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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice White
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issue in this case is whether the National Security Agency (NSA) invoked the proper statutory authority when it terminated respondent John Doe, an NSA employee. The Court of Appeals held that NSA did not — a decision with which we disagree. We first describe the statutes relevant to this case.
Section 7532 of Title 5 of the United States Code, on which the Court of Appeals relied, was passed in 1950 and reenacted and codified in 1966, as part of Chapter 75 of Title 5, the Chapter that deals with adverse actions against employees of the United States. See 5 U. S. C. §7532. The section provides that the head of an agency “may suspend without pay” an employee when he considers such action “necessary in the interests of national security,” see § 7532(a), and “may remove” the suspended employee if such action is “necessary or advisable in the interests of national security.” § 7532(b). Subsection (c) of §7532 specifies the procedural protections to which a suspended employee is entitled prior to removal.
The National Security Agency Act of 1959 (1959 NSA Act) empowers the Secretary of Defense, or his designee, to establish NSA positions and appoint employees thereto “as may be necessary to carry out the functions of such agency.” Note following 50 U. S. C. § 402. By virtue of the 1959 NSA Act, NSA employees who are not preferred eligible veterans are in the “excepted” service, hence not covered by the removal provisions of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978. 5 U. S. C. §§7511-7513. Pursuant to the Defense Department Directive No. 5100.23 (May 17, 1967), as printed in App. in No. 86-5395 (CADC), p. 60, the Secretary delegated his 1959 NSA Act appointment authority to the NSA Director, who promulgated internal personnel regulations. See National Security Agency Central Security Service Personnel Management Manual 30-2 (PMM), Ch. 370 (Aug. 12, 1980), App. to Pet. for Cert. 36a. Chapter 370 of these regulations describes procedures for removing employees, and states generally that removal is permissible for “such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service,” §3-4, App. to Pet. for Cert. 39a. Dismissals proposed under Chapter 370 guarantee employees various procedural protections, such as 30-day advance notice, an opportunity to respond and to have legal representation, and a written final decision. Although Chapter 370 assigns to some employees the further right to appeal an adverse action to the Merit Systems Protection Board, nonveterans like Doe at NSA do not have this right; nor does Chapter 370 provide for a hearing or review by the Secretary of Defense.
In 1964, Congress amended the Internal Security Act of 1950 by passing an Act relating to “Personnel Security Procedures in the National Security Agency.” 78 Stat. 168, 50 U. S. C. §§831-833 (NSA Personnel Security Procedures Act). Section 831 requires the Secretary of Defense to promulgate regulations assuring that no person will be employed or continue to be employed by NSA or have access to classified information unless such employment or access is “clearly consistent with the national security.” The Secretary’s determination is final. The Secretary’s authority under §831 has been delegated to the NSA Director and implemented through regulations, including a regulation requiring security clearance for employment at NSA. See PMM, Ch. 371, §§1-1, 1-3. Section 832(a) proscribes NSA employment to any person not subjected to a full field investigation and “cleared for access to classified information.” In addition, Congress directs that boards of appraisal are to assist in appraising the loyalty and suitability of persons for access to classified information in those cases where the NSA Director doubts such suitability. § 832(b). Section 833(a) gives the Secretary authority to terminate the employment of any NSA officer or employee whenever he considers that action “to be in the interest of the United States” and determines that the procedures stated in other provisions of the law “cannot be invoked consistently with national security.”
This case began in 1982 when John Doe, a cryptographic material control technician at NSA for 16 years, disclosed to NSA officials that he had engaged in homosexual relationships with foreign nationals. Doe was notified of his proposed removal pursuant to Chapter 370 of the PMM, which governs NSA’s procedures for removal for cause. The notification letter of Virginia C. Jenkins, Director of Civilian Personnel, was dated November 23, 1982, and explained that Doe’s “indiscriminate personal conduct with unidentified foreign nationals” makes impossible his continued — and essential to NSA employment — access to classified information. See App. in No. 86-5395 (CADC), p. 83. The notice also advised Doe of his adjudicatory rights to contest the decision, which rights he exercised through counsel, including in his answer the results of a psychiatric evaluation as to his security threat. Pursuant to 50 U. S. C. § 832(b), the NSA Director convened a board of appraisal, which ultimately con-eluded that Doe’s access to classified material was “clearly inconsistent with the national security.” See App. in No. 5395 (CADC), p. 108. After a hearing before the Director, Doe was notified that his security clearance was being revoked. Because this clearance is a condition of NSA employment, the Director, pursuant to the authority delegated to him under the 1959 NSA Act, removed Doe. Relying on 5 U. S. C. § 7532, Doe then requested a hearing before the Secretary of Defense, claiming that the 1959 NSA Act does not authorize removals and that he could only be discharged by the Secretary after a hearing before that official or his designee. Both the Secretary and the Director replied that Doe’s removal was “for cause” under Chapter 370 of the PMM and was not pursuant to the Secretary’s §7532 summary authority.
Doe brought suit in the District Court challenging his removal on constitutional and statutory grounds. He charged, inter alia, that the 1959 NSA Act’s appointment authority delegated by the Secretary of Defense to the NSA Director does not include the authority to remove employees; hence NSA is required to apply 5 U. S. C. § 7532’s termination procedures that guarantee NSA employees a preremoval hearing before the Secretary or his designee, the NSA Director. The District Court denied this argument and granted summary judgment for petitioners. Acknowledging that the NSA Director could have elected to proceed under either § 833 or § 7532 summary authority, the court held that the Director could also proceed under the authority provided by the 1959 NSA Act. Doe v. Weinberger, Civ. Action No. 85-1996 (DC, Apr. 25, 1986).
The Court of Appeals reversed as to the optional applicability of §7532 and vacated the remainder of the District Court’s decision. Doe v. Weinberger, 820 F. 2d 1275 (1987). The Court of Appeals was of the view that the chronology of congressional action indicates that § 7532, which predates the establishment of NSA, must control NSA employee dismissals on national security grounds. The court acknowledged § 833’s parallel summary removal scheme, but held that because the NSA Director disclaimed reliance on that section, remand to NSA for compliance with §7532 was obligatory. We granted the Secretary’s and Director’s petition for certiorari. 485 U. S. 904 (1988).
The 1959 NSA Act authorizes the Secretary of Defense, or his designee, “to establish such positions, and to appoint thereto, without regard to the civil service laws, such officers and employees, in the National Security Agency, as may be necessary to carry out the functions of such agency.” Note following 50 U. S. C. §402. The Secretary, in turn, issued Defense Department Directive No. 5100.23 to delegate this appointment authority to the NSA Director, which authority was implemented by regulations covering both the hiring and removal of NSA employees. Although the 1959 NSA Act does not refer to termination, the Court has held, as a matter of statutory interpretation, that, absent a “specific provision to the contrary, the power of removal from office is incident to the power of appointment.” Keim v. United States, 177 U. S. 290, 293 (1900); see also Crenshaw v. United States, 134 U. S. 99, 108 (1890); Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886, 896 (1961). Neither the Court of Appeals nor respondent questions this general proposition, nor have they shown that Congress expressly or impliedly indicated a contrary purpose in the 1959 NSA Act or its subsequent amendments.
The Court of Appeals, however, held that removals for national security reasons must occur under either 5 U. S. C. §7532 or 50 U. S. C. §833 and that because NSA disclaimed reliance on § 833, resort to § 7532 rather than NSA’s for-cause removal regulations was mandatory. In our view, however, §833 and §7532 are not the exclusive means to remove NSA employees for national security reasons, but instead contemplate alternative recourse to NSA’s ordinary removal mechanisms pursuant to the 1959 NSA Act. This discretionary aspect of §§833 and 7532 is manifest in both the express statutory language and also the legislative history of these provisions.
Section 833(a) states: “[Notwithstanding sections 7512 and 7532 of title 5, or any other provision of law,” the Secretary of Defense “may” remove an employee provided that he finds that “the procedures prescribed in other provisions of law that authorize the termination . . . cannot be invoked consistently with the national security.” Petitioners correctly argue that where the for-cause procedures for removal under §7512 or under the regulations adopted under the 1959 NSA Act do not jeopardize national security, recourse may, even must, be had to those other procedures.
Section 7532 also is not mandatory. It provides that “[notwithstanding other statutes,” the head of an agency “may” suspend and remove employees “in the interests of national security.” This language declares that even though other statutes might not permit it, the Secretary may authorize removals pursuant to § 7532 procedures, rather than those governing terminations under those other laws. The Court of Appeals did not expressly address the permissive character of the section and construed the statute to require the Secretary, in all cases of removal based on national security, to resort to the removal procedures of § 833 or § 7532, notwithstanding other available statutory removal regimes.
The Court of Appeals reached this conclusion by relying on two sentences from the House Report on the bill that ultimately became the predecessor to § 7532. These sentences state that the bill guarantees employees in various agencies, including the Department of Defense, the right to appeal to the head of the department in removal cases covered by §7532. This passage, however, does not indicate that §7532 procedures are the exclusive means for removals on national security grounds or that § 7532 displaces the otherwise applicable removal provisions of the agencies covered by the section. Read as the Court of Appeals understood them, the two sentences confound the permissive language of the statute and are inconsistent with other evidence from the legislative history.
Congress enacted the §7532 and §833 summary removal measures to supplement, not narrow, ordinary agency removal procedures. Section 7532, like § 833, applies to a special class of national security cases, and authorizes summary suspension and unreviewable removal at the Secretary’s personal initiative after a hearing of unspecified scope. The removal provisions apply only to an employee who has been suspended. An employee so removed is ineligible for employment elsewhere in the Government without approval by the Office of Personnel Management. See 5 U. S. C. § 7312. The Court has held that in light of its summary nature, Congress intended § 7532 to be invoked only where there is “an immediate threat of harm to the ‘national security’ ” in the sense that the delay from invoking “normal dismissal procedures” could “cause serious damage to the national security.” Cole v. Young, 351 U. S. 536, 546 (1956). Were §7532 the exclusive procedure in this case and like cases, no national security termination would be permissible without an initial suspension and adherence to the Cole v. Young standard. We are unconvinced that Congress intended any such result when it enacted § 7532.
Indeed, when Congress passed the NSA Personnel Security Procedures Act in 1964, 50 U. S. C. §§831-833, Congress must have intended that § 7532 did not impose this restriction on the various affected agencies. The stringency would conflict with the provisions of that Act that require the Secretary to apply general security considerations in selecting NSA employees. Just as the Secretary need only find “inconsistency” with national security to reject an applicant seeking the necessary NSA clearance for classified information, see §831, so too the boards of appraisal that assist in this determination are authorized to recommend denial or cancellation of such clearance if the NSA Director “doubt[s]” that clearance is consistent with national security. See § 832(b). The Secretary, in turn, must adhere to a board’s recommendation unless he makes the affirmative finding that clearance is in the national interest. See ibid. Under the construction adopted by the Court of Appeals, however, the revocation of a security clearance ordered by NS A pursuant to a board’s recommendation will not suffice for the dismissal mandated by § 832(a), but rather would require further review by the Secretary under the more stringent standard imposed by § 7532.
The Court of Appeals was of the view that its construction of §7532 is necessary to provide employees sought to be removed on national security grounds with procedures equivalent to those provided by that section. This approach assumes that NSA’s ordinary clearance revocation and for cause dismissal procedures are less protective than those guaranteed by § 7532. This is a doubtful proposition, to say the least. The section, as we have said, provides for summary suspension without pay, affords a hearing of undefined scope before the agency head, and attaches to a removal order the sanction that the employee is ineligible for other governmental employment. NSA’s for-cause removals neither are preceded by suspension nor entail a collateral bar from federal employment. In this case, Doe was on the payroll until removed, and the record does not indicate that the hearing Doe received, or the other procedural protections accorded to him, were inferior to those that would have been available under § 7532. Indeed, in Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U. S. 518, 533 (1988), we rejected the argument that § 7532 would have provided more protections than the Navy’s ordinary for-cause removal procedures. More significantly, the Court of Appeals’ view that Congress enacted §7532 to extend new protections to all employees sought to be dismissed on national security grounds runs counter to explicit congressional statements that the legislation was proposed “to increase the authority of the heads of Government departments engaged in sensitive activities to summarily suspend employees considered to be bad security risks, and to terminate their services if subsequent investigation develops facts which support such action.” S. Rep. No. 2158, at 2; see also H. R. Rep. No. 2330, at 2.
We thus agree with the conclusion of the Merit Systems Protection Board in a similar case that “section 7532 is not the exclusive basis for removals based upon security clearance revocations,” Egan v. Department of the Navy, 28 M. S. P. R. 509, 521 (1985), and with the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit that “[t]here is nothing in the text of section 7532 or in its legislative history to suggest that its procedures were intended to preempt section 7513 procedures whenever the removal could be taken under section 7532. The language of section 7532 is permissive.” Egan v. Department of the Navy, 802 F. 2d 1563, 1568 (1986).
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
Title 5 U. S. C. § 7532(c) accords the suspended employee the following procedural rights before removal: “(A) a written statement of the charges against him within 30 days after suspension, which may be amended within 30 days thereafter and which shall be stated as specifically as security considerations permit; (B) an opportunity within 30 days thereafter, plus an additional 30 days if the charges are amended, to answer the charges and submit affidavits; (C) a hearing, at the request of the employee, by an agency authority duly constituted for this purpose; (D) a review of his case by the head of the agency or his designee, before a decision adverse to the employee is made final; and (E) a written statement of the decision of the head of the agency.”
See Defense Department Directive No. 5210.45, p. 3 (May 9, 1964), as printed in App. in No. 86-5395 (CADC), p. 75 (emphasis added), which reads: “When the two conditions [in §833 — i. e., (1) other statutory removal provisions, which (2) will safeguard the national security — ] do not exist, the Director, NSA shall, when appropriate, take action pursuant to other provisions of law, as applicable, to terminate the employment of a civilian officer or employee. The Director shall recommend to the Secretary of Defense the exercise of the authority of [§ 833] only when the termination of the employment of a civilian officer or employee cannot, because of paramount national security interests, be carried out under any other provision of law.”
The relevant sentences in the House Report state: “Under the present law, with respect to [the Departments of State and Defense,] the officer or employee who is suspended or terminated as a security risk is not entitled as a matter of right to an appeal to the head of the agency concerned. This legislation extends this appeal right to employees [of these agencies].” H. R. Rep. No. 2330, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (1950).
The Court of Appeals also noted that 5 U. S. C. §7533 provides that § 7532 does not “impair the powers vested in the Atomic Energy Commission [AEC] — or the requirement — that adequate provision be made for administrative review” of a termination by that Agency, yet does omit any similar exception for the pre-existing powers of any other agency. The Court of Appeals extrapolated that except in the case of the AEC, § 7532 supplants the removal authority of all agencies covered by the section in all cases involving national security. This conjecture extracts far more meaning than is warranted from the special mention by Congress that it intended to preserve the unique, expansive removal powers of the AEC, particularly in light of § 7532’s language indicating that its applicability is permissive.
Numerous congressional reports and statements indicate that §7532 and its legislative antecedents were proposed as extraordinary, supplementary measures to enable the Secretary of Defense, and other agency heads responsible for United States security, to respond to rare, urgent threats to national security. See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 2158, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 2, 6 (1950); H. R. Rep. No. 2330, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 2, 6 (1950); S. Rep. No. 1155, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1948); Hearing on S. 1561 and S. 1570 before the Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 2-3, 4 (1948).
Respondent defends the result reached by the Court of Appeals on the alternative ground that NSA violated its own regulations in removing him. That claim, as well as others argued to the Court of Appeals, was not passed on by that court, and we prefer to leave the matter to the Court of Appeals in the first instance.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
C
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
A Kentucky statute requires the posting of a copy of the Ten Commandments, purchased with private contributions, on the wall of each public classroom in the State. Petitioners, claiming that this statute violates the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment, sought an injunction against its enforcement. The state trial court upheld the statute, finding that its “avowed purpose” was “secular and not religious,” and that the statute would “neither advance nor inhibit any religion or religious group” nor involve the State excessively in religious matters. App. to Pet. for Cert. 38-39. The Supreme Court of the Commonwealth of Kentucky affirmed by an equally divided court. 599 S. W. 2d 157 (1980). We reverse.
This Court has announced a three-part test for determining whether a challenged state statute is permissible under the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution:
“First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion . . . ; finally the statute must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.' " Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 612-613 (1971) (citations omitted).
If a statute violates any of these three principles, it must be struck down under the Establishment Clause. We conclude that Kentucky’s statute requiring the posting of the Ten Commandments in public school rooms has no secular legislative purpose, and is therefore unconstitutional.
The Commonwealth insists that the statute in question serves a secular legislative purpose, observing that the legislature required the following notation in small print at the bottom of each display of the Ten Commandments: “The secular application of the Ten Commandments is clearly seen in its adoption as the fundamental legal code of Western Civilization and the Common Law of the United States.” 1978 Ky. Acts, ch. 436, § 1 (effective June 17, 1978), Ky. Rev. Stat. § 158.178 (1980).
The trial court found the “avowed” purpose of the statute to be secular, even as it labeled the statutory declaration “self-serving.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 37. Under this Court’s rulings, however, such an “avowed” secular purpose is not sufficient to avoid conflict with the First Amendment. In Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203 (1963), this Court held unconstitutional the daily reading of Bible verses and the Lord’s Prayer in the public schools, despite the school district’s assertion of such secular purposes as “the promotion of moral values, the contradiction to the materialistic trends of our times, the perpetuation of our institutions and the teaching of literature.” Id., at 223.
The pre-eminent purpose for posting the Ten Commandments on schoolroom walls is plainly religious in nature. The Ten Commandments are undeniably a sacred‘text in the Jewish and Christian faiths, and no legislative recitation of a supposed secular purpose can blind us to that fact. The Commandments do not confine themselves to arguably secular matters, such as honoring one’s parents, killing or murder, adultery, stealing, false witness, and covetousness. See Exodus 20: 12-17; Deuteronomy 5: 16-21. Rather, the first part of the Commandments concerns the religious duties of believers: worshipping the Lord God alone, avoiding idolatry, not using the Lord’s name in vain, and observing the Sabbath Day. See Exodus 20: 1-11; Deuteronomy 5: 6-15.
This is not a case in which the Ten Commandments are integrated into the school curriculum, where the Bible may constitutionally be used in an appropriate study of history, civilization, ethics, comparative religion, or the like. Abington School District v. Schempp, supra, at 225. Posting of religious texts on the wall serves no such educational function. If the posted copies of the Ten Commandments are to have any effect at all, it will be to induce the schoolchildren to read, meditate upon, perhaps to venerate and obey, the Commandments. However desirable this might be as a matter of private devotion, it is not a permissible state objective under the Establishment Clause.
It does not matter that the posted copies of the Ten Commandments are financed by voluntary private contributions, for the mere posting of the copies under the auspices of the legislature provides the “official support of the State . . . Government” that the Establishment Clause prohibits. 374 U. S., at 222; see Engel v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421, 431 (1962). Nor is it significant that the Bible verses involved in this case are merely posted on the wall, rather than read aloud as in Schempp and Engel, for “it is no defense to urge that the religious practices here may be relatively minor encroachments on the First Amendment.” Abington School District v. Schempp, supra, at 225. We conclude that Ky. Rev. Stat. § 158.178 (1980) violates the first part of the Lemon v. Kurtzman test, and thus the Establishment Clause of the Constitution.
The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted, and the judgment below is reversed.
It is so ordered.
The Chief Justice and Justice Blackmun dissent. They would grant certiorari and give this case plenary consideration.
Justice Stewart dissents from this summary reversal of the courts of Kentucky, which, so far as appears, applied wholly correct constitutional .criteria in reaching their decisions.
The statute provides in its entirety:
“(1) It shall be the duty of the superintendent of public instruction, provided sufficient funds are available as provided in subsection (3) of this Section, to ensure that a durable, permanent copy of the Ten Commandments shall be displayed on a wall in each public elementary and secondary school classroom in the Commonwealth. The copy shall be sixteen (16) inches wide by twenty (20) inches high.
“(2) In small print below the last commandment shall appear a notation concerning the purpose of the display, as follows: ‘The secular application of the Ten Commandments is clearly seen in its adoption as the fundamental legal code of Western Civilization and the Common Law of the United States.’
“(3) The copies required by this Act shall be purchased with funds made available through voluntary contributions made to the state treasurer for the purposes of this Act.” 1978 Ky. Acts, ch. 436, § 1 (effective June 17, 1978), Ky. Rev. Stat. § 168.178 (1980).
The First Amendment’ provides in relevant part: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .” This prohibition is applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203, 215-216 (1963).
As this Court commented in Abington School District v. Schempp, supra, at 224: “Surely the place of the Bible as an instrument of religion cannot be gainsaid . . . .”
Moreover, while the actual copies of the Ten Commandments were purchased through private contributions, the State nevertheless expended public money in administering the statute. For example, the statute requires that the state treasurer serve as a collecting agent for the contributions. Ky. Rev. Stat. §158.178 (3) (1980).
The Supreme Court eases cited by the dissenting opinion as contrary, Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756 (1973); Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U. S. 825 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1971); Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236 (1968), are easily distinguishable: all are cases involving state assistance to private schools. Such assistance has the obvious legitimate secular purpose of promoting educational opportunity. The posting of the Ten Commandments on classroom walls has no such secular purpose.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
C
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Douglas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In 1970 the people of Illinois amended its constitution adding Art. IX-A to become effective January 1, 1971, and reading:
“Notwithstanding any other provision of this Constitution, the taxation of personal property by valuation is prohibited as to individuals.”
There apparently appeared on the ballot when Art. IX-A was approved the following:
“The amendment would abolish the personal property tax by valuation levied against individuals. It would not affect the same tax levied against corporations and other entities not considered in law to be individuals. The amendment would achieve this result by adding a new article to the Constitution of 1870, Article IX-A, thus setting aside existing provisions of Article IX, Section 1, that require the taxation by valuation of all forms of property, real and personal or other, owned by individuals and corporations.”
Respondent Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., a corporation, brought an action against Illinois officials on its behalf and on behalf of all other corporations and “non-individuals” subject to the personal property tax, claiming that the tax violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment since it exempts from personal property taxes all personal property owned by individuals but retains such taxes as to personal property owned by corporations and other “non-individuals.” The Circuit Court held the Revenue Act of Illinois, as amended by Art. IX-A, unconstitutional as respects corporations by reason of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Shapiro and other individuals also brought suit alleging they are natural persons who own personal property, one for himself and his family, one as a sole proprietor of a business, and one as a partnership. A different trial judge entered an order in these cases dismissing the complaints except as to Shapiro and members of his class. The trial judge held that all other provisions of Illinois law imposing personal property taxes on property owned by corporations and other “non-individuals” were unaffected by Art. IX-A, in line with the statement on the ballot, quoted above.
All respondents in both cases appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court, which held that Art. IX-A did not affect all forms of real and personal property taxes but only personal property taxes on individuals, which it construed to mean “ad valorem taxation of personal property owned by a natural person or by two or more natural persons as joint tenants or tenants in common.” 49 Ill. 2d 137, 148, 273 N. E. 2d 592, 597. As so construed, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the tax violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id., at 151, 273 N. E. 2d, at 599, one Justice dissenting. The cases are here on writs of certiorari which we granted. 405 U. S. 1039.
The Equal Protection Clause does not mean that a State may not draw lines that treat one class of individuals or entities differently from the others. The test is whether the difference in treatment is an invidious discrimination. Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U. S. 663, 666. Where taxation is concerned and no specific federal right, apart from equal protection, is imperiled, the States have large leeway in making classifications and drawing lines which in their judgment produce reasonable systems of taxation. As stated in Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U. S. 522, 526-527:
“The States have a very wide discretion in the laying of their taxes. When dealing with their proper domestic concerns, and not trenching upon the prerogatives of the National Government or violating the guaranties of the Federal Constitution, the States have the attribute of sovereign powers in devising their fiscal systems to ensure revenue and foster their local interests. Of course, the States, in the exercise of their taxing power, are subject to the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. But that clause imposes no iron rule of equality, prohibiting the flexibility and variety that are appropriate to reasonable schemes of state taxation. The State may impose different specific taxes upon different trades and professions and may vary the rate of excise upon various products. It is not required to resort to close distinctions or to maintain a precise, scientific uniformity with reference to composition, use or value.”
In that case we used the phrase “palpably arbitrary” or “invidious” as defining the limits placed by the Equal Protection Clause on state power. Id,., at 530. State taxes which have the collateral effect of restricting or even destroying an occupation or a business have been sustained, so long as the regulatory power asserted is properly within the limits of the federal-state regime created by the Constitution. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U. S. 40, 44 47. When it comes to taxes on corporations and taxes on individuals, great leeway is permissible so far as equal protection is concerned. They may be classified differently with respect to their right to receive or earn income. In Lawrence v. State Tax Comm’n, 286 U. S. 276, 283, a state statute relieved domestic corporations of an income tax derived from activities carried on outside the State, but imposed the tax on individuals obtaining such income. We upheld the tax against the claim that it violated the Equal Protection Clause, saying:
“We cannot say that investigation in these fields would not disclose a basis for the legislation which would lead reasonable men to conclude that there is just ground for the difference here made. The existence, unchallenged, of differences between the taxation of incomes of individuals and of corporations in every federal revenue act since the adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment, demonstrates that there may be.” Id., at 283-284.
It is true that in Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, 277 U. S. 389, the Court held that a gross receipts tax levied on corporations doing a taxi business violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, when no such tax was levied on individuals and partnerships operating taxicabs in competition with the corporate taxpayers. Justices Holmes, Brandeis, and Stone dissented. Id., at 403-412. Mr. Justice Holmes stated:
“If usually there is an important difference of degree between the business done by corporations and that done by individuals, I see no reason why the larger businesses may not be taxed and the small ones disregarded, and I think it would be immaterial if here and there exceptions were found to the general rule. . . . Furthermore if the State desired to discourage this form of activity in corporate form and expressed its desire by a special tax I think that there is nothing in the Fourteenth Amendment to prevent it.” Id., at 403.
Each of these dissenters thought Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107, should govern Quaker City Cab. The Flint case involved a federal tax upon the privilege of doing business in a corporate capacity, but it was not laid on businesses carried on by a partnership or private individual. It was, therefore, contended that the tax was “so unequal and arbitrary” as to be beyond the power of Congress. Id., at 158. We had not yet held that the Fifth Amendment in its use of due process carries a mandate of equal protection. But the Court in dictum stated:
“[I]t could not be said, even if the principles of the Fourteenth Amendment were applicable to the present case, that there is no substantial difference between the carrying on of business by the corporations taxed, and the same business when conducted by a private firm or individual. The thing taxed is not the mere dealing in merchandise, in which the actual transactions may be the same, whether conducted by individuals or corporations, but the tax is laid upon the privileges which exist in conducting business with the advantages which inhere in the corporate capacity of those taxed, and which are not enjoyed by private firms or individuals. These advantages are obvious, and have led to the formation of such companies in nearly all branches of trade. The continuity of the business, without interruption by death or dissolution, the transfer of property interests by the disposition of shares of stock, the advantages of business controlled and managed by corporate directors, the general absence of individual liability, these and other things inhere in the advantages of business thus conducted, which do not exist when the same business is conducted by private individuals or partnerships. It is this distinctive privilege which is the subject of taxation, not the mere buying or selling or handling of goods which may be the same, whether done by corporations or individuals.” Id., at 161-162.
While Quaker City Cab came after Flint, cases following Quaker City Cab have somewhat undermined it. White River Co. v. Arkansas, 279 U. S. 692, involved a state statute for collection of back taxes on lands owned by corporations but not individuals. The Court sustained the statute. Mr. Justice Butler, Mr. Chief justice Taft, and Mr. Justice Van Devanter dissented, asserting that Quaker City Cab was not distinguishable. The majority made no effort to distinguish Quaker City Cab beyond saying that it did not involve, as did White River, back taxes. Id., at 696.
In Rapid Transit Co. v. New York, 303 U. S. 573, an excise tax was levied on every utility but not on other business units. In sustaining the tax against the claim of lack of equal protection, the Court said:
“Since carriers or other utilities with the right of eminent domain, the use of public property, special franchises or public contracts, have many points of distinction from other businesses, including relative freedom from competition, especially significant with increasing density of population and municipal expansion, these public service organizations have no valid ground by virtue of the equal protection clause to object to separate treatment related to such distinctions.” Id., at 579.
We reached the same result in Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Browning, 310 U. S. 362, where Tennessee had used one system for making assessments under its ad valorem tax law as respects most taxpayers and a totally different one for public service corporations. So far as equal protection was concerned, we said that the grievance of the particular complainant was “common to the whole class” and not “invidious to a particular taxpayer.” Id., at 368.
Approval of the treatment “with that separateness” which distinguishes public service corporations from others, ibid., leads us to conclude in the present cases that making corporations and like entities, but not individuals, liable for ad valorem taxes on personal property does not transcend the requirements of equal protection.
In Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U. S. 83, a State laid an ad valorem tax of 50$ per $100 on deposits in banks outside the State and only 10(i per $1,000 on deposits within the State. The classification was sustained against the charge of invidious discrimination, the Court noting that “in taxation, even more than in other fields, legislatures possess the greatest freedom in classification.” Id., at 88. There is a presumption of constitutionality which can be overcome “only by the most explicit demonstration that a classification is a hostile and oppressive discrimination against particular persons and classes.” Ibid. And the Court added, “The burden is on the one attacking the legislative arrangement to negative every conceivable basis which might support it.” Ibid. That idea has been elaborated. Thus, in Carmichael v. Southern Coal Co., 301 U. S. 495, the Court, in sustaining an unemployment tax on employers, said:
“A state legislature, in the enactment of laws, has the widest possible latitude within the limits of the Constitution. In the nature of the case it cannot record a complete catalogue of, the considerations which move its members to enact laws. In the absence of such a record courts cannot assume that its action is capricious, or that, with its informed acquaintance with local conditions to which the legislation is to be applied, it was not aware of facts which afford reasonable basis for its action. Only by faithful adherence to this guiding principle of judicial review of legislation is it possible to preserve to the legislative branch its rightful independence and its ability to function.” Id., at 510.
Illinois tells us that the individual personal property tax was discriminatory, unfair, almost impossible to administer, and economically unsound. Assessment practices varied from district to district. About a third of the individuals paid no personal property taxes at all, while the rest paid on their bank accounts, automobiles, household furniture, and other resources, and in rural areas they paid on their livestock, grain, and farm implements as well. As respects corporations, the State says, the tax is uniformly enforceable. Illinois says, moreover, that Art. IX-A is only the first step in totally eliminating the ad valorem personal property tax by 1979 but for fiscal reasons it was impossible to abolish the tax all at once.
We could strike down this tax as discriminatory only if we substituted our judgment on facts of which we can be only dimly aware for a legislative judgment that reflects a vivid reaction to pressing fiscal problems. Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania is only a relic of a bygone era. We cannot follow it and stay within the narrow confines of judicial review, which is an important part of our constitutional tradition.
Reversed.
In 1969, the Illinois Legislature had provided for the submission of the proposed amendment to a referendum vote.
The result was either to reverse with directions to dismiss the complaints or to affirm the judgment that dismissed the complaints. Those two cases were heard by the Illinois Supreme Court along with a petition to file original suit with that court by one Maynard, who owned nonbusiness personal property, and by three school districts. That petition was dismissed.
Classic examples are the taxes that discriminated against newspapers, struck down under the First Amendment (Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233) or that discriminated against interstate commerce (see Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Calvert, 347 U. S. 157) or required licenses to engage in interstate commerce.
See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497, decided May 17, 1954, which held that federal discrimination (in that case racial in nature) may be so arbitrary as to be violative of due process as the term is used in the Fifth Amendment.
In Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Grosjean, 301 U. S. 412, a State classified chain stores for purposes of a chain store tax according to the number of stores — inside and outside the State. The Court sustained the tax, saying: “The statute bears equally upon all who fall into the same class, and this satisfies the guaranty of equal protection.” Id., at 424. In Carmichael v. Southern Coal Co., 301 U. S. 495, a State laid an unemployment tax on employers, excluding, inter alia, agriculture, domestic service, crews of vessels on navigable waters, and eleemosynary institutions. The Court sustained the tax, saying: “This Court has repeatedly held that inequalities which result from a singling out of one particular class for taxation or exemption, infringe no constitutional limitation.” Id., at 509. And it added: “A legislature is not bound to tax every member of a class or none. It may make distinctions of degree having a rational basis, and when subjected to judicial scrutiny they must be presumed to rest on that basis if there is any conceivable state of facts which would support it.” Ibid.
Note 5, supra.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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H
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice O’Connor
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757 (1966), held that a State could force a defendant to submit to a blood-alcohol test without violating the defendant’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. We now address a question left open in Schmerber, supra, at 765, n. 9, and hold that the admission into evidence of a defendant’s refusal to submit to such a test likewise does not offend the right against self-incrimination.
I
Two Madison, South Dakota, police officers stopped respondent’s car after they saw him fail to stop at a stop sign. The officers asked respondent for his driver’s license and asked him to get out of the car. As he left the car, respondent staggered and fell against the car to support himself. The officers smelled alcohol on his breath. Respondent did not have a driver’s license, and informed the officers that it was revoked after a previous driving-while-intoxicated conviction. The officers asked respondent to touch his finger to his nose and to walk a straight line. When respondent failed these field sobriety tests, he was placed under arrest and read his Miranda rights. Respondent acknowledged that he understood his rights and agreed to talk without a lawyer present. App. 11. Reading from a printed card, the officers then asked respondent to submit to a blood-alcohol test and warned him that he could lose his license if he refused. Respondent refused to take the test, stating “I’m too drunk, I won’t pass the test.” The officers again read the request to submit to a test, and then took respondent to the police station, where they read the request to submit a third time. Respondent continued to refuse to take the test, again saying he was too drunk to pass it.
South Dakota law specifically declares that refusal to submit to a blood-alcohol test “may be admissible into evidence at the trial.” S. D. Comp. Laws Ann. §32-23-10.1 (Supp. 1982). Nevertheless, respondent sought to suppress all evidence of his refusal to take the blood-alcohol test. The Circuit Court granted the suppression motion for three reasons: the South Dakota statute allowing evidence of refusal violated respondent’s federal constitutional rights; the officers failed to advise respondent that the refusal could be used against him at trial; and the refusal was irrelevant to the issues before the court. The State appealed from the entire order. The South Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the suppression of the act of refusal on the grounds that § 32-23-10.1, which allows the introduction of this evidence, violated the federal and state privilege against self-incrimination. 312 N. W. 2d 723 (1981). The court reasoned that the refusal was a communicative act involving respondent’s testimonial capacities and that the State compelled this communication by forcing respondent “‘to choose between submitting to a perhaps unpleasant examination and producing testimonial evidence against himself,’” id., at 726 (quoting State v. Andrews, 297 Minn. 260, 262, 212 N. W. 2d 863, 864 (1973), cert. denied, 419 U. S. 881 (1974)).
Since other jurisdictions have found no Fifth Amendment violation from the admission of evidence of refusal to submit to blood-alcohol tests, we granted certiorari to resolve the conflict. 456 U. S. 971 (1982).
HH hH
The situation underlying this case — that of the drunk driver — occurs with tragic frequency on our Nation’s highways. The carnage caused by drunk drivers is well documented and needs no detailed recitation here. This Court, although not having the daily contact with the problem that the state courts have, has repeatedly lamented the tragedy. See Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U. S. 432, 439 (1957) (“The increasing slaughter on our highways, most of which should be avoidable, now reaches the astounding figures only heard of on the battlefield”); Tate v. Short, 401 U. S. 395, 401 (1971) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (deploring “traffic irresponsibility and the frightful carnage it spews upon our highways”); Perez v. Campbell, 402 U. S. 637, 657, 672 (1971) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (footnote omitted) (“The slaughter on the highways of this Nation exceeds the death toll of all our wars”); Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U. S. 1, 17-19 (1979) (recognizing the “compelling interest in highway safety”).
As part of its program to deter drinkers from driving, South Dakota has enacted an “implied consent” law. S. D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 32-23-10 (Supp. 1982). This statute declares that any person operating a vehicle in South Dakota is deemed to have consented to a chemical test of the alcoholic content of his blood if arrested for driving while intoxicated. In Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757 (1966), this Court upheld a state-compelled blood test against a claim that it infringed the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. We recognized- that a coerced blood test infringed to some degree the “inviolability of the human personality” and the “requirement that the State procure the evidence against an accused ‘by its own independent labors,’ ” but noted the privilege has never been given the full scope suggested by the values it helps to protect. Id., at 762. We therefore held that the privilege bars the State only from compelling “communications” or “testimony.” Since a blood test was “physical or real” evidence rather than testimonial evidence, we found it unprotected by the Fifth Amendment privilege.
Schmerber, then, clearly allows a State to force a person suspected of driving while intoxicated to submit to a blood-alcohol test. South Dakota, however, has declined to authorize its police officers to administer a blood-alcohol test against the suspect’s will. Rather, to avoid violent confrontations, the South Dakota statute permits a suspect to refuse the test, and indeed requires police officers to inform the suspect of his right to refuse. S. D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 32-23-10 (Supp. 1982). This permission is not without a price, however. South Dakota law authorizes the Department of Public Safety, after providing the person who has refused the test an opportunity for a hearing, to revoke for one year both the person’s license to drive and any nonresident operating privileges he may possess. § 32-23-11. Such a penalty for refusing to take a blood-alcohol test is unquestionably legitimate, assuming appropriate procedural protections. See Mackey v. Montrym, supra.
South Dakota further discourages the choice of refusal by allowing the refusal to be used against the defendant at trial. S. D. Comp. Laws. Ann. §§32-23-10.1 and 19-13-28.1 (Supp. 1982). Schmerber expressly reserved the question of whether evidence of refusal violated the privilege against self-incrimination. 384 U. S., at 765, n. 9. The Court did indicate that general Fifth Amendment principles, rather than the particular holding of Griffin v. California, 380 U. S. 609 (1965), should control the inquiry. 384 U. S., at 766, n. 9.
Most courts applying general Fifth Amendment principles to the refusal to take a blood test have found no violation of the privilege against self-incrimination. Many courts, following the lead of Justice Traynor’s opinion for the California Supreme Court in People v. Sudduth, 65 Cal. 2d 543, 421 P. 2d 401 (1966), cert. denied, 389 U. S. 850 (1967), have reasoned that refusal to submit is a physical act rather than a communication and for this reason is not protected by the privilege. As Justice Traynor explained more fully in the companion case of People v. Ellis, 65 Cal. 2d 529, 421 P. 2d 393 (1966) (refusal to display voice not testimonial), evidence of refusal to take a potentially incriminating test is similar to other circumstantial evidence of consciousness of guilt, such as escape from custody and suppression of evidence. The court below, relying on Dudley v. State, 548 S. W. 2d 706 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977), and State v. Andrews, 297 Minn. 260, 212 N. W. 2d 863 (1973), cert. denied, 419 U. S. 881 (1974), rejected this view. This minority view emphasizes that the refusal is “a tacit or overt expression and communication of defendant’s thoughts,” 312 N. W. 2d, at 726, and that the Constitution “simply forbids any compulsory revealing or communication of an accused person’s thoughts or mental processes, whether it is by acts, failure to act, words spoken or failure to speak.” Dudley, supra, at 708.
While we find considerable force in the analogies to flight and suppression of evidence suggested by Justice Traynor, we decline to rest our decision on this ground. As we recognized in Schmerber, the distinction between real or physical evidence, on the one hand, and communications or testimony, on the other, is not readily drawn in many cases. 384 U. S., at 764. The situations arising from a refusal present a difficult gradation from a person who indicates refusal by complete inaction, to one who nods his head negatively, to one who states “I refuse to take the test,” to the respondent here, who stated “I’m too drunk, I won’t pass the test.” Since no impermissible coercion is involved when the suspect refuses to submit to take the test, regardless of the form of refusal, we prefer to rest our decision on this ground, and draw possible distinctions when necessary for decision in other circumstances.
As we stated in Fisher v. United States, 425 U. S. 391, 397 (1976), “[t]he Court has held repeatedly that the Fifth Amendment is limited to prohibiting the use of ‘physical or moral compulsion’ exerted on the person asserting the privilege.” This coercion requirement comes directly from the constitutional language directing that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U. S. Const., Arndt. 5 (emphasis added). And as Professor Levy concluded in his history of the privilege, “[t]he element of compulsion or involuntariness was always an ingredient of the right and, before the right existed, of protests against incriminating interrogatories.” L. Levy, Origins of the Fifth Amendment 328 (1968).
Here, the State did not directly compel respondent to refuse the test, for it gave him the choice of submitting to the test or refusing. Of course, the fact the government gives a defendant or suspect a “choice” does not always resolve the compulsion inquiry. The classic Fifth Amendment violation — telling a defendant at trial to testify — does not, under an extreme view, compel the defendant to incriminate himself. He could submit to self-accusation, or testify falsely (risking perjury) or decline to testify (risking contempt). But the Court has long recognized that the Fifth Amendment prevents the State from forcing the choice of this “cruel trilemma” on the defendant. See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n, 378 U. S. 52, 55 (1964). See also New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U. S. 450, 459 (1979) (telling a witness under a grant of legislative immunity to testify or face contempt sanctions is “the essence of coerced testimony”). Similarly, Schmerber cautioned that the Fifth Amendment may bar the use of testimony obtained when the proffered alternative was to submit to a test so painful, dangerous, or severe, or so violative of religious beliefs, that almost inevitably a person would prefer “confession.” 384 U. S., at 765, n. 9. Cf. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 458 (1966) (unless compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings is dispelled, no statement is truly a product of free choice).
In contrast to these prohibited choices, the values behind the Fifth Amendment are not hindered when the State offers a suspect the choice of submitting to the blood-alcohol test or having his refusal used against him. The simple blood-alcohol test is so safe, painless, and commonplace, see Schmerber, 384 U. S., at 771, that respondent concedes, as he must, that the State could legitimately compel the suspect, against his will, to accede to the test. Given, then, that the offer of taking a blood-alcohol test is clearly legitimate, the action becomes no less legitimate when the State offers a second option of refusing the test, with the attendant penalties for making that choice. Nor is this a case where the State has subtly coerced respondent into choosing the option it had no right to compel, rather than offering a true choice. To the contrary, the State wants respondent to choose to take the test, for the inference of intoxication arising from a positive blood-alcohol test is far stronger than that arising from a refusal to take the test.
We recognize, of course, that the choice to submit or refuse to take a blood-alcohol test will not be an easy or pleasant one for a suspect to make. But the criminal process often requires suspects and defendants to make difficult choices. See, e. g., Crampton v. Ohio, decided with McGautha v. California, 402 U. S. 183, 213-217 (1971). We hold, therefore, that a refusal to take a blood-alcohol test, after a police officer has lawfully requested it, is not an act coerced by the officer, and thus is not protected by the privilege against self-incrimination.
III
Relying on Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U. S. 610 (1976), respondent also suggests that admission at trial of his refusal violates the Due Process Clause because respondent was not fully warned of the consequences of refusal. Doyle held that the Due Process Clause prohibits a prosecutor from using a defendant’s silence after Miranda warnings to impeach his testimony at trial. Just a Term before, in United States v. Hale, 422 U. S. 171 (1975), we had determined under our supervisory power that the federal courts could not use such silence for impeachment because of its dubious probative value. Although Doyle mentioned this rationale in applying the rule to the States, 426 U. S., at 617, the Court relied on the fundamental unfairness of implicitly assuring a suspect that his silence will not be used against him and then using his silence to impeach an explanation subsequently offered at trial. Id., at 618.
Unlike the situation in Doyle, we do not think it fundamentally unfair for South Dakota to use the refusal to take the test as evidence of guilt, even though respondent was not specifically warned that his refusal could be used against him at trial. First, the right to silence underlying the Miranda warnings is one of constitutional dimension, and thus cannot be unduly burdened. See Miranda, supra, at 468, n. 37. Cf. Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U. S. 603 (1982) (postarrest silence without Miranda warnings may be used to impeach trial testimony). Respondent’s right to refuse the blood-alcohol test, by contrast, is simply a matter of grace bestowed by the South Dakota Legislature.
Moreover, the Miranda warnings emphasize the dangers of choosing to speak (“whatever you say can and will be used as evidence against you in court”), but give no warning of adverse consequences from choosing to remain silent. This imbalance in the delivery of Miranda warnings, we recognized in Doyle, implicitly assures the suspect that his silence will not be used against him. The warnings challenged here, by contrast, contained no such misleading implicit assurances as to the relative consequences of his choice. The officers explained that, if respondent chose to submit to the test, he had the right to know the results- and could choose to take an additional test by a person chosen by him. The officers did not specifically warn respondent that the test results could be used against him at trial. Explaining the consequences of the other option, the officers specifically warned respondent that failure to take the test could lead to loss of driving privileges for one year. It is true the officers did not inform respondent of the further consequence that evidence of refusal could be used against him in court, but we think it unrealistic to say that the warnings given here implicitly assure a suspect that no consequences other than those mentioned will occur. Importantly, the warning that he could lose his driver’s license made it clear that refusing the test was not a “safe harbor,” free of adverse consequences.
While the State did not actually warn respondent that the test results could be used against him, we hold that such a failure to warn was not the sort of implicit promise to forgo use of evidence that would unfairly “trick” respondent if the evidence were later offered against him at trial. We therefore conclude that the use of evidence of refusal after these warnings comported with the fundamental fairness required by due process.
IV
The judgment of the South Dakota Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
The officer read the Miranda warning from a printed card. He read: “You have the right to remain silent. You don’t have to talk to me unless you want to do so. If you want to talk to me I must advise you whatever you say can and will be used as evidence against you in court. You have the right to confer with a lawyer, and to have a lawyer present with you while you’re being questioned. If you want a lawyer but are unable to pay for one, a lawyer will be appointed to represent you free of any cost to you. Knowing these rights, do you want to talk to me without having a lawyer present? You may stop talking to me at any time. You may also demand a lawyer at any time.” App. 8. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 467-473 (1966).
The card read: “I have arrested you for driving or being in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs, a violation of S. D. C. L. 32-23-1. I request that you submit to a chemical test of your blood to determine your blood alcohol concentration. You have the right to refuse to submit to such a test and if you do refuse no test will be given. You have the right to a chemical test by a person of your own choosing at your own expense in addition to the test I have requested. You have the right to know the results of any chemical test. If you refuse the test I have requested, your driver’s license and any non-residence driving privilege may be revoked for one year after an opportunity to appear before a hearing officer to determine if your driver’s license or non-residence driving privilege shall be revoked. If your driver’s license or non-residence driving privileges are revoked by the hearing officer, you have the right to appeal to Circuit Court. Do you understand what I told you? Do you wish to submit to the chemical test I have requested?” App. 8-10.
Responding to other questions, respondent informed the officers that he had been drinking “close to one ease” by himself at home, and that his last drink was “about ten minutes ago.” Tr. of Preliminary Hearing 8.
South Dakota Comp. Laws Ann. §19-13-28.1 (Supp. 1982) likewise declares that, notwithstanding the general rule in South Dakota that the claim of a privilege is not a proper subject of comment by judge or counsel, evidence of refusal to submit to a chemical analysis of blood, urine, breath, or other bodily substance “is admissible into evidence” at a trial for driving under the influence of alcohol. A person “may not claim privilege against self-incrimination with regard to admission of refusal to submit to chemical analysis.” Ibid.
As Justice Stevens emphasizes, post, at 567, the South Dakota Supreme Court clearly held that the statute violated the State as well as Federal Constitution. Although this would be an adequate state ground for decision, we do not read the opinion as resting on an independent state ground. Rather, we think the court determined that admission of this evidence violated the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and then concluded without further analysis that the state privilege was violated as well. In reaching its holding, the court first analyzed our decisions in Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757 (1966), and Miranda v. Arizona, supra. The court then described the issue for its review as being “[t]o determine whether the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination applies to refusal evidence,” 312 N. W. 2d 723, 725 (1981) (emphasis added), and later asked “whether this testimonial evidence was compelled for purposes of applying the Fifth Amendment standard,” id., at 726 (emphasis added). The cases relied on by the court to resolve these issues analyze the federal privilege against self-incrimination.
The analysis of the court below was remarkably similar to that of the state-court opinion reviewed in Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648, 651-653 (1979). That state-court opinion analyzed various decisions interpreting the Federal Constitution, concluded that the Fourth Amendment violated the police procedure at issue there, and then summarily held that the State Constitution was therefore also infringed. As we characterized their analysis, every police practice found to violate the Fourth Amendment would, without further analysis, be held to be contrary to the State Constitution as well. In such a situation, we concluded, this Court has jurisdiction to review the federal constitutional issue decided below.
Justice Stevens, while expressing general dissatisfaction with Prouse, attempts to distinguish it by noting that the state court there had said the State and Federal Constitutions are “ ‘substantially similar’ and that ‘a violation of the latter is necessarily a violation of the former.’ ” Post, at 571, n. 7. But the South Dakota Supreme Court made virtually identical statements. In a footnote, the court recognized the textual difference between the federal and state constitutional privileges against self-incrimination, but noted that this Court in Schmerber had interpreted the Fifth Amendment prohibition “in light of the more liberal definition of ‘evidence’ as used in our state constitution.” 312 N. W. 2d, at 726, n. Therefore, the court concluded, “[s]ince the Fifth Amendment of the U. S. Constitution is broad enough to exclude this evidence, there is no need to draw a distinction at this time between S. D. Const. Art. VI, § 9 and the Fifth Amendment of the U. S. Constitution.” Ibid. The court could not have stated more clearly that it simply assumed that any violation of the Fifth Amendment privilege also violated, without further analysis, the state privilege. This was precisely the reasoning we found sufficient in Prouse to give us jurisdiction to hear the case and decide the federal constitutional issue.
The South Dakota Supreme Court also remanded for a determination whether respondent’s statement that he was too drunk to pass the test was made after a voluntary waiver of his right to remain silent. As yet, of course, there has been no final judgment in this ease. This Court nevertheless has jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1257(3) to review the federal constitutional issue which has been finally determined, because if the State ultimately prevails at trial, the federal issue will be mooted; and if the State loses at trial, governing state law, S. D. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 23A-32-4 and 23A-32-5 (1979), prevents it from again presenting the federal claim for review. See California v. Stewart (decided with Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 498, n. 71 (1966)); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469, 481 (1975).
See, e. g., cases cited in nn. 11 and 13, infra.
Schmerber also rejected arguments that the coerced blood test violated the right to due process, the right to counsel, and the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Schmerber did caution that due process concerns could be involved if the police initiated physical violence while administering the test, refused to respect a reasonable request to undergo a different form of testing, or responded to resistance with inappropriate force. 384 U. S., at 760, n. 4.
Griffin held that a prosecutor’s or trial court’s comments on a defendant’s refusal to take the witness stand impermissibly burdened the defendant’s Fifth Amendment right to refuse. Unlike the defendant’s situation in Griffin, a person suspected of drunk driving has no constitutional right to refuse to take a blood-alcohol test. The specific rule of Griffin is thus inapplicable.
See, e. g., Newhouse v. Misterly, 415 F. 2d 514 (CA9 1969); Hill v. State, 366 So. 2d 318, 324-325 (Ala. 1979); Campbell v. Superior Court, 106 Ariz. 542, 479 P. 2d 685 (1971); State v. Haze, 218 Kan. 60, 542 P. 2d 720 (1975) (refusal to give handwriting exemplar); City of Westerville v. Cunningham, 15 Ohio St. 2d 121, 239 N. E. 2d 40 (1968).
The Court in Schmerber pointed to the lie detector test as an example of evidence that is difficult to characterize as testimonial or real. Even though the test may seek to obtain physical evidence, we reasoned that to compel a person to submit to such testing “is to evoke the spirit and history of the Fifth Amendment.” 384 U. S., at 764. See also People v. Ellis, 65 Cal. 2d 529, 537, and n. 9, 421 P. 2d 393, 397, and n. 9 (1966) (analyzing lie detector tests as within the Fifth Amendment privilege). A second example of seemingly physical evidence that nevertheless invokes Fifth Amendment protection was presented in Estelle v. Smith, 451 U. S. 454 (1981). There, we held that the Fifth Amendment privilege protected compelled disclosures during a court-ordered psychiatric examination. We specifically rejected the claim that the psychiatrist was observing the patient’s communications simply to infer facts of his mind, rather than to examine the truth of the patient’s statements.
Many courts have found no self-incrimination problem on the ground of no coercion, or on the analytically related ground that the State, if it can compel submission to the test, can qualify the right to refuse the test. See, e. g., Welch v. District Court, 594 F. 2d 903 (CA2 1979); State v. Meints, 189 Neb. 264, 202 N. W. 2d 202 (1972); State v. Gardner, 52 Ore. App. 663, 629 P. 2d 412 (1981); State v. Brean, 136 Vt. 147, 385 A. 2d 1085 (1978).
Nothing in the record suggests that respondent made or could sustain such a claim in this ease.
In the context of an arrest for driving while intoxicated, a police inquiry of whether the suspect will take a blood-alcohol test is not an interrogation within the meaning of Miranda. As we stated in Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U. S. 291, 301 (1980), police words or actions “normally attendant to arrest and custody” do not constitute interrogation. The police inquiry here is highly regulated by state law, and is presented in virtually the same words to all suspects. It is similar to a police request to submit to fingerprinting or photography. Respondent’s choice of refusal thus enjoys no prophylactic Miranda protection outside the basic Fifth Amendment protection. See generally Arenella, Schmerber and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: A Reappraisal, 20 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 31, 56-58 (1982).
Even though the officers did not specifically advise respondent that the test results could be used against him in court, no one would seriously contend that this failure to warn would make the test results inadmissible, had respondent chosen to submit to the test. Cf. Schneckloth v. Busta monte, 412 U. S. 218 (1973) (knowledge of right to refuse not an essential part of proving effective consent to a search).
Since the State wants the suspect to submit to the test, it is in its interest fully to warn suspects of the consequences of refusal. We are informed that police officers in South Dakota now warn suspects that evidence of their refusal can be used against them in court. Tr. of Oral Arg. 16.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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A
|
sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Souter
delivered the opinion of the Court.
We are called upon to decide whether 2 Live Crew’s commercial parody of Roy Orbison’s song, “Oh, Pretty Woman,” may be a fair use within the meaning of the Copyright Act of 1976,17 U. S. C. § 107 (1988 ed. and Supp. IV). Although the District Court granted summary judgment for 2 Live Crew, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding the defense of fair use barred by the song’s commercial character and excessive borrowing. Because we hold that a parody’s commercial character is only one element to be weighed in a fair use enquiry, and that insufficient consideration was given to the nature of parody in weighing the degree of copying, we reverse and remand.
I
In 1964, Roy Orbison and William Dees wrote a rock ballad called “Oh, Pretty Woman” and assigned their rights in it to respondent Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. See Appendix A, infra, at 594. Acuff-Rose registered the song for copyright protection.
Petitioners Luther R. Campbell, Christopher Wongwon, Mark Ross, and David Hobbs are collectively known as 2 Live Crew, a popular rap music group. In 1989, Campbell wrote a song entitled “Pretty Woman,” which he later described in an affidavit as intended, “through comical lyrics, to satirize the original work....” App. to Pet. for Cert. 80a. On July 5, 1989, 2 Live Crew’s manager informed Acuff-Rose that 2 Live Crew had written a parody of “Oh, Pretty Woman,” that they would afford all credit for ownership and authorship of the original song to Acuff-Rose, Dees, and Orbison, and that they were willing to pay a fee for the use they wished to make of it. Enclosed with the letter were a copy of the lyrics and a recording of 2 Live Crew’s song. See Appendix B, infra, at 595. Acuff-Rose’s agent refused permission, stating that “I am aware of the success enjoyed by ‘The 2 Live Crews’, but I must inform you that we cannot permit the use of a parody of ‘Oh, Pretty Woman.’ ” App. to Pet. for Cert. 85a. Nonetheless, in June or July 1989, 2 Live Crew released records, cassette tapes, and compact discs of “Pretty Woman” in a collection of songs entitled “As Clean As They Wanna Be.” The albums and compact discs identify the authors of “Pretty Woman” as Orbison and Dees and its publisher as Acuff-Rose.
Almost a year later, after nearly a quarter of a million copies of the recording had been sold, Acuff-Rose sued 2 Live Crew and its record company, Luke Skyywalker Records, for copyright infringement. The District Court granted summary judgment for 2 Live Crew, reasoning that the commercial purpose of 2 Live Crew’s song was no bar to fair use; that 2 Live Crew’s version was a parody, which “quickly degenerates into a play on words, substituting predictable lyrics with shocking ones” to show “how bland and banal the Orbison song” is; that 2 Live Crew had taken no more than was necessary to “conjure up” the original in order to parody it; and that it was “extremely unlikely that 2 Live Crew’s song could adversely affect the market for the original.” 754 F. Supp. 1150, 1154-1155, 1157-1158 (MD Tenn. 1991). The District Court weighed these factors and held that 2 Live Crew’s song made fair use of Orbison’s original. Id., at 1158-1159.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded. 972 F. 2d 1429, 1439 (1992). Although it assumed for the purpose of its opinion that 2 Live Crew’s song was a parody of the Orbison original, the Court of Appeals thought the District Court had put too little emphasis on the fact that “every commercial use... is presumptively... unfair,” Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U. S. 417, 451 (1984), and it held that “the admittedly commercial nature” of the parody “requires the conclusion” that the first of four factors relevant under the statute weighs against a finding of fair use. 972 F. 2d, at 1435, 1437. Next, the Court of Appeals determined that, by “taking the heart of the original and making it the heart of a new work,” 2 Live Crew had, qualitatively, taken too much. Id., at 1438. Finally, after noting that the effect on the potential market for the original (and the market for derivative works) is “undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use,” Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U. S. 539, 566 (1985), the Court of Appeals faulted the District Court for “refus[ing] to indulge the presumption” that “harm for purposes of the fair use analysis has been established by the presumption attaching to commercial uses.” 972 F. 2d, at 1438-1439. In sum, the court concluded that its “blatantly commercial purpose... prevents this parody from being a fair use.” Id., at 1439.
We granted certiorari, 507 U. S. 1003 (1993), to determine whether 2 Live Crew’s commercial parody could be a fair use.
II
It is uncontested here that 2 Live Crew’s song would be an infringement of Acuff-Rose’s rights in “Oh, Pretty Woman,” under the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U. S. C. § 106 (1988 ed. and Supp. IV), but for a finding of fair use through parody. From the infancy of copyright protection, some opportunity for fair use of copyrighted materials has been thought necessary to fulfill copyright’s very purpose, “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts____” U. S. Const., Art. I, §8, cl. 8. For as Justice Story explained, “[i]n truth, in literature, in science and in art, there are, and can be, few, if any, things, which in an abstract sense, are strictly new and original throughout. Every book in literature, science and art, borrows, and must necessarily borrow, and use much which was well known and used before.” Emerson v. Davies,. 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (No. 4,436) (CCD Mass. 1845). Similarly, Lord Ellenborough expressed the inherent tension in the need simultaneously to protect copyrighted material and to allow others to build upon it when he wrote, “while I shall think myself bound to secure every man in the enjoyment of his copy-right, one must not put manacles upon science.” Carey v. Kearsley, 4 Esp. 168, 170, 170 Eng. Rep. 679, 681 (K. B. 1803). In copyright cases brought under the Statute of Anne of 1710, English courts held that in some instances “fair abridgements” would not infringe an author’s rights, see W. Patry, The Fair Use Privilege in Copyright Law 6-17 (1985) (hereinafter Patry); Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1105 (1990) (hereinafter Leval), and although the First Congress enacted our initial copyright statute, Act of May 31,1790,1 Stat. 124, without any explicit reference to “fair use,” as it later came to be known, the doctrine was recognized by the American courts nonetheless.
In Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (No. 4,901) (CCD Mass. 1841), Justice Story distilled the essence of law and methodology from the earlier cases: “look to the nature and objects of the selections made, the quantity and value of the materials used, and the degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or supersede the objects, of the original work.” Id., at 348. Thus expressed, fair use remained exclusively judge-made doctrine until the passage of the 1976 Copyright Act, in which Justice Story’s summary is discernible:
Ҥ 107. Limitations on exclusive rights: Fair use
“Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include—
“(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
“(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
“(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and “(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.
“The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors.” 17 U. S. C. § 107 (1988 ed. and Supp. IV).
Congress meant § 107 “to restate the present judicial doctrine of fair use, not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way” and intended that courts continue the common-law tradition of fair use adjudication. H. R. Rep. No. 94-1476, p. 66 (1976) (hereinafter House Report); S. Rep. No. 94-473, p. 62 (1975) (hereinafter Senate Report). The fair use doctrine thus “permits [and requires] courts to avoid rigid application of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the very creativity which that law is designed to foster.” Stewart v. Abend, 495 U. S. 207, 236 (1990) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
The task is not to be simplified with bright-line rules, for the statute, like the doctrine it recognizes, calls for case-by-case analysis. Harper & Row, 471 U. S., at 560; Sony, 464 U. S., at 448, and n. 31; House Report, pp. 65-66; Senate Report, p. 62. The text employs the terms “including” and “such as” in the preamble paragraph to indicate the “illustrative and not limitative” function of the examples given, § 101; see Harper & Row, supra, at 561, which thus provide only general guidance about the sorts of copying that courts and
Congress most commonly had found to be fair uses. Nor may the four statutory factors be treated in isolation, one from another. All are to be explored, and the results weighed together, in light of the purposes of copyright. See Leval 1110-1111; Patry & Pérlmutter, Fair Use Misconstrued: Profit, Presumptions, and Parody, 11 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L. J. 667, 685-687 (1993) (hereinafter Patry & Perlmutter).
A
The first factor in a fair use enquiry is “the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes.” § 107(1). This factor draws on Justice Story’s formulation, “the nature and objects of the selections made.” Folsom v. Marsh, supra, at 348. The enquiry here may be guided by the examples given in the preamble to §107, looking to whether the use is for criticism, or comment, or news reporting, and the like, see § 107. The central purpose of this investigation is to see, in Justice Story’s words, whether the new work merely “supersede^] the objects” of the original creation, Folsom v. Marsh, supra, at 348; accord, Harper & Row, supra, at 562 (“supplanting” the original), or instead adds something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message; it asks, in other words, whether and to what extent the new work is “transformative.” Leval 1111. Although such transformative use is not absolutely necessary for a finding of fair use, Sony, supra, at 455, n. 40, the goal of copyright, to promote science and the arts, is generally furthered by the creation of transformative works. Such works thus lie at the heart of the fair use doctrine’s guarantee of breathing space within the confines of copyright, see, e. g., Sony, supra, at 478-480 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), and the more transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use.
This Court has only once before even considered whether parody may be fair use, and that time issued no opinion because of the Court’s equal division. Benny v. Loew’s Inc., 239 F. 2d 532 (CA9 1956), aff’d sub nom. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Loew’s Inc., 356 U. S. 43 (1958). Suffice it to say now that parody has an obvious claim to trans-formative value, as Acuff-Rose itself does not deny. Like less ostensibly humorous forms of criticism, it can provide social benefit, by shedding light on an earlier work, and, in the process, creating a new one. We thus line up with the courts that have held that parody, like other comment or criticism, may claim fair use under § 107. See, e. g., Fisher v. Dees, 794 F. 2d 432 (CA9 1986) (“When Sonny Sniffs Glue,” a parody of “When Sunny Gets Blue,” is fair use); Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co., 482 F. Supp. 741 (SDNY), aff’d, 623 F. 2d 252 (CA2 1980) (“I Love Sodom,” a “Saturday Night Live” television parody of “I Love New York,” is fair use); see also House Report, p. 65; Senate Report, p. 61 (“[U]se in a parody of some of the content of the work parodied” may be fair use).
The germ of parody lies in the definition of the Greek parodeia, quoted in Judge Nelson’s Court of Appeals dissent, as “a song sung alongside another.” 972 F 2d, at 1440, quoting 7 Encyclopedia Britannica 768 (15th ed. 1975). Modern dictionaries accordingly describe a parody as a “literary or artistic work that imitates the characteristic style of an author or a work for comic effect or ridicule,” or as a “composition in prose or verse in which the characteristic turns of thought and phrase in an author or class of authors are imitated in such a way as to make them appear ridiculous.” For the purposes of copyright law, the nub of the definitions, and the heart of any parodist’s claim to quote from existing material, is the use of some elements of a prior author’s composition to create a new one that, at least in part, comments on that author’s works. See, e.g., Fisher v. Dees, supra, at 437; MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F. 2d 180, 185 (CA2 1981). If, on the contrary, the commentary has no critical bearing on the substance or style of the original composition, which the alleged infringer merely uses to get attention or to avoid the drudgery in working up something fresh, the claim to fairness in borrowing from another’s work diminishes accordingly (if it does not vanish), and other factors, like the extent of its commerciality, loom larger. Parody needs to mimic an original to make its point, and so has some claim to use the creation of its victim’s (or collective victims’) imagination, whereas satire can stand on its own two feet and so requires justification for the very act of borrowing. See ibid.; Bisceglia, Parody and Copyright Protection: Turning the Balancing Act Into a Juggling Act, in ASCAP, Copyright Law Symposium, No. 34, p. 25 (1987).
