination that is unable to detect the unrecorded agreement and to prompt the invocation of available protective measures, including termination of the bank’s deposit insurance. See § 1818 (1982 ed. and Supp. IV). Thus, insofar as the recording provision is concerned, the state of the FDIC’s knowledge at that time is what is crucial. But as we discussed earlier, see supra, at 92, § 1823(e) is meant to ensure more than just the FDIC’s ability to rely on bank records at the time of an examination or acquisition. The statutory requirements that an agreement be approved by the bank’s board or loan committee and filed contemporaneously in the bank’s records assure prudent consideration of the loan before it is made, and protect against collusive reconstruction of loan terms by bank officials and borrowers (whose interests may well coincide when a bank is about to fail). Knowledge by the FDIC could substitute for the latter protection only if it existed at the very moment the agreement was concluded, and could substitute for the former assurance not at all.
The short of the matter is that Congress opted for the certainty of the requirements set forth in § 1823(e). An agreement that meets them prevails even if the FDIC did not know of it; and an agreement that does not meet them fails even if the FDIC knew. It would be rewriting the statute to hold otherwise. Such a categorical recording scheme is of course not unusual. Under Article 9 of the U. C. C., for example, a filing secured creditor prevails even over those unrecorded security interests of which he was aware. See, e. g., Rockwell Int’l Credit Corp. v. Valley Bank, 109 Idaho 406, 408-409, 707 P. 2d 517, 519-520 (Ct. App. 1985); Bloom v. Hilty, 427 Pa. 463, 471, 234 A. 2d 860, 863-864 (1967); 9 R. Anderson, Uniform Commercial Code § 9-312:74, p. 298 (3d ed. 1985); J. White & R. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code §25-4, p. 1037 (2d ed. 1980).
* *
A condition to payment of a note, including the truth of an express warranty, is part of the “agreement” to which the writing, approval, and filing requirements of 12 U. S. C. § 1823(e) attach. Because the representations alleged by petitioners constitute such a condition and did not meet the requirements of the statute, they cannot be asserted as defenses here. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
The Langleys also alleged certain other misrepresentations by Planters, including that the Langleys would have no personal liability on the notes, that Planters would provide another purchaser for the land as soon as the sale to the Langleys was closed, and that no payments would be due until the property was resold. The Langleys concede that 12 U. S. C. § 1823(e) bars these other misrepresentations from being asserted as defenses to FDIC’s suit on the note because they were promissory in nature. Brief for Petitioners 12.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Chief Justice Burger
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is an appeal from a three-judge District Court for the District of Maryland. Nine minors, appellees here, .brought an action under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief to prevent the State from filing exceptions with the Juvenile Court to proposed findings and recommendations made by masters of that court. The minors’ claim was based on an alleged violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court’s jurisdiction was invoked under 28 U. S. C. §§ 1343, 2281, and 2284 (as then written); this Court’s jurisdiction, under 28 U. S. C. § 1253.
I
In order to understand the present Maryland scheme for the use of masters in juvenile court proceedings, it is necessary to trace briefly the history both of antecedent schemes and of this and related litigation.
Prior to July 1975, the use of masters in Maryland juvenile proceedings was governed by Rule 908 (e), Maryland Rules of Procedure. It provided that a master “shall hear such cases as may be assigned to him by the court.” The Rule further directed that, at the conclusion of the hearing, the master transmit the case file and his “findings and recommendations” to the Juvenile Court. If no party filed exceptions to these findings and recommendations, they were to be “promptly . . . confirmed, modified or remanded by the judge.” If, however, a party filed exceptions — and in delinquency hearings, only the State had the authority to do so — then, after notice, the Juvenile Court judge would “hear the entire matter or such specific matters as set forth in the exceptions de novo.”
In the city of Baltimore, after the State filed a petition alleging that a minor had committed a delinquent act, the clerk of the Juvenile Court generally would assign the case to one of seven masters. In the ensuing unrecorded hearing, the State would call its witnesses and present its evidence in accordance with the rules of evidence applicable in criminal cases. The minor could offer evidence in defense. At the conclusion of the presentation of evidence, the master usually would announce his findings and contemplated recommendations. In a minority of those cases where the recommendations favored the minor’s position, the State would file exceptions, whereupon the Juvenile Court judge would try the case de novo.
In 1972, a Baltimore City Master concluded, after a hearing, that the State had failed to show beyond a reasonable doubt that a minor, William Anderson, had assaulted and robbed a woman. His recommendation to the Juvenile Court judge reflected that conclusion. The State filed exceptions. Anderson responded with a motion to dismiss the notice of exceptions, contending that Rule 908 (e), with its provision for a de novo hearing, violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Juvenile Court judge ruled that juvenile proceedings as such were not outside the scope of the Double Jeopardy Clause. He then held that the proceeding before him on the State’s exceptions would violate Anderson’s right not to be twice put in jeopardy and, on that basis, granted the motion to dismiss. The judge granted the same relief to similarly situated minors, including several who later initiated the present litigation.
The State appealed and the Court of Special Appeals reversed. In re Anderson, 20 Md. App. 31, 315 A. 2d 540 (1974). That court assumed, for purposes of its decision, that jeopardy attached at the commencement of the initial hearing before the master. It held, however:
“ [T]here is no adjudication by reason of the master’s findings and recommendations. The proceedings before the master and his findings and recommendations are simply the first phase of the hearing which continues with the consideration by the juvenile judge. Whether the juvenile judge, in the absence of exceptions, accepts the master’s findings or recommendatipns, modifies them or remands them, or whether, when exceptions are filed, he hears the matter himself de novo, there is merely a continuance of the hearing and the initial jeopardy. In other words, the hearing, and the jeopardy thereto attaching, terminate only upon a valid adjudication by the juvenile judge, not upon the findings and recommendations of the master.” Id., at 47, 315 A. 2d, at 549 (footnotes omitted; emphasis added).
On this basis, the court concluded that the de novo hearing was not a second exposure to jeopardy.
On appeal by the minors, the Court of Appeals affirmed, although on a rationale different from that of the intermediate appellate court. In re Anderson, 272 Md. 85, 321 A. 2d 516 (1974). It held that “a hearing before a master is not such a hearing as places a juvenile in jeopardy.” Central to this holding was the court’s conclusion that masters in Maryland serve only as ministerial assistants to judges; although authorized to hear evidence, report findings, and make recommendations to the judge, masters are entrusted with none of the judicial power of the State, including the sine qua non of judicial office — the power to enter a binding judgment.
In November 1974, five months after the Court of Appeals’ decision, nine juveniles sought federal habeas corpus relief, contending that by taking exceptions to masters’ recommendations favorable to them the State was violating their rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause. These same nine minors also initiated a class action under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 in which they sought a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against the future operation of Rule 908 (e). The sole constitutional basis for their complaint was, again, the Double Jeopardy Clause. A three-judge court was convened to hear this matter, and it is the judgment of that court we now review.
Before either the three-judge District Court or the single judge reviewing the habeas corpus petitions could act, the-Maryland Legislature.,enacted legislation which, for the first time, provided a statutory basis for the use of masters in juvenile court proceedings. In doing so, it modified slightly the scheme previously operative under Rule 908 (e). The new legislation required that hearings before a master be recorded and that, at their conclusion, the master submit to the Juvenile Court judge written findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations. Either party was authorized to file exceptions and could elect a hearing on the record or a de novo hearing before the judge. The legislature specified that the master’s “proposals and recommendations . . . for juvenile causes do not constitute orders or final action of the court.” Accordingly, the judge could, even in the absence of exceptions, reject a'master’s recommendations and conduct a de novo hearing or, if the parties agreed, a hearing on the record. Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. § 3-813 (Supp. 1977).
In June 1975, within two months of the enactment of § 3-813 and before its July 1, 1975, effective date, the single-judge United States District Court held that the Rule 908 (e) provision for a de novo hearing on the State’s exceptions violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. Aldridge v. Dean, 395 F. Supp. 1161 (Md. 1975). In that court’s view, a juvenile was placed in jeopardy as soon as the State offered evidence in the hearing before a master. The court also concluded that to subject a juvenile to a de novo hearing before the Juvenile Court judge was to place him in jeopardy a second time. Accordingly, it granted habeas corpus relief to the six petitioners already subjected by the State to a de novo hearing. The petitions of the remaining three, who had not yet been brought before the Juvenile Court judge, were dismissed without prejudice as being premature.
In response to both the enactment of § 3-813 and the decision in Aldridge v. Dean, supra, the Maryland Court of Appeals, in the exercise of its rulemaking power, promulgated a new rule, and the one currently in force, Rule 911, to govern the use of masters in juvenile proceedings. Rule 911 differs from the statute in significant aspects. First, in order to emphasize the nonfinal nature of a master’s conclusions, it stresses that all of his “findings, conclusions, recommendations or . . . orders” are only proposed. Second, the State no longer has power to secure a de novo hearing before the Juvenile Court judge after unfavorable proposals by the master. The State still may file exceptions, but the judge can act on them only on the basis of the record made before the master and “such additional [relevant] evidence ... to which the parties raise no objection.” The judge retains his power to accept, reject, or modify the master’s proposals, to remand to the master for further hearings, and to supplement the record for his own review with additional evidence to which the parties do not object
Thus, Rule 911 is a direct product of the desire of the State to continue using masters to meet the heavy burden of juvenile court caseloads while at the same time assuring that their use not violate the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy. To this end, the Rule permits the presentation and recording of evidence in the absence of the only officer authorized by the state constitution, see In re Anderson, 272 Md., at 104-105, 321 A. 2d, at 526-527, and by statute, § 3-813, to serve as the factfinder and judge.
After the effective date of Rule 911, July 1, 1975, the plaintiffs in the § 1983 action amended their complaint to bring Rule 911 within its scope. They continued to challenge the state procedure, however, only on the basis of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Other juveniles intervened as the ongoing work of the juvenile court brought them within the definition of the proposed class. Their complaints in intervention likewise rested only on the Double Jeopardy Clause.
The three-judge District Court certified the proposed class under Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23 (b) (2) to consist of all juveniles involved in proceedings where the State had filed exceptions to a master’s proposed findings of nondelinquency. That court then held that a juvenile subjected to a hearing before a master is placed in jeopardy, even though the master has no power to enter a final order. It also held that the Juvenile Court judge’s review of the record constitutes a “second proceeding at which [the juvenile] must once again marshal whatever resources he can against the State’s and at which the State is given a second opportunity to obtain a conviction.” 436 F. Supp. 1361, 1369 (Md. 1977). Accordingly, the three-judge District Court enjoined the defendant state officials from taking exceptions to either a master’s proposed finding of nondelinquency or his proposed disposition.
We noted probable jurisdiction solely to determine whether the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits state officials, acting in accordance with Rule 911, from taking exceptions to a master’s proposed findings. 434 U. S. 963 (1977).
II
The general principles governing this case are well established.
“A State may not put a defendant in jeopardy twice for the same offense. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U. S. 784. The constitutional protection against double jeopardy unequivocally prohibits a second trial following an acquittal. The public interest in the finality of criminal judgments is so strong that an acquitted defendant may not be retried even though The acquittal was based upon an egregiously erroneous foundation.’ ... If the innocence of the accused has been confirmed by a final judgment, the Constitution conclusively presumes that a second trial would be unfair.
“Because jeopardy attaches before the judgment becomes final, the constitutional protection also embraces the defendant’s Valued right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal.’ . . . Consequently, as a general rule, the prosecutor is entitled to one, and only one, opportunity to require an accused to stand trial.” Arizona v. Washington, 434 U. S. 497, 503-505 (1978) (footnotes omitted).
In the application of these general principles, the narrow question here is whether the State in filing exceptions to a master’s proposals, pursuant to Rule 911, thereby “require [s] an accused to stand trial” a second time. We hold that it does not. Maryland has created a system with Rule 911 in which an accused juvenile is subjected to a single proceeding which begins with a master’s hearing and culminates with an adjudication by a judge.
Importantly, a Rule 911 proceeding does not impinge on the purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause. A central purpose “of the prohibition against successive trials” is to bar “the prosecution [from] another opportunity to supply evidence which it failed to muster in the first proceeding.” Burks v. United States, 437 17. S. 1, 11 (1978). A Rule 911 proceeding does not provide the prosecution that forbidden “second crack.” The State presents its evidence once before the master. The record is then closed, and additional evidence can be received by the Juvenile Court judge only with the consent of the minor.
The Double Jeopardy Clause also precludes the prosecutor from “enhanc[ing] the risk that an innocent defendant may be convicted,” Arizona v. Washington, supra, at 504, by taking the question of guilt to a series of persons or groups empowered to make binding determinations. Appellees contend that in its operation Rule 911 gives the State the chance to persuade two such factfinders: first the master, then the Juvenile Court judge. In support of this contention they point to evidence that juveniles and their parents sometimes consider the master “the judge” and his recommendations “the verdict.” Within the limits of jury trial rights, see McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U. S. 528 (1971), and other constitutional constraints, it is for the State, not the parties, to designate and empower the factfinder and adjudicator. And here Maryland has conferred those roles only on the Juvenile Court judge. Thus, regardless of which party is initially favored by the master’s proposals, and regardless of the presence or absence of exceptions, the judge is empowered to accept, modify, or reject those proposals.
Finally, there is nothing in the record to indicate that the procedure authorized under Rule 911 unfairly subjects the defendant to the embarrassment, expense, and ordeal of a second trial proscribed in Green v. United States, 355 U. S. 184 (1957). Indeed, there is nothing to indicate that the juvenile is even brought before the judge while he conducts the “hearing on the record,” or that the juvenile’s attorney appears at the “hearing” and presents oral argument or written briefs. But even if there were such participation or appearance, the burdens are more akin to those resulting from a judge’s permissible request for post-trial briefing or argument following a bench trial than to the “expense” of a full-blown second trial contemplated by the Court in Green.
In their effort to characterize a Rule 911 proceeding as two trials for double jeopardy purposes, appellees rely on two decisions of this Court, Breed v. Jones, 421 U. S. 519 (1975), and United States v. Jenkins, 420 U. S. 358 (1975).
In Breed, we held that a juvenile was placed twice in jeopardy when, after an adjudicatory hearing in Juvenile Court on a charge of delinquent conduct, he was transferred to adult criminal court, tried, and convicted for the same conduct. All parties conceded that jeopardy attached at the second proceeding in criminal court. The State contended, however, that jeopardy did not attach in the Juvenile Court proceeding, although that proceeding could have culminated in a deprivation of the juvenile’s liberty. We rejected this contention and also the contention that somehow jeopardy “continued” from the first to the second trial. Breed is therefore inapplicable to the Maryland scheme, where juveniles are subjected to only one proceeding, or “trial.”
Appellees also stress this language from Jenkins:
“[I]t is enough for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause . . . that further proceedings of some sort, devoted to the resolution of factual issues going to the elements of the offense charged, would have been required upon reversal and remand. Even if the District Court were to receive no additional evidence, it would still be necessary for it to make supplemental findings .... [To do so] would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.” 420 TJ. S., at 370 (emphasis added).
Although we doubt that the Court’s decision in a case can be correctly identified by reference to three isolated sentences, any language in Jenkins must now be read in light of our subsequent decision in United States v. Scott, 437 U. S. 82 (1978). In Scott we held that it is not all proceedings requiring the making of supplemental findings that are barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause, but only those that follow a previous trial ending in an acquittal; in a conviction either not reversed on appeal or reversed because of insufficient evidence, see Burks v. United States, supra; or in a mistrial ruling not prompted by “manifest necessity,” see Arizona v. Washington, 434 U. S. 497 (1978). A Juvenile Court judge’s decision terminating a Rule 911 proceeding follows none of those occurrences. Furthermore, Jenkins involved appellate review of the final judgment of a trial court fully empowered to enter that judgment. Nothing comparable occurs in a Rule 911 proceeding. See n. 15, supra.
To the extent the Juvenile Court judge makes supplemental findings in a manner permitted by Rule 911 — either sua sponte, in response to the State’s exceptions, or in response to the juvenile’s exceptions, and either on the record or on a record supplemented by evidence to which the parties raise no objection — he does so without violating the constraints of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Rule 908 (e) was the sole authority for the use of masters in juvenile causes. The practice was not treated in Maryland statutes.
Maryland, like 39 other States, defines a delinquent act as one that, if committed by an adult, would violate a criminal statute. See statutes collected at McCarthy, Delinquency Dispositions Under the Juvenile Justice Standards: The Consequences of a Change of Rationale, 52 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 1093 n. 2 (1977).
The official name of the court is Circuit Court of Baltimore City, Division for Juvenile Causes.
In 1974, of 5,345 delinquency hearings conducted in the Juvenile Court, 5,098 were held before masters. The remaining 247 were assigned in the first instance to the judge.
In 1974, the Juvenile Court judge conducted 80 de novo, or “exceptions,” hearings in delinquency matters. All hearings before the judge were recorded.
When the minors appealed here from this decision, we dismissed for want of a substantial federal question, Epps v. Maryland, 419 U. S. 809 (1974), and also denied certiorari, Anderson v. Maryland, 421 U. S. 1000 (1975).
At the time of its promulgation, the new Rule was numbered 910. As a result of recent nonsubstantive amendments and recodification, it received the 911 designation, by which it is referred to throughout this opinion.
The juvenile, after filing exceptions, can still elect either a de novo hearing or a hearing on the record.
Rule 911, in its entirety, provides:
“a. Authority.
“1. Detention or Shelter Care.
“A master is authorized to order detention or shelter care in accordance with Rule 912 (Detention or Shelter Care) subject to an immediate review by a judge if requested by any party.
“2. Other Matters.
“A master is authorized to hear any cases and matters assigned to him by the court, except a hearing on a waiver petition. The findings, conclusions and recommendations of a master do not constitute orders or final action of the court.
“b. Report to the Court.
“Within ten days following the conclusion of a disposition hearing by a master, he shall transmit to the judge the entire file in the ease, together with a written report of his proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, recommendations and proposed orders with respect to adjudication and disposition. A copy of his report and proposed order shall be served upon each party as provided by Rule 306 (Service of Pleadings and Other Papers).
“c. Review by Court if Exceptions Filed.
“Any party may file exceptions to the master’s proposed findings, conclusions, recommendations or proposed orders. Exceptions shall be in writing, filed with the clerk within five days after the master’s report is served upon the party, and shall specify those items to which the party excepts, and whether the hearing is to be de novo or on the record. A copy shall be served upon all other parties pursuant to Rule 306 (Service of Pleadings and Other Papers).
“Upon the filing of exceptions, a prompt hearing shall be scheduled on the exceptions. An excepting party other than the State may elect a hearing de novo or a hearing oil the record. If the State is the excepting party, the hearing shall be on the record, supplemented by such additional evidence as the judge considers relevant and to which the parties raise no objection. In either case the hearing shall be limited to those matters to which exceptions have been taken.
“d. Review by Court in Absence of Exceptions.
“In the absence of timely and proper exceptions, the master's proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law and recommendations may be adopted by the court and the proposed or other appropriate orders may be entered based on them. The court may remand the case to the master for further hearings, or may, on its own motion, schedule and conduct a further hearing supplemented by such additional evidence as the court considers relevant and to which the parties raise no objection. Action by the court under this section shall be taken within two days after the expiration of the time for filing exceptions.”
Defendants, appellants here, are the State’s Attorney for Baltimore City, the operations chief of the State’s Attorney’s Office for Baltimore City, the Chief State Attorney assigned to the Baltimore City Juvenile Court, and the Clerk of that court.
The State did not contend, either in the District Court or here, that appellees’ suit for injunctive relief should be dismissed under the abstention doctrine of Younger v Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971). In these circumstances, we are not inclined to examine the application of the doctrine sua sponte. See Ohio Bureau of Employment Services v. Hodory, 431 U. S. 471, 477-480 (1977) (“If the State voluntarily chooses to submit to a federal forum, principles of comity do not demand that the federal court force the case back into the State’s own system”).
There is also a mootness question in this case. At the time of final argument before the District Court, Fields, the last in a series of intervening plaintiffs, was the only named plaintiff with a live controversy against the State. By that time, the State had either withdrawn its exceptions against the other named plaintiffs or completed the adjudicatory process by securing a ruling, one way or the other, from the Juvenile Court judge. After final argument, but before the District Court announced its decision, the State withdrew its exceptions to the master’s proposals respecting Fields. Nevertheless, the District Court, at the outset of its decision, granted Fields’ motion to intervene and certified the class. 436 F. Supp., at 1362.
We conclude that under the principles announced in Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393 (1975), the State’s action, with respect to the original named plaintiffs and the intervenors, did not deprive the District Court of the power to certify the class action when it did and that, accordingly, a live controversy presently exists between the unnamed class members and the State. In Sosna, we observed:
“[T]here may be cases in which the controversy involving the named plaintiffs is such that it becomes moot as to them before the district court can reasonably be expected to rule on a certification motion. In such instances, whether the certification can be said to ‘relate back’ to the filing of the complaint may depend upon the circumstances of the particular case and especially the reality of the claim that otherwise the issue would evade review.” Id., at 402 n. 11.
Here the rapidity of judicial review of exceptions to masters’ proposals creates mootness questions with' respect to named plaintiffs, and even perhaps with respect to a series of intervening plaintiffs appearing thereafter, “before the district court can reasonably be expected to rule on a certification motion.” Ibid.
In cases such as this one where mootness problems are likely to arise, district courts should heed strictly the requirement of Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23 (c)(1) that “[a]s soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought as a class action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be so maintained.” (Emphasis added.)
The State contends that jeopardy does not attach at the hearing before the master. Our decision in Breed v. Jones, 421 U. S. 519 (1975), however, suggests the contrary conclusion. “We believe it is simply too late in the day to conclude . . . that a juvenile is not put in jeopardy at a proceeding whose object is to determine whether he has committed acts that violate a criminal law and whose potential consequences include both the stigma inherent in such a determination and the deprivation of liberty for many years.” Id., at 529. The California juvenile proceeding reviewed in Breed involved the use of a referee, or master, and was not materially different — for purposes of analysis of attachment of jeopardy— from a Rule 911 proceeding. See generally In re Edgar M., 14 Cal. 3d 727, 537 P. 2d 406 (1975); cf. Jesse W. v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 893, 576 P. 2d 963 (1978).
It is not essential to decision in this ease, however, to fix the precise time when jeopardy attaches.
The District Court noted that Rule 911 differs from § 3-813, see supra, at 210-211, but concluded that under Maryland decisional law the Rule governs. 436 F. Supp., at 1365. The parties do not dispute the District Court’s reading of state law. Accordingly, like the District Court, we consider only Rule 911 in resolving the constitutional challenge.
It is not usual in a criminal proceeding for the evidence to be presented and recorded in the absence of the one authorized to determine guilt. But if there are any objections to such a system, they do not arise from the guarantees of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Appellees also rely on Keener v. United States, 195 U. S. 100 (1904). There a Manila lawyer was charged with embezzling the funds of his client. He was tried before the judge of a “court of first instance” and acquitted. The United States took an appeal to the Philippine Supreme Court, which, after reviewing the record, entered a judgment of guilty and imposed sentence. This Court held that an Act of Congress, which extended double jeopardy guarantees to the Philippines, required reversal of the conviction.
The differences between the present case and Keener are material. There the trial judge was authorized to try serious criminal cases and to enter judgment, either of acquittal or conviction. The Philippine trial judge did not serve as an “assistant” or master of the Philippine Supreme Court for the purpose of making proposed findings to the appellate judges. Id., at 115, 121, 133. Mr. Justice Brown in dissent accurately characterized the Philippine trial judge’s role as embracing “the great and dangerous power of finally acquitting the most notorious criminals.” Id., at 137. The Philippine Supreme Court’s role was appellate, and its jurisdiction was invoked by the Government’s decision to appeal an otherwise binding judgment.
See also Trono v. United States, 199 U. S. 521 (1905). its rales relating to the use of masters, see ante, at 209-210, the record before us indicates that the character of the hearing has not materially changed since that decision.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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B
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Clean Water Act forbids the "addition" of any pollutant from a "point source" to "navigable waters" without the appropriate permit from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Federal Water Pollution Control Act, §§ 301(a), 502(12)(A), as amended by the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 (Clean Water Act) § 2, 86 Stat. 844, 886, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1362(12)(A). The question presented here is whether the Act "requires a permit when pollutants originate from a point source but are conveyed to navigable waters by a nonpoint source," here, "groundwater." Pet. for Cert. i. Suppose, for example, that a sewage treatment plant discharges polluted water into the ground where it mixes with groundwater, which, in turn, flows into a navigable river, or perhaps the ocean. Must the plant's owner seek an EPA permit before emitting the pollutant? We conclude that the statutory provisions at issue require a permit if the addition of the pollutants through groundwater is the functional equivalent of a direct discharge from the point source into navigable waters.
I
A
Congress' purpose as reflected in the language of the Clean Water Act is to " 'restore and maintain the ... integrity of the Nation's waters,' " § 101(a), 86 Stat. 816. Prior to the Act, Federal and State Governments regulated water pollution in large part by setting water quality standards. See EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Bd. , 426 U.S. 200, 202-203, 96 S.Ct. 2022, 48 L.Ed.2d 578 (1976). The Act restructures federal regulation by insisting that a person wishing to discharge any pollution into navigable waters first obtain EPA's permission to do so. See id., at 203-205, 96 S.Ct. 2022 ; Milwaukee v. Illinois , 451 U.S. 304, 310-311, 101 S.Ct. 1784, 68 L.Ed.2d 114 (1981).
The Act's provisions use specific definitional language to achieve this result. First, the Act defines "pollutant" broadly, including in its definition, for example, any solid waste, incinerator residue, " 'heat,' " " 'discarded equipment,' " or sand (among many other things). § 502(6), 86 Stat. 886. Second, the Act defines a "point source" as " 'any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance ... from which pollutants are or may be discharged,' " including, for example, any " 'container,' " " 'pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit,' " or " 'well.' " § 502(14), id., at 887. Third, it defines the term "discharge of a pollutant" as " 'any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters [including navigable streams, rivers, the ocean, or coastal waters] from any point source.' " § 502(12), id., at 886.
The Act then sets forth a statutory provision that, using these terms, broadly states that (with certain exceptions) " 'the discharge of any pollutant by any person' " without an appropriate permit " 'shall be unlawful.' " § 301, id., at 844. The question here, as we have said, is whether, or how, this statutory language applies to a pollutant that reaches navigable waters only after it leaves a "point source" and then travels through groundwater before reaching navigable waters. In such an instance, has there been a "discharge of a pollutant," that is, has there been "any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source? "
B
The petitioner, the County of Maui, operates a wastewater reclamation facility on the island of Maui, Hawaii. The facility collects sewage from the surrounding area, partially treats it, and pumps the treated water through four wells hundreds of feet underground. This effluent, amounting to about 4 million gallons each day, then travels a further half mile or so, through groundwater, to the ocean.
In 2012, several environmental groups, the respondents here, brought this citizens' Clean Water Act lawsuit against Maui. See § 505(a), id., at 888. They claimed that Maui was "discharg[ing]" a "pollutant" to "navigable waters," namely, the Pacific Ocean, without the permit required by the Clean Water Act. The District Court, relying in part upon a detailed study of the discharges, found that a considerable amount of effluent from the wells ended up in the ocean (a navigable water). It wrote that, because the "path to the ocean is clearly ascertainable," the discharge from Maui's wells into the nearby groundwater was "functionally one into navigable water." 24 F.Supp.3d 980, 998 (Haw. 2014). And it granted summary judgment in favor of the environmental groups. See id., at 1005.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court, but it described the relevant statutory standard somewhat differently. The appeals court wrote that a permit is required when "the pollutants are fairly traceable from the point source to a navigable water such that the discharge is the functional equivalent of a discharge into the navigable water." 886 F.3d 737, 749 (2018) (emphasis added). The court left "for another day the task of determining when, if ever, the connection between a point source and a navigable water is too tenuous to support liability ...." Ibid.
Maui petitioned for certiorari. In light of the differences in the standards adopted by the different Courts of Appeals, we granted the petition. Compare, e.g., 886 F.3d at 749 ("fairly traceable"), with Upstate Forever v. Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, L. P. , 887 F.3d 637, 651 (C.A.4 2018) ("direct hydrological connection"), and Kentucky Waterways Alliance v. Kentucky Util. Co. , 905 F.3d 925, 932-938 (C.A.6 2018) (discharges through groundwater are excluded from the Act's permitting requirements).
II
The linguistic question here concerns the statutory word "from." Is pollution that reaches navigable waters only through groundwater pollution that is "from" a point source, as the statute uses the word? The word "from" is broad in scope, but context often imposes limitations. "Finland," for example, is often not the right kind of answer to the question, "Where have you come from?" even if long ago you were born there.
The parties here disagree dramatically about the scope of the word "from" in the present context. The environmental groups, the respondents, basically adopt the Ninth Circuit's view-that the permitting requirement applies so long as the pollutant is "fairly traceable" to a point source even if it traveled long and far (through groundwater) before it reached navigable waters. They add that the release from the point source must be "a proximate cause of the addition of pollutants to navigable waters." Brief for Respondents 20.
Maui, on the other hand, argues that the statute creates a "bright-line test." Brief for Petitioner 27-28. A point source or series of point sources must be "the means of delivering pollutants to navigable waters." Id., at 28. They add that, if "at least one nonpoint source (e.g., unconfined rainwater runoff or groundwater)" lies "between the point source and the navigable water," then the permit requirement "does not apply." Id., at 54. A pollutant is "from" a point source only if a point source is the last "conveyance" that conducted the pollutant to navigable waters.
The Solicitor General, as amicus curiae , supports Maui, at least in respect to groundwater. Reiterating the position taken in a recent EPA "Interpretive Statement," see 84 Fed. Reg. 16810 (2019), he argues that, given the Act's structure and history, "a release of pollutants to groundwater is not subject to" the Act's permitting requirement "even if the pollutants subsequently migrate to jurisdictional surface waters," such as the ocean. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 12 (capitalization omitted).
We agree that statutory context limits the reach of the statutory phrase "from any point source" to a range of circumstances narrower than that which the Ninth Circuit's interpretation suggests. At the same time, it is significantly broader than the total exclusion of all discharges through groundwater described by Maui and the Solicitor General.
III
Virtually all water, polluted or not, eventually makes its way to navigable water. This is just as true for groundwater. See generally 2 Van Nostrand's Scientific Encyclopedia 2600 (10th ed. 2008) (defining "Hydrology"). Given the power of modern science, the Ninth Circuit's limitation, "fairly traceable," may well allow EPA to assert permitting authority over the release of pollutants that reach navigable waters many years after their release (say, from a well or pipe or compost heap) and in highly diluted forms. See, e.g., Brief for Aquatic Scientists et al. as Amici Curiae 13-28.
The respondents suggest that the standard can be narrowed by adding a "proximate cause" requirement. That is, to fall within the permitting provision, the discharge from a point source must "proximately cause" the pollutants' eventual addition to navigable waters. But the term "proximate cause" derives from general tort law, and it takes on its specific content based primarily on "policy" considerations. See CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride , 564 U.S. 685, 701, 131 S.Ct. 2630, 180 L.Ed.2d 637 (2011) (plurality opinion). In the context of water pollution, we do not see how it significantly narrows the statute beyond the words "fairly traceable" themselves.
Our view is that Congress did not intend the point source-permitting requirement to provide EPA with such broad authority as the Ninth Circuit's narrow focus on traceability would allow. First, to interpret the word "from" in this literal way would require a permit in surprising, even bizarre, circumstances, such as for pollutants carried to navigable waters on a bird's feathers, or, to mention more mundane instances, the 100-year migration of pollutants through 250 miles of groundwater to a river.
Second, and perhaps most important, the structure of the statute indicates that, as to groundwater pollution and nonpoint source pollution, Congress intended to leave substantial responsibility and autonomy to the States. See, e.g., § 101(b), 86 Stat. 816 (stating Congress' purpose in this regard). Much water pollution does not come from a readily identifiable source. See 3 Van Nostrand's Scientific Encyclopedia, at 5801 (defining "Water Pollution"). Rainwater, for example, can carry pollutants (say, as might otherwise collect on a roadway); it can pollute groundwater, and pollution collected by unchanneled rainwater runoff is not ordinarily considered point source pollution. Over many decades, and with federal encouragement, the States have developed methods of regulating nonpoint source pollution through water quality standards, and otherwise. See, e.g., Nonpoint Source Program, Annual Report (California) 6 (2016-2017) (discussing state timberland management programs to address addition of sediment-pollutants to navigable waters); id., at 10-11 (discussing regulations of vineyards to control water pollution); id. at 17-19 (discussing livestock grazing management, including utilization ratios and time restrictions); Nonpoint Source Management Program, Annual Report (Maine) 8-10 (2018) (discussing installation of livestock fencing and planting of vegetation to reduce nonpoint source pollution); Oklahoma's Nonpoint Source Management Program, Annual Report 5, 14 (2017) (discussing program to encourage voluntary no-till farming to reduce sediment pollution).
The Act envisions EPA's role in managing nonpoint source pollution and groundwater pollution as limited to studying the issue, sharing information with and collecting information from the States, and issuing monetary grants. See §§ 105, 208, 86 Stat. 825, 839; see also Water Quality Act of 1987, § 316, 101 Stat. 52 (establishing Nonpoint Source Management Programs). Although the Act grants EPA specific authority to regulate certain point source pollution (it can also delegate some of this authority to the States acting under EPA supervision, see § 402(b), 86 Stat. 880), these permitting provisions refer to "point sources" and "navigable waters," and say nothing at all about nonpoint source regulation or groundwater regulation. We must doubt that Congress intended to give EPA the authority to apply the word "from" in a way that could interfere as seriously with States' traditional regulatory authority-authority the Act preserves and promotes-as the Ninth Circuit's "fairly traceable" test would.
Third, those who look to legislative history to help interpret a statute will find that this Act's history strongly supports our conclusion that the permitting provision does not extend so far. Fifty years ago, when Congress was considering the bills that became the Clean Water Act, William Ruckelshaus, the first EPA Administrator, asked Congress to grant EPA authority over "ground waters" to "assure that we have control over the water table ... so we can ... maintai[n] a control over all the sources of pollution, be they discharged directly into any stream or through the ground water table." Water Pollution Control Legislation-1971 (Proposed Amendments to Existing Legislation): Hearings before the House Committee on Public Works, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 230 (1971). Representative Les Aspin similarly pointed out that there were "conspicuou[s]" references to groundwater in all sections of the bill except the permitting section at issue here. Water Pollution Control Legislation-1971: Hearings before the House Committee on Public Works on H. R. 11896 and H. R. 11895, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 727 (1972). The Senate Committee on Public Works "recognize[d] the essential link between ground and surface waters." S. Rep. No. 92-414, p. 73 (1971).
But Congress did not accept these requests for general EPA authority over groundwater. It rejected Representative Aspin's amendment that would have extended the permitting provision to groundwater. Instead, Congress provided a set of more specific groundwater-related measures such as those requiring States to maintain "affirmative controls over the injection or placement in wells" of "any pollutants that may affect ground water." Ibid. These specific state-related programs were, in the words of the Senate Public Works Committee, "designed to protect ground waters and eliminate the use of deep well disposal as an uncontrolled alternative to toxic and pollution control." Ibid. The upshot is that Congress was fully aware of the need to address groundwater pollution, but it satisfied that need through a variety of state-specific controls. Congress left general groundwater regulatory authority to the States; its failure to include groundwater in the general EPA permitting provision was deliberate.
Finally, longstanding regulatory practice undermines the Ninth Circuit's broad interpretation of the statute. EPA itself for many years has applied the permitting provision to pollution discharges from point sources that reached navigable waters only after traveling through groundwater. See, e.g. , United States Steel Corp. v. Train , 556 F.2d 822, 832 (C.A.7 1977) (permit for "deep waste-injection well" on the shore of navigable waters). But, in doing so, EPA followed a narrower interpretation than that of the Ninth Circuit. See, e.g. , In re Bethlehem Steel Corp. , 2 E. A. D. 715, 718 (EAB 1989) (Act's permitting requirement applies only to injection wells "that inject into ground water with a physically and temporally direct hydrologic connection to surface water"). EPA has opposed applying the Act's permitting requirements to discharges that reach groundwater only after lengthy periods. See McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation (MESS) v. Cheney , 763 F.Supp. 431, 437 (E.D. Cal. 1989) (United States argued that permitting provisions do not apply when it would take "literally dozens, and perhaps hundreds, of years for any pollutants" to reach navigable waters); Greater Yellowstone Coalition v. Larson , 641 F.Supp.2d 1120, 1139 (D. Idaho 2009) (same in respect to instances where it would take "between 60 and 420 years" for pollutants to travel "one to four miles" through groundwater before reaching navigable waters). Indeed, in this very case (prior to its recent Interpretive Statement, see infra , at 1474 - 1475), EPA asked the Ninth Circuit to apply a more limited "direct hydrological connection" test. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in No. 15-17447 (CA9), pp. 13-20. The Ninth Circuit did not accept this suggestion.
We do not defer here to EPA's interpretation of the statute embodied in this practice. Indeed, EPA itself has changed its mind about the meaning of the statutory provision. See infra, at 1474 - 1475. But this history, by showing that a comparatively narrow view of the statute is administratively workable, offers some additional support for the view that Congress did not intend as broad a delegation of regulatory authority as the Ninth Circuit test would allow.
As we have said, the specific meaning of the word "from" necessarily draws its meaning from context. The apparent breadth of the Ninth Circuit's "fairly traceable" approach is inconsistent with the context we have just described.
IV
A
Maui and the Solicitor General argue that the statute's permitting requirement does not apply if a pollutant, having emerged from a "point source," must travel through any amount of groundwater before reaching navigable waters. That interpretation is too narrow, for it would risk serious interference with EPA's ability to regulate ordinary point source discharges.
Consider a pipe that spews pollution directly into coastal waters. There is an "addition of " a "pollutant to navigable waters from [a] point source." Hence, a permit is required. But Maui and the Government read the permitting requirement not to apply if there is any amount of groundwater between the end of the pipe and the edge of the navigable water. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 5-6, 24-25. If that is the correct interpretation of the statute, then why could not the pipe's owner, seeking to avoid the permit requirement, simply move the pipe back, perhaps only a few yards, so that the pollution must travel through at least some groundwater before reaching the sea? Cf. Brief for State of Maryland et al. as Amici Curiae 9, n. 4. We do not see how Congress could have intended to create such a large and obvious loophole in one of the key regulatory innovations of the Clean Water Act. Cf. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Bd. , 426 U.S. at 202-204, 96 S.Ct. 2022 (basic purpose of Clean Water Act is to regulate pollution at its source); The Emily , 9 Wheat. 381, 390, 6 L.Ed. 116 (1824) (rejecting an interpretation that would facilitate "evasion of the law").
B
Maui argues that the statute's language requires its reading. That language requires a permit for a "discharge." A "discharge" is "any addition" of a pollutant to navigable waters "from any point source ." And a "point source" is "any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance " (such as a pipe, ditch, well, etc.). Reading "from" and "conveyance" together, Maui argues that the statutory meaning of "from any point source" is not about where the pollution originated, but about how it got there. Under what Maui calls the means-of-delivery test, a permit is required only if a point source itself ultimately delivers the pollutant to navigable waters. Under this view, if the pollutant must travel through groundwater to reach navigable waters, then it is the groundwater, not the pipe, that is the conveyance.
Congress sometimes adopts less common meanings of common words, but this esoteric definition of "from," as connoting a means, does not remotely fit in this context. The statute couples the word "from" with the word "to"-strong evidence that Congress was referring to a destination ("navigable waters") and an origin ("any point source"). Further underscoring that Congress intended this every day meaning is that the object of "from" is a "point source "-a source, again, connoting an origin. That Maui's proffered interpretation would also create a serious loophole in the permitting regime also indicates it is an unreasonable one.
C
The Solicitor General agrees that, as a general matter, the permitting requirement applies to at least some additions of pollutants to navigable waters that come indirectly from point sources. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 33-35. But the Solicitor General argues that the proper interpretation of the statute is the one reflected in EPA's recent Interpretive Statement. After receiving more than 50,000 comments from the public, and after the Ninth Circuit released its opinion in this case, EPA wrote that "the best, if not the only, reading" of the statutory provisions is that "all releases of pollutants to groundwater" are excluded from the scope of the permitting program, "even where pollutants are conveyed to jurisdictional surface waters via groundwater." 84 Fed. Reg. 16810, 16811.
Neither the Solicitor General nor any party has asked us to give what the Court has referred to as Chevron deference to EPA's interpretation of the statute. See Chevron U.S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. , 467 U.S. 837, 844, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). Even so, we often pay particular attention to an agency's views in light of the agency's expertise in a given area, its knowledge gained through practical experience, and its familiarity with the interpretive demands of administrative need. See United States v. Mead Corp. , 533 U.S. 218, 234-235, 121 S.Ct. 2164, 150 L.Ed.2d 292 (2001) ; Skidmore v. Swift & Co. , 323 U.S. 134, 139-140, 65 S.Ct. 161, 89 L.Ed. 124 (1944). But here, as we have explained, to follow EPA's reading would open a loophole allowing easy evasion of the statutory provision's basic purposes. Such an interpretation is neither persuasive nor reasonable.
EPA correctly points out that Congress did not require a permit for all discharges to groundwater; rather, Congress authorized study and funding related to groundwater pollution. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 15-19. But there is quite a gap between "not all" and "none." The statutory text itself alludes to no exception for discharges through groundwater. These separate provisions for study and funding that EPA points to would be a "surprisingly indirect route" to convey "an important and easily expressed message"-that the permit requirement simply does not apply if the pollutants travel through groundwater. Landgraf v. USI Film Products , 511 U.S. 244, 262, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994). In truth, the most these provisions show is that Congress thought that the problem of groundwater pollution, as distinct from navigable water pollution, would primarily be addressed by the States or perhaps by other federal statutes.
EPA's new interpretation is also difficult to reconcile with the statute's reference to "any addition" of a pollutant to navigable waters. Cf. Milwaukee , 451 U.S. at 318, 101 S.Ct. 1784 ("Every point source discharge is prohibited unless covered by a permit" (footnote omitted)). It is difficult to reconcile EPA's interpretation with the statute's inclusion of "wells" in the definition of "point source," for wells most ordinarily would discharge pollutants through groundwater. And it is difficult to reconcile EPA's interpretation with the statutory provisions that allow EPA to delegate its permitting authority to a State only if the State (among other things) provides " 'adequate authority' " to " 'control the disposal of pollutants into wells.' " § 402(b), 86 Stat. 881. What need would there be for such a proviso if the federal permitting program the State replaces did not include such discharges (from wells through groundwater) in the first place?
In short, EPA's oblique argument about the statute's references to groundwater cannot overcome the statute's structure, its purposes, or the text of the provisions that actually govern.
D
Perhaps, as the two dissents suggest, the language could be narrowed to similar effect by reading the statute to refer only to the pollutant's immediate origin. See post , at 1479 - 1480 (opinion of THOMAS, J.); post, at 1486 - 1487 (opinion of ALITO, J.). But there is no linguistic basis here to so limit the statute in that way. Again, whether that is the correct reading turns on context. Justice THOMAS insists that in the case of a discharge through groundwater, the pollutants are added "from the groundwater." Post , at 1480. Indeed, but that does not mean they are not also "from the point source." Ibid . When John comes to the hotel, John might have come from the train station, from Baltimore, from Europe, from any two of those three places, or from all three. A sign that asks all persons who arrive from Baltimore to speak to the desk clerk includes those who took a taxi from the train station. There is nothing unnatural about such a construction. As the plurality correctly noted in Rapanos v. United States , 547 U.S. 715, 126 S.Ct. 2208, 165 L.Ed.2d 159 (2006), the statute here does not say "directly" from or "immediately" from. Id., at 743, 126 S.Ct. 2208 (opinion of Scalia, J.). Indeed, the expansive language of the provision-any addition from any point source-strongly suggests its scope is not so limited.
Justice ALITO appears to believe that there are only two possible ways to read "from": as referring either to the immediate source, or else to the original source. Post, at 1484 - 1485, 1486 - 1487. Because he agrees that the statute cannot reasonably be read always to reach the original source, he concludes the statute must refer only to the immediate origin. But as the foregoing example illustrates, context may indicate that "from" includes an intermediate stop-Baltimore, not Europe or the train station.
Justice THOMAS relies on the word "addition," but we fail to see how that word limits the statute to discharges directly to navigable waters. Ordinary language abounds in counter examples: A recipe might instruct to "add the drippings from the meat to the gravy"; that instruction does not become incomprehensible, or even peculiar, simply because the drippings will have first collected in a pan or on a cutting board. And while it would be an unusual phrasing (as statutory phrasings often are), we do not see how the recipe's meaning would transform if it instead said to "add the drippings to the gravy from the meat." To take another example: If Timmy is told to "add water to the bath from the well" he will know just what it means-even though he will have to use a bucket to complete the task.
And although Justice THOMAS resists the inevitable implications of his reading of the statute, post , at 1481 - 1482, that reading would create the same loopholes as those offered by the petitioner and the Government, and more. It would necessarily exclude a pipe that drains onto the beach next to navigable waters, even if the pollutants then flow to those waters. It also seems to exclude a pipe that hangs out over the water and adds pollutants to the air, through which the pollutants fall to navigable waters. The absurdity of such an interpretation is obvious enough.
We therefore reject this reading as well: Like Maui's and the Government's, it is inconsistent with the statutory text and simultaneously creates a massive loophole in the permitting scheme that Congress established.
E
For the reasons set forth in Part III and in this Part, we conclude that, in light of the statute's language, structure, and purposes, the interpretations offered by the parties, the Government, and the dissents are too extreme.
V
Over the years, courts and EPA have tried to find general language that will reflect a middle ground between these extremes. The statute's words reflect Congress' basic aim to provide federal regulation of identifiable sources of pollutants entering navigable waters without undermining the States' longstanding regulatory authority over land and groundwater. We hold that the statute requires a permit when there is a direct discharge from a point source into navigable waters or when there is the functional equivalent of a direct discharge . We think this phrase best captures, in broad terms, those circumstances in which Congress intended to require a federal permit. That is, an addition falls within the statutory requirement that it be "from any point source" when a point source directly deposits pollutants into navigable waters, or when the discharge reaches the same result through roughly similar means.
Time and distance are obviously important. Where a pipe ends a few feet from navigable waters and the pipe emits pollutants that travel those few feet through groundwater (or over the beach), the permitting requirement clearly applies. If the pipe ends 50 miles from navigable waters and the pipe emits pollutants that travel with groundwater, mix with much other material, and end up in navigable waters only many years later, the permitting requirements likely do not apply.
The object in a given scenario will be to advance, in a manner consistent with the statute's language, the statutory purposes that Congress sought to achieve. As we have said (repeatedly), the word "from" seeks a "point source" origin, and context imposes natural limits as to when a point source can properly be considered the origin of pollution that travels through groundwater. That context includes the need, reflected in the statute, to preserve state regulation of groundwater and other nonpoint sources of pollution. Whether pollutants that arrive at navigable waters after traveling through groundwater are "from" a point source depends upon how similar to (or different from) the particular discharge is to a direct discharge.
The difficulty with this approach, we recognize, is that it does not, on its own, clearly explain how to deal with middle instances. But there are too many potentially relevant factors applicable to factually different cases for this Court now to use more specific language. Consider, for example, just some of the factors that may prove relevant (depending upon the circumstances of a particular case): (1) transit time, (2) distance traveled, (3) the nature of the material through which the pollutant travels, (4) the extent to which the pollutant is diluted or chemically changed as it travels, (5) the amount of pollutant entering the navigable waters relative to the amount of the pollutant that leaves the point source, (6) the manner by or area in which the pollutant enters the navigable waters, (7) the degree to which the pollution (at that point) has maintained its specific identity. Time and distance will be the most important factors in most cases, but not necessarily every case.
At the same time, courts can provide guidance through decisions in individual cases. The Circuits have tried to do so, often using general language somewhat similar to the language we have used. And the traditional common-law method, making decisions that provide examples that in turn lead to ever more refined principles, is sometimes useful, even in an era of statutes.
The underlying statutory objectives also provide guidance. Decisions should not create serious risks either of undermining state regulation of groundwater or of creating loopholes that undermine the statute's basic federal regulatory objectives.
EPA, too, can provide administrative guidance (within statutory boundaries) in numerous ways, including through, for example, grants of individual permits, promulgation of general permits, or the development of general rules. Indeed, over the years, EPA and the States have often considered the Act's application to discharges through groundwater.
Both Maui and the Government object that to subject discharges to navigable waters through groundwater to the statute's permitting requirements, as our interpretation will sometimes do, would vastly expand the scope of the statute, perhaps requiring permits for each of the 650,000 wells like petitioner's or for each of the over 20 million septic systems used in many Americans' homes. Brief for Petitioner 44-48; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 24-25. Cf. Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA , 573 U.S. 302, 324, 134 S.Ct. 2427, 189 L.Ed.2d 372 (2014).
But EPA has applied the permitting provision to some (but not to all) discharges through groundwater for over 30 years. See supra , at 1472 - 1473. In that time we have seen no evidence of unmanageable expansion. EPA and the States also have tools to mitigate those harms, should they arise, by (for example) developing general permits for recurring situations or by issuing permits based on best practices where appropriate. See, e.g., 40 CFR § 122.44(k) (2019). Judges, too, can mitigate any hardship or injustice when they apply the statute's penalty provision. That provision vests courts with broad discretion to set a penalty that takes account of many factors, including "any good-faith efforts to comply" with the Act, the "seriousness of the violation," the "economic impact of the penalty on the violator," and "such other matters as justice may require." See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d). We expect that district judges will exercise their discretion mindful, as we are, of the complexities inherent to the context of indirect discharges through groundwater, so as to calibrate the Act's penalties when, for example, a party could reasonably have thought that a permit was not required.
In sum, we recognize that a more absolute position, such as the means-of-delivery test or that of the Government or that of the Ninth Circuit, may be easier to administer. But, as we have said, those positions have consequences that are inconsistent with major congressional objectives, as revealed by the statute's language, structure, and purposes. We consequently understand the permitting requirement, § 301, as applicable to a discharge (from a point source) of pollutants that reach navigable waters after traveling through groundwater if that discharge is the functional equivalent of a direct discharge from the point source into navigable waters.
VI
Because the Ninth Circuit applied a different standard, we vacate its judgment and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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H
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Scalia
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Little Tucker Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1346(a)(2), provides that “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction, concurrent with the United States Court of Federal Claims, of... [a]ny ... civil action or claim against the United States, not exceeding $10,000 in amount, founded . . . upon . . . any Act of Congress.” We consider whether the Little Tucker Act waives the sovereign immunity of the United States with respect to damages actions for violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA or Act), 15 U. S. C. § 1681 et sea.
I—I
FCRA has as one of its purposes to “protect consumer privacy.” Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Burr, 551 U. S. 47, 52 (2007); see 84 Stat. 1128, 15 U. S. C. § 1681. To that end, FCRA provides, among other things, that “no person that accepts credit cards or debit cards for the transaction of business shall print more than the last 5 digits of the card number or the expiration date upon any receipt provided to the cardholder at the point of the sale or transaction.” § 1681c(g)(l) (emphasis added). The Act defines “person” as “any individual, partnership, corporation, trust, estate, cooperative, association, government or governmental subdivision or agency, or other entity.” § 1681a(b).
FCRA imposes civil liability for willful or negligent noncompliance with its requirements: “Any person who willfully fails to comply” with the Act “with respect to any consumer” “is liable to that consumer” for actual damages or damages “of not less than $100 and not more than $1,000,” as well as punitive damages, attorney’s fees, and costs. § 1681n(a); see also § 1681o (civil liability for negligent noncompliance). The Act includes a jurisdictional provision, which provides that “[a]n action to enforce any liability created under this subchapter may be brought in any appropriate United States district court, without regard to the amount in controversy, or in any other court of competent jurisdiction” within the earlier of “2 years after the date of discovery by the plaintiff of the violation that is the basis for such liability” or “5 years after the date on which the violation that is the basis for such liability occurs.” § 1681p.
Respondent James X. Bormes is an attorney who filed a putative class action against the United States in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois seeking damages under FCRA. Bormes alleged that he paid a $350 federal-court filing fee for a client using his own credit card on Pay.gov, an Internet-based system used by federal courts and dozens of federal agencies to process online payment transactions. According to Bormes, his Pay.gov electronic receipt included the last four digits of his credit card, in addition to its expiration date, in willful violation of § 1681c(g)(l). He claimed that he and thousands of similarly situated persons were entitled to recover damages under §1681n, and asserted jurisdiction under §1681p, as well as under the Little Tucker Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1346(a)(2).
The District Court dismissed the suit, holding that FCRA does not contain the explicit waiver of sovereign immunity necessary to permit a damages suit against the United States. 638 F. Supp. 2d 958, 962 (ND Ill. 2009). The court did not address the Little Tucker Act as an asserted basis for jurisdiction. Respondent appealed to the Federal Circuit, which has exclusive jurisdiction “of an appeal from a final decision of a district court of the United States ... if the jurisdiction of that court was based, in whole or in part, on” the Little Tucker Act. 28 U. S. C. § 1295(a)(2). Arguing that the Little Tucker Act’s jurisdictional grant did not apply to respondent’s suit, the Government moved to transfer the appeal to the Seventh Circuit.
The Federal Circuit denied the transfer motion and went on to vacate the District Court’s decision. Without deciding whether FCRA itself contained the requisite waiver of sovereign immunity, the court held that the Little Tucker Act provided the Government’s consent to suit for violation of FCRA. The court explained that the Little Tucker Act applied because FCRA “ ‘can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government for the damage sustained.’” 626 F. 3d 574, 578 (2010) (quoting United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U. S. 465, 472 (2003)). This “fair interpretation” rule, the court explained, “demands a showing ‘demonstrably lower’ than the initial waiver of sovereign immunity” contained in the Little Tucker Act itself. 626 F. 3d, at 578. The court reasoned that FCRA satisfied the “fair interpretation” rule because its damages provision applies to “any person” who willfully violates its requirements, 15 U. S. C. § 1681n(a), and the Act elsewhere defines “person” to include “any . . . government,” § 1681a(b). 626 F. 3d, at 580. The Federal Circuit remanded to the District Court for further proceedings. We granted certiorari, 565 U. S. 1153 (2012).
r"H HH
Sovereign immunity shields the United States from suit absent a consent to be sued that is ‘“unequivocally expressed.’ ” United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U. S. 30, 33-34 (1992) (quoting Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U. S. 89, 95 (1990); some internal quotation marks omitted). The Little Tucker Act is one statute that unequivocally provides the Federal Government’s consent to suit for certain money-damages claims. United States v. Mitchell, 463 U. S. 206, 216 (1983) (Mitchell II). Subject to exceptions not relevant here, the Little Tucker Act provides that “district courts shall have original jurisdiction, concurrent with the United States Court of Federal Claims,” of a “civil action or claim against the United States, not exceeding $10,000 in amount, founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.” 28 U. S. C. § 1346(a)(2). The Little Tucker Act and its companion statute, the Tucker Act, § 1491(a)(1), do not themselves “creat[e] substantive rights,” but “are simply jurisdictional provisions that operate to waive sovereign immunity for claims premised on other sources of law.” United States v. Navajo Nation, 556 U. S. 287, 290 (2009).
Bormes argues that whether or not FCRA itself unambiguously waives sovereign immunity, the Little Tucker Act authorizes his FCRA damages claim against the United States. The question, then, is whether a damages claim under FCRA “falls within the terms of the Tucker Act,” so that “the United States has presumptively consented to suit.” Mitchell II, supra, at 216. It does not. Where, as in FCRA, a statute contains its own self-executing remedial scheme, we look only to that statute to determine whether Congress intended to subject the United States to damages liability.
A
The Court of Claims was established, and the Tucker Act enacted, to open a judicial avenue for certain monetary claims against the United States. Before the creation of the Court of Claims in 1855, see Act of Feb. 24, 1855 (1855 Act), ch. 122, § 1, 10 Stat. 612, it was not uncommon for statutes to impose monetary obligations on the United States without specifying a means of judicial enforcement. As a result, claimants routinely petitioned Congress for private bills to recover money owed by the Federal Government. See Mitchell II, supra, at 212 (citing P. Bator, P. Mishkin, D. Shapiro & H. Wechsler, Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal System 98 (2d ed. 1973)). As this individualized legislative process became increasingly burdensome for Congress, the Court of Claims was created “to relieve the pressure on Congress caused by the volume of private bills.” Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U. S. 530, 552 (1962) (plurality opinion). The 1855 Act authorized the Court of Claims to hear claims against the United States “founded upon any law of Congress,” § 1,10 Stat. 612, and thus allowed claimants to sue the Federal Government for monetary relief premised on other sources of law. (Specialized legislation remained necessary to authorize the payments approved by the Court of Claims until 1863, when Congress empowered the court to enter final judgments. See Act of Mar. 3, 1863 (1863 Act), ch. 92, 12 Stat. 765; Mitchell II, supra, at 212-214 (recounting the history of the Court of Claims).)
Enacted in 1887, the Tucker Act was the successor statute to the 1855 and 1863 Acts and replaced most of their provisions. See Act of Mar. 3, 1887 (1887 Act), ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505; Mitchell II, supra, at 213-214. Like the 1855 Act berfore it, the Tucker Act provided the Federal Government’s consent to suit in the Court of Claims for claims “founded upon . . . any law of Congress.” 1887 Act § 1, 24 Stat. 505. Section 2 of the 1887 Act created concurrent jurisdiction in the district courts for claims of up to $1,000. The Tucker Act’s jurisdictional grant, and accompanying immunity waiver, supplied the missing ingredient for an action against the United States for the breach of monetary obligations not otherwise judicially enforceable.
B
The Tucker Act is displaced, however, when a law assert-edly imposing monetary liability on the United States contains its own judicial remedies. In that event, the specific remedial scheme establishes the exclusive framework for the liability Congress created under the statute. Because a “precisely drawn, detailed statute pre-empts more general remedies,” Hinck v. United States, 550 U. S. 501, 506 (2007) (quoting EC Term of Years Trust v. United States, 550 U. S. 429, 434 (2007); internal quotation marks omitted), FCRA’s self-executing remedial scheme supersedes the gap-filling role of the Tucker Act.
We have long recognized that an additional remedy in the Court of Claims is foreclosed when it contradicts the limits of a precise remedial scheme. In Nichols v. United States, 7 Wall. 122, 131 (1869), the issue was whether the 1855 Act authorized suit in the Court of Claims for improper assessment of duties on imported liquor that had already been paid without protest. The Court held that it did not. The revenue laws already provided a remedy: An aggrieved merchant could sue to recover the tax, but only after paying the duty under protest. Aet of Feb. 26,1845, ch. 22, 5 Stat. 727. The Court rejected the supposition that “Congress, after having carefully constructed a revenue system, with ample provisions to redress wrong, intended to give to the taxpayer and importer a further and different remedy.” 7 Wall., at 131. Permitting suit under the 1855 Act, the Court concluded, would frustrate congressional intent with respect to the specific remedial scheme already in place. The 1855 Act was confined to a gap-filling role. As we said in a later case, “the general laws which govern the Court of Claims may be resorted to for relief” only because “[n]o special remedy has been provided” to enforce a payment to which the claimant was entitled. United States v. Kaufman, 96 U. S. 567, 569 (1878). Where the “liability is one created by statute,” the “special remedy provided by the same statute is exclusive.” Ibid.
Our more recent cases have consistently held that statutory schemes with their own remedial framework exclude alternative relief under the general terms of the Tucker Act. See, e. g., Hinck, supra; United States v. Fausto, 484 U. S. 439 (1988); United States v. Erika, Inc., 456 U. S. 201 (1982). Respondent contends that in each of those cases Congress had unambiguously demonstrated its intent to foreclose additional review by the Court of Federal Claims—whereas here, no similar intent to preclude Tucker Act jurisdiction is apparent. See Brief for Respondent 27-28. But our precedents collectively stand for a more basic proposition: Where a specific statutory scheme provides the accoutrements of a judicial action, the metes and bounds of the liability Congress intended to create can only be divined from the text of the statute itself.
In Hinck, for example, we held that the Tax Court provides the exclusive forum for suits under 26 U. S. C. § 6404(h), which authorizes judicial review of the Treasury Secretary's decision not to abate interest under § 6404(e)(1). We relied on “our past recognition that when Congress enacts a specific remedy when no remedy was previously recognized . . . the remedy provided is generally regarded as exclusive.” 550 U. S., at 506. Section 6404(h), we concluded, “fits the bill”: It “provides a forum for adjudication, a limited class of potential plaintiffs, a statute of limitations, a standard of review, and authorization for judicial relief.” Ibid. It did not matter that Congress “fail[edj explicitly to define the Tax Court’s jurisdiction as exclusive.” Ibid. We found it “quite plain that the terms of § 6404(h)—a ‘precisely drawn, detailed statute' filling a perceived hole in the law— control all requests for review of § 6404(e)(1) determinations.” Ibid.
Like § 6404(h), FCRA creates a detailed remedial scheme. Its provisions “set out a carefully circumscribed, time-limited, plaintiff-specific” cause of action, and “also precisely define the appropriate forum.” Id., at 507. It authorizes aggrieved consumers to hold “any person” who “willfully” or “negligent[ly]” fails to comply with the Act’s requirements liable for specified damages. 15 U. S. C. §§ 1681n(a), 1681o. Claims to enforce liability must be brought within a specified limitations period, § 1681p, and jurisdiction will lie “in any appropriate United States district court, without regard to the amount in controversy, or in any other court of competent jurisdiction,” ibid. Without resort to the Tucker Act, FCRA enables claimants to pursue in court the monetary relief contemplated by the statute.
Plaintiffs cannot, therefore, mix and match FCRA’s provisions with the Little Tucker Act’s immunity waiver to create an action against the United States. Since FCRA is a detailed remedial scheme, only its own text can determine whether the damages liability Congress crafted extends to the Federal Government. To hold otherwise—to permit plaintiffs to remedy the absence of a waiver of sovereign immunity in specific, detailed statutes by pleading general Tucker Act jurisdiction—would transform the sovereign-immunity landscape.
The Federal Circuit was therefore wrong to conclude that the Tucker Act justified applying a “less stringent” sovereign-immunity analysis to FCRA than our cases require. 626 F. 3d, at 582. It distorted our case law in applying to FCRA the immunity-waiver standard we expressed in White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U. S., at 472: whether the statute “ ‘can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government for the damage sustained.’ ” 626 F. 3d, at 578. That is the test for determining whether a statute that imposes an obligation but does not provide the elements of a cause of action qualifies for suit under the Tucker Act—more specifically, whether the failure to perform an obligation undoubtedly imposed on the Federal Government creates a right to monetary relief. See White Mountain Apache Tribe, supra; Mitchell II, 463 U. S. 206. That test is not relevant when a “mandate of compensation” is contained in a statute that provides a detailed judicial remedy against those who are subject to its requirements. FCRA is such a statute. By using the “fair interpretation” test to determine whether FCRA’s civil liability provisions apply to the United States, the Federal Circuit directed the test to a purpose for which it was not designed and leapfrogged the threshold concern that the Tucker Act cannot be superimposed on an existing remedial scheme.
⅜ * ⅝
We do not decide here whether FCRA itself waives the Federal Government’s immunity to damages actions under § 1681n. That question is for the Seventh Circuit to consider once this case is transferred to it on remand. But whether or not FCRA contains the necessary waiver of immunity, any attempt to append a Tucker Act remedy to the statute’s existing remedial scheme interferes with its intended scope of liability.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded with instructions to transfer the case to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
It is undisputed that this class action satisfied the Little Tucker Act’s amount-in-controversy limitation. We have held that to require only that the “claims of individual members of the clas[s] do not exceed $10,000.” United States v. Will, 449 U. S. 200, 211, n. 10 (1980).
Whereas the Little Tucker Act creates jurisdiction in the district courts concurrent with the Court of Federal Claims for covered claims of $10,000 or less, the Tucker Act assigns jurisdiction to the Court of Federal Claims regardless of monetary amount. As relevant here, the scope of the two statutes is otherwise the same. The third statute in the Tucker Act trio, the Indian Tucker Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1506, “confers a like waiver for Indian tribal claims that ‘otherwise would be cognizable in the Court of Federal Claims if the claimant were not an Indian tribe.”’ United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U. S. 465, 472 (2003) (quoting § 1505).
For example, the Act of March 30, 1814, provided that every noncom-missioned U. S. army officer who “may be captured by the enemy, shall be entitled to receive during his captivity ... the same pay, subsistence, and allowance to which he may be entitled whilst in the actual service of the United States.” § 14,3 Stat. 115, repealed in 1962 by Pub. L. 87-649, § 14, 76 Stat. 498. The 1814 Act clearly “command[ed] the payment of a specified amount of money by the United States,” Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U. S. 879, 923 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting), but did not designate a means of judicial relief in the event the Government failed to pay.
For purposes of this case, the current versions of the Tucker Act and Little Tucker Act resemble the 1887 Act. Compare 28 U. S. C. § 1491(a)(1) (permitting suits “founded ... upon ... any Act of Congress”) with Tucker Act § 1, 24 Stat. 505 (permitting suits “founded upon . .. any law of Congress, except for pensions”). The prior functions of the Court of Claims are now divided between the Court of Federal Claims at the trial level and the Federal Circuit at the appellate.
We therefore need not resolve the parties’ disagreement about whether certain inconsistencies between the Little Tucker Act and FCRA can be reconciled. Compare 28 U. S. C. § 1346(a)(2) (no claims in district court “exceeding $10,000 in amount”) with 15 U. S. C. § 1681p (claims may be brought in district court “without regard to the amount in controversy”); compare 28 U. S. C. §2501 (claims must be filed in the Court of Federal Claims within six years of accrual) with 15 U. S. C. § 1681p (claims under FCRA must be filed within the earlier of two years after discovery or five years after the alleged violation). Reconcilable or not, FCRA governs. The Government also contends that the Tucker Act does not apply because §§ 1681n and 1681o sound in tort. We do not decide the merits of that alternative argument.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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E
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Blackmun
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Stroud v. United States, 251 U. S. 15 (1919), concerned a defendant who was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment, and who then obtained, upon confession of error by the Solicitor General, a reversal of his conviction and a new trial. This Court, by a unanimous vote in that case, held that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment did not bar the imposition of the death penalty when Stroud at his new trial was again convicted.
The issue in the present case is whether the reasoning of Stroud is also to apply under a system where a jury’s sentencing decision is made at a bifurcated proceeding’s second stage at which the prosecution has the burden of proving certain elements beyond a reasonable doubt before the death penalty may be imposed.
I
Missouri law provides two, and only two, possible sentences for a defendant convicted of capital murder: (a) death, or (b) life imprisonment without eligibility for probation or parole for 50 years. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.008.1 (1978).
Like most death penalty legislation enacted after this Court’s decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238 (1972), the Missouri statutes contain substantive standards to guide the discretion of the sentencer. The statutes also afford procedural safeguards to the convicted defendant. Section 565.006 provides that the trial court shall conduct a separate presentence hearing for the defendant who is convicted by a jury of capital murder. The hearing must be held before the same jury that found the defendant guilty, and “additional evidence in extenuation, mitigation, and aggravation of punishment” shall be heard. “Only such evidence in aggravation as the prosecution has made known to the defendant prior to his trial shall be admissible.” The jury must consider whether the evidence shows that there exist any of the 10 aggravating circumstances or the 7 mitigating circumstances specified by the statute, see §§ 565.012.2 and 565.012.3; whether any other mitigating or aggravating circumstances authorized by law exist; whether any aggravating circumstances that do exist are sufficient to warrant the imposition of the death penalty; and whether any mitigating circumstances that exist outweigh the aggravating circumstances. § 565.012.1. A jury that imposes the death penalty must designate in writing the aggravating circumstance or circumstances that it finds beyond a reasonable doubt. § 565.012.4. It also must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that any aggravating circumstance or circumstances that it finds to exist are sufficient to warrant the imposition of the death penalty. Missouri Approved Instructions — Criminal (MAI-Cr) § 15.42 (1979). A Missouri jury is instructed that it is not compelled to impose the death penalty, even if it decides that a sufficient aggravating circumstance or circumstances exist and that it or they are not outweighed by any mitigating circumstance or circumstances. MAI-Cr. § 15.46. A jury’s decision to impose the death penalty must be unanimous. If the jury is unable to agree, the defendant receives the alternative sentence of life imprisonment described above. § 565.006.2; MAI-Cr. § 15.48.
II
In December 1977, petitioner Robert Bullington was indicted in St. Louis County, Mo., for capital murder and other crimes arising out of the abduction of a young woman and her subsequent death by drowning.
The Circuit Court of St. Louis County granted petitioner’s pretrial motion for a change of venue to Jackson County in the western part of the State. The prosecution, by letter, informed the defense that the State would seek the death penalty if the jury convicted the defendant of capital murder. App. 12. The letter-notice stated that the prosecution would present evidence of two aggravating circumstances specified by the statute: that “[t]he offense was committed by a person . . . who has a substantial history of serious assaultive criminal convictions,” § 565.012.2 (1), and that “[t]he offense was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, or depravity of mind,” § 565.012.2 (7).
At the guilt-or-innocence phase of petitioner’s trial, the jury returned a verdict of guilty of capital murder. App. 21. On the following day, the trial court proceeded to hold the presentence hearing required by § 565.006.2. Evidence submitted by the prosecution was received. None was offered by the defense. After argument by counsel, instructions from the judge, and deliberation, the jury returned its additional verdict fixing petitioner’s punishment not at death, but at imprisonment for life without eligibility for probation or parole for 50 years. App. 27.
Petitioner then moved, on various grounds, for judgment of acquittal or in the alternative for a new trial. While that motion was pending, Duren v. Missouri, 439 U. S. 357 (1979), was decided. In that case this Court held that Missouri’s constitutional and statutory provisions allowing women to claim automatic exemption from jury service deprived a defendant of his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments right to a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community. The trial court overruled petitioner’s motion for acquittal but, relying upon Duren, granted his motion for a new trial. App. 44.
Soon thereafter, the prosecution served and filed a formal “Notice of Evidence in Aggravation,” stating that it intended again to seek the death penalty. The notice specified the same aggravating circumstances the State sought to prove at the first trial, see also Tr. of Oral Arg. 36, and asserted that it would introduce the evidence that was previously disclosed to defense counsel. App. 45-46. The defense moved to strike the notice, id., at 47, arguing that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment (as made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, Benton v. Maryland, 395 U. S. 784, 794 (1969)) barred the imposition of the penalty of death when the first jury had declined to impose the death sentence.
The trial court announced that it would grant that motion and would not permit the State to seek the death penalty. Before the court issued a formal order to this effect, the prosecution sought a writ of prohibition or mandamus from the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District. After granting a temporary “stop order,” App. 56, the Court of Appeals without opinion denied the State’s request and dissolved the stop order. Id., at 57. The Supreme Court of Missouri, however, granted the prosecution’s motion for transfer of the case to that court and issued a preliminary-writ of prohibition. After argument, the court, sitting en banc and by a divided vote, sustained the State’s position and made the writ absolute. State ex rel. Westfall v. Mason, 594 S. W. 2d 908 (1980). It held that neither the Double Jeopardy Clause, nor the Eighth Amendment, nor the Due Process Clause barred the imposition of the death penalty upon petitioner at his new trial, and that allowing the prosecution to seek capital punishment would not impermissibly chill a defendant’s effort to seek redress for any constitutional violation committed at his initial trial.
We granted certiorari, 449 U. S. 819 (1980), in order to consider the important issues raised by petitioner regarding the administration of the death penalty.
Ill
It is well established that the Double Jeopardy Clause forbids the . retrial of a defendant who has been acquitted of the crime charged. United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U. S. 117, 129-130 (1980); Burks v. United States, 437 U. S. 1, 16 (1978) ; United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U. S. 564, 571 (1977); Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U. S. 141, 143 (1962); Green v. United States, 355 U. S. 184 (1957). This Court, however, has resisted attempts to extend that principle to sentencing. The imposition of a particular sentence usually is not regarded as an “acquittal” of any more severe sentence that could have been imposed. The Court generally has concluded, therefore, that the Double Jeopardy Clause imposes no absolute prohibition against the imposition of a harsher sentence at retrial after a defendant has succeeded in having his original conviction set aside. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U. S. 711 (1969). See also United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U. S., at 133, 137-138; Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U. S. 17, 23-24 (1973); Stroud v. United States, 251 U. S. 15 (1919).
The procedure that resulted in the imposition of the sentence of life imprisonment upon petitioner Bullington at his first trial, however, differs significantly from those employed in any of the Court’s-cases where the Double Jeopardy Clause has been held inapplicable to sentencing. The jury in this case was not given unbounded discretion to select an appropriate punishment from a wide range authorized by statute. Rather, a separate hearing was required and was held, and the jury was presented both a choice between two alternatives and standards to guide the making of that choice. Nor did the prosecution simply recommend what it felt to be an appropriate punishment. It undertook the burden of establishing certain facts beyond a reasonable doubt in its quest to obtain the harsher of the two alternative verdicts. The presentence hearing resembled and, indeed, in all relevant respects was like the immediately preceding trial on the issue of guilt or innocence. It was itself a trial on the issue of punishment so precisely defined by the Missouri statutes.
In contrasty the sentencing procedures considered in the Court’s previous cases did not have the hallmarks of the trial on guilt or innocence. In Pearce, Chaffin, and Stroud, there was no separate sentencing proceeding at which the prosecution was required to prove — beyond a reasonable doubt or otherwise — additional facts in order to justify the particular sentence. In each of those cases, moreover, the sentencer’s discretion was essentially unfettered. In Stroud, no standards had been enacted to guide the jury’s discretion. In Pearce, the judge had a wide range of punishments from which to choose with no explicit standards imposed to guide him. And in Chaffin, the discretion given to the jury was extremely broad. That defendant, convicted in Georgia of robbery, could have been sentenced to death, to life imprisonment, or to a prison term of between 4 and 20 years. 412 U. S., at 18, and n. 1. The statute contained no standards to guide the jury's exercise of its discretion.
In only one prior case, United States v. DiFrancesco, has this Court considered a separate or bifurcated sentencing procedure at which it was necessary for the prosecution to prove additional facts. The federal statute under consideration there, the "dangerous special offender” provision of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 18 U. S. C. §§ 3575 and 3576, requires a separate presentence hearing. The Government must prove the additional fact that the defendant is a “dangerous special offender,” as defined in the statute, in order for the court to impose an enhanced sentence. But there are highly pertinent differences between the Missouri procedures controlling the present case and those found constitutional in DiFrancesco. The federal procedures at issue in DiFrancesco include appellate review of a sentence “on the record of the sentencing court,” § 3576, not a de novo proceeding that gives the Government the opportunity to convince a second factfinder of its view of the facts. Moreover, the choice presented to the federal judge under § 3575 is far broader than that faced by the state jury at the present petitioner’s trial. Bullington’s Missouri jury was given— and under the State’s statutes could be given — only two choices, death or life imprisonment. On the other hand, if the Federal Government proves that a person convicted of a felony is a dangerous special offender, the judge may sentence that person to “an appropriate term not to exceed twenty-five years and not disproportionate in severity to the maximum term otherwise authorized by law for such felony.” §3575 (b). Finally, although the statute requires the Government to prove the additional fact that the defendant is a “dangerous special offender,” it need do so only by a preponderance of the evidence. Ibid. This stands in contrast to the reasonable-doubt standard of the Missouri statute, the same standard required to be used at the trial on the issue of guilt or innocence. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (1979); In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358 (1970). The State’s use of this standard indicates that, as has been said generally of the criminal case, “the interests of the defendant are of such magnitude that . . . they have been protected by standards of proof designed to exclude as nearly as possible the likelihood of an erroneous judgment. . . . [O]ur society imposes almost the entire risk of error upon itself.” Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S. 418, 423-424 (1979).
IV
These procedural differences become important when the underlying rationale of the cases is considered. The State here relies principally upon North Carolina v. Pearce. The Court’s starting point in that case, 395 U. S., at 719-720, was the established rule that there is no double jeopardy bar to retrying a defendant who has succeeded in overturning his conviction. See, e. g., United States v. Tateo, 377 U. S. 463 (1964); United States v. Ball, 163 U. S. 662, 672 (1896). The Court stated that this rule rests on the premise that the original conviction has been nullified and “the slate wiped clean.” 395 U. S., at 721. Therefore, if the defendant is convicted again, he constitutionally may be subjected to whatever punishment is lawful, subject only to the limitation that he receive credit for time served.
There is an important exception, however, to the rule recognized in Pearce. A defendant may not be retried if he obtains a reversal of his conviction on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to convict. Burks v. United States, 437 U. S. 1 (1978). The reasons for this exception are relevant here:
“[RJeversal for trial error, as distinguished from evi-dentiary insufficiency, does not constitute a decision to the effect that the government has failed to prove its cases. As such, it implies nothing with respect to the guilt or innocence of the defendant. . . .
“The same cannot be said when a defendant’s conviction has been overturned due to a failure of proof at trial, in which case the prosecution cannot complain of prejudice, for it has been given one fair opportunity to offer whatever proof it can assemble. . . . Since we necessarily accord absolute finality to a jury’s verdict of acquittal — no matter how erroneous its decision — it is difficult to conceive how society has any greater interest in retrying a defendant when, on review, it is decided as a matter of law that the jury could not properly have returned a verdict of guilty.” Id., at 15-16 (emphasis in original).
The decision in Burks was foreshadowed by Green v. United States, 355 U. S. 184 (1957). In that case, the defendant had been indicted for first-degree murder, and the trial court instructed the jury that it could convict him either of that crime or of the lesser included offense of second-degree murder. The juiy convicted him of second-degree murder, but the conviction was reversed on appeal. The Court held that a retrial on the first-degree murder charge was barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause, because the defendant “was forced to run the gantlet once on that charge and the jury refused to convict him.” Id., at 190. See also Price v. Georgia, 398 U. S. 323 (1970).
Thus, the “clean slate” rationale recognized in Pearce is inapplicable whenever a jury agrees or an appellate court decides that the prosecution has not proved its case.
In the usual sentencing proceeding, however, it is impossible to conclude that a sentence less than the statutory maximum “constitute [s] a decision to the effect that the government has failed to prove its case.” In the normal process of sentencing, “there are virtually no rules or tests or standards — and thus no issues to resolve . . . M. Frankel, Criminal Sentences: Law Without Order 38 (1973). Thus, “[t]he discretion of the judge ... in [sentencing] matters is virtually free of substantive control or guidance. Where the judge has power to select a term of imprisonment within a range the exercise of that authority is left fairly at large.” Kadish, Legal Norm and Discretion in the Police and Sentencing Processes, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 904, 916 (1962).
The Court’s cases that have considered the role of the Double Jeopardy Clause in sentencing have noted this absence of sentencing standards. In DiFrancesco, for example, we observed: “[A] sentence is characteristically determined in large part on the basis of information, such as the presen-tence report, developed outside the courtroom. It is purely a judicial determination, and much that goes into it is the result of inquiry that is nonadversary in nature.” 449 U. S., at 136-137. And even if it is the jury that imposes the sentence, “[n]ormally, there would be no way for the jury to place on the record the reasons for its collective sentencing determination . . . .” Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U. S., at 28, n. 15.
By enacting a capital sentencing procedure that resembles a trial on the issue of guilt or innocence, however, Missouri explicitly requires the jury to determine whether the prosecution has “proved its case.” Both Burks and Green, as has been noted, state an exception to the general rule relied upon in North Carolina v. Pearce. That exception is applicable here, and we therefore refrain from extending the rationale of Pearce to the very different facts of the present case. Chief Justice Bardgett, in his dissent from the ruling of the Missouri Supreme Court majority, observed that the sentence of life imprisonment which petitioner received at his first trial meant that “the jury has already acquitted the defendant of whatever was necessary to impose the death sentence.” 594 S. W. 2d, at 922. We agree.
A verdict of acquittal on the issue of guilt or innocence is, of course, absolutely final. The values that underlie this principle, stated for the Court by Justice Black, are equally applicable when a jury has rejected the State’s claim that the defendant deserves to die:
“The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty.” Creen v. United States, 355 U. S., at 187-188.
See also United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U. S., at 136. The “embarrassment, expense and ordeal” and the “anxiety and insecurity” faced by a defendant at the penalty phase of a Missouri capital murder trial surely are at least equivalent to that faced by any defendant at the guilt phase of a criminal trial. The “unacceptably high risk that the [prosecution], with its superior resources, would wear down a defendant,” id., at 130, thereby leading to an erroneously imposed death sentence, would exist if the State were to have a further opportunity to convince a jury to impose the ultimate punishment. Missouri’s use of the reasonable-doubt standard indicates that in a capital sentencing proceeding, it is the State, not the defendant, that should bear “almost the entire risk of error.” Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S., at 424. Given these considerations, our decision today does not at all depend upon the State’s announced intention to rely only upon the same aggravating circumstances it sought to prove at petitioner’s first trial or upon its statement that it would introduce no new evidence in support of its contention that petitioner deserves the death penalty. Having received “one fair opportunity to offer whatever proof it could assemble,” Burks v. United States, 437 U. S., at 16, the State is not entitled to another.
V
The Court already has held that many of the protections available to a defendant at a criminal trial also are available at a sentencing hearing similar to that required by Missouri in a capital case. See, e. g., Specht v. Patterson, 386 U. S. 605 (1967) (due process protections such as right to counsel, right to confront witnesses, and right to present favorable evidence are available at hearing at which sentence may be imposed based upon “a new finding of fact . . . that was not an ingredient of the offense charged,” id., at 608). Because the sentencing proceeding at petitioner’s first trial was like the trial on the question of guilt or innocence, the protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause to one acquitted by a jury also is available to him, with respect to the death penalty, at his retrial. We therefore refrain from extending the reasoning of Stroud v. United States, 251 U. S. 15 (1919), to this very different situation.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Missouri is reversed, and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
“. . . nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . .”
The definition of capital murder in Missouri is set forth in Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.001 (1978):
“Any person who unlawfully, willfully, knowingly, deliberately, and with premeditation kills or causes the killing of another human being is guilty of the offense of capital murder.”
Section 565.008.1 reads:
“Persons convicted of the offense of capital murder shall, if the judge or jury so recommends after complying with the provisions of sections 565.006 and 565.012, be punished by death. If the judge or jury does not recommend the imposition of the death penalty on a finding of guilty of capital murder, the convicted person shall be punished by imprisonment by the division of corrections during his natural life and shall not be eligible for probation or parole until he has served a minimum of fifty years of his sentence.”
At all relevant times, § 565.006 read in pertinent part:
“1. At the conclusion of all trials upon an indictment or information for capital murder heard by a jury, and after argument of counsel and proper charge from the court, the jury shall retire to consider a verdict of guilty or not guilty without any consideration of punishment, and by their verdict ascertain, whether the defendant is guilty of capital murder, murder in the first degree, murder in the second degree, manslaughter, or is not guilty of any offense. ...
“2. Where the jury . . . returns a verdict or finding of guilty as provided in subsection 1 of this section, the court shall resume the trial and conduct a presentence hearing before the jury ... at which time the only isssue shall be the determination of the punishment to be imposed. In such hearing, subject to the laws of evidence, the jury . . . shall hear additional evidence in extenuation, mitigation, and aggravation of punishment, including the record of any prior criminal convictions and pleas of guilty or pleas of nolo contendere of the defendant, or the absence of any such prior criminal convictions and pleas. Only such evidence in aggravation as the prosecution has made known to the defendant prior to his trial shall be admissible. The jury . . . shall also hear argument by the defendant or his counsel and the prosecuting attorney regarding the punishment to be imposed. The prosecuting attorney shall open and the defendant shall conclude the argument to the jury .... Upon conclusion of the evidence and arguments, the judge shall give the jury appropriate instructions and the jury shall retire to determine the punishment to be imposed. In capital murder eases in which the death penalty may be imposed by a jury . . . the additional procedure provided in section 565.012 shall be followed. The jury . . . shall fix a sentence within the limits prescribed by law. The judge shall impose the sentence fixed by the jury .... If the jury cannot, within a reasonable time, agree to the punishment, the judge shall impose sentence within the limits of the law; except that, the judge shall in no instance impose the death penalty when, in cases tried by a jury, the jury cannot agree upon the punishment.
“3. If the trial court is reversed on appeal because of error only in the presentenee hearing, the new trial which may be ordered shall apply only to the issue of punishment.”
The statute was amended by 1979 Mo. Laws H. B. 251, but the amendment does not affect the present case.
Because the petitioner in this case.was sentenced by a jury at his first trial, we describe only Missouri’s procedure for imposition of the death penalty by a jury.
Section 565.012.2 was amended in 1980 to provide two additional specified aggravating circumstances. Those added were:
“(11) The capital murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in the perpetration or in the attempt to perpetrate the felony of rape or forcible rape or the felony of sodomy or forcible sodomy;
“(12) The capital murder was committed by the defendant for the purpose of preventing the person killed from testifying in any judicial proceeding.” Mo. Rev. Stat. §§565.012.2 (11) and (12) (Supp. 1980).
Petitioner also was charged with the state crimes of kidnaping, armed criminal action, burglar}', and flourishing a dangerous and deadly weapon. At his trial, petitioner was found guilty of all these charges.
Although further proceedings are to take place in state court, the judgment rejecting petitioner’s double jeopardy claim is “final” -within the meaning of the jurisdictional statute, 28 U. S. C. § 1257. Harris v. Washington, 404 U. S. 55 (1971). See Abney v. United States, 431 U. S. 651 (1977).
Subsequent to this Court’s decisions in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238 (1972), and Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153 (1976), courts of at least two States have concluded that a defendant originally sentenced to life imprisonment may not be sentenced to death upon retrial after reversal of his original conviction. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has relied upon this Court’s eases construing the Double Jeopardy Clause. Sanne v. State, 609 S. W. 2d 762, 766-767 (1980); Brasfield v. State, 600 S. W. 2d 288, 298 (1980). The Supreme Court of Georgia has concluded that the imposition of a death sentence in these circumstances would violate the state-law requirement, Ga. Code §27-2537 (c)(3) (1979), that the sentence not be “ ‘excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant.’ ” Ward v. State, 239 Ga. 205, 208-209, 236 S. E. 2d 365, 368 (1977).
At the statutorily prescribed presentence hearing, counsel make opening statements, testimony is taken, evidence is introduced, the jury is instructed, and final arguments are made. The jury then deliberates and returns its formal punishment verdict. § 565.006.2. See n. 4, supra. All these steps were taken at petitioner’s presentence hearing following his first trial.
We think it not without some significance that the pertinent Missouri statute itself speaks specifically of the presentence hearing in terms of a continuing “trial.” Section 565.006.2 states that after the verdict of guilty of capital murder is returned, “the court shall resume the trial and conduct a presentence hearing.” (Emphasis added.)
In Stroud, the relevant statute provided: “Every person guilty of murder in the first degree shall suffer death,” but “the jury may qualify their verdict by adding thereto ‘without capital punishment;’ and whenever the jury shall return a verdict qualified as aforesaid, the person convicted shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life.” Act of Mar. 4, 1909, §§275, 330, 35 Stat. 1143, 1152, codified currently as 18 U. S. C. §1111 (b).
At Stroud’s retrial, the court essentially repeated the language of this statute to the jury, giving it no further guidance as to the appropriate penalty. Record in Stroud v. United States, O. T. 1919, No. 276, p. 472. At the previous trial, the judge had told the jury that he would not “pretend to tell you the various considerations that come into determining that question [of the proper sentence].” Record in Stroud v. United States, O. T. 1917, No. 694, p. 177.
Pearce was convicted of assault with intent to commit rape, a state crime punishable by a prison term of between 1 and 15 years. N. C. Gen. Stat. § 14r-22 (1969), repealed by 1979 N. C. Sess. Laws, eh. 682, §7, and replaced.
In discussing the usual attributes of jury sentencing, the Court in Chaffin observed: “Normally, there would be no way for a jury to place on the record the reasons for its collective sentencing determination, and ordinarily the resentencing jury would not be informed of any conduct of the accused unless relevant to the question of guilt.” 412 U. S., at 28, n. 15. This starkly illustrates the significant difference between the sentencing procedure in that case and the procedure now required by Missouri in a capital murder case.
The statute authorizes “review of whether the procedure employed was lawful, the findings made were clearly erroneous, or the sentencing court’s discretion was abused.” 18 U. S. C. § 3576.
The other eases that concern the application of the Double Jeopardy Clause to sentencing do not add significantly to the State’s argument. Chaffin relies primarily upon Pearce. See 412 U. S., at 23-24. Stroud states only that “[t]he fact that the jury may thus mitigate the punishment to imprisonment for life did not render the conviction less than one for first degree murder.” 251 U. S., at 18. Stroud’s jury was not required to find any facts in addition to those necessary for a conviction for first-degree murder in order to sentence him to death.
DiFrancesco relies upon “the history of sentencing practices, . . . the pertinent rulings of this Court, [and] considerations of double jeopardy policy . . . .” 449 U. S., at 132. The history of sentencing practices is of little assistance to Missouri in this case, since the sentencing procedures for capital cases instituted after the decision in Furman are unique. As we see below, considerations of double jeopardy policy favor petitioner in this case, rather than the State. Missouri, therefore, can rely only upon DiFrancesco’s discussion of the Court’s prior cases, a discussion that relies chiefly upon Pearce. See 449 U. S., at 134-136.
“Sentencing and parole release decisions in this country have largely been left to the unfettered discretion of the officials involved. Legislatures have traditionally set high maximum penalties within which judges must choose specific sentences, but generally have provided little guidance for the exercise of this choice. Although the purposes of sentencing have often been defined as including deterrence, retribution, incapacitation, rehabilitation, and community condemnation to maintain respect for law, legislatures have been silent regarding which purposes are primary and how conflicts among the purposes are to be resolved. For example, federal law currently requires merely that in determining a sentence, the court consider ‘in its opinion the ends of justice and best interest of the public.’ [18 U. S. C. §4205 (b).]
“In effect, sentencing policymaking has traditionally been delegated to a multitude of independent judges to be exercised in the context of individual cases. There has been no attempt to separate policymaking from individual sentencing determinations. Normally, some type of presentence investigation is available which attempts to provide an informational basis for an intelligent and 'individualized’ sentencing decision. Yet, which factors should be considered, under what circumstances, and how they are to be weighted are decisions left solely to the unfettered discretion of the individual decisionmakers.” Hoffman & Stover, Reform in the Determination of Prison Terms: Equity, Determinacy, and the Parole Release Function, 7 Hofstra L. Rev. 89, 96 (1978) (footnotes omitted).
Because of our conclusion on the Double Jeopardy Clause issue, we have no occasion to address petitioner’s claims under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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A
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit denied.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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H
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Stevens
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Under what is recognized for present purposes as an incorrect interpretation of rather complex federal regulations, during 1975, 1976, and 1977 respondent received and expended $71,480 in federal funds to provide health care services to Medicare beneficiaries to which it was not entitled. The question presented is whether the Government is estopped from recovering those funds because respondent relied on the express authorization of a responsible Government agent in making the expenditures.
Under the Medicare program, Title XVIII of the Social Security Act, 79 Stat. 291, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §§ 1395-1395vv, providers of health care services are reimbursed for the reasonable cost of services rendered to Medicare beneficiaries as determined by the Secretary of Health and Human Services (Secretary). § 1395x(v)(l)(A). Providers receive interim payments at least monthly covering the cost of services they have rendered. §1395g(a). Congress recognized, however, that these interim payments would not always correctly reflect the amount of reimbursable costs, and accordingly instructed the Secretary to develop mechanisms for making appropriate retroactive adjustments when reimbursement is found to be inadequate or excessive. § 1395x(v)(l)(A)(ii). Pursuant to this statutory mandate, the Secretary requires providers to submit annual cost reports which are then audited to determine actual costs. 42 CFR §§405.454, 405.1803 (1982). The Secretary may reopen any reimbursement determination within a 3-year period and make appropriate adjustments. §405.1885.
The Act also permits a provider to elect to receive reimbursement through a “fiscal intermediary.” 42 U. S. C. §1395h; 42 CFR §421.103 (1982). If the intermediary the provider has nominated meets the Secretary’s requirements, the Secretary then enters into an agreement with the intermediary to have it perform those administrative responsibilities she assigns it. §§421.5, 421.110. These duties include receipt, disbursement, and accounting for funds used in making Medicare payments, auditing the records of providers in order to ensure payments have been proper, resolving disputes over cost reimbursement, reviewing and reconsidering payments to providers, and recovering over-payments to providers. §§421.100(b), (c), (e), (f), 421.120(e). The fiscal intermediary must also “serve as a center for, and communicate to providers, any information or instructions furnished to it by the Secretary, and serve as a channel of communication from providers to the Secretary.” 42 U. S. C. § 1395h(a)(2)(A).
Respondent Community Health Services of Crawford County, Inc. (hereafter respondent), is a nonprofit corporation. In 1966 it entered into a contract with petitioner’s predecessor, the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, to provide home health care services to individuals eligible for benefits under Part A of the Medicare program, 42 U. S. C. §§ 1395c to 1395Í-2. Under the contract, respondent received reimbursement through a fiscal intermediary, the Travelers Insurance Cos. (Travelers).
In 1973 Congress enacted the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA), 87 Stat. 839, codified, as amended, at 29 U. S. C. § 801 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. V), and repealed, Pub. L. 97-300, 96 Stat. 1357, authorizing the use of federal funds to provide training and job opportunities for economically disadvantaged persons. In 1975 respondent began participating in the program, which reimbursed it for the salaries and fringe benefits paid to certain of its employees. CETA funds made it possible for respondent to take on additional personnel and to provide additional home health care services.
To prevent what would be in effect double reimbursement of providers’ costs, one of the regulations concerning reasonable costs reimbursable under the Medicare program indicates that grants received by a provider in order to pay specific operating costs must be subtracted from the reasonable costs for which the provider may receive reimbursement. After obtaining a CETA grant, respondent’s administrator contacted Travelers to ask whether the salaries of its CETA-funded employees who provided services to patients eligible for Medicare benefits were reimbursable as reasonable costs under Medicare. Travelers’ Medicare manager orally advised respondent that the CETA funds were “seed money” within the meaning of § 612.2 of the Provider Reimbursement Manual, which is defined as “[g]rants designated for the development of new health care agencies or for expansion of services of established agencies,” and therefore, even though the CETA employees’ salaries constituted specific operating costs paid by a federal grant, they were reimbursable under the Medicare program.
Relying on Travelers’ advice, respondent included costs for which it was receiving CETA reimbursement in its cost reports, and received reimbursement for those sums amounting to $7,694, $32,460, and $31,326 in fiscal 1975, 1976, and 1977, respectively. On several occasions during this period, respondent requested and received from Travelers oral verification of the propriety of this treatment. With these additional funds, respondent expanded its annual number of home health care visits from approximately 4,000 in 1974 to over 81,000 in the next three years. Its annual budget increased during that period from about $200,000 to about $900,000.
It is undisputed that correct administrative practice required Travelers to refer respondent’s inquiry to the Department of Health and Human Services for a definitive answer. However, Travelers did not do this until August 7, 1977, when a written request for instructions was finally submitted to the Philadelphia office of the Department’s Bureau of Health Insurance. Travelers was then formally advised that the CETA funds were not “seed money” and therefore had to be subtracted from respondent’s Medicare reimbursement. On October 7,1977, Travelers formally notified respondent of this determination. Travelers then reopened respondent’s cost reports for the preceding three years and recomputed respondent’s reimbursable costs, determining that respondent had been overpaid a total of $71,480.
In May 1978 Travelers made a formal demand for repayment of the disputed amount. Respondent filed suit and obtained temporary injunctive relief against the Secretary and Travelers; in November 1979, the parties entered into a stipulation providing that the Secretary would postpone any attempts at recoupment and that the civil action would be stayed pending the outcome of administrative review.
Thereafter, the Secretary’s Provider Reimbursement Review Board (PRRB) conducted a hearing and issued a written opinion rejecting the position that CETA funds were “seed money.” The PRRB found, however, that the Secretary’s right to recoup the 1975 overpayment was barred because Travelers had not given respondent a written notice of reopening within the 3-year limitations period; thus, the amount in dispute was reduced to approximately $63,800. On April 10,1980, respondent filed a complaint in the District Court seeking review of the administrative determination. The District Court consolidated that case with the equitable action that had been filed about two years earlier. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court ruled in favor of the Secretary, accepting the PRRB’s view of the Secretary’s regulations and rejecting respondent’s claim that the Secretary ought to be estopped to deny that the CETA grants were “seed money” because of the representations of her agent, Travelers. The District Court held that it was unreasonable for respondent to believe it could be in effect twice reimbursed for a given expense.
The Court of Appeals reversed, reaching only the estoppel question. Community Health Services of Crawford County, Inc. v. Califano, 698 F. 2d 615 (CA3 1983). It held that the Government may be estopped by the “affirmative misconduct” of its agents and that Travelers’ erroneous advice coupled with its failure to refer the question to the Secretary constituted such misconduct. It rejected as “clearly erroneous” the District Court’s finding that it was unreasonable for respondent to rely on Travelers’ advice, concluding instead that respondent acted reasonably because the relevant regulation had no clear meaning and respondent had no source other, than Travelers to which it could turn for advice.
HH
Estoppel is an equitable doctrine invoked to avoid injustice in particular cases. While a hallmark of the doctrine is its flexible application, certain principles are tolerably clear:
“If one person makes a definite misrepresentation of fact to another person having reason to believe that the other will rely upon it and the other in reasonable reliance upon it does an act . . . the first person is not entitled
“(b) to regain property or its value that the other acquired by the act, if the other in reliance upon the misrepresentation and before discovery of the truth has so changed his position that it would be unjust to deprive him of that which he thus acquired.” Restatement (Second) of Torts §894(1) (1979).
Thus, the party claiming the estoppel must have relied on its adversary’s conduct “in such a manner as to change his position for the worse,” and that reliance must have been reasonable in that the party claiming the estoppel did not know nor should it have known that its adversary’s conduct was misleading. See Wilber National Bank v. United States, 294 U. S. 120, 124-125 (1935).
HH
When the Government is unable to enforce the law because the conduct of its agents has given rise to an estoppel, the interest of the citizenry as a whole in obedience to the rule of law is undermined. It is for this reason that it is well settled that the Government may not be estopped on the same terms as any other litigant. Petitioner urges us to expand this principle into a flat rule that estoppel may not in any circumstances run against the Government. We have left the issue open in the past, and do so again today. Though the arguments the Government advances for the rule are substantial, we are hesitant, when it is unnecessary to decide this case, to say that there are no cases in which the public interest in ensuring that the Government can enforce the law free from estoppel might be outweighed by the countervailing interest of citizens in some minimum standard of decency, honor, and reliability in their dealings with their Government. But however heavy the burden might be when an estoppel is asserted against the Government, the private party surely cannot prevail without at least demonstrating that the traditional elements of an estoppel are present. We are unpersuaded that that has been done in this case with respect to either respondent’s change in position or its reliance on Travelers’ advice.
Ill
To analyze the nature of a private party’s detrimental change in position, we must identify the manner in which reliance on the Government’s misconduct has caused the private citizen to change his position for the worse. In this case the consequences of the Government’s misconduct were not entirely adverse. Respondent did receive an immediate benefit as a result of the double reimbursement. Its detriment is the inability to retain money that it should never have received in the first place. Thus, this is not a case in which the respondent has lost any legal right, either vested or contingent, or suffered any adverse change in its status. When a private party is deprived of something to which it was entitled of right, it has surely suffered a detrimental change in its position. Here respondent lost no rights but merely was induced to do something which could be corrected at a later time.
There is no doubt that respondent will be adversely affected by the Government’s recoupment of the funds that it has already spent. It will surely have to curtail its operations and may even be forced to seek relief from its debts through bankruptcy. However, there is no finding as to the extent of the likely curtailment in the volume of services provided by respondent, much less that respondent will reduce its activities below the level that obtained when it was first advised that the double reimbursement was proper. Respondent may need an extended period of repayment or other modifications in the recoupment process if it is to continue to operate, but questions concerning the Government’s method of enforcing collection are not before us. The question is whether the Government has entirely forfeited its right to the money.
A for-profit corporation could hardly base an estoppel on the fact that the Government wrongfully allowed it the interest-free use of taxpayers’ money for a period of two or three years, enabling it to expand its operation. No more can respondent claim any right to expand its services to levels greater than those it would have provided had the error never occurred. Curtailment of operation does not justify an estoppel when — by respondent’s own account — the expansion of its operation was achieved through unlawful access to governmental funds. And even if there will be a reduction below the service provided by respondent prior to its receipt of CETA funds, the record does not foreclose the possibility that the aggregate advantages to the community stemming from respondent’s use of the money have more than offset the actual hardship associated with now being required to restore these funds. Respondent cannot raise an estoppel without proving that it will be significantly worse off than if it had never obtained the CETA funds in question.
> H-i
Justice Holmes wrote: Men must turn square corners when they deal with the Government.” Rock Island, A. & L. R. Co. v. United States, 254 U. S. 141, 143 (1920). This observation has its greatest force when a private party seeks to spend the Government’s money. Protection of the public fisc requires that those who seek public funds act with scrupulous regard for the requirements of law; respondent could expect no less than to be held to the most demanding standards in its quest for public funds. This is consistent with the general rule that those who deal with the Government are expected to know the law and may not rely on the conduct of Government agents contrary to law.
As a participant in the Medicare program, respondent had a duty to familiarize itself with the legal requirements for cost reimbursement. Since it also had elected to receive reimbursement through Travelers, it also was acquainted with the nature of and limitations on the role of a fiscal intermediary. When the question arose concerning respondent’s CETA funds, respondent’s own action in consulting Travelers demonstrates the necessity for it to have obtained an interpretation of the applicable regulations; respondent indisputably knew that this was a doubtful question not clearly covered by existing policy statements. The fact that Travelers’ advice was erroneous is, in itself, insufficient to raise an estoppel, as is the fact that the Secretary had not anticipated this problem and made a clear resolution available to respondent. There is simply no requirement that the Government anticipate every problem that may arise in the administration of a complex program such as Medicare; neither can it be expected to ensure that every bit of informal advice given by its agents in the course of such a program will be sufficiently reliable to justify expenditure of sums of money as substantial as those spent by respondent. Nor was the advice given under circumstances that should have induced respondent’s reliance. As a recipient of public funds well acquainted with the role of a fiscal intermediary, respondent knew Travelers only acted as a conduit; it could not resolve policy questions. The relevant statute, regulations, and Reimbursement Manual, with which respondent should have been and was acquainted, made that perfectly clear. Yet respondent made no attempt to have the question resolved by the Secretary; it was satisfied with the policy judgment of a mere conduit.
The appropriateness of respondent’s reliance is further undermined because the advice it received from Travelers was oral. It is not merely the possibility of fraud that undermines our confidence in the reliability of official action that is not confirmed or evidenced by a written instrument. Written advice, like a written judicial opinion, requires its author to reflect about the nature of the advice that is given to the citizen, and subjects that advice to the possibility of review, criticism, and reexamination. The necessity for ensuring that governmental agents stay within the lawful scope of their authority, and that those who seek public funds act with scrupulous exactitude, argues strongly for the conclusion that an estoppel cannot be erected on the basis of the oral advice that underlay respondent’s cost reports. That is especially true when a complex program such as Medicare is involved, in which the need for written records is manifest.
In sum, the regulations governing the cost reimbursement provisions of Medicare should and did put respondent on ample notice of the care with which its cost reports must be prepared, and the care which would be taken to review them within the relevant 3-year period. Yet respondent prepared those reports on the basis of an oral policy judgment by an official who, it should have known, was not in the business of making policy. That is not the kind of reasonable reliance that would even give rise to an estoppel against a private party. It therefore cannot estop the Government.
Thus, assuming estoppel can ever be appropriately applied against the Government, it cannot be said that the detriment respondent faces is so severe or has been imposed in such an unfair way that petitioner ought to be estopped from enforcing the law in this case. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Congress also authorized petitioner to adjust interim payments on account of previous overpayments or underpayments. § 1395g(a).
“(a) Principle. Unrestricted grants, gifts, and income from endowments should not be deducted from operating costs in computing reimbursable cost. Grants, gifts, or endowment income designated by a donor for paying specific operating costs should be deducted from the particular operating cost or group of costs.
“(b) Definitions — (1) Unrestricted grants, gifts, income from. endowment. Unrestricted grants, gifts, and income from endowments are funds, cash or otherwise, given to a provider without restriction by the donor as to their use.
“(2) Designated or restricted grants, gifts, and income from endowments. Designated or restricted grants, gifts, and income from endowments are funds, cash or otherwise, which must be used only for the specific purpose designated by the donor. This does not refer to unrestricted grants, gifts, or income from endowments which have been restricted for a specific purpose by the provider.
“(c) Application. (1) Unrestricted funds, cash or otherwise, are generally the property of the provider to be used in any manner its management deems appropriate and should not be deducted from operating costs. It would be inequitable to require providers to use the unrestricted funds to reduce the payments for care. The use of these funds is generally a means of recovering costs which are not otherwise recoverable.
“(2) Donor-restricted funds which are designated for paying certain hospital operating expenses should apply and serve to reduce these costs or group of costs and benefit all patients who use services covered by the donation. If such costs are not reduced, the provider would secure reimbursement for the same expense twice; it would be reimbursed through the donor-restricted contributions as well as from patients and third-party payers including the title XVIII health insurance program.” 42 CFR § 405.423 (1982) (emphasis supplied).
“Seed Money Grants. — Grants designated for the development of new health care agencies or for expansion of services of established agencies are generally referred to as ‘seed money’ grants. ‘Seed money’ grants are not deducted from costs in computing allowable costs. These grants are usually made to cover specific operating costs or group[s] of costs for services for a stated period of time. During this time, the provider will develop sufficient patient caseloads to enable continued self-sustaining operation with funds received from Medicare reimbursement as well as from funds received from other patients or other third-party payers.” Medicare Provider Reimbursement Manual, HIM-15, Pt. I, §612.2 (Aug. 1968), reproduced in 1 CCH, Medicare & Medicaid Guide ¶ 5461 (1983).
Presumably because CETA program participants provided services to some individuals not eligible for Medicare benefits, the aggregate amount of CETA reimbursements was substantially larger than the portion for which Medicare reimbursement was claimed. The total amount of reimbursement respondent received in CETA funds was $16,555, $53,952, and $81,118 in 1975, 1976, and 1977, respectively.
From its review of the record the Court of Appeals concluded that respondent had consulted Travelers and was advised that the CETA grants qualified as “seed money” on five separate occasions. However, the District Court made no finding as to the number of times that this advice was requested and received.
The Board also found that the required written notice for 1976 had not been served on respondent, but noted that the Secretary still had time to comply with the notice requirement for that year. A timely notice for 1976 was thereafter served on respondent.
The District Court also held that Travelers was not independently liable to respondent for its incorrect advice.
See also Restatement (Second) of Agency §8B (1958).
3 J. Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence § 805, p. 192 (S. Symons ed. 1941); see also id., §812.
“The truth concerning these material facts must be unknown to the other party claiming the benefit of the estoppel, not only at the time of the conduct which amounts to a representation or concealment, but also at the time when that conduct is acted upon by him. If, at the time when he acted, such party had knowledge of the truth, or had the means by which with reasonable diligence he could acquire the knowledge so that it would be negligence on his part to remain ignorant by not using those means, he cannot claim to have been misled by relying upon the representation or concealment.” Id., §810, at 219 (footnote omitted).
See, e. g., INS v. Hibi, 414 U. S. 5, 8 (1973) (per curiam); Federal Crop Insurance Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U. S. 380, 383 (1947).
See INS v. Miranda, 459 U. S. 14, 19 (1982) (per curiam); Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U. S. 785, 788 (1981) (per curiam); Montana v. Kennedy, 366 U. S. 308, 315 (1961). In fact, at least two of our cases seem to rest on the premise that when the Government acts in misleading ways, it may not enforce the law if to do so would harm a private party as a result of governmental deception. See United States v. Pennsylvania Industrial Chemical Corp., 411 U. S. 655, 670-675 (1973) (criminal defendant may assert as a defense that the Government led him to believe that its conduct was legal); Moser v. United States, 341 U. S. 41 (1951) (applicant cannot be deemed to waive right to citizenship on the basis of a form he signed when he was misled as to the effect signing would have on his rights). See also Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U. S. 164, 178-180 (1979); Santobello v. New York, 404 U. S. 257 (1971); Branson v. Wirth, 17 Wall. 32, 42 (1873). This principle also underlies the doctrine that an administrative agency may not apply a new rule retroactively when to do so would unduly intrude upon reasonable reliance interests. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U. S. 267, 295 (1974); Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412 U. S. 800, 807-808 (1973) (plurality opinion); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U. S. 194, 203 (1947).
See generally St. Regis Paper Co. v. United States, 368 U. S. 208, 229 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting) (“Our Government should not by picayunish haggling over the scope of its promise, permit one of its arms to do that which, by any fair construction, the Government has given its word that no arm will do. It is no less good morals and good law that the Government should turn square corners in dealing with the people than that the people should turn square corners in dealing with their government”); Federal Crop Insurance Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U. S., at 387-388 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“It is very well to say that those who deal with the Government should turn square corners. But there is no reason why the square corners should constitute a one-way street”); Brandt v. Hickel, 427 F. 2d 53, 57 (CA9 1970) (“To say to these appellants, ‘The joke is on you. You shouldn’t have trusted us,’ is hardly worthy of our great government”); Menges v. Dentler, 33 Pa. 495, 500 (1859) (“Men naturally trust in their government, and ought to do so, and they ought not to suffer for it”). See also Giglio v. United States, 405 U. S. 150, 154-155 (1972).
This case is, therefore, plainly distinguishable from Moser v. United States, 341 U. S. 41 (1951), in which the petitioner “was led to believe that he would not thereby lose his rights to citizenship.” Id., at 46.
See Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U. S., at 789 (per curiam).
See United States v. Stewart, 311 U. S. 60, 70 (1940); Sutton v. United States, 256 U. S. 575 (1921); Pine River Logging Co. v. United States, 186 U. S. 279, 291 (1902); Hart v. United States, 95 U. S. 316 (1877). See also Automobile Club v. Commissioner, 353 U. S. 180 (1957).
Whatever the form in which the Government functions, anyone entering into an arrangement with the Government takes the risk of having accurately ascertained that he who purports to act for the Government stays within the bounds of his authority. The scope of this authority may be explicitly defined by Congress or be limited by delegated legislation, properly exercised through the rule-making power. And this is so even though, as here, the agent himself may have been unaware of the limitations upon his authority.” Federal Crop Insurance Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U. S., at 384.
See United States v. California, 332 U. S. 19, 39-40 (1947); United States v. Stewart, 311 U. S., at 70; United States v. San Francisco, 310 U. S. 16, 31-32 (1940); Wilber National Bank v. United States, 294 U. S. 120, 123-124 (1935); Utah v. United States, 284 U. S. 534, 545-546 (1932); Jeems Bayou Fishing & Hunting Club v. United States, 260 U. S. 561, 564 (1923); Sutton v. United States, 256 U. S., at 579; Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U. S. 389, 409 (1917); Pine River Logging Co. v. United States, 186 U. S., at 291; Hart v. United States, 95 U. S., at 318-319; Gibbons v. United States, 8 Wall. 269, 274 (1869); Lee v. Munroe, 7 Cranch 366 (1813).
See Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U. S., at 789-790 (per curiam); Montana v. Kennedy, 366 U. S. 308, 314-315 (1961).
See INS v. Miranda, 459 U. S. 14 (1982) (per curiam); INS v. Hibi, 414 U. S. 5 (1973) (per curiam).
See generally Schweiker v. Hansen, supra.
Under the law of agency, a principal may be bound by the acts of an agent only if that agent acted with actual or apparent authority. Restatement (Second) of Agency §§ 145, 159 (1958). Travelers had neither with respect to the interpretation of the regulations in question. See also id., § 141, Comment b (principal may be estopped to deny lack of actual or apparent authority only when it negligently leads third parties to believe authority exists).
The Court of Appeals believed that respondent did all it could have done since it was unable to deal with the Secretary directly. However, that belief, even if accurate, would not make respondent’s reliance on Travelers’ policy judgment any more reasonable. Moreover, given the role of Travelers as a conduit for information, it is far from clear that had respondent specifically requested that Travelers pass on its question to the Department, Travelers would not have been under a duty to do so. Even if there were no such duty, there is nothing in the record to indicate that Travelers would have been unwilling to honor such a request.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Brennan
announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion in which Justice Marshall, Justice Blackmun, and Justice Stevens join.
The issue presented in this case is whether an award of attorney’s fees under 42 U. S. C. § 1988 is per se “unreasonable” within the meaning of the statute if it exceeds the amount of damages recovered by the plaintiff in the underlying civil rights action.
I
Respondents, eight Chicano individuals, attended a party on the evening of August 1, 1975, at the Riverside, California, home of respondents Santos and Jennie Rivera. A large number of unidentified police officers, acting without a warrant, broke up the party using tear gas and, as found by the District Court, “unnecessary physical force.” Many of the guests, including four of the respondents, were arrested. The District Court later found that “[t]he party was not creating a disturbance in the community at the time of the break-in.” App. 188. Criminal charges against the arrest-ees were ultimately dismissed for lack of probable cause.
On June 4,1976, respondents sued the city of Riverside, its Chief of Police, and 30 individual police officers under 42 U. S. C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985(3), and 1986 for allegedly violating their First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The complaint, which also alleged numerous state-law claims, sought damages and declaratory and injunctive relief. On August 5, 1977, 23 of the individual police officers moved for summary judgment; the District Court granted summary judgment in favor of 17 of these officers. The case against the remaining defendants proceeded to trial in September 1980. The jury returned a total of 37 individual verdicts in favor of the respondents and against the city and five individual officers, finding 11 violations of § 1983, 4 instances of false arrest and imprisonment, and 22 instances of negligence. Respondents were awarded $33,350 in compensatory and punitive damages: $13,300 for their federal claims, and $20,050 for their state-law claims.
Respondents also sought attorney’s fees and costs under § 1988. They requested compensation for 1,946.75 hours expended by their two attorneys at a rate of $125 per hour, and for 84.5 hours expended by law clerks at a rate of $25 per hour, a total of $245,456.25. The District Court found both the hours and rates reasonable, and awarded respondents $245,456.25 in attorney’s fees. The court rejected respondents’ request for certain additional expenses, and for a multiplier sought by respondents to reflect the contingent nature of their success and the high quality of their attorneys’ efforts.
Petitioners appealed only the attorney’s fees award, which the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Rivera v. City of Riverside, 679 F. 2d 795 (1982). Petitioners sought a writ of certiorari from this Court. We granted the writ, vacated the Court of Appeals’ judgment, and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U. S. 424 (1983). 461 U. S. 952 (1983). On remand, the District Court held two additional hearings, reviewed additional briefing, and reexamined the record as a whole. The court made extensive findings of fact and conclusions of law, and again concluded that respondents were entitled to an award of $245,456.25 in attorney’s fees, based on the same total number of hours expended on the case and the same hourly rates. The court again denied respondents’ request for certain expenses and for a multiplier.
Petitioners again appealed the fee award. And again, the Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that “the district court correctly reconsidered the case in light of Hensley....” 763 F. 2d 1580, 1582 (1985). The Court of Appeals rejected three arguments raised by petitioners; First, the court rejected petitioners’ contention that respondents’ counsel should not have been compensated for time spent litigating claims other than those upon which respondents ultimately prevailed. Emphasizing that the District Court had determined that respondents’ attorneys had “spent no time on claims unrelated to the successful claims,” ibid., the Court of Appeals concluded that “[t]he record supports the district court’s findings that all of the plaintiffs’ claims involve a ‘common core of facts’ and that the claims involve related legal theories.” Ibid. The court also observed that, consistent with Hensley, the District Court had “considered the degree of success [achieved by respondents’ attorneys] and found a reasonable relationship between the extent of that success and the amount of the fee award.” 763 F. 2d, at 1582. Second, the Court of Appeals rejected the argument that the fee award was excessive because it exceeded the amount of damages awarded by the jury. Examining the legislative history of § 1988, the court found no support for the proposition that an award of attorney’s fees may not exceed the amount of damages recovered by a prevailing plaintiff. Finally, the court found that the District Court’s “extensive findings of fact and conclusions of law” belied petitioners’ claim that the District Court had not reviewed the record to determine whether the fee award was justified. The Court of Appeals concluded:
“In short, the district court applied the necessary criteria to justify the attorney’s fees awarded and explained the reasons for the award clearly and concisely. As required by Hensley, the district court adequately discussed the extent of the plaintiffs’ success and its relationship to the amount of the attorney’s fees awarded. The award is well within the discretion of the district court.” Id., at 1583 (citation omitted).
Petitioners again sought a writ of certiorari from this Court, alleging that the District Court’s fee award was not “reasonable” within the meaning of § 1988, because it was disproportionate to the amount of damages recovered by respondents. We granted the writ, 474 U. S. 917 (1985), and now affirm the Court of Appeals.
a
<i
In Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U. S. 240 (1975), the Court reaffirmed the “American Rule” that, at least absent express statutory authorization to the contrary, each party to a lawsuit ordinarily shall bear its own attorney’s fees. In response to Alyeska, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U. S. C. § 1988, which authorized the district courts to award reasonable attorney’s fees to prevailing parties in specified civil rights litigation. While the statute itself does not explain what constitutes a reasonable fee, both the House and Senate Reports accompanying § 1988 expressly endorse the analysis set forth in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F. 2d 714 (CA5 1974). See S. Rep. No. 94-1011, p. 6 (1976) (hereafter Senate Report); H. R. Rep. No. 94-1558, p. 8 (1976) (hereafter House Report). Johnson identifies 12 factors to be considered in calculating a reasonable attorney’s fee.
Hensley v. Eckerhart, supra, announced certain guidelines for calculating a reasonable attorney’s fee under §1988. Hensley stated that “[t]he most useful starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.” Id., at 433. This figure, commonly referred to as the “lodestar,” is presumed to be the reasonable fee contemplated by § 1988. The opinion cautioned that “[t]he district court... should exclude from this initial fee calculation hours that were not ‘reasonably expended’” on the litigation. Id., at 434 (quoting Senate Report, at 6).
Hensley then discussed other considerations that might lead the district court to adjust the lodestar figure upward or downward, including the “important factor of the ‘results obtained. ’ ” 461 U. S., at 434. The opinion noted that where a prevailing plaintiff has succeeded on only some of his claims, an award of fees for time expended on unsuccessful claims may not be appropriate. In these situations, the Court held that the judge should consider whether or not the plaintiff’s unsuccessful claims were related to the claims on which he succeeded, and whether the plaintiff achieved a level of success that makes it appropriate to award attorney’s fees for hours reasonably expended on unsuccessful claims:
“In [some] cases the plaintiff’s claims for relief will involve a common core of facts or will be based on related legal theories. Much of counsel’s time will be devoted generally to the litigation as a whole, making it difficult to divide the hours expended on a claim-by-claim basis. Such a lawsuit cannot be viewed as a series of discrete claims. Instead the district court should focus on the significance of the overall relief obtained by the plaintiff in relation to the hours reasonably expended on the litigation.” Id., at 435.
Accordingly, Hensley emphasized that “[w]here a plaintiff has obtained excellent results, his attorney should recover a fully compensatory fee,” and that “the fee award should not be reduced simply because the plaintiff failed to prevail on every contention raised in the lawsuit.” Ibid.
B
Petitioners argue that the District Court failed properly to follow Hensley in calculating respondents’ fee award. We disagree. The District Court carefully considered the results obtained by respondents pursuant to the instructions set forth in Hensley, and concluded that respondents were entitled to recover attorney’s fees for all hours expended on the litigation. First, the court found that “[t]he amount of time expended by counsel in conducting this litigation was reasonable and reflected sound legal judgment under the circumstances.” App. 190. The court also determined that counsel’s excellent performances in this case entitled them to be compensated at prevailing market rates, even though they were relatively young when this litigation began. See Johnson, 488 F. 2d, at 718-719 (“If a young attorney demonstrates the skill and ability, he should not be penalized for only recently being admitted to the bar”).
The District Court then concluded that it was inappropriate to adjust respondents’ fee award downward to account for the fact that respondents had prevailed only on some of their claims, and against only some of the defendants. The court first determined that “it was never actually clear what officer did what until we had gotten through with the whole trial,” App. 236, so that “[u]nder the circumstances of this case, it was reasonable for plaintiffs initially to name thirty-one individual defendants... as well as the City of Riverside as defendants in this action.” Id., at 188. The court remarked:
“I think every one of the claims that were made were related and if you look at the common core of facts that we had here that you had total success.... There was a problem about who was responsible for what and that problem was there all the way through to the time that we concluded the case. Some of the officers couldn’t agree about who did what and it is not at all suprising that it would, in my opinion, have been wrong for you not to join all those officers since you yourself did not know precisely who were the officers that were responsible.” Id., at 235-236.
The court then found that the lawsuit could not “be viewed as a series of discrete claims,” Hensley, 461 U. S., at 435:
“All claims made by plaintiffs were based on a common core of facts. The claims on which plaintiffs did not prevail were closely related to the claims on which they did prevail. The time devoted to claims on which plaintiffs did not prevail cannot reasonably be separated from time devoted to claims on which plaintiffs did prevail.” App. 189.
The District Court also considered the amount of damages recovered, and determined that the size of the damages award did not imply that respondents’ success was limited:
“[T]he size of the jury award resulted from (a) the general reluctance of jurors to make large awards against police officers, and (b) the dignified restraint which the plaintiffs exercised in describing their injuries to the jury. For example, although some of the actions of the police would clearly have been insulting and humiliating to even the most insensitive person and were, in the opinion of the Court, intentionally so, plaintiffs did not attempt to play up this aspect of the case.” Id., at 188-189.
The court paid particular attention to the fact that the case “presented complex and interrelated issues of fact and law,” id., at 187, and that “[a] fee award in this civil rights action will... advance the public interest,” id., at 191:
“Counsel for plaintiffs... served the public interest by vindicating important constitutional rights. Defendants had engaged in lawless, unconstitutional conduct, and the litigation of plaintiffs’ case was necessary to remedy defendants’ misconduct. Indeed, the Court was shocked at some of the acts of the police officers in this case and was convinced from the testimony that these acts were motivated by a general hostility to the Chicano community in the area where the incident occured. The amount of time expended by plaintiffs’ counsel in conducting this litigation was clearly reasonable and necessary to serve the public interest as well as the interests of plaintiffs in the vindication of their constitutional rights.” Id., at 190.
Finally, the District Court “focus[ed] on the significance of the overall relief obtained by [respondents] in relation to the hours reasonably expended on the litigation.” Hensley, supra, at 435. The court concluded that respondents had “achieved a level of success in this case that makes the total number of hours expended by counsel a proper basis for making the fee award,” App. 192:
“Counsel for plaintiffs achieved excellent results for their clients, and their accomplishment in this case was outstanding. The amount of time expended by counsel in conducting this litigation was reasonable and reflected sound legal judgment under the circumstances.” Id., at 190.
Based on our review of the record, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the District Court’s findings were not clearly erroneous. We conclude that the District Court correctly applied the factors announced in Hensley in calculating respondents’ fee award, and that the court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees for all time reasonably spent litigating the case.
Ill
Petitioners, joined by the United States as amicus curiae, maintain that Hensley’s, lodestar approach is inappropriate in civil rights cases where a plaintiff recovers only monetary damages. In these cases, so the argument goes, use of the lodestar may result in fees that exceed the amount of damages recovered and that are therefore unreasonable. Likening such cases to private tort actions, petitioners and the United States submit that attorney’s fees in such cases should be proportionate to the amount of damages a plaintiff recovers. Specifically, they suggest that fee awards in damages cases should be modeled upon the contingent-fee arrangements commonly used in personal injury litigation. In this case, assuming a 33% contingency rate, this would enti-tie respondents to recover approximately $11,000 in attorney’s fees.
The amount of damages a plaintiff recovers is certainly relevant to the amount of attorney’s fees to be awarded under §1988. See Johnson, 488 F. 2d, at 718. It is, however, only one of many factors that a court should consider in calculating an award of attorney’s fees. We reject the proposition that fee awards under § 1988 should necessarily be proportionate to the amount of damages a civil rights plaintiff actually recovers.
A
As an initial matter, we reject the notion that a civil rights action for damages constitutes nothing more than a private tort suit benefiting only the individual plaintiffs whose rights were violated. Unlike most private tort litigants, a civil rights plaintiff seeks to vindicate important civil and constitutional rights that cannot be valued solely in monetary terms. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U. S. 247, 266 (1978). And, Congress has determined that “the public as a whole has an interest in the vindication of the rights conferred by the statutes enumerated in §1988, over and above the value of a civil rights remedy to a particular plaintiff....” Hensley, 461 U. S., at 444, n. 4 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Regardless of the form of relief he actually obtains, a successful civil rights plaintiff often secures important social benefits that are not reflected in nominal or relatively small damages awards. In this case, for example, the District Court found that many of petitioners’ unlawful acts were “motivated by a general hostility to the Chicano community,” App. 190, and that this litigation therefore served the public interest:
“The institutional behavior involved here... had to be stopped and... nothing short of having a lawsuit like this would have stopped it.... [T]he improper motivation which appeared as a result of all of this seemed to me to have pervaded a very broad segment of police officers in the department.” Id., at 237.
In addition, the damages a plaintiff recovers contributes significantly to the deterrence of civil rights violations in the future. See McCann v. Coughlin, 698 F. 2d 112, 129 (CA2 1983). This deterrent effect is particularly evident in the area of individual police misconduct, where injunctive relief generally is unavailable.
Congress expressly recognized that a plaintiff who obtains relief in a civil rights lawsuit “‘does so not for himself alone but also as a ‘private attorney general,’ vindicating a policy that Congress considered of the highest importance.’” House Report, at 2 (quoting Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U. S. 400, 402 (1968)). “If the citizen does not have the resources, his day in court is denied him; the congressional policy which he seeks to assert and vindicate goes unvindicated; and the entire Nation, not just the individual citizen, suffers.” 122 Cong. Rec. 33313 (1976) (remarks of Sen. Tunney).
Because damages awards do not reflect fully the public benefit advanced by civil rights litigation, Congress did not intend for fees in civil rights cases, unlike most private law cases, to depend on obtaining substantial monetary relief. Rather, Congress made clear that it “intended that the amount of fees awarded under [§ 1988] be governed by the same standards which prevail in other types of equally complex Federal litigation, such as antitrust cases and not be reduced because the rights involved may be nonpecuniary in nature.” Senate Report, at 6 (emphasis added). “[CJounsel for prevailing parties should be paid, as is traditional with attorneys compensated by a fee-paying client, ‘for all time reasonably expended on a matter.’” Ibid, (quoting Van Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 8 EPD ¶9444 (CD Cal. 1974) (emphasis added)). The Senate Report specifically approves of the fee awards made in cases such as Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 64 F. R. D. 680 (ND Cal. 1974); Van Davis v. County of Los Angeles, supra; and Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 66 F. R. D. 483 (WDNC 1975). In each of these cases, counsel received substantial attorney’s fees despite the fact the plaintiffs sought no monetary damages. Thus, Congress recognized that reasonable attorney’s fees under §1988 are not conditioned upon and need not be proportionate to an award of money damages. The lower courts have generally eschewed such a requirement.
B
A rule that limits attorney’s fees in civil rights cases to a proportion of the damages awarded would seriously undermine Congress’ purpose in enacting §1988. Congress enacted § 1988 specifically because it found that the private market for legal services failed to provide many victims of civil rights violations with effective access to the judicial process. See House Report, at 3. These victims ordinarily cannot afford to purchase legal services at the rates set by the private market. See id., at 1 (“Because a vast majority of the victims of civil rights violations cannot afford legal counsel, they are unable to present their cases to the courts”); Senate Report, at 2 (“In many cases arising under our civil rights laws, the citizen who must sue to enforce the law has little or no money with which to hire a lawyer”); see also 122 Cong. Rec. 35127 (1976) (remarks of Rep. Holtzman) (“Plaintiffs who suffer discrimination and other infringements of their civil rights are usually not wealthy people”); id., at 35128 (remarks of Rep. Seiberling) (“Most Americans... cannot afford to hire a lawyer if their constitutional rights are violated or if they are the victims of illegal discrimination”); id., at 31832 (remarks of Sen. Hathaway) (“[R]ight now the vindication of important congressional policies in the vital area of civil rights is made to depend upon the financial resources of those least able to promote them”). Moreover, the contingent fee arrangements that make legal services available to many victims of personal injuries would often not encourage lawyers to accept civil rights cases, which frequently involve substantial expenditures of time and effort but produce only small monetary recoveries. As the House Report states:
“[WJhile damages are theoretically available under the statutes covered by [§ 1988], it should be observed that, in some cases, immunity doctrines and special defenses, available only to public officials, preclude or severely limit the damage remedy. Consequently, awarding counsel fees to prevailing plaintiffs in such litigation is particularly important and necessary if Federal civil and consitutional rights are to be adequately protected.” House Report, at 9. (emphasis added; footnote omitted).
See also 122 Cong. Rec., at 33314 (remarks of Sen. Kennedy) (“[C]ivil rights cases — unlike tort or antitrust cases — do not provide the prevailing plaintiff with a large recovery from which he can pay his lawyer”). Congress enacted § 1988 specifically to enable plaintiffs to enforce the civil rights laws even where the amount of damages at stake Would not otherwise make it feasible for them to do so:
“[F]ee awards have proved an essential remedy if private citizens are to have a meaningful opportunity to vindicate the important Congressional policies which these laws contain.
.. If private citizens are to be able to assert their civil rights, and if those who violate the Nation’s fundamental laws are not to proceed with impunity, then citizens must have the opportunity to recover what it costs them to vindicate these rights in court.” Senate Report, at 2.
See also Kerr v. Quinn, 692 F. 2d 875, 877 (CA2 1982) (“The function of an award of attorney’s fees is to encourage the bringing of meritorious civil rights claims which might otherwise be abandoned because of the financial imperatives surrounding the hiring of competent counsel”).
A rule of proportionality would make it difficult, if not impossible, for individuals with meritorious civil rights claims but relatively small potential damages to obtain redress from the courts. This is totally inconsistent with Congress’ purpose in enacting § 1988. Congress recognized that private-sector fee arrangements were inadequate to ensure sufficiently vigorous enforcement of civil rights. In order to ensure that lawyers would be willing to represent persons with legitimate civil rights grievances, Congress determined that it would be necessary to compensate lawyers for all time reasonably expended on a case.
This case illustrates why the enforcement of civil rights laws cannot be entrusted to private-sector fee arrangements. The District Court observed that “[g]iven the nature of this lawsuit and the type of defense presented, many attorneys in the community would have been reluctant to institute and to continue to prosecute this action.” App. 189. The court concluded, moreover, that “[c]ounsel for plaintiffs achieved excellent results for their clients, and their accomplishment in this case was outstanding. The amount of time expended by counsel in conducting this litigation was reasonable and reflected sound legal judgment under the circumstances.” Id., at 190. Nevertheless, petitioners suggest that respondents’ counsel should be compensated for only a small fraction of the actual time spent litigating the case. In light of the difficult nature of the issues presented by this lawsuit and the low pecuniary value of many of the rights respondents sought to vindicate, it is highly unlikely that the prospect of a fee equal to a fraction of the damages respondents might recover would have been sufficient to attract competent counsel. Moreover, since counsel might not have found it economically feasible to expend the amount of time respondents’ counsel found necessary to litigate the case properly, it is even less likely that counsel would have achieved the excellent results that respondents’ counsel obtained here. Thus, had respondents had to rely on private-sector fee arrangements, they might well have been unable to obtain redress for their grievances. It is precisely for this reason that Congress enacted § 1988.
IV
We agree with petitioners that Congress intended that statutory fee awards be “adequate to attract competent counsel, but... not produce windfalls to attorneys.” Senate Report, at 6. However, we find no evidence that Congress intended that, in order to avoid “windfalls to attorneys,” attorney’s fees be proportionate to the amount of damages a civil rights plaintiff might recover. Rather, there already exists a wide range of safeguards designed to protect civil rights defendants against the possibility of excessive fee awards. Both the House and Senate Reports identify standards for courts to follow in awarding and calculating attorney’s fees, see ibid.; House Report, at 8; these standards are designed to ensure that attorneys are compensated only for time reasonably expended on a case. The district court has the discretion to deny fees to prevailing plaintiffs under special circumstances, see Hensley, 461 U. S., at 429 (citing Senate Report, at 4), and to award attorney’s fees against plaintiffs who litigate frivolous or vexatious claims. See Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U. S. 412, 416-417 (1978); Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U. S. 5, 14-16 (1980) (per curiam); House Report, at 6-7. Furthermore, we have held that a civil rights defendant is not liable for attorney’s fees incurred after a pretrial settlement offer, where the judgment recovered by the plaintiff is less than the offer. Marek v. Chesny, 473 U. S. 1 (1985). We believe that these safeguards adequately protect against the possibility that § 1988 might produce a “windfall” to civil rights attorneys.
In the absence of any indication that Congress intended to adopt a strict rule that attorney’s fees under § 1988 be proportionate to damages recovered, we decline to adopt such a rule ourselves. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is hereby
Affirmed.
Counsel for respondents explained to the District Court that respondents had not pursued their request for injunctive relief because “the bottom line of what we would ask for is that the police officers obey the law. And that is virtually always denied by a court because a court properly, I think, says that for the future we will assume that all police officers will abide by the law, including the Constitution.” App. 219. The District Court’s response to this explanation is significant:
“[I]f you [respondents] had asked for [injunctive relief] against some of the officers I think I would have granted it.... I would agree with you that there is a problem about telling the officers that they have to obey the law. But if you want to know what the Court thought about some of the behavior, it was — it would have warranted an injunction.” Ibid.
The District Court determined that $125 per hour was the “rate typical of the prevailing market rate for similar services by lawyers of comparable skill, experience and reputation within the Central District at the time these services were performed,” id,., at 190, and that “[t]he rate of $25 per hour, which counsel seeks as compensation for the time expended by two law clerks, was lower than the customary hourly rate for such services at the time those services were performed.” Ibid.
These factors are: (1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the “undesirability” of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases. 488 P. 2d, at 717-719.
Hensley stated that a fee applicant should “exercise ‘billing judgment’ with respect to hours worked.” 461 U. S., at 437. Petitioners maintain that respondents failed to exercise “billing judgment” in this case, since they sought compensation for all time spent litigating this case. We think this argument misreads the mandate of Hensley. Hensley requires a fee applicant to exercise “billing judgment” not because he should necessarily be compensated for less than the actual number of hours spent litigating a case, but because the hours he does seek compensation for must be reasonable. “Counsel for the prevailing party should make a good-faith effort to exclude from a fee request hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary... Id., at 434. In this case, the District Court found that the number of hours expended by respondents’ counsel was reasonable. Thus, counsel did, in fact, exercise the “billing judgment” recommended in Hensley.
Hensley also stated that a fee applicant should “maintain billing time records in a manner that will enable a reviewing court to identify distinct claims.” Id., at 437. Petitioners submit that the time records submitted by respondents’ attorneys made it difficult for the District Court to identify and separate distinct claims. The District Court, however, does not appear to have shared this view. In any event, while it is true that some of the disputed time records do not identify the precise claims worked on at the time, we find this lapse unimportant, in light of the District Court’s finding that all of respondents’ claims were interrelated.
At the second hearing on remand, the court also remarked:
“I have tried several civil rights violation cases in which police officers have figured and in the main they prevailed because juries do not bring in verdicts against police officers very readily nor against cities. The size of the verdicts against the individuals is not at all surprising because juries are very reluctant to bring in large verdicts against police officers who don’t have the resources to answer those verdicts. The relief here I think was absolutely complete.” App. 235.
In addition to the amount involved and the results obtained, the District Court also discussed several of the other factors identified in Johnson, including: the time and labor required; the novelty and difficulty of the questions presented; the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; the customary fee; the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; and the undesirability of the case.
With respect to the time and labor required to litigate the case, petitioners suggest that much of the time for which respondents’ counsel received compensation was not “reasonable.” See Brief for Petitioners 12-13. However, the District Court considered, and properly rejected, these arguments.- For example, petitioners object to fees being awarded for the 59 hours respondents’ counsel spent preparing jury instructions which, according to petitioners, “were subsequently mostly discarded by the trial court.” Id., at 12. The District Court, however, denied having discarded respondents’ jury instructions. App. 215. Similarly, petitioners object to fees being awarded for 197 hours of conversation between respondents’ two attorneys. The District Court however, noted: “I haven’t got any doubt that it probably took 250 hours of conversation about the case between the two of them.” Ibid. We believe that the District Court was in the best position to determine whether the time expended by respondents’ counsel was reasonable.
The District Court also observed that even though respondents ultimately dropped their request for injunctive relief, petitioners’ misconduct clearly “would have warranted an injunction.” Id., at 219; see n. 1, supra.
See DeFilippo v. Morizio, 759 F. 2d 231, 235 (CA2 1985); Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F. 2d 546, 557 (CA10 1983); McCann v. Coughlin, 698 F. 2d 112, 128-129 (CA2 1983); Jones v. MacMillan Bloedel Containers, Inc., 685 F. 2d 236, 238-239 (CA8 1982); Basiardanes v. City of Galveston, 682 F. 2d 1203, 1220 (CA5 1982); Furtado v. Bishop, 635 F. 2d 915, 917-918 (CA1 1980); Coop v. City of South Bend, 635 F. 2d 652, 655 (CA7 1980); Perez v. University of Puerto Rico, 600 F. 2d 1, 2 (CA1 1979); Walston v. School Board, 566 F.' 2d 1201, 1204-1205 (CA4 1977).
Of course, we do not mean to suggest that private-sector comparisons are irrelevant to fee calculations under § 1988. We have suggested that in determining an appropriate hourly rate for a lawyer’s services, “the rates charged in private representations may afford relevant comparisons.” Blum v. Stenson, 465 U. S. 886, 896, n. 11 (1984). We have also indicated that “[c]ounsel for a prevailing party should make a good-faith effort to exclude from a fee request hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary, just as a lawyer in private practice ethically is obligated to exclude such hours from his fee submission.” Hensley, 461 U. S., at 434. However, while private-market considerations are not irrelevant, Congress clearly rejected the notion that attorney’s fees under § 1988 should be based on private-sector fee arrangements.
The United States suggests that “[t]he prospect of recovering $11,000 for representing [respondents] in a damages suit (assuming a contingency rate of 33%) is likely to attract a substantial number of attorneys.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 22-23. However, the District Court found that the 1,946.75 hours respondents’ counsel spent litigating the case were reasonable and that “[t]here was not any possible way that you could have avoided putting in that amount of time... App. 238. We reject the United States’ suggestion that the prospect of working nearly 2,000 hours at a rate of $5.65 an hour, to be paid more than 10 years after the work began, is “likely to attract a substantial number of attorneys.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 23.
Thus, petitioners could have avoided liability for the bulk of the attorney’s fees for which they now find themselves liable by making a reasonable settlement offer in a timely manner. While petitioners did offer respondents $25,000 in settlement at the time the jury was deliberating the case, this offer was made, as the District Court noted, “well after [respondents’ counsel] had spent thousands of dollars on preparation for trial..
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
F
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
This ease is one of the school segregation cases which we dealt with nearly a decade ago in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483, 349 U. S. 294. After remand, numerous opinions were written by the District Court and the Court of Appeals but the mandate issued at the time of the Brown case has never been implemented. In 1956 the Board of Supervisors decided not to levy taxes or appropriate funds for integrated public schools; and white children have attended white-only schools operated by the Prince Edward School Foundation, which has received state support. The District Court enjoined allowance of such support (198 F. Supp. 497) and held that the public schools could not remain closed while public schools in other counties stayed open. 207 F. Supp. 349. Thereafter litigation was instituted in the Virginia courts which resulted, in a ruling by the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals that the Virginia Constitution compels neither the State nor the county to reopen the public schools in Prince Edward County or to furnish funds for that purpose. 204 Va. 650, 133 S. E. 2d 565. The Court of Appeals, prior to that decision, vacated the judgment of the District Court with instructions to abstain from further proceedings until the Virginia state decision became final (322 F. 2d 332) — a judgment which was stayed by Mr. Justice Brennan on September 30,1963, “pending the timely filing and disposition of a petition for a writ of certiorari.” The case is here on a petition for cer-tiorari which raises not only the propriety of the judgment of the Court of Appeals insofar as it directed the District Court to abstain until the Virginia courts had acted, but other issues going to the merits.
In view of the long delay in the case since our decision in the Brown case and the importance of the questions presented, we grant certiorari and put the case down for argument March 30, 1964, on the merits, as we have done in other comparable situations without waiting for final action by the Court of Appeals. See 28 U. S. C. § 1254 (1); Youngstown Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579, 584; Wilson v. Girard, 354 U. S. 524, 526.
See 249 F. 2d 462, reversing 149 F. Supp. 431; 266 F. 2d 507, reversing 164 F. Supp. 786.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Black
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case, like that of Edward Katzinger Co. v. Chicago Metallic Mfg. Co., ante, p. 394, this day decided, involves the right of a patent licensee to defend a suit for royalties only under a licensing agreement which contains a price-fixing provision. Certain subsidiary questions are also raised.
Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing Company owned Jones’ Patent No. 1,651,709. The invention claimed was a brazing “solder comprising copper and phosphorus as the main and essential constituents.” Westinghouse sued MacGregor for infringement. The litigation was settled, and MacGregor took a license from Westinghouse authorizing MacGregor to make, use, and sell solder containing the constituents described in Westinghouse’s patent claim. MacGregor agreed to pay 10% royalties on the net selling price of the solder. Sections 5 and 6 of the license agreement, set out below, required MacGregor to sell the solder for no less than the price Westinghouse charged its own customers. MacGregor paid royalties on solder he made and sold which contained only phosphorus and copper. Later he began to make and sell solders composed of phosphorus, copper, and tin, or phosphorus, copper, and silver. For a time he paid royalties on these. But he also applied for and obtained patents on these two latter solders which added tin and silver respectively to the phosphorus-copper combination. MacGregor then declined to pay royalties on these solders on the ground that they were not covered by Westinghouse’s patent. Westinghouse brought this suit for an accounting and payment of unpaid royalties in a Pennsylvania state court. Mac-Gregor filed an answer denying liability and asserting a counterclaim. His answer asserted that the solders which were described in his patents were not covered by Westinghouse’s patent. He alleged that the effort of Westinghouse to make him pay royalties on these solders constituted an unlawful exercise of Westinghouse’s patent monopoly and that Westinghouse should not be allowed to recover in the courts for this reason. In a counterclaim, he maintained that by inadvertence and mistake he had paid royalties on solders covered by his own patents. He charged that if the Westinghouse patent should be construed to cover these latter solders, it was invalid. He further contended that the price-fixing provision was a violation of the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act and constituted an unlawful use of Westinghouse’s patent monopoly which rendered the whole license agreement illegal. In his counterclaim MacGregor asked, not only for judgment for refund of the royalties alleged to have been inadvertently paid, but also for damages on account of the illegal restraint imposed upon him by the agreement.
The state trial court declined to consider the validity of the patent, holding that it was presumed to be valid, and that MacGregor as a licensee had no right to challenge it. Assuming the patent and all the claims in it to be valid on this theory, the state court found the claims broad enough in scope to cover all the solders manufactured and sold by MacGregor. The trial court did not give a like presumption to the validity of the patents issued to MacGregor, but held that the solders covered by those patents infringed the presumptively valid patents of Westinghouse. The state supreme court affirmed. 350 Pa. 333, 38 A. 2d 244. It agreed with the trial court that MacGregor was estopped to attack the validity of Westinghouse's patent. It recognized that there could be no estoppel in the present case under our decision in Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co., 317 U. S. 173, but for its interpretation of the Sola decision as applying only to suits in which the licensor sought affirmative relief to enforce compliance with the price-fixing provision. Since no such relief was asked in this case, the state supreme court felt that there was no existing controversy which involved the price-fixing provision- — that the questions of their effect and validity were “moot.” Thus it assumed, as did the petitioner in Katzinger Co. v. Chicago Metallic Mfg. Co., supra, that a royalty agreement was severable from price-fixing covenants.
For the reasons stated in today's Katzinger opinion we hold that the covenant to pay royalties was'not severable from the covenant to sell at fixed prices. Since Mac-Gregor invoked federal law to sustain his challenge to the validity of the patent, the alleged misuse of the patent, and the price-fixing covenant, his contentions raised federal questions not governed by state estoppel or contract severability rules. Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co., supra, 176-177; Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Co., 326 U. S. 249. Accordingly, we hold as a matter of federal law that the state supreme court was wrong in affirming the judgment in this cause on the ground that the licensee, MacGregor, was estopped to offer proof of his allegation of invalidity. This error will require, as the state court anticipated, that the cause be remanded for a new trial to determine the validity of Westinghouse’s patent. For we do not think that the present state of this record justifies acceptance of MacGregor’s contention that we should now pass on validity of the patent. If it be determined on remand that the patent is invalid, there is no question but that, as MacGregor contends, the price-fixing agreement violates the anti-trust laws. Katzinger Co. v. Chicago Metallic Co., supra; Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co., supra, at 175; Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Co., supra.
But there are alternative federal questions raised here by MacGregor upon which decision might turn even though Westinghouse’s patent be held valid. MacGregor pleaded that the price-fixing agreement so effectively wiped out all competition to Westinghouse in the manufacture and sale of these solders that the whole license contract should be held illegal as a violation of the Sherman and Clayton Acts. MacGregor also contended that the license contract should be held unenforceable in the courts on the ground that Westinghouse had attempted to use it to extend the patent’s scope beyond its lawful coverage. But since the cause must again be tried in the state court we shall not pass on either of these contentions at this time.
The judgment is reversed and the case remanded to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
“5. Westinghouse grants this license on the express condition that the prices, terms and conditions of sale for use or sale in the United States of America, its territories and possessions of brazing solders embodying the invention covered by said Letters Patent and so long as such brazing solders continue to be covered by said patent, shall be no more favorable to the customer than those which from time to time Westinghouse establishes and maintains for its own sales of similar or competing brazing solders under such patent to such or other similarly situated customer purchasing in like quantities. Mac-Gregor shall be notified of all such prices, terms and conditions of sale fixed by Westinghouse.
“The prices, terms and conditions of sale of Westinghouse may be changed by Westinghouse from time to time, notice being given MacGregor, but not less than five days’ notice shall be given before any such change shall go into effect.
“6. It is agreed that it shall be regarded as an evasion of this agreement amounting to a breach thereof for MacGregor to reduce Westinghouse’s sale price or alter Westinghouse’s selling terms and conditions of sale directly or indirectly either through its own organization, its agents or others by any device, subterfuge or evasion or by any means whatever or to make the prices lower or the terms or conditions more favorable than those set forth by Westinghouse.”
Copper, phosphorus and tin solder is Patent No. 2,125,680; copper, phosphorus and silver solder is Patent No. 2,162,627.
The agreement to fix prices, if unlawful at all, was so whether it was executed or not. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150; American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U. S. 781, 810. But this agreement by MacGregor to sell at fixed prices was no mere token, for the trial court found that on July 11, 1940, Westinghouse called MacGregor’s attention to his obligation to observe user and distributor prices, and that on October 23, 1940, Westinghouse, through one of its attorneys, wrote MacGregor’s attorney that “if MacGregor sells direct to the user, he should conform to the user prices established, and when he sells direct to the dealer, he should conform to the dealer prices established.” The oral testimony of Westinghouse’s representatives construed the contract as requiring Mac-Gregor to maintain the prices. Moreover, the record before us shows that MacGregor positively testified that he had maintained the Westinghouse prices on the copper-phosphorus combination because he considered himself bound to do so under the license contract.
Since the case is to be remanded for trial of the validity of the patent, we find it unnecessary to consider the propriety in any event of indulging a presumption of validity in favor of Westinghouse’s patent without giving a presumption of a patentable difference to those of MacGregor. See Miller v. Eagle Manufacturing Co., 151 U. S. 186, 208.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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H
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice White
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondents were black employees at the Bessemer, Ala., plant of petitioner Pullman-Standard (the Company), a manufacturer of railway freight cars and parts. They brought suit against the Company and the union petitioners — the United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC, and its Local 1466 (collectively USW) — alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 263, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. IV), and 42 U. S. C. §1981. As they come here, these cases involve only the validity, under Title VII, of a seniority system maintained by the Company and USW. The District Court found “that the differences in terms, conditions or privileges of employment resulting [from the seniority system] are ‘not the result of an intention to discriminate’ because of race or color,” App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 80-1190, p. A-147 (hereinafter App.), and held, therefore, that the system satisfied the requirements of § 703(h) of the Act. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed:
“Because we find that the differences in the terms, conditions and standards of employment for black workers and white workers at Pullman-Standard resulted from an intent to discriminate because of race, we hold that the system is not legally valid under section 703(h) of Title VII, 42 U. S. C. 2000e-2(h).” 624 F. 2d 525, 533-534 (1980).
We granted the petitions for certiorari filed by USW and by the Company, 451 U. S. 906 (1981), limited to the first question presented in each petition: whether a court of appeals is bound by the “clearly erroneous” rule of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) in reviewing a district court’s findings of fact, arrived at after a lengthy trial, as to the motivation of the parties who negotiated a seniority system; and whether the court below applied wrong legal criteria in determining the bona fides of the seniority system. We conclude that the Court of Appeals erred in the course of its review and accordingly reverse its judgment and remand for further proceedings.
I
Title VII is a broad remedial measure, designed “to assure equality of employment opportunities. ” McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792, 800 (1973). The Act was designed to bar not only overt employment discrimination, “but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation.” Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U. S. 424, 431 (1971). “Thus, the Court has repeatedly held that a prima facie Title VII violation may be established by policies or practices that are neutral on their face and in intent but that nonetheless discriminate in effect against a particular group.” Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324, 349 (1977) (hereinafter Teamsters). The Act’s treatment of seniority systems, however, establishes an exception to these general principles. Section 703(h), 78 Stat. 257, as set forth in 42 U. S. C. §2000e-2(h), provides in pertinent part:
“Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchap-ter, it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority... system... provided that such differences are not the result of an intention to discriminate because of race.”
Under this section, a showing of disparate impact is insufficient to invalidate a seniority system, even though the result may be to perpetuate pre-Act discrimination. In Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U. S. 63, 82 (1977), we summarized the effect of § 703(h) as follows: “[AJbsent a discriminatory purpose, the operation of a seniority system cannot be an unlawful employment practice even if the system has some discriminatory consequences.” Thus, any challenge to a seniority system under Title VII will require a trial on the issue of discriminatory intent: Was the system adopted because of its racially discriminatory impact?
This is precisely what happened in these cases. Following our decision in Teamsters, the District Court held a new trial on the limited question of whether the seniority system was “instituted or maintained contrary to Section 703(h) of the new Civil Rights Act of 1964.” App. A-125. That court concluded, as we noted above and will discuss below, that the system was adopted and maintained for purposes wholly independent of any discriminatory intent. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed.
I — I I — I
Petitioners submit that the Court of Appeals failed to comply with the command of Rule 52(a) that the findings of fact of a district court may not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. We first describe the findings of the District Court and the Court of Appeals.
Certain facts are common ground for both the District Court and the Court of Appeals. The Company’s Bessemer plant was unionized in the early 1940’s. Both before and after unionization, the plant was divided into a number of different operational departments. USW sought to represent all production and maintenance employees at the plant and was elected in 1941 as the bargaining representative of a bargaining unit consisting of most of these employees. At that same time, IAM became the bargaining representative of a unit consisting of five departments. Between 1941 and 1944, IAM ceded certain workers in its bargaining unit to USW. As a result of this transfer, the IAM bargaining unit became all white.
Throughout the period of representation by USW, the plant was approximately half black. Prior to 1965, the Company openly pursued a racially discriminatory policy of job assignments. Most departments contained more than one job category and as a result most departments were racially mixed. There were no lines of progression or promotion within departments.
The seniority system at issue here was adopted in 1954. Under that agreement, seniority was measured by length of continuous service in a particular department. Seniority was originally exercised only for purposes of layoffs and hirings within particular departments. In 1956, seniority was formally recognized for promotional purposes as well. Again, however, seniority, with limited exceptions, was only exercised within departments; employees transferring to new departments forfeited their seniority. This seniority system remained virtually unchanged until after this suit was brought in 1971.
The District Court approached the question of discriminatory intent in the manner suggested by the Fifth Circuit in James v. Stockham Valves & Fittings Co., 559 F. 2d 310 (1977). There, the Court of Appeals stated that under Teamsters “the totality of the circumstances in the development and maintenance of the system is relevant to examining that issue.” 559 F. 2d, at 352. There were, in its view, however, four particular factors that a court should focus on.
First, a court must determine whether the system “operates to discourage all employees equally from transferring between seniority units.” Ibid. The District Court held that the system here “was facially neutral and... was applied equally to all races and ethnic groups.” App. A-132. Although there were charges of racial discrimination in its application, the court held that these were “not substantiated by the evidence.” Id., at A-133. It concluded that the system “applied equally and uniformly to all employees, black and white, and that, given the approximately equal number' of employees of the two groups, it was quantitatively neutral as well.” Id., at A-134.
Second, a court must examine the rationality of the departmental structure, upon which the seniority system relies, in light of the general industry practice. James, supra, at 352. The District Court found that linking seniority to “departmental age” was “the modal form of agreements generally, as well as with manufacturers of railroad equipment in particular.” App. A-137. Furthermore, it found the basic arrangement of departments at the plant to be rationally related to the nature of the work and to be “consistent with practices which were... generally followed at other unionized plants throughout the country.” Id., at A-136—A-137. While questions could be raised about the necessity of certain departmental divisions, it found that all of the challenged lines of division grew out of historical circumstances at the plant that were unrelated to racial discrimination. Although unionization did produce an all-white IAM bargaining unit, it found that USW “cannot be charged with racial bias in its response to the IAM situation. [USW] sought to represent all workers, black and white, in the plant.” Id., at A-145. Nor could the Company be charged with any racial discrimination that may have existed in IAM:
“The company properly took a ‘hands-off’ approach towards the establishment of the election units.... It bargained with those unions which were afforded representational status by the NLRB and did s.o without any discriminatory animus.” Id., at A-146.
Third, a court had to consider “whether the seniority system had its genesis in racial discrimination,” James, supra, at 352, by which it meant the relationship between the system and other racially discriminatory practices. Although finding ample discrimination by the Company in its employment practices and some discriminatory practices by the union, the District Court concluded that the seniority system was in no way related to the discriminatory practices:
“The seniority system... had its genesis... at a period when racial segregation was certainly being practiced; but this system was not itself the product of this bias. The system rather came about as a result of colorblind objectives of a union which — unlike most structures and institutions of the era — was not an arm of a segregated society. Nor did it foster the discrimination... which was being practiced by custom in the plant.” App. A-144.
Finally, a court must consider “whether the system was negotiated and has been maintained free from any illegal purpose.” James, supra, at 352. Stating that it had “carefully considered the detailed record of negotiation sessions and contracts which span a period of some thirty-five years,” App. A-146, the court found that the system was untainted by any discriminatory purpose. Thus, although the District Court focused on particular factors in carrying out the analysis required by § 703(h), it also looked to the entire record and to the “totality of the system under attack.” Id., at A-147.
The Court of Appeals addressed each of the four factors of the James test and reached the opposite conclusion. First, it held that the District Court erred in putting aside qualitative differences between the departments in which blacks were concentrated and those dominated by whites, in considering whether the system applied “equally” to whites and blacks. This is a purported correction of a legal standard under which the evidence is to be evaluated.
Second, it rejected the District Court’s conclusion that the structure of departments was rational, in line with industry practice, and did not reflect any discriminatory intent. Its discussion is brief but focuses on the role of IAM and certain characteristics unique to the Bessemer plant. The court concluded:
“The record evidence, generally, indicates arbitrary creation of the departments by the company since unionization and an attendant adverse affect [sic] on black workers. The individual differences between the departmental structure at Pullman-Standard and that of other plants, and as compared with industry practice, are indicative of attempts to maintain one-race departments.” 624 F. 2d, at 532.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals did not purport to be correcting a legal error, nor did it refer to or expressly apply the clearly-erroneous standard.
Third, in considering the “genesis” of the system, the Court of Appeals held that the District Court erred in holding that the motives of IAM were not relevant. This was the correction of a legal error on the part of the District Court in excluding relevant evidence. The court did not stop there, however. It went on to hold that IAM was acting out of discriminatory intent — an issue specifically not reached by the District Court — and that “considerations of race permeated the negotiation and the adoption of the seniority system in 1941 and subsequent negotiations thereafter.” Ibid.
Fourth, despite this conclusion under the third James factor the Court of Appeals then recited, but did not expressly set aside or find clearly erroneous, the District Court’s findings with respect to the negotiation and maintenance of the seniority system.
The court then announced that “[hjaving carefully reviewed the evidence offered to show whether the departmental seniority system in the present case is ‘bona fide’ within the meaning of § 703(h) of Title VII, we reject the district court’s finding.” 624 F. 2d, at 533. Elaborating on its disagreement, the Court of Appeals stated:
“An analysis of the totality of the facts and circumstances surrounding the creation and continuance of the departmental system at Pullman-Standard leaves us with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. There is no doubt, based upon the record in this case, about the existence of a discriminatory purpose. The obvious principal aim of the I. A. M. in 1941 was to exclude black workers from its bargaining unit. That goal was ultimately reached when maneuvers by the I. A. M. and U. S. W. resulted in an all-white I. A. M. unit. The U. S. W., in the interest of increased membership, acquiesced in the discrimination while succeeding in significantly segregating the departments within its own unit.
“The district court might have reached a different conclusion had it given the I. A. M.’s role in the creation and establishment of the seniority system its due consideration.” Ibid, (footnote omitted).
Having rejected the District Court’s finding, the court made its own findings as to whether the USW seniority system was protected by § 703(h):
“We consider significant in our decision the manner by which the two seniority units were set up, the creation of the various all-white and all-black departments within the U. S. W. unit at the time of certification and in the years thereafter, conditions of racial discrimination which affected the negotiation and renegotiation of the system, and the extent to which the system and the attendant no-transfer rule locked blacks into the least remunerative positions within the company. Because we find that the differences in the terms, conditions and standards of employment for black workers and white workers at Pullman-Standard resulted from an intent to discriminate because of race, we hold that the system is not legally valid under section 703(h) of Title VII, 42 U. S. C. §2000e-2(h).” Id., at 533-534.
In connection with its assertion that it was convinced that a mistake had been made, the Court of Appeals, in a footnote, referred to the clearly-erroneous standard of Rule 52(a). Id., at 533, n. 6. It pointed out, however, that if findings “are made under an erroneous view of controlling legal principles, the clearly erroneous rule does not apply, and the findings may not stand.” Ibid. Finally, quoting from East v. Romine, Inc., 518 F. 2d 332, 339 (CA5 1975), the Court of Appeals repeated the following view of its appellate function in Title VII cases where purposeful discrimination is at issue:
“‘Although discrimination vel non is essentially a question of fact it is, at the same time, the ultimate issue for resolution in this case, being expressly proscribed by 42 U. S. C. A. § 2000e-2(a). As such, a finding of discrimination or non-discrimination is a finding of ultimate fact. [Cites omitted.] In reviewing the district court’s findings, therefore, we will proceed to make an independent determination of appellant’s allegations of discrimination, though bound by findings of subsidiary fact which are themselves not clearly erroneous.’” 624 F. 2d, at 533, n. 6.
III
Pointing to the above statement of the Court of Appeals and to similar statements in other Title VII cases coming from that court, petitioners submit that the Court of Appeals made an independent determination of discriminatory-purpose, the “ultimate fact” in this case, and that this was error under Rule 52(a). We agree with petitioners that if the Court of Appeals followed what seems to be the accepted rule in that Circuit, its judgment must be reversed.
Rule 52(a) broadly requires that findings of fact not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. It does not make exceptions or purport to exclude certain categories of factual findings from the obligation of a court of appeals to accept a district court’s findings unless clearly erroneous. It does not divide facts into categories; in particular, it does not divide findings of fact into those that deal with “ultimate” and those that deal with “subsidiary” facts.
The Rule does not apply to conclusions of law. The Court of Appeals, therefore, was quite right in saying that if a district court’s findings rest on an erroneous view of the law, they may be set aside on that basis. But here the District Court was not faulted for misunderstanding or applying an erroneous definition of intentional discrimination. It was reversed for arriving at what the Court of Appeals thought was an erroneous finding as to whether the differential impact of the seniority system reflected an intent to discriminate on account of race. That question, as we see it, is a pure question of fact, subject to Rule 52(a)’s clearly-erroneous standard. It is not a question of law and not a mixed question of law and fact.
The Court has previously noted the vexing nature of the distinction between questions of fact and questions of law. See Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U. S. 665, 671 (1944). Rule 52(a) does not furnish particular guidance with respect to distinguishing law from fact. Nor do we yet know of any other rule or principle that will unerringly distinguish a factual finding from a legal conclusion. For the reasons that follow, however, we have little doubt about the factual nature of § 703(h)’s requirement that a seniority system be free of an intent to discriminate.
Treating issues of intent as factual matters for the trier of fact is commonplace. In Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 443 U. S. 526, 534 (1979), the principal question was whether the defendants had intentionally maintained a racially segregated school system at a specified time in the past. We recognized that issue as essentially factual, subject to the clearly-erroneous rule. In Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U. S. 278 (1960), the Court held that the principal criterion for identifying a gift under the applicable provision of the Internal Revenue Code was the intent or motive of the donor — “one that inquires what the basic reason for his conduct was in fact.” Id., at 286. Resolution of that issue determined the ultimate issue of whether a gift had been made. Both issues were held to be questions of fact subject to the clearly-erroneous rule. In United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 338 U. S. 338, 341 (1949), an antitrust case, the Court referred to “[findings as to the design, motive and intent with which men act” as peculiarly factual issues for the trier of fact and therefore subject to appellate review under Rule 52.
Justice Black’s dissent in Yellow Cab suggested a contrary approach. Relying on United States v. Griffith, 334 U. S. 100 (1948), he argued that it is not always necessary to prove “specific intent” to restrain trade; it is enough if a restraint is the result or consequence of a defendant’s conduct or business arrangements. Such an approach, however, is specifically precluded by § 703(h) in Title VII cases challenging seniority systems. Differentials among employees that result from a seniority system are not unlawful employment practices unless the product of an intent to discriminate. It would make no sense, therefore, to say that the intent to discriminate required by § 703(h) may be presumed from such an impact. As § 703(h) was construed in Teamsters, there must be a finding of actual intent to discriminate on racial grounds on the part of those who negotiated or maintained the system. That finding appears to us to be a pure question of fact.
This is not to say that discriminatory impact is not part of the evidence to be considered by the trial court in reaching a finding on whether there was such a discriminatory intent as a factual matter. We do assert, however, that under § 703(h) discriminatory intent is a finding of fact to be made by the trial court; it is not a question of law and not a mixed question of law and fact of the kind that in some cases may allow an appellate court to review the facts to see if they satisfy some legal concept of discriminatory intent. Discriminatory intent here means actual motive; it is not a legal presumption to be drawn from a factual showing of something less than actual motive. Thus, a court of appeals may only reverse a district court’s finding on discriminatory intent if it concludes that the finding is clearly erroneous under Rule 52(a). Insofar as the Fifth Circuit assumed otherwise, it erred.
IV
Respondents do not directly defend the Fifth Circuit rule that a trial court’s finding on discriminatory intent is not subject to the clearly-erroneous standard of Rule 52(a). Rather, among other things, they submit that the Court of Appeals recognized and, where appropriate, properly applied Rule 52(a) in setting aside the findings of the District Court. This position has force, but for two reasons it is not persuasive.
First, although the Court of Appeals acknowledged and correctly stated the controlling standard of Rule 52(a), the acknowledgment came late in the court’s opinion. The court had not expressly referred to or applied Rule 52(a) in the course of disagreeing with the District Court’s resolution of the factual issues deemed relevant under James v. Stockham Valves & Fittings Co., 559 P. 2d 310 (1977). Furthermore, the paragraph in which the court finally concludes that the USW seniority system is unprotected by § 703(h) strongly suggests that the outcome was the product of the court’s independent consideration of the totality of the circumstances it found in the record.
Second and more fundamentally, when the court stated that it was convinced that a mistake had been made, it then identified not only the mistake but also the source of that mistake. The mistake of the District Court was that on the record there could be no doubt about the existence of a discriminatory purpose. The source of the mistake was the District Court’s failure to recognize the relevance of the racial purposes of IAM. Had the District Court “given the I. A. M.’s role in the creation and establishment of the seniority system its due consideration,” it “might have reached a different conclusion.” Supra, at 284.
When an appellate court discerns that a district court has failed to make a finding because of an erroneous view of the law, the usual rule is that there should be a remand for further proceedings to permit the trial court to make the missing findings:
“[FJactfinding is the basic responsibility of district courts, rather than appellate courts, and... the Court of Appeals should not have resolved in the first instance this factual dispute which had not been considered by the District Court.” DeMarco v. United States, 415 U. S. 449, 450, n. (1974).
Likewise, where findings are infirm because of an erroneous view of the law, a remand is the proper course unless the record permits only one resolution of the factual issue. Kelley v. Southern Pacific Co., 419 U. S. 318, 331-332 (1974). All of this is elementary. Yet the Court of Appeals, after holding that the District Court had failed to consider relevant evidence and indicating that the District Court might have come to a different conclusion had it considered that evidence, failed to remand for further proceedings as to the intent of IAM and the significance, if any, of such a finding with respect to the intent of USW itself. Instead, the Court of Appeals made its own determination as to the motives of IAM, found that USW had acquiesced in the IAM conduct, and apparently concluded that the foregoing was sufficient to remove the system from the protection of § 703(h).
Proceeding in this manner seems to us incredible unless the Court of Appeals construed its own well-established Circuit rule with respect to its authority to arrive at independent findings on ultimate facts free of the strictures of Rule 52(a) also to permit it to examine the record and make its own independent findings with respect to those issues on which the district court’s findings are set aside for an error of law. As we have previously said, however, the premise for this conclusion is infirm: whether an ultimate fact or not, discriminatory intent under § 703(h) is a factual matter subject to the clearly-erroneous standard of Rule 52(a). It follows that when a district court’s finding on such an ultimate fact is set aside for an error of law, the court of appeals is not relieved of the usual requirement of remanding for further proceedings to the tribunal charged with the task of factfinding in the first instance.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the cases are remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
In their original complaint, besides challenging the seniority system discussed in this opinion, plaintiffs also alleged discrimination in job assignments and promotions and the failure to post publicly a list of changes in assignments. These were all brought as “class” issues. Two charges of individual discrimination were also brought. The Court of Appeals held that the Company had violated Title VII in making job assignments and in selecting foremen. In granting certiorari, we declined to review those aspects of the decision.
The procedural history of these cases is rather complex. The original complaint was filed in 1971. Since that time the case has been tried three times and has twice been reviewed by the Court of Appeals.
In 1941, prior to unionization, the Bessemer plant was divided into 20 departments. By 1954, there were 28 departments—26 USW units and 2 International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAM) units. The departments remained essentially unchanged after 1954.
The International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW) gained representation status for two small departments. The IBEW unit was all white. IBEW, however was decertified in 1946 and its members were reabsorbed into a department represented by USW.
A departmental seniority system was part of the initial collective-bargaining agreement between the Company and USW in 1942. Between 1947 and 1954, however, the seniority system changed from one based on departments to one based upon particular occupations within departments. In 1954, the system went back to a departmental base.
The only exceptions, until 1972 (see n. 7, infra), were for employees transferring at the request of the Company or for those electing transfer in lieu of layoff.
In 1972, the Company entered into an agreement with the Department of Labor to bring its employment practices into compliance with Executive Order No. 11246, 3 CFR 339 (1964-1965 Comp.). This provided an exception to the departmental limit on seniority, allowing certain black employees to make interdepartmental transfers without any loss of seniority.
The Fifth Circuit relied upon the following passage in Teamsters, 431 U. S., at 355-356:
“The seniority system in this litigation is entirely bona fide. It applies equally to all races and ethnic groups. To the extent that it ‘locks’ employees into non-line-driver jobs, it does so for all.... The placing of line drivers in a separate bargaining unit from other employees is rational, in accord with the industry practice, and consistent with National Labor Relation Board precedents. It is conceded that that seniority system did not have its genesis in racial discrimination, and that it was negotiated and has been maintained free from any illegal purpose.”
This passage was of course not meant to be an exhaustive list of all the factors that a district court might or should consider in making a finding of discriminatory intent.
The court specifically declined to make any finding on whether the no-transfer provision of the seniority system had a greater relative effect on blacks than on whites, because of qualitative differences in the departments in which they were concentrated. It believed that such an inquiry would have been inconsistent with the earlier Fifth Circuit opinion in this case.
In particular, the court focused on the history of the unionization process at the plant and found certain of the departmental divisions to be based on the evolving relationship between USW and IAM.
With respect to USW, the District Court found that “[u]nion meetings were conducted with different sides of the hall for white and black members, and social functions of the union were also segregated.” App. A-142. It also found, however, that “[w]hile possessing some of the trappings taken from an otherwise segregated society, the USW local was one of the few institutions in the area which did not function in fact to foster and maintain segregation; rather, it served a joint interest of white and black workers which had a higher priority than racial considerations.” Id., at A-143.
It does not appear to us that the District Court actually found a qualitative difference but held it to be irrelevant. The relevant passage of the District Court opinion read as follows: “By ranking the twenty-eight USW and IAM departments according to some perceived order of desirability, one could... attempt to measure the relative effect of the no-transfer rule on white and black employees.... It may well be that a somewhat greater impact was felt by blacks than whites although... this conclusion is by no means certain.” Id., at A-134.
The original complaint in this case did not mention IAM. Prior to the first trial, respondents sought and received leave to amend their complaint to add IAM as a Rule 19 defendant, “insofar as the relief requested may involve or infringe upon the provisions of such Union’s collective bargaining agreement with the Company.” Order of the District Court, June 4, 1974 (App. 29).
In United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U. S. 364, 395 (1948), this Court characterized the clearly-erroneous standard as follows:
“A finding is ‘clearly erroneous’ when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”
We note that the Court of Appeals quoted this passage at the conclusion of its analysis of the District Court opinion. Supra, at 283.
See Jackson v. City of Killeen, 654 F. 2d 1181, 1184 (1981); Payne v. McLemore’s Wholesale & Retail Stores, 654 F. 2d 1130, 1147 (1981); Wilkins v. University of Houston, 654 F. 2d 388, 390 (1981); Lindsey v. Mississippi Research & Development Center, 652 F. 2d 488, 492 (1981); Rohde v. K. O. Steel Castings, Inc., 649 F. 2d 317, 320 (1981); Joshi v. Florida State University, 646 F. 2d 981, 986 (1981); Phillips v. Joint Legislative Committee, 637 F. 2d 1014, 1024 (1981); Danner v. United States Civil Service Comm’n, 635 F. 2d 427, 430-431 (1981); Thompson v. Leland Police Dept., 633 F. 2d 1111, 1112 (1980); Crawford v. Western Electric Co., 614 F. 2d 1300, 1311 (1980); Burdine v. Texas Dept. of Community Af fairs, 608 F. 2d 563, 566 (1979); Williams v. Tallahassee Motors, Inc., 607 F. 2d 689, 690 (1979); Parson v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., 575 F. 2d 1374, 1382 (1978); Causey v. Ford Motor Co., 516 F. 2d 416, 420-421 (1975); East v. Romine, Inc., 518 F. 2d 332, 338-339 (1975).
There is some indication in the opinions of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (see n. 15, supra) that the Circuit rule with respect to “ultimate facts” is only another way of stating a standard of review with respect to mixed questions of law and fact — the ultimate “fact” is the statutory, legally determinative consideration (here, intentional discrimination) which is or is not satisfied by subsidiary facts admitted or found by the trier of fact. As indicated in the text, however, the question of intentional discrimination under § 703(h) is a pure question of fact. Furthermore, the Court of Appeals’ opinion in this case appears to address the issue as a question of fact unmixed with legal considerations.
At the same time, this Court has on occasion itself indicated that findings on “ultimate facts” are independently reviewable. In Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U. S. 665 (1944), the issue was whether or not the findings of the two lower courts satisfied the clear-and-convincing standard of proof necessary to sustain a denaturalization decree. The Court held that the conclusion of the two lower courts that the exacting standard of proof had been satisfied was not an unreviewable finding of fact but one that a reviewing court could independently assess. The Court referred to the finding as one of “ultimate” fact, which in that case involved an appraisal of the strength of the entire body of evidence. The Court said that the significance of the clear-and-convincing proof standard “would be lost” if the ascertainment by the lower courts whether that exacting standard of proof had been satisfied on the whole record were to be deemed a “fact” of the same order as all other “facts not open to review here.” Id., at 671.
The Fifth Circuit’s rule on appellate consideration of “ultimate facts” has its roots in this discussion in Baumgartner. In Galena Oaks Corp. v. Scofield, 218 F. 2d 217 (CA5 1954), in which the question was whether the gain derived from the sale of a number of houses was to be treated as capital gain or ordinary income, the Court of Appeals relied directly on Baum-gartner in holding that this was an issue of “ultimate fact” that an appellate court may review free of the elearly-erroneous rule. Causey v. Ford Motor Co., supra, at 421, relying on Galena Oaks Corp. v. Scofield, supra, said that “although discrimination vel non is essentially a question of fact, it is, at the same time, the ultimate issue for resolution in this case” and as such, was deemed to be independently reviewable. The passage from East v. Romine, Inc., supra, at 339, which was repeated in the cases before us now, supra, at 285, rested on the opinion in Causey v. Ford Motor Co.
Whatever Baumgartner may have meant by its discussion of “ultimate facts,” it surely did not mean that whenever the result in a case turns on a factual finding, an appellate court
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Chief Justice Rehnquist
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Section 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U. S. C. § 6103, lays down a general rule that “returns” and “return information” as defined therein shall be confidential. “Return information” is elaborately defined in § 6103(b)(2); immediately after that definition appears the following proviso, known as the Haskell Amendment:
“[B]ut such term does not include data in a form which cannot be associated with, or otherwise identify, directly or indirectly, a particular taxpayer.”
Petitioner Church of Scientology of California, seeking disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act, contends that the Haskell Amendment excepts from the definition of “return information” all material in the files of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) which can be redacted to delete those parts which would identify a particular taxpayer. Respondent IRS in opposition argues that the mere redaction of identifying data will not, by virtue of the Haskell Amendment, take the material out of the definition of “return information.” We agree with the IRS.
Petitioner filed a request with respondent under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U. S. C. §552, for the production of numerous documents. Among the materials sought by petitioner were “[c]opies of all information relating to or containing the names of, Scientology, Church of Scientology, any specific Scientology church or entity identified by containing the words Scientology, Hubbard and/or Dianetics in their names, L. Ron Hubbard or Mary Sue Hubbard in the form of written record, correspondence, document, memorandum, form, computor [sic] tape, computor [sic] program or microfilm, which is contained in” an extensive list of respondent’s case files and data systems. FOIA Request Dated May 16, 1980, App. 20a-27a. Petitioner also requested similar information from the offices and personal areas of a number of respondent’s officials.
Dissatisfied by the slow response to its request, petitioner filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to compel release of the materials. In the District Court the parties agreed — as they continue to agree here — that § 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code is the sort of statute referred to by the FOIA in 5 U. S. C. § 552(b)(3) relating to matters that are “specifically exempted from disclosure by statute . . . ”; thus, if §6103 forbids the disclosure of material, it may not be produced in response to a request under the FOIA. Respondent argued that many of the records were protected as “returns” or “return information” under § 6103. Section 6103(a) provides that “[r]eturns and return information shall be confidential” and shall not be disclosed “except as authorized by this title.” A “return” is defined in § 6103(b)(1) as “any tax or information return, declaration of estimated tax, or claim for refund” including supporting schedules, attachments, and lists. Section 6103(b)(2) then supplies a more extensive definition of “return information,” which includes:
“[A] taxpayer’s identity, the nature, source, or amount of his income, payments, receipts, deductions, exemptions, credits, assets, liabilities, net worth, tax liability, tax withheld, deficiencies, over-assessments, or tax payments, whether the taxpayer’s return was, is being, or will be examined or subject to other investigation or processing, or any other data, received by, recorded by, prepared by, furnished to, or collected by the Secretary with respect to a return or with respect to the determination of the existence, or possible existence, of liability (or the amount thereof) of any person under this title for any tax, penalty, interest, fine, forfeiture, or other imposition, or offense . . . .”
After providing this detailed explanation of confidential “return information,” § 6103(b)(2), as previously noted, continues: “but such term does not include data in a form which cannot be associated with, or otherwise identify, directly or indirectly, a particular taxpayer.” This last clause — the Haskell Amendment — was proposed as a floor amendment by Senator Haskell of Colorado and was adopted by a voice vote during the debate on the 1976 amendments to the Internal Revenue Code.
The District Court, after an in camera review of representative documents, held that respondent had correctly limited its search for and disclosure of materials requested by petitioner. 569 F. Supp. 1165 (DC 1983). Petitioner appealed that decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Following briefing and argument before a three-judge panel, the Court of Appeals sua sponte undertook en banc review of the meaning of the Haskell Amendment and the modification it works upon § 6103(b)(2). The Court of Appeals concluded that, by using the words “in a form,” Congress contemplated “not merely the deletion of an identifying name or symbol on a document that contains return information, but agency reformulation of the return information into a statistical study or some other composite product. . . .” 253 U. S. App. D. C. 85, 92, 792 F. 2d 153, 160 (1986) (emphasis in original). Thus, the court held, before respondent may produce documents otherwise protected, the Haskell Amendment requires that some modification have occurred in the form of the data contained in the documents. “[M]ere deletion of the taxpayer’s name or other identifying data is not enough, since that would render the reformulation requirement entirely duplicative of the nonidentification requirement.” Id., at 95, 792 F. 2d, at 163.
We granted certiorari, 479 U. S. 1063 (1987), to consider the scope of the Haskell Amendment and its relation to the confidentiality provisions of §§ 6103(a) and (b). Petitioner believes that the Haskell Amendment makes significantly greater inroads on the definition of “return information” than did the Court of Appeals. It makes two interrelated contentions: first, that the Haskell Amendment removes from the classification of “return information” all data which do not identify a particular taxpayer, and, second, that 5 U. S. C. § 552(b) — requiring that “[a]ny reasonably segregable portion” of a record be provided to a requester after deletion of the portions which are exempt — compels respondent to redact “return information” in its files where possible so as to bring that material within the terms of the Haskell Amendment. We reject both of these arguments.
We are told by the IRS that, as a practical matter, “return information” might include the report of an audit examination, internal IRS correspondence concerning a taxpayer’s claim, or a notice of deficiency issued by the IRS proposing an increase in the taxpayer’s assessment. Tr. of Oral Arg. 24-25. Petitioner asserts that the segregation requirement of the FOIA, § 552(b), directs respondent to remove the identifiers from such documents as these and that, once the materials are purged of such identifiers, they must be disclosed because they no longer constitute return information described in § 6103(b)(2).
We find no support for petitioner’s arguments in either the language of § 6103 or in its legislative history. In addition to the returns themselves, which are protected from disclosure by § 6103(b)(1), § 6103(b)(2) contains an elaborate description of the sorts of information related to returns that respondent is compelled to keep confidential. If the mere removal of identifying details from return information sufficed to put the information “in a form” envisioned by the Haskell Amendment, the remainder of the categories included in § 6103(b)(2) would often be irrelevant. The entire section could have been prefaced by the simple instruction to respondent that the elimination of identifiers would shift related tax data outside the realm of protected return information. Respondent would then first determine whether the information could be redacted so as not to identify a taxpayer; only if it could not would the extensive list of materials that constitute “return information” become pertinent. And if petitioner correctly interprets the intent of the Haskell Amendment, Congress’ drafting was awkward in the extreme. The Amendment exempts “data in a form” (emphasis added) that cannot be associated with or otherwise identify a particular taxpayer. A much more natural phrasing would omit the confusing and unnecessary words “in a form” and refer simply to data.
Other provisions of § 6103 likewise belie petitioner’s construction of the Haskell Amendment. Subsections (c) through (o) of § 6103 set forth various exceptions to the general rule that returns and return information are confidential and not to be disclosed. These subsections provide that in some circumstances, and with special safeguards, returns and return information can be made available to congressional committees, the President, state tax officials, and other federal agencies. The subsections also recognize that “return information” remains such even when it does not identify a particular taxpayer. Subsections 6103 (f)(1), (2), and (4), for example, allow the release of returns and return information to congressional committees, but distinguish between return information that identifies a taxpayer and return information that does not. Subsection (f) is thus inconsistent with petitioner’s theory that nonidentifying data cease to be return information at all.
The legislative history of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520, of which the amendments to § 6103 are a part, also indicates that Congress did not intend the statute to allow the disclosure of otherwise confidential return information merely by the redaction of identifying details. One of the major purposes in revising § 6103 was to tighten the restrictions on the use of return information by entities other than respondent. See S. Rep. No. 94-938, p. 318 (1976) (“[Rjeturns and return information should generally be treated as confidential and not subject to disclosure except in those limited situations delineated in the newly amended section 6103”). Petitioner’s suggestion that the Haskell Amendment was intended to modify the restrictions of §6103 by making all nonidentifying return information eligible for disclosure would mean that the Amendment was designed to undercut the legislation’s primary purpose of limiting access to tax filings.
The circumstances under which the Haskell Amendment was adopted make us reluctant to credit it with this expansive purpose. During debate on the Senate floor, Senator Haskell proposed that § 6103(b)(2) be amended to make clear that return information “does not include data in a form which cannot be associated with, or otherwise identify, directly or indirectly, a particular taxpayer.” He then added this explanation of his proposal:
“[T]he purpose of this amendment is to insure that statistical studies and other compilations of data now prepared by the Internal Revenue Service and disclosed by it to outside parties will continue to be subject to disclosure to the extent allowed under present law. Thus the Internal Revenue Service can continue to release for research purposes statistical studies and compilations of data, such as the tax model, which do not identify individual taxpayers.
“The definition of ‘return information’ was intended to neither enhance nor diminish access now obtainable under the Freedom of Information Act to statistical studies and compilations of data by the Internal Revenue Service. Thus, the addition by the Internal Revenue Service of easily deletable identifying information to the type of statistical study or compilation of data which, under its current practice, has [sic] been subject to disclosure, will not prevent disclosure of such study or compilation under the newly amended § 6103. In such an instance, the identifying information would be deleted and disclosure of the statistical study or compilation of data be made.” 122 Cong. Rec. 24012 (1976).
After these remarks, the floor manager of the legislation, Senator Long, added that he would “be happy to take this amendment to conference. It might not be entirely necessary, but it might serve a good purpose.” The Haskell Amendment was then passed by voice vote in the Senate and became part of the conference bill.
We find it difficult to believe that Congress in this manner adopted an amendment which would work such an alteration to the basic thrust of the draft bill amending § 6103. The Senate’s purpose in revising § 6103 was, as we have noted, to impose greater restrictions on the disclosure of tax data; a change in the proposed draft permitting disclosure of all return information after deletion of material identifying a particular taxpayer would have, it seems to us, at a minimum engendered some debate in the Senate and resulted in a rollcall vote. More importantly, Senator Haskell’s remarks clearly indicate that he did not mean to revise § 6103(b)(2) in this fashion. He refers only to statistical studies and compilations, and gives no intimation that his amendment would require respondent to remove identifying details from material as it exists in its files in order to comply with its requirement. All in all, we think this is a case where common sense suggests, by analogy to Sir Arthur Conan Doyle’s “dog that didn’t bark,” that an amendment having the effect petitioner ascribes to it would have been differently described by its sponsor, and not nearly as readily accepted by the floor manager of the bill.
We thus hold that, as with a return itself, removal of identification from return information would not deprive it of protection under § 6103(b). Since such deletion would not make other-wise protected return information disclose-able, respondent has no duty under the FOIA to undertake such redaction. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is accordingly
Affirmed.
Justices Brennan and Sc alia took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
The decision of the District of Columbia Circuit was thus in substantial agreement with the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in King v. IRS, 688 F. 2d 488 (1982), and the Eleventh Circuit’s determination in Currie v. IRS, 704 F. 2d 523 (1983). The Seventh Circuit concluded in King that § 6103 “protects from disclosure all nonamalgamated items listed in subsection (b) (2)(A), and that the Haskell Amendment provides only for the disclosure of statistical tabulations which are not associated with or do not identify particular taxpayers.” 688 F. 2d, at 493. Similarly, in Currie the Eleventh Circuit held that the Haskell Amendment does not obligate the IRS, in a suit under the FOIA, to delete identifying material from documents and release what would otherwise be return information. 704 F. 2d, at 531-532.
The Ninth Circuit, however, reached a different result in Long v. IRS, 596 F. 2d 362 (1979), cert. denied, 446 U. S. 917 (1980). In Long, the court found that the Haskell Amendment removes from the category of protected return information any documents that do not identify a particular taxpayer once names, addresses, and similar details are deleted. See 596 F. 2d, at 367-369.