The fact that parody can claim legitimacy for some appropriation does not, of course, tell either parodist or judge much about where to draw the line. Like a book review quoting the copyrighted material criticized, parody may or may not be fair use, and petitioners’ suggestion that any parodie use is presumptively fair has no more justification in law or fact than the equally hopeful claim that any use for news reporting should be presumed fair, see Harper & Row, 471 U. S., at 561. The Act has no hint of an evidentiary preference for parodists over their victims, and no workable presumption for parody could take account of the fact that parody often shades into satire when society is lampooned through its creative artifacts, or that a work may contain both parodie and nonparodic elements. Accordingly, parody, like any other use, has to work its way through the relevant factors, and be judged case by case, in light of the ends of the copyright law.
Here, the District Court held, and the Court of Appeals assumed, that 2 Live Crew’s “Pretty Woman” contains parody, commenting on and criticizing the original work, whatever it may have to say about society at large. As the District Court remarked, the words of 2 Live Crew’s song copy the original’s first line, but then “quickly degenerate] into a play on words, substituting predictable lyrics with shocking ones... [that] derisively demonstrate] how bland and banal the Orbison song seems to them.” 754 F. Supp., at 1155 (footnote omitted). Judge Nelson, dissenting below, came to the same conclusion, that the 2 Live Crew song “was clearly intended to ridicule the white-bread original” and “reminds us that sexual congress with nameless streetwalkers is not necessarily the stuff of romance and is not necessarily without its consequences. The singers (there are several) have the same thing on their minds as did the lonely man with the nasal voice, but here there is no hint of wine and roses.” 972 F. 2d, at 1442. Although the majority below had difficulty discerning any criticism of the original in 2 Live Crew’s song, it assumed for purposes of its opinion that there was some. Id., at 1435-1436, and n. 8.
We have less difficulty in finding that critical element in 2 Live Crew’s song than the Court of Appeals did, although having found it we will not take the further step of evaluating its quality. The threshold question when fair use is raised in defense of parody is whether a parodie character may reasonably be perceived. Whether, going beyond that, parody is in good taste or bad does not and should not matter to fair use. As Justice Holmes explained, “[i]t would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of [a work], outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits. At the one extreme some works of genius would be sure to miss appreciation. Their very novelty would make them repulsive until the public had learned the new language in which their author spoke.” Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U. S. 239, 251 (1903) (circus posters have copyright protection); cf. Yankee Publishing Inc. v. News America Publishing, Inc., 809 F. Supp. 267, 280 (SDNY 1992) (Leval, J.) (“First Amendment protections do not apply only to those who speak clearly, whose jokes are funny, and whose parodies succeed”) (trademark case).
While we might not assign a high rank to the parodie element here, we think it fair to say that 2 Live Crew’s song reasonably could be perceived as commenting on the original or criticizing it, to some degree. 2 Live Crew juxtaposes ■the romantic musings of a man whose fantasy comes true, with degrading taunts, a bawdy demand for sex, and a sigh of relief from paternal responsibility. The later words can be taken as a comment on the naivete of the original of an earlier day, as a rejection of its sentiment that ignores the ugliness of street life and the debasement that it signifies. It is this joinder of reference and ridicule that marks off the author’s choice of parody from the other types of comment and criticism that traditionally have had a claim to fair use protection as transformative works.
The Court of Appeals, however, immediately cut short the enquiry into 2 Live Crew’s fair use claim by confining its treatment of the first factor essentially to one relevant fact, the commercial nature of the use. The court then inflated the significance of this fact by applying a presumption ostensibly culled from Sony, that “every commercial use of copyrighted material is presumptively... unfair....” Sony, 464 U. S., at 451. In giving virtually dispositive weight to the commercial nature of the parody, the Court of Appeals erred.
The language of the statute makes clear that the commercial or nonprofit educational purpose of a work is only one element of the first factor enquiry into its purpose and character. Section 107(1) uses the term “including” to begin the dependent clause referring to commercial use, and the main clause speaks of a broader investigation into “purpose and character.” As we explained in Harper & Row, Congress resisted attempts to narrow the ambit of this traditional enquiry by adopting categories of presumptively fair use, and it urged courts to preserve the breadth of their traditionally ample view of the universe of relevant evidence. 471 U. S., at 561; House Report, p. 66. Accordingly, the mere fact that a use is educational and not for profit does not insulate it from a finding of infringement, any more than the commercial character of a use bars a finding of fairness. If, indeed, commerciality carried presumptive force against a finding of fairness, the presumption would swallow nearly all of the illustrative uses listed in the preamble paragraph of § 107, including news reporting, comment, criticism, teaching, scholarship, and research, since these activities “are generally conducted for profit in this country.” Harper & Row, supra, at 592 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Congress could not have intended such a rule, which certainly is not inferable from the common-law cases, arising as they did from the world of letters in which Samuel Johnson could pronounce that “[n]o man but a blockhead ever wrote, except for money.” 3 Boswell’s Life of Johnson 19 (G. Hill ed. 1934).
Sony itself called for no hard evidentiary presumption. There, we emphasized the need for a “sensitive balancing of interests,” 464 U. S., at 455, n. 40, noted that Congress had “eschewed a rigid, bright-line approach to fair use,” id., at 449, n. 31, and stated that the commercial or nonprofit educational character of a work is “not conclusive,” id., at 448-449, but rather a fact to be “weighed along with other[s] in fair use decisions,” id., at 449, n. 32 (quoting House Report, p. 66). The Court of Appeals’s elevation of one sentence from Sony to a per se rule thus runs as much counter to Sony itself as to the long common-law tradition of fair use adjudication. Rather, as we explained in Harper & Row, Sony stands for the proposition that the “fact that a publication was commercial as opposed to nonprofit is a separate factor that tends to weigh against a finding of fair use.” 471 U. S., at 562. But that is all, and the fact that even the force of that tendency will vary with the context is a further reason against elevating commerciality to hard presumptive significance. The use, for example, of a copyrighted work to advertise a product, even in a parody, will be entitled to less indulgence under the first factor of the fair use enquiry than the sale of a parody for its own sake, let alone one performed a single time by students in school. See generally Patry & Perlmutter 679-680; Fisher v. Dees, 794 F. 2d, at 437; Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F. 2d 1253, 1262 (CA2 1986); Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F. 2d 1510, 1522 (CA9 1992).
B
The second statutory factor, “the nature of the copyrighted work,” § 107(2), draws on Justice Story’s expression, the “value of the materials used.” Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas., at 348. This factor calls for recognition that some works are closer to the core of intended copyright protection than others, with the consequence that fair use is more difficult to establish when the former works are copied. See, e. g., Stewart v. Abend, 495 U. S., at 237-238 (contrasting fictional short story with factual works); Harper & Row, 471 U. S., at 563-564 (contrasting soon-to-be-published memoir with published speech); Sony, 464 U. S., at 455, n. 40 (contrasting motion pictures with news broadcasts); Feist, 499 U. S., at 348-351 (contrasting creative works with bare factual compilations); 3 M. Nimmer & D. Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright §13.05[A][2] (1993) (hereinafter Nimmer); Leval 1116. We agree with both the District Court and the Court of Appeals that the Orbison original’s creative expression for public dissemination falls within the core of the copyright’s protective purposes. 754 F. Supp., at 1155-1156; 972 F. 2d, at 1437. This fact, however, is not much help in this case, or ever likely to help much in separating the fair use sheep from the infringing goats in a parody case, since parodies almost invariably copy publicly known, expressive works.
C
The third factor asks whether “the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole,” § 107(3) (or, in Justice Story’s words, “the quantity and value of the materials used,” Folsom v. Marsh, supra, at 348) are reasonable in relation to the purpose of the copying. Here, attention turns to the persuasiveness of a parodist’s justification for the particular copying done, and the enquiry will harken back to the first of the statutory factors, for, as in prior cases, we recognize that the extent of permissible copying varies with the purpose and character of the use. See Sony, supra, at 449-450 (reproduction of entire work “does not have its ordinary effect of militating against a finding of fair use” as to home videotaping of television programs); Harper & Row, supra, at 564 (“[E]ven substantial quotations might qualify as fair use in a review of a published work or a news account of a speech” but not in a scoop of a soon-to-be-published memoir). The facts bearing on this factor will also tend to address the fourth, by revealing the degree to which the parody may serve as a market substitute for the original or potentially licensed derivatives. See Leval 1123.
The District Court considered the song’s parodie purpose in finding that 2 Live Crew had not helped themselves overmuch. 754 F. Supp., at 1156-1157. The Court of Appeals disagreed, stating that “[w]hile it may not be inappropriate to find that no more was taken than necessary, the copying was qualitatively substantial.... We conclude that taking the heart of the original and making it the heart of a new work was to purloin a substantial portion of the essence of the original.” 972 F. 2d, at 1438.
The Court of Appeals is of course correct that this factor calls for thought not only about the quantity of the materials used, but about their quality and importance, too. In Harper & Row, for example, the Nation had taken only some 300 words out of President Ford’s memoirs, but we signaled the significance of the quotations in finding them to amount to “the heart of the book,” the part most likely to be newsworthy and important in licensing serialization. 471 U. S., at 564-566, 568 (internal quotation marks omitted). We also agree with the Court of Appeals that whether “a substantial portion of the infringing work was copied verbatim” from the copyrighted work is a relevant question, see id., at 565, for it may reveal a dearth of transformative character or purpose under the first factor, or a greater likelihood of market harm under the fourth; a work composed primarily of an original, particularly its heart, with little added or changed, is more likely to be a merely superseding use, fulfilling demand for the original.
Where we part company with the court below is in applying these guides to parody, and in particular to parody in the song before us. Parody presents a difficult case. Parody’s humor, or in any event its comment, necessarily springs from recognizable allusion to its object through distorted imitation. Its art lies in the tension between a known original and its parodie twin. When parody takes aim at a particular original work, the parody must be able to “conjure up” at least enough of that original to make the object of its critical wit recognizable. See, e. g., Elsmere Music, 623 F. 2d, at 253, n. 1; Fisher v. Dees, 794 F. 2d, at 438-439. What makes for this recognition is quotation of the original’s most distinctive or memorable features, which the parodist can be sure the audience will know. Once enough has been taken to assure identification, how much more is reasonable will depend, say, on the extent to which the song’s overriding purpose and character is to parody the original or, in contrast, the likelihood that the parody may serve as a market substitute for the original. But using some characteristic features cannot be avoided.
We think the Court of Appeals was insufficiently appreciative of parody’s need for the recognizable sight or sound when it ruled 2 Live Crew’s use unreasonable as a matter of law. It is true, of course, that 2 Live Crew copied the characteristic opening bass riff (or musical phrase) of the original, and true that the words of the first line copy the Orbison lyrics. But if quotation of the opening riff and the first line may be said to go to the “heart” of the original, the heart is also what most readily conjures up the song for parody, and it is the heart at which parody takes aim. Copying does not become excessive in relation to parodie purpose merely because the portion taken was the original’s heart. If 2 Live Crew had copied a significantly less memorable part of the original, it is difficult to see how its parodie character would have come through. See Fisher v. Dees, supra, at 439.
This is not, of course, to say that anyone who calls himself a parodist can skim the cream and get away scot free. In parody, as in news reporting, see Harper & Row, supra, context is everything, and the question of fairness asks what else the parodist did besides go to the heart of the original. It is significant that 2 Live Crew not only copied the first line of the original, but thereafter departed markedly from the Orbison lyrics for its own ends. 2 Live Crew not only copied the bass riff and repeated it, but also produced otherwise distinctive sounds, interposing “scraper” noise, overlaying the music with solos in different keys, and altering the drum beat. See 754 F. Supp., at 1155. This is not a case, then, where “a substantial portion” of the parody itself is composed of a “verbatim” copying of the original. It is not, that is, a case where the parody is so insubstantial, as compared to the copying, that the third factor must be resolved as a matter of law against the parodists.
Suffice it to say here that, as to the lyrics, we think the Court of Appeals correctly suggested that “no more was taken than necessary,” 972 F. 2d, at 1438, but just for that reason, we fail to see how the copying can be excessive in relation to its parodie purpose, even if the portion taken is the original’s “heart.” As to the music, we express no opinion whether repetition of the bass riff is excessive copying, and we remand to permit evaluation of the amount taken, in light of the song’s parodie purpose and character, its trans-formative elements, and considerations of the potential for market substitution sketched more fully below.
D
The fourth fair use factor is “the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.” § 107(4). It requires courts to consider not only the extent of market harm caused by the particular actions of the alleged infringer, but also “whether unrestricted and widespread conduct of the sort engaged in by the defendant... would result in a substantially adverse impact on the potential market” for the original. Nimmer § 13.05[A][4], p. 13-102.61 (footnote omitted); accord, Harper & Row, 471 U. S., at 569; Senate Report, p. 65; Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas., at 349. The enquiry “must take account not only of harm to the original but also of harm to the market for derivative works.” Harper & Row, supra, at 568.
Since fair use is an affirmative defense, its proponent would have difficulty carrying the burden of demonstrating fair use without favorable evidence about relevant markets. In moving for summary judgment, 2 Live Crew left themselves at just such a disadvantage when they failed to address the effect on the market for rap derivatives, and confined themselves to uncontroverted submissions that there was no likely effect on the market for the original. They did not, however, thereby subject themselves to the evidentiary presumption applied by the Court of Appeals. In assessing the likelihood of significant market harm, the Court of Appeals quoted from language in Sony that “ ‘[i]f the intended use is for commercial gain, that likelihood may be presumed. But if it is for a noncommercial purpose, the likelihood must be demonstrated.’” 972 F. 2d, at 1438, quoting Sony, 464 U. S., at 451. The court reasoned that because “the use of the copyrighted work is wholly commercial,... we presume that a likelihood of future harm to Acuff-Rose exists.” 972 F. 2d, at 1438. In so doing,
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
H
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Chief Justice Vinson
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner was tried for rape in the Superior Court of Fulton County, Georgia. He was convicted and sentenced to death. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed after overruling petitioner’s contention that the jury which convicted him had been selected by a means repugnant to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We granted certiorari to review this claim. 345 U. S. 903.
The indictment, upon which petitioner was tried, was returned by a grand jury in Walker County, Georgia. A change of venue was granted and the cause removed to Fulton County. By proper pleadings petitioner, a Negro, challenged the array of petit jurors selected to try his case; he charged that discrimination had been practiced against members of his race. Testimony was then taken, and thereafter the trial court overruled the challenge.
The salient facts, developed in this hearing, are undisputed. Under Georgia law the task of organizing panels of petit jurors for criminal cases falls upon a county Board of Jury Commissioners. In discharging this responsibility the Commissioners, at stated intervals, select prospective jurors from the county tax returns. Their list is then printed; the names of white persons on this list are printed on white tickets; the names of Negroes are printed on yellow tickets. These tickets — white and yellow — are placed in a jury box. A judge of the Superior Court then draws a number of tickets from the box. The tickets are handed to a sheriff who in turn entrusts them to a clerk. It is the clerk’s duty to “arrange” the tickets and to type up, in final form, the list of persons to be called to serve on the panel.
Approximately sixty persons were selected to make up the panel from which the jury in this particular case was drawn. The judge who picked out the tickets — bearing the names of persons composing the panel — testified that he did not, nor had he ever, practiced discrimination in any way, in the discharge of that duty. There is no contradictory evidence. Yet the fact remains that there was not a single Negro in that panel. The State concedes that Negroes are available for jury service in Fulton County, and we are told that Negroes generally do serve on juries in the courts of that county. The question we must decide, based upon our independent analysis of the record, is whether petitioner has made a sufficient showing of discrimination in the organization of this particular panel. We think he has.
The Jury Commissioners, and the other officials responsible for the selection of this panel, were under a constitutional duty to follow a procedure — “a course of conduct” — which would not “operate to discriminate in the selection of jurors on racial grounds.” Hill v. Texas, 316 U. S. 400, 404 (1942). If they failed in that duty, then this conviction must be reversed — no matter how strong the evidence of petitioner’s guilt. That is the law established by decisions of this Court spanning more than seventy years of interpretation of the meaning of “equal protection.”
Petitioner’s charge of discrimination in the jury selection in this case springs from the Jury Commissioners’ use of white and yellow tickets. Obviously that practice makes it easier for those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate. Further, the practice has no authorization in the Georgia statutes — which simply enjoin the Commissioners to select “upright and intelligent men to serve as jurors . ...” It is important to note that the Supreme Court of Georgia, in this case, specifically disapproved of the use of separately colored tickets in Fulton County, saying that it constituted “prima facie evidence of discrimination.”
We agree. Even if the white and yellow tickets were drawn from the jury box without discrimination, opportunity was available to resort to it at other stages in the selection process. And, in view of the case before us, where not a single Negro was selected to serve on a panel of sixty — though many were available — we think that petitioner has certainly established a prima facie case of discrimination.
The court below affirmed, however, because petitioner had failed to prove some particular act of discrimination by some particular officer responsible for the selection of the jury; and the State now argues that it is petitioner’s burden to fill this “factual vacuum.” We cannot agree. If there is a “vacuum” it is one which the State must fill, by moving in with sufficient evidence to dispel the prima facie case of discrimination. We have held before, and the Georgia Supreme Court, itself, recently followed these decisions, that when a prima facie case of discrimination is presented, the burden falls, forthwith, upon the State to overcome it. The State failed to meet this test.
Reversed.
Mr. Justice Black concurs in the result.
Mr. Justice Jackson took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Avery v. State, 209 Ga. 116, 70 S. E. 2d 716 (1952).
Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 587 (1935).
E. g., Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S. 370 (1881); Rogers v. Alabama, 192 U. S. 226 (1904); Norris v. Alabama, supra; Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U. S. 354 (1939); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U. S. 282 (1950).
Ga. Code Ann. § 59-106. See Crumb v. State, 205 Ga. 547, 54 S. E. 2d 639 (1949).
Norris v. Alabama, supra, 294 U. S., at 594-595, 598; Hill v. Texas, 316 U. S. 400, 405-406 (1942); Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U. S. 463 (1947).
Crumb v. State, supra.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice O’Connor
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case requires the Court to revisit the data-consideration provision of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 61 Stat. 163, as amended, 7 U. S. C. §136 et seq., which was considered last Term in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U. S. 986 (1984). Monsanto examined whether FIFRA’s data-consideration provision effects an uncompensated taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment. In this case we address whether Article III of the Constitution prohibits Congress from selecting binding arbitration with only limited judicial review as the mechanism for resolving disputes among participants in FIFRA’s pesticide registration scheme. We conclude it does not and reverse the judgment below.
H-i
The Court’s opinion in Monsanto details the development of FIFRA from the licensing and labeling statute enacted in 1947 to the comprehensive regulatory statute of the present. This case, like Monsanto, concerns the most recent amendment to FIFRA, the Federal Pesticide Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 819 (1978 Act), which sought to correct problems created by the Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 973 (1972 Act), itself a major revision of prior law. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., supra, at 991-992.
A
As a precondition for registration of a pesticide, manufacturers must submit research data to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) concerning the product’s health, safety, and environmental effects. The 1972 Act established data-sharing provisions intended to streamline pesticide registration procedures, increase competition, and avoid unnecessary duplication of data-generation costs. S. Rep. No. 92-838, pp. 72-73 (1972) (1972 S. Rep.). Some evidence suggests that before 1972 data submitted by one registrant had “as a matter of practice but without statutory authority, been considered by the Administrator to support the registration of the same or a similar product by another registrant.” Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., supra, at 1009, n. 14. Such registrations were colloquially known as “me too” or “follow-on” registrations. Section 3(c)(1)(D) of the 1972 Act provided statutory authority for the use of previously submitted data as well as a scheme for sharing the costs of data generation.
“In effect, the provision instituted a mandatory data-licensing scheme. The amount of compensation was to be negotiated by the parties, or, in the event negotiations failed, was to be determined by the EPA, subject to judicial review upon instigation of the original data submitter. The scope of the 1972 data-consideration provision, however, was limited, for any data designated as ‘trade secrets or commercial or financial information’... could not be considered at all by EPA to support another registration unless the original submitter consented.” Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., supra, at 992-993.
Congress enacted the original data-compensation provision in 1972 because it believed “recognizing a limited proprietary interest” in data submitted to support pesticide registrations would provide an added incentive beyond statutory patent protection for research and development of new pesticides. H. R. Rep. No. 95-663, pp. 17-18 (1977); S. Rep. No. 95-334, pp. 7, 34-40 (1977) (1977 S. Rep.). The data submitters, however, contended that basic health, safety, and environmental data essential to registration of a competing pesticide qualified for protection as a trade secret. With EPA bogged down in cataloging data and the pesticide industry embroiled in litigation over what types of data could legitimately be designated “trade secrets,’’ new pesticide registrations “ground to a virtual halt.” Id., at 3.
The 1978 amendments were a response to the “logjam of litigation that resulted from controversies over data compensation and trade secret protection.” Ibid. Congress viewed data-sharing as essential to the registration scheme, id., at 7, but concluded EPA must be relieved of the task of valuation because disputes regarding the compensation scheme had “for all practical purposes, tied up their registration process” and “[EPA] lacked the expertise necessary to establish the proper amount of compensation.” 123 Cong. Rec. 25709 (1977) (statement of Sen. Leahy, floor manager of S. 1678). Legislators and the Agency agreed that “[dieter-mining the amount and terms of such compensation are matters that do not require active government involvement [and] compensation payable should be determined to the fullest extent practicable, within the private sector.” Id., at 25710.
Against this background, Congress in 1978 amended § 3(c)(1)(D) and § 10(b) to clarify that the trade secret exemption from the data-consideration provision did not extend to health, safety, and environmental data. In addition, the 1978 amendments granted data submitters a 10-year period of exclusive use for data submitted after September 30,1978, during which time the data may not be cited without the original submitter’s permission. § 3(c)(l)(D)(i).
Regarding compensation for use of data not protected by the 10-year exclusive use provision, the amendment substituted for the EPA Administrator’s determination of the appropriate compensation a system of negotiation and binding arbitration to resolve compensation disputes among registrants. Section 3(c)(l)(D)(ii) authorizes EPA to consider data already in its files in support of a new registration, permit, or new use, but “only if the applicant has made an offer to compensate the original data submitter.” If the applicant and data submitter fail to agree, either may invoke binding arbitration. The arbitrator’s decision is subject to judicial review only for “fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct.” Ibid,. The statute contains its own sanctions. Should an applicant or data submitter fail to comply with the scheme, the Administrator is required to cancel the new registration or to consider the data without compensation to the original submitter. The Administrator may also issue orders regarding sale or use of existing pesticide stocks. Ibid.
The concept of retaining statutory compensation but substituting binding arbitration for valuation of data by EPA emerged as a compromise. This approach was developed by representatives of the major chemical manufacturers, who sought to retain the controversial compensation provision, in discussions with industry groups representing follow-on registrants, whose attempts to register pesticides had been roadblocked by litigation since 1972. Hearings on Extending and Amending FIFRA before the Subcommittee on Department Investigations, Oversight, and Research of the House Committee on Agriculture, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 522-523 (1977) (testimony of Robert Alikonis, General Counsel to Pesticide Formulators Association).
B
Appellees are 13 large firms engaged in the development and marketing of chemicals used to manufacture pesticides. Each has in the past submitted data to EPA in support of registrations of various pesticides. When the 1978 amendments went into effect, these firms were engaged in litigation in the Southern District of New York challenging the constitutionality under Article I and the Fifth Amendment of the provisions authorizing data-sharing and disclosure of data to the public. In response to this Court’s decision in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U. S. 50 (1982), appellees amended their complaint to allege that the statutory mechanism of binding arbitration for determining the amount of compensation due them violates Article III of the Constitution. Article III, §1, provides that “[t]he judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested” in courts whose judges enjoy tenure “during good Behaviour” and compensation that “shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.” Appellees allege Congress in FIFRA transgressed this limitation by allocating to arbitrators the functions of judicial officers and severely limiting review by an Article III court.
The District Court granted appellees’ motion for summary judgment on their Article III claims. It found the issues ripe because the “statutory compulsion to seek relief through arbitration” raised a constitutionally sufficient case or controversy. Although troubled by what appeared a “standardless delegation of powers,” the District Court did not reach the Article I issue because it held that Article III barred FIFRA’s “absolute assignment of [judicial] power” to arbitrators with only limited review by Article III judges. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 571 F. Supp. 117, 124 (1983). The District Court, rather than striking down the statutory limitation on judicial review, enjoined the entire FIFRA data use and compensation scheme. App. to Juris. Statement 25a.
Appellant took a direct appeal to this Court pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1252. We vacated the judgment of the District Court and remanded for reconsideration in light of our supervening decision in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U. S. 986 (1984). Ruckelshaus v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., 468 U. S. 1201 (1984). In Monsanto, we ruled that FIFRA’s data-consideration provisions may be deemed a “public use” even though the most direct beneficiaries of the regulatory scheme will be the later applicants. 467 U. S., at 1014. Insofar as FIFRA authorizes the Administrator to consider trade secrets submitted during the period between 1972 and 1978, a period during which the registrant entertained a reasonable, investment-backed expectation that its trade secret data would be held confidential, we held it effects a taking. But the data originator must complete arbitration and, in the event of a shortfall, exhaust its Tucker Act remedies against the United States before it can be ascertained whether it has been deprived of just compensation. The Court distinguished between the “ability to vindicate [the] constitutional right to just compensation” and the “ability to vindicate [the] statutory right to obtain compensation from a subsequent applicant.” Id., at 1019. But we declined to reach Monsanto’s Article III claim, explaining:
“Monsanto did not allege or establish that it had been injured by actual arbitration under the statute. While the District Court acknowledged that Monsanto had received several offers of compensation from applicants for registration, it did not find that EPA had considered Monsanto’s data in considering another application. Further, Monsanto and any subsequent applicant may negotiate and reach agreement concerning an outstanding offer. If they do not reach agreement, then the controversy must go to arbitration. Only after EPA has considered data submitted by Monsanto in evaluating another application and an arbitrator has made an award will Monsanto’s claims with respect to the constitutionality of the arbitration scheme become ripe.” Ibid, (citation omitted).
On remand in this case, appellees amended their complaint to reflect that EPA had, in fact, considered their data in support of other registration applications. The amended complaint also alleged that data submitted by appellee Stauffer Chemical Company (Stauffer), originator of the chemicals butylate and EPTC, had been used in connection with registrations by PPG Industries, Inc. (PPG), and Drexel Chemical Company of pesticides containing butylate and EPTC as active ingredients. App. 23. The complaint further alleged Stauffer had invoked the arbitration provisions of § 3(c)(l)(D)(ii) against PPG, and appellees entered in evidence the award of the arbitration panel, handed down on June 28, 1983. Id., at 42. Stauffer claimed the arbitrators’ award fell far short of the compensation to which it was entitled.
In view of these developments, the District Court concluded that “[t]he claims presented by Stauffer challenging the constitutionality of FIFRA § 3(c)(1)(D) are ripe for resolution under the criteria established by the Supreme Court” in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., supra. The remaining plaintiffs, the District Court held, were aggrieved by the clear threat of compulsion to resort to unconstitutional arbitration. App. to Juris. Statement la-4a. The District Court reinstated its prior judgment enjoining the operation of the data-consideration provisions as violative of Article III. EPA again took a direct appeal and we noted probable jurisdiction. 469 U. S. 1032 (1984). This Court stayed the judgment pending disposition of the appeal.
II
As a threshold matter, we must determine whether appel-lees’ Article III claims demonstrate sufficient ripeness to establish a concrete case or controversy. Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U. S. 102, 138-139 (1974). Appellant contends that the District Court erred in addressing these claims because the criteria established in Monsanto for ripeness remained unsatisfied. Appellant argues that only one firm, Stauffer, engaged in arbitration and it seeks to enforce rather than challenge the award. Appellees counter that they are aggrieved by the threat of an unconstitutional arbitration procedure which assigns the valuation of their data to civil arbitrators and prohibits judicial review of the amount of compensation. Stauffer in particular argues that it was doubly injured by the arbitration. Although it claimed a shortfall of some $50 million, it was precluded by § 3(c)(l)(D)(ii) from seeking judicial review of the award against PPG. While seeking to enforce the award should its Article III claim fail, Stauffer has consistently challenged the validity of the entire FIFRA data-consideration scheme both here and in litigation initiated by PPG. See n. 3, supra.
We agree that Stauffer has an independent right to adjudication in a constitutionally proper forum. See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U. S. 530, 533 (1962). Although appellees contend and the District Court found that they were injured by the shortfall in the award, it is sufficient for purposes of a claim under Article III challenging a tribunal’s jurisdiction that the claimant demonstrate it has been or inevitably will be subjected to an exercise of such unconstitutional jurisdiction. See Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U. S., at 56-57, aff’g 12 B. R. 946 (Minn. 1981) (reversing Bankruptcy Court’s denial of pretrial motion to dismiss contract claim). “[A party] may object to proceeding further with [a] lawsuit on the grounds that if it is to be resolved by an agency of the United States, it may be resolved only by an agency which exercises ‘[t]he judicial power of the United States’ described by Art. Ill of the Constitution.” 458 U. S., at 89 (opinion concurring in judgment). In contrast to the Taking Clause claim in Monsanto, appellees’ Article III injury is not a function of whether the tribunal awards reasonable compensation but of the tribunal’s authority to adjudicate the dispute. Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., supra; Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, supra. Thus appellees state an independent claim under Article III, apart from any monetary injury sustained as a result of the arbitration.
“[Rjipeness is peculiarly a question of timing.” Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, supra, at 140. “[I]ts basic rationale is to prevent the courts, through premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements.” Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136, 148 (1967). The Article III challenge in Monsanto was, in this sense, premature. Monsanto had not alleged that its data had ever been considered in support of other registrations, much less that Monsanto had failed to reach a negotiated settlement or been forced to resort to an unconstitutional arbitration. In fact, no FIFRA arbitrations had as yet taken place when Monsanto brought its claim. Monsanto’s claim thus involved “contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.” 13A C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure §3532 (1984). By contrast, the FIFRA data-consideration procedures are now in place and numerous follow-on registrations have been issued. See Brief for Appellees 3, n. 3 (citing Docket Entry No. 132, p. 2). Each of the appellees in this action has alleged as yet uncompensated use of its data. App. 23. Stauffer has engaged in an arbitration lasting many months and consuming 2,700 pages of transcript. There is no doubt that the “effects [of the arbitration scheme] have [been felt by Stauffer] in a concrete way.” Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S., at 148-149.
In addition, “the fitness of the issues for judicial decision” and “the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration” must inform any analysis of ripeness. Id., at 149. The issue presented in this case is purely legal, and will not be clarified by further factual development. Cf. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Comm’n, 461 U. S. 190, 201 (1983). Doubts about the validity of FIFRA’s data-consideration and compensation schemes have plagued the pesticide industry and seriously hampered the effectiveness of FIFRA’s reforms of the registration process. “To require the industry to proceed without knowing whether the [arbitration scheme] is valid would impose a palpable and considerable hardship.” Id., at 201-202. At a minimum Stauffer, and arguably each appellee whose data have been used pursuant to the challenged scheme, suffers the continuing uncertainty and expense of depending for compensation on a process whose authority is undermined because its constitutionality is in question. See ibid. “‘One does not have to await the consummation of threatened injury to obtain preventive relief. If the injury is certainly impending, that is enough.’ ” Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U. S., at 143, quoting Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U. S. 553, 593 (1923). Nothing would be gained by postponing a decision, and the public interest would be well served by a prompt resolution of the constitutionality of FIFRA’s arbitration scheme. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U. S. 59, 82 (1978).
Finally, appellees clearly have standing to contest EPA’s issuance of follow-on registrations pursuant to what they contend is an unconstitutional statutory provision. They allege an injury from EPA’s unlawful conduct — the injury of being forced to choose between relinquishing any right to compensation from a follow-on registrant or engaging in an unconstitutional adjudication. Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S. 737 (1984). Appellees also allege injury which is likely to be redressed by the relief they request. Ibid. The use, registration, and compensation scheme is integrated in a single subsection that explicitly ties the follow-on registration to the arbitration. See § 3(c)(l)(D)(ii) (EPA “shall deny” or “cancel” follow-on registration if arbitration section is not complied with). It is evident that Congress linked EPA’s authority to issue follow-on registrations to the original data submitter’s ability to obtain compensation. A decision against the provision’s constitutionality, therefore, would support remedies such as striking down the statutory restrictions on judicial review or enjoining EPA from issuing or retaining in force follow-on registrations pursuant to § 3(c)(l)(D)(ii).
Ill
Appellees contend that Article III bars Congress from requiring arbitration of disputes among registrants concerning compensation under FIFRA without also affording substantial review by tenured judges of the arbitrator’s decision. Article III, § 1, establishes a broad policy that federal judicial power shall be vested in courts whose judges enjoy life tenure and fixed compensation. These requirements protect the role of the independent judiciary within the constitutional scheme of tripartite government and assure impartial adjudication in federal courts. United States v. Will, 449 U. S. 200, 217-218 (1980); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 122 (1976) (per curiam).
An absolute construction of Article III is not possible in this area of “frequently arcane distinctions and confusing precedents.” Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U. S., at 90 (opinion concurring in judgment). “[NJeither this Court nor Congress has read the Constitution as requiring every federal question arising under the federal law... to be tried in an Art. Ill court before a judge enjoying life tenure and protection against salary reduction.” Palmore v. United States, 411 U. S. 389, 407 (1973). Instead, the Court has long recognized that Congress is not barred from acting pursuant to its powers under Article I to vest decisionmaking authority in tribunals that lack the attributes of Article III courts. See, e. g., Walters v. National Assn. of Radiation Survivors, ante, p. 305 (Board of Veterans’ Appeals); Palmore v. United States, supra (District of Columbia courts); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22 (1932) (Deputy Commissioner of Employees’ Compensation Commission); Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 18 How. 272 (1856) (Treasury accounting officers). Many matters that involve the application of legal standards to facts and affect private interests are routinely decided by agency action with limited or no review by Article III courts. See, e. g., 5 U. S. C. §§ 701(a)(1), 701(a)(2); Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U. S. 821, 837-838 (1985); United States v. Erika, Inc., 456 U. S. 201, 206 (1982) (no review of Medicare reimbursements); Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 18 (1983) (administrative agencies can conclusively adjudicate claims created by the administrative state, by and against private persons); Redish, Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and the Northern Pipeline Decision, 1983 Duke L. J. 197 (same).
The Court’s most recent pronouncement on the meaning of Article III is Northern Pipeline. A divided Court was unable to agree on the precise scope and nature of Article Ill’s limitations. The Court’s holding in that case establishes only that Congress may not vest in a non-Article III court the power to adjudicate, render final judgment, and issue binding orders in a traditional contract action arising under state law, without consent of the litigants, and subject only to ordinary appellate review. 458 U. S., at 84 (plurality opinion); id., at 90-92 (opinion concurring in judgment); id., at 92 (Burger, C. J., dissenting).
A
Appellees contend that their claims to compensation under FIFRA are a matter of state law, and thus are encompassed by the holding of Northern Pipeline. We disagree. Any right to compensation from follow-on registrants under §3 (c)(l)(D)(ii) for EPA’s use of data results from FIFRA and does not depend on or replace a right to such compensation under state law. Cf. Northern Pipeline Construction Co., supra, at 84 (plurality opinion) (contract claims at issue were matter of state law); Crowell v. Benson, supra, at 39-40 (replacing traditional admiralty negligence action with administrative scheme of strict liability). As a matter of state law, property rights in a trade secret are extinguished when a company discloses its trade secret to persons not obligated to protect the confidentiality of the information. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U. S., at 1002, citing R. Milgrim, Trade Secrets § 1.01[2] (1983). Therefore registrants who submit data with notice of the scheme established by the 1978 amendments, and its qualified protection of trade secrets as defined in §10, can claim no property interest under state law in data subject to § 3(c)(l)(D)(ii). Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., supra, at 1005-1008. Cf. 21 U. S. C. §§ 348(a)(2), 376(a)(1); 21 CFR §71.15 (1985); 21 CFR § 171.1(b) (1984) (data submitted under Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act is in public domain and follow-on registrants need not submit independent data). Nor do individuals who submitted data prior to 1978 have a right to compensation under FIFRA that depends on state law. To be sure, such users might have a claim that the new scheme results in a taking of property interests protected by state law. See 467 U. S., at 1013-1014. Compensation for any uncompensated taking is available under the Tucker Act. For purposes of compensation under FIFRA’s regulatory scheme, however, it is the “mandatory licensing provision” that creates the relationship between the data submitter and the follow-on registrant, and federal law supplies the rule of decision. Cf. Northern Pipeline Construction Co., supra, at 90 (opinion concurring in judgment).
Alternatively, appellees contend that FIFRA confers a. “private right” to compensation, requiring either Article III adjudication or review by an Article III court sufficient to retain “the essential attributes of the judicial power.” Northern Pipeline Construction Co., supra, at 77, 85-86 (plurality opinion). This “private right” argument rests on the distinction between public and private rights drawn by the plurality in Northern Pipeline. The Northern Pipeline plurality construed the Court’s prior opinions to permit only three clearly defined exceptions to the rule of Article III adjudication: military tribunals, territorial courts, and decisions involving “public” as opposed to “private” rights. Drawing upon language in Crowell v. Benson, supra, at 50, the plurality defined “public rights” as “matters arising between the Government and persons subject to its authority in connection with the performance of the constitutional functions of the executive or legislative departments.” 458 U. S., at 67-68. It identified “private rights” as “ ‘the liability of one individual to another under the law as defined.’” Id., at 69-70, quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S., at 51.
This theory that the public rights/private rights dichotomy of Crowell and Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Im provement Co., 18 How. 272 (1856), provides a bright-line test for determining the requirements of Article III did not command a majority of the Court in Northern Pipeline. Insofar as appellees interpret that case and Crowell as establishing that the right to an Article III forum is absolute unless the Federal Government is a party of record, we cannot agree. Cf. Northern Pipeline Construction Co., 458 U. S., at 71 (plurality opinion) (noting that discharge in bankruptcy, which adjusts liabilities between individuals, is arguably a public right). But see id., at 69, n. 23. Nor did a majority of the Court endorse the implication of the private right/public right dichotomy that Article III has no force simply because a dispute is between the Government and an individual. Compare id., at 68, n. 20, with id., at 70, n. 23.
B
Chief Justice Hughes, writing for the Court in Crowell, expressly rejected a formalistic or abstract Article III inquiry, stating:
“In deciding whether the Congress, in enacting the statute under review, has exceeded the limits of its authority to prescribe procedure..., regard must be had, as in other cases where constitutional limits are invoked, not to mere matters of form but to-the substance of what is required.” 285 U. S., at 53 (emphasis added).
Crowell held that Congress could replace a seaman’s traditional negligence action in admiralty with a statutory scheme of strict liability. In response to practical concerns, Congress rejected adjudication in Article III courts and instead provided that claims for compensation would be determined in an administrative proceeding by a deputy commissioner appointed by the United States Employees’ Compensation Commission. Id., at 43. “[T]he findings of the deputy commissioner, supported by evidence and within the scope of his authority” were final with respect to injuries to employees within the purview of the statute. Id., at 46. Although such findings clearly concern obligations among private parties, this fact did not make the scheme invalid under Article III. Instead, after finding that the administrative proceedings satisfied due process, id., at 45-48, Crowell concluded that the judicial review afforded by the statute, including review of matters of law, “provides for the appropriate exercise of the judicial function in this class of cases.” Id., at 54.
The enduring lesson of Crowell is that practical attention to substance rather than doctrinaire reliance on formal categories should inform application of Article III. Cf. Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U. S., at 547-548. The extent of judicial review afforded by the legislation reviewed in Crowell does not constitute a minimal requirement of Article III without regard to the origin of the right at issue or the concerns guiding the selection by Congress of a particular method for resolving disputes. In assessing the degree of judicial involvement required by Article III in this case, we note that the statute considered in Crowell is different from FIFRA in significant respects. Most importantly, the statute in Crowell displaced a traditional cause of action and affected a pre-existing relationship based on a common-law contract for hire. Thus it clearly fell within the range of matters reserved to Article III courts under the holding of Northern Pipeline. See 458 U. S., at 70-71, and n. 25 (plurality opinion) (noting that matters subject to a “suit at common law or in equity or admiralty” are at “protected core” of Article III judicial powers); id., at 90 (opinion concurring in judgment) (noting that state law contract actions are “the stuff of the traditional actions at common law tried by the courts at Westminster in 1789”).
If the identity of the parties alone determined the requirements of Article III, under appellees’ theory the constitutionality of many quasi-adjudicative activities carried on by administrative agencies involving claims between individuals would be thrown into doubt. See 5 K. Davis, Administrative Law §29:23, p. 443 (2d ed. 1984) (concept described as “revolutionary”); Note, A Literal Interpretation of Article III Ignores 150 Years of Article I Court History: Marathon Oil Pipeline Co. v. Northern Pipeline Construction Co., 19 New England L. Rev. 207, 231-232 (1983) (“public rights doctrine exalts form over substance”); Note, The Supreme Court, 1981 Term, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 62, 262, n. 39 (1982). For example, in' Switchmen v. National Mediation Board, 320 U.S. 297 (1943), cited with approval in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, 333 (1966), the Court upheld as constitutional a provision of the Railway Labor Act that established a “right” of a majority of a craft or class to choose its bargaining representative and vested the resolution of disputes concerning representation solely in the National Mediation Board, without judicial review. The Court concluded:
“The Act... writes into law the ‘right’ of the ‘majority of any craft or class of employees’ to ‘determine who shall be the representative of the craft or class for purposes of this Act.’ That ‘right’ is protected by [a provision] which gives the Mediation Board the power to resolve controversies concerning it.... A review by the federal district courts of the Board’s determination is not necessary to preserve or protect that ‘right.’ Congress for reasons of its own decided upon the method for protection of the ‘right’ which it created.” 320 U. S., at 300-301.
See also Union Pacific R. Co. v. Price, 360 U. S. 601, 608 (1959); NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U. S. 111, 131, 135 (1944) (Board’s conclusions reviewable for rational basis and warrant in the record). Cf. Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U. S. 184, 199 (1958), (Brennan, J., dissenting) (discussing Switchmen).
The Court has treated as a matter of “public right” an essentially adversary proceeding to invoke tariff protections against a competitor, as well as an administrative proceeding to determine the rights of landlords and tenants. See Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm’n, 430 U. S. 442, 454-455 (1977), citing as an example of “public rights” the federal landlord/tenant law discussed in Block v. Hirsh, 256 U. S. 135 (1921); Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U. S. 438, 447 (1929) (tariff dispute). These proceedings surely determine liabilities of individuals. Such schemes would be beyond the power of Congress under appellees’ interpretation of Crowell. In essence, the public rights doctrine reflects simply a pragmatic understanding that when Congress selects a quasi-judicial method of resolving matters that “could be conclusively determined by the Executive and Legislative Branches,” the danger of encroaching on the judicial powers is reduced. Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U. S., at 68 (plurality opinion), citing Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S., at 50.
C
Looking beyond form to the substance of what FIFRA accomplishes, we note several aspects of FIFRA that persuade us the arbitration scheme adopted by Congress does not contravene Article III. First, the right created by FIFRA is not a purely “private” right, but bears many of the characteristics of a “public” right. Use of a registrant’s data to support a follow-on registration serves a public purpose as an integral part of a program safeguarding the public health. Congress has the power, under Article I, to authorize an agency administering a complex regulatory scheme to allocate costs and benefits among voluntary participants in the program without providing an Article III adjudication. It also has the power to condition issuance of registrations or licenses on compliance with agency procedures. Article III is not so inflexible that it bars Congress from shifting the task of data valuation from the agency to the interested parties. Cf. United States v. Erika, Inc., 456 U. S., at 203 (private insurance carrier assigned task of deciding Medicare claims); Crowell v. Benson, supra, at 50-51.
The 1978 amendments represent a pragmatic solution to the difficult problem of spreading the costs of generating adequate information regarding the safety, health, and environmental impact of a potentially dangerous product. Congress, without implicating Article III, could have authorized EPA to charge follow-on registrants fees to cover the cost of data and could have directly subsidized FIFRA data submitters for their contributions of needed data. See St. Joseph Stockyards Co. v. United States, 298 U. S. 38, 49-53 (1936) (ratemaking is an essentially legislative function). Instead, it selected a framework that collapses these two steps into one, and permits the parties to fix the amount
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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H
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Blackmun
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question that confronts us in this case is whether the filing of a class action tolls the applicable statute of limitations, and thus permits all members of the putative class to file individual actions in the event that class certification is denied, provided, of course, that those actions are instituted within the time that remains on the limitations period.
Respondent Theodore Parker, a Negro male, was discharged from his employment with petitioner Crown, Cork &- Seal Company, Inc., in July 1977. In October of that year, he filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging that he had been harassed and then discharged on account of his race. On November 9, 1978, the EEOC issued a Determination Letter finding no reasonable cause to believe respondent’s discrimination charge was true, and, pursuant to § 706(f) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Act), 78 Stat. 260, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5(f), sent respondent a Notice of Right to Sue. App. 5A, 7A.
Two months earlier, while respondent’s charge was pending before the EEOC, two other Negro males formerly employed by petitioner filed a class action in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. Pendleton v. Crown, Cork & Seal Co., Civ. No. M-78-1734. The complaint in that action alleged that petitioner had discriminated against its Negro employees with respect to hiring, discharges, job assignments, promotions, disciplinary actions, and other terms and conditions of employment, in violation of Title VII of the Act, 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq. The named plaintiffs purported to represent a class of “black persons who have been, continue to be and who in the future will be denied equal employment opportunities by defendant on the grounds of race or color.” App. to Brief for Petitioner 2a. It is undisputed that respondent was a member of the asserted class.
In May 1979, the named plaintiffs in Pendleton moved for class certification. Nearly a year and a half later, on September 4,1980, the District Court denied that motion. App. to Brief for Petitioner 7a. The court ruled that the named plaintiffs’ claims were not typical of those of the class, that the named plaintiffs would not be adequate representatives, and that the class was not so numerous as to make joinder impracticable. Thereafter, Pendleton proceeded as an individual action on behalf of its named plaintiffs.
On October 27,1980, within 90 days after the denial of class certification but almost two years after receiving his Notice of Right to Sue, respondent filed the present Title VII action in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, alleging that his discharge was racially motivated. Respondent moved to consolidate his action with the pending Pendleton ease, but petitioner opposed the motion on the ground that the two cases were at substantially different stages of preparation. The motion to consolidate was denied. The District Court then granted summary judgment for petitioner, ruling that respondent had failed to file his action within 90 days of receiving his Notice of Right to Sue, as required by the Act’s § 706(f)(1), 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5(f )(1). 514 F. Supp. 122 (1981).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed. 677 F. 2d 391 (1982). Relying on American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U. S. 538 (1974), the Court of Appeals held that the filing of the Pendleton class action had tolled Title VII’s statute of limitations for all members of the putative class. Because the Pendleton suit was instituted before respondent received his Notice, and because respondent had filed his action within 90 days after the denial of class certification, the Court of Appeals concluded that it was timely.
Two other Courts of Appeals have held that the tolling rule of American Pipe applies only to putative class members who seek to intervene after denial of class certification, and not to those who, like respondent, file individual actions. We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict. 459 U. S. 986 (1982).
II
A
American Pipe was a federal antitrust suit brought by the State of Utah on behalf of itself and a class of other public bodies and agencies. The suit was filed with only 11 days left to run on the applicable statute of limitations. The District Court eventually ruled that the suit could not proceed as a class action, and eight days after this ruling a number of putative class members moved to intervene. This Court ruled that the motions to intervene were not time-barred. The Court reasoned that unless the filing of a class action tolled the statute of limitations, potential class members would be induced to file motions to intervene or to join in order to protect themselves against the possibility that certification would be denied. 414 U. S., at 553. The principal purposes of the class-action procedure — promotion of efficiency and economy of litigation — would thereby be frustrated. Ibid. To protect the policies behind the class-action procedure, the Court held that “the commencement of a class action suspends the applicable statute of limitations as to all asserted members of the class who would have been parties had the suit been permitted to continue as a class action.” Id., at 554.
Petitioner asserts that the rule of American Pipe was limited to intervenors, and does not toll the statute of limitations for class members who file actions of their own. Petitioner relies on the Court’s statement in American Pipe that “the commencement of the original class suit tolls the running of the statute for all purported members of the class who make timely motions to intervene after the court has found the suit inappropriate for class action status.” Id., at 553 (emphasis added). While American Pipe concerned only intervenors, we conclude that the holding of that case is not to be read so narrowly. The filing of a class action tolls the statute of limitations “as to all asserted members of the class,” id., at 554, not just as to intervenors.
The American Pipe Court recognized that unless the statute of limitations was tolled by the filing of the class action, class members would not be able to rely on the existence of the suit to protect their rights. Only by intervening or taking other action prior to the running of the statute of limitations would they be able to ensure that their rights would not be lost in the event that class certification was denied. Much the same inefficiencies would ensue if American Pipe’s tolling rule were limited to permitting putative class members to intervene after the denial of class certification. There are many reasons why a class member, after the denial of class certification, might prefer to bring an individual suit rather than intervene. The forum in which the class action is pending might be an inconvenient one, for example, or the class member might not wish to share control over the litigation with other plaintiffs once the economies of a class action were no longer available. Moreover, permission to intervene might be refused for reasons wholly unrelated to the merits of the claim. A putative class member who fears that class certification may be denied would have every incentive to file a separate action prior to the expiration of his own period of limitations. The result would be a needless multiplicity of actions — precisely the situation that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and the tolling rule of American Pipe were designed to avoid.
B
Failure to apply American Pipe to class members filing separate actions also would be inconsistent with the Court’s reliance on American Pipe in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U. S. 156 (1974). In Eisen, the Court held that Rule 23(c)(2) required individual notice to absent class members, so that each class member could decide whether to “opt out” of the class and thereby preserve his right to pursue his own lawsuit. 417 U. S., at 176. The named plaintiff in Eisen argued that such notice would be fruitless because the statute of limitations had long since run on the claims of absent class members. This argument, said the Court, was “disposed of by our recent decision in American Pipe . . . which established that commencement of a class action tolls the applicable statute of limitations as to all members of the class.” Id., at 176, n. 13.
If American Pipe’s tolling rule applies only to intervenors, this reference to American Pipe is misplaced and makes no sense. Eisen’s notice requirement was intended to inform the class member that he could “preserve his opportunity to press his claim separately” by opting out of the class. 417 U. S., at 176 (emphasis added). But a class member would be unable to “press his claim separately” if the limitations period had expired while the class action was pending. The Eisen Court recognized this difficulty, but concluded that the right to opt out and press a separate claim remained meaningful because the filing of the class action tolled the statute of limitations under the rule of American Pipe. 417 U. S., at 176, n. 13. If American Pipe were limited to intervenors, it would not serve the purpose assigned to it by Eisen; no class member would opt out simply to intervene. Thus, the Eisen Court necessarily read American Pipe as we read it today, to apply to class members who choose to file separate suits.
C
The Court noted in American Pipe that a tolling rule for class actions is not inconsistent with the purposes served by statutes of limitations. 414 U. S., at 554. Limitations periods are intended to put defendants on notice of adverse claims and to prevent plaintiffs from sleeping on their rights, see Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U. S. 250, 256-257 (1980); American Pipe, 414 U. S., at 561 (concurring opinion); Burnett v. New York Central R. Co., 380 U. S. 424, 428 (1965), but these ends are met when a class action is commenced. Class members who do not file suit while the class action is pending cannot be accused of sleeping on their rights; Rule 23 both permits and encourages class members to rely on the named plaintiffs to press their claims. And a class complaint “notifies the defendants not only of the substantive claims being brought against them, but also of the number and generic identities of the potential plaintiffs who may participate in the judgment.” American Pipe, 414 U. S., at 555; see United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U. S. 385, 395 (1977). The defendant will be aware of the need to preserve evidence and witnesses respecting the claims of all the members of the class. Tolling the statute of limitations thus creates no potential for unfair surprise, regardless of the method class members choose to enforce their rights upon denial of class certification.
Restricting the rule of American Pipe to intervenors might reduce the number of individual lawsuits filed against a particular defendant but, as discussed above, this decrease in litigation would be counterbalanced by an increase in protective filings in all class actions. Moreover, although a defendant may prefer not to defend against multiple actions in multiple forums once a class has been decertified, this is not an interest that statutes of limitations are designed to protect. Cf. Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U. S. 463, 467 (1962). Other avenues exist by which the burdens of multiple lawsuits may be avoided; the defendant may seek consolidation in appropriate cases, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 42(a); 28 U. S. C. § 1404 (change of venue), and multidistrict proceedings may be available if suits have been brought in different jurisdictions, see 28 U. S. C. § 1407.
H — < l-H H-I
We conclude, as did the Court m American Pipe, that the commencement of a class action suspends the applicable statute of limitations as to all asserted members of the class who would have been parties had the suit been permitted to eon-tinue as a class action.” 414 U. S., at 554. Once the statute of limitations has been tolled, it remains tolled for all members of the putative class until class certification is denied. At that point, class members may choose to file their own suits or to intervene as plaintiffs in the pending action.
In this case, respondent clearly would have been a party in Pendleton if that suit had been permitted to continue as a class action. The filing of the Pendleton action thus tolled the statute of limitations for respondent and other members of the Pendleton class. Since respondent did not receive his Notice of Right to Sue until after the Pendleton action was filed, he retained a full 90 days in which to bring suit after class certification was denied. Respondent’s suit was thus timely filed.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
The named plaintiffs in Pendleton later settled their claims, and their action was dismissed with prejudice. Respondent Parker, as permitted by United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U. S. 385, 392-395 (1977), then intervened in that lawsuit for the limited purpose of appealing the denial of class certification. He failed, however, to take a timely appeal.
See Pavlak v. Church, 681 F. 2d 617 (CA9 1982), cert. pending, No. 82-650; Stull v. Bayard, 561 F. 2d 429, 433 (CA2 1977), cert. denied, 434 U. S. 1035 (1978); Arneil v. Ramsey, 550 F. 2d 774, 783 (CA2 1977).
Petitioner also argues that American Pipe does not apply in Title VII actions, because the time limit contained in § 706(f)(1), 42 U. S. C. §2000e-5(f)(1), is jurisdictional and may not be tolled. This argument is foreclosed by the Court’s decisions in Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U. S. 385, 398 (1982), and Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U. S. 807, 811, and n. 9 (1980).
Putative class members frequently are not entitled to intervene as of right under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a), and permissive intervention under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b) may be denied in the discretion of the District Court. American Pipe, 414 U. S., at 559-560; id., at 562 (concurring opinion); see Railroad Trainmen v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 331 U. S. 519, 524-525 (1947). In exercising its discretion the district court considers “whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties,” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 24(b), and a court could conclude that undue delay or prejudice would result if many class members were brought in as plaintiffs upon the denial of class certification. Thus, permissive intervention well may be an uncertain prospect for members of a proposed class.
Several Members of the Court have indicated that American Pipe’s tolling rule can apply to class members who file individual suits, as well as to those who seek to intervene. See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U. S. 454, 474-475 (1975) (MARSHALL, J., joined by Douglas and Brennan, 33., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“In American Pipe we held that initiation of a timely class action tolled the running of the limitation period as to individual members of the class, enabling them to institute separate actions after the District Court found class action an inappropriate mechanism for the litigation”); United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U. S., at 402 (Powell, J., joined by Burger, C. J., and White, J., dissenting) (“Under American Pipe, the filing of a class action complaint tolls the statute of limitations until the District Court makes a decision regarding class status. If class status is denied,... the statute of limitations begins to run again as to class members excluded from the class. In order to protect their rights, such individuals must seek to intervene in the individual action (or possibly file an action of their own) before the time remaining in the limitations period expires”).
Petitioner’s complaints about the burden of defending multiple suits ring particularly hollow in this case, since petitioner opposed respondent’s efforts to consolidate his action with Pendleton.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
I
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Stevens
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether a court reporter is absolutely immune from damages liability for failing to produce a transcript of a federal criminal trial.
I
In March 1986, after a 2-day trial, a jury convicted petitioner of bank robbery. Petitioner promptly appealed and ordered a copy of the transcript from respondent Ruggenberg, who had served as the court reporter. The court ordered Ruggenberg to produce a transcript by May 29, 1986.
Over two years later, Ruggenberg had yet to provide a transcript, despite a long series of hearings, court orders, and new filing deadlines. In July 1988, Ruggenberg finally explained that she had lost many of her trial notes, though additional notes and tapes were later to come to light. At one point in the proceedings, Ruggenberg was fined and arrested as the Court of Appeals sought to obtain this and other overdue transcripts. Eventually, making use of Ruggenberg’s partial notes and materials submitted by the parties pursuant to Rule 10(c) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, another reporter produced a partial transcript and the appellate process went forward. As a result of the delay in obtaining a transcript, petitioner’s appeal was not heard until four years after his conviction. 950 F. 2d 1471, 1472-1473 (CA9 1991); No. C88-260TB (WD Wash., Feb. 16, 1990), pp. 2-3, reprinted in App. 24.
In 1990, the Court of Appeals set aside petitioner’s conviction and remanded the ease to the District Court to determine whether petitioner’s appeal had been prejudiced by the lack of a verbatim transcript, and whether the delay in receiving the transcript violated petitioner’s constitutional right to due process. United States v. Antoine, 906 F. 2d 1379 (CA9). The District Court ruled against petitioner on both issues and reinstated his conviction. No. C85-87T (WD Wash., Aug. 21,1991), reprinted in App. 45. The Court of Appeals then affirmed. 967 F. 2d 592 (CA9 1992) (judgt. order), reprinted in App. 66.
In the meantime, before the Court of Appeals disposed of his first appeal in 1990, petitioner filed this civil action, seeking damages from Ruggenberg and respondent Byers & Anderson, Inc., the firm that had engaged her pursuant to its contract to provide reporting services to the District Court. Following discovery, the District Court granted summary judgment in favor of respondents on the ground that they were entitled to absolute immunity. Petitioner’s pendent state-law claims were dismissed on jurisdictional grounds. No. C88-260TB, supra, reprinted in App. 23.
Without reaching questions of liability or damages, the Court of Appeals affirmed. Reasoning that judicial immunity is “justified and defined by the functions it protects and serves,” Forrester v. White, 484 U. S. 219, 227 (1988) (emphasis omitted), and that “the tasks performed by a court reporter in furtherance of her statutory duties are functionally part and parcel of the judicial process,” the Court of Appeals held that actions within the scope of a reporter’s authority are absolutely immune. 950 F. 2d, at 1475-1476.
Some Circuits have held that court reporters are protected only by qualified immunity. We granted certiorari to resolve this conflict. 506 U. S. 914 (1992).
II
The proponent of a claim to absolute immunity bears the burden of establishing the justification for such immunity. In determining which officials perform functions that might justify a full exemption from liability, “we have undertaken ‘a considered inquiry into the immunity historically accorded the relevant official at common law and the interests behind it.’” Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S. 478, 508 (1978) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409, 421 (1976)); see also Burns v. Reed, 500 U. S. 478, 485 (1991).
The skilled, professional court reporter of today was unknown during the centuries when the common-law doctrine of judicial immunity developed. See generally Ratteray, Verbatim Reporting Comes of Age, 56 Judicature 368 (1973). It was not until the late 19th century that official court reporters began to appear in state courts. Id., at 368-369. Prior to enactment of the Court Reporter Act in 1944, the federal system did not provide for official court reporting. Court reporters were not among the class of persons protected by judicial immunity in the 19th century.
Faced with the absence of a common-law tradition involving court reporters themselves, respondents urge us to treat as their historical counterparts common-law judges who made handwritten notes during trials. We find the analogy unpersuasive. The function performed by judicial note-takers at common law is significantly different from that performed by court reporters today. Whereas court reporters are charged by statute with producing a “verbatim” transcript of each session of the court, for inclusion in the official record, 28 U. S. C. § 753(b), common-law judges exercise discretion and judgment in deciding exactly what, and how much, they will write. Early judicial notetakers, for instance, left records from which the “narrative of the trial cannot be reconstructed”; their notes were for their own purposes in charging the jury and were never entered into the public record. Langbein, Shaping the Eighteenth-Century Criminal Trial: A View from the Ryder Sources, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 5-6 (1983).
There is a second problem with respondents’ theory. Even had common-law judges performed the functions of a court reporter, that would not end the immunity inquiry. It would still remain to consider whether judges, when performing that function, were themselves entitled to absolute immunity. We do not doubt that judicial notetaking as it is commonly practiced is protected by absolute immunity, because it involves the kind of discretionary decisionmaking that the doctrine of judicial immunity is designed to protect. But if we could imagine a hypothetical case in which a common-law judge felt himself bound to transcribe an entire proceeding verbatim, it is far less clear — and neither respondent refers us to any case law suggesting — that this administrative duty would be similarly protected. Indeed, we have recently held that judges are not entitled to absolute immunity when acting in their administrative capacity. Forrester v. White, 484 U. S. 219, 229 (1988).
We are also unpersuaded by the contention that our “functional approach” to immunity, see Burns v. Reed, 500 U. S., at 486, requires that absolute immunity be extended to court reporters because they are “part of the judicial function,” see 950 F. 2d, at 1476. The doctrine of judicial immunity is supported by a long-settled understanding that the independent and impartial exercise of judgment vital to the judiciary might be impaired by exposure to potential damages liability. Accordingly, the “touchstone” for the doctrine’s applicability has been “performance of the function of resolving disputes between parties, or of authoritatively adjudicating private rights.” 500 U. S., at 500 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). When judicial immunity is extended to officials other than judges, it is because their judgments are “functionally] comparable]” to those of judges — that is, because they, too, “exercise a discretionary judgment” as a part of their function. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S., at 423, n. 20. Cf. Westfall v. Erwin, 484 U. S. 292, 297-298 (1988) (absolute immunity from state-law tort actions available to executive officials only when their conduct is discretionary).
The function performed by court reporters is not in this category. As noted above, court reporters are required by statute to “reeor[d] verbatim” court proceedings in their entirety. 28 U. S. C. § 753(b). They are afforded no discretion in the carrying out of this duty; they are to record, as accurately as possible, what transpires in court. See McLallen v. Henderson, 492 F. 2d 1298, 1299 (CA8 1974) (court reporters not absolutely immune “because their duties are ministerial, not discretionary, in nature”); Waterman v. State, 35 Misc. 2d 954, 957, 232 N. Y. S. 2d 22, 26 (Ct. Cl. 1962), aff'd in part, rev’d in part, 241 N. Y. S. 2d 314 (4th Dept., App. Div. 1963) (same). We do not mean to suggest that the task is less than difficult, or that reporters who do it well are less than highly skilled. But the difficulty of a job does not by itself make it functionally comparable to that of a judge. Cf. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U. S. 335, 342 (1986) (police officer not entitled to absolute immunity for conduct involved in applying for warrant). Nor is it sufficient that the task of a court reporter is extremely important or, in the words of the Court of Appeals, “indispensable to the appellate process.” 950 F. 2d, at 1476. As we explained in Forrester, some of the tasks performed by judges themselves, “even though they may be essential to the very functioning of the courts, have not . . . been regarded as judicial acts.” 484 U. S., at 228. In short, court reporters do not exercise the kind of judgment that is protected by the doctrine of judicial immunity.
Finally, respondents argue that strong policy reasons support extension of absolute immunity to court reporters. According to respondents, given the current volume of litigation in the federal courts, some reporters inevitably will be unable to meet deadlines. Absolute immunity would help to protect the entire judicial process from vexatious lawsuits brought by disappointed litigants when this happens. Requiring court reporters to defend against allegations like those asserted here, on the other hand, would not only be unfair, but would also aggravate the problem by contributing further to the caseload in the federal courts.
Assuming the relevance of respondents’ policy arguments, we find them unpersuasive for three reasons. First, our understanding is that cases of this kind are relatively rare. Respondents have not provided us with empirical evidence demonstrating the existence of any significant volume of vexatious and burdensome actions against reporters, even in the Circuits in which reporters are not absolutely immune. See n. 3, supra. Second, if a large number of cases does materialize, and we have misjudged the significance of this burden, then a full review of the countervailing policy considerations by the Congress may result in appropriate amendment to the Court Reporter Act. Third, and most important, we have no reason to believe that the Federal Judiciary, which surely is familiar with the special virtues and concerns of the court reporting profession, will be unable to administer justice to its members fairly.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 10(c) provides in relevant part:
“Statement on the evidence or proceedings when no report was made or when the transcript is unavailable. — If no report of the evidence or proceedings at a hearing or trial was made, or if a transcript is unavailable, the appellant may prepare a statement of the evidence or proceedings from the best available means, including the appellant’s recollection.”
In addition to state-law claims, petitioner's complaint had alleged a violation of 42 U. S. C. § 1983. Noting that petitioner's state-law claims had been dismissed on jurisdictional grounds, and that § 1983 does not provide a basis for suit against federal agents, the Court of Appeals assumed that the complaint alleged facts sufficient to support a federal claim like that recognized in Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 950 F. 2d 1471, 1473-1474 (CA9 1991). Because the only question presented by the certiorari petition relates to the absolute immunity defense on which the Court of Appeals based its decision, see Pet. for Cert, i, we have no occasion to comment on the validity of petitioner's underlying cause of action.
See McLallen v. Henderson, 492 F. 2d 1298, 1299-1300 (CA8 1974); Slavin v. Curry, 574 F. 2d 1256, 1265-1266 (CA5 1978); Green v. Maraio, 722 F. 2d 1013, 1018 (CA2 1983). The Seventh Gircuit, like the Ninth, provides absolute immunity for court reporters. Scruggs v. Moellering, 870 F. 2d 376, 377, cert. denied, 493 U. S. 956 (1989).