The original panel applied the en bane decision to the search and disclosure undertaken by respondent. See 253 U. S. App. D. C. 78, 792 F. 2d 146 (1986). Although many of the requested documents were protected as “return information,” the panel found that the District Court had erred in accepting respondént’s blanket assertion that all information responsive to petitioner’s request in files unrelated to petitioner’s California branch was exempt from disclosure. The panel remanded the case to District Court with instructions that respondent conduct a new search for information about the third parties identified by petitioner and justify any withholding of the information under the FOIA or § 6103. See id., at 84-85, 792 F. 2d, at 152-153.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
E
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
Under Aid to Families With Dependent Children (AFDC), 49 Stat. 627, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 601 et seq., the Federal Government partially reimburses States for welfare programs that either comply with all federal prescriptions or receive a waiver from the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS). 42 U. S. C. § 1315. California seeks to change its AFDC program by limiting new residents, for the first year they live in California, to the benefits paid in the State from which they came. See Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code Ann. §11450.03 (West Supp. 1994). Green and other new residents who receive AFDC benefits challenged the constitutionality of this California statute in a federal court action; they maintain that the payment differential between new and long-term residents burdens interstate migration and thus violates the right to travel recognized in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969), and its progeny. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California enjoined the payment differential, 811 F. Supp. 516, 523 (1993), and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, 26 F. 3d 95 (1994). We granted California’s petition for certiorari. Post, p. 922. We now find, however, that no justiciable controversy is before us, because the case in its current posture is not ripe.
The California statute provides that the payment differential shall not take effect absent receipt by the State of an HHS waiver. See Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code Ann. § 11450.03(b) (West Supp. 1994). HHS originally granted a waiver, which was in effect when the District Court and Court of Appeals ruled. But “ripeness is peculiarly a question of timing,” and “it is the situation now rather than the situation at the time of the [decision, under review] that must govern.” Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U. S. 102, 140 (1974). After the Court of Appeals ruled in this case, it vacated the HHS waiver in a separate proceeding, concluding that the Secretary had not adequately considered objections to California’s program. Beno v. Shalala, 30 F. 3d 1057, 1073-1076 (CA9 1994). The Secretary did not seek this Court’s review of the Beno decision. California acknowledges that even if it prevails here, the payment differential will not take effect. Tr. of Oral Arg. 3-6. Absent favorable action by HHS on a renewed application for a waiver, California will continue to treat Green and others similarly situated the same way it treats long-term California residents. The parties have no live dispute now, and whether one will arise in the future is conjectural. See Hall v. Beals, 396 U. S. 45 (1969) (per curiam) (after this Court noted probable jurisdiction, Colorado Legislature reduced to two months challenged six-month residency requirement for voting in Presidential elections; revival of controversy consequently became too speculative to warrant Court’s passing on substantive issues).
In view of the impediment to dispositive adjudication, we direct the vacation of prior judgments in this case. As we explained earlier this Term, in deciding whether to disturb prior judgments in a case rendered nonjusticiable, we have inquired, pivotally, “whether the party seeking relief from the judgment below caused the [nonjusticiability] by voluntary action.” U. S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, ante, at 25. Unlike settlement, see ibid., or a losing party’s decision to forgo appeal, see Karcher v. May, 484 U. S. 72, 83 (1987), California’s loss of the federal approval necessary to implement its program was not voluntary. Vacatur is appropriate, therefore, to “clea[r] the path for future relitigation of the issues between the parties and [to] eliminat[e] a judgment, review of which was prevented through happenstance.” United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U. S. 36, 40 (1950).
Accordingly, the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals is vacated, and the ease is remanded to that court with directions to order the vacation of the District Court’s judgment and the dismissal of the case.
It is so ordered.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
I
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Souter
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (WARN Act or Act), 102 Stat. 890, 29 U. S. C. §2101 et seq., obligates certain employers to give workers or their union 60 days’ notice before a plant closing or mass layoff. If an employer fails to give the notice, the employees may sue for backpay for each day of the violation, and, in the alternative, the union is ostensibly authorized to sue on their behalf. See North Star Steel Co. v. Thomas, 515 U. S. 29 (1995); Part II, infra.
Permitting a union to sue under the Act on behalf of its employee-members raises a question of standing. In Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm’n, 432 U. S. 333 (1977), we described a three-prong test for an association’s standing to sue based on injury to one of its members. The third element, at issue here, would bar such a suit when “the claim asserted [or] the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.” Id., at 343. Relying on Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490 (1975), Hunt held that “individual participation” is not normally necessary when an association seeks prospective or injunctive relief for its members, but indicated that such participation would be required in an action for damages to an association’s members, thus suggesting that an association’s action for damages running solely to its members would be barred for want of the association’s standing to sue. See Hunt, supra, at 343.
The questions presented here are whether, in enacting the WARN Act, Congress intended to abrogate this otherwise applicable standing limitation so as to permit the union to sue for damages running to its workers, and, if it did, whether it had the constitutional authority to do so. We answer yes to each question.
t — I
On January 17, 1992, respondent Brown Shoe Company wrote to a representative of the United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, stating that Brown Shoe would shut down its Dixon, Missouri, plant and permanently lay off 277 employees beginning on March 20, 1992. App. 62-63. The complaint filed by petitioner United Food and Commercial Workers Union Local 751 charged that Brown Shoe’s representations were false insofar as they are relevant here, and that in fact, even before sending the letter, Brown Shoe had begun the layoffs, which continued through February and into March. App. 8-9. The union accordingly claimed a violation of the WARN Act and sought the statutory remedy of 60-days’ backpay for each of its affected members.
The District Court dismissed the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), saying that “when an organization seeks to recover monetary relief on behalf of its members, courts have found that such claims necessarily require participation of individual members in the suit.” 820 F. Supp. 1192, 1193-1194 (ED Mo. 1993). The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed, concluding that “[e]ach union member who wishes to recover WARN Act damages from Brown Shoe must participate in the suit so that his or her right to damages can be determined and the quantum of damages can be calculated by the court on the basis of particularized proof. Therefore, the union cannot meet the third part of the Hunt test and is precluded from asserting associational standing.” 50 F. 3d 1426, 1432 (1995). We granted certiorari, 516 U. S. 930 (1995), and now reverse.
II
At the outset, Brown Shoe argues that the WARN Act grants a union no authority to sue for damages on behalf of its members. Because the question on which we granted certiorari (whether Congress has the constitutional authority to alter the third prong of the associational standing enquiry) assumes that the WARN Act does grant the union such authority, Brown Shoe urges us to declare the writ of certiorari improvidently granted. In North Star Steel, however, we noted, contrary to Brown Shoe’s position, that “[t]he class of plaintiffs” who may sue for backpay under the WARN Act “includes aggrieved employees (or their unions, as representatives).” 515 U. S., at 31, and on further consideration we have no doubt that we were reading the statute correctly.
The key requirement of the Act is found in § 2102, which prohibits an employer from ordering “a plant closing or mass layoff until the end of a 60-day period” running from the date of the employer’s written notice of the closing or layoff “(1) to each representative of the affected employees as of the time of the notice or, if there is no such representative at that time, to each affected employee,” and “(2) to the State dislocated worker unit... and the chief elected official of the unit of local government within which such closing or layoff is to occur.” 29 U. S. C. § 2102(a). Congress defined the “representative” to which § 2102(a)(1) refers as the employees’ union, “an exclusive representative of employees within the meaning of section 9(a) or 8(f) of the National Labor Relations Act (29 U. S. C. 159(a), 158(f)) or section 2 of the Railway Labor Act (45 U. S. C. 152).” 102 Stat. 890, 29 U. S. C. § 2101(a)(4).
Enforcement of the § 2102 notice requirement is addressed in § 2104(a), the following provisions of which answer Brown Shoe’s argument. Section 2104(a)(1) makes a violating employer liable to “each aggrieved employee” for backpay and benefits for each day of the violation. Section 2104(a)(5) provides that “[a] person seeking to enforce such liability, including a representative of employees ... aggrieved under paragraph (1) . . . , may sue either for such person or for other persons similarly situated, or both, [in an appropriate district court].”
Since the union is the “representative of employees . . . aggrieved,” it is a person who may sue on behalf of the “persons similarly situated” in order to “enforce such liability.” “[S]uch liability” must refer to liability under §2104, since its remedies are exclusive. See 29 U. S. C. § 2104(b). Because the section makes no provision for liability to the union itself, any “such liability” sought by the union must (so far as concerns us here) be liability to its employee-members, so long as they can be understood to be “persons similarly situated” for the purposes of the Act. We believe they may be so understood, since each is aggrieved by the employer’s failure to give timely notice.
Brown Shoe’s alternative construction is unconvincing. It contends that a previous bill would have imposed civil liability on employers who failed to notify the union of a plant closing or mass layoff, and would have permitted the union to sue to recover a penalty where an employer failed to provide the required notice. See S. 538, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). In the ultimately enacted version of the legislation, Congress eliminated this provision, with the result that the WARN Act no longer speaks to the “rights and welfare of unions,” Brief for Respondent 12. Brown Shoe’s argument is that the class of persons “similarly situated” is the class entitled to sue for damages, so that the elimination of the union’s entitlement to a civil penalty requires the conclusion that the union is no longer “similarly situated” to “employees . . . aggrieved under paragraph (1),” and thus not permitted to sue under the Act.
The flaw in this argument is that it would force us to conclude that the provision for suits by unions is attributable only to congressional inadvertence, whereas inadvertence is not the only possible, or even plausible, explanation for the authorization. For one, the statutory reference to persons “similarly situated” can very readily be understood to mean the class of persons to whom notice is owed but not given. In this respect, the union and its members are certainly persons “similarly situated.” Brown Shoe’s argument also fails to explain why Congress would necessarily have intended to eliminate the union’s power to sue on behalf of members (as Brown Shoe assumes the union could have done prior to the amendment) just because the union was no longer entitled to a penalty in its own right. The argument for Brown Shoe’s preferred construction simply rests on one speculative possibility in opposing a straightforward reading of the provision that a union may bring suit on behalf of its members, who are “employees ... aggrieved under paragraph (1).” Speculation loses, for the more natural reading of the statute’s text, which would give effect to all of its provisions, always prevails over a mere suggestion to disregard or ignore duly enacted law as legislative oversight.
HH HH HH
This brings us to the primary question m the case: whether the union has standing to bring this action on behalf of its members. Article III of the Constitution limits the federal judicial power to “Cases” or “Controversies,” thereby entailing as an “irreducible minimum” that there be (1) an injury in fact, (2) a causal relationship between the injury and the challenged conduct, and (3) a likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. See, e. g., Northeastern Fla. Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors of America v. Jacksonville, 508 U. S. 656, 663 (1993); Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U. S. 464, 472 (1982). Supplementing these constitutional requirements, the prudential doctrine of standing has come to encompass “several judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction.” See Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S. 737, 751 (1984); see also Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83, 97 (1968). The question here is whether a bar to the union’s suit found in the test for so-called associational standing is constitutional and absolute, or prudential and malleable by Congress.
A
The notion that an organization might have standing to assert its members’ injury has roots in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U. S. 449, 459 (1958), where the Court noted that for the purpose of determining the scope of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People’s (NAACP’s) rights as a litigant, the association “and its members are in every practical sense identical.” The Court accordingly permitted the NAACP to rely on violations of its members’ First Amendment associational rights in suing to bar the State of Alabama from compelling disclosure of the association’s membership lists. See also Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 128, 183-187 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U. S. 249, 255-259 (1953); NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 428 (1963); National Motor Freight Traffic Assn., Inc. v. United States, 372 U. S. 246, 247 (1963); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S. 727, 739 (1972).
The modern doctrine of associational standing, under which an organization may sue to redress its members’ injuries, even without a showing of injury to the association itself, emerges from a trilogy of cases. We first squarely recognized an organization’s standing to bring such a suit in Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490 (1975).
“The association must allege that its members, or any one of them, are suffering immediate or threatened injury as a result of the challenged action of the sort that would make out a justiciable case had the members themselves brought suit. . . . [S]o long as the nature of the claim and of the relief sought does not make the individual participation of each injured party indispensable to proper resolution of the cause, the association may be an appropriate representative of its members, entitled to invoke the court’s jurisdiction.” Id., at 511.
Worth’s requirements for associational standing were elaborated in Hunt. There we held that the Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, a state agency whose statutory charge was to promote the State’s apple industry, had standing to bring a dormant Commerce Clause challenge to a North Carolina statute forbidding the display of Washington State apple grades on apple containers. Relying on Warth, the Hunt Court stated a three-prong associational standing test:
“[W]e have recognized that an association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members when: (a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.” 432 U. S., at 343.
Finally, in Automobile Workers v. Brock, 477 U. S. 274 (1986), we held that a union had standing to challenge an agency’s construction of a statute providing benefits to workers who lost their jobs because of competition from imports. The union there did not allege any injury to itself, nor was it argued that the members’ associational rights were affected. Reaffirming and applying the three-part test emerging from Warth and Hunt, we held that the union had standing to bring the suit. 477 U. S., at 281-288. See also Pennell v. San Jose, 485 U. S. 1, 7, and n. 3 (1988).
B
The Court of Appeals here concluded that the union’s members would have had standing to sue on their own (the first prong), and recognized that the interests the union sought to protect were germane to its purpose (the second prong). But it denied the union’s claim of standing because it found that the relief sought by the union, damages on behalf of its members, would require the participation of individual members in the lawsuit. 50 F. 3d, at 1431. It relied on the statement in Warth that “[i]f in a proper case the association seeks a declaration, injunction, or some other form of prospective relief, it can reasonably be supposed that the remedy, if granted, will inure to the benefit of those members of the association actually injured. Indeed, in all cases in which we have expressly recognized standing in associations to represent their members, the relief sought has been of this kind.” 422 U. S., at 515. These and later precedents have been understood to preclude associational standing when an organization seeks damages on behalf of its members. See, e. g., Telecommunications Research & Action Center v. Allnet Communication Services, Inc., 806 F. 2d 1093, 1094-1095 (CADC 1986) (“[L]ower federal courts have consistently rejected association assertions of standing to seek monetary, as distinguished from injunctive or declaratory, relief on behalf of the organization’s members”) (collecting cases).
One court has suggested that this bar is of constitutional magnitude, see National Assn. of Realtors v. National Real Estate Assn., Inc., 894 F. 2d 937, 941 (CA7 1990) (“[Associations have been held to have standing under Article III of the Constitution to seek injunctive relief — but never damages”). The Court of Appeals here apparently agreed with that suggestion, and so dismissed for lack of union standing despite the WARN Act’s provision permitting the union to sue. We therefore take up the question whether the third prong of the associational standing enquiry is of constitutional character.
C
Although Warth noted that the test’s first requirement, that at least one of the organization’s members would have standing to sue on his own, is grounded on Article III as an element of “the constitutional requirement of a case or controversy,” Warth, supra, at 511, our cases have not otherwise clearly disentangled the constitutional from the prudential strands of the associational standing test. Cf. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U. S., at 471 (“[I]t has not always been clear in the opinions of this Court whether particular features of the ‘standing’ requirement have been required by Art. Ill ex proprio vigore, or whether they are requirements that the Court itself has erected and which were not compelled by the language of the Constitution”); June, The Structure of Standing Requirements for Citizen Suits and the Scope of Congressional Power, 24 Envtl. L. 761, 793 (1994) (noting uncertainty “whether requirements such as [associational] standing are constitutional or prudential in nature”). Resort to general principles, however, leads us to say that the associational standing test’s third prong is a prudential one.
There are two ways in which Hunt addresses the Article III requirements of injury in fact, causal connection to the defendant’s conduct, and redressability. First and most obviously, it guarantees the satisfaction of these elements by requiring an organization suing as representative to include at least one member with standing to present, in his or her own right, the claim (or the type of claim) pleaded by the association. As Hunt’s most direct address to Article III standing, this first prong can only be seen as itself an Article III necessity for an association’s representative suit. Cf. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U. S. 26, 40 (1976) (the association “can establish standing only as representatives of those of their members who have been injured in fact, and thus could have brought suit in their own right”). Hunt’s second prong is, at the least, complementary to the first, for its demand that an association plaintiff be organized for a purpose germane to the subject of its member’s claim raises an assurance that the association’s litigators will themselves have a stake in the resolution of the dispute, and thus be in a position to serve as the defendant’s natural adversary. But once an association has satisfied Hunt’s first and second prongs assuring adversarial vigor in pursuing a claim for which member Article III standing exists, it is difficult to see a constitutional necessity for anything more. See generally Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560-561 (1992). To see Hunt’s third prong as resting on less than constitutional necessity is not, of course, to rob it of its value. It may well promote adversarial intensity. It may guard against the hazard of litigating a case to the damages stage only to find the plaintiff lacking detailed records or the evidence necessary to show the harm with sufficient specificity. And it may hedge against any risk that the damages recovered by the association will fail to find their way into the pockets of the members on whose behalf injury is claimed. But these considerations are generally on point whenever one plaintiff sues for another’s injury. And although we noted in Flast that “a litigant will ordinarily not be permitted to assert the rights of absent third parties,” 392 U. S., at 99, n. 20; see also Valley Forge, supra, at 474, we recognized in Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S., at 751, that “the general prohibition on a litigant’s raising another person’s legal rights” is a “judicially self-imposed limi[t] on the exercise of federal jurisdiction,” not a constitutional mandate. Indeed, the entire doctrine of “representational standing,” of which the notion of “associational standing” is only one strand, rests on the premise that in certain circumstances, particular relationships (recognized either by common-law tradition or by statute) are sufficient to rebut the background presumption (in the statutory context, about Congress’s intent) that litigants may not assert the rights of absent third parties. Hence the third prong of the associational standing test is best seen as focusing on these matters of administrative convenience and efficiency, not on elements of a case or controversy within the meaning of the Constitution.
Circumstantial evidence of the prudential nature of this requirement is seen in the wide variety of other contexts in which a statute, federal rule, or accepted common-law practice permits one person to sue on behalf of another, even where damages are sought. “ [Representative damages litigation is common — from class actions under Fed. R. Civ. R 23(b)(3) to suits by trustees representing hundreds of creditors in bankruptcy to parens patriae actions by state governments to litigation by and against executors of decedents’ estates.” In re Oil Spill by the Amoco Cadiz off the Coast of France on Mar. 16, 1978, 954 F. 2d 1279, 1319 (CA7 1992) (per curiam). In addition, § 706(f)(1) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U. S. C. § 2000e — 5(f)(1), expressly authorizes the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to sue for backpay on behalf of employees who are victims of employment discrimination, General Telephone Co. of Northwest v. EEOC, 446 U. S. 318 (1980), and the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U. S. C. § 201 et seq., contains a comparable provision permitting the Secretary of Labor to sue for the recovery of unpaid minimum wages and overtime compensation, 29 U. S. C. § 216(c). If these provisions for representative actions were generally resulting in nonad-versarial actions that failed to resolve the claims of the individuals ultimately interested, their disservice to the core Article III requirements would be no secret. There is no reason to expect that union actions under the WARN Act portend any greater Article III incursions.
D
Because Congress authorized the union to sue for its members’ damages, and because the only impediment to that suit is a general limitation, judicially fashioned and prudentially imposed, there is no question that Congress may abrogate the impediment. As we noted in Warth, prudential limitations are rules of “judicial self-governance” that “Congress may remove ... by statute.” 422 U. S., at 509. It has done so without doubt in this instance.
* * *
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Because the District Court dismissed the complaint, for the purposes of deciding this appeal we assume the truth of this allegation. Nor do we reach the merits of, or any other issue about, the union’s further complaint that Brown Shoe’s letter was defective because it was sent to an individual who worked for the International. The complaint alleges that United Food Local 751, not the International or its employee, is the exclusive representative of the affected employees and is thus statutorily entitled to notice of the closing and mass layoff.
The District Court had also denied the union’s motion to amend its complaint to add employees as plaintiffs. App. to Pet. for Cert. 18a-19a. The Court of Appeals held that the District Court’s decision in this respect did not represent an abuse of its discretion. 50 F. 3d, at 1432. The correctness of this determination is outside the scope of the questions presented here. See Pet. for Cert. i.
102 Stat. 893, as set forth in 29 U. S. C. § 2104(a)(1):
“Any employer who orders a plant closing or mass layoff in violation of section 2102 of this title shall be liable to each aggrieved employee who suffers an employment loss as a result of such closing or layoff for—
“(A) back pay for each day of violation at a rate of compensation not less than the higher of—
“(i) the average regular rate received by such employee during the last 3 years of the employee’s employment; or
“(ii) the final regular rate received by such employee; and
“(B) benefits under an employee benefit plan . . ., including the cost of medical expenses incurred during the employment loss which would have been covered under an employee benefit plan if the employment loss had not occurred.
“Such liability shall be calculated for the period of the violation, up to a maximum of 60 days, but in no event for more than one-half the number of days the employee was employed by the employer.”
The union also argues that it has standing because it suffered direct injury. The Court of Appeals held that the union lacked standing to assert its direct injury because neither backpay to the employees nor its “catch-all prayer for relief” would redress the union’s injury. 50 F. 3d 1426, 1431, n. 7 (CA8 1995). The union argues here that its injury would be redressed because an award of damages to the employees would deter future violations and would facilitate the union’s role in assisting its members. In light of our resolution of the associational standing question, we do not have occasion today to address this issue.
United Food argues that “given the simplified nature of the monetary relief here provided,” Brief for Petitioner 44, n. 17, the third prong of the Hunt test is satisfied despite its claim for damages. In light of our conclusion that in the WARN Act Congress has abrogated the third prong of the associational standing test, we need not decide here whether, absent congressional action, the third prong would bar a “simplified” claim for damages.
Because the union is statutorily entitled to receive notice under the WARN Act, and because of the paramount role, under federal labor law, that unions play in protecting the interests of their members, it is clear that this test is satisfied here. We therefore need not decide whether this prong is prudential in the sense that Congress may definitively declare that a particular relation is sufficient.
The germaneness of a suit to an association’s purpose may, of course, satisfy a standing requirement without necessarily rendering the association’s representation adequate to justify giving the association’s suit pre-clusive effect as against an individual ostensibly represented. See generally Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U. S. 797 (1985); Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Epstein, 516 U. S. 367, 395-399 (1996) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See also Automobile Workers v. Brock, 477 U. S. 274, 289 (1986) (“[A]n association might prove an inadequate representative of its members’ legal interests for a number of reasons”); Note, Associational Standing and Due Process: The Need for an Adequate Representation Scrutiny, 61 B. U. L. Rev. 174 (1981). In this case, of course, no one disputes the adequacy of the union, selected by the employees following procedures governed by a detailed body of federal law and serving as the duly authorized collective-bargaining representative of the employees, as an associational representative. See generally NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U. S. 575 (1969).
See, e. g., Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U. S. 149 (1990) (recognizing a next-friend’s standing).
See, e. g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq., and the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 1060, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 201 et seq.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
I
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a companion case to No. 62, Goldberg v. Kelly, ante, p. 254. It is a class action brought by all recipients of old age benefits who are subject to California welfare termination provisions. A three-judge District Court for the Northern District of California held that the California procedure for pre-termination review in welfare cases satisfies the requirements of the Due Process Clause, 296 F. Supp. 138 (1968), and we noted probable jurisdiction, 394 U. S. 970 (1969). This procedure requires notice to the recipient of the proposed discontinuance or suspension at least three days prior to its effective date, together with reasons for the intended action and a statement of what information or action is required to re-establish eligibility, advice that the recipient may meet his caseworker before his benefits are terminated “[t]o discuss the entire matter informally for purposes of clarification and, where possible, resolution,” and assurance that there will be “prompt investigation” of the case and restoration of payments “as soon as there is eligibility” to receive them. The procedure does not, however, afford the recipient an evidentiary hearing at which he may personally appear to offer oral evidence and confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him. In Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, decided today, we held that procedural due process requires such an evidentiary pre-termination hearing before welfare payments may be discontinued or suspended. Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court must be and is reversed on the authority of Goldberg v. Kelly.
Reversed.
Mr. Justice Black, for the reasons set forth in his dissenting opinion in No. 62, Goldberg v. Kelly, ante, p. 271, dissents and would affirm the judgment below.
California State Department of Social Welfare, Public Social Services Manual, Reg. 44-325 (effective April 1, 1968). The pertinent provisions of the regulation state:
“.43 . . . The recipient . . . shall be notified,, in writing, immediately upon the initial decision being made to withhold a warrant beyond its usual delivery date . . . and in no case less than three . . . mail delivery days prior to the usual delivery date of the warrant .... The county shall give such notice as it has reason to believe will be effective including, if necessary, a home call by appropriate personnel. . . . Every notification shall include:
“.431 A statement setting forth the proposed action and the grounds therefor, together with what information, if any, is needed or action required to reestablish eligibility ....
“.432 Assurance that prompt investigation is being made; that the withheld warrant will be delivered as soon as there is eligibility to receive it; and that the evidence or other information which brought about the withholding action will be freely discussed with the recipient . . . if he so desires ....
“.434 A statement that the recipient . . . may have the opportunity to meet with his caseworker ... in the county department, at a specified time, or during a given time period which shall not exceed three . . . working days, and the last day of which shall be at least one . . . day prior to the usual delivery date of the warrant, and at a place specifically designated in order to enable the recipient . . .
“(a) To learn the nature and extent of the information on which the withholding action is based;
“(b) To provide any explanation or information, including, but not limited to that described in the notification . . . ;
“(c) To discuss the entire matter informally for purposes of clarification and, where possible, resolution.”
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice White
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The problem of irrigating the arid lands of the Colorado River Basin has been confronted by the peoples of that region for 2,000 years and by Congress and this Court for many decades. Today we conclude another chapter in this original action brought to determine rights to the waters of the Colorado River. In earlier proceedings in this case, the United States, an intervenor in the principal action, acquired water rights for five Indian reservations that are dependent upon the river for their water. The United States, and the Tribes which ask to intervene in the action, now seek to have those water rights increased.
I
The Colorado River Compact of 1922 divided the waters of the Colorado River between the Upper- and Lower-Basin States, but fell short of apportioning the respective shares among the individual States. Nor did the Boulder Canyon Project Act of 1928, 45 Stat. 1057, as amended, 43 U. S. C. § 617 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. V) (Project Act), a vast federal effort to harness and put to use the waters of the lower Colorado River, expressly effect such an apportionment. The principal dispute that became increasingly pressing over the years concerned the respective shares of the Lower-Basin States, particularly the shares of California and Arizona.
This litigation began in 1952 when Arizona, to settle this dispute, invoked our original jurisdiction, U. S. Const., Art. Ill, §2, cl. 2, by filing a motion for leave to file a bill of complaint against California and seven public agencies of the State. Arizona sought to confirm its title to water in the Colorado River system and to limit California’s annual consumptive use of the river’s waters. Nevada intervened, praying for determination of its water rights; Utah and New Mexico were joined as defendants; and the United States intervened, seeking water rights on behalf of various federal establishments, including the reservations of five Indian Tribes — the Colorado River Indian Tribes, Fort Mojave Indian Tribe, Chemehuevi Indian Tribe, Cocopah Indian Tribe, and Fort Yuma (Quechan) Indian Tribe.
After lengthy proceedings, Special Master Simon Rifkind filed a report recommending a certain division of the Colorado River waters among California, Arizona, and Nevada. The parties’ respective exceptions to the Master’s report were extensively briefed and the case was twice argued. The Court for the most part agreed with the Special Master, 373 U. S. 546 (1963), and our views were carried forward in the decree found at 376 U. S. 340 (1964).
The long and rich story of the efforts on behalf of the States involved to arrive at a mutually satisfactory plan of apportionment is set forth in the Special Master’s report and the Court’s opinion and need not be repeated here. We agreed with the Special Master that the allocation of Colorado River water was to be governed by the standards set forth in the Project Act rather than by the principles of equitable apportionment which in the absence of statutory directive this Court has applied to disputes between States over entitlement to water from interstate streams. Nor was the local law of prior appropriation necessarily controlling. The Project Act itself was held to have created a comprehensive scheme for the apportionment among California, Nevada, and Arizona of the Lower Basin’s share of the mainstream waters of the Colorado River, leaving each State its tributaries. Congress had decided that a fair division of the first 7.5 million acre-feet of such mainstream waters would give 4.4 million acre-feet to California, 2.8 million acre-feet to Arizona, and 300,000 acre-feet to Nevada. Arizona and California would share equally in any surplus. 373 U. S., at 565.
Over strong objection, we also agreed with the Special Master that the United States had reserved water rights for the Indian reservations, effective as of the time of their creation. Id., at 598-600. See Winters v. United States, 207 U. S. 564 (1908). These water rights, having vested before the Project Act became effective on June 25, 1929, were ranked with other “present perfected rights,” and as such were entitled to priority under the Act. 373 U. S., at 600. Rejecting more restrictive standards for measuring the water rights intended to be reserved for the reservations, we agreed with the Master and the United States, speaking on behalf of the Tribes, that the “only feasible and fair way by which reserved water for the reservations can be measured is irrigable acreage.” Id., at 601. We further sustained the Master’s findings, arrived at after full, adversary proceedings, as to the various acreages of practicably irrigable land on the different reservations. Ibid. These findings were subsequently incorporated in our decree of March 9, 1964. Article 11(D) of our decree specified each reservation’s entitlement to diversions from the mainstream.
Not all aspects of the case were finally resolved in the 1964 decree. First, in the course of determining irrigable acreage on the reservations, the Master resolved a dispute between the United States and the States with respect to the boundaries of the Colorado River and Fort Mojave Indian Reservations, generally finding that the reservations were smaller than the United States claimed them to be. Although we based the water rights decreed to these two reservations on the irrigable acreage within the boundaries determined by the Special Master, we found that it had been “unnecessary” for the Special Master finally to have determined these boundaries and provided in Article 11(D) that the quantities of water provided for the Fort Mojave Indian Reservation and the Colorado River Indian Reservation “shall be subject to appropriate adjustment by agreement or decree of this Court in the event that the boundaries of the respective reservations are finally determined.” 376 U. S., at 345. See Part V, infra. Second, Article VI of the decree provided that the parties, within two years, should provide the Court with a list of the outstanding present perfected rights in the mainstream waters. Finally, in Article IX of the decree we retained jurisdiction over the case for the purpose of further modifications and orders that we deemed proper.
On January 9, 1979, we entered a supplemental decree identifying the present perfected rights to the use of the mainstream water in each State and their priority dates as agreed to by the parties. 439 U. S. 419. We also decreed that, in the event of shortage, the Secretary of the Interior shall, before providing for the satisfaction of these present perfected rights, first provide for the satisfaction in full of the Indian water rights set forth in the 1964 decree for the five reservations. We expressly noted that these quantities, fixed in paragraphs 1 through 5 of Article 11(D) of the 1964 decree “shall continue to be subject to appropriate adjustment by agreement or decree of this Court in the event that the boundaries of the respective reservations are finally determined.” 439 U. S., at 421. The 1979 decree thus resolved outstanding issues in the litigation. But before that decree was entered new questions arose: The five Indian Tribes, ultimately joined by the United States, made claims for additional water rights to reservation lands.
Because the United States had represented their interests, the Indian Tribes previously had no part in the litigation. In 1977, however, the Fort Mojave, Chemehuevi, and Quechan (Fort Yuma) Indian Tribes moved for leave to intervene as indispensable parties. By April 10, 1978, the Colorado River Indian Tribes and the Cocopah Indian Tribe had also filed petitions for intervention. Three of the Tribes sought intervention to oppose entry of the 1979 decree that was to set the priority order for water rights in the Colorado River. The Tribes also raised claims for additional water rights appurtenant to two types of land: (1) the so-called “omitted” lands — irrigable lands, within the recognized 1964 boundaries of the reservations, for which it was said that the United States failed to claim water rights in the earlier litigation; and (2) “boundary” lands — lands that were or should have been officially recognized as part of the reservations and that had assertedly been finally determined to lie within the reservations within the meaning of the 1964 decree.
Initially, both the state parties and the United States opposed intervention. Subsequently, the United States dropped its opposition to the Tribes’ intervention. Still later, on December 22, 1978, the United States joined the Indians in moving for a supplemental decree to grant additional water rights to the reservations. In our 1979 decree, we denied the motion of the Fort Mojave, Chemehuevi, and Que-chan Tribes to' intervene insofar as they sought to oppose entry of the supplemental decree. Other matters raised by their motion, as well as that of the United States’ and the other two Tribes, were not resolved. We appointed Senior Judge Elbert P. Tuttle Special Master and referred these motions to him. 439 U. S., at 436-437.
After conducting hearings, the Special Master issued a preliminary report on August 28, 1979, granting the Indian Tribes leave to intervene in subsequent hearings on the merits. In addition, the Special Master concluded that certain boundaries of the reservations had now been finally determined within the meaning of Article 11(D) of the 1964 decree, primarily because of administrative decisions taken by the Secretary of the Interior. These decisions purported considerably to enlarge the reservations affected and, with respect to the Colorado River and Mojave Reservations, were for the most part reassertions of the positions submitted by the United States to Special Master Rifkind, rejected by him, and left open by us to later final resolution. We refused to allow the States to file exceptions at that time, 444 U. S. 1009 (1980), and the Special Master held further hearings on the merits.
On' February 22, 1982, the Special Master issued his final report. The Special Master’s findings were almost entirely consistent with the position of the United States and the Indian Tribes. Rejecting the States’ strong objections to reopening the question of whether more practicable irrigable acreage actually existed than the United States claimed, Special Master Rifkind found, and our 1963 opinion and 1964 decree specified, the Special Master concluded that each of the Tribes was entitled to additional water rights based on land that he determined to be irrigable over and beyond that previously found. Furthermore, based on his earlier boundary determination, the Master determined that there was additional practicably irrigable acreage for which the Indians were entitled to further water rights. The States have filed exceptions to both of these determinations, as well as to various factual findings concerning the amount of practicably irrigable acreage.
Ill
The States have also refiled their exceptions to the Special Master’s preliminary findings allowing the Indian Tribes to intervene in the action. We consider this matter first.
We agree with the Special Master that the Indian Tribes’ motions to intervene should be granted. The States oppose the motions and insist that, without their consent, the Tribes’ participation violates the Eleventh Amendment. Assuming, arguendo, that a State may interpose its immunity to bar' a suit brought against it by an Indian tribe, United States v. Minnesota, 270 U. S. 181, 193-195 (1926), the States involved no longer may assert that immunity with respect to the subject matter of this action. Water right claims for the Tribes were brought by the United States. Nothing in the Eleventh Amendment “has ever been seriously supposed to prevent a State’s being sued by the United States.” United States v. Mississippi, 380 U. S. 128, 140 (1965). See, e. g., United States v. Texas, 143 U. S. 621, 646 (1892); United States v. California, 297 U. S. 175 (1936); United States v. California, 332 U. S. 19, 26-28 (1947). The Tribes do not seek to bring new claims or issues against the States, but only ask leave to participate in an adjudication of their vital water rights that was commenced by the United States. Therefore, our judicial power over the controversy is not enlarged by granting leave to intervene, and the States’ sovereign immunity protected by the Eleventh Amendment is not compromised. See, e. g., Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U. S. 725, 745, n. 21 (1981).
The States also oppose intervention on grounds that the presence of the United States insures adequate representation of the Tribes’ interests. The States maintain that the prerequisites for intervention as of right set forth in Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are not satisfied. Aside from the fact that our own Rules make clear that the Federal Rules are only a guide to procedures in an original action, see this Court’s Rule 9.2; Utah v. United States, 394 U. S. 89, 95 (1969), it is obvious that the Indian Tribes, at a minimum, satisfy the standards for permissive intervention set forth in the Federal Rules. The Tribes’ interests in the water of the Colorado basin have been and will continue to be determined in this litigation since the United States’ action as their representative will bind the Tribes to any judgment. Heckman v. United States, 224 U. S. 413, 444-445 (1912). Moreover, the Indians are entitled “‘to take their place as independent qualified members of the modern body politic.’” Poafpybitty v. Shelly Oil Co., 390 U. S. 365, 369 (1968), quoting Board of County Comm’rs v. Seber, 318 U. S. 705, 715 (1943). Accordingly, the Indians’ participation in litigation critical to their welfare should not be discouraged. The States have failed to present any persuasive reason why their interests would be prejudiced or this litigation unduly delayed by the Tribes’ presence. The Tribes’ motions to intervene are sufficiently timely with respect to this phase of the litigation. Of course, permission to intervene does not carry with it the right to relitigate matters already determined in the case, unless those matters would otherwise be subject to reconsideration. The motions to intervene are granted.
l — i <1
We turn now to the first major question m the case: whether the determination of practicably irrigable acreage within recognized reservation boundaries should be reopened to consider claims for “omitted” lands for which water rights could have been sought in the litigation preceding the 1964 decree. The Special Master agreed with the United States and the Tribes that it is not too late in the day to modify the 1964 adjudication and decree, notwithstanding his own finding that “[t]he claim in the original case... embraced the totality of water rights for the Reservation lands.” Tuttle Report, at 31. We disagree with the Special Master and sustain the exceptions filed by the States and state agencies to his conclusion. In our opinion, the prior determination of Indian water rights in the 1964 decree precludes relitigation of the irrigable acreage issue.
Arizona v. California, unlike many other disputes over water rights that we have adjudicated, has been and continues to be governed mainly by statutory considerations. The primary isfeue in the case — the allocation of the waters of the Lower Colorado River Basin among the States — was resolved by the distribution of waters intended by Congress and written into the Project Act. The question of Indian water rights — an important but ancillary concern — was also decided by recourse to congressional policy rather than judicial equity. We held that the creation of the reservations by the Federal Government implied an allotment of water necessary to “make the reservation livable.” 373 U. S., at 599-600. See Winters v. United States, 207 U. S. 564 (1908); Cappaert v. United States, 426 U. S. 128, 141 (1976). We rejected the argument, urged by the States, that equitable apportionment should govern the question. We were “not convinced by Arizona’s argument that each reservation is so much like a State that its rights to water should be determined by the doctrine of equitable apportionment.” 373 U. S., at 597. “Moreover, even were we to treat an Indian reservation like a State, equitable apportionment would still not control, since, under our view, the Indian claims here are governed by the statutes and Executive Orders creating the reservations. ” Ibid.
We went on to reject Arizona’s further arguments that (1) the doctrine of Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan, 3 How. 212 (1845), and Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U. S. 1 (1894), prevented the Federal Government from reserving waters for federally reserved lands, 373 U. S., at 597; (2) water rights could not be reserved by Executive Order, id., at 598; and (3) there was insufficient evidence that the United States intended to reserve water for the Tribes, id., at 598-600.
The standard for quantifying the reserved water rights was also hotly contested by the States, who argued that the Master adopted a much too liberal measure. Our decision to rely upon the amount of practicably irrigable acreage contained within the reservation constituted a rejection of Arizona’s proposal that the quantity-of water reserved should be measured by the Indians’ “reasonably foreseeable needs,” i. e., by the number of Indians. The practicably-irrigable-acreage standard was preferable because how many Indians there will be and what their future needs will be could “only be guessed,” id., at 601. By contrast, the irrigable-acreage standard allowed a present water allocation that would be appropriate for future water needs. Id., at 600-601. Therefore, with respect to the question of reserved rights for the reservations, and the measurement of those rights, the Indians, as represented by the United States, won what can be described only as a complete victory. A victory, it should be stressed, that was in part attributable to the Court’s interest in a fixed calculation of future water needs. Applying the irrigable-acreage standard, we found that the Master’s determination as to the amount of practicably irrigable acreage, an issue also subject to adversary proceedings, was reasonable. Our subsequent decree reflected this judgment. 376 U. S. 340 (1964).
The Tribes and the United States now claim that certain practicably irrigable acreage was “omitted” from those calculations. There is no question that if these claims were presented in a different proceeding, a court would be without power to reopen the matter due to the operation of res judicata. That would be true here were it not for Article IX of the 1964 decree which provides:
“Any of the parties may apply at the foot of this decree for its amendment or for farther relief. The Court retains jurisdiction of this suit for the purpose of any order, direction, or modification of the decree, or any supplementary decree, that may at any time be deemed proper in relation to the subject matter in controversy.”
We agree with the United States and the Tribes that this provision grants us power to correct certain errors, to determine reserved questions, and, if necessary, to make modifications in the decree. We differ in our understanding of the circumstances which make exercise of this power appropriate.
The Special Master believed that the decision whether to exercise that discretion should be governed by “law of the case” principles. Unlike the more precise requirements of res judicata, law of the case is an amorphous concept. As most commonly defined, the doctrine posits that when a court decides upon a rule of law, that decision should continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages in the same case. See IB J. Moore & T. Currier, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 0.404 (1982) (hereinafter Moore). Law of the case directs a court’s discretion, it does not limit the tribunal’s power. Southern R. Co. v. Clift, 260 U. S. 316, 319 (1922); Messenger v. Anderson, 225 U. S. 436, 444 (1912). In that sense, the doctrine might appear applicable here. But law of the case doctrine was understandably crafted with the course of ordinary litigation in mind. Such litigation proceeds through preliminary stages, generally matures at trial, and produces a judgment, to which, after appeal, the binding finality of res judicata and collateral estoppel will attach. To extrapolate wholesale law of the case into the situation of our original jurisdiction, where jurisdiction to accommodate changed circumstances is often retained, would weaken to an intolerable extent the finality of our decrees in original actions, particularly in a case such as this turning on statutory rather than Court-fashioned equitable criteria.
For the following reasons, we hold that Article IX must be given a narrower reading and should be subject to the general principles of finality and repose, absent changed circumstances or unforeseen issues not previously litigated.
First, while the the technical rules of preclusion are not strictly applicable, the principles upon which these rules are founded should inform our decision. It is clear that res judicata and collateral estoppel do not apply if a party moves the rendering court in the same proceeding to correct or modify its judgment. IB Moore ¶ 0.407, pp. 931-935; R. Field, B. Kaplan, & K. Clermont, Materials on Civil Procedure 860 (4th ed. 1978). Nevertheless, a fundamental precept of common-law adjudication is that an issue once determined by a competent court is conclusive. Montana v. United States, 440 U. S. 147, 153 (1979); Federated Department Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U. S. 394, 398 (1981); Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U. S. 351, 352-353 (1877). “To preclude parties from contesting matters that they have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate protects their adversaries from the expense and vexation attending multiple lawsuits, conserves judicial resources, and fosters reliance on judicial action by minimizing the possibility of inconsistent decisions.” Montana v. United States, supra, at 153-154.
In no context is this more true than with respect to rights in real property. Abraham Lincoln once described with scorn those who sat in the basements of courthouses combing property records to upset established titles. Our reports are replete with reaffirmations that questions affecting titles to land, once decided, should no longer be considered open. Minnesota Co. v. National Co., 3 Wall. 332, 334 (1866); United States v. Title Ins. Co., 265 U. S. 472, 486 (1924). Certainty of rights is particularly important with respect to water rights in the Western United States. The development of that area of the United States would not have been possible without adequate water supplies in an otherwise water-scarce part of the country. Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U. S. 800, 804 (1976). The doctrine of prior appropriation, the prevailing law in the Western States, is itself largely a product of the compelling need for certainty in the holding and use of water rights.
Recalculating the amount of practicably irrigable acreage runs directly counter to the strong interest in finality in this case. A major purpose of this litigation, from its inception to the present day, has been to provide the necessary assurance to States of the Southwest and to various private interests, of the amount of water they can anticipate to receive from the Colorado River system. “In the arid parts of the West... claims to water for use on federal reservations inescapably vie with other public and private claims for the limited quantities to be found in the rivers and streams.” United States v. New Mexico, 438 U. S. 696, 699 (1978). If there is no surplus of water in the Colorado River, an increase in federal reserved water rights will require a “gallon-for-gallon reduction in the amount of water available for water-needy state and private appropriators.” Id., at 705. As Special Master Tuttle recognized, “[n]ot a great deal of evidence is really needed to convince anyone that western states would rely upon water adjudications.” Tuttle Report, at 46. Not only did the Metropolitan Water District in California and the Central Arizona Project predicate their plans on the basis of the 1964 allocations, but, due to the high priority of Indian water claims, an enlargement of the Tribes’ allocation cannot help but exacerbate potential water shortage problems for these projects and their States.
Article IX did not contemplate a departure from these fundamental principles so as to permit retrial of factual or legal issues that were fully and fairly litigated 20 years ago. The Article does not explicate the conditions under which changes in the decree are appropriate. Very little discussion surrounded the Article, which was included in Master Rifkind’s recommended decree as an agreed-upon provision. This in itself suggests that the Article was mainly a safety net added to retain jurisdiction and to ensure that we had not, by virtue of res judicata, precluded ourselves from adjusting the decree in light of unforeseeable changes in circumstances.
This reading is supported by the proceedings before Master Rifkind. The record demonstrates that it was the understanding of the parties and Master Rifkind’s intention that the calculation of practicably irrigable acreage be final. That was our understanding as well, and was reflected in his and our choice of the practicably-irrigable-acreage standard as a measure which would allow a fixed present determination of future needs for water. It is untenable that the parties, the Special Master, and this Court would have intended Article IX to undercut the prevailing understanding that the calculation of practicably irrigable acreage was to be final without so much as discussing the subject.
This interpretation of Article IX is consistent with our action in prior original cases. Our long history of resolving disputes over boundaries and water rights reveals a simple fact: This Court does not reopen an adjudication in an original action to reconsider whether initial factual determinations were correctly made. In two original cases in which provisions virtually identical to Article IX were included, subsequent modifications were made in reaction to changed circumstances. Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U. S. 367 (1929), 281 U. S. 179, decree entered, 281 U. S. 696 (1930), temporarily modified, 352 U. S. 945 (1956), 352 U. S. 983 (1957), superseded, 388 U. S. 426 (1967); New Jersey v. New York, 283 U. S. 336, decree entered, 283 U. S. 805 (1931), modified, 347 U. S. 995 (1954). The Court’s purpose in retaining jurisdiction in those cases can be gleaned from the respective reports of the Special Masters, which note the need for flexibility in light of changed conditions and questions which could not be disposed of at the time of an initial decree. This interpretation is also consistent with the role of a “court of equity to modify an injunction in adaptation to changed conditions.” Railway Employes v. Wright, 364 U. S. 642, 647 (1961); United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U. S. 106, 114 (1932).
We note that our cases with similar reservations of jurisdiction involved equitable apportionment where our latitude to correct inequitable allocations injustices is at its broadest. If even there our retention of jurisdiction was limited to the consideration of new issues and changed circumstances, rather than to permit the relitigation of factual determinations on which a decree has been based, a fortiori the reservation of jurisdiction in this case, not governed by equitable apportionment, is no broader.
We also fear that the urge to relitigate, once loosed, will not be easily cabined. The States have already indicated, if the issue were reopened, that the irrigable-acreage standard itself should be reconsidered in light of our decisions in United States v. New Mexico, 438 U. S. 696 (1978), and Washington v. Washington Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Assn., 443 U. S. 658 (1979), and we are not persuaded that a defensible line can be drawn between the reasons for reopening this litigation advanced by the Tribes and the United States on the one hand and the States on the other. It would be counter to the interests of all parties to this case to open what may become a Pandora’s Box, upsetting the certainty of all aspects of the decree. These considerations, combined with the practice in our original cases and the strong res judicata interests involved, lead us to conclude that the irrigable-acreage question should not be relitigated.
Because we have determined that the principles of res judi-cata advise against reopening the calculation of the amount of practicably irrigable acreage, and that Article IX does not demand that we do so, it is unnecessary to resolve the bitterly contested question of the extent to which the States have detrimentally relied on the 1964 decree. Detrimental reliance is certainly relevant in a balancing of the equities when determining whether changed circumstances justify modification of a decree. We believe that a certain manner of reliance has occurred, swpra, at 621, but even the absence of detrimental reliance cannot open an otherwise final determination of a fully litigated issue. Finality principles would become meaningless if an adversarially determined issue were final only if the equities were against revising it.
Similarly, it is hardly determinative that the changes requested by the United States and the Indian Tribes do not involve reallocations of as much water as was involved in the initial litigation. Aside from the fact that the requested increases of between 15 and 22 percent in the amount of irrigable acreage determined in the initial decree hardly constitute “relatively minor adjustments,” the magnitude of the adjustment requested is relevant only after it is established that the underlying legal issue is one which should be redetermined.
Finally, the absence of the Indian Tribes in the prior proceedings in this case does not dictate or authorize relitigation of their reserved rights. As a fiduciary, the United States had full authority to bring the Winters rights claims for the Indians and bind them in the litigation. Heckman v. United States, 224 U. S. 413 (1912). We find no merit in the Tribes’ contention that the United States’ representation of their interests was inadequate whether because of a claimed conflict of interests arising from the Government’s interest in securing water rights for other federal property, or otherwise. The United States often represents varied interests in litigation involving water rights, particularly given the large extent and variety of federal land holdings in the West. See, e. g., Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U. S., at 805. The Government’s representation of these varied interests does not deprive our decisions of finality. In this case, there is no demonstration that the United States, as a fiduciary, was involved in an actual conflict of interest. From the initiation of this case, the Government has taken seriously its responsibility to represent the Tribes’ interests, and we have no indication that the Government’s representation of the Tribes’ interests with respect to the amount of practicably irrigable acreage was legally inadequate. Recognition of Indian water rights would not diminish other federally reserved water rights. Under the Project Act, there was no basis for the Government to believe that Indian water rights and water needs for other federal property were in direct competition. Our 1963 opinion bore this out: perfected rights for the use of federal establishments were charged against the States’ apportionment, 373 U. S., at 601, and, in times of shortage, under the decree, the Secretary of the Interior retained broad power to ensure that perfected rights for the use of federal establishments are satisfied. Id., at 593-594; 376 U. S., at 343-344. Indeed, the substantial water allocations awarded the Tribes reflect the competency of the United States’ representation. We believe the issue of practicably irrigable acreage was fully and fairly litigated in 1963.
Accordingly, we sustain the States’ exceptions to this aspect of the Special Master’s report.
V
We now address the dispute over reservation boundaries, which first arose during the hearing before Special Master Rifkind.
A
In the course of the proof by the United States as to the extent of the irrigable acreage of the Colorado River and Fort Mojave Reservations, California disputed the location of the boundaries of these reservations. On the theory that failure to adjudicate these controversies would leave non-Indian users in doubt as to the water available for their use, and would leave the Secretary in doubt as to how to operate Hoover Dam and the mainstream works below, the former Master deemed it necessary to resolve the boundary disputes, see Rifkind Report, at 256-257, and he held several days of hearings on these matters. Tr. 19,992 et seq. California objected to these proceedings. The State felt it lacked authority to represent the private individuals who claimed title to land the United States contended was part of the reservations. Id., at 19,998-20,000. The Master nevertheless ruled on the boundary issues, for the most part in California’s favor — that is, the Master concluded that the reservations covered a smaller area than the United States claimed and that the irrigable acreage and reserved water rights should be determined on this basis.
California maintained its position before this Court that the Master should not have determined the disputed boundary of the Colorado River Reservation. California contended that it would be unfair to prejudice any of the parties in future litigation over land titles or political jurisdiction by approving findings on a tangential issue never pleaded by the United States. The State also observed that postponing determination of the boundary dispute would not materially affect the priority of the water right to which the disputed land was entitled, since both the Indians and the Palo Verde Irrigation District, in which California would place the disputed land, had high priorities. California did not specifically object to the Master’s resolution of the Fort Mojave boundary dispute, no doubt because, on the merits of this issue, the Master entirely agreed with the State’s position.
The United States responded that the Master acted properly by resolving the boundary disputes:
“The determination of the boundary of each Reservation is an essential prerequisite to the determination of the quantum of the water rights for that Reservation. There is no question of the Court’s jurisdiction to resolve boundary questions nor of the authority of California to act as parens patriae for its citizens in such matters.”
The United States did not file any exceptions to the boundary determinations of the Special Master.
We did not accept the Master’s resolution of the boundary disputes:
“We disagree with the Master’s decision to determine the disputed boundaries of the Colorado River Indian Reservation and the Fort Mohave Indian Reservation. We hold that it is unnecessary to resolve those disputes here. Should a dispute over title arise because of some future refusal by the Secretary to deliver water to either area, the dispute can be settled at that time.” 373 U. S., at 601.
The decree that we entered limited the water rights of the two reservations to those awarded by the Master, based on the irrigable acreage within the boundaries as he had found them, but with respect to the boundary disputes, as stipulated by the parties, Article 11(D)(5) of the decree provided:
“[T]he quantities [of water] fixed in [the paragraphs setting the water rights of the Colorado River and Fort Mojave Reservations] shall be subject to appropriate adjustment by agreement or decree of this Court in the event that the boundaries of the respective reservations are finally determined.” 376 U. S., at 345.
B
The disputes about the boundaries of the Colorado River and the Fort Mojave Reservations are still with us. And since the
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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B
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
The Appellate Court of Illinois held here that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause required the dismissal of criminal charges because the police, acting in good faith and according to normal police procedures, destroyed evidence that respondent had requested more than 10 years earlier in a discovery motion. Petitioner, the State of Illinois, contends that such a result is foreclosed by our decision in Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U. S. 51 (1988). There we held that “unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law.” Id., at 58. We agree with petitioner, grant the petition for certiorari and respondent’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.
In September 1988, Chicago police arrested respondent in the course of a traffic stop during which police observed him furtively attempting to conceal a plastic bag containing a white powdery substance. Four tests conducted by the Chicago Police Crime Lab and the Illinois State Police Crime Lab confirmed that the bag seized from respondent contained cocaine.
Respondent was charged with possession of cocaine in the Circuit Court of Cook County in October 1988. He filed a motion for discovery eight days later requesting all physical evidence the State intended to use at trial. The State responded that all evidence would be made available at a reasonable time and date upon request. Respondent was released on bond pending trial. In July 1989, however, he failed to appear in court, and the court issued an arrest warrant to secure his presence. Respondent remained a fugitive for over 10 years, apparently settling in Tennessee. The outstanding arrest warrant was finally executed in November 1999, after respondent was detained on an unrelated matter. The State then reinstated the 1988 cocaine-possession charge.
Before trial, the State informed respondent that in September 1999, the police, acting in accord with established procedures, had destroyed the substance seized from him during his arrest. Respondent thereupon formally requested production of the substance and filed a motion to dismiss the cocaine-possession charge based on the State’s destruction of evidence. The trial court denied the motion, and the ease proceeded to a jury trial. The State introduced evidence tending to prove the facts recounted above. Respondent’s case in chief consisted solely of his own testimony, in which he denied that he ever possessed cocaine and insinuated that the police had “framed” him for the crime. The jury returned a verdict of guilty, and respondent was sentenced to one year of imprisonment.
The Appellate Court reversed the conviction, holding that the Due Process Clause required dismissal of the charge. Relying on the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision in Illinois v. Newberry, 166 Ill. 2d 310, 652 N. E. 2d 288 (1995), the Appellate Court reasoned:
“ ‘Where evidence is requested by the defense in a discovery motion, the State is on notice that the evidence must be preserved, and the defense is not required to make an independent showing that the evidence has exculpatory value in order to establish a due process violation. If the State proceeds to destroy the evidence, appropriate sanctions may be imposed even if the destruction is inadvertent. No showing of bad faith is necessary.’” App. to Pet. for Cert. 12 (quoting Newberry, supra, at 317, 652 N. E. 2d, at 292) (citation omitted in original).
The Appellate Court observed that Newberry distinguished our decision in Youngblood on the ground that the police in Youngblood did not destroy evidence subsequent to a discovery motion by the defendant. App. to Pet. for Cert. 13. While acknowledging that “there is nothing in the record to indicate that the alleged cocaine was destroyed in bad faith,” id., at 15, the court further determined that Newberry dictated dismissal because, unlike in Youngblood, the destroyed evidence provided respondent’s “only hope for exoneration,” App. to Pet. for Cert. 15, and was “ ‘essential to and determinative of the outcome of the case,”’ App. to Pet. for Cert. 16 (quoting Newberry, supra, at 315, 652 N. E. 2d, at 291). Consequently, the court concluded that respondent “was denied due process when he was tried subsequent to the destruction of the alleged cocaine.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 16. The Illinois Supreme Court denied leave to appeal.
We have held that when the State suppresses or fails to disclose material exculpatory evidence, the good or bad faith of the prosecution is irrelevant: a due process violation occurs whenever such evidence is withheld. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 (1963); United States v. Agurs, 427 U. S. 97 (1976). In Youngblood, by contrast, we recognized that the Due Process Clause “requires a different result when we deal with the failure of the State to preserve evidentiary material of which no more can be said than that it could have been subjected to tests, the results of which might have exonerated the defendant.” 488 U. S., at 57. We concluded that the failure to preserve this “potentially useful evidence" does not violate due process “unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police.” Id., at 58 (emphasis added).
The substance of “potentially useful evidence” referred to in Youngblood, not the material exculpatory evidence addressed in Brady and Agurs. At most, respondent could hope that, had the evidence been preserved, a fifth test conducted on the substance would have exonerated him. See Youngblood, 488 U. S., at 57. But respondent did not allege, nor did the Appellate Court find, that the Chicago police acted in bad faith when they destroyed the substance. Quite the contrary, police testing indicated that the chemical makeup of the substance inculpated, not exculpated, respondent, see id., at 57, n., and it is undisputed that police acted in “good faith and in accord with their normal practice,” id., at 56 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting California v. Trombetta, 467 U. S. 479, 488 (1984), in turn quoting Killian v. United States, 368 U. S. 231, 242 (1961)). Under Youngblood, then, respondent has failed to establish a due process violation.
We have never held or suggested a pending discovery request eliminates the necessity of showing bad faith on the part of police. Indeed, the result reached in this case demonstrates why such a per se rule would negate the very reason we adopted the bad-faith requirement in the first place: to “limi[t] the extent of the police’s obligation to preserve evidence to reasonable grounds and confin[e] it to that class of cases where the interests of justice most clearly require it.” 488 U. S., at 58.
We also disagree that Youngblood ever the contested evidence provides a defendant’s “only hope for exoneration” and is “ ‘essential to and determinative of the outcome of the case.’” App. to Pet. for Cert. 15-16 (citing Newberry, supra, at 315, 652 N. E. 2d, at 291). In Youngblood, the Arizona Court of Appeals said that the destroyed evidence “could [have] eliminate^] the defendant as the perpetrator.” 488 U. S., at 54 (quotation marks and citations omitted). Similarly here, an additional test might have provided the defendant with an opportunity to show that the police tests were mistaken. It is thus difficult to distinguish the two cases on this basis. But in any event, the applicability of the bad-faith' requirement in Youngblood depended not on the centrality of the contested evidence to the prosecution’s case or the defendant’s defense, but on the distinction between “material exculpatory” evidence and “potentially useful” evidence. 488 U. S., at 57-58. As we have held, supra, at 548, the substance destroyed here was, at best, “potentially useful” evidence, and therefore Young-blood's bad-faith requirement applies.
The judgment of the Appellate Court of Illinois is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Respondent suggests that we lack jurisdiction because the Appellate Court relied on Newberry, which in turn relied on an adequate and independent state ground. See, e. g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032, 1040-1042 (1983). Respondent is correct that Newberry relied on both the Due Process Clause, and in the alternative, Illinois Supreme Court Rule 415(g)(i) (1990). 166 Ill. 2d, at 314-317, 652 N. E. 2d, at 290-292. The Appellate Court, however, relied only on the portion of Newberry that addressed due process, and the Appellate Court based its decision solely on the Due Process Clause. Accordingly, we have jurisdiction to review that decision. See, e. g., Long, supra, at 1038, n. 4 (“We may review a state case decided on a federal ground even if it is clear that there was an available state ground for decision on which the state court could properly have relied” (citing Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U. S. 35, 37, n. 3 (1967) (per curiam))).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
D
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Clark
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This proceeding in bankruptcy is on objections to the allowance of claims equal to the principal amount of bonds of the debtor acquired at a discount during its insolvency by close relatives and an office associate of directors of debtor. Petitioner’s objection that equitable considerations require limitation of the claims was dismissed by the referee, and the District Court affirmed. 80 F. Supp. 822. Following affirmance by a divided Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 173 F. 2d 944, we granted certiorari because the issue presented has importance in the administration of the arrangement and corporate reorganization provisions of the Bankruptcy Act. 337 U. S. 923.
On January 8, 1946, Calton Crescent, Inc., sold its only property, an apartment house located in New Rochelle, New York, for $300,000 pursuant to a contract entered into in October 1945. Being unable to discharge in full its obligations under debenture bonds maturing in 1953, outstanding in principal amount of $254,450, debtor filed in May 1946, a petition under Ch. XI of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U. S. C. § 701 et seq. Under the plan of arrangement, authorizing a dividend of 43.61% of the principal amount of the bonds, respondents Regine Becker, Emily K. Becker, and Walter A. Fribourg were to receive an aggregate dividend of $64,237.53 on allowance of claims based on respective individual holdings of debentures which total $147,300 in principal sum but were acquired at a total cost of $10,195.43. Petitioner, Manufacturers Trust Company, appearing individually as creditor for fees and disbursements due it as indenture trustee and also as original trustee under said indenture, objected to allowance of respondents’ claims as filed, on the ground that the circumstances of respondents’ acquisitions require limitation of their claims to the cost of the debentures plus interest.
The circumstances pertinent to our consideration of petitioner’s objections are as follows: The debtor was organized in 1933 to take title to the apartment property pursuant to a plan of reorganization. By January 1942 debtor had defaulted under the terms of the first mortgage and was operating with a deficit; at no time in the previous several years had its debentures been selling on the market at more than 8% of face value.
While debtor was then considering a sale of the property for $220,000, a suit to enjoin the sale was brought by Sanford Becker, son of respondent Regine Becker and husband of respondent Emily Becker. Thereafter he proposed to arrange a loan on second mortgage to debtor of $15,000 to pay off the arrearages on the first mortgage, all share and debenture holders being invited to participate. In April 1942 debtor accepted the offer, but none of its share or debenture holders elected to participate other than respondent Fribourg, who had desk room in the offices of Sanford Becker and his brother Norman Becker and was a long-time friend of the former. The loan was made by respondents Regine Becker, Emily Becker, and Fribourg. The second mortgage thus created was in default by the end of 1942, and in 1943 respondents took an assignment of rents but did not foreclose; nor was there change in management of the property. The second mortgage and interest were paid upon sale of the property in 1946. In addition to the second mortgage, sums aggregating $7,921.63 were advanced by respondents to pay taxes; this amount was repaid without interest in 1944 and 1945. Pursuant to provisions of the loan agreement in 1942, Sanford and Norman Becker were made directors of debtor, and when the remaining three directors resigned in 1944, the vacancies were filled by nominees of the Becker brothers.
The referee found that from early 1942 the market value of the property of debtor was insufficient to pay its debts. However, the record shows a tax valuation during the period of only slightly less than the outstanding indebtedness. And although the debtor’s operating account frequently ran in arrears, it revealed a surplus in 1945. Prior to disposing of its property debtor was at all times a going concern.
The debentures on which respondents claim were acquired, at prices varying from 3% to 14% of face value, after the Becker brothers became directors in 1942. Sanford Becker did not buy additional debentures after becoming a director. Norman Becker never owned any interest whatever in the debtor. Although neither of the Becker directors was interested in any purchase of the respondents, the debentures of Regine and Emily Becker were purchased through the agency of the Becker brothers and in the latter’s judgment. The debentures of Regine Becker were purchased from an over-the-counter securities broker. Those of Emily Becker were acquired in part from the same dealer, in part from an estate whose attorneys were fully informed as to debtor’s financial affairs, and in part from a Christian Association represented by a member of its investment committee who was fully advised as to the condition of debtor.
Some of Fribourg’s debentures were bought from dealers in the over-the-counter market; others were acquired through an agent from the president and vice president of debtor when they withdrew from its management in 1944, and from other holders after the retiring president insisted that the offer made to him by Fribourg’s agent be extended to all holders and be accompanied by a statement of the president’s intention to accept. Fribourg was in the market for speculative securities and purchased the debentures as a “gamble,” being influenced by the tax valuation of the apartment building.
All of respondents’ debentures, with the exception of $2,000 in face value purchased by Fribourg from a dealer, were acquired in advance of the contract for sale of the apartment property and the filing of debtor’s petition for arrangement.
It was the referee’s finding, left undisturbed by both courts below, that respondents’ purchases were without overreaching or failure to disclose any material fact to the selling bondholders. Petitioner does not here contend that respondents’ claims should be limited because of conduct by the Becker directors or by respondents amounting to bad faith or abuse of fiduciary advantage. Nor does petitioner contend that respondents’ bondholdings influenced the conduct of corporate affairs to the injury of the corporation or other creditors. Indeed, the referee found that the purchases were not unfair to debtor, that at the time of respondents’ purchases debtor was not in the field to settle its indebtedness on the debentures, and that the assistance rendered to debtor by respondents materially aided in its grave financial situation. Moreover, the findings indicate that the most generous suggestion of an offer for the apartment building after the Beckers became directors and prior to the sale was at a figure substantially less than the sale price.
Petitioner urges broadly that directors are precluded from profiting by the purchase of claims against an insolvent corporation. And, it contends, if directors may claim only the cost of debt securities acquired at a discount during a debtor’s insolvency, those related as respondents are to the Becker directors should not be permitted to do more. Thus we view respondents’ claims initially as if they were claims of directors.
This Court has repeatedly insisted on good faith and fair dealing on the part of corporate fiduciaries. It is especially clear, when claims in bankruptcy accrue to the benefit of a corporate officer or director, that the court must reject any claim that would not be fair and equitable to other creditors. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U. S. 295, 308-309 (1939).
Claims of a corporate officer or director arising out of transactions with the corporation have been enforced when good faith and fairness were found. Sanford Fork & Tool Co. v. Howe, Brown & Co., 157 U. S. 312 (1895); cf. Manufacturing Co. v. Bradley, 105 U. S. 175 (1882); see Richardson’s Ex’r v. Green, 133 U. S. 30, 43 (1890); Twin-Lick Oil Co. v. Marbury, 91 U. S. 587, 589-591 (1876). Likewise a standard of good faith and fair dealing has been found applicable, where not superseded by a differing legislative or administrative rule, to purchases by directors of corporate shares, in the over-the-counter market, at less than book value on conversion under a plan of public utility reorganization. Securities and Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corporation, 318 U. S. 80 (1943); cf. id., 332 U. S. 194 (1947). In the first Chen ery decision it was declared that equity has not imposed “upon officers and directors of a corporation any fiduciary duty to its stockholders which precludes them, merely because they are officers and directors, from buying and selling the corporation’s stock.” 318 U. S. at 88.
When the transactions underlying respondents’ claims here are drawn alongside a good faith standard of fiduciary obligation, they appear unobjectionable. There is no component of unfair dealing or bad faith. The findings negative any misrepresentation or deception, any utilization of inside knowledge or strategic position, or any rivalry with the corporation. During the period of the purchases the conduct of the Becker directors and of respondents with reference to the affairs of the debtor was to its substantial benefit and to the advantage of the other debenture holders. And there is nothing to suggest that had the debentures been acquired by the Becker directors, they would have been unjustly enriched. Cf. Securities and Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corporation, supra, 318 U. S. at 86.
However, it is the contention of petitioner, and of the Securities and Exchange Commission as amicus curiae, that a standard of good faith and fair dealing is inadequate here. Relying particularly upon Magruder v. Drury, 235 U. S. 106 (1914), they invoke the principle that a trustee can make no profit from his trust. But Magruder v. Drury involved an express trust, and even during insolvency corporate assets “are not in any true and complete sense trusts.” Hollins v. Brierfield Coal & Iron Co., 150 U. S. 371, 381-382 (1893).
The Commission asserts, also, that if a director is free to acquire corporate obligations at a discount during insolvency and later enforce them in full, he will be subject to a possible conflict of interests inconsistent with his role as fiduciary to creditors of the corporation. Specifically it is argued that he may seek to postpone adjustment of claims or the institution of proceedings for relief, when such action would serve the interests of the corporation and its creditors, in order to continue his own purchase of corporate obligations at a market price lower than the valuation which he has made with the benefit of inside information.
This Court has recognized that equity must apply not only the doctrines of unjust enrichment when fiduciaries have yielded to the temptation of self-interest but also a standard of loyalty which will prevent a conflict of interests from arising. See Weil v. Neary, 278 U. S. 160, 173 (1929); cf. Woods v. City Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 312 U. S. 262, 268 (1941). In this case the consideration is whether or to what extent a conflict of interests would arise from a director’s opportunity to purchase unmatured obligations of a corporation which, though technically insolvent, remains nevertheless a going concern. That “there is no such conflict in the ordinary case of the purchase by a director in a going corporation of its outstanding obligations,” Seymour v. Spring Forest Cemetery Assn., 144 N. Y. 333, 344, 39 N. E. 365, 367 (1895), would seem true not only of solvent corporations. Certainly the present record does not tend to establish that the opportunity for such purchases during insolvency would deprive a going corporation of the sound judgment of its officer. And in any event the potentiality of conflict must be weighed against the desirability of permitting reinforcement of the insolvent’s position insofar as a director’s acquisition of claims may help. On this record the probability that an actual conflict of loyalties arose from the opportunity to purchase respondents’ claims, while the debtor was a going concern, is not great enough to justify the exercise of equity jurisdiction which petitioner urges.
Undoubtedly the possibilities of a conflict of interests for the purchasing director are intensified as the corporation becomes less a going concern and more a prospective subject of judicial relief. And if it is clear that a fiduciary may ordinarily purchase debt claims in fair transactions during solvency of the corporation, the lower federal courts seem equally agreed that he cannot purchase after judicial proceedings for the relief of a debtor are expected or have begun. In this case, which lies between, it is unnecessary to determine precisely at what point the probability of conflict requires that equity declare ended the opportunity for profitable trading. It could hardly have been prior to the latest purchases of Regine and Emily Becker.
The nature of the relation between Fribourg and the Becker directors makes immaterial that some of Fribourg’s debentures may have been purchased after the corporation ceased to have the potency of a going concern, in expectation of or even after bankruptcy. Neither director had any indirect interest in Fribourg’s holdings or served as his agent for purchase. Fribourg, moreover, had begun to acquire debentures some months before the negotiations leading to the election of the Beckers as directors of the debtor and, according to Fribourg’s uncontradicted testimony, he began to purchase after looking over the apartment following Sanford Becker’s mention of his own purchase. There is nothing in the record to indicate that Fribourg’s purchases after the Beckers became directors were influenced by advice from them. Accordingly, any consideration of Fribourg’s claim as that of a director is precluded.
A word of caution as to the scope of our decision is desirable in view of Judge Learned Hand’s opinion below. He suggested that if in fact liquidation had been imminent at the time of respondents’ purchases or if it were fairly demonstrable, as a matter of experience, that a director free from all potential self-interest would be more likely to initiate liquidation proceedings or to effect a debt settlement than one not wholly disinterested, a court of equity should explore such issues and not dismiss them out of hand. This decision is not meant to negative the relevance of these issues when raised by a proper record. We mention these matters because the Securities and Exchange Commission urges the importance of a decision in this case for questions that may well arise in proceedings under Ch. X. In such proceedings the Securities and Exchange Commission, acting as the statutory ad-visor to the court, would be within its rightful function in submitting to the court the light of its experience on dealings of the general kind disclosed in this case. Here we have proven facts in a particular case, and not a body of evidence submitted by the Securities and Exchange Commission, presumably informed by expert understanding.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
Mr. Justice Douglas took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
The amount and cost of the respective holdings of the respondents, insofar as objected to, are as follows:
, Principal Amount Cost
Regine Becker.................... $44,500 $3060. 63
Emily K. Becker.................. 52,800 5010.00
Walter A. Fribourg................ 50,000 2124.80
Sanford Becker and respondent Fribourg first became interested in the affairs of debtor in September 1941. Soon thereafter each purchased, independently, debentures of debtor of the face value of $5,000. No contest is made of these purchases.
It appears that transactions in the debentures included the transfer of capital shares of the debtor which had no market apart from the debentures.
The major items of indebtedness consisted of (1) the first mortgage on the apartment building in original principal amount of $175,000, which had been reduced by 1946 to $154,000, of which reduction $7,875 had been paid since 1943; (2) the second mortgage and tax advances of the respondents totalling some $22,000, and (3) the debentures of $254,450, on which, however, interest was payable only if earned. The tax valuation was $421,630.
The District Court’s characterization of debtor as a going concern was not upset by the Court of Appeals and is accepted here.
Regine Becker began purchases on February 10, 1944, and continued through August 30, 1945. The purchases of Emily Becker were made between May 24, 1944, and February 5, 1945. In addition to the purchases referred to in note 2, supra, Fribourg made purchases through June 4, 1946.
The latest purchase by a respondent clearly prior to the contract for sale was by Regine Becker on August 30 preceding the contract in October 1945. Fribourg apparently acquired $1,500 of debentures after the contract of sale and an additional $500 after the filing of debtor’s petition.
Since the power of disallowance of claims, conferred on the bankruptcy court by § 2 of the Act, 30 Stat. 545, 11 U. S. C. § 11, embraces the rejection of claims “in whole or in part, according to the equities of the case,” Pepper v. Litton, 308 U. S. 295, 304-305 (1939), the court may undoubtedly require limitation of the amount of claims in view of equitable considerations. Cf. Bankruptcy Act, § 212, 52 Stat. 895, 11 U. S. C. § 612.
Cf. In re The Van Sweringen Co., 119 F. 2d 231 (C. A. 6th Cir. 1941); In re Norcor Mfg. Co., 109 F. 2d 407 (C. A. 7th Cir. 1940).
Cf. In re Jersey Materials Co., 50 F. Supp. 428 (D. N. J. 1943); In re McCrory Stores Corp., 12 F. Supp. 267 (S. D. N. Y. 1935).
Other holdings upon which the Commission relies, Pepper v. Litton, supra, note 7, and Woods v. City Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 312 U. S. 262 (1941), were considered in Securities and Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corporation, 318 U. S. 80, 89 (1943), and there distinguished on grounds which are also dispositive here.
Courts of equity, in defining the responsibility of officers of a corporation which is insolvent and yet a going concern, have frequently assigned greater importance to the corporation’s vitality than to its insolvency. E. g., Sanford Fork & Tool Co. v. Howe, Brown & Co., 157 U. S. 312 (1895); White, Potter & Paige Mfg. Co. v. Henry B. Pettes Importing Co., 30 F. 864 (E. D. Mo. 1887).
As respondents’ purchases of debentures resulted in their securing control of debtor, see note 2, supra, the acquisitions arguably were a factor in preventing further financial deterioration of debtor. See also 62 Harv. L. Rev. 1391, 1392 (1949): Insolvency “is the very time when such purchases may be of most benefit to the corporation, since the credit of the corporation may be improved if it is known that directors are purchasing the corporation’s securities; also it may be possible to forestall a bankruptcy petition while the corporation improves its financial position.”
Cf. In the Matter of Wade Park Manor Corporation, Report of Special Master: Claims of Macklin et al. (N. D. Ohio, 1949); see 3 Collier, Bankruptcy (14th ed.), p. 1784, 1948 Supp. p. 124.
See In re Philadelphia & Western R. Co., 64 F. Supp. 738, 739 (E. D. Pa. 1946); Ripperger v. Allyn, 25 F. Supp. 554, 555 (S. D. N. Y. 1938); In re McCrory Stores Corp., note 9, supra, at 269.
Monroe v. Scofield, 135 F. 2d 725 (C. A. 10th Cir. 1943); In re Norcor Mfg. Co., note 8, supra; In re Philadelphia & Western R. Co., note 14, supra; In re Jersey Materials Co., note 9, supra; In re Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 46 F. Supp. 77 (S. D. Cal. 1941).
Thus it becomes unnecessary to determine whether the relation of the Becker respondents to the directors was such as to require limitation of these respondents’ claims if they would be disallowed in part as claims of directors.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
H
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice O’Connor
delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to Part III.
This case requires us to decide whether the Equal Access Act, 98 Stat. 1302, 20 U. S. C. §§ 4071-4074, prohibits Westside High School from denying a student religious group permission to meet on school premises during noninstructional time, and if so, whether the Act, so construed, violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
I
Respondents are current and former students at Westside High School, a public secondary school in Omaha, Nebraska. At the time this suit was filed, the school enrolled about 1,450 students and included grades 10 to 12; in the 1987-1988 school year, ninth graders were added. Westside High School is part of the Westside Community Schools system, an independent public school district. Petitioners are the Board of Education of Westside Community Schools (District 66); Wayne W. Meier, the president of the school board; James E. Findley, the principal of Westside High School; Kenneth K. Hanson, the superintendent of schools for the school district; and James A. Tangdell, the associate superintendent of schools for the school district.
Students at Westside High School are permitted to join various student groups and clubs, all of which meet after school hours on school premises. The students may choose from approximately 30 recognized groups on a voluntary basis. A list of student groups, together with a brief description of each provided by the school, appears in the Appendix to this opinion.
School Board Policy 5610 concerning “Student Clubs and Organizations” recognizes these student clubs as a “vital part of the total education program as a means of developing citizenship, wholesome attitudes, good human relations, knowledge and skills.” App. 488. Board Policy 5610 also provides that each club shall have faculty sponsorship and that “clubs and organizations shall not be sponsored by any political or religious organization, or by any organization which denies membership on the basis of race, color, creed, sex or political belief.” App. 488. Board Policy 6180 on “Recognition of Religious Beliefs and Customs” requires that “[students adhering to a specific set of religious beliefs or holding to little or no belief shall be alike respected.” App. 462. In addition, Board Policy 5450 recognizes its students’ “Freedom of Expression,” consistent with the authority of the board. App. 489.
There is no written school board policy concerning the formation of student clubs. Rather, students wishing to form a club present their request to a school official who determines whether the proposed club’s goals and objectives are consistent with school board policies and with the school district’s “Mission and Goals”—a broadly worded “blueprint” that expresses the district’s commitment to teaching academic, physical, civic, and personal skills and values. Id., at 473-478.
In January 1985, respondent Bridget Mergens met with Westside’s Principal, Dr. Findley, and requested permission to form a Christian club at the school. The proposed club would have the same privileges and meet on the same terms and conditions as other Westside student groups, except that the proposed club would not have a faculty sponsor. According to the students’ testimony at trial, the club’s purpose would have been, among other things, to permit the students to read and discuss the Bible, to have fellowship, and to pray together. Membership would have been voluntary and open to all students regardless of religious affiliation.
Findley denied the request, as did Associate Superintendent Tangdell. In February 1985, Findley and Tangdell informed Mergens that they had discussed the matter with Superintendent Hanson and that he had agreed that her request should be denied. The school officials explained that school policy required all student clubs to have a faculty sponsor, which the proposed religious club would not or could not have, and that a religious club at the school would violate the Establishment Clause. In March 1985, Mergens appealed the denial of her request to the board of education, but the board voted to uphold the denial.
Respondents, by and through their parents as next friends, then brought this suit in the United States District Court for the District of Nebraska seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. They alleged that petitioners’ refusal to permit the proposed club to meet at Westside violated the Equal Access Act, 20 U. S. C. §§ 4071-4074, which prohibits public secondary schools that receive federal financial assistance and that maintain a “limited open forum” from denying “equal access” to students who wish to meet within the forum on the basis of the content of the speech at such meetings, §4071(a). Respondents further alleged that petitioners’ actions denied them their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to freedom of speech, association, and the free exercise of religion. Petitioners responded. that the Equal Access Act did not apply to Westside and that, if the Act did apply, it violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment and was therefore unconstitutional. The United States intervened in the action pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2403 to defend the constitutionality of the Act.
The District Court entered judgment for petitioners. The court held that the Act did not apply in this case because Westside did not have a “limited open forum” as defined by the Act—all of Westside’s student clubs, the court concluded, were curriculum-related and tied to the educational function of the school. The court rejected respondents’ constitutional claims, reasoning that Westside did not have a limited public forum as set forth in Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263 (1981), and that Westside’s denial of respondents’ request was reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns, see Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U. S. 260, 273 (1988).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. 867 F. 2d 1076 (1989). The Court of Appeals held that the District Court erred in concluding that all the existing student clubs at Westside were curriculum related. The Court of Appeals noted that the “broad interpretation” advanced by the Westside school officials “would make the [Equal Access Act] meaningless” and would allow any school to “arbitrarily deny access to school facilities to any unfavored student club on the basis of its speech content,” which was “exactly the result that Congress sought to prohibit by enacting the [Act].” Id., at 1078. The Court of Appeals instead found that “[m]any of the student clubs at WHS, including the chess club, are noncurriculum-related.” Id., at 1079. Accordingly, because it found that Westside maintained a limited open forum under the Act, the Court of Appeals concluded that the Act applied to “forbi[d] discrimination against [respondents’] proposed club on the basis of its religious content.” Ibid.
The Court of Appeals then rejected petitioners’ contention that the Act violated the Establishment Clause. Noting that the Act extended the decision in Widmar v. Vincent, supra, to public secondary schools, the Court of Appeals concluded that “[a]ny constitutional attack on the [Act] must therefore be predicated on the difference between secondary school students and university students.” 867 F. 2d, at 1080 (footnote omitted). Because “Congress considered the difference in the maturity level of secondary students and university students before passing the [Act],” the Court of Appeals held, on the basis of Congress’ factfinding, that the Act did not violate the Establishment Clause. Ibid.
We granted certiorari, 492 U. S. 917 (1989), and now affirm.
II
A
In Widmar v. Vincent, supra, we invalidated, on free speech grounds, a state university regulation that prohibited student use of school facilities “‘for purposes of religious worship or religious teaching.’” Id., at 265. In doing so, we held that an “equal access” policy would not violate the Establishment Clause under our decision in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 612-613 (1971). In particular, we held that such a policy would have a secular purpose, would not have the primary effect of advancing religion, and would not result in excessive entanglement between government and religion. Widmar, 454 U. S., at 271-274. We noted, however, that “[u]niversity students are, of course, young adults. They are less impressionable than younger students and should be able to appreciate that the University’s policy is one of neutrality toward religion.” Id., at 274, n. 14.
In 1984, Congress extended the reasoning of Widmar to public secondary schools. Under the Equal Access Act, a public secondary school with a “limited open forum” is prohibited from discriminating against students who wish to conduct a meeting within that forum on the basis of the “religious, political, philosophical, or other content of the speech at such meetings.” 20 U. S. C. §§ 4071(a) and (b). Specifically, the Act provides:
“It shall be unlawful for any public secondary school which receives Federal financial assistance and which has a limited open forum to deny equal access or a fair opportunity to, or discriminate against, any students who wish to conduct a meeting within that limited open forum on the basis of the religious, political, philosophical, or other content of the speech at such meetings.” § 4071(a).
A “limited open forum” exists whenever a public secondary school “grants an offering to or opportunity for one or more noncurriculum related student groups to meet on school premises during noninstructional time.” § 4071(b). “Meeting” is defined to include “those activities of student groups which are permitted under a school’s limited open forum and are not directly related to the school curriculum.” § 4072(3). “Noninstructional time” is defined to mean “time set aside by the school before actual classroom instruction begins or after actual classroom instruction ends.” § 4072(4). Thus, even if a public secondary school allows only one “noncurriculum related student group” to meet, the Act’s obligations are triggered and the school may not deny other clubs, on the basis of the content of their speech, equal access to meet on school premises during noninstructional time.
The Act further specifies that a school “shall be deemed to offer a fair opportunity to students who wish to conduct a meeting within its limited open forum” if the school uniformly provides that the meetings are voluntary and student initiated; are not sponsored by the school, the government, or its agents or employees; do not materially and substantially interfere with the orderly conduct of educational activities within the school; and are not directed, controlled, conducted, or regularly attended by “nonschool persons.” §§ 4071(c)(1), (2), (4), and (5). “Sponsorship” is defined to mean “the act of promoting, leading, or participating in a meeting. The assignment of a teacher, administrator, or other school employee to a meeting for custodial purposes does not constitute sponsorship of the meeting.” § 4072(2). If the meetings are religious, employees or agents of the school or government may attend only in a “nonparticipatory capacity.” § 4071(c)(3). Moreover, a State may not influence the form of any religious activity, require any person to participate in such activity, or compel any school agent or employee to attend a meeting if the content of the speech at the meeting is contrary to that person’s beliefs. §§ 4071 (d)(1), (2), and (4).
Finally, the Act does not “authorize the United States to deny or withhold Federal financial assistance to any school,” § 4071(e), or “limit the authority of the school, its agents or employees, to maintain order and discipline on school premises, to protect the well-being of students and faculty, and to assure that attendance of students at meetings is voluntary,” § 4071(f).
B
The parties agree that Westside High School receives federal financial assistance and is a public secondary school within the meaning of the Act. App. 57-58. The Act’s obligation to grant equal access to student groups is therefore triggered if Westside maintains a “limited open forum”— i. e., if it permits one or more “noncurriculum related student groups” to meet on campus before or after classes.
Unfortunately, the Act does not define the crucial phrase “noncurriculum related student group. ” Our immediate task is therefore one of statutory interpretation. We begin, of course, with the language of the statute. See, e. g., Mallard v. United States District Court, Southern District of Iowa, 490 U. S. 296, 300 (1989); United States v. James, 478 U. S. 597, 604 (1986). The common meaning of the term “curriculum” is “the whole body of courses offered by an educational institution or one of its branches. ” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 557 (1976); see also Black’s Law Dictionary 345 (5th ed. 1979) (“The set of studies or courses for a particular period, designated by a school or branch of a school”). Cf. Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U. S., at 271 (high school newspaper produced as part of the school’s journalism class was part of the curriculum). Any sensible interpretation of “noncurriculum related student group” must therefore be anchored in the notion that such student groups are those that are not related to the body of courses offered by the school. The difficult question is the degree of “unrelatedness to the curriculum” required for a group to be considered “noncurriculum related.”
The Act’s definition of the sort of “meeting[s]” that must be accommodated under the statute, § 4071(a), sheds some light on this question. “The term ‘meeting’ includes those activities of student groups which are... not directly related to the school curriculum.” § 4072(3) (emphasis added). Con gress’ use of the phrase “directly related” implies that student groups directly related to the subject matter of courses offered by the school do not fall within the “noncurriculum related” category and would therefore be considered “curriculum related.”
The logic of the Act also supports this view, namely, that a curriculum-related student group is one that has more than just a tangential or attenuated relationship to courses offered by the school. Because the purpose of granting equal access is to prohibit discrimination between religious or political clubs on the one hand and other noncurriculum-related student groups on the other, the Act is premised on the notion that a religious or political club is itself likely to be a noncurriculum-related student group. It follows, then, that a student group that is “curriculum related” must at least have a more direct relationship to the curriculum than a religious or political club would have.
Although the phrase “noncurriculum related student group” nevertheless remains sufficiently ambiguous that we might normally resort to legislative history, see, e. g., James, supra, at 606, we find the legislative history on this issue less than helpful. Because the bill that led to the Act was extensively rewritten in a series of multilateral negotiations after it was passed by the House and reported out of committee by the Senate, the Committee Reports shed no light on the language actually adopted. During congressional debate on the subject, legislators referred to a number of different definitions, and thus both petitioners and respondents can cite to legislative history favoring their interpretation of the phrase. Compare 130 Cong. Rec. 19223 (1984) (statement of Sen. Hatfield) (curriculum-related clubs are those that are “really a kind of extension of the classroom”), with ibid, (statement of Sen. Hatfield) (in response to question whether school districts would have full authority to decide what was curriculum related, “[w]e in no way seek to limit that discretion”). See Laycock, Equal Access and Moments of Silence: The Equal Status of Religious Speech by Private Speakers, 81 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1, 37-39 (1986).
We think it significant, however, that the Act, which was passed by wide, bipartisan majorities in both the House and the Senate, reflects at least some consensus on a broad legislative purpose. The Committee Reports indicate that the Act was intended to address perceived widespread discrimination against religious speech in public schools, see H. R. Rep. No. 98-710, p. 4 (1984); S. Rep. No. 98-357, pp. 10-11 (1984), and, as the language of the Act indicates, its sponsors contemplated that the Act would do more than merely validate the status quo. The Committee Reports also show that the Act was enacted in part in response to two federal appellate court decisions holding that student religious groups could not, consistent with the Establishment Clause, meet on school premises during noninstructional time. See H. R. Rep. No. 98-710, supra, at 3-6 (discussing Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Independent School Dist., 669 F. 2d 1038, 1042-1048 (CA5 1982), cert. denied, 459 U. S. 1155-1156 (1983), and Brandon v. Guilderland Bd. of Ed., 635 F. 2d 971 (CA2 1980), cert. denied, 454 U. S. 1123 (1981)); S. Rep. No. 98-357, supra, at 6-9, 11-14 (same). A broad reading of the Act would be consistent with the views of those who sought to end discrimination by allowing students to meet and discuss religion before and after classes.
In light of this legislative purpose, we think that the term “noncurriculum related student group” is best interpreted broadly to mean any student group that does not directly relate to the body of courses offered by the school. In our view, a student group directly relates to a school’s curriculum if the subject matter of the group is actually taught, or will soon be taught, in a regularly offered course; if the subject matter of the group concerns the body of courses as a whole; if participation in the group is required for a particular course; or if participation in the group results in academic credit. We think this limited definition of groups that directly relate to the curriculum is a commonsense interpretation of the Act that is consistent with Congress’ intent to provide a low threshold for triggering the Act’s requirements.
For example, a French club would directly relate to the curriculum if a school taught French in a regularly offered course or planned to teach the subject in the near future. A school’s student government would generally relate directly to the curriculum to the extent that it addresses concerns, solicits opinions, and formulates proposals pertaining to the body of courses offered by the school. If participation in a school’s band or orchestra were required for the band or orchestra classes, or resulted in academic credit, then those groups would also directly relate to the curriculum. The existence of such groups at a school would not trigger the Act’s obligations.
On the other hand, unless a school could show that groups such as a chess club, a stamp collecting club, or a community service club fell within our description of groups that directly relate to the curriculum, such groups would be “noncurriculum related student groups” for purposes of the Act. The existence of such groups would create a “limited open forum” under the Act and would prohibit the school from denying equal access to any other student group on the basis of the content of that group’s speech. Whether a specific student group is a “noncurriculum related student group” will therefore depend on a particular school’s curriculum, but such determinations would be subject to factual findings well within the competence of trial courts to make.
Petitioners contend that our reading of the Act unduly hinders local control over schools and school activities, but we think that schools and school districts nevertheless retain a significant measure of authority over the type of officially recognized activities in which their students participate. See, e. g., Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U. S. 260 (1988); Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U. S. 675 (1986). First, schools and school districts maintain their traditional latitude to determine appropriate subjects of instruction. To the extent that a school chooses to structure its course offerings and existing student groups to avoid the Act’s obligations, that result is not prohibited by the Act. On matters of statutory interpretation, “[o]ur task is to apply the text, not to improve on it.” Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 493 U. S. 120, 126 (1989). Second, the Act expressly does not limit a school’s authority to prohibit meetings that would “materially and substantially interfere with the orderly conduct of educational activities within the school.” § 4071(c)(4); cf. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U. S. 503, 509 (1969). The Act also preserves “the authority of the school, its agents or employees, to maintain order and discipline on school premises, to protect the well-being of students and faculty, and to assure that attendance of students at meetings is voluntary.” § 4071(f). Finally, because the Act applies only to public secondary schools that receive federal financial assistance, § 4071(a), a school district seeking to escape the statute’s obligations could simply forgo federal funding. Although we do not doubt that in some cases this may be an unrealistic option, Congress clearly sought to prohibit schools from discriminating on the basis of the content of a student group’s speech, and that obligation is the price a federally funded school must pay if it opens its facilities to noncurriculum-related student groups.
The dissent suggests that “an extracurricular student organization is ‘noncurriculum related’ if it has as its purpose (or as part of its purpose) the advocacy of partisan theological, political, or ethical views.” Post, at 276; see also post, at 271, 290 (Act is triggered only if school permits “controversial” or “distasteful” groups to use its facilities); post, at 291 (“noncurriculum” subjects are those that “‘cannot properly be included in a public school curriculum’”). This interpretation of the Act, we are told, is mandated by Congress’ intention to “track our own Free Speech Clause jurisprudence,” post, at 279, n. 10, by incorporating Widmar’s notion of a “limited public forum” into the language of the Act. Post, at 271-272.
This suggestion is flawed for at least two reasons. First, the Act itself neither uses the phrase “limited public forum” nor so much as hints that that doctrine is somehow “incorporated” into the words of the statute. The operative language of the statute, 20 U. S. C. § 4071(a), of course, refers to a “limited open forum,” a term that is specifically defined in the next subsection, § 4071(b). Congress was presumably aware that “limited public forum,” as used by the Court, is a term of art, see, e. g., Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators’ Assn., 460 U. S. 37, 45-49 (1983), and had it intended to import that concept into the Act, one would suppose that it would have done so explicitly. Indeed, Congress’ deliberate choice to use a different term—and to define that term—can only mean that it intended to establish a standard different from the one established by our free speech cases. See Laycock, 81 Nw. U. L. Rev., at 36 (“The statutory ‘limited open forum’ is an artificial construct, and comparisons with the constitutional [‘limited public forum’] cases can be misleading”). To paraphrase the dissent, “[i]f Congress really intended to [incorporate] Widmar for reasons of administrative clarity, Congress kept its intent well hidden, both in the statute and in the debates preceding its passage.” Post, at 281-282, n. 15.
Second, and more significant, the dissent’s reliance on the legislative history to support its interpretation of the Act shows just how treacherous that task can be. The dissent appears to agree with our view that the legislative history of the Act, even if relevant, is highly unreliable, see, e. g., post, at 274-275, n. 5, and 281-282, n. 15, yet the interpretation it suggests rests solely on a few passing, general references by legislators to our decision in Widmar, see post, at 274, and n. 4. We think that reliance on legislative history is hazardous at best, but where “‘not even the sponsors of the bill knew what it meant,?” post, at 281, n. 15 (quoting Laycock, supra, at 38 (citation omitted)), such reliance cannot form a reasonable basis on which to interpret the text of a statute. For example, the dissent appears to place great reliance on a comment by Senator Levin that the Act extends the rule in Widmar to secondary schools, see post, at 274, n. 4, but Senator Levin’s understanding of the “rule,” expressed in the same breath as the statement on which the dissent relies, fails to support the dissent’s reading of the Act. See 130 Cong. Rec. 19236 (1984) (“The pending amendment will allow students equal access to secondary schools student-initiated religious meetings before and after school where the school generally allows groups of secondary school students to meet during those times”) (emphasis added). Moreover, a number of Senators, during the same debate, warned that some of the views stated did not reflect their own views. See, e. g., ibid. (“I am troubled with the legislative history that you are making here”) (statement of Sen. Chiles); id., at 19237 (“[T]here have been a number of statements made on the floor today which may be construed as legislative history modifying what my understanding was or what anyone’s understanding might be of this bill”) (statement of Sen. Denton). The only thing that can be said with any confidence is that some Senators may have thought that the obligations of the Act would be triggered only when a school permits advocacy groups to meet on school premises during noninstructional time. That conclusion, of course, cannot bear the weight the dissent places on it.
C
The parties in this case focus their dispute on 10 of Westside’s approximately 30 voluntary student clubs: Interact (a service club related to Rotary International); Chess Club; Subsurfers (a club for students interested in scuba diving); National Honor Society; Photography Club; Welcome to Westside Club (a club to introduce new students to the school); Future Business Leaders of America; Zonta Club (the female counterpart to Interact); Student Advisory Board (student government); and Student Forum (student government). App. 60. Petitioners contend that all of these student activities are curriculum related because they further the goals of particular aspects of the school’s curriculum. The Welcome to Westside Club, for example, helps “further the School’s overall goal of developing effective citizens by requiring student members to contribute to their fellow students.” Brief for Petitioners 16. The student government clubs “advance the goals of the School’s political science classes by providing an understanding and appreciation of government processes.” Id., at 17. Subsurfers furthers “one of the essential goals of the Physical Education Department-enabling students to develop life-long recreational interests.” Id., at 18. The Chess Club “supplemen[s] math and science courses because it enhances students’ ability to engage in critical thought processes.” Id., at 18-19. Participation in Interact and the Zonta Club “promotes effective citizenship, a critical goal of the WHS curriculum, specifically the Social Studies Department.” Id., at 19.
To the extent that petitioners contend that “curriculum related” means anything remotely related to abstract educational goals, however, we reject that argument. To define “curriculum related” in a way that results in almost no schools having limited open fora, or in a way that permits schools to evade the Act by strategically describing existing student groups, would render the Act merely hortatory. See 130 Cong. Rec. 19222 (1984) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (“[A] limited open forum should be triggered by what a school does, not by what it says”). As the court below explained:
“Allowing such a broad interpretation of ‘curriculum-related’ would make the [Act] meaningless. A school’s administration could simply declare that it maintains a closed forum and choose which student clubs it wanted to allow by tying the purposes of those student clubs to some broadly defined educational goal. At the same time the administration could arbitrarily deny access to school facilities to any unfavored student club on the basis of its speech content. This is exactly the result that Congress sought to prohibit by enacting the [Act]. A public secondary school cannot simply declare that it maintains a closed forum and then discriminate against a particular student group on the basis of the content of the speech of that group.” 867 F. 2d, at 1078.
See also Garnett v. Renton School Dist. No. 403, 874 F. 2d 608, 614 (CA9 1989) (“Complete deference [to the school district] would render the Act meaningless because school boards could circumvent the Act’s requirements simply by asserting that all student groups are curriculum related”).
Rather, we think it clear that Westside’s existing student groups include one or more “noncurriculum related student groups.” Although Westside’s physical education classes apparently include swimming, see Record, Tr. of Preliminary Injunction Hearing 25, counsel stated at oral argument that scuba diving is not taught in any regularly offered course at the school, Tr. of Oral Arg. 6. Based on Westside’s own description of the group, Subsurfers does not directly relate to the curriculum as a whole in the same way that a student government or similar group might. App. 485-486. Moreover, participation in Subsurfers is not required by any course at the school and does not result in extra academic credit. Id., at 170-171, 236. Thus, Subsurfers is a “noncurriculum related student group” for purposes of the Act. Similarly, although math teachers at Westside have encouraged their students to play chess, id., at 442-444, chess is not taught in any regularly offered course at the school, Tr. of Oral Arg. 6, and participation in the Chess Club is not required for any class and does not result in extra credit for any class, App. 302-304. The Chess Club is therefore another “noncurriculum related student group” at Westside. Moreover, Westside’s principal acknowledged at trial that the Peer Advocates program—a service group that works with special education classes—does not directly relate to any courses offered by the school and is not required by any courses offered by the school. Id., at 231-233; see also id., at 198-199 (participation in Peer Advocates is not required for any course and does not result in extra credit in any course). Peer Advocates would therefore also fit within our description of a “noncurriculum related student group.” The record therefore supports a finding that Westside has maintained a limited open forum under the Act.
Although our definition of “noncurriculum related student activities” looks to a school’s actual practice rather than its stated policy, we note that our conclusion is also supported by the school’s own description of its student activities. As reprinted in the Appendix to this opinion, the school states that Band “is included in our regular curriculum”; Choir “is a course offered as part of the curriculum”; Distributive Education “is an extension of the Distributive Education class”; International Club is “developed through our foreign language classes”; Latin Club is “designed for those students who are taking Latin as a foreign language”; Student Publications “includes classes offered in preparation of the yearbook (Shield) and the student newspaper (Lance)”; Dramatics “is an extension of a regular academic class”; and Orchestra “is an extension of our regular curriculum.” These descriptions constitute persuasive evidence that these student clubs directly relate to the curriculum. By inference, however, the fact that the descriptions of student activities such as Subsurfers and chess do not include such references strongly suggests that those clubs do not, by the school’s own admission, directly relate to the curriculum. We therefore conclude that Westside permits “one or more noncurriculum related student groups to meet on school premises during noninstructional time,” § 4071(b). Because Westside maintains a “limited open forum” under the Act, it is prohibited from discriminating, based on the content of the students’ speech, against students who wish to meet on school premises during noninstructional time.
The remaining statutory question is whether petitioners’ denial of respondents’ request to form a religious group constitutes a denial of “equal access” to the school’s limited open forum. Although the school apparently permits respondents to meet informally after school, App. 315-316, respondents seek equal access in the form of official recognition by the school. Official recognition allows student clubs to be part of the student activities program and carries with it access to the school newspaper, bulletin boards, the public address system, and the annual Club Fair. Id., at 434-435. Given that the Act explicitly prohibits denial of “equal access... to... any students who wish to conduct a meeting within [the school’s] limited open forum” on the basis of the religious content of the speech at such meetings, § 4071(a), we hold that Westside’s denial of respondents’ request to form a Christian club denies them “equal access” under the Act.
Because we rest our conclusion on statutory grounds, we need not decide—and therefore express no opinion on—whether the First Amendment requires the same result.
II
Petitioners contend that even if Westside has created a limited open forum within the meaning of the Act, its denial of official recognition to the proposed Christian club must nevertheless stand because the Act violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, as applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. Specifically, petitioners maintain that because the school’s recognized student activities are an integral part of its educational mission, official recognition of respondents’ proposed club would effectively incorporate religious activities into the school’s official program, endorse participation in the religious club, and provide the club with an official platform to proselytize other students.
We disagree. In Widmar, we applied the three-part Lemon test to hold that an “equal access” policy, at the university level, does not violate the Establishment Clause. See 454 U. S., at 271-275 (applying Lemon, 403 U. S., at 612-613). We concluded that “an open-forum policy, including nondiscrimination against religious speech, would have a secular purpose,” 454 U. S., at 271 (footnotes omitted), and would in fact avoid entanglement with religion. See id., at 272, n. 11 (“[T]he University would risk greater ‘entanglement’ by attempting to enforce its exclusion of ‘religious worship’ and ‘religious speech’”). We also found that although incidental benefits accrued to religious groups who used university facilities, this result did not amount to an establishment of religion. First, we stated that a university’s forum does not “confer any imprimatur of state approval on religious sects or practices.” Id., at 274. Indeed, the message is one of neutrality rather than endorsement; if a State refused to let religious groups use facilities open to others, then it would demonstrate not neutrality but hostility toward religion. “The Establishment Clause
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
C
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Rehnquist
delivered the opinion of the Court.
I
Appellees Bartley, Gentile, Levine, Mathews, and Weand were the named plaintiffs in a complaint challenging the constitutionality of Pennsylvania statutes governing the voluntary admission and voluntary commitment to Pennsylvania mental health institutions of persons 18 years of age or younger. The named plaintiffs alleged that they were then being held at Haver ford State Hospital, a Pennsylvania mental health facility, and that they had been admitted or committed pursuant to the challenged provisions of the Pennsylvania Mental. Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966, Pa. Stat. Ann., tit. 50, §4101 et seq. (1969). Various state and hospital officials were named as defendants.
Plaintiffs sought to vindicate not only their own constitutional rights, but also sought to represent a class consisting of
“all persons under eighteen years of age who have been, are, or, may be admitted or committed to Haverford State Hospital and all other state mental health facilities under the challenged provisions of the state statute.” App. 10a-lla (complaint ¶7).
A three-judge United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania struck down the statutes as violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 402 F. Supp. 1039 (1975). The court also entered a broad order requiring the implementation of detailed procedural protections for those admitted under the Pennsylvania statutes. On December 15, 1975, this Court granted appellants' application for a stay of the judgment of the District Court. On March 22, 1976, we noted probable jurisdiction. 424 U. S. 964.
In general, the 1966 Act, which has been superseded to a significant degree, provides for three types of admission to a mental health facility for examination, treatment, and care: voluntary admission or commitment (§§402 and 403), emergency commitment (§405), and civil court commitment (§ 406). At issue here was the constitutionality of the voluntary admission and commitment statutes, §§ 402 and 403, as those statutes regulate the admission of persons 18 years of age or younger. The statutes provide that juveniles may be admitted upon the application of a parent, guardian, or individual standing in loco parentis and that, unlike adults, the admitted person is free to withdraw only with the consent of the parent or guardian admitting him.
There have been two major changes in the Pennsylvania statutory scheme that have materially affected the rights of juveniles: the promulgation of regulations under the 1966 Act, and the enactment of the Mental Health Procedures Act in 1976. At the time the complaint was filed, the 1966 Act made little or no distinction between older and younger juveniles. Each of the named plaintiffs was at that time between 15 and 18 years of age. After the commencement of this action, but before class certification or decision on the merits by the District Court, the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare promulgated regulations which substantially increased the procedural safeguards afforded to minors 13 years of age or older. The regulations, promulgated pursuant to statutory authority, became effective September 1, 1973. The major impact of the regulations upon this litigation stems from the fact that the regulations accord significant procedural protections to those 13 and older, but not to those less than 13. The older juveniles are given notification of their rights, the telephone number of counsel, and the right to institute a § 406 involuntary commitment proceeding in court within two business days. Under § 406, a judicial hearing is held after notice to the parties. The younger juveniles are not given the right to a hearing and are still remitted to relying upon the admitting parent or guardian.
Although the regulations sharply differentiate between juveniles of less than 13 years of age and those 13 to 18, on April 29, 1974, the District Court nonetheless certified the following class to be represented by the plaintiffs:
“This action shall be maintained as a class action under Rule 23(b)(1) and (2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of the class comprised of all persons eighteen years of age or younger who have been, are or may be admitted or committed to mental health facilities in Pennsylvania pursuant to the challenged provisions of the state mental health law (i. e., 50 P. S. §§ 4402 and 4403). This definition of the class is without prejudice to the possibility that it may be amended or altered before the decision on the merits herein.” App. 270a.
On July 9, 1976, after the decision below and after this Court had noted probable jurisdiction, Pennsylvania enacted a new statute substantially altering its voluntary admission procedures. Mental Health Procedures Act, Pa. Act No. 143. The new Act completely repeals the provisions declared unconstitutional below except insofar as they relate to mentally retarded persons. § 502. Under the hew Act, any person 14 years of age or over may voluntarily admit himself, but his parents may not do so; those 14 to 18 who were subject to commitment by their parents under the 1966 Act are treated essentially as adults under the new Act. § 201. Under the new Act children 13 and younger may still be admitted for treatment by a parent, guardian, or person standing in loco parentis. Ibid. Those 14 and over may withdraw from voluntary treatment “at any time by giving written notice.” § 206 (a). Those under 14 may be released by request of the parent; in addition, “any responsible party” may petition the Juvenile Division of the Court of Common Pleas to request withdrawal of the child or modification of his treatment. § 206 (b).
Because we have concluded that the claims of the named appellees are mooted by the new Act, and that the claims of the unnamed members of the class are not properly presented for review, we do not dwell at any length upon the statutory scheme for voluntary commitment in Pennsylvania or upon the rationale of the District Court’s holding that the 1966 Act and regulations did not satisfy due process.
II
This case presents important constitutional issues — issues that were briefed and argued before this Court. However, for reasons hereafter discussed, we conclude that the claims of the named appellees are mooted by the new Act and decline to adjudicate the claims of the class certified by the District Court. That class has been fragmented by the enactment of the new Act and the promulgation of the regulations.
Constitutional adjudication being a matter of “great gravity and delicacy,” see Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 345 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring), we base our refusal to pass on the merits on “the policy rules often invoked by the Court 'to avoid passing prematurely on constitutional questions. Because {such] rules operate in “cases confessedly within [the Court’s] jurisdiction” . . . they find their source in policy, rather than purely constitutional, considerations.’ ” Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U. S. 747, 756 n. 8 (1976).
A
At the time the complaint was filed, each of the named plaintiffs was older than 14, and insofar as the record indicates, mentally ill. The essence of their position was that, as matters stood at that time, a juvenile 18 or younger could be “voluntarily” admitted upon application of his parent, over the objection of the juvenile himself. Thus, appellees urged in their complaint that the Due Process Clause required that they be accorded the right to a hearing, as well as other procedural protections, to ensure the validity of the commitment. App. 21a-22a (complaint ¶ 46).
The fact that the Act was passed after the decision below does not save the named appellees’ claims from mootness. There must be a live case or controversy before this Court, Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393, 402 (1975), and we apply the law as it is now, not as it stood below. Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U. S. 379 (1975); Sosna v. Iowa, supra. Thus the enactment of the new statute clearly moots the claims of the named appellees, and all others 14 or older and mentally ill.
These concerns were eradicated with the passage of the new Act, which applied immediately to all persons receiving voluntary treatment. § 501. The Act, in essence, treats mentally ill juveniles 14 and older as adults. They may voluntarily commit themselves, but their parents may not do so, § 201, and one receiving voluntary treatment may withdraw at any time by giving written notice. § 206. With respect to the named appellees, the Act completely repealed and replaced the statutes challenged below, and obviated their demand for a hearing, and other procedural protections, since the named appellees had total freedom to leave the hospital, and could not be forced to return absent their consent. After the passage of the Act, in no sense were the named appellees “detained and incarcerated involuntarily in mental hospitals,” as they had alleged in the complaint, App. 21a.
B
If the only appellees before us were the named appellees, the mootness of the case with respect to them would require that we vacate the judgment of the District Court with instructions to dismiss their complaint. United States v. Munsingwear, 340 U. S. 36 (1950). But as we have previously indicated, the District Court certified, pursuant to Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23, the class described supra, at 125-126.
In particular types of class actions this Court has held that the presence of a properly certified class may provide an added dimension to our Art. Ill analysis, and that the mootness of the named plaintiffs’ claims does not “inexorably” require dismissal of the action. Sosna, supra, at 399-401. See also Franks v. Bowman Transportation, Inc., supra, at 752-757; Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 110-111, n. 11 (1975). But we have never adopted a flat rule that the mere fact of certification of a class by a district court was sufficient to require us to decide the merits of the claims of unnamed class members when those of the named parties had become moot. Cf. Sosna, supra, at 402. Here, the promulgation of the regulations materially changed, prior to class certification, the controverted issues with respect to a large number of unnamed plaintiffs; prior to decision by this Court, the controverted issues pertaining to even more unnamed plaintiffs have been affected by the passage of the 1976 Act. We do not think that the fragmented residual of the class originally certified by the District Court may be treated as were the classes in Sosna and Franks.
There is an obvious lack of homogeneity among those unnamed members of the class originally certified by the District Court. Analysis of the current status of the various subgroups reveals a bewildering lineup of permutations and combinations. As we parse it, the claims of those 14 and older and mentally ill are moot. They have received by statute all that they claimed under the Constitution. Those 14 and older and mentally retarded are subject to the 1966 Act, struck down by the District Court, but are afforded the protections of the regulations. Their claims are not wholly mooted, but are satisfied in many respects by the regulations. Those 13 and mentally ill are subject to the admissions procedures of the new Act, arguably supplemented by the procedural protection of the regulations. The status of their claims is unclear. Those 13 and mentally retarded are subject to the 1966 Act and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Their claims are satisfied in many respects. Those younger than 13 and mentally ill are unaided by the regulations and are subject to the admissions procedures of the 1976 Act, the constitutional effect of which has not been reviewed by the District Court. Those younger than 13 and mentally retarded are subject to the 1966 Act, unaffected by the regulations. This latter group is thus the only group whose status has not changed materially since the outset of the litigation. These fragmented subclasses are represented by named plaintiffs whose constitutional claims are moot, and it is the attorneys for these named plaintiffs who have conducted the litigation in the District Court and in this Court.
The factors which we have just described make the class aspect of this litigation a far cry indeed from that aspect of the litigation in Sosna and in Franks, where we adjudicated the merits of the class claims notwithstanding the mootness of the claims of the named parties. In Sosna, the named plaintiff had by the time the litigation reached this Court fulfilled the residency requirement which she was challenging, but the class described in the District Court’s certification remained exactly the same. In that case, mootness was due to the inexorable passage of time, rather than to any change in the law. In Franks, a Title VII discrimination lawsuit, the named plaintiff had been subsequently discharged for a nondiscriminatory reason, and therefore before this Court that plaintiff no longer had a controversy with his employer similar to those of the unnamed members of the class. But the metes and bounds of each of those classes remained the same; the named plaintiff was simply no longer within them.
Here, by contrast, the metes and bounds of the class certified by the District Court have been carved up by two changes in the law. In Sosna and Franks, the named plaintiffs had simply “left” the class, but the class remained substantially unaltered. In both of those cases, the named plaintiff's mootness was not related to any factor also affecting the unnamed members of the class. In this case, however, the class has been both truncated and compartmentalized by legislative action; this intervening legislation has rendered moot not only the claims of the named plaintiffs but also the claims of a large number of unnamed plaintiffs. The legislation, coupled with the regulations, has in a word materially changed the status of those included within the class description.
For all of the foregoing reasons, we have the gravest doubts whether the class, as presently constituted, comports with the requirements of Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23 (a) , And it is only a “properly certified” class that may succeed to the adversary position of a named representative whose claim becomes moot. Indianapolis School Comm’rs v. Jacobs, 420 U. S. 128 (1975).
In addition to the differences to which we have already adverted, the issues presented by these appellees, unlike that presented by the appellant in Sosna, supra, are not “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” In the latter case there is a significant benefit in according the class representative the opportunity to litigate on behalf of the class, since otherwise there may well never be a definitive resolution of the constitutional claim on the merits by this Court. We stated in Franks that “[gjiven a properly certified class action, . . . mootness turns on whether, in the specific circumstances of the given case at the time it is before this Court, an adversary relationship sufficient to fulfill this function exists.” 424 U. S., at 755-756. We noted that the “evading review” element was one factor to be considered in evaluating the adequacy of the adversary relationship in this Court. Id., at 756 n. 8. In this case, not only is the issue one that will not evade review, but the existence of a “properly certified class action” is dubious, and the initial shortcomings in the certification have multiplied. See Indianapolis School Comm’rs v. Jacobs, supra.
In sum, none of the critical factors that might require us to adjudicate the claims of a class after mootness of the named plaintiff’s claims are present here. We are dealing with important constitutional issues on the merits, issues which are not apt to evade review, in the context of mooted claims on the part of all of the named parties and a certified class which, whatever the merits of its original certification by the District Court, has been fragmented by the enactment of legislation since that certification. While there are “live” disputes between unnamed members of portions of the class certified by the District Court, on the one hand, and appellants, on the other, these disputes are so unfocused as to make informed resolution of them almost impossible. Cf. Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U. S. 379 (1976). We accordingly decline to pass on the merits of appellees’ constitutional claims.
We conclude that before the “live” claims of the fragmented subclasses remaining in this litigation can be decided on the merits, the case must be remanded to the District Court for reconsideration of the class definition, exclusion of those whose claims are moot, and substitution of class representatives with live claims.
Because the District Court will confront this task on remand, we think it not amiss to remind that court that it is under the same obligation as we are to “stop, look, and listen” before certifying a class in order to adjudicate constitutional claims. That court, in its original certification, ignored the effect of the regulations promulgated by appellants which made a dramatic distinction between older and younger juveniles, and, according to the District Court, 402 F. Supp., at 1042, accorded the named appellees all of the protections which they sought, save two: the right to a precommitment hearing, and the specification of the time for the postcommitment hearing.
This distinction between older and younger juveniles, recognized by state administrative authorities (and later by the Pennsylvania Legislature in its enactment of the 1976 Act), emphasizes the very possible differences in the interests of the older juveniles and the younger juveniles. Separate counsel for the younger juveniles might well have concluded that it would not have been in the best interest of their clients to press for the requirement of an automatic precommitment hearing, because of the possibility that such a hearing with its propensity to pit parent against child might actually be antithetical to the best interest of the younger juveniles. In the event that these issues are again litigated before the District Court, careful attention must be paid to the differences between mentally ill and mentally retarded, and between the young and the very young. It may be that Pennsylvania’s experience in implementing the new Act will shed light on these issues.
Ill
This disposition is made with full recognition of the importance of the issues, and of our assumption that all parties earnestly seek a decision on the merits. As Mr. Justice Brandéis stated in his famous concurrence in Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S., at 345:
“The fact that it would be convenient for the parties and the public to have promptly decided whether the legislation assailed is valid, cannot justify a departure from these settled rules . . . .”
And, as we have more recently observed in the context of “ripeness”:
“All of the parties now urge that the ‘conveyance taking’ issues are ripe for adjudication. However, because issues of ripeness involve, at least in part, the existence of a live ‘Case or Controversy,’ we cannot rely upon concessions of the parties and must determine whether the issues are ripe for decision in the ‘Case or Controversy’ sense. Further, to the extent that questions of ripeness involve the exercise of judicial restraint from unnecessary decision of constitutional issues, the Court must determine whether to exercise that restraint and cannot be bound by the wishes of the parties.” Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U. S. 102, 138 (1974). (Footnote omitted.)
Our analysis of the questions of mootness and of our ability to adjudicate the claims of the class in this case is consistent with the long-established rule that this Court will not “formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.” Liverpool, N. Y. & P. S. S. Co. v. Emigration Comm’rs, 113 U. S. 33, 39 (1885). The judgment of the District Court is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Haverford State Hospital was initially named as a defendant but was dismissed by mutual agreement. 402 F. Supp. 1039, 1043 n. 6 (ED Pa. 1975).
The principal distinction between the sections is that a voluntary commitment is not to exceed 30 days, with successive periods not to exceed 30 days each, as long as care or observation is necessary. There is no time limitation following a voluntary admission to a facility. See id., at 1054r-1055, n. 3 (dissenting opinion). See also n. 4, infra. There has been no distinction between the two sections for purposes of this lawsuit. Hence, unless otherwise indicated, we shall use the words “admitted” and “committed” interchangeably.
The statutes provide:
§ 402. “Voluntary admission; application, examination and acceptance; duration of admission
“(a) Application for voluntary admission to a facility for examination, treatment and care may be made by:
“(1) Any person over eighteen years of age.
“(2) A parent, guardian or individual standing in loco parentis to the person to be admitted, if such person is eighteen years of age or younger.
“(b) When an application is made, the director of the facility shall cause an examination to be made. If it is determined that the person named in the application is in need of care or observation, he may be admitted.
“(c) Except where application for admission has been made under the provisions of section 402 (a) (2) and the person admitted is still eighteen years of age or younger, any person voluntarily admitted shall be free to withdraw at any time. Where application has been made under the provisions of section 402 (a) (2), only the applicant or his successor shall be free to withdraw the admitted person so long as the admitted person is eighteen years of age or younger.
“(d) Each admission under the provisions of this section shall be reviewed at least annually by a committee, appointed by the director from the professional staff of the facility wherein the person is admitted, to determine whether continued care is necessary. Said committee shall malee written recommendations to the director which shall be filed at the facility and be open to inspection and review by the department and such other persons as the secretary by regulation may permit.
“Where the admission is under the provisions of section 402 (a) (2), the person admitted shall be informed at least each sixty days of the voluntary nature of his status at the facility.” Pa. Stat. Ann., tit. 50, § 4402 (1969) (footnote omitted).
§ 403. “Voluntary commitment; application, examination and acceptance; duration of commitment
“(a) Application for voluntary commitment to a facility for examination, treatment and care may be made by:
“(1) Any person over eighteen years of age.
“(2) A parent, guardian or individual standing in loco parentis to the person to be admitted, if such person is eighteen years of age or younger.
“ (b) The application shall be in writing, signed by the applicant in the presence of at least one witness. When an application is made, the director of the facility shall cause an examination to be made. If it is determined that the person named in the application is in need of care or observation, he shall be committed for a period not to exceed thirty days. Successive applications for continued voluntary commitment may be made for successive periods not to exceed thirty days each, so long as care or observation is necessary.
“(c) No person voluntarily committed shall be detained for more than ten days after he has given written notice to the director of his intention or desire to leave the facility, or after the applicant or his successor has given written notice of intention or desire to remove the detained person.
“(d) Each commitment under the provisions of this section shall be reviewed at least annually by a committee, appointed by the director from the professional staff of the facility wherein the person is cared for, to determine whether continued care and commitment is necessary. Said committee shall make written recommendations to the director which shall be filed at the facility and be open to inspection and review by the department and such other persons as the secretary by regulation shall permit.
“Where the commitment is under the provisions of section 403 (a) (2), the person committed shall be informed at least each sixty days of the voluntary nature of his status at the facility.” Pa. Stat. Ann., tit. 50, §4403 (1969) (footnote omitted).
With respect to those voluntarily admitted, the 1966 Act explicitly distinguishes between adults, who are free to withdraw at any time, and those 18 and younger, who may withdraw only with the consent of the admitting parent or guardian. § 402 (c). However, §403 (c), relating to withdrawal after voluntary commitment, does not explicitly make an age distinction, and, on its face, would allow either the person committed or the applicant {i. e., the parent or guardian) to effect the withdrawal. However, neither the court below nor the parties have read the statute as containing this distinction. E. g., Brief for Appellants 25.
§ 201 (2) of the 1966 Act.
Relevant portions of the regulations are set forth in the District Court’s opinion. 402 F. Supp., at 1042-1043, n. 5.
Section 406 is the statute that provides for the hearing procedures to be used in an involuntary civil court commitment. Pa. Stat. Ann., tit. 50, §4406 (1969).
Section 201 provides:
“Any person 14 years of age or over who believes that he is in need of treatment and substantially understands the nature of voluntary commitment may submit himself to examination and treatment under this act, provided that the decision to do so is made voluntarily. A parent, guardian, or person standing in loco parentis to a child less than 14 years of age may subject such child to examination and treatment under this act, and in so doing shall be deemed to be acting for the child. Except as otherwise authorized in this act, all of the provisions of this act governing examination and treatment shall apply.”
Section 206 provides:
“(a) A person in voluntary inpatient treatment may withdraw at any time by giving written notice unless, as stated in section 203, he has agreed in writing at the time of his admission that his release can be delayed following such notice for a period to be specified in the agreement, provided that such period shall not exceed 72 hours.
“(b) If the person is under the age of 14, his parent, legal guardian, or person standing in loco parentis may effect his release. If any responsible party believes that it would be in the best interest of a person under 14 years of age in voluntary treatment to be withdrawn therefrom or afforded treatment constituting a less restrictive alternative, such party may file a petition in the Juvenile Division of the court of common pleas for the county in which the person under 14 years of age resides, requesting a withdrawal from or modification of treatment. The court shall promptly appoint an attorney for such minor person and schedule a hearing to determine what inpatient treatment, if any, is in the minor’s best interest. The hearing shall be held within ten days of receipt of the petition, unless continued upon the request of the attorney for such minor. The hearing shall be conducted in accordance with the rules governing other Juvenile Court proceedings.
“(c) Nothing in this act shall be construed to require a facility to continue inpatient treatment where the director of the facility determines such treatment is not medically indicated. Any dispute between a facility and a county administrator as to the medical necessity for voluntary inpatient treatment of a person shall be decided by the Commissioner of Mental Health or his designate.” (Footnote omitted.)
The following notations are found in various medical records and evaluations in the record: (a) appellee Bartley, “Admission Note: Organic Brain Syndrome with epilepsy” (App. 137a); (b) appellee Gentile, “Schizophrenia” (id., at 145a); appellee Levine, “functioning within the average range of intelligence” (id., at 167a); appellee Weand, “dull normal range of intelligence” (id., at 169a); appellee Mathews, “functioning on a lower average range of intelligence, giving evidence of bright, normal and even superior learning capacities” (id., at 175a).
Given our view that the Act moots the claims of the named appellees, we need not address the issue of whether the promulgation of the new regulations had previously mooted their claims.
Mr. Justice Brennan suggests that none of this is relevant to our adjudication of the case. Post, at 140-142. Implicit in this suggestion is the conclusion that in the present posture of this case certification of a class represented by these named plaintiffs would be acceptable. This approach disregards the prerequisites to class actions contained in Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23 (a), see n. 14, infra, and pushed to its logical conclusions would do away with the standing requirement of Art. III. See, e. g., Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U. S. 31, 33 (1962) (parties may not “represent a class of whom they are not a part”); Schlesinger v. Reservists to Stop the War, 418 U. S. 208, 216 (1974) (class representative must “possess the same interest and suffer the same injury” as members of class).
Mr. Justice Brennan, post, at 142, seeks to minimize the extent of the changes in the law by asserting that only 20% of the plaintiff class is affected by the new Act. Even if this assertion were undisputed, it would not affect our disposition of the case. But we have no way to test the reliability of that figure. Before the new Act was passed, the distinction between mentally ill and mentally retarded was largely irrelevant for admissions purposes; hence the District Court made no findings with respect to the proportion of the class in each category, and the dissent does not indicate any support in the record for this figure, which first appears in the Reply Brief for Appellants 1 n. 2. Since this information was supplied by a party seeking a determination on the merits, it cannot be treated as a form of “admission against interest” by a litigant on appeal. In addition, the suggestion that 80% of the class remains in statu quo ante completely overlooks the substantial changes wrought by the regulations, which classified on the basis of age, rather than on the basis of mental illness or mental retardation.
Rule 23 (a) provides:
“(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.”
Mr. Justice Brennan suggests that our refusal to review the merits of these claims, and our vacation of the District Court’s judgment, are simply a confusing and unnecessary exaltation of form over substance. While our refusal to pass on the merits rests on discretionary considerations, we have long heeded such discretionary counsel in constitutional litigation. See Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 341 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). The dissent’s startling statement that our insistence on plaintiffs with live claims is “purely a matter of form,” post, at 142, would read into the Constitution a vastly expanded version of Rule 23 while reading Art. Ill out of the Constitution. The availability of thoroughly prepared attorneys to argue both sides of a constitutional question, and of numerous amici curiae ready to assist in the decisional process, even though all of them “stand like greyhounds in the slips, straining upon the start,” does not dispense with the requirement that there be a live dispute between “live” parties before we decide such a question.
The dissent, post, at 137, attaches great weight to the fact that the State argues that the case is not moot. As we have pointed out in the text, infra, at 136, the fact that the parties desire a decision on the merits does not automatically entitle them to receive such a decision. It is not at all unusual for all parties in a case to desire an adjudication on the merits when the alternative is additional litigation; but their desires can be scarcely thought to dictate the result of our inquiry into whether the merits should be reached. The dissent’s additional reliance on the “numerous amici [who have requested] an authoritative constitutional ruling . . .” post, at 140, overlooks the fact that briefs for no fewer than eight of these amici argue that the case is moot or suggest that the case be remanded for consideration of the intervening legislation.
Upon promulgation of the regulations, the named appellees received, inter alia, the right to institute a “section 406” involuntary commitment proceeding in court within two business days. Under § 406, a judicial hearing is held after notice to the parties; counsel is provided for in digents. It is this right to a hearing that was the gravamen of appellees’ complaint. App. 21a-23a (complaint ¶46).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
I
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Scalia
delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to Part II-D-2.
We consider whether a defendant forfeits his Sixth Amendment right to confront a witness against him when a judge determines that a wrongful act by the defendant made the witness unavailable to testify at trial.
I
On September 29, 2002, petitioner Dwayne Giles shot his ex-girlfriend, Brenda Avie, outside the garage of his grandmother’s house. No witness saw the shooting, but Giles’ niece heard what transpired from inside the house. She heard Giles and Avie speaking in conversational tones. Avie then yelled “Granny” several times and a series of gunshots sounded. Giles’ niece and grandmother ran outside and saw Giles standing near Avie with a gun in his hand. Avie, who had not been carrying a weapon, had been shot six times. One wound was consistent with Avie’s holding her hand up at the time she was shot, another was consistent with her having turned to her side, and a third was consistent with her having been shot while lying on the ground. Giles fled the scene after the shooting. He was apprehended by police about two weeks later and charged with murder.
At trial, Giles testified that he had acted in self-defense. Giles described Avie as jealous, and said he knew that she had once shot a man, that he had seen her threaten people with a knife, and that she had vandalized his home and car on prior occasions. He said that on the day of the shooting, Avie came to his grandmother’s house and threatened to kill him and his new girlfriend, who had been at the house earlier. He said that Avie had also threatened to kill his new girlfriend when Giles and Avie spoke on the phone earlier that day. Giles testified that after Avie threatened him at the house, he went into the garage and retrieved a gun, took the safety off, and started walking toward the back door of the house. He said that Avie charged at him, and that he was afraid she had something in her hand. According to Giles, he closed his eyes and fired several shots, but did not intend to kill Avie.
Prosecutors sought to introduce statements that Avie had made to a police officer responding to a domestic-violence report about three weeks before the shooting. Avie, who was crying when she spoke, told the officer that Giles had accused her of having an affair, and that after the two began to argue, Giles grabbed her by the shirt, lifted her off the floor, and began to choke her. According to Avie, when she broke free and fell to the floor, Giles punched her in the face and head, and after she broke free again, he opened a folding knife, held it about three feet away from her, and threatened to kill her if he found her cheating on him. Over Giles’ objection, the trial court admitted these statements into evidence under a provision of California law that permits admission of out-of-court statements describing the infliction or threat of physical injury on a declarant when the declarant is unavailable to testify at trial and the prior statements are deemed trustworthy. Cal. Evid. Code Ann. § 1370 (West Supp. 2008).
A jury convicted Giles of first-degree murder. He appealed. While his appeal was pending, this Court decided in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U. S. 36, 53-54 (2004), that the Confrontation Clause requires that a defendant have the opportunity to confront the witnesses who give testimony against him, except in cases where an exception to the confrontation right was recognized at the time of the founding. The California Court of Appeal held that the admission of Avie’s unconfronted statements at Giles’ trial did not violate the Confrontation Clause as construed by Crawford because Crawford recognized a doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing. 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 843, 847 (2004) (officially depublished). It concluded that Giles had forfeited his right to confront Avie because he had committed the murder for which he was on trial, and because his intentional criminal act made Avie unavailable to testify. The California Supreme Court affirmed on the same ground. 40 Cal. 4th 833, 837, 152 P. 3d 433, 435 (2007). We granted certiorari. 552 U. S. 1136 (2008).
II
The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” The Amendment contemplates that a witness who makes testimonial statements admitted against a defendant will ordinarily be present at trial for cross-examination, and that if the witness is unavailable, his prior testimony will be introduced only if the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine him. Crawford, 541 U. S., at 68. The State does not dispute here, and we accept without deciding, that Avie’s statements accusing Giles of assault were testimonial. But it maintains (as did the California Supreme Court) that the Sixth Amendment did not prohibit prosecutors from introducing the statements because an exception to the confrontation guarantee permits the use of a witness’s unconfronted testimony if a judge finds, as the judge did in this ease, that the defendant committed a wrongful act that rendered the witness unavailable to testify at trial. We held in Crawford that the Confrontation Clause is “most naturally read as a reference to the right of confrontation at common law, admitting only those exceptions established at the time of the founding.” Id., at 54. We therefore ask whether the theory of forfeiture by wrongdoing accepted by the California Supreme Court is a founding-era exception to the confrontation right.
A
We have previously acknowledged that two forms of testimonial statements were admitted at common law even though they were unconfronted. See id., at 56, n. 6, 62. The first of these were declarations made by a speaker who was both on the brink of death and aware that he was dying. See, e. g., King v. Woodcock, 1 Leach 500, 501-504, 168 Eng. Rep. 352, 353-354 (1789); State v. Moody, 3 N. C. 31 (Super. L. & Eq. 1798); United States v. Veitch, 28 F. Cas. 367, 367-368 (No. 16,614) (CC DC 1803); King v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. 78, 80-81 (Gen. Ct. 1817). Avie did not make the unconfronted statements admitted at Giles’ trial when she was dying, so her statements do not fall within this historic exception.
A second common-law doctrine, which we will refer to as forfeiture by wrongdoing, permitted the introduction of statements of a witness who was “detained” or “kept away” by the “means or procurement” of the defendant. See, e. g., Lord Motley’s Case, 6 How. St. Tr. 769, 771 (H. L. 1666) (“detained”); Harrison’s Case, 12 How. St. Tr. 833, 851 (H. L. 1692) (“made him keep away”); Queen v. Scaife, 117 Q. B. 238, 242, 117 Eng. Rep. 1271, 1273 (Q. B. 1851) (“kept away”); see also 2 W. Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown 425 (4th ed. 1762) (hereinafter Hawkins) (same); T. Peake, Compendium of the Law of Evidence 62 (2d ed. 1804) (“sent” away); 1 G. Gilbert, Law of Evidence 214 (1791) (“detained and kept back from
appearing by the means and procurement of the prisoner”). The doctrine has roots in the 1666 decision in Lord Motley’s Case, at which judges concluded that a witness’s having been “detained by the means or procurement of the prisoner” provided a basis to read testimony previously given at a coroner’s inquest. 6 How. St. Tr., at 770-771. Courts and commentators also concluded that wrongful procurement of a witness’s absence was among the grounds for admission of statements made at bail and committal hearings conducted under the Marian statutes, which directed justices of the peace to take the statements of felony suspects and the persons bringing the suspects before the magistrate, and to certify those statements to the court, Crawford, supra, at 43-44; J. Langbein, Prosecuting Crime in the Renaissance 10-12, 16-20 (1974). See 2 Hawkins 429. This class of confronted statements was also admissible if the witness who made them was dead or unable to travel. Ibid.
The terms used to define the scope of the forfeiture rule suggest that the exception applied only when the defendant engaged in conduct designed to prevent the witness from testifying. The rule required the witness to have been “kept back” or “detained” by “means or procurement” of the defendant. Although there are definitions of “procure” and “procurement” that would merely require that a defendant have caused the witness’s absence, other definitions would limit the causality to one that was designed to bring about the result “procured.” See 2 N. Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language (1828) (defining “procure” as “to contrive and effect” (emphasis added)); ibid, (defining “procure” as “[t]o get; to gain; to obtain; as by request, loan, effort, labor or purchase”); 12 Oxford English Dictionary 559 (2d ed. 1989) (def. 1(3)) (defining “procure” as “[t]o contrive or devise with care (an action or proceeding); to endeavour to cause or bring about (mostly something evil) to or for a person”). Similarly, while the term “means” could sweep in all cases in which a defendant caused a witness to fail to appear, it can also connote that a defendant forfeits confrontation rights when he uses an intermediary for the purpose of making a witness absent. See 9 id., at 516 (“[A] person who intercedes for another or uses influence in order to bring about a desired result”); N. Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language 822 (1869) (“That through which, or by the help of which, an end is attained”).
Cases and treatises of the time indicate that a purpose-based definition of these terms governed. A number of them said that prior testimony was admissible when a witness was kept away by the defendant’s “means and contrivance.” See 1 J. Chitty, A Practical Treatise on the Criminal Law 81 (1816) (“kept away by the means and contrivance of the prisoner”); S. Phillipps, A Treatise on the Law of Evidence 165 (1814) (“kept out of the way by the means and contrivance of the prisoner”); Drayton v. Wells, 10 S. C. L. 409, 411 (S. C. 1819) (“kept away by the contrivance of the opposite party”). This phrase requires that the defendant have schemed to bring about the absence from trial that he “contrived.” Contrivance is commonly defined as the act of “inventing, devising or planning,” 1 Webster, supra, at 47 (1828), “ingeniously endeavouring' the accomplishment of anything,” “the bringing to pass by planning, scheming, or stratagem,” or “[a]daption of means to an end; design, intention,” 3 Oxford English Dictionary, supra, at 850.
An 1858 treatise made the purpose requirement more explicit still, stating that the forfeiture rule applied when a witness “had been kept out of the way by the prisoner, or by some one on the prisoner’s behalf, in order to prevent him from giving evidence against him” E. Powell, The Practice of the Law of Evidence 166 (1858) (emphasis added). The wrongful-procurement exception was invoked in a manner consistent with this definition. We are aware of no case in which the exception was invoked although the defendant had not engaged in conduct designed to prevent a witness from testifying, such as offering a bribe.
B
The manner in which the rule was applied makes plain that unconfronted testimony would not be admitted without a showing that the defendant intended to prevent a witness from testifying. In cases where the evidence suggested that the defendant had caused a person to be absent, but had not done so to prevent the person from testifying — as in the typical murder case involving accusatorial statements by the victim — the testimony was excluded unless it was confronted or fell within the dying-declarations exception. Prosecutors do not appear to have even argued that the judge could admit the unconfronted statements because the defendant committed the murder for which he was on trial.
Consider King v. Woodcock. William Woodcock was accused of killing his wife Silvia, who had been beaten and left near death. A Magistrate took Silvia Woodcock’s account of the crime, under oath, and she died about 48 hours later. The judge stated that “[g]reat as a crime of this nature must always appear to be, yet the inquiry into it must proceed upon the rules of evidence.” 1 Leach, at 500, 168 Eng. Rep., at 352. Aside from testimony given at trial in the presence of the prisoner, the judge said, there were “two other species which are admitted by law: The one is the dying declaration of a person who has received a fatal blow; the other is the examination of a prisoner, and the depositions of the witnesses who may be produced against him” taken under the Marian bail and committal statutes. Id., at 501, 168 Eng. Rep., at 352-353 (footnote omitted). Silvia Woodcock’s statement could not be admitted pursuant to the Marian statutes because it was unconfronted — the defendant had not been brought before the examining Magistrate and “the prisoner therefore had no opportunity of contradicting the facts it contains.” Id., at 502, 168 Eng. Rep., at 353. Thus, the statements were admissible only if the witness “apprehended that she was in such a state of mortality as would inevitably oblige her soon to answer before her Maker for the truth or falsehood of her assertions.” Id., at 503, 168 Eng. Rep., at 353-354 (footnote omitted). Depending on the account one credits, the court either instructed the jury to consider the statements only if Woodcock was “in fact under the apprehension of death,” id., at 504,168 Eng. Rep., at 354, or determined for itself that Woodcock was “quietly resigned and submitting to her fate” and admitted her statements into evidence, 1 E. East, Pleas of the Crown 356 (1803).
King v. Dingier, 2 Leach 561, 168 Eng. Rep. 383 (1791), applied the same test to exclude unconfronted statements by a murder victim. George Dingier was charged with killing his wife Jane, who suffered multiple stab wounds that left her in the hospital for 12 days before she died. The day after the stabbing, a Magistrate took Jane Dingier’s deposition — as in Woodcock, under oath — “of the facts and circumstances which had attended the outrage committed upon her.” 2 Leach, at 561, 168 Eng. Rep., at 383. George Dingier’s attorney argued that the statements did not qualify as dying declarations and were not admissible Marian examinations because they were not taken in the presence of the prisoner, with the result that the defendant did not “have, as he is entitled to have, the benefit of cross-examination.” Id., at 562, 168 Eng. Rep., at 384. The prosecutor agreed, but argued the deposition should still be admitted because “it was the best evidence that the nature of the case would afford.” Id., at 563, 168 Eng. Rep., at 384. Relying on Woodcock, the court “refused to receive the examination into evidence.” 2 Leach, at 563, 168 Eng. Rep., at 384.
Many other cases excluded victims’ statements when there was insufficient evidence that the witness was aware he was about to die. See Thomas John’s Case, 1 East 357, 358 (P. C. 1790); Welbourn’s Case, 1 East 358, 360 (P. C. 1792); United States v. Woods, 28 F. Cas. 762, 763 (No. 16,760) (CC DC 1834); Lewis v. State, 17 Miss. 115, 120 (1847); Montgomery v. State, 11 Ohio 424, 425-426 (1842); Nelson v. State, 26 Tenn. 542, 543 (1847); Smith v. State, 28 Tenn. 9, 23 (1848). Courts in all these cases did not even consider admitting the statements on the ground that the defendant’s crime was to blame for the witness’s absence — even when the evidence establishing that was overwhelming. The reporter in Woodcock went out of his way to comment on the strength of the case against the defendant: “The evidence, independent of the information or declarations of the deceased, was of a very pressing and urgent nature against the prisoner.” 1 Leach, at 501, 168 Eng. Rep., at 352.
Similarly, in Smith v. State, supra, the evidence that the defendant had caused the victim’s death included, but was not limited to, the defendant’s having obtained arsenic from a local doctor a few days before his wife became violently ill; the defendant’s paramour testifying at trial that the defendant admitted to poisoning his wife; the defendant’s having asked a physician “whether the presence of arsenic could be discovered in the human stomach a month after death”; and, the answer to that inquiry apparently not having been satisfactory, the defendant’s having tried to hire a person to burn down the building containing his wife’s body. Id., at 10-11. If the State’s reading of common law were correct, the dying declarations in these cases and others like them would have been admissible.
Judges and prosecutors also failed to invoke forfeiture as a sufficient basis to admit unconfronted statements in the cases that did apply the dying-declarations exception. This failure, too, is striking. At a murder trial, presenting evidence that the defendant was responsible for the victim’s death would have been no more difficult than putting on the government’s case in chief. Yet prosecutors did not attempt to obtain admission of dying declarations on wrongful-procurement-of-absence grounds before going to the often considerable trouble of putting on evidence to show that the crime victim had not believed he could recover. See, e. g., King v. Commonwealth, 4 Va., at 80-81 (three witnesses called to testify on the point); Gibson v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. Ill, 116-117 (Gen. Ct. 1817) (testimony elicited from doctor and witness); Anthony v. State, 19 Tenn. 265, 278-279 (1838) (doctor questioned about expected fatality of victim’s wound and about victim’s demeanor).
The State offers another explanation for the above cases. It argues that when a defendant committed some act of wrongdoing that rendered a witness unavailable, he forfeited his right to object to the witness’s testimony on confrontation grounds, but not on hearsay grounds. See Brief for Respondent 23-24. No case or treatise that we have found, however, suggested that a defendant who committed wrongdoing forfeited his confrontation rights but not his hearsay rights. And the distinction would have been a surprising one, because courts prior to the founding excluded hearsay evidence in large part because it was unconfronted. See, e.g., 2 Hawkins 606 (6th ed. 1787); 2 M. Bacon, A New Abridgment of the Law 313 (1736). As the plurality said in Dutton v. Evans, 400 U. S. 74, 86 (1970), “[i]t seems apparent that the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause and the evidentiary hearsay rule stem from the same roots.”
The State and the dissent note that common-law authorities justified the wrongful-procurement rule by invoking the maxim that a defendant should not be permitted to benefit from his own wrong. See, e. g., G. Gilbert, Law of Evidence 140-141 (1756) (if a witness was “detained and kept back from appearing by the means and procurement” testimony would be read because a defendant “shall never be admitted to shelter himself by such evil Practices on the Witness, that being to give him Advantage of his own Wrong”). But as the evidence amply shows, the “wrong” and the “evil Practices” to which these statements referred was conduct designed to prevent a witness from testifying. The absence of a forfeiture rule covering this sort of conduct would create an intolerable incentive for defendants to bribe, intimidate, or even kill witnesses against them. There is nothing mysterious about courts’ refusal to carry the rationale further. The notion that judges may strip the defendant of a right that the Constitution deems essential to a fair trial, on the basis of a prior judicial assessment that the defendant is guilty as charged, does not sit well with the right to trial by jury. It is akin, one might say, to “dispensing with jury trial because a defendant is obviously guilty.” Crawford, 541 U. S., at 62.
c
Not only was the State’s proposed exception to the right of confrontation plainly not an “exceptio[n] established at the time of the founding,” id., at 54; it is not established in American jurisprudence since the founding. American courts never—prior to 1985—invoked forfeiture outside the context of deliberate witness tampering.
This Court first addressed forfeiture in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145 (1879), where, after hearing testimony that suggested the defendant had kept his wife away from home so that she could not be subpoenaed to testify, the trial court permitted the Government to introduce testimony of the defendant’s wife from the defendant’s prior trial. See id., at 148-150. On appeal, the Court held that admission of the statements did not violate the right of the defendant to confront witnesses at trial, because when a witness is absent by the defendant’s “wrongful procurement,” the defendant “is in no condition to assert that his constitutional rights have been violated” if “their evidence is supplied in some lawful way.” Id., at 158. Reynolds invoked broad forfeiture principles to explain its holding. The decision stated, for example, that “[t]he Constitution does not guarantee an accused person against the legitimate consequences of his own wrongful acts,” ibid., and that the wrongful-procurement rule “has its foundation” in the principle that no one should be permitted to take advantage of his wrong, and is “the outgrowth of a maxim based on the principles of common honesty,” id., at 159.
Reynolds relied on these maxims (as the common-law authorities had done) to be sure. But it relied on them (as the common-law authorities had done) to admit prior testimony in a case where the defendant had engaged in wrongful conduct designed to prevent a witness’s testimony. The Court’s opinion indicated that it was adopting the common-law rule. It cited leading common-law cases—Lord Motley's Case, Harrison’s Case, and Scaife—described itself as “content with” the “long-established usage” of the forfeiture principle, and admitted prior confronted statements under circumstances where admissibility was open to no doubt under Lord Morley’s Case. Reynolds, supra, at 158-159.
If the State’s rule had a historical pedigree in the common law or even in the 1879 decision in Reynolds, one would have expected it to be routinely invoked in murder prosecutions like the one here, in which the victim’s prior statements inculpated the defendant. It was never invoked in this way. The earliest case identified by the litigants and amici curiae which admitted unconfronted statements on a forfeiture theory without evidence that the defendant had acted with the purpose of preventing the witness from testifying was decided in 1985. United States v. Rouco, 765 F. 2d 983 (CA11).
In 1997, this Court approved a Federal Rule of Evidence, entitled “Forfeiture by wrongdoing,” which applies only when the defendant “engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing that was intended to, and did, procure the unavailability of the declarant as a witness.” Fed. Rule Evid. 804(b)(6). We have described this as a rule “which codifies the forfeiture doctrine.” Davis v. Washington, 547 U. S. 813, 833 (2006). Every commentator we are aware of has concluded the requirement of intent “means that the exception applies only if the defendant has in mind the particular purpose of making the witness unavailable.” 5 C. Mueller & L. Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence § 8:134, p. 235 (3d ed. 2007); 5 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein’s Federal Evidence § 804.03[7][b], p. 804-32 (J. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 2008); 2 K. Broun, McCormick on Evidence 176 (6th ed. 2006). The commentators come out this way because the dissent’s claim that knowledge is sufficient to show intent is emphatically not the modern view. See 1 W. LaPave, Substantive Criminal Law § 5.2, p. 340 (2d ed. 2003).
In sum, our interpretation of the common-law forfeiture rule is supported by (1) the most natural reading of the language used at common law; (2) the absence of common-law cases admitting prior statements on a forfeiture theory when the defendant had not engaged in conduct designed to prevent a witness from testifying; (3) the common law’s uniform exclusion of unconfronted inculpatory testimony by murder victims (except testimony given with awareness of impending death) in the innumerable cases in which the defendant was on trial for killing the victim, but was not shown to have done so for the purpose of preventing testimony; (4) a subsequent history in which the dissent’s broad forfeiture theory has not been applied. The first two and the last are highly persuasive; the third is in our view conclusive.
D
1
The dissent evades the force of that third point by claiming that no testimony would come in at common law based on a forfeiture theory unless it was confronted. It explains the exclusion of murder victims’ testimony by arguing that wrongful procurement was understood to be a basis for admission of Marian depositions — which the defendant would have had the opportunity to confront — but not for the admission of unconfronted testimony. See post, at 394.
That explanation is not supported by the cases. In Harrison’s Case, the leading English case finding wrongful procurement, the witness’s statements were admitted without regard to confrontation. An agent of the defendant had attempted to bribe a witness, who later disappeared under mysterious circumstances. The prosecutor contended that he had been “spirited, or withdrawn from us, by a gentleman that said he came to [the witness] from the prisoner, and desired him to be kind to the prisoner.” 12 How. St. Tr., at 851. The court allowed the witness’s prior statements before the coroner to be read, id., at 852, although there was no reason to think the defendant would have been present at the prior examination.
The reasoning of the common-law authorities reinforces the conclusion that the wrongful-procurement rule did not depend on prior confrontation. The judge in Harrison’s Case, after being told that “Mr. Harrison’s agents or friends have, since the last sessions, made or conveyed away a young man that was a principal evidence against him,” declared that if this were proved, “it will no way conduce to Mr. Harrison’s advantage.” Id., at 835-836. Similarly, a leading treatise’s justification of the use of statements from coroner’s inquests when a witness was “detained and kept back from appearing by the means and procurement” of the defendant was that the defendant “shall never be admitted to shelter himself by such evil Practices on the Witness, that being to give him Advantage of his own Wrong.” G. Gilbert, Law of Evidence 141 (1756). But if the defendant could keep out unconfronted prior testimony of a wrongfully detained witness he would profit from “such evil Practices.”
While American courts understood the admissibility of statements made at prior proceedings (including coroner’s inquests like the one in Harrison’s Case) to turn on prior opportunity for cross-examination as a general matter, see Crawford, 541 U. S., at 47, n. 2, no such limit was applied or expressed in early wrongful-procurement eases. In Rex v. Barber, 1 Root 76 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1775), “[o]ne White, who had testified before the justice and before the grand-jury against Barber, and minutes taken of his testimony, was sent away by one Bullock, a friend of Barber’s, and by his instigation; so that he could not be had to testify before the petitjury. The court admitted witnesses to relate what White had before testified.” Two leading evidentiary treatises and a Delaware case reporter cite that case for the proposition that grand jury statements were admitted on a wrongful-procurement theory. See Phillipps, Treatise on Evidence, at 200, n. (a); T. Peake, Compendium of the Law of Evidence 91, n. (m) (American ed. 1824); State v. Lewis, 1 Del. Cas. 608, 609, n. 1 (Ct. Quarter Sess. 1818). (Of course the standard practice since approximately the 17th century has been to conduct grand jury proceedings in secret, without confrontation, in part so that the defendant does not learn the State’s case in advance. S. Beale, W. Bryson, J. Felman, & M. Elston, Grand Jury Law and Practice § 5.2 (2d ed. 2005); see also 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2360, pp. 728-735 (J. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).)
The Georgia Supreme Court’s articulation of the forfeiture rule similarly suggests that it understood forfeiture to be a basis for admitting unconfronted testimony. The court wrote that Lord Morley’s Case established that if a witness “who had been examined by the Crown, and was then absent, was detained by the means or procurement of the prisoner,” “then the examination should be read” into evidence. Williams v. State, 19 Ga. 402, 403 (1856). Its rule for all cases in which the witness “had been examined by the Crown” carried no confrontation limit, and indeed, the court adopted the rule from Lord Morley’s Case which involved not Marian examinations carrying a confrontation requirement, but coroner’s inquests that lacked one.
The leading American case on forfeiture of the confrontation right by wrongful procurement was our 1879 decision in Reynolds. That case does not set forth prior confrontation as a requirement for the doctrine’s application, and begins its historical analysis with a full description of the rule set forth in Lord Motley’s Case, which itself contained no indication that the admitted testimony must have been previously confronted. It followed that description with a citation of Harrison’s Case—which, like Lord Motley’s Case, applied wrongful procurement to coroner’s inquests, not confronted Marian examinations—saying that the rule in those cases “seems to have been recognized as the law in England ever since.” 98 U. S., at 158. The opinion’s description of the forfeiture rule is likewise unconditioned by any requirement of prior confrontation:
“The Constitution gives the accused the right to a trial at which he should be confronted with the witnesses against him; but if a witness is absent by his own wrongful procurement, he cannot complain if competent evidence is admitted to supply the place of that which he kept away.... [The Constitution] grants him the privilege of being confronted with the witnesses against him; but if he voluntarily keeps the witnesses away, he cannot insist on his privilege. If, therefore, when absent by his procurement, their evidence is supplied in some lawful way, he is in no condition to assert that his constitutional rights have been violated.” Ibid.
There is no mention in this paragraph of a need for prior confrontation, even though if the Court believed such a limit applied, the phrase “their evidence is supplied” would more naturally have read “their previously confronted evidence is supplied.” Crawford reaffirmed this understanding by citing Reynolds for a forfeiture exception to the confrontation right. 541 U. S., at 54. And what Reynolds and Crawford described as the law became a seeming holding of this Court in Davis, which, after finding an absent witness’s unconfronted statements introduced at trial to have been testimonial, and after observing that “one who obtains the absence of a witness by wrongdoing forfeits the constitutional right to confrontation,” 547 U. S., at 833, remanded with the instruction that “[t]he Indiana courts may (if they are asked) determine on remand whether... a claim of forfeiture is properly raised and, if so, whether it is meritorious,” id., at 834.
Although the case law is sparse, in light of these decisions and the absence of even a single case declining to admit unconfronted statements of an absent witness on wrongful-procurement grounds when the defendant sought to prevent the witness from testifying, we are not persuaded to displace the understanding of our prior cases that wrongful procurement permits the admission of prior unconfronted testimony.
But the parsing of cases aside, the most obvious problem with the dissent’s theory that the forfeiture rule applied only to confronted testimony is that it amounts to self-immolation. If it were true, it would destroy not only our case for a narrow forfeiture rule, but the dissent’s case for a broader one as well. Prior confronted statements by witnesses who are unavailable are admissible whether or not the defendant was responsible for their unavailability. 541 U. S., at 68. If the forfeiture doctrine did not admit unconfronted prior testimony at common law, the conclusion must be, not that the forfeiture doctrine requires no specific intent in order to render unconfronted testimony available, but that unconfronted testimony is subject to no forfeiture doctrine at all.
2
Having destroyed its own case, the dissent issues a thinly veiled invitation to overrule Crawford and adopt an approach not much different from the regime of Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U. S. 56 (1980), under which the Court would create the exceptions that it thinks consistent with the policies underlying the confrontation guarantee, regardless of how that guarantee was historically understood. The “basic purposes and objectives” of forfeiture doctrine, it says, require that a defendant who wrongfully caused the absence of a witness be deprived of his confrontation rights, whether or not there was any such rule applicable at common law. Post, at 384.
If we were to reason from the “basic purposes and objectives” of the forfeiture doctrine, we are not at all sure we would come to the dissent’s favored result. The common-law forfeiture rule was aimed at removing the otherwise powerful incentive for defendants to intimidate, bribe, and kill the witnesses against them—in other words, it is grounded in “the ability of courts to protect the integrity of their proceedings.” Davis, supra, at 834. The boundaries of the doctrine seem to us intelligently fixed so as to avoid
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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A
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Chief Justice Burger
delivered the opinion of the Court.
We granted certiorari to decide whether an individual reasonably suspected of engaging in criminal activity may be detained for a period of 20 minutes, when the detention is necessary for law enforcement officers to conduct a limited investigation of the suspected criminal activity.
I — I
<1
On the morning of June 9, 1978, Agent Cooke of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) was on patrol in an unmarked vehicle on a coastal road near Sunset Beach, North Carolina, an area under surveillance for suspected drug trafficking. At approximately 6:30 a. m., Cooke noticed a blue pickup truck with an attached camper shell traveling on the highway in tandem with a blue Pontiac Bonneville. Respondent Savage was driving the pickup, and respondent Sharpe was driving the Pontiac. The Pontiac also carried a passenger, Davis, the charges against whom were later dropped. Observing that the truck was riding low in the rear and that the camper did not bounce or sway appreciably when the truck drove over bumps or around curves, Agent Cooke concluded that it was heavily loaded. A quilted material covered the rear and side windows of the camper.
Cooke’s suspicions were sufficiently aroused to follow the two vehicles for approximately 20 miles as they proceeded south into South Carolina. He then decided to make an “investigative stop” and radioed the State Highway Patrol for assistance. Officer Thrasher, driving a marked patrol car, responded to the call. Almost immediately after Thrasher caught up with the procession, the Pontiac and the pickup turned off the highway and onto a campground road. Cooke and Thrasher followed the two vehicles as the latter drove along the road at 55 to 60 miles an hour, exceeding the speed limit of 35 miles an hour. The road eventually looped back to the highway, onto which Savage and Sharpe turned and continued to drive south.
At this point, all four vehicles were in the middle lane of the three right-hand lanes of the highway. Agent Cooke asked Officer Thrasher to signal both vehicles to stop. Thrasher pulled alongside the Pontiac, which was in the lead, turned on his flashing light, and motioned for the driver of the Pontiac to stop. As Sharpe moved the Pontiac into the right lane, the pickup truck cut between the Pontiac and Thrasher’s patrol car, nearly hitting the patrol car, and continued down the highway. Thrasher pursued the truck while Cooke pulled up behind the Pontiac.
Cooke approached the Pontiac and identified himself. He requested identification, and Sharpe produced a Georgia driver’s license bearing the name of Raymond J. Pavlo-vich. Cooke then attempted to radio Thrasher to determine whether he had been successful in stopping the pickup truck, but he was unable to make contact for several minutes, apparently because Thrasher was not in his patrol car. Cooke radioed the local police for assistance, and two officers from the Myrtle Beach Police Department arrived about 10 minutes later. Asking the two officers to “maintain the situation,” Cooke left to join Thrasher.
In the meantime, Thrasher had stopped the pickup truck about one-half mile down the road. After stopping the truck, Thrasher had approached it with his revolver drawn, ordered the driver, Savage, to get out and assume a “spread eagled” position against the side of the truck, and patted him down. Thrasher then holstered his gun and asked Savage for his driver’s license and the truck’s vehicle registration. Savage produced his own Florida driver’s license and a bill of sale for the truck bearing the name of Pavlovich. In response to questions from Thrasher concerning the ownership of the truck, Savage said that the truck belonged to a friend and that he was taking it to have its shock absorbers repaired. When Thrasher told Savage that he would be held until the arrival of Cooke, whom Thrasher identified as a DEA agent, Savage became nervous, said that he wanted to leave, and requested the return of his driver’s license. Thrasher replied that Savage was not free to leave at that time.
Agent Cooke arrived at the scene approximately 15 minutes after the truck had been stopped. Thrasher handed Cooke Savage’s license and the bill of sale for the truck; Cooke noted that the bill of sale bore the same name as Sharpe’s license. Cooke identified himself to Savage as a DEA agent and said that he thought the truck was loaded with marihuana. Cooke twice sought permission to search the camper, but Savage declined to give it, explaining that he was not the owner of the truck. Cooke then stepped on the rear of the truck and, observing that it did not sink any lower, confirmed his suspicion that it was probably overloaded. He put his nose against the rear window, which was covered from the inside, and reported that he could smell marihuana. Without seeking Savage’s permission, Cooke removed the keys from the ignition, opened the rear of the camper, and observed a large number of burlap-wrapped bales resembling bales of marihuana that Cooke had seen in previous investigations. Agent Cooke then placed Savage under arrest and left him with Thrasher.
Cooke returned to the Pontiac and arrested Sharpe and Davis. Approximately 30 to 40 minutes had elapsed between the time Cooke stopped the Pontiac and the time he returned to arrest Sharpe and Davis. Cooke assembled the various parties and vehicles and led them to the Myrtle Beach police station. That evening, DEA agents took the truck to the Federal Building in Charleston, South Carolina. Several days later, Cooke supervised the unloading of the truck, which contained 43 bales weighing a total of 2,629 pounds. Acting without a search warrant, Cooke had eight randomly selected bales opened and sampled. Chemical tests showed that the samples were marihuana.
B
Sharpe and Savage were charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute it in violation of 21 U. S. C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U. S. C. §2. The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina denied respondents’ motion to suppress the contraband, and respondents were convicted.
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the convictions. Sharpe v. United States, 660 F. 2d 967 (1981). The majority assumed that Cooke “had an articulable and reasonable suspicion that Sharpe and Savage were engaged in marijuana trafficking when he and Thrasher stopped the Pontiac and the truck.” Id., at 970. But the court held the investigative stops unlawful because they “failed to meet the requirement of brevity” thought to govern detentions on less than probable cause. Ibid. Basing its decision solely on the duration of the respondents’ detentions, the majority concluded that “the length of the detentions effectively transformed them into de facto arrests without bases in probable cause, unreasonable seizures under the Fourth Amendment.” Ibid. The majority then determined that the samples of marihuana should have been suppressed as the fruit of respondents’ unlawful seizures. Id., at 971. As an:alternative basis for its decision, the majority held that the warrantless search of the bales taken from the pickup violated Robbins v. California, 453 U. S. 420 (1981). Judge Russell dissented as to both grounds of the majority’s decision.
The Government petitioned for certiorari, asking this Court to review both of the alternative grounds held by the Court of Appeals to justify suppression. We granted the petition, vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and remanded the case for further consideration in the light of the intervening decision in United States v. Ross, 456 U. S. 798 (1982). United States v. Sharpe, 457 U. S. 1127 (1982).
On remand, a divided panel of the Court of Appeals again reversed the convictions. 712 F. 2d 65 (1983). The majority concluded that, in the light of Ross, it was required to “disavow” its alternative holding disapproving the warrant-less search of the marihuana bales. But, “[fjinding that Ross does not adversely affect our primary holding” that the detentions of the two defendants constituted illegal seizures, the court readopted the prior opinion as modified. Ibid. The majority declined “to reexamine our principal holding or to reargue the same issues that were addressed in detail in the original majority and dissenting opinions,” reasoning that its action complied with this Court’s mandate. The panel assumed that “[h]ad [this] Court felt that a reversal was in order, it could and would have said so.” Id., at 65, n. 1. Judge Russell again dissented.
We granted certiorari, 467 U. S. 1250 (1984), and we reverse.
) — 1
A
The Fourth Amendment is not, of course, a guarantee against all searches and seizures, but only against unreasonable searches and seizures. The authority and limits of the Amendment apply to investigative stops of vehicles such as occurred here. United States v. Hensley, 469 U. S. 221, 226 (1985); United States v. Cortez, 449 U. S. 411, 417 (1981); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648, 663 (1979); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, 878, 880 (1975). In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968), we adopted a dual inquiry for evaluating the reasonableness of an investigative stop. Under this approach, we examine
“whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.” Id., at 20.
As to the first part of this inquiry, the Court of Appeals assumed that the police had an articulable and reasonable suspicion that Sharpe and Savage were engaged in marihuana trafficking, given the setting and all the circumstances when the police attempted to stop the Pontiac and the pickup. 660 F. 2d, at 970. That assumption is abundantly supported by the record. As to the second part of the inquiry, however, the court concluded that the 30- to 40-minute detention of Sharpe and the 20-minute detention of Savage “failed to meet the [Fourth Amendment’s] requirement of brevity.” Ibid.
It is not necessary for us to decide whether the length of Sharpe’s detention was unreasonable, because that detention bears no causal relation to Agent Cooke’s discovery of the marihuana. The marihuana was in Savage’s pickup, not in Sharpe’s Pontiac; the contraband introduced at respondents’ trial cannot logically be considered the “fruit” of Sharpe’s detention. The only issue in this case, then, is whether it was reasonable under the circumstances facing Agent Cooke and Officer Thrasher to detain Savage, whose vehicle contained the challenged evidence, for approximately 20 minutes. We conclude that the detention of Savage clearly meets the Fourth Amendment’s standard of reasonableness.
The Court of Appeals did not question the reasonableness of Officer Thrasher’s or Agent Cooke’s conduct during their detention of Savage. Rather, the court concluded that the length of the detention alone transformed it from a Terry stop into a defacto arrest. Counsel for respondents, as ami-cus curiae, assert that conclusion as their principal argument before this Court, relying particularly upon our decisions in Dunaway v. New York, 442 U. S. 200 (1979); Florida v. Royer, 460 U. S. 491 (1983); and United States v. Place, 462 U. S. 696 (1983). That reliance is misplaced.
In Dunaway, the police picked up a murder suspect from a neighbor’s home and brought him to the police station, where, after being interrogated for an hour, he confessed. The State conceded that the police lacked probable cause when they picked up the suspect, but sought to justify the warrantless detention and interrogation as an investigative stop. The Court rejected this argument, concluding that the defendant’s detention was “in important respects indistinguishable from a traditional arrest.” 442 U. S., at 212. Dunaway is simply inapposite here: the Court was not concerned with the length of the defendant’s detention, but with .events occurring during the detention.
In Royer, government agents stopped the defendant in an airport, seized his luggage, and took him to a small room used for questioning, where a search of the luggage revealed narcotics. The Court held that the defendant’s detention constituted an arrest. See 460 U. S., at 503 (plurality opinion); id., at 509 (Powell, J., concurring); ibid. (Brennan, J., concurring in result). As in Dunaway, though, the focus was primarily on facts other than the duration of the defendant’s detention — particularly the fact that the police confined the defendant in a small airport room for questioning.
The plurality in Royer did note that “an investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.” 460 U. S., at 500. The Court followed a similar approach in Place. In that case, law enforcement agents stopped the defendant after his arrival in an airport and seized his luggage for 90 minutes to take it to a narcotics detection dog for a “sniff test.” We decided that an investigative seizure of personal property could be justified under the Terry doctrine, but that “[t]he length of the detention of respondent’s luggage alone precludes the conclusion that the seizure was reasonable in the absence of probable cause.” 462 U. S., at 709. However, the rationale underlying that conclusion was premised on the fact that the police knew of respondent’s arrival time for several hours beforehand, and the Court assumed that the police could have arranged for a trained narcotics dog in advance and thus avoided the necessity of holding respondent’s luggage for 90 minutes. “[I]n assessing the effect of the length of the detention, we take into account whether the police diligently pursue their investigation.” Ibid.; see also Royer, supra, at 500.
Here, the Court of Appeals did not conclude that the police acted less than diligently, or that they unnecessarily prolonged Savage’s detention. Place and Royer thus provide no support for the Court of Appeals’ analysis.
Admittedly, Terry, Dunaway, Royer, and Place, considered together, may in some instances create difficult line-drawing problems in distinguishing an investigative stop from a de facto arrest. Obviously, if an investigative stop continues indefinitely, at some point it can no longer be justified as an investigative stop. But our cases impose no rigid time limitation on Terry stops. While it is clear that “the brevity of the invasion of the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests is an important factor in determining whether the seizure is so minimally intrusive as to be justifiable on reasonable suspicion,” United States v. Place, supra, at 709, we have emphasized the need to consider the law enforcement purposes to be served by the stop as well as the time reasonably needed to effectuate those purposes. United States v. Hensley, 469 U. S., at 228-229, 234-235; Place, supra, at 703-704, 709; Michigan v. Summers, 452 U. S. 692, 700, and n. 12 (1981) (quoting 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.2, pp. 36-37 (1978)). Much as a “bright line” rule would be desirable, in evaluating whether an investigative detention is unreasonable, common sense and ordinary human experience must govern over rigid criteria.
We sought to make this clear in Michigan v. Summers, supra:
“If the purpose underlying a Terry stop — investigating possible criminal activity — is to be served, the police must under certain circumstances be able to detain the individual for longer than the brief time period involved in Terry and Adams [v. Williams, 407 U. S. 143 (1972)].” 452 U. S., at 700, n. 12.
Later, in Place, we expressly rejected the suggestion that we adopt a hard-and-fast time limit for a permissible Terry stop:
“We understand the desirability of providing law enforcement authorities with a clear rule to guide their conduct. Nevertheless, we question the wisdom of a rigid time limitation. Such a limit would undermine the equally important need to allow authorities to graduate their responses to the demands of any particular situation.” 462 U. S., at 709, n. 10.
The Court of Appeals’ decision would effectively establish a per se rule that a 20-minute detention is too long to be justified under the Terry doctrine. Such a result is clearly and fundamentally at odds with our approach in this area.
B
In assessing whether a detention is too long in duration to be justified as an investigative stop, we consider it appropriate to examine whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the defendant. See Michigan v. Summers, supra, at 701, n. 14 (quoting 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.2, p. 40 (1978)); see also Place, 462 U. S., at 709; Royer, 460 U. S., at 500. A court making this assessment should take care to consider whether the police are acting in a swiftly developing situation, and in such cases the court should not indulge in unrealistic second-guessing. See generally post, at 712-716 (Brennan, J., dissenting). A creative judge engaged in post hoc evaluation of police conduct can almost always imagine some alternative means by which the objectives of the police might have been accomplished. But “[t]he fact that the protection of the public might, in the abstract, have been accomplished by ‘less intrusive’ means does not, by itself, render the search unreasonable.” Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U. S. 433, 447 (1973); see also United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S. 543, 557, n. 12 (1976). The question is not simply whether some other alternative was available, but whether the police acted unreasonably in failing to recognize or to pursue it.
We readily conclude that, given the circumstances facing him, Agent Cooke pursued his investigation in a diligent and reasonable manner. During most of Savage’s 20-minute detention, Cooke was attempting to contact Thrasher and enlisting the help of the local police who remained with Sharpe while Cooke left to pursue Officer Thrasher and the pickup. Once Cooke reached Officer Thrasher and Savage, he proceeded expeditiously: within the space of a few minutes, he examined Savage’s driver’s license and the truck’s bill of sale, requested (and was denied) permission to search the truck, stepped on the rear bumper and noted that the truck did not move, confirming his suspicion that it was probably overloaded. He then detected the odor of marihuana.
Clearly this case does not involve any delay unnecessary to the legitimate investigation of the law enforcement officers. Respondents presented no evidence that the officers were dilatory in their investigation. The delay in this case was attributable almost entirely to the evasive actions of Savage, who sought to elude the police as Sharpe moved his Pontiac to the side of the road. Except for Savage’s maneuvers, only a short and certainly permissible pre-arrest detention would likely have taken place. The somewhat longer detention was simply the result of a “graduate[d] . . . respons[e] to the demands of [the] particular situation,” Place, supra, at 709, n. 10.
We reject the contention that a 20-minute stop is unreasonable when the police have acted diligently and a suspect’s actions contribute to the added delay about which he complains. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
Officer Thrasher testified that the respondents’ vehicles turned off the highway “[a]bout one minute” after he joined the procession. 4 Record 141. principle is wholly irrelevant when the defendant has had his conviction nullified and the government seeks review here. Thus, when confronted with precisely this situation in Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U. S. 1 (1984) (per curiam), we did not hesitate to reach and decide the merits of the case; had we thought that we should decline to reach every constitutional issue that might become moot, we would have denied certiorari. Cf. Eisler v. United States, 338 U. S. 189, 194 (1949) (Murphy, J., dissenting) (“That the ease may become moot if a defendant does not return does not distinguish it from any other case we decide. For subsequent events may render any decision nugatory”).
We granted certiorari on June 18, 1984. On August 27, counsel for respondents notified the Court that respondents had become fugitives. On October 1, we directed counsel for respondents to file a brief as amicus curiae in support of affirmance of the Court of Appeals’ judgment. Because our reversal of the Court of Appeals’ judgment may lead to the reinstatement of respondents’ convictions, respondents’ fugitive status does not render this case moot. See United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U. S. 579, 581-582, n. 2 (1983); Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396 U. S. 365, 366 (1970) (per curiam).
Justice Stevens would have this Court adopt a rule that, whenever a respondent or appellee before the Court becomes a fugitive before we render a decision, we must vacate the judgment under review and remand with directions to dismiss the appeal. This theory is not supported by our precedents, and indeed would be a break with a recent decision. The line of authority upon which the dissent relies concerns the situation in which a fugitive defendant is the party seeking review here. In those very different cases, dismissal of the petition or appeal is based on the equitable principle that a fugitive from justice is “disentitled” to call upon this Court for a review of his conviction. See United States v. Campos-Serrano, 404 U. S. 293, 294-295, n. 2 (1971); Molinaro, supra, at 366; see also Estelle v. Dorrough, 420 U. S. 534, 541-542 (1975) (per curiam). This equitable
Agent Cooke had observed the vehicles traveling in tandem for 20 miles in an area near the coast known to be frequented by drug traffickers. Cooke testified that pickup trucks with camper shells were' often used to transport large quantities of marihuana. App. 10. Savage’s pickup truck appeared to be heavily loaded, and the windows of the camper were covered with a quilted bed-sheet material rather than curtains. Finally, both vehicles took evasive actions and started speeding as soon as Officer Thrasher began following them in his marked car. See n. 1, supra. Perhaps none of these facts, standing alone, would give rise to a reasonable suspicion; but taken together as appraised by an experienced law enforcement officer, they provided clear justification to stop the vehicles and pursue a limited investigation.
The pertinent facts relied on by the Court in Dunaway were that (1) the defendant was taken from a private dwelling; (2) he was transported unwillingly to the police station; and (3) he there was subjected to custodial interrogation resulting in a confession. See 442 U. S., at 212.
It was appropriate for Officer Thrasher to hold Savage for the brief period pending Cooke’s arrival. Thrasher could not be certain that he was aware of all of the facts that had aroused Cooke’s suspicions; and, as a highway patrolman, he lacked Cooke’s training and experience in dealing with narcotics investigations. In this situation, it cannot realistically be said that Thrasher, a state patrolman called in to assist a federal agent in making a stop, acted unreasonably because he did not release Savage based solely on his own limited investigation of the situation and without the consent of Agent Cooke.
Even if it could be inferred that Savage was not attempting to elude the police when he drove his car between Thrasher’s patrol car and Sharpe’s Pontiac — in the process nearly hitting the patrol car, see App. 17, 37 — such an assumption would not alter our analysis or our conclusion. The significance of Savage’s actions is that, whether innocent or purposeful, they made it necessary for Thrasher and Cooke to split up, placed Thrasher and Cooke out of contact with each other, and required Cooke to enlist the assistance of local police before he could join Thrasher and Savage.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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A
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
The motion to dispense with printing the motion to dismiss is granted. The motion to dismiss is also granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of a properly presented federal question.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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I
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice O’Connor
delivered the opimon of the Court.
The petitioner was convicted of two counts of transporting a forged security in interstate commerce in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 2314. He challenges his conviction on the ground that the statute requires proof, concededly lacking at trial, that the securities had been forged before being taken across state lines. Because of a conflict among the Circuits on this issue of statutory construction, we granted certiorari. 454 U. S. 815 (1981). For the reasons stated below, we affirm the petitioner’s conviction.
HH
Petitioner Charles McElroy was indicted by a federal grand jury on three counts. Counts 1 and 3 charged that on two occasions the petitioner transported in interstate commerce falsely made and forged securities from Ohio to Pennsylvania in violation of 18 U. S. C. §2314, the National Stolen Property Act. Count 2 charged McElroy with transporting a stolen car in interstate commerce from Pennsylvania to Ohio in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 2312.
According to the proof at trial, several blank checks were stolen from Local 125 of the Laborers’ International Union in Youngstown, Ohio, in late March or early April 1977. After the Union discovered the theft, it closed the account on which the checks were drawn. Seventeen months later, in October 1978, the petitioner ordered a used Corvette from the Don Allen Chevrolet Agency in Pittsburgh, Pa., for $6,706. Using the name “William Jones,” the petitioner told the salesman that he lived in Warrenville Heights, Ohio, but worked in the Pittsburgh area. The petitioner returned the next day and paid for the car with one of the stolen Union checks, on which a signature had been forged. After learning the following day from the drawee bank in Ohio that the account had been closed, the dealership made no effort to negotiate the check. This transaction formed the basis for count 1 (transportation of a forged check in interstate commerce) and count 2 (transportation of a stolen vehicle, the Corvette, in interstate commerce) of the indictment.
. In December 1978, the petitioner sought to purchase a boat and trailer from the Rini Marine Sales Co. in Beaver Falls, Pa. Adhering to his previously successful scheme, he used the fictitious name “William Jones” and gave an Ohio address for his residence. One week after his initial inquiry he paid for a boat and trailer with one of the stolen Union checks, on which a signature had been forged. Too late, Philip Rini, the owner of Rini Marine Sales, became suspicious and telephoned the Youngstown, Ohio, bank only to learn that the check had been stolen and the signature forged. He, too, abandoned hope of negotiating the check, and turned to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for help. Count 3 arose from this transaction.
At the conclusion of the Government’s case, the petitioner moved for a judgment of acquittal on all three counts on the ground that the Government had not submitted sufficient evidence for the case to go to the jury. The petitioner contended that he was entitled to an acquittal on count 2 because the Government failed to submit any evidence showing that the petitioner had transported the Corvette from Pennsylvania to Ohio, and on counts 1 and 3 because the Government had not adduced any evidence showing that the petitioner had caused the stolen checks to be brought through interstate commerce into Pennsylvania. The trial court denied these motions.
After the petitioner rested, the trial court instructed the jury that in order to find the petitioner guilty on counts 1 and 3, it must find that he transported the check in a forged condition in “interstate commerce,” and that such transportation could take place entirely within the State of Pennsylvania if it was a “continuation of the movement that began out of state.” Tr. 164A. The petitioner unsuccessfully objected to this instruction, contending that under § 2314 the Government had the burden of proving that the check was forged in Ohio before it was transported across the state line to Pennsylvania. Tr. 92A. The petitioner was convicted on all three counts, and sentenced to serve seven years on each of counts 1 and 3 and five years on count 2, the sentences on all three counts to run concurrently.
The Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, vacated the judgment on count 2, holding that the Government had presented insufficient evidence to sustain a conviction. 644 F. 2d 274 (CA3 1981) (en banc). The court affirmed the judgment on counts 1 and 3, however, holding that the Government had presented sufficient evidence to sustain the convictions, and that the trial judge correctly had instructed the jury that the Government need not prove that the stolen checks had been forged before crossing state lines. “It is immaterial whether the signatures were forged in Ohio or in Pennsylvania. If at any point in the interstate movement the check was in a forged condition, the statute was satisfied.” Id., at 279. All but one judge agreed with the majority’s construction of the phrase “interstate commerce” as used in §2314.
II
The question presented by this case is one of statutory construction. The petitioner claims that the language and legislative history of §2314 demonstrate congressional intent to limit the reach of that provision to those persons who transport forged securities across state lines. As a fallback position, the petitioner contends that §2314’s use of the expression “interstate commerce” is sufficiently ambiguous to require this Court to apply the principle of lenity and construe the provision in the petitioner’s favor,
A
Petitioner bases his initial argument on Congress’ use of the past tense “forged” in § 2314, from which he urges us to infer that Congress intended to prohibit only the transportation of securities that were forged before entering the stream of interstate commerce, that is, before crossing state lines. Fundamental to the petitioner’s argument is the unarticu-lated assumption that “interstate commerce,” as used in the section, does not continue after the security has crossed the state border. However, if subsequent movement of the check in the destination State constitutes interstate commerce, then a forgery of the check in the course of that movement involves transportation of a forged security in interstate commerce in violation of § 2314. Thus, the validity of the petitioner’s argument turns on whether the statutory phrase “interstate commerce” comprehends movement of a forged security within the destination State.
The paragraph of §2314 under which the petitioner was convicted prohibits the “transportation] in interstate or foreign commerce [of] any... forged... securities..., knowing the same to have been... forged.”. Title 18 U.S.C. § 10 provides that the “term ‘interstate commerce,’ as used in this title, includes commerce between one State... and another State.” On their face, these two provisions are not limited to unlawful activities that occur while crossing state borders, but seemingly have a broader reach. In particular, the language of § 10 suggests that crossing state lines is not the sole manifestation of “interstate commerce.”
The origin of the “interstate commerce” element of § 2314 was the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act (Dyer Act),. 41 Stat. 324, which was enacted in 1919 to provide “severe punishment of those guilty of the stealing of automobiles in interstate or foreign commerce.” H. R. Rep. No. 312, 66th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1919). See S. Rep. No. 202, 66th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1919) (describing the bill as designed to “punish the transportation of stolen motor vehicles in interstate or foreign commerce”). Representative Dyer, the sponsor of the bill that was enacted, defended Congress’ authority to enact the proposed law, noting that the courts had upheld a variety of regulatory statutes enacted under the Commerce Clause, including a criminal statute declaring unlawful the “[ljarceny of goods from railroad cars being transported in interstate commerce.” 58 Cong. Rec. 5472 (1919). In response to a question from Representative Anderson concerning possible differences in the meaning of “interstate commerce” in §§2 and 4 of the Act, Representative Dyer replied:
“[I]f there is any difference there, which I do not see, the matter would be construed by the Supreme Court, which has passed many times upon what is meant by interstate and foreign commerce.” Ibid.
Plainly, Representative Dyer, the chief sponsor of the bill, believed that the statutory meaning of “interstate commerce” could be found in previous Supreme Court decisions using the phrase to define the scope of congressional authority under the Commerce Clause. See also H. R. Rep. No. 312, 66th Cong., 1st Sess., 3-4 (1919) (justifying Congress’ authority to enact the Dyer Act by reference to this Court’s decisions holding that Congress has plenary power under the Commerce Clause to regulate interstate commerce).
Although the House Report accompanying the bill, as well as several Members of Congress during the debates, stated that the Act would prevent the transportation of stolen automobiles across state lines, Congress’ use of the more general phrase “interstate commerce” and its reliance on this Court’s constitutional decisions defining the scope of “interstate commerce” indicate that Congress intended the statutory phrase to be as broad as this Court had used that phrase in Commerce Clause decisions before 1919. In those decisions, this Court had made clear that interstate commerce begins well before state lines are crossed, and ends only when movement of the item in question has ceased in the destination State. We conclude, therefore, that in § 2314 Congress intended to proscribe the transportation of a forged security at any and all times during the course of its movement in interstate commerce, and that the stream of interstate commerce may continue after a state border has been crossed. Consequently, the trial judge in this case correctly instructed the jury that McElroy’s transportation of the forged check within Pennsylvania would violate §2314 if the jury found that movement to be a “continuation of the movement that began out of state.” Tr. 164A.
Moreover, the purpose underlying § 2314 leads us to conclude that Congress did not intend to require federal prosecutors to prove that the securities had been forged before crossing state lines. In United States v. Sheridan, 329 U. S. 379, 384 (1946), this Court observed that in § 2314 Congress “contemplated coming to the aid of the states in detecting and punishing criminals whose offenses are complete under state law, but who utilize' the channels of interstate commerce to make a successful getaway and thus make the state’s detecting and punitive processes impotent” (footnote omitted). Given this broad purpose, we find it difficult to believe, absent some indication in the statute itself or the legislative history, that Congress would have undercut sharply that purpose by hobbling federal prosecutors in their effort to combat crime in interstate commerce. Under the petitioner’s proposed construction, a patient forger easily could evade the reach of federal law, yet operate in the channels of interstate commerce. As the Government points out in its brief, moreover, the petitioner’s construction produces the anomalous result that no federal crime would have been committed in this case until the victims returned the forged checks to the out-of-state drawee bank for payment. Brief for United States 18, n. 11. While Congress could have written the statute to produce this result, there is no basis for us to adopt such a limited reading.
B
The petitioner argues alternatively that even if a reading of § 2314 does not clearly support his interpretation, the provision is ambiguous and the ambiguity should be resolved by reading the provision narrowly to require the checks to have been forged before crossing the state line. For support, the petitioner cites United States v. Bass, 404 U. S. 336 (1971), where this Court considered a challenge to a conviction under 18 U. S. C. App. § 1202(a), which prohibits a convicted felon from “receiv[ing], possessing], or transporting] in commerce or affecting commerce... any firearm.” The issue framed by the Court was whether “in commerce or affecting commerce” modified “possesses” as well as “transports,” since the respondent, a convicted felon, had been charged with possession of a shotgun, but the Government had made no effort to show that he had possessed the firearm “in commerce or affecting commerce.” The Court found both the language of the provision and its legislative history ambiguous on this question, and decided on two grounds to read the statute narrowly, that is, to read “in commerce or affecting commerce” as modifying “possesses” as well as “transports.” The Court reasoned that ambiguity concerning the reach of a criminal statute should be resolved by reading the statute narrowly in order to encourage Congress to speak clearly, thus giving the populace “fair warning” of the line between criminal and lawful activity, and in order to have the Legislature, not the courts, define criminal activity. Id., at 347-348. Also, absent a clear statement of purpose from Congress, the Court was unwilling to read a federal criminal statute in a way that would encroach on a traditional area of state criminal jurisdiction.
The present case, however, does not raise significant questions of ambiguity, for the statutory language and legislative history of the Dyer Act indicate that Congress defined the term “interstate commerce” more broadly than the petitioner contends. We hold that Congress intended to use the term “interstate commerce” as this Court had been using it in Commerce Clause cases before 1919. As we observed in United States v. Bramblett, 348 U. S. 503, 509-510 (1955), although “criminal statutes are to be construed strictly... this does not mean that every criminal statute must be given the narrowest possible meaning in complete disregard of the purpose of the legislature” (footnote omitted).
r — ¶ HH HH
Through § 2314, Congress has sought to aid the States in their detection and punishment of criminals who evade state authorities by using the channels of interstate commerce. Based on this congressional purpose, the trial judge in the present case correctly instructed the jury that they could find the petitioner guilty of violating § 2314 if they found that the forgeries occurred during the course of interstate commerce, which includes a “continuation of a movement that began out of state,” even though movement of the forged checks was restricted to one State. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court below.
So ordered.
Title 18 U. S. C. §2314 provides in pertinent part:
“Whoever, with unlawful or fraudulent intent, transports in interstate or foreign commerce any falsely made, forged, altered, or counterfeited securities or tax stamps, knowing the same to have been falsely made, forged, altered, or counterfeited..,.
“Shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.”
Title 18 U. S. C. §2312 provides:
“Whoever transports in interstate or foreign commerce a motor vehicle or aircraft, knowing the same to have been stolen, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.”
Title 18 U. S. C. §2311 states that, as used in §§2311-2318, the term “[s]eeurities includes any... check.”
Tr. 68A-78A.
The petitioner introduced no evidence.
The entire instruction on this issue was as follows:
“Well, [interstate commerce] means any movement or transportation of these forged checks from one state into another, and it includes all continuing movements of said forged check while in the second state, in this case Pennsylvania, until the movement of said forged check has ceased.
“Now, the Government must show that the checks were transported in interstate commerce in a forged condition. However, the transportation within the destination state here, Pennsylvania, may be considered transportation in interstate commerce if it is a continuation of the movement that began out of state.
“The Government need not exclude every speculative possibility that the transportation may have been interrupted at some point, nor need the Government show each step in the security’s movement in interstate commerce.