We have consistently “emphasized that the official seeking absolute immunity bears the burden of showing that such immunity is justified for the function in question. The presumption is that qualified rather than absolute immunity is sufficient to protect government officials in the exercise of their duties. We have been quite sparing in our recognition of absolute immunity, and have refused to extend it any further than its justification would warrant.” Burns v. Reed, 500 U. S. 478, 486-487 (1991) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
For purposes of immunity, we have not distinguished actions brought under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 against state officials from Bivens actions brought against federal officials. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S. 478, 503-504 (1978).
58 Stat. 5, as amended, 28 U. S. C. §753.
In a case decided in 1942, we pointed out:
“There is no law of the United States creating the position of official court stenographer and none requiring the stenographic report of any case, civil or criminal, and there is none providing for payment for the services of a stenographer in reporting judicial proceedings. The practice has been for the parties to agree that a designated person shall so report. The one selected must be paid by private arrangement with one or more of the parties to the litigation. The amount paid to him is not costs in the cause nor taxable as such against any of the parties.” Miller v. United States, 317 U. S. 192, 197.
“Judicial Immunity... was an absolute immunity from all claims relating to the exercise of judicial functions. See, e. g., T. Cooley, Law of Torts 408-409 (1880). It extended not only to judges narrowly speaking, but to ‘military and naval officers in exercising their authority to order courts-martial for the trial of their inferiors, or in putting their inferiors under arrest preliminary to trial;... to grand and petit jurors in the discharge of their duties as such; to assessors upon whom is imposed the duty of valuing property for the purpose of a levy of taxes; to commissioners appointed to appraise damages when property is taken under the right of eminent domain; to officers empowered to lay out, alter, and discontinue highways; to highway officers in deciding that a person claiming exemption from a road tax is not in fact exempt, or that one arrested is in default for not having worked out the assessment; to members of a township board in deciding upon the allowance of claims; to arbitrators, and to the collector of customs in exercising his authority to sell perishable property, and in fixing upon the time for notice of sale.’ Id. at 410-411 (footnotes omitted).
“As is evident from the foregoing catalog, judicial immunity extended not only to public officials but also to private citizens (in particular jurors and arbitrators); the touchstone for its applicability was performance of the function of resolving disputes between parties, or of authoritatively adjudicating private rights.” Burns v. Reed, 500 U. S., at 499-500 (Scania, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).
Indeed, the doctrine of judicial immunity was recognized in part to avoid imposing on judges the obligation to make complete trial transcripts.
“If upon such allegations a judge could be compelled to answer in a civil action for his judicial acts, not only would his office be degraded and his usefulness destroyed, but he would be subjected for his protection to the necessity of preserving a complete record of all the evidence produced before him in every litigated case, and of the authorities cited and arguments presented, in order that he might be able to show to the judge before whom he might be summoned by the losing party... that he had decided as he did with judicial integrity....” Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 349 (1872).
"For it is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself Liability to answer to every one who might feel himself aggrieved by the action of the judge, would be inconsistent with the possession of this freedom, and would destroy that independence without which no judiciary can be either respectable or useful.” Id., at 347. See also Mireles v. Waco, 502 U. S. 9, 10 (1991), and cases cited therein.
“A court stenographer, notwithstanding the fact that he is an officer of the court, by the very nature of his work performs no judicial function. His duties are purely ministerial and administrative; he has no power of decision. The doctrine [of judicial immunity] has no application to the facts with which we are confronted here.” Waterman, 35 Misc. 2d, at 957, 232 N. Y. S. 2d, at 26.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
H
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Jackson
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This controversy grows out of the voluntary merger of Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company and Pere Marquette Railway Company, which companies, together with Alleghany Corporation, sought approval by the Interstate Commerce Commission. Pere Marquette is incorporated under the laws of Michigan, while Chesapeake & Ohio is chartered by Virginia. Chesapeake & Ohio acquired and for some years exercised active control of Pere Marquette, whose properties and operations complement rather than compete with those of Chesapeake & Ohio. Late in 1945 merger proceedings were commenced under enabling statutes of the two states and were consummated with approval of considerably more than the number of shares made necessary by statutes of the respective states. The Interstate Commerce Commission found, and there is no attack upon the findings, that the public interest is served by merger and unification of these properties and operations. The Commission also concluded that the plan as a whole, and as applied to each group of shareholders, is just and reasonable, and there is no attack upon this conclusion except that by the appellants which is treated fully herein. Consequently, details of the plan are of little importance to this litigation.
Appellants are owners of 2,100 shares of $100 par 5% cumulative preferred stock of Pere Marquette. Their interests aggregate a little less than 2% of the outstanding stock of this class. Dividends on this stock have been unpaid since 1931 and, as of the commencement of this controversy, were in arrears in the sum of $72.50 per share, an amount that is increasing with time. The Pere Marquette charter provides for full payment of the stock at par, plus accrued unpaid dividends, “in the event of dissolution, liquidation, or winding up of the company, voluntary or involuntary . . . before any amounts are paid to holders of the . . . common stock.” The appellants contend that the merger hereinafter described terminates the corporate existence and, under this clause as construed by Michigan law, amounts to a “winding up.” They insist that since the merger makes provision for some compensation to common stockholders these appellants have the right, under Michigan law, to have their shares recognized on the basis of at least $172.50 each. The Commission found the market value per share ranged, at different times, from $87 to $99, while the merger terms give stocks in exchange which would have realized about $90 and $111 per share on the same dates. Appellants dissented from the merger, but Michigan law provides no specific right or procedure for appraisal and retirement of the holdings of a stockholder dissenting from a railroad merger.
When application was filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission under § 5 of the Interstate Commerce Act as amended (49 U. S. C. § 5), for approval and authorization of the merger, as well as for other relief, appellants intervened and asked that body to determine, recognize and protect their asserted right to the full legal liquidation figure. The Commission approved the merger and the merger terms, finding them just and reasonable as to each class of stockholders. However, it disclaimed jurisdiction to pass upon the further claims of the appellants asserted on the basis of their interpretation of Michigan law. It reviewed at some length the economic position of the stock. It recited that these shares had received no dividends since 1931 and that appellants’ witnesses agreed that these stockholders could not expect to receive any dividends for many years, apart from the merger. The Commission also pointed out the deficit in operations of Pere Marquette for the first quarter of 1946 as contrasted with the net income of Chesapeake and Ohio, and concluded that “On the whole, it would seem that the prospects of Pere Marquette stockholders for returns on their investments would be enhanced by merger of their company into the Chesapeake & Ohio.” The Commission did not question that the stockholders, on liquidation, dissolution or winding up of Pere Marquette, would be entitled to be paid in full the par value of their shares and accumulated dividends before any payment to holders of common stock. It did not undertake to determine the ultimate worth of these stocks in case of an actual liquidation, but it considered their present intrinsic value on a capitalized earnings basis, an actual yield basis, and its present market position and concluded: “Accordingly, considering Pere Marquette’s investment according to its books, other property values, the company’s history as to earnings, its future prospects, and the market appraisal of its stocks, all as set forth above, we find that, as to the stockholders of both parties generally, the proposed ratios of exchange, stock issues, and assumptions of indebtedness are just and reasonable.”
The Commission then noted the contention of the appellants that as to them the terms were not just and reasonable, because they are deprived of contract rights under Michigan law, which they have not waived. It is contended that the Commission should not remit the dissenting stockholders to remedies in state courts as the Commission would thereby decline the jurisdiction conferred by § 5 and § 20a of the Act. But the Commission considered that it was entrusted with authority to decide the public interest aspects of the merger of these transportation facilities and that it could not be expected to enter into the question of “compensation of dissenting stockholders on specified bases” before approval and merger. It thought that, having found the treatment of each class to be just and reasonable, it had done its full duty “when we make certain that all stockholders of the same class are to be treated alike.” It declined to decide the Michigan law question as to what the rights of dissenting stockholders were, and whether the merger was equivalent to a liquidation, but said: “This does not mean that the Chesapeake & Ohio and the Pere Marquette do not remain free to settle controversies with dissenting stockholders through negotiation and litigation in the courts.”
Taking into account the small percentage of the dissenting shares, the current assets position of the Chesapeake & Ohio, and the maximum possible cost to the merged company of the settlement of these claims on the basis most favorable to appellants, it considered that the company was amply able to bear “any probable expenditure of cash that it might be required to make in connection with the merger. Accordingly, it appears that consummation of the merger will not involve a burden of excessive expenditure.” The Commission thus left in a state of suspense, subject to further litigation or negotiation, these claims concerning the extent of the capital obligations of a constituent company, after examining them sufficiently to determine only that, however settled, they did not involve enough to affect the solvency of the new company or jeopardize its operations.
The Commission denied appellants’ petition for rehearing and they filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia to set aside the order authorizing the merger. A court of three judges, convened as required by law, sustained the Commission, 72 F. Supp. 560. Appellants bring to us the question whether the Commission, in view of its authority over mergers, which is declared to be exclusive and plenary, could decline to determine just what the dissenting stockholders’ legal rights were under the Michigan law and the Pere Marquette charter, and to recognize them in full by the terms of the merger.
The disposition of appellants’ claims, as well as the nature of the claims themselves, requires consideration of the relative function and authority of federal and state law in regulating and approving voluntary railroad mergers. The appellants contend that their share in the merged company is to be measured by, or their remedies as dissenters are to be found in, state law, but that the federal agency is bound to determine and apply that law. The Commission on the other hand refuses either finally to foreclose or to allow these claims. It apparently leaves it open to the state courts, or to the parties by negotiation, to add to the surviving carrier’s capital obligations, which the Commission has found to be just and reasonable, others founded only in state law and as to which it has made no such findings. We conclude that neither position is wholly consistent with the federal statutory plan for authorization and approval of mergers.
It is not for us to adjudicate the existence or the measure of any rights that Michigan law may confer upon dissenting stockholders. Neither the Commission nor this Court can make a plenary and exclusive decision as to what the law of a state may be, for the function of declaring and interpreting its own law is left to each state of the Union. But the effect of the state law in relation to a constitutional Act of Congress, in view of the constitutional provision that the latter shall be “the supreme law of the land,” “laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding,” is for us to determine. Our first inquiry here, therefore, is whether the Interstate Commerce Act accords recognition to those state law rights, if any exist. To determine this federal question we assume, but do not decide, that Michigan law would consider this merger to be a liquidation, and would regard the recognition given to the common stock as entitling these dissenters to “full payment” in cash or its equivalent for both the par value of their preferred shares and accrued unpaid dividends thereon. Assuming such to be their rights under the law of the State, we must decide whether approval of a railroad merger under the Transportation Act of 1940 is conditioned upon observance of such state law rights or can be made by the Commission contingently subject to them. A résumé of the history of that Act throws light on the problem dealt with by that legislation.
The basic railroad facilities of the United States were constructed under state authorization and restrictions by corporations whose powers and limitations were prescribed by state legislatures, or resulted from limitations on. the states themselves. Construction in reference primarily to local or regional transportation needs created duplicating and competing facilities in some areas and provided inadequate ones in others. Expansion necessary to serve advancing national frontiers was stimulated by extensive subsidies from the Federal Government, largely in the form of land grants. But the stress and strain of World War I brought home to us that the railroads of the country did not function as a really national system of transportation. That crisis also made plain the confusions, inefficiencies, inadequacies and dangers to our national defense and economy flowing from the patchwork railroad pattern that local interests under local law had created.
The demand for an integrated, efficient and coordinated system of rail transport, equal to the needs of our national economy and defense, resulted in the Transportation Act of 1920. In a series of decisions on particular problems, this Court defined the general purposes of that Act to be the establishment of a new federal railway policy to insure adequate transportation service by means of securing a fair return on capital devoted to the service, restoration of impaired railroad credit, and regulation of rates, security issues, consolidations and mergers in the interest of the public. The tenor of all of these was to confirm the power and duty of the Interstate Commerce Commission, regardless of state law, to control rate and capital structures, physical make-up and relations between carriers, in the light of the public interest in an efficient national transportation system. Railroad Commission of Wisconsin v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 257 U. S. 563; New England Divisions Case, 261 U. S. 184; Dayton-Goose Creek R. Co. v. United States, 263 U. S. 456; Railroad Commission of California v. Southern Pacific Co., 264 U. S. 331; Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe R.Co., 270 U. S. 266.
As a means to this end, the 1920 Act required the Commission to prepare and adopt a plan for nationwide consolidations of the railway properties of the country. It made this master plan the governing consideration in approving voluntary consolidations of railroads which were permitted only if in harmony with and in furtherance of the Commission’s over-all plans. If they met that test, Congress provided that mergers could be consummated notwithstanding any restraint or prohibition by state authority.
By 1940 it had become apparent that the ambitious nation-wide plan of consolidation was not bearing fruit. Various studies and investigations led to the conclusion that it was a case where the best was an enemy of the good, and waiting for the perfect official plan was defeating or postponing less ambitious but more attainable voluntary improvements. The Transportation Act of 1940 relieved the Commission of formulating a nationwide plan of consolidations. Instead, it authorized approval by the Commission of carrier-initiated, voluntary plans of merger or consolidation if, subject to such terms, conditions and modifications as the Commission might prescribe, the proposed transactions met with certain tests of public interest, justice and reasonableness, in which case they should become effective regardless of state authority. The Act does not specify every consideration to which the Commission must give weight in determining whether or not any plan meets the tests. Section 5 (2) provides only that, “among others,” the Commission shall consider the effect upon adequate transportation service, the effect of inclusion or failure to include other railroads, total fixed charges, and the interests of the carrier employees affected. This Court has recently and unanimously said in reference to this Act, “Congress has long made the maintenance and development of an economical and efficient railroad system a matter of primary national concern. Its legislation must be read with this purpose in mind.” Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Daniel, 333 U.S. 118.
So reading the legislation relevant to this merger, we find that approval of a voluntary railroad merger which is within the scope of the Act is dependent upon three, and upon only three, considerations: First, a finding that it “will be consistent with the public interest.” (§ 5 (2) (b).) Second, a finding that, subject to any modification made by the Commission, it is “just and reasonable.” (§ 5 (2) (b).) Third, assent of a “majority, unless a different vote is required under applicable State law, in which case the number so required shall assent, of the votes of the holders of the shares entitled to vote.” (§5(11).) When these conditions have been complied with, the Commission-approved transaction goes into effect without need for invoking any approval under state authority, and the parties are relieved of “restraints, limitations, and prohibitions of law, Federal, State, or municipal, insofar as may be necessary to enable them to carry into effect the transaction so approved or provided for in accordance with the terms and conditions, if any, imposed by the Commission, and to hold, maintain, and operate any properties and exercise any control or franchises acquired through such transaction.” (§5(11).)
The Commission, under this Act as well as the Act of 1920, was also given complete control of the capital structure to result from a merger. The carrier, even if permitted by state law which created it, may issue no stock,, bond or evidence of indebtedness without approval. It may assume no obligation in respect of the securities of another person or corporation except with approval. And the approval is to be given only on a finding that it “(a) is for some lawful object within its corporate purposes, and compatible with the public interest, which is necessary or appropriate for or consistent with the proper performance by the carrier of service to the public as a common carrier, and which will not impair its ability to perform that service, and (b) is reasonably necessary and appropriate for such purpose.” 49 U. S. C. § 20a (2).
The jurisdiction of the Commission under both § 5 and § 20a is made plenary and exclusive and independent of all other state or federal authority. §5 (11); § 20a (7).
The Commission, as we have seen, has found that the liabilities asserted by appellants, if settled by litigation or negotiation, will not impair the carrier’s ability to perform its service, but it has not found the assumption of such liabilities to be compatible with the public interest under § 5 and § 20a. Indeed, since these claims exceed what the Commission has found to be just and reasonable, it could hardly find that assumption of such claims would be compatible with the public interest.
It appears to us inconsistent with the Interstate Commerce Act for the Commission to leave claims growing out of the capital structure of one of the constituent companies to be added to the obligations of the surviving carrier, contingent upon the decision of some other tribunal or agreement of the parties themselves. We think that the Commission must pass upon and approve all capital liabilities which the merged company will assume or discharge as a result of merger. If some greater amount than that specified in the agreement is to be allowed to any class of stockholders, it must either deplete the cash or inflate the liabilities or capital issues of the new company. It may be that in this case the merged company will be strong enough to carry this burden and still perform its public service. But that is not the sole purpose of the supervision provided by statute. It is also in the public interest that no capitalization or indebtedness be carried over except that which meets the test of the Act in all other respects. We think the Commission was in error in assuming tha,t it did not have, or was at liberty to renounce or delegate, power finally to settle the amount of capital liabilities of the new company and the proportion or amount thereof which each class of stockholders should receive on account of its contributions to the new entity.
We think it is equally clear that the Commission must look for standards in passing on a voluntary merger only to the Interstate Commerce Act. In matters within its scope it is the supreme law of the land. Its purpose to bring within its scope everything pertaining to the capital structures of such mergers could hardly be made more plain. Indeed, the very fact on which appellants rely heavily, that the Commission’s jurisdiction is “plenary” and “exclusive,” argues with equal force that federal law is also plenary and exclusive. The Commission likely would not and probably could not be given plenary and exclusive jurisdiction to interpret and apply any state’s law. Whatever rights the appellants ask- the Commission to assure must be founded on federal, not on state, law.
Apart from meeting the test of the public interest, the merger terms, as to stockholders, must be found to be just and reasonable. These terms would be largely meaningless to the stockholders if their interests were ultimately to be settled by reference to provisions of corporate charters and of state laws. Such charters and laws usually have been drawn on assumptions that time and experience have unsettled. Public regulation is not obliged and we cannot lightly assume it is intended to restore values, even if promised by charter terms, if they have already been lost through the operation of economic forces. Cf. Market Street R. Co. v. Commission, 324 U. S. 548. In appraising a stockholder’s position in a merger as to justice and reasonableness, it is not the promise that a charter made to him but the current worth of that promise that governs, it is not what he once put into a constituent company but what value he is contributing to the merger that is to be made good.
In construing the words “fair and equitable” in a federal statute of very similar purposes, we have held that although the full priority rule applies in liquidation of a solvent holding company pursuant to a federal statute, the priority is satisfied by giving each class the full economic equivalent of what they presently hold, and that, as a matter of federal law, liquidation preferences provided by the charter do not apply. We said that, although the company was in fact being liquidated in compliance with an administrative order, the rights of the stockholders could be valued “on the basis of a going business and not as though a liquidation were taking place.” Consequently the liquidation preferences were only one factor in valuation rather than determinative of amounts payable. Otis & Co. v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 323 U. S. 624.
The appellants here, although the enterprise is to continue, insist on a valuation according to the letter of the charter. By this method the longer their stock is in default of dividends or earnings, the greater interest it would have in the merged properties if the common stock was to be recognized at all. The Commission, however, did not consider that a long-continued default and the prospect of further default added greatly to the present intrinsic or market value of the stock in exchange. Its measuring rod was an economic rather than a legalistic one. The Commission considered the stock’s past yield, present market value, and future prospects. It found that, all things considered, the merger terms gave to these appellants in new stock the fair economic equivalent of what they already held. It considered the deal just and reasonable on an exchange basis for a continuing enterprise. But it did not undertake to say whether, under the letter of their charter as construed under the law of Michigan, the preferred stockholders may not have a contract that would exact more than an economic equivalent.
Since the federal law clearly contemplates merger as a step in continuing the enterprise, it follows that what Michigan law might give these dissenters on a winding-up or liquidation is irrelevant, except insofar as it may be reflected in current values for which they are entitled to an equivalent. It would be inconsistent to allow state law to apply a liquidation basis to what federal law designates as a basis for continued public service. Federal law requires that merger terms be just and reasonable to all groups of stockholders, in contemplation of the continued use of their capital in the public calling to which it has been dedicated. Congress has made no provision by which minority stockholders, dissatisfied with a proposed railroad merger, may block it or compel retirement of their capital, as statutes often permit to be done in the case of private corporations where the public interest is not much concerned with its effect on the enterprise. And since Congress dealt with the subject of stockholders’ consent, its failure to provide for withdrawal of non-consenting capital cannot be considered an oversight to be supplied by us. A part of the capital dedicated to a railroad enterprise cannot withdraw itself without authorization any more than all of the capital can withdraw itself and abandon the railroad without approval. It must submit to regulations and to readjustments in the public interest on just and reasonable terms.
In determining whether each class of stockholder receives an equivalent of what it turns in, the Commission, of course, is under a duty to see that minority interests are protected, especially when there is an absence of arm’s length bargaining or the terms of the merger have been imposed by management interests adverse to any class of stockholders. The Commission indicates both awareness and discharge of this duty in this case. Its finding that this plan is just and reasonable is not challenged here except on the basis of Michigan law. When stockholders are given what it is just and reasonable they should have, the Interstate Commerce Act does not permit state law to impose greater obligations on the financial structure of the merging railroads with consequent increased calls upon their assets or earning capacity.
We therefore hold that no rights alleged to have been granted to dissenting stockholders by state law provision concerning liquidation survive the merger agreement approved by the requisite number of stockholders and approved by the Commission as just and reasonable. Any such rights are, as a matter of federal law, accorded recognition in the obligation of the Commission not to approve any plan which is not just and reasonable. In making that determination, those rights are to be considered to the extent that they may affect intrinsic or market values. While the Commission has found that what the appellants are given in this plan is just and reasonable, the record indicates that it may have declined to consider these claims, even if they are found to have some effect on the intrinsic value of the stock, because it thought it lacked jurisdiction. Under these circumstances, we cannot be sure that in arriving at its conclusion that the plan was just and reasonable it did not exclude some factors that it should consider under the views set out in this opinion. We therefore reverse the judgment below and remand the case to the Commission for reconsideration under the principles herein expressed.
Reversed and remanded.
Mr. Justice Reed took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Section 5 as amended provides in part as follows:
“(2) (a) It shall be lawful, with the approval and authorization of the Commission, as provided in subdivision (b)—
“(i) for two or more carriers to consolidate or merge their properties or franchises, or any part thereof, into one corporation for the ownership, management, and operation of the properties theretofore in separate ownership . . .
“(b) Whenever a transaction is proposed under subparagraph (a), the carrier or carriers or persons seeking authority therefor shall present an application to the Commission, and thereupon the Commission shall notify the Governor of each State in which any part of the properties of the carriers involved in the proposed transaction is situated, and also such carriers and the applicant or applicants . . . and shall afford reasonable opportunity for interested parties to be heard. ... If the Commission finds that, subject to such terms and conditions and such modifications as it shall find to be just and reasonable, the proposed transaction is within the scope of sub-paragraph (a) and will be consistent with the public interest, it shall enter an order approving and authorizing such transaction, upon the terms and conditions, and with the modifications, so found to be just and reasonable . . .
“(c) In passing upon any proposed transaction under the provisions of this paragraph (2), the Commission shall give weight to the following considerations, among others: (1) The effect . . . upon adequate transportation service to the public; (2) the effect upon the public interest of the inclusion, or failure to include, other railroads in the territory . . .; (3) the total fixed charges resulting from the proposed transaction; and (4) the interest of the carrier employees affected. . . .
“(e) No transaction which contemplates a guaranty or assumption of payment of dividends or of fixed charges, shall be approved by the Commission under this paragraph (2) except upon a specific finding by the Commission that such guaranty or assumption is not inconsistent with the public interest. . . .
“(4) It shall be unlawful for any person, except as provided in paragraph (2), to enter into any transaction within the scope of subparagraph (a) thereof . . .
“(11) The authority conferred by this section shall be exclusive and plenary, and any carrier or corporation participating in or resulting from any transaction approved by the Commission thereunder, shall have full power (with the assent, in the case of a purchase and sale, a lease, a corporate consolidation, or a corporate merger, of a majority, unless a different vote is required under applicable State law, in which case the number so required shall assent, of the votes of the holders of the shares entitled to vote of the capital stock of such corporation at a regular meeting of such stockholders, the notice of such meeting to include such purpose, or at a special meeting thereof called for such purpose) to carry such transaction into effect and to own and operate any properties and exercise any control or franchises acquired through said transaction without invoking any approval under State authority; and any carriers or other corporations, and their officers and employees and any other persons, participating in a transaction approved or authorized under the provisions of this section shall be and they are hereby relieved from the operation of the antitrust laws and of all other restraints, limitations, and prohibitions of law, Federal, State, or municipal, insofar as may be necessary to enable them to carry into effect the transaction so approved or provided for in accordance with the terms and conditions, if any, imposed by the Commission, and to hold, maintain, and operate any properties and exercise any control or franchises acquired through such transaction. Nothing in this section shall be construed to create or provide for the creation, directly or indirectly, of a Federal corporation, but any power granted by this section to any carrier or other corporation shall be deemed to be in addition to and in modification of its powers under its corporate charter or under the laws of any State.”
For pertinent provisions of § 5 and § 20a see notes 1 and 15 respectively.
28 U. S. C. § 47
28 U. S. C. § 47 (a); 28 U. S. C. § 345
Act of September 18,1940, 54 Stat. 898.
Act of February 28,1920, 41 Stat. 456.
“It is manifest . . . that the act made a new departure. . . .” Chief Justice Taft, in Railroad Commisdon of Wisconsin v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 257 U. S. 563, 585.
In Dayton-Goose Creek R. Co. v. United States, 263 U. S. 466, 478, in referring to the Wisconsin case, 257 U. S. 563, and the New England Divisions Case, 261 U. S. 184, the late Chief Justice said: “In both cases it was pointed out that the Transportation Act adds a new and important object to previous interstate commerce legislation, which was designed primarily to prevent unreasonable or discriminatory rates against persons and localities. The new act seeks affirmatively to build up a system of railways prepared to handle promptly all the interstate traffic of the country. It aims to give the owners of the railways an opportunity to earn enough to maintain their properties and equipment in such a state of efficiency that they can carry well this burden. To achieve this great purpose, it puts the railroad systems of the country more completely than ever under the fostering guardianship and control of the Commission, which is to supervise their issue of securities, their car supply and distribution, their joint use of terminals, their construction of new lines, their abandonment of old lines, and by a proper division of joint rates, and by fixing adequate rates for interstate commerce, and in case of discrimination, for intrastate commerce, to secure a fair return upon the properties of the carriers engaged.”
§ 407 (4).
§407 (6) (a).
§407 (8).
See, for example, report and recommendations by the President’s Committee of Six, appointed September 20, 1938, whose report dated December 23, 1938, is considered part of the legislative history of the Transportation Act of 1940.
See note 1, supra.
The Act itself included a statement of the “National Transportation Policy” in these terms: “It is hereby declared to be the national transportation policy of the Congress to provide for fair and impartial regulation of all modes of transportation subject to the provisions of this Act, so administered as to recognize and preserve the inherent advantages of each; to promote safe, adequate, economical, and efficient service and foster sound economic conditions in transportation and among the several carriers; to encourage the establishment and maintenance of reasonable charges for transportation services, without unjust discriminations, undue preferences or advantages, or unfair or destructive competitive practices; to cooperate with the several States and the duly authorized officials thereof; and to encourage fair wages and equitable working conditions; — all to the end of developing, coordinating, and preserving a national transportation system by water, highway, and rail, as well as other means, adequate to meet the needs of the commerce of the United States, of the Postal Service, and of the national defense. All of the provisions of this Act shall be administered and enforced with a view to carrying out the above declaration of policy.”
Repeated recommendations of the Commission that the federal government occupy the field of regulation of railroad security issues and assumption of obligations were followed in 1920 by addition of § 20a to the Interstate Commerce Act (§ 439 of the Transportation Act of 1920,41 Stat.494).
As early as 1907 the Commission had stated that “the time has come when some reasonable regulation should be imposed upon the issuance of securities by railways engaged in interstate commerce.” 12 I. C. C. 277, 306. This recommendation was renewed in the Commission’s annual report for 1907, p. 24, and in every succeeding annual report up to and including 1919. The Commission incorporated in the 1919 report the statement concerning recommended legislation it had submitted to the Senate Interstate Commerce Committee, which inclúded a recommendation for regulation of security issues.
House Report No. 456, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. (November 10, 1919), said with respect to the section which later became § 20a: . . The
enactment of the pending bill will put the control over stock and bond issues exclusively in the hands of the Federal Government and will result in uniformity and greater promptness of action.”
Section 20a as enacted in 1920 remained unchanged by the Transportation Act of 1940 and provides in part as follows:
“(2) ... it shall be unlawful for any carrier to issue any share of capital stock or any bond or other evidence of interest in or indebtedness of the carrier ... or to assume any obligation or liability as lessor, lessee, guarantor, indorser, surety, or otherwise, in respect of the securities of any other person, natural or artificial, even though permitted by the authority creating the carrier corporation, unless and until, and then only to the extent that, upon application by the carrier, and after investigation by the Commission of the purposes and uses of the proposed issue and the proceeds thereof, or of the proposed assumption of obligation or liability in respect of the securities of any other person, natural or artificial, the Commission by order authorizes such issue or assumption. The Commission shall make such order only if it finds that such issue or assumption: (a) is for some lawful object within its corporate purposes, and compatible with the public interest, which is necessary or appropriate for or consistent with the proper performance by the carrier of service to the public as a common carrier, and which will not impair its ability to perform that service, and (b) is reasonably necessary and appropriate for such purpose. . . .
“(6) Upon receipt of any such application for authority the Commission shall cause notice thereof to be given to and a copy filed with the governor of each State in which the applicant carrier operates. The railroad commissions, public service or utilities commissions, or other appropriate State authorities of the State shall have the right to make before the Commission such representations as they may deem just and proper for preserving and' conserving the rights and interests of their people and the States, respectively, involved in such proceedings. The Commission may hold hearings, if it sees fit, to enable it to determine its decision upon the application for authority.
“(7) The jurisdiction conferred upon the Commission by this section shall be exclusive and plenary, and a carrier may issue securities and assume obligations or liabilities in accordance with the provisions of this section without securing approval other than as specified herein. . .
For text of § 5 (11) see note 1.
For text of § 20a (7) see note 15.
In an early case (Pittsburgh & W. Va. R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 54 App. D. C. 34, 293 F. 1001, appeal dismissed 266 U. S. 640) in which the constitutionality of § 20a had been upheld, the Court said: “If ‘a fair return on capital devoted to the transportation service’ [New England Divisions Case, 261 U. S. 184, 189] was to be insured the railway companies, and at the same time proper service and equitable rates accorded the public, the supervision of the issuance of stock, the incurring of bonded indebtedness, the extension and consolidation of railway lines, becomes of the utmost importance. Without this power to supervise the issue of stock and bonds, and thus limit the dividend and interest obligations of the carriers, as well as the expenditures in extensions and improvements, the fixing of adequate rates to insure a just return to the carrier, and at the same time equitable protection to the public, would be impossible. . . .”
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
J
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Blackmun
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Federal Open Market Committee has a practice, authorized by regulation, 12 CFR § 271.5 (1978), of withholding certain monetary policy directives from the public during the month they are in effect. At the end of the month, the directives are published in full in the Federal Register. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that this practice violates the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U. S. C. § 552. 184 U. S. App. D. C. 203, 565 F. 2d 778 (1977). We granted certiorari on the strength of the Committee’s representations that this ruling could seriously interfere with the implementation of national monetary policy. 436 U. S. 917 (1978).
I
Open market operations — the purchase and sale of Government securities in the domestic securities market — are the most important monetary policy instrument of the Federal Reserve System. When the Federal Reserve System buys securities in the open market, the payment is ordinarily credited in the reserve account of the seller’s bank, increasing the total volume of bank reserves. When the Federal Reserve System sells securities on the open market, the sales price usually is debited in the reserve account of the buyer’s bank, decreasing the total volume of reserves. Changes in the volume of bank reserves affect the ability of banks to make loans and investments. This in turn has a substantial impact on interest rates and investment activity in the economy as a whole.
The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC or Committee), petitioner herein, by statute has exclusive control over the open market operations of the entire Federal Reserve System. 12 U. S. C. §263 (b). The FOMC is charged with conducting open market operations “with a view to accommodating commerce and business and with regard to their bearing upon the general credit situation of the country.” § 263 (c). To implement this authority, the Committee has established a combined investment pool for all Federal Reserve banks, known as the System Open Market Account. A senior officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York is regularly appointed Account Manager of the System Open Market Account.
The FOMC meets approximately once a month to review the overall state of the economy and consider the appropriate course of monetary and open market policy. The Committee’s principal conclusions are embodied in a statement called the Domestic Policy Directive. The Directive summarizes the economic and monetary background of the FOMC’s deliberations and indicates in general terms whether the Committee wishes to follow an expansionary, deflationary, or unchanged monetary policy in the period ahead. The Committee also attempts to agree on specific tolerance ranges for the growth in the money supply and for the federal funds rate. The recent practice of the Committee has been to include these tolerance ranges in the Domestic Policy Directive.
The day-to-day operations of the Account Manager are guided by the Domestic Policy Directive and associated tolerance ranges, and by a daily conference call with the staff and at least one member of the FOMC. Subject to this oversight, the Manager has broad discretion in implementing the Committee’s policy. In transacting business for the System Open Market Account, he deals with about 25 dealers who actively trade in United States Government and federal agency securities. Roughly half of these dealers are departments of large commercial banks; the others include large investment firms and smaller firms that specialize in Government securities. These dealers trade primarily for their own account. App. 33.
The Federal Reserve Board is required by statute to keep a record of all policy actions taken by the FOMC with respect to open market operations. 12 U. S. C. § 247a. To comply with this requirement, the FOMC secretariat prepares a document during the month after each Committee meeting. This document is called the Record of Policy Actions. It contains a general review of economic and monetary conditions at the time of the meeting, the text of the Domestic Policy Directive, any other policy actions taken by the Committee, the votes on these actions, and the dissenting views, if any. A draft of the Record of Policy Actions is distributed to the participants at the next meeting of the Committee for their comments, and is revised and released for publication in the Federal Register a few days later. 41 Fed. Reg. 22261 (1976).
In other words, the Record of Policy Actions is published in the Federal Register almost as soon as it is drafted and approved in final form by the Committee. The Domestic Policy Directive, however, exists as a document for approximately one month before it makes its first public appearance as part of the Record of Policy Actions. Moreover, by the time the Domestic Policy Directive is released as part of the Record of Policy Actions, it has been supplanted by a new Directive and is no longer the current and effective policy of the FOMC.
II
Respondent, when this action was instituted in May 1975, was a law student at Georgetown University Law Center, Washington, D. C. App. 8. The complaint alleged that he had “developed a strong interest in administrative law and the operation of agencies of the federal government,” and had formed a desire to study “the process by which the FOMC regulates the national money supply through the frequent adoption of domestic policy directives.” Ibid.
In pursuit of these professed academic interests, respondent in March 1975, through counsel, filed a request under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) seeking the “[r]ecords of policy actions taken by the Federal Open Market Committee at its meetings in January 1975 and February 1975, including, but not limited to, instructions to the Manager of the Open Market Account and any other person relating to the purchase and sale of securities and foreign currencies.” Id., at 13. The FOMC denied the request, explaining that the Records of Policy Actions, including the Domestic Policy Directive, were available only on a delayed basis under the policy set forth in 12 CFR § 271.5. An administrative appeal resulted in release of the requested documents, but only because the withholding period by then had expired. Governor Robert C. Holland of the Federal Reserve Board, on behalf of the Committee, wrote to respondent’s counsel that the Committee remained firmly committed to what he described as “a legislative policy against premature disclosures which would impair the effectiveness of the operations of Government agencies.” App. 21.
Respondent then instituted this litigation in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the operation of 12 CFR § 271.5 and the policy of delayed disclosure. App. 7. The FOMC in due course moved for summary judgment, and submitted affidavits from Committee members and staff that generally advanced two reasons why immediate disclosure of the Domestic Policy Directives and tolerance ranges would interfere with the FOMC’s statutory functions.
First, the Committee argued that immediate release of the Domestic Policy Directive and tolerance ranges would make it difficult to implement limited or gradual changes in monetary policy. Disclosure of the FOMC’s monetary policy objectives would have an immediate “announcement effect,” as market participants moved quickly to adjust their holdings of Government securities in anticipation of purchases or sales by the System Open Market Account. This would result in sudden price and interest rate movements, which might be considerably larger than the Committee contemplated and might be beyond the power of the FOMC or the Federal Reserve to control.
Second, the FOMC contended that immediate disclosure of the Directive and tolerance ranges would permit large institutional investors, who would have the means to analyze the information quickly and act rapidly in buying or selling securities, to obtain an unfair advantage over small investors.
Respondent submitted no counter-affidavits to these contentions, since he considered them “irrelevant” to the legal issues presented. Brief for Respondent 33-34, n. 12. The District Court apparently agreed. Without addressing the FOMC’s affidavits, or entering any findings about the effect that premature disclosure might have on open market operations, the court granted summary judgment for respondent. 413 F. Supp. 494 (DC 1976). It held, as the FOMC had conceded, that the Domestic Policy Directives were “statements of general policy... formulated and adopted by the agency” that, under 5 U. S. C. § 552 (a)(1)(D), had to be “currently publish [ed] in the Federal Register for the guidance of the public.” It further concluded that by waiting until a new Directive had been promulgated before publishing the preceding one, the FOMC was in violation of the “current publication” requirement. 413 F. Supp., at 505. Finally, the court rejected the Committee’s contentions that the Domestic Policy Directives could be withheld under either Exemption 2 of the FOIA, relating to internal personnel rules and practices of an agency, or Exemption 5, relating to inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available to a party other than an agency in litigation with an agency.
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, the FOMC did not contest the ruling that the Domestic Policy Directives were “statements of general policy” that, under § 552 (a) (1) (D), had to be “currently publish [ed] ” in the Federal Register. Similarly, it did not challenge the conclusion that the 1-month delay failed to satisfy the current-publication requirement. Moreover, the Committee abandoned the argument that the Directives were covered by Exemption 2. The Committee, instead, concentrated on the contention that premature disclosure would seriously disrupt the conduct of open market operations, and continued to urge that the policy of delayed disclosure was authorized by Exemption 5.
The Court of Appeals rejected the FOMC’s Exemption 5 arguments. It held that the Domestic Policy Directives were not exempt from disclosure under the “executive” privilege attaching to predecisional communications. It also ruled that Exemption 5 was not designed to protect against premature disclosure of otherwise final decisions. Finally, it concluded that there was no other civil discovery privilege that could serve as a basis for holding that the Directives were exempt from disclosure under Exemption 5. Like the District Court, the Court of Appeals expressed no opinion about the FOMC’s assertion that immediate disclosure of the Domestic Policy Directives and tolerance ranges would seriously interfere with the conduct of national monetary policy. If the assertion were true, the court suggested, Congress could specifically exempt this material from the prompt-disclosure requirement of the FOIA. 184 U. S. App. D. C. 203, 565 F. 2d 778 (1977).
Ill
This Court has had frequent occasion to consider the FOIA, and it is not necessary to describe its history and background in detail. It suffices to say that the purpose of the FOIA is “to establish a general philosophy of full agency disclosure unless information is exempted under clearly delineated statutory language.” S. Rep. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1965). The Act makes available to any person all agency records, which it divides into three categories: some must be currently published in the Federal Register, 5 U. S. C. § 552 (a)(1); others must be “promptly publish [ed]” or made publicly available and indexed, § 552 (a) (2); and all others must be promptly furnished on request, § 552 (a)(3). It then defines nine specific categories of records to which the Act “does not apply.” § 552 (b). The district court is given jurisdiction to enjoin an agency from withholding agency records, and to order the production of any agency records improperly withheld. §552 (a)(4)(B). The burden in any such proceeding is on the agency to establish that the requested information is exempt. Ibid.
At issue here is Exemption 5 of the FOIA, which provides that the affirmative disclosure provisions do not apply to “inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency.” § 552 (b)(5). Exemption 5, in other words, applies to documents that (a) are “inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters,” and (b) consist of material that “would not be available by law to a party... in litigation with the agency.”
A
There can be little doubt that the FOMC’s Domestic Policy Directives constitute “inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters.” FOMC is clearly an “agency” as that term is defined in the Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U. S. C. §§ 551 (1), 552 (e). And the Domestic Policy Directives are essentially the FOMC’s written instructions to the Account Manager, a subordinate official of the agency. These instructions, although possibly of interest to members of the public, are binding only upon the Account Manager. The Directives do not establish rules that govern the adjudication of individual rights, nor do they require particular conduct or forbearance by any member of the public. They are thus “intra-agency memorandums” within the meaning of Exemption 5.
B
Whether the Domestic Policy Directives “would not be available by law to a party... in litigation with the agency” presents a more difficult question. The House Report states that Exemption 5 was intended to allow an agency to withhold intra-agency memoranda which would not “routinely be disclosed to a private party through the discovery process in litigation with the agency....” H. R. Rep. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 10 (1966). EPA v. Mink, 410 U. S. 73, 86-87 (1973), recognized that one class of intra-agency memoranda shielded by Exemption 5 is agency reports and working papers subject to the “executive” privilege for predecisional deliberations. NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U. S. 132 (1975), confirmed this interpretation, and further held that Exemption 5 encompasses materials that constitute a privileged attorney’s work product. Id., at 154-155.
The FOMC does not contend that the Domestic Policy Directives are protected by either the privilege for predeci-sional communications or the privilege for an attorney’s work product. Its principal argument, instead, is that Exemption 5 confers general authority upon an agency to delay disclosure of intra-agency memoranda that would undermine the effectiveness of the agency’s policy if released immediately. This general authority exists, according to the FOMC, even if the memoranda in question could be routinely discovered by a party in civil litigation with the agency.
We must reject this analysis. First, since the FOMC does not indicate that the asserted authority to defer disclosure of intra-agency memoranda rests on a privilege enjoyed by the Government in the civil discovery context, its argument is fundamentally at odds with the plain language of the statute. EPA v. Mink, 410 U. S., at 85-86; NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U. S., at 149. In addition, the Committee’s argument proves too much. Such an interpretation of Exemption 5 would appear to allow an agency to withhold any memoranda, even those that contain final opinions and statements of policy, whenever the agency concluded that disclosure would not promote the “efficiency” of its operations or otherwise would not be in the “public interest.” This would leave little, if anything, to FOIA’s requirement of prompt disclosure, and would run counter to Congress’ repeated rejection of any interpretation of the FOIA which would allow an agency to withhold information on the basis of some vague “public interest” standard. H. R. Rep. No. 1497, supra, at 5, 9; S. Rep. No. 813, supra, at 3, 5, 8; EPA v. Mink, 410 U. S., at 78-80.
The FOMC argues, in the alternative, that there are several civil discovery privileges, in addition to the privileges for pre-decisional communications and an attorney’s work product, that would allow a district court to delay discovery of documents such as the Domestic Policy Directives until they are no longer operative. The Committee contends that Exemption 5 incorporates each of these privileges, and that it thus shields the Directives from a requirement of immediate disclosure.
Preliminarily, we note that it is not clear that Exemption 5 was intended to incorporate every privilege known to civil discovery. See NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U. S. 214, 254 n. 12 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). There are, to be sure, statements in our cases construing Exemption 5 that imply as much. See, e. g., Renegotiation Board v. Grumman Aircraft Corp., 421 U. S. 168, 184 (1975) (“Exemption 5 incorporates the privileges which the Government enjoys under the relevant statutory and case law in the pretrial discovery context”). Heretofore, however, this Court has recognized only two privileges in Exemption 5, and, as NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U. S., at 150-154, emphasized, both these privileges are expressly mentioned in the legislative history of that Exemption. Moreover, material that may be subject to some other discovery privilege may also be exempt from disclosure under one of the other eight exemptions of FOIA, particularly Exemptions 1, 4, 6, and 7. We hesitate to construe Exemption 5 to incorporate a civil discovery privilege that would substantially duplicate another exemption. Given that Congress specifically recognized that certain discovery privileges were incorporated into Exemption 5, and dealt with other civil discovery privileges in exemptions other than Exemption 5, a claim that a privilege other than executive privilege or the attorney privilege is covered by Exemption 5 must be viewed with caution.
The most plausible of the three privileges asserted by the FOMC is based on Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 26 (c)(7), which provides that a district court, “for good cause shown,” may-order “that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial information not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated way.” The Committee argues that the Domestic Policy Directives constitute “confidential... commercial information,” at least during the month in which they provide guidance to the Account Manager, and that they therefore would be privileged from civil discovery during this period.
The federal courts have long recognized a qualified evi-dentiary privilege for trade secrets and other confidential commercial information. See, e. g., E. I. du Pont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U. S. 100, 103 (1917); 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2212, pp. 156-157 (McNaughton rev. 1961). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide similar qualified protection for trade secrets and confidential commercial information in the civil discovery context. Federal Rule Civ. Proc. 26 (c)(7), which replaced former Rule 30 (b) in 1970, was intended in this respect to “reflec[t] existing law.” Advisory Committee’s Notes on Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 26, 28 U. S. C. App., p. 444. The Federal Rules, of course, are fully applicable to the United States as a party. See, e. g., United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U. S. 677, 681 (1958); 4 J. Moore, Federal Practice ¶26.61 [2], p. 26-263, (1976). And we see no reason why the Government could not, in an appropriate case, obtain a protective order under Rule 26 (c)(7).
To be sure, the House and Senate Reports do not provide the same unequivocal support for an Exemption 5 privilege for “confidential... commercial information” as they do for the executive and attorney work product privileges. Nevertheless, we think that the House Report, when read in conjunction with the hearings conducted by the relevant House and Senate Committees, can fairly be read as authorizing at least a limited form of Exemption 5 protection for “confidential... commercial information.”
In hearings that preceded the enactment of the FOIA, various agencies complained that the original Senate bill, which did not include the present Exemption 5, failed to provide sufficient protection for confidential commercial information and other information about Government business transactions. For example, the Department of Defense expressed concern that information relating to the purchase or sale of real estate, materials, or other property might not be protected, Hearings on S. 1160, etc., before the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 418 (1965); the General Services Administration stressed the need to avoid early disclosure of information that might prejudice the ¡Government's bargaining position in business transactions, ¡id., at 480; and the Post Office Department urged that in matters such as the negotiation of contracts, it should stand on the same footing as a private party. Hearings on H. It. 5012, etc., before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 224 (1965). Included among those expressing such criticism was the Acting General Counsel of the Department of the Treasury, who specifically referred to the Department’s concern about premature disclosure of information concerning Federal Reserve open market operations. Id., at 49.
After the hearings were completed, Congress amended the provision that ultimately became Exemption 5 to provide for nondisclosure of materials that “would not be available by law to a party... in litigation with the agency.” The House Report, echoing the Report on the original Senate bill, S. Rep. No. 1219, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 6-7, 13-14 (1964), explained that one purpose of the revised Exemption 5 was to protect internal agency deliberations and thereby ensure “full and frank exchange of opinions” within an agency. H. R. Rep. No. 1497, supra n. 15, at 10. It then added, significantly:
“Moreover, a Government agency cannot always operate effectively if it is required to disclose documents or information which it has received or generated before it completes the process of awarding a contract or issuing an order, decision or regulation. This clause is intended to exempt from disclosure this and other information and records wherever necessary without, at the same time, permitting indiscriminate administrative secrecy” (emphasis added). Ibid.
In light of the complaints registered by the agencies about premature disclosure of information relating to Government contracts, we think it is reasonable to infer that the House Report, in referring to “information... generated '[in] the process of awarding a contract,” specifically contemplated a limited privilege for confidential commercial information pertaining to such contracts.
This conclusion is reinforced by consideration of the differences between commercial information generated in the process of awarding a contract, and the type of material protected by executive privilege. The purpose of the privilege for predecisional deliberations is to insure that a decision-maker will receive the unimpeded advice of his associates. The theory is that if advice is revealed, associates may be reluctant to be candid and frank. It follows that documents shielded by executive privilege remain privileged even after the decision to which they pertain may have been effected, since disclosure at any time could inhibit the free flow of advice, including analysis, reports, and expression of opinion within the agency. The theory behind a privilege for confidential commercial information generated in the process of awarding a contract, however, is not that the flow of advice may be hampered, but that the Government will be placed at a competitive disadvantage or that the consummation of the contract may be endangered. Consequently, the rationale for protecting such information expires as soon as the contract is awarded or the offer withdrawn.
We are further convinced that recognition of an Exemption 5 privilege for confidential commercial information generated in the process of awarding a contract would not substantially duplicate any other FOIA exemption. The closest possibility is Exemption 4, which applies to “trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential.” 5 U. S. C. § 552 (b)(4). Exemption 4, however, is limited to information “obtained from a person,” that is, to information obtained outside the Government. See 5 U. S. C. §551 (2). The privilege for confidential information about Government contracts recognized by the House Report, in contrast, is necessarily confined to information generated by the Federal Government itself.
We accordingly conclude that Exemption 5 incorporates a qualified privilege for confidential commercial information, at least to the extent that this information is generated by the Government itself in the process leading up to awarding a contract.
c
The only remaining questions are whether the Domestic Policy Directives constitute confidential commercial information of the sort given qualified protection by Exemption 5, and, if so, whether they would in fact be privileged in civil discovery. Although the analogy is not exact, we think that the Domestic Policy Directives and associated tolerance ranges are substantially similar to confidential commercial information generated in the process of awarding a contract. During the month that the Directives provide guidance to the Account Manager, they are surely confidential, and the information is commercial in nature because it relates to the buying and selling of securities on the open market. Moreover, the Directive and associated tolerance ranges are generated in the course of providing ongoing direction to the Account Manager in the execution of large-scale transactions in Government securities; they are, in this sense, the Government’s buy-sell order to its broker.
Although the Domestic Policy Directives can fairly be described as containing confidential commercial information generated in the process of awarding a contract, it does not necessarily follow that they are protected against immediate disclosure in the civil discovery process. As with most evi-dentiary and discovery privileges recognized by law, “there is no absolute privilege for trade secrets and similar confidential information.” 8 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2043, p. 300 (1970); 4 J. Moore, Federal Practice ¶ 26.60 [4], p. 26-242 (1970). Cf. United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 705-707 (1974). “The courts have not given trade secrets automatic and complete immunity against disclosure, but have in each case weighed their claim to privacy against the need for disclosure. Frequently, they have been afforded a limited protection.” Advisory Committee’s Notes on Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 26, 28 U. S. C. App., p. 444; 4 J. Moore, Federal Practice ¶ 26.75, pp. 26-540 to 26-543 (1970). We are mindful that “the discovery rules can only be applied under Exemption 5 by way of rough analogies,” EPA v. Mink, 410 U. S., at 86, and, in particular, that the individual FOIA applicant’s need for information is not to be taken into account in determining whether materials are exempt under Exemption 5. Ibid.; NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U. S., at 149 n. 16. Nevertheless, the sensitivity of the commercial secrets involved, and the harm that would be inflicted upon the Government by premature disclosure, should continue to serve as relevant criteria in determining the applicability of this Exemption 5 privilege. Accordingly, we think that if the Domestic Policy Directives contain sensitive information not otherwise available, and if immediate release of these Directives would significantly harm the Government’s monetary functions or commercial interests, then a slight delay in the publication of the Directives, such as that authorized by 12 CFR § 271.5, would be permitted under Exemption 5.
Here, the District Court made no fiñdings about the impact of immediate disclosure of the Domestic Policy Directives and tolerance ranges. The Committee submitted unanswered affidavits purporting to show that prompt disclosure of this information would interfere with the orderly execution of the FOMC’s monetary policies, and would give unfair advantage to large investors. In this Court, the EOMC has sought to supplement those affidavits by arguing, for the first time, that immediate release of the Domestic Policy Directives would jeopardize the Government’s commercial interests by imposing substantial additional borrowing costs on the United States Treasury. Respondent has sought, again for the first time, to show that there is substantial disagreement among experts about the impact of prompt disclosure of the Directives, and that some experts actually believe prompt disclosure would have a beneficial effect. Brief for Respondent 33-46.
Under the circumstances, we do not consider whether, or to what extent, the Domestic Policy Directives would in fact be afforded protection in civil discovery. That determination must await the development of a proper record. If the District Court on remand concludes that the Directives would be afforded protection, then it should also consider whether the operative portions of the Domestic Policy Directives can feasibly be segregated from the purely descriptive materials therein, and the latter made subject to disclosure or publication without delay. See EPA v. Mink, 410 U. S., at 91.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
The regulation provides:
Ҥ271.5 Deferment of availability of certain information.
“(a) Deferred availability of information. In some instances, certain types of information of the Committee are not published in the Federal Register or made available for public inspection or copying until after such period of time as the Committee may determine to be reasonably necessary to avoid the effects described in paragraph (b) of this section or as may otherwise be necessary to prevent impairment of the effective discharge of the Committee’s statutory responsibilities.
“(b) Reasons for deferment of availability. Publication of, or access to, certain information of the Committee may be deferred because earlier disclosure of such information would:
“(1) Interfere with the orderly execution of policies adopted by the Committee in the performance of its statutory functions;
“(2) Permit speculators and others to gain unfair profits or to obtain advantages by speculative trading in securities, foreign exchange, or otherwise;
“(3) Result in unnecessary or unwarranted disturbances in the securities market;
“(4) Make open market operations more costly;
“(5) Interfere with the orderly execution of the objectives or policies of other Government agencies concerned with domestic or foreign economic or fiscal matters; or
“(6) Interfere with, or impair the effectiveness of, financial transactions with foreign banks, bankers, or countries that may influence the flow of gold and of dollar balances to or from foreign countries.”
App. 46, 55. See generally Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, The Federal Reserve System, Purposes and Functions 14r-15, 49-67 (1974).
Other major economic tools employed by the Federal Reserve System include the setting of reserve requirements for commercial banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System, and the determination of the discount rate for borrowing by member banks. App. 46, 56.
Under the Federal Reserve Board’s Regulation D, 12 CFR Pt. 204 (1978), member banks are required to hold reserves in a prescribed ratio to deposits. Member banks typically respond to an increase in available reserves (or to a reduction in the required reserve-to-deposit ratio) by either making new loans and investments, or by selling their excess reserves to other member banks that can take advantage of these reserves because of particular lending or investment opportunities. App. 47.
The Committee is composed of the seven members of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and five representatives of the Federal Reserve banks. 12 U. S. C. § 263 (a).
The tolerance ranges for the growth of the money supply are stated in terms of “Mi,” defined as currency in circulation plus demand deposits held by the public in commercial banks, and “M2,” defined as “M-l” plus time and savings deposits, other than large negotiable certificates of deposit, held in commercial banks. App. 81. The federal funds rate is the rate at which commercial banks are willing to lend or borrow immediately available reserves on an overnight basis. Id., at 78. As such, it is particularly sensitive to changes in the availability of reserves. The Committee’s use of these concepts, expressed in terms of tolerance ranges, is illustrated by the operative language of the Domestic Policy Directive adopted at the October 17, 1978, meeting of the FOMC:
“Early in the period before the next regular meeting, System open market operations shall be directed at attaining a weekly-average Federal funds rate slightly above the current level. Subsequently, operations shall be directed at maintaining the weekly-average Federal funds rate within the range of 8% to 9% per cent. In deciding on the specific objective for the Federal funds rate the Manager shall be guided mainly by a range of tolerance for growth in M-2 over the October-November period of 5% to 9% per cent, provided that growth of M-1 over that period does not exceed an annual rate of 6% per cent.” 64 Fed. Res. Bull. 947, 956, (1978).
Prior to February 1977, the Domestic Policy Directives did not include specific tolerance ranges for the growth in money supply and the federal funds rate. Instead, the operative language of the Directives contained such general phrases as “the Committee seeks to achieve some easing in bank reserve and money market conditions, provided that the monetary aggregates do not appear to be growing excessively”; “the Committee seeks to achieve bank reserve and money market conditions consistent with more rapid growth in monetary aggregates over the months ahead than has occurred in recent months”; or “the Committee seeks to achieve bank reserve and money market conditions consistent with moderate growth in monetary aggregates over the months ahead.” App. 82-83. The record' does not indicate in what manner the tolerance ranges were communicated to the Account Manager during this period.
After February 1977, the operative language of the Directives began to incorporate specific tolerance ranges of the form set forth in n. 5, supra. The record contains no explanation as to why the FOMC began including the tolerance ranges in the Directives at that time. Nor is there any explanation in the Record of Policy Actions issued after the February meeting. 63 Fed. Res. Bull. 380-394 -(1977).
Prior to 1967, the Records of Policy Actions were published only in the Federal Reserve Board’s Annual Report to Congress. See Committee’s Press Release, Mar. 24, 1975, App. 59; 413 F. Supp. 494, 504 (DC 1976). In response to the passage of the Freedom of Information Act in that year, the FOMC instituted a policy of releasing the Record of Policy Actions, including the Domestic Policy Directive, 90 days after the Directive was adopted by the Commission. Ibid. On March 21, 1975, just before the instant lawsuit was filed, the period of delay was shortened to 45 days. 40 Fed. Reg. 13204 (1975). The present policy was adopted on May 24, 1976. 41 Fed. Reg. 22261 (1976).
Because the Record of Policy Actions is not completed and formally adopted until the meeting after the meeting to which it applies, respondent apparently conceded in the Court of Appeals that the Committee’s present guidelines for release of that document are consistent with the FOIA. See 184 U. S. App. D. C. 203, 207, 565 F. 2d 778, 782 (1977).
Respondent also requested the Memoranda of Discussion for the January 1975 and February 197
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
E
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted, the judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals of New York for further consideration in light of Waller v. Florida, 397 U. S. 387.
Mr. Justice Black is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted and the judgmeht reversed on the ground that the state prosecution is barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Stevens
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The President has directed the Coast Guard to intercept vessels illegally transporting passengers from Haiti to the United States and to return those passengers to Haiti without first determining whether they may qualify as refugees. The question presented in this case is whether such forced repatriation, “authorized to be undertaken only beyond the territorial sea of the United States,” violates § 243(h)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA or Act). We hold that neither § 243(h) nor Article 33 of the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees applies to action taken by the Coast Guard on the high seas.
I
Aliens residing illegally in the United States are subject to deportation after a formal hearing. Aliens arriving at the border, or those who are temporarily paroled into the country, are subject to an exclusion hearing, the less formal process by which they, too, may eventually be removed from the United States. In either a deportation or exclusion proceeding the alien may seek asylum as a political refugee for whom removal to a particular country may threaten his life or freedom. Requests that the Attorney General grant asylum or withhold deportation to a particular country are typically, but not necessarily, advanced as parallel claims in either a deportation or an exclusion proceeding. When an alien proves that he is a “refugee,” the Attorney General has discretion to grant him asylum pursuant to § 208 of the Act. If the proof shows that it is more likely than not that the alien’s life or freedom would be threatened in a particular country because of his political or religious beliefs, under § 243(h) the Attorney General must not send him to that country. The INA offers these statutory protections only to aliens who reside in or have arrived at the border of the United States. For 12 years, in one form or another, the interdiction program challenged here has prevented Haitians such as respondents from reaching our shores and invoking those protections.
On September 23,1981, the United States and the Republic of Haiti entered into an agreement authorizing the United States Coast Guard to intercept vessels engaged in the illegal transportation of undocumented aliens to our shores. While the parties agreed to prosecute “illegal traffickers,” the Haitian Government also guaranteed that its repatriated citizens would not be punished for their illegal departure. The agreement also established that the United States Government would not return any passengers “whom the United States authorities determine^] to qualify for refugee status.” App. 382.
On September 29,1981, President Reagan issued a proclamation in which he characterized “the continuing illegal migration by sea of large numbers of undocumented aliens into the southeastern United States” as “a serious national problem detrimental to the interests of the United States.” Presidential Proclamation No. 4865, 3 CFR 50-51 (1981-1983 Comp.). He therefore suspended the entry of undocumented aliens from the high seas and ordered the Coast Guard to intercept vessels carrying such aliens and to return them to their point of origin. His Executive Order expressly “provided, however, that no person who is a refugee will be returned without his consent.” Exec. Order No. 12324, 3 CFR § 2(c)(3), p. 181 (1981-1983 Comp.).
In the ensuing decade, the Coast Guard interdicted approximately 25,000 Haitian migrants. After interviews conducted on board Coast Guard cutters, aliens who were identified as economic migrants were “screened out” and promptly repatriated. Those who made a credible showing of political refugee status were “screened in” and transported to the United States to file formal applications for asylum. App. 231.
On September 30, 1991, a group of military leaders displaced the government of Jean Bertrand Aristide, the first democratically elected president in Haitian history. As the District Court stated in an uncontested finding of fact, since the military coup “hundreds of Haitians have been killed, tortured, detained without a warrant, or subjected to violence and the destruction of their property because of their political beliefs. Thousands have been forced into hiding.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 144a. Following the coup the Coast Guard suspended repatriations for a period of several weeks, and the United States imposed economic sanctions on Haiti.
On November 18,1991, the Coast Guard announced that it would resume the program of interdiction and forced repatriation. The following day, the Haitian Refugee Center, Inc., representing a class of interdicted Haitians, filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida alleging that the Government had failed to establish and implement adequate procedures to protect Haitians who qualified for asylum. The District Court granted temporary relief that precluded any repatriations until February 4, 1992, when a reversal on appeal in the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit and a denial of certiorari by this Court effectively terminated that litigation. See Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. v. Baker, 949 F. 2d 1109 (1991) (per curiam), cert. denied, 502 U. S. 1122 (1992).
In the meantime the Haitian exodus expanded dramatically. During the six months after October 1991, the Coast Guard interdicted over 34,000 Haitians. Because so many interdicted Haitians could not be safely processed on Coast Guard cutters, the Department of Defense established temporary facilities at the United States Naval Base in Guantanamo, Cuba, to accommodate them during the screening process. Those temporary facilities, however, had a capacity of only about 12,500 persons. In the first three weeks of May 1992, the Coast Guard intercepted 127 vessels (many of which were considered unseaworthy, overcrowded, and unsafe); those vessels carried 10,497 undocumented aliens. On May 22, 1992, the United States Navy determined that no additional migrants could safely be accommodated at Guantanamo. App. 231-233.
With both the facilities at Guantanamo and available Coast Guard cutters saturated, and with the number of Haitian emigrants in unseaworthy craft increasing (many had drowned as they attempted the trip to Florida), the Government could no longer both protect our borders and offer the Haitians even a modified screening process. It had to choose between allowing Haitians into the United States for the screening process or repatriating them without giving them any opportunity to establish their qualifications as refugees. In the judgment of the President’s advisers, the first choice not only would have defeated the original purpose of the program (controlling illegal immigration), but also would have impeded diplomatic efforts to restore democratic government in Haiti and would have posed a life-threatening danger to thousands of persons embarking on long voyages in dangerous craft. The second choice would have advanced those policies but deprived the fleeing Haitians of any screening process at a time when a significant minority of them were being screened in. See id., at 66.
On May 23, 1992, President Bush adopted the second choice. After assuming office, President Clinton decided not to modify that order; it remains in effect today. The wisdom of the policy choices made by Presidents Reagan, Bush, and Clinton is not a matter for our consideration. We must decide only whether Executive Order No. 12807, 57 Fed. Reg. 23133 (1992), which reflects and implements those choices, is consistent with § 243(h) of the INA.
II
Respondents filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York on March 18, 1992 — before the promulgation of Executive Order No. 12807. The plaintiffs include organizations that represent interdicted Haitians as well as Haitians who were then being detained at Guantanamo. They sued the Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Attorney General, the Secretary of State, the Commandant of the Coast Guard, and the Commander of the Guantanamo Naval Base, complaining that the screening procedures provided on Coast Guard cutters and at Guantanamo did not adequately protect their statutory and treaty rights to apply for refugee status and avoid repatriation to Haiti.
They alleged that the September 1991 coup had “triggered a continuing widely publicized reign of terror in Haiti”; that over 1,500 Haitians were believed to “have been killed or subjected to violence and destruction of their property because of their political beliefs and affiliations”; and that thousands of Haitian refugees “have set out in small boats that are often overloaded, unseaworthy, lacking basic safety equipment, and operated by inexperienced persons, braving the hazards of a prolonged journey over high seas in search of safety and freedom.” App. 24.
In April, the District Court granted the plaintiffs a preliminary injunction requiring defendants to give Haitians on Guantanamo access to counsel for the screening process. We stayed that order on April 22, 1992, 503 U. S. 1000, and, while the defendants’ appeal from it was pending, the President issued the Executive Order now under attack. Plaintiffs then applied for a temporary restraining order to enjoin implementation of the Executive Order. They contended that it violated § 243(h) of the Act and Article 33 of the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. The District Court denied the application because it concluded that § 243(h) is “unavailable as a source of relief for Haitian aliens in international waters,” and that such a statutory provision was necessary because the Protocol’s provisions are not “self-executing.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 166a-168a.
The Court of Appeals reversed. Haitian Centers Council, Inc. v. McNary, 969 F. 2d 1350 (CA2 1992). After concluding that the decision of the Eleventh Circuit in Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. v. Baker, 953 F. 2d 1498 (1992), did not bar its consideration of the issue, the court held that § 243(h)(1) does not apply only to aliens within the United States. The court found its conclusion mandated by both the broad definition of the term “alien” in § 101(a)(3) and the plain language of § 243(h), from which the 1980 amendment had removed the words “within the United States.” The court reasoned that the text of the statute defeated the Eleventh Circuit’s reliance on the placement of § 243(h)(1) in Part V of the INA (titled “Deportation; Adjustment of Status”) as evidence that it applied only to aliens in the United States. Moreover, the Court of Appeals rejected the Government’s suggestion that since § 243(h) restricted actions of the Attorney General only, it did not limit the President’s power to order the Coast Guard to repatriate undocumented aliens intercepted on the high seas.