“Now, if you believe that the Government has shown that the Defendant transported the checks while they were in a forged condition within the State of Pennsylvania, the requirements of the law are satisfied if that transportation was part of interstate commerce. In other words, the check had to originate at sometime in Ohio and had to have been transported at sometime in Pennsylvania in order to effect interstate commerce. So the Government must prove this Defendant transported the checks involved in Counts 1 and 3 of the indictment in interstate commerce between Ohio and Pennsylvania, but need not prove the place in Ohio from which the checks started or from where the Defendant started.” Id., at 164A-165A.
After some discussion at the bench with the lawyers, the judge further instructed the jury:
“As to Counts 1 and 3, the Government must prove with evidence that convinces you beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant caused the transportation of the two checks in question, that is, in Counts 1 and 3, the check to Rini, the check to Don Allen Chevrolet, in interstate commerce, from Ohio to Pennsylvania.” Id., at 181 A.
That part of the Court of Appeals’ judgment vacating the conviction on count 2 is not before this Court.
Judge Adams, joined by Chief Judge Seitz, concurred in the majority opinion on counts 1 and 3, but dissented from the court’s holding that the conviction on count 2 should be vacated. Although he agreed that the trial judge correctly had instructed the jury on counts 1 and 3, Judge Garth dissented from the affirmance on those counts, arguing that the Government had presented insufficient evidence to sustain the convictions. Judge Higginbotham concurred with the majority opinion on count 2, but dissented from its holdings on counts 1 and 3. He reasoned that § 2314 was ambiguous, and that consequently the principle of lenity required the court to construe the statute strictly against the Government and hold that the statute was violated only if the security had been forged before crossing state lines.
The petitioner concedes that Congress has authority under the Commerce Clause, Art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (which provides in part that “Congress shall have Power... To regulate Commerce... among the several States”), to enact a criminal statute prohibiting the transportation in interstate commerce of a security that was not forged until after crossing state lines. Consequently, the issue in the present case is the meaning that Congress ascribed to the phrase “interstate commerce” in § 2314.
Although the petitioner challenged the sufficiency of the evidence on counts 1 and 3 in his petition for writ of certiorari, this Court limited the grant of certiorari to, the statutory construction issue. Thus, we accept the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the jury’s finding that “on each occasion [the petitioner] made a trip from Ohio to Pennsylvania, carrying with him a check that was forged either in Ohio or Pennsylvania.” 644 F. 2d 274, 279 (CA3 1981).
The predecessor of 18 U. S. C. § 10 was § 2(b) of the Dyer Act, which stated that the term “interstate commerce” “shall include transportation from one State... to another State.” 41 Stat. 325.
The Act provided in part:
“Sec. 2. That... :
“(b) The term ‘interstate or foreign commerce’ as used in this Act shall include transportation from one State... to another State....
“Sec. 3. That whoever shall transport or cause to be transported in interstate or foreign commerce a motor vehicle, knowing the same to have been stolen, shall be punished by a fine of not more than $5,000, or by imprisonment of not more than five years, or both.
“Sec. 4. That whoever shall receive, conceal, store, barter, sell, or dispose of any motor vehicle, moving as, or which is a part of, or which constitutes interstate or foreign commerce, knowing the same to have been stolen, shall be punished by a fine of not more than $5,000, or by imprisonment of not more than five years, or both.”
The Act was expanded in 1934 to cover other types of stolen property, see National Stolen Property Act, 48 Stat. 794, and in 1939 to cover forged securities. See Act of Aug. 3,1939, 53 Stat. 1178. Sections 3 and 4 were later codified as 18 U. S. C. §§ 2312 and 2313 respectively. None of the legislative Reports or debates concerning these amendments, however, contains any explanation of the “interstate commerce” requirement. See H. R. Rep. No. 1462, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1934) (stating that the new Act was “designed to punish interstate transportation of stolen property, securities, or money,” and that it was “drafted to follow the language of the Dyer Act, the constitutionality of which has frequently been upheld in the Federal courts”); S. Rep. No. 538, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1934) (approving a Justice Department memorandum stating that the purpose of the Act is “to provide a penalty for knowingly transporting stolen property in interstate or foreign commerce”); H. R. Rep. No. 422, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1939) (stating that the bill “widens the scope of the National Stolen Property Act of 1934... by making its provisions applicable to embezzled property, securities and money”); S. Rep. No. 674, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1939) (approving a letter from the Attorney General stating in part that the “principal purposes of the pending bill are to extend the existing law to property that.has been embezzled, and also to forged or counterfeited securities”).
Obviously, Representative Dyer believed that a federal crime would be committed even though the larceny did not occur at the exact moment that the railroad car crossed a state line. It is fair to conclude from this example that he understood “interstate commerce,” as used in the Dyer Act, to have a broader meaning than transportation across state lines.
The entire colloquy between Representatives Dyer and Anderson is as follows:
“Mr. ANDERSON. I will ask the gentleman whether the committee meant the same thing in its definition of interstate commerce in section 2 as it meant in section 4?
“Mr. DYER. I think so. If the gentleman will point out wherein it differs, I shall be glad.
“Mr. ANDERSON. In the definition under section 2 interstate commerce means transportation from one State to another, while if you refer to section 4 you find there you have a vehicle or motor car constituting interstate or foreign commerce, and you scarcely have a sensible section.
“Mr. DYER. I will say to the gentleman that if there is any difference there, which I do not see, the matter would be construed by the Supreme Court, which has passed many times upon what is meant by interstate and foreign commerce. I think it really is not necessary to put the definition in this bill. It was done at the request of some of the members of the committee. The Supreme Court has decided many times what is interstate commerce. I do not think myself that any definition is necessary.” 58 Cong. Rec. 5472 (1919).
Of course, the definition to which Representative Dyer refers stated that interstate commerce “shall include transportation from one State... to another State.” 41 Stat. 325 (emphasis added). The dissenting opinion entirely ignores Congress’ use of the word “include” in the 1919 Act, choosing instead to read the definition as if Congress’ only “objective... was to proscribe the transportation of a stolen automobile from one State to another.” Post, at 666.
In the 1934 National Stolen Property Act, 48 Stat. 794, Congress expanded the coverage of the Dyer Act, and in § 2(a) provided that “[t]he term ‘interstate... commerce’ shall mean transportation from one State... to any State.” The House Report makes clear that the “bill is drafted to follow the language of the Dyer Act, the constitutionality of which has frequently been upheld in the Federal courts.” H. R. Rep. No. 1462, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1934). Although a “change of [statutory] language is some evidence of a change of purpose,” Johnson v. United States, 225 U. S. 405, 415 (1912), the inference of a change of intent is only “a workable rule of construction, not an infallible guide to legislative intent, and cannot overcome more persuasive evidence.” United States v. Dickerson, 310 U. S. 554, 561 (1940). Because the legislative history contains no indication that the variation in the language had changed the meaning of “interstate commerce,” and more importantly, because the House Report states that the language of the 1934 Act was drafted to follow the language of the Dyer Act, we conclude that Congress intended nothing by the change in language. Moreover, in 1948; Congress made an additional modification in the definition of “interstate commerce,” this time resubstituting the word “include” and substituting the word “commerce” for the word “transportation” to “avoid the narrower connotation” of the latter word. H. R. Rep. No. 304, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., A7 (1947). If any inference can be drawn from these changes, both in 1934 and in 1948, it is only that Congress intended no substantive change in the meaning of “interstate commerce.”
See H. R. Rep. No. 312, 66th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1919) (noting that “ttlhieves steal automobiles and take them from one State to another and ofttimes have associates in this crime who receive and sell the stolen machines”); id., at 3 (“The power of the Congress to enact this law and to punish the theft of automobiles in one State and the removing of them into another State can not be questioned”); id., at 4 (“No good reason exists why Congress, invested with the power to regulate commerce among the several States, should not provide that such commerce should not be polluted by the carrying of stolen property from one State to another”); 58 Cong. Rec. 5470 (1919) (remarks of Rep. Dyer) (stating that “this bill is for the purpose of providing punishment for those stealing automobiles and automobile trucks and taking them from one State to another State”); id., at 5472 (remarks of Rep. Dyer) (“Section 3 provides for the punishment of a thief stealing a car and transporting it from one State to another”); id., at 5473 (remarks of Rep. Reavis) (stating that he would support a broader bill that would make it a “felony to transport stolen property of any kind from one State to another”); ibid, (remarks of Rep. Igoe) (“The offense sought to be reached in the act is the transportation, the taking it across the line, taking it from one State to another”); id., at 6433 (remarks of Sen. Cum-mins) (stating that the “bill is for the purpose of giving the Federal courts jurisdiction for the punishment of’ thieves who carry stolen automobiles across state lines).
None of these statements, however, purports to limit the statutory definition of interstate commerce to the act of crossing state lines. Nor is there any basis to believe that Congress used the phrase “interstate commerce” in the statute interchangeably with “ ‘interstate transportation’... or some such phrase focusing on state lines.” Stevens, J., dissenting, post, at 663-664. While Congress may have been concerned principally with thieves who cross state borders with stolen cars, it did not so limit the language of the statute. Instead, Congress drafted a more comprehensive statute that would reach criminals who use interstate channels to avoid detection and punishment.
The dissenting opinion’s alternative explanation — that Congress used the expression “ ‘interstate commerce’ merely to indicate the source of its authority,” post, at 665 — is also unpersuasive. Although supporters of the bill were careful to justify its constitutionality, nothing in the statutory language or the legislative history indicates that Congress used the constitutionally significant term “interstate commerce” in the bill merely to point to its authority to enact such legislation. Rather, the most rational inference is that Congress used the term to specify the types of activities proscribed by the Act — thefts involving “interstate commerce” as that term had been interpreted by this Court.
Some Circuits have even indicated that the statutory phrase “interstate commerce” is coextensive with congressional authority under the Commerce Clause. See United States v. Roselli, 432 F. 2d 879, 891 (CA9 1970) (“The sole reason for conditioning [§ 2314’s] prohibitions upon use of interstate commerce is to provide a constitutional basis for the exercise of federal power”), cert. denied, 401 U. S. 924 (1971); United States v. Ludwig, 523 F. 2d 705, 707 (CA8 1975) (same), cert. denied, 423 U. S. 1076 (1976).
See Champion v. Ames, 188 U. S. 321, 358 (1903) (illustrating that a regulatory statute enacted under the Commerce Clause can take the form of a prohibition, the Court stated that “it cannot be doubted that Congress, under its power to regulate commerce, may... provide for [cattle to be] inspected before transportation begins”); Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U. S. 498, 527 (1911) (goods are in “interstate... commerce when they have ‘actually started in the course of transportation to another State, or [are] delivered to a carrier for transportation’ ”) (quoting Coe v. Errol, 116 U. S. 517, 525 (1886)); Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Sabine Tram Co., 227 U. S. 111, 122-123 (1913); Illinois Central R. Co. v. Fuentes, 236 U. S. 157, 163 (1915) (“generally when this interstate character has been acquired it continues at least until the load reaches the point where the parties originally intended that the movement should finally end”).
The House Report on the Dyer Act cited Champion v. Ames, supra, to justify Congress’ constitutional authority to enact the Dyer Act. H. R. Rep. No. 312, 66th Cong., 1st Sess., 4 (1919).
Even though Congress did not address the meaning of “interstate commerce” in the 1934 and 1939 extensions of the Dyer Act, there is no reason to believe that Congress abandoned its original meaning. In fact, because the Supreme Court between 1919 and 1939 continued to define interstate commerce more broadly than merely as commerce crossing state lines, see, e. g., Champlain Realty Co. v. Brattleboro, 260 U. S. 366 (1922); Carson Petroleum Co. v. Vial, 279 U. S. 95 (1929), there is ample reason to believe that Congress intended § 2314 to have the same reach as its predecessor section in the Dyer Act.
The facts of the present case illustrate this point. The petitioner, who lived in Ohio at the time he forged the Union checks, see Tr. 16A, brought the stolen checks from Ohio into Pennsylvania. He forged them at an unknown time and place to purchase a boat and a car. Requiring prosecutors to prove on which side of the border the petitioner forged the checks, when in fact the petitioner had transported the forged checks in continuation of a longer interstate journey, serves no purpose. In addition, as the supporters of the Dyer Act recognized, federal authority may be necessary to investigate fully the crime and to compel witnesses from other States to testify. See 58 Cong. Rec. 5475 (1919) (remarks of Rep. Newton) (“all the witnesses from anywhere in the United States can be compelled to appear and testify [before the grand jury], and a full and complete investigation can be had in every ease, and when a case is called for trial, the barrier of the State line having been swept away, the witnesses will be compelled to appear and testify in open court”). Absent federal jurisdiction, it may have been impossible, or at the least extraordinarily difficult, to compel Union and bank officials from Ohio to testify in a Pennsylvania state court that the checks had been stolen, when they had been stolen, when the bank account had been closed, that the signature on the checks had been forged, and that the petitioner had no authority to write those checks.
There is no foundation for the fear expressed in the dissenting opinion that our decision today is a broad expansion of federal jurisdiction in criminal law. Post, at 660. The implications of this case are limited by the facts and its holding that the forged check was transported in interstate commerce only because that transportation was a continuation of a longer journey that began out of state. If the entire transaction — obtaining and forging the checks, purchasing the car and boat, and returning the checks to the bank for collection — had occurred solely within Ohio, it seems clear that the checks would not have been “transport[ed] in interstate commerce.” In light of today’s limited holding, the dissent’s suggestion that we are overburdening limited federal prosecutorial resources, post, at 674, is misplaced.
See also Pereira v. United States, 347 U. S. 1, 9 (1954) (holding that since the fraudulently obtained checks had to be sent to an out-of-state bank for collection, the petitioner was guilty of violating § 2314 because he “ ‘caused’ [the check] to be transported in interstate commerce”).
The cases cited by the petitioner in support of his position do not dissuade us from our conclusion, for none of the cases based its holding on an analysis of the language, legislative history, or purpose of §2314. In United States v. Owens, 460 F. 2d 467, 469 (CA5 1972), for example, the court simply quoted the pertinent language of § 2314 and held, without analysis or citation to authority, that it “is obvious that to prove the commission of an.offense under this portion of section 2314 the Government must show that the instrument traveled interstate in its forged or altered condition.” See United States v. Hilyer, 543 F. 2d 41, 43 (CA8 1976) (citing only Owens for the proposition that § 2314 requires proof that the security was forged before crossing state lines); United States v. Sparrow, 635 F. 2d 794, 796 (CA10 1980) (en banc) (citing only Owens and Hilyer for its holding that “the plain meaning of [§ 2314] requires the prosecution to show that the security was in a'forged or altered condition at the time of its interstate passage”), cert. denied, 450 U. S. 1004 (1981).
We note that our holding today is consistent with other cases construing similar federal statutes designed to combat theft in the channels of interstate commerce. In United States v. Ajlouny, 629 F
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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A
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Chief Justice Burger
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the questions (a) whether the California Franchise Investment Law, which invalidates certain arbitration agreements covered by the Federal Arbitration Act, violates the Supremacy Clause and (b) whether arbitration under the federal Act is impaired when a class-action structure is imposed on the process by the state courts.
r*H
Appellant Southland Corp. is the owner and franchisor of 7-Eleven convenience stores. Southland’s standard franchise agreement provides each franchisee with a license to use certain registered trademarks, a lease or sublease of a convenience store owned or leased by Southland, inventory financing, and assistance in advertising and merchandising. The franchisees operate the stores, supply bookkeeping data, and pay Southland a fixed percentage of gross profits. The franchise agreement also contains the following provision requiring arbitration:
“Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this Agreement or the breach hereof shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the Rules of the American Arbitration Association . . . and judgment upon any award rendered by the arbitrator may be entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof.”
Appellees are 7-Eleven franchisees. Between September 1975 and January 1977, several appellees filed individual actions against Southland in California Superior Court alleging, among other things, fraud, oral misrepresentation, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and violation of the disclosure requirements of the California Franchise Investment Law, Cal. Corp. Code Ann. §31000 et seq. (West 1977). Southland’s answer, in all but one of the individual actions, included the affirmative defense of failure to arbitrate.
In May 1977, appellee Keating filed a class action against Southland on behalf of a class that assertedly includes approximately 800 California franchisees. Keating’s principal claims were substantially the same as those asserted by the other franchisees. After the various actions were consolidated, Southland petitioned to compel arbitration of the claims in all cases, and appellees moved for class certification.
The Superior Court granted Southland’s motion to compel arbitration of all claims except those claims based on the Franchise Investment Law. The court did not pass on ap-pellees’ request for class certification. Southland appealed from the order insofar as it excluded from arbitration the claims based on the California statute. Appellees filed a petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition in the California Court of Appeal arguing that the arbitration should proceed as a class action.
The California Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s refusal to compel arbitration of appellees’ claims under the Franchise Investment Law. Keating v. Superior Court, Alameda County, 167 Cal. Rptr. 481 (1980). That court interpreted the arbitration clause to require arbitration of all claims asserted under the Franchise Investment Law, and construed the Franchise Investment Law not to invalidate such agreements to arbitrate. Alternatively, the court concluded that if the Franchise Investment Law rendered arbitration agreements involving commerce unenforceable, it would conflict with §2 of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U. S. C. §2, and therefore be invalid under the Supremacy Clause. 167 Cal. Rptr., at 493-494. The Court of Appeal also determined that there was no “insurmountable obstacle” to conducting an arbitration on a classwide basis, and issued a writ of mandate directing the trial court to conduct class-certification proceedings. Id., at 492.
The California Supreme Court, by a vote of 4-2, reversed the ruling that claims asserted under the Franchise Investment Law are arbitrable. Keating v. Superior Court of Alameda County, 31 Cal. 3d 584, 645 P. 2d 1192 (1982). The California Supreme Court interpreted the Franchise Investment Law to require judicial consideration of claims brought under that statute and concluded that the California statute did not contravene the federal Act. Id., at 604, 645 P. 2d, 1203-1204. The court also remanded the case to the trial court for consideration of appellees’ request for classwide arbitration.
We postponed consideration of the question of jurisdiction pending argument on the merits. 459 U. S. 1101 (1983). We reverse in part and dismiss in part.
II
A
Jurisdiction of this Court is asserted under 28 U. S. C. § 1257(2), which provides for an appeal from a final judgment of the highest court of a state when the validity of a challenged state statute is sustained as not in conflict with federal law. Here Southland challenged the California Franchise Investment Law as it was applied to invalidate a contract for arbitration made pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act. Appellees argue that the action of the California Supreme Court with respect to this claim is not a “final judgment or decree” within the meaning of § 1257(2).
Under Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469, 482-483 (1975), judgments of state courts that finally decide a federal issue are immediately appealable when “the party seeking review here might prevail [in the state court] on the merits on nonfederal grounds, thus rendering unnecessary review of the federal issue by this Court, and where reversal of the state court on the federal issue would be preclusive of any further litigation on the relevant cause of action . . . .” In these circumstances, we have resolved the federal issue “if a refusal immediately to review the state-court decision might seriously erode federal policy.” Id., at 483.
The judgment of the California Supreme Court with respect to this claim is reviewable under Cox Broadcasting, supra. Without immediate review of the California holding by this Court there may be no opportunity to pass on the federal issue and as a result “there would remain in effect the unreviewed decision of the State Supreme Court” holding that the California statute does not conflict with the Federal Arbitration Act. Id., at 485. On the other hand, reversal of a state-court judgment in this setting will terminate litigation of the merits of this dispute.
Finally, the failure to accord immediate review of the decision of the California Supreme Court might “seriously erode federal policy.” Plainly the effect of the judgment of the California court is to nullify a valid contract made by private parties under which they agreed to submit all contract disputes to final, binding arbitration. The federal Act permits “parties to an arbitrable dispute [to move] out of court and into arbitration as quickly and easily as possible.” Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U. S. 1, 22 (1983).
Contracts to arbitrate are not to be avoided by allowing one party to ignore the contract and resort to the courts. Such a course could lead to prolonged litigation, one of the very risks the parties, by contracting for arbitration, sought to eliminate. In The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U. S. 1, 12 (1972), we noted that the contract fixing a particular forum for resolution of all disputes
“was made in an arm’s-length negotiation by experienced and sophisticated businessmen, and absent some compelling and countervailing reason it should be honored by the parties and enforced by the courts.”
The Zapata Court also noted that
“the forum clause was a vital part of the agreement, and it would be unrealistic to think that the parties did not conduct their negotiations, including fixing the monetary terms, with the consequences of the forum clause figuring prominently in their calculations.” Id., at 14 (footnote omitted).
For us to delay review of a state judicial decision denying enforcement of the contract to arbitrate until the state-court litigation has run its course would defeat the core purpose of a contract to arbitrate. We hold that the Court has jurisdiction to decide whether the Federal Arbitration Act preempts §31512 of the California Franchise Investment Law.
B
That part of the appeal relating to the propriety of superimposing class-action procedures on a contract arbitration raises other questions. Southland did not contend in the California courts that, and the state courts did not decide whether, state law imposing class-action procedures was pre-empted by federal law. When the California Court of Appeal directed Southland to address the question whether state or federal law controlled the class-action issue, South-land responded that state law did not permit arbitrations to proceed as class actions, that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were inapplicable, and that requiring arbitrations to proceed as class actions “could well violate the [federal] constitutional guaranty of procedural due process.” Southland did not claim in the Court of Appeal that if state law required class-action procedures, it would conflict with the federal Act and thus violate the Supremacy Clause.
In the California Supreme Court, Southland argued that California law applied but that neither the contract to arbitrate nor state law authorized class-action procedures to govern arbitrations. Southland also contended that the Federal Rules were inapplicable in state proceedings. Southland pointed out that although California law provided a basis for class-action procedures, the Judicial Council of California acknowledged “the incompatibility of class actions and arbitration. ” Petition for Hearing 23. It does not appear that Southland opposed class procedures on federal grounds in the California Supreme Court. Nor does the record show that the California Supreme Court passed upon the question whether superimposing class-action procedures on a contract arbitration was contrary to the federal Act.
Since it does not affirmatively appear that the validity of the state statute was “drawn in question” on federal grounds by Southland, this Court is without jurisdiction to resolve this question as a matter of federal law under 28 U. S. C. §1257(2). See Bailey v. Anderson, 326 U. S. 203, 207 (1945).
HH í — I I — I
As previously noted, the California Franchise Investment Law provides:
“Any condition, stipulation or provision purporting to bind any person acquiring any franchise to waive compliance with any provision of this law or any rule or order hereunder is void.” Cal. Corp. Code Ann. §31512 (West 1977).
The California Supreme Court interpreted this statute to require judicial consideration of claims brought under the state statute and accordingly refused to enforce the parties’ contract to arbitrate such claims. So interpreted the California Franchise Investment Law directly conflicts with §2 of the Federal Arbitration Act and violates the Supremacy Clause.
In enacting §2 of the federal Act, Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration. The Federal Arbitration Act provides:
“A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” 9 U. S. C. §2.
Congress has thus mandated the enforcement of arbitration agreements.
We discern only two limitations on the enforceability of arbitration provisions governed by the Federal Arbitration Act: they must be part of a written maritime contract or a contract “evidencing a transaction involving commerce” and such clauses may be revoked upon “grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” We see nothing in the Act indicating that the broad principle of enforceability is subject to any additional limitations under state law.
The Federal Arbitration Act rests on the authority of Congress to enact substantive rules under the Commerce Clause. In Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U. S. 395 (1967), the Court examined the legislative history of the Act and concluded that the statute “is based upon . . . the incontestable federal foundations of ‘control over interstate commerce and over admiralty.’” Id., at 405 (quoting H. R. Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1924)). The contract in Prima Paint, as here, contained an arbitration clause. One party in that case alleged that the other had committed fraud in the inducement of the contract, although not of the arbitration clause in particular, and sought to have the claim of fraud adjudicated in federal court. The Court held that, notwithstanding a contrary state rule, consideration of a claim of fraud in the inducement of a contract “is for the arbitrators and not for the courts,” 388 U. S., at 400. The Court relied for this holding on Congress’ broad power to fashion substantive rules under the Commerce Clause.
At least since 1824 Congress’ authority under the Commerce Clause has been held plenary. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 196 (1824). In the words of Chief Justice Marshall, the authority of Congress is “the power to regulate; that is, to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed.” Ibid. The statements of the Court in Prima Paint that the Arbitration Act was an exercise of the Commerce Clause power clearly implied that the substantive rules of the Act were to apply in state as well as federal courts. As Justice Black observed in his dissent, when Congress exercises its authority to enact substantive federal law under the Commerce Clause, it normally creates rules that are enforceable in state as well as federal courts. Prima Paint, supra, at 420.
In Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U. S., at 1, 25, and n. 32, we reaffirmed our view that the Arbitration Act “creates a body of federal substantive law” and expressly stated what was implicit in Prima Paint, i. e., the substantive law the Act created was applicable in state and federal courts. Moses H. Cone began with a petition for an order to compel arbitration. The District Court stayed the action pending resolution of a concurrent state-court suit. In holding that the District Court had abused its discretion, we found no showing of exceptional circumstances justifying the stay and recognized “the presence of federal-law issues” under the federal Act as “a major consideration weighing against surrender [of federal jurisdiction].” 460 U. S., at 26. We thus read the underlying issue of arbitrability to be a question of substantive federal law: “Federal law in the terms of the Arbitration Act governs that issue in either state or federal court.” Id., at 24.
Although the legislative history is not without ambiguities, there are strong indications that Congress had in mind something more than making arbitration agreements enforceable only in the federal courts. The House Report plainly suggests the more comprehensive objectives:
“The purpose of this bill is to make valid and enforcible [sic] agreements for arbitration contained in contracts involv ing interstate commerce or within the jurisdiction or [sic] admiralty, or which may be the subject of litigation in the Federal courts.” H. R. Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1924) (emphasis added).
This broader purpose can also be inferred from the reality that Congress would be less likely to address a problem whose impact was confined to federal courts than a problem of large significance in the field of commerce. The Arbitration Act sought to “overcome the rule of equity, that equity will not specifically enforce an[y] arbitration agreement.” Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214 before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 67th Cong., 4th Sess., 6 (1923) (Senate Hearing) (remarks of Sen. Walsh). The House Report accompanying the bill stated:
“The need for the law arises from . . . the jealousy of the English courts for their own jurisdiction. . . . This jealousy survived for so lon[g] a period that the principle became firmly embedded in the English common law and was adopted with it by the American courts. The courts have felt that the precedent was too strongly fixed to be overturned without legislative enactment . . . .” H. R. Rep. No. 96, supra, at 1-2.
Surely this makes clear that the House Report contemplated a broad reach of the Act, unencumbered by state-law constraints. As was stated in Metro Industrial Painting Corp. v. Terminal Construction Co., 287 F. 2d 382, 387 (CA2 1961) (Lumbard, C. J., concurring), “the purpose of the act was to assure those who desired arbitration and whose contracts related to interstate commerce that their expectations would not be undermined by federal judges, or ... by state courts or legislatures.” Congress also showed its awareness of the widespread unwillingness of state courts to enforce arbitration agreements, e. g., Senate Hearing, at 8, and that such courts were bound by state laws inadequately providing for
“technical arbitration by which, if you agree to arbitrate under the method provided by the statute, you have an arbitration by statute[;] but [the statutes] ha[d] nothing to do with validating the contract to arbitrate.” Ibid.
The problems Congress faced were therefore twofold: the old common-law hostility toward arbitration, and the failure of state arbitration statutes to mandate enforcement of arbitration agreements. To confine the scope of the Act to arbitrations sought to be enforced in federal courts would frustrate what we believe Congress intended to be a broad enactment appropriate in scope to meet the large problems Congress was addressing.
Justice O’Connor argues that Congress viewed the Arbitration Act “as a procedural statute, applicable only in federal courts.” Post, at 25. If it is correct that Congress sought only to create a procedural remedy in the federal courts, there can be no explanation for the express limitation in the Arbitration Act to contracts “involving commerce.” 9 U. S. C. § 2. For example, when Congress has authorized this Court to prescribe the rules of procedure in the federal courts of appeals, district courts, and bankruptcy courts, it has not limited the power of the Court to prescribe rules applicable only to causes of action involving commerce. See, e. g., 28 U. S. C. §§2072, 2075, 2076 (1976 ed. and Supp. V). We would expect that if Congress, in enacting the Arbitration Act, was creating what it thought to be a procedural rule applicable only in federal courts, it would not so limit the Act to transactions involving commerce. On the other hand, Congress would need to call on the Commerce Clause if it intended the Act to apply in state courts. Yet at the same time, its reach would be limited to transactions involving interstate commerce. We therefore view the “involving commerce” requirement in §2, not as an inexplicable limitation on the power of the federal courts, but as a necessary qualification on a statute intended to apply in state and federal courts.
Under the interpretation of the Arbitration Act urged by Justice O’Connor, claims brought under the California Franchise Investment Law are not arbitrable when they are raised in state court. Yet it is clear beyond question that if this suit had been brought as a diversity action in a federal district court, the arbitration clause would have been enforceable. Prima Paint, supra. The interpretation given to the Arbitration Act by the California Supreme Court would therefore encourage and reward forum shopping. We are unwilling to attribute to Congress the intent, in drawing on the comprehensive powers of the Commerce Clause, to create a right to enforce an arbitration contract and yet make the right dependent for its enforcement on the particular forum in which it is asserted. And since the overwhelming proportion of all civil litigation in this country is in the state courts, we cannot believe Congress intended to limit the Arbitration Act to disputes subject only to federal-court jurisdiction. Such an interpretation would frustrate congressional intent to place “[a]n arbitration agreement . . . upon the same footing as other contracts, where it belongs.” H. R. Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1924).
In creating a substantive rule applicable in state as well as federal courts, Congress intended to foreclose state legislative attempts to undercut the enforceability of arbitration agreements. We hold that §31512 of the California Franchise Investment Law violates the Supremacy Clause.
IV
The judgment of the California Supreme Court denying enforcement of the arbitration agreement is reversed; as to the question whether the Federal Arbitration Act precludes a class-action arbitration and any other issues not raised in the California courts, no decision by this Court would be appropriate at this time. As to the latter issues, the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
California Corp. Code Ann. §31512 (West 1977) provides: “Any condition, stipulation or provision purporting to bind any person acquiring any franchise to waive compliance with any provision of this law or any rule or order hereunder is void.”
Supplemental Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Petition for Writs of Mandate or Prohibition in Civ. No. 45162 (Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist.), pp. 19-25.
The question Southland presented to the State Supreme Court was “[w]hether a court may enter an order compelling a private commercial arbitration governed by the Federal Arbitration Act... to proceed as a class action even though the terms of the parties’ arbitration agreement do not provide for such a procedure.” Petition for Hearing in Civ. No. 45162 (Cal. 1980). Southland argued that (1) the decision of the Court of Appeal “is in conflict with the decisions of other Courts of Appeal in this State,” id., at 3; (2) class actions would delay and complicate arbitration, increase its cost, and require judicial supervision, “considerations [which] strongly militate against the creation of class action arbitration procedures,” id., at 22; and (3) there was no basis in law for class actions. According to appellants, the Federal Kules of Civil Procedure did not apply in California courts. Id., at 23. Southland thus relied, not on federal law, but on California law in opposing class-action procedures.
The California Supreme Court cited “[a]nalogous authority” supporting consolidation of arbitration proceedings by federal courts. 31 Cal. 3d, at 611-612, 645 P. 2d, at 1208. E. g., Compania, Española de Petroleos, S. A. v. Nereus Shipping, S. A., 527 F. 2d 966, 975 (CA2 1975), cert. denied, 426 U. S. 936 (1976); In re Czarnikow-Rionda Co., 512 F. Supp. 1308, 1309 (SDNY 1981). This, along with support by other state courts and the California Legislature for consolidation of arbitration proceedings, permitted the court to conclude that class-action proceedings were authorized: “It is unlikely that the state Legislature in adopting the amendment to the Arbitration Act authorizing consolidation of arbitration proceedings, intended to preclude a court from ordering classwide arbitration in an appropriate case. We conclude that a court is not without authority to do so.” 31 Cal. 3d, at 613, 645 P. 2d, at 1209. The California Supreme Court thus ruled that imposing a class-action structure on the arbitration process was permissible as a matter of state law.
We note that in defining “commerce” Congress declared that “nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.” 9 U. S. C. § 1.
The procedures to be used in an arbitration are not prescribed by the federal Act. We note, however, that Prima Paint considered the question of what issues are for the courts and what issues are for the arbitrator.
Appellees contend that the arbitration clause, which provides for the arbitration of “any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this Agreement or the breach hereof,” does not cover their claims under the California Franchise Investment Law. We find the language quoted above broad enough to cover such claims. Cf. Prima Paint, 388 U. S., at 403-404, 406 (finding nearly identical language to cover a claim that a contract was induced by fraud).
It is estimated that 2% of all civil litigation in this country is in the federal courts. Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the U. S. Courts 3 (1982) (206,000 filings in federal district courts in 12 months ending June 30, 1982, excluding bankruptcy filings); Flango & Eisner, Advance Report, The Latest State Court Caseload Data, 7 State Court J., 18 (Winter 1983) (approximately 13,600,000 civil filings during comparable period, excluding traffic filings).
While the Federal Arbitration Act creates federal substantive law requiring the parties to honor arbitration agreements, it does not create any independent federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1331 or otherwise. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U. S. 1, 25, n. 32 (1983). This seems implicit in the provisions in § 3 for a stay by a “court in which such suit is pending” and in § 4 that enforcement may be ordered by “any United States district court which, save for such agreement, would have jurisdiction under title 28, in a civil action or in admiralty of the subject matter of a suit arising out of the controversy between the parties.” Ibid.; Prima Paint, supra, at 420, and n. 24 (Black, J., dissenting); Krauss Bros. Lumber Co. v. Louis Bossert & Sons, Inc., 62 F. 2d 1004, 1006 (CA2 1933) (L. Hand, J.).
The contention is made that the Court’s interpretation of § 2 of the Act renders §§ 3 and 4 “largely superfluous.” Post, at 31, n. 20. This misreads our holding and the Act. In holding that the Arbitration Act preempts a state law that withdraws the power to enforce arbitration agreements, we do not hold that §§3 and 4 of the Arbitration Act apply to proceedings in state courts. Section 4, for example, provides that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply in proceedings to compel arbitration. The Federal Rules do not apply in such state-court proceedings.
The California Supreme Court justified its holding by reference to our conclusion in Wilko v. Swan, 346 U. S. 427 (1953), that arbitration agreements are nonbinding as to claims arising under the federal Securities Act of 1933. 31 Cal. 3d, at 602, 645 P. 2d, at 1202-1203. The analogy is unpersuasive. The question in Wilko was not whether a state legislature could create an exception to § 2 of the Arbitration Act, but rather whether Congress, in subsequently enacting the Securities Act, had in fact created such an exception.
Justice Stevens dissents in part on the ground that § 2 of the Arbitration Act permits a party to nullify an agreement to arbitrate on “such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” Post, at 19. We agree, of course, that a party may assert general contract defenses such as fraud to avoid enforcement of an arbitration agreement. We conclude, however, that the defense to arbitration found in the California Franchise Investment Law is not a ground that exists at law or in equity “for the revocation of any contract” but merely a ground that exists for the revocation of arbitration provisions in contracts subject to the California Franchise Investment Law. Moreover, under this dissenting view, “a state policy of providing special protection for franchisees . . . can be recognized without impairing the basic purposes of the federal statute.” Post, at 21. If we accepted this analysis, states could wholly eviscerate congressional intent to place arbitration agreements “upon the same footing as other contracts,” H. R. Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1924), simply by passing statutes such as the Franchise Investment Law. We have rejected this analysis because it is in conflict with the Arbitration Act and would permit states to override the declared policy requiring enforcement of arbitration agreements.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
H
|
sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U. S. 1 (1964), we held that “[w]hile it may not be possible [for the States] to draw congressional districts with mathematical precision,” id., at 18, Art. I, § 2, of the Constitution requires that “as nearly as is practicable one man’s vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another’s.” Id., at 7-8. We are required in these cases to elucidate the “as nearly as practicable” standard.
The Missouri congressional redistricting statute challenged in these cases resulted from that State’s second attempt at congressional redistricting since Wesberry was decided. In 1965, a three-judge District Court for the Western District of Missouri declared that the Missouri congressional districting Act then in effect was unconstitutional under Wesberry but withheld any judicial relief “until the Legislature of the State of Missouri has once more had an opportunity to deal with the problem . . . .” Preisler v. Secretary of State of Missouri, 238 F. Supp. 187, 191. Thereafter, the General Assembly of Missouri enacted a redistricting statute, but this statute too was declared unconstitutional. The District Court, however, retained jurisdiction to review any further plan that might be enacted. Preisler v. Secretary of State of Missouri, 257 F. Supp. 953 (1966), aff’d, sub nom. Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 385 U. S. 450 (1967). In 1967, the General Assembly enacted the statute under attack here, Mo. Rev. Stat., c. 128 (Cum. Supp. 1967), and the Attorney General of Missouri moved in the District Court for a declaration sustaining the Act and an order dismissing the case.
Based on the best population data available to the legislature in 1967, the 1960 United States census figures, absolute population equality among Missouri’s 10 congressional districts would mean a population of 431,981 in each district. The districts created by the 1967 Act, however, varied from this ideal within a range of 12,260 below it to 13,542 above it. The difference between the least and most populous districts was thus 25,802. In percentage terms, the most populous district was 3.13% above the mathematical ideal, and the least populous was 2.84% below.
The District Court found that the General Assembly had not in fact relied on the census figures but instead had based its plan on less accurate data. In addition, the District Court found that the General Assembly had rejected a redistricting plan submitted to it which provided for districts with smaller population variances among them. Finally, the District Court found that the simple device of switching some counties from one district to another would have produced a plan with markedly reduced variances among districts. Based on these findings, the District Court, one judge dissenting, held that the 1967 Act did not meet the constitutional standard of equal representation for equal numbers of people “as nearly as practicable,” and that the State had failed to make any acceptable justification for the variances. 279 F. Supp. 952 (1967). We noted probable jurisdiction but stayed the District Court’s judgment pending appeal and expressly authorized the State “to conduct 1968 congressional elections under and pursuant to [the] 1967 . . . Act . . . 390 U. S. 939 (1968). We affirm.
Missouri’s primary argument is that the population variances among the districts created by the 1967 Act are so small that they should be considered de minimis and for that reason to satisfy the “as nearly as practicable” limitation and not to require independent justification. Alternatively, Missouri argues that justification for the variances was established in the evidence: it is contended that the General Assembly provided for variances out of legitimate regard for such factors as the representation of distinct interest groups, the integrity of county fines, the compactness of districts, the population trends within the State, the high proportion of military personnel, college students, and other nonvoters in some districts, and the political realities of “legislative interplay.”
I.
We reject Missouri’s argument that there is a fixed numerical or percentage population variance small enough to be considered de minimis and to satisfy without question the “as nearly as practicable” standard. The whole thrust of the “as nearly as practicable” approach is inconsistent with adoption of fixed numerical standards which excuse population variances without regard to the circumstances of each particular case. The extent to which equality may practicably be achieved may differ from State to State and from district to district. Since “equal representation for equal numbers of people [is] the fundamental goal for the House of Representatives,” Wesberry v. Sanders, supra, at 18, the “as nearly as practicable” standard requires that the State make a good-faith effort to achieve precise mathematical equality. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 577 (1964). Unless population variances among congressional districts are shown to have resulted despite such effort, the State must justify each variance, no matter how small.
There are other reasons for rejecting the de minimis approach. We can see no nonarbitrary way to pick a cutoff point at which population variances suddenly become de minimis. Moreover, to consider a certain range of variances de minimis would encourage legislators to strive for that range rather than for equality as nearly as practicable. The District Court found, for example, that at least one leading Missouri legislator deemed it proper to attempt to achieve a 2% level of variance rather than to seek population equality.
Equal representation for equal numbers of people is a principle designed to prevent debasement of voting power and diminution of access to elected representatives. Toleration of even small deviations detracts from these purposes. Therefore, the command of Art. I, § 2, that States create congressional districts which provide equal representation for equal numbers of people permits only the limited population variances which are unavoidable despite a good-faith effort to achieve absolute equality, or for which justification is shown.
Clearly, the population variances among the Missouri congressional districts were not unavoidable. Indeed, it is not seriously contended that the Missouri Legislature came as close to equality as it might have come. The District Court found that, to the contrary, in the two reapportionment efforts of the Missouri Legislature since Wesberry “the leadership of both political parties in the Senate and the House were given nothing better to work with than a makeshift bill produced by what has been candidly recognized to be no more than ... an expedient political compromise.” 279 F. Supp., at 966. Legislative proponents of the 1967 Act frankly conceded at the District Court hearing that resort to the simple device of transferring entire political subdivisions of known population between contiguous districts would have produced districts much closer to numerical equality. The District Court found, moreover, that the Missouri Legislature relied on inaccurate data in constructing the districts, and that it rejected without consideration a plan which would have markedly reduced population variances among the districts. Finally, it is simply inconceivable that population disparities of the magnitude found in the Missouri plan were unavoidable. The New York apportionment plan of regions divided into districts of almost absolute population equality described in Wells v. Rockefeller, post, at 545-546, provides striking evidence that a state legislature which tries can achieve almost complete numerical equality among all the State’s districts. In sum, “it seems quite obvious that the State could have come much closer to providing districts of equal population than it did.” Swann v. Adams, 385 U. S. 440, 445 (1967).
We therefore turn to the question whether the record establishes any legally acceptable justification for the population variances. It was the burden of the State “to present . . . acceptable reasons for the variations among the populations of the various . . . districts . . . .” Swann v. Adams, supra, at 443-444.
II.
We agree with the District Court that Missouri has not satisfactorily justified the population variances among the districts.
Missouri contends that variances were necessary to avoid fragmenting areas with distinct economic and social interests and thereby diluting the effective representation of those interests in Congress. But to accept population variances, large or small, in order to create districts with specific interest orientations is antithetical to the basic premise of the constitutional command to provide equal representation for equal numbers of people. “[N] either history alone, nor economic or other sorts of group interests, are permissible factors in attempting to justify disparities from population-based representation. Citizens, not history or economic interests, cast votes.” Reynolds v. Sims, supra, at 579-580. See also Davis v. Mann, 377 U. S. 678, 692 (1964).
We also reject Missouri’s argument that “[t]he reasonableness of the population differences in the congressional districts under review must ... be viewed in the context of legislative interplay. The legislative leaders all testified that the act in question was in their opinion a reasonable legislative compromise. ... It must be remembered . . . that practical political problems are inherent in the enactment of congressional reapportionment legislation.” We agree with the District Court that “the rule is one of ‘practicability’ rather than political ‘practicality.’ ” 279 F. Supp., at 989. Problems created by partisan politics cannot justify an apportionment which does not otherwise pass constitutional muster.
Similarly, we do not find legally acceptable the argument that variances are justified if they necessarily result from a State’s attempt to avoid fragmenting political subdivisions by drawing congressional district lines along existing county, municipal, or other political subdivision boundaries. The State’s interest in constructing congressional districts in this manner, it is suggested, is to minimize the opportunities for partisan gerrymandering. But an argument that deviations from equality are justified in order to inhibit legislators from engaging in partisan gerrymandering is no more than a variant of the argument, already rejected, that considerations of practical politics can justify population disparities.
Missouri further contends that certain population variances resulted from the legislature’s taking account of the fact that the percentage of eligible voters among the total population differed significantly from district to district — some districts contained disproportionately large numbers of military personnel stationed at bases maintained by the Armed Forces and students in attendance at universities or colleges. There may be a question whether distribution of congressional seats except according to total population can ever be permissible under Art. I, § 2. But assuming without deciding that apportionment may be based on eligible voter population rather than total population, the Missouri plan is still unacceptable. Missouri made no attempt to ascertain the number of eligible voters in each district and to apportion accordingly. At best it made haphazard adjustments to a scheme based on total population: overpopulation in the Eighth District was explained away by the presence in that district of a military base and a university; no attempt was made to account for the presence of universities in other districts or the disproportionate numbers of newly arrived and short-term residents in the City of St. Louis. Even as to the Eighth District, there is no indication that the excess population allocated to that district corresponds to the alleged extraordinary additional numbers of noneligible voters there.
Missouri also argues that population disparities between some of its congressional districts result from the legislature’s attempt to take into account projected population shifts. We recognize that a congressional district-ing plan will usually be in effect for at least 10 years and five congressional elections. Situations may arise where substantial population shifts over such a period can be anticipated. Where these shifts can be predicted with a high degree of accuracy, States that are redistricting may properly consider them. By this we mean to open no avenue for subterfuge. Findings as to population trends must be thoroughly documented and applied throughout the State in a systematic, not an ad hoc, manner. Missouri’s attempted justification of the substantial underpopulation in the Fourth and Sixth Districts falls far short of this standard. The District Court found “no evidence . . . that the . . . General Assembly adopted any policy of population projection in devising Districts 4 and 6, or any other district, in enacting the 1967 Act.” 279 F. Supp., at 983.
Finally, Missouri claims that some of the deviations from equality were a consequence of the legislature’s attempt to ensure that each congressional district would be geographically compact. However, in Reynolds v. Sims, supra, at 580, we said, “Modern developments and improvements in transportation and communications make rather hollow, in the mid-1960’s, most claims that deviations from population-based representation can validly be based solely on geographical considerations. Arguments for allowing such deviations in order to insure effective representation for sparsely settled areas and to prevent legislative districts from becoming so large that the availability of access of citizens to their representatives is impaired are today, for the most part, unconvincing.” In any event, Missouri’s claim of compactness is based solely upon the unaesthetic appearance of the map of congressional boundaries that would result from an attempt to effect some of the changes in district lines which, according to the lower court, would achieve greater equality. A State’s preference for pleasingly shaped districts can hardly justify population variances.
Affirmed.
[For dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan, see post, p. 549.]
[For dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice White, see post, p. 553.]
The redistricting effected by the 1967 Act, based on a population of 4,319,813 according to the 1960 census, is as follows:
% Variation
District No. Population. From, Ideal.
One 439,746 + 1.80
Two 436,448 + 1.03
Three 436,099 + 0.95
Four 419,721 - 2.84
Five 431,178 - 0.19
Six 422,238 - 2.26
Seven 436,769 + 1.11
Eight 445,523 + 3.13
Nine 428,223 - 0.87
Ten 423,868 - 1.88
Ideal population per district. 431,981
Average variation from ideal. 1.6%
Ratio of largest to smallest district. 1.06 to 1
Number of districts within 1.88% of ideal. 7
Population difference between largest and smallest districts.. 25,802
Contrary to appellants’ assertion, we have not sustained the constitutionality of any congressional districting plan with population variances of the magnitude found in the Missouri plan. In Connor v. Johnson, 386 U. S. 483 (1967), the only issue presented to this Court was whether the districting plan involved racial gerrymandering. Alton v. Tawes, 384 U. S. 315 (1966), and Kirk v. Gong, 389 U. S. 574 (1968), involved situations where the lower courts themselves had reapportioned the districts on an emergency basis, and our affirmances were based on agreement with the use of the plans in that circumstance, and not on any view that the plans in question achieved equality as nearly as practicable.
Brief for Appellants 37-38.
It is dubious in any event that the temptation to gerrymander would be much inhibited, since the legislature would still be free to choose which of several subdivisions, all with their own political complexion, to include in a particular congressional district. Besides, opportunities for gerrymandering are greatest when there is freedom to construct unequally populated districts. “[T]he artistry of the political cartographer is put to its highest test when he must work with constituencies of equal population. At such times, his skills can be compared to those of a surgeon, for both work under fixed and arduous rules. However, if the mapmaker is free to allocate varying populations to different districts, then the butcher's cleaver replaces the scalpel; and the results reflect sharply the difference in the method of operation.” A. Hacker, Congressional Districting 59 (1964 rev. ed.).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Ginsburg
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case concerns the fees that may be awarded attorneys who successfully represent Social Security benefits claimants in court. Under 42 U. S. C. § 406(b) (1994 ed. and Supp. V), a prevailing claimant’s fees are payable only out of the benefits recovered; in amount, such fees may not exceed 25 percent of past-due benefits. At issue is a question that has sharply divided the Federal Courts of Appeals: What is the appropriate starting point for judicial determinations of “a reasonable fee for [representation before the court]”? See ibid. Is the contingent-fee agreement between claimant and counsel, if not in excess of 25 percent of past-due benefits, presumptively reasonable? Or should courts begin with a lodestar calculation (hours reasonably spent on the case times reasonable hourly rate) of the kind we have approved under statutes that shift the obligation to pay to the loser in the litigation? See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U. S. 424, 426 (1983) (interpreting Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U. S. C. § 1988, which allows a “prevailing party” to recover from his adversary “a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Congress, we conclude, designed § 406(b) to control, not to displace, fee agreements between Social Security benefits claimants and their counsel. Because the decision before us for review rests on lodestar calculations and rejects the primacy of lawful attorney-client fee agreements, we reverse the judgment below and remand for recalculation of counsel fees payable from the claimants’ past-due benefits.
I
A
Fees for representation of individuals claiming Social Security old-age, survivor, or disability benefits, both at the administrative level and in court, are governed by prescriptions Congress originated in 1965. Social Security Amendments of 1965, 79 Stat. 403, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §406. The statute deals with the administrative and judicial review stages discretely: § 406(a) governs fees for representation in administrative proceedings; § 406(b) controls fees for representation in court. See also 20 CFR § 404.1728(a) (2001).
For representation of a benefits claimant at the administrative level, an attorney may file a fee petition or a fee agreement. 42 U. S. C. § 406(a). In response to a petition, the agency may allow fees “for services performed in connection with any claim before” it; if a determination favorable to the benefits claimant has been made, however, the Commissioner of Social Security “shall... fix... a reasonable fee” for an attorney’s services. § 406(a)(1) (1994 ed.) (emphasis added). In setting fees under this method, the agency takes into account, in addition to any benefits award, several other factors. See 20 CFR § 404.1725(b) (2001). Fees may be authorized, on petition, even if the benefits claimant was unsuccessful. § 404.1725(b)(2).
As an alternative to fee petitions, the Social Security Act, as amended in 1990, accommodates contingent-fee agreements filed with the agency in advance of a ruling on the claim for benefits. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990,104 Stat. 1388-266 to 1388-267, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §§ 406(a)(2) — (4) (1994 ed. and Supp. V). If the ruling on the benefits claim is favorable to the claimant, the agency will generally approve the fee agreement, subject to this limitation: Fees may not exceed the lesser of 25 percent of past-due benefits or $4,000 (increased to $5,300 effective February 2002). §§ 406(a)(2)(A)(ii), (iii) (1994 ed.); 67 Fed. Reg. 2477 (2002); see Social Security Administration, Office of Hearings and Appeals, Litigation Law Manual (HALLEX) 1-5-109 III.A (Feb. 5,1999).
For proceedings in court, Congress provided for fees on rendition of “a judgment favorable to a claimant.” 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A) (1994 ed., Supp. V). The Commissioner has interpreted § 406(b) to “prohibit] a lawyer from charging fees when there is no award of back benefits.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 37-38; see Brief in Opposition 12, n. 12 (reading § 406(b) to “prohibi[t] other [fee] arrangements such as non-contingent hourly fees”).
As part of its judgment, a court may allow “a reasonable fee... not in excess of 25 percent of the... past-due benefits” awarded to the claimant. § 406(b)(1)(A). The fee is payable “out of, and not in addition to, the amount of [the] past-due benefits.” Ibid. Because benefits amounts figuring in the fee calculation are limited to those past due, attorneys may not gain additional fees based on a claimant’s continuing entitlement to benefits.
The prescriptions set out in §§ 406(a) and (b) establish the exclusive regime for obtaining fees for successful representation of Social Security benefits claimants. Collecting or even demanding from the client anything more than the authorized allocation of past-due benefits is a criminal offense. §§ 406(a)(5), (b)(2) (1994 ed.); 20 CFR §§404.1740-1799 (2001).
In many cases, as in the instant case, the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), enacted in 1980, effectively increases the portion of past-due benefits the successful Social Security claimant may pocket. 94 Stat. 2329, as amended, 28 U. S. C. § 2412. Under EAJA, a party prevailing against the United States in court, including a successful Social Security benefits claimant, may be awarded fees payable by the United States if the Government’s position in the litigation was not “substantially justified." § 2412(d)(1)(A). EAJA fees are determined not by a percent of the amount recovered, but by the “time expended” and the attorney’s “[hourly] rate,” § 2412(d)(1)(B), capped in the mine run of cases at $125 per hour, § 2412(d)(2)(A). Cf. 5 U. S. C. § 504 (authorizing payment of attorney’s fees by the Government when a party prevails in a federal agency adjudication).
Congress harmonized fees payable by the Government under EAJA with fees payable under § 406(b) out of the claimant’s past-due Social Security benefits in this manner: Fee awards may be made under both prescriptions, but the claimant’s attorney must “refun[d] to the claimant the amount of the smaller fee.” Act of Aug. 5, 1985, Pub. L. 99-80, §3, 99 Stat. 186. “Thus, an EAJA award offsets an award under Section 406(b), so that the [amount of the total past-due benefits the claimant actually receives] will be increased by the... EAJA award up to the point the claimant receives 100 percent of the past-due benefits.” Brief for United States 3.
B
Petitioners Gary Gisbrecht, Barbara Miller, and Nancy Sandine brought three separate actions in the District Court for the District of Oregon under 42 U. S. C. § 405(g) (1994 ed.), seeking Social Security disability benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. All three petitioners were represented by the same attorneys, and all three prevailed on the merits of their claims. Gisbrecht was awarded $28,366 in past-due benefits; Miller, $30,056; and San-dine, $55,952. Each petitioner then successfully sought attorneys’ fees payable by the United States under EAJA: Gisbrecht was awarded $3,339.11, Miller, $5,164.75, and Sandine, $6,836.10.
Pursuant to contingent-fee agreements standard for Social Security claimant representation, see 1 B. Samuels, Social Security Disability Claims §21:10 (2d ed. 1994), Gisbrecht, Miller, and Sandine had each agreed to pay counsel 25 percent of all past-due benefits recovered, App. to Pet. for Cert. 72-86. Their attorneys accordingly requested § 406(b) fees of $7,091.50 from Gisbreeht’s recovery, $7,514 from Miller’s, and $13,988 from Sandine’s. Given the EAJA offsets, the amounts in fact payable from each client’s past-due benefits recovery would have been $3,752.39 from Gisbrecht’s recovery, $2,349.25 from Miller’s, and $7,151.90 from Sandine’s.
Following Circuit precedent, see Allen v. Shalala, 48 F. 3d 456, 458-459 (CA9 1995), the District Court in each case declined to give effect to the attorney-client fee agreement. Gisbrecht v. Apfel, No. CV-98-0437-RE (Ore., Apr. 14,1999); Miller v. Apfel, No. CV-96-6164-AS (Ore., Mar. 30, 1999); Sandine v. Apfel, No. CV-97-6197-ST (Ore., June 18, 1999). Instead, the court employed for the § 406(b) fee calculation a “lodestar” method, under which the number of hours reasonably devoted to each case was multiplied by a reasonable hourly fee. This method yielded as § 406(b) fees $3,135 from Gisbrecht’s recovery, $5,461.50 from Miller’s, and $6,550 from Sandine’s. Offsetting the EAJA. awards, the court determined that no portion of Gisbrecht’s or Sandine’s past-due benefits was payable to counsel, and that only $296.75 of Miller’s recovery was payable to he]* counsel as a § 406(b) fee. The three claimants appealed.
Adhering to Circuit precedent applying the lodestar method to calculate fees under § 406(b), the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit consolidated the cases and affirmed the District Court’s fee dispositions. Gisbrecht v. Apfel, 238 F. 3d 1196 (2000). The Appeals Court noted that fees determined under the lodestar method could be adjusted by applying 12 further factors, one of them, “whether the fee is fixed or contingent.” Id., at 1198 (quoting Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F. 2d 67, 70 (CA9 1975)). While “a district court must consider a plaintiff’s request to increase a fee [based on a contingent-fee agreement],” the Ninth Circuit stated, “a court ‘is not required to articulate its reasons’ for accepting or rejecting such a request.” 238 F. 3d, at 1199 (quoting Widrig v. Apfel, 140 F. 3d 1207, 1211 (CA9 1998)) (emphasis in original).
We granted certiorari, 534 U. S. 1039 (2001), in view of the division among the Circuits on the appropriate method of calculating fees under § 406(b). Compare Coup v. Heckler, 834 F. 2d 313 (CA3 1987); Craig v. Secretary, Dept. of Health and Human Servs., 864 F. 2d 324 (CA4 1989); Brown v. Sullivan, 917 F. 2d 189 (CA5 1990); Cotter v. Bowen, 879 F. 2d 359 (CA8 1989); Hubbard v. Shalala, 12 F. 3d 946 (CA10 1993); and Kay v. Apfel, 176 F. 3d 1322 (CA11 1999) (all following, in accord with the Ninth Circuit, a lodestar method), with Wells v. Sullivan, 907 F. 2d 367 (CA2 1990); Rodriguez v. Bowen, 865 F. 2d 739 (CA6 1989) (en banc); and McGuire v. Sullivan, 873 F. 2d 974 (CA7 1989) (all giving effect to attorney-client contingent-fee agreement, if resulting fee is reasonable). We now reverse the Ninth Circuit’s judgment.
II
Beginning with the text, §406(b)’s words, “a reasonable fee... not in excess of 25 percent of... the past-due benefits,” read in isolation, could be construed to allow either the Ninth Circuit’s lodestar approach or petitioners’ position that the attorney-client fee agreement ordinarily should control, if not “in excess of 25 percent.” The provision instructs “a reasonable fee,” which could be measured by a lodestar calculation. But § 4Q6(b)’s language does not exclude contingent-fee contracts that produce fees no higher than the 25 percent ceiling. Such contracts are the most common fee arrangement between attorneys and Social Security claimants. See Department of Health and Human Services, Social Security Administration, Office of Hearings and Appeals, Report to Congress: Attorney Fees Under Title II of the Social Security Act 15,66,70 (July 1988) (hereinafter SSA Report); Brief for National Organization of Social Security Claimants’ Representatives as Amicus Curiae 1-2. Looking outside the statute’s inconclusive text, we next take into account, as interpretive guides, the origin and standard application of the proffered approaches.
The lodestar method has its roots in accounting practices adopted in the 1940’s to allow attorneys and firms to determine whether fees charged were sufficient to cover overhead and generate suitable profits. W. Ross, The Honest Hour: The Ethics of Time-Based Billing by Attorneys 16 (1996) (hereinafter Honest Hour). An American Bar Association (ABA) report, published in 1958, observed that attorneys’ earnings had failed to keep pace with the rate of inflation; the report urged attorneys to record the hours spent on each case in order to ensure that fees ultimately charged afforded reasonable compensation for counsels’ efforts. See Special Committee on Economics of Law Practice, The 1958 Lawyer and His 1938 Dollar 9-10 (reprint 1959).
Hourly records initially provided only an internal accounting check. See Honest Hour 19. The fees actually charged might be determined under any number of methods: the annual retainer; the fee-for-service method; the “eyeball” method, under which the attorney estimated an annual fee for regular clients; or the contingent-fee method, recognized by this Court in Stanton v. Embrey, 93 U. S. 548, 556 (1877), and formally approved by the ABA in 1908. See Honest Hour 13-19. As it became standard accounting practice to record hours spént on a client’s matter, attorneys increasingly realized that billing by horn’s devoted to a case was administratively convenient; moreover, as an objective measure of a lawyer’s labor, hourly billing was readily impartable to the client. Id., at 18. By the early 1970’s, the practice of hourly billing had become widespread. See id., at 19, 21.
The federal courts did not swiftly settle on hourly rates as the overriding criterion for attorney’s fee awards. In 1974, for example, the Fifth Circuit issued an influential opinion holding that, in setting fees under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U. S. C. §2000e-5(k) (1970 ed.), courts should consider not only the number of hours devoted to a case but also 11 other factors. Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F. 2d 714, 717-719 (1974). The lodestar method did not gain a firm foothold until the mid-1970’s, see Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. of Philadelphia v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F. 2d 161 (CA3 1973), appeal after remand, 540 F. 2d 102 (1976), and achieved dominance in the federal courts only after this Court’s decisions in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U. S. 424 (1983), Blum v. Stenson, 465 U. S. 886 (1984), and Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478 U. S. 546 (1986).
Since that time, “[t]he ‘lodestar’ figure has, as its name suggests, become the guiding light of our fee-shifting jurisprudence.” Burlington v. Dague, 505 U. S. 557, 562 (1992) (relying on Hensley, Blum, and Delaware Valley to apply lodestar method to fee determination under Solid Waste Disposal Act, § 7002(e), 42 U. S. C. § 6972(e) (1988 ed.), and Clean Water Act, § 505(d), 33 U. S. C. § 1365(d) (1988 ed.), and noting prior application of lodestar method to Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U. S. C. § 1988 (1988 ed., Supp. III); Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. §2000e-5(k) (1988 ed., Supp. III); and Clean Air Act, 42 U. S. C. § 7604(d) (1988 ed.)). As we recognized in Hensley, “[i]deally,... litigants will settle the amount of a fee.” 461 U. S., at 437. But where settlement between the parties is not possible, “[t]he most useful starting point for [court determination of] the amount of a reasonable fee [payable by the loser] is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.” Id., at 433. Thus, the lodestar method today holds sway in federal-court adjudication of disputes over the amount of fees properly shifted to the loser in the litigation. See id., at 440 (Burger, C. J., concurring) (decision addresses statute under which “a lawyer seeks to have his adversary pay the fees of the prevailing party”).
Fees shifted to the losing party, however, are not at issue here. Unlike 42 U. S. C. § 1988 (1994 ed. and Supp. V) and EAJA, 42 U. S. C. § 406(b) (1994 ed., Supp. V) does not authorize the prevailing party to recover fees from the losing party. Section 406(b) is of another genre: It authorizes fees payable from the successful party’s recovery. Several statutes governing suits against the United States similarly provide that fees may be paid from the plaintiff’s recovery. See, e. g., Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U. S. C. §2678 (“No attorney shall charge, demand, receive, or collect for services rendered, fees in excess of 25 per centum of any [court] judgment rendered [in am FTCA suit], or in excess of 20 per centum of any award, compromise, or settlement made [by a federal agency to settle an FTCA claim].”); Veterans’ Benefits Act, 38 U.S.C. § 5904(d)(1) (1994 ed.) (“When a claimant [for veterans’ benefits] and an attorney have entered into a [contingent-]fee agreement [under which fees are paid by withholding from the claimant’s benefits award], the total fee payable to the attorney may not exceed 20 percent of the total amount of any past-due benefits awarded on the basis of the claim.”). Characteristically in cases of the kind we confront, attorneys and clients enter into contingent-fee agreements “specifying that the fee will be 25 percent of any past-due benefits to which the claimant becomes entitled.” Brief for National Organization of Social Security Claimants’ Representatives as Amicus Curiae 2; see Brief for Washington Legal Foundation et al. as Amici Curiae 9, n. 6 (“There is no serious dispute among the parties that virtually every attorney representing Title II disability claimants includes in his/her retainer agreement a provision calling for a fee equal to 25% of the past-due benefits awarded by the courts.”).
Contingent fees, though problematic, particularly when not exposed to court review, are common in the United States in many settings. Such fees, perhaps most visible in tort litigation, are also used in, e. g., patent litigation, real estate tax appeals, mergers and acquisitions, and public offerings. See ABA Formal Opinion 94-389, ABA/BNA Lawyers’ Manual On Professional Conduct 1001:248, 1001:250 (1994). But see id., at 1001:248, n. 3 (quoting observation that controls on contingent fees sire needed to “reduce financial incentives that encourage lawyers to file unnecessary, unwarranted[,] and unmeritorious suits” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Traditionally and today, “the marketplace for Social Security representation operates largely on a contingency fee basis.” SSA Report 3; see also id., at 15, 66, 70; App. to Pet. for Cert. 56, (50, 88, 89, 91 (affidavits of practitioners).
Before 1965, the Social Security Act imposed no limits on contingent-fee agreements drawn by counsel and signed by benefits claimants. In formulating the 1965 Social Security Act amendments that included § 406(b), Congress recognized that “attorneys have upon occasion charged... inordinately large fees for representing claimants [in court].” S. Rep. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt., 1, p. 122 (1965). Arrangements yielding exorbitant fees, the Senate Report observed, reserved for the lawyer one-third to one-half of the accrued benefits. Ibid. Congress was mindful, too, that the longer the litigation persisted, the greater the buildup of past-due benefits and, correspondingly, of legal fees awardable from those benefits if the claimant prevailed. Ibid.
Attending to these realities, Congress provided for “a reasonable fee, not in excess of 25 percent of accrued benefits,” as part of the court’s judgment, and further specified that “no other fee would be payable.” Ibid. Violation of the “reasonable fee” or “25 percent of accrued benefits” limitation was made subject to the same penalties as those applicable for charging a fee larger than the amount approved by the Commissioner for services at the administrative level— a fine of up to $500, one year’s imprisonment, or both. Ibid. “[T]o assure the payment of the fee allowed by the court,” Congress authorized the agency “to certify the amount of the fee to the attorney out of the amount of the accrued benefits.” Ibid.; see supra, at 804, n. 13.
Congress thus sought to protect claimants against “inordinately large fees” and also to ensure that attorneys representing successful claimants would not risk “nonpayment of [appropriate] fees.” SSA Report 66 (internal quotation marks omitted). But nothing in the text or history of § 406(b) reveals a “desig[n] to prohibit or discourage attorneys and claimants from entering into contingent fee agreements.” Ibid. Given the prevalence of contingent-fee agreements between attorneys and Social Security claimants, it is unlikely that Congress, simply by prescribing “reasonable fees,” meant to outlaw, rather than to contain, such agreements.
This conclusion is bolstered by Congress’ 1990 authorization of contingent-fee agreements under § 406(a), the provision governing fees for agency-level representation. Before enacting this express authorization, Congress instructed the Social Security Administration to prepare a report on attorney’s fees under Title II of the Social Security Act. Pub. L. 100-203, § 9021(b), 101 Stat. 1330-295. The report, presented to Congress in 1988, reviewed several methods of determining attorney’s fees, including the lodestar method. See SSA Report 10-11. This review led the agency to inform Congress that, although the contingency method was hardly flawless, the agency could “identify no more effective means of ensuring claimant access to attorney representation.” Id., at 25.
Congress subsequently altered § 406(a) to validate contingent-fee agreements filed with the agency prior to disposition of the claim for benefits. See 42 U. S. C. § 406(a)(2) (1994 ed.); supra, at 795. As petitioners observe, Brief for Petitioners 24, it would be anomalous if contract-based fees expressly authorized by § 406(a)(2) at the administrative level were disallowed for court representation under § 406(b).
It is also unlikely that Congress, legislating in 1965, and providing for a contingent fee tied to a 25 percent of past-due benefits boundary, intended to install a lodestar method courts did not develop until some years later. See supra, at 801-802. Furthermore, we again emphasize, the lodestar method was designed to govern imposition of fees on the losing party. See, e. g., Dague, 505 U. S., at 562. In such cases, nothing prevents the attorney for the prevailing party from gaining additional fees, pursuant to contract, from his own client. See Venegas v. Mitchell, 495 U. S. 82, 89-90 (1990) (“[None] of our cases has indicated that [42 U. S. C.] § 1988... protects plaintiffs from having to pay what they have contracted to pay, even though their contractual liability is greater than the statutory award that they may collect from losing opponents. Indeed, depriving plaintiffs of the option of promising to pay more than the statutory fee if that is necessary to secure counsel of their choice would not further § 1988’s general purpose of enabling such plaintiffs... to secure competent counsel.”). By contrast, § 406(b) governs the total fee a claimant’s attorney may receive for court representation; any endeavor by the claimant’s attorney to gain more than that fee, or to charge the claimant a noncon-tingent fee, is a criminal offense. 42 U. S. C. § 406(b)(2); 20 CFR § 404.1740(c)(2) (2001).
Most plausibly read, we conclude, § 406(b) does not displace contingent-fee agreements as the primary means by which fees are set for successfully representing Social Security benefits claimants in court. Rather, § 406(b) calls for court review of such arrangements as an independent check, to assure that they yield reasonable results in particular cases. Congress has provided one boundary line: Agreements are unenforceable to the extent that they provide for fees exceeding 25 percent of the past-due benefits. § 406(b)(1)(A) (1994 ed., Supp. V). Within the 25 percent boundary, as petitioners in this case acknowledge, the attorney for the successful claimant must show that the fee sought is reasonable for the services rendered. See Brief for Petitioners 40.
Courts that approach fee determinations by looking first to the contingent-fee agreement, then testing it for reasonableness, have appropriately reduced the attorney’s recovery based on the character of the representation and the results the representative achieved. See, e. g., McGuire, 873 F. 2d, at 983 (“Although the contingency agreement should be given significant weight in fixing a fee, a district judge must independently assess the reasonableness of its terms.”); Lewis v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 707 F. 2d 246, 249-250 (CA6 1983) (instructing reduced fee when representation is substandard). If the attorney is responsible for delay, for example, a reduction is in order so that the attorney will not profit from the accumulation of benefits during the pendency of the case in court. See Rodriquez, 865 F. 2d, at 746-747. If the benefits are large in comparison to the amount of time counsel spent on the case, a downward adjustment is similarly in order. See id., at 747 (reviewing court should disallow “windfalls for lawyers”); Wells, 907 F. 2d, at 372 (same). In this regard, the court may require the claimant’s attorney to submit, not as a basis for satellite litigation, but as an aid to the court’s assessment of the reasonableness of the fee yielded by the fee agreement, a record of the hours spent representing the claimant and a statement of the lawyer’s normal hourly billing charge for noncontingent-fee cases. See Rodriquez, 865 F. 2d, at 741. Judges of our district courts are accustomed to making reasonableness determinations in a wide variety of contexts, and their assessments in such matters, in the event of an appeal, ordinarily qualify for highly respectful review.
* * *
The courts below erroneously read § 406(b) to override customary attorney-client contingent-fee agreements. We hold that § 406(b) does not displace contingent-fee agreements within the statutory ceiling; instead, § 406(b) instructs courts to review for reasonableness fees yielded by those agreements. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
49 Stat. 624, as amended.
Before 1965, Congress did not explicitly authorize attorney’s fees for in-court representation of Social Security benefits claimants. At least two Courts of Appeals, however, concluded that 42 U. S. C. § 405(g) implicitly authorized such fees. See Bowen v. Galbreath, 485 U. S. 74, 75-76 (1988) (citing Celebrezze v. Sparks, 342 F. 2d 286 (CA5 1965)) (“Under 42 U. S. C. § 405(g), a court reviewing [a Social Security benefits decision] has the power to enter ‘a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision The court in Sparks reasoned that where a statute gives a court jurisdiction, it must be presumed, absent any indication to the contrary, that the court was intended to exercise all the powers of a court, including the power to provide for payment of attorney’s fees out of any recovery. 342 F. 2d, at 288-289 [citing Folsom v. McDonald, 237 F. 2d 380, 382-383 (CA4 1956)].”).
As to administrative proceedings, the Social Security Act originally made no provision for attorney’s fees. 49 Stat. 620 (1935). Four years later, Congress amended the Act to permit the Social Security Board to prescribe maximum fees attorneys could charge for representation of claimants before the agency. Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, 53 Stat. 1360. Congress expected the need for counsel in agency proceedings to be slim. H. R. Rep. No. 728, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 44-45 (1939); S. Rep. No. 734, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 53 (1939). The Board subsequently established a maximum fee of $10, permitting a higher fee only by petition to the agency. 20 CFR § 403.713(d) (1949). The agency later prescribed separate fees for representation at the initial and appellate levels of the administrative process. 20 CFR §404.976 (1961).
Title 20 CFR § 404.1725(b) provides:
“Evaluating a request for approval of a fee.
“(1) When we evaluate a representative’s request for approval of a fee, we consider the purpose of the social security program, which is to provide a measure of economic security for the beneficiaries of the program, together with—
“(i) The extent and type of services the representative performed;
“(ii) The complexity of the case;
“(iii) The level of skill and competence required of the representative in giving the services;
“(iv) The amount of time the representative spent on the case;
“(v) The results the representative achieved;
“(vi) The level of review to which the claim was taken and the level of the review at which the representative became your representative; and
“(vii) The amount of fee the representative requests for his or her services, including any amount authorized or requested before, but not including the amount of any expenses he or she incurred.
“(2) Although we consider the amount of benefits, if any, that are payable, we do not base the amount of fee we authorize on the amount of the benefit alone, but on a consideration of all the factors listed in this section. The benefits payable in any claim are determined by specific provisions of law and are unrelated to the efforts of the representative. We may authorize a fee even if no benefits are payable.”
A higher fee may be awarded if “the court determines that an increase in the cost of living or a special factor, such as the limited availability of qualified attorneys for the proceeding involved, justifies a higher fee.” 28 U. S. C. §2412(d)(2)(A)(ii).
Section 405(g) authorizes judicial review of administrative denials of applications for Social Security benefits.
Although the claimants were named as the appellants below, and are named as petitioners here, the real parties in interest are their attorneys, who seek to obtain higher fee awards under § 406(b). For convenience, we nonetheless refer to claimants as petitioners. See Hopkins v. Cohen, 390 U. S. 530, 531, n. 2 (1968). We also note that the Commissioner of Social Security here, as in the Ninth Circuit, has no direct financial stake in the answer to the § 406(b) question; instead, she plays a part in the fee determination resembling that of a trustee for the claimants. See, e. g., Lewis v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 707 F. 2d 246, 248 (CA6 1983).
A fourth case, Anderson v. Apfel, No. CV-96-6311-HO (Ore., Sept. 29, 1999), was also consolidated with petitioners’ cases; we denied certiorari in Anderson in the order granting certiorari on petitioners’ question. See 534 U. S. 1039 (2001).
Kerr directed consideration of “(1) the time and labor required, (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
F
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sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Chief Justice Vinson
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case originated in proceedings before the Federal Power Commission initiated pursuant to § 5 (a) of the Natural Gas Act of 1938. After overruling objections to its jurisdiction, the Commission entered an order requiring the petitioner to effect substantial rate reductions in certain of its sales of natural gas and to file new schedules of rates and charges. Petitioner, in seeking review of the order in the Circuit Court of Appeals, denied the jurisdiction of the Commission to set rates for the sales in issue in this case and asserted that the rates so established were confiscatory. That Court, one judge dissenting, denied the petition for review. We granted certiorari limited to the question of the Commission’s jurisdiction.
Petitioner owns and operates 110 natural gas wells and owns or controls over 56,000 acres in the Monroe field of northern Louisiana. Petitioner’s main pipe line transports gas southward from the Monroe field through a part of Mississippi and back into Louisiana, where at Baton Rouge sales are made to various distributing companies and industrial consumers. Petitioner concedes that with respect to these operations it is a natural gas company within the meaning of § 2 (6) of the Act and that the Commission has jurisdiction to regulate the rates of sales connected therewith.
The issue of this case involves the jurisdiction of the Federal Power Commission to regulate sales made in the field by petitioner to three pipe-line companies, each of which transports the gas so purchased to markets in States other than Louisiana. Gas produced from petitioner’s wells flows into petitioner’s system of field pipe lines, moving first into branch lines, then into trunk lines, and finally into the main trunk lines from which delivery is made to the three purchasing companies. During the course of this movement petitioner purchases gas from other producers in the field which gas is introduced into petitioner’s system at designated points and is there commingled with the gas moving from petitioner’s own wells. By far the larger part of the gas so purchased by petitioner has been gathered from various wells of the selling companies before delivery to petitioner is made. The gas moves through petitioner’s system at well pressure. Shortly after the sales in question are completed, the gas is directed through the compressor stations of the purchasing companies and is there subjected to increased pressure in order that it may be moved to markets as far distant as Illinois. The entire movement of the gas from the wells to the purchasing companies through the compressor pumps and across the state lines is a continuous process without interruption for storage, processing or for any other purpose. All the gas sold in these transactions is destined for ultimate public consumption in States other than Louisiana.
It appears that petitioner supplies only a part of the gas purchased by the three pipe-line companies in the Monroe field. Counsel for petitioner conceded before the Commission that the prices charged the three pipe-line companies were, by agreement, identical with those being charged by other producers in the field. The Commission found that petitioner was an affiliate of one of the three purchasing companies. It was the conclusion of the Commission that the rates charged by petitioner in these sales were “unjust, unreasonable and unlawful” and ordered rate reductions amounting to $596,320 per year as applied to the volume of gas sold in the test year of 1941.
Petitioner has at no time contended that regulation of its sales to the three purchasing companies is beyond the constitutional powers of Congress. Petitioner has vigorously asserted, however, that Congress did not exercise its full powers in the Natural Gas Act and that in § 1 (b) of the Act the jurisdiction of the Federal Power Commission is so limited as to preclude valid regulation of the sales by that agency. Section 1 (b) provides:
“The provisions of this Act shall apply to the transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce, to the sale in interstate commerce of natural gas for resale for ultimate public consumption for domestic, commercial, industrial, or any other use, and to natural-gas companies engaged in such transportation or sale, but shall not apply to any other transportation or sale of natural gas or to the local distribution of natural gas or to the facilities used for such distribution or to the production or gathering of natural gas.”
It is not denied that the transactions in question were sales of natural gas for resale for ultimate public consumption.
Petitioner has raised two issues: First, it is contended, the sales are not “in interstate commerce.” Second, the sales are a part of “production or gathering” and hence not within the Commission’s power of regulation.
We have no doubt that the sales are in interstate commerce. Indeed, petitioner did not contest that position before the Commission, but, so far as the record reveals, raised the issue for the first time in its petition for rehearing in the Circuit Court of Appeals. The Federal Power Commission found that the gas sold to the three pipe-line companies moves “. . . in a constant flow from the mouths of the wells from which it is produced through pipe lines belonging to Interstate to the compressor station of the respective purchaser, and thence through said compressor stations into the pipe line of said respective purchaser and thus into and through states other than Louisiana . . . , all without interruption, and said gas is so destined from the moment of its production.” The Commission further found that “The gas transported and sold by Interstate to these three pipe line companies continues its flow in interstate commerce and, as an established course of business well known to Interstate, is destined for resale for ultimate public consumption in . . . markets outside Louisiana.”
Under the circumstances described by the Commission, it is clear that the sales in question were quite as much in interstate commerce as they would have been had the pipes of the petitioner crossed the state line before reaching the points of sale. Thus in Public Utilities Commission v. Attleboro Steam & Electric Co., 273 U. S. 83 (1927), a sale of electrical energy at the state line was held to be in interstate commerce. Commenting on that case, this Court in Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 319 U. S. 61, 69 (1943) stated: “We see no distinction between a sale at or before reaching the state line.” There is nothing in the terms of the Act or in its legislative history to indicate that Congress intended that a more restricted meaning be attributed to the phrase “in interstate commerce” than that which theretofore had been given to it in the opinions of this Court. Section 2 (7) of the Act defines “interstate commerce” as “. . . commerce between any point in a State and any point outside thereof, or between points within the same State but through any place outside thereof, . . . .” Clearly the sales in question were a part of commerce being carried on between points in Louisiana and points in other States. There is nothing in that language to suggest that Congress intended that sales consummated before the gas crosses a state line should not be regarded as being “in” such commerce.
Nor are we impressed with the suggestion that the interstate movement of the gas should be regarded as beginning when the gas, theretofore moving through petitioner’s pipe line system at well pressure, is subjected to increased pressure in the compressor stations of the purchasing companies in order that the gas may be moved to the distant markets. Long before the gas reaches the compressor pumps it has been committed to its interstate journey which follows without interruption or deviation. Under such circumstances, the increase of pressure in the compressor stations must be regarded as merely an incident in the interstate commerce rather than as its origin.
The Company contends, however, that regardless of whether the sales in question are in interstate commerce, those transactions fall within the clause of § 1 (b) specifically excepting from the Commission’s jurisdiction regulation of “. . . the production or gathering of natural gas.” In evaluating that contention we should not lose sight of the objectives sought to be accomplished by Congress in passing the Natural Gas Act.
In a series of decisions announced prior to the passage of the Act, this Court had held that, although Congress had not acted, the regulation of wholesale rates of gas and electrical energy moving in interstate commerce is beyond the constitutional powers of the States. Petitioner, relying in part upon the principles established by those cases, has successfully avoided regulation by the Louisiana Public Service Commission. As was stated in the House Committee report, the “basic purpose” of Congress in passing the Natural Gas Act was “to occupy this field in which the Supreme Court has held that the States may not act.” In denying the Federal Power Commission jurisdiction to regulate the production or gathering of natural gas, it was not the purpose of Congress to free companies such as petitioner from effective public control. The purpose of that restriction was, rather, to preserve in the States powers of regulation in areas in which the States are constitutionally competent to act. Thus the House Committee Report states: “The bill takes no authority from State commissions, and is so drawn as to complement and in no manner usurp State regulatory authority . . . .” Clearly, among the powers thus reserved to the States is the power to regulate the physical production and gathering of natural gas in the interests of conservation or of any other consideration of legitimate local concern. It was the intention of Congress to give the States full freedom in these matters. Thus, where sales, though technically consummated in interstate commerce, are made during the course of production and gathering and are so closely connected with the local incidents of that process as to render rate regulation by the Federal Power Commission inconsistent or a substantial interference with the exercise by the State of its regulatory functions, the jurisdiction of the Federal Power' Commission does not attach. But such conflict must be clearly shown. Exceptions to the primary grant of jurisdiction in the section are to be strictly construed. It is not sufficient to defeat the Commission’s jurisdiction over sales for resale in interstate commerce to assert that in the exercise of the power of rate regulation in such cases, local interests may in some degree be affected.
. There is nothing in the record to indicate that the regulation in question is in any way inconsistent with the exercise by Louisiana of the powers over production and gathering of natural gas reserved to it by Congress in § 1 (b) of the Act. The State in a series of enactments has made elaborate provision for the conservation of its natural gas resources and has established various rules and regulations relating to the production and gathering process. Most of those provisions, presumably, are applicable to petitioner’s field operations. The record is devoid of any suggestion that Louisiana has ever opposed the jurisdiction of the Federal Power Commission in this case or has ever urged that federal regulation of the sales in question would interfere with the exercise by the State of its regulatory functions. We do not suggest that the jurisdiction of the Commission in any case is to be determined by the resistance or lack of resistance on the part of the State to federal regulation. But in evaluating the Company’s contention that the State’s powers have been invaded, we regard it a matter of some significance that although the State has freely exercised its regulatory powers over the production and gathering of natural gas, there is no evidence of any conflict, present or threatened, in the performing of those functions by the State with the exercise of the jurisdiction of the Federal Power Commission in this case.
It is not contended that the Commission is precluded from regulating the sales in question by reason of the exception from the Commission’s jurisdiction relating to the production of natural gas. Petitioner asserts, however, that the sales to the three pipe-line companies are a part of the gathering process and consequently not within the Commission’s power of regulation. This basic contention' has given rise to a great many subsidiary questions such as whether the sales were made from petitioner’s “gathering” lines or from petitioner’s “transmission” lines and whether the gathering process continued to the points of sale or was, as the Commission found, completed at some point prior to surrender of custody and passage of title. We have found it unnecessary to resolve those issues. The gas moved by petitioner to the points of sale consisted of gas produced from petitioner’s wells commingled with that produced and gathered by other companies and introduced into petitioner’s pipe-line system during the course of the movement. By the time the sales are consummated, nothing further in the gathering process remains to be done. We have held that these sales are in interstate commerce. It cannot be doubted that their regulation is predominately a matter of national, as contrasted to local concern. All the gas sold in these transactions is destined for consumption in States other than Louisiana. Unreasonable charges exacted at this stage of the interstate movement become perpetuated in large part in fixed items of costs which must be covered by rates charged subsequent purchasers of the gas, including the ultimate consumer. It was to avoid such situations that the Natural Gas Act was passed.
For reasons stated above, we have concluded that the Federal Power Commission in this case has not exceeded the jurisdiction conferred upon it by Congress in § 1 (b) of the Natural Gas Act.
Affirmed.
52 Stat. 821, 15 U. S. C. § 717 et seq.; 56 Stat. 83.
3 F. P. C. 416.
156 F. 2d 949 (1946).
Section 2 (6) provides: “‘Natural-gas company’ means a person engaged in the transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce, or the sale in interstate commerce of such gas for resale.”
The three companies include the Mississippi River Fuel Corporation, Southern Natural Gas Company, and the United Gas Pipe Line Company to which gas is sold for the account of the Memphis Natural Gas Company.
Petitioner produced and purchased a total of 51,659,799 Mcf of gas in the Monroe field during 1941. Of this total, petitioner produced from its own wells 28, 819, 814 Mcf. Of the 22,839,985 Mcf purchased, 95% was gathered by the producers before delivery to petitioner; the remaining 5% was purchased by petitioner directly at the well heads. Petitioner sold 21,863,278 Mcf to the three purchasing companies in the transactions in question.
Gas in the Monroe field is “dry” gas and consequently is not subjected to any extraction processing. Before moving into the compressor pumps the gas is run through a series of “scrubbers” which remove dirt and foreign particles. This is accomplished, however, without interruption in the movement.
The transactions in question supply the Mississippi Fuel Corp. with 22% of its requirements, 24% of the requirements of the Memphis Natural Gas Co., and 16.61% of the requirements of Southern Natural Gas Co.
In its complaint filed in the District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana invoking the equity powers of the Court to restrain the Louisiana Public Service Commission from conducting an investigation into petitioner’s rates and charges, petitioner specifically asserted that the sales in question are in interstate commerce and thus beyond the jurisdiction of the state commission. The District Court granted the requested relief. Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. Public Service Commission; 33 F. Supp. 50; 34 F. Supp. 980 (1940).
Shafer v. Farmers Grain Co., 268 U. S. 189 (1925); Lemke v. Farmers Grain Co., 258 U. S. 50 (1922); Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U. S. 282 (1921). And see Illinois Natural Gas Co. v. Centred Illinois Public Service Co., 314 U. S. 498, 503-504 (1942); Currin v. Wallace, 306 U. S. 1, 10 (1939); Peoples Natural Gas Co. v. Public Service Comm’n, 270 U. S. 550, 554 (1926); Illinois Central R. Co. v. Railroad Comm’n, 236 U. S. 157, 163 (1915). Cf. Milk Control Board v. Eisenberg Farm Products, 306 U. S. 346 (1939).
Illinois Natural Gas Co. v. Central Illinois Public Service Co., 314 U. S. 498, 508 (1942); Peoples Natural Gas Co. v. Federal Power Comm’n, 75 U. S. App. D. C. 235, 127 F. 2d 153 (1942). Cf. Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v. Federal Power Comm’n, 319 U. S. 61, 70-71 (1943).
Cf. Illinois Natural Gas Co. v. Central Illinois Public Service Co., supra at 504-505; State Tax Comm’n v. Interstate Natural Gas Co., 284 U. S. 41, 44 (1931).
Missouri v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 265 U. S. 298 (1924); Public Utilities Comm’n v. Attleboro Steam & Electric Co., 273 U. S. 83 (1927); State Corp. Comm’n v. Wichita Gas Co., 290 U. S. 561 (1934).
See note 9, supra.
H. R. Rep. No. 709,75th Cong., 1st Sess., 2.
Ibid.
Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Federal Power Comm’n, 324 U. S. 581, 602-603 (1945).
The Federal Power Commission has not asserted jurisdiction over all sales taking place in the natural gas fields even though in interstate commerce for resale for ultimate public consumption. In the Matter of Columbian Fuel Corp., 2 F. P. C. 200; In the Matter of Billings Co., 2 F. P. C. 288. We express no opinion as to the validity of the jurisdictional tests employed by the Commission in these cases.
Cf. Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Federal Power Comm’n, supra at 603; Federal Power Comm’n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U. S. 591, 607-612 (1944).
La. Gen. Stat. §§ 4766-4826.2.
The record contains testimony by counsel for petitioner to the effect that these provisions apply to petitioner and that petitioner’s operations have conformed with their requirements.
Counsel for the Louisiana Public Service Commission and for two Louisiana municipalities participated in the proceedings before the Federal Power Commission.
A number of cases in this Court have held that the reasonableness of cost items such as that incurred by a purchasing pipe-line company in acquiring gas for transportation may be inquired into during the course of subsequent regulation when buyer and seller are affiliated corporations and there is evidence that the sales were not made at arm’s length. The Commission found affiliation to exist between petitioner and only one of the three purchasing companies, the Mississippi River Fuel Corporation. There was a finding of “close contractual and operating arrangements” between petitioner and another of the purchasing companies. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. Slattery, 302 U. S. 300 (1937); Columbus Gas & Fuel Co. v. Public Utilities Comm’n, 292 U. S. 398 (1934); Dayton Power & Light Co. v. Public Utilities Comm’n, 292 U. S. 290 (1934); Western Distributing Co. v. Public Service Comm’n, 285 U. S. 119 (1932); Smith v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 282 U. S. 133 (1930); United Fuel Gas Co. v. Railroad Comm’n, 278 U. S. 300 (1929).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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H
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
On April 17, 1952, the Governor of Michigan signed the Michigan Communist Control Bill. On April 22, 1952, the Communist Party of Michigan and William Albertson, its Executive Secretary, filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. Sections 2-5, inclusive, and Section 7 of the Act were alleged to violate various provisions of the Federal Constitution. A declaratory judgment to that effect was sought, along with an injunction to prevent state officials and officers from enforcing the Act. A three-judge District Court found the Act constitutional, 106 F. Supp. 635, and an appeal was taken to this Court.
Section 5 of the Act requires the registration of Communists, the Communist Party and Communist front organizations, and Section 7 prevents them from appearing on any ballot in the State. “Communist,” “Communist Party,” and “Communist front organization” are given a statutory meaning by the Michigan Legislature. Mich. Acts 1952, No. 117.
These definitions are challenged by the appellants as void for vagueness. The definition of a Communist as a member of the communist party, notwithstanding the fact that he may not pay dues to, or hold a card in, said party . . . .” is said to be vague since once dues and cards are eliminated as criteria there are no readily apparent means of determining who is a member. As to the definition of the Communist Party as an organization “. . . substantially directed, dominated or controlled by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics or its satellites” it is contended there are no standards as to what is a “satellite.” In regard to the definition of both Communist Party and Communist front organization as an organization which “. . . in any manner advocates, or acts to further, the world communist movement” appellants point to the failure to define the “world communist movement” as creating vagueness. The answers given to these and possibly other problems of construction and interpretation arising under the definitions in Sections 2-4 will determine the ultimate scope of the Act.
Interpretation of state legislation is primarily the function of state authorities, judicial and administrative. The construction given to a state statute by the state courts is binding upon federal courts. There has been no interpretation of this statute by the state courts. The absence of such construction stems from the fact this action in federal court was commenced only five days after the statute became law.
There is pending in the Circuit Court for Wayne County, Michigan, a bill seeking a declaratory judgment that the Act is unconstitutional, both on federal and state grounds. That action is being held in abeyance pending our mandate and decision in this case.
We deem it appropriate in this case that the state courts construe this statute before the District Court further considers the action. See Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U. S. 549 (1947); American Federation of Labor v. Watson, 327 U. S. 582 (1946); and Spector Motor Service v. McLaughlin, 323 U. S. 101 (1944).
The judgment is vacated and the cause remanded to the District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan with directions to vacate the restraining order it issued and to hold the proceedings in abeyance a reasonable time pending construction of the statute by the state courts either in pending litigation or other litigation which may be instituted.
It is so ordered.
Mr. Justice Black dissents.
"Sec. 2. A 'communist' is a person who:
“(a) Is a member of the communist party, notwithstanding the fact that he may not pay dues to, or hold a card in, said party; or
" (b) Knowingly contributes funds or any character of property to the communist party; or
“(c) Commits or advocates the commission of any act reasonably calculated to further the overthrow of the government of the United States of America, the government of the state of Michigan, or the government of any political subdivision of either of them, by force or violence; or
“(d) Commits or advocates the commission of any act reasonably calculated to further the overthrow of the government of the United States, the government of the state of Michigan, or the government of any political subdivision of either of them, by unlawful or unconstitutional means, and the substitution of a communist government or a government intended to be substantially directed, dominated or controlled by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics or its satellites.'
"Sec. 3. The ‘communist party’ is any organization which is substantially directed, dominated or controlled by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics or its satellites, or which in any manner advocates, or acts to further, the world communist movement.
“Sec. 4. A ‘communist front organization’ is any organization, the members of which are not all communists, but which is substantially directed, dominated or controlled by communists or by the communist party, or which in any manner advocates, or acts to further, the world communist movement. The attorney general of the state of Michigan annually shall prepare and cause to be published a list of all such communist front organizations.”
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
I
|
sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
The judgment below is reversed. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533; Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly of Colorado, 377 U. S. 713. The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with the views stated in our opinions in Reynolds v. Sims and in the other cases relating to state legislative apportionment decided along with Reynolds.