Nor did the Court of Appeals accept the Government’s reliance on Article 33 of the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. It recognized that the 1980 amendment to the INA had been intended to conform our statutory law to the provisions of the Convention, but it read Article 33.1’s prohibition against return, like the statute’s, “plainly” to cover “all refugees, regardless of location.” 969 F. 2d, at 1362. This reading was supported by the “object and purpose” not only of that Article but also of the Convention as a whole. While the Court of Appeals recognized that the negotiating history of the Convention disclosed that the representatives of at least six countries construed the Article more narrowly, it thought that those views might have represented a dissenting position and that, in any event, it would “turn statutory construction on its head” to allow ambiguous legislative history to outweigh the Convention’s plain text. Id., at 1366.
The Second Circuit’s decision conflicted with the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Haitian Refugee Center v. Baker, 953 F. 2d 1498 (1992), and with the opinion expressed by Judge Edwards in Haitian Refugee Center v. Gracey, 257 U. S. App. D. C. 367, 410-414, 809 F. 2d 794, 837-841 (1987) (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part). Because of the manifest importance of the issue, we granted certiorari, 506 U. S. 814 (1992).
Ill
Both parties argue that the plain language of § 243(h)(1) is dispositive. It reads as follows:
“The Attorney General shall not deport or return any alien (other than an alien described in section 1251(a)(4)(D) of this title) to a country if the Attorney General determines that such alien’s life or freedom would be threatened in such country on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U. S. C. § 1253(h)(1) (1988 ed., Supp. IV).
Respondents emphasize the words “any alien” and “return”; neither term is limited to aliens within the United States. Respondents also contend that the 1980 amendment deleting the words “within the United States” from the prior text of § 243(h), see n. 2, supra, obviously gave the statute an extraterritorial effect. This change, they further argue, was required in order to conform the statute to the text of Article 33.1 of the Convention, which they find as unambiguous as the present statutory text.
Petitioners’ response is that a fair reading of the INA as a whole demonstrates that § 243(h) does not apply to actions taken by the President or Coast Guard outside the United States; that the legislative history of the 1980 amendment supports their reading; and that both the text and the negotiating history of Article 33 of the Convention indicate that it was not intended to have any extraterritorial effect.
We shall first review the text and structure of the statute and its 1980 amendment, and then consider the text and negotiating history of the Convention.
A. The Text and Structure of the INA
Although § 243(h)(1) refers only to the Attorney General, the Court of Appeals found it “difficult to believe that the proscription of § 243(h)(1) — returning an alien to his persecutors — was forbidden if done by the attorney general but permitted if done by some other arm of the executive branch.” 969 F. 2d, at 1360. Congress “understood” that the Attorney General is the “President’s agent for dealing with immigration matters,” and would intend any reference to her to restrict similar actions of any Government official. Ibid. As evidence of this understanding, the court cited 8 U. S. C. § 1103(a). That section, however, conveys to us a different message. It provides, in part:
“The Attorney General shall be charged with the administration and enforcement of this chapter and all other laws relating to the immigration and naturalization of aliens, except insofar as this chapter or such laws relate to the powers, functions, and duties conferred upon the President, the Secretary of State, the officers of the Department of State, or diplomatic or consular officers....” (Emphasis added.)
Other provisions of the Act expressly confer certain responsibilities on the Secretary of State, the President and, indeed, on certain other officers as well. The 1981 and 1992 Executive Orders expressly relied on statutory provisions that confer authority on the President to suspend the entry of “any class of aliens” or to “impose on the entry of aliens any restrictions he may deem to be appropriate.” We cannot say that the interdiction program created by the President, which the Coast Guard was ordered to enforce, usurped authority that Congress had delegated to, or implicated responsibilities that it had imposed on, the Attorney General alone.
The reference to the Attorney General in the statutory text is significant not only because that term cannot reasonably be construed to describe either the President or the Coast Guard, but also because it suggests that it applies only to the Attorney General’s normal responsibilities under the INA. The most relevant of those responsibilities for our purposes are her conduct of the deportation and exclusion hearings in which requests for asylum or for withholding of deportation under § 243(h) are ordinarily advanced. Since there is no provision in the statute for the conduct of such proceedings outside the United States, and since Part V and other provisions of the INA obviously contemplate that such proceedings would be held in the country, we cannot reasonably construe § 243(h) to limit the Attorney General’s actions in geographic areas where she has not been authorized to conduct such proceedings. Part V of the INA contains no reference to a possible extraterritorial application.
Even if Part V of the Act were not limited to strictly domestic procedures, the presumption that Acts of Congress do not ordinarily apply outside our borders would support an interpretation of § 243(h) as applying only within United States territory. See, e. g., EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U. S. 244, 248 (1991) (citing Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filarlo, 336 U. S. 281, 285 (1949)); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 585-589, and n. 4 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment); see also Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U. S. 428, 440 (1989) (“When it desires to do so, Congress knows how to place the high seas within the jurisdictional reach of a statute”). The Court of Appeals held that the presumption against extraterritoriality had “no relevance in the present context” because there was no risk that § 243(h), which can be enforced only in United States courts against the United States Attorney General, would conflict with the laws of other nations. 969 F. 2d, at 1358. We have recently held, however, that the presumption has a foundation broader than the desire to avoid conflict with the laws of other nations. Smith v. United States, 507 U. S. 197, 206-207, n. 5 (1993).
Respondents’ expansive interpretation of the word “return” raises another problem: It would make the word “deport” redundant. If “return” referred solely to the destination to which the alien is to be removed, it alone would have been sufficient to encompass aliens involved in both deportation and exclusion proceedings. And if Congress had meant to refer to all aliens who might be sent back to potential oppressors, regardless of their location, the word “deport” would have been unnecessary. By using both words, the statute implies an exclusively territorial application, in the context of both kinds of domestic immigration proceedings. The use of both words reflects the traditional division between the two kinds of aliens and the two kinds of hearings. We can reasonably conclude that Congress used the two words “deport” and “return” only to make § 243(h)’s protection available in both deportation and exclusion proceedings. Indeed, the history of the 1980 amendment confirms that conclusion.
B. The History of the Refugee Act of 1980
As enacted in 1952, § 243(h) authorized the Attorney General to withhold deportation of aliens “within the United States.” Six years later we considered the question whether it applied to an alien who had been paroled into the country while her admissibility was being determined. We held that even though she was physically present within our borders, she was not “within the United States” as those words were used in § 243(h). Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U. S. 185, 186 (1958). We explained the important distinction between “deportation” or “expulsion,” on the one hand, and “exclusion,” on the other:
“It is important to note at the outset that our immigration laws have long made a distinction between those aliens who have come to our shores seeking admission, such as petitioner, and those who are within the United States after an entry, irrespective of its legality. In the latter instance the Court has recognized additional rights and privileges not extended to those in the former category who are merely ‘on the threshold of initial entry.’ Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U. S. 206, 212 (1953). See Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U. S. 590, 596 (1953). The distinction was carefully preserved in Title II of the Immigration and Nationality Act.” Id., at 187.
Under the INA, both then and now, those seeking “admission” and trying to avoid “exclusion” were already within our territory (or at its border), but the law treated them as though they had never entered the United States at all; they were within United States territory but not “within the United States.” Those who had been admitted (or found their way in) but sought to avoid “expulsion” had the added benefit of ‘.‘deportation proceedings”; they were both within United States territory and “within the United States.” Ibid. Although the phrase “within the United States” presumed the alien’s actual presence in the United States, it had more to do with an alien’s legal status than with his location.
The 1980 amendment erased the long-maintained distinction between deportable and excludable aliens for purposes of § 243(h). By adding the word “return” and removing the words “within the United States” from § 243(h), Congress extended the statute’s protection to both types of aliens, but it did nothing to change the presumption that both types of aliens would continue to be found only within United States territory. The removal of the phrase “within the United States” cured the most obvious drawback of § 243(h): As interpreted in Leng May Ma, its protection was available only to aliens subject to deportation proceedings.
Of course, in addition to this most obvious purpose, it is possible that the 1980 amendment also removed any territorial limitation of the statute, and Congress might have intended a double-barreled result. That possibility, however, is not a substitute for the affirmative evidence of intended extraterritorial application that our cases require. Moreover, in our review of the history of the amendment, we have found no support whatsoever for that latter, alternative, purpose.
The addition of the phrase “or return” and the deletion of the phrase “within the United States” are the only relevant changes made by the 1980 amendment to § 243(h)(1), and they are fully explained by the intent to apply § 243(h) to exclusion as well as to deportation proceedings. That intent is plainly identified in the legislative history of the amendment. There is no change in the 1980 amendment, however, that could only be explained by an assumption that Congress also intended to provide for the statute’s extraterritorial application. It would have been extraordinary for Congress to make such an important change in the law without any mention of that possible effect. Not a scintilla of evidence of such an intent can be found in the legislative history.
In sum, all available evidence about the meaning of § 243(h) — the Government official at whom it is directed, its location in the Act, its failure to suggest any extraterritorial application, the 1980 amendment that gave it a dual reference to “deport or return,” and the relevance of that dual structure to immigration law in general — leads unerringly to the conclusion that it applies in only one context: the domestic procedures by which the Attorney General determines whether deportable and excludable aliens may remain in the United States.
IV
Although the protection afforded by § 243(h) did not apply in exclusion proceedings before 1980, other provisions of the Act did authorize relief for aliens at the border seeking protection as refugees in the United States. See INS v. Stevic, 467 U. S., at 415-416. When the United States acceded to the Protocol in 1968, therefore, the INA already offered some protection to both classes of refugees. It offered no such protection to any alien who was beyond the territorial waters of the United States, though, and we would not expect the Government to assume a burden as to those aliens without some acknowledgment of its dramatically broadened scope. Both Congress and the Executive Branch gave extensive consideration to the Protocol before ratifying it in 1968; in all of their published consideration of it there appears no mention of the possibility that the United States was assuming any extraterritorial obligations. Nevertheless, because the history of the 1980 Act does disclose a general intent to conform our law to Article 33 of the Convention, it might be argued that the extraterritorial obligations imposed by Article 33 were so clear that Congress, in acceding to the Protocol, and then in amending the statute to harmonize the two, meant to give the latter a correspondingly extraterritorial effect. Or, just as the statute might have imposed an extraterritorial obligation that the Convention does not (the argument we have just rejected), the Convention might have established an extraterritorial obligation which the statute does not; under the Supremacy Clause, that broader treaty obligation might then provide the controlling rule of law. With those possibilities in mind we shall consider both the text and negotiating history of the Convention itself.
Like the text and the history of § 243(h), the text and negotiating history of Article 33 of the United Nations Convention are both completely silent with respect to the Article’s possible application to actions taken by a country outside its own borders. Respondents argue that the Protocol’s broad remedial goals require that a nation be prevented from repatriating refugees to their potential oppressors whether or not the refugees are within that nation’s borders. In spite of the moral weight of that argument, both the text and negotiating history of Article 33 affirmatively indicate that it was not intended to have extraterritorial effect.
A. The Text of the Convention
Two aspects of Article 33’s text are persuasive. The first is the explicit reference in Article 33.2 to the country in which the alien is located; the second is the parallel use of the terms “expel or return,” the latter term explained by the French word “refouler.”
The full text of Article 33 reads as follows:
“Article 33. — Prohibition of Expulsion or Return (■refoulement’)
“1. No Contracting State shall expel or return (‘re-fouler’) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.
“2. The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country.” Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U. S. T. 6259, 6276, T. I. A. S. No. 6577 (emphasis added).
Under the second paragraph of Article 33 an alien may not claim the benefit of the first paragraph if he poses a danger to the country in which he is located. If the first paragraph did apply on the high seas, no nation could invoke the second paragraph’s exception with respect to an alien there: An alien intercepted on the high seas is in no country at all. If Article 33.1 applied extraterritorially, therefore, Article 33.2 would create an absurd anomaly: Dangerous aliens on the high seas would be entitled to the benefits of 33.1 while those residing in the country that sought to expel them would not. It is more reasonable to assume that the coverage of 33.2 was limited to those already in the country because it was understood that 33.1 obligated the signatory state only with respect to aliens within its territory.
Article 33.1 uses the words “expel or return (‘refouler’)” as an obvious parallel to the words “deport or return” in § 243(h)(1). There is no dispute that “expel” has the same meaning as “deport”; it refers to the deportation or expulsion of an alien who is already present in the host country. The dual reference identified and explained in our opinion in Leng May Ma v. Barber suggests that the term “return (‘re-fouler’)” refers to the exclusion of aliens who are merely “ ‘on the threshold of initial entry.’ ” 357 U. S., at 187 (quoting Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U. S. 206, 212 (1953)).
This suggestion — that “return” has a legal meaning narrower than its common meaning — is reinforced by the parenthetical reference to “refouler,” a French word that is not an exact synonym for the English word “return.” Indeed, neither of two respected English-French dictionaries mentions “refouler” as one of many possible French translations of “return.” Conversely, the English translations of “re-fouler” do not include the word “return.” They do, however, include words like “repulse,” “repel,” “drive back,” and even “expel.” To the extent that they are relevant, these translations imply that “return” means a defensive act of resistance or exclusion at a border rather than an act of transporting someone to a particular destination. In the context of the Convention, to “return” means to “repulse” rather than to “reinstate.”
The text of Article 33 thus fits with Judge Edwards’ understanding that “ ‘expulsion’ would refer to a ‘refugee already admitted into a country’ and that ‘return’ would refer to a. ‘refugee already within the territory but not yet resident there.’ Thus, the Protocol was not intended to govern parties’ conduct outside of their national borders.” Haitian Refugee Center v. Gracey, 257 U. S. App. D. C., at 413, 809 F. 2d, at 840 (footnotes omitted). From the time of the Convention, commentators have consistently agreed with this view.
The drafters of the Convention and the parties to the Protocol — like the drafters of § 243(h) — may not have contemplated that any nation would gather fleeing refugees and return them to the one country they had desperately sought to escape; such actions may even violate the spirit of Article 33; but a treaty cannot impose uncontemplated extraterritorial obligations on those who ratify it through no more than its general humanitarian intent. Because the text of Article 33 cannot reasonably be read to say anything at all about a nation’s actions toward aliens outside its own territory, it does not prohibit such actions.
B. The Negotiating History of the Convention
In early drafts of the Convention, what finally emerged as Article 33 was numbered 28. At a negotiating conference of plenipotentiaries held in Geneva, Switzerland, on July 11, 1951, the Swiss delegate explained his understanding that the words “expel” and “return” covered only refugees who had entered the host country. He stated:
“Mr. ZUTTER (Switzerland) said that the Swiss Federal Government saw no reason why article 28 should not be adopted as it stood; for the article was a necessary one. He thought, however, that its wording left room for various interpretations, particularly as to the meaning to be attached to the words ‘expel’ and ‘return’. In the Swiss Government’s view, the term “expulsion” applied to a refugee who had already been admitted to the territory of a country. The term ‘refoulement’, on the other hand, had a vaguer meaning; it could not, however, be applied to a refugee who had not yet entered the territory of a country. The word ‘return’, used in the English text, gave that idea exactly. Yet article 28 implied the existence of two categories of refugee: refugees who were liable to be expelled, and those who were liable to be returned. In any case, the States represented at the Conference should take a definite position with regard to the meaning to be attached to the word ‘return’. The Swiss Government considered that in the present instance the word applied solely to refugees who had already entered a country, but were not yet resident there. According to that interpretation, States were not compelled to allow large groups of persons claiming refugee status to cross its frontiers. He would be glad to know whether the States represented at the Conference accepted his interpretations of the two terms in question. If they did, Switzerland would be willing to accept article 28, which was one of the articles in respect of which States could not, under article 36 of the draft Convention, enter a reservation.” (Emphases added.)
No one expressed disagreement with the position of the Swiss delegate on that day or at the session two weeks later when Article 28 was again discussed. At that session, the delegate of the Netherlands recalled the Swiss delegate’s earlier position:
“Baron van BOETZELAER (Netherlands) recalled that at the first reading the Swiss representative had expressed the opinion that the word ‘expulsion’ related to a refugee already admitted into a country, whereas the word ‘return’ (‘refoulement’) related to a refugee already within the territory but not yet resident there. According to that interpretation, article 28 would not have involved any obligations in the possible case of mass migrations across frontiers or of attempted mass migrations.
“He wished to revert to that point, because the Netherlands Government attached very great importance to the scope of the provision now contained in article 33. The Netherlands could not accept any legal obligations in respect of large groups of refugees seeking access to its territory.
“At the first reading the representatives of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden had supported the Swiss interpretation. From conversations he had since had with other representatives, he had gathered that the general consensus of opinion was in favour of the Swiss interpretation.
“In order to dispel any possible ambiguity and to reassure his Government, he wished to have it placed on record that the Conference was in agreement with the interpretation that the possibility of mass migrations across frontiers or of attempted mass migrations was not covered by article 33.
“There being no objection, the PRESIDENT ruled that the interpretation given by the Netherlands representative should be placed on record.
“Mr. HOARE (United Kingdom) remarked that the Style Committee had considered that the word ‘return’ was the nearest equivalent in English to the French term ‘refoulement’. He assumed that the word ‘return’ as used in the English text had no wider meaning.
“The PRESIDENT suggested that in accordance with the practice followed in previous Conventions, the French word ‘refoulement’ (‘refouler’ in verbal uses) should be included in brackets and between inverted commas after the English word ‘return’ wherever the latter occurred in the text.” (Emphasis added.)
Although the significance of the President’s comment that the remarks should be “placed on record” is not entirely clear, this much cannot be denied: At one time there was a “general consensus,” and in July 1951 several delegates understood the right of non-refoulement to apply only to aliens physically present in the host country. There is no record of any later disagreement with that position. Moreover, the term “refouler” was included in the English version of the text to avoid the expressed concern about an inappropriately broad reading of the English word “return.”
Therefore, even if we believed that Executive Order No. 12807 violated the intent of some signatory states to protect all aliens, wherever they might be found, from being transported to potential oppressors, we must acknowledge that other signatory states carefully — and successfully — sought to avoid just that implication. The negotiating history, which suggests that the Convention’s limited reach resulted from a deliberate bargain, is not dispositive, but it solidly supports our reluctance to interpret Article 33 to impose obligations on
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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B
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Jackson
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Two courts below have concurred in holding three patent claims to be valid, and it is stipulated that, if valid, they have been infringed. The issue, for the resolution of which we granted certiorari, is whether they applied correct criteria of invention. We hold that they have not, and that by standards appropriate for a combination patent these claims are invalid.
Stated without artifice, the claims assert invention of a cashier’s counter equipped with a three-sided frame, or rack, with no top or bottom, which, when pushed or pulled, will move groceries deposited within it by a customer to the checking clerk and leave them there when it is pushed back to repeat the operation. It is kept on the counter by guides. That the resultant device works as claimed, speeds the customer on his way, reduces checking costs for the merchant, has been widely adopted and successfully used, appear beyond dispute.
The District Court explicitly found that each element in this device was known to prior art. “However,” it found, “the conception of a counter with an extension to receive a bottomless self-unloading tray with which to push the contents of the tray in front of the cashier was a decidedly novel feature and constitutes a new and useful combination.”
The Court of Appeals regarded this finding of invention as one of fact, sustained by substantial evidence, and affirmed it as not clearly erroneous. It identified no other new or different element to constitute invention and overcame its doubts by consideration of the need for some such device and evidence of commercial success of this one.
Since the courts below perceived invention only in an extension of the counter, we must first determine whether they were right in so doing. We think not. In the first place, the extension is not mentioned in ¿he claims, except, perhaps, by a construction too strained to be consistent with the clarity required of claims which define the boundaries of a patent monopoly. 38 Stat. 958, 35 U. S. C. § 33; United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U. S. 228; General Electric Co. v. Wabash Corp., 304 U. S. 364. In the second place, were we to treat the extension as adequately disclosed, it would not amount to an invention. We need not go so far as to say that invention never can reside in mere change of dimensions of an old device, but certainly it cannot be found in mere elongation of a merchant’s counter — a contrivance which, time out of mind, has been of whatever length suited the merchant’s needs. In the third place, if the extension itself were conceded to be a patentable improvement of the counter, and the claims were construed to include it, the patent would nevertheless be invalid for overclaiming the invention by including old elements, unless, together with its other old elements, the extension made up a new combination patentable as such. Bassick Mfg. Co. v. Hollingshead Co., 298 U. S. 415, 425; Carbice Corp. v. American Patents Development Corp., 283 U. S. 27. Thus, disallowing the only thing designated by the two courts as an invention, the question is whether the combination can survive on any other basis.- What indicia of invention should the courts seek in a case where nothing tangible is new, and invention, if it exists at all, is only in bringing old elements together?
While this Court has sustained combination patents, it never has ventured to give a precise and comprehensive definition of the test to be applied in such cases. The voluminous literature which the subject has excited discloses no such test. It is agreed that the key to patent-ability of a mechanical device that brings old factors into cooperation is presence or lack of invention. In course of time the profession came to employ the term “combination” to imply its presence and the term “aggregation” to signify its absence, thus making antonyms in legal art of words which in ordinary speech are more nearly synonyms. However useful as words of art to denote in short form that an assembly of units has failed or has met the examination for invention, their employment as tests to determine invention results in nothing but confusion. The concept of invention is inherently elusive when applied to combination of old elements. This, together with the imprecision of our language, have counselled courts and text writers to be cautious in affirmative definitions or rules on the subject.
The negative rule accrued from many litigations was condensed about as precisely as the subject permits in Lincoln Engineering Co. v. Stewart-Warner Corp., 303 U. S. 545, 549: “The mere aggregation of a number of old parts or elements which, in the aggregation, perform or produce no new or different function or operation than that theretofore performed or produced by them, is not patentable invention.” To the same end is Toledo Pressed Steel Co. v. Standard Parts, Inc., 307 U. S. 350, and Cuno Engineering Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U. S. 84. The conjunction or concert of known elements must contribute something; only when the whole in some way exceeds the sum of its parts is the accumulation of old devices patentable. Elements may, of course, especially in chemistry or electronics, take on some new quality or function from being brought into concert, but this is not a usual result of uniting elements old in mechanics. This case is wanting in any unusual or surprising consequences from the unification of the elements here concerned, and there is nothing to indicate that the lower courts scrutinized the claims in the light of this rather severe test.
Neither court below has made any finding that old elements which made up this device perform any additional or different function in the combination than they perform out of it. This counter does what a store counter always has done — it supports merchandise at a convenient height while the customer makes his purchases and the merchant his sales. The three-sided rack will draw or push goods put within it from one place to another — just what any such a rack would do on any smooth surface— and the guide rails keep it from falling or sliding off from the counter, as guide rails have ever done. Two and two have been added together, and still they make only four.
Courts should scrutinize combination patent claims with a care proportioned to the difficulty and improbability of finding invention in an assembly of old elements. The function of a patent is to add to the sum of useful knowledge. Patents cannot be sustained when, on the contrary, their effect is to subtract from former resources freely available to skilled artisans. A patent for a combination which only unites old elements with no change in their respective functions, such as is presented here, obviously withdraws what already is known into the field of its monopoly and diminishes the resources available to skillful men. This patentee has added nothing to the total stock of knowledge, but has merely brought together segments of prior art and claims them in congregation as a monopoly.
The Court of Appeals and the respondent both lean heavily on evidence that this device filled a long-felt want and has enjoyed commercial success. But commercial success without invention will not make patentability. Toledo Pressed Steel Co. v. Standard Parts, Inc., supra. The courts below concurred in finding that every element here claimed (except extension of the counter) was known to prior art. When, for the first time, those elements were put to work for the supermarket type of stores, although each performed the same mechanical function for them that it had been known to perform, they produced results more striking, perhaps, than in any previous utilization. To bring these devices together and apply them to save the time of customer and checker was a good idea, but scores of progressive ideas in business are not patentable, and we conclude on the findings below that this one was not.
It is urged, however, that concurrence of two courts below, in holding the patent claims valid, concludes this Court. A recent restatement of the “two-court rule” reads, “A court of law, such as this Court is, rather than a court for correction of errors in fact finding, cannot undertake to review concurrent findings of fact by two courts below in the absence of a very obvious and exceptional showing of error.” Graver Tank Co. v. Linde Co., 336 U. S. 271, 275. The questions of general importance considered here are not contingent upon resolving conflicting testimony, for the facts are little in dispute. We set aside no finding of fact as to invention, for none has been made except as to the extension of the counter, which cannot stand as a matter of law. The defect that we find in this judgment is that a standard of invention appears to have been used that is less exacting than that required where a combination is made up entirely of old components. It is on this ground that the judgment below is
Reversed.
Claims 4, 5, and 6 of the Turnham patent No. 2,242,408, which are involved in the controversy, read as follows:
“4. A checker’s stand including a counter of the character described, an open bottom pusher frame thereon, means to guide said frame in sliding movement so that goods placed on the end of said counter within said frame may be pushed along the counter in a group to a position adjacent the checker by movement of said frame.
“5. A cashier’s counter for cash and carry type of grocery comprising a portion spaced from the cashier’s stand and upon which the merchandise may be deposited and arranged, a bottomless three sided frame on said portion and within which the merchandise is deposited and arranged, means whereby said frame is movable on said counter from said portion to a position adjacent the cashier’s stand so that the merchandise may thus be moved as a group to a point where it may be conveniently observed, counted and registered by the cashier.
“6. A cashier’s counter for cash and carry type of grocery comprising a portion spaced from the cashier’s stand and upon which the merchandise may be deposited and arranged, a bottomless frame on said portion and within which the merchandise is deposited and arranged, means whereby said frame is movable on said counter from said portion to a position adjacent the cashier’s stand so that the merchandise may thus be moved as a group to a point where it may be conveniently observed, counted and registered by the cashier, said frame being open at the end adjacent the cashier’s stand and readily movable to be returned over said portion so as to receive the merchandise of another customer while the cashier is occupied with the previous group.”
339 U. S. 947.
Finding of Fact No. 15 of District Judge Picard, whose opinion appears at 78 F. Supp. 388.
E. g., Keystone Mfg. Co. v. Adams, 151 U. S. 139; Diamond Rubber Co. v. Consolidated Tire Co., 220 U. S. 428.
The Index to Legal Periodicals reveals no less than sixty-four articles relating to combination patents and the theory and philosophy underlying the patent laws. Among the many texts are 1 Walker on Patents (Deller’s ed. 1937); Stedman, Patents; Toulmin, Handbook of Patents; Merwin, Patentability of Inventions; Amdur, Patent Law and Practice; and 1 Roberts, Patentability and Patent Interpretation.
With respect to the word “invention,” Mr. Justice Brown said: “The truth is the word cannot be defined in such manner as to afford any substantial aid in determining whether a particular device involves an exercise of the inventive faculty or not. In a given case we may be able to say that there is present invention of a very high order. In another we can see that there is lacking that impalpable something which distinguishes invention from simple mechanical skill. Courts, adopting fixed principles as a guide, have by a process of exclusion determined that certain variations in old devices do or do not involve invention; but whether the variation relied upon in a particular case is anything more than ordinary mechanical skill is a question which cannot be answered by applying the test of any general definition.” McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U. S. 419, 427.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
H
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
Petitioners Watts and Blue were dismissed from their positions as schoolteachers in Seward, Alaska, on grounds of “immorality,” which under Alaska Statutes 1962, § 14.20.170 was defined as “conduct of the person tending to bring the individual concerned or the teaching profession into public disgrace or disrespect.” Petitioners’ dismissals were upheld by the Alaska Superior Court (Third Judicial District), and on appeal the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s decision. 395 P. 2d 372. The Alaska Supreme Court noted that “[t]he immoral conduct complained of as to the appellant Watts was his holding of private conversations with various teachers in which he solicited their support in an attempt to oust the school superintendent from his job. The allegedly immoral conduct of the appellant Blue was his making of a speech to a labor union at Seward in which he stated, We have been unable to get rid of the [school] Superintendent, so we are going to get rid of the Board/ or words to that effect.” 395 P. 2d, at 374. The Alaska Supreme Court held that this conduct “had a tendency to bring the [petitioners] . . . and the teaching profession into public disgrace or disrespect,” within the terms of the statute, 395 P. 2d, at 375, and it therefore sustained their dismissals. Petitioners contend that their dismissals for engaging in the conduct here described unconstitutionally infringe their rights to political expression guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
We need not consider petitioners’ contentions at this time, for since their petition for certiorari was filed Alaska has amended its statutes in this area. House Bill 27, adopted by the Alaska Legislature and signed by the Governor on March 31, 1965, now defines “immorality” as grounds for revocation of a teaching certificate, as “the commission of an act which, under the laws of the state, constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude.” Moreover, Alaska Statutes, Tit. 14, c. 20, have been amended by the addition of a new section which reads:
“Sec. 14.20.095. Right to Comment and Criticize Not to be Restricted. No rule or regulation of the commissioner of education, a local school board, or local school administrator may restrict or modify the right of a teacher to engage in comment and criticism outside school hours, relative to school administrators, members of the governing body of any school or school district, any other public official, or any school employee, to the same extent that any private individual may exercise the right.”
This Court has held that supervening changes in state law that may be relevant to the disposition of a case may require that the cause be remanded for appropriate action by the state court. See, e. g., Missouri ex rel. Wabash R. Co. v. Public Service Comm’n, 273 U. S. 126, 131. Cf. Trunkline Gas Co. v. Hardin County, 375 U. S. 8, Accordingly, it is appropriate to allow the Alaska court to consider the effect of the new Alaska statutes upon this case. To that end, the petition for certiorari is granted, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Alaska is vacated, and this case is remanded to that court for such further consideration as may be deemed appropriate by that court under Alaska law.
Vacated and remanded.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
I
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Blackmun
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents an issue of state-court venue of a transitory cause of action against a national bank. The .suit Was filed in the state court of the county of the branch and not in the court of the different county specified in the bank’s charter.
The governing statute is Rev. Stat. § 5198, 12 U. S. C. § 94:
“Actions and proceedings against any association under this chapter may be had in any district or Territorial court of the United States held within the district in which such association may be established, or in any State, county, or municipal court in the county or city in which said association is located having jurisdiction in similar cases.”
The dispute obviously centers in the word “located” as it is employed in the statute.
I
Petitioner Citizens and Southern National Bank is a national banking association. It received its charter from the Comptroller of the Currency on May 2, 1927. The “place where its operations . . . are to be carried on,” is described in that charter as the “City of Savannah, in the County of Chatham and State of Georgia.” App. 13. For some time now, however, the bank has done business not only at Savannah but also at branches, authorized under 12 U. S. C. § 36, in other Georgia counties. Tr. of Oral Arg. 4. One of these branches is at Decatur in De Kalb County. See United States v. Citizens & Southern Nat. Bank, 422 U. S. 86, 92 n. 4, 94 (1975). De Kalb County adjoins Fulton County; the city of Atlanta lies in both.
In late June 1975 respondent Bougas sued petitioner bank. His complaint was filed in the state court of De Kalb County. He sought actual and punitive damages for an alleged conversion of a $25,000 savings certificate issued to respondent and deposited by him as collateral for his son’s note on which respondent had signed as surety.
The bank accompanied its answer to the complaint with a motion to dismiss respondent’s suit “on the grounds of improper venue and lack of jurisdiction over Defendant.” App. 9. It asserted that a national bank may be sued in a state court only “in the county in which its charter was issued,” that is, for petitioner, only in Chatham County. Ibid. The De Kalb County Court denied that motion. App. to Pet. for Cert. A5. The Georgia Court of Appeals granted the bank’s application for interlocutory appeal, but in due course affirmed. 138 Ga. App. 706, 227 S. E. 2d 434 (1976). We granted certiorari, 429 U. S. 1071 (1977), in order to resolve an apparent conflict, hereinafter noted, among state courts in their construction of the word “located” in 12 U. S. C. § 94, when a defendant national bank is conducting banking business at an authorized branch outside its charter county.
Two issues are suggested by the parties: (1) Where is a national bank “located,” within the meaning of § 94, for purposes of a transitory action brought in a state court, when it conducts banking business at an authorized branch outside its charter county? (2) In any event, does its conduct of banking business at the branch constitute a waiver, actual or presumptive, of any venue restriction § 94 otherwise imposes? We decide the case adversely to the bank on the first issue and do not reach the question of waiver.
II
This Court has had prior occasion to consider § 94. It is now settled that the statute’s provision concerning venue in state courts, despite the presence of what might be regarded as permissive language, “is not permissive, but mandatory, and, therefore, 'that national banks may be sued only in those state courts in the county where the banks are located.’ ” National Bank v. Associates of Obstetrics, 425 U. S. 460, 461 (1976), quoting Mercantile Nat. Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U. S. 555, 561 (1963). See Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U. S. 148, 152 (1976); Cope v. Anderson, 331 U. S. 461, 467 (1947). The venue provision, however, has been held to be a privilege personal to the bank, and to be subject to waiver. Charlotte Nat. Bank v. Morgan, 132 U. S. 141, 145 (1889); Mercantile Nat. Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U. S., at 561, and n. 12.
In our view, this language of command does not in itself equate the statute’s word “located” with the county designated in the bank’s organization certificate and in its formal charter. Petitioner insists that the Court’s reference in Langdeau to the effect that a ruling that would recognize state jurisdictional and venue requirements “would render altogether meaningless a congressional enactment permitting suit to bo brought in the bank’s home county,” id., at 560, “implicitly entails the conclusion that a national bank cannot also be sued in any county wherein it operates branch banks.” Brief for Petitioner 17. This, however, overstates the language and holding in Langdeau, a case that did not concern authorized branch banking at all. Langdeau is only the starting point, not the conclusion, for the resolution of the present case.
Ill
A. The lower federal courts appear to be unanimous in holding that a national bank, under § 94, is “established” only in the federal district that encompasses the place specified in the bank’s charter. E. g., Leonardi v. Chase Nat. Bank, 81 F. 2d 19, 21-22 (CA2), cert. denied, 298 U. S. 677 (1936); Northside Iron & Metal Co. v. Dobson & Johnson, Inc., 480 F. 2d 798, 799-800 (CA5 1973). See 7A Michie, Banks and Banking, ch. 15, § 220a (4) (1973 ed.); 1 J. Moore, J. Lucas, H. Fink, D. Weckstein, & J. Wicker, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 0.144 [2.-1], p. 1473 (2d ed. 1977). This rule, however, is not without its scholarly criticism. See Steinberg, Waiver of Venue under the National Bank Act: Preferential Treatment for National Banks, 62 Iowa L. Rev. 129 (1976); Comment, Restricted Venue in Suits Against National Banks: A Procedural Anachronism, 15 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 179 (1973); Note, An Assault on the Venue Sanctuary of National Banks, 34 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 765 (1966); ALI, Study of the Division of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts 77, 412-413 (1969). See also Ronson Corp. v. Liquifin Aktiengesellschaft, 483 F. 2d 852, 855 (CA3 1973).
We are not concerned in the present case, however, with this federal aspect of venue, and we have no occasion here to review these rulings.
B. We note in the decided state cases no less than three diverse interpretations of § 94:
1. Several rulings consider the words “established” and “located” to be functionally synonymous. Absent waiver, these cases restrict a state-court action against a national bank to the place designated in the bank’s charter. E. g., Ebeling v. Continental Illinois Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 272 Cal. App. 2d 724, 726-727, 77 Cal. Rptr. 612, 614 (1969); Gregor J. Schaefer Sons, Inc. v. Watson, 26 App. Div. 2d 659, 272 N. Y. S. 2d 790, 791 (1966); Prince v. Franklin Nat. Bank, 62 Misc. 2d 855, 310 N. Y. S. 2d 390, 391 (Sup. Ct. 1970). See 7A Michie, Banks and Banking, ch. 15, § 220b (1973 ed.).
2. In contrast, other decisions hold that “established” and “located” are not synonymous. For state-court purposes, it is said, a bank may be “located” in any place where it operates and maintains a branch doing general banking business, even though, for federal-court purposes, it is “established” only at the place specified in its charter. E. g., Security Mills of Asheville, Inc. v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 281 N. C. 525, 532, 189 S. E. 2d 266, 271 (1972); Holson v. Gosnell, 264 S. C. 619, 623, 216 S. E. 2d 539, 541 (1975), cert. denied, 423 U. S. 1048 (1976); Central Bank v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. App. 3d 962, 971, 106 Cal. Rptr. 912, 918 (1973). The Georgia Court of Appeals in the present litigation so interpreted § 94. 138 Ga. App., at 709, 227 S. E. 2d, at 436.
3. Still other courts conclude that by establishing a branch in a county other than that designated in its charter, a national bank presumptively waives any venue restriction of § 94, at least as to a suit arising out of banking activity at that branch. Lapinsohn v. Lewis Charles, Inc., 212 Pa. Super. 185, 193-195, 240 A. 2d 90, 94-95, cert. denied sub nom. First Camden Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Lapinsohn, 393 U. S. 952 (1968); Security Mills of Asheville, Inc. v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., supra (alternative ground). See Vann v. First Nat. Bank, 324 So. 2d 94, 95 (Fla. App. 1975), and Exchange Nat. Bank v. Rotocast Plastics Products, Inc., 341 So. 2d 787, 789 (Fla. App. 1977).
These inconsistent approaches cannot all be appropriately interpretive of § 94. We therefore look to the legislative history to see what light it may afford.
IV
This Court reviewed that history, so far as it concerned the state-court venue provision, in Mercantile Nat. Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U. S., at 558-562. There the Court noted: (a) “Unquestionably Congress had authority to prescribe the manner and circumstances under which [national] banks could sue or be sued in the courts,” id., at 559. (b) The “roots” of the venue problem “reach back to” the National Bank Act of 1863, 12 Stat. 665. 371 U. S., at 558. (c) Section 59 of the 1863 Act, 12 Stat. 681, spoke only of suits in a federal court “within the district in which the association was established” and made no mention of suits in state courts, 371 U. S., at 559. (d) The 1863 Act was replaced shortly by the National Bank Act of 1864, 13 Stat. 99, ch. 106, which, in its § 57, “carried forward the former § 59 and also added” the provision that “ 'suits . . . may be had ... in any state, county, or municipal court in the county or city in which said association is located, having jurisdiction in similar cases,’ ” 371 U. S., at 560. (e) “Congress intended that in those courts alone could a national bank be sued against its will,” ibid. (f) Although § 57 was omitted from Title 62 (National Banks) of the Revised Statutes of 1873, Title 13 (the Judiciary) contained provisions, § 563 Fifteenth, “granting the federal courts jurisdiction over suits by and against national banks brought in the district of their residence,” 371 U. S., at 560. And (g) the Act of February 18, 1875, ch. 80, 18 Stat., pt. 3, p. 320, added to § 5198 of the Revised Statutes of 1873 “provisions substantially identical to § 57 of the 1864 Act,” and thus, “for a second time Congress specified the precise federal and state courts in which suits against national banks could be brought,” 371 U.S., at 560-561.
The conclusions drawn by the Court from Langdeau’s review of the history of § 94’s state-court venue provision were the obvious ones already noted: “[N]ational banks may be sued only in those state courts in the county where the banks are located,” 371 U. S., at 561, and “the statute must be given a mandatory reading,” id., at 562. This is not to say, however— and the Court in Langdeau did not say — that § 94’s pivotal word “located,” in a branch banking context, would mean and be restricted to the place designated in the bank’s charter. What the Court in Langdeau specifically held was that § 94 prevailed, on a plea of privilege, over a state venue statute that would have permitted suit in an outside county where a receivership proceeding for an allegedly defrauded insurance company was pending. Langdeau in no way hampers our consideration of the branch banking problem.
There can be little question, as petitioner argues, Brief for Petitioner 14, that at the time the 1864 Act was passed, the activities of a national bank were restricted to one particular location. That Act’s provisions to the effect that the organization certificate (as 12 U. S. C. § 22 also requires today) shall specifically state “the particular county and city, town, or village” of its place of operations, 13 Stat. 101, and that the bank’s “usual business shall be transacted at an office or banking house located in the place specified in its organization certificate,” 13 Stat. 102 (cf. 12 U. S. C. § 81), indicated as much. National banks (other, perhaps, than those that originally were state banks with existing branches) were not permitted to engage in branch banking until 1927, when the McFadden Act, 44 Stat., pt. 2, p. 1224, was passed; moreover, the McFadden Act allowed national banks to “establish” branches only if permitted by state law, and only “within the limits of the city, town, or village in which said association is situated,” id., at 1228. It was not until 1933 that Congress approved, upon specified conditions, national bank branches beyond the place named in the charter. 48 Stat. 189-190.
Petitioner argues that since a national bank in 1864 was permitted only one “location,” namely, that specified in the charter, “there is no statutory basis for interpreting the word ‘located’ as having multi-county reference.” Brief for Petitioner 15. It says that one may not presume “that the Congress anticipated by some sixty years the advent of multi-county branch banking and formulated its statutory language accordingly.” Ibid.
We need not travel that far analytically in determining congressional intent. It suffices to stress that Congress did not contemplate today’s national banking system, replete with branches, when it formulated the 1864 Act; that there are no sure indicators of 1864 congressional intent with respect to a banking system that did not then exist; and that prior to 1927, and, indeed, prior to 1933, Congress had no occasion whatsoever to be concerned with state-court venue other than at the place designated in the bank’s charter. Throughout this early period, the words “established” and “located” led to the same ultimate venue result.
Nevertheless, the two words are different. One must concede that a federal judicial district, which the statute associates with the word “established,” is not the same as the geographical area that delineates the jurisdiction of a state court, which the statute associates with “located.” Whatever the reason behind the distinction in the words, it does exist, and we recognize it. In fact, in Langdeau, the Court did not coalesce the two terms but said that “national banks may be sued only in those state courts in the county where the banks are located,” 371 U. S., at 561.
There is no enduring rigidity about the word “located.” What Congress was concerned with was the untoward interruption of a national bank’s business that might result from compelled production of bank records for distant litigation. Charlotte Nat. Bank v. Morgan, 132 U. S., at 145; Mercantile Nat. Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U. S., at 561-562, n. 12. That concern largely evaporates when the venue of a state-court suit coincides with the location of an authorized branch. It is also diminished by improvements in data processing and transportation.
V
Finally, we do not share petitioner’s proposition that, for still another reason, the words “established” and “located,” although different, may not have dichotomous meanings. Petitioner notes the appearance of “any” and “the” in § 94, and argues that the former suggests a potential plurality, whereas the definite article modifies nouns that are singular and denote a unique geographical status. Petitioner then asserts that from this grammatical construction of the statute it may be concluded that if Congress had intended a plurality of places where a national bank could be located, it would have substituted “any” for “the,” or at least would have employed plural nouns rather than singular ones.
This dissection of the face of the statute is possible argumentation. But petitioner does not proffer it as anything more than that. It is certainly not persuasive in itself, and our experience with the inexactitude of congressional language, an inexactitude that perhaps often is inevitable — see, for example, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976); Chemehuevi Tribe of Indians v. FPC, 420 U. S. 395 (1975) — does not convince us that much weight can be attached to the use of “any” and “the,” respectively, in § 94.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia is
Affirmed.
The word “located” appears in at least two other federal statutes concerning national banks:
Title 28 U. S. C. § 1394 provides:
“Any civil action by a national banking association to enjoin the Comptroller of the Currency, under the provisions of any Act of Congress relating to such associations, may be prosecuted in the judicial district where such association is located.”
And 28 U. S. C. § 1348 reads:
“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action commenced by the United States, or by direction of any officer thereof, against any national banking association, any civil action to wind up the affairs of any such association, and any action by a banking association established in the district for which the court is held, under chapter 2 of Title 12, to enjoin the Comptroller of the Currency, or any receiver acting under his direction, as provided by such chapter.
“All national banking associations shall, for the purposes of all other actions by or against them, be deemed citizens of the States in which they are respectively located.”
See First Nat. Bank v. Williams, 252 U. S. 504 (1920), and Herrmann v. Edwards, 238 U. S. 107 (1915), for comments upon the history of these respective statutes.
Title 12 U. S. C. § 22 reads in part:
“The persons uniting to form such an association shall, under their hands, make an organization certificate, which shall specifically state:
“Second. The place where its operations of discount and deposit are to be carried on, designating the State, Territory, or District, and the particular county and city, town, or village.”
The Supreme Court of Georgia, with one justice dissenting, denied certiorari. App. to Pet. for Cert. A8. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was also denied, with two justices dissenting. Id., at A9.
The Court long ago perceived a “local-action exception” to this rule. Casey v. Adams, 102 U. S. 66, 67-68 (1880). See National Bank v. Associates of Obstetrics, 425 U. S. 460, 461-462, n. (1976); Michigan Nat. Bank v. Robertson, 372 U. S. 591, 593 (1963). The exception, however, as Casey v. Adams itself acknowledges, 102 U. S., at 67, does not apply to an ordinary transitory action. See Mercantile Nat. Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555, 561 n. 11 (1963).
At oral argument petitioner acknowledged that Langdeau “is not determinative of the issue.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 15.
In a number of federal cases the words “established” and “located” have been regarded as essentially the same. E. g., Leonardi v. Chase Nat. Bank, 81 F. 2d 19, 21-22 (CA2), cert. denied, 298 U. S. 677 (1936); Northside Iron & Metal Co. v. Dobson & Johnson, Inc., 480 F. 2d 798, 799 (CA5 1973); Fisher v. First Nat. Bank, 538 F. 2d 1284, 1286-1287 (CA7 1976), cert. denied, 429 U. S. 1062 (1977); United States Nat. Bank v. Hill, 434 F. 2d 1019, 1020 (CA9 1970). See 7A Michie, Banks and Banking, ch. 15, §220a (4) (1973 ed.). These cases, however, necessarily were concerned with the word “established” and not with “located.” None dealt with the issue of venue of a state-court suit against a national bank in a county in which the bank was operating only a branch.
The addition was:
“That suits, actions, and proceedings against any association under this title may be had in any circuit, district, or territorial court of the United States held within the district in which such association may be established, or in any State, county, or municipal court in the county or city in which said association is located having jurisdiction in similar cases.”
See Third Nat. Bank v. Impac, Ltd., 432 U. S. 312, 316-318 (1977); id., at 325-327 (dissenting opinion).
Petitioner argues that the failure of Congress to change § 94 when it approved branch banking 'demonstrates a congressional intent to restrict venue to the charter county. Brief for Petitioner 15-16, n. 28. We do not find this argument persuasive; petitioner offers nothing to the effect that Congress even considered venue when it authorized branch banking in 1927 and 1933.
One may argue, of course, that the concern also should evaporate with respect to a federal suit at the place of the branch. That issue is not before us. In any event, as has been stated above, we have no occasion here to disturb the consistent authority relating to federal venue.
This interpretation of § 94 will not inconvenience the bank or unfairly burden it with distant litigation in violation of any congressional policy. We recognize that Congress adopts venue provisions in part for the convenience of the parties. See Olberding v. Illinois Central R. Co., 346 U. S. 338, 340 (1953) (interpreting 28 U. S. C. § 1391 (a)). Litigation of this dispute in De Kalb County inconveniences no one to any real degree. Respondent chose to file his suit there. Petitioner has established a permanent business there, taking advantage of the commerce of the community. Its attorneys have their offices in adjoining Fulton County, part of the Atlanta metropolitan area. Litigation in De Kalb County cannot be more inconvenient than litigation in Chatham County, the place of chartering, some 200 miles away.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
I
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
Petitioners seek our writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the Court of Appeals dismissing their appeal as untimely.
The facts are undisputed. Petitioners brought this action to recover the purchase price of securities alleged to have been worthless and fraudulently sold to them by respondents in violation of § 12 of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended (48 Stat. 84, 15 U. S. C. § 771), and of § 10 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (48 Stat. 891, 15 U. S. C. § 78j (b)), Respondents moved to dismiss petitioners’ first amended complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. On May 10, 1955, the District Court sustained the motion, dismissed the complaint, and granted petitioners “twenty days from this date within which to file an amended complaint.” On May 27, 1955, petitioners moved to vacate the order of May 10 dismissing the first amended complaint or, in the alternative, to extend the time to file an amended complaint. On that date (May 27, 1955) the Court overruled petitioners’ motion to vacate the order of May 10, but granted leave to petitioners to file an amended complaint within 20 days from May 27, 1955. Petitioners did not file an amended complaint. On March 25,1957, petitioners filed an instrument in the case by which they elected to stand on their first amended complaint. On that day (March 25, 1957) the Court ordered that “this cause of action be and it hereby is dismissed without costs.” On April 16, 1957, petitioners filed notice of appeal “from final judgment entered in this action on March 25, 1957.” Respondent moved in the Court of Appeals to dismiss the appeal as untimely. The Court of Appeals, holding that the order of May 27, 1955, became the District Court’s final judgment in the case when petitioners failed to file an amended complaint within the 20 days thereby allowed for that purpose, sustained the motion and dismissed the appeal of April 16, 1957, as not taken within 30 days from the entry of the judgment. 246 F. 2d 281.
We think that the District Court’s order of May 27, 1955, denying petitioners’ motion to vacate the order of May 10, 1955, but granting further leave to petitioners to amend their complaint, did not constitute the final judgment in the case. It did not direct “that all relief be denied” (Rule 58 of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure) but left the suit pending for further proceedings “either by amendment of the [complaint] or entry of a final judgment.” Missouri & Kansas Interurban R. Co. v. City of Olathe, 222 U. S. 185, 186. The situation did “not differ from an order sustaining a demurrer with leave to amend; another order of absolute dismissal after expiration of the time allowed for amendment is required to make a final disposition of the cause.” Cory Bros. & Co., Ltd., v. United States, 47 F. 2d 607. Cf. United States v. F. & M. Schaefer Brewing Co., 356 U. S. 227; Clark v. Kansas City, 172 U. S. 334; Crutcher v. Joyce, 134 F. 2d 809; Western Electric Co. v. Pacent Reproducer Corp., 37 F. 2d 14, and Riverside Oil & Rfg. Co. v. Dudley, 33 F. 2d 749.
Although to be sure nearly two years elapsed between the time petitioners were given leave to file an amended complaint and their motion of March 25, 1957, the defendants also did not, as they so easily could have done, nor did the District Court exercising power sua sponte over its own calendar, take any step to put a definitive end to the case and thereby fix an unequivocal terminal date for appealability. The undesirability of useless delays in litigation is more than offset by the hazards of confusion or misunderstanding as to the time for appeal.
It was the District Court’s order of March 25,1957, dismissing “this cause of action,” that constituted the final judgment in the case. It directed “that all relief be denied” and required “the clerk [to] enter judgment” accordingly (Rule 58). The appeal of April 16, 1957, was taken within 30 days from the date of entry of the judgment and hence was timely under 73 (a) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The writ of certiorari is granted and the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the cause is remanded to that court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
I
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
This is an appeal under 28 U. S. C. § 1253 from an order of a three-judge District Court enjoining the appellants from prosecuting the appellee on the felony charge that his motion picture projector is a “criminal instrument” under § 16.01 of the Texas Penal Code. Since no substantial question about the constitutionality of § 16.01 has been raised, we dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction in this Court.
The facts of this case are relatively simple. The ap-pellee, Richard Dexter, ran the Fiesta Theatre in San Antonio, Tex., which in June and July 1974 was exhibiting the film “Deep Throat.” On three separate occasions, an officer of the San Antonio police force paid for admission, entered the theater, and viewed the film. The officer, on each occasion, then wrote out a “Motion for Adversary Hearing” to determine whether there was probable cause to seize the film for violating the Texas obscenity laws. Each time, a magistrate held a short “hearing” in the lobby of the theater, at which he heard the testimony of the police officer, then viewed the film. Each time, the magistrate then issued a warrant to seize the film and to seize the projector as a “criminal instrument” under § 16.01 of the Texas Penal Code. Ap-pellee was then arrested and charged with “commercial obscenity” in violation of Texas Penal Code, § 43.23, and “use of a criminal instrument” in violation of § 16.01. The charge of commercial obscenity is a Class B misdemeanor, carrying a fine not to exceed $1,000, confinement not to exceed 180 days, or both. Appellee did not, according to the trial court, pursue any complaint about these charges in the federal court. He was brought to trial on these charges in the state courts and they are not in issue here. His challenge, rather, was against the prosecutor’s charging him with violations of the criminal instruments statute for his possession of ordinary 16-mm. movie projectors. Violation of that statute is a third-degree felony, and carries a penalty of from 2 to 10 years’ confinement and a fine not to exceed $5,000. Although the felony complaints were lodged and appellee was forced to post some $31,000 in bonds, these charges were never presented to the grand jury.
A “criminal instrument,” for purposes of the Texas statute, is anything “specially designed, made, or adapted for the commission of an offense.” From an examination of the “clear language of the statute” and from an examination of the unofficial “practice commentary” to the statute, the District Court concluded that “[b]y no stretch of the imagination could this statute be used to cover the plaintiff’s actions or the possession of an ordinary portable 16 millimeter motion picture projector with removable interchangeable reels.”
From its conclusion as to the obvious inapplicability of the statute, and from the prosecutor’s failure to present the charges to the grand jury, the District Court found that “[cjharging the plaintiff with a § 16.01 violation . . . cannot have been undertaken with any design to actually convict the plaintiff of the crime. .. . Such a blatant use of an inappropriate statute, which bootstrapped the misdemeanor offense into a felony was effective in requiring that bail for a felony offense be set, not once but several times. The authorities could not believe, however, that Dexter would ultimately be convicted.”
Appellants present several contentions regarding the jurisdiction of the District Court and the correctness of its decision. We do not reach these questions, however, as we have concluded that we have no jurisdiction to consider this case on direct appeal. Jurisdiction is predicated on 28 U. S. C. § 1253, granting the right of direct appeal from an order “granting an . . . injunction in any civil action . . . required by any Act of Congress to be heard and determined by a district court of three judges.” Title 28 U. S. C. § 2281 provides that “[a]n . . . injunction restraining the enforcement, operation or execution of any State statute by restraining the action of any officer of such State in the enforcement or execution of such statute . . . shall not be granted . . . upon the ground of the unconstitutionality of such statute unless the application therefor is heard and determined by a district court of three judges . . . .” Under this statute a three-judge court is required if “a complaint seeks to enjoin a state statute on substantial grounds of federal unconstitutionality, . . . even though nonconstitutional grounds of attack are also alleged . . . .” Florida Lime Growers v. Jacobsen, 362 U. S. 73, 85 (1960). However, in this case the District Court ruled that the actions of the appellants were not taken in the enforcement of the statute and thus no serious question about the constitutionality of the statute was presented.
As noted above, the District Court found that the felony “criminal instruments” charges were made in bad faith and without any design actually to convict ap-pellee on those charges. Rather, the felony charges were made as part of a pattern of harassment by the San Antonio police designed to force appellee to stop exhibiting “Deep Throat.” But the arrests and the charges were not made in any attempt to enforce § 16.01. Nor was the injunction granted on the ground that § 16.01 was unconstitutional; rather, it was granted on the ground that the local officials had acted unconstitutionally in using that statute as a pretext for arrest and the setting of felony bonds when they knew that the statute was inapplicable and that no conviction could ever be obtained. Since no substantial question concerning the constitutionality of § 16.01 was presented to the District Court, a three-judge court was not required. Cf. Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U. S. 31 (1962).
A somewhat better argument might be made that the prosecutor’s actions were part of an effort to enforce the commercial obscenity statute, albeit in a somewhat irregular manner. However, it could not be contended that the District Court grounded its injunction in any way on the unconstitutionality of the commercial obscenity statute; the constitutionality of that statute was not even considered in this case.
Since a three-judge court was not required in this case, the appeal should have been taken to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Since the time for appeal may have passed, we vacate the judgment and remand to the District Court so that it may enter a fresh decree from which a timely appeal can, if desired, be taken. Gonzalez v. Automatic Employees Credit Union, 419 U. S. 90 (1974); Moody v. Flowers, 387 U. S. 97 (1967).
It is so ordered.
Texas Penal Code Ann. § 16.01 (1974):
“Unlawful Use of Criminal Instrument
“(a) A person commits an offense if:
“(1) he possesses a criminal instrument with intent to use it in the commission of an offense; or
“(2) with knowledge of its character and with intent to use or aid or permit another to use in the commission of an offense, he manufactures, adapts, sells, installs, or sets up a criminal instrument.
“(b) For purposes of this section, ‘criminal instrument’ means anything that is specially designed, made, or adapted for the commission of an offense.
“(c) An offense under this section is a felony of the third degree.”
Although the appellee has not moved to dismiss the appeal, this Court must take notice on its own motion where jurisdiction does not appear. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U. S. 294, 306 (1962).
There was another occasion where substantially the same events occurred, but appellee was not arrested, although a theater employee named William Walker was.
Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 12.22 (1974).
Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 12.34 (1974).
Appellants argued below that the District Attorney believed he was precluded from pursuing those charges by the restraining order issued by the federal court. However, the restraining order specifically provided that "no pending state criminal prosecutions are enjoined and the State is free to bring to trial and try any such cases.” The District Judge also informed the appellants on at least two occasions during the hearings that the restraining order did not bar the bringing of indictments on any pending charges.
See n. 1, supra.
Universal Amusement Co. v. Vance, 404 F. Supp. 33, 48, 51 (SD Tex. 1975).
Id., at 48.
Cf. Phillips v. United States, 312 U. S. 246, 252 (1941): “But an attack on lawless exercise of authority in a particular case is not an attack upon the constitutionality of a statute conferring the authority .... It is significant that the United States in its complaint did not charge the enabling acts of Oklahoma with unconstitutionality, but assailed merely the Governor’s action as exceeding the bounds of law.” This situation is, of course, to be distinguished from an attack on a statute said to be unconstitutional “as applied.” See also Ex parte Bransford, 310 U. S. 354 (1940).
We have no occasion to consider whether the District Court was correct in deciding that § 16.01 did not — and that appellants knew it did not — authorize appellants’ actions. Nor do we consider whether, having so decided, the court was empowered to grant appellee relief enjoining the State from prosecuting him on the pending felony charges purportedly filed pursuant to that section. We hold only that by having made that decision, the court removed from the case any possibility that the statute might be enjoined on the grounds of its unconstitutionality.
This ease was consolidated in the District Court with several other cases, at least some of which did bring into question the constitutionality of a state statute. Each case before this Court, however, must' be considered separately to determine whether or not this Court has jurisdiction to consider its merits.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
I
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
In this case, we are confronted with an issue similar to the one determined today in Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Water District, ante, p. 719. Appellee Toltec Watershed Improvement District was established after referendum held pursuant to Wyoming’s Watershed Improvement District Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§41-354.1 to 41-354.26 (Supp. 1971). After formation, appellee sought a right of entry onto lands owned by appellant Associated Enterprises, Inc., and leased by Johnston Fuel Liners, for the purpose of carrying out studies to determine the feasibility of constructing a dam and reservoir. When Associated Enterprises resisted, the district sought to enforce its right in state court. Arguing that the statutes authorizing the referendum violated the Equal Protection Clause since under § 41-354.9 only landowners are entitled to vote and under § 41-354.10 a watershed improvement district cannot be determined to be administratively practicable and feasible unless a majority of the votes cast, representing a majority of the acreage in the district, favor its creation, appellants maintained that the district was illegally formed. The trial court agreed that had the district been formed in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, appellants would have a good defense under state law to the asserted right of entry, but it held against them on the merits. The Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed. 490 P. 2d 1069.
Appellants urge here that the provisions entitling only landowners to vote and weighting the vote according to acreage violate the Equal Protection Clause. Like the California water storage district, the Wyoming watershed district is a governmental unit of special or limited purpose whose activities have a disproportionate effect on landowners within the district. The district's operations are conducted through projects and the land (is assessed for any benefits received. Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 41-354.17, 41-354.21, 41-354.22. Such assessments constitute a lien on the land until paid. Id., § 41-354.23.
We cannot agree with the dissent's intimation that the Wyoming Legislature has in any sense abdicated to a wealthy few the ultimate authority over land management in that State. The statute authorizing the establishment of improvement districts was enacted by a legislature in which all of the State's electors have the unquestioned right to be fairly represented. Under the act, districts may be formed only as subdivisions of soil and water conservation districts. Id., § 41-354.3. And a precondition to their formation referendum is a determination by a board of supervisors of the affected conservation district, popularly elected by both occupiers and owners of land within the district, that the watershed improvement district is both necessary and administratively practicable. Id., §§41-354.7, 41-354.8; Wyoming Conservation Districts Law, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 11-234 et seg., § 11-243 (Supp. 1971). As in Salyer, supra, we hold that the State could rationally conclude that landowners are primarily burdened and benefited by the establishment and operation of watershed districts and that it may condition the vote accordingly. The judgment appealed from is, therefore,
Affirmed.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner is a partner in a New York manufacturing firm engaged in interstate commerce, some of whose employees have been organized by a local union of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters. Petitioner was subpoenaed to appear before a New York grand jury conducting an inquiry regarding bribery of labor representatives, conspiracy and extortion, constituting crimes under state law. Petitioner, duly sworn, was asked a question concerning the union’s representation in certain wage negotiations with petitioner’s firm; he refused to answer on the ground that his answer might tend to incriminate him. The grand jury then granted petitioner immunity from prosecution, applying N. Y. Penal Law, §§ 381, 2447, which provides that one duly granted immunity
“shall not be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter or thing concerning which, in accordance with the order by competent authority, he gave answer or produced evidence, and that no such answer given or evidence produced shall be received against him upon any criminal proceeding.” § 2447 (2).
Having been thus granted immunity, petitioner was directed to answer the question. He again refused to do so on the ground of possible self-incrimination.
In a subsequent appearance before the grand jury, petitioner was asked, and was directed to answer by the foreman, fourteen other questions concerning relations and transactions between petitioner and union officials. Petitioner again invoked the privilege against self-incrimination. On application of the foreman of the grand jury, respondent Schweitzer, as judge of a New York Court of General Sessions, ordered petitioner to return to the grand jury and make answer to the questions put to him.
After further refusal to answer, petitioner was once more ordered to appear before respondent Schweitzer; when he did so, the respondent district attorney moved that petitioner be punished for contempt of court. In opposition to this application petitioner stood on his refusal to answer inasmuch as the immunity granted by the grand jury did not protect him against federal prosecution. Respondent Schweitzer adjudged petitioner in contempt of court and sentenced him to serve thirty days in jail and to pay a fine of $250. 4 Mise. 2d 449, 157 N. Y. S. 2d 820.
Petitioner applied to the Supreme Court of New York for reversal of the contempt conviction and for an order prohibiting respondents from proceeding further in the matter. He alleged that his danger of self-incrimination was attributable to the prosecutorial potentialities of § 302 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 136, 157, 29 U. S. C. § 186, making it unlawful
“for any employer to pay or deliver, or to agree to pay or deliver, any money or other thing of value to any representative of any of his employees who are employed in an industry affecting commerce” (§302 (a)),
and to the fact that the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York had “made public announcement of his intention to cooperate with the [respondent] District Attorney ... in the prosecution of criminal cases in the field of the subject matter out of which petitioner’s commitment arose.” The petition for reversal of the contempt conviction was denied by the Supreme Court; this judgment was unanimously affirmed in the Appellate Division, 2 App. Div. 2d 579, 157 N. Y. S. 2d 158, and, without opinion, by the Court of Appeals of New York, 2 N. Y. 2d 913, 141 N. E. 2d 825, which duly amended its remittitur to show that it had passed on and rejected petitioner's claim of a privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment, 2 N. Y. 2d 975, 142 N. E. 2d 649. We granted certiorari, 355 U. S. 804, to consider this constitutional question.
Petitioner does not claim that his conviction of contempt for refusal to answer questions put to him in a state proceeding deprived him of liberty or property without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; that such a claim is without merit was settled in Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78. His contention is, rather, that, because the Congress of the United States has in the exercise of its constitutional powers made certain conduct unlawful, the Fifth Amendment gives him the privilege, which he can assert against either a State or the National Government, against giving testimony that might tend to implicate him in a violation of the federal Act. Because of the momentum of adjudication whereby doctrine expands from case to case, such a claim carries dangerous implications. It may well lead to the contention that when Congress enacts a statute carrying criminal sanctions it has as a practical matter withdrawn from the States their traditional power to investigate in aid of prosecuting conventional state crimes, some facts of which may be entangled in a federal offense. To recognize such a claim would disregard the historic distribution of power as between Nation ■ and States in our federal system.
The essence of a constitutionally formulated federalism is the division of political and legal powers between two systems of government constituting a single Nation. The crucial difference between federalisms is in a wide sweep of powers conferred upon the central government with a reservation of specific powers to the constituent units as against a particularization of powers granted to the federal government with the vast range of governmental powers left to the constituent units. The difference is strikingly illustrated by the British North America Act, 1867, 30 Vict., c. 3, and the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, 1900, 63 & 64 Vict., c. 12. It is relevant to remind that our Constitution is one of particular powers given to the National Government' with the powers not so delegated reserved to the States or, in the case of limitations upon both governments, to the people. Except insofar as penal remedies may be provided by Congress under the explicit authority to “make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution” the other powers granted by Art. I, § 8, the bulk of authority to legislate on what may be compendi-ously described as criminal justice, which in other nations belongs to the central government, is under our system the responsibility of the individual States.