Mr. Justice Clark and Mr. Justice Stewart would affirm the judgment because the Michigan system of legislative apportionment is clearly a rational one and clearly does not frustrate effective majority rule.
Mr. Justice Harlan dissents for the reasons stated in his dissenting opinion in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 589.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court.
A criminal defendant who wishes a court of appeals to consider a claim that a ruling of a trial court was in error must first make his objection known to the trial-court judge. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide two ways of doing so. They say that
"[a] party may preserve a claim of error by informing the court ... of [1] the action the party wishes the court to take, or [2] the party's objection to the court's action and the grounds for that objection." Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 51(b).
Errors "not brought to the court's attention" in one of these two ways are subject to review only insofar as they are "plain." Rule 52(b); see United States v. Olano , 507 U.S. 725, 732-736, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993).
In this case, a criminal defendant argued in the District Court that the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) did not support imposing any prison time for a supervised-release violation. At the very least, the defendant contended, any term of imprisonment should be less than 12 months long. The judge nevertheless imposed a sentence of 12 months. The question is whether the defendant's district-court argument for a specific sentence (namely, nothing or less than 12 months) preserved his claim on appeal that the 12-month sentence was unreasonably long. We think that it did.
I
The petitioner in this case, Gonzalo Holguin-Hernandez, was convicted of drug trafficking and sentenced to 60 months in prison and five years of supervised release.
At the time of his conviction, he was also serving a term of supervised release related to an earlier crime. The Government asked the court to find that petitioner had violated the conditions of that earlier term, to revoke it, and to impose an additional consecutive prison term consistent with the pertinent Sentencing Guidelines, namely, 12 to 18 months in prison. See United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual §§ 7B1.4(a), 7B1.3(f) (Nov. 2018).
Petitioner's counsel argued that there "would be no reason under [18 U.S.C. §]3553 that an additional consecutive sentence would get [petitioner's] attention any better than" the five years in prison the court had already imposed for the current trafficking offense. App. 10. She added that the petitioner understood that, if he offended again, he was "going to serve his life in prison." Ibid. And she urged the court to impose either "no additional time or certainly less than the [G]uidelines." Ibid. At the least, she said, the court should "depart" from the Guidelines, imposing a sentence "below" the applicable range "because it is a substantial sentence and to me over represents the role that he played in" the underlying offense. Ibid.
The court then imposed a consecutive term of 12 months, a sentence at the bottom of, but not below, the Guidelines range. See id. , at 11. The judge indicated that he did not disagree with counsel's argument, but thought that circumstances justified a greater sentence. He asked counsel if there was "[a]nything further." Ibid. Counsel said that there was not. See ibid.
Petitioner appealed, arguing that the 12-month sentence was unreasonably long in that it was " 'greater than necessar[y]' to accomplish the goals of sentencing." Kimbrough v. United States , 552 U.S. 85, 101, 128 S.Ct. 558, 169 L.Ed.2d 481 (2007) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) ); see also, e.g. , Gall v. United States , 552 U.S. 38, 49-50, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007) (noting the District Court's obligation to "consider all of the § 3553(a) factors to determine" the "appropriate sentence"); 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (making these factors applicable in substantial part to proceedings to revoke or modify a term of supervised release). The Court of Appeals held that petitioner had forfeited this argument by failing to "object in the district court to the reasonableness of the sentence imposed." 746 Fed.Appx. 403 (C.A.5 2018) (per curiam ). The court would, of course, consider whether the error petitioner asserted was "plain." See ibid. ; Rule 52(b) (permitting review of a plain error "even though it was not brought to the court's attention"). But it found no plain error, and so it affirmed.
Petitioner sought review in this Court and, in light of differences among the Courts of Appeals, we granted his petition for certiorari. Compare 746 Fed.Appx. 403 with, e.g. , United States v. Curry , 461 F.3d 452, 459 (C.A.4 2006) ; United States v. Vonner , 516 F.3d 382, 389 (C.A.6 2008) (en banc); United States v. Castro-Juarez , 425 F.3d 430, 433-434 (C.A.7 2005) ; United States v. Sullivan , 327 Fed.Appx. 643, 645 (C.A.7 2009) ; United States v. Autery , 555 F.3d 864, 868-871 (C.A.9 2009) ; United States v. Torres-Duenas , 461 F.3d 1178, 1183 (C.A.10 2006) ; United States v. Gonzalez-Mendez , 545 Fed.Appx. 848, 849, and n. 1 (C.A.11 2013) ; United States v. Bras , 483 F.3d 103, 113 (C.A.D.C. 2007). Because the Government agrees with petitioner that the Fifth Circuit's approach is inconsistent with the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, we appointed K. Winn Allen to defend the judgment below as amicus curiae . He has ably discharged his responsibilities.
II
Congress has instructed sentencing courts to impose sentences that are " 'sufficient, but not greater than necessary , to comply with' " (among other things) certain basic objectives, including the need for "just punishment, deterrence, protection of the public, and rehabilitation." Dean v. United States , 581 U.S. ----, ----, 137 S.Ct. 1170, 1175, 197 L.Ed.2d 490 (2017) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) ; emphasis added); see Pepper v. United States , 562 U.S. 476, 491, 493, 131 S.Ct. 1229, 179 L.Ed.2d 196 (2011). If the trial court follows proper procedures and gives adequate consideration to these and the other listed factors, then the question for an appellate court is simply, as here, whether the trial court's chosen sentence was "reasonable" or whether the judge instead "abused his discretion in determining that the § 3553(a) factors supported" the sentence imposed. Gall , 552 U.S. at 56, 128 S.Ct. 586 ; see United States v. Booker , 543 U.S. 220, 261-262, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005).
By "informing the court" of the "action" he "wishes the court to take," Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 51(b), a party ordinarily brings to the court's attention his objection to a contrary decision. See Rule 52(b). And that is certainly true in cases such as this one, where a criminal defendant advocates for a sentence shorter than the one ultimately imposed. Judges, having in mind their "overarching duty" under § 3553(a), would ordinarily understand that a defendant in that circumstance was making the argument (to put it in statutory terms) that the shorter sentence would be " 'sufficient' " and a longer sentence " 'greater than necessary' " to achieve the purposes of sentencing. Pepper , 562 U.S. at 493, 131 S.Ct. 1229 (quoting § 3553(a) ). Nothing more is needed to preserve the claim that a longer sentence is unreasonable.
We do not agree with the Court of Appeals' suggestion that defendants are required to refer to the "reasonableness" of a sentence to preserve such claims for appeal. See 746 Fed.Appx. 403 ; United States v. Peltier , 505 F.3d 389, 391 (C.A.5 2007). The rulemakers, in promulgating Rule 51, intended to dispense with the need for formal "exceptions" to a trial court's rulings. Rule 51(a) ; see also Advisory Committee's 1944 Notes on Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 51, 18 U.S.C. App., p. 591. They chose not to require an objecting party to use any particular language or even to wait until the court issues its ruling. Rule 51(b) (a party may "infor[m] the court" of its position either "when the court ruling or order is made or" when it is "sought"). The question is simply whether the claimed error was "brought to the court's attention." Rule 52(b). Here, it was.
The Court of Appeals properly noted that, to win on appeal, a defendant making such a claim must show that the trial court's decision was not "reasonable." Gall , 552 U.S. at 56, 128 S.Ct. 586. But that fact is not relevant to the issue here. Our decisions make plain that reasonableness is the label we have given to "the familiar abuse-of-discretion standard" that "applies to appellate review" of the trial court's sentencing decision. Id. , at 46, 128 S.Ct. 586 (emphasis added); see Kimbrough , 552 U.S. at 90-91, 128 S.Ct. 558 ; Rita v. United States , 551 U.S. 338, 351, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007) ; Booker , 543 U.S. at 261, 125 S.Ct. 738. The substantive standard that Congress has prescribed for trial courts is the "parsimony principle" enshrined in § 3553(a). Dean , 581 U.S., at ----, 137 S.Ct., at 1175 ; see Pepper , 562 U.S. at 491, 131 S.Ct. 1229. A defendant who, by advocating for a particular sentence, communicates to the trial judge his view that a longer sentence is "greater than necessary" has thereby informed the court of the legal error at issue in an appellate challenge to the substantive reasonableness of the sentence. He need not also refer to the standard of review.
III
The Government and amicus raise other issues. They ask us to decide what is sufficient to preserve a claim that a trial court used improper procedures in arriving at its chosen sentence. And they ask us to decide when a party has properly preserved the right to make particular arguments supporting its claim that a sentence is unreasonably long. We shall not consider these matters, however, for the Court of Appeals has not considered them. See, e.g. , Tapia v. United States , 564 U.S. 319, 335, 131 S.Ct. 2382, 180 L.Ed.2d 357 (2011) ; Cutter v. Wilkinson , 544 U.S. 709, 718, n. 7, 125 S.Ct. 2113, 161 L.Ed.2d 1020 (2005). We hold only that the defendant here properly preserved the claim that his 12-month sentence was unreasonably long by advocating for a shorter sentence and thereby arguing, in effect, that this shorter sentence would have proved "sufficient," while a sentence of 12 months or longer would be "greater than necessary" to "comply with" the statutory purposes of punishment. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice ALITO, with whom Justice GORSUCH joins, concurring.
I agree with the Court that a defendant who requests a specific sentence during a sentencing hearing need not object to the sentence after its pronouncement in order to preserve a challenge to its substantive reasonableness (i.e. , length) on appeal. I write to emphasize what we are not deciding.
First , we do not decide "what is sufficient to preserve a claim that a trial court used improper procedures in arriving at its chosen sentence." Ante , at 767. That question is not currently before us. Nevertheless, as we have previously explained, failing to object at all to a procedural error (e.g. , a district court's miscalculation of the Guidelines range) will subject a procedural challenge to plain-error review. Molina-Martinez v. United States , 578 U.S. ----, ---- - ----, 136 S.Ct. 1338, 1342-1343, 194 L.Ed.2d 444 (2016)
Second , we do not decide what is sufficient to preserve any "particular" substantive-reasonableness argument. Ante , at 767. Again, the question here "is simply whether the claimed error was 'brought to the court's attention.' " Ante , at 766 (quoting Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 52(b) ). Thus, we do not suggest that a generalized argument in favor of less imprisonment will insulate all arguments regarding the length of a sentence from plain-error review. The plain-error rule serves many interests, judicial efficiency and finality being chief among them. See Puckett v. United States , 556 U.S. 129, 134-135, 129 S.Ct. 1423, 173 L.Ed.2d 266 (2009). Requiring a party to bring an error to the attention of the court enables the court to correct itself, obviating the need for an appeal. At the very least, the court can explain its reasoning and thus assist the appellate process. A court cannot address particular arguments or facts not brought to its attention.
Third , we do not decide whether this petitioner properly preserved his particular substantive-reasonableness arguments, namely, that he did not pose a danger to the public and that a 12-month sentence would not serve deterrence purposes. See ante , at 765, 766 - 767. In determining whether arguments have been preserved, courts should make a case-specific assessment of how the error was "brought to the court's attention." Rule 52(b) ; see also, e.g. , United States v. Vonner , 516 F.3d 382, 392 (C.A.6) (en banc) ("While we do not require defendants to challenge the 'reasonableness' of their sentences in front of the district court, we surely should apply plain-error review to any arguments for leniency that the defendant does not present to the trial court"), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 816, 129 S.Ct. 68, 172 L.Ed.2d 26 (2008). On remand, the Fifth Circuit can decide whether petitioner preserved these specific arguments and whether the sentence was substantively unreasonable.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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A
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
Pro se petitioner Maria L. Gaydos seeks leave to proceed informa pauperis and requests this Court to issue a writ of mandamus ordering (1) the Clerk of the District Court for the District of New Jersey to file her Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) lawsuit challenging this Court’s orders in 10 previous cases in which Gaydos was denied leave to proceed in forma pauperis under this Court’s Rule 39.8; (2) the disqualification of William T. Walsh, Clerk of the District Court, and William K. Suter, Clerk of this Court; and (3) the issuance of summons under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4. In the alternative, she asks this Court to exercise its original jurisdiction over her FOIA suit because her complaint concerns this Court’s orders.
We deny petitioner’s requests. Petitioner is allowed until December 23, 1996, within which to pay the docketing fees required by Rule 38 and to submit her petition in compliance with Rule 33.1. For the reasons discussed below, we direct the Clerk of the Court not to accept any further petitions for certiorari or for extraordinary writs in noncriminal matters from petitioner unless she first pays the docketing fee required by Rule 38 and submits her petition in compliance with Rule 33.1.
Petitioner has a history of frivolous, repetitive filings. She has been denied leave to proceed in forma pauperis 10 times, and she has filed at least 8 other petitions. This most recent petition is nearly incomprehensible, and alludes to, among other things, fraud by the staff of this Court and impending impeachment proceedings against Clerks Walsh and Suter in the House of Representatives. We also note that the relief she purports to seek has already been granted: The District Court docketed petitioner’s FOIA complaint as Case No. 96-CV-42435 on September 9, 1996, and promptly dismissed it “in its entirety” the following week.
We enter the order barring future in forma pauperis filings for the reasons discussed in Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1 (1992). Because petitioner has limited her abuse of our processes to nonerimi-nal cases, we limit our sanction accordingly.
It is so ordered.
Rule 39.8 provides: “If satisfied that a petition for a writ of certiorari, jurisdictional statement, or petition for an extraordinary writ... is frivolous or malicious, the Court may deny a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis.”
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
B
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Jackson
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Twenty-one Negro firemen, sometime employed by southern railroads, brought this suit against the principal defendant, the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, three railroads, two local lodges of the Brotherhood, and certain officers of those lodges. The complaint alleges in substance that the Brotherhood is an exclusively white man’s union and, as it includes a majority of the craft, it is possessed of sole collective bargaining power in behalf of the entire craft including the Negro firemen in consequence of the Railway Labor Act. It has negotiated agreements and arrangements with the southern railroads which discriminate against colored firemen, who are denominated “not-promotable” while white ones are “promotable.” The effect of the agreements is to deprive them, solely because of their race, of rights and job assignments to which their seniority would entitle them. Many Negro firemen have been thus displaced or demoted and replaced by white firemen having less seniority. The complaint asked for a declaration of petitioners’ rights, for an injunction restraining compliance with the above agreements, and for damages. In short, the cause of action pleaded is substantially the same as that which this Court sustained in Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 323 U. S. 192, and Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, 323 U. S. 210.
It is needless to recite additional details of the present case. What it adds to the governing facts of the earlier cases is a continuing and willful disregard of rights which this Court in unmistakable terms has said must be accorded to Negro firemen.
Upon the complaint, supplemented by evidence that the deliberate elimination of Negro firemen was proceeding at a rapid pace and that they would soon be entirely displaced, motion was made for a preliminary injunction to prevent further discrimination and loss of job assignments pending the outcome of the litigation.
The Brotherhood did not meet the allegations of the bill of complaint or the affidavits. It rested on a motion to dismiss, assigning as grounds that it had not been properly served with process and that venue was unlawfully laid in the District of Columbia. The trial court, after hearing evidence of the parties on these matters, denied the motion to dismiss and granted a preliminary injunction.
The Brotherhood alone petitioned the Court of Appeals under District of Columbia Code, § 17-101, for a special appeal and stay of the injunction. These were granted and that court reversed. Holding that venue was improperly laid in the District of Columbia, it ordered the case transferred to the Northern District of Ohio. 84 U. S. App. D. C. 67, 175 F. 2d 802. We granted certiorari. 337 U. S. 954.
At the outset we are met by the contention in support of the judgment below that service of process upon the Brotherhood was not legally perfected, in which case, of course, it would not properly be before the Court at all. The District Court, after hearing evidence upon the subject, held that service upon the Brotherhood was sufficient. The Court of Appeals noted that this question was raised but did not reverse upon this ground. Instead, it considered at length whether the action constitutionally could be entertained by the courts of the District of Columbia, a subject which would hardly be ripe for decision if the action had not been properly commenced anywhere. Moreover, its decision transferred the cause to the Northern District of Ohio, a power which it could exert only if it considered the service adequate to confer jurisdiction of the parties. We accept the ruling of the District Court on the adequacy of service, based as it is essentially on matters of fact, and undisturbed and impliedly approved by the Court of Appeals. We hold that personal jurisdiction of the respondent is established.
This cause of action is founded on federal law, and the venue provision generally applicable to federal courts at the time this action was commenced required such actions to be brought in the district whereof defendant “is an inhabitant.” 28 U. S. C. § 112. Effective September 1, 1948, this provision was modified to require that such actions be brought “only in the judicial district where all defendants reside, except as otherwise provided by law.” 28 U. S. C. (Supp. II) § 1391 (b). It was assumed in the courts below, and since it involves a question of fact we do not stop to inquire as to whether they were correct in so doing, that if this general federal venue statute is the sole authority for bringing this case in the District of Columbia, the venue could not be supported, as this defendant claims neither to reside in nor to inhabit the District.
But there is, additionally, a venue statute enacted by Congress, applicable to the courts of the District of Columbia, which permits an action to be maintained if the defendant shall be “an inhabitant of, or found within, the District.” D. C. Code § 11-308. (Italics supplied.) See also § 11-306. The District Court concluded upon all the evidence that the Brotherhood was found within the District, and it based venue upon that finding. The Court of Appeals did not deny that the defendant was so “found” within the meaning of this Act, but held the Act itself unavailing to this plaintiff because it believed that the constitutional power of Congress under Art. I, § 8, Cl. 17, to provide for the government of the District of Columbia, does not enable Congress to vest jurisdiction of such cases as this in District of Columbia courts. It based this reasoning on O’Donoghue v. United States, 289 U. S. 516.
Little would be accomplished by reviewing the conflicting theories as to the origin and extent of congressional power over District of Columbia courts. It is enough to say that we do not read any prior decision of this Court to deny Congress power to invest these courts with jurisdiction to hear and decide such a cause as we have here. We hold that a party asserting a right under the Constitution or federal laws may invoke either the general venue statutes or the special District of Columbia statutes and that the courts of this District may exercise their authority in cases committed to them by either.
The respondent has strenuously urged throughout that in view of the provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U. S. C. §§ 101 et seq., the District Court was without jurisdiction to grant relief by injunction.
The Court of Appeals did not pass upon this contention, and were it a question of first impression we should not be disposed to consider it here at the present stage of the proceedings. But this is not a question of first impression. In Virginian R. Co. v. System Federation, 300 U. S. 515, we held that the Norris-LaGuardia Act did not deprive federal courts of jurisdiction to compel compliance with positive mandates of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U. S. C. §§ 151 et seq., enacted for the benefit and protection, within a particular field, of the same groups whose rights are preserved by the Norris-LaGuardia Act. To depart from those views would be to strike from labor’s hands the sole judicial weapon it may employ to enforce such minority rights as these petitioners assert and which we have held are now secured to them by federal statute. To hold that this Act deprives labor of means of enforcing bargaining rights specifically accorded by the Railway Labor Act would indeed be to “turn the blade inward.” We adhere to the views expressed in the Virginian case.
But the Brotherhood urges that the controversy in the Virginian case did not involve a labor dispute within the meaning of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and that accordingly that case must be distinguished on its facts. The Act defines a “labor dispute” to include “any controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment, or concerning the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment . . . 29 U. S. C. § 113 (c). (Emphasis supplied.) We do not accept the Brotherhood’s invitation to narrow the meaning of that term. The purpose of the Act would be vitiated and the scope of its protection limited were it to be construed as not extending to efforts of a duly certified bargaining agent to obtain recognition by an employer. Moreover, if this Court had considered that a labor dispute was not involved, it would hardly have taken the trouble, in the Virginian case, to refute contentions based upon parts of the Act, which as a whole extends its protection solely to such disputes.
The Steele and Tunstall cases, supra, arose under circumstances almost indistinguishable from those of the instant case, and the complaints asked the same kind of relief. We held there that, as the exclusive statutory representative of the entire craft under the Railway Labor Act, the Brotherhood could not bargain for the denial of equal employment and promotion opportunities to a part of the craft upon grounds of race. We pointed out that the statute which grants the majority exclusive representation for collective bargaining purposes strips minorities within the craft of all power of self-protection, for neither as groups nor as individuals can they enter into bargaining with the employers on their own behalf. Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U. S. 342; J. I. Case Co. v. Labor Board, 321 U. S. 332; Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. Labor Board, 321 U. S. 678. And we held that abuse of its powers by perpetrating discriminatory employment practices based on racial considerations gives rise to a cause of action under federal law which federal courts will entertain and will remedy by injunction. But although the Norris-LaGuardia Act relates to the jurisdiction of the federal courts to grant injunctions in labor disputes, the issue was not pressed, and we did not discuss it at length.
However, the opinion left no doubt as to the Court’s position: “In the absence of any available administrative remedy, the right here asserted, to a remedy for breach of the statutory duty of the bargaining representative to represent and act for the members of a craft, is of judicial cognizance. That right would be sacrificed or obliterated if it were without the remedy which courts can give for breach of such a duty or obligation and which it is their duty to give in cases in which they have jurisdiction. . . . For the present command there is no mode of enforcement other than resort to the courts, whose jurisdiction and duty to afford a remedy for a breach of statutory duty are left unaffected. The right is analogous to the statutory right of employees to require the employer to bargain with the statutory representative of a craft, a right which this Court has enforced and protected by its injunction in Texas & New Orleans R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Clerks [281 U. S. 548], 556-557, 560, and in Virginian R. Co. v. System Federation, supra, 548, and like it is one for which there is no available administrative remedy.” Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., supra, 207. And see Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, supra, 213.
It would serve no purpose to review at length the reasons which, in the Steele and Tunstall cases, supra, impelled us to conclude that the Railway Labor Act imposes upon the Brotherhood the duty to represent all members of the craft without discrimination and invests a racial minority of the craft with the right to enforce that duty. It suffices to say that we reiterate that such is the law.
Nor does the Norris-LaGuardia Act contain anything to suggest that it would deprive these Negro firemen of recourse to equitable relief from illegal discriminatory representation by which there would be taken from them their seniority and ultimately their jobs. Conversely there is nothing to suggest that, in enacting the subsequent Railway Labor Act provisions insuring petitioners’ right to nondiscriminatory representation by their bargaining agent, Congress intended to hold out to them an illusory right for which it was denying them a remedy. If, in spite of the Virginian, Steele, and Tunstall cases, supra, there remains any illusion that under the NorrisLaGuardia Act the federal courts are powerless to enforce these rights, we dispel it now. The District Court has jurisdiction to enforce by injunction petitioners’ rights to nondiscriminatory representation by their statutory representative.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, the order of the District Court is reinstated, and the cause is remanded to the District Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Let the mandate go down forthwith.
Reversed and remanded.
Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Minton took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
I
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Chief Justice Rehnquist
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether the jurisdiction of a court-martial convened pursuant to the Uniform Code of Military Justice (U. C. M. J.) to try a member of the Armed Forces depends on the “service connection” of the offense charged. We hold that it does not, and overrule our earlier decision in O’Callahan v. Parker, 395 U. S. 258 (1969).
While petitioner Richard Solorio was on active duty in the Seventeenth Coast Guard District in Juneau, Alaska, he sexually abused two young daughters of fellow coastguardsmen. Petitioner engaged in this abuse over a 2-year period until he was transferred by the Coast Guard to Governors Island, New York. Coast Guard authorities learned of the Alaska crimes only after petitioner’s transfer, and investigation revealed that he had later committed similar sexual abuse offenses while stationed in New York. The Governors Island commander convened a general court-martial to try petitioner for crimes alleged to have occurred in Alaska and New York.
There is no “base” or “post” where Coast Guard personnel live and work in Juneau. Consequently, nearly all Coast Guard military personnel reside in the civilian community. Petitioner’s Alaska offenses were committed in his privately owned home, and the fathers of the 10- to 12-year-old victims in Alaska were active duty members of the Coast Guard assigned to the same command as petitioner. Petitioner’s New York offenses also involved daughters of fellow coast-guardsmen, but were committed in Government quarters on the Governors Island base.
After the general court-martial was convened in New York, petitioner moved to dismiss the charges for crimes committed in Alaska on the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction under this Court’s decisions in O’Callahan v. Parker, supra, and Relford v. Commandant, U. S. Disciplinary Barracks, 401 U. S. 355 (1971). Ruling that the Alaska offenses were not sufficiently “service connected” to be tried in the military criminal justice system, the court-martial judge granted the motion to dismiss. The Government appealed the dismissal of the charges to the United States Coast Guard Court of Military Review, which reversed the trial judge’s order and reinstated the charges. 21 M. J. 512 (1985).
The United States Court of Military Appeals affirmed the Court of Military Review, concluding that the Alaska offenses were service connected within the meaning of O’Callahan and Relford. 21 M. J. 251 (1986). Stating that “not every off-base offense against a servicemember’s dependent is service-connected,” the court reasoned that “sex offenses against young children... have a continuing effect on the victims and their families and ultimately on the morale of any military unit or organization to which the family member is assigned.” Id., at 256. In reaching its holding, the court also weighed a number of other factors, including: the interest of Alaska civilian officials in prosecuting petitioner; the hardship on the victims, who had moved from Alaska, that would result if they were called to testify both at a civilian trial in Alaska and at the military proceeding in New York; and the benefits to petitioner and the Coast Guard from trying the Alaska and New York offenses together. This Court subsequently granted certiorari pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1259(3) (1982 ed., Supp. III) to review the decision of the Court of Military Appeals. 476 U. S. 1181 (1986). We now affirm.
The Constitution grants to Congress the power “[t]o make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces.” U. S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 14. Exercising this authority, Congress has empowered courts-martial to try servicemen for the crimes proscribed by the U. C. M. J., Arts. 2, 17, 10 U. S. C. §§ 802, 817. The Alaska offenses with which petitioner was charged are each described in the U. C. M. J. See n. 1, supra. Thus it is not disputed that the court-martial convened in New York possessed the statutory authority to try petitioner on the Alaska child abuse specifications.
In an unbroken line of decisions from 1866 to 1960, this Court interpreted the Constitution as conditioning the proper exercise of court-martial jurisdiction over an offense on one factor: the military status of the accused. Gosa v. Mayden, 413 U. S. 665, 673 (1973) (plurality opinion); see Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U. S. 234, 240-241, 243 (1960); Reid v. Covert, 354 U. S. 1, 22-23 (1957) (plurality opinion); Grafton v. United States, 206 U. S. 333, 348 (1907); Johnson v. Sayre, 158 U. S. 109, 114 (1895); Smith v. Whitney, 116 U. S. 167, 183-185 (1886); Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U. S. 509, 513-514 (1879); Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, 123 (1866); cf. United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U. S. 11, 15 (1955); Kahn v. Anderson, 255 U. S. 1, 6-9 (1921); Givens v. Zerbst, 255 U. S. 11, 20-21 (1921). This view was premised on what the Court described as the “natural meaning” of Art. I, § 8, cl. 14, as well as the Fifth Amendment’s exception for “cases arising in the land or naval forces.” Reid v. Covert, supra, at 19; United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, supra, at 15. As explained in Kinsella v. Singleton, supra:
“The test for jurisdiction... is one of status, namely, whether the accused in the court-martial proceeding is a person who can be regarded as falling within the term ‘land and naval Forces.’...” Id., at 240-241 (emphasis in original).
“Without contradiction, the materials... show that military jurisdiction has always been based on the ‘status’ of the accused, rather than on the nature of the offense. To say that military jurisdiction ‘defies definition in terms of military “status” ’ is to defy the unambiguous language of Art. I, § 8, cl. 14, as well as the historical background thereof and the precedents with reference thereto.” Id., at 243.
Implicit in the military status test was the principle that determinations concerning the scope of court-martial jurisdiction over offenses committed by servicemen was a matter reserved for Congress:
“[T]he rights of men in the armed forces must perforce be conditioned to meet certain overriding demands of discipline and duty, and the civil courts are not the agencies which must determine the precise balance to be struck in this adjustment. The Framers expressly entrusted that task to Congress.” Burns v. Wilson, 346 U. S. 137, 140 (1953) (plurality opinion) (footnote omitted).
See also Coleman v. Tennessee, supra, at 514; Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 181, 187 (1962).
In 1969, the Court in O’Callahan v. Parker departed from the military status test and announced the “new constitutional principle” that a military tribunal may not try a serviceman charged with a crime that has no service connection. See Gosa v. Mayden, supra, at 673. Applying this principle, the O’Callahan Court held that a serviceman’s off-base sexual assault on a civilian -with no connection with the military could not be tried by court-martial. On reexamination of O’Callahan, we have decided that the service connection test announced in that decision should be abandoned.
The constitutional grant of power to Congress to regulate the Armed Forces, Art. I, § 8, cl. 14, appears in the same section as do the provisions granting Congress authority, inter alia, to regulate commerce among the several States, to coin money, and to declare war. On its face there is no indication that the grant of power in Clause 14 was any less plenary than the grants of other authority to Congress in the same section. Whatever doubts there might be about the extent of Congress’ power under Clause 14 to make rules for the “Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces,” that power surely embraces the authority to regulate the conduct of persons who are actually members of the Armed Services. As noted by Justice Harlan in his O’Callahan dissent, there is no evidence in the debates over the adoption of the Constitution that the Framers intended the language of Clause 14 to be accorded anything other than its plain meaning. Alexander Hamilton described these powers of Congress “essential to the common defense” as follows:
“These powers ought to exist without limitation, because it is impossible to foresee or define the extent and variety of national exigencies, or the correspondent extent and variety of the means which may be necessary to satisfy them....
“... Are fleets and armies and revenues necessary for this purpose [common safety]? The government of the Union must be empowered to pass all laws, and to make all regulations which have relation to them.” The Federalist No. 23, pp. 152-154 (E. Bourne ed. 1947).
The O’Callahan Court’s historical foundation for its holding rests on the view that “[b]oth in England prior to the American Revolution and in our own national history military trial of soldiers committing civilian offenses has been viewed with suspicion.” 395 U. S., at 268. According to the Court, the historical evidence demonstrates that, during the late 17th and 18th centuries in England as well as the early years of this country, courts-martial did not have authority to try soldiers for civilian offenses. The Court began with a review of the 17th-century struggle in England between Parliament and the Crown over control of the scope of court-martial jurisdiction. As stated by the Court, this conflict was resolved when William and Mary accepted the Bill of Rights in 1689, which granted Parliament exclusive authority to define the jurisdiction of military tribunals. See ibid. The Court correctly observed that Parliament, wary of abuses of military power, exercised its new authority sparingly. Indeed, a statute enacted by Parliament in 1689 provided for court-martial only for the crimes of sedition, mutiny, and desertion, and exempted members of militia from its scope. Mutiny Act of 1689, 1 Wm. & Mary, ch. 5.
The O’Callahan Court’s representation of English history following the Mutiny Act of 1689, however, is less than accurate. In particular, the Court posited that “[i]t was... the rule in Britain at the time of the American Revolution that a soldier could not be tried for a civilian offense committed in Britain; instead military officers were required to use their energies and office to insure that the accused soldier would be tried before a civil court.” 395 U. S., at 269. In making this statement, the Court was apparently referring to Section XI, Article I, of the British Articles of War in effect at the time of the Revolution. This Article provided:
“Whenever any Officer or Soldier shall be accused of a Capital Crime, or of having used Violence, or committed any Offence against the Persons or Property of Our Subjects,... the Commanding Officer, and Officers of every Regiment, Troop, or Party to which the... accused shall belong, are hereby required, upon Application duly made by, or in behalf of the Party or Parties injured, to use... utmost Endeavors to deliver over such accused... to the Civil Magistrate.” British Articles of War of 1774, reprinted in G. Davis, Military Law of the United States 581, 589 (3d rev. ed. 1915).
This provision, however, is not the sole statement in the Articles bearing on court-martial jurisdiction over civilian offenses. Specifically, Section XIV, Article XVI, provided that all officers and soldiers who
“shall maliciously destroy any Property whatsoever belonging to any of Our Subjects, unless by Order of the then Commander in Chief of Our Forces, to annoy Rebels or other Enemies in Arms against Us, he or they that shall be found guilty of offending herein shall (besides such Penalties as they are liable to by law) be punished according to the Nature and Degree of the Offence, by the Judgment of a Regimental or General Court Martial.” Id., at 593.
Under this provision, military tribunals had jurisdiction over offenses punishable under civil law. Nelson & Westbrook
11. Accordingly, the O’Callahan Court erred in suggesting that, at the time of the American Revolution, military tribunals in England were available “only where ordinary civil courts were unavailable.” 395 U. S., at 269, and n. 11.
The history of early American practice furnishes even less support to O’Callahan’s historical thesis. The American Articles of War of 1776, which were based on the British Articles, contained a provision similar to Section XI, Article I, of the British Articles, requiring commanding officers to deliver over to civil magistrates any officer or soldier accused of “a capital crime,... having used violence, or... any offence against the persons or property of the good people of any of the United American States” upon application by or on behalf of an injured party. American Articles of War of 1776, Section X, Article I, reprinted in 2 Winthrop 1494. It has been postulated that American courts-martial had jurisdiction over the crimes described in this provision where no application for a civilian trial was made by or on behalf of the injured civilian. Indeed, American military records reflect trials by court-martial during the late 18th century for offenses against civilians and punishable under civil law, such as theft and assault.
The authority to try soldiers for civilian crimes may be found in the much-disputed “general article” of the 1776 Articles of War, which allowed court-martial jurisdiction over “[a]ll crimes not capital, and all disorders and neglects which officers and soldiers may be guilty of, to the prejudice of good order and military discipline.” American Articles of War of 1776, Section XVIII, Article 5, reprinted in 2 Winthrop 1503. Some authorities, such as those cited by the O’Callahan Court, interpreted this language as limiting court-martial jurisdiction to crimes that had a direct impact on military discipline. Several others, however, have interpreted the language as encompassing all noncapital crimes proscribed by the civil law. Even W. Winthrop, the authority relied on most extensively by the majority in O’Callahan, recognized that military authorities read the general article to include crimes “committed upon or against civilians... at or near a military camp or post.” 2 Winthrop 1124, 1126, n. 1.
We think the history of court-martial jurisdiction in England and in this country during the 17th and 18th centuries is far too ambiguous to justify the restriction on the plain language of Clause 14 which O’Callahan imported into it. There is no doubt that the English practice during this period shows a strong desire in that country to transfer from the Crown to Parliament the control of the scope of court-martial jurisdiction. And it is equally true that Parliament was chary in granting jurisdiction to courts-martial, although not as chary as the O’Callahan opinion suggests. But reading Clause 14 consistently with its plain language does not dis-serve that concern; Congress, and not the Executive, was given the authority to make rules for the regulation of the Armed Forces.
The O’Callahan Court cryptically stated: “The 17th century conflict over the proper role of courts-martial in the enforcement of the domestic criminal law was not, however, merely a dispute over what organ of government had jurisdiction. It also involved substantive disapproval of the general use of military courts for trial of ordinary crimes.” 395 U. S., at 268. But such disapproval in England at the time of William and Mary hardly proves that the Framers of the Constitution, contrary to the plenary language in which they conferred the power on Congress, meant to freeze court-martial usage at a particular time in such a way that Congress might not change it. The unqualified language of Clause 14 suggests that whatever these concerns, they were met by vesting in Congress, rather than the Executive, authority to make rules for the government of the military.
Given the dearth of historical support for the O’Callahan holding, there is overwhelming force to Justice Harlan’s reasoning that the plain language of the Constitution, as interpreted by numerous decisions of this Court preceding O’Callahan, should be controlling on the subject of court-martial jurisdiction. 395 U. S., at 275-278 (dissenting); cf. Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U. S. 658, 696 (1978) (“[W]e ought not ‘disregard the implications of an exercise of judicial authority assumed to be proper for [100] years’”), quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U. S. 294, 307 (1962).
Decisions of this Court after O’Callahan have also emphasized that Congress has primary responsibility for the delicate task of balancing the rights of servicemen against the needs of the military. As we recently reiterated, “ ‘[j]udicial deference... is at its apogee when legislative action under the congressional authority to raise and support armies and make rules and regulations for their governance is challenged.’” Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.. S. 503, 508 (1986), quoting Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U. S. 57, 70 (1981). Since O’Callahan, we have adhered to this principle of deference in a variety of contexts where, as here, the constitutional rights of servicemen were implicated. See, e. g., Goldman v. Weinberger, supra, at 509-510 (free exercise of religion); Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U. S. 296, 300-305 (1983) (racial discrimination); Rostker v. Goldberg, supra, at 64-66, 70-71 (sex discrimination); Brown v. Glines, 444 U. S. 348, 357, 360 (1980) (free expression); Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U. S. 25, 43 (1976) (right to counsel in summary court-martial proceedings); Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U. S. 738, 753 (1975) (availability of injunctive relief from an impending court-martial); Parker v. Levy, 417 U. S. 733, 756 (1974) (due process rights and freedom of expression).
The notion that civil courts are “ill equipped” to establish policies regarding matters of military concern is substantiated by experience under the service connection approach. Chappell v. Wallace, supra, at 305. In his O’Callahan dissent, Justice Harlan forecasted that “the infinite permutations of possibly relevant factors are bound to create confusion and proliferate litigation over the [court-martial] jurisdiction issue.” 395 U. S., at 284. In fact, within two years after O’Callahan, this Court found it necessary to expound on the meaning of the decision, enumerating a myriad of factors for courts to weigh in determining whether an offense is service connected. Relford v. Commandant, U. S. Disciplinary Barracks, 401 U. S. 355 (1971). Yet the service connection approach, even as elucidated in Relford, has proved confusing and difficult for military courts to apply.
Since O’Callahan and Relford, military courts have identified numerous categories of offenses requiring specialized analysis of the service connection requirement. For example, the courts have highlighted subtle distinctions among offenses committed on a military base, offenses committed off-base, offenses arising from events occurring both on and off a base, and offenses committed on or near the boundaries of a base. Much time and energy has also been expended in litigation over other jurisdictional factors, such as the status of the victim of the crime, and the results are difficult to reconcile. The confusion created by the complexity of the service connection requirement, however, is perhaps best illustrated in the area of off-base drug offenses. Soon after O’Callahan, the Court of Military Appeals held that drug offenses were of such “special military significance” that their trial by court-martial was unaffected by the decision. United States v. Beeker, 18 U. S. C. M. A. 563, 565, 40 C. M. R. 275, 277 (1969). Nevertheless, the court has changed its position on the issue no less than two times since Beeker, each time basing its decision on O’Callahan and Relford.
When considered together with the doubtful foundations of O’Callahan, the confusion wrought by the decision leads us to conclude that we should read Clause 14 in accord with the plain meaning of its language as we did in the many years before O’Callahan was decided. That case’s novel approach to court-martial jurisdiction must bow “to the lessons of experience and the force of better reasoning.” Burnet v. Corona do Oil & Gas Co., 285 U. S. 393, 406-408 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). We therefore hold that the requirements of the Constitution are not violated where, as here, a court-martial is convened to try a serviceman who was a member of the Armed Services at the time of the offense charged. The judgment of the Court of Military Appeals is
Affirmed.
Petitioner was charged with 14 specifications alleging indecent liberties, lascivious acts, and indecent assault in violation of U. C. M. J., Art. 134, 10 U. S. C. § 934, 6 specifications alleging assault in violation of Art. 128, 10 U. S. C. § 928, and 1 specification alleging attempted rape in violation of Art. 80, 10 U. S. C. § 880. The specifications alleged to have occurred in Alaska included all of the Article 128 and Article 80 specifications and 7 of the Article 134 specifications.
Following the decision of the Court of Military Appeals, petitioner unsuccessfully sought a stay from that court and from Chief Justice Burger. The court-martial reconvened and petitioner was convicted of 8 of the 14 specifications alleging offenses committed in Alaska and 4 of the 7 specifications alleging offenses committed in New York. These convictions are currently under review by the convening authority pursuant to U. C. M. J., Art. 60, 10 U. S. C. § 860.
One pre-1969 decision of this Court suggests that the constitutional power of Congress to authorize trial by court-martial must be limited to “the least possible power adequate to the end proposed.” United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U. S. 11, 23 (1955) (emphasis deleted). Broadly read, this dictum applies to determinations concerning Congress’ authority over the courts-martial of servicemen for crimes committed while they were servicemen. Yet the Court in Toth v. Quarles was addressing only the question whether an ex-serviceman may be tried by court-martial for crimes committed while serving in the Air Force. Thus, the dictum may be also interpreted as limited to that context.
See O’Callahan, 395 U. S., at 277 (Harlan, J., dissenting); 2 M. Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, pp. 329-330 (1911); 5 J. Elliot, Debates on the Federal Constitution 443, 545 (1876).
See, e. g., 1 W. Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents 8-9 (2d ed. 1896) (hereinafter Winthrop); G. Nelson & J. Westbrook, Court-Martial Jurisdiction Over Servicemen for “Civilian” Offenses: An Analysis of O’Callahan v. Parker, 54 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 7-11 (1969) (hereinafter Nelson & Westbrook).
There is some confusion among historians and legal scholars about which version of the British Articles of War was “in effect” at the time of the American Revolution. Some cite to the Articles of War of 1765 and others to the Articles of War of 1774. Compare, e. g., 2 Winthrop 1448, with J. Horbaly, Court-Martial Jurisdiction 34 (1986) (unpublished dissertation, Yale Law School) (hereinafter Horbaly). For present purposes, however, the two versions of the Articles contain only stylistic differences. In the interest of simplicity, we will refer to the 1774 Articles.
See Nelson & Westbrook 14; cf. Duke & Vogel, The Constitution and the Standing Army: Another Problem of Court-Martial Jurisdiction, 13 Vand. L. Rev. 435, 445-446 (1960) (hereinafter Duke & Vogel).
See O’Callahan, 395 U. S., at 278, n. 3 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also J. Bishop, Justice under Fire 81-82 (1974); Nelson & Westbrook 15; Comment, O’Callahan and Its Progeny: A Survey of Their Impact on the Jurisdiction of Courts-Martial, 15 Vill. L. Rev. 712, 719, n. 38 (1970) (hereinafter Comment).
See 2 Winthrop 1123; Duke & Vogel 446-447.
See, e. g., Grafton v. United States, 206 U. S. 333, 348 (1907); Hearings before the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, Appendix to S. Rep. No. 130, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., 91 (statement of Brig. Gen. Enoch Crowder).
George Washington also seems to have held this view. When informed of the decision of a military court that a complaint by a civilian against a member of the military should be redressed only in a civilian court, he stated in a General Order dated February 24, 1779:
“All improper treatment of an inhabitant by an officer or soldier being destructive of good order and discipline as well as subversive of the rights of society is as much a breach of military, as civil law and as punishable by the one as the other.” 14 Writings of George Washington 140-141 (J. Fitzpatrick ed. 1936).
The history of court-martial jurisdiction after the adoption of the Constitution also provides little support for O’Callahan. For example, in 1800, Congress enacted Articles for the Better Government of the Navy, which provided that “[a]ll offences committed by persons belonging to the navy while on the shore, shall be punished in the same manner as if they had been committed at sea.” Act of Apr. 23, 1800, ch. 33, Art. XVII, 2 Stat. 47. Among the offenses punishable if committed at sea were murder, embezzlement, and theft. In addition, the Act also provided that “[i]f any person in the navy shall, when on shore, plunder, abuse, or maltreat any inhabitant, or injure his property in any way, he shall suffer such punishment as a court martial shall adjudge.” Art. XXVII, 2 Stat. 48. This broad grant of jurisdiction to naval courts-martial would suggest that limitations on the power of other military tribunals during this period were the result of legislative choice rather than want of constitutional power.
See, e. g., O’Callahan, 395 U. S., at 277 (Harlan, J., dissenting); 1 W. Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution 413-414, 424-426 (1953) (hereinafter Crosskey); Comment 718; but cf. Horbaly 45-56.
The only other basis for saying that the Framers intended the words of Art. I, § 8, cl. 14, to be narrowly construed is the suggestion that the Framers “could hardly have been unaware of Blaekstone’s strong condemnation of criminal justice administered under military procedures.” Duke & Vogel 449. In his Commentaries, Blaekstone wrote:
“When the nation was engaged in war... more rigorous methods were put in use for the raising of armies and the due regulation and discipline of the soldiery: which are to be looked upon only as temporary excrescences bred out of the distemper of the state, and not as any part of the permanent and perpetual laws of the kingdom. For martial law, which is built on no settled principles, but is entirely arbitrary in it’s [sic] decisions, is... something indulged in rather than allowed as a law. The necessity of order and discipline in an army is the only thing which can give it countenance; and therefore it ought not to be permitted in time of peace, when the king’s courts are open to all persons to receive justice according to the laws of the land.” 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *413.
Although we do not doubt that Blackstone’s views on military law were known to the Framers, see Crosskey 411-412, 424-425, we are not persuaded that their relevance is sufficiently compelling to overcome the unqualified language of Art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
See Cooper, O’Callahan Revisited: Severing the Service Connection, 76 Mil. L. Rev. 165, 186-187 (1977) (hereinafter Cooper); Tomes, The Imagination of the Prosecutor: The Only Limitation to Off-Post Jurisdiction Now, Fifteen Years After O’Callahan v. Parker, 25 Air Force L. Rev. 1, 9-35 (1985) (hereinafter Tomes); cf. United States v. Alef, 3 M. J. 414, 416, n. 4. (Ct. Mil. App. 1977); United States v. McCarthy, 2 M. J. 26, 29, n. 1 (Ct. Mil. App. 1976).
See, e. g., United States v. Garries, 19 M. J. 845 (A. F. C. M. R. 1985) (serviceman’s on-post murder of wife held service connected), aff’d, 22 M. J. 288 (Ct. Mil. App.), cert. denied, 479 U. S. 985 (1986); United States v. Williamson, 19 M. J. 617 (A. C. M. R. 1984) (serviceman’s off-post sexual offense involving young girl held service connected); United States v. Mauck, 17 M. J. 1033 (A. C. M. R.) (variety of offenses committed 15 feet from arsenal boundary held service connected), review denied, 19 M. J. 106 (Ct. Mil. App. 1984); United States v. Scott, 15 M. J. 589 (A. C. M. R. 1983) (serviceman’s off-post murder of another serviceman held service connected where crime had its basis in on-post conduct of participants).
Compare United States v. Wilson, 2 M. J. 24 (Ct. Mil. App. 1976) (off-post robbery and assault of a fellow serviceman held not service connected), and United States v. Tucker, 1 M. J. 463 (Ct. Mil. App. 1976) (off-post concealment of property stolen from fellow serviceman on-post held not service connected), with United States v. Lockwood, 15 M. J. 1 (Ct. Mil. App. 1983) (on-post larceny of fellow serviceman’s wallet and use of identification cards in it to obtain loan from an off-post business establishment held service connected), and United States v. Shorte, 18 M. J. 518 (A. F. C. M. R. 1984) (off-post felonious assault committed against fellow serviceman held not service connected).
See Cooper 172-182; Tomes 13-31.
Seven years after United States v. Beeker, the Court of Military Appeals expressly renounced that decision, holding that O’Callahan and Relford mandated the conclusion that off-base drug offenses by a serviceman could not be tried by court-martial. See United States v. McCarthy, supra; United States v. Williams, 2 M. J. 81, 82 (Ct. Mil. App. 1976); see also United States v. Conn, 6 M. J. 351, 353 (Ct. Mil. App. 1979); United States v. Alef supra, at 415-418. Reversing its position again in 1980, the Court of Military Appeals decided that such a restrictive approach was not required under this Court’s decisions. United States v. Trottier, 9 M. J. 337, 340-351 (1980). The court therefore held that “the gravity and immediacy of the threat to military personnel and installations posed by the drug traffic and... abuse convince us that very few drug involvements of a service person will not be ‘service connected.’” Id., at 351.
United States v. Trottier, however, has not settled the confusion in this area. In Trottier, the court identified the following exception to its general rule: “[I]t would not appear that use of marijuana by a serviceperson on a lengthy period of leave away from the military community would have such an effect on the military as to warrant the invocation of a claim of special military interest and significance adequate to support court-martial jurisdiction under O’Callahan.” Id., at 350, n. 28. Since Trottier, at least two lower military court decisions have found court-martial jurisdiction over offenses arguably falling within this exception. See United States v. Lange, 11 M. J. 884 (A. P. C. M. R. 1981), review denied, 12 M. J. 318 (Ct. Mil. App. 1981) (off-post use of marijuana during 6-day leave held sufficient to establish service connection); United States v. Brace, 11 M. J. 794 (A. F. C. M. R.), review denied, 12 M. J. 109 (Ct. Mil. App. 1981) (off-post use of marijuana during 6-day leave 275 miles from post held sufficient to establish service connection); see also Horbaly 534-535.
Petitioner argues that the Court of
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
CHIEF Justice Burger
delivered the opinion of the Court.
We granted certiorari to determine whether the Education of the Handicapped Act or the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 requires a school district to provide a handicapped child with clean intermittent catheterization during school hours.
I
Amber Tatro is an 8-year-old girl born with a defect known as spina bifida. As a result, she suffers from orthopedic and speech impairments and a neurogenic bladder, which prevents her from emptying her bladder voluntarily. Consequently, she must be catheterized every three or four hours to avoid injury to her kidneys. In accordance with accepted medical practice, clean intermittent catheterization (CIC), a procedure involving the insertion of a catheter into the urethra to drain the bladder, has been prescribed. The procedure is a simple one that may be performed in a few minutes by a layperson with less than an hour’s training. Amber’s parents, babysitter, and teenage brother are all qualified to administer CIC, and Amber soon will be able to perform this procedure herself.
In 1979 petitioner Irving Independent School District agreed to provide special education for Amber, who was then three and one-half years old. In consultation with her parents, who are respondents here, petitioner developed an individualized education program for Amber under the requirements of the Education of the Handicapped Act, 84 Stat. 175, as amended significantly by the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 89 Stat. 773, 20 U. S. C. §§ 1401(19), 1414(a)(5). The individualized education program provided that Amber would attend early childhood development classes and receive special services such as physical and occupational therapy. That program, however, made no provision for school personnel to administer CIC.
Respondents unsuccessfully pursued administrative remedies to secure CIC services for Amber during school hours. In October 1979 respondents brought the present action in District Court against petitioner, the State Board of Education, and others. See § 1415(e)(2). They sought an injunction ordering petitioner to provide Amber with CIC and sought damages and attorney’s fees. First, respondents invoked the Education of the Handicapped Act. Because Texas received funding under that statute, petitioner was required to provide Amber with a “free appropriate public education,” §§ 1412(1), 1414(a)(l)(C)(ii), which is defined to include “related services,” §1401(18). Respondents argued that CIC is one such “related service.” Second, respondents invoked §504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 394, as amended, 29 U. S. C. §794, which forbids an individual, by reason of a handicap, to be “excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under” any program receiving federal aid.
The District Court denied respondents’ request for a preliminary injunction. Tatro v. Texas, 481 F. Supp. 1224 (ND Tex. 1979). That court concluded that CIC was not a “related service” under the Education of the Handicapped Act because it did not serve a need arising from the effort to educate. It also held that § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act did not require “the setting up of governmental health care for people seeking to participate” in federally funded programs. Id., at 1229.
The Court of Appeals reversed. Tatro v. Texas, 625 F. 2d 557 (CA5 1980) (Tatro I). First, it held that CIC was a “related service” under the Education of the Handicapped Act, 20 U. S. C. § 1401(17), because without the procedure Amber could not attend classes and benefit from special education. Second, it held that petitioner’s refusal to provide CIC effectively excluded her from a federally funded educational program in violation of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The Court of Appeals remanded for the District Court to develop a factual record and apply these legal principles.
On remand petitioner stressed the Education of the Handicapped Act’s explicit provision that “medical services” could qualify as “related services” only when they served the purpose of diagnosis or evaluation. See n. 2, supra. The District Court held that under Texas law a nurse or other qualified person may administer CIC without engaging in the unauthorized practice of medicine, provided that a doctor prescribes and supervises the procedure. The District Court then held that, because a doctor was not needed to administer CIC, provision of the procedure was not a “medical service” for purposes of the Education of the Handicapped Act. Finding CIC to be a “related service” under that Act, the District Court ordered petitioner and the State Board of Education to modify Amber’s individualized education program to include provision of CIC during school hours. It also awarded compensatory damages against petitioner. Tatro v. Texas, 516 F. Supp. 968 (ND Tex. 1981).
On the authority of Tatro I, the District Court then held that respondents had proved a violation of §504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Although the District Court did not rely on this holding to authorize any greater injunctive or compensatory relief, it did invoke the holding to award attorney’s fees against petitioner and the State Board of Education. 516 F. Supp., at 968; App. to Pet. for Cert. 55a-63a. The Rehabilitation Act, unlike the Education of the Handicapped Act, authorizes prevailing parties to recover attorney’s fees. See 29 U. S. C. §794a.
The Court of Appeals affirmed. Tatro v. Texas, 703 F. 2d 823 (CA5 1983) (Tatro II). That court accepted the District Court’s conclusion that state law permitted qualified persons to administer CIC without the physical presence of a doctor, and it affirmed the award of relief under the Education of the Handicapped Act. In affirming the award of attorney’s fees based on a finding of liability under the Rehabilitation Act, the Court of Appeals held that no change of circumstances since Tatro I justified a different result.
We granted certiorari, 464 U. S. 1007 (1983), and we affirm in part and reverse in part.
II
This case poses two separate issues. The first is whether the Education of the Handicapped Act requires petitioner to provide CIC services to Amber. The second is whether §504 of the Rehabilitation Act creates such an obligation. We first turn to the claim presented under the Education of the Handicapped Act.
States receiving funds under the Act are obliged to satisfy certain conditions. A primary condition is that the state implement a policy “that assures all handicapped children the right to a free appropriate public education.” 20 U. S. C. § 1412(1). Each educational agency applying to a state for funding must provide assurances in turn that its program aims to provide “a free appropriate public education to all handicapped children.” § 1414(a)(l)(C)(ii).
A “free appropriate public education” is explicitly defined as “special education and related services.” § 1401(18). The term “special education” means
“specially designed instruction, at no cost to parents or guardians, to meet the unique needs of a handicapped child, including classroom instruction, instruction in physical education, home instruction, and instruction in hospitals and institutions.” § 1401(16).
“Related services” are defined as
“transportation, and such developmental, corrective, and other supportive services (including speech pathology and audiology, psychological services, physical and occupational therapy, recreation, and medical and counseling services, except that such medical services shall be for diagnostic and evaluation purposes only) as may be required to assist a handicapped child to benefit from special education, and includes the early identification and assessment of handicapping conditions in children.” § 1401(17) (emphasis added).
The issue in this case is whether CIC is a “related service” that petitioner is obliged to provide to Amber. We must answer two questions: first, whether CIC is a “supportive servic[e] . . . required to assist a handicapped child to benefit from special education”; and second, whether CIC is excluded from this definition as a “medical servic[e]” serving purposes other than diagnosis or evaluation.
A
The Court of Appeals was clearly correct in holding that CIC is a “supportive servic[e]. . . required to assist a handicapped child to benefit from special education.” It is clear on this record that, without having CIC services available during the school day, Amber cannot attend school and thereby “benefit from special education.” CIC services therefore fall squarely within the definition of a “supportive service.”
As we have stated before, “Congress sought primarily to make public education available to handicapped children” and “to make such access meaningful.” Board of Education of Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. Rowley, 458 U. S. 176, 192 (1982). A service that enables a handicapped child to remain at school during the day is an important means of providing the child with the meaningful access to education that Congress envisioned. The Act makes specific provision for services, like transportation, for example, that do no more than enable a child to be physically present in class, see 20 U. S. C. §1401(17); and the Act specifically authorizes grants for schools to alter buildings and equipment to make them accessible to the handicapped, § 1406; see S. Rep. No. 94-168, p. 38 (1975); 121 Cong. Rec. 19483-19484 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Stafford). Services like CIC that permit a child to remain at school during the day are no less related to the effort to educate than are services that enable the child to reach, enter, or exit the school.
We hold that CIC services in this case qualify as a “supportive servic[e] . . . required to assist a handicapped child to benefit from special education.”
B
We also agree with the Court of Appeals that provision of CIC is not a “medical servic[ej,” which a school is required to provide only for purposes of diagnosis or evaluation. See 20 U. S. C. § 1401(17). We begin with the regulations of the Department of Education, which are entitled to deference. See, e. g., Blum v. Bacon, 457 U. S. 132, 141 (1982). The regulations define “related services” for handicapped children to include “school health services,” 34 CFR §300.13(a) (1983), which are defined in turn as “services provided by a qualified school nurse or other qualified person,” §300.13(b) (10). “Medical services” are defined as “services provided by a licensed physician.” §300.13(b)(4). Thus, the Secretary has determined that the services of a school nurse otherwise qualifying as a “related service” are not subject to exclusion as a “medical service,” but that the services of a physician are excludable as such.
This definition of “medical services” is a reasonable interpretation of congressional intent. Although Congress devoted little discussion to the “medical services” exclusion, the Secretary could reasonably have concluded that it was designed to spare schools from an obligation to provide a service that might well prove unduly expensive and beyond the range of their competence. From this understanding of congressional purpose, the Secretary could reasonably have concluded that Congress intended to impose the obligation to provide school nursing services.
Congress plainly required schools to hire various specially trained personnel to help handicapped children, such as “trained occupational therapists, speech therapists, psychologists, social workers and other appropriately trained personnel.” S. Rep. No. 94-168, supra, at 33. School nurses have long been a part of the educational system, and the Secretary could therefore reasonably conclude that school nursing services are not the sort of burden that Congress intended to exclude as a “medical service.” By limiting the “medical services” exclusion to the services of a physician or hospital, both far more expensive, the Secretary has given a permissible construction to the provision.
Petitioner’s contrary interpretation of the “medical services” exclusion is unconvincing. In petitioner’s view, CIC is a “medical service,” even though it may be provided by a nurse or trained layperson; that conclusion rests on its reading of Texas law that confines CIC to uses in accordance with a physician’s prescription and under a physician’s ultimate supervision. Aside from conflicting with the Secretary’s reasonable interpretation of congressional intent, however, such a rule would be anomalous. Nurses in petitioner School District are authorized to dispense oral medications and administer emergency injections in accordance with a physician’s prescription. This kind of service for nonhandicapped children is difficult to distinguish from the provision of CIC to the handicapped. It would be strange indeed if Congress, in attempting to extend special services to handicapped children, were unwilling to guarantee them services of a kind that are routinely provided to the nonhandicapped.
To keep in perspective the obligation to provide services that relate to both the health and educational needs of handicapped students, we note several limitations that should minimize the burden petitioner fears. First, to be entitled to related services, a child must be handicapped so as to require special education. See 20 U. S. C. § 1401(1); 34 CFR §300.5 (1983). In the absence of a handicap that requires special education, the need for what otherwise might qualify as a related service does not create an obligation under the Act. See 34 CFR §300.14, Comment (1) (1983).
Second, only those services necessary to aid a handicapped child to benefit from special education must be provided, regardless how easily a school nurse or layperson could furnish them. For example, if a particular medication or treatment may appropriately be administered to a handicapped child other than during the school day, a school is not required to provide nursing services to administer it.
Third, the regulations state that school nursing services must be provided only if they can be performed by a nurse or other qualified person, not if they must be performed by a physician. See 34 CFR §§ 300.13(a), (b)(4), (b)(10) (1983). It bears mentioning that here not even the services of a nurse are required; as is conceded, a layperson with minimal training is qualified to provide CIC. See also, e. g., Department of Education of Hawaii v. Katherine D., 727 F. 2d 809 (CA9 1983).
Finally, we note that respondents are not asking petitioner to provide equipment that Amber needs for CIC. Tr. of Oral Arg. 18-19. They seek only the services of a qualified person at the school.
We conclude that provision of CIC to Amber is not subject to exclusion as a “medical service,” and we affirm the Court of Appeals’ holding that CIC is a “related service” under the Education of the Handicapped Act.
) — I » — I HH
Respondents sought relief not only under the Education of the Handicapped Act but under §504 of the Rehabilitation Act as well. After finding petitioner liable to provide CIC under the former, the District Court proceeded to hold that petitioner was similarly liable under § 504 and that respondents were therefore entitled to attorney’s fees under § 505 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U. S. C. §794a. We hold today, in Smith v. Robinson, post, p. 992, that §504 is inapplicable when relief is available under the Education of the Handicapped Act to remedy a denial of educational services. Respondents are therefore not entitled to relief under § 504, and we reverse the Court of Appeals’ holding that respondents are entitled to recover attorney’s fees. In all other respects, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
The Education of the Handicapped Act’s procedures for administrative hearings are set out in 20 U. S. C. § 1415. In this case a hearing officer ruled that the Education of the Handicapped Act did require the school to provide CIC, and the Texas Commissioner of Education adopted the hearing officer’s decision. The State Board of Education reversed, holding that the Act did not require petitioner to provide CIC.
As discussed more fully later, the Education of the Handicapped Act defines “related services” to include “supportive services (including . . . medical and counseling services, except that such medical services shall be for diagnostic and evaluation purposes only) as may be required to assist a handicapped child to benefit from special education.” 20 U. S. C. § 1401(17).
The District Court dismissed the claims against all defendants other than petitioner and the State Board, though it retained the members of the State Board “in their official capacities for the purpose of injunctive relief.” 516 F. Supp., at 972-974.
The District Court held that § 505 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U. S. C. § 794a, which authorizes attorney’s fees as a part of a prevailing party’s costs, abrogated the State Board’s immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 56a-60a. The State Board did not petition for certiorari, and the Eleventh Amendment issue is not before us.
Specifically, the “special education and related services” must
“(A) have been provided at public expense, under public supervision and direction, and without charge, (B) meet the standards of the State educational agency, (C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary school education in the State involved, and (D) [be] provided in conformity with the individualized education program required under section 1414(a)(5) of this title.” § 1401(18).
Petitioner claims that courts deciding cases arising under the Education of the Handicapped Act are limited to inquiring whether a school district has followed the requirements of the state plan and has followed the Act’s procedural requirements. However, we held in Board of Education of Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. Rowley, 458 U. S. 176, 206, n. 27 (1982), that a court is required “not only to satisfy itself that the State has adopted the state plan, policies, and assurances required by the Act, but also to determine that the State has created an [individualized education plan] for the child in question which conforms with the requirements of § 1401(19) [defining such plans].” Judicial review is equally appropriate in this case, which presents the legal question of a school’s substantive obligation under the “related services” requirement of § 1401(17).
The Department of Education has agreed with this reasoning in an interpretive ruling that specifically found CIC to be a “related service.” 46 Fed. Reg. 4912 (1981). Accord, Tokarcik v. Forest Hills School District, 665 F. 2d 443 (CA3 1981), cert. denied sub nom. Scanlon v. Tokarcik, 458 U. S. 1121 (1982). The Secretary twice postponed temporarily the effective date of this interpretive ruling, see 46 Fed. Reg. 12495 (1981); id., at 18975, and later postponed it indefinitely, id., at 25614. But the Department presently does view CIC services as an allowable cost under Part B of the Act. Ibid.
The obligation to provide special education and related services is expressly phrased as a “conditiofn]” for a state to receive funds under the Act. See 20 U. S. C. § 1412; see also S. Rep. No. 94-168, p. 16 (1975). This refutes petitioner’s contention that the Act did not “impos[e] an obligation on the States to spend state money to fund certain rights as a condition of receiving federal moneys” but “spoke merely in precatory terms,” Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1, 18 (1981).
The Secretary of Education is empowered to issue such regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of the Act. 20 U. S. C. § 1417(b). This function was initially vested in the Commissioner of Education of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, who promulgated the regulations in question. This function was transferred to the Secretary of Education when Congress created that position, see Department of Education Organization Act, §§ 301(a)(1), (2)(H), 93 Stat. 677, 20 U. S. C. §§ 3441(a)(1), (2)(H).
The regulations actually define only those “medical services” that are owed to handicapped children: “services provided by a licensed physician to determine a child’s medically related handicapping condition which results in the child’s need for special education and related services.” 34 CFR § 300.13(b)(4) (1983). Presumably this means that “medical services” not owed- under the statute are those “services by a licensed physician” that serve other purposes.
Children with serious medical needs are still entitled to an education. For example, the Act specifically includes instruction in hospitals and at home within the definition of “special education.” See 20 U. S. C. § 1401(16).
Petitioner attempts to distinguish the administration of prescription drugs from the administration of CIC on the ground that Texas law expressly limits the liability of school personnel performing the former, see Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 21.914(c) (Supp. 1984), but not the latter. This distinction, however, bears no relation to whether CIC is a “related service.” The introduction of handicapped children into a school creates numerous new possibilities for injury and liability. Many of these risks are more serious than that posed by CIC, which the courts below found is a safe procedure even when performed by a 9-year-old girl. Congress assumed that states receiving the generous grants under the Act were up to the job of managing these new risks. Whether petitioner decides to purchase more liability insurance or to persuade the State to extend the limitation on liability, the risks posed by CIC should not prove to be a large burden.
We need not address respondents’ claim that CIC, in addition to being a “related service,” is a “supplementary ai[d] and servic[e]” that petitioner must provide to enable Amber to attend classes with nonhandicapped students under the Act’s “mainstreaming” directive. See 20 U. S. C. § 1412(5)(B). Respondents have not sought an order prohibiting petitioner from educating Amber with handicapped children alone. Indeed, any request for such an order might not present a live controversy. Amber’s present individualized education program provides for regular public school classes with nonhandicapped children. And petitioner has admitted that it would be far more costly to pay for Amber’s instruction and CIC services at a private school, or to arrange for home tutoring, than to provide CIC at the regular public school placement provided in her current individualized education program. Tr. of Oral Arg. 12.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Harlan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this case we must decide whether the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania may, consistently with the Commerce Clause and the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, impose an annual property tax on the total value of freight cars owned by the appellant, a Pennsylvania corporation, despite the fact that a considerable number of such cars spend a substantial portion of the tax year on the lines of other railroads located outside the State. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania upheld the application of the State’s Capital Stock Tax, Purdon’s Pa. Stat. Ann., 1949, Tit. 72, §§ 1871, 1901, to the full value of all appellant’s freight cars. 403 Pa. 419, 169 A. 2d 878. We postponed consideration of the question of jurisdiction to the hearing on the merits, 368 U. S. 912, and now find that the appeal is appropriately before us under 28 U. S. C. § 1257 (2). E. g., Standard Oil Co. v. Peck, 342 U. S. 382.
We take the facts pertinent to decision from a stipulation submitted by the parties to the trial court. The appellant is a Pennsylvania corporation authorized to operate a railroad only within the State. It has not been licensed to do business elsewhere. The company’s track runs from the anthracite coal region in Pennsylvania to the Pennsylvania-New Jersey border, at Easton, where it connects with the lines of the Central Railroad Company of New Jersey (hereinafter CNJ), a New Jersey corporation which owns all the outstanding shares of appellant’s stock.
In 1951, the year for which the tax was assessed, the appellant owned 3,074 freight cars which were put to use in ordinary transport operations in three ways: (1) by the appellant on its own tracks; (2) by CNJ on that company’s tracks in New Jersey; (3) by other unaffiliated railroads on their own lines in various parts of the country. CNJ’s use of appellant’s cars was pursuant to operating agreements under which CNJ was obliged to pay a daily rental equal to the then-effective rate prescribed by the Association of American Railroads. In order to facilitate interstate transportation by the interchange of equipment among carriers, as prescribed by 49 U. S. C. § 1, pars. (4), (10), (12), the members of the Association, including the appellant, had entered into a separate “Car Service and Per Diem Agreement” under which each subscriber was authorized to use on its own lines the available freight cars of other subscribers at the established per diem rental. Consequently, during 1951 many of the appellant’s freight cars were also used by other railroads on lines outside Pennsylvania.
Appellant contended in the state courts, as it does here, that in computing its Pennsylvania capital stock tax, which is measured by the value of such property as is not exempt from taxation (note 1, supra), it was constitutionally entitled to deduct from the value of its taxable assets a proportional share reflecting the time spent by its freight cars outside Pennsylvania. In support of this claim appellant offered a statistical summary of the use of its freight cars during 1951, seeking to prove that a daily average of more than 1,659 of its 3,074 cars were located on the lines of railroads (including CNJ) which owned no track in Pennsylvania.
It also claimed that a daily average of approximately 1,056 other cars had been used by railroads having lines both within and without Pennsylvania. As to such cars, appellant sought to allocate to Pennsylvania only such portions of their value as the combined ratio of road miles of each user-railroad’s tracks within Pennsylvania bore to its total road mileage throughout the United States.
These claims were disallowed by the Pennsylvania Board of Finance and Revenue, by the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County, and by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. The state courts relied primarily on this Court’s decision in New York Central R. Co. v. Miller, 202 U. S. 584, which upheld the constitutionality of a domiciliary State’s ad valorem property tax levied upon the full value of a railroad’s rolling stock, albeit "some considerable proportion of the [railroad’s] . . . cars always . . . [was] absent from the State.” Id., at 595.
I.
Since Miller this Court has decided numerous cases touching on the intricate problems of accommodating, under the Due Process and Commerce Clauses, the taxing powers of domiciliary and other States with respect to the instrumentalities of interstate commerce. None of these decisions has weakened the pivotal holding in Miller— that a railroad or other taxpayer owning rolling stock cannot avoid the imposition of its domicile’s property tax on the full value of its assets merely by proving that some determinable fraction of its property was absent from the State for part of the tax year. This Court has consistently held that the State of domicile retains jurisdiction to tax tangible personal property which has “not acquired an actual situs elsewhere.” Johnson Oil Refining Co. v. Oklahoma, 290 U. S. 158, 161.
This is because a State casts no forbidden burden upon interstate commerce by subjecting its own corporations, though they be engaged in interstate transport, to nondiscriminatory property taxes. It is only “multiple taxation of interstate operations,” Standard Oil Co. v. Peck, 342 U. S. 382, 385, that offends the Commerce Clause. And obviously multiple taxation is possible only if there exists some jurisdiction, in addition to the domicile of the taxpayer, which may constitutionally impose an ad valorem tax.
Nor does the Due Process Clause confine the domiciliary State’s taxing power to such proportion of the value of the property being taxed as is equal to the fraction of the tax year which the property spends within the State’s borders. Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194, held only that the Due Process Clause prohibited ad valorem taxation by the owner’s domicile of tangible personal property permanently located in some other State. Northwest Airlines, Inc., v. Minnesota, 322 U. S. 292, reaffirmed the principle established by earlier cases that tangible property for which no tax situs has been established elsewhere may be taxed to its full value by the owner’s domicile. See New York Central R. Co. v. Miller, supra; Southern Pacific Co. v. Kentucky, 222 U. S. 63, 69; Johnson Oil Refining Co. v. Oklahoma, supra. If such property has had insufficient contact with States other than the owner’s domicile to render any one of these jurisdictions a “tax situs,” it is surely appropriate to presume that the domicile is the only State affording the “opportunities, benefits, or protection” which due process demands as a prerequisite for taxation. See Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 336 U. S. 169, 174.
Accordingly, the burden is on the taxpayer who contends that some portion of its total assets are beyond the reach of the taxing power of its domicile to prove that the same property may be similarly taxed in another jurisdiction. Cf. Dixie Ohio Express Co. v. State Revenue Comm’n, 306 U. S. 72.
The controlling question here is, therefore, the same as it was in Standard Oil Co. v. Peck, 342 U. S. 382, where the decision whether a state property tax might constitutionally be imposed on the full value of a domiciliary’s moving assets turned on whether “ ‘a defined part of the domiciliary corpus’ ” — there consisting of boats and barges traveling along inland waters — “could be taxed by the several states on an apportionment basis.” 342 U. S., at 384.
Since the burden of proving an exemption is on the taxpayer who claims it, we must consider whether the stipulated facts show that some determinable portion of the value of the appellant’s freight cars had acquired a tax situs in a jurisdiction other than Pennsylvania.
II.
With respect to the freight cars that had been used on the lines of CNJ during the taxable year, the stipulation establishes that they “were run on fixed routes and regular schedules . . . over the lines of CNJ ... in New Jersey.” Their habitual employment within the jiiris-diction in this manner would assuredly support New Jersey’s imposition of an apportioned ad valorem tax on the value of the appellant’s fleet of freight cars. Marye v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 127 U. S. 117, 123-124; Pullman’s Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U. S. 18, 23; Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Lynch, 177 U. S. 149; Johnson Oil Refining Co. v. Oklahoma, 290 U. S. 158, 162-163; cf. Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 336 U. S. 169; Braniff Airways, Inc., v. Nebraska Board of Equalization, 347 U. S. 590, 601. Consequently, the daily average of freight cars located on the CNJ lines in the 1951 tax year, 158 in number, could not constitutionally be included in the computation of this Pennsylvania tax. In this respect, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision (which is difficult to reconcile with its holding as to the similarly situated locomotives, note 4, supra) cannot be accepted.
III.
We conclude, however, that on the record before us Pennsylvania was constitutionally permitted to tax, at full value, the remainder of appellant’s fleet of freight cars, including those used by other railroads under the Car Service and Per Diem Agreement of the Association of American Railroads. These were, in the language of the stipulation, “regularly, habitually and/or continuously employed” in this manner, but they did not run “on fixed routes and regular schedules” as did the cars used by CNJ.
Since the domiciliary State is precluded from imposing an ad valorem tax on any property to the extent that it could be taxed by another State, not merely on such property as is subjected to tax elsewhere, the validity of Pennsylvania’s tax must be determined by considering whether the facts in the record disclose a possible tax situs in some other jurisdiction. Had the record shown that appellant’s cars traveled through other States along fixed and regular routes, even if it were silent with respect to the length of time spent in each nondomiciliary State, it would doubtless follow that the States through which the regular traffic flowed could impose a property tax measured by some fair apportioning formula. Cf. Braniff Airways, Inc., v. Nebraska Board of Equalization, 347 U. S. 590. And this would render unconstitutional any domiciliary ad valorem tax at full value on property that could thus be taxed elsewhere. Standard Oil Co. v. Peck, supra, at 384.
Alternatively a nondomiciliary tax situs may be acquired even if the rolling stock does not follow prescribed routes and schedules in its course through the nondomiciliary State. In American Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Hall, 174 U. S. 70, this Court sustained the constitutionality of a Colorado property tax on a stipulated average number of railroad cars that had been located within the territorial limits of Colorado during the tax year, although it was agreed' by the parties that the cars “never were run in said State in fixed numbers nor at regular times, nor as a regular part of particular trains.” Id., at 72. Habitual employment within the State of a substantial number of cars, albeit on irregular routes, may constitute sufficient contact to establish a tax situs permitting taxation of the average number of cars so engaged.
On the record before us, however, we find no evidence, except as to the CNJ cars, of either regular routes through particular nondomiciliary States or habitual presence, though on irregular missions, in particular nondomiciliary States. It is not disputed that many of the railroads listed as owning no track within Pennsylvania do have lines in more than one State, but there is no way of knowing which, if any, of these States may have acquired taxing jurisdiction over some of appellant’s freight cars. And even with respect to railroads whose lines do not extend beyond the borders of a single State, it cannot be determined whether their use of appellant’s cars was habitual or merely sporadic. It must be obvious that the fraction of a railroad’s lines located within Pennsylvania is wholly unilluminating as to the consistency with which that railroad used appellant’s cars in some other State.
In short, except as to freight cars traveling on the lines of the CNJ, this record shows only that a determinable number of appellant’s cars were employed outside the Commonwealth , of Pennsylvania during the relevant tax year. But as this leaves at large the possibility of their having a nondomiciliary tax situs elsewhere, that showing does not suffice under our cases to exclude Pennsylvania from taxing such cars to their full value. Neither Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, supra, nor Standard Oil Co. v. Peck, supra, is properly read to the contrary. In the former, the case was remanded for further proceedings “not inconsistent” with the Court’s opinion that the cars in question, “so far as they were [permanently] located and employed in other States,” were not subject to the taxing power of the domiciliary State. 199 U. S., at 211. In the latter, the existence of a tax situs in one or more nondomiciliary States sufficiently appeared from the record. Note 6, supra. To accept the proposition that a mere general showing of continuous use of movable property outside the domiciliary State is sufficient to exclude the taxing power of that State with respect to it, would surely result in an unsound rule; in instances where it was ultimately found that a tax situs existed in no other State such property would escape this kind of taxation entirely.
As we have shown there is nothing to the contrary in Standard Oil Co. v. Peck. Note 6, supra. And neither the Braniff nor Ott case points to a different conclusion. In Braniff the airplanes held subject to nondomiciliary taxation were shown by the record to have flown on fixed and regular routes. 347 U. S., at 600-601. In Ott the Court was careful to point out that “the statute ‘was intended to cover and actually covers here, an average portion of property permanently within the State — and by permanently is meant throughout the taxing year.' ” 336 U. S., at 175. (Emphasis added.) In the case before us it is impossible to tell, except as to cars on the lines of the CNJ, what the average number of cars was annually in any given State.
IV.
Finally, we think that the appellant’s equal protection argument is insubstantial and that it was correctly rejected by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. For purposes of this tax, Pennsylvania could reasonably differentiate ’ between railroads having tracks which lay only within its borders and those whose tracks were located both within and without the State. The various considerations that justify such a classification from a federal constitutional standpoint need hardly be elaborated. It is sufficient to note that the State might reasonably have concluded that the probability of a nondomiciliary apportioned ad valorem tax on a railroad’s total assets is greater if the railroad maintains tracks in another State than if it does not. Or it might have determined that the imposition of franchise or other taxes by nondomiciliary States in which the. railroad did business compelled some mitigation of the domiciliary’s property tax in order to prevent an oppressive tax burden. In either event, the possible basis for the taxing measure’s classification would be reasonable and could not be held to violate the Equal Protection Clause. Cf. Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc., v. Bowers, 358 U. S. 522, 526-528; Stebbins v. Riley, 268 U. S. 137, 142; Kidd v. Alabama, 188 U. S. 730.
Accordingly, we conclude that with respect to all cars other than those employed by CNJ on its lines in New Jersey the appellant has failed to sustain its burden of proving that a tax situs had been acquired elsewhere. The exemption was properly disallowed in this regard.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania is vacated and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter took no part in the decision of this case.
Mr. Justice White took no pait in the consideration or decision of this case.
The tax imposed by the state statute is denominated a “capital stock tax,” but it has been construed by the Pennsylvania courts as being the equivalent of a property tax. Pennsylvania v. Standard Oil Co., 101 Pa. 119, 145; Pennsylvania v. Union Shipbuilding Co., 271 Pa. 403, 114 A. 257. Property employed by a corporation in its operations in another State and permanently located there is not subject to this tax. Pennsylvania v. American Dredging Co., 122 Pa. 386, 15 A. 443. The value of the capital stock subjected to the tax is determined by multiplying the total value of the capital stock, as measured by the worth of all the corporation’s real and personal property, by the ratio that the value of such nonexempt property within Pennsylvania (including that temporarily outside the State) bears to the value of the corporation’s property everywhere. Purdon’s Pa. Stat. Ann., 1949, Tit. 72, § 1896; Pennsylvania v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 145 Pa. 96, 22 A. 157. With reference to this precise taxing measure, this Court has said in the past that it, in practical effect, amounts to “a tax upon the specific property which gives the added value to the capital stock.” Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 198 U. S. 341, 357.
If appellant’s entire fleet of cars (3,074) is multiplied by the number of days in the year 1951 (365), the total number of “car days” comes to 1,122,010. Appellant’s schedules show that 605,678 “car days” were spent on railroads which owned no track in Pennsylvania. If this latter number is divided by 365, the quotient (1,659) represents the average number of cars located on such railroads on any one day during 1951.
For example, appellant computes 91,899 “car days” as having been spent on the lines of the New York Central Railroad. Since 7.36% of that railroad’s track mileage is within Pennsylvania, appellant allocates 6,764 “car days,” a proportional share, to Pennsylvania.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania did find, however, that certain diesel locomotives which had been leased to CNJ by the appellant and which traveled along fixed routes and schedules had acquired a tax situs in New Jersey and could not be taxed at their full value by Pennsylvania. The State has not sought review of this part of that decision.
E. g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Kentucky, 222 U. S. 63; Johnson Oil Refining Co. v. Oklahoma, 290 U. S. 158; Northwest Airlines, Inc., v. Minnesota, 322 U. S. 292; Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 336 U. S. 169; Standard Oil Co. v. Peck, 342 U. S. 382; Braniff Airways. Inc., v. Nebraska State Board of Equalization, 347 U. S. 590. See generally Developments, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 953, 979-987.
The record in Standard Oil Co. v. Peck discloses that the boats and barges which Ohio sought to tax had been traveling along three regular routes on the Mississippi and Ohio Rivers: from Memphis, Tennessee, to Mt. Vernon, Indiana; from Memphis, Tennessee, to Bromley, Kentucky; and from Baton Rouge or Gibson’s Landing, Louisiana, to Bromley, Kentucky. The States in which the vessels landed, as well as those through which they regularly traveled, could undoubtedly have traced these regular trips and levied appropriately apportioned ad valorem taxes.
The fact that revenues for the use of one or more of appellant’s cars were accounted for by a subscriber to the “Car Service and Per Diem Agreement” does not necessarily indicate that such cars were ever used on the lines of that subscriber. For under the Agreement subscribers were authorized to permit the use of another railroad’s cars by nonsubscribers, though they themselves remained liable to the owner railroad for the per diem rentals in respect of their nonsubscriber use.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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H
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice KAGAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this case, we consider a federal court's inherent authority to sanction a litigant for bad-faith conduct by ordering it to pay the other side's legal fees. We hold that such an order is limited to the fees the innocent party incurred solely because of the misconduct-or put another way, to the fees that party would not have incurred but for the bad faith. A district court has broad discretion to calculate fee awards under that standard. But because the court here granted legal fees beyond those resulting from the litigation misconduct, its award cannot stand.
I
Respondents Leroy, Donna, Barry, and Suzanne Haeger sued the Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company (among other defendants) after the family's motorhome swerved off the road and flipped over. The Haegers alleged that the failure of a Goodyear G159 tire on the vehicle caused the accident: Their theory was that the tire was not designed to withstand the level of heat it generated when used on a motorhome at highway speeds. Discovery in the case lasted several years-and itself generated considerable heat. The Haegers repeatedly asked Goodyear to turn over internal test results for the G159, but the company's responses were both slow in coming and unrevealing in content. After making the District Court referee some of their more contentious discovery battles, the parties finally settled the case (for a still-undisclosed sum) on the eve of trial.
Some months later, the Haegers' lawyer learned from a newspaper article that, in another lawsuit involving the G159, Goodyear had disclosed a set of test results he had never seen. That data indicated that the G159 got unusually hot at speeds of between 55 and 65 miles per hour. In ensuing correspondence, Goodyear conceded withholding the information from the Haegers even though they had requested (both early and often) "all testing data" related to the G159. Record in No. 2:05-cv-2046 (D Ariz.), Doc. 938, p. 8; see id., Doc. 938-1, at 24, 36; id., Doc. 1044-2, at 25 (filed under seal). The Haegers accordingly sought sanctions for discovery fraud, claiming that "Goodyear knowingly concealed crucial 'internal heat test' records related to the [G159's] defective design." Id., Doc. 938, at 1. That conduct, the Haegers urged, entitled them to attorney's fees and costs expended in the litigation. See id., at 14.
The District Court agreed to make such an award in the exercise of its inherent power to sanction litigation misconduct. The court's assessment of Goodyear's actions was harsh (and is not contested here). Goodyear, the court found, had engaged in a "years-long course" of bad-faith behavior. 906 F.Supp.2d 938, 972 (D.Ariz.2012). By withholding the G159's test results at every turn, the company and its lawyers had made "repeated and deliberate attempts to frustrate the resolution of this case on the merits." Id., at 971. But because the case had already settled, the court had limited options. It could not take the measure it most wished: an "entry of default judgment" against Goodyear.
Id., at 972. All it could do for the Haegers was to order Goodyear to reimburse them for attorney's fees and costs paid during the suit.
But that award, in the District Court's view, could be comprehensive, covering both expenses that could be causally tied to Goodyear's misconduct and those that could not. The court calculated that the Haegers had spent $2.7 million in legal fees and costs since the moment, early in the litigation, when Goodyear made its first dishonest discovery response. And the court awarded the Haegers that entire sum. In the "usual[ ]" case, the court reasoned, "sanctions under a [c]ourt's inherent power must be limited to the amount [of legal fees] caused by the misconduct." Id., at 974-975 (emphasis deleted). But this case was not the usual one: Here, "the sanctionable conduct r[ose] to a truly egregious level." Id., at 975. And when a litigant behaves that badly, the court opined, "all of the attorneys' fees incurred in the case [can] be awarded," without any need to find a "causal link between [those expenses and] the sanctionable conduct." Ibid. As further support for its decision, the court considered the chances that full and timely disclosure of the test results would have affected Goodyear's settlement calculus. "While there is some uncertainty," the court stated, "the case more likely than not would have settled much earlier." Id., at 972.
Perhaps sensing thin ice, the District Court also made a "contingent award" in the event that the Court of Appeals reversed its preferred one. App. to Pet. for Cert. 180a. Here, the District Court recognized the possibility that a "linkage between [Goodyear's] misconduct and [the Haegers'] harm is required." Ibid. If so, the court stated, its fee award should be reduced to $2 million. The deduction of $700,000, which was based on estimates Goodyear offered, represented fees that the Haegers incurred in developing claims against other defendants and proving their own medical damages. See App. 69.
A divided Ninth Circuit panel affirmed the full $2.7 million award. According to the majority, the District Court acted properly in "award[ing] the amount [it] reasonably believed" the Haegers expended in attorney's fees and costs "during the time when [ Goodyear was] acting in bad faith." 813 F.3d 1233, 1250 (2016). Or repeated in just slightly different words: The District Court "did not abuse its discretion" in "award[ing] the Haegers all their attorneys' fees and costs in prosecuting the action once [Goodyear] began flouting [its] discovery obligations." Id., at 1249. Judge Watford disagreed. He would have demanded a "causal link between Goodyear's misconduct and the fees awarded." Id., at 1255 (dissenting opinion). The only part of the District Court's opinion that might support such a connection, Judge Watford noted, was its hypothesis that disclosure of the test results would have produced an earlier settlement, and thus obviated the need for further legal expenses. But Judge Watford thought that theory unpersuasive: Because Goodyear would still have had plausible defenses to the Haegers' suit, "[i]t's anyone's guess how the litigation would have proceeded" had timely disclosure occurred. Ibid. Accordingly, Judge Watford would have reversed the District Court for awarding fees beyond those "sustained as a result of Goodyear's misconduct." Id., at 1256.
The Court of Appeals' decision created a split of authority: Other Circuits have insisted on limiting sanctions like this one to fees or costs that are causally related to a litigant's misconduct. We therefore granted certiorari. 579 U.S. ---- (2016).
II
Federal courts possess certain "inherent powers," not conferred by rule or statute, "to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases." Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-631, 82 S.Ct. 1386, 8 L.Ed.2d 734 (1962). That authority includes "the ability to fashion an appropriate sanction for conduct which abuses the judicial process." Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44-45, 111 S.Ct. 2123, 115 L.Ed.2d 27 (1991). And one permissible sanction is an "assessment of attorney's fees"-an order, like the one issued here, instructing a party that has acted in bad faith to reimburse legal fees and costs incurred by the other side. Id., at 45, 111 S.Ct. 2123.
This Court has made clear that such a sanction, when imposed pursuant to civil procedures, must be compensatory rather than punitive in nature. See Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 826-830, 114 S.Ct. 2552, 129 L.Ed.2d 642 (1994) (distinguishing compensatory from punitive sanctions and specifying the procedures needed to impose each kind). In other words, the fee award may go no further than to redress the wronged party "for losses sustained"; it may not impose an additional amount as punishment for the sanctioned party's misbehavior. Id., at 829, 114 S.Ct. 2552 (quoting United States v. Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 304, 67 S.Ct. 677, 91 L.Ed. 884 (1947) ). To level that kind of separate penalty, a court would need to provide procedural guarantees applicable in criminal cases, such as a "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of proof. See id., at 826, 832-834, 838-839, 114 S.Ct. 2552. When (as in this case) those criminal-type protections are missing, a court's shifting of fees is limited to reimbursing the victim.
That means, pretty much by definition, that the court can shift only those attorney's fees incurred because of the misconduct at issue. Compensation for a wrong, after all, tracks the loss resulting from that wrong. So as we have previously noted, a sanction counts as compensatory only if it is "calibrate[d] to [the] damages caused by" the bad-faith acts on which it is based. Id., at 834, 114 S.Ct. 2552. A fee award is so calibrated if it covers the legal bills that the litigation abuse occasioned. But if an award extends further than that-to fees that would have been incurred without the misconduct-then it crosses the boundary from compensation to punishment. Hence the need for a court, when using its inherent sanctioning authority (and civil procedures), to establish a causal link-between the litigant's misbehavior and legal fees paid by the opposing party.
That kind of causal connection, as this Court explained in another attorney's fees case, is appropriately framed as a but-for test: The complaining party (here, the Haegers) may recover "only the portion of his fees that he would not have paid but for" the misconduct. Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826, 836, 131 S.Ct. 2205, 180 L.Ed.2d 45 (2011) ; see Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. ----, ----, 134 S.Ct. 1710, 1722, 188 L.Ed.2d 714 (2014) ("The traditional way to prove that one event was a factual cause of another is to show that the latter would not have occurred 'but for' the former"). In Fox, a prevailing defendant sought reimbursement under a fee-shifting statute for legal expenses incurred in defending against several frivolous claims. See 563 U.S., at 830, 131 S.Ct. 2205 ; 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The trial court granted fees for all legal work relating to those claims-regardless of whether the same work would have been done (for example, the same depositions taken) to contest the non -frivolous claims in the suit. We made clear that was wrong. When a "defendant would have incurred [an] expense in any event[,] he has suffered no incremental harm from the frivolous claim," and so the court lacks a basis for shifting the expense. Fox, 563 U.S., at 836, 131 S.Ct. 2205. Substitute "discovery abuse" for "frivolous claim" in that sentence, and the same thing goes in this case. Or otherwise said (and again borrowing from Fox ), when "the cost[ ] would have been incurred in the absence of" the discovery violation, then the court (possessing only the power to compensate for harm the misconduct has caused) must leave it alone. Id., at 838, 131 S.Ct. 2205.
This but-for causation standard generally demands that a district court assess and allocate specific litigation expenses-yet still allows it to exercise discretion and judgment. The court's fundamental job is to determine whether a given legal fee-say, for taking a deposition or drafting a motion-would or would not have been incurred in the absence of the sanctioned conduct. The award is then the sum total of the fees that, except for the misbehavior, would not have accrued. See id., at 837-838, 131 S.Ct. 2205 (providing illustrative examples). But as we stressed in Fox, trial courts undertaking that task "need not, and indeed should not, become green-eyeshade accountants" (or whatever the contemporary equivalent is). Id., at 838, 131 S.Ct. 2205. "The essential goal" in shifting fees is "to do rough justice, not to achieve auditing perfection." Ibid . Accordingly, a district court "may take into account [its] overall sense of a suit, and may use estimates in calculating and allocating an attorney's time." Ibid . The court may decide, for example, that all (or a set percentage) of a particular category of expenses-say, for expert discovery-were incurred solely because of a litigant's bad-faith conduct. And such judgments, in light of the trial court's "superior understanding of the litigation," are entitled to substantial deference on appeal. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983).
In exceptional cases, the but-for standard even permits a trial court to shift all of a party's fees, from either the start or some midpoint of a suit, in one fell swoop. Chambers v. NASCO offers one illustration. There, we approved such an award because literally everything the defendant did-"his entire course of conduct" throughout, and indeed preceding, the litigation-was "part of a sordid scheme" to defeat a valid claim. 501 U.S., at 51, 57, 111 S.Ct. 2123 (brackets omitted). Thus, the district court could reasonably conclude that all legal expenses in the suit "were caused ... solely by [his] fraudulent and brazenly unethical efforts." Id., at 58, 111 S.Ct. 2123. Or to flip the example: If a plaintiff initiates a case in complete bad faith, so that every cost of defense is attributable only to sanctioned behavior, the court may again make a blanket award. And similarly, if a court finds that a lawsuit, absent litigation misconduct, would have settled at a specific time-for example, when a party was legally required to disclose evidence fatal to its position-then the court may grant all fees incurred from that moment on. In each of those scenarios, a court escapes the grind of segregating individual expense items (a deposition here, a motion there)-or even categories of such items (again, like expert discovery)-but only because all fees in the litigation, or a phase of it, meet the applicable test: They would not have been incurred except for the misconduct.