The choice of this form of federal arrangement was the product of a jealous concern lest federal power encroach upon the proper domain of the States and upon the rights of the people. It was the same jealous concern that led to the restrictions on the National Government expressed by the first ten amendments, colloquially known as the Bill of Rights. These provisions are deeply concerned with procedural'safeguards pertaining to criminal justice within the restricted area of federal jurisdiction. They are not restrictions upon the vast domain of the criminal law that belongs exclusively to the States. Needless to say, no statesman of his day cared more for safeguarding the liberties that were enshrined in the Bill of Rights than did James Madison. But it was his view that these liberties were already protected against federal action by the Constitution itself. “My own opinion,” he wrote to Thomas Jefferson, “has always been in favor of a bill of rights; provided it be so framed as not to imply powers not meant to be included in the enumeration. At the same time I have never thought the omission a material defect, nor been anxious to supply it even by subsequent amendment, for any other reason than that it is anxiously desired by others. I have favored it because I supposed it might be of use, and if properly executed could not be of disservice. I have not viewed it in an important light 1. Because I conceive that in a certain degree, though not in the extent argued by Mr. Wilson, the rights in question are reserved by the manner in which the federal powers are granted. ...” Plainly enough the limitations arising from the manner in which the federal powers were granted were limitations on the Federal Government, not on the States. The Bill of Rights that Madison sponsored because others anxiously desired that these limitations be made explicit patently was likewise limited to the Federal Government. If conclusive proof of this were needed, it is afforded by the fact that when Madison came to sponsor the Bill of. Rights in the House of Representatives as safeguards against the Federal Government he proposed that like safeguards against the States be placed in the United States Constitution. Congress; however, rejected such limitations upon state power.
While the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 did not change the distribution of powers between the States and the Federal Government so as to withdraw the basic interests of criminal justice from the exclusive control of the States, it did impose restrictions upon the States in the making and in the enforcement of the criminal laws. It did this insofar as the “fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions,” Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U. S. 312, 316; Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319; Malinski v. New York, 324 U. S. 401, 412-416, with 438, are implied in the comprehensive concept of due process of law. But this concept does not blur the great division of powers between the Federal Government and the individual States in the enforcement of the criminal law.
Generalities though these observations be, they bear decisively on the issue that has been tendered in this case. To yield to the contention of the petitioner would not only disregard the uniform course of decision by this Court for over a hundred years in recognizing the legal autonomy of state and federal governments. In these days of the extensive sweep of such federal statutes as the income tax law and the criminal sanctions for their evasions, investigation under state law to discover corruption and misconduct, generally, in violation of state law could easily be thwarted if a State were deprived of its power to expose such wrongdoing with a view to remedial legislation or prosecution. While corruption and generally low standards in local government may not today be as endemic as Lord Bryce reported them to be in The American Commonwealth (1888), not even the most cheerful view of the improvements that have since taken place can afford justification for blunting the power of States to ferret out, and thereby guard against, such corruption by restrictions that would reverse our whole constitutional history. To achieve these essential ends of state government the States may find it necessary, as did New York, to require full disclosure in exchange for immunity from prosecution. This cannot be denied on the claim that such state law of immunity may expose the potential witness to prosecution under federal law. See Jack v. Kansas, 199 U. S. 372. Every witness before a state grand jury investigation would feel free to block those vitally important proceedings.
In construing the Fifth Amendment and its privilege against self-incrimination, one must keep in mind its essential quality as a restraint upon compulsion of testimony by the newly organized Federal Government at which the Bill of Rights was directed, and not as a general declaration of policy against compelling testimony. It is plain that the amendment can no more be thought of as restricting action by the States than as restricting the conduct of private citizens. The sole — although deeply valuable — purpose of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is the security of the individual against the exertion of the power of the Federal Government to compel incriminating testimony with a view to enabling that same Government to convict a man out of his own mouth.
Of course the Federal Government may not take advantage of this recognition of the States’ autonomy in order to evade the Bill of Rights. If a federal officer should be a party to the compulsion of testimony by state agencies, the protection of the Fifth Amendment would come into play. Such testimony is barred in a federal prosecution, see Byars v. United States, 273 U. S. 28. Whether, in a case of such collaboration between state and federal officers, the defendant could successfully assert his privilege in the state proceeding, we need not now decide, for the record before us is barren of evidence that the State was used as an instrument of federal prosecution or investigation. Petitioner’s assertion that a federal prosecuting attorney announced his intention of cooperating with state officials in the prosecution of cases in a general field of criminal law presents a situation devoid of legal significance as a joint state and federal endeavor.
This Court with all its shifting membership has repeatedly found occasion to say that whatever inconveniences and embarrassments may be involved, they are the price we pay for our federalism, for having our people amenable to — as well as served and protected by — two governments. If a person may, through immunized self-disclosure before a law-enforcing agency of the State, facilitate to some extent his amenability to federal process, or vice versa, this too is a price to be paid for our federalism. Against it must be put what would be a greater price, that of sterilizing the power of both governments by not recognizing the autonomy of each within its proper sphere.
Judgment affirmed.
No force or validity is added to petitioner’s argument by the invocation of the Supremacy Clause, Art. VI, cl. 2, and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Whatever the applicability of the Fifth Amendment, it is in no way expanded by those two provisions. Cf. Twining v. New Jersey, supra, at 99: “[T]he exemption from compulsory self-incrimination is not a privilege or immunity of National citizenship
In 1833 Mr. Chief Justice Marshall had this to say:
“Had the framers of these amendments intended them to be limitations on the powers of the state governments, they would have imitated the framers of the original constitution, and have expressed that intention. Had congress engaged in the extraordinary occupation of improving the constitutions of the several states by affording the people additional protection from the exercise of power by their own governments in matters which concerned themselves alone, they would have declared this purpose in plain and intelligible language.
“But it is universally understood, it is a part of the history of the day, that the great revolution which established the constitution of the United States, was not effected without immense opposition. Serious fears were extensively entertained that those powers which the patriot statesmen, who then watched over the interests of our country, deemed essential to union, and to the attainment of those invaluable objects for which union was sought, might be exercised in a manner dangerous to liberty. In almost every convention by which the constitution was adopted, amendments to guard against the abuse of power were recommended. These amendments demanded security against the apprehended encroachments of the general government — not against those of the local governments.” Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243, 250.
Letter to Thomas Jefferson, Oct. 17, 1788, 14 Papers of Thomas Jefferson (Boyd ed. 1958) 16,18. Madison-went on to give the following additional reasons for his view: “2. Because there is great reason to fear that a positive declaration of some of the most essential rights could not be obtained in the requisite latitude. I am sure that the rights of conscience in particular, if submitted to public definition would be narrowed much more than they are likely ever to be by an assumed power. ... 3. Because the limited powers of the federal Government and the jealousy of the subordinate Governments, afford a security which has not existed in the case of the State Governments, and exists in no other. 4. Because experience proves the. inefficacy of a bill of rights on those occasions when its eontroul is most needed.” 14 id., at 18-19. The entire, rather long, letter merits reading. For an account of Madison’s management of the resolution that became the Bill of Rights, see Brant, James Madison: Father of the Constitution, 1787-1800, c. 21.
“Mr. MadisoN conceived this to be the most valuable amendment in the whole list. If there were any reason to restrain the Government of the United States from infringing upon these essential rights, it was equally necessary that they should be secured against the State Governments. He thought that if they provided against the one, it was as necessary to provide against the other, and was satisfied that it would be equally grateful to the people.” 1 Annals of Cong. 755 (1789).
By 1900 the applicability of the Bill of Rights to the States had been rejected in cases involving claims based on virtually every provision in the first eight Articles of Amendment. See, e. g., Article I: Permoli v. Municipality No. 1, 3 How. 589, 609 (free exercise of religion); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, 552 (right to assemble and petition the Government); Article II: United States v. Cruikshank, supra, at 553 (right to keep and bear arms); Article IV: Smith v. Maryland, 18 How. 71, 76 (no warrant except on probable cause); Spies v. Illinois, 123 U. S. 131, 166 (security against unreasonable searches and seizures); Article V: Barron v. Baltimore, note 2, supra, at 247 (taking without just compensation); Fox v. Ohio, 5 How. 410, 434 (former jeopardy); Twitchell v. Pennsylvania, 7 Wall. 321, 325-327 (deprivation of life without due process of law); Spies v. Illinois, supra, at 166 (compulsory self-incrimination); Eilenbecker v. Plymouth County, 134 U. S. 31, 34-35 (presentment or indictment by grand jury); Article VI: Twitchell v. Pennsylvania, supra, at 325-327 (right to be informed of nature and cause of accusation); Spies v. Illinois, supra, at 166 (speedy and public trial by impartial jury); In re Sawyer, 124 U. S. 200, 219 (compulsory process); Eilenbecker v. Plymouth County, supra, at 34-35 (confrontation of witnesses); Article VII: Livingston’s Lessee v. Moore, 7 Pet. 469, 551-552 (right of jury trial in civil cases); Justices v. Murray, 9 Wall. 274, 278 (re-examination of facts tried by jury) ; Article VIII: Pervear v. Massachusetts, 5 Wall. 475, 479-480 (excessive fines, cruel and unusual punishments).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Opinion of the Court by
Mr. Justice Murphy, announced by Mr. Justice Rutledge.
This case involves another impact of § 177 (a) of the Judicial Code on the power of the Court of Claims to award interest in a judgment against the United States.
The N. Y. Rayon Importing Co., Inc., (Rayon #1) and the Nyrayco Importing & Converting Corporation (Ny-rayco) were engaged in the importation of rayon yarn. Between 1925 and 1929 they paid customs duties on such importations which they claimed were erroneous. Prior to March 1, 1930, they filed protests with the Collector of Customs in accordance with applicable Tariff Act provisions, which resulted in the institution of actions in the United States Customs Court.
On March 1,1930, the N. Y. Rayon Importing Co., Inc., (Rayon #2) was incorporated for the purpose of acquiring all the assets and assuming all the liabilities of Rayon #1, Nyrayco and two other corporations in the rayon business. As a part of this reorganization, Rayon #1 was dissolved as of March 1, 1930, the New York Secretary of State issuing a certificate of dissolution on that date.
Rayon #2 was voluntarily dissolved on January 9,1931, in accordance with New York law. Nyrayco was dissolved on December 16, 1935, by proclamation for nonpayment of New York franchise taxes.
In 1937, long after these three corporations were dissolved, the Customs Court rendered decisions sustaining the protests which Rayon #1 and Nyrayco had filed in connection with the duties on rayon yarn imported between 1925 and 1929. A reliquidation of the customs entries was directed. On reliquidation, the Collector of Customs ascertained that a refund of $362,482.71 was payable to Rayon #1 and $30,809.75 to Nyrayco. Checks payable to those corporations were drawn, but since the corporations had been dissolved the Collector caused the checks to be transmitted to the General Accounting Office “for lawful disposition.” Representatives of Rayon #2 thereafter requested the General Accounting Office to deliver these checks to them; this request was denied and the Comptroller General deposited the proceeds of the checks in the Treasury in a trust fund entitled “Outstanding Liabilities 1938,” pursuant to law.
Several unsuccessful attempts were made by the representatives of the three dissolved corporations to obtain the money in the trust fund. First, a consent decree was entered in a declaratory judgment proceeding in the Supreme Court of the State of New York adjudicating that, as among the three dissolved corporations, Rayon #2 was the owner of these customs refunds or the proceeds thereof. But the General Accounting Office refused to make payment when confronted with this decree. Thereafter, on February 26, 1943, attorneys for the three dissolved corporations suggested to the Comptroller General that the money be released to Rayon #1 and Nyrayco with the consent of Rayon #2, each corporation being represented by its director or directors as trustees in liquidation. The Comptroller General rejected this proposal and stated that payment would be permitted only upon final judgment by a court of competent jurisdiction concluding the issue of ownership. He suggested that a suit be brought for this purpose in the Court of Claims.
Rayon #2 and its liquidating directors and trustees then brought this suit in the Court of Claims, claiming that Rayon #2 continued to exist for the purpose of collecting and distributing its assets and that it was the owner of the funds in issue. Rayon #1 and Nyrayco also brought suits in the Court of Claims; they claimed the amounts of their respective refunds and alleged that ownership remained in them. After consideration of all three claims, the court held that the rights of Rayon #1 and Nyrayco had been taken over by Rayon #2 and its liquidating directors and trustees, who were thus entitled to recover the amounts held in trust by the United States. 64 F. Supp. 684. As a part of its judgment, however, the Court of Claims awarded' 6% interest on the total fund, such interest to run from April 19, 1941, the date of an amendment to the New York Tax Law which retroactively clarified the capacity to sue of involuntarily dissolved corporations.
We issued a writ of certiorari in No. 94, on petition of the United States, to review the action of the Court of Claims in awarding such interest. At the same time, we issued a writ of certiorari in No. 96 on a cross-petition of Rayon #2 and its liquidating directors and trustees urging that interest should have been allowed from the time of the issuance of the refund checks in 1937 and 1938 rather than from April 19,1941.
In our opinion, § 177 (a) of the Judicial Code prohibits the award of any interest under the circumstances of this case. Section 177 (a) provides that “No interest shall be allowed on any claim up to the time of the rendition of judgment by the Court of Claims, unless upon a contract expressly stipulating for the payment of interest, . . As we recently pointed out in United States v. Thayer-West Point Hotel Co., 329 U. S. 585, this provision codifies the traditional rule regarding the immunity of the United States from liability for interest on unpaid accounts or claims. In other words, in the absence of constitutional requirements, interest can be recovered against the United States only if express consent to such a recovery has been given by Congress. And Congress has indicated in § 177 (a) that its consent can take only two forms: (1) a specific provision for the payment of interest in a statute; (2) an express stipulation for the payment of interest in a contract duly entered into by agents of the United States. Thus there can be no consent by implication or by use of ambiguous language. Nor can an intent on the part of the framers of a statute or contract to permit the recovery of interest suffice where the intent is not translated into affirmative statutory or contractual terms. The consent necessary to waive the traditional immunity must be express, and it must be strictly construed. Tillson v. United States, 100 U. S. 43; United States v. Thayer-West Point Hotel Co., supra.
Tested by those standards, the award of interest in this case cannot be sustained. There is obviously no contractual stipulation involved. And the appropriation statutes which cover the refunds here in issue contain no provision whatever for the recovery of interest. Act of May 14, 1937, 50 Stat. 137,142; Act of June 25,1938,52 Stat. 1114, 1149. The traditional immunity of the United States, as codified in § 177 (a), accordingly applies.
The Court of Claims, without making a reference to §177 (a), sought to justify its award of interest on what it thought “would be right or just.” It felt that the officials of the General Accounting Office had delayed too long in determining the ownership of the refund claims and that, at the very least, they could have suggested at an earlier date that a suit in the Court of Claims was necessary. Inasmuch as it was known since the time of the Customs Court’s decisions in 1937 that the money did not belong to the Government, the Court of Claims believed that it was only fair that the true owners get interest from the time when all defects and uncertainties were removed in New York as to the capacity of dissolved corporations to maintain suits or to be sued.
But assuming that the equities of the situation all favor the owners of the refund claims, the Court of Claims did not thereby acquire power to carve out an implied exception to the plain words of § 177 (a). Had Congress desired to permit the recovery of interest in situations where the Court of Claims felt it just or equitable, it could have so provided. The absence of such a provision is conclusive evidence that the court lacks any power of that nature. Indeed, any other conclusion would permit the Court of Claims to supply the consent which only Congress can give to the imposition of interest against the United States.
By the same token, if we assume that the officials of the General Accounting Office unreasonably delayed the determination of ownership of the funds, such action or inaction could not operate as a consent on the part of the United States. Tillson v. United States, supra. It has long been settled that officers of the United States possess no power through their actions to waive an immunity of the United States or to confer jurisdiction on a court in the absence of some express provision by Congress. Carr v. United States, 98 U. S. 433; Stanley v. Schwalby, 162 U. S. 255; Minnesota v. United States, 305 U. S. 382; United States v. Shaw, 309 U. S. 495. The same rule applies here. Only Congress can take the necessary steps to waive the immunity of the United States from liability for interest on unpaid claims. Cf. Smyth v. United States, 302 U. S. 329, 353.
The owners of the refund claims, however, seek to avoid the effect of § 177 (a) by urging that it applies only to original claims which have not previously been reduced to judgment. This proceeding, it is said, is based upon the pre-existing judgments of the Customs Court, thereby precluding the application of § 177 (a). We do not pause here to inquire into the nature and effect of the decisions rendered by the Customs Court or the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims to entertain suits based upon pre-existing judgments. It is enough to note that the traditional rule embodied in § 177 (a) is a complete one covering all types of claims, including those arising out of pre-existing judgments. As we have seen, any exception to that rule must be grounded upon an express provision in a statute or contract. It follows that any exception relating to preexisting judgments must be traced to specific language in a contract or some other statute. Section 177 (a) by itself warrants no such exception. Cf. 31 U. S. C. § 226.
In this connection, the owners of the refund claims point to the Act of March 3, 1875, as amended in 1933. That Act directs the Comptroller General to withhold payment from a judgment creditor of the United States, if such creditor is indebted in turn to the United States, until the indebtedness is satisfied. The Comptroller General is to cause suit to be brought on the Government’s cross debt if the judgment creditor denies- the indebtedness. The Act then expressly permits 6% interest to be paid to the judgment creditor for the period of the withholding if the Government fails to win its suit and to substantiate its asserted set-off. Thus to that limited extent the Act of March 3, 1875, marks an exception to the traditional rule set forth in § 177 (a). See, for example, American Potash Co. v. United States, 80 Ct. Cl. 160, 8 F. Supp. 717; Stewart & Co. v. United States, 71 Ct. Cl. 126.
But the inapplicability of that Act to the facts of this case is at once apparent. The Act relates solely to the situation where the Government asserts a set-off against a judgment creditor. No such set-off is here asserted; there is nothing more than a withholding of payment by the Government until an ascertainment of ownership. In fact, there is no real claim that the situation in the instant case can be fitted within the terms of the Act of March 3, 1875. There is merely an argument that the policy of that Act in providing for the payment of interest where the withholding results from an erroneous belief in the existence of a cross-indebtedness applies with equal force where the withholding results from an attempt to determine ownership of a claim. But the immunity of the United States from liability for interest is not to be waived by policy arguments of this nature. Courts lack the power to award interest against the United States on the basis of what they think is or is not sound policy. We reiterate that only express language in a statute or contract can justify the imposition of such interest. Such language is absent in this instance.
We accordingly reverse the judgment of the Court of Claims in No. 94 to the extent that it includes an award of interest. And since it becomes unnecessary to consider the merits of the cross-claims, the writ of certiorari previously issued in No. 96 is dismissed.
So ordered.
U.S. C. §284 (a).
Section 21 of the Act of June 26, 1934, c. 756, 48 Stat. 1235, 31 U. S. C. § 725t.
This non-adversary proceeding only affected rights as between Rayon #1 and Nyrayco, on the one hand, and Rayon #2 on the other. It provided the Government no protection as against the other possible claimants who were later impleaded and cited in the Court of Claims action. See footnote 4.
The three suits were consolidated. In all three cases, the Societé Pour Nouveaux Placements de Capitaux was impleaded as plaintiff. It filed a disclaimer of interest and the Court of Claims dismissed “all claims of interest” which it had. Several other persons and companies were named by the United States as having possible claims, but none of them asserted any claims or filed any intervening petitions; the court dismissed “all claims of interest” as to them.
April 19, 1941, was the date when the Governor of New York approved an amendment to § 203a of the New York Tax Law, removing all possible question whether corporations which had previously and involuntarily been dissolved under the New York Tax Law for non-payment of franchise taxes had the right to maintain suits. This had relevance, however, only to Nyrayco. Rayon #1 and Rayon #2 were voluntarily dissolved in accordance with § 105 of the New York Stock Corporation Law. Their right to maintain suit to collect their assets was never questioned.
Rayon #2 and its liquidating directors and trustees claim that the date of April 19, 1941, has no relevance whatever to the claim of Rayon #1. See footnote 5. And they claim that this date has no proper relation to the Nyrayco claim since the Government made no objection to Nyrayco’s capacity to sue until several years after the decisions of the Customs Court and after checks in its name had been drawn by the Government.
Act of March 3, 1875, 18 Stat. 481, as amended by the Act of March 3, 1933, c. 212, Title II, § 13, 47 Stat. 1516, 31 U. S. C. § 227. This provides:
“When any final judgment recovered against the United States duly allowed by legal authority shall be presented to the Comptroller General of the United States for payment, and the plaintiff therein shall be indebted to the United States in any manner, whether as principal or surety, it shall be the duty of the Comptroller General of the United States to withhold payment of an amount of such judgment equal to the debt thus due to the United States; and if such plaintiff assents to such set-off, and discharges his judgment or an amount thereof equal to said debt, the Comptroller General of the United States shall execute a discharge of the debt due from the plaintiff to the United States. But if such plaintiff denies his indebtedness to the United States, or refuses to consent to the set-off, then the Comptroller General of the United States shall withhold payment of such further amount of such judgment, as in his opinion will be sufficient to cover all legal charges and costs in prosecuting the debt of the United States to final judgment. And if such debt is not already in suit, it shall be the duty of the Comptroller General of the United States to cause legal proceedings to be immediately commenced to enforce the same, and to cause the same to be prosecuted to final judgment with all reasonable dispatch. And if in such action judgment shall be rendered against the United States, or the amount recovered for debt and costs shall be less than the amount so withheld as before provided, the balance shall then be paid over to such plaintiff by such Comptroller General of the United States with 6 per centum interest thereon for the time it has been withheld from the plaintiff.”
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
H
|
sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Chief Justice Burger
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented by this case is whether an arrest made in good-faith reliance on an ordinance, which at the time had not been declared unconstitutional, is valid regardless of a subsequent judicial determination of its unconstitutionality.
I
At approximately 10 p. m. on September 14, 1976, Detroit police officers on duty in a patrol car received a radio call to investigate two persons reportedly appearing to be intoxicated in an alley. When they arrived at the alley, they found respondent and a young woman. The woman was in the process of lowering her slacks. One of the officers asked what they were doing, and the woman replied that she was about to reheve herself. The officer then asked respondent for identification; respondent asserted that he was Sergeant Mash, of the Detroit Police Department; he also purported to give his badge number, but the officer was unable to hear it. When respondent again was asked for identification, he changed his answer and said either that he worked for or that he knew Sergeant Mash. Respondent did not appear to be intoxicated.
Section 39-1-52.3 of the Code of the City of Detroit provides that a police officer may stop and question an individual if he has reasonable cause to believe that the individual’s behavior warrants further investigation for criminal activity. In 1976 the Detroit Common Council amended § 39-1-52.3 to provide that it should be unlawful for any person stopped pursuant thereto to refuse to identify himself and produce evidence of his identity.
When he failed to identify himself, respondent was taken into custody for violation of § 39-1-52.3; he was searched by one of the officers who found a package of marihuana in one of respondent’s shirt pockets, and a tinfoil packet secreted inside a cigarette package in the other. The tinfoil packet subsequently was opened at the station; an analysis established that it contained phencyclidine, another controlled substance.
Respondent was charged with possession of the controlled substance phencyclidine. At the preliminary examination, he moved to suppress the evidence obtained in the search following the arrest; the trial court denied the motion. The Michigan Court of Appeals allowed an interlocutory appeal and reversed. It held that the Detroit ordinance, § 39-1-52.3, was unconstitutionally vague and concluded that since respondent had been arrested pursuant to that, ordinance, both the arrest and the search were invalid.
The court expressly rejected the contention that an arrest made in good-faith reliance on a presumptively valid ordinance is valid regardless of whether the ordinance subsequently is declared unconstitutional. Accordingly, the Michigan Court of Appeals remanded with instructions to suppress the evidence and quash the information. 80 Mich. App. 197, 262 N. W. 2d 921 (1977).
The Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. We granted certiorari, 439 U. S. 816 (1978), to review the Michigan court’s holding that evidence should be suppressed on federal constitutional grounds, although it was obtained as a result of an arrest pursuant to a presumptively valid ordinance. That holding was contrary to the holdings of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit that such arrests are valid. See United States v. Carden, 529 F. 2d 443 (1976); United States v. Kilgen, 445 F. 2d 287 (1971).
II
Respondent was not charged with or tried for violation of the Detroit ordinance. The State contends that because of the violation of the ordinance, i. e., refusal to identify himself, which respondent committed in the presence of the officers, respondent was subject to a valid arrest. The search that followed being incidental to that arrest, the State argues that it was equally valid and the drugs found should not have been suppressed. Respondent contends that since the ordinance which he was arrested for violating has been found unconstitutionally vague on its face, the arrest and search were invalid as violative of his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Accordingly, he contends the drugs found in the search were correctly suppressed.
Under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, an arresting officer may, without a warrant, search a person validly arrested. United States v. Robinson, 414 U. S. 218 (1973); Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U. S. 260 (1973). The constitutionality of a search incident to an arrest does not depend on whether there is any indication that the person arrested possesses weapons or evidence. The fact of a lawful arrest, standing alone, authorizes a search. United States v. Robinson, supra, at 235. Here the officer effected the arrest of respondent for his refusal to identify himself; contraband drugs were found as a result of the search of respondent’s person incidental to that arrest. If the arrest was valid when made, the search was valid and the illegal drugs are admissible in evidence.
Whether an officer is authorized to make an arrest ordinarily depends, in the first instance, on state law. Ker v. California, 374 U. S. 23, 37 (1963); Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 15, and n. 5 (1948). Respondent does not contend, however, that the arrest was not authorized by Michigan law. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 764.15 (1970). His sole contention is that since the arrest was for allegedly violating a Detroit ordinance later held unconstitutional, the search was likewise invalid.
Ill
It is not disputed that the Constitution permits an officer to arrest a suspect without a warrant if there is probable cause to believe that the suspect has committed or is committing an offense. Adams v. Williams, 407 U. S. 143, 148-149 (1972); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89, 91 (1964). The validity of the arrest does not depend on whether the suspect actually committed a crime; the mere fact that the suspect is later acquitted of the offense for which he is arrested is irrelevant to the validity of the arrest. We have made clear that the kinds and degree of proof and the procedural requirements necessary for a conviction are not prerequisites to a valid arrest. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 119-123 (1975); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160, 174-176 (1949).
When the officer arrested respondent, he had abundant probable cause to believe that respondent’s conduct violated the terms of the ordinance. The ordinance provides that a person commits an offense if (a) an officer has reasonable cause to believe that given behavior warrants further investigation, (b) the officer stops him, and (c) the suspect refuses to identify himself. The offense is then complete.
Respondent’s presence with a woman, in the circumstances described, in an alley at 10 p. m. was clearly, in the words of the ordinance, “behavior . . . warrant [ing] further investigation.” Respondent’s inconsistent and evasive responses to the officer’s request that he identify himself, stating first that he was Sergeant Mash of the Detroit Police Department and then that he worked for or knew Sergeant Mash, constituted a refusal by respondent to identify himself as the ordinance required. Assuming, arguendo, that a person may not constitutionally be required to answer questions put by an officer in some circumstances, the false identification violated the plain language of the Detroit ordinance.
The remaining question, then, is whether, in these circumstances, it can be said that the officer lacked probable cause to believe that the conduct he observed and the words spoken constituted a violation of law simply because he should have known the ordinance was invalid and would be judicially declared unconstitutional. The answer is clearly negative.
This Court repeatedly has explained that “probable cause” to justify an arrest means facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge that are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense. See Gerstein v. Pugh, supra, at 111; Adams v. Williams, supra, at 148; Beck v. Ohio, supra, at 91; Draper v. United States, 358 U. S. 307, 313 (1959); Brinegar v. United States, supra, at 175-176; Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 162 (1925).
On this record there was abundant probable cause to satisfy the constitutional prerequisite for an arrest. At that time, of course, there was no controlling precedent that this ordinance was or was not constitutional, and hence the conduct observed violated a presumptively valid ordinance. A prudent officer, in the course of determining whether respondent had committed an offense under all the circumstances shown by this record, should not have been required to anticipate that a court would later hold the ordinance unconstitutional.
Police are charged to enforce laws until and unless they are declared unconstitutional. The enactment of a law forecloses speculation by enforcement officers concerning its constitutionality — with the possible exception of a law so grossly and flagrantly unconstitutional that any person of reasonable prudence would be bound to see its flaws. Society would be ill-served if its police officers took it upon themselves to determine which laws are and which are not constitutionally entitled to enforcement.
In Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547 (1967), persons who had been arrested for violating a statute later declared unconstitutional by this Court sought damages for false arrest under state law and for violation of the Fourteenth Amendment under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. Mr. Chief Justice Warren speaking for the Court, in holding that police action based on a presumptively valid law was subject to a valid defense of good faith, observed: “A policeman’s lot is not so unhappy that he must choose between being charged with dereliction of duty if he does not arrest when he has probable cause, and being mulcted' in damages if he does.” 386 U. S., at 555. The Court held that “the defense of good faith and probable cause, which the Court of Appeals found available to the officers in the common-law action for false arrest and imprisonment, is also available to them in the action under § 1983.” Id., at 557. Here, the police were not required to risk “being charged with dereliction of duty if [they did] not arrest when [they had] probable cause” on the basis of the conduct observed.
IV
We have held that the exclusionary rule required suppression of evidence obtained in searches carried out pursuant to statutes, not previously declared unconstitutional, which purported to authorize the searches in question without probable cause and without a valid warrant. See, e. g., Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U. S. 465 (1979); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U. S. 266 (1973); Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 40 (1968); Berger v. New York, 388 U. S. 41 (1967). Our holding today is not inconsistent with these decisions; the statutes involved in those cases bore a different relationship to the challenged searches than did the Detroit ordinance to respondent’s arrest and search.
Those decisions involved statutes which, by their own terms, authorized searches under circumstances which did not satisfy the traditional warrant and probable-cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment. For example, in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, supra, we held invalid a search pursuant to a federal statute which authorized the Border Patrol to search any vehicle within a “reasonable distance” of the border, without a warrant or probable cause. The Attorney General, by regulation, fixed 100 miles as a “reasonable distance” from the border. 413 U. S., at 268. We held a search so distant from the point of entry was unreasonable under the Constitution. In Berger v. New York we struck down a statute authorizing searches under warrants which did not “particularly describ[e] the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized,” as required by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. 388 U. S., at 55-56.
In contrast, the ordinance here declared it a misdemeanor for one stopped for “investigation” to “refuse to identify himself” ; it did not directly authorize the arrest or search. Once respondent refused to identify himself as the presumptively valid ordinance required, the officer had probable cause to believe respondent was committing an offense in his presence, and Michigan's general arrest statute, Mich. Comp. Laws § 764.15 (1970), authorized the arrest of respondent, independent of the ordinance. The search which followed was valid because it was incidental to that arrest. The ordinance is relevant to the validity of the arrest and search only as it pertains to the “facts and circumstances” we hold constituted probable cause for arrest.
The subsequently determined invalidity of the Detroit ordinance on vagueness grounds does not undermine the validity of the arrest made for violation of that ordinance, and the evidence discovered in the search of respondent should not have been suppressed. Accordingly, the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
As amended, Code of the City of Detroit §39-1-52.3 provided:
“When a police officer has reasonable cause to believe that the behavior of an individual warrants further investigation for criminal activity, the officer may stop and question such person. It shall be unlawful for any person stopped pursuant to this section to refuse to identify himself, and to produce verifiable documents or other evidence of such identification. In the event that such person is unable to provide reasonable evidence of his true identity, the police officer may transport him to the nearest precinct in order to ascertain his identity.”
While holding the ordinance unconstitutional, the Michigan Court of Appeals construed the ordinance to make refusal to identify oneself a crime meriting arrest. 80 Mich. App. 197, 201 n. 1, 262 N. W. 2d 921, 923 n. 1 (1977).
The preamble to the amendment indicates that it was enacted in response to an emergency caused by a marked increase in crime, particularly street crime by gangs of juveniles.
The woman was arrested on a charge of disorderly conduct; she is not involved in this case.
The purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police action. No conceivable purpose of deterrence would be served by suppressing evidence which, at the time it was found on the person of the respondent, was the product of a lawful arrest and a lawful search. To deter police from enforcing a presumptively valid statute was never remotely in the contemplation of even the most zealous advocate of the exclusionary rule.
In terms of the ordinance, § 39-1-52.3 authorizes officers to detain an individual who is “unable to provide reasonable evidence of his true identity.” However, the State disclaims reliance on this provision to authorize the arrest of a person who, like respondent, “refuse [s] to identify himself.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 5.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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A
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Stevens
announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which Justice Blackmun, Justice O’Connor, and Justice Souter join.
The question presented is whether an owner’s lack of knowledge of the fact that her home had been purchased with the proceeds of illegal drug transactions constitutes a defense to a forfeiture proceeding under the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, § 511(a), 84 Stat. 1276, as amended, 21 U. S. C. § 881(a)(6).
I
On April 3, 1989, the Government filed an in rem action against the parcel of land in Rumson, New Jersey, on which respondent’s home is located. The verified complaint alleged that the property had been purchased in 1982 by respondent with funds provided by Joseph Brenna that were “the proceeds traceable to an [unlawful] exchange for a controlled substance,” App. 13, and that the property was therefore subject to seizure and forfeiture under § 881(a)(6), id., at 15.
On April 12, 1989, in an ex 'parte proceeding, the District Court determined that there was probable cause to believe the premises were subject to forfeiture, and issued a summons and warrant for arrest authorizing the United States marshal to take possession of the premises. Respondent thereafter asserted a claim to the property, was granted the right to defend the action, and filed a motion for summary judgment.
During pretrial proceedings, the following facts were established. In 1982, Joseph Brenna gave respondent approximately $240,000 to purchase the home that she and her three children have occupied ever since. Respondent is the sole owner of the property. From 1981 until their separation in 1987, she maintained an intimate personal relationship with Brenna. There is probable cause to believe that the funds used to buy the house were proceeds of illegal drug trafficking, but respondent swears that she had no knowledge of its origins.
Among the grounds advanced in support of her motion for summary judgment was the claim that she was an innocent owner under § 881(a)(6). The District Court rejected this defense for two reasons: First, it ruled that “the innocent owner defense may only be invoked by those who can demonstrate that they are bona fide purchasers for value” (emphasis in original); second, the court read the statute to offer the innocent owner defense only to persons who acquired an interest in the property before the acts giving rise to the forfeiture took place.
Respondent was allowed to take an interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1292(b). One of the controlling questions of law presented to the Court of Appeals was:
“Whether an innocent owner defense may be asserted by a person who is not a bona fide purchaser for value concerning a parcel of land where the government has established probable cause to believe that the parcel of land was purchased with monies traceable to drug proceeds.” 742 F. Supp. 189, 192 (NJ 1990).
Answering that question in the affirmative, the Court of Appeals remanded the case to the District Court to determine whether respondent was, in fact, an innocent owner. The Court of Appeals refused to limit the innocent owner defense to bona fide purchasers for value because the plain language of the statute contains no such limitation, because it read the legislative history as indicating that the term “owner” should be broadly construed, and because the difference between the text of § 881(a)(6) and the text of the criminal forfeiture statute evidenced congressional intent not to restrict the civil section in the same way.
The Court of Appeals also rejected the argument that respondent could not be an innocent owner unless she acquired the property before the drug transaction occurred. In advancing that argument the Government had relied on the “relation back” doctrine embodied in § 881(h), which provides that “[a]ll right, title, and interest in property described in subsection (a) of this section shall vest in the United States upon commission of the act giving rise to forfeiture under this section.” The court held that the relation back doctrine applied only to “property described in subsection (a)” and that the property at issue would not fit that description if respondent could establish her innocent owner defense. The court concluded that the Government’s interpretation of § 881(h) “would essentially serve to emasculate the innocent owner defense provided for in section 881(a)(6). No one ob-taming property after the occurrence of the drug transaction — including a bona fide purchase for value — would be eligible to offer an innocent owner defense on his behalf.” 937 F. 2d 98, 102 (CA3 1991).
The conflict between the decision of the Court of Appeals and decisions of the Fourth and Tenth Circuits, see In re One 1985 Nissan, 889 F. 2d 1317 (CA4 1989); Eggleston v. Colorado, 873 F. 2d 242, 245-248 (CA10 1989), led us to grant certiorari, 503 U. S. 905 (1992). We now affirm.
II
Laws providing for the official seizure and forfeiture of tangible property used in criminal activity have played an important role in the history of our country. Colonial courts regularly exercised jurisdiction to enforce English and local statutes authorizing the seizure of ships and goods used in violation of customs and revenue laws. Indeed, the misuse of the hated general warrant is often cited as an important cause of the American Revolution.
The First Congress enacted legislation authorizing the seizure and forfeiture of ships and cargos involved in customs offenses. Other statutes authorized the seizure of ships engaged in piracy. When a ship was engaged in acts of “piratical aggression,” it was subject to confiscation notwithstanding the innocence of the owner of the vessel. Later statutes involved the seizure and forfeiture of distilleries and other property used to defraud the United States of tax revenues from the sale of alcoholic beverages. See, e. g., United States v. Stowell, 133 U. S. 1, 11-12 (1890). In these cases, as in the piracy cases, the innocence of the owner of premises leased to a distiller would not defeat a decree of condemnation based on the fraudulent conduct of the lessee.
In all of these early cases the Government’s right to take possession of property stemmed from the misuse of the property itself. Indeed, until our decision in Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294 (1967), the Government had power to seize only property that “ ‘the private citizen was not permitted to possess.’ ” The holding in that case that the Fourth Amendment did not prohibit the seizure of “mere evidence” marked an important expansion of governmental power. See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U. S. 547, 577-580 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
The decision by Congress in 1978 to amend the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 1236, to authorize the seizure and forfeiture of proceeds of illegal drug transactions, see 92 Stat. 3777, also marked an important expansion of governmental power. Before that amendment, the statute had authorized forfeiture of only the illegal substances themselves and the instruments by which they were manufactured and distributed. The original forfeiture provisions of the 1970 statute had closely paralleled the early statutes used to enforce the customs laws, the piracy laws, and the revenue laws: They generally authorized the forfeiture of property used in the commission of criminal activity, and they contained no innocent owner defense. They applied to stolen goods, but they did not apply to proceeds from the sale of stolen goods. Because the statute, after its 1978 amendment, does authorize the forfeiture of such proceeds and also contains an express and novel protection for innocent owners, we approach the task of construing it with caution.
III
The Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the protection afforded to innocent owners is not limited to bona fide purchasers. The text of the statute is the strongest support for this conclusion. The statute authorizes the forfeiture of moneys exchanged for a controlled substance, and “all proceeds traceable to such an exchange,” with one unequivocal exception:
“[N]o property shall be forfeited under this paragraph, to the extent of the interest of an owner, by reason of any act or omission established by that owner to have been committed or omitted without the knowledge or consent of that owner.” 21 U. S. C. § 881(a)(6).
The term “owner” is used three times and each time it is unqualified. Such language is sufficiently unambiguous to foreclose any contention that it applies only to bona fide purchasers. Presumably that explains why the Government does not now challenge this aspect of the Court of Appeals’ ruling.
That the funds respondent used to purchase her home were a gift does not, therefore, disqualify respondent from claiming that she is an owner who had no knowledge of the alleged fact that those funds were “proceeds traceable” to illegal sales of controlled substances. Under the terms of the statute, her status would be precisely the same if, instead of having received a gift of $240,000 from Brenna, she had sold him a house for that price and used the proceeds to buy the property at issue.
IV
Although the Government does not challenge our interpretation of the statutory term “owner,” it insists that respondent is not the “owner” of a house she bought in 1982 and has lived in ever since. Indeed, it contends that she never has been the owner of this parcel of land because the statute vested ownership in the United States at the moment when the proceeds of an illegal drug transaction were used to pay the purchase price. In support of its position, the Government relies on both the text of the 1984 amendment to the statute and the common-law relation back doctrine. We conclude, however, that neither the amendment nor the common-law rule makes the Government an owner of property before forfeiture has been decreed.
In analyzing the Government’s relation back argument, it is important to remember that respondent invokes the innocent owner defense against a claim that proceeds traceable to an illegal transaction are forfeitable. The Government contends that the money that Brenna received in exchange for narcotics became Government property at the moment Brenna received it and that respondent’s house became Government property when that tainted money was used in its purchase. Because neither the money nor the house could have constituted forfeitable proceeds until after an illegal transaction occurred, the Government’s submission would effectively eliminate the innocent owner defense in almost every imaginable case in which proceeds could be forfeited. It seems unlikely that Congress would create a meaningless defense. Moreover, considering that a logical application of the Government’s submission would result in the forfeiture of property innocently acquired by persons who had been paid with illegal proceeds for providing goods or services to drug traffickers, the burden of persuading us that Congress intended such an inequitable result is especially heavy.
The Government recognizes that the 1984 amendment did not go into effect until two years after respondent acquired the property at issue in this case. It therefore relies heavily on the common-law relation back doctrine applied to in rem forfeitures. That doctrine applied the fiction that property used in violation of law was itself the wrongdoer that must be held to account for the harms it had caused. Because the property, or “res,” was treated as the wrongdoer, it was appropriate to regard it as the actual party to the in rem forfeiture proceeding. Under the relation back doctrine, a decree of forfeiture had the effect of vesting title to the offending res in the Government as of the date of its offending conduct. Because we are not aware of any common-law precedent for treating proceeds traceable to an unlawful exchange as a fictional wrongdoer subject to forfeiture, it is not entirely clear that the common-law relation back doctrine is applicable. Assuming that the doctrine does apply, however, it is nevertheless clear that under the common-law rule the fictional and retroactive vesting was not self-executing.
Chief Justice Marshall explained that forfeiture does not automatically vest title to property in the Government:
“It has been proved, that in all forfeitures accruing at common law, nothing vests in the government until some legal step shall be taken for the assertion of its right, after which, for many purposes, the doctrine of relation carries back the title to the commission of the offence.” United States v. Grundy, 3 Cranch 337, 350-351 (1806).
The same rule applied when a statute (a statute that contained no specific relation back provision) authorized the forfeiture. In a passage to which the Government has referred us, we stated our understanding of how the Government’s title to forfeited property relates back to the moment of forfeitability:
“By the settled doctrine of this court, whenever a statute enacts that upon the commission of a certain act specific property used in or connected with that act shall be forfeited, the forfeiture takes effect immediately upon the commission of the act; the right to the property then vests in the United States, although their title is not perfected until judicial condemnation; the forfeiture constitutes a statutory transfer of the right to the United States at the time the offence is committed; and the condemnation, when obtained, relates back to that time, and avoids all intermediate sales and alienations, even to purchasers in good faith.” United States v. Stowell, 133 U. S., at 16-17 (emphases added).
If the Government wins a judgment of forfeiture under the common-law rule — which applied to common-law forfeitures and to forfeitures under statutes without specific relation back provisions — the vesting of its title in the property relates back to the moment when the property became forfeit-able. Until the Government does win such a judgment, however, someone else owns the property. That person may therefore invoke any defense available to the owner of the property before the forfeiture is decreed.
In this case a statute allows respondent to prove that she is an innocent owner. And, as the Chief Justice further explained in Grundy, if a forfeiture is authorized by statute, “the rules of the common law may be dispensed with,” 3 Cranch, at 351. Congress had the opportunity to dispense with the common-law doctrine when it enacted § 881(h); as we read that subsection, however, Congress merely codified the common-law rule. Because that rule was never applied to the forfeiture of proceeds, and because the statute now contains an innocent owner defense, it may not be immediately clear that they lead to the same result.
The 1984 amendment provides:
“All right, title, and interest in property described in subsection (a) of this section shall vest in the United States upon commission of the act giving rise to forfeiture under this section.” 21 U. S. C. § 881(h).
Because proceeds traceable to illegal drug transactions are a species of “property described in subsection (a),” the Government argues that this provision has the effect of preventing such proceeds from becoming the property of anyone other than the United States. The argument fails.
Although proceeds subject to § 881(h) are “described” in the first part of subsection (a)(6), the last clause of that subsection exempts certain proceeds — proceeds owned by one unaware of their criminal source — from forfeiture. As the Senate Report on the 1984 amendment correctly observed, the amendment applies only to “property which is subject to civil forfeiture under section 881(a).” Under § 881(a)(6), the property of one who can satisfy the innocent owner defense is not subject to civil forfeiture. Because the success of any defense available under § 881(a) will necessarily determine whether § 881(h) applies, § 881(a)(6) must allow an assertion of the defense before § 881(h) applies.
Therefore, when Congress enacted this innocent owner defense, and then specifically inserted this relation back provision into the statute, it did not disturb the common-law rights of either owners of forfeitable property or the Government. The common-law rule had always allowed owners to invoke defenses made available to them before the Government’s title vested, and after title did vest, the common-law rule had always related that title back to the date of the commission of the act that made the specific property forfeit-able. Our decision denies the Government no benefits of the relation back doctrine. The Government cannot profit from the common-law doctrine of relation back until it has obtained a judgment of forfeiture. And it cannot profit from the statutory version of that doctrine in § 881(h) until respondent has had the chance to invoke and offer evidence to support the innocent owner defense under § 881(a)(6).
V
As a postscript we identify two issues that the parties have addressed, but that need not be decided.
The Government has argued that the Court of Appeals’ construction of the statute is highly implausible because it would enable a transferee of the proceeds of an illegal exchange to qualify as an innocent owner if she was unaware of the illegal transaction when it occurred but learned about it before she accepted the forfeitable proceeds. Respondent disputes this reading of the statute and argues that both legislative history and common sense suggest that the transferee’s lack of knowledge must be established as of the time the proceeds at issue are transferred. Moreover, whether or not the text of the statute is sufficiently ambiguous to justify resort to the legislative history, equitable doctrines may foreclose the assertion of an innocent owner defense by a party with guilty knowledge of the tainted character of the property. In all events, we need not resolve this issue in this case; respondent has assumed the burden of convincing the trier of fact that she had no knowledge of the alleged source of Brenna’s gift in 1982, when she received it. In its order denying respondent’s motion for summary judgment, the District Court assumed that respondent could prove what she had alleged, as did the Court of Appeals in allowing the interlocutory appeal from that order. We merely decide, as did both of those courts, whether her asserted defense was insufficient as a matter of law.
At oral argument, the Government also suggested that the statutory reference to “all proceeds traceable to such an exchange” is subject to a narrowing construction that might avoid some of the harsh consequences suggested in the various amici briefs expressing concerns about the impact of the statute on real estate titles. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 5-10, 19-25. If a house were received in exchange for a quantity of illegal substances and that house were in turn exchanged for another house, would the traceable proceeds consist of the first house, the second house, or both, with the Government having an election between the two? Questions of this character are not embraced within the issues that we granted certiorari to resolve, however, and for that reason, see Yee v. Escondido, 503 U. S. 519, 535-538 (1992), we express no opinion concerning the proper construction of that statutory term.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
The statute provides:
“The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States and no property right shall exist in them:
“(6) All moneys, negotiable instruments, securities, or other things of value furnished or intended to be furnished by any person in exchange for a controlled substance in violation of [21 U. S. C. §§ 801-904], all proceeds traceable to such an exchange, and all moneys, negotiable instruments, and securities used or intended to be used to facilitate any violation of this subchapter, except that no property shall be forfeited under this paragraph, to the extent of the interest of an owner, by reason of any act or omission established by that owner to have been committed or omitted without the knowledge or consent of that owner.”
See n. 1, supra. The complaint also alleged that the property had been used in 1986 to facilitate the distribution of proceeds of an illegal drug transaction, and was therefore subject to forfeiture pursuant to § 881(a)(7), which provides:
“The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States and no property right shall exist in them:
“(7) All real property, including any right, title, and interest (including any leasehold interest) in the whole of any lot or tract of land and any appurtenances or improvements, which is used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission of, a violation of this subchapter punishable by more than one year’s imprisonment, except that no property shall be forfeited under this paragraph, to the extent of an interest of an owner, by reason of any act or omission established by that owner to have been committed or omitted without the knowledge or consent of that owner.”
No issue concerning the Government’s claim under subparagraph (7) is presented before us.
The United States Marshals Service entered into an agreement with respondent that allows her to remain in possession of the property pending the outcome of the litigation.
“I find that the claimant cannot successfully invoke the ‘innocent owner’ defense here, because she admits that she received the proceeds to purchase the premises as a gift from Mr. Brenna. More particularly, I find that where, as here, the government has demonstrated probable cause to believe that property is traceable to proceeds from drug transactions, the innocent owner defense may only be invoked by those who can demonstrate that they are bona fide purchasers for value.” 738 F. Supp. 864, 860 (NJ 1990).
“In particular, the ‘innocent owner defense’ at issue provides that ‘no property shall be forfeited... to the extent of the interest of an owner, by reason of any act or omission... committed or omitted without the knowledge or consent of that owner.’ 21 U. S. C. §881(a)(6) (emphasis supplied). This language implies that the acts or omissions giving rise to forfeiture must be committed after the third party acquires a legitimate ownership interest in the property.” Ibid, (emphasis in original).
“Despite the appeal of this analysis, the plain language of the innocent owner provision speaks only in terms of an ‘owner’ and in no way limits the term ‘owner’ to a bona fide purchaser for value.” 937 F. 2d 98, 101 (CA3 1991).
“Furthermore, in United States v. Parcel of Real Property Known as 6109 Grubb Road, 886 F. 2d 618 (3d Cir. 1989), we determined, after reviewing the legislative history of section 881(a)(6), that ‘the term “owner” should be broadly interpreted to include any person with a recognizable legal or equitable interest in the property seized.’ Id. at 625 n. 4 (quoting 1978 U. S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 9522-23).” Id., at 101-102.
“Moreover, as the district court pointed out, the criminal forfeiture statute, section 853, is explicitly limited to bona fide purchasers for value, while in section 881 Congress omitted such limiting language. We believe that such a difference was intended by Congress.” Ibid.
“Long before the adoption of the Constitution the common law courts in the Colonies — and later in the states during the period of Confederation — were exercising jurisdiction in rem in the enforcement of forfeiture statutes. Like the Exchequer, in cases of seizure on navigable waters they exercised a jurisdiction concurrently with the courts of admiralty. But the vice-admiralty courts in the Colonies did not begin to function with any real continuity until about 1700 or shortly afterward. See Andrews, Vice-Admiralty Courts in the Colonies, in Records of the Vice-Admiralty Court of Rhode Island, 1617-1752 (ed. Towle, 1936), p. 1; Andrews, The Colonial Period of American History, vol. 4, ch. 8; Harper, The English Navigation. Laws, ch. 15; Osgood, the American Colonies in the 18th Century, vol. 1, pp. 185-222, 299-303. By that time, the jurisdiction of common law courts to condemn ships and cargoes for violation of the Navigation Acts had been firmly established, apparently without question, and was regularly exercised throughout the colonies. In general the suits were brought against the vessel or article to be condemned, were tried by jury, closely followed the procedure in Exchequer, and if successful resulted in judgments of forfeiture or condemnation with a provision for sale.” C. J. Hendry Co. v. Moore, 318 U. S. 133, 139-140 (1943) (footnotes omitted).
Writing for the Court in Stanford v. Texas, 379 U. S. 476, 481-482 (1965), Justice Stewart explained: “Vivid in the memory of the newly independent Americans were those general warrants known as writs of assistance under which officers of the Crown had so bedeviled the colonists. The hated writs of assistance had given customs officials blanket authority to search where they pleased for goods imported in violation of the British tax laws. They were denounced by James Otis as ‘the worst instrument of arbitrary power, the most destructive of English liberty, and the fundamental principles of law, that ever was found in an English law book,’ because they placed ‘the liberty of every man in the hands of every petty officer.’ The historic occasion of that denunciation, in 1761 at Boston, has been characterized as ‘perhaps the most prominent event which inaugurated the resistance of the colonies to the oppressions of the mother country. “Then and there,” said John Adams, “then and there was the first scene of the first act of opposition to the arbitrary claims of Great Britain. Then and there the child Independence was born.’” Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 625.”
See, e. g., §§12, 36, 1 Stat. 39, 47; §§13, 14, 22, 27, 67, 1 Stat. 157-159, 161, 163-164, 176.
See The Palmyra, 12 Wheat. 1, 8 (1827).
“The next question is, whether the innocence of the owners can withdraw the ship from the penalty of confiscation under the act of Congress. Here, again, it may be remarked that the act makes no exception whatsoever, whether the aggression be with or without the co-operation of the owners. The vessel which commits the aggression is treated as the offender, as the guilty instrument or thing to which the forfeiture attaches, without any reference whatsoever to the character or conduct of the owner. The vessel or boat (says the act of Congress) from which such piratical aggression, &c., shall have been first attempted or made shall be condemned. Nor is there any thing new in a provision of this sort. It is not an uncommon course in the admiralty, acting under the law of nations, to treat the vessel in which or by which, or by the master or crew thereof, a wrong or offense has been done as the offender, without any regard whatsoever to the personal misconduct or responsibility of the owner thereof. And this is done from the necessity of the case, as the only adequate means of suppressing the offence or wrong, or insuring an indemnity to the injured party. The doctrine also is familiarly applied to cases of smuggling and other misconduct under our revenue laws; and has been applied to other kindred cases, such as cases arising on embargo and non-intercourse acts. In short, the acts of the master and crew, in cases of this sort, bind the interest of the owner of the ship, whether he be innocent or guilty; and he impliedly submits to whatever the law denounces as a forfeiture attached to the ship by reason of their unlawful or wanton wrongs.” Harmony v. United States, 2 How. 210, 233-234 (1844).
“Beyond controversy, the title of the premises and property was in the claimant; and it is equally certain that he leased the same to the lessee for the purposes of a distillery, and with the knowledge that the lessee intended to use the premises to carry on that business, and that he did use the same for that purpose.
“Fraud is not imputed to the owner of the premises; but the evidence and the verdict of the jury warrant the conclusion that the frauds charged in the information were satisfactorily proved, from which it follows that the decree of condemnation is correct, if it be true, as heretofore explained, that it was the property and not the claimant that was put to trial under the pleadings; and we are also of the opinion that the theory adopted by the court below, that, if the lessee of the premises and the operator of the distillery committed the alleged frauds, the government was entitled to a verdict, even though the jury were of the opinion that the claimant was ignorant of the fraudulent acts or omissions of the distiller.” Dobbins’s Distillery v. United States, 96 U. S. 395, 403-404 (1878).
“Thus stolen property — the fruits of crime — was always subject to seizure. And the power to search for stolen property was gradually extended to cover ‘any property which the private citizen was not permitted to possess,’ which included instrumentalities of crime (because of the early notion that items used in crime were forfeited to the State) and contraband. Kaplan, Search and Seizure: A No-Man’s Land in the Criminal Law, 49 Calif. L. Rev. 474, 475. No separate governmental interest in seizing evidence to apprehend and convict criminals was recognized; it was required that some property interest be asserted. The remedial structure also reflected these dual premises. Trespass, replevin, and the other means of redress for persons aggrieved by searches and seizures, depended upon proof of a superior property interest. And since a lawful seizure presupposed a superior claim, it was inconceivable that a person could recover property lawfully seized.” Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S., at 303-304.
A precedent for this expansion had been established in 1970 by the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), see 18 U. S. C. § 1963(a). Even RICO, however, did not specifically provide for the forfeiture of “proceeds” until 1984, when Congress added § 1963(a)(3) to resolve any doubt whether it intended the statute to reach so far. See S. Rep. No. 98-225, pp. 191-200 (1983); Russello v. United States, 464 U. S. 16 (1983).
Section 511(a) of the 1970 Act, 84 Stat. 1276, provided:
“The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States and no property right shall exist in them:
“(1) All controlled substances which have been manufactured, distributed, dispensed, or acquired in violation of this title.
“(2) All raw materials, products, and equipment of any kind which are used, or intended for use, in manufacturing, compounding, processing, delivering, importing, or exporting any controlled substance in violation of this title.
“(3) All property which is used, or intended for use, as a container for property described in paragraph (1) or (2).
“(4) All conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels, which are used, or are intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, possession, or concealment of property described in paragraph (1) or (2), except that—
“(A) no conveyance used by any person as a common carrier in the transaction of business as a common carrier shall be forfeited under the provisions of this section unless it shall appear that the owner or other person in charge of such conveyance was a consenting party or privy to a violation of this title or title III; and
“(B) no conveyance shall be forfeited under the provisions of this section by reason of any act or omission established by the owner thereof to have been committed or omitted by any person other than such owner while such conveyance was unlawfully in the possession of a person other than the owner in violation of the criminal laws of the United States, or of any State.
“(5) All books, records, and research, including formulas, microfilm, tapes, and data which are used, or intended for use, in violation of this title.”
At oral argument the Government suggested that a narrow interpretation of the word “proceeds” would “probably” prevent this absurdity. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 27. The Government’s brief, however, took the unequivocal position that the statute withholds the innocent owner defense from anyone who acquires proceeds after the illegal transaction took place. See Brief for United States 10, 21, 25, 27.
See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U. S. 663, 680-684 (1974).
In his dissent, Justice Kennedy advocates the adoption of a new common-law rule that would avoid the need to construe the terms of the statute that created the Government’s right to forfeit proceeds of drug transactions. Under his suggested self-executing rule, patterned after an amalgam of the law of trusts and the law of secured transactions, the Government would be treated as the owner of a secured or beneficial interest in forfeitable proceeds even before a decree of forfeiture is entéred. The various authorities that he cites support the proposition that if such an interest exists, it may be extinguished by a sale to a bona fide purchaser; they provide no support for the assumption that such an interest springs into existence independently. As a matter of common law, his proposal is inconsistent with Chief Justice Marshall’s statement that “nothing vests in the government until some legal step shall be taken,” and with the cases cited by Justice Scalia, post, at 132. As a matter of statutory law, it is improper to rely on § 881(a) as the source of the' Government’s interest in proceeds without also giving effect to the statutory language defining the scope of that interest. That a statutory provision contains “puzzling” language, or seems unwise, is not an appropriate reason for simply ignoring its text.
Justice Kennedy’s dramatic suggestion that our construction of the 1984 amendment “rips out,” post, at 145, the “centerpiece of the Nation’s drug enforcement laws,” post, at 144, rests on what he characterizes as the “safe” assumption that the innocent owner defense would be available to “an associate” of a criminal who could “shelter the proceeds from forfeiture, to be reacquired once he is clear from law enforcement authorities,” ibid. As a matter of fact, forfeitable proceeds are much more likely to be possessed by drug dealers themselves than by transferees sufficiently remote to qualify as innocent owners; as a matter of law, it is quite clear that neither an “associate” in the criminal enterprise nor a temporary custodian of drug proceeds would qualify as an innocent owner; indeed, neither would a sham bona fide purchaser.
See Pet. for Cert. 9-10; Brief for United States 17.
The Report provides:
“Section 306 also adds two new subsections at the end of section 881. The first provides that all right, title, and interest in property which is subject to civil forfeiture under section 881(a) vests in the United States upon the commission of the acts giving rise to the forfeiture.” S. Rep. No. 98-226, p. 215 (1983) (emphasis added).
The logic of the Government’s argument would apparently apply as well to the innocent owner defense added to the statute in 1988. That amendment provides, in part:
“[N]o conveyance shall be forfeited under this paragraph to the extent of an interest of an owner, by reason of any act or omission established by that owner to have been committed or omitted without the knowledge, consent, or willful blindness of the owner.” §6075(3)(C), 102 Stat. 4324. That amendment presumably was enacted to protect lessors like the owner whose yacht was forfeited in a proceeding that led this Court to observe
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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A
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Kennedy
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Court must interpret, once again, § 924(c) of Title 18 of the United States Code. This provision prohibits the use or carrying of a firearm in relation to a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime, or the possession of a firearm in furtherance of such crimes. § 924(c)(1)(A). A violation of the statute carries a mandatory minimum term of five years’ imprisonment, § 924(c)(l)(A)(i); but if the firearm is a ma-ehinegun, the statute requires a 30-year mandatory minimum sentence, § 924(c)(l)(B)(ii). Whether a firearm was used, carried, or possessed is, as all concede, an element of the offense. At issue here is whether the fact that the firearm was a machinegun is an element to be proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt or a sentencing factor to be proved to the judge at sentencing.
In an earlier case the Court determined that an analogous machinegun provision in a previous version of § 924 constituted an element of an offense to be proved to the jury. Castillo v. United States, 530 U. S. 120 (2000). The Castillo decision, however, addressed the statute as it existed before congressional amendments made in 1998. And in a case after Castillo, the brandishing provision in the post-1998 version of § 924 was held to provide a sentencing factor, not an element of the offense. Harris v. United States, 536 U. S. 545 (2002). In light of the 1998 amendments and the Harris decision, the question of how to interpret §924’s machinegun provision is considered once more in the instant case.
I
On June 16, 2005, respondents Martin O’Brien and Arthur Burgess attempted to rob an armored car making a scheduled delivery of cash to a bank. Along with a third collaborator, respondents hid in a minivan and waited for the armored car to make its stop. Each of the men carried a firearm. Containing nearly $2 million and attended by two guards, the armored car arrived. A guard began to unload boxes of coins. The three men came out of the van and, while one of them brandished his weapon, they ordered the guards to get on the ground. One guard did so, but the other ran to a nearby restaurant. Respondents abandoned the robbery and fled without taking any money. No shots were fired, and no one was injured.
Authorities apprehended respondents and recovered the three firearms used during the attempted robbery. The firearms were a semiautomatic Sig-Sauer pistol, an AK-47 semiautomatic rifle, and a Cobray pistol. The Cobray pistol had been manufactured as, and had the external appearance of, a semiautomatic firearm. According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, though, it operated as a fully automatic weapon, apparently due to some alteration of its original firing mechanism. Respondents dispute whether the Cobray in fact did operate as a fully automatic weapon.
Respondents were indicted on multiple counts. Relevant here are counts three and four, both of which charged offenses under § 924(c). Count three charged respondents with using a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, which carries a statutory minimum of five years’ imprisonment. Count four charged respondents in more specific terms, alleging use of a machinegun (the Cobray) in furtherance of a crime of violence, as proscribed by §§ 924(c)(1)(A) and (B)(ii). The latter provision mandates a minimum sentence of 30 years’ imprisonment.
The Government moved to dismiss count four on the basis that it would be unable to establish the count beyond a reasonable doubt. (The issues in the present case do not require the Court to consider any contention that a defendant who uses, carries, or possesses a firearm must be aware of the weapon’s characteristics. This opinion expresses no views on the point.)
The Government then maintained that the machinegun provision in § 924(c)(l)(B)(ii) was a sentencing factor, so that, if respondents were convicted of carrying a firearm under count three, the court could determine at sentencing that the particular firearm was a machinegun, thus activating the 30-yéár mandatory minimum. The District Court dismissed count four, as the Government requested, but rejected the Government’s position that the machinegun provision was a sentencing enhancement to be determined by the court at sentencing once there was a conviction on count three. It ruled that the machinegun provision states an element of a crime. Thus, to invoke the 30-year minimum sentence, the Government was required to charge in the indictment, and then prove to the jury, that the Cobray was a machinegun.
At this point, after the District Court foreclosed the possibility of respondents’ facing a 30-year minimum, respondents pleaded guilty to the remaining counts, including count three. The District Court sentenced O’Brien to a 102-month term for his § 924(c) conviction, to run consecutively with his sentence on two other counts. It sentenced Burgess to an 84-month term for his § 924(c) conviction, also to run consecutively to his sentence on the other charges. The Government appealed the District Court’s ruling that the §924 machinegun provision constitutes an element of an offense instead of a sentencing factor.
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed. It looked primarily to Castillo, 530 U. S. 120, which held that the machinegun provision in an earlier version of § 924(c) constituted an element of an offense, not a sentencing factor. The court noted that the statute under consideration in Castillo had been revised by Congress, “break[ing] what was a single run-on sentence into subpara-graphs,” and it acknowledged that the earlier repealed version of the statute was “slightly more favorable to the [respondents] than the current version[,] but not markedly so.” 542 F. 3d 921, 925 (2008). It found “no evidence that the breaking up of the sentence into the present subdivisions or recasting of language was anything more than a current trend — probably for ease of reading — to convert lengthy sentences in criminal statutes into subsections in the fashion of the tax code.” Id., at 926. The court concluded: “Absent a clearer or more dramatic change in language or legislative history expressing a specific intent to assign judge or jury functions, we think that Castillo is close to binding,” and any reconsideration of the issue should be left to this Court. Ibid.; see also Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U. S. 477, 484 (1989) (“If a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions”).
We granted certiorari. 557 U. S. 966 (2009).
II
Elements of a crime must be charged in an indictment and proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974); Jones v. United States, 526 U. S. 227, 282 (1999). Sentencing factors, on the other hand, can be proved to a judge at sentencing by a preponderance of the evidence. See McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U. S. 79, 91-92 (1986). Though one exception has been established, see Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U. S. 224, 228 (1998), “ '[i]t is unconstitutional for a legislature to remove from the jury the assessment of facts that increase the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed.’” Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U. S. 466, 490 (2000) (quoting Jones, supra, at 252-253 (Stevens, J., concurring)). In other words, while sentencing factors may guide or confine a judge’s discretion in sentencing an offender “within the range prescribed by statute,” Apprendi, supra, at 481, judge-found sentencing factors cannot increase the maximum sentence a defendant might otherwise receive based purely on the facts found by the jury.
Subject to this constitutional constraint, whether a given fact is an element of the crime itself or a sentencing factor is a question for Congress. When Congress is not explicit, as is often the case because it seldom directly addresses the distinction between sentencing factors and elements, courts look to the provisions and the framework of the statute to determine whether a fact is an element or a sentencing factor. Almendarez-Torres, supra, at 228. In examining whether the machinegun provision in § 924 is an element or a sentencing factor, the analysis must begin with this Court’s previous examination of the question in Castillo.
In Castillo, the Court considered a prior version of § 924, which provided:
“(c)(1) Whoever, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime . . . , uses or carries a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such crime of violence or drug trafficking crime, be sentenced to imprisonment for five years, and if the firearm is a short-barreled rifle [or a] short-barreled shotgun to imprisonment for ten years, and if the firearm is a machinegun, or a destructive device, or is equipped with a firearm silencer or firearm muffler, to imprisonment for thirty years....” 18 U. S. C. § 924(c)(1) (1988 ed., Supp. V).
In determining whether the machinegun provision in the just-quoted version of § 924 constituted an element or a sentencing factor, the Court in Castillo observed that the bare statutory language was “neutral.” 530 U. S., at 124. It examined five factors directed at determining congressional intent: (1) language and structure, (2) tradition, (3) risk of unfairness, (4) severity of the sentence, and (5) legislative history. Id., at 124-131. The Court unanimously concluded that the machinegun provision provided an element of an offense, noting that the first four factors favored treating it as such while legislative history did not significantly favor either side. Ibid.
Ill
A
Section 924(c) was amended to its current form in 1998.
The amendment had been enacted when the Court considered Castillo, supra, at 125, but the pre-1998 version of the statute was at issue there. The instant case concerns the post-1998 (and current) version of the statute, which provides:
“(A) Except to the extent that a greater minimum sentence is otherwise provided by this subsection or by any other provision of law, any person who, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime . . . uses or carries a firearm, or who, in furtherance of any such crime, possesses a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such crime of violence or drug trafficking crime—
“(i) be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 5 years;
“(ii) if the firearm is brandished, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 7 years; and “(iii) if the firearm is discharged, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 10 years.
“(B) If the firearm possessed by a person convicted of a violation of this subsection—
“(i) is a short-barreled rifle, short-barreled shotgun, or semiautomatic assault weapon, the person shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 10 years; or
“(ii) is a maehinegun or a destructive device, or is equipped with a firearm silencer or firearm muffler, the person shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 80 years.” 18 U. S. C. § 924(c)(1).
The 1998 amendment did make substantive changes to the statute, to be discussed below; but for purposes of the present case the most apparent effect of the amendment was to divide what was once a lengthy principal sentence into separate subparagraphs. This Court’s observation in considering the first Castillo factor, that “Congress placed the element 'uses or carries a firearm’ and the word 'machinegun' in a single sentence, not broken up with dashes or separated into subsections,” 580 U. S., at 124-125, no longer holds true. Aside from this new structure, however, the 1998 amendment of § 924 did nothing to affect the second through fifth Castillo factors. Each of the factors, except for legislative history (which, assuming its relevance, remains relatively silent), continues to favor the conclusion that the machinegun provision is an element of an offense.
Legal tradition and past congressional practice are the second Castillo factor. The factor is to be consulted when, as here, a statute’s text is unclear as to whether certain facts constitute elements or sentencing factors. Sentencing factors traditionally involve characteristics of the offender— such as recidivism, cooperation with law enforcement, or acceptance of responsibility. Id., at 126. Characteristics of the offense itself are traditionally treated as elements, and the use of a machinegun under § 924(c) lies “closest to the heart of the crime at issue.” Id., at 127. This is no less true today than it was 10 years ago in Castillo. Unsurprisingly, firearm type is treated as an element in a number of statutes, as “numerous gun crimes make substantive distinctions between weapons such as pistols and machine-guns.” Ibid.; see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(a)(4), 922(b)(4), and 922(o)(l).
The Government counters that this tradition or pattern has evolved since the version of § 924(c) under review in Castillo was enacted. The Government contends that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines altered the tradition by treating the possession of a firearm as a sentencing factor. Brief for United States 23 (citing United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual §2K2.1(a)(5) (Nov. 1998) (raising base offense level “if the offense involved a firearm”))-
The argument is not persuasive. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 98 Stat. 1987, establishing the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, was enacted four years before the version of § 924 under review in Castillo, see Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, § 6460,102 Stat. 4373. While the resulting Guidelines were not effective until 1987, this was still before the 1988 enactment of the statute at issue in Castillo, and 13 years before this Court’s conclusion in Castillo that firearm type is traditionally treated as an offense element. The Government cannot claim the benefit of any shift in how the law traditionally treats firearm type from the Guidelines, for that supposed shift would have occurred before the 1988 version of § 924 was enacted. The Guidelines were explicitly taken into account when this Court analyzed the traditions in Castillo. 530 U. S., at 126 (discussing Federal Sentencing Guidelines in determining what traditionally qualifies as a sentencing factor).
The third Castillo factor, potential unfairness, was unchanged by the restructuring of § 924. The Court explained in Castillo that treating the machinegun provision as a sentencing factor “might unnecessarily produce a conflict between the judge and the jury” because “a jury may well have to decide which of several weapons” a defendant used. Id., at 128. The concern was that the judge may not know which weapon the jurors determined a defendant used, and “a judge’s later, sentencing-related decision that the defendant used the machinegun, rather than, say, the pistol, might conflict with the jury’s belief that he actively used the pistol.” Ibid. This same concern arises under the current version of § 924, where jurors might have to determine which among several weapons a defendant used, carried, or possessed in furtherance of a crime.
The Government’s response, that permitting a judge to make this finding would “streamlin[e] guilt-stage proceedings, without interfering with the accuracy of fact-finding,” Brief for United States 33, is unconvincing. It does not address the particular unfairness concern expressed in Castillo, which was not alleviated by the restructuring of § 924. And the Government does not suggest that it would be subjected to any unfairness if the machinegun provision continues to be treated as an element.
The fourth Castillo factor, the severity of the sentence accompanying a finding that a defendant carried a machinegun under § 924, was also unaffected by the statute’s restructuring. A finding that a defendant carried a machinegun under §924, in contrast to some less dangerous firearm, vaults a defendant’s mandatory minimum sentence from 5 to 30 years, 530 U. S., at 131, or from 7 to 30 years if, as in this case, the firearm was brandished, § 924(c)(l)(A)(ii). This is not akin to the “incremental changes in the minimum” that one would “expect to see in provisions meant to identify matters for the sentencing judge’s consideration,” Harris, 536 U. S., at 554 (from 5 years to 7 years); it is a drastic, sixfold increase that strongly suggests a separate substantive crime.
There is one substantive difference between the old and new versions of § 924 that might bear on this fourth factor. The previous version of § 924 provided mandatory sentences: 5 years for using or carrying a firearm and 30 years if the firearm is a machinegun, for example. See § 924(c)(1) (1988 ed., Supp. V). The current statute provides only mandatory mínimums: not less than 5 years for using or possessing a firearm; not less than 7 for brandishing it; and not less than 30 if the firearm is a machinegun. §§ 924(c)(l)(A)(i), (ii), (B)(ii). The Government argues that this difference is critical because a 30-year sentence is conceivable under the statute even without a finding that the particular weapon is a machinegun. Brief for United States 25.
This is a distinction in theory, perhaps, but not in practice. Neither the Government nor any party or amicus has identified a single defendant whose conviction under § 924 for possessing or brandishing a nonspecific firearm led to a sentence approaching the 30-year sentence that is required when the firearm is a machinegun. Respondents advise, without refutation, that most courts impose the mandatory minimum of 7 years’ imprisonment for brandishing a nonspecific weapon and the longest sentence that has come to the litigants’ or the Court’s attention is 14 years. Brief for Respondent O’Brien 46, 48 (citing United States v. Batts, 317 Fed. Appx. 329 (CA4 2009) (per curiam)); see also Harris, supra, at 578 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Indeed, in the instant case, Burgess received the statutory minimum 7-year sentence, and O’Brien received only 18 months more than that. Once the machinegun enhancement was off the table, the Government itself did not seek anything approaching 30-year terms, instead requesting 12-year terms for each respondent.
The immense danger posed by machineguns, the moral depravity in choosing the weapon, and the substantial increase in the minimum sentence provided by the statute support the conclusion that this prohibition is an element of the crime, not a sentencing factor. It is not likely that Congress intended to remove the indictment and jury trial protections when it provided for such an extreme sentencing increase. See Jones, 526 U. S., at 233 (“It is at best questionable whether the specification of facts sufficient to increase a penalty range by two-thirds, let alone from 15 years to life, was meant to carry none of the process safeguards that elements of an offense bring with them for a defendant’s benefit”). Perhaps Congress was not concerned with parsing the distinction between elements and sentencing factors, a matter more often discussed by the courts when discussing the proper allocation of functions between judge and jury. Instead, it likely was more focused on deterring the crime by creating the mandatory minimum sentences. But the severity of the increase in this case counsels in favor of finding that the prohibition is an element, at least absent some clear congressional indication to the contrary.
The fifth factor considered in Castillo was legislative history, and the Court there found it to be of little help. 530 U. S., at 130 (“Insofar as this history may be relevant, however, it does not significantly help the Government”). The 1998 amendment has its own legislative record, discussed below, but the parties accurately observe that it is silent as to congressional consideration of the distinction between elements and sentencing factors. Brief for United States 29; Brief for Respondent O’Brien 28-29. This silence is not neutral, however, because as explained below, it tends to counsel against finding that Congress made a substantive change to this statutory provision.
Four of the five factors the Court relied upon in Castillo point in the same direction they did 10 years ago. How the 1998 amendment affects the remaining factor — the provision’s language and structure — requires closer examination.
B
In Castillo, the Court interpreted § 924(c) in its original version, though Congress had at that point already amended the provision. Here, the applicable principle is that Congress does not enact substantive changes sub silentio. See Director of Revenue of Mo. v. CoBank ACB, 531 U. S. 316, 323 (2001). In light of Castillo’s determination that the machinegun provision in the previous version of § 924 is an element, a change should not be inferred “[a]bsent a clear indication from Congress of a change in policy.” Grogan v. Garner, 498 U. S. 279, 290 (1991); see also Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U. S. 298, 313, n. 12 (1994) (“[W]hen this Court construes a statute, it is explaining its understanding of what the statute has meant continuously since the date when it became law”).
The Government argues that the 1998 amendment restructuring § 924(c) demonstrates the congressional judgment to reclassify the machinegun provision as a sentencing factor, rather than as an offense element. But the better understanding, as the Government acknowledged in its submission in Castillo, is that “there is nothing to suggest that the 1998 amendments were intended to change, rather than simply reorganize and clarify, [§924]’s treatment of firearm type.” Brief for United States, O. T. 1999, No. 99-658, p. 41. A closer review of the 1998 amendment confirms this.
There are three principal differences between the previous and current versions of § 924(c): two substantive changes and a third regarding the stylistic structure of the statute. The first difference, as discussed above, supra, at 229, is that the amendment changed what were once mandatory sentences into mandatory minimum sentences. A person convicted of the primary offense of using or carrying a firearm during a crime of violence was once to “be sentenced to imprisonment for five years,” but under the current version he or she is to “be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 5 years.”
The second difference is that the amended version includes the word “possesses” in addition to “uses or carries” in its principal paragraph, and then adds the substantive provisions in §§ 924(c)(l)(A)(ii) and (iii), which provide mandatory mínimums for brandishing (7 years) and discharging (10 years) the firearm. These provisions are new substantive additions to the text of the previous version, which provided a bare 5-year mandatory minimum for any offender who “use[d] or carrie[d] a firearm,” without concern for how the firearm was used.
The changes were a direct response to this Court’s decision in Bailey v. United States, 516 U. S. 137 (1995), which held that the word “use” in the preamendment version of §924 “must connote more than mere possession of a firearm by a person who commits a drug offense.” Id., at 143. The Court in Bailey went on to observe that, “[h]ad Congress intended possession alone to trigger liability under § 924(c)(1), it easily could have so provided” by using the word “possess,” as it had so frequently done in other statutory provisions. Ibid. Three years later, Congress made the change and added the word “possesses” to the principal paragraph. Congress additionally provided mandatory sentences above the 5-year minimum depending on whether and how the firearm was used. Sections 924(c)(l)(A)(ii) and (iii) provide sentencing enhancements for brandishing or discharging the firearm, and the Court has held that these enhancements are sentencing factors to be found by a judge. See Harris, 536 U. S., at 552-556; see also Dean v. United States, 556 U. S. 568, 573-574 (2009) (referring to the brandishing and discharge provisions as “sentencing factors”). The 1998 amendment was colloquially known as the “Bailey Fix Act.” 144 Cong. Rec. 26608 (1998) (remarks of Sen. De-Wine); see also Dean, supra, at 579 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Aside from shifting the mandatory sentences to mandatory minimums, and this so-called Bailey fix, Congress left the substance of the statute unchanged. Neither of these substantive changes suggests that Congress meant to transform the machinegun provision from an element into a sentencing factor.
The Government stresses a third, structural, difference in the statute, pointing out that the machinegun provision now resides in a separate subparagraph, § 924(c)(1)(B), whereas it once resided in the principal paragraph that unmistakably lists offense elements. This structural or stylistic ehange, though, does not provide a “clear indication” that Congress meant to alter its treatment of machineguns as an offense element. See Grogan, 498 U. S., at 290. A more logical explanation for the restructuring is that it broke up a lengthy principal paragraph, which exceeded 250 words even before adding more to it for the Bailey fix, into a more readable statute. This is in step with current legislative drafting guidelines, which advise drafters to break lengthy statutory provisions into separate subsections that can be read more easily. See House Legislative Counsel’s Manual on Drafting Style, HLC No. 104.1, § 312, pp. 23-25 (1995); Senate Office of the Legislative Counsel, Legislative Drafting Manual § 112, pp. 10-11 (1997).
While the Court has indicated that placing factors in separate subsections is one way Congress might signal that it is treating them as sentencing factors as opposed to elements, Castillo, 530 U. S., at 124-125, Harris, 536 U. S., at 552-553, it has rejected the view that this structural consideration predominates even when other factors point in the other direction, id., at 553 (“[E]ven if a statute ‘has a look to it suggesting that the numbered subsections are only sentencing provisions,’ ” the Court will not ignore “compelling evidence to the contrary” (quoting Jones, 526 U. S., at 232)). For instance, in Jones the Court found that the federal carjacking statute set forth elements of multiple offenses despite a structure similar to the statute at issue here. Id., at 232-239. And in Harris, the Court was careful to point out that, unlike the case at bar, the other Castillo factors “reinforce[d] the single-offense interpretation implied by the statute’s structure.” 536 U. S., at 553.
In examining the amended version of § 924(c)’s structure, there is an additional consideration that supports interpreting the machinegun provision to be an offense element. As explained above, the brandishing and discharge provisions codified in §§ 924(c)(l)(A)(ii) and (iii) do state sentencing factors. See Harris, supra, at 552-556; Dean, supra, at 573-574. Had Congress intended to treat firearm type as a sentencing factor, it likely would have listed firearm types as clauses (iv) and (v) of subparagraph (A), instead of as clauses (i) and (ii) of subparagraph (B). By listing firearm type in stand-alone subparagraph (B), Congress set it apart from the sentencing factors in (A)(ii) and (iii); this is consistent with preserving firearm type as an element of a separate offense.
To be sure, there are some arguments in favor of treating the machinegun provision as a sentencing factor. The current structure of § 924(c) is more favorable to that interpretation than was true in Castillo, particularly because the machinegun provision is now positioned between the sentencing factors provided in (A)(ii) and (iii), see Harris, supra, at 552-556, and the recidivist provisions in (C)(i) and (ii), which are typically sentencing factors as well. See Almendarez-Torres, 523 U. S., at 230. These points are overcome, however, by the substantial weight of the other Castillo factors and the principle that Congress would not enact so significant a change without a clear indication of its purpose to do so. The evident congressional purpose was to amend the statute to counteract Bailey and to make the statute more readable but not otherwise to alter the substance of the statute. The analysis and holding of Castillo control this case. The machinegun provision in § 924(c)(l)(B)(ii) is an element of an offense.
* * *
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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A
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The impeachment exception to the exclusionary rule permits the prosecution in a criminal proceeding to introduce illegally obtained evidence to impeach the defendant’s own testimony. The Illinois Supreme Court extended this exception to permit the prosecution to impeach the testimony of all defense witnesses with illegally obtained evidence. 123 Ill. 2d 523, 528 N. E. 2d 723 (1988). Finding this extension inconsistent with the balance of values underlying our previous applications of the exclusionary rule, we reverse.
H-l
On the night of August 30, 1982, eight young boys returning home from a party were confronted by a trio of other boys who demanded money. When the eight boys refused to comply, one member of the trio produced a gun and fired into the larger group, killing one boy and seriously injuring another. When the police arrived, the remaining members of the larger group provided eyewitness accounts of the event and descriptions of the perpetrators.
The next evening, two detectives of the Chicago Police Department took 15-year-old Darryl James into custody as a suspect in the shooting. James was found at his mother’s beauty parlor sitting under a hair dryer; when he emerged, his hair was black and curly. After placing James in their car, the detectives questioned him about his prior hair color. He responded that the previous day his hair had been reddish brown, long, and combed straight back. The detectives questioned James again later at the police station, and he further stated that he had gone to the beauty parlor in order to have his hair “dyed black and curled in order to change his appearance.” App. 11.
The State subsequently indicted James for murder and attempted murder. Prior to trial, James moved to suppress the statements regarding his hair, contending that they were the fruit of a Fourth Amendment violation because the detectives lacked probable cause for his warrantless arrest. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court sustained this motion and ruled that the statements would be inadmissible at trial.
At trial, five members of the larger group of boys testified for the State, and each made an in-court identification of the defendant. Each testified that the person responsible for the shooting had “reddish” hair, worn shoulder length in a slicked-back “butter” style. Each also recalled having seen James several weeks earlier at a parade, at which time James had the aforementioned hair color and style. At trial, however, his hair was black and worn in a “natural” style. Despite the discrepancy between the witnesses’ description and his present appearance, the witnesses stood firm in their conviction that James had been present and had fired the shots.
James did not testify in his own defense. He called as a witness Jewel Henderson, a friend of his family. Henderson testified that on the day of the shooting she had taken James to register for high school and that, at that time, his hair was black. The State then sought, over James’ objection, to introduce his illegally obtained statements as a means of impeaching the credibility of Henderson’s testimony. After determining that the suppressed statements had been made voluntarily, the trial court overruled James’ objection. One of the interrogating detectives then reported James’ prior admissions that he had reddish hair the night of the shooting and he dyed and curled his hair the next day in order to change his appearance. James ultimately was convicted of both murder and attempted murder and sentenced to 30 years’ imprisonment.
On appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court reversed James’ convictions and ordered a new trial. 153 Ill. App. 3d 131, 505 N. E. 2d 1118 (1987). The appellate court held that the exclusionary rule barred admission of James’ illegally obtained statements for the purpose of impeaching a defense witness’ testimony and that the resulting constitutional error was not harmless. However, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed. The court reasoned that, in order to deter the defendant from engaging in perjury “by proxy,” the impeachment exception to the exclusionary rule ought to be expanded to allow the State to introduce illegally obtained evidence to impeach the testimony of defense witnesses other than the defendant himself. The court therefore ordered James’ convictions reinstated. We granted certiorari. 489 U. S. 1010 (1989).
II
“There is no gainsaying that arriving at the truth is a fundamental goal of our legal system.” United States v. Havens, 446 U. S. 620, 626 (1980). But various constitutional rules limit the means by which government may conduct this search for truth in order to promote other values embraced by the Framers and cherished throughout our Nation’s history. “Ever since its inception, the rule excluding evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment has been recognized as a principal mode of discouraging lawless police conduct. . . . [WJithout it the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures would be a mere ‘form of words.’” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 12 (1968), quoting Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, 655 (1961). The occasional suppression of illegally obtained yet probative evidence has long been considered a necessary cost of preserving overriding constitutional values: “[T]here is nothing new in the realization that the Constitution sometimes insulates the criminality of a few in order to protect the privacy of us all.” Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U. S. 321, 329 (1987).
This Court has carved out exceptions to the exclusionary rule, however, where the introduction of reliable and probative evidence would significantly further the truth-seeking function of a criminal trial and the likelihood that admissibility of such evidence would encourage police misconduct is but a “speculative possibility.” Harris v. New York, 401 U. S. 222, 225 (1971). One exception to the rule permits prosecutors to introduce illegally obtained evidence for the limited purpose of impeaching the credibility of the defendant’s own testimony. This Court first recognized this exception in Walder v. United States, 347 U. S. 62 (1954), permitting the prosecutor to introduce into evidence heroin obtained through an illegal search to undermine the credibility of the defendant’s claim that he had never possessed narcotics. The Court explained that a defendant
“must be free to deny all the elements of the case against him without thereby giving leave to the Government to introduce by way of rebuttal evidence illegally secured by it, and therefore not available for its case in chief. Beyond that, however, there is hardly justification for letting the defendant affirmatively resort to perjurious testimony in reliance on the Government’s disability to challenge his credibility.” Id., at 65.
In Harris v. New York, supra, and Oregon v. Hass, 420 U. S. 714 (1975), the Court applied the exception to permit prosecutors to impeach defendants using incriminating yet voluntary and reliable statements elicited in violation of Miranda requirements. Finally, in United States v. Havens, supra, the Court expanded the exception to permit prosecutors to introduce illegally obtained evidence in order to impeach a defendant’s “answers to questions put to him on cross-examination that are plainly within the scope of the defendant’s direct examination.” Id., at 627.
This Court insisted throughout this line of cases that “evidence that has been illegally obtained ... is inadmissible on the government’s direct case, or otherwise, as substantive evidence of guilt.” Id., at 628. However, because the Court believed that permitting the use of such evidence to impeach defendants’ testimony would further the goal of truthseeking by preventing defendants from perverting the exclusionary rule “ ‘into a license to use perjury by way of a defense,”’ id., at 626 (citation omitted), and because the Court further believed that permitting such use would create only a “speculative possibility that impermissible police conduct will be encouraged thereby,” Harris, supra, at 225, the Court concluded that the balance of values underlying the exclusionary rule justified an exception covering impeachment of defendants’ testimony.
Ill
In this case, the Illinois Supreme Court held that our balancing approach in Walder and its progeny justifies expanding the scope of the impeachment exception to permit prosecutors to use illegally obtained evidence to impeach the credibility of defense witnesses. We disagree. Expanding the class of impeachable witnesses from the defendant alone to all defense witnesses would create different incentives affecting the behavior of both defendants and law enforcement officers. As a result, this expansion would not promote the truth-seeking function to the same extent as did creation of the original exception, and yet it would significantly undermine the deterrent effect of the general exclusionary rule. Hence, we believe that this proposed expansion would frustrate rather than further the purposes underlying the exclusionary rule.
The previously recognized exception penalizes defendants for committing perjury by allowing the prosecution to expose their perjury through impeachment using illegally obtained evidence. Thus defendants are discouraged in the first instance from “affirmatively resort[ing] to perjurious testimony.” Walder, supra, at 65. But the exception leaves defendants free to testify truthfully on their own behalf; they can offer probative and exculpatory evidence to the jury without opening the door to impeachment by carefully avoiding any statements that directly contradict the suppressed evidence. The exception thus generally discourages perjured testimony without discouraging truthful testimony.
In contrast, expanding the impeachment exception to encompass the testimony of all defense witnesses would not have the same beneficial effects. First, the mere threat of a subsequent criminal prosecution for perjury is far more likely to deter a witness from intentionally lying on a defendant’s behalf than to deter a defendant, already facing conviction for the underlying offense, from lying on his own behalf. Hence the Illinois Supreme Court’s underlying premise that a defendant frustrated by our previous impeachment exception can easily find a witness to engage in “perjury by proxy” is suspect.
More significantly, expanding the impeachment exception to encompass the testimony of all defense witnesses likely would chill some defendants from presenting their best defense — and sometimes any defense at all — through the testimony of others. Whenever police obtained evidence illegally, defendants would have to assess prior to trial the likelihood that the evidence would be admitted to impeach the otherwise favorable testimony of any witness they call. Defendants might reasonably fear that one or more of their witnesses, in a position to offer truthful and favorable testimony, would also make some statement in sufficient tension with the tainted evidence to allow the prosecutor to introduce that evidence for impeachment. First, defendants sometimes need to call “reluctant” or “hostile” witnesses to provide reliable and probative exculpatory testimony, and such witnesses likely will not share the defendants’ concern for avoiding statements that invite impeachment through contradictory evidence. Moreover, defendants often cannot trust even “friendly” witnesses to testify without subjecting themselves to impeachment, simply due to insufficient care or attentiveness. This concern is magnified in those occasional situations when defendants must call witnesses to testify despite having had only a limited opportunity to consult with or prepare them in advance. For these reasons, we have recognized in a variety of contexts that a party “cannot be absolutely certain that his witnesses will testify as expected.” Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U. S. 605, 609 (1972). As a re-suit, an expanded impeachment exception likely would chill some defendants from calling witnesses who would otherwise offer probative evidence.
This realization alters the balance of values underlying the current impeachment exception governing defendants’ testimony. Our prior cases make clear that defendants ought not be able to “pervert” the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence into a shield for perjury, but it seems no more appropriate for the State to brandish such evidence as a sword with which to dissuade defendants from presenting a meaningful defense through other witnesses. Given the potential chill created by expanding the impeachment exception, the conceded gains to the truth-seeking process from discouraging or disclosing perjured testimony would be offset to some extent by the concomitant loss of probative witness testimony. Thus, the truth-seeking rationale supporting the impeachment of defendants in Walder and its progeny does not apply to other witnesses with equal force.
Moreover, the proposed expansion of the current impeachment exception would significantly weaken the exclusionary rule’s deterrent effect on police misconduct. This Court has characterized as a mere “speculative possibility,” Harris v. New York, 401 U. S., at 225, the likelihood that permitting prosecutors to impeach defendants with illegally obtained evidence would encourage police misconduct. Law enforcement officers will think it unlikely that the defendant will first decide to testify at trial and will also open the door inadvertently to admission of any illegally obtained evidence. Hence, the officers’ incentive to acquire evidence through illegal means is quite weak.
In contrast, expanding the impeachment exception to all defense witnesses would significantly enhance the expected value to the prosecution of illegally obtained evidence. First, this expansion would vastly increase the number of occasions on which such evidence could be used. Defense witnesses easily outnumber testifying defendants, both because many defendants do not testify themselves and because many if not most defendants call multiple witnesses on their behalf. Moreover, due to the chilling effect identified above, see supra, at 315-316, illegally obtained evidence holds even greater value to the prosecution for each individual witness than for each defendant. The prosecutor’s access to impeachment evidence would not just deter perjury; it would also deter defendants from calling witnesses in the first place, thereby keeping from the jury much probative exculpatory evidence. For both of these reasons, police officers and their superiors would recognize that obtaining evidence through illegal means stacks the deck heavily in the prosecution’s favor. It is thus far more than a “speculative possibility” that police misconduct will be encouraged by permitting such use of illegally obtained evidence.
The United States argues that this result is constitutionally acceptable because excluding illegally obtained evidence solely from the prosecution’s case in chief would still provide a quantum of deterrence sufficient to protect the privacy interests underlying the exclusionary rule. We disagree. Of course, a police officer might in certain situations believe that obtaining particular evidence through illegal means, re-suiting in,its suppression from the case in chief, would prevent the prosecution from establishing a prima facie case to take to a jury. In such situations, the officer likely would be deterred from obtaining the evidence illegally for fear of jeopardizing the entire case. But much if not most of the time, police officers confront opportunities to obtain evidence illegally after they have already legally obtained (or know that they have other means of legally obtaining) sufficient evidence to sustain a prima facie case. In these situations, a rule requiring exclusion of illegally obtained evidence from only the government’s case in chief would leave officers with little to lose and much to gain by overstepping constitutional limits on evidence gathering. Narrowing the exclusionary rule in this manner, therefore, would significantly undermine the rule’s ability “to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way — by removing the incentive to disregard it.” Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206, 217 (1960). So long as we are committed to protecting the people from the disregard of their constitutional rights during the course of criminal investigations, inadmissibility of illegally obtained evidence must remain the rule, not the exception.
IV
The cost to the truth-seeking process of evidentiary exclusion invariably is perceived more tangibly in discrete prosecutions than is the protection of privacy values through deterrence of future police misconduct. When defining the precise scope of the exclusionary rule, however, we must focus on systemic effects of proposed exceptions to ensure that individual liberty from arbitrary or oppressive police conduct does not succumb to the inexorable pressure to introduce all incriminating evidence, no matter how obtained, in each and every criminal case. Our previous recognition of an impeachment exception limited to the testimony of defendants reflects a careful weighing of the competing values. Because expanding the exception to encompass the testimony of all defense witnesses would not further the truth-seeking value with equal force but would appreciably undermine the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule, we adhere to the line drawn in our previous cases.
Accordingly, we hold that the Illinois Supreme Court erred in affirming James’ convictions despite the prosecutor’s use of illegally obtained statements to impeach a defense witness’ testimony. The court’s judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
See generally Illinois v. Krull, 480 U. S. 340, 347 (1987) (when evaluating proposed exceptions to the exclusionary rule, this Court “has examined whether the rule’s deterrent effect will be achieved, and has weighed the likelihood of such deterrence against the costs of withholding reliable information from the truth-seeking process”); United States v. Leon, 468 U. S. 897, 908-913 (1984) (discussing balancing approach).
Certain Members of the Court have previously expressed their view that the exclusionary rule is designed not merely to deter police misconduct but also to prevent courts from becoming parties to the constitutional violation by admitting illegally obtained evidence at trial. See United States v. Leon, 468 U. S., at 931-938 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting); id., at 976-978 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966).
See also Oregon v. Hass, 420 U. S. 714, 721 (1975) (“[TJrial court instructed the jury that the statements attributed to [defendant] could be used only in passing on his credibility and not as evidence of guilt”); Hands v. New York, 401 U. S. 222, 223 (1971) (same); Walder v. United States, 347 U. S. 62, 64 (1954) (same).
The dissent concedes, as it must, that “of course, false testimony can result from faulty recollection” as opposed to intentional lying. Post, at 326. Even assuming that Henderson’s testimony in this case (as opposed to the detective’s contrary testimony) was indeed false, nothing in the record suggests that Henderson intentionally committed perjury rather than honestly provided her best (even if erroneous) perception and recollection of events.
These reasons to doubt a party’s ability to control the testimony of his own witnesses led long ago to abandonment of the common-law rule that a party automatically “vouches for” and hence is inexorably bound by what the witnesses say. See, e. g., Fed. Rule Evid. 607 (“The credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party, including the party calling him”); see generally 3A J. Wigmore, Evidence § 899, p. 655 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1970) (“[E]very experienced lawyer knows that he is often required to call witnesses who happen to have some knowledge of the facts but whose trustworthiness he could not guarantee. There are also many occasions upon which a lawyer is surprised by the witness testifying in direct contradiction to a prior statement given to the attorney” (citation omitted)); cf. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U. S. 284 (1973) (state evidentiary rule precluding defendant from impeaching own witness after witness offered incriminating testimony violated due process). See also Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409, 426 (1976) (holding prosecutors absolutely immune from damages liability for having knowingly presented perjured witness testimony against criminal defendants, observing that the “veracity of witnesses in criminal cases frequently is subject to doubt before and after they testify .... If prosecutors were hampered in exercising their judgment as to the use of such witnesses by concern about resulting personal liability, [they often would refrain from calling such witnesses and hence] the triers of fact in criminal cases often would be denied relevant evidence”); id., at 446 (White, J., concurring in judgment) (“[0]ne of the effects of permitting suits for knowing use of perjured testimony will be detrimental to the [truth-seeking] process —prosecutors may withhold questionable but valuable testimony from the court”).
Apparently to minimize this concern, the Illinois Supreme Court suggested that prosecutors could impeach witnesses only with respect to statements that are “purposely presented by the defendant.” 123 Ill. 2d 523, 537, 528 N. E. 2d 723, 729 (1988). However, the court did not even purport to determine whether James had “purposely presented” Henderson’s testimony that his hair had been black on the day of the shooting, an omission that clearly highlights “the difficulty of determining whether particular testimony elicited from a defense witness was ‘purposely presented’ by the defendant.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 21, n. 5. Given the inherent subjectivity of this proposed test, a defendant could hardly be confident that all witness statements that are actually inadvertent or surprising to the defendant will be found to be such by the trial court so as not to open the door to impeachment. This proposed limitation thus would not meaningfully blunt the chill imposed on defendants’ presentation of witnesses.
The Illinois Supreme Court also suggested that prosecutors could be allowed to impeach witnesses only with respect to statements offered on direct examination, perhaps recognizing that defendants likely would feel even more insecure about their witnesses’ ability to avoid statements triggering admissibility of suppressed evidence when responding to cross-examination by the prosecutor. We need not decide whether there is a salient distinction between direct and cross-examination in this context, cf. United States v. Havens, 446 U. S. 620 (1980) (rejecting such distinction with respect to defendants’ testimony), because even the more limited expansion of the impeachment exception would palpably inhibit defendants’ presentation of a defense.
Finally, the dissent embraces the Illinois Supreme Court’s suggestion that prosecutors could be allowed to impeach witnesses only when their testimony is in “direct conflict” with the illegally seized evidence. Post, at 325. The dissent suggests that judicial inquiry as to the inconsistency of various statements is “commonplace” under various rules of evidence. Post, at 325, n. 1. But the result of such an inquiry distinguishing between “direct” and “indirect” evidentiary conflicts is far from predictable. Indeed, the authority upon which the dissent relies to define a direct evi-dentiary conflict observes that “[s]uch is the possible variety of statement that it is often difficult to determine whether this inconsistency exists.” 3A Wigmore § 1040, at 1048. The ex ante uncertainty whether a court might find a witness’ testimony to pose a “direct” conflict and therefore trigger the impeachment exception likely will chill defendants’ presentation of potential witnesses in many cases.
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 18-22.
Indeed, the detectives who unlawfully detained James and elicited his incriminating statements already knew that there were several eyewitnesses to the shooting. Because the detectives likely believed that the exclusion of any statement they obtained from James probably would not have precluded the prosecution from making a prima facie case, an exclusionary rule applicable only to the prosecution’s case in chief likely would have provided little deterrent effect in this case.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
A
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sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Me. Justice Powell
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Human Relations Ordinance of the City of Pittsburgh (the Ordinance) has been construed below by the courts of Pennsylvania as forbidding newspapers to carry “help-wanted” advertisements in sex-designated columns except where the employer or advertiser is free to make hiring or employment referral decisions on the basis of sex. We are called upon to decide whether the Ordinance as so construed violates the freedoms of speech and of the press guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. This issue is a sensitive one, and a full understanding of the context in which it arises is critical to its resolution.
I
The Ordinance proscribes discrimination in employment on the basis of race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, place of birth, or sex. In relevant part, § 8 of the Ordinance declares it to be unlawful employment practice, “except where based upon a bona fide occupational exemption certified by the Commission”:
“(a) For any employer to refuse to hire any person or otherwise discriminate against any person with respect to hiring . . . because of . . . sex.
“(e) For any 'employer,’ employment agency or labor organization to publish or circulate, or to cause to be published or circulated, any notice or advertisement relating to 'employment’ or membership which indicates any discrimination because of . . . sex.
“(j) For any person, whether or not an employer, employment agency or labor organization, to aid . . . in the doing of any act declared to be an unlawful employment practice by this ordinance . . . .”
The present proceedings were initiated on October 9, 1969, when the National Organization for Women, Inc. (NOW) filed a complaint with the Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations (the Commission), which is charged with implementing the Ordinance. The complaint alleged that the Pittsburgh Press Co. (Pittsburgh Press) was violating § 8 (j) of the Ordinance by “allowing employers to place advertisements in the male or female columns, when the jobs advertised obviously do not have bona fide occupational qualifications or exceptions Finding probable cause to believe that Pittsburgh Press was' violating the Ordinance, the Commission held a hearing, at which it received evidence and heard argument from the parties and from other interested organizations. Among the exhibits introduced at the hearing were clippings from the help-wanted advertisements carried in the January 4, 1970, edition of the Sunday Pittsburgh Press, arranged by column. In many cases, the advertisements consisted simply of the job title, the salary, and the employment agency carrying the listing, while others included somewhat more extensive job descriptions.
On July 23, 1970, the Commission issued a Decision and Order. It found that during 1969 Pittsburgh Press carried a total of 248,000 help-wanted advertisements; that its practice before October 1969 was to use columns captioned “Male Help Wanted,” “Female Help Wanted,” and “Male-Female Help Wanted”; that it thereafter used the captions “Jobs — Male Interest,” “Jobs — Female Interest,” and “Male-Female”; and that the advertisements were placed in the respective columns according to the advertiser’s wishes, either volunteered by the advertiser or offered in response to inquiry by Pittsburgh Press. The Commission first concluded that § 8 (e) of the Ordinance forbade employers, employment agencies, and labor organizations to submit advertisements for placement in sex-designated columns. It then held that Pittsburgh Press, in violation of § 8 (j), aided the advertisers by maintaining a sex-designated classification system. After specifically considering and rejecting the argument that the Ordinance violated the First Amendment, the Commission ordered Pittsburgh Press to cease and desist such violations and to utilize a classification system with no reference to sex. This order was affirmed in all relevant respects by the Court of Common Pleas.
On appeal in the Commonwealth Court, the scope of the order was narrowed to allow Pittsburgh Press to carry advertisements in sex-designated columns for jobs exempt from the antidiscrimination provisions of the Ordinance. As pointed out in that court’s opinion, the Ordinance does not apply to employers of fewer than five persons, to employers outside the city of Pittsburgh, or to religious, fraternal, charitable, or sectarian organizations, nor does it apply to employment in domestic service or in jobs for which the Commission has certified a bona fide occupational exception. The modified order bars “all reference to sex in employment advertising column headings, except as may be exempt under said Ordinance, or as may be certified as exempt by said Commission.” 4 Pa. Commw. 448, 470, 287 A. 2d 161, 172 (1972). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied review, and we granted certiorari to decide whether, as Pittsburgh Press contends, the modified order violates the First Amendment by restricting its editorial judgment. 409 U. S. 1036 (1972). We affirm.
II
There is little need to reiterate that the freedoms of speech and of the press rank among our most cherished liberties. As Mr. Justice Black put it: “In the First Amendment the Founding Fathers gave the free press the protection it must have to fulfill its essential role in our democracy.” New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U. S. 713, 717 (1971) (concurring opinion). The durability of our system of self-government hinges upon the preservation of these freedoms.
“[S]ince informed public opinion is the most potent of all restraints upon misgovernment, the suppression or abridgement of the publicity afforded by a free press cannot be regarded otherwise than with grave concern. ... A free press stands as one of the great interpreters between the government and the people. To allow it to be fettered is to fetter ourselves.” Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233, 250 (1936).
The repeated emphasis accorded this theme in the decisions of this Court serves to underline the narrowness of the recognized exceptions to the principle that the press may not be regulated by the Government. Our inquiry must therefore be whether the challenged order falls within any of these exceptions.
At the outset, however, it is important to identify with some care the nature of the alleged abridgment. This is not a case in which the challenged law arguably disables the press by undermining its institutional viability. As the press has evolved from an assortment of small printers into a diverse aggregation including large publishing empires as well, the parallel growth and complexity of the economy have led to extensive regulatory legislation from which “[t]he publisher of a newspaper has no special immunity.” Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U. S. 103, 132 (1937). Accordingly, this Court has upheld application to the press of the National Labor Relations Act, ibid.; the Fair Labor Standards Act, Mabee v. White Plains Publishing Co., 327 U. S. 178 (1946); Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U. S. 186 (1946); and the Sherman Antitrust Act, Associated Press v. United States, 326 U. S. 1 (1945); Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U. S. 131 (1969). See also Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U. S. 665 (1972). Yet the Court has recognized on several occasions the special institutional needs of a vigorous press by striking down laws taxing the advertising revenue of newspapers with circulations in excess of 20,000, Grosjean v. American Press Co., supra; requiring a license for the distribution of printed matter, Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444 (1938); and prohibiting the door-to-door distribution of leaflets, Martin v. Struthers, 319 U. S. 141 (1943).
But no suggestion is made in this case that the Ordinance was passed with any purpose of muzzling or curbing the press. Nor does Pittsburgh Press argue that the Ordinance threatens its financial viability or impairs in any significant way its ability to publish and distribute its newspaper. In any event, such a contention would not be supported by the record.
Ill
In a limited way, however, the Ordinance as construed does affect the makeup of the help-wanted section of the newspaper. Under the modified order, Pittsburgh Press will be required to abandon its present policy of providing sex-designated columns and allowing advertisers to select the columns in which their help-wanted advertisements will be placed. In addition, the order does not allow Pittsburgh Press to substitute a policy under which it would make an independent decision regarding placement in sex-designated columns.
Respondents rely principally on the argument that this regulation is permissible because the speech is commercial speech unprotected by the First Amendment. The commercial-speech doctrine is traceable to the brief opinion in Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U. S. 52 (1942), sustaining a city ordinance which had been interpreted to ban the distribution by handbill of an advertisement soliciting customers to pay admission to tour a submarine. Mr. Justice Roberts, speaking for a unanimous Court, said:
“We are . . . clear that the Constitution imposes no such restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising.” Id., at 54.
Subsequent cases have demonstrated, however, that speech is not rendered commercial by the mere fact that it relates to an advertisement. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 (1964), a city official of Montgomery, Alabama, brought a libel action against four clergymen and the New York Times. The names of the clergymen had appeared in an advertisement, carried in the Times, criticizing police action directed against members of the civil rights movement. In holding that this political advertisement was entitled to the same degree of protection as ordinary speech, the Court stated:
“That the Times was paid for publishing the advertisement is as immaterial in this connection as is the fact that newspapers and books are sold.” Id., at 266.
See also Smith v. California, 361 U. S. 147 (1959); Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U. S. 463, 474 (1966). If a newspaper’s profit motive were determinative, all aspects of its operations — from the selection of news stories to the choice of editorial position — would be subject to regulation if it could be established that they were conducted with a view toward increased sales. Such a basis for regulation clearly would be incompatible with the First Amendment.
The critical feature of the advertisement in Valentine v. Chrestensen was that, in the Court’s view, it did no more than propose a commercial transaction, the sale of admission to a submarine. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, Mr. Justice Brennan, for the Court, found the Chrestensen advertisement easily distinguishable:
“The publication here was not a ‘commercial’ advertisement in the sense in which the word was used in Chrestensen. It communicated information, expressed opinion, recited grievances, protested claimed abuses, and sought financial support on behalf of a movement whose existence and objectives are matters of the highest public interest and concern.” 376 U. S., at 266.
In the crucial respects, the advertisements in the present record resemble the Chrestensen rather than the Sullivan advertisement. None expresses a position on whether, as a matter of social policy, certain positions ought to be filled by members of one or the other sex, nor does any of them criticize the Ordinance or the Commission’s enforcement practices. Each is no more than a proposal of possible employment. The advertisements are thus classic examples of commercial speech.
But Pittsburgh Press contends that Chrestensen is not applicable, as the focus in this case must be upon the exercise of editorial judgment by the newspaper as to where to place the advertisement rather than upon its commercial content. The Commission made a finding of fact that Pittsburgh Press defers in every case to the advertiser’s wishes regarding the column in which a want ad should be placed. It is nonetheless true, however, that the newspaper does make a judgment whether or not to allow the advertiser to select the column. We must therefore consider whether this degree of judgmental discretion by the newspaper with respect to a purely commercial advertisement is distinguishable, for the purposes of First Amendment analysis, from the content of the advertisement itself. Or, to put the question differently, is the conduct of the newspaper with respect to the employment want ad entitled to a protection under the First Amendment which the Court held in Chrestensen was not available to a commercial advertiser?
Under some circumstances, at least, a newspaper’s editorial judgments in connection with an advertisement take on the character of the advertisement and, in those cases, the scope of the newspaper’s First Amendment protection may be affected by the content of the advertisement. In the context of a libelous advertisement, for example, this Court has held that the First Amendment does not shield a newspaper from punishment for libel when with actual malice it publishes a falsely defamatory advertisement. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra, at 279-280. Assuming the requisite state of mind, then, nothing in a newspaper’s editorial decision to accept an advertisement changes the character of the falsely defamatory statements. The newspaper may not defend a libel suit on the ground that the falsely defamatory statements are not its own.
Similarly, a commercial advertisement remains commercial in the hands of the media, at least under some circumstances. In Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Acting Attorney General, 405 U. S. 1000 (1972), aff’g 333 F. Supp. 582 (DC 1971), this Court summarily affirmed a district court decision sustaining the constitutionality of 15 U. S. C. § 1335, which prohibits the electronic media from carrying cigarette advertisements. The District Court there found that the advertising should be treated as commercial speech, even though the First Amendment challenge was mounted by radio broadcasters rather than by advertisers. Because of the peculiar characteristics of the electronic media, National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U. S. 190, 226-227 (1943), Capital Broadcasting is not dispositive here on the ultimate question of the constitutionality of the Ordinance. Its significance lies, rather, in its recognition that the exercise of this kind of editorial judgment does not necessarily strip commercial advertising of its commercial character.
As for the present case, we are not persuaded that either the decision to accept a commercial advertisement which the advertiser directs to be placed in a sex-designated column or the actual placement there lifts the newspaper’s actions from the category of commercial speech. By implication at least, an advertiser whose want ad appears in the “Jobs — Male Interest” column is likely to discriminate against women in his hiring decisions. Nothing in a sex-designated column heading sufficiently dissociates the designation from the want ads placed beneath it to make the placement severable for First Amendment purposes from the want ads themselves. The combination, which conveys essentially the same message as an overtly discriminatory want ad, is in practical effect an integrated commercial statement.
Pittsburgh Press goes on to argue that if this package of advertisement and placement is commercial speech, then commercial speech should be accorded a higher level of protection than Chrestensen and its progeny would suggest. Insisting that the exchange of information is as important in the commercial realm as in any other, the newspaper here would have us abrogate the distinction between commercial and other speech.
Whatever the merits of this contention may be in other contexts, it is unpersuasive in this case. Discrimination in employment is not only commercial activity, it is illegal commercial activity under the Ordinance. We have no doubt that a newspaper constitutionally could be forbidden to publish a want ad proposing a sale of narcotics or soliciting prostitutes. Nor would the result be different if the nature of the transaction were indicated by placement under columns captioned “Narcotics for Sale” and “Prostitutes Wanted” rather than stated within the four corners of the advertisement.
The illegality in this case may be less overt, but we see no difference in principle here. Sex discrimination in nonexempt employment has been declared illegal under § 8 (a) of the Ordinance, a provision not challenged here. And § 8 (e) of the Ordinance forbids any employer, employment agency, or labor union to publish or cause to be published any advertisement “indicating” sex discrimination. This, too, is unchallenged. Moreover, the Commission specifically concluded that it is an unlawful employment practice for an advertiser to cause an employment advertisement to be published in a sex-designated column.
Section 8 (j) of the Ordinance, the only provision which Pittsburgh Press was found to have violated and the only provision under attack here, makes it unlawful for “any person ... to aid ... in the doing of any act declared to be an unlawful employment practice by this ordinance.” The Commission and the courts below concluded that the practice of placing want ads for nonexempt employment in sex-designated columns did indeed “aid” employers to indicate illegal sex preferences. The advertisements, as embroidered by their placement, signaled that the advertisers were likely to show an illegal sex preference in their hiring decisions. Any Pirst Amendment interest which might be served by advertising an ordinary commercial proposal and which might arguably outweigh the governmental interest supporting the regulation is altogether absent when the commercial activity itself is illegal and the restriction on advertising is incidental to a valid limitation on economic activity.
IV
It is suggested, in the brief of an amicus curiae, that apart from other considerations, the Commission’s order should be condemned as a prior restraint on expression. As described by Blackstone, the protection against prior restraint at common law barred only a system of administrative censorship:
“To subject the press to the restrictive power of a licenser, as was formerly done, both before and since the revolution, ... is to subject all freedom of sentiment to the prejudices of one man, and make him the arbitrary and infallible judge of all controverted points in learning, religion, and government.” 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *152.
While the Court boldly stepped beyond this narrow doctrine in Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697 (1931), in striking down an injunction against further publication of a newspaper found to be a public nuisance, it has never held that all injunctions are impermissible. See Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U. S. 143 (1951). The special vice of a prior restraint is that communication will be suppressed, either directly or by inducing excessive caution in the speaker, before an adequate determination that it is unprotected by the First Amendment.
The present order does not endanger arguably protected speech. Because the order is based on a continuing course of repetitive conduct, this is not a case in which the Court is asked to speculate as to the effect of publication. Cf. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U. S. 713 (1971). Moreover, the order is clear and sweeps no more broadly than necessary. And because no interim relief was granted, the order will not have gone into effect before our final determination that the actions of Pittsburgh Press were unprotected.
V
We emphasize that nothing in our holding allows government at any level to forbid Pittsburgh Press to publish and distribute advertisements commenting on the Ordinance, the enforcement practices of the Commission, or the propriety of sex preferences in employment. Nor, a jortiori, does our decision authorize any restriction whatever, whether of content or layout, on stories or commentary originated by Pittsburgh Press, its columnists, or its contributors. On the contrary, we reaffirm unequivocally the protection afforded to editorial judgment and to the free expression of views on these and other issues, however controversial. We hold only that the Commission’s modified order, narrowly drawn to prohibit placement in sex-designated columns of advertisements for nonexempt job opportunities, does not infringe the First Amendment rights of Pittsburgh Press.
Affirmed.
[For Appendix to opinion of the Court, see post, p. 392.]
APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT
Among the advertisements carried in the Sunday Pittsburgh Press on January 4, 1970, was the following one, submitted by an employment agency and placed in the “JOBS — MALE INTEREST” column:
ACAD. INSTRUCTORS. $13,000
ACCOUNTANTS . 10,000
ADM. ASS’T, CPA. 15,000
ADVERTISING MGR. 10,000
BOOKKEEPER F-C. 9,000
FINANCIAL CONSULTANT. 12,000
MARKETING MANAGER. 15,000
MGMT. TRAINEE. 8,400
OFFICE MGR. TRAINEE. 7,200
LAND DEVELOPMENT. 30,000
PRODUCT. MANAGER. 18,000
PERSONNEL MANAGER. OPEN
SALES-ADVERTISING . 8,400
SALES-CONSUMER . 9,600
SALES-INDUSTRIAL . 12,000
SALES-MACHINERY . 8,400
RETAIL MGR. 15,000
Most Positions Fee Paid EMPLOYMENT SPECIALISTS 2248 Oliver Bldg. 261-2250 Employment Agency
App. 311a.
On the same day, the same agency’s advertisement in the “JOBS-FEMALE INTEREST” column was as follows:
ACAD. INSTRUCTORS. $13,000
ACCOUNTANTS . 6,000
AUTO-INS. UNDERWRITER. OPEN
BOOKKEEPER-INS . 5,000
CLERK-TYPIST . 4,200
DRAFTSMAN . 6,000
KEYPUNCH D. T. 6,720
KEYPUNCH BEGINNER. 4,500
PROOFREADER . 4,900
RECEPTIONIST — Mature D. T.... OPEN
EXEC. SEC. 6,300
SECRETARY . 4,800
SECRETARY, Equal Oppor. 6,000
SECRETARY D. T. 5,400
TEACHERS-Pt, Time. day 33.
TYPIST-Statistical . 5,000
Most Positions Fee Paid
EMPLOYMENT SPECIALISTS 2248 Oliver Bldg. 261-2250 Employment Agency
Ibid.
Characteristic of those offering fuller job descriptions was the following advertisement, carried in the “JOBS — MALE INTEREST” column:
STAFF MANAGEMENT TRAINEE TO $12,000
If you have had background in the management of small business then this could be the stepping stone you have been waiting for. You will be your own boss with no cash outlay. Call or write today.
App. 313a.
For the full text of the Ordinance and the 1969 amendment adding sex to the list of proscribed classifications, see App. 410a-436a.
These exhibits are reproduced in App. 299a-333a.
For examples of these want ads, see the Appendix to this opinion, infra, at 392-393.
The full text of the Commission’s Decision and Order is set forth in the Appendix to the Petition for Certiorari, at la-18a.
The Commission specifically found that:
“5. The Pittsburgh Press permits the advertiser to select the column within which its advertisement is to be inserted.
“6. When an advertiser does not indicate a column, the Press asks the advertiser whether it wants a male or female for the job and then inserts the advertisement in the jobs — male interest or jobs — female interest column accordingly.” Id., at 16a.
See id., at 19a.
Pittsburgh Press also argues that the Ordinance violates due process in that there is no rational connection between sex-designated column headings and sex discrimination in employment. It draws attention to a disclaimer which it runs at the beginning of each of the “Jobs — Male Interest” and “Jobs — Female Interest” columns:
“Notice to Job Seekers”
“Jobs are arranged under Male and Female classifications for the convenience of our readers. This is done because most jobs generally appeal more to persons of one sex than the other. Various laws and ordinances — local, state, and federal, prohibit discrimination in employment because of sex unless sex is a bona fide occupational requirement. Unless the advertisement itself specifies one sex or the other, job seekers should assume that the advertiser will consider applicants of either sex in compliance with the laws against discrimination.”
It suffices to dispose of this contention by noting that the Commission’s commonsense recognition that the two are connected is supported by evidence in the present record. See App. 236a-239a. See also Hailes v. United, Air Lines, 464 F. 2d 1006, 1009 (CA6 1972). The Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex of the Federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission reflect a similar conclusion. See 29 CFR § 1604.4.
See also Jones v. Opelika, 319 U. S. 103 (1943); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105 (1943).
In response to questioning at oral argument, counsel for Pittsburgh Press stated only:
“Now, I’m not prepared to answer whether the company makes money on [want ads] or not. I suspect it does. They charge for want-ads, and they do make a lot of their revenue in the newspaper through advertising, of course; and I suspect it is profitable.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 10.
In Head v. New Mexico Board, 374 U. S. 424 (1963), this Court upheld an injunction prohibiting a newspaper and a radio station from carrying optometrists’ advertisements which violated New Mexico law. But because the issue had not been raised in the lower courts, this Court did not consider the appellant’s First Amendment challenge. Id., at 432 n. 12.
See also New York State Broadcasters Assn. v. United States, 414 F. 2d 990 (CA2 1969), cert. denied, 396 U. S. 1061 (1970) (refusing to strike down a ban on broadcasts promoting a lottery).
See Note, Freedom of Expression in a Commercial Context, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 1191, 1195-1196 (1965). Cf. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582, 593 n. 42 (D. C. 1971) (Wright, J., dissenting); Camp-of-the-Pines, Inc. v. New York Times Co., 184 Misc. 389, 53 N. Y. S. 2d 475 (1945).
Brief for Amicus Curiae American Newspaper Publishers Association 22 n. 32.
The dissent of The Chief Justice argues that Pittsburgh Press is in danger of being “subject to summary punishment for contempt for having made an 'unlucky’ legal guess.” Post, at 396-397. The Commission is without power to punish summarily for contempt. When it concludes that its order has been violated, “the Commission shall certify the case and the entire record of its proceedings to the City Solicitor, who shall invoke the aid of an appropriate court to secure enforcement or compliance with the order or to impose [a fine of not more than $300] or both." § 14 of the Ordinance; Appendix to Pet. for Cert. 103a. But, more fundamentally, it was the newspaper’s policy of allowing employers to place advertisements in sex-designated columns without regard to the exceptions or exemptions contained in the Ordinance, not its treatment of particular want ads, which was challenged in the complaint and was found by the Commission and the courts below to be violative of the Ordinance. Nothing in the modified order or the opinions below prohibits the newspaper from relying in good faith on the representation of an advertiser that a particular job falls within an exception to the Ordinance.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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C
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice O’Connor
announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which The Chief Justice, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer join.
Section 26.10.160(B) of the Revised Code of Washington permits “[a]ny person” to petition a superior court for visitation rights “at any time,” and authorizes that court to grant such visitation rights whenever “visitation may serve the best interest of the child.” Petitioners Jenifer and Gary Troxel petitioned a Washington Superior Court for the right to visit their grandchildren, Isabelle and Natalie Troxel. Respondent Tommie Granville, the mother of Isabelle and Natalie, opposed the petition. The ease ultimately reached the Washington Supreme Court, which held that §26.10.160(3) unconstitutionally interferes with the fundamental right of parents to rear their children.
I
Tommie Granville and Brad Troxel shared a relationship that ended in June 1991. The two never married, but they had two daughters, Isabelle and Natalie. Jenifer and Gary Troxel are Brad’s parents, and thus the paternal grandparents of Isabelle and Natalie. After Tommie and Brad separated in 1991, Brad lived with his parents and regularly brought his daughters to his parents’ home for weekend visitation. Brad committed suicide in May 1993. Although the Troxels at first continued to see Isabelle and Natalie on a regular basis after their son’s death, Tommie Granville informed the Troxels in October 1993 that she wished to limit their visitation with her daughters to one short visit per month. In re Smith, 137 Wash. 2d 1, 6, 969 P. 2d 21, 23-24 (1998); In re Troxel, 87 Wash. App. 131, 133, 940 P. 2d 698, 698-699 (1997).
In December 1993, the Troxels commenced the present action by filing, in the Washington Superior Court for Skagit County, a petition to obtain visitation rights with Isabelle and Natalie. The Troxels filed their petition under two Washington statutes, Wash. Rev. Code §§26.09.240 and 26.10.160(3) (1994). Only the latter statute is at issue in this case. Section 26.10.160(3) provides: “Any person may petition the court for visitation rights at any time including, but not limited to, custody proceedings. The court may order visitation rights for any person when visitation may serve the best interest of the child whether or not there has been any change of circumstances.” At trial, the Troxels requested two weekends of overnight visitation per month and two weeks of visitation each summer. Granville did not oppose visitation altogether, but instead asked the court to order one day of visitation per month with no overnight stay. 87 Wash. App., at 133-134, 940 P. 2d, at 699. In 1995, the Superior Court issued an oral ruling and entered a visitation decree ordering visitation one weekend per month, one week during the summer, and four hours on both of the petitioning grandparents’ birthdays. 137 Wash. 2d, at 6, 969 P. 2d, at 23; App. to Pet. for Cert. 76a-78a.
Granville appealed, during which time she married Kelly Wynn. Before addressing the merits of Granville’s appeal, the Washington Court of Appeals remanded the ease to the Superior Court for entry of written findings of fact and conclusions of law. 137 Wash. 2d, at 6, 969 P. 2d, at 23. On remand, the Superior Court found that visitation was in Isabelle’s and Natalie’s best interests:
“The Petitioners [the Troxels] are part of a large, central, loving family, all located in this area, and the Petitioners can provide opportunities for the children in the areas of cousins and music.
.. The court took into consideration all factors regarding the best interest of the children and considered all the testimony before it. The children would be bene-fitted from spending quality time with the Petitioners, provided that that time is balanced with time with the childrens’ [sic] nuclear family. The court finds that the childrens’ [sic] best interests are served by spending time with their mother and stepfather’s other six children.” App. 70a.
Approximately nine months after the Superior Court entered its order on remand, Granville’s husband formally adopted Isabelle and Natalie. Id,, at 60a-67a.
The Washington Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s visitation order and dismissed the Troxels’ petition for visitation, holding that nonparents lack standing to seek visitation under §26.10.160(3) unless a custody action is pending. In the Court of Appeals’ view, that limitation on nonparental visitation actions was “consistent with the constitutional restrictions on state interference with parents’ fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and management of their children.” 87 Wash. App., at 135, 940 P. 2d, at 700 (internal quotation marks omitted). Having resolved the case on the statutory ground, however, the Court of Appeals did not expressly pass on Granville’s constitutional challenge to the visitation statute. Id., at 138, 940 P. 2d, at 701.
The Washington Supreme Court granted the Troxels’ petition for review and, after consolidating their case with two other visitation cases, affirmed. The court disagreed with the Court of Appeals’ decision on the statutory issue and found that the plain language of §26.10.160(3) gave the Trox-els standing to seek visitation, irrespective of whether a custody action was pending. 137 Wash. 2d, at 12, 969 P. 2d, at 26-27. The Washington Supreme Court nevertheless agreed with the Court of Appeals’ ultimate conclusion that the Troxels could not obtain visitation of Isabelle and Natalie pursuant to §26.10.160(3). The court rested its decision on the Federal Constitution, holding that §26.10.160(3) unconstitutionally infringes on the fundamental right of parents to rear their children. In the court’s view, there were at least two problems with the nonparental visitation statute. First, according to the Washington Supreme Court, the Constitution permits a State to interfere with the right of parents to rear their children only to prevent harm or potential harm to a child. Section 26.10.160(3) fails that standard because it requires no threshold showing of harm. Id., at 16-20, 969 P. 2d, at 28-30. Second, by allowing “ 'any person’ to petition for forced visitation of a child at 'any time’ with the only requirement being that the visitation serve the best interest of the child,” the Washington visitation statute sweeps too broadly. Id., at 20, 969 P. 2d, at 30. “It is not within the province of the state to make significant decisions concerning the custody of children merely because it could make a 'better’ decision.” Ibid., 969 P. 2d, at 31. The Washington Supreme Court held that “[p]arents have a right to limit visitation of their children with third persons,” and that between parents and judges, “the parents should be the ones to choose whether to expose their children to certain people or ideas.” Id., at 21, 969 P. 2d, at 31. Four justices dissented from the Washington Supreme Court’s holding on the constitutionality of the statute. Id., at 23-43, 969 P. 2d, at 32-42.
We granted certiorari, 527 U. S. 1069 (1999), and now affirm the judgment.
II
The demographic changes of the past century make it difficult to speak of an average American family. The composition of families varies greatly from household to household. While many children may have two married parents and grandparents who visit regularly, many other children are raised in single-parent households. In 1996, children living with only one parent accounted for 28 percent of all children under age 18 in the United States. U. S. Dept, of Commerce, Bureau of Census, Current Population Reports, 1997 Population Profile of the United States 27 (1998). Understandably, in these single-parent households, persons outside the nuclear family are called upon with increasing frequency to assist in the everyday tasks of child rearing. In many cases, grandparents play an important role. For example, in 1998, approximately 4 million children — or 5.6 percent of all children under age 18 — lived in the household of their grandparents. U. S. Dept, of Commerce, Bureau of Census, Current Population Reports, Marital Status and Living Arrangements: March 1998 (Update), p. i (1998).
The nationwide enactment of nonparental visitation statutes is assuredly due, in some part, to the States* recognition of these changing realities of the American family. Because grandparents and other relatives undertake duties of a parental nature in many households, States have sought to ensure the welfare of the children therein by protecting the relationships those children form with such third parties. The States’ nonparental visitation statutes are further supported by a recognition, which varies from State to State, that children should have the opportunity to benefit from relationships with statutorily specified persons — for example, their grandparents. The extension of statutory rights in this area to persons other than a child’s parents, however, comes with an obvious cost. For example, the State’s recognition of an independent third-party interest in a child can place a substantial burden on the traditional parent-child relationship. Contrary to Justice Stevens’ accusation, our description of state nonparental visitation statutes in these terms, of course, is not meant to suggest that “children are so much chattel.” Post, at 89 (dissenting opinion). Rather, our terminology is intended to highlight the fact that these statutes can present questions of constitutional import. In this case, we are presented with just such a question. Specifically, we are asked to decide whether §26.10.160(3), as applied to Tommie Granville and her family, violates the Federal Constitution.
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no State shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” We have long recognized that the Amendment’s Due Process Clause, like its Fifth Amendment counterpart, “guarantees more than fair process.” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U. S. 702, 719 (1997). The Clause also includes a substantive component that “provides heightened protection against government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests.” Id., at 720; see also Reno v. Flores, 507 U. S. 292, 301-302 (1993).
The liberty interest at issue in this case — the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children— is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court. More than 75 years ago, in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, 399, 401 (1923), we held that the “liberty” protected by the Due Process Clause includes the right of parents to “establish a home and bring up children” and “to control the education of their own.” Two years later, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 534-535 (1925), we again held that the “liberty of parents and guardians” includes the right “to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control.” We explained in Pierce that “[t]he child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.” Id., at 535. We returned to the subject in Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158 (1944), and again confirmed that there is a constitutional dimension to the right of parents to direct the upbringing of their children. “It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.” Id., at 166.
In subsequent eases also, we have recognized the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children. See, e. g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U. S. 645, 651 (1972) (“It is plain that the interest of a parent in the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children ‘eome[s] to this Court with a momentum for respect lacking when appeal is made to liberties which derive merely from shifting economic arrangements’ ” (citation omitted)); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205, 232 (1972) (“The history and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children. This primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition”); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U. S. 246, 255 (1978) (“We have recognized on numerous occasions that the relationship between parent and child is constitutionally protected”); Parham v. J. R., 442 U. S. 584, 602 (1979) (“Our jurisprudence historically has reflected Western civilization concepts of the family as a unit with broad parental authority over minor children. Our eases have consistently followed that course”); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U. S. 745, 758 (1982) (discussing “[t]he fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child”); Glucksberg, supra, at 720 (“In a long line of cases, we have held that, in addition to the specific freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights, the ‘liberty’ specially protected by the Due Process Clause includes the righ[t]... to direct the education and upbringing of one’s children” (citing Meyer and Pierce)). In light of this extensive precedent', it cannot now be doubted that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.
Section 26.10.160(3), as applied to Granville and her family in this ease, unconstitutionally infringes on that fundamental parental right. The Washington nonparental visitation statute is breathtakingly broad. According to the statute’s text, “[a]ny person may petition the court for visitation rights at any time,” and the eourt may grant such visitation rights whenever "visitation may serve the best interest of the child” §26.10.160(3) (emphases added). That language effectively permits any third party seeking visitation to subject any decision by a parent concerning visitation of the parent’s children to state-court review. Once the visitation petition has been filed in court and the matter is placed before a judge, a parent’s decision that visitation would not be in the child’s best interest is accorded no deference. Section 26.10.160(3) contains no requirement that a court accord the parent’s decision any presumption of validity or any weight whatsoever. Instead, the Washington statute places the best-interest determination solely in the hands of the judge. Should the judge disagree with the parent’s estimation of the child’s best interests, the judge’s view necessarily prevails. Thus, in practical effect, in the State of Washington a eourt can disregard and overturn any decision by a fit custodial parent concerning visitation whenever a third party affected by the decision files a visitation petition, based solely on the judge’s determination of the child’s best interests. The Washington Supreme Court had the opportunity to give §26.10.160(3) a narrower reading, but it declined to do so. See, e. g., 137 Wash. 2d, at 5, 969 R 2d, at 23 (“[The statute] allow[s] any person, at any time, to petition for visitation without regard to relationship to the child, without regard to changed circumstances, and without regard to harm”); id., at 20, 969 P. 2d, at 30 (“[The statute] allowfs] ‘any person’ to petition for forced visitation of a child at ‘any time’ with the only requirement being that the visitation serve the best interest of the child”).
Turning to the facts of this case, the record reveals that the Superior Court’s order was based on precisely the type of mere disagreement we have just described and nothing more. The Superior Court’s order was not founded on any special factors that might justify the State’s interference with Granville’s fundamental right to make decisions concerning the rearing of her two daughters. To be sure, this case involves a visitation petition filed by grandparents soon after the death of their son — the father of Isabelle and Natalie — but the combination of several factors here compels our conclusion that §26.10.160(3), as applied, exceeded the bounds of the Due Pi’ocess Clause.
First, the Troxels did not allege, and no court has found, that Granville was an unfit parent. That aspect of the case is important, for there is a presumption that fit parents act in the best interests of their children. As this Court explained in Parham,:
“[0]ur constitutional system long ago rejected any notion that a child is the mere creature of the State and, on the contrary, asserted that parents generally have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare [their children] for additional obligations.... The law’s concept of the family rests on a presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment required for making life’s difficult decisions. More important, historically it has recognized that natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their children.” 442 U. S., at 602 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Accordingly, so long as a parent adequately cares for his or her children (i. <?., is fit), there will normally be no reason for the State to inject itself into the private realm of the family to further question the ability of that parent to make the best decisions concerning the rearing of that parent’s children. See, e. g., Flores, 507 U. S., at 304.
The problem here is not that the Washington Superior Court intervened, but that when it did so, it gave no special weight at all to Granville’s determination of her daughters’ best interests. More importantly, it appears that the Superior Court applied exactly the opposite presumption. In reciting its oral ruling after the conclusion of closing arguments, the Superior Court judge explained: '
“The burden is to show that it is in the best interest of the children to have some visitation and some quality time with their grandparents. I think in most situations a eommonsensical approach [is that] it is normally in the best interest of the children to spend quality time with the grandparent, unless the grandparent, [sic] there are some issues or problems involved wherein the grandparents, their lifestyles are going to impact adversely upon the children. That certainly isn’t the case here from what I can tell.” Verbatim Report of Proceedings in In re Troxel, No. 93-3-00650-7 (Wash. Super. Ct., Dec. 14, 19, 1994), p. 213 (hereinafter Verbatim Report).
The judge’s comments suggest that he presumed the grandparents’ request should be granted unless the children would be “impacted] adversely.” In effect, the judge placed on Granville, the fit custodial parent, the burden of disproving that visitation would be in the best interest of her daughters. The judge reiterated moments later: “I think [visitation with the Troxels] would be in the best interest of the children and I haven’t been shown it is not in [the] best interest of the children.” Id., at 214.
The decisional framework employed by the Superior Court directly contravened the traditional presumption that a fit parent will act in the best interest of his or her child. See Parham, supra, at 602. In that respect, the court’s presumption failed to provide any protection for Granville’s fundamental constitutional right to make decisions concerning the rearing of her own daughters. Cf., e. g., Cal. Fam. Code Ann. § 3104(e) (West 1994) (rebuttable presumption that grandparent visitation is not in child’s best interest if parents agree that visitation rights should not be granted); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 19A, § 1803(3) (1998) (court may award grandparent visitation if in best interest of child and “would not significantly interfere with any parent-child relationship or with the parent’s rightful authority over the child”); Minn. Stat. §257.022(2)(a)(2) (1998) (court may award grandparent visitation if in best interest of child and “such visitation would not interfere with the parent-child relationship”); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-1802(2) (1998) (court must find “by clear and convincing evidence” that grandparent visitation “will not adversely interfere with the parent-child relationship”); R. I. Gen. Laws § 15-5-24.3(a)(2)(v) (Supp. 1999) (grandparent must rebut, by clear and convincing evidence, presumption that parent’s decision to refuse grandparent visitation was reasonable); Utah Code Ann. § 30-5-2(2)(e) (1998) (same); Hoff v. Berg, 595 N. W. 2d 285, 291-292 (N. D. 1999) (holding North Dakota grandparent visitation statute unconstitutional because State has no “compelling interest in presuming visitation rights of grandparents to an unmarried minor are in the child’s best interests and forcing parents to accede to court-ordered grandparental visitation unless the parents are first able to prove such visitation is not in the best interests of their minor child”). In an ideal world, parents might always seek to cultivate the bonds between grandparents and their grandchildren. Needless to say, however, our world is far from perfect, and in it the decision whether such an intergenerational relationship would be beneficial in any specific case is for the parent to make in the first instance. And, if a fit parent’s decision of the kind at issue here becomes subject to judicial review, the court must accord at least some special weight to the parent’s own determination.
Finally, we note that there is no allegation that Granville ever sought to cut off visitation entirely. Rather, the present dispute originated when Granville informed the Troxels that she would prefer to restrict their visitation with Isabelle and Natalie to one short visit per month and special holidays. See 87 Wash. App., at 133, 940 P. 2d, at 699; Verbatim Report 12. In the Superior Court proceedings Gran-ville did not oppose visitation but instead asked that the duration of any visitation order be shorter than that requested by the Troxels. While the Troxels requested two weekends per month and two full weeks in the summer, Granville asked the Superior Court to order only one day of visitation per month (with no overnight stay) and participation in the Gran-ville family’s holiday celebrations. See 87 Wash. App., at 133, 940 P. 2d, at 699; Verbatim Report 9 (“Right off the bat we’d like to say that our position is that grandparent visitation is in the best interest of the children. It is a matter of how much and how it is going to be structured”) (opening statement by Granville’s attorney). The Superior Court gave no weight to Granville’s having assented to visitation even before the filing of any visitation petition or subsequent court intervention. The court instead rejected Granville’s proposal and settled on a middle ground, ordering one weekend of visitation per month, one week in the summer, and time on both of the petitioning grandparents’ birthdays. See 87 Wash. App., at 133-134, 940 P. 2d, at 699; Verbatim Report 216-221. Significantly, many other States expressly provide by statute that courts may not award visitation unless a parent has denied (or unreasonably denied) visitation to the concerned third party. See, e. g., Miss. Code Ann. § 93-16-3(2)(a) (1994) (court must find that “the parent or custodian of the child unreasonably denied the grandparent visitation rights with the child”); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 109.121(l)(a)(B) (1997) (court may award visitation if the “custodian of the child has denied the grandparent reasonable opportunity to visit the child”); R. I. Gen. Laws §§ 15-5-24.3(a)(2)(iii)-(iv) (Supp. 1999) (court must find that parents prevented grandparent from visiting grandchild and that “there is no other way the petitioner is able to visit his or her grandchild without court intervention”).
Considered together with the Superior Court’s reasons for awarding visitation to the Troxels, the combination of these factors demonstrates that the visitation order in this case was an unconstitutional infringement on Granville’s fundamental right to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of her two daughters. The Washington Superior Court failed to accord the determination of Granville, a fit custodial parent, any material weight. In fact, the Superior Court made only two formal findings in support of its- visitation order. First, the Troxels “are part of a large, central, loving family, all located in this area, and the [Troxels] can provide opportunities for the children in the areas of cousins and music.” App. 70a. Second, “[t]he children would be benefited from spending quality time with the [Troxels], provided that that time is balanced with time with the chil-drens’ [sic] nuclear family.” Ibid. These slender findings, in combination with the court’s announced presumption in favor of grandparent visitation and its failure to accord significant weight to Granville’s already having offered meaningful visitation to the Troxels, show that this case involves nothing more than a simple disagreement between the Washington Superior Court and Granville concerning her children’s best interests. The Superior Court’s announced reason for ordering one week of visitation in the summer demonstrates our conclusion well: “I look back on some personal experiences.... We always spen[t] as kids a week with one set of grandparents and another set of grandparents, [and] it happened to work out in our family that [it] turned out to be an enjoyable experience. Maybe that can, in this family, if that is how it works out.” Verbatim Report 220-221. As we have explained, the Due Process Clause does not permit a State to infringe on the fundamental right of parents to make child rearing decisions simply because a state judge believes a “better” decision could be made. Neither the Washington nonparental visitation statute generally — which places no limits on either the persons who may petition for visitation or the circumstances in which such a petition may be granted — nor the Superior Court in this specific ease required anything more. Accordingly, we hold that §26.10.160(3), as applied in this case, is unconstitutional.
Because we rest our decision on the sweeping breadth of §26.10.160(3) and the application of that broad, unlimited power in this ease, we do not consider the primary constitutional question passed on by the Washington Supreme Court — whether the Due Process Clause requires all nonpa-rental visitation statutes to include a showing of harm or potential harm to the child as a condition precedent to granting visitation. We do not, and need not, define today the precise scope of the parental due process right in the visitation context. In this respect, we agree with Justice Kennedy that the constitutionality of any standard for awarding visitation turns on the specific manner in which that standard is applied and that the constitutional protections in this area are best “elaborated with care.” Post, at 101 (dissenting opinion). Because much state-court adjudication in this context occurs on a case-by-case basis, we would be hesitant to hold that specific nonparental visitation statutes violate the Due Process Clause as a per se matter. See, e. g., Fair banks v. McCarter, 330 Md. 39,49-50, 622 A. 2d 121, 126-127 (1993) (interpreting best-interest standard in grandparent visitation statute normally to require court’s consideration of certain factors); Williams v. Williams, 256 Va. 19, 501 S. E. 2d 417, 418 (1998) (interpreting Virginia nonparental visitation statute to require finding of harm as condition precedent to awarding visitation).
Justice Stevens criticizes our reliance on what he characterizes as merely “a guess” about the Washington courts’ interpretation of § 26.10.160(3). Post, at 82 (dissenting opinion). Justice Kennedy likewise states that “[m]ore specific guidance should await a case in which a State’s highest court has considered all of the facts in the course of elaborating the protection afforded to parents by the laws of the State and by the Constitution itself.” Post, at 102 (dissenting opinion). We respectfully disagree. There is no need to hypothesize about how the Washington courts might apply §26.10.160(3) because the Washington Superior Court did apply the statute in this very case. Like the Washington Supreme Court, then, we are presented with an actual visitation order and the reasons why the Superior Court believed entry of the order was appropriate in this ease. Paced with the Superior Court’s application of §26.10.160(8) to Granville and her family, the Washington Supreme Court chose not to give the statute a narrower construction. Rather, that court gave §26.10.160(3) a literal and expansive interpretation. As we have explained, that broad construction plainly encompassed the Superior Court’s application of the statute. See supra, at 67.
There is thus no reason to remand the ease for further proceedings in the Washington Supreme Court. As Justice Kennedy recognizes, the burden of litigating a domestic relations proceeding can itself be “so disruptive of the parent-child relationship that the constitutional right of a custodial parent to make certain basic determinations for the child’s welfare becomes implicated.” Post, at 101. In this case, the litigation costs incurred by Granville on her trip through the Washington court system and to this Court are without a doubt already substantial. As we have explained, it is apparent that the entry of the visitation order in this case violated the Constitution. We should say so now, without forcing the parties into additional litigation that would further burden Granville’s parental right. We therefore hold that the application of §26.10.160(8) to Granville and her family violated her due process right to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of her daughters.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Washington Supreme Court is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
A11 50 States have statutes that provide for grandparent visitation in some form. See Ala. Code § 30-3-4.1 (1989); Alaska Stat. Ann. § 25.20.065 (1998); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §25-409 (1994); Ark. Code Ann. §9-13-103 (1998); Cal. Fam. Code Ann. §3104 (West 1994); Colo. Rev. Stat. §19-1-117 (1999); Conn. Gen. Stat. §46b-59 (1995); Del. Code Ann., Tit. 10, §1031(7) (1999); Fla. Stat. §752.01 (1997); Ga. Code Ann. §19-7-3 (1991); Haw. Rev. Stat. §571-46.3 (1999); Idaho Code §32-719 (1999); Ill. Comp. Stat., eh. 750, §5/607 (1998); Ind. Code §31-17-5-1 (1999); Iowa Code §598.35 (1999); Kan. Stat. Ann. §38-129 (1993); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §405.021 (Baldwin 1990); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §9:344 (West Supp. 2000); La. Civ. Code Ann., Art. 136 (West Supp. 2000); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 19A, §1803 (1998); Md. Fam. Law Code Ann. §9-102 (1999); Mass. Gen. Laws §119:39D (1996); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 722.27b (West Supp. 1999); Minn. Stat. §257.022 (1998); Miss. Code Ann. §98-16-3 (1994); Mo. Rev. Stat. §452.402 (Supp. 1999); Mont. Code Ann. §40-9-102 (1997); Neb. Rev. Stat. §43-1802 (1998); Nev. Rev. Stat. §125C.050 (Supp. 1999); N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §458:17-d (1992); N. J. Stat. Ann. §9:2-7.1 (West Supp. 1999-2000); N. M. Stat. Ann. §40-9-2 (1999); N. Y. Dorn. Rel. Law §72 (McKinney 1999); N. C. Gen. Stat. §§50-13.2,50-13.2A (1999); N. D. Cent. Code §14-09-05.1 (1997); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§3109.051, 3109.11 (Supp. 1999); Oída. Stat., Tit. 10, §5 (Supp. 1999); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 109.121 (1997); 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§5311-5313 (1991); R. I. Gen. Laws §§15-5-24 to 15-5-24.3 (Supp. 1999); S. C. Code Ann. §20-7-420(33) (Supp. 1999); S. D. Codified Laws §25-4-52 (1999); Tenn. Code Ann. §§36-6-306, 36-6-307 (Supp. 1999); Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §153.433 (Supp. 2000); Utah Code Ann. §30-5-2 (1998); Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 15, §§1011-1013 (1989); Va. Code Ann. §20
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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E
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Stewart
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Section 301 (k) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act prohibits the “alteration, mutilation, destruction, obliteration, or removal of the whole or any part of the labeling of, or the doing of any other act with respect to, a food, drug, device, or cosmetic, if such act is done while such article is held for sale . . . after shipment in interstate commerce and results in such article being adulterated or misbranded.” Section 402 of the Act provides, among other things, that “[a] food shall be deemed to be adulterated — (a) ... (3) if it consists in whole or in part of any filthy, putrid, or decomposed substance, or if it is otherwise unfit for food; or (4) if it has been prepared, packed, or held under insanitary conditions whereby it may have become contaminated with filth, or whereby it may have been rendered injurious to health . ...” The question presented by this appeal is whether a criminal information which alleges the holding of food by a public storage warehouseman (after interstate shipment and before ultimate sale) under insanitary conditions in a building accessible to rodents, birds and insects, where it may have become contaminated with filth, charges an offense under § 301 (k).
The Government filed a criminal information containing allegations to this effect in the District Court for the Middle District of Florida, charging the appellee, a public storage warehouseman, with violations of § 301 (k). The court construed § 301 (k) as not applying to the mere act of “holding” goods, and dismissed the information for failure to allege an offense under the statute. 217 F. Supp. 638, 639. The order of dismissal was appealed by the Government under the Criminal Appeals Act, which gives this Court jurisdiction to review on direct appeal a judgment dismissing an information on the basis of a “construction of the statute upon which the . . . information is founded.” We noted probable jurisdiction. 373 U. S. 921. For the reasons which follow, we reverse the judgment of the District Court.
In arriving at its construction of the statute, the District Court reasoned that § 301 (k) “as it is presently written, is too vague and indefinite to apply to the mere act of ‘holding’ goods.” 217 F. Supp., at 639. Accordingly, “in an effort to uphold the statute as constitutional,” the court applied the rule of ejusdem generis to limit the words “the doing of any other act” in § 301 (k) to acts of “the same general nature” as those specifically enumerated in the subsection, i. e., acts relating to the alteration, mutilation, destruction, obliteration, or removal of the labeling of articles. Ibid. We find such reliance on the rule of ejusdem generis misplaced; its application to § 301 (k) is contrary to both the text and legislative history of the subsection, and unnecessary to a constitutionally permissible construction of the statute.
The language of § 301 (k) unambiguously defines two distinct offenses with respect to food held for sale after interstate shipment. As originally enacted in 1938, the subsection prohibited “[t]he alteration, mutilation, destruction, obliteration, or removal” of the label, or “the doing of any other act” with respect to the product which “results in such article being misbranded.” The section was amended in 1948 to prohibit additionally “the doing of any other act” with respect to the product which “results in such article being adulterated.” The acts specifically enumerated in the original enactment relate to the offense of misbranding through labeling or the lack thereof. The separate offense of adulteration, on the other hand, is concerned solely with deterioration or contamination of the commodity itself. For the most part, acts resulting in misbranding and acts resulting in adulteration are wholly distinct. Consequently, since the enumerated label-defacing offenses bear no textual or logical relation to the scope of the general language condemning acts of product adulteration, application of the rule of ejusdem generis to limit the words “the doing of any other act” resulting in product adulteration in § 301 (k) to acts of the same general character as those specifically enumerated with respect to misbranding is wholly inappropriate.
Moreover, the legislative history makes plain that no such application of the rule was intended. As the House Committee Report on the proposed 1948 amendment unequivocally stated:
“It seems clear that under the subsection as now in force the rule of ejusdem generis would not apply in interpreting the words ‘or the doing of any other act . . . ,’ and it is even more clear that this rule will not apply in the interpretation of the subsection as amended by this bill.”
It is equally clear from this legislative history that Congress intended to proscribe the particular conduct charged in the information filed below — the holding of food under insanitary conditions whereby it may have become contaminated. The House Committee Report noted that the amended section would “penalize, among other acts resulting in adulteration or misbranding, the act of holding articles under insanitary conditions whereby they may become contaminated with filth or rendered injurious to health,” and emphasized that the Committee intended the amendments to be applied to their fullest constitutional limits.
Congress chose statutory language appropriate to effectuate this purpose. Section 301 (k), as amended, prohibits “any . . . act” which results in adulteration of the product. And food is adulterated if it “has been prepared, packed, or held under insanitary conditions whereby it may have become contaminated with filth.” This language defines with particularity an explicit standard of conduct. Section 301 (k), read together with the definition of food adulteration contained in §402 (a)(4), therefore, gives ample warning that the “holding” or storing of food under insanitary conditions whereby it may have become contaminated is prohibited.
It is settled law in the area of food and drug regulation that a guilty intent is not always a prerequisite to the imposition of criminal sanctions. Food and drug legislation, concerned as it is with protecting the lives and health of human beings, under circumstances in which they might be unable to protect themselves, often “dispenses with the conventional requirement for criminal conduct — awareness of some wrongdoing. In the interest of the larger good it puts the burden of acting at hazard upon a person otherwise innocent but standing in responsible relation to a public danger. United States v. Balint, 258 U. S. 250.” United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U. S. 277, 281.
It is argued, nevertheless, that the Government in this case is seeking to impose criminal sanctions upon one “who is, by the very nature of his business powerless” to protect against this kind of contamination, however high the standard of care exercised. Whatever the truth of this claim, it involves factual proof to be raised defensively at a trial on the merits. We are here concerned only with the construction of the statute as it relates to the sufficiency of the information, and not with the scope and reach of the statute as applied to such facts as may be developed by evidence adduced at a trial.
Finally, the appellee attempts to uphold the dismissal of the information on a ground not relied on by the District Court. The appellee says that it was a bailee of the food, not a seller, and that it was not holding the food for sale within the meaning of § 301 (k). Both the language and the purpose of the statute refute this construction. The language of § 301 (k) does not limit its application to one holding title to the goods, and since the danger to the public from insanitary storage of food is the same regardless of the proprietary status of the person storing it, the purpose of the legislation — to safeguard the consumer from the time the food is introduced into the channels of interstate commerce to the point that it is delivered to the ultimate consumer — would be substantially thwarted by such an unwarranted reading of the statutory language. United States v. Kocmond, 200 F. 2d 370, 372; cf. United States v. Sullivan, 332 U. S. 689, 696; United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U. S. 277, 282.
Accordingly, we hold that a criminal information charging a public storage warehouseman with holding food (after interstate shipment and before ultimate sale) under insanitary conditions whereby it may have become contaminated with filth, charges an offense under § 301 (k) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. The order of the District Court dismissing the information is therefore reversed and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
52 Stat. 1040, 21 U. S. C. § 331 (k).
52 Stat. 1040, 21 U. S. C. §§342 (a)(3) and (4).
The information was in six counts, the counts differing only with respect to the particular shipment or product involved. Each count charged that appellee had received an article of food which had been shipped in interstate commerce, and that while this food was being held for sale, appellee caused it to be held in a building accessible to rodents, birds, and insects, thus exposing it to contamination, and thereby adulterating the food within the meaning of § 402 (a) of the Act, 21 U. S. C. § 342 (a), in that the food consisted in part of a filthy substance, to wit, rodent excreta, insect larvae, etc., and in that it was held under insanitary conditions whereby it might have become contaminated with filth.
“An appeal may be taken by and on behalf of the United States from the district courts direct to the Supreme Court of the United States in all criminal cases in the following instances:
“From a decision or judgment setting aside, or dismissing any indictment or information, or any count thereof, where such decision or judgment is based upon the invalidity or construction of the statute upon which the indictment or information is founded. . . .” 62 Stat. 844, 18 U. S. C. § 3731.
52 Stat. 1042, 21 U. S. C. § 331 (k). See United States v. Sullivan, 332 U. S. 689.
62 Stat. 582, 21 U. S. C. § 331 (k).
The House Committee concerned with the proposed amendment to § 301 (k) was aware of this textual problem.
“The present section 301 (k) forbids, first, certain acts with respect to the labeling of an article, and, second, ‘any other act with respect to’ the article itself which results in its being misbranded. . . . [Adulteration more often occurs as a result of acts done to or with respect to the article itself. Since the section already contains the broad phrase ‘any other act with respect to’ the article, and since this phrase is not limited by the preceding enumeration of forbidden acts with respect to the labeling, there is no need in making it applicable to adulteration, to change the existing statutory language in this regard.” H. R. Rep. No. 807, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 3.
Id., at pp. 3-4.
Id., at p. 6. During the Senate hearings on the amendment, the Associate Commissioner of Food and Drugs explained that “under the bill as enacted here, if there was a definite showing of violation on the part of the warehouse which had this material stored, a prosecution of them criminally for doing the act of holding under these insanitary conditions, which result in adulteration could ensue.” Hearing before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, United States Senate, on S. 1190 and H. R. 4071, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., April 17, 1948.
See note 2, supra.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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H
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice White
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This ease presents the question whether the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule should be modified so as not to bar the use in the prosecution’s case in chief of evidence obtained by officers acting in reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate but ultimately found to be unsupported by probable cause. To resolve this question, we must consider once again the tension between the sometimes competing goals of, on the one hand, deterring official misconduct and removing inducements to unreasonable invasions of privacy and, on the other, establishing procedures under which criminal defendants are “acquitted or convicted on the basis of all the evidence which exposes the truth.” Alderman v. United States, 394 U. S. 165, 175 (1969).
I
In August 1981, a confidential informant of unproven reliability informed an officer of the Burbank Police Department that two persons known to him as “Armando” and “Patsy” were selling large quantities of cocaine and methaqualone from their residence at 620 Price Drive in Burbank, Cal. The informant also indicated that he had witnessed a sale of methaqualone by “Patsy” at the residence approximately five months earlier and had observed at that time a shoebox containing a large amount of cash that belonged to “Patsy.” He further declared that “Armando” and “Patsy” generally kept only small quantities of drugs at their residence and stored the remainder at another location in Burbank.
On the basis of this information, the Burbank police initiated an extensive investigation focusing first on the Price Drive residence and later on two other residences as well. Cars parked at the Price Drive residence were determined to belong to respondents Armando Sanchez, who had previously been arrested for possession of marihuana, and Patsy Stewart, who had no criminal record. During the course of the investigation, officers observed an automobile belonging to respondent Ricardo Del Castillo, who had previously been arrested for possession of 50 pounds of marihuana, arrive at the Price Drive residence. The driver of that car entered the house, exited shortly thereafter carrying a small paper sack, and drove away. A check of Del Castillo’s probation records led the officers to respondent Alberto Leon, whose telephone number Del Castillo had listed as his employer’s. Leon had been arrested in 1980 on drug charges, and a companion had informed the police at that time that Leon was heavily involved in the importation of drugs into this country. Before the current investigation began, the Burbank officers had learned that an informant had told a Glendale police officer that Leon stored a large quantity of methaqualone at his residence in Glendale. During the course of this investigation, the Burbank officers learned that Leon was living at 716 South Sunset Canyon in Burbank.
Subsequently, the officers observed several persons, at least one of whom had prior drug involvement, arriving at the Price Drive residence and leaving with small packages; observed a variety of other material activity at the two residences as well as at a condominium at 7902 Via Magdalena; and witnessed a variety of relevant activity involving respondents’ automobiles. The officers also observed respondents Sanchez and Stewart board separate flights for Miami. The pair later returned to Los Angeles together, consented to a search of their luggage that revealed only a small amount of marihuana, and left the airport. Based on these and other observations summarized in the affidavit, App. 34, Officer Cyril Rombach of the Burbank Police Department, an experienced and well-trained narcotics investigator, prepared an application for a warrant to search 620 Price Drive, 716 South Sunset Canyon, 7902 Via Magdalena, and automobiles registered to each of the respondents for an extensive list of items believed to be related to respondents’ drug-trafficking activities. Officer Rombach’s extensive application was reviewed by several Deputy District Attorneys.
A facially valid search warrant was issued in September 1981 by a State Superior Court Judge. The ensuing searches produced large quantities of drugs at the Via Magdalena and Sunset Canyon addresses and a small quantity at the Price Drive residence. Other evidence was discovered at each of the residences and in Stewart’s and Del Castillo’s automobiles. Respondents were indicted by a grand jury in the District Court for the Central District of California and charged with conspiracy to possess and distribute cocaine and a variety of substantive counts.
The respondents then filed motions to suppress the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant. The District Court held an evidentiary hearing and, while recognizing that the case was a close one, see id., at 131, granted the motions to suppress in part. It concluded that the affidavit was insufficient to establish probable cause, but did not suppress all of the evidence as to all of the respondents because none of the respondents had standing to challenge all of the searches. In response to a request from the Government, the court made clear that Officer Rombach had acted in good faith, but it rejected the Government’s suggestion that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule should not apply where evidence is seized in reasonable, good-faith reliance on a search warrant.
The District Court denied the Government’s motion for reconsideration, id., at 147, and a divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, judgt. order reported at 701 F. 2d 187 (1983). The Court of Appeals first concluded that Officer Rombach’s affidavit could not establish probable cause to search the Price Drive residence. To the extent that the affidavit set forth facts demonstrating the basis of the informant’s knowledge of criminal activity, the information included was fatally stale. The affidavit, moreover, failed to establish the informant’s credibility. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals concluded that the information provided by the informant was inadequate under both prongs of the two-part test established in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108 (1964), and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U. S. 410 (1969). The officers’ independent investigation neither cured the staleness nor corroborated the details of the informant’s declarations. The Court of Appeals then considered whether the affidavit formed a proper basis for the search of the Sunset Canyon residence. In its view, the affidavit included no facts indicating the basis for the informants’ statements concerning respondent Leon’s criminal activities and was devoid of information establishing the informants’ reliability. Because these deficiencies had not been cured by the police investigation, the District Court properly suppressed the fruits of the search. The Court of Appeals refused the Government’s invitation to recognize a good-faith exception to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule. App. to Pet. for Cert. 4a.
The Government’s petition for certiorari expressly declined to seek review of the lower courts’ determinations that the search warrant was unsupported by probable cause and presented only the question “[w]hether the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule should be modified so as not to bar the admission of evidence seized in reasonable, good-faith reliance on a search warrant that is subsequently held to be defective.” We granted certiorari to consider the propriety of such a modification. 463 U. S. 1206 (1983). Although it undoubtedly is within our power to consider the question whether probable cause existed under the “totality of the circumstances” test announced last Term in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213 (1983), that question has not been briefed or argued; and it is also within our authority, which we choose to exercise, to take the case as it comes to us, accepting the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that probable cause was lacking under the prevailing legal standards. See this Court’s Rule 21.1(a).
We have concluded that, in the Fourth Amendment context, the exclusionary rule can be modified somewhat without jeopardizing its ability to perform its intended functions. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
II
Language in opinions of this Court and of individual Justices has sometimes implied that the exclusionary rule is a necessary corollary of the Fourth Amendment, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, 651, 655-657 (1961); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 462-463 (1928), or that the rule is required by the conjunction of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. Mapp v. Ohio, supra, at 661-662 (Black, J., concurring); Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 20, 33-34 (1925). These implications need not detain us long. The Fifth Amendment theory has not withstood critical analysis or the test of time, see Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U. S. 463 (1976), and the Fourth Amendment “has never been interpreted to proscribe the introduction of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or against all persons.” Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 486 (1976).
A
The Fourth Amendment contains no provision expressly precluding the use of evidence obtained in violation of its commands, and an examination of its origin and purposes makes clear that the use of fruits of a past unlawful search or seizure “work[s] no new Fourth Amendment wrong.” United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 354 (1974). The wrong condemned by the Amendment is “fully accomplished” by the unlawful search or seizure itself, ibid., and the exclusionary rule is neither intended nor able to “cure the invasion of the defendant’s rights which he has already suffered.” Stone v. Powell, supra, at 540 (White, J., dissenting). The rule thus operates as “a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved.” United States v. Calandra, supra, at 348.
Whether the exclusionary sanction is appropriately imposed in a particular case, our decisions make clear, is “an issue separate from the question whether the Fourth Amendment rights of the party seeking to invoke the rule were violated by police conduct.” Illinois v. Gates, supra, at 223. Only the former question is currently before us, and it must be resolved by weighing the costs and benefits of preventing the use in the prosecution’s case in chief of inherently trustworthy tangible evidence obtained in reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate that ultimately is found to be defective.
The substantial social costs exacted by the exclusionary rule for the vindication of Fourth Amendment rights have long been a source of concern. “Our cases have consistently recognized that unbending application of the exclusionary sanction to enforce ideals of governmental rectitude would impede unacceptably the truth-finding functions of judge and jury.” United States v. Payner, 447 U. S. 727, 734 (1980). An objectionable collateral consequence of this interference with the criminal justice system’s truth-finding function is that some guilty defendants may go free or receive reduced sentences as a result of favorable plea bargains. Particularly when law enforcement officers have acted in objective good faith or their transgressions have been minor, the magnitude of the benefit conferred on such guilty defendants offends basic concepts of the criminal justice system. Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S., at 490. Indiscriminate application of the exclusionary rule, therefore, may well “generate] disrespect for the law and administration of justice.” Id., at 491. Accordingly, “[a]s with any remedial device, the application of the rule has been restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served.” United States v. Calandra, supra, at 348; see Stone v. Powell, supra, at 486-487; United States v. Janis, 428 U. S. 433, 447 (1976).
B
Close attention to those remedial objectives has characterized our recent decisions concerning the scope of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule. The Court has, to be sure, not seriously questioned, “in the absence of a more efficacious sanction, the continued application of the rule to suppress evidence from the [prosecution’s] case where a Fourth Amendment violation has been substantial and deliberate....” Franks v. Delaware, 438 U. S. 154, 171 (1978); Stone v. Powell, supra, at 492. Nevertheless, the balancing approach that has evolved in various contexts — including criminal trials — “forcefully suggests] that the exclusionary rule be more generally modified to permit the introduction of evidence obtained in the reasonable good-faith belief that a search or seizure was in accord with the Fourth Amendment.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S., at 255 (WHITE, J., concurring in judgment).
In Stone v. Powell, supra, the Court emphasized the costs of the exclusionary rule, expressed its view that limiting the circumstances under which Fourth Amendment claims could be raised in federal habeas corpus proceedings would not reduce the rule’s deterrent effect, id., at 489-495, and held that a state prisoner who has been afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate a Fourth Amendment claim may not obtain federal habeas relief on the ground that unlawfully obtained evidence had been introduced at his trial. Cf. Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U. S. 545, 560-563 (1979). Proposed extensions of the exclusionary rule to proceedings other than the criminal trial itself have been evaluated and rejected under the same analytic approach. In United States v. Calandra, for example, we declined to allow grand jury witnesses to refuse to answer questions based on evidence obtained from an unlawful search or seizure since “[a]ny incremental deterrent effect which might be achieved by extending the rule to grand jury proceedings is uncertain at best.” 414 U. S., at 348. Similarly, in United States v. Janis, supra, we permitted the use in federal civil proceedings of evidence illegally seized by state officials since the likelihood of deterring police misconduct through such an extension of the exclusionary rule was insufficient to outweigh its substantial social costs. In so doing, we declared that, “[i]f... the exclusionary rule does not result in appreciable deterrence, then, clearly, its use in the instant situation is unwarranted.” Id., at 454.
As cases considering the use of unlawfully obtained evidence in criminal trials themselves make clear, it does not follow from the emphasis on the exclusionary rule’s deterrent value that “anything which deters illegal searches is thereby commanded by the Fourth Amendment.” Alderman v. United States, 394 U. S., at 174. In determining whether persons aggrieved solely by the introduction of damaging evidence unlawfully obtained from their co-conspirators or codefendants could seek suppression, for example, we found that the additional benefits of such an extension of the exclusionary rule would not outweigh its costs. Id., at 174-175. Standing to invoke the rule has thus been limited to cases in which the prosecution seeks to use the fruits of an illegal search or seizure against the victim of police misconduct. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S. 128 (1978); Brown v. United States, 411 U. S. 223 (1973); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471, 491-492 (1963). Cf. United States v. Payner, 447 U. S. 727 (1980).
Even defendants with standing to challenge the introduction in their criminal trials of unlawfully obtained evidence cannot prevent every conceivable use of such evidence. Evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment and inadmissible in the prosecution’s case in chief may be used to impeach a defendant’s direct testimony. Walder v. United States, 347 U. S. 62 (1954). See also Oregon v. Hass, 420 U. S. 714 (1975); Harris v. New York, 401 U. S. 222 (1971). A similar assessment of the “incremental furthering” of the ends of the exclusionary rule led us to conclude in United States v. Havens, 446 U. S. 620, 627 (1980), that evidence inadmissible in the prosecution’s case in chief or otherwise as substantive evidence of guilt may be used to impeach statements made by a defendant in response to “proper cross-examination reasonably suggested by the defendant’s direct examination.” Id., at 627-628.
When considering the use of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment in the prosecution’s case in chief, moreover, we have declined to adopt a per se or “but for” rule that would render inadmissible any evidence that came to light through a chain of causation that began with an illegal arrest. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U. S. 590 (1975); Wong Sun v. United States, supra, at 487-488. We also have held that a witness’ testimony may be admitted even when his identity was discovered in an unconstitutional search. United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U. S. 268 (1978). The perception underlying these decisions — that the connection between police misconduct and evidence of crime may be sufficiently attenuated to permit the use of that evidence at trial — is a product of considerations relating to the exclusionary rule and the constitutional principles it is designed to protect. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U. S. 200, 217-218 (1979); United States v. Ceccolini, supra, at 279. In short, the “dissipation of the taint” concept that the Court has applied in deciding whether exclusion is appropriate in a particular case “attempts to mark the point at which the detrimental consequences of illegal police action become so attenuated that the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule no longer justifies its cost.” Brown v. Illinois, supra, at 609 (Powell, J., concurring in part). Not surprisingly in view of this purpose, an assessment of the flagrancy of the police misconduct constitutes an important step in the calculus. Dunaway v. New York, supra, at 218; Brown v. Illinois, supra, at 603-604.
The same attention to the purposes underlying the exclusionary rule also has characterized decisions not involving the scope of the rule itself. We have not required suppression of the fruits of a search incident to an arrest made in good-faith reliance on a substantive criminal statute that subsequently is declared unconstitutional. Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U. S. 31 (1979). Similarly, although the Court has been unwilling to conclude that new Fourth Amendment principles are always to have only prospective effect, United States v. Johnson, 457 U. S. 537, 560 (1982), no Fourth Amendment decision marking a “clear break with the past” has been applied retroactively. See United States v. Peltier, 422 U. S. 531 (1975); Desist v. United States, 394 U. S. 244 (1969); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618 (1965). The propriety of retroactive application of a newly announced Fourth Amendment principle, moreover, has been assessed largely in terms of the contribution retroactivity might make to the deterrence of police misconduct. United States v. Johnson, supra, at 560-561; United States v. Peltier, supra, at 536-539, 542.
As yet, we have not recognized any form of good-faith exception to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule. But the balancing approach that has evolved during the years of experience with the rule provides strong support for the modification currently urged upon us. As we discuss below, our evaluation of the costs and benefits of suppressing reliable physical evidence seized by officers reasonably relying on a warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate leads to the conclusion that such evidence should be admissible in the prosecution’s case in chief.
HH HH
A
Because a search warrant “provides the detached scrutiny of a neutral magistrate, which is a more reliable safeguard against improper searches than the hurried judgment of a law enforcement officer ‘engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime,’ ” United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1, 9 (1977) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 14 (1948)), we have expressed a strong preference for warrants and declared that “in a doubtful or marginal case a search under a warrant may be sustainable where without one it would fall.” United States v. Ventresca, 380 U. S. 102, 106 (1965). See Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S., at 111. Reasonable minds frequently may differ on the question whether a particular affidavit establishes probable cause, and we have thus concluded that the preference for warrants is most appropriately effectuated by according “great deference” to a magistrate’s determination. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U. S., at 419. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S., at 236; United States v. Ventresca, supra, at 108-109.
Deference to the magistrate, however, is not boundless. It is clear, first, that the deference accorded to a magistrate’s finding of probable cause does not preclude inquiry into the knowing or reckless falsity of the affidavit on which that determination was based. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U. S. 154 (1978). Second, the courts must also insist that the magistrate purport to “perform his ‘neutral and detached’ function and not serve merely as a rubber stamp for the police.” Aguilar v. Texas, supra, at 111. See Illinois v. Gates, supra, at 239. A magistrate failing to “manifest that neutrality and detachment demanded of a judicial officer when presented with a warrant application” and who acts instead as “an adjunct law enforcement officer” cannot provide valid authorization for an otherwise unconstitutional search. Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U. S. 319, 326-327 (1979).
Third, reviewing courts will not defer to a warrant based on an affidavit that does not “provide the magistrate with a substantial basis for determining the existence of probable cause.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S., at 239. “Sufficient information must be presented to the magistrate to allow that official to determine probable cause; his action cannot be a mere ratification of the bare conclusions of others.” Ibid. See Aguilar v. Texas, supra, at 114-115; Giordenello v. United States, 357 U. S. 480 (1958); Nathanson v. United States, 290 U. S. 41 (1933). Even if the warrant application was supported by more than a “bare bones” affidavit, a reviewing court may properly conclude that, notwithstanding the deference that magistrates deserve, the warrant was invalid because the magistrate’s probable-cause determination reflected an improper analysis of the totality of the circumstances, Illinois v. Gates, supra, at 238-239, or because the form of the warrant was improper in some respect.
Only in the first of these three situations, however, has the Court set forth a rationale for suppressing evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant; in the other areas, it has simply excluded such evidence without considering whether Fourth Amendment interests will be advanced. To the extent that proponents of exclusion rely on its behavioral effects on judges and magistrates in these areas, their reliance is misplaced. First, the exclusionary rule is designed to deter police misconduct rather than to punish the errors of judges and magistrates. Second, there exists no evidence suggesting that judges and magistrates are inclined to ignore or subvert the Fourth Amendment or that lawlessness among these actors requires application of the extreme sanction of exclusion.
Third, and most important, we discern no basis, and are offered none, for believing that exclusion of evidence seized pursuant to a warrant will have a significant deterrent effect on the issuing judge or magistrate. Many of the factors that indicate that the exclusionary rule cannot provide an effective “special” or “general” deterrent for individual offending law enforcement officers apply as well to judges or magistrates. And, to the extent that the rule is thought to operate as a “systemic” deterrent on a wider audience, it clearly can have no such effect on individuals empowered to issue search warrants. Judges and magistrates are not adjuncts to the law enforcement team; as neutral judicial officers, they have no stake in the outcome of particular criminal prosecutions. The threat of exclusion thus cannot be expected significantly to deter them. Imposition of the exclusionary sanction is not necessary meaningfully to inform judicial officers of their errors, and we cannot conclude that admitting evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant while at the same time declaring that the warrant was somehow defective will in any way reduce judicial officers’ professional incentives to comply with the Fourth Amendment, encourage them to repeat their mistakes, or lead to the granting of all colorable warrant requests.
B
If exclusion of evidence obtained pursuant to a subsequently invalidated warrant is to have any deterrent effect, therefore, it must alter the behavior of individual law enforcement officers or the policies of their departments. One could argue that applying the exclusionary rule in cases where the police failed to demonstrate probable cause in the warrant application deters future inadequate presentations or “magistrate shopping” and thus promotes the ends of the Fourth Amendment. Suppressing evidence obtained pursuant to a technically defective warrant supported by probable cause also might encourage officers to scrutinize more closely the form of the warrant and to point out suspected judicial errors. We find such arguments speculative and conclude that suppression of evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant should be ordered only on a case-by-case basis and only in those unusual cases in which exclusion will further the purposes of the exclusionary rule.
We have frequently questioned whether the exclusionary rule can have any deterrent effect when the offending officers acted in the objectively reasonable belief that their conduct did not violate the Fourth Amendment. “No empirical researcher, proponent or opponent of the rule, has yet been able to establish with any assurance whether the rule has a deterrent effect....” United States v. Janis, 428 U. S., at 452, n. 22. But even assuming that the rule effectively deters some police misconduct and provides incentives for the law enforcement profession as a whole to conduct itself in accord with the Fourth Amendment, it cannot be expected, and should not be applied, to deter objectively reasonable law enforcement activity.
As we observed in Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U. S. 433, 447 (1974), and reiterated in United States v. Peltier, 422 U. S., at 539:
“The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule necessarily assumes that the police have engaged in willful, or at the very least negligent, conduct which has deprived the defendant of some right. By refusing to admit evidence gained as a result of such conduct, the courts hope to instill in those particular investigating officers, or in their future counterparts, a greater degree of care toward the rights of an accused. Where the official action was pursued in complete good faith, however, the deterrence rationale loses much of its force.”
The Peltier Court continued, id., at 542:
“If the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police conduct, then evidence obtained from a search should be suppressed only if it can be said that the law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly be charged with knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.”
See also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S., at 260-261 (White, J., concurring in judgment); United States v. Janis, supra, at 459; Brown v. Illinois, 422 U. S., at 610-611 (Powell, J., concurring in part). In short, where the officer’s conduct is objectively reasonable,
“excluding the evidence will not further the ends of the exclusionary rule in any appreciable way; for it is painfully apparent that... the officer is acting as a reasonable officer would and should act in similar circumstances. Excluding the evidence can in no way affect his future conduct unless it is to make him less willing to do his duty.” Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S., at 539-540 (White, J., dissenting).
This is particularly true, we believe, when an officer acting with objective good faith has obtained a search warrant from a judge or magistrate and acted within its scope. In most such cases, there is no police illegality and thus nothing to deter. It is the magistrate’s responsibility to determine whether the officer’s allegations establish probable cause and, if so, to issue a warrant comporting in form with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. In the ordinary case, an officer cannot be expected to question the magistrate’s probable-cause determination or his judgment that the form of the warrant is technically sufficient. “[Ojnce the warrant issues, there is literally nothing more the policeman can do in seeking to comply with the law.” Id., at 498 (Burger, C. J., concurring). Penalizing the officer for the magistrate’s error, rather than his own, cannot logically contribute to the deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations.
c
We conclude that the marginal or nonexistent benefits produced by suppressing evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant cannot justify the substantial costs of exclusion. We do not suggest, however, that exclusion is always inappropriate in cases where an officer has obtained a warrant and abided by its terms. “[Searches pursuant to a warrant will rarely require any deep inquiry into reasonableness,” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S., at 267 (White, J., concurring in judgment), for “a warrant issued by a magistrate normally suffices to establish” that a law enforcement officer has “acted in good faith in conducting the search.” United States v. Ross, 456 U. S. 798, 823, n. 32 (1982). Nevertheless, the officer’s reliance on the magistrate’s probable-cause determination and on the technical sufficiency of the warrant he issues must be objectively reasonable, cf. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800, 815-819 (1982), and it is clear that in some eircum-stances the officer will have no reasonable grounds for believing that the warrant was properly issued.
Suppression therefore remains an appropriate remedy if the magistrate or judge in issuing a warrant was misled by information in an affidavit that the affiant knew was false or would have known was false except for his reckless disregard of the truth. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U. S. 154 (1978). The exception we recognize today will also not apply in cases where the issuing magistrate wholly abandoned his judicial role in the manner condemned in Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U. S. 319 (1979); in such circumstances, no reasonably well trained officer should rely on the warrant. Nor would an officer manifest objective good faith in relying on a warrant based on an affidavit “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.” Brown v. Illinois, 422 U. S., at 610-611 (Powell, J., concurring in part); see Illinois v. Gates, supra, at 263-264 (White, J., concurring in judgment). Finally, depending on the circumstances of the particular case, a warrant may be so facially deficient — i. e., in failing to particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized— that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid. Cf. Massachusetts v. Sheppard, post, at 988-991.
In so limiting the suppression remedy, we leave untouched the probable-cause standard and the various requirements for a valid warrant. Other objections to the modification of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule we consider to be insubstantial. The good-faith exception for searches conducted pursuant to warrants is not intended to signal our unwillingness strictly to enforce the requirements of the Fourth Amendment, and we do not believe that it will have this effect. As we have already suggested, the good-faith exception, turning as it does on objective reasonableness, should not be difficult to apply in practice. When officers have acted pursuant to a warrant, the prosecution should ordinarily be able to establish objective good faith without a substantial expenditure of judicial time.
Nor are we persuaded that application of a good-faith exception to searches conducted pursuant to warrants will preclude review of the constitutionality of the search or seizure, deny needed guidance from the courts, or freeze Fourth Amendment law in its present state. There is no need for courts to adopt the inflexible practice of always deciding whether the officers’ conduct manifested objective good faith before turning to the question whether the Fourth Amendment has been violated. Defendants seeking suppression of the fruits of allegedly unconstitutional searches or seizures undoubtedly raise live controversies which Art. Ill empowers federal courts to adjudicate. As cases addressing questions of good-faith immunity under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, compare O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U. S. 563 (1975), with Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U. S. 555, 566, n. 14 (1978), and cases involving the harmless-error doctrine, compare Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U. S. 371, 372 (1972), with Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U. S. 1 (1970), make clear, courts have considerable discretion in conforming their decisionmaking processes to the exigencies of particular cases.
If the resolution of a particular Fourth Amendment question is necessary to guide future action by law enforcement officers and magistrates, nothing will prevent reviewing courts from deciding that question before turning to the good-faith issue. Indeed, it frequently will be difficult to determine whether the officers acted reasonably without resolving the Fourth Amendment issue. Even if the Fourth Amendment question is not one of broad import, reviewing courts could decide in particular cases that magistrates under their supervision need to be informed of their errors and so evaluate the officers’ good faith only after finding a violation. In other circumstances, those courts could reject suppression motions posing no important Fourth Amendment questions by turning immediately to a consideration of the officers’ good faith. We have no reason to believe that our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence would suffer by allowing reviewing courts to exercise an informed discretion in making this choice.
IV
When the principles we have enunciated today are applied to the facts of this case, it is apparent that the judgment of the Court of Appeals cannot stand. The Court of Appeals applied the prevailing legal standards to Officer Rombach’s warrant application and concluded that the application could not support the magistrate’s probable-cause determination. In so doing, the court clearly informed the magistrate that he had erred in issuing the challenged warrant. This aspect of the court’s judgment is not under attack in this proceeding.
Having determined that the warrant should not have issued, the Court of Appeals understandably declined to adopt a modification of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule that this Court had not previously sanctioned. Although the modification finds strong support in our previous cases, the Court of Appeals’ commendable self-restraint is not to be criticized. We have now reexamined the purposes of the exclusionary rule and the propriety of its application in cases where officers have relied on a subsequently invalidated search warrant. Our conclusion is that the rule’s purposes will only rarely be served by applying it in such circumstances.
In the absence of an allegation that the magistrate abandoned his detached and neutral role, suppression is appropriate only if the officers were dishonest or reckless in preparing their affidavit or could not have harbored an objectively reasonable belief in the existence of probable cause. Only respondent Leon has contended that no reasonably well trained police officer could have believed that there existed probable cause to search his house; significantly, the other respondents advance no comparable argument. Officer Rombach’s application for a warrant clearly was supported by much more than a “bare bones” affidavit. The affidavit related the results of an extensive investigation and, as the opinions of the divided panel of the Court of Appeals make clear, provided evidence sufficient to create disagreement among thoughtful and competent judges as to the existence of probable cause. Under these circumstances, the officers’ reliance on the magistrate’s determination of probable cause was objectively reasonable, and application of the extreme sanction of exclusion
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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A
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
The Constitution of the State of Washington provides: “In criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have . . . the right to appeal in all cases . . . .” Wash. Const., Amend. 10. In 1935, after petitioner was convicted of murder in a Washington state court and sentenced to life imprisonment, he gave timely notice of appeal to the Supreme Court of the State. Washington law authorizes a trial judge to have a stenographic transcript of trial proceedings furnished an indigent defendant at public expense “if in his opinion justice will thereby be promoted.” Remington's Wash. Rev. Stat., 1932, § 42-5. Alleging substantial errors in his trial petitioner moved for a free transcript. The trial judge denied this motion, finding that “justice would not be promoted ... in that defendant has been accorded a fair and impartial trial, and in the Court's opinion no grave or prejudicial errors occurred therein.” Petitioner then moved in the State Supreme Court for writ of mandate ordering the trial judge to have a transcript furnished for the prosecution of his appeal. The Supreme Court denied this petition and simultaneously granted the State’s motion to dismiss petitioner’s appeal for failure to file a certified “statement of facts” and “transcript of record.” In 1956 petitioner applied for habeas corpus in the Washington Supreme Court charging that failure to furnish a free transcript of the proceedings had violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. His petition was denied without opinion and we granted certiorari. 353 U. S. 922.
In this Court the State does not deny petitioner’s allegations of poverty, the substantiality of the trial errors he alleges, or the necessity for him to have some record of the proceedings in order to prosecute his appeal properly. It does argue that petitioner might have utilized notes compiled by someone other than the official court reporter. Assuming that under some circumstances such notes could be an adequate substitute for a court reporter’s transcript there is nothing in this record to show that any were available to petitioner, and the Washington courts appear to have proceeded on the assumption that he could not effectively prosecute his appeal unless the motion for a free transcript was granted. The State concedes that the reporter’s transcript from the 1935 trial is still available. In Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12, we held that a State denies a constitutional right guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment if it allows all convicted defendants to have appellate review except those who cannot afford to pay for the records of their trials. We hold that Washington has denied this constitutional right here. The conclusion of the trial judge that there was no reversible error in the trial cannot be an adequate substitute for the right to full appellate review available to all defendants in Washington who can afford the expense of a transcript. We do not hold that a State must furnish a transcript in every case involving an indigent defendant. But here, as in the Griffin case, we do hold that, “[djestitute defendants must be afforded as adequate appellate review as defendants who have money enough to buy transcripts.” Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12, 19.
The judgment of the Washington Supreme Court is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Reversed ' and remanded.
Mr. Justice Harlan and Mr. Justice Whittaker, believing that on this record the Griffin case, decided in 1956, should not be applied to this conviction occurring in 1935, would affirm the judgment.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, not having heard the argument, took no part in the consideration or disposition of the case.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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B
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Stewart
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The principal question presented by this case is whether § 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of discrimination in federal employment.
The petitioner, Clarence Brown, is a Negro who has been employed by the General Services Administration since 1957. He is currently classified in grade GS-7 and has not been promoted since 1966. In December • 1970 Brown was referred, along with two white colleagues, for promotion to grade GS-9 by his supervisors. All three were rated “highly qualified,” and the promotion was given to one of the white candidates for the position. Brown filed a complaint with the GSA Equal Employment Opportunity Office alleging that racial discrimination had biased the selection process. That complaint was withdrawn when Brown was told that other GS-9 positions.would soon be available.
Another GS-9 position did become vacant in June 1971, for which the petitioner along with two others was recommended as “highly qualified.” Again a white applicant was chosen. Brown filed a second administrative complaint with the GSA Equal Employment Opportunity Office. After preparation and review of an investigative report, the GSA Regional Administrator notified the petitioner that there was no evidence that race had played a part in the promotion. Brown requested a hearing, and one was held before a complaints examiner of the Civil Service Commission. In February 1973, the examiner issued his findings and recommended decision. He found no evidence of racial discrimination; rather, he determined that Brown had not been advanced because he had not been “fully cooperative.”
The GSA rendered its final decision in March 1973. The agency’s Director of Civil Rights informed Brown by letter of his conclusion, that considerations of race had not entered the promotional process. The Director’s letter told Brown that if he chose, he might carry the administrative process further by lodging an appeal with the Board of Appeals and Review of the Civil Service Commission and that, alternatively, he could file suit within 30 days in federal district court.
Forty-two days later Brown filed suit in a Federal District Court. The complaint alleged jurisdiction under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as amended by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 103, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq. (1970 ed. and Supp. IV), “with particular reference to” § 717; under 28 U. S. C. § 1331 (general federal-question jurisdiction) ; under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U. S. C. §§ 2201, 2202; and under the Civil Rights Act of 1866, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1981.
The respondents moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, on the ground that Brown had not filed the complaint within 30 days of final agency action as required by § 717 (c) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 XT. S. C. § 2000e-16 (c) (1970 ed., Supp. IV). The District Court granted the motion.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of dismissal. 507 F. 2d 1300 (1974). It held, first, that the § 717 remedy for federal employment discrimination was retroactively available to any employee, such as the petitioner, whose administrative complaint was pending at the time § 717 became effective on March 24, 1972. The appellate court held, second, that § 717 provides the exclusive judicial remedy for federal employment discrimination, and that the complaint had not been timely filed under that statute. Finally, the court ruled that if § 717 did not pre-empt other remedies, then the petitioner’s complaint was still properly dismissed because of his failure to exhaust available administrative remedies. We granted certio-rari, 421 U. S. 987 (1975), to consider the important issues of federal law presented by this case.
The primary question in this litigation is not difficult to state: Is §717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as added by § 11 of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-16 (1970 ed., Supp, IV), the exclusive individual remedy available to a federal employee complaining of job-related racial discrimination? But the question is easier to state than it is to resolve. Congress simply failed explicitly to describe § 717’s position in the constellation of antidiscrimination law. We must, therefore, infer congressional intent in less obvious ways. As Mr. Chief Justice Marshall once wrote for the Court: “Where the mind labours to discover the design of the legislature, it seizes every thing from which aid can be derived . . . .” United States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch 358, 386 (1805).
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbids employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U. S. C. §§ 2000e-2, 2000e-3 (1970 ed. and Supp. IV). Until it was amended in 1972 by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act, however, Title VII did not protect federal employees. 42 U. S. C. §2000e(b). Although federal employment discrimination clearly violated both the Constitution, Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497 (1954), and statutory law, 5 U. S. C. § 7151, before passage of the 1972 Act, the effective availability of either administrative or judicial relief was far from sure. Charges of racial discrimination were handled parochially within each federal agency. A hearing examiner might come from outside the agency, but he had no authority to conduct an independent examination, and his conclusions and findings were in the nature of recommendations that the agency was free to accept or reject. Although review lay in the Board of Appeals and Review of the Civil Service Commission, Congress found “skepticism” among federal employees “regarding the Commission’s record in obtaining just resolutions of complaints and adequate remedies. This has, in turn, discouraged persons from filing complaints with the Commission for fear that doing so will only result in antagonizing their supervisors and impairing any future hope of advancement.”
If administrative remedies were ineffective, judicial relief from federal employment discrimination was even more problematic before 1972. Although an action seeking to enjoin unconstitutional agency conduct would lie, it was doubtful that backpay or other compensatory relief for employment discrimination was available at the time that Congress was considering the 1972 Act. For example, in Gnotta v. United States, 415 F. 2d 1271, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit had held in 1969 that there was no jurisdictional basis to support the plaintiff’s suit alleging that the Corps of Engineers had discriminatorily refused to promote him. Damages for alleged discrimination were held beyond the scope of the Tucker Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1346, since no express or implied contract was involved. 415 F. 2d, at 1278. And the plaintiff’s cause of action under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. §§ 701-706, and the Mandamus Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1361, was held to be barred by sovereign immunity, since his claims for promotion would necessarily involve claims against the Treasury:
“A suit against an officer of the United States is one against the United States itself 'if the decree would operate against’ the sovereign; Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U. S. 57, 58 . . . (1963) [,] or if ‘the judgment sought would expend itself on the public treasury or domain, or interfere with the public administration,’ Land v. Dollar, 330 U. S. 731, 738, . . . (1947); or if the effect of the judgment would be ‘to restrain the Government from acting, or to compel it to act,' Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U. S. 682, 704, . . . (1949).” 415 F. 2d, at 1277.
See also Blaze v. Moon, 440 F. 2d 1348 (CA5 1971) (no jurisdiction over suit by a Negro alleging wrongful discharge from Corps of Engineers).
Concern was evinced during the hearings before the committees of both Houses over the apparent inability of federal employees to engage the judicial machinery in cases of alleged employment discrimination. See, e. g., Hearings on S. 2515 et al. before the Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 296, 301, 308, 318 (1971); Hearings on H. R. 1746 before the General Subcommittee on Labor of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 320, 322, 385-386, 391-392 (1971). Although there was considerable disagreement over whether a civil action would lie to remedy agency discrimination, the committees ultimately concluded that judicial review was not available at all or, if available, that some forms of relief were foreclosed. Thus, the Senate Report observed: “The testimony of the Civil Service Commission notwithstanding, the committee found that an aggrieved Federal employee does not have access to the courts. In many cases, the employee must overcome a U. S. Government defense of sovereign immunity or failure to exhaust administrative remedies with no certainty as to the steps required to exhaust such remedies. Moreover, the remedial authority of the Commission and the courts has also been in doubt.” S. Rep. No. 92-415, p. 16 (1971). Similarly, the House Committee stated: “There is serious doubt that court review is available to the aggrieved Federal employee. Monetary restitution or back pay is not attainable. In promotion situations, a critical area of discrimination, the promotion is often no longer available.” H. R. Rep. No. 92-238, p. 25 (1971).
The conclusion of the committees was reiterated during floor debate. Senator Cranston, coauthor of the amendment relating to federal employment, asserted that it would, “[f]or the first time, permit Federal employees to sue the Federal Government in discrimination cases . . . .” 118 Cong. Rec. 4929 (1972). Senator Williams, sponsor and floor manager of the bill, stated that it “provides, for the first time, to my knowledge, for the right of an individual to take his complaint to court.” Id,, at 4922.
The legislative history thus leaves little doubt that Congress was persuaded that federal employees who were treated discriminatorily had no effective judicial remedy. And the case law suggests that that conclusion was entirely reasonable. Whether that understanding of Congress was in some ultimate sense incorrect is not what is important in determining the legislative intent in amending the 1964 Civil Rights Act to cover federal employees. For the relevant inquiry is not whether Congress correctly perceived the then state of the law, but rather what its perception of the state of the law was.
This unambiguous congressional perception seems to indicate that the congressional intent in 1972 was to create an exclusive, pre-emptive administrative and judicial scheme for the redress of federal employment discrimination. We need not, however, rest our decision upon this inference alone. For the structure of the 1972 amendment itself fully confirms the conclusion that Congress intended it to be exclusive and pre-emptive.
Section 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-16 (1970 ed., Supp. IV), proscribes federal employment discrimination and establishes an administrative and judicial enforcement system. Section 717 (a) provides that all personnel actions affecting federal employees and applicants for federal employment “shall be made free from any discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”
Sections 717 (b) and (c) establish complementary administrative and judicial enforcement mechanisms designed to eradicate federal employment discrimination. Subsection (b) delegates to the Civil Service Commission full authority to enforce the provisions of subsection (a) “through appropriate remedies, including reinstatement or hiring of employees with or without back pay,” to issue “rules, regulations, orders and instructions as it deems necessary and appropriate” to carry out its responsibilities under the Act, and to review equal employment opportunity plans that are annually submitted to it by each agency and department.
Section 717 (c) permits an aggrieved employee to file a civil action in a federal district court to review his claim of employment discrimination. Attached to that right, however, are certain preconditions. Initially, the complainant must seek relief in the agency that has allegedly discriminated against him. He then may seek further administrative review with the Civil Service Commission or, alternatively, he may, within 30 days of receipt of notice of the agency's final decision, file suit in federal district court without appealing to the Civil Service Commission. If he does appeal to the Commission, he may file suit within 30 days of the Commission's final decision. In any event, the complainant may file a civil action if, after 180 days from the filing of the charge or the appeal, the agency or Civil Service Commission has not taken final action.
Sections 706 (f) through (k), 42 U. S. C. §§ 2000&-5 (f) through 2000e-5 (k) (1970 ed. and Supp. IV), which are incorporated “as applicable” by § 717 (d), govern such issues as venue, the appointment of attorneys, attorneys' fees, and the scope of relief. Section 717 (e), finally, retains within each governmental agency “primary responsibility to assure nondiscrimination in employment....''
The balance, completeness, and structural integrity of § 717 are inconsistent with the petitioner's contention that the judicial remedy afforded by § 717 (c) was designed merely to supplement other putative judicial relief. His view fails, in our estimation, to accord due weight to the fact that unlike these other supposed remedies/ § 717 does not contemplate merely judicial relief. Rather, it provides for a careful blend of administrative and judicial enforcement powers. Under the petitioner’s theory, by perverse operation of a type of Gresham’s law, § 717, with its rigorous administrative exhaustion requirements and time limitations, would be driven out of currency were immediate access to the courts under other, less demanding statutes permissible. The crucial administrative role that each agency together with the Civil Service Commission was given by Congress in the eradication of employment discrimination would be eliminated “by the simple expedient of putting a different label on [the] pleadings.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 475, 489-490 (1973). It would require the suspension of disbelief to ascribe to Congress the design to allow its careful and thorough remedial scheme to be circumvented by artful pleading.
The petitioner relies upon our decision in Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U. S. 454 (1975), for the proposition that Title VII did not repeal pre-existing remedies for employment discrimination. In Johnson the Court held that in the context of private employment Title VII did not pre-empt other remedies. But that decision is inapposite here. In the first place, there were no problems of sovereign immunity in the context of the Johnson case. Second, the holding in Johnson rested upon the explicit legislative history of the 1964 Act which “ 'manifests a congressional intent to allow an individual to pursue independently his rights under both Title VII and other applicable state and federal statutes.’ ” 421 U. S., at 459, quoting Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U. S. 36, 48 (1974). Congress made clear “ 'that the remedies available to the individual under Title VII are co-extensive with the indiv[i] dual's right to sue under the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U. S. C. § 1981, and that the two procedures augment each other and are not mutually exclusive.’ ” 421 U. S., at 459, quoting H. R. Rep. No. 92-238, p. 19 (1971). See also Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U. S. 409, 415-417 (1968). There is no such legislative history behind the 1972 amendments. Indeed, as indicated above, the congressional understanding was precisely to the contrary.
In a variety of contexts the Court has held that a precisely drawn, detailed statute pre-empts more general remedies. In Preiser v. Rodriguez, supra, for example, state prisoners whose good-time credits had been canóeled for disciplinary reasons brought suit under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, in conjunction with a habeas corpus action. Although acknowledging that the civil rights statute was, by its terms, literally applicable, we held that challenges to the fact or duration of imprisonment appropriately lie only under habeas corpus, the “more specific act.” Permitting such challenges to be brought under the general, civil rights statute, where exhaustion is not required, would undermine the “strong policy requiring exhaustion of state remedies” when prisoners challenge the length of their confinement. 411 U. S., at 488-490. The Court has reached similar results in cases in which injured federal employees have claimed the right to proceed under facially applicable tort recovery statutes. E. g., United States v. Demko, 385 U. S. 149 (1966) (18 U. S. C. § 4126; Federal Tort Claims Act); Patterson v. United States, 359 U. S. 495 (1959) (Federal Employees’ Compensation Act; Suits in Admiralty Act); Johansen v. United States, 343 U. S. 427 (1952) (Federal Employees’ Compensation Act; Public Vessels Act). We have consistently held that a narrowly tailored employee compensation scheme pre-empts the more general tort recovery statutes. See also Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Products Corp., 353 U. S. 222 (1957); Stonite Products Co. v. Melvin Lloyd Co., 315 U. S. 561 (1942) (in patent cases, venue is governed exclusively by statute dealing specifically with patent cases; general venue statute held inapplicable).
In the case at bar, as in Preiser and the other cases cited above, the established principle leads unerringly to the conclusion that § 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, provides the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of discrimination in federal employment.