III
It is an oddity of this case that both sides agree with just about everything said in the last six paragraphs about the pertinent law. Do legal fees awarded under a court's inherent sanctioning authority have to be compensatory rather than punitive when civil litigation procedures are used? The Haegers and Goodyear alike say yes. Does that mean the fees awarded must be causally related to the sanctioned party's misconduct? A joint yes on that too. More specifically, does the appropriate causal test limit the fees, a la Fox, to those that would not have been incurred but for the bad faith? No argument there either. And in an exceptional case, such as Chambers, could that test produce an award extending as far as all of the wronged party's legal fees? Once again, agreement (if with differing degrees of enthusiasm). See Brief for Petitioner 17, 23-24, 31; Brief for Respondents 17-18, 22-23; Tr. of Oral Arg. 34-35, 46-47.
All the parties really argue about here is what that law means for this case. Goodyear contends that it requires throwing out the trial court's fee award and instructing the court to consider the matter anew. The Haegers maintain, to the contrary, that the award can stand. They initially contend-pointing to a couple of passages from the Ninth Circuit's opinion-that both courts below articulated and applied the very but-for causation standard we have laid out. See Brief for Respondents 17-18 (highlighting the Ninth Circuit's statements that Goodyear's "bad faith conduct caused significant harm" and that the District Court "determine[d] the appropriate amount of fees to award as sanctions to compensate the [Haegers] for the damages they suffered as a result of [Goodyear's] bad faith"). And even if we reject that view, the Haegers continue, we may uphold the fee award on the ground that it in fact passes a but-for test. That standard is satisfied (so they say) for either of two reasons. First, because the case would have settled as soon as Goodyear disclosed the requested heat-test results, thus putting an end to the Haegers' legal bills. Or second, because (settlement prospects aside) the withholding of that data so infected the lawsuit as to account for each and every expense the Haegers subsequently incurred. See id., at 14-15, 22, 26.
The Haegers' defense of the lower courts' reasoning is a non-starter: Neither of them used the correct legal standard. As earlier recounted, the District Court specifically disclaimed the "usual [ ]" need to find a "causal link" between misconduct and fees when the sanctioned party's behavior was bad enough-in the court's words, when it "r [ose] to a truly egregious level." 906 F.Supp.2d, at 975 (emphasis deleted); see supra, at 1185. In such circumstances, the court thought, it could award "all" fees, including those that would have been incurred in the absence of the misconduct. 906 F.Supp.2d, at 975. And the court confirmed that approach even while conceding that it might be wrong: By issuing a "contingent award" of $2 million, meant to go into effect if the Ninth Circuit demanded a causal "linkage between the misconduct and harm," the District Court made clear that its primary, $2.7 million award was not so confined. App. to Pet. for Cert. 180a; see supra, at 1185. Still, the Court of Appeals left the larger sanction in place, because it too mistook what findings were needed to support that award. In the Ninth Circuit's view, the trial court could grant all attorney's fees incurred "during the time when [ Goodyear was] acting in bad faith." 813 F.3d, at 1250 (emphasis added); see id., at 1249 (permitting an award of fees incurred "once [Goodyear] began flouting [its] discovery obligations" (emphasis added)); supra, at 1185. But that is a temporal limitation, not a causal one; and, like the District Court's "egregiousness" requirement, it is wide of the mark. A sanctioning court must determine which fees were incurred because of, and solely because of, the misconduct at issue (however serious, or concurrent with a lawyer's work, it might have been). No such finding lies behind the $2.7 million award made and affirmed below.
Nor are we tempted to fill in that gap, as the Haegers have invited us to do. As an initial matter, the Haegers have not shown that this litigation would have settled as soon as Goodyear divulged the heat-test results (thus justifying an all-fees award from the moment it was supposed to disclose, see supra, at 1187 - 1188). Even the District Court did not go quite that far: In attempting to buttress its comprehensive award, it said only (and after expressing "some uncertainty") that the suit probably would have settled "much earlier." 906 F.Supp.2d, at 972. And that more limited finding is itself subject to grave doubt, even taking into account the deference owed to the trial court. As Judge Watford reasoned, the test results, although favorable to the Haegers' version of events, did not deprive Goodyear of colorable defenses. In particular, Goodyear still could have argued, as it had from the beginning, that "the Haegers' own tire, which had endured more than 40,000 miles of wear and tear, failed because it struck road debris." 813 F.3d, at 1256 (dissenting opinion). And indeed, that is pretty much the course Goodyear took in another suit alleging that the G159 caused a motorhome accident. See Schalmo v. Goodyear, No. 51-2006-CA-2064-WS (Fla. Cir. Ct., 6th Cir., Pasco County). In that case (as Judge Watford again observed), Goodyear produced the very test results at issue here, yet still elected to go to trial. See 813 F.3d, at 1256. So we do not think the record allows a finding, as would support the $2.7 million award, that disclosure of the heat-test results would have led straightaway to a settlement.
Further, the Haegers cannot demonstrate that Goodyear's non-disclosure so permeated the suit as to make that misconduct a but-for cause of every subsequent legal expense, totaling the full $2.7 million. If nothing else, the District Court's back-up fee award belies that theory. After introducing a causal element into the equation, the court found that the $700,000 of fees that the Haegers incurred in litigating against other defendants and proving their own medical damages had nothing to do with Goodyear's discovery decisions. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 180a; supra, at 1185. The Haegers have failed to offer any concrete reason for questioning that judgment, and we do not see how they could. At a minimum, then, the sanction order could not force Goodyear to reimburse those expenses-because, again, the Haegers would have paid them even had the company behaved immaculately in every respect.
That leaves the question whether the contingent $2 million award should now stand-or, alternatively, whether the District Court must reconsider from scratch which fees to shift. In the absence of any waiver issue, we would insist on the latter course. Although the District Court considered causation in arriving at its back-up award, we cannot tell from its sparse discussion whether its understanding of that requirement corresponds to the standard we have described. That uncertainty points toward demanding a do-over, under the unequivocally right legal rules. But the Haegers contend that Goodyear has waived any ability to challenge the $2 million award. In their view, that sum reflected Goodyear's own submission-which it may not now amend-that only about $700,000 of the fees sought would have been incurred "regardless of Goodyear's behavior." App. 69; see Brief for Respondents 41; supra, at 1185. The Court of Appeals did not previously address that issue, and we decline to decide it in the first instance. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 718, n. 7, 125 S.Ct. 2113, 161 L.Ed.2d 1020 (2005) ("[W]e are a court of review, not of first view"). The possibility of waiver should therefore be the initial order of business below. If a waiver is found, that is the end of this case. If not, the District Court must reassess fees in line with a but-for causation requirement.
For these reasons, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice GORSUCH took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
The additional defendants named in the Haegers' complaint were Gulf Stream Coach, the manufacturer of the motorhome, and Spartan Motors, the manufacturer of the vehicle's chassis. In the course of the litigation, the Haegers reached a settlement with Gulf Stream, and the District Court granted Spartan's motion for summary judgment.
The court reasoned that no statute or rule enabled it to reach all the offending behavior. Sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, the court thought, should not be imposed after final judgment in a case. See 906 F.Supp.2d 938, 973, n. 24 (D.Ariz.2012). And sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, it noted, could address the wrongdoing of only Goodyear's attorneys, rather than of Goodyear itself. See 906 F.Supp.2d, at 973.
See, e.g., Plaintiffs' Baycol Steering Comm. v. Bayer Corp., 419 F.3d 794, 808 (C.A.8 2005) ; Bradley v. American Household, Inc., 378 F.3d 373, 378 (C.A.4 2004) ; United States v. Dowell, 257 F.3d 694, 699 (C.A.7 2001).
Bagwell also addressed "coercive" sanctions, designed to make a party comply with a court order. 512 U.S., at 829, 114 S.Ct. 2552. That kind of sanction is not at issue here.
Rule-based and statutory sanction regimes similarly require courts to find such a causal connection before shifting fees. For example, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that a district court may order a party to pay attorney's fees "caused by" discovery misconduct, Rule 37(b)(2)(C), or "directly resulting from" misrepresentations in pleadings, motions, and other papers, Rule 11(c)(4). And under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, a court may require an attorney who unreasonably multiplies proceedings to pay attorney's fees incurred "because of" that misconduct. Those provisions confirm the need to establish a causal link between misconduct and fees when acting under inherent authority, given that such undelegated powers should be exercised with especial "restraint and discretion." Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764, 100 S.Ct. 2455, 65 L.Ed.2d 488 (1980).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
I
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Kennedy
delivered the opinion of the Court.
A decision by local zoning authorities to deny a church a building permit was challenged under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA or Act), 107 Stat. 1488, 42 U. S. C. § 2000bb et seq. The case calls into question the authority of Congress to enact RFRA. We conclude the statute exceeds Congress’ power.
I
Situated on a hill in the city of Boerne, Texas, some 28 miles northwest of San Antonio, is St. Peter Catholic Church. Built in 1923, the church’s structure replicates the mission style of the region’s earlier history. The church seats about 230 worshippers, a number too small for its growing parish. Some 40 to 60 parishioners cannot be accommodated at some Sunday masses. In order to meet the needs of the congregation the Archbishop of San Antonio gave permission to the parish to plan alterations to enlarge the building.
A few months later, the Boerne City Council passed an ordinance authorizing the city’s Historic Landmark Commission to prepare a preservation plan with proposed historic landmarks and districts. Under the ordinance, the commission must preapprove construction affecting historic landmarks or buildings in a historic district.
Soon afterwards, the Archbishop applied for a building permit so construction to enlarge the church could proceed. City authorities, relying on the ordinance and the designation of a historic district (which, they argued, included the church), denied the application. The Archbishop brought this suit challenging the permit denial in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. 877 F. Supp. 355 (1995).
The complaint contained various claims, but to this point the litigation has centered on RFRA and the question of its constitutionality. The Archbishop relied upon RFRA as one basis for relief from the refusal to issue the permit. The District Court concluded that by enacting RFRA Congress exceeded the scope of its enforcement power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court certified its order for interlocutory appeal and the Fifth Circuit reversed, finding RFRA to be constitutional. 73 F. 3d 1352 (1996). We granted certiorari, 519 U. S. 926 (1996), and now reverse.
II
Congress enacted RFRA in direct response to the Court s decision in Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U. S. 872 (1990). There we considered a Free Exercise Clause claim brought by members of the Native American Church who were denied unemployment benefits when they lost their jobs because they had used peyote. Their practice was to ingest peyote for sacramental purposes, and they challenged an Oregon statute of general applicability which made use of the drug criminal. In evaluating the claim, we declined to apply the balancing test set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398 (1963), under which we would have asked whether Oregon’s prohibition substantially burdened a religious practice and, if it did, whether the burden was justified by a compelling government interest. We stated:
“[Gjovernment’s ability to enforce generally applicable prohibitions of socially harmful conduct... cannot depend on measuring the effects of a governmental action on a religious objector’s spiritual development. To make an individual’s obligation to obey such a law contingent upon the law’s coincidence with his religious beliefs, except where the State’s interest is ‘compelling’... contradicts both constitutional tradition and common sense.” 494 U. S., at 885 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
The application of the Sherbert test, the Smith decision explained, would have produced an anomaly in the law, a constitutional right to ignore neutral laws of general applicability. The anomaly would have been accentuated, the Court reasoned, by the difficulty of determining whether a particular practice was central to an individual’s religion. We explained, moreover, that it “is not within the judicial ken to question the centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith, or the validity of particular litigants’ interpretations of those creeds.” 494 U. S., at 887 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
The only instances where a neutral, generally applicable law had failed to pass constitutional muster, the Smith Court noted, were cases in which other constitutional protections were at stake. Id., at 881-882. In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205 (1972), for example, we invalidated Wisconsin’s mandatory school-attendance law as applied to Amish parents who refused on religious grounds to send their children to school. That case implicated not only the right to the free exercise of religion but also the right of parents to control their children’s education.
The Smith decision acknowledged the Court had employed the Sherbert test in considering free exercise challenges to state unemployment compensation rules on three occasions where the balance had tipped in favor of the individual. See Sherbert, supra; Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Security Div., 450 U. S. 707 (1981); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of Fla., 480 U. S. 136 (1987). Those cases, the Court explained, stand for “the proposition that where the State has in place a system of individual exemptions, it may not refuse to extend that system to cases of religious hardship without compelling reason.” 494 U. S., at 884 (internal quotation marks omitted). By contrast, where a general prohibition, such as Oregon’s, is at issue, “the sounder approach, and the approach in accord with the vast majority of our precedents, is to hold the test inapplicable to [free exercise] challenges.” Id., at 885. Smith held that neutral, generally applicable laws may be applied to religious practices even when not supported by a compelling governmental interest.
Four Members of the Court disagreed. They argued the law placed a substantial burden on the Native American Church members so that it could be upheld only if the law served a compelling state interest and was narrowly tailored to achieve that end. Id., at 894. Justice O’Connor concluded Oregon had satisfied the test, while Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall, could see no compelling interest justifying the law’s application to the members.
These points of constitutional interpretation were debated by Members of Congress in hearings and floor debates. Many criticized the Court’s reasoning, and this disagreement resulted in the passage of RFRA. Congress announced:
“(1) [T]he framers of the Constitution, recognizing free exercise of religion as an unalienable right, secured its protection in the First Amendment to the Constitution; “(2) laws 'neutral’ toward religion may burden religious exercise as surely as laws intended to interfere with religious exercise;
“(3) governments should not substantially burden religious exercise without compelling justification;
“(4) in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U. S. 872 (1990), the Supreme Court virtually eliminated the requirement that the government justify burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws neutral toward religion; and
“(5) the compelling interest test as set forth in prior Federal court rulings is a workable test for striking sensible balances between religious liberty and competing prior governmental interests.” 42 U. S. C. § 2000bb(a).
The Act’s stated purposes are:
“(1) to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205 (1972) and to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened; and
“(2) to provide a claim or defense to persons whose religious exercise is substantially burdened by government.” §2000bb(b).
RFRA prohibits “[government” from “substantially bur-denting]” a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability unless the government can demonstrate the burden “(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.” §2000bb-l. The Act’s mandate applies to any “branch, department, agency, instrumentality, and official (or other person acting under color of law) of the United States,” as well as to any “State, or... subdivision of a State.” § 2000bb-2(l).'The Act’s universal coverage is confirmed in § 2000bb-3(a), under which RFRA “applies to all Federal and State law, and the implementation of that law, whether statutory or otherwise, and whether adopted before or after [RFRA’s enactment].” In accordance with RFRA’s usage of the term, we shall use “state law” to include local and municipal ordinances.
III
A
Under our Constitution, the Federal Government is one of enumerated powers. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 405 (1819); see also The Federalist No. 45, p. 292 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (J. Madison). The judicial authority to determine the constitutionality of laws, in cases and controversies, is based on the premise that the “powers of the legislature are defined and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written.” Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 176 (1803).
Congress relied on its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power in enacting the most far-reaching and substantial of RFRA’s provisions, those which impose its requirements on the States. See Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, S. Rep. No. 103-111, pp. 13-14 (1993) (Senate Report); H. R. Rep. No. 103-88, p. 9 (1993) (House Report). The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in relevant part:
“Section 1.... No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
“Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”
The parties disagree over whether RFRA is a proper exercise of Congress’ §5 power “to enforce” by “appropriate legislation” the constitutional guarantee that no State shall deprive any person of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,” nor deny any person “equal protection of the laws.”
In defense of the Act, respondent the Archbishop contends, with support from the United States, that RFRA is permissible enforcement legislation. Congress, it is said, is only protecting by legislation one of the liberties guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, the free exercise of religion, beyond what is necessary under Smith. It is said the congressional decision to dispense with proof of deliberate or overt discrimination and instead concentrate on a law’s effects accords with the settled understanding that § 5 includes the power to enact legislation designed to prevent, as well as remedy, constitutional violations. It is further contended that Congress’ § 5 power is not limited to remedial or preventive legislation.
All must acknowledge that § 5 is “a positive grant of legislative power” to Congress, Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U. S. 641, 651 (1966). In Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339, 345-346 (1880), we explained the scope of Congress’ § 5 power in the following broad terms:
“Whatever legislation is appropriate, that is, adapted to carry out the objects the amendments have in view, whatever tends to enforce submission to the prohibitions they contain, and to secure to all persons the enjoyment of perfect equality of civil rights and the equal protection of the laws against State denial or invasion, if not prohibited, is brought within the domain of congressional power.”
Legislation which deters or remedies constitutional violations can fall within the sweep of Congress’ enforcement power even if in the process it prohibits conduct which is not itself unconstitutional and intrudes into “legislative spheres of autonomy previously reserved to the States.” Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445, 455 (1976). For example, the Court upheld a suspension of literacy tests and similar voting requirements under Congress’ parallel power to enforce the provisions of the Fifteenth Amendment, see U. S. Const., Amdt. 15, §2, as a measure to combat racial discrimination in voting, South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, 308 (1966), despite the facial constitutionality of the tests under Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U. S. 45 (1959). We have also concluded that other measures protecting voting rights are within Congress’ power to enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, despite the burdens those measures placed on the States. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, supra (upholding several provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965); Katzenbach v. Morgan, supra (upholding ban on literacy tests that prohibited certain people schooled in Puerto Rico from voting); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U. S. 112 (1970) (upholding 5-year nationwide ban on literacy tests and similar voting requirements for registering to vote); City of Rome v. United States, 446 U. S. 156, 161 (1980) (upholding 7-year extension of the Voting Rights Act’s requirement that certain jurisdictions preclear any change to a “ ‘standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting’ ”); see also James Everard’s Breweries v. Day, 265 U. S. 545 (1924) (upholding ban on medical prescription of intoxicating malt liquors as appropriate to enforce Eighteenth Amendment ban on manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes).
It is also true, however, that “[a]s broad as the congressional enforcement power is, it is not unlimited.” Oregon v. Mitchell, supra, at 128 (opinion of Black, J.). In assessing the breadth of § 5’s enforcement power, we begin with its text. Congress has been given the power “to enforce” the “provisions of this article.” We agree with respondent, of course, that Congress can enact legislation under § 5 enforcing the constitutional right to the free exercise of religion. The “provisions of this article,” to which §5 refers, include the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Congress’ power to enforce the Free Exercise Clause follows from our holding in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 303 (1940), that the “fundamental concept of liberty embodied in [the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause] embraces the liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment.” See also United States v. Price, 383 U. S. 787, 789 (1966) (there is “no doubt of the power of Congress to enforce by appropriate criminal sanction every right guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
Congress’ power under § 5, however, extends only to “enforcing]” the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court has described this power as “remedial,” South Carolina v. Katzenbach, supra, at 326. The design of the Amendment and the text of § 5 are inconsistent with the suggestion that Congress has the power to decree the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment’s restrictions on the States. Legislation which alters the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause cannot be said to be enforcing the Clause. Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by changing what the right is. It has been given the power “to enforce,” not the power to determine what constitutes a constitutional violation. Were it not so, what Congress would be enforcing would no longer be, in any meaningful sense, the “provisions of [the Fourteenth Amendment].”
While the line between measures that remedy or prevent unconstitutional actions and measures that make a substantive change in the governing law is not easy to discern, and Congress must have wide latitude in determining where it lies, the distinction exists and must be observed. There must-be a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end. Lacking such a connection, legislation may become substantive in operation and effect. History and our case law support drawing the distinction, one apparent from the text of the Amendment.
1
The Fourteenth Amendment’s history confirms the remedial, rather than substantive, nature of the Enforcement Clause. The Joint Committee on Reconstruction of the 39th Congress began drafting what would become the Fourteenth Amendment in January 1866. The objections to the Committee’s first draft of the Amendment, and the rejection of the draft, have a direct bearing on the central issue of defining Congress’ enforcement power. In February, Republican Representative John Bingham of Ohio reported the following draft Amendment to the House of Representatives on behalf of the Joint Committee:
“The Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper to secure to the citizens of each State all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States, and to all persons in the several States equal protection in the rights of life, liberty, and property.” Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 1034 (1866).
The proposal encountered immediate opposition, which continued through three days of debate. Members of Congress from across the political spectrum criticized the Amendment, and the criticisms had a common theme: The proposed Amendment gave Congress too much legislative power at the expense of the existing constitutional structure. E. g., id., at 1063-1065 (statement of Rep. Hale); id., at 1082 (statement of Sen. Stewart); id., at 1095 (statement of Rep. Hotchkiss); id., at App. 133-135 (statement of Rep. Rogers). Democrats and conservative Republicans argued that the proposed Amendment would give Congress a power to intrude into traditional areas of state responsibility, a power inconsistent with the federal design central to the Constitution. Typifying these views, Republican Representative Robert Hale of New York labeled the Amendment “an utter departure from every principle ever dreamed of by the men who framed our Constitution,” id., at 1063, and warned that under it “all State legislation, in its codes of civil and criminal jurisprudence and procedure... may be overridden, may be repealed or abolished, and the law of Congress established instead.” Ibid. Senator William Stewart of Nevada likewise stated the Amendment would permit “Congress to legislate fully upon all subjects affecting life, liberty, and property,” such that “there would not be much left for the State Legislatures,” and would thereby “work an entire change in our form of government.” Id., at 1082; accord, id., at 1087 (statement of Rep. Davis); id., at App. 133 (statement of Rep. Rogers). Some radicals, like their brethren “unwilling that Congress shall have any such power... to establish uniform laws throughout the United States upon... the protection of life, liberty, and property,” id., at 1095 (statement of Rep. Hotchkiss), also objected that giving Congress primary responsibility for enforcing legal equality would place power in the hands of changing congressional majorities, ibid. See generally Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 57 (1955); Graham, Our “Declaratory” Fourteenth Amendment, 7 Stan. L. Rev. 3, 21 (1954).
As a result of these objections having been expressed from so many different quarters, the House voted to table the proposal until April. See, e. g., B. Kendrick, Journal of the Joint Committee of Fifteen on Reconstruction 215, 217 (1914); Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App. 115 (1871) (statement of Rep. Farnsworth). The congressional action was seen as marking the defeat of the proposal. See The Nation, Mar. 8, 1866, p. 291 (“The postponement of the amendment... is conclusive against the passage of [it]”); New York Times, Mar. 1, 1866, p. 4 (“It is doubtful if this ever comes before the House again...”); see also Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., at App. 115 (statement of Rep. Farnsworth) (The Amendment was “given its quietus by a postponement for two months, where it slept the sleep that knows no waking”). The measure was defeated “chiefly because many members of the legal profession s[aw] in [it]... a dangerous centralization of power,” The Nation, supra, at 291, and “many leading Republicans of th[e] House [of Representatives] would not consent to so radical a change in the Constitution,” Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., at App. 151 (statement of Rep. Garfield). The Amendment in its early form was not again considered. Instead, the Joint Committee began drafting a new article of Amendment, which it reported to Congress on April 30, 1866.
Section 1 of the new draft Amendment imposed self-executing limits on the States. Section 5 prescribed that “[t]he Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.” See Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., at 2286. Under the revised Amendment, Congress’ power was no longer plenary but remedial. Congress was granted the power to make the substantive constitutional prohibitions against the States effective. Representative Bingham said the new draft would give Congress “the power... to protect by national law the privileges and immunities of all the citizens of the Republic... whenever the same shall be abridged or denied by the unconstitutional acts of any State.” Id., at 2542. Representative Stevens described the new draft Amendment as “allowing] Congress to correct the unjust legislation of the States.” Id., at 2459. See also id., at 2768 (statement of Sen. Howard) (§5 “enables Congress, in case the States shall enact laws in conflict with the principles of the amendment, to correct that legislation by a formal congressional enactment”). See generally H. Brannon, The Rights and Privileges Guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States 387 (1901) (Congress’ “powers are only prohibitive, corrective, vetoing, aimed only at undue process of law”); id., at 420, 452-455 (same); T. Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 294, n. 1 (2d ed. 1871) (“This amendment of the Constitution does not concentrate power in the general government for any purpose of police government within the States; its object is to preclude legislation by any State which shall ‘abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States’ ”). The revised Amendment proposal did not raise the concerns expressed earlier regarding broad congressional power to prescribe uniform national laws with respect to life, liberty, and property. See, e. g., Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., at App. 151 (statement of Rep. Garfield) (“The [Fourteenth Amendment] limited but did not oust the jurisdiction of the State[s]”). After revisions not relevant here, the new measure passed both Houses and was ratified in July 1868 as the Fourteenth Amendment.
The significance of the defeat of the Bingham proposal was apparent even then. During the debates over the Ku Klux Klan Act only a few years after the Amendment’s ratification, Representative James Garfield argued there were limits on Congress’ enforcement power, saying “unless we ignore both the history and the language of these clauses we cannot, by any reasonable interpretation, give to [§ 5]... the force and effect of the rejected [Bingham] clause.” Ibid.; see also id., at App. 115-116 (statement of Rep. Farnsworth). Scholars of successive generations have agreed with this assessment. See H. Flack, The Adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment 64 (1908); Bickel, The Voting Rights Cases, 1966 S. Ct. Rev. 79, 97.
The design of the Fourteenth Amendment has proved significant also in maintaining the traditional separation of powers between Congress and the Judiciary. The first eight Amendments to the Constitution set forth self-executing prohibitions on governmental action, and this Court has had primary authority to interpret those prohibitions. The Bing-ham draft, some thought, departed from that tradition by vesting in Congress primary power to interpret and elaborate on the-meaning of the new Amendment through legislation. Under it, “Congress, and not the courts, was to judge whether or not any of the privileges or immunities were not secured to citizens in the several States.” Flack, supra, at 64. While this separation-of-powers aspect did not occasion the widespread resistance which was caused by the proposal’s threat to the federal balance, it nonetheless attracted the attention of various Members. See Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., at 1064 (statement of Rep. Hale) (noting that Bill of Rights, unlike the Bingham proposal, “provided] safeguards to be enforced by the courts, and not to be exercised by the Legislature”); id., at App. 133 (statement of Rep. Rogers) (prior to Bingham proposal it “was left entirely for the courts... to enforce the privileges and immunities of the citizens”). As enacted, the Fourteenth Amendment confers substantive rights against the States which, like the provisions of the Bill of Rights, are self-executing. Cf. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S., at 325 (discussing Fifteenth Amendment). The power to interpret the Constitution in a case or controversy remains in the Judiciary.
2
The remedial and preventive nature of Congress’ enforcement power, and the limitation inherent in the power, were confirmed in our earliest cases on the Fourteenth Amendment. In the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3 (1883), the Court invalidated sections of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 which prescribed criminal penalties for denying to any person “the full enjoyment of” public accommodations and conveyances, on the grounds that it exceeded Congress’ power by seeking to regulate private conduct. The Enforcement Clause, the Court said, did not authorize Congress to pass “general legislation upon the rights of the citizen, but corrective legislation, that is, such as may be necessary and proper for counteracting such laws as the States may adopt or enforce, and which, by the amendment, they are prohibited from making or enforcing... Id., at 13-14. The power to “legislate generally upon” life, liberty, and property, as opposed to the “power to provide modes of redress” against offensive state action, was “repugnant” to the Constitution. Id., at 15. See also United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214, 218 (1876); United States v. Harris, 106 U. S. 629, 639 (1883); James v. Bowman, 190 U. S. 127, 139 (1903). Although the specific holdings of these early cases might have been superseded or modified, see, e. g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U. S. 241 (1964); United States v. Guest, 383 U. S. 745 (1966), their treatment of Congress’ § 5 power as corrective or preventive, not definitional, has not been questioned.
Recent cases have continued to revolve around the question whether §5 legislation can be considered remedial. In South Carolina v. Katzenbach, supra, we emphasized that “[t]he constitutional propriety of [legislation adopted under the Enforcement Clause] must be judged with reference to the historical experience... it reflects.” 383 U. S., at 308. There we upheld various provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, finding them to be “remedies aimed at areas where voting discrimination has been most flagrant,” id., at 315, and necessary to “banish the blight of racial discrimination in voting, which has infected the electoral process in parts of our country for nearly a century,” id., at 308. We noted evidence in the record reflecting the subsisting and pervasive discriminatory — and therefore unconstitutional — use of literacy tests. Id., at 333-334. The Act’s new remedies, which used the administrative resources of the Federal Government, included the suspension of both literacy tests and, pending federal review, all new voting regulations in covered jurisdictions, as well as the assignment of federal examiners to list qualified applicants enabling those listed to vote. The new, unprecedented remedies were deemed necessary given the ineffectiveness of the existing voting rights laws, see id., at 313-315, and the slow, costly character of case-by-case litigation, id., at 328.
After South Carolina v. Katzenbach, the Court continued to acknowledge the necessity of using strong remedial and preventive measures to respond to the widespread and persisting deprivation of constitutional rights resulting from this country’s history of racial discrimination. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U. S., at 132 (“In enacting the literacy test ban... Congress had before it a long history of the discriminatory use of literacy tests to disfranchise voters on account of their race”) (opinion of Black, J.); id., at 147 (Literacy tests “have been used at times as a discriminatory weapon against some minorities, not only Negroes but Americans of Mexican ancestry, and American Indians”) (opinion of Douglas, J.); id., at 216 (“Congress could have determined that racial prejudice is prevalent throughout the Nation, and that literacy tests unduly lend themselves to discriminatory application, either conscious or unconscious”) (opinion of Harlan, J.); id., at 235 (“[T]here is no question but that Congress could legitimately have concluded that the use of literacy tests anywhere within the United States has the inevitable effect of denying the vote to members of racial minorities whose inability to pass such tests is the direct consequence of previous governmental discrimination in education”) (opinion of Brennan, J.); id., at 284 (“[Nationwide [suspension of literacy tests] may be reasonably thought appropriate when Congress acts against an evil such as racial discrimination which in varying degrees manifests itself in every part of the country”) (opinion of Stewart, J.); City of Rome, 446 U. S., at 182 (“Congress’ considered determination that at least another 7 years of statutory remedies were necessary to counter the perpetuation of 95 years of pervasive voting discrimination is both unsurprising and unassailable”); Morgan, 384 U. S., at 656 (Congress had a factual basis to conclude that New York’s literacy requirement “constituted an invidious discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause”).
3
Any suggestion that Congress has a substantive, non-remedial power under the Fourteenth Amendment is not supported by our case law. In Oregon v. Mitchell, supra, at 112, a majority of the Court concluded Congress had exceeded its enforcement powers by enacting legislation lowering the minimum age of voters from 21 to 18 in state and local elections. The five Members of the Court who reached this conclusion explained that the legislation intruded into an area reserved by the Constitution to the States. See 400 U. S., at 125 (concluding that the legislation was unconstitutional because the Constitution “reserves to the States the power to set voter qualifications in state and local elections”) (opinion of Black, J.); id., at 154 (explaining that the “Fourteenth Amendment was never intended to restrict the authority of the States to allocate their political power as they see fit”) (opinion of Harlan, J.); id., at 294 (concluding that States, not Congress, have the power “to establish a qualification for voting based on age”) (opinion of Stewart, J., joined by Burger, C. J., and Blackmun, J.). Four of these five were explicit in rejecting the position that § 5 endowed Congress with the power to establish the meaning of constitutional provisions. See id., at 209 (opinion of Harlan, J.); id., at 296 (opinion of Stewart, J.). Justice Black’s rejection of this position might be inferred from his disagreement with Congress’ interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause. See id., at 125.
There is language in our opinion in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U. S. 641 (1966), which could be interpreted as acknowledging a power in Congress to enact legislation that expands the rights contained in § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. This is not a necessary interpretation, however, or even the best one. In Morgan, the Court considered the constitutionality of §4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which provided that no person who had successfully completed the sixth primary grade in a public school in, or a private school accredited by, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in which the language of instruction was other than English could be denied the right to vote because of an inability to read or write English. New York’s Constitution, on the other hand, required voters to be able to read and write English. The Court provided two related rationales for its conclusion that § 4(e) could “be viewed as a measure to secure for the Puerto Rican community residing in New York nondiscriminatory treatment by government.” Id., at 652. Under the first rationale, Congress could prohibit New York from denying the right to vote to large segments of its Puerto Rican community, in order to give Puerto Ricans “enhanced political power” that would be “helpful in gaining nondiscriminatory treatment in public services for the entire Puerto Rican community.” Ibid. Section 4(e) thus could be justified as a remedial measure to deal with “discrimination in governmental services.” Id., at 653. The second rationale, an alternative holding, did not address discrimination in the provision of public services but “discrimination in establishing voter qualifications.” Id., at 654. The Court perceived a factual basis on which Congress could have concluded that New York’s literacy requirement “constituted an invidious discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.” Id., at 656. Both rationales for upholding § 4(e) rested on unconstitutional discrimination by New York and Congress’ reasonable attempt to combat it. As Justice Stewart explained in Oregon v. Mitchell, supra, at 296, interpreting Morgan to give Congress the power to interpret the Constitution “would require an enormous extension of that decision’s rationale.”
If Congress could define its own powers by altering the Fourteenth Amendment’s meaning, no longer would the Constitution be “superior paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means.” It would be “on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and, like other acts,... alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it.” Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch, at 177. Under this approach, it is difficult to conceive of a principle that would limit congressional power. See Van Alstyne, The Failure of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 46 Duke L. J. 291, 292-303 (1996). Shifting legislative majorities could change the Constitution and effectively circumvent the difficult and detailed amendment process contained in Article V.
We now turn to consider whether RFRA can be considered enforcement legislation under §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
B
Respondent contends that RFRA is a proper exercise of Congress’ remedial or preventive power. The Act, it is said, is a reasonable means of protecting the free exercise of religion as defined by Smith. It prevents and remedies laws
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
C
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice SCALIAdelivered the opinion of the Court.
Federal law prohibits States from imposing taxes that "discriminat[e] against a rail carrier." 49 U.S.C. § 11501(b)(4). We are asked to decide whether a State violates this prohibition by taxing diesel fuel purchases made by a rail carrier while exempting similar purchases made by its competitors; and if so, whether the violation is eliminated when other tax provisions offset the challenged treatment of railroads.
I
Alabama taxes businesses and individuals for the purchase or use of personal property. Ala.Code §§ 40-23-2(1), 40-23-61(a) (2011). Alabama law sets the general tax rate at 4% of the value of the property purchased or used. Ibid.
The State applies the tax, at the usual 4% rate, to railroads' purchase or use of diesel fuel for their rail operations. But it exempts from the tax purchases and uses of diesel fuel made by trucking transport companies (whom we will call motor carriers) and companies that transport goods interstate through navigable waters (water carriers). Motor carriers instead pay a 19-cent-per-gallon fuel-excise tax on diesel; water carriers pay neither the sales nor fuel-excise tax on their diesel. § 40-17-325(a)(2), and (b); § 40-23-4(a)(10) (2014 Cum. Supp.). The parties stipulate that rail carriers, motor carriers, and water carriers compete.
Respondent CSX Transportation, a rail carrier operating in Alabama and other States, believes this asymmetrical tax treatment "discriminates against a rail carrier" in violation of the alliterative Railroad Revitalization and Regulation Reform Act of 1976, or 4-R Act. 49 U.S.C. § 11501(b)(4). It sought to enjoin petitioners, the Alabama Department of Revenue and its Commissioner (Alabama or State), from collecting sales tax on its diesel fuel purchases.
At first, the District Court and Eleventh Circuit both rejected CSX's complaint. CSX Transp., Inc. v. Alabama Dept. of Revenue,350 Fed.Appx. 318 (2009). On this lawsuit's first trip here, we reversed. We rejected the State's argument that sales-and-use tax exemptions cannot "discriminate" within the meaning of subsection (b)(4), and remanded the case for further proceedings. CSX Transp., Inc. v. Alabama Dept. of Revenue,562 U.S. 277, 296-297, 131 S.Ct. 1101, 179 L.Ed.2d 37 (2011)(CSX I).
On remand, the District Court rejected CSX's claim after a trial. 892 F.Supp.2d 1300 (N.D.Ala.2012). The Eleventh Circuit reversed. 720 F.3d 863 (2013). It held that, on CSX's challenge, CSX could establish discrimination by showing the State taxed rail carriers differently than their competitors-which, by stipulation, included motor carriers and water carriers. But it rejected Alabama's argument that the fuel-excise taxes offset the sales taxes-in other words, that because it imposed its fuel-excise tax on motor carriers, but not rail carriers, it was justified in imposing the sales tax on rail carriers, but not motor carriers. Ibid.
We granted certiorari to resolve whether the Eleventh Circuit properly regarded CSX's competitors as an appropriate comparison class for its subsection (b)(4) claim. 573 U.S. ----, 134 S.Ct. 2900, 189 L.Ed.2d 854 (2014). We also directed the parties to address whether, when resolving a claim of unlawful tax discrimination, a court should consider aspects of a State's tax scheme apart from the challenged provision. Ibid.
II
The 4-R Act provides:
"(b) The following acts unreasonably burden and discriminate against interstate commerce, and a State, subdivision of a State, or authority acting for a State or subdivision of a State may not do any of them:
"(1) Assess rail transportation property at a value that has a higher ratio to the true market value of the rail transportation property than the ratio that the assessed value of other commercial and industrial property in the same assessment jurisdiction has to the true market value of the other commercial and industrial property.
"(2) Levy or collect a tax that may not be made under paragraph (1) of this subsection.
"(3) Levy or collect an ad valorem property tax at a tax rate that exceeds the tax rate applicable to commercial and industrial property in the same assessment jurisdiction.
"(4) Impose another tax that discriminates against a rail carrier providing transportation subject to the jurisdiction of the Board under this part." § 11501(b)(1)-(4).
In our last opinion in this case, we held that "discriminates" in subsection (b)(4) carries its ordinary meaning, and that a tax discriminates under subsection (b)(4) when it treats "groups [that] are similarly situated" differently without sufficient "justification for the difference in treatment." CSX I, supra,at 287, 131 S.Ct. 1101. Here, we address the meaning of these two quoted phrases.
A
The first question in this case is who is the "comparison class" for purposes of a subsection (b)(4) claim. Alabama argues that the only appropriate comparison class for a subsection (b)(4) claim is all general commercial and industrial taxpayers. We disagree. While all general and commercial taxpayers is anappropriate comparison class, it is not the only one.
Nothing in the ordinary meaning of the word "discrimination" suggests that it occurs only when the victim is singled out relative to the population at large. If, for example, a State offers free college education to all returning combat veterans, but arbitrarily excepts those who served in the Marines, we would say that Marines have experienced discrimination. That would remain the case even though the Marines are treated the same way as members of the general public, who have to pay for their education.
Context confirms that the comparison class for subsection (b)(4) is not limited as Alabama suggests. The 4-R Act is an "asymmetrical statute." Id.,at 296, 131 S.Ct. 1101. Subsections (b)(1) to (b)(3) contain three specific prohibitions directed towards property taxes. Each requires comparison of railroad property to commercial and industrial property in the same assessment jurisdiction. The Act therefore limits the comparison class for challenges under those provisions. Even if the jurisdiction treats railroads less favorably than residential property, no violation of these subsections has occurred. Subsection (b)(4) contains no such limitation, leaving the comparison class to be determined as it is normally determined with respect to discrimination claims. And we think that depends on the theory of discrimination alleged in the claim. When a railroad alleges that a tax targets it for worse treatment than local businesses, all other commercial and industrial taxpayers are the comparison class. When a railroad alleges that a tax disadvantages it compared to its competitors in the transportation industry, the railroad's competitors in that jurisdiction are the comparison class.
So, picking a comparison class is extraordinarily easy. Unlike under subsections (b)(1)-(3), the railroad is not limited to all commercial and industrial taxpayers; all the world, or at least all the world within the taxing jurisdiction, is its comparison-class oyster. But that is not as generous a concession as might seem. What subsection (b)(4) requires, and subsections (b)(1)-(3) do not, is a showing of discrimination-of a failure to treat similarly situated persons alike. A comparison class will thus support a discrimination claim only if it consists of individuals similarly situated to the claimant.
That raises the question of when a proposed comparison class qualifies as similarly situated. In the Equal Protection Clause context, very few taxpayers are regarded as similarly situated and thus entitled to equal treatment. There, a State may tax different lines of businesses differently with near-impunity, even if they are apparently similar. We have upheld or approved of distinctions between utilities-including a railroad-and other corporations, New York Rapid Transit Corp. v. City of New York,303 U.S. 573, 579, 58 S.Ct. 721, 82 L.Ed. 1024 (1938), between wholesalers and retailers in goods, Caskey Baking Co. v. Virginia,313 U.S. 117, 120-121, 61 S.Ct. 881, 85 L.Ed. 1223 (1941), between chain retail stores and independent retail stores, State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs of Ind. v. Jackson,283 U.S. 527, 535, 541-542, 51 S.Ct. 540, 75 L.Ed. 1248 (1931), between anthracite coal mines and bituminous coal mines, Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U.S. 245, 254, 257, 43 S.Ct. 83, 67 L.Ed. 237 (1922), and between sellers of coal oil and sellers of coal, Southwestern Oil Co. v. Texas,217 U.S. 114, 121, 30 S.Ct. 496, 54 L.Ed. 688 (1910). As one treatise has observed, we recognize a "wide latitude state legislatures enjoy in drawing tax classifications under the Equal Protection Clause." 1 J. Hellerstein & W. Hellerstein, State Taxation ¶ 3.03[1], p. 3-5 (3d ed. 2001-2005). This includes the power to impose "widely different taxes on various trades or professions." Id.,at 3-5 to 3-6. It would be permissible-as far as the Equal Protection Clause is concerned-for a State to tax a rail carrier more than a motor carrier, despite the seeming similarity in their lines of business.
The concept of "similarly situated" individuals cannot be so narrow here. That would deprive subsection (b)(4) of all real-world effect, providing protection that the Equal Protection Clause already provides. Moreover, the category of "similarly situated" (b)(4) comparison classes must include commercial and industrial taxpayers. There is no conceivable reason why the statute would forbid property taxes higher than what that class enjoys (or suffers), but permit other taxes that discriminate in favor of that class vis-à-vis railroads. And we think the competitors of railroads can be another "similarly situated" comparison class, since discrimination in favor of that class most obviously frustrates the purpose of the 4-R Act, which was to "restore the financial stability of the railway system of the United States," § 101(a), 90 Stat. 33, while "foster[ing] competition among all carriers by railroad and other modes of transportation," § 101(b)(2). We need not, and thus do not, express any opinion on what other comparison classes may qualify. Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof.
Alabama claims that because subsections (b)(1) and (b)(3) (and (b)(2) through reference to (b)(1)) establish a comparison class of "commercial and industrial property," subsection (b)(4) must establish a comparison class of "general commercial and industrial taxpayers." This inverts normal rules of interpretation, which would say that the explicit limitation to "commercial and industrial" in the first three provisions, and the absence of such a limitation in the fourth, suggests that no such limitation applies to the fourth. Moreover, Alabama's interpretation would require us to dragoon the modifier "commercial and industrial"-but not the noun "property"-from the first three provisions, append "general" in front of it and "taxpayers" after, both words foreign to the preceding subsections. We might also have to strip away the restrictions in the definition of "commercial and industrial property," which excludes land primarily used for agricultural purposes and timber growing. 49 U.S.C. § 11501(a)(4). This is not our concept of fidelity to a statute's text.
Alabama responds that the introductory clause of § 11501(b)-which declares that the "following acts unreasonably burden and discriminate against interstate commerce,"-"binds its four subsections together," Brief for Petitioners 23 (emphasis deleted), and gives them a common object and scope. The last time this case appeared before us, Alabama made a similar argument in support of the claim that, because subsections (b)(1)-(3) cover only property taxes, so too does subsection (b)(4). See Brief for Respondents in CSX Transp., Inc. v. Alabama Dept. of Revenue,O.T. 2010, No. 09-520, p. 25-26. We rejected this argument then, and we reject it again now.
Alabama persists that a case-specific inquiry allows a railroad to "hand-pick [its] comparison class," Brief for Petitioners 41, which would be unfair-a "windfall" to railroads. Ibid. As we have described above, picking a class is easy, but it is not easy to establish that the selected class is "similarly situated" for purposes of discrimination in taxation. The Eleventh Circuit properly concluded that, in light of CSX Transportation's complaint and the parties' stipulation, a comparison class of competitors consisting of motor carriers and water carriers was appropriate, and differential treatment vis-à-vis that class would constitute discrimination. We therefore turn to the court's refusal to consider Alabama's alternative tax justifications.
B
A State's tax discriminates only where the State cannot sufficiently justify differences in treatment between similarly situated taxpayers. As we have discussed above, a rail carrier and its competitors can be considered similarly situated for purposes of this provision. But what about the claim that those competitors are subject to other taxes that the railroads avoid? We think Alabama can justify its decision to exempt motor carriers from its sales and use tax through its decision to subject motor carriers to a fuel-excise tax.
It does not accord with ordinary English usage to say that a tax discriminates against a rail carrier if a rival who is exempt from that tax must pay anothercomparable tax from which the rail carrier is exempt. If that were true, both competitors could claim to be disfavored-discriminated against-relative to each other. Our negative Commerce Clause cases endorse the proposition that an additional tax on third parties may justify an otherwise discriminatory tax. Gregg Dyeing Co. v. Query,286 U.S. 472, 479-480, 52 S.Ct. 631, 76 L.Ed. 1232 (1932). We think that an alternative, roughly equivalent tax is one possible justification that renders a tax disparity nondiscriminatory.
CSX claims that because the statutory prohibition forbids "impos[ing] another tax that discriminates against a rail carrier," 49 U.S.C. § 11501(b)(4)-"tax" in the singular-the appropriate inquiry is whether the challenged tax discriminates, not whether the tax code as a whole does so. It is undoubtedly correct that the "tax" (singular) must discriminate-but it does not discriminate unless it treats railroads differently from other similarly situated taxpayers without sufficient justification. A comparable tax levied on a competitor may justify not extending that competitor's exemption from a general tax to a railroad. It is easy to display the error of CSX's single-tax-provision approach. Under that model, the following tax would violate the 4-R Act: "(1) All railroads shall pay a 4% sales tax. (2) All other individuals shall also pay a 4% sales tax."
CSX would undoubtedly object that not every case will be so easy, and that federal courts are ill qualified to explore the vagaries of state tax law. We are inclined to agree, but that cannot carry the day. Congress assigned this task to the courts by drafting an antidiscrimination command in such sweeping terms. There is simply no discrimination when there are roughly comparable taxes. If the task of determining when that is so is "Sisyphean," as the Eleventh Circuit called it, 720 F.3d, at 871, it is a Sisyphean task that the statute imposes. We therefore cannot approve of the Eleventh Circuit's refusal to consider Alabama's tax-based justification, and remand for that court to consider whether Alabama's fuel-excise tax is the rough equivalent of Alabama's sales tax as applied to diesel fuel, and therefore justifies the motor carrier sales-tax exemption.
C
While the State argues that the existence of a fuel-excise tax justifies its decision to exempt motor carriers from the sales and use tax, it cannot offer a similar defense with respect to its exemption for water carriers. Water carriers pay neither tax.
The State, however, offers other justifications for the water carrier exemption-for example, that such an exemption is compelled by federal law. The Eleventh Circuit failed to examine these justifications, asserting that the water carriers were the beneficiaries of a discriminatory tax regime. We do not consider whether Alabama's alternative rationales justify its exemption, but leave that question for the Eleventh Circuit on remand.
* * *
The judgment of the Eleventh Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice THOMAS, with whom Justice GINSBURGjoins, dissenting.
In order to violate 49 U.S.C. § 11501(b)(4), "a tax exemption scheme must target or single out railroads by comparison to general commercial and industrial taxpayers." CSX Transp., Inc. v. Alabama Dept. of Revenue (CSX I ), 562 U.S. 277, 297-298, 131 S.Ct. 1101, 179 L.Ed.2d 37 (2011)(THOMAS, J., dissenting). Because CSX cannot prove facts that would satisfy that standard, I would reverse the judgment below and remand for the entry of judgment in favor of the Alabama Department of Revenue.
I
A
Last time this case was before the Court, I explained in detail my reasons for interpreting "another tax that discriminates against a rail carrier" in § 11501(b)(4)to refer to a tax "that targets or singles out railroads as compared to other commercial and industrial taxpayers." Id.,at 298, 131 S.Ct. 1101. I briefly summarize that reasoning here.
Because the meaning of "discriminates" is ambiguous at first glance, I look to the term's context to resolve this uncertainty. Id.,at 298-299, 131 S.Ct. 1101. Both the structure and background of the statute indicate that subsection (b)(4) prohibits only taxes that single out railroads as compared to other commercial and industrial taxpayers.
Subsection (b)(4) is a residual clause, the meaning of which is best understood by reference to the provisions that precede it. Subsection (b) begins by announcing that "[t]he following acts... discriminate against interstate commerce" and are prohibited. § 11501(b). Subsections (b)(1) through (3) then list three tax-related actions that single out rail carriers by treating rail property differently from all other commercial and industrial property. §§ 11501(b)(1)-(3); id.,at 300, 131 S.Ct. 1101. Subsections (b)(1) and (b)(3) explicitly identify "commercial and industrial property" as the comparison class, and subsection (b)(2) incorporates that comparison class by reference. § 11501(b); id.,at 300, 131 S.Ct. 1101. Subsection (b)(4) refers back to these provisions when it forbids "[i]mpos[ing] another tax that discriminates against a rail carrier." § 11501(b)(4)(emphasis added); id.,at 300, 131 S.Ct. 1101. The statutory structure therefore supports the conclusion that a tax "discriminates against a rail carrier" within the meaning of subsection (b)(4) if it singles out railroads for unfavorable treatment as compared to the general class of commercial and industrial taxpayers. Id.,at 300-301, 131 S.Ct. 1101.
The statutory background supports the same conclusion. When Congress enacted the 4-R Act, it was apparent that railroads were "easy prey for State and local tax assessors in that they are nonvoting, often nonresident, targets for local taxation, who cannot easily remove themselves from the locality." Id.,at 301, 131 S.Ct. 1101(internal quotation marks omitted). Subsections (b)(1) through (3) thus "establish a political check" by preventing States from imposing excessive property taxes on railroads "without imposing the same taxes more generally on voting, resident local businesses." Ibid.Subsection (b)(4) is best understood as addressing the same problem in the same way. Id.,at 301-302, 131 S.Ct. 1101.
B
Alabama's tax scheme cannot be said to "discriminat[e] against a rail carrier." Id.,at 302, 131 S.Ct. 1101. To begin, the scheme does not single out rail carriers. Although one would not know it from the majority opinion, the tax is not directed at rail carriers, their property, their activity, or goods uniquely consumed by them. It is instead a generally applicable sales tax. It applies (with other exemptions not at issue here) to all goods purchased, used, or stored in the State of Alabama. Ala.Code §§ 40-23-2(1), 40-23-61(a) (2011). The only relevant good exempted from the tax is diesel on which the motor fuel tax has been paid, § 40-17-325(b), and no provision of law prevents rail carriers from buying such diesel. See Brief for Respondent 46, n. 13 (acknowledging that CSX pays the motor fuel tax on the diesel fuel it uses in trucks and other on-road vehicles). Water carriers, it is true, enjoy a special carve-out from this sales tax, § 40-23-4(a)(10) (Cum. Supp. 2014), but that exemption singles out water carriers, not rail carriers.
Even if this constellation of exemptions to Alabama's sales tax could be said to single out rail carriers from the general class of their interstate competitors, the tax surely does not single out rail carriers as compared to commercial and industrial taxpayers. Those taxpayers are subject to exactly the same generally applicable sales and use tax regime as are rail carriers.
II
A
The Court started off on the wrong track in CSX Iwhen it relied on a generic dictionary definition of "discriminates" in the face of a statutory context suggesting a more specific definition. See 562 U.S., at 304, 131 S.Ct. 1101. Today's decision continues that error.
The Court uncritically accepts the conclusion that the "discriminat[ion]" addressed by the statute encompasses any distinction between rail carriers and their comparison class, ante, at 1141, as opposed to mere "singling out" or something in between, even though the word "discriminates" is ambiguous in that way.CSX I, supra,at 299, 131 S.Ct. 1101. The Court's usual practice has not been to treat the meaning of "discriminates" so casually. See generally Guardians Assn. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of New York City,463 U.S. 582, 590-593, 103 S.Ct. 3221, 77 L.Ed.2d 866 (1983)(opinion of White, J.) (discussing the Court's shifting definition of the ambiguous term "discrimination").
Today's decision compounds this error by holding that a rail carrier may make out a claim of discrimination using any comparison class so long as that class consists of "individuals similarly situated to the claimant" rail carrier. Ante,at 1141 - 1142. The majority purports to derive this limitation from the dictionary, but then finds itself unable to proceed: After all, Black's Law Dictionary contains no entry defining what it means to be "similarly situated" for the purpose of subsection (b)(4). Forced finally to turn to the statutory context, the majority rejects the statutorily defined competitor class of commercial and industrial taxpayers in favor of a shifting comparison class of its own creation.
B
The majority disregards the commercial and industrial property comparison class identified in subsections (b)(1) through (3) because subsection (b)(4) does not explicitly include language from those provisions. See ante, at 1141 - 1142, 1142 - 1143. It asserts that defining the comparison class for the purpose of subsection (b)(4) by reference to the comparison class identified in subsections (b)(1) through (b)(3) "would require us to dragoon the modifier 'commercial and industrial'-but not the noun 'property'-from the first three provisions, append 'general' in front of it and 'taxpayers' after, both words foreign to the preceding subsections.'' Ante,at 1142 - 1143.
The majority's accusation of grammatical conscription misses the point. Subsection (b)(4) is a residual clause, explicitly marked as such by the use of the word "another." See Washington State Dept. of Social and Health Servs. v. Guardianship Estate of Keffeler,537 U.S. 371, 384, 123 S.Ct. 1017, 154 L.Ed.2d 972 (2003). Like other residual clauses, it need not use the same language as the clauses it follows to derive meaning from those clauses. See, e.g., Sossamon v. Texas,563 U.S. 277, ----, 131 S.Ct. 1651, 1662-1663, 179 L.Ed.2d 700 (2011); James v. United States,550 U.S. 192, 217-218, 127 S.Ct. 1586, 167 L.Ed.2d 532 (2007)(SCALIA, J., dissenting). Where, as here, a residual clause includes an ambiguous word like "discriminates," we must look to the clauses that precede it to guide our understanding of its scope.
In some sense, my task in giving meaning to the statutory term "discriminates" is no different from the majority's: to determine what type of differential treatment the statute forbids. The first three clauses provide important clues that the statute forbids singling out rail carriers from other commercial and industrial taxpayers because commercial and industrial taxpayers are the ones who pay taxes on "commercial and industrial property." The majority pursues the same logical train of thought when it opines that "the category of'similarly situated' (b)(4) comparison classes must include commercial and industrial taxpayers" because "[t]here is no conceivable reason why the statute would forbid property taxes higher than what that class enjoys (or suffers), but permit other taxes that discriminate in favor of that class vis-à-vis railroads." Ante,at 1142. Where we part ways is in the inferences we draw from the statutory context.
Treating subsection (b)(4) as a residual clause does not require the grammatical distortions that the majority alleges. The word "discriminates" in subsection (b)(4) is not a referential phrase whose antecedent is uncertain. If it were, then it would be necessary to select an antecedent that would fit grammatically in place of "discriminates." Instead, I look to (b)(1) to (3) merely to clarify an ambiguity in the meaningof "discriminates," a task that does not require me to "dragoon" the language of the prior clauses into subsection (b)(4).
Nor does my approach rely on the first three clauses of § 11501(b)to supply a general limitation on the independent prohibition that appears in subsection (b)(4). See United States v. Aguilar,515 U.S. 593, 615, 115 S.Ct. 2357, 132 L.Ed.2d 520 (1995)(SCALIA, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (criticizing this type of argument). That is what Alabama sought to do in CSX Iwhen it argued that subsection (b)(4) is limited to property taxes (or their equivalent "in lieu" taxes). Ante,at 1142 - 1143; CSX I,562 U.S., at 285, 131 S.Ct. 1101(majority opinion). I joined the majority in rejecting that argument. Id.,at 297, 131 S.Ct. 1101(dissenting opinion). But whereas there is no uncertainty about the meaning of "taxes" in subsection (b)(4) that would justify importing the property tax limitation from the three preceding subsections, id.,at 284-285, 131 S.Ct. 1101(majority opinion), there is a good deal of uncertainty about the meaning of "discriminates." This uncertainty justifies looking to the three previous clauses to understand the type of differential treatment § 11501(b)is meant to prohibit. Id.,at 298-299, 131 S.Ct. 1101(dissenting opinion); see Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc.,446 U.S. 578, 588-589, 100 S.Ct. 1889, 64 L.Ed.2d 525 (1980). And those three previous clauses easily supply the answer to the comparison class question.
C
Unwilling to so limit the range of available comparison classes, the majority takes an approach to determining which individuals are "similarly situated" for purposes of the statute that "is almost entirely ad hoc," James, supra,at 215, 127 S.Ct. 1586(SCALIA, J., dissenting). It asserts that the comparison class will "depen[d] on the theory of discrimination alleged in the claim." Ante,at 1141. Sometimes the comparison class will be "all other commercial and industrial taxpayers," sometimes it will be "the railroad's competitors" in a particular jurisdiction, and sometimes it may be some other comparison class entirely. Id.,at 1141 - 1142.
The sole evidence on which the majority relies to conclude that competitors are similarly situated, and therefore qualify as a comparison class, is the professed purposes of the Act: "to'restore the financial stability of the railway system of the United States,' while 'foster[ing] competition among all carriers by railroad and other modes of transportation.' " Ante,at 1142 (quoting 90 Stat. 33, §§ 101(a), (b)(2)). Interpreting statutory text solely in light of purpose, absent any reliance on text or structure, is dangerous business because it places courts in peril of substituting their policy judgment for that of Congress. In considering statutory purpose, therefore, we should be careful that any inferences of purpose are tied to text rather than instinct.
The majority throws such caution to the wind. Its two-sentence argument is a perfect illustration of the dangers of a purely purpose-based approach. The majority cherry-picks two of a number of stated goals of a complex piece of legislation over 100 pages long and assumes that this specific provision was assigned to those specific purposes. And then it interprets the statute to perform in the manner the majority believes is best designed to "restore... financial stability" and "foster... competition." Ante,at 1142 (alteration omitted).
I have no reason to doubt the economic soundness of the majority's conclusion that discrimination between rail carriers and their competitors threatens their financial stability and impedes competition, but I lack the majority's certitude that § 11501(b)(4)is designed to further those goalsby combatting that evil,at least in the waythe majority asserts. Instead, the first three subsections provide strong textual evidence that § 11501(b)was designed to stabilize rail carriers by protecting them from discrimination against interstate commerce. And they provide evidence of Congress' chosen mechanism for accomplishing that goal: tying the fate of interstate rail carriers to the broader class of commercial and industrial taxpayers. See supra,at 1140.
The introductory clause of § 11501(b)provides further evidence that the evil at which subsection (b)(4) is targeted is not discrimination between rail carriers and their competitors, but "acts [that] unreasonably burden and discriminate against interstate commerce." The majority's response to this evidence-that the Court rejected a similar argument when it refused to limit subsection (b)(4) to property taxes or their kin, ante,at 1142 - 1143-is a non sequitur. The introductory clause contains no reference to property taxes that "binds its four subsections together" as prohibitions on discriminatory property taxes. Ibid.(internal quotation marks omitted).But it doeshave a reference to discrimination against interstate commerce, which does tie the sections together to serve thatcommon statutory purpose. This, in turn, weighs against the majority's inferences about how § 11501(b)relates to the stated purposes of the 4-R Act.
The majority's conclusion that competitors are a permissible comparison class completely ignores these contextual clues, permitting subsection (b)(4) to serve different statutory goals by a different mechanism than its three predecessor clauses. And it leads to odd inconsistencies. If we were to understand the provision as prohibiting only discrimination between rail carriers and their competitors, then it might well further the goal of promoting competition between interstate carriers. But the majority instead selects a shifting-comparison-class approach, requiring rail carriers to be treated at least as well as their competitors and any other similarly situated taxpayers. See ante,at 1141 - 1142. This most-favored taxpayer status is a position the competitors do not enjoy, so the majority's position could result in tax schemes that impedecompetition between interstate carriers rather than promote it.
Identifying "similarly situated" taxpayers by the undisciplined approach the majority endorses could well lead to other unanticipated consequences. This is why the policy judgments needed to link statutory mechanisms to statutory purposes are best left to Congress. If this Court is going to adopt a shifting-comparison-class approach to § 11501(b)(4), then it should at least demand a stronger textual link between the comparison class a claimant seeks to import into subsection (b)(4) and any purpose that the claimant argues it serves.
III
Because the majority adopts an interpretation of § 11501(b)(4)that is not grounded in the text, it should come as no surprise that this interpretation is difficult to apply, as this case demonstrates. It is easy to see how, accepting water carriers as a comparison class, the scheme treats water carriers and rail carriers differently when it grants water carriers, but not rail carriers, an exemption from the sales tax. Ala.Code § 40-23-4(a)(10). Identifying the difference in treatment between rail and motor carriers, by contrast, requires a good deal more imagination.
The majority's approach exhibits that imagination. It glosses over the general applicability of the provisions that apply to rail and motor carriers, stating that "[t]he State applies the [sales or use] tax, at the usual 4% rate, to railroads' purchase or use of diesel fuel for their rail operations," but "exempts from the tax purchases and uses of diesel fuel made by [motor carriers]." Ante, at 1140. A quick glimpse at the code reveals that this is not quite the case. The applicability of the sales and use taxes does not depend on the identity of the purchaser, but on whether the purchaser pays another excise tax, § 40-17-325(b), which in turn depends on the nature of the product purchased and its use, §§ 40-17-328, 40-17-329, which in turn merely correlates to the carriers' operations.
As
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
H
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Souter
delivered the opinion of the Court.
California law requires employers to pay all wages due immediately upon an employee’s discharge, imposes a penalty for refusal to pay promptly, precludes any private contractual waiver of these minimum labor standards, and places responsibility for enforcing these provisions on the State Commissioner of Labor (Commissioner or Labor Commissioner), ostensibly for the benefit of all employees. Respondent, the Labor Commissioner, has construed a further provision of state law as barring enforcement of these wage and penalty claims on behalf of individuals like petitioner, whose terms and conditions of employment are governed by a collective-bargaining agreement containing an arbitration clause. We hold that federal law pre-empts this policy, as abridging the exercise of such employees’ rights under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or Act), 29 U. S. C. §151 et seq., and that redress for this unlawful refusal to enforce may be had under 42 U. S. C. § 1983.
I
Until her discharge on January 2, 1990, petitioner Karen Livadas worked as a grocery clerk in a Vallejo, California, Safeway supermarket. The terms and conditions of her employment were subject to a collective-bargaining agreement between Safeway and Livadas’s union, Local 373 of the United Food and Commercial Workers, AFL-CIO. Unexceptionally, the agreement provided that “[disputes as to the interpretation or application of the agreement,” including grievances arising from allegedly unjust discharge or suspension, would be subject to binding arbitration. See Food Store Contract, United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 373, AFL-CIO, Solano and Napa Counties §§ 18.2,18.3 (Mar. 1, 1989-Feb. 29, 1992) (Food Store Contract). When notified of her discharge, Livadas demanded immediate payment of wages owed her, as guaranteed to all California workers by state law, see Cal. Lab. Code Ann. §201 (West 1989), but her store manager refused, referring to the company practice of making such payments by check mailed from a central corporate payroll office. On January 5,1990, Livadas received a check from Safeway, in the full amount owed for her work through January 2.
On January 9,1990, Livadas filed a claim against Safeway with the California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (DLSE or Division), asserting that under § 203 of the Labor Code the company was liable to her for a sum equal to three days’ wages, as a penalty for the delay between discharge and the date when payment was in fact received. Livadas requested the Commissioner to enforce the claim.
By an apparently standard form letter dated February 7, 1990, the Division notified Livadas that it would take no action on her complaint:
“It is our understanding that the employees working for Safeway are covered by a collective bargaining agreement which contains an arbitration clause. The provisions of Labor Code Section 229 preclude this Division from adjudicating any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of any collective bargaining agreement containing an arbitration clause.
“Labor Code Section 203 requires that the wages continue at the ‘same rate’ until paid. In order to establish what the ‘same rate’ was, it is necessary to look to the collective bargaining agreement and ‘apply’ that agreement. The courts have pointed out that such an application is exactly what the provisions of Labor Code § 229 prohibit.” App. 16.
The letter made no reference to any particular aspect of Livadas’s claim making it unfit for enforcement, and the Commissioner’s position is fairly taken to be that DLSE enforcement of § 203 claims, as well as other claims for which relief is pegged to an employee’s wage rate, is generally unavailable to employees covered by collective-bargaining agreements.
Livadas brought this action in the United States District Court under Rev. Stat. § 1979,42 U. S. C. § 1983, alleging that the nonenforcement policy, reflecting the Commissioner’s reading of Labor Code § 229, was pre-empted as conflicting with Livadas’s rights under § 7 of the NLRA, 49 Stat. 452, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 157, because the policy placed a penalty on the exercise of her statutory right to bargain collectively with her employer. She stressed that there was no dispute about the amount owed and that neither she nor Safeway had begun any grievance proceeding over the penalty. Livadas sought a declaration that the Commissioner’s interpretation of §229 was pre-empted, an injunction against adherence to the allegedly impermissible policy, and an order requiring the Commissioner either to process her penalty claim or (if it would be time barred under state law) pay her damages in the amount the Commissioner would have obtained if the Commissioner had moved against the employer in time.
The District Court granted summary judgment for Livadas, holding the labor pre-emption claim cognizable under § 1983, see Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles, 493 U. S. 103 (1989) (Golden State II), and the Commissioner’s policy pre-empted as interfering with her § 7 right, see, e. g., Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles, 475 U. S. 608 (1986) (Golden State I), by denying her the benefit of a minimum labor standard, namely, the right to timely payment of final wages secured by Labor Code §§201 and 203. 749 F. Supp. 1526 (ND Cal. 1990). The District Court treated as irrelevant the Commissioner’s assertion that the policy was consistent with state law (e. g., Labor Code § 229) and rejected the defense that it was required by federal law, namely, § 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947 (LMRA), 61 Stat. 156, 29 U. S. C. § 185(a), which has been read to pre-empt state-court resolution of disputes turning on the rights of parties under collective-bargaining agreements. The District Court explained that resolution of the claim under § 203 “requires reference only to a calendar, not to the [collective-bargaining agreement],” 749 F. Supp., at 1536, and granted petitioner all requested relief. Id., at 1540.
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. 987 F. 2d 552 (1993). The court acknowledged that federal law gives Livadas a right to engage in collective bargaining and that § 1983 would supply a remedy for official deprivation of that right, but the panel majority concluded that no federal right had been infringed. The court reasoned that the policy was based on the Commissioner’s reading of Labor Code § 229, whose function of keeping state tribunals from adjudicating claims in a way that would interfere with the operation of federal labor policy is, by definition, consistent with the dictates of federal law. Noting that Livadas did not assert pre-emption of § 229 itself or object to the California courts’ interpretation of it, the majority concluded that her case reduced to an assertion that the Commissioner had misinterpreted state law, an error for which relief could be obtained in California courts.
Livadas could not claim to be “penalized,” the Appeals panel then observed, for she stood “in the same position as every other employee in the state when it comes to seeking the Commissioner’s enforcement. Every employee... is subject to an eligibility determination, and every employee... is subject to the risk that the Commissioner will get it wrong.” 987 F. 2d, at 559. The Ninth Circuit majority concluded by invoking the “general policies of federal labor law” strongly favoring the arbitration of disputes and reasoning that, “Congress would not want state officials erring on the side of adjudicating state law disputes whenever it is a close call as to whether a claim is preempted.” Id., at 560. We granted certiorari, 510 U. S. 1083 (1994), to address the important questions of federal labor law implicated by the Commissioner’s policy, and we now reverse.
II
A
A state rule predicating benefits on refraining from conduct protected by federal labor law poses special dangers of interference with congressional purpose. In Nash v. Florida Industrial Comm’n, 389 U. S. 235 (1967), a unanimous Court held that a state policy of withholding unemployment benefits solely because an employee had filed an unfair labor practice charge with the National Labor Relations Board had a “direct tendency to frustrate the purpose of Congress” and, if not pre-empted, would “defeat or handicap a valid national objective by... withdrawing] state benefits... simply because” an employee engages in conduct protected and encouraged by the NLRA. Id., at 239; see also Golden State I, supra, at 618 (city may not condition franchise renewal on settlement of labor dispute). This case is fundamentally no different from Nash. Just as the respondent state commission in that case offered an employee the choice of pursuing her unfair labor practice claim or receiving unemployment compensation, the Commissioner has presented Livadas and others like her with the choice of having state-law rights under §§201 and 203 enforced or exercising the right to enter into a collective-bargaining agreement with an arbitration clause. This unappetizing choice, we conclude, was not intended by Congress, see infra, at 130, and cannot ultimately be reconciled with a statutory scheme premised on the centrality of the right to bargain collectively and the desirability of resolving contract disputes through arbitration. Cf. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U. S. 724, 755 (1985) (state law held not pre-empted because it “neither encourage[s] nor discouragefs] the collective-bargaining processes”).
B
1
The Commissioner’s answers to this pre-emption conclusion flow from two significant misunderstandings of law. First, the Commissioner conflates the policy that Livadas challenges with the state law on which it purports to rest, Labor Code §229, assuming that if the statutory provision is consistent with federal law, her policy must be also. But on this logic, a policy of issuing general search warrants would be justified if it were adopted to implement a state statute codifying word-for-word the “good-faith” exception to the valid warrant requirement recognized in United States v. Leon, 468 U. S. 897 (1984). The relationship between policy and state statute and between the statute and federal law is, in any event, irrelevant. The question presented by this case is not whether Labor Code § 229 is valid under the Federal Constitution or whether the Commissioner’s policy is, as a matter of state law, a proper interpretation of § 229. Pre-emption analysis, rather, turns on the actual content of respondent’s policy and its real effect on federal rights. See Nash v. Florida Industrial Comm’n, 389 U. S. 235 (1967) (holding pre-empted an administrative policy interpreting presumably valid state unemployment insurance law exception for “labor disputes” to include proceedings under NLRB complaints); see also 987 F. 2d, at 561 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
Having sought to lead us to the wrong question, the Commissioner proposes the wrong approach for answering it, defending the distinction drawn in the challenged statutory interpretation, between employees represented by unions and those who are not, as supported by a “rational basis,” see, e. g., Brief for Respondent 17. But such reasoning mistakes a standard for validity under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses for what the Supremacy Clause requires. The power to tax is no less the power to destroy, McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819), merely because a state legislature has an undoubtedly rational and “legitimate” interest in raising revenue. In labor pre-emption cases, as in others under the Supremacy Clause, our office is not to pass judgment on the reasonableness of state policy, see, e. g., Golden State I, 475 U. S. 608 (1986) (city’s desire to remain “neutral” in labor dispute does not determine pre-emption). It is instead to decide if a state rule conflicts with or otherwise “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives” of the federal law. Brown v. Hotel Employees, 468 U. S. 491, 501 (1984) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
That is not to say, of course, that the several rationales for the policy urged on the Court by the Commissioner and amici are beside the point here. If, most obviously, the Commissioner’s policy were actually compelled by federal law, as she argues it is, we could hardly say that it was, simultaneously, pre-empted; at the least, our task would then be one of harmonizing statutory law. But we entertain this and other justifications claimed, not because constitutional analysis under the Supremacy Clause is an open-ended balancing act, simply weighing the federal interest against the intensity of local feeling, see id., at 503, but because claims of justification can sometimes help us to discern congressional purpose, the “ultimate touchstone” of our enquiry. Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U. S. 497, 504 (1978) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also New York Telephone Co. v. New York State Dept. of Labor, 440 U. S. 519, 533 (1979) (plurality opinion).
2
We begin with the most complete of the defenses mounted by the Commissioner, one that seems (or seemed until recently, at least) to be at the heart of her position: that the challenged policy, far from being pre-empted by federal law, is positively compelled by it, and that even if the Commissioner had been so inclined, the LMRA § 301 would have precluded enforcement of Livadas’s penalty claim. The non-enforcement policy, she suggests, is a necessary emanation from this Court’s §301 pre-emption jurisprudence, marked as it has been by repeated admonitions that courts should steer clear of collective-bargaining disputes between parties who have provided for arbitration. See, e.g., Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U. S. 202 (1985). Because, this argument runs (and Livadas was told in the DLSE no-action letter), disposition of a union-represented employee’s penalty claim entails the “interpretation or application” of a collective-bargaining agreement (since determining the amount owed turns on the contractual rate of pay agreed) resort to a state tribunal would lead it into territory that Congress, in enacting §301, meant to be covered exclusively by arbitrators.
This reasoning, however, mistakes both the functions § 301 serves in our national labor law and our prior decisions according that provision pre-emptive effect. To be sure, we have read the text of § 301 not only to grant federal courts jurisdiction over claims asserting breach of collective-bargaining agreements but also to authorize the development of federal common-law rules of decision, in large part to assure that agreements to arbitrate grievances would be enforced, regardless of the vagaries of state law and lingering hostility toward extrajudicial dispute resolution, see Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U. S. 448, 455-456 (1957); see also Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U. S. 574 (1960); Avco Corp. v. Machinists, 390 U. S. 557, 559 (1968) (“§301... was fashioned by Congress to place sanctions behind agreements to arbitrate grievance disputes”). And in Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U. S. 95 (1962), we recognized an important corollary to the Lincoln Mills rule: while § 301 does not preclude state courts from taking jurisdiction over cases arising from disputes over the interpretation of collective-bargaining agreements, state contract law must yield to the developing federal common law, lest common terms in bargaining agreements be given different and potentially inconsistent interpretations in different jurisdictions. See 369 U. S., at 103-104.
And while this sensible “acorn” of § 301 pre-emption recognized in Lucas Flour has sprouted modestly in more recent decisions of this Court, see, e. g., Lueck, supra, at 210 (“[I]f the policies that animate §301 are to be given their proper range... the pre-emptive effect of § 301 must extend beyond suits alleging contract violations”), it has not yet become, nor may it, a sufficiently “mighty oak,” see Golden State I, 475 U. S., at 622 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), to supply the cover the Commissioner seeks here. To the contrary, the pre-emption rule has been applied only to assure that the purposes animating § 301 will be frustrated neither by state laws purporting to determine “questions relating to what the parties to a labor agreement agreed, and what legal consequences were intended to flow from breaches of that agreement,” Lueck, 471 U. S., at 211, nor by parties’ efforts to renege on their arbitration promises by “relabeling” as tort suits actions simply alleging breaches of duties assumed in collective-bargaining agreements, id., at 219; see Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U. S. 650, 652 (1965) (“[Federal labor policy requires that individual employees wishing to assert contract grievances must attempt use of the contract grievance procedure agreed upon by employer and union as the mode of redress”) (emphasis deleted).
In Lueck and in Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U. S. 399 (1988), we underscored the point that §301 cannot be read broadly to pre-empt nonnegotiable rights conferred on individual employees as a matter of state law, and we stressed that it is the legal character of a claim, as “independent” of rights under the collective-bargaining agreement, Lueck, supra, at 213 (and not whether a grievance arising from “precisely the same set of facts” could be pursued, Lingle, supra, at 410) that decides whether a state cause of action may go forward. Finally, we were clear that when the meaning of contract terms is not the subject of dispute, the bare fact that a collective-bargaining agreement will be consulted in the course of state-law litigation plainly does not require the claim to be extinguished, see Lingle, supra, at 413, n. 12 (“A collective-bargaining agreement may, of course, contain information such as rate of pay... that might be helpful in determining the damages to which a worker prevailing in a state-law suit is entitled”).
These principles foreclose even a colorable argument that a claim under Labor Code §203 was pre-empted here. As the District Court aptly observed, the primary text for deciding whether Livadas was entitled to a penalty was not the Food Store Contract, but a calendar. The only issue raised by Livadas’s claim, whether Safeway “willfully fail[ed] to pay” her wages promptly upon severance, Cal. Lab. Code Ann. §203 (West 1989), was a question of state law, entirely independent of any understanding embodied in the collective-bargaining agreement between the union and the employer. There is no indication that there was a “dispute” in this case over the amount of the penalty to which Livadas would be entitled, and Lingle makes plain in so many words that when liability is governed by independent state law, the mere need to “look to” the collective-bargaining agreement for damages computation is no reason to hold the state-law claim defeated by § 301. See 486 U. S., at 413, n. 12.
Beyond the simple need to refer to bargained-for wage rates in computing the penalty, the collective-bargaining agreement is irrelevant to the dispute (if any) between Livadas and Safeway. There is no suggestion here that Livadas’s union sought or purported to bargain away her protections under § 201 or § 203, a waiver that we have said would (especially in view of Labor Code §219) have to be “‘clear and unmistakable,’ ” see Lingle, supra, at 409-410, n. 9 (quoting Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U. S. 693, 708 (1983)), for a court even to consider whether it could be given effect, nor is there any indication that the parties to the collective-bargaining agreement understood their arbitration pledge to cover these state-law claims. See generally Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U. S. 20, 35 (1991); cf. Food Store Contract § 18.8. But even if such suggestions or indications were to be found, the Commissioner could not invoke them to defend her policy, which makes no effort to take such factors into account before denying enforcement.
c
1
Before this Court, however, the Commissioner does not confine herself to the assertion that Livadas’s claim would have been pre-empted by LMRA § 301. Indeed, largely putting aside that position, she has sought here to cast the policy in different terms, as expressing a “conscious decision,” see Brief for Respondent 14, to keep the State’s “hands off” the claims of employees protected by collective-bargaining agreements, either because the Division’s efforts and resources are more urgently needed by others or because official restraint will actually encourage the collective-bargaining and arbitral processes favored by federal law. The latter, more ambitious defense has been vigorously taken up by the Commissioner’s amici, who warn that invalidation of the disputed policy would sound the death knell for other, more common governmental measures that take account of collective-bargaining processes or treat workers represented by unions differently from others in any respect.
Although there surely is no bar to our considering these alternative explanations, cf. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471, 475, n. 6 (1970) (party may defend judgment on basis not relied upon below), we note, as is often the case with such late-blooming rationales, that the overlap between what the Commissioner now claims to be state policy and what the state legislature has enacted into law is awkwardly inexact. First, if the Commissioner’s policy (or California law) were animated simply by the frugal desire to conserve the State’s money for the protection of employees not covered by collective-bargaining agreements, the Commissioner’s emphasis, in the letter to Livadas and in this litigation, on the need to “interpret” or “apply” terms of a collective-bargaining agreement would be entirely misplaced.
Nor is the nonenforcement policy convincingly defended as giving parties to a collective-bargaining agreement the “benefit of their bargain,” see Brief for Respondent 18, n. 13, by assuring them that their promise to arbitrate is kept and not circumvented. Under the Commissioner’s policy, enforcement does not turn on what disputes the parties agreed would be resolved by arbitration (the bargain struck), see Gilmer, 500 U. S., at 26, or on whether the contractual wage rate is even subject to (arbitrable) dispute. Rather, enforcement turns exclusively on the fact that the contracting parties consented to any arbitration at all. Even if the Commissioner could permissibly presume that state-law claims are generally intended to be arbitrated, but cf. id., at 35 (employees in prior cases “had not agreed to arbitrate their statutory claims, and the labor arbitrators were not authorized to resolve such claims”), her policy goes still further. Even in cases when it could be said with “positive assurance,” Warrior & Gulf, 363 U. S., at 582, that the parties did not intend that state-law claims be subject to arbitration, cf. Food Store Contract § 18.8 (direct wage claim not involving interpretation of agreement may be submitted “to any other tribunal or agency which is authorized and empowered” to enforce it), the Commissioner would still deny enforcement, on the stated basis that the collective-bargaining agreement nonetheless contained “an arbitration clause” and because the claim would, on her view, entail “interpretation,” of the agreement’s terms. Such an irrebuttable presumption is not easily described as the benefit of the parties’ “bargain.”
The Commissioner and amici finally suggest that denying enforcement to union-represented employees’ claims under §§201 and 203 (and other Labor Code provisions) is meant to encourage parties to bargain collectively for their own rules about the payment of wages to discharged workers. But with this suggestion, the State’s position simply slips any tether to California law. If California’s goal really were to stimulate such freewheeling bargaining on these subjects, the enactment of Labor Code §219, expressly and categorically prohibiting the modification of these Labor Code rules by “private agreement,” would be a very odd way to pursue it. Cf. Cal. Lab. Code Ann. §227.3 (West 1989) (allowing parties to collective-bargaining agreement to arrive at different rule for vacation pay). In short, the policy, the rationales, and the state law are not coherent.
2
Even at face value, however, neither the “hands off” labels nor the vague assertions that general labor law policies are thereby advanced much support the Commissioner’s defense here. The former merely takes the position discussed and rejected earlier, that a distinction between claimants represented by unions and those who are not is “rational,” the former being less “in need” than the latter. While we hardly suggest here that every distinction between union-represented employees and others is invalid under the NLRA, see infra, at 131-132, the assertion that represented employees are less “in need” precisely because they have exercised federal rights poses special dangers that advantages conferred by federal law will be canceled out and its objectives undermined. Cf. Metropolitan Life, 471 U. S., at 756 (“It would turn the policy that animated the Wagner Act on its head to understand it to have penalized workers who have chosen to join a union by preventing them from benefiting from state labor regulations imposing minimal standards on nonunion employers”). Accordingly, as we observed in Metropolitan Life, the widespread practice in Congress and in state legislatures has assumed the contrary, bestowing basic employment guarantees and protections on individual employees without singling out members of labor unions (or those represented by them) for disability; see id., at 755; accord, tingle, 486 U. S., at 411-412.
Nor do professions of “neutrality” lay the dangers to rest. The pre-empted action in Golden State I could easily have been redescribed as following a “hands-off” policy, in that the city sought to avoid endorsing either side in the course of a labor dispute, see 475 U. S., at 622 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (city did not seek “to place its weight on one side or the other of the scales of economic warfare”), and the respondent commission in Nash may have understood its policy as expressing neutrality between the parties in a yet-to-be-decided unfair labor practice dispute. See also Rum Creek Coal Sales, Inc. v. Caperton, 971 F. 2d 1148, 1154 (CA4 1992) (NLRA forbids state policy, under state law barring “aid or assistance” to either party to a labor dispute, of not arresting picketers who violated state trespass laws). Nor need we pause long over the assertion that nonenforcement of valid state-law claims is consistent with federal labor law by “encouraging” the operation of collective bargaining and arbitration process. Denying represented employees basic safety protections might “encourage” collective bargaining over that subject, and denying union employers the protection of generally applicable state trespass law might lead to increased bargaining over the rights of labor pickets, cf. Rum Creek, supra, but we have never suggested that labor law’s bias toward bargaining is to be served by forcing employees or employers to bargain for what they would otherwise be entitled to as a matter of course. See generally Metropolitan Life, supra, at 757 (Congress did not intend to “remove the backdrop of state law... and thereby artificially create a no-law area”) (emphasis deleted and internal quotation marks omitted).
The precedent cited by the Commissioner and amici as supporting the broadest “hands off” view, Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U. S. 1 (1987), is not in point. In that case we held that there was no federal pre-emption of a Maine statute that allowed employees and employers to contract for plant-closing severance payments different from those otherwise mandated by state law. That decision, however, does not even purport to address the question supposedly presented here: while there was mention of state latitude to “balance the desirability of a particular substantive labor standard against the right of self-determination regarding the terms and conditions of employment,” see id., at 22, the policy challenged here differs in two crucial respects from the “unexceptional exercise of the [State’s] police power,” ibid, (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), defended in those terms in our earlier case. Most fundamentally, the Maine law treated all employees equally, whether or not represented by a labor organization. All were entitled to the statutory severance payment, and all were allowed to negotiate agreements providing for different benefits. See id., at 4, n. 1. Second, the minimum protections of Maine’s plant-closing law were relinquished not by the mere act of signing an employment contract (or collective-bargaining agreement), but only by the parties’ express agreement on different terms, see id., at 21.
While the Commissioner and her amici call our attention to a number of state and federal laws that draw distinctions between union and nonunion represented employees, see, e.g., D. C. Code Ann. §36-103 (1993) (“Unless otherwise specified in a collective agreement... [w]henever an employer discharges an employee, the employer shall pay the employee’s wages earned not later than the working day following such discharge”); 29 U. S. C. § 203(o) (“Hours [w]orked” for Fair Labor Standards Act measured according to “express terms of... or practice under bona fide collective-bargaining agreement”), virtually all share the important second feature observed in Coyne, that union-represented employees have the full protection of the minimum standard, absent any agreement for something different. These “opt out” statutes are thus manifestly different in their operation (and their effect on federal rights) from the Commissioner’s rule that an employee forfeits his state-law rights the moment a collective-bargaining agreement with an arbitration clause is entered into. But cf. Metropolitan Edison, 460 U. S., at 708. Hence, our holding that the Commissioner’s unusual policy is irreconcilable with the structure and purposes of the Act should cast no shadow on the validity of these familiar and narrowly drawn opt-out provisions.
Ill
Having determined that the Commissioner’s policy is in fact pre-empted by federal law, we find strong support in our precedents for the position taken by both courts below that Livadas is entitled to seek relief under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 for the Commissioner’s abridgment of her NLRA rights. Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action for the deprivation, under color of law, of a citizen’s “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States, and we have given that provision the effect its terms require, as affording redress for violations of federal statutes, as well as of constitutional norms. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U. S. 1, 4 (1980). We have, it is true, recognized that even the broad statutory text does not authorize a suit for every alleged violation of federal law. A particular statutory provision, for example, may be so manifestly precatory that it could not fairly be read to impose a “binding obligatio[n]” on a governmental unit, Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1, 27 (1981), or its terms may be so “vague and amorphous” that determining whether a “deprivation” might have occurred would strain judicial competence. See Wright v. Roanoke Redevelop ment and Housing Authority, 479 U. S. 418, 431-432 (1987). And Congress itself might make it clear that violation of a statute will not give rise to liability under § 1983, either by express words or by providing a comprehensive alternative enforcement scheme. See Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Assn., 453 U. S. 1 (1981). But apart from these exceptional cases, §1983 remains a generally and presumptively available remedy for claimed violations of federal law. See also Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U. S. 439, 443 (1991).
Our conclusion that Livadas is entitled to seek redress under §1983 is, if not controlled outright, at least heavily foreshadowed by our decision in Golden State II. We began there with the recognition that not every instance of federal pre-emption gives rise to a §1983 cause of action, see 493 U. S., at 108, and we explained that to decide the availability of § 1983 relief a court must look to the nature of the federal law accorded pre-emptive effect and the character of the interest claimed under it, ibid. We had no difficulty concluding, however, as we had often before, see, e. g., Hill v. Florida ex rel. Watson, 325 U. S. 538 (1945), that the NLRA protects interests of employees and employers against abridgment by a State, as well as by private actors; that the obligations it imposes on governmental actors are not so “vague and amorphous” as to exceed judicial competence to decide; and that Congress had not meant to foreclose relief under § 1983. In so concluding, we contrasted the intricate scheme provided to remedy violations by private actors to the complete absence of provision for relief from governmental interference, see 493 U. S., at 108-109. Indeed, the only issue seriously in dispute in Golden State II was whether the freedom to resort to “peaceful methods of... economic pressure,” id., at 112 (internal quotation marks omitted), which we had recognized as implicit in the structure of the Act, could support § 1983 liability in the same manner as official abridgment of those rights enumerated in the text would do. Ibid. The Court majority said yes, explaining that “[a] rule of law that is the product of judicial interpretation of a vague, ambiguous, or incomplete statutory provision is no less binding than a rule that is based on the plain meaning of a statute.” Ibid.
The right Livadas asserts, to complete the collective-bargaining process and agree to an arbitration clause, is, if not provided in so many words in the NLRA, see n. 10, supra, at least as immanent in its structure as the right of the cab company in Golden State II. And the obligation to respect it on the part of the Commissioner and others acting under color of law is no more “vague and amorphous” than the obligation in Golden State. Congress, of course, has given no more indication of any intent to foreclose actions like Livadas’s than the sort brought by the cab company. Finding no cause for special caution here, we hold that Livadas’s claim is properly brought under § 1983.
IV
In an effort to give wide berth to federal labor law and policy, the Commissioner declines to enforce union
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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J
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Kennedy
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The jury in a Texas state court convicted petitioner La-Royce Lathair Smith of first-degree murder and determined he should receive a death sentence. This Court now reviews a challenge to the sentencing proceeding for a second time.
The sentencing took place in the interim between our decisions in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U. S. 302 (1989) (Penry I), and Penry v. Johnson, 532 U. S. 782 (2001) (Penry II). In Penry I the Court addressed the special-issue questions then submitted to Texas juries to guide their sentencing determinations in capital cases. The decision held that the Texas special issues were insufficient to allow proper consideration of some forms of mitigating evidence. Following a pretrial challenge to the special issues by Smith, the trial court issued a charge instructing the jury to nullify the special issues if the mitigating evidence, taken as a whole, convinced the jury Smith did not deserve the death penalty. After Smith’s trial, Penry II held a similar nullification charge insufficient to cure the flawed special issues. Smith, on state collateral review, continued to seek relief based on the inadequacy of the special issues, arguing that the nullification charge had not remedied the problem identified in his pretrial objection. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the denial of relief, distinguishing Smith’s case from the Penry precedents. Ex parte Smith, 132 S. W. 3d 407 (2004).
This Court, by summary disposition, reversed. Smith v. Texas, 543 U. S. 37 (2004) (per curiam) (Smith I). On remand the Court of Criminal Appeals again denied Smith relief. It held, for the first time, that Smith’s pretrial objections did not preserve the claim of constitutional error he asserts. Under the Texas framework for determining whether an instructional error merits reversal, the state court explained, this procedural default required Smith to show egregious harm — a burden the court held he did not meet. Ex parte Smith, 185 S. W. 3d 455, 467-473 (2006). The requirement that Smith show egregious harm was predicated, we hold, on a misunderstanding of the federal right Smith asserts; and we therefore reverse.
I
A
The Special Issues
Under Texas law the jury verdict form provides special-issue questions to guide the jury in determining whether the death penalty should be imposed. At the time of Smith’s trial, Texas law set forth three special issues. The first addressed deliberateness; the second concerned future dangerousness; and the third asked whether the killing was an unreasonable response to provocation by the victim. Provocation was not applicable to Smith’s case so the third question was not included in the instructions. If the jury answered the two applicable special-issue questions in the affirmative, the death penalty would be imposed.
In Penry I, the Court held that neither of these special-issue instructions was “broad enough to provide a vehicle for the jury to give mitigating effect” to the evidence at issue in that case. Penry II, supra, at 798 (citing, and characterizing, Penry I, supra, at 322-325). We refer to the inadequacy of the special-issue instructions as “Penry error.”
For the brief period between Penry I and the Texas Legislature’s addition of a catchall special issue, Texas courts attempted to cure Penry error with a nullification charge. In Smith’s case the trial court instructed that if a juror was convinced the correct answer to each special-issue question was “yes,” but nevertheless concluded the defendant did not deserve death in light of all the mitigating evidence, the juror must answer one special-issue question “no.” The charge was not incorporated into the verdict form. See, e. g., 1 App. 123-124. In essence the jury was instructed to misrepresent its answer to one of the two special issues when necessary to take account of the mitigating evidence.
In Penry II, the Court concluded that a nullification charge created an ethical and logical dilemma that prevented jurors from giving effect to the mitigating evidence when the evidence was outside the scope of the special issues. As the Court explained, “because the supplemental [nullification] instruction had no practical effect, the jury instructions . . . were not meaningfully different from the ones we found constitutionally inadequate in Penry 532 U. S., at 798. In other words, Penry II held that the nullification charge did not cure the Penry error.
Penry II and Smith I recognized the ethical dilemma, the confusion, and the capriciousness introduced into jury deliberations by directing the jury to distort the meaning of an instruction and a verdict form. Penry II, supra, at 797-802; Smith I, supra, at 45-48. These are problems distinct from Penry error and may be grounds for reversal as an independent matter; but we need not reach that issue here, just as the Court did not need to reach it in Penry II or Smith I.
When this Court reversed the Court of Criminal Appeals in Smith I, it did so because the nullification charge had not cured the underlying Penry error. See Smith I, 548 U. S., at 48 (holding that “the burden of proof. .. was tied by law to findings of deliberateness and future dangerousness that had little, if anything, to do with” the mitigating evidence). While the ethical and logical quandary caused by the jury nullification charge may give rise to distinct error, this was not the basis for reversal in Smith I. On remand the Court of Criminal Appeals misunderstood this point. Its interpretation of federal law was incorrect.
In light of our decision in Smith I, our review of the facts need not restate the brutality of the murder Smith committed or the evidence he offered in mitigation. See id., at 38-43. We need only address the conclusion of the Court of Criminal Appeals that the constitutional error asserted by Smith was caused by the nullification charge and that, having failed to alert the trial court to that error, Smith was required to demonstrate egregious harm to obtain relief.