We hold, therefore, that since Brown failed to file a timely complaint under § 717 (c), the District Court properly dismissed the case. Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
After the petition for writ of certiorari was filed, the petitioner was laterally transferred to another Government agency. That transfer does not affect his claim for backpay or for equitable relief. The petitioner is still classified as a GS-7 and still wants the specific GS-9 position in the GSA for which he applied in 1971.
The letter stated in part:
“Therefore, based upon my findings, I am rendering the final agency decision on the complaint as follows:
“That the evidence in the case does not support the complaint of racial discrimination for promotion against you, but that you should receive career and performance counseling from your immediate supervisor to help you formulate plans to receive appropriate training and to correct your deficiencies as noted by management.
“If this decision does not meet with your satisfaction, you may file an appeal in writing, either in person or by mail, with the Board of Appeals and Review, U. S. Civil Service Commission, Washington, DC 20415. The Board's decision is the final administrative appeal. This appeal must be filed within 15 calendar days of receipt of this letter.
“If you choose to appeal to the Board of Appeals and Review, you retain the right to file a civil action in Federal district court within 30 calendar days after receipt of the Board’s final decision on your appeal. You also have the right to file a civil action in Federal district court within 30 calendar days of receipt of this letter or 180 days after filing an appeal with the Board of Appeals and Review if no decision has been made.”
Brown later moved for leave to amend his complaint to allege additional grounds of jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1343 (4) and the Tucker Act, 28 U. S. C. §§ 1346 (a) and (b), and to allege that more than $10,000 was in controversy. The District Court denied the motion, and the Court of Appeals did not review that order of denial.
The parties have apparently acquiesced in this holding by the Court of Appeals, and we have no occasion to disturb it.
S. Rep. No. 92-415, p. 14 (1971).
Ibid.; see H. R. Rep. No. 92-238, p. 24 (1971).
See, e. g., Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497 (1954); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579 (1952).
By parity of reasoning, sovereign immunity would, of course, also bar claims against federal agencies for damages and promotion brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1866, as amended, 42 R. S. C. § 1981, and under the general federal-question jurisdictional grant of 28 U. S. C. § 1331.
But see DeLong v. Hampton, 422 F. 2d 21 (CA3 1970) (jurisdiction in district court to review determination by the Civil Service Commission that plaintiff was properly dismissed).
The petitioner maintains that in 1972, despite adverse court decisions, 42 U. S. C. § 1981; the Mandamus Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1361 ; the Tucker Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1346; 28 U. S. C. § 1331 (general federal-question jurisdiction); and the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. § 702, all conferred jurisdiction on the federal courts in federal employment discrimination cases.
Title 42 U. S. C. §2000e-16 (1970 ed., Supp. IV) reads in full:
“(a) Discriminatory practices prohibited; employees or applicants for employment subject to coverage.
“All personnel actions affecting employees or applicants for employment (except with regard to aliens employed outside the limits of the United States) in military departments as defined in section 102 of Title 5, in executive agencies (other than the General Accounting Office) as defined in section 105 of Title 5 (including employees and applicants for employment who are paid from non-appropriated funds), in the United States Postal Service and the Postal Rate Commission, in those units of the Government of the District of Columbia having positions in the competitive service, and in those units of the legislative and judicial branches of the Federal Government having positions in the competitive service, and in the Library of Congress shall be made free from any discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
“(b) Civil Service Commission; enforcement powers; issuance of rules, regulations, etc.; annual review and approval of national and regional equal employment opportunity plans; review and evaluation of equal employment opportunity programs and publication of progress reports; consultations with interested parties; compliance with rules, regulations, etc.; contents of national and regional equal employment opportunity plans; authority of Librarian of Congress.
“Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, the Civil Service Commission shall have authority to enforce the provisions of subsection (a) of this section through appropriate remedies, including reinstatement or hiring of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of this section, and shall issue such rules, regulations, orders and instructions as it deems necessary and appropriate to carry out its responsibilities under this section. The Civil Service Commission shall—
“(1) be responsible for the annual review and approval of a national and regional equal employment opportunity plan which each department and agency and each appropriate unit referred to in subsection (a) of this section shall submit in order to maintain an affirmative program of equal employment opportunity for all such employees and applicants for employment;
“(2) be responsible for the review and evaluation of the operation of all agency equal employment opportunity programs, periodically obtaining and publishing (on at least a semiannual basis) progress reports from each such department, agency, or unit; and
“(3) consult with and solicit the recommendations of interested individuals, groups, and organizations relating to equal employment opportunity.
“The head of each such department, agency, or unit shall comply with such rules, regulations, orders, and instructions which shall include a provision that an employee or applicant for employment shall be notified of any final action taken on any complaint of discrimination filed by him thereunder. The plan submitted by each department, agency, and unit shall include, but not be limited to—
“(1) provision for the establishment of training and education programs designed to provide a maximum opportunity for employees to advance so as to perform at their highest potential; and
“(2) a description of the qualifications in terms of training and experience relating to equal employment opportunity for the principal and operating officials of each such department, agency, or unit responsible for carrying out the equal employment opportunity program and of the allocation of personnel and resources proposed by such department, agency, or unit to carry out its equal employment opportunity program.
“With respect to employment in the Library of Congress, authorities granted in this subsection to the Civil Service Commission shall be exercised by the Librarian of Congress.
“(c) Civil action by employee or applicant for employment for redress of grievances; time for bringing of action; head of department, agency, or unit as defendant.
“Within thirty days of receipt of notice of final action taken by a department, agency, or unit referred to in subsection (a) of this section, or by the Civil Service Commission upon an appeal from a decision or order of such department, agency, or unit on a complaint of discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex or national origin, brought pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, Executive Order 11478 or any succeeding Executive orders, or after one hundred and eighty days from the filing of the initial charge with the department, agency, or unit or with the Civil Service Commission on appeal from a decision or order of such department, agency, or unit until such time as final action may be taken by a department, agency, or unit, an employee or applicant for employment, if aggrieved by the final disposition of his complaint, or by the failure to take final action on his complaint, may file a civil action as provided in section 2000e-5 of this title, in which civil action the head of the department, agency, or unit, as appropriate, shall be the. defendant.
“(d) Section 2000e-5 (f) through (k) of this title applicable to civil actions.
“The provisions of section 2000e-5 (f) through (k) of this title, as applicable, shall govern civil actions brought hereunder.
“(e) Government agency or official not relieved of responsibility to assure nondiscrimination in employment or equal employment opportunity.
“Nothing contained in this Act shall relieve any Government agency or official of its or his primary responsibility to assure nondiscrimination in employment as required by the Constitution and statutes or of its or his responsibilities under Executive Order 11478 relating to equal employment opportunity in the Federal Government.”
See n. 10, supra.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice KAGANdelivered the opinion of the Court.
Before suing an employer for discrimination, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commission) must try to remedy unlawful workplace practices through informal methods of conciliation. This case requires us to decide whether and how courts may review those efforts. We hold that a court may review whether the EEOC satisfied its statutory obligation to attempt conciliation before filing suit. But we find that the scope of that review is narrow, thus recognizing the EEOC's extensive discretion to determine the kind and amount of communication with an employer appropriate in any given case.
I
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 241, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.,sets out a detailed, multi-step procedure through which the Commission enforces the statute's prohibition on employment discrimination. The process generally starts when "a person claiming to be aggrieved" files a charge of an unlawful workplace practice with the EEOC. § 2000e-5(b). At that point, the EEOC notifies the employer of the complaint and undertakes an investigation. See ibid.If the Commission finds no "reasonable cause" to think that the allegation has merit, it dismisses the charge and notifies the parties. Ibid.The complainant may then pursue her own lawsuit if she chooses. See § 2000e-5(f)(1).
If, on the other hand, the Commission finds reasonable cause, it must first "endeavor to eliminate [the] alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion." § 2000e-5(b). To ensure candor in those discussions, the statute limits the disclosure and use of the participants' statements: "Nothing said or done during and as a part of such informal endeavors" may be publicized by the Commission or "used as evidence in a subsequent proceeding without the written consent of the persons concerned." Ibid.The statute leaves to the EEOC the ultimate decision whether to accept a settlement or instead to bring a lawsuit. So long as "the Commission has been unable to secure from the respondent a conciliation agreement acceptable to the Commission" itself, the EEOC may sue the employer. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
This case began when a woman filed a charge with the EEOC claiming that petitioner Mach Mining, LLC, had refused to hire her as a coal miner because of her sex. The Commission investigated the allegation and found reasonable cause to believe that Mach Mining had discriminated against the complainant, along with a class of women who had similarly applied for mining jobs. See App. 15. In a letter announcing that determination, the EEOC invited both the company and the complainant to participate in "informal methods" of dispute resolution, promising that a Commission representative would soon "contact [them] to begin the conciliation process." Id.,at 16. The record does not disclose what happened next. But about a year later, the Commission sent Mach Mining a second letter, stating that "such conciliation efforts as are required by law have occurred and have been unsuccessful" and that any further efforts would be "futile." Id.,at 18-19.
The EEOC then sued Mach Mining in federal district court alleging sex discrimination in hiring. The Commission's complaint maintained that "[a]ll conditions precedent to the institution of this lawsuit"-including an attempt to end the challenged practice through conciliation-"ha[d] been fulfilled." Id.,at 22. In its answer, Mach Mining contested that statement, asserting that the EEOC had failed to "conciliat[e] in good faith" prior to filing suit. Id.,at 30.
The Commission subsequently moved for summary judgment on that issue, contending that its "conciliation efforts are not subject to judicial review." Motion for Summary Judgment in No. 3:11-cv-00879 (SD Ill.), p. 1. At most, the Commission argued, the court could inspect the EEOC's two letters to Mach Mining to confirm that the EEOC had met its duty to attempt conciliation. See id.,at 11, 19. Mach Mining responded by urging the court to consider the overall "reasonable[ness]" of the EEOC's efforts, based on evidence the company would present about the conciliation process. Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment in No. 3:11-cv-00879 (SD Ill.), p. 20. The trial court agreed with Mach Mining that it should review whether the Commission had made "a sincere and reasonable effort to negotiate." Civ. No. 11-879 (S.D.Ill., Jan. 28, 2013), App. to Pet. for Cert. 40a, 2013 WL 319337, *5(internal quotation marks omitted). At the EEOC's request, the court then authorized an immediate appeal of its ruling. See Civ. No. 11-879 (S.D.Ill., May 20, 2013), App. to Pet. for Cert. 52a-55a, 2013 WL 2177770, *5-*6; 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that "the statutory directive to attempt conciliation" is "not subject to judicial review." 738 F.3d 171, 177 (2013). According to the court, that provision entrusts conciliation "solely to the EEOC's expert judgment" and thus provides no "workable standard" of review for courts to apply. Id.,at 174, 177. The Seventh Circuit further reasoned that judicial review of the conciliation process would "undermine enforcement of Title VII" by "protract[ing] and complicat[ing]" discrimination suits. Id.,at 178-179(quoting Doe v. Oberweis Dairy,456 F.3d 704, 710 (C.A.7 2006)). In its concluding paragraph, however, the court indicated that it had in fact subjected the EEOC's activities to a smidgen of review: Because the Commission "pled on the face of its complaint that it ha[d] complied with all" prerequisites to suit and because its two letters to Mach Mining were "facially sufficient" to show that conciliation had occurred, the court stated, "our review of [that process] is satisfied." 738 F.3d, at 184.
Other Courts of Appeals have held that Title VII allows judicial review of the EEOC's conciliation efforts, but without agreeing on what that review entails.We granted certiorari, 573 U.S. ----, 134 S.Ct. 2872, 189 L.Ed.2d 831 (2014), to address whether and to what extent such an attempt to conciliate is subject to judicial consideration.
II
Congress rarely intends to prevent courts from enforcing its directives to federal agencies. For that reason, this Court applies a "strong presumption" favoring judicial review of administrative action. Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians,476 U.S. 667, 670, 106 S.Ct. 2133, 90 L.Ed.2d 623 (1986). That presumption is rebuttable: It fails when a statute's language or structure demonstrates that Congress wanted an agency to police its own conduct. See Block v. Community Nutrition Institute,467 U.S. 340, 349, 351, 104 S.Ct. 2450, 81 L.Ed.2d 270 (1984). But the agency bears a "heavy burden" in attempting to show that Congress "prohibit [ed] all judicial review" of the agency's compliance with a legislative mandate. Dunlop v. Bachowski,421 U.S. 560, 567, 95 S.Ct. 1851, 44 L.Ed.2d 377 (1975).
Title VII, as the Government acknowledges, imposes a duty on the EEOC to attempt conciliation of a discrimination charge prior to filing a lawsuit. See Brief for Respondent 20. That obligation is a key component of the statutory scheme. In pursuing the goal of "bring[ing] employment discrimination to an end," Congress chose "[c]ooperation and voluntary compliance" as its "preferred means." Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC,458 U.S. 219, 228, 102 S.Ct. 3057, 73 L.Ed.2d 721 (1982)(quoting Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,415 U.S. 36, 44, 94 S.Ct. 1011, 39 L.Ed.2d 147 (1974)). Accordingly, the statute provides, as earlier noted, that the Commission "shall endeavor to eliminate [an] alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion." § 2000e-5(b); see supra,at 1649. That language is mandatory, not precatory. Cf. National Railroad Passenger Corporation v. Morgan,536 U.S. 101, 109, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002)(noting that the word "shall" admits of no discretion). And the duty it imposes serves as a necessary precondition to filing a lawsuit. Only if the Commission is "unable to secure" an acceptable conciliation agreement-that is, only if its attempt to conciliate has failed-may a claim against the employer go forward. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
Courts routinely enforce such compulsory prerequisites to suit in Title VII litigation (and in many other contexts besides). An employee, for example, may bring a Title VII claim only if she has first filed a timely charge with the EEOC-and a court will usually dismiss a complaint for failure to do so. See, e.g., id.,at 104-105, 114-115, 122 S.Ct. 2061. Similarly, an employee must obtain a right-to-sue letter before bringing suit-and a court will typically insist on satisfaction of that condition. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,411 U.S. 792, 798, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973); see also, e.g.,Hallstrom v. Tillamook County,493 U.S. 20, 26, 110 S.Ct. 304, 107 L.Ed.2d 237 (1989)(upholding dismissal of an environmental suit for failure to comply with a notice provision serving as a "condition precedent"); United States v. Zucca,351 U.S. 91, 76 S.Ct. 671, 100 L.Ed. 964 (1956)(affirming dismissal of a denaturalization suit because of the Government's failure to comply with a mandatory prerequisite). That ordinary part of Title VII litigation-see a prerequisite to suit, enforce a prerequisite to suit-supports judicial review of the EEOC's compliance with the law's conciliation provision.
The Government, reiterating the Seventh Circuit's view, contests that conclusion, arguing that Title VII provides "no standards by which to judge" the EEOC's performance of its statutory duty. Brief for Respondent 17. The Government highlights the broad leeway the statute gives the EEOC to decide how to engage in, and when to give up on, conciliation. In granting that discretion, the Government contends, Congress deprived courts of any "judicially manageable" criteria with which to review the EEOC's efforts. Id.,at 36(quoting Heckler v. Chaney,470 U.S. 821, 830, 105 S.Ct. 1649, 84 L.Ed.2d 714 (1985)). And in that way Congress "demonstrate[d] [its] intention to preclude judicial review." Brief for Respondent 39.
But in thus denying that Title VII creates a "reviewable prerequisite to suit," the Government takes its observation about discretion too far. Id.,at 37(quoting 738 F.3d, at 175). Yes, the statute provides the EEOC with wide latitude over the conciliation process, and that feature becomes significant when we turn to defining the proper scope of judicial review. See infra,at 1654 - 1655. But no, Congress has not left everythingto the Commission. Consider if the EEOC declined to make any attempt to conciliate a claim-if, after finding reasonable cause to support a charge, the EEOC took the employer straight to court. In such a case, Title VII would offer a perfectly serviceable standard for judicial review: Without any "endeavor" at all, the EEOC would have failed to satisfy a necessary condition of litigation.
Still more, the statute provides certain concrete standards pertaining to what that endeavor must entail. Again, think of how the statute describes the obligatory attempt: "to eliminate [the] alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion." § 2000e-5(b). Those specified methods necessarily involve communication between parties, including the exchange of information and views. As one dictionary variously defines the terms, they involve "consultation or discussion," an attempt to "reconcile" different positions, and a "means of argument, reasoning, or entreaty." American Heritage Dictionary 385, 382, 1318 (5th ed. 2011). That communication, moreover, concerns a particular thing: the "alleged unlawful employment practice." So the EEOC, to meet the statutory condition, must tell the employer about the claim-essentially, what practice has harmed which person or class-and must provide the employer with an opportunity to discuss the matter in an effort to achieve voluntary compliance. See also infra,at 1655. If the Commission does not take those specified actions, it has not satisfied Title VII's requirement to attempt conciliation. And in insisting that the Commission do so, as the statutory language directs, a court applies a manageable standard.
Absent such review, the Commission's compliance with the law would rest in the Commission's hands alone. We need not doubt the EEOC's trustworthiness, or its fidelity to law, to shy away from that result. We need only know-and know that Congress knows-that legal lapses and violations occur, and especially so when they have no consequence. That is why this Court has so long applied a strong presumption favoring judicial review of administrative action. See supra,at 1650 - 1651. Nothing overcomes that presumption with respect to the EEOC's duty to attempt conciliation of employment discrimination claims.
III
That conclusion raises a second dispute between the parties: What is the proper scope of judicial review of the EEOC's conciliation activities? The Government (once having accepted the necessity for some review) proposes that courts rely solely on facial examination of certain EEOC documents. Mach Mining argues for far more intrusive review, in part analogizing to the way judges superintend bargaining between employers and unions. We accept neither suggestion, because we think neither consistent with the choices Congress made in enacting Title VII. The appropriate scope of review enforces the statute's requirements as just described-in brief, that the EEOC afford the employer a chance to discuss and rectify a specified discriminatory practice-but goes no further. See supra,at 1652; infra,at 1655. Such limited review respects the expansive discretion that Title VII gives to the EEOC over the conciliation process, while still ensuring that the Commission follows the law.
The Government argues for the most minimalist form of review imaginable. Echoing the final paragraph of the decision below, the Government observes that the EEOC, in line with its standard practice, wrote two letters to Mach Mining. See supra,at 1649 - 1650, 1650. The first, after announcing the Commission's finding of reasonable cause, informed the company that "[a] representative of this office will be in contact with each party in the near future to begin the conciliation process." App. 16. The second, sent about a year later, stated that the legally mandated conciliation attempt had "occurred" and failed. Id.,at 18. According to the Government, those "bookend" letters are all a court ever needs for review, because they "establish" that the EEOC met its obligation to attempt conciliation. Brief for Respondent 21.
But review of that kind falls short of what Title VII demands because the EEOC's bookend letters fail to prove what the Government claims. Contrary to its intimation, those letters do not themselves fulfill the conciliation condition: The first declares only that the process will start soon, and the second only that it has concluded. The two letters, to be sure, may provide indirect evidence that conciliation efforts happened in the interim; the later one expressly represents as much. But suppose an employer contests that statement. Let us say the employer files an affidavit alleging that although the EEOC promised to make contact, it in fact did not. In that circumstance, to treat the letters as sufficient-to take them at face value, as the Government wants-is simply to accept the EEOC's say-so that it complied with the law. And as earlier explained, the point of judicial review is instead to verify the EEOC's say-so-that is, to determine that the EEOC actually, and not just purportedly, tried to conciliate a discrimination charge. See supra,at 1652 - 1653. For that, a court needs more than the two bookend letters the Government proffers.
Mach Mining, for its part, would have a court do a deep dive into the conciliation process. Citing the standard set out in the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), Mach Mining wants a court to consider whether the EEOC has "negotiate[d] in good faith" over a discrimination claim.
Brief for Petitioner 37; see 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)(imposing a duty on employers and unions to bargain "in good faith with respect to ... terms and conditions of employment"). That good-faith obligation, Mach Mining maintains, here incorporates a number of specific requirements. In every case, the EEOC must let the employer know the "minimum ... it would take to resolve" the claim-that is, the smallest remedial award the EEOC would accept. Tr. of Oral Arg. 63. The Commission must also lay out "the factual and legal basis for" all its positions, including the calculations underlying any monetary request. Brief for Petitioner 39. And the Commission must refrain from making "take-it-or-leave-it" offers; rather, the EEOC has to go back and forth with the employer, considering and addressing its various counter-offers and giving it sufficient time at each turn "to review and respond." Id.,at 40. The function of judicial review, Mach Mining concludes, is to compel the Commission to abide by these rules.
To begin, however, we reject any analogy between the NLRA and Title VII. The NLRA is about process and process alone. It creates a sphere of bargaining-in which both sides have a mutual obligation to deal fairly-without expressing any preference as to the substantive agreements the parties should reach. See §§ 151, 158(d). By contrast, Title VII ultimately cares about substantive results, while eschewing any reciprocal duties of good-faith negotiation. Its conciliation provision explicitly serves a substantive mission: to "eliminate" unlawful discrimination from the workplace. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). In discussing a claim with an employer, the EEOC must always insist upon legal compliance; and the employer, for its part, has no duty at all to confer or exchange proposals, but only to refrain from any discrimination. Those differences make judicial review of the NLRA's duty of good-faith bargaining a poor model for review of Title VII's conciliation requirement. In addressing labor disputes, courts have devised a detailed body of rules to police good-faith dealing divorced from outcomes-and so to protect the NLRA's core procedural apparatus. But those kinds of rules do not properly apply to a law that treats the conciliation process not as an end in itself, but only as a tool to redress workplace discrimination.
More concretely, Mach Mining's proposed code of conduct conflicts with the latitude Title VII gives the Commission to pursue voluntary compliance with the law's commands. Every aspect of Title VII's conciliation provision smacks of flexibility. To begin with, the EEOC need only "endeavor" to conciliate a claim, without having to devote a set amount of time or resources to that project. § 2000e-5(b). Further, the attempt need not involve any specific steps or measures; rather, the Commission may use in each case whatever "informal" means of "conference, conciliation, and persuasion" it deems appropriate. Ibid. And the EEOC alone decides whether in the end to make an agreement or resort to litigation: The Commission may sue whenever "unable to secure" terms "acceptable to the Commission." § 2000e-5(f)(1)(emphasis added). All that leeway respecting how to seek voluntary compliance and when to quit the effort is at odds with Mach Mining's bargaining checklist. Congress left to the EEOC such strategic decisions as whether to make a bare-minimum offer, to lay all its cards on the table, or to respond to each of an employer's counter-offers, however far afield. So too Congress granted the EEOC discretion over the pace and duration of conciliation efforts, the plasticity or firmness of its negotiating positions, and the content of its demands for relief. For a court to assess any of those choices-as Mach Mining urges and many courts have done, see n. 1, supra-is not to enforce the law Congress wrote, but to impose extra procedural requirements. Such judicial review extends too far.
Mach Mining's brand of review would also flout Title VII's protection of the confidentiality of conciliation efforts. The statute, recall, provides that "[n]othing said or done during and as a part of such informal endeavors may be made public by the Commission ... or used as evidence in a subsequent proceeding without the written consent of the persons concerned"-both the employer and the complainant. § 2000e-5(b); see EEOC v. Associated Dry Goods Corp.,449 U.S. 590, 598, and n. 13, 101 S.Ct. 817, 66 L.Ed.2d 762 (1981). But the judicial inquiry Mach Mining proposes would necessitatethe disclosure and use of such information in a later Title VII suit: How else could a court address an allegation that the EEOC failed to comply with all the negotiating rules Mach Mining espouses?The proof is in this very case: The District Court held that it could not strike from the record descriptions of the conciliation process because they spoke to whether the EEOC had made a "sincere and reasonable effort to negotiate." App. to Pet. for Cert. 40a (internal quotation marks omitted); see supra,at 1650. The court thus failed to give effect to the law's non-disclosure provision. And in so doing, the court undermined the conciliation process itself, because confidentiality promotes candor in discussions and thereby enhances the prospects for agreement. As this Court has explained, "[t]he maximum results from the voluntary approach will be achieved if" the parties know that statements they make cannot come back to haunt them in litigation. Associated Dry Goods Corp.,449 U.S., at 599, n. 16, 101 S.Ct. 817(quoting 110 Cong. Rec. 8193 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Dirksen)). And conversely, the minimum results will be achieved if a party can hope to use accounts of those discussions to derail or delay a meritorious claim.
By contrast with these flawed proposals, the proper scope of judicial review matches the terms of Title VII's conciliation provision, as we earlier described them. See supra,at 1652. The statute demands, once again, that the EEOC communicate in some way (through "conference, conciliation, and persuasion") about an "alleged unlawful employment practice" in an "endeavor" to achieve an employer's voluntary compliance. § 2000e-5(b). That means the EEOC must inform the employer about the specific allegation, as the Commission typically does in a letter announcing its determination of "reasonable cause." Ibid. Such notice properly describes both what the employer has done and which employees (or what class of employees) have suffered as a result. And the EEOC must try to engage the employer in some form of discussion (whether written or oral), so as to give the employer an opportunity to remedy the allegedly discriminatory practice. Judicial review of those requirements (and nothing else) ensures that the Commission complies with the statute. At the same time, that relatively barebones review allows the EEOC to exercise all the expansive discretion Title VII gives it to decide how to conduct conciliation efforts and when to end them. And such review can occur consistent with the statute's non-disclosure provision, because a court looks only to whether the EEOC attempted to confer about a charge, and not to what happened (i.e., statements made or positions taken) during those discussions.
A sworn affidavit from the EEOC stating that it has performed the obligations noted above but that its efforts have failed will usually suffice to show that it has met the conciliation requirement. Cf. United States v. Clarke,573 U.S. ----, ----, 134 S.Ct. 2361, 2367, 189 L.Ed.2d 330 (2014)("[A]bsent contrary evidence, the [agency] can satisfy [the relevant] standard by submitting a simple affidavit from" the agency representative involved). If, however, the employer provides credible evidence of its own, in the form of an affidavit or otherwise, indicating that the EEOC did not provide the requisite information about the charge or attempt to engage in a discussion about conciliating the claim, a court must conduct the factfinding necessary to decide that limited dispute. Cf. id.,at ---- - ----, 134 S.Ct., at 2367-2368. Should the court find in favor of the employer, the appropriate remedy is to order the EEOC to undertake the mandated efforts to obtain voluntary compliance. See § 2000e-5(f)(1)(authorizing a stay of a Title VII action for that purpose).
IV
Judicial review of administrative action is the norm in our legal system, and nothing in Title VII withdraws the courts' authority to determine whether the EEOC has fulfilled its duty to attempt conciliation of claims. But the scope of that review is narrow, reflecting the abundant discretion the law gives the EEOC to decide the kind and extent of discussions appropriate in a given case. In addressing a claim like Mach Mining's, courts may not impinge on that latitude and on the Commission's concomitant responsibility to eliminate unlawful workplace discrimination.
For the reasons stated, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
See, e.g.,EEOC v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co.,340 F.3d 1256, 1259 (C.A.11 2003)(holding that the EEOC must, among other things, "respond in a reasonable and flexible manner to the reasonable attitudes of the employer"); EEOC v. Keco Industries, Inc.,748 F.2d 1097, 1102 (C.A.6 1984)(holding that the EEOC must "make a good faith effort to conciliate").
Mach Mining tries to show that broad judicial review is compatible with Title VII's non-disclosure provision, but fails to do so. The company first contends that the statutory bar is limited to "using what was said or done in a conciliation as evidence going to the merits of the claims." Brief for Petitioner 27 (emphasis added). But to make that argument, Mach Mining must add many words to the text (those shown here in italics). The actual language refers to "evidence in a subsequent proceeding," without carving out evidence relating to non-merits issues. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). And in any case, under Mach Mining's own view of Title VII, compliance with the conciliation mandate is a merits issue, because it is a necessary "element of the [EEOC's] claim, which the [EEOC] must plead and prove." Brief for Petitioner 9; see id.,at 31. Mach Mining therefore presents a back-up argument: "[T]he confidentiality limitation should be deemed waived" when the employer puts conciliation at issue. Id.,at 30. But again, to effect a waiver Title VII requires "the written consent of the persons concerned," which includes not just the employer but the complainant too. § 2000e-5(b); see supra,at 1654. And the employer's decision to contest the EEOC's conciliation efforts cannot waive, by "deem[ing]" or otherwise, the employee's statutory rights.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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I
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Chief Justice Burger
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented by this case is whether a State may transfer a prisoner to federal custody pursuant to 18 U. S. C. § 5003 in the absence of a prior determination that the prisoner who is being transferred has a need for specialized treatment available in the federal prison system.
I
In December 1974, the Commissioner of Corrections for the State of Vermont announced that he would soon close the 187-year-old Windsor prison, the State’s only maximum-security facility, because Windsor had become inadequate in several respects. Rebideau v. Stoneman, 398 F. Supp. 805, 808, n. 7 (Vt. 1975). In anticipation of that closing, the United States and Vermont entered into an agreement pursuant to 18 U. S. C. § 5003 (a) by which the United States agreed to house in federal prisons up to 40 prisoners originally committed to the prisons of Vermont. The contract recited that the Director of the United States Bureau of Prisons had certified that facilities were available at federal institutions to accommodate 40 Vermont prisoners.
In 1975, when Windsor was finally closed, Vermont was left with several minimum-security community correctional centers and the Vermont Correction and Diagnostic Treatment Facility at St. Albans, Vt. St. Albans has the capacity for short-term incarceration of inmates with high security needs, but it is not designed for long-term incarceration of inmates classified as high security risks.
II
The petitioner, Robert Howe, was convicted in a Vermont court of first-degree murder arising out of the rape and strangulation of an elderly female neighbor. He was sentenced to life imprisonment and assigned to the St. Albans facility to begin serving his sentence. Because of the nature of his offense and the length of his term, however, the Classification Committee of the Vermont Department of Corrections determined that he should be kept in a maximum-security facility and recommended that he be transferred to a federal prison. Accordingly, the Vermont Department of Corrections held a hearing to decide whether he should be transferred to a federal institution. Howe was afforded advance notice of the hearing and of the reasons for the proposed transfer; he was present at the hearing; and he was represented by a law adviser from the facility’s staff, who submitted various items of evidence in opposition to the proposed transfer.
The hearing officer recommended that the petitioner be transferred to a federal institution on the ground that “no treatment programs exist in the State of Vermont, which could provide both treatment and long term maximum security supervision” for him. App. 25. The hearing officer found that Howe was dangerous and could not be integrated into a community-based program. The State relied on a psychiatric report describing Howe as a “ ‘dangerous person who could well repeat the same pattern of assaultive behavior toward women at any time in the future.’ ” Id., at 26. The hearing officer also found that Howe would be “highly resistant to treatment” and that he was an escape risk. Indeed, Howe had escaped from the maximum-security wing of St. Albans while detained there prior to his trial.
On March 9, 1977, Vermont’s Acting Commissioner of Corrections approved Howe’s transfer to the federal prison system. Under the terms of the contract between the United States and Vermont, he was incarcerated initially in the federal penitentiary at Atlanta, Ga., and later was transferred to the federal penitentiary at Terre Haute, Ind.
As an inmate in the federal maximum-security penitentiaries, Howe enjoyed the same complete freedom of movement within the institution as other prisoners. By contrast, at St. Albans, he had not been given this freedom of movement, but had been generally confined to the maximum-security wing. The programs at St. Albans were substantially the same as those at the federal prisons, although Howe had less opportunity to take advantage of them because of the restrictions on his mobility at the state facility. The only two programs in which he actually participated at St. Albans were psychiatric counseling and educational courses. At Terre Haute, he ran a sewing machine until he had a heart attack. His principal activities now are knitting and crocheting.
On December 5, 1978, the petitioner filed this civil action in the United States District Court for the District of Vermont, naming as defendants the Attorney General of the United States and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons. Respondent William Ciuros, Vermont’s Commissioner of Corrections, intervened. Relying on Lono v. Fenton, 581 F. 2d 645 (CA7 1978) (en banc), the petitioner challenged his transfer to the federal prison system on the ground that the federal officials lacked statutory authority to accept custody. It was the petitioner’s position that the sole statutory authority for transfers of state inmates, § 5003, requires federal authorities to make an individual determination that each state prisoner so transferred needs a particular specialized treatment program available in the federal prison system. The petitioner argued that no such individual determination had been made in his case, and that the transfer had not been effected for special treatment needs but for general penological reasons, that is, maximum-security incarceration.
Following a hearing, the District Court denied the petitioner’s request for relief, holding:
“[T]he [A]ct plainly and unambiguously requires no showing of specialized treatment needs or facilities before a Vermont state prisoner may be transferred to the federal prison system in accordance with the contract under which [the petitioner] was so transferred. . . . 18 U. S. C. 5003 (a) requires nothing more of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons than a certification that facilities exist within the federal system in which state prisoners may be accommodated. That requirement has been met in the case at hand.” 480 F. Supp. 111, 115 (1978).
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. 625 F. 2d 454 (1980). The court observed that 18 U. S. C. § 5003 authorizes states to contract not simply for “treatment” but for the “custody, care, subsistence, education, treatment, and training of persons convicted.” It reasoned that nothing in the language of the statute gives “treatment” primacy or provides a basis for concluding that, whatever other services are provided, “treatment” must always be furnished to prisoners transferred under the statute. While acknowledging that there was a modicum of support in the legislative history for the petitioner’s argument, the Court of Appeals rejected it because it “has no basis in the language of the statute.” 625 F. 2d, at 457.
We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict in the Circuits. Sub nom. Howe v. Civiletti, 449 U. S. 1123 (1981).
Ill
The challenge here is not to the action of the State of Vermont in seeking to transfer the petitioner, but to the authority of the Federal Government, in the official person of the Attorney General, to receive and to hold him in a federal penitentiary. Under 18 U. S. C. § 4001 (a) “no citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress.” The petitioner avers that he is being held by the federal authorities illegally because neither § 5003 nor any other provision authorizes his detention. In particular, he argues that § 5003 has a narrow and limited thrust, that is, that a state prisoner may not be transferred to a federal institution except for an identified specialized treatment and that, before any such transfer may be made, the Federal Government must conduct an inquiry and make an individualized determination that the transferee needs, and the federal facility can provide, that treatment. On the other hand, the respondents contend that § 5003 is not so limited, and that the petitioner’s detention is clearly authorized by the plain language of that provision.
Because § 5003 obviously authorizes federal detention of state prisoners under some circumstances, our task is to determine the precise nature of those circumstances and whether appropriate circumstances are present in this case.
A
As in every ease involving the interpretation of a statute, analysis must begin with the language employed by Congress. Rubin v. United States, 449 U. S. 424, 430 (1981); Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U. S. 330, 337 (1979). By its terms, § 5003 (a) authorizes the Attorney General to contract with a state or territory “for the custody, care, subsistence, education, treatment, and training of persons convicted of criminal offenses in the courts of [that] State or Territory.” On its face, the authority furnished by this language encompasses much more than a limited authority to provide for the specialized treatment needs of state prisoners. “Treatment” is, after all, only one of several services cataloged; the focus of the statute, is upon care, custody, subsistence, education, and training as well as upon treatment. Nothing in the construction of the provision supports the view that “treatment” is more important than any of the other listed categories, and nothing in the passage can be fairly read as requiring that some kind of “treatment” must be furnished to every state prisoner transferred to a federal facility pursuant to a contract authorized by § 5003 (a).
The petitioner does not contest the breadth of the charter granted by the language just quoted. Rather, he focuses on the requirement that the Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons certify the availability of “proper and adequate treatment facilities and personnel.” The petitioner reads this requirement as imposing a substantive limitation or restriction on the purposes for which prisoners may be transferred: to wit, a prisoner may be transferred only for treatment.
The petitioner’s reading of the statute strains the plain meaning of its language. The act of certification by the Director is nothing more than the starting point in the process of contractual negotiation envisioned by § 5003 (a). Absent surplus capacity in the federal system, discussions between federal and state authorities regarding the transfer of state prisoners to federal facilities would be pointless. Once the Director certifies that a surplus capacity exists — that is, that there is room for more inmates — the transfer becomes a possibility. The certification clause cannot be read as requiring any more than that federal facilities and personnel must be available to handle whatever prisoners are received.
There is no special significance to the fact that the Director certifies the existence of “treatment facilities,” as opposed to prison facilities generally. First, the term “treatment facilities” is an appropriate general reference to the existing federal prison facilities. It is true, of course, that other terms may be used — and, in fact, are used — to describe the federal prisons; that, however, does not belie the appropriateness of the term “treatment facilities” as a general reference to the federal penal system.
Second, if, as the petitioner advocates, the phrase “treatment facilities” is read as a substantive restriction upon the purposes for which a prisoner may be transferred, § 5003 is rendered internally inconsistent. According to the petitioner, by virtue of § 5003 (a), a state prisoner may be transferred to a federal prison only if that facility affords him specialized treatment found to be needed. However, § 5003 (c) provides, with certain exceptions not applicable to this case, that all state prisoners in federal custody are subject to the same statutory and regulatory scheme that governs federal prisoners. And that statutory and regulatory scheme contains provisions that would undermine § 5003 (a) as that section is read by the petitioner. For example, by statute, federal prisoners may be transferred from one facility to another at the discretion of the Attorney General, 18 U. S. C. § 4082 (b), and federal officials have discretion to decide which inmates have access to rehabilitation programs, Moody v. Daggett, 429 U. S. 78, 88, n. 9 (1976). It makes no sense to interpret § 5003 as forcing federal authorities to accept only a state prisoner who is in need of treatment at a particular facility when those same officials are free to transfer that same prisoner from the facility, thereby denying him access to the treatment program.
In sum, the plain language of § 5003 (a) authorizes contracts not simply for treatment, but also for the custody, care, subsistence, education, and training of state prisoners in federal facilities. The certification requirement is simply a housekeeping measure designed to ensure that the federal system has the capacity to absorb the state prisoners. Nothing in the language of § 5003 (a) restricts or limits the use of federal prison facilities to those state prisoners who are in need of some particular treatment.
B
When the terms of a statute are unambiguous, our inquiry comes to an end, except “in 'rare and exceptional circumstances.’ ” TVA v. Hill, 437 U. S. 153, 187, n. 33 (1978) (quoting Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U. S. 55, 60 (1930)). No rare and exceptional circumstances are present here; our reading of the statute is fully supported by the legislative history of § 5003.
The petitioner disagrees. He notes that, when asked on the Senate floor to explain § 5003 (a), Senator McCarran answered that, whereas 18 U. S. C. § 4002 allows the Federal Government to contract with state officials for the confinement of federal prisoners,
" [t]his bill would authorize a more or less reciprocal arrangement whereby, under certain conditions in a limited category of cases . . . the Attorney General may contract with State officials for the custody of persons convicted and sentenced under State laws.” 97 Cong. Rec. 13543 (1951).
The petitioner finds significance in the Senator’s use of the words “under certain conditions” and “in a limited category of cases.”
Read as a whole, the legislative record reveals that § 5003 was enacted to provide a practical solution to a simple problem, that is, to permit the states to transfer their prisoners to federal custody in the same way that the Federal Government for years had been placing prisoners in state custody pursuant to 18 U. S. C. § 4002. Until this century, there was no federal prison system to speak of; instead, federal prisoners were housed in state prisons. By 1952, however, a sufficient number of federal prisons had been built that Congress could respond to requests from the states that the Federal Bureau of Prisons provide facilities in cases where state facilities were inadequate in some way. Section 5003 was the congressional response to this evolving situation.
A desire to help states with insufficient facilities, a sentiment that permeates the legislative history of § 5003, may be detected even in the remarks of Senator McCarran quoted by the petitioner. The Senator described the new section as a “reciprocal” of § 4002, one authorizing the Attorney General to extend to the states the same type of service he was authorized to receive from them under § 4002. Because federal officials exercise broad authority under § 4002, the “reciprocal” authority purportedly extended under § 5003 (a) likely was understood by Congress to be equally broad.
In addition to Senator McCarran’s remarks, the petitioner relies heavily upon a passage in the Report of the House Judiciary Committee on the bill that was to become § 5003. The Committee stated:
“The proposed legislation restricts or limits the use of Federal prison facilities to those convicted State offenders who are in need of treatment. The term “treatment” as used in this bill, in addition to its ordinary meaning of providing medical care, is also meant to include corrective and preventive guidance and training as defined in the Youth Corrections Act.” H. R. Rep. No. 1663, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1952).
The petitioner’s reliance upon this passage is understandable, but a single sentence — especially one taken from a Report issued five months after one chamber, the Senate, had passed § 5003 — cannot obscure the unmistakable intent of Congress to create by § 5003 broad authority in federal officials to accept custody of state prisoners in the federal prisons. Indeed, nowhere is this intent clearer than in another passage from the very same page:
“State prisons for many years housed and cared for Federal prisoners — until the Federal Government built its own institutions. Today, by [virtue of §4002], the Attorney General is authorized to contract for the care and custody of our Federal prisoners. . . . The committee sees no reason why Federal facilities and personnel should not, in turn, be made available for State offenders, provided, of course, the Federal Government is reimbursed for any expenses involved.” Ibid.
The legislative history of § 5003 reveals that Congress perceived a need to respond to state requests for the federal prison system to undertake “custody, treatment, and training” of state prisoners where the states lacked an institutional capacity to do so themselves. S. Rep. No. 978, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1951). It is clear that § 5003 was a broad response to this perceived need. Nothing in the legislative history of § 5003 makes this case one of the “rare and exceptional cases” requiring a departure from the plain language of the statute.
C
Because the Attorney General, and through him the Bureau of Prisons, are charged with the administration of § 5003, their view of the meaning of the statute is entitled to considerable deference. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U. S. 267, 274—275 (1974); Udall v. Tollman, 380 U. S. 1, 16 (1965). Moreover, in this case, the Bureau’s interpretation of the statute merits greater than normal weight because it was the Bureau that drafted the legislation and steered it through Congress with little debate.
The contract between the United States and Vermont that served as the basis for the petitioner’s transfer to federal custody is just one indication that the Federal Bureau of Prisons has construed § 5003 as broadly authorizing it to accept whatever prisoners are referred to it by state officials. In nearly 30 years of administering this statute, several Attorneys General have interpreted the statute consistently as a grant of plenary authority to contract with the states, limited only by certification that space and personnel were available.
Furthermore, Congress has had ample opportunity to express whatever dissatisfaction it might have regarding this administrative interpretation of § 5003. As early as 1952, in its Annual Report, the Bureau of Prisons advised Congress of its view of the statute:
“[Section 5003] authorize^] the Attorney General, when adequate facilities and personnel are available, to contract with State officials for the care and custody of State prisoners. . . .
“The confinement of Federal prisoners in State institutions has been authorized since 1776. . . . The present act affords an opportunity for reciprocity which had not hitherto existed. While it is not anticipated that the new statute will be used widely, States may on occasion wish to request Federal care for particular prisoners who need facilities available in the Federal prison system but not in their own. For example, a State may wish to transfer a vicious intractable offender who cannot be handled readily in its own institutions, or a female prisoner for whom appropriate facilities are not available, or a prisoner needing special medical or psychiatric care.” U. S. Dept, of Justice, Annual Report of the Bureau of Prisons 16-17 (1952) (emphasis added).
Congress indicated no reservation or objection to this interpretation of § 5003 in 1952, or in any year thereafter. Furthermore, in 1965, when Congress added § 5003 (d) so as to include the Canal Zone within the purview of § 5003, the Senate Report expressly described § 5003 (a) as broadly permitting the transfer of persons convicted in the Canal Zone to federal prisons. S. Rep. No. 799, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1965).
The contemporaneous and uniform construction of § 5003 (a) by the agency that proposed its enactment and is charged with its enforcement has been that the statute authorizes contracts based upon a broad range of purposes, including the transfer shown by this record. In the absence of any evidence of congressional objection, the agency’s interpretation must be given great weight.
IV
The plain language, the legislative history, and the longstanding administrative interpretation of § 5003 (a) clearly demonstrate that the provision is a broad charter authorizing the transfer of state prisoners to federal custody. There is no basis in § 5003 (a) for the petitioner’s challenge to his transfer to federal custody. Given our disposition of this issue, it is unnecessary to address the other arguments made by the petitioner.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
Title 18 U. S. C. § 5003 provides in pertinent part:
“(a) The Attorney General, when the Director [of the United States Bureau of Prisons] shall certify that proper and adequate treatment facilities and personnel are available, is hereby authorized to contract with the proper officials of a State or Territory for the custody, care, subsistence, education, treatment, and training of persons convicted of criminal offenses in the courts of such State or Territory: Provided, That any such contract shall provide for reimbursing the United States in full for all costs or other expenses involved.
“(e) Unless otherwise specifically provided in the contract, a person committed to the Attorney General hereunder shall be subject to all the provisions of law and regulations applicable to persons committed for violations of laws of the United States not inconsistent with the sentence imposed.”
The contract between the United States and Vermont provides in pertinent part:
“1. The [United States] will undertake the custody, care and treatment, including the furnishings and subsistence and all necessary medical and hospital services and supplies, of State prisoners committed to the Federal institution. . . .
“2. The State may without prior approval by the [United States] and without individual application to the [United States] transfer up to 40 State prisoners for commitment to a Bureau of Prisons facility.” 625 F. 2d 454, 455, n. 1 (1980).
The federal respondents argue that the petitioner lacked standing to bring this action because he is not a federal prisoner, but merely a prisoner of the State of Vermont temporarily in the custody of the Federal Government. This argument, raised for the first time in this Court, fails to give adequate weight to the plain language of § 4001 (a) proscribing detention of any kind by the United States, absent a congressional grant of authority to detain. If the petitioner is correct that neither § 5003 nor any other Act of Congress authorizes his detention by federal authorities, his detention would be illegal even though that detention is on behalf, and at the pleasure, of the State of Vermont.
Though the Seventh Circuit, in both Lono v. Fenton, 581 F. 2d 645 (1978) (en banc), and Anthony v. Wilkinson, 637 F. 2d 1130 (1980), held that absence of suitable state facilities is a precondition for a § 5003 transfer, the petitioner expressly disavows that contention in this Court. Reply Brief for the Petitioner 7. The petitioner argues only that § 5003 requires a finding that the proposed transferee is in need of specialized treatment and that the needed treatment is in fact available in the federal system.
The petitioner argues that the concept of “treatment” is limited to such things as medical treatment, psychiatric treatment, alcohol or drug rehabilitation programs, and special programs for juveniles. In his view, the concept does not include secure incarceration for dangerous offenders.
The petitioner notes that there are statutes referring to federal prisons as “penal institutions” or “correctional institutions.” But those statutes were passed by Congresses other than the Congress that passed § 5003. Moreover, those statutes typically concern the operation or management of prisons as institutional entities rather than processing of prisoners within them. In any event, places of confinement under sentence have long been described in alternative terms.
See n. 1, supra.
Only one Circuit has adopted the reading of § 5003 (a) urged by the petitioner. Lono v. Fenton, 581 F. 2d 645 (CA7 1978) (en banc). Each of the other Circuits to consider the meaning of § 5003 (a) has rejected the petitioner’s interpretation of that provision. Sisbarro v. Warden, 592 F. 2d 1 (CA1 1979); Beshaw v. Fenton, 635 F. 2d 239 (CA3 1980); United States ex rel. Gereau v. Henderson, 526 F. 2d 889 (CA5 1976); Fletcher v. Warden, 641 F. 2d 850 (CA10 1981).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
D
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
[563 U.S. 124]
PER CURIAM.
The writ of certiorari is dismissed as improvidently granted.
It is so ordered.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
I
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
Petitioner, who was 14 years old at the time, was adjudged a delinquent by the Juvenile Court of Fairfield County, Ohio, on September 7, 1966, on the basis of the trial judge’s finding that there was “probable cause” to believe that he had committed a crime that would be a felony if committed by an adult, namely, second-degree murder. Petitioner appealed to the Ohio Court of Appeals for Fairfield County, contending that the proceeding in the Juvenile Court which resulted in the order adjudicating him a delinquent violated his rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Specifically he argued- that he had been determined to be a delinquent on the basis of an unconstitutionally low standard of proof, and that he had been denied his constitutional rights to trial by jury, to an impartial tribunal, and to bail pending disposition of the case against him; he also contended that his privilege against self-incrimination had been violated by the admission into evidence against him of statements made in response to questioning from police officers. The Ohio Court of Appeals rejected these contentions and affirmed the judgment of the Juvenile Court on January 3, 1967. 13 Ohio App. 2d 11, 233 N. E. 2d 333. On March 15, 1967, the Supreme Court of Ohio, sua sponte, dismissed petitioner’s further appeal on the ground that it presented “no substantial constitutional question.” Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari in this Court, which we granted, 389 U. S. 819 (1967), raising the same issues presented in the Ohio courts.
Under Ohio law an adjudication that a child is a delinquent can have numerous substantial consequences. For example, once such a determination is made the Juvenile Court may place the child in a variety of state institutions or in a foster home. Ohio Rev. Code § 2151.35. Another alternative disposition in a case where the child has been found to have committed a felony is for the Juvenile Court to bind the child over to the Court of Common Pleas for trial under the criminal statutes applicable to adults. Ohio Rev. Code § 2151.26. At the time the petition for certiorari was filed in this case on April 11, 1967, no disposition beyond the adjudication itself and ordering of a physical and mental examination of petitioner had been made by the Juvenile Court. We have since been informed by the parties that petitioner has been bound over for trial as an adult and that he has been indicted for the crime of first-degree murder.
The State argues vigorously that, because of the disposition subsequently made by the Juvenile Court, the proceeding at which the determination of delinquency was made was merely the equivalent of a probable cause hearing for an adult. Petitioner, on the other hand, asserts that his adjudication as a delinquent is final for purposes of appellate review and that substantial consequences of that decision continue despite the supervening transfer of jurisdiction over petitioner to the adult criminal courts. The resolution of this dispute is crucial to many of the issues presented by petitioner, since, for example, in ordinary probable cause hearings involving adults there is no right to either trial by jury or a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The unresolved question under Ohio law is not whether the adjudication of delinquency is a final, appealable order. The Ohio Court of Appeals considered that issue and ruled that the order is appealable, and the Ohio Supreme Court necessarily accepted this conclusion because its dismissal of the appeal was not based on the jurisdictional issue. The question which the Ohio courts have not settled is what, if any, effect the “disposition” order, entered after their decisions on the appeal and after the petition for certiorari was filed here, has upon the prior delinquency determination made by the Juvenile Court.
On the constitutional issues, petitioner relies heavily on In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1, which was decided on May 15, 1967, some two months after the dismissal by the Ohio Supreme Court in this case. In Gault, this Court held squarely, for the first time., that various of the federal constitutional guarantees accompanying ordinary criminal proceedings were applicable to state juvenile court proceedings where possible commitment to a state institution was involved. Because the Ohio courts have not had the opportunity to assess the impact of that decision on petitioner’s claims, we deem it appropriate to vacate the judgment of the Ohio Court of Appeals and remand the case for reconsideration in light of Gault. Upon such remand, the Ohio court may, of course, also consider the impact, if any, on the questions raised by petitioner of the intervening order of the Juvenile Court requiring him to face trial in the adult courts.
The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to the Ohio Court of Appeals for Fairfield County for consideration in light of In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1 (1967).
Vacated and remanded.
In addition, Ohio specifically provides that a delinquency judgment may be considered by any court with respect to sentencing or probation in subsequent criminal proceedings. Ohio Rev. Code §2151.35. For a general discussion of the practical consequences for juveniles of a delinquency record, see the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society 66-67, 75 (1967), and its Task Force Report: Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime 92-93, 360-361, 385, 417-418 (1967).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question for decision is whether § 102 (2) (C) of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 83 Stat. 853, 42 U. S. C. §4332 (2)(C), requires federal agencies to prepare environmental impact statements (EIS’s) to accompany appropriation requests. We hold that it does not.
I
NEPA sets forth its purposes in bold strokes:
“The purposes of this Act are: To declare a national policy which will encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his environment; to promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man; to enrich the understanding of the ecological systems and natural resources important to the Nation_” 83 Stat. 852, 42 U. S. C. § 4321.
Congress recognized, however, that these desired goals could be incorporated, into the everyday functioning of the Federal Government only with great difficulty. See S. Rep. No. 91-296, p. 19 (1969). NEPA therefore contains “action-forcing procedures which will help to insure that the policies [of the Act] are implemented.” Ibid. See Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U. S. 390, 409 (1976). Section 102 (2)(C) of the Act sets out one of these procedures:
“The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible... (2) all agencies of the Federal Government shall—
“(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on- — •
“(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
“(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented,
“(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
“(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man’s environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
“(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.” 83 Stat. 853, 42 U. S. C. § 4332 (2) (C) (emphasis supplied).
The thrust of § 102 (2) (C) is thus that environmental concerns be integrated into the very process of agency decision-making. The “detailed statement” it requires is the outward sign that environmental values and consequences have been considered during the planning stage of agency actions. If environmental concerns are not interwoven into the fabric of agency planning, the “action-forcing” characteristics of § 102 (2)(C) would be lost. “In the past, environmental factors have frequently been ignored and omitted from consideration in the early stages of planning.... As a result, unless the results of planning are radically revised at the policy level— and this often means the Congress — environmental enhancement opportunities may be foregone and unnecessary degradation incurred.” S. Rep. No. 91-296, supra, at 20. For this reason the regulations of the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) require federal agencies to “integrate the NEPA process with other planning at the earliest possible time to insure that planning and decisions reflect environmental values....” 43 Fed. Reg. 55992 (1978) (to be codified at 40 CFR § 1501.2).
In 1974, respondents, three organizations with interests in the preservation of the environment, brought suit in the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia alleging that § 102 (2) (C) requires federal agencies to prepare EIS’s to accompany their appropriation requests. Respondents named as defendants the Secretary of the Interior and the Director of'the Office of Mangement and Budget (OMB), and alleged that proposed curtailments in the budget of the National Wildlife Refuge System (NWRS), 80 Stat. 927, 16 U. S. C. § 668dd, would “cut back significantly the operations, maintenance, and staffing of units within the System.” Complaint ¶ 17. The System is administered by the Fish and Wildlife Service of the Department of the Interior, and consists of more than 350 refuges encompassing more than 30 million acres in 49 States. The primary purpose of the NWRS is to provide a national program “for the restoration, preservation, development and management of wildlife and wildlands habitat; for the protection and preservation of endangered or threatened species and their habitat; and for the management of wildlife and wildlands to obtain the maximum benefits from these resources.” 50 CFR § 25.11 (b) (1978). Respondents alleged that the proposed budget curtailments would significantly affect the quality of the human environment, and hence should have been accompanied by an EIS prepared both by the Fish and Wildlife Service and by OMB.
The District Court agreed with respondents’ contentions. Relying on provisions of the then applicable CEQ guidelines, and on the Department of the Interior’s Manual, the District Court held that “appropriation requests are 'proposals for legislation’ within the meaning of NEPA,” and also that “annual proposals for financing the Refuge System are major Federal actions which clearly have a significant effect on the environment.” Sierra Club v. Morton, 395 F. Supp. 1187, 1188, 1189 (1975). The District Court granted respondents’ motion for summary judgment, and provided declaratory and injunctive relief. It stated that the Department of the Interior and OMB were required “to prepare, consider, and disseminate environmental impact statements on annual proposals for financing the National Wildlife Refuge System.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 61a.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit modified the holding of the District Court. The Court of Appeals was apprehensive because “[a] rule requiring preparation of an EIS on the annual budget request for virtually every ongoing program would trivialize NEPA.” 189 U. S. App. D. C. 117, 125, 581 F. 2d 895, 903 (1978). Therefore, the Court of Appeals concluded that § 102 (2) (C) required the preparation of an EIS only when an appropriation request accompanies “a 'proposal’ for taking new action which significantly changes the status quo,” or when “the request for budget approval and appropriations is one that ushers in a considered programmatic course following a programmatic review.” 189 U. S. App. D. C., at 125, 581 F. 2d, at 903. Section 102 (2) (C) would thus have no application to “a routine request for budget approval and appropriations for continuance and management of an ongoing program.” 189 U. S. App. D. C., at 125, 581 F. 2d, at 903. The Court of Appeals held, however, that there was no need for injunctive relief because the Fish and Wildlife Service had completed during the pendency of the appeal a “Programmatic EIS” that adequately evaluated the environmental consequences for the NWRS of various budgetary alternatives. Id., at 126, 581 F. 2d, at 904. See United States Fish and Wildlife Service, Final Environmental Statement: Operation of the National Wildlife Refuge System (Nov. 1976).
We granted certiorari, 439 U. S. 1065 (1979), and we now reverse.
II
NEPA requires EIS’s to be included in recommendations or reports on both “proposals for legislation... significantly affecting the quality of the human environment” and “proposals for... major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.” 42 U. S. C. § 4332 (2) (C). See CEQ regulations, 43 Fed. Reg. 56001 (1978) (to be codified at 40 CFR § 1506.8 (a)). Petitioners argue, however, that the requirements of § 102 (2)(C) have no application to the budget process. The contrary holding of the Court of Appeals rests on two alternative interpretations of § 102 (2)(C). The first is that appropriation requests which are the result of “an agency’s painstaking review of an ongoing program,” 189 U. S. App. D. C., at 125, 581 F. 2d, at 903, are “proposals for legislation” within the meaning of § 102 (2) (C). The second is that appropriation requests which are the reflection of “new” agency initiatives constituting “major Federal actions” under NEPA, are themselves “proposals for... major Federal actions” for purposes of § 102 (2)(C). We hold that neither interpretation is correct.
A
We note initially that NEPA makes no distinction between “proposals for legislation” that are the result of “painstaking review,” and those that are merely “routine.” When Congress has thus spoken “in the plainest of words,” TVA v. Hill, 437 U. S. 153, 194 (1978), we will ordinarily decline to fracture the clear language of a statute, even for the purpose of fashioning from the resulting fragments a rule that “accords with ‘common sense and the public weal.’ ” Id., at 195. Therefore, either all appropriation requests constitute “proposals for legislation,” or none does.
There is no direct evidence in the legislative history of NEPA that enlightens whether Congress intended the phrase “proposals for legislation” to include requests for appropriations. At the time of the Court of Appeals’ decision, however, CEQ guidelines provided that § 102 (2) (C) applied to “[recommendations or favorable reports relating to legislation including requests for appropriations.” 40 CFR § 1500.5 (a)(1) (1977). At that time CEQ’s guidelines were advisory in nature, and were for the purpose of assisting federal agencies in complying with NEPA. § 1500.1 (a).
In 1977, however, President Carter, in order to create a single set of uniform, mandatory regulations, ordered CEQ, “after consultation with affected agencies,” to “[i]ssue regulations to Federal agencies for the implementation of the procedural provisions” of NEPA. Exec. Order No. 11991, 3 CFR 124 (1978). The President ordered the heads of federal agencies to “comply with the regulations issued by the Council....” Ibid. CEQ has since issued these regulations, 43 Fed. Reg. 55978-56007 (1978), and they reverse CEQ’s prior interpretation of § 102 (2)(C). The regulations provide specifically that “'[1] egislation’ includes a bill or legislative proposal to Congress... but does not include requests for appropriations.” 43 Fed. Reg. 56004 (1978) (to be codified at 40 CFR § 1508.17). (Emphasis supplied.) CEQ explained this reversal by noting that, on the basis of “traditional concepts relating to appropriations and the budget cycle, considerations of timing and confidentiality, and other factors,... the Council in its experience found that preparation of EISs is ill-suited to the budget preparation process.” 43 Fed. Reg., at 55989.
CEQ’s interpretation of NEPA is entitled to substantial deference. See Warm Springs Dam Task Force v. Gribble, 417 U. S. 1301, 1309-1310 (1974) (Douglas, J., in chambers). The Council was created by NEPA, and charged in that statute with the responsibility “to review and appraise the various programs and activities of the Federal Government in the light of the policy set forth in... this Act..., and to, make recommendations to the President with respect thereto.” 83 Stat. 855, 42 U. S. C. § 4344 (3).
It is true that in the past we have been somewhat less inclined to defer to “administrative guidelines” when they have “conflicted with earlier pronouncements of the agency.” General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U. S. 125, 143 (1976). But CEQ’s reversal of interpretation occurred during the detailed and comprehensive process, ordered by the President, of transforming advisory guidelines into mandatory regulations applicable to all federal agencies. See American Trucking Assns. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 387 U. S. 397, 416 (1967). A mandatory requirement that every federal agency submit EIS’s with its appropriation requests raises wholly different and more serious issues “of fair and prudent administration,” ibid., than does nonbinding advice. This is particularly true in light of the Court of Appeals’ correct observation that “ [a] rule requiring preparation of an EIS on the annual budget request for virtually every ongoing program would trivialize NEPA.” 189 U. S. App. D. C., at 125, 581 F. 2d, at 903. The Court of Appeals accurately noted that such an interpretation of NEPA would be a “reductio ad absurdum.... It would be absurd to require an EIS on every decision on the management of federal land, such as fluctuation in the number of forest fire spotters.” Id., at 124, 581 F. 2d, at 902. Even respondents do not now contend that NEPA should be construed so that all appropriation requests constitute “proposals for legislation.” Brief for Respondents 13 n. 6, 55-61.
CEQ’s interpretation of the phrase “proposals for legislation” is consistent with the traditional distinction which Congress has drawn between “legislation” and “appropriation.” The rules of both Houses “prohibit ‘legislation’ from being added to an appropriation bill.” L. Fisher, Budget Concepts and Terminology: The Appropriations Phase, in 1 Studies in Taxation, Public Finance and Related Subjects — A Compendium 437 (Fund for Public Policy Research 1977). See Standing Rules of the United States Senate, Rule 16 (4) (“No amendment which proposes general legislation shall be received to any general appropriation bill Rules of the House of Representatives, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., Rule XXI (2) (1979); 7 C. Cannon, Precedents of the House of Representatives §§ 1172,1410,1443,1445,1448,1459, 1463, 1470, 1472 (1936). The distinction is maintained “to assure that program and financial matters are considered independently of one another. This division of labor is intended to enable the Appropriations Committees to concentrate on financial issues and to prevent them from trespassing on substantive legislation.” House Budget Committee, Congressional Control of Expenditures 19 (Comm. Print 1977). House and Senate rules thus require a “previous choice of policy... before any item of appropriations might be included in a general appropriations bill.” United States ex rel. Chapman v. FPC, 345 U. S. 153, 164 n. 5 (1953). Since appropriations therefore “have the limited and specific purpose of providing funds for authorized programs,” TVA v. Hill, 437 U. S., at 190, and since the “action-forcing” provisions of NEPA are directed precisely at the processes of “planning and... decisionmak-ing,” 42 U. S. C. §4332 (2) (A), which are associated with underlying legislation, we conclude that the distinction made by CEQ’s regulations is correct and that “proposals for legislation” do not include appropriation requests.
B
The Court of Appeals’ alternative interpretation of NEPA is that appropriation requests constitute “proposals for... major Federal actions.” But this interpretation distorts the language of the Act, since appropriation requests do not “propose” federal actions at all; they instead fund actions already proposed. Section 102 (2) (C) is thus best interpreted as applying to those recommendations or reports that actually propose programmatic actions, rather than to those which merely suggest how such actions may be funded. Any other result would create unnecessary redundancy. For example, if the mere funding of otherwise unaltered agency programs were construed to constitute major federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, the resulting EIS’s would merely recapitulate the EIS’s that should have accompanied the initial proposals of the programs. And if an agency program were to be expanded or revised in a manner that constituted major federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, an EIS would'have been required to accompany the underlying programmatic decision. An additional EIS at the appropriation stage would add nothing.
Even if changes in agency programs occur because of budgetary decisions, an EIS at the appropriation stage would only be repetitive. For example, respondents allege in their complaint that OMB required the Fish and Wildlife Service to decrease its appropriation request for the NWRS, and that this decrease would alter the operation of the NWRS in a manner that would significantly affect the quality of the human environment. See n. 9, supra. But since the Fish and Wildlife Service could respond to OMB’s budgetary curtailments in a variety of ways, see United States Fish and Wildlife Service, Final Environmental Statement: Operation of the National Wildlife Refuge System (Nov. 1976), it is impossible to predict whether or how any particular budget cut will in fact significantly affect the quality of the human environment. OMB’s determination to cut the Service’s budget is not a programmatic proposal, and therefore requiring OMB to include an EIS in its budgetary cuts would be premature. See Aberdeen & Rockfish R. Co. v. SCRAP, 422 U. S. 289, 320 (1975). And since an EIS must be prepared if any of the revisions the Fish and Wildlife Service proposes in its ongoing programs in response to OMB’s budget cuts would significantly affect the quality of the human environment, requiring the Fish and Wildlife Service to include an EIS with its revised appropriation request would merely be redundant. Moroever, this redundancy would have the deleterious effect of circumventing and eliminating the careful distinction Congress has maintained between appropriation and legislation. It would flood House and Senate Appropriations Committees with EIS’s focused on the policy issues raised by underlying authorization legislation, thereby dismantling the “division of labor” so deliberately created by congressional rules.
C
We conclude therefore, for the reasons given above, that appropriation requests constitute neither “proposals for legislation” nor “proposals for... major Federal actions,” and that therefore the procedural requirements of § 102 (2) (C) have no application to such requests. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
So ordered.
Section 101 (b) articulates these purposes with even greater particularity :
“In order to carry out the policy set forth in this Act, it is the continuing responsibility of the Federal Government to use all practicable means, consistent with other essential considerations of national policy, to improve and coordinate Federal plans, functions, programs, and resources to the end that the Nation may—
“(1) fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the environment for succeeding generations;
“ (2) assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and esthetically and culturally