B
The Trial
Before voir dire, Smith filed three written motions addressing the jury instructions. In the first, he argued that Jurek v. Texas, 428 U. S. 262 (1976), and Penry I established the constitutional inadequacy of the special issues. The motion maintained that Texas law denied the trial cotut power to cure the problem because “[t]he exclusive methodology for submission to the jury of special issues with regard to infliction of the death penalty [is] contained in” Article 37.071 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Annotated (Vernon 2006 Supp. Pamphlet), which did not authorize the trial court to add an additional special issue on mitigation. 1 App. 9. The trial court, the objection stated, would not be able to provide “any instruction with regard to mitigating evidence which would permit the jury to make a moral reasoned response to” mitigating evidence not covered by the special issues. Ibid. Smith would offer such evidence.
The second pretrial motion raised a related but distinct argument. Smith began by noting that in Jurek the Supreme Court had found Article 37.071 constitutional on its face. He argued, however, it did so with the understanding that the Texas courts would give broad construction to terms in the special issues such as “‘deliberately.’” 1 App. 12. They had not done so and therefore “[t]here [was] no provision in Texas for the jury to decide the appropriateness of the death penalty taking into consideration the personal moral culpability of the [defendant balanced by mitigating evidence which is not directly or circumstantially probative in answering the special issues.” Id., at 13. Smith therefore reasoned that Article 37.071 was unconstitutional.
The third pretrial motion asked the court to state the contents of the mitigation charge prior to voir dire so Smith could exercise his jury challenges intelligently. Id., at 17-19.
The trial court denied the first two motions. Id., at 21. In response to the third it provided Smith a copy of its proposed mitigation charge. That charge, which we will refer to as “the nullification charge,” defined mitigating evidence broadly before explaining to the jury, in relevant part:
“[I]f you believe that the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the answers to the Special Issues are ‘Yes,’ and you also believe from the mitigating evidence, if any, that the Defendant should not be sentenced to death, then you shall answer at least one of the Special Issues ‘No’ in order to give effect to your belief that the death penalty should not be imposed due to the mitigating evidence presented to you. In this regard, you are further instructed that the State of Texas must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the death sentence should be imposed despite the mitigating evidence, if any, admitted before you.” Smith I, supra, at 40 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The nullification charge did not define or describe the special issues. 1 App. 105-110. The judge told counsel: “If you see something in that charge that you’d like worded differently or you think could be made clearer or better, I’m always willing to entertain different wording or different ways of putting the idea. So if you come up with something you like better, just let me know and I’ll look at it.” Id., at 21. Smith raised no additional objection and did not suggest alternative wording for the nullification charge.
The jury received the nullification charge from the judge, but the verdict form did not incorporate it. The form was confined to the special issues of deliberateness and future dangerousness. Id., at 123-124. The jury unanimously answered “yes” to both special-issue questions, and Smith was sentenced to death.
C
Post-Trial Proceedings
The State does not contest the validity of Smith’s challenge to the special issues in his pretrial motion. It does contend that since Smith did not object to the nullification charge, his state habeas petition rests on an unpreserved claim, namely, that the nullification charge excluded his mitigating evidence. The State’s formulation of the federal right claimed by Smith, a formulation accepted by the Court of Criminal Appeals, is based on an incorrect reading of federal law and this Court’s precedents. Considering Smith’s first two pretrial motions together, as the trial court did, it is evident Smith’s objection was that the special-issue framework violated the Eighth Amendment because it prevented the court from formulating jury instructions that would ensure adequate consideration of his mitigating evidence. This framework failed because the special issues were too narrow, the trial court was unable to promulgate a new catchall special issue, and the Texas courts did not define “deliberately” in broad terms. The State is correct that this was an objection based on Penry error, not one based on the confusion caused by the nullification instruction.
A review of Smith’s post-trial proceedings shows that the central argument of his habeas petition, and the basis for this Court’s decision in Smith I, is the same constitutional error asserted at trial.
1
Direct Appeal
On direct appeal from the trial court, Smith renewed his argument that the special issues were unconstitutional:
“[I]n [Penry I], the Supreme Court held that there was an Eighth Ame[n]dment violation where there was mitigating evidence not relevant to the special verdict questions, or that had relevance to the defendant’s moral culpability beyond the scope of the special verdict questions, and the jury instructions would have provided the jury with no vehicle for expressing its reasoned moral response to that evidence.
“By its extremely narrow interpretation of the requirements of Penry, this Court has unconstitutionally narrowed the sentencer’s discretion to consider relevant mitigating evidence .... The special issues ... do not in reality provide a vehicle for individualized consideration of the appropriateness of assessment of the death penalty and [the article establishing them] is unconstitutional as applied.” 1 App. 133-134.
Both the Court of Criminal Appeals, in its most recent opinion, and the State, in its brief on direct appeal, recognized Smith’s pretrial motions preserved this argument. 185 S. W. 3d, at 462, and n. 9 (holding Smith’s direct-appeal argument that “the jury was unable to give effect to his mitigating evidence in answering the special issues” was “based upon his pretrial motion”); Brief for Texas in No. 71,333 (Tex. Grim. App.), p. 62, Record 674 (“[Smith] reiterates his [pretrial] claim that the statute is unconstitutional as applied since it fails to provide an effective vehicle for the jury to apply mitigating evidence”).
In its opinion affirming the sentence on direct review the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the “instruction complied with Penry and provided a sufficient vehicle for the jury to consider any mitigating evidence [Smith] offered.” Smith v. State, No. 71,333 (June 22,1994), p. 11, 1 App. 147.
2
First and Second State Habeas
In 1998, Smith sought state habeas relief. Under state law the petition was untimely. The Court of Criminal Appeals, over a dissent, rejected an argument that neglect by Smith’s counsel merited equitable tolling. Ex parte Smith, 977 S. W. 2d 610 (1998) (en banc); see id., at 614 (Overstreet, J., dissenting). Texas then amended its filing rules to allow the exception the Court of Criminal Appeals had declined to create. The statutory change permitted Smith to file for habeas relief.
Smith filed his second habeas petition before this Court’s decision in Penry II. He argued once more that the special issues were inadequate: “In Penry [I], the Supreme Court... held that the former Texas capital sentencing statute did not provide an adequate vehicle for expressing its reasoned moral response to [mitigating] evidence in rendering its sentencing decision.” Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to Section 4A of Article 11.071 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure in No. W91-22808-R(A) (Tex. Crim. App.), p. 191, Record 193 (internal quotation marks omitted). Smith acknowledged the trial court tried to solve the problem with the nullification charge, but he explained that “[i]t confounds common sense to suggest jurors — who are sworn to tell the truth — would ever understand that they were authorized to answer [special-issue] questions falsely.” Id., at 193, Record 195. Smith continued:
“Nothing in the special issues themselves linked the ‘nullification’ instruction to the specific questions asked; nothing in the special issues themselves authorized the jury to consider mitigating evidence when answering the questions; nothing in the special issues themselves authorized the jury to answer the questions ‘no’ when the truthful answer was ‘yes’; in short, nothing in the special issues permitted the jury to apply the ‘nullification’ instruction.” Id., at 194, Record 196.
Smith conceded he had not objected to the nullification charge but confirmed that he had challenged the special-issues statute and that the Court of Criminal Appeals had reached the merits of this claim on direct review.
The State, relying upon a procedural bar different from and indeed contradictory to the one it now raises, responded that “[t]his claim [was] procedurally barred as it was both raised and decided on the merits on direct appeal.” 1 App. 156; see also id., at 157 (describing Smith’s position as an “identical complaint” and an “identical argument” to his claim on direct appeal). The State contended, in the alternative, that Smith’s position was meritless because the nullification charge cured any problem with the special issues. Respondent’s Original Answer and Response to Applicant’s Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus in No. W9122803-R(A) (Tex. Crim. App.), pp. 136-139, Record 467-470.
The state trial court denied habeas relief on the ground Smith was procedurally barred from raising the same claim denied on direct review absent “a subsequent change in the law so as to render the judgment void . . ." Ex parte Smith, No. W91-22803-R, pp. 86-87 (265th Dist. Ct. of Dallas Cty., Tex., Apr. 5, 2001).
3
Appeal from the Denial of State Habeas Relief
While Smith’s appeal from the state trial court’s denial of his second habeas petition was pending, this Court decided Penry II. Smith filed a brief in the Court of Criminal Appeals explaining the relevance of Penry II to his habeas claim. He noted that the special-issue questions in his case were for all relevant purposes the same as those in Penry II. Applicant’s Brief for Submission in View of the United States Supreme Court’s Opinion in Penry v. Johnson in No. W91-22803-R, pp. 4-5. He maintained the nullification charges were also indistinguishable, id., at 5-6, and had in Penry II been held insufficient “to cure the error created by the Special Issues,” Applicant’s Brief for Submission, at 6-7. Smith concluded by explaining that the procedural bar for raising an issue already resolved on direct review did not apply “where an intervening legal decision renders a previously rejected claim meritorious.” Id., at 12 (citing Ex parte Drake, 883 S. W. 2d 213, 215 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (en banc)). (We note the Court of Criminal Appeals recently adopted this position. See Ex parte Hood, 211 S. W. 3d 767, 775-778 (2007).)
The Court of Criminal • Appeals ordered supplemental briefing on the relevance of Penry II. Given that Penry II addressed the sufficiency of a nullification charge as a cure for inadequate special issues, Smith’s supplemental brief concentrated on the same issue. Nevertheless, his central argument remained that he “presented significant mitigating evidence that was virtually indistinguishable from Penry’s and thus undeniably beyond the scope of the special issues.” Applicant’s Supplemental Briefing on Submission in No. 74,228, p. 12 (hereinafter Applicant’s Supp. Briefing). The nullification charge was inadequate as well, in his view, because, based on the ethical dilemma, “there is a reasonable probability that the nullification instruction . . . precluded [a juror who found that Smith’s personal culpability did not warrant a death sentence] from expressing that conclusion.” Id., at 13. Alternatively, Smith argued he was “also entitled to relief under Penry IF’ because “[e]ven if the jury might have been able to give effect to some of [his] mitigating evidence within the scope of [the] special issues, the confusing nullification instruction itself” may have prevented the jury from doing so. Id., at 14. As such, the nullification charge was “worse than no instruction at all.” Id., at 15-16 (emphasis deleted).
The State responded that the special issues were adequate and, furthermore, that the nullification charge, unlike the charge in Penry II, cured any problem. State’s Brief in No. 74,228 (Tex. Crim. App.), pp. 2-11. In response to Smith’s second argument the State contended “it tests the bounds of reason to grant [Smith] relief based on a good-faith attempt to give him a supplemental instruction to which he was not constitutionally entitled.” Id., at 11. In reply Smith reiterated his two distinct arguments, devoting most of the brief to his original trial objection. Applicant’s Reply to Respondent’s Response to Applicant’s Brief for Submission in No. 74,228 (Tex. Crim. App.).
The Court of Criminal Appeals denied the habeas petition. It found no Penry error, reasoning that the special issues were adequate to consider the mitigating evidence. Ex parte Smith, 132 S. W. 3d, at 412-415. Any evidence excluded from the purview of the jury, the court indicated, was not “constitutionally significant.” Id., at 413, n. 21. In the alternative the court held the nullification charge and the argument at trial were distinguishable from those at issue in Penry II. In Smith’s case, the court reasoned, the nullification charge would have been an adequate cure even if the special issues were too narrow. 132 S. W. 3d, at 416-417.
The majority did not adopt or address the reasoning of the two concurring opinions, which argued that Smith had procedurally defaulted his “Penry II claim” because while he had objected to the special issues at trial, he had not objected separately to the nullification charge. Id., at 423-424 (opinion of Hervey, J.); id., at 428 (opinion of Holcomb, J.).
4
Smith I
The ruling of the Court of Criminal Appeals in Smith’s second state habeas proceeding was reversed by this Court in Smith I. The Court’s summary disposition first rejected as unconstitutional the Texas court's screening test for “constitutionally significant” evidence. 543 U. S., at 43-48; see also Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U. S. 274 (2004).
The Smith I Court next observed that although Smith had presented relevant mitigating evidence, the jury’s consideration was “tied by law to findings of deliberateness and future dangerousness that had little, if anything, to do with” that evidence. 543 U. S., at 45, 48. There was, in other words, a Penry error. As a final matter, despite differences between the nullification charges in Smith 1 and Penry II, the variances were “constitutionally insignificant” because “Penry II identified a broad and intractable problem.” 543 U. S., at 46, 47 (citing Penry II, 532 U. S., at 799-800). The nullification charge was therefore inadequate under Penry II. The judgment was reversed and the case remanded. 543 U. S., at 48-49.
5
Remand Following Smith I
On remand Smith’s brief urged that harmless-error review was inappropriate because under the nullification charge the jury proceedings became capricious. See Applicant’s Brief on Remand in No. 74,228 (Tex. Crim. App.), pp. 8-18. The State responded that Smith was procedurally barred because he waited to raise his allegation of “jury charge error” under Penry II until the second state habeas petition nine years after his conviction. State’s Brief on Remand in No. 74,228 (Tex. Crim. App.), pp. 1, 2 (hereinafter State’s Brief on Remand). The State maintained this was an adequate and independent state ground for denying relief. Ibid. Smith’s motion and direct appeal, the State said, had been based on a challenge to the statute setting forth the special issues, not to the jury charge. Id., at 5-6. The State also maintained that this Court had not addressed whether the special issues were “a sufficient vehicle for the jury to give effect to [Smith’s] mitigation evidence.” Id., at 12-16.
Smith replied to the procedural-bar argument by noting he had “consistently raised his claim regarding the inadequacy of the special issues to permit constitutionally adequate consideration of his mitigating evidence and this Court has consistently addressed the merits of [that] claim.” Applicant’s Reply Brief on Remand in No. 74,228 (Tex. Crim. App.), p. 1.
The Court of Criminal Appeals denied relief. The court’s confusion with the interplay between Penry I and Penry II is evident from the beginning. Reasoning that “[t]he Supreme Court did not address our conclusion that the two special issues provided [Smith’s] jury with a constitutionally sufficient vehicle to give effect to his mitigating evidence,” 185 S. W. 3d, at 463 (internal quotation marks omitted), the court again concluded that the special issues were adequate, id., at 464-467. Nevertheless, because of its “uncertainty” regarding this Court’s Penry II jurisprudence, the Court of Criminal Appeals went on to “assume, for the sake of argument, that at least some of [Smith’s] evidence was not fully encompassed by the two special issues” and that “the jury charge in this case was constitutionally deficient under Penry 77.” 185 S. W. 3d, at 467.
The Court then applied the framework of Almanza v. State, 686 S. W. 2d 157 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (en banc), to Smith’s claim of error. Under Almanza, Smith needed first to show instructional error. Having assumed Smith had done so, the court next asked whether the error was preserved for review. If so, Smith would need to establish some “actual,” not merely theoretical, harm resulting from the error. If Smith had not preserved the error, by contrast, he would need to establish not merely some harm but also that the harm was egregious. 185 S. W. 3d, at 467.
The court found Smith had not preserved his claim of instructional error. Smith’s only objection at trial, reasoned the state court, was that the statute authorizing the special issues was unconstitutional in light of Penry I. 185 S. W. 3d, at 461-462, and n. 8. This objection did not preserve a challenge to the nullification charge based on Penry II, so Smith was required to show egregious harm. That showing had not been addressed by this Court’s holding in Smith I, the Court of Criminal Appeals indicated, because this Court only required that Smith demonstrate a reasonable probability of harm. In the view of the Court of Criminal Appeals there was little likelihood that Smith’s jury had failed to consider the mitigating evidence. 185 S. W. 3d, at 468-473. On this basis the court concluded Smith had failed to show egregious harm and, as such, habeas relief was foreclosed.
We granted certiorari. 549 U. S. 948 (2006).
II
A
The special issues through which Smith’s jury sentenced him to death did not meet constitutional standards, as held in Penry I; and the nullification charge did not cure that error, as held in Penry II. This was confirmed in Smith I. The Court of Criminal Appeals on remand denied relief, nonetheless, based on two determinations: first, that Smith’s federal claim was not preserved; second, as a result, that Smith was required by Almanza to show egregious harm. As a general matter, and absent some important exceptions, when a state court denies relief because a party failed to comply with a regularly applied and well-established state procedural rule, a federal court will not consider that issue. Ford v. Georgia, 498 U. S. 411, 423-424 (1991).
Smith disputes that the application of Almanza on state habeas review is a “firmly established and regularly followed state practice.” James v. Kentucky, 466 U. S. 341, 348-349 (1984). The State argues it is. We may assume the State is correct on this point, for in our view the predicate finding of procedural failure that led the Court of Criminal Appeals to apply the heightened Almanza standard is based on a misinterpretation of federal law.
The State and the Court of Criminal Appeals read Smith I as having reversed because the nullification charge “prevented giving effect to [Smith’s] mitigating evidence because it placed the jurors in an unconstitutional ethical quandary.” Brief for Respondent 28. It is true Smith’s second state habeas petition included an argument that the nullification charge itself prevented the jury from considering his mitigating evidence. This, however, was not the only, or even the primary, argument he presented to the Court of Criminal Appeals and this Court. As detailed above, Smith’s central objection at each stage has been to the special issues.
In Smith I, this Court agreed the special issues were inadequate and so reversed the Court of Criminal Appeals. In challenging the special issues Smith did contend that the nullification charge was flawed. This Court engaged in much the same analysis. That analysis was only necessary, however, because the Court of Criminal Appeals had twice rejected Smith’s claim of Penry error based on the mistaken idea that “regardless of whether [Smith’s] mitigating evidence was beyond the scope of the two statutory special is-
sues, the judge’s extensive supplemental [nullification] instruction provided a sufficient vehicle for the jury to consider all of [Smith’s] mitigating evidence.” Ex parte Smith, 132 S. W. 3d, at 410. In other words, Smith argued, and this Court agreed, that the special issues prevented the jury from considering his mitigating evidence; and the nullification charge failed to cure that error. In its opposition to certiorari in Smith I, the State understood that under Penry II it was the special issues, not the nullification charge, that created the error. See Brief in Opposition in Smith v. Texas, O. T. 2004, No. 04-5323, p. 17 (“In essence, the [nullification] instruction did not create new error; rather, the instruction simply failed to correct the error identified in Penry F).
The Court of Criminal Appeals’ mistaken belief that Penry II, and by extension Smith I, rested on a separate error arising from the nullification charge may have stemmed from Smith’s use of the term “Penry II error” in his supplemental brief and from this Court’s citation to Penry II, rather than Penry I, in Smith I. Applicant’s Supp. Briefing 11. Smith’s labeling of the claim in his supplemental brief, however, did not change its substance. See Ex parte Caldwell, 58 S. W. 3d 127, 130 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Rawlings v. State, 874 S. W. 2d 740, 742 (Tex. App. Fort Worth 1994). And this Court’s reference to Penry II, rather than Penry I, has been explained above. As the parties’ post-trial filings, the state courts’ judgments, and this Court’s decision in Smith I make clear, Smith challenged the special issues under Penry I at trial and did not abandon or transform that claim during his lengthy post-trial proceedings.
After Smith I, the State argued for the first time that Smith’s pretrial motions, and his argument on direct appeal, raised a “statutory” complaint about the entire Texas death penalty scheme different from his current theory. State's Brief on Remand 6. The State expanded on that claim in its arguments to this Court, in which it suggested Smith made a strategic decision to launch a broad attack on the state system rather than attempt to obtain adequate instructions in his own case. Brief for Respondent 28, 32-33; Tr. of Oral Arg. 40. Regardless of how the State now characterizes it, Smith’s claim was treated by the Court of Criminal Appeals as a Penry challenge to the adequacy of the special issues in his case, and that is how it was treated by this Court in Smith 1.
The Court of Criminal Appeals on remand misunderstood the interplay of Penry I and Penry II, and it mistook which of Smith’s claims furnished the basis for this Court’s opinion in Smith I. These errors of federal law led the state court to conclude Smith had not preserved at trial the claim this Court vindicated in Smith I, even when the Court of Criminal Appeals previously had held Smith’s claim of Penry error was preserved. The state court’s error of federal law cannot be the predicate for requiring Smith to show egregious harm. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U. S. 68, 75 (1985).
B
Under Almanza, once Smith established the existence of instructional error that was preserved by a proper objection, he needed only to show he suffered “some harm” from that error. In other words, relief should be granted so long as the error was not harmless. 686 S. W. 2d, at 171. It would appear this lower standard applies to Smith’s preserved challenge to the special issues.
The Court of Criminal Appeals explained in its recent decision in Penry v. State, 178 S. W. 3d 782 (2005), that once a state habeas petitioner establishes “a reasonable likelihood that the jury believed that it was not permitted to consider” some mitigating evidence, he has shown that the error was not harmless and therefore is grounds for reversal. Id., at 786-788 (citing Boyde v. California, 494 U. S. 370 (1990)). We note that the Court of Criminal Appeals stated in dicta in this case that even assuming Smith had established that there was a reasonable probability of error, he had not shown “‘actual’ harm,” 185 S. W. 3d, at 468, and therefore would not even satisfy the lower Almanza standard. We must assume that this departure from the clear rule of Penry v. State resulted from the state court’s confusion over our decision in Smith I.
The Court of Criminal Appeals is, of course, required to defer to our finding of Penry error, which is to say our finding that Smith has shown there was a reasonable likelihood that the jury interpreted the special issues to foreclose adequate consideration of his mitigating evidence. See Johnson v. Texas, 509 U. S. 350, 367 (1993). Accordingly, it appears Smith is entitled to relief under the state harmless-error framework.
* * Hs
In light of our resolution of this case, we need not reach the question whether the nullification charge resulted in a separate jury-confusion error, and if so whether that error is subject to harmless-error review.
For the reasons we have stated, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Chief Justice Vinson
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The petitioners in these causes — a corporation and some of its stockholders — seek an accounting from respondents — certain other corporations which, prior to a reorganization in 1943, were subsidiaries of the petitioning corporation. It is petitioners’ theory that respondents had unjustly enriched themselves by wrongfully appropriating a “tax loss” incurred by petitioner Western Pacific Railroad Corporation and applying it to the sole benefit of respondent Western Pacific Railroad Company.
The factual background upon which petitioners’ complaint was founded is as complicated as it is unique. For present purposes, we may pass over it. Suffice it to say that the cause of action was founded on a theory of unjust enrichment; jurisdiction of the federal courts was invoked upon the grounds of the diverse citizenship of the parties.
The District Court denied relief, and the Court of Appeals affirmed by a two-to-one vote. Petitioners then applied for a rehearing before the Court of Appeals en banc. With one dissent, the rehearing was denied; the court in its order struck the request that the rehearing be en banc. Petitioners then filed a second application protesting that the action of the two judges, who struck out the request for a rehearing en banc, was error because such a request was authorized by statute and required the attention of the full court.
The Court of Appeals, en banc, declined to entertain this second application. Chief Judge Denman dissented. We granted certiorari; among other things, we deemed it important to resolve the en banc questions precipitated by this litigation. 344 U. S. 809.
The issues stem from 28 U. S. C. § 46 (c). It reads:
“Cases and controversies shall be heard and determined by a court or division of not more than three judges, unless a hearing or rehearing before the court in banc is ordered by a majority of the circuit judges. of the circuit who are in active service. A court in banc shall consist of all active circuit judges of the circuit.”
It is petitioners’ claim that the Code vests in a defeated party the right to ask for a rehearing en banc; the court as a whole must act upon such a petition; thus the Court of Appeals erred in refusing to entertain the application in this case.
Obviously, the claim calls for close analysis of § 46 (c). What particular right, if any, does it give to a litigant in a Court of Appeals? To what extent is he entitled to put the merits of his cause before each member of the court in pressing his demand for a hearing or a rehearing before the entire court?
In our view, § 46 (c) is not addressed to litigants. It is addressed to the Court of Appeals. It is a grant of power. It vests in the court the power to order hearings en banc. It goes no further. It neither forbids nor requires each active member of a Court of Appeals to entertain each petition for a hearing or rehearing en banc. The court is left free to devise its own administrative machinery to provide the means whereby a majority may order such a hearing.
The statute, enacted in 1948, is but a legislative ratification of Textile Mills Securities Corp. v. Commissioner, 314 U. S. 326 (1941) — a decision which went no further than to sustain the power of a Court of Appeals to order a hearing en banc. When the statute is cast in historical perspective, this becomes more readily apparent.
As early as 1938, the Judicial Conference of Senior Circuit Judges recommended that the Judicial Code be amended to make it clear that “the majority of the circuit judges may be able to provide for a court of more than three judges when in their opinion-unusual circumstances make such action advisable.” The recommendation was renewed in 1939 and again in 1940. Thereafter, in 1941, when a conflict developed between circuits as to the power to sit en banc under the old Judicial Code, identical bills were introduced in both the House (H. R. 3390) and the Senate (S. 1053) to amend the Code as recommended by the Judicial Conference. The proposed amendment took the form of a proviso to § 117:
“... Provided, That, in a circuit where there are more than three circuit judges, the majority of the circuit judges may provide for a court of all the active and available circuit judges of the circuit to sit in banc for the hearing of particular cases, when in their opinion such action is advisable.” H. R. 3390, S. 1053, 77th Cong., 1st Sess.
When this legislation came up for a hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Senator Danaher expressly raised the problem, “On whose motion would the court assemble en banc?” He was told that counsel might make a “suggestion,” but that “the convening of the full court would be at the initiative of the court,” and that it would not be desirable “to encourage the initiation of this suggestion by counsel.” Senator McFarland said that from looking at the provision he got the impression that “they [the court] would be the ones to do the acting.” Senator Kilgore agreed. Senator Danaher concluded that the amendment would be “impractical unless we make it clear that... the judges themselves decide.”
This bit of legislative history is significant. Congress was attempting to frame legislation which would empower a majority of circuit judges in any Court of Appeals to “provide” for hearings en banc. The problem was immediately raised: how would a court be convened en banc — would the legislation, as framed, give litigants the right to compel every judge to act on an application for a full court? The proponents of the legislation, and those who studied it, worked out this answer in their study of the problem: the determination of how the en banc power was to be exercised was to rest with the court itself — litigants should be free to suggest that a particular case was appropriate for consideration by the full court, but they should be given no right to compel all circuit judges to take formal action on the suggestion.
Subsequent history of later proposals — drafted in substantially similar language — discloses no change in purpose. The amendment to § 117 of the old Judicial Code passed the House, but it was never acted upon by the Senate. It may have died because this Court’s decision in Textile Mills intervened.
The inter-circuit conflict which brought on the proposed amendment to § 117, and which was later resolved by the decision of this Court in Textile Mills, was purely a dispute over the power to sit en banc; it never reached the problem of how en banc proceedings were to be initiated. In Lang’s Estate v. Commissioner, 97 F. 2d 867 (1938), the Ninth Circuit had held that under § 117 there was no way in which a circuit of more than three judges could provide the means to convene itself en banc. But the Third Circuit, in Textile Mills, reached a contrary conclusion:
.. we cannot agree with Judge Denman’s contrary conclusion in Lang’s Estate.... We conclude that this court has power to provide, as it has done by Rule 4 (1), for sessions of the court en banc, consisting of all the circuit judges of the circuit in active service.” 117 F. 2d 62, 70-71. (Emphasis supplied.)
In affirming the Third Circuit, this Court did no more than sustain that court’s exercise of the “power to provide... for sessions of the court en banc.” There is nothing in that decision to indicate that we recognized any right in parties to have their cases passed upon by more than three circuit judges.
This was the state of the law in 1944, when the movement to revise the Judicial Code was in its early stages. At that time, Judge Maris, Chairman of the Judicial Conference Committee on the Revision of the Judicial Code, submitted a memorandum to the House Committee on Revision of Laws. Pointing to this Court’s decision in Textile Mills, he urged that the new Code should expressly provide “that except in cases and controversies... which the court by rule or special order directs to be heard by the full court, all cases and controversies brought before the court shall be heard by not more than three judges.” This proposal was the genesis of the present § 46 (c). It was motivated by a dual purpose: to give express recognition to the doctrine of Textile Mills, while at the same time securing the tradition of three-judge courts against any further intrusion.
The first legislative draft of § 46 (c) did not differ in any material respect from its present form, and the provision passed through the succeeding drafts and stages of legislative development without attracting any specific comment. But we are not left unassisted when we seek to divine the legislators’ understanding of § 46 (c). We have the Reviser’s Notes, which are entitled to great weight. These comments were before Congress when it reviewed the proposed revision of the Code, and were relied upon to “explain... the source of the law and the changes made in the course of the codification and revision.”
The Reviser’s Notes tell us that their purpose was twofold: to “authorize the establishment of divisions of the court,” and to “provide for the assignment of circuit judges for hearings” en banc. Referring to the latter purpose, the Notes quote extensively from this Court’s opinion in Textile Mills. The language they quote is significant. It describes certain housekeeping functions of a Court of Appeals — functions which cannot be discharged by the court unless, on its own motion, it convenes itself as a body and acts as a body — such as rule making, appointing clerks and fixing the times when court shall be held. Clearly the Reviser’s Notes assimilated the power to sit en banc to the power to discharge these housekeeping functions, and it was precisely that description of the power which the revisers saw fit to use in describing to Congress what they deemed to be the nature of the power conferred by § 46 (c).
Furthermore, the Notes make it apparent that if the revisers intended to do anything more than codify Textile Mills, their concern was with preserving the “tradition” of three-judge courts against any further inroads. An interpretation of § 46 (c), which authorizes litigants, of right, to compel nonsitting judges to act in every case, is certainly a departure from the tradition of three-judge courts — a most controversial change which was plainly not anticipated by Textile Mills. Yet Congress’ purpose was codification, not alteration, of the rules pertaining to the administration of the courts. The Senate was told by its Judiciary Committee that “great care has been exercised to make no changes in the existing law which would not meet with substantially unanimous approval.” Similarly, Judge Maris told the House Committee on the Judiciary that the new Code “embodies a number of practical improvements in the judicial machinery of a wholly noncontroversial nature which have resulted from suggestions originating with the judges whose day to day administration of the various provisions of the Judicial Code gives them a special knowledge of these matters.”
A first reading of § 46 (c) may well leave one with doubts. It reposes power in “a majority of active circuit judges,” and says no more. Perhaps, without further study, one might be inclined to fall back upon the general experience of our jurisprudence, and determine that the litigant is, by implication, given the right to compel the full court to determine whether it will exercise its power in a given case. But a study of the legislative background of § 46 (c) dispels such an idea and makes it quite clear that the draftsmen intended to grant the en banc power and no more; the court itself was to establish the procedure for exercise of the power.
This interpretation makes for an harmonious reading of the whole of § 46. In this Section, Congress speaks to the Courts of Appeals: the court, itself, as a body, is authorized to arrange its calendar and distribute its work among its membership; the court, itself, as a body, may designate the places where it will sit. Ordinarily, added Congress, cases are to be heard by divisions of three. But Congress went further; it left no doubt that the court, by a majority vote, could convene itself en banc to hear or rehear particular cases.
The juxtaposition of this last enactment with the others negates petitioners’ interpretation of the Act. Litigants are certainly given no special standing to partake, as of right, in the court’s decisions pertaining to arrangement of its calendar and the assignment of its cases to divisions. Just as the statute makes no provision binding the court to entertain every request that a particular case be assigned to a particular division, so it should not be construed to compel the court to entertain, en banc, motions for a hearing or rehearing en banc.
A contrary reading — one which would sustain petitioners — would obviously require a practice which might thrust unwarranted extra burdens on the court. It is difficult to believe that Congress intended to give an automatic, second appeal to each litigant in a Court of Appeals composed of more than three judges. Yet petitioners would have us hold that such a “horizontal” appeal is implicit in § 46. And, if petitioners are correct as to their claim that petitions for rehearing en banc must, as a matter of law, be passed upon by the full bench, the argument should apply equally to petitions requesting that the initial hearing of the case be en banc, because § 46 (c) treats “hearings” and “rehearings” with equality. But, again, there is nothing to suggest that every party in every case in every Court of Appeals may submit, as of right, a petition to every judge — a petition in the nature of a preliminary appeal — asking that the full bench examine his cause and formally rule on the question of whether it shall be heard en banc.
Accordingly, we hold that § 46 (c) does not require a Court of Appeals to do what petitioners claim should have been done in this case. The statute deals, not with rights, but with power. The manner in which that power is to be administered is left to the court itself. A majority may choose to abide by the decision of the division by entrusting the initiation of a hearing or rehearing en banc to the three judges who are selected to hear the case. On the other hand, there is nothing in § 46 (c) which requires the full bench to adhere to a rule which delegates that responsibility to the division. Because § 46 (c) is a grant of power, and nothing more, each Court of Appeals is vested with a wide latitude of discretion to decide for itself just how that power shall be exercised.
But even if the statute grants only power plus the discretion for its exercise, that does not mark the end of our review of the en banc phase of this case. The en banc power, confirmed by § 46 (c), is, as we emphasized in the Textile Mills case, a necessary and useful power — indeed too useful that we should ever permit a court to ignore the possibilities of its use in cases where its use might be appropriate. If § 46 (c) is to achieve its fundamental purpose, certain fundamental requirements should be observed by the Courts of Appeals. In the exercise of our “general power to supervise the administration of justice in the federal courts,” the responsibility lies with this Court to define these requirements and insure their observance.
It is essential, of course, that a circuit court, and the litigants who appear before it, understand the practice— whatever it may be — whereby the court convenes itself en banc. In promulgating the rules governing that procedure the court should recognize the full scope of its powers under § 46 (c). Consistent with the statute, the court may, as has been shown, adopt a practice whereby the majority of the full bench may determine whether there will be hearings or rehearings en banc, or they may delegate the responsibility for the initiation of the en banc power to the divisions of the court. But in recognizing the full scope of § 46 (c), the full membership of the court will be mindful, of course, that the statute commits the en banc power to the majority of active circuit judges so that a majority always retains the power to revise the procedure and withdraw whatever responsibility may have been delegated to the division. And, recognizing the value of an efficient use of the en banc power, the court should adopt such means as will enable its full membership to determine whether the court’s administration of the power is achieving the full purpose of the statute so that the court will better be able to change its en banc procedure, should it deem change advisable.
It is also essential that litigants be left free to suggest to the court, or to the division — depending upon where power of initiation resides, as determined by the active circuit judges of the court — that a particular case is appropriate for consideration by all the judges. A court may take steps to use the en banc power sparingly, but it may not take steps to curtail its use indiscriminately. Counsel are often well equipped to point up special circumstances and important implications calling for en banc consideration of the cases which they ask the court to decide. If, in the exercise of its discretion under § 46 (c), a court denies litigants the privilege of reaching the ear of every circuit judge on the en banc question, there is still no reason to deny them access to the few circuit judges who must act initially, and perhaps decisively, on the matter for the others. Counsel’s suggestion need not require any formal action by the court; it need not be treated as a motion; it is enough if the court simply gives each litigant an opportunity to call attention to circumstances in a particular case which might warrant a rehearing en banc. And of course to hold that counsel are entitled to speak to the en banc question, is not to hold that the court itself is in any way deprived of the power to initiate én banc hearings sua sponte. The statute commits the power of initiation to the court; the litigants’ function must therefore be limited; but, certainly, if the en banc power is to be wisely utilized, there is no reason to deny the litigants any chance to aid the court in its effective implementation of the statute.
Finally, it is essential to recognize that the question of whether a cause should be heard en banc is an issue which should be considered separate and apart from the question of whether there should be a rehearing by the division. The three judges who decide an appeal may be satisfied as to the correctness of their decision. Yet, upon reflection, after fully hearing an appeal, they may come to believe that the case is of such significance to the full court that it deserves the attention of the full court.
The foregoing should make it clear that rejection of petitioners’ interpretation of § 46 (c) does not compel affirmance of all that was done below in disposing of the applications for a rehearing en banc. It should also be decided whether the en banc issue has been adequately-treated by the Court of Appeals. A review of the proceedings below convinces us that further consideration by that court is appropriate.
After the division which heard the appeal had announced its decision, petitioners asked for a rehearing en banc. A per curiam issued from the division:
“The petitions of the appellants and intervenors for a rehearing are denied. Insofar as the petitions seek a rehearing en banc, they are stricken as being without authority in law or in the rules or practice of the court. See Kronberg v. Hale, 9 Cir., 181 F. 2d 767.” 197 F. 2d, at 1012.
The striking of petitioners’ motion is certainly ambiguous. If we accord full legal significance to this order, we must conclude that the division ruled that counsel were not free to suggest, even to the division, that the case was appropriate for a rehearing en banc. Enough has already been said to show that this was error.
Indeed, if the three judges who decided the merits of this cause were of the opinion that counsel’s request was “without authority in law,” it may well be that they simply considered themselves powerless to act in any way on the en banc question. Two judges on the panel were district judges. One district judge dissented from the denial of a rehearing, and his understanding of the procedure which the Court of Appeals utilized to convene its full bench seems to differ from what was subsequently-announced by six members of the court. Indeed, at that time, it was by no means clear just what procedure the court followed to convene itself en banc.
Following the second decision of the division, petitioners renewed their demand for a rehearing en banc by asking the court to reinstate their petition. Chief Judge Denman convened the active circuit judges so that the court might determine its authority in the matter, set forth its interpretation of § 46 (c) and fully advise the bar of its determination. Accordingly the court, en banc, declined to entertain petitioners’ application and proceeded to explain why. Construing § 46 (c) the court said, 197 F. 2d, at 1015:
“The statute, it will be recalled, commits to a 'court or division of not more than three judges’ the power to hear and determine the cases and controversies assigned to it. Obviously its determination of any such case or controversy is a decision of the Court of Appeals, and as such is a final decision, subject to review only as prescribed by 28 U. S. C. A. § 1254. Circuit judges other than those designated to sit on such court or division are not members of it, and officially they play, and are entitled to play, no part in its deliberations at any stage. That this is so is made clear by subdivision (a) of § 46... providing that ‘Circuit judges shall sit on the court and its divisions in such order and at such times as the court directs.’ If regard be had for this mandate circuit judges may not intrude themselves, or be compelled on petition of a losing party to intrude, upon a court or division on which they have not by order of the court been directed to sit.
“A petition for rehearing in any such case, whatever its form or wording, must necessarily be treated as addressed to and is solely for disposition by the court or division to which the case was assigned for determination.... From this time forward petitions, if any, for rehearing in banc in cases determined by divisions of three judges will be considered and disposed of by the latter as ordinary petitions for rehearing.”
This language suggests that the full bench has refused completely to consider the merits of the en banc request. Instead, the court ruled that, “from this time forward,” the division, alone, is entrusted with that-responsibility. Yet there is nothing to show that this procedure, which the full bench said was to govern henceforth, had been followed by the division in this case. On the contrary, as has been shown, the division in this case apparently acted on the theory that it was “without authority in law” to consider the en banc request.
This language also suggests that the court thought that it had no discretion in administering the en banc power, that § 46 (c) “necessarily” limited consideration of the question of whether there should be a hearing en banc to the division. Perhaps other language in the opinion negates the inference that the full court ruled as it did because it believed the statute required that result and permitted no alternative practice. But, at the very least, we are left in doubt. Certainly Chief Judge Denman, who dissented vigorously, thought that the court’s ruling came as a matter of statutory compulsion. And of course if it did, it rests on an erroneous interpretation of § 46 (c).
We have, then, a record which seems to tell us that the division of the Court of Appeals, which decided the merits of this difficult and complicated litigation, turned a deaf ear to counsel’s request for a full bench — quite conceivably on the theory that the division lacked the power to act. Likewise the full bench refused to countenance the request, saying that the initial responsibility “necessarily” lay with the division alone — although the division may have been unaware of that responsibility. Possibly acting under a misconception of the breadth of its powers, the full bench has promulgated rules for the hearing of cases en banc, and if the court has misconceived its powers perhaps it may now wish to adopt some other practice to administer § 46 (c).
The statute which we have construed is not without ambiguity; perhaps that difficulty is now resolved. The action of the court below is also not without ambiguity, for the court announced a practice which, “from this time forward,” was to govern the ordering of rehearings en banc, but that practice was not followed in this case; neither the full bench nor the division — whose decision was to govern henceforth — gave any independent consideration to the merits of the en banc issue in this case.
Accordingly, we vacate the order of the division denying petitioners a rehearing and vacate the order of the full court denying petitioners leave to file a motion to reinstate their petition for rehearing en banc; we remand the case to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings. We hold that the statute is simply a grant of power to order hearings and rehearings en banc and to establish the procedure governing the exercise of that power. We hold that litigants are given no statutory right to compel each member of the court to give formal consideration to an application for a rehearing en banc. We hold that the statute does not compel the court to adopt any particular procedure governing the exercise of the power; but whatever the procedure which is adopted, it should be clearly explained, so that the members of the court and litigants in the court may become thoroughly familiar with it; and further, whatever the procedure which is adopted, it should not prevent a litigant from suggesting to those judges who, under the procedure established by the court, have the responsibility of initiating a rehearing en banc, that his case is an appropriate one for the exercise of the power. On remand, and in light of our interpretation of the statute and the basic requirements necessary for its efficient administration, the court should determine and clearly set forth the particular procedure it will follow, henceforth, in exercising its en banc power. If the court chooses to abide by a procedure which entrusts the initiation of rehearings en banc to the division, then the court should give an opportunity to the division for appropriate consideration of that question in this case.
Now the Judicial Conference of the United States.
Annual Report of the Attorney General (1938) p. 23. For a full treatment of statutory difficulties which gave rise to some doubts as to the power to sit en banc, see Textile Mills Securities Corp. v. Commissioner, 314 U. S. 326, 328-330.
Annual Report of the Attorney General (1939) pp. 15, 16. Report of the Judicial Conference of Senior Circuit Judges (1940) p. 7.
Lang’s Estate v. Commissioner, 97 F. 2d 867 (C. A. 9th Cir. 1938); Commissioner v. Textile Mills Securities Corp., 117 F. 2d 62 (C. A. 3d Cir. 1940), discussed in text infra.
The full text of this discussion is found in the Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on S. 1053, 77th Cong., 1st Sess.
87 Cong. Rec. 8117. See H. R. Rep. No. 1246, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. Much of this legislative history is set out in footnote 14 of Mr. Justice Douglas’ opinion for the Court in Textile Mills.
Supra, note 4.
Memorandum of August 18, 1944, submitted to the Committee on Revision of Laws on August 21, 1944. (Emphasis supplied.) See note 9, infra.
Revision of Federal Judicial Code, Preliminary Draft [of H. R. 3498, 79th Cong., 1st Sess.], Committee Print (1945), p. 11. The Reviser’s Notes to § 46 (c) in this preliminary draft contained the following: “Such subsection (c) is based on recommendations of Circuit Judge Albert B. Maris of the third circuit in his memorandum dated August 18, 1944, and submitted to the Committee on Revision of the Laws on August 21, 1944.”
H. R. 3498, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. §46 (c) read:
“(c) In each circuit cases shall be heard and determined by a court or division of not more than three judges unless a hearing or rehearing before the court in banc is ordered by a majority of the circuit judges of the circuit who are in active service. A court in banc shall consist of all active circuit judges present and available in the circuit.”
The section came into its present form in the next draft, H. R. 7124, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. § 46 (c).
Ex parte Collett, 337 U. S. 55, 68-71 (1949).
S. Rep. No. 1559, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 2.
The full text of the Reviser’s Note (6 U. S. Cong. Serv. ’48, pp. 1707-1708) reads:
“Based in part on title 28, U. S. C., 1940 ed., § 212 (Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 117, 36 Stat. 1131).
“Subsections (a)-(c) authorize the establishment of divisions of the court and provide for the assignment of circuit judges for hearings and rehearings in banc.
“The Supreme Court of the United States has ruled that, notwithstanding the three-judge provision of section 212 of title 28, U. S. C., 1940 ed., a court of appeals might lawfully consist of a greater number of judges, and that the five active circuit judges of the third circuit might sit in banc for the determination of an appeal. (See Textile Mills Securities Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 1941, 62 S. Ct. 272, 314 U. S. 326, 86 L. Ed. 249.)
“The Supreme Court in upholding the unanimous view of the five judges as to their right to sit in banc, notwithstanding the contrary opinion in Langs Estate v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 1938, 97 F. 2d 867, said in the Textile Mills case: ‘There are numerous functions of the court, as a “court of record, with appellate jurisdiction”, other than hearing and deciding appeals. Under the Judicial Code these embrace: prescribing the form of writs and other process and the form and style of its seal (28 U. S. C., § 219); the making of rules and regulations (28 U. S. C., § 219); the appointment of a clerk (28 U. S. C., § 221) and the approval of the appointment and removal of deputy clerks (28 U. S. C., § 222); and the fixing of the “times” when court shall be held (28 U. S. C., § 223). Furthermore, those various sections of the Judicial Code provide that each of these functions shall be performed by the court.’
“This section preserves the interpretation established by the Textile Mills case but provides in subsection (c) that cases shall be heard by a court of not more than three judges unless the court has provided for hearing in bane. This provision continues the tradition of a three-judge appellate court and makes the decision of a division, the decision of the court, unless rehearing in banc is ordered. It makes judges available for other assignments, and permits a rotation of judges in such manner as to give to each a maximum of time for the preparation of opinions.
“Whether divisions should sit simultaneously at the same or different places in the circuit is a matter for each court to determine.”
314 U. S., at 332.
See the next to final paragraph quoted in note 13, supra.
S. Rep. No. 1559, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 2. (Emphasis supplied.)
Hearings before Subcommittee No. 1 of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives on H. R. 1600 and H. R. 2055, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 19. (Emphasis supplied.)
The full text of 28 U. S. C. § 46 reads:
"Assignment of judges; divisions; hearings; quorum.
“(a) Circuit judges shall sit on the court and its divisions in such order and at such times as the court directs.
“(b) In each circuit the court may authorize the hearing and determination of cases and controversies by separate divisions, each consisting of three judges. Such divisions shall sit at the times and places and hear the cases and controversies assigned as the court directs.
“(c) Cases and controversies shall be heard and determined by a court or division of not more than three judges, unless a hearing or rehearing before the court in banc is ordered by a majority of the circuit judges of the circuit who are in active service. A court in banc shall consist of all active circuit judges of the circuit.
“(d) A majority of the number of judges authorized to constitute a court or division thereof, as provided in paragraph (c), shall constitute a quorum.”
Having wide discretion the court may provide that the power may be called into play by any procedure convenient to the court. The statute simply provides that “a majority of the circuit judges of the circuit who are in active service” may order the hearing or rehearing en banc. This should not compel the full court to assemble, formally, en banc, to issue an order convening the full court. A more informal procedure may be used; such an order may be issued by the Chief Judge through the individual action of the necessary circuit judges without the necessity of convening the full court.
See 314 U. S., at 334-336. For further discussion on the utility and importance of permitting courts of appeals to sit en banc, reflecting the purpose behind §46 (c), see H. R. Rep. No. 1246, 77th Cong., 1st Sess.; Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on S. 1053, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 39-40. See also Annual Report of the Attorney General (1939) pp. 15, 16; Report of the Judicial Conference of Senior Circuit Judges (1940) p. 7. That this Court has deemed the en banc power to be an important and useful device in the administration of justice in the courts of appeals is apparent from our action in United States ex rel. Robinson v. Johnston, 316 U. S. 649 (1942), and Civil Aeronautics Board v. American Air Transport, Inc., 344 U. S. 4 (1952). In the Robinson case, supra, where it appeared that a “conflict of views” had arisen “among the judges of the Ninth Circuit,” we remanded the case “for further proceedings, including leave to petitioner to apply for a hearing before the court en banc.” 316 U. S. 649, 650. In the American Air Transport case, supra, where the division of the Court of Appeals “were unable to agree on a disposition of the case,” we said, after dismissing the certificate: “Perhaps the Court of Appeals may now wish to hear this case en banc to resolve the deadlock indicated in the certificate and give full review to the entire case.” 344 U. S., at 5.
See United States v. National City Lines, 334 U. S. 573, 589 (1948).
Cf. United States ex rel. Robinson
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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I
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Powell
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question in this case is whether a dominant shareholder who voluntarily surrenders a portion of his shares to the corporation, but retains control, may immediately deduct from taxable income his basis in the surrendered shares.
I
Respondents Peter and Karla Fink were the principal shareholders of Travco Corporation, a Michigan manufacturer of motor homes. Travco had one class of common stock outstanding and no preferred stock. Mr. Fink owned 52.2 percent, and Mrs. Fink 20.3 percent, of the outstanding shares. Travco urgently needed new capital as a result of financial difficulties it encountered in the mid-1970’s. The Finks voluntarily surrendered some of their shares to Travco in an effort to “increase the attractiveness of the corporation to outside investors.” Brief for Respondents 3. Mr. Fink surrendered 116,146 shares in December 1976; Mrs. Fink surrendered 80,000 shares in January 1977. As a result, the Finks’ combined percentage ownership of Travco was reduced from 72.5 percent to 68.5 percent. The Finks received no consideration for the surrendered shares, and no other shareholder surrendered any stock. The effort to attract new investors was unsuccessful, and the corporation eventually was liquidated.
On their 1976 and 1977 joint federal income tax returns, the Finks claimed ordinary loss deductions totaling $389,040, the full amount of their adjusted basis in the surrendered shares. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue disallowed the deductions. He concluded that the stock surrendered was a contribution to the corporation’s capital. Accordingly, the Commissioner determined that the surrender resulted in no immediate tax consequences, and that the Finks’ basis in the surrendered shares should be added to the basis of their remaining shares of Travco stock.
In an unpublished opinion, the Tax Court sustained the Commissioner’s determination for the reasons stated in Frantz v. Commissioner, 83 T. C. 162, 174-182 (1984), aff’d, 784 F. 2d 119 (CA2 1986), cert. pending, No. 86-11. In Frantz the Tax Court held that a stockholder’s non pro rata surrender of shares to the corporation does not produce an immediate loss. The court reasoned that “[t]his conclusion . . . necessarily follows from a recognition of the purpose of the transfer, that is, to bolster the financial position of [the corporation] and, hence, to protect and make more valuable [the stockholder’s] retained shares.” 83 T. C., at 181. Because the purpose of the shareholder’s surrender is “to decrease or avoid a loss on his overall investment,” the Tax Court in Frantz was “unable to conclude that [he] sustained a loss at the time of the transaction.” Ibid. “Whether [the shareholder] would sustain a loss, and if so, the amount thereof, could only be determined when he subsequently disposed of the stock that the surrender was intended to protect and make more valuable.” Ibid. The Tax Court recognized that it had sustained the taxpayer’s position in a series of prior cases. Id., at 174-175. But it concluded that these decisions were incorrect, in part because they “encourage[d] a conversion of eventual capital losses into immediate ordinary losses.” Id., at 182.
In this case, a divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the Tax Court. 789 F. 2d 427 (1986). The court concluded that the proper tax treatment of this type of stock surrender turns on the choice between “unitary” and “fragmented” views of stock ownership. Under the “fragmented view,” “each share of stock is considered a separate investment,” and gain or loss is computed separately on the sale or other disposition of each share. Id., at 429. According to the “unitary view,” “the ‘stockholder’s entire investment is viewed as a single indivisible property unit,’” ibid, (citation omitted), and a sale or disposition of some of the stockholder’s shares only produces “an ascertainable gain or loss when the stockholder has disposed of his remaining shares.” Id., at 432. The court observed that both it and the Tax Court generally had adhered to the fragmented view, and concluded that “the facts of the instant case [do not] present sufficient justification for abandoning” it. Id., at 431. It therefore held that the Finks were entitled to deduct their basis in the surrendered shares immediately as an ordinary loss, except to the extent that the surrender had increased the value of their remaining shares. The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the Tax Court for a determination of the increase, if any, in the value of the Finks’ remaining shares that was attributable to the surrender.
Judge Joiner dissented. Because the taxpayers’ “sole motivation in disposing of certain shares is to benefit the other shares they hold[,]. . . [vjiewing the surrender of each share as the termination of an individual investment ignores the very reason for the surrender.” Id., at 435. He concluded: “Particularly in cases such as this, where the diminution in the shareholder’s corporate control and equity interest is so minute as to be illusory, the stock surrender should be regarded as a contribution to capital.” Ibid.
We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the Circuits, 479 U. S. 960 (1986), and now reverse.
II
A
It is settled that a shareholder’s voluntary contribution to the capital of the corporation has no immediate tax consequences. 26 U. S. C. §263; 26 CFR § 1.263(a)-2(f) (1986). Instead, the shareholder is entitled to increase the basis of his shares- by the amount of his basis in the property transferred to the corporation. See 26 U. S. C. § 1016(a)(1). When the shareholder later disposes of his shares, his contribution is reflected as a smaller taxable gain or a larger deductible loss. This rule applies not only to transfers of cash or tangible property, but also to a shareholder’s forgiveness of a debt owed to him by the corporation. 26 CFR § 1.61-12(a) (1986). Such transfers are treated as contributions to capital even if the other shareholders make proportionately smaller contributions, or no contribution at all. See, e. g., Sackstein v. Commissioner, 14 T. C. 566, 569 (1950). The rules governing contributions to capital reflect the general principle that a shareholder may not claim an immediate loss for outlays made to benefit the corporation. Deputy v. Du Pont, 308 U. S. 488 (1940); Eskimo Pie Corp. v. Commissioner, 4 T. C. 669, 676 (1945), aff’d, 153 F. 2d 301 (CA3 1946). We must decide whether this principle also applies to a controlling shareholder’s non pro rata surrender of a portion of his shares.
B
The Finks contend that they sustained an immediate loss upon surrendering some of their shares to the corporation. By parting with the shares, they gave up an ownership interest entitling them to future dividends, future capital appreciation, assets in the event of liquidation, and voting rights. Therefore, the Finks contend, they are entitled to an immediate deduction. See 26 U. S. C. §§ 165(a) and (c)(2). In addition, the Finks argue that any non pro rata stock transaction “give[s] rise to immediate tax results.” Brief for Respondents 13. For example, a non pro rata stock dividend produces income because it increases the recipient’s proportionate ownership of the corporation. Koshland v. Helvering, 298 U. S. 441, 445 (1936). By analogy, the Finks argue that a non pro rata surrender of shares should be recognized as an immediate loss because it reduces the surrendering shareholder’s proportionate ownership.
Finally, the Finks contend that their stock surrenders were not contributions to the corporation’s capital. They note that a typical contribution to capital, unlike a non pro rata stock surrender, has no effect on the contributing shareholder’s proportionate interest in the corporation. Moreover, the Finks argue, a contribution of cash or other property increases the net worth of the corporation. For example, a shareholder’s forgiveness of a debt owed to him by the corporation decreases the corporation’s liabilities. In contrast, when a shareholder surrenders shares of the corporation’s own stock, the corporation’s net worth is unchanged. This is because the corporation cannot itself exercise the right to vote, receive dividends, or receive a share of assets in the event of liquidation. G. Johnson & J. Gentry, Finney and Miller’s Principles of Accounting 538 (7th ed. 1974).
III
A shareholder who surrenders a portion of his shares to the corporation has parted with an asset, but that alone does not entitle him to an immediate deduction. Indeed, if the shareholder owns less than 100 percent of the corporation’s shares, any non pro rata contribution to the corporation’s capital will reduce the net worth of the contributing shareholder. A shareholder who surrenders stock thus is similar to one who forgives or surrenders a debt owed to him by the corporation; the latter gives up interest, principal, and also potential voting power in the event of insolvency or bankruptcy. But, as stated above, such forgiveness of corporate debt is treated as a contribution to capital rather than a current deduction. Supra, at 94. The Finks’ voluntary surrender of shares, like a shareholder’s voluntary forgiveness of debt owed by the corporation, closely resembles an investment or contribution to capital. See B. Bittker & J. Eustice, Federal Income Taxation of Corporations and Shareholders § 3.14, p. 3-59 (4th ed. 1979) (“If the contribution is voluntary, it does not produce gain or loss to the shareholder”). We find the similarity convincing in this case.
The fact that a stock surrender is not recorded as a contribution to capital on the corporation’s balance sheet does not compel a different result. Shareholders who forgive a debt owed by the corporation or pay a corporate expense also are denied an immediate deduction, even though neither of these transactions is a contribution to capital in the accounting sense. Nor are we persuaded by the fact that a stock surrender, unlike a typical contribution to capital, reduces the shareholder’s proportionate interest in the corporation. This Court has never held that every change in a shareholder’s percentage ownership has immediate tax consequences. Of course, a shareholder’s receipt of property from the corporation generally is a taxable event. See 26 U. S. C. §§ 301, 316. In contrast, a shareholder’s transfer of property to the corporation usually has no immediate tax consequences. § 263.
The Finks concede that the purpose of their stock surrender was to protect or increase the value of their investment in the corporation. Brief for Respondents 3. They hoped to encourage new investors to provide needed capital and in the long run recover the value of the surrendered shares through increased dividends or appreciation in the value of their remaining shares. If the surrender had achieved its purpose, the Finks would not have suffered an economic loss. See Johnson, Tax Models for Nonprorata Shareholder Contributions, 3 Va. Tax. Rev. 81, 104-108 (1983). In this case, as in many cases involving closely held corporations whose shares are not traded on an open market, there is no reliable method of determining whether the surrender will result in a loss until the shareholder disposes of his remaining shares. Thus, the Finks’ stock surrender does not meet the requirement that an immediately deductible loss must be “actually sustained during the taxable year.” 26 CFR §1.165-1(b) (1986).
Finally, treating stock surrenders as ordinary losses might encourage shareholders in failing corporations to convert potential capital losses to ordinary losses by voluntarily surrendering their shares before the corporation fails. In this way shareholders might avoid the consequences of 26 U. S. C. § 165(g)(1), which provides for capital-loss treatment of stock that becomes worthless. Similarly, shareholders may be encouraged to transfer corporate stock rather than other property to the corporation in order to realize a current loss.
We therefore hold that a dominant shareholder who voluntarily surrenders a portion of his shares to the corporation, but retains control, does not sustain an immediate loss deductible from taxable income. Rather, the surrendering shareholder must reallocate his basis in the surrendered shares to the shares he retains. The shareholder’s loss, if any, will be recognized when he disposes of his remaining shares. A reallocation of basis is consistent with the general principle that “[p]ayments made by a stockholder of a corporation for the purpose of protecting his interest therein must be regarded as [an] additional cost of his stock,” and so cannot be deducted immediately. Eskimo Pie Corp. v. Commissioner, 4 T. C., at 676. Our holding today is not inconsistent with the settled rule that the gain or loss on the sale or disposition of shares of stock equals the difference between the amount realized in the sale or disposition and the shareholder’s basis in the particular shares sold or exchanged. See 26 U. S. C. § 1001(a); 26 CFR § 1.1012-1(c)(1) (1986). We conclude only that a controlling shareholder’s voluntary surrender of shares, like contributions of other forms of property to the corporation, is not an appropriate occasion for the recognition of gain or loss.
IV
For the reasons we have stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is reversed.
It is so ordered.
Justice Blackmun concurs in the result.
In addition, Mr. Fink’s sister owned 10 percent of the stock, his brother-in-law owned 4.1 percent, and his mother owned 2.2 percent. App. to Pet. for Cert. 30a.
The unadjusted basis of shares is their cost. 26 U. S. C. § 1012. Adjustments to basis are made for, among other things, “expenditures, receipts, losses, or other items, properly chargeable to capital account.” § 1016(a)(1).
E. g., Tilford v. Commissioner, 75 T. C. 134 (1980), rev’d, 705 F. 2d 828 (CA6), cert. denied, 464 U. S. 992 (1983); Smith v. Commissioner, 66 T. C. 622, 648 (1976), rev’d sub nom. Schleppy v. Commissioner, 601 F. 2d 196 (CA5 1979); Downer v. Commissioner, 48 T. C. 86, 91 (1967); Estate of Foster v. Commissioner, 9 T. C. 930, 934 (1947); Miller v. Commissioner, 45 B. T. A. 292, 299 (1941); Budd International Corp. v. Commissioner, 45 B. T. A. 737, 755-756 (1941). The Commissioner acquiesced in Miller and Budd, but later withdrew his acquiescence. See 1941-2 Cum. Bull. 9; 1942-2 Cum. Bull. 3; 1977-1 Cum. Bull. 2.
The dissent overstates the extent to which the Commissioner’s disallowance of ordinary loss deductions is contrary to the “settled construction of law.” Post, at 105. In fact, the Commissioner’s position was uncertain when the Finks surrendered their shares in 1976 and 1977. Although the Commissioner had acquiesced in the Tax Court’s holdings that non pro rata surrenders give rise to ordinary losses, “it often took a contrary position in litigation.” Note, Frantz or Fink: Unitary or Fractional View for Non-Prorata Stock Surrenders, 48 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 905, 908 (1987). See, e. g., Smith v. Commissioner, supra, at 647-650; Duett v. Commissioner, 19 TCM 1381 (1960). In 1969, moreover, the Commissioner clearly took the position that a non pro rata surrender by a majority shareholder is a contribution to capital that does not result in an immediate loss. Rev. Rul. 69-368, 1969-2 Cum. Bull. 27. Thus, the Finks, unlike the taxpayer in Dickman v. Commissioner, 465 U. S. 330 (1984), knew or should have known that their ordinary loss deductions might not be allowed. For this reason, the Commissioner’s disallowance of the Finks’ deductions was not an abuse of discretion.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the Tax Court’s holding and agreed with its reasoning. Frantz v. Commissioner, 784 F. 2d 119, 123-126 (1986), cert. pending, No. 86-11.
The Courts of Appeals for the Second and Fifth Circuits have held that a dominant shareholder’s non pro rata stock surrender does not give rise to an ordinary loss. Frantz v. Commissioner, supra; Schleppy v. Commissioner, supra.
The Finks concede that a pro rata stock surrender, which by definition does not change the percentage ownership of any shareholder, is not a taxable event. Cf. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189 (1920) (pro rata stock dividend does not produce taxable income).
As a practical matter, however, the Finks did not give up a great deal. Their percentage interest in the corporation declined by only 4 percent. Because the Finks retained a majority interest, this reduction in their voting power was inconsequential. Moreover, Travco, like many corporations in financial difficulties, was not paying dividends.
In most eases, however, stock dividends are not recognized as income until the shares are sold. See 26 U. S. C. § 305.
Treasury stock — that is, stock that has been issued, reacquired by the corporation, and not canceled — generally is shown as an offset to the shareholder’s equity on the liability side of the balance sheet. G. Johnson & J. Gentry, Finney and Miller’s Principles of Accounting 538 (7th ed. 1974).
For example, assume that a shareholder holding an 80 percent interest in a corporation with a total liquidation value of $100,000 makes a non pro rata contribution to the corporation’s capital of $20,000 in cash. Assume further that the shareholder has no other assets. Prior to the contribution, the shareholder’s net worth was $100,000 ($20,000 plus 80 percent of $100,000). If the corporation were immediately liquidated following the contribution, the shareholder would receive only $96,000 (80 percent of $120,000). Of course such a non pro rata contribution is rare in practice. Typically a shareholder will simply purchase additional shares.
It is true that a corporation’s stock is not considered an asset of the corporation. A corporation’s own shares nevertheless may be as valuable to the corporation as other property contributed by shareholders, as treasury shares may be resold. This is evidenced by the fact that corporations often purchase their own shares on the open market.
Indeed, if the Finks did not make this concession their surrender probably would be treated as a nondeductible gift. See 26 CFR § 25.2511-1(h)(1) (1986).
The Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-514, §§ 301, 311, 100 Stat. 2216, 2219, eliminated the differential tax rates for capital gains and ordinary income. The difference between a capital loss and an ordinary loss remains important, however, because individuals are permitted to deduct only $3,000 of capital losses against ordinary income each year, and corporations may not deduct any capital losses from ordinary income. 26 U. S. C. § 1211. In contrast, ordinary losses generally are deductible from ordinary income without limitation. §§ 165(a) and (c)(2).
The Court of Appeals in this case did not discuss the possibility of allowing a capital loss rather than an ordinary loss, and the parties raise it only in passing. We note, however that a capital loss is realized only upon the “sal[e] or exchang[e]” of a capital asset. 26 U. S. C. § 1211(b)(3). A voluntary surrender, for no consideration, would not seem to qualify as a sale or exchange. Frantz v. Commissioner, 784 P. 2d, at 124.
Our holding today also draws support from two other sections of the Code. First, § 83 provides that, if a shareholder makes a “bargain sale” of stock to a corporate officer or employee as compensation, the “bargain” element of the sale must be treated as a contribution to the corporation’s capital. S. Rep. No. 91-552, pp. 123-124 (1969); 26 CFR § 1.83-6(d) (1986). Section 83 reversed the result in Downer v. Commissioner, 48 T. C. 86 (1967), a decision predicated on the fragmented view of stock ownership adopted by the Court of Appeals in this case. To be sure, Congress was concerned in § 83 with transfers of restricted stock to employees as compensation rather than surrenders of stock to improve the corporation’s financial condition. In both cases, however, the shareholder’s underlying purpose is to increase the value of his investment.
Second, if a shareholder’s stock is redeemed — that is, surrendered to the corporation in return for cash or other property — the shareholder is not entitled to an immediate deduction unless the redemption results in a substantial reduction in the shareholder’s ownership percentage. §§ 302 (a), (b), (d); 26 CFR § 1.302-2(c) (1986). Because the Finks’ surrenders resulted in only a slight reduction in their ownership percentage, they would not have been entitled to an immediate loss if they had received consideration for the surrendered shares. 26 U. S. C. § 302(b). Although the Finks did not receive a direct payment of cash or other property, they hoped to be compensated by an increase in the value of their remaining shares.
The Finks remained the controlling shareholders after their surrender. We therefore have no occasion to decide in this case whether a surrender that causes the shareholder to lose control of the corporation is immediately deductible. In related contexts, the Code distinguishes between minimal reductions in a shareholder’s ownership percentage and loss of corporate control. See § 302(b)(2) (providing “exchange” rather than dividend treatment for a “substantially disproportionate redemption of stock” that brings the shareholder’s ownership percentage below 50 percent); § 302(b)(3) (providing similar treatment when the redemption terminates the shareholder’s interest in the corporation).
In this case we use the term “control” to mean ownership of more than half of a corporation’s voting shares. We recognize, of course, that in larger corporations — especially those whose shares are listed on a national exchange — a person or entity may exercise control in fact while owning less than a majority of the voting shares. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 13(d), 48 Stat. 894, 15 U. S. C. §78m(d) (requiring persons to report acquisition of more than 5 percent of a registered equity security).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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L
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Stevens
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Prior to 1995, the Santa Fe High School student who occupied the school’s elective office of student douneil chaplain delivered a prayer over the public address system before each varsity football game for the entire season. This practice, along with others, was challenged in District Court as a violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. While these proceedings were pending in the District Court, the school district adopted a different policy that permits, but does not require, prayer initiated and led by a student at all home games. The District Court entered an order modifying that policy to permit only nonseetarian, non-proselytizing prayer. The Court of Appeals held that, even as modified by the District Court, the football prayer policy was invalid. We granted the school district’s petition for certiorari to review that holding.
> — 1
The Santa Fe Independent School District (District) is a political subdivision of the State of Texas, responsible for the education of more than 4,000 students in a small community in the southern part of the State. The District includes the Santa Fe High School, two primary schools, an intermediate school and the junior high school. Respondents are two sets of current or former students and their respective mothers. One family is Mormon and the other is Catholic. The District Court permitted respondents (Does) to litigate anonymously to protect them from intimidation or harassment.
Respondents commenced this action in April 1995 and moved for a temporary restraining order to prevent the District from violating the Establishment Clause at the imminent graduation exercises. In their complaint the Does alleged that the District had engaged in several proselytizing practices, such as promoting attendance at a Baptist revival meeting, encouraging membership in religious clubs, chastising children who held minority religious beliefs, and distributing Gideon Bibles on school premises. They also alleged that the District allowed students to read Christian invocations and benedictions from the stage at graduation ceremonies, and to deliver overtly Christian prayers over the public address system at home football games.
On May 10, 1995, the District Court entered an interim order addressing a number of different issues. With respect to the impending graduation, the order provided that “non-denominational prayer” consisting of “an invocation and/or benediction” could be presented by a senior student or students selected by members of the graduating class. The text of the prayer was to be determined by the students, without scrutiny or preapproval by school officials. References to particular religious figures “such as Mohammed, Jesus, Buddha, or the like” would be permitted “as long as the general thrust of the prayer is non-proselytizing.” App. 32.
In response to that portion of the order, the District adopted a series of policies over several months dealing with prayer at school functions. The policies enacted in May and July for graduation ceremonies provided the format for the August and October policies for football games. The May policy provided:
“ ‘The board has chosen to permit the graduating senior class, with the advice and counsel of the senior class principal or designee, to elect by secret ballot to choose whether an invocation and benediction shall be part of the graduation exercise. If so chosen the class shall elect by secret ballot, from a list of student volunteers, students to deliver nonsectarian, nonproselytizing invocations and benedictions for the purpose of solemnizing their graduation ceremonies.’ ” 168 F. 3d 806,811 (CA5 1999) (emphasis deleted).
The parties stipulated that after this policy was adopted, “the senior class held an election to determine whether to have an invocation and benediction at the commencement [and that the] class voted, by secret ballot, to include prayer at the high school graduation.” App. 52. In a second vote the class elected two seniors to deliver the invocation and benediction.
In July, the District enacted another policy eliminating the requirement that invocations and benedictions be “nonsectarian and nonproselytising,” but also providing that if the District were to be enjoined from enforcing that policy, the May policy would automatically become effective.
The August policy, which was titled “Prayer at Football Games,” was similar to the July policy for graduations. It also authorized two student elections, the first to determine whether “invocations” should be delivered, and the second to select the spokesperson to deliver them. Like the July policy, it contained two parts, an initial statement that omitted any requirement that the content of the invocation be “nonsectarian and nonproselytising,” and a fallback provision that automatically added that limitation if the preferred policy should be enjoined. On August 31, 1995, according to the parties’ stipulation: “[T]he district’s high school students voted to determine whether a student would deliver prayer at varsity football games.... The students chose to allow a student to say a prayer at football games.” Id., at 65. A week later, in a separate election, they selected a student “to deliver the prayer at varsity football games.” Id., at 66.
The final policy (October policy) is essentially the same as the August policy, though it omits the word “prayer” from its title, and refers to “messages” and “statements” as well as “invocations.” It is the validity of that policy that is before us.
The District Court did enter an order precluding enforcement of the first, open-ended policy. Relying on our decision in Lee v. Weisman, 505 U. S. 577 (1992), it held that the school’s “action must not 'coerce anyone to support or participate in’ a religious exercise.” App. to Pet. for Cert. E7. Applying that test, it concluded that the graduation prayers appealed “to distinctively Christian beliefs,” and that delivering a prayer “over the school’s public address system prior to each football and baseball game coerces student participation in religious events.” Both parties appealed, the District contending that the enjoined portion of the October policy was permissible and the Does contending that both alternatives violated the Establishment Clause. The Court of Appeals majority agreed with the Does.
The decision of the Court of Appeals followed Fifth Circuit precedent that had announced two rules. In Jones v. Clear Creek Independent School Dist., 977 F. 2d 963 (1992), that court held that student-led prayer that was approved by a vote of the students and was nonseetarian and nonproselytiz-ing was permissible at high school graduation ceremonies. On the other hand, in later cases the Fifth Circuit made it clear that the Clear Creek rule applied only to high school graduations and that school-encouraged prayer was constitutionally impermissible at school-related sporting events. Thus, in Doe v. Duncanville Independent School Dist., 70 F. 3d 402 (1995), it had described a high school graduation as “a significant, once in-a-lifetime event” to be contrasted with athletic events in “a setting that is far less solemn and extraordinary.” Id., at 406-407.
In its opinion in this ease, the Court of Appeals explained:
“The controlling feature here is the same as in Dun-canville: The prayers are to be delivered at football games — hardly the sober type of annual event that can be appropriately solemnized with prayer. The distinction to which [the District] points is simply one without difference. Regardless of whether the prayers are selected by vote or spontaneously initiated at these frequently-recurring, informal, school-sponsored events, school officials are present and have the authority to stop the prayers. Thus, as we indicated in Duncan-ville, our decision in Clear Creek II hinged on the singular context and singularly serious nature of a graduation ceremony. Outside that nurturing context, a Clear Creek Prayer Policy cannot survive. We therefore reverse the district court’s holding that [the District’s] alternative Clear Creek Prayer Policy can be extended to football games, irrespective of the presence of the nonseetarian, nonproselytizing restrictions.” 168 F. 3d, at 823.
The dissenting judge rejected the majority’s distinction between graduation ceremonies and football games. In his opinion the District’s October policy created a limited public forum that had a secular purpose and provided neutral accommodation of noncoereed, private, religious speech.
We granted the District’s petition for certiorari, limited to the following question: “Whether petitioner’s policy permitting student-led, student-initiated prayer at football games violates the Establishment Clause.” 528 U. S. 1002 (1999). We conclude, as did the Court of Appeals, that it does.
I-H HH
The first Clause in the First Amendment to the Federal Constitution provides that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” The Fourteenth Amendment imposes those substantive limitations on the legislative power of the States and their political subdivisions. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U. S. 38, 49-50 (1985). In Lee v. Weisman, 505 U. S. 577 (1992), we held that a prayer delivered by a rabbi at a middle school graduation ceremony violated that Clause. Although this case involves student prayer at a different type of school function, our analysis is properly guided by the principles that we endorsed in Lee.
As we held in that ease:
“The principle that government may accommodate the free exercise of religion does not supersede the fundamental limitations imposed by the Establishment Clause. It is beyond dispute that, at a minimum, the Constitution guarantees that government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise, or otherwise act in a way which ‘establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or tends to do so.’” Id., at 587 (citations omitted) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U. S. 668, 678 (1984)).
In this case the District first argues that this principle is inapplicable to its October policy- because the messages are private student speech, not public speech. It reminds us that “there is a crucial difference between government speech endorsing religion, which the Establishment Clause forbids, and •private speech endorsing religion, which the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses protect.” Board of Ed. of Westside Community Schools (Dist. 66) v. Mergens, 496 U. S. 226, 250 (1990) (opinion of O’Connor, J.). We certainly agree with that distinction, but we are not persuaded that the pregame invocations should be regarded as “private speech.”
These invocations are authorized by a government policy and take place on government property at government-sponsored school-related events. Of course, not every message delivered under such circumstances is the government’s own. We have held, for example, that an individual’s contribution to a government-created forum was not government speech. See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U. S. 819 (1995). Although the District relies heavily on Rosenberger and similar cases involving such forums, it is clear that the pregame ceremony is not the type of forum discussed in those cases. The Santa Fe school officials simply do not “evince either ‘by policy or by practice/ any intent to open the [pregame ceremony] to ‘indiscriminate use/... by the student body generally.” Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U. S. 260, 270 (1988) (quoting Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U. S. 37, 47 (1983)). Rather, the school allows only one student, the same student for the entire season, to give the invocation. The statement or invocation, moreover, is subject to particular regulations that confine the content and topic of the student’s message, see infra, at 306-307, 309. By comparison, in Perry we rejected a claim that the school had created a limited public forum in its school mail system despite the fact that it had allowed far more speakers to address a much broader range of topics than the policy at issue here. As we concluded in Perry, “selective access does not transform government property into a public forum.” 460 U. S., at 47.
Granting only one student access to the stage at a time does not, of course, necessarily preclude a finding that a school has created a limited public forum. Here, however, Santa Fe’s student election system ensures that only those messages deemed “appropriate” under the District’s policy may be delivered. That is, the majoritarian process implemented by the District guarantees, by definition, that minority candidates will never prevail and that their views will be effectively silenced.
Recently, in Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. System v. Southworth, 529 U. S. 217 (2000), we explained why student elections that determine, by majority vote, which expressive activities shall receive or not receive school benefits are constitutionally problematic:
“To the extent the referendum substitutes majority determinations for viewpoint neutrality it would undermine the constitutional protection the program requires. The whole theory of viewpoint neutrality is that minority views are treated with the same respect as are majority views. Access to a public forum, for instance, does not depend upon majoritarian consent. That principle is controlling here.” Id., at 285.
Like the student referendum for funding in Southworth, this student election does nothing to protect minority views but rather places the students who hold such views at the mercy of the majority. Because “fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections,” West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 638 (1943), the District’s elections are insufficient safeguards of diverse student speech.
In Lee, the school district made the related argument that its policy of endorsing only “civic or nonsectarian” prayer was acceptable because it minimized the intrusion on the audience as a whole. We rejected that claim by explaining that such a majoritarian policy “does not lessen the offense or isolation to the objectors. At best it narrows their number, at worst increases their sense of isolation and affront.” 505 U. S., at 594. Similarly, while Santa Fe’s majoritarian election might ensure that most of the students are represented, it does nothing to protect the minority; indeed, it likely serves to intensify their offense.
Moreover, the District has failed to divorce itself from the religious content in the invocations. It has not succeeded in doing so, either by claiming that its policy is “‘one of neutrality rather than endorsement’” or by characterizing the individual student as the “circuit-breaker” in the process. Contrary to the District’s repeated assertions that it has adopted a “hands-off” approach to the pregame invocation, the realities of the situation plainly reveal that its policy involves both perceived and actual endorsement of religion. In this case, as we found in Lee, the “degree of school involvement” makes it clear that the pregame prayers bear “the imprint of the State and thus put school-age children who objected in an untenable position.” Id., at 590.
The District has attempted to disentangle itself from the religious messages by developing the two-step student election process. The text of the October policy, however, exposes the extent of the school’s entanglement. The elections take place at all only because the school “board has chosen to 'permit students to deliver a brief invocation and/or message.” App. 104 (emphasis added). The elections thus “shall” be conducted “by the high school student council” and “[u)pon advice and direction of the high school principal.” Id., at 104-105. The decision whether to deliver a message is first made by majority vote of the entire student body, followed by a choice of the speaker in a separate, similar majority election. Even though the particular words used by the speaker are not determined by those votes, the policy mandates that the “statement or invocation” be “consistent with the goals and purposes of this policy,” which are “to solemnize the event, to promote good sportsmanship and student safety, and to establish the appropriate environment for the competition.” Ibid.
In addition to involving the school in the selection of the speaker, the policy, by its terms, invites and encourages religious messages. The policy itself states that the purpose of the message is “to solemnize the event.” A religious message is the most obvious method of solemnizing an event. Moreover, the requirements that the message “promote good sportsmanship” and “establish the appropriate environment for competition” further narrow the types of message deemed appropriate, suggesting that a solemn, yet nonreligious, message, such as commentary on United States foreign policy, would be prohibited. Indeed, the only type of message that is expressly endorsed in the text is an “invocation” — a term that primarily describes an appeal for divine assistance. In fact, as used in the past at Santa Fe High School, an “invocation” has always entailed a focused religious message. Thus, the expressed purposes of the policy encourage the selection of a religious message, and that is precisely how the students understand the policy. The results of the elections described in the parties’ stipulation make it clear that the students understood that the central question before them was whether prayer should be a part of the pregame ceremony. We recognize the important role that public worship plays in many communities, as well as the sincere desire to include public prayer as a part of various occasions so as to mark those occasions’ significance. But such religious activity in public schools, as elsewhere, must comport with the First Amendment.
The actual or perceived endorsement of the message, moreover, is established by factors beyond just the text of the policy. Once the student speaker is selected and the message composed, the invocation is then delivered to a large audience assembled as part of a regularly scheduled, school-sponsored function conducted on school property. The message is broadcast over the school’s public address system, which remains subject to the control of school officials. It is fair to assume that the pregame ceremony is clothed in the traditional indicia of school sporting events, which generally include not just the team, but also cheerleaders and band members dressed in uniforms sporting the school name and mascot. The school’s name is likely written in large print across the field and on banners and flags. The crowd will certainly inelude many who display the school colors and insignia on their school T-shirts, jackets, or hats and who may also be waving signs displaying the school name. It is in a setting such as this that “[t]he board has chosen to permit” the elected student to rise and give the "statement or invocation.”
In this context the members of the listening audience must perceive the pregame message as a public expression of the views of the majority of the student body delivered with the approval of the school administration. In cases involving state participation in a religious activity, one of the relevant questions is “whether an objective observer, acquainted with the text, legislative history, and implementation of the statute, would perceive it as a state endorsement of prayer in public schools.” Wallace, 472 U. S., at 73, 76 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment); see also Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U. S. 753, 777 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Regardless of the listener’s support for, or objection to, the message, an objective Santa Fe High School student will unquestionably perceive the inevitable pregame prayer as stamped with her school’s seal of approval.
The text and history of this policy, moreover, reinforce our objective student’s perception that the prayer is, in actuality, encouraged by the school. When a governmental entity professes a secular purpose for an arguably religious policy, the government’s characterization is, of course, entitled to some deference. But it is nonetheless the duty of the courts to "distinguis[h3 a sham secular purpose from a sincere one.” Wallace, 472 U. S., at 75 (O’CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment).
According to the District, the secular purposes of the policy are to “foste[r] free expression of private persons... as well [as to] solemniz[e] sporting events, promot[e] good sportsmanship and student safety, and establis[h] an appropriate environment for competition.” Brief for Petitioner 14. We note, however, that the District’s approval of only one specific kind of message, an “invocation,” is not necessary to further any of these purposes. Additionally, the fact that only one student is permitted to give a content-limited message suggests that this policy does little to “foste[r] free expression.” Furthermore, regardless of whether one considers a sporting event an appropriate occasion for solemnity, the use of an invocation to foster such solemnity is impermissible when, in actuality, it constitutes prayer sponsored by the school. And it is unclear what type of message would be both appropriately “solemnizing” under the District’s policy and yet nonreligious.
Most striking to us is the evolution of the current policy from the long-sanctioned office of “Student Chaplain” to the candidly titled “Prayer at Football Games” regulation. This histoiy indicates that the District intended to preserve the practice of prayer before football games. The conclusion that the District viewed the October policy simply as a continuation of the previous policies is dramatically illustrated by the faet that the school did not conduct a new election, pursuant to the current policy, to replace the results of the previous election, which occurred under the former policy. Given these observations, and in light of the school’s history of regular delivery of a student-led prayer at athletic events, it is reasonable to infer that the specific purpose of the policy was to preserve a popular “state-sponsored religious practice.” Lee, 505 U. S., at 596.
School sponsorship of a religious message is impermissible because it sends the ancillary message to members of the audience who are nonadherants “that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an ae-companying message to adherants that they are insiders, favored members of the political community.” Lynch, 465 U. S., at 688 (O’Connor, J., concurring). The delivery of such a message — over the school’s public address system, by a speaker representing the student body, under the supervision of school faculty, and pursuant to a school policy that explicitly and implicitly encourages public prayer — is not properly characterized as “private” speech.
Ill
The District next argues that its football policy is distinguishable from the graduation prayer in Lee because it does not coerce students to participate in religious observances. Its argument has two parts: first, that there is no impermissible government coercion because the pregame messages are the product of student choices; and second, that there is really no coercion at all because attendance at an extracurricular event, unlike a graduation ceremony, is voluntary.
The reasons just discussed explaining why the alleged “circuit-breaker” mechanism of the dual elections and student speaker do not turn public speech into private speech also demonstrate why these mechanisms do not insulate the school from the coercive element of the final message. In fact, this aspect of the District’s argument exposes anew the concerns that are created by the majoritarian election system. The parties’ stipulation clearly states that the issue resolved in the first election was “whether a student would deliver prayer at varsity football games,” App. 65, and the controversy in this case demonstrates that the views of the students are not unanimous on that issue.
One of the purposes served by the Establishment Clause is to remove debate over this kind of issue from governmental supervision or control. We explained in Lee that the “preservation and transmission of religious beliefs and worship is a responsibility and a choice committed to the private sphere.” 505 U. S., at 589. The two student elections authorized by the policy, coupled with the debates that presumably must precede each, impermissibly invade that private sphere. The election mechanism, when considered in light of the history in which the policy in question evolved, reflects a device the District put in place that determines whether religious messages will be delivered at home football games. The mechanism encourages divisiveness along religious lines in a public school setting, a result at odds with the Establishment Clause. Although it is true that the ultimate choice of student speaker is “attributable to the students,” Brief for Petitioner 40, the District’s decision to hold the constitutionally problematic election is clearly “a choice attributable to the State,” Lee, 505 U. S., at 587.
The District further argues that attendance at the commencement ceremonies at issue in Lee “differs dramatically” from attendance at high school football games, which it contends “are of no more than passing interest to many students” and are “decidedly extracurricular,” thus dissipating any coercion. Brief for Petitioner 41. Attendance at a high school football game, unlike showing up for class, is certainly not required in order to receive a diploma. Moreover, we may assume that the District is correct in arguing that the informal pressure to attend an athletic event is not as strong as a senior’s desire to attend her own graduation ceremony.
There are some students, however, such as cheerleaders, members of the band, and, of course, the team members themselves, for whom seasonal commitments mandate their attendance, sometimes for class credit. The District also minimizes the importance to many students of attending and participating in extracurricular activities as part of a complete educational experience. As we noted in Lee, “[l]aw reaches past formalism.” 505 U. S., at 595. To assert that high school students do not feel immense social pressure, or have a truly genuine desire, to be involved in the extracurricular event that is American high school football is “formalistic in the extreme.” Ibid. We stressed in Lee the obvious- observation that “adolescents are often susceptible to pressure from their peers towards conformity, and that the influence is strongest in matters of social convention.” Id., at 598. High school home football games are traditional gatherings of a school community; they bring together students and faculty as well as friends and family from years present and past to root for a common cause. Undoubtedly, the games are not important to some students, and they voluntarily choose not to attend. For many others, however, the choice between attending these games and avoiding personally offensive religious rituals is in no practical sense an easy one. The Constitution, moreover, demands that the school may not force this difficult choice upon these students for “[i]t is a tenet of the First Amendment that the State cannot require one of its citizens to forfeit his or her rights and benefits as the price of resisting conformance to state-sponsored religious practice.” Id., at 596.
Even if we regard every high school student’s decision to attend a home football game as purely voluntary, we are nevertheless persuaded that the delivery of a pregame prayer has the improper effect of coercing those present to participate in an act of religious worship. For “the government may no more use social pressure to enforce orthodoxy than it may use more direct means.” Id., at 594. As in Lee, “[w]hat to most believers may seem nothing more than a reasonable request that the nonbeliever respect their religious practices, in a school context may appear to the nonbeliever or dissenter to be an attempt to employ the machinery of the State to enforce a religious orthodoxy.” Id., at 592. The constitutional command will not permit the District “to exact religious conformity from a student as the price” of joining her classmates at a varsity football game.
The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment prevent the government from making any law respecting the establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. By no means do these commands impose a prohibition on all religious activity in our public schools. See, e. g., Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School Dist., 508 U. S. 384, 395 (1993); Board of Ed. of Westside Community Schools (Dist. 66) v. Mergens, 496 U. S. 226 (1990); Wallace, 472 U. S., at 59. Indeed, the common purpose of the Religion Clauses “is to secure religious liberty.” Engel v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421, 430 (1962). Thus, nothing in the Constitution as interpreted by this Court prohibits any public school student from voluntarily praying at any time before, during, or after the sehoolday. But the religious liberty protected by the Constitution is abridged when the State affirmatively sponsors the particular religious practice of prayer.
IV
Finally, the District argues repeatedly that the Does have made a premature facial challenge to the October policy that necessarily must fail. The District emphasizes, quite correctly, that until a student actually delivers a solemnizing message under the latest version of the policy, there can be no certainty that any of the statements or invocations will be religious. Thus, it concludes, the October policy necessarily survives a facial challenge.
This argument, however, assumes that we are concerned only with the serious constitutional injury that occurs when a student is forced to participate in an act of religious worship because she chooses to attend a school event. But the Constitution also requires that we keep in mind “the myriad, subtle ways in which Establishment Clause values can be eroded,” Lynch, 465 U. S., at 694 (O’Connor, J., concurring), and that we guard against other different, yet equally important, constitutional injuries. One is the mere passage by the District of a policy that has the purpose and perception of government establishment of religion. Another is the implementation of a governmental electoral process that subjects the issue of prayer to a majoritarian vote.
"016 District argues that the facial challenge must fail because “Santa Fe’s Football Policy cannot be invalidated on the basis of some ‘possibility or even likelihood’ of an unconstitutional application.” Brief for Petitioner 17 (quoting Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U. S. 589, 613 (1988)). Our Establishment Clause cases involving facial challenges, however, have not focused solely on the possible applications of the statute, but rather have considered whether the statute has an unconstitutional purpose. Writing for the Court in Bowen, The CHIEF Justice concluded that “[a]s in previous eases involving facial challenges on Establishment Clause grounds, e. g., Edwards v. Aguillard, [482 U. S..578 (1987)]; Mueller v. Allen, 468 U. S. 388 (1983), we assess the constitutionality of an enactment by reference to the three factors first articulated in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 612 (1971)..., which guides ‘[t]he general nature of our inquiry in this area,’ Mueller v. Allen, supra, at 394.” 487 U. S., at 602. Under the Lemon standard, a court must invalidate a statute if it lacks “a secular legislative purpose.” Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 612 (1971). It is therefore proper, as part of this facial challenge, for us to examine the purpose of the October policy.
As discussed, swpra, at 306-307,309, the text of the October policy alone reveals that it has an unconstitutional purpose. The plain language of the policy clearly spells out the extent of school involvement in both the election of the speaker and the content of the message. Additionally, the text of the October policy specifies only one, clearly preferred message — that of Santa Fe’s traditional religious “invocation.” Finally, the extremely selective access of the policy and other content restrictions confirm that it is not a content-neutral regulation that creates a limited public forum for the expression of student speech. Our examination, however, need not stop at an analysis of the text of the policy.
This ease comes to us as the latest step in developing litigation brought as a challenge to institutional practices that unquestionably violated the Establishment Clause. One of those practices was the District’s long-established tradition of sanctioning student-led prayer at varsity football games. The narrow question before us is whether implementation of the October policy insulates the continuation of such prayers from constitutional scrutiny. It does not. Our inquiry into this question not only can, but must, include an examination of the circumstances surrounding its enactment. Whether a government activity violates the Establishment Clause is “in large part a legal question to be answered on the basis of judicial interpretation of social facts.... Every government practice must be judged in its unique circumstances —” Lynch, 465 U. S., at 693-694 (O’Connok, J., concurring). Our discussion in the previous sections, supra, at 307-310, demonstrates that in this ease the District’s direct involvement with school prayer exceeds constitutional limits.
The District, nevertheless, asks us to pretend that we do not recognize what every Santa Fe High School student understands clearly — that this policy is about prayer. The District further asks us to accept what is obviously untrue: that these messages are necessary to “solemnize” a football game and that this single-student, year-long position is essential to the protection of student speech. We refuse to turn a blind eye to the context in which this policy arose, and that context quells any doubt that this policy was implemented with the purpose of endorsing school prayer.
Therefore, the simple enactment of this policy, with the purpose and perception of school endorsement of student prayer, was a constitutional violation. We need not wait for the inevitable to confirm and magnify the constitutional injury. In Wallace, for example, we invalidated Alabama's as yet unimplemented and voluntary “moment of silence” statute based on our conclusion that it was enacted “for the sole purpose of expressing the State’s endorsement of prayer activities for one minute at the beginning of each school day.” 472 U. S., at 60; see also Church of Lukumi Bdbalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U. S. 520, 582 (1998). Therefore, even if no Santa Fe High School student were ever to offer a religious message, the October policy fails a facial challenge because the attempt by the District to encourage prayer is also at issue. Government efforts to endorse religion cannot evade constitutional reproach based solely on the remote possibility that those attempts may fail.
This policy likewise does not survive a facial challenge because it impermissibly imposes upon the student body a majoritarian election on the issue of prayer. Through its election scheme, the District has established a governmental electoral mechanism that turns the school into a forum for religious debate. It further empowers the student body majority with the authority to subject students of minority views to constitutionally improper messages. The award of that power alone, regardless of the students’ ultimate use of it, is not acceptable. Like the referendum in Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. System v. Southworth, 529 U. S. 217 (2000), the election mechanism established by the District undermines the essential protection of minority viewpoints. Such a system encourages divisiveness along religious lines and threatens the imposition of coercion upon those students not desiring to participate in a religious exercise. Simply by establishing this school-related procedure, which entrusts the inherently nongovernmental subject of religion to a majoritarian vote, a constitutional violation has occurred. No further injury is required for the policy to fail a facial challenge.
To properly examine this policy on its face, we “must be deemed aware of the history and context of the community and forum,” Pinette, 515 U. S., at 780 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Our examination of those circumstances above leads to the conclusion that this policy does not provide the District with the constitutional safe harbor it sought. The policy is invalid on its face because it establishes an improper majoritarian election on religion, and unquestionably has the purpose and creates the perception of encouraging the delivery of prayer at a series of important school events.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is, accordingly, affirmed.
It is so ordered.
A decision, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals noted, that many District officials “apparently neither agreed with nor particularly respected.” 168 F. 3d 806, 809, n. 1 (CA5 1999). About a month after the complaint was filed, the
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
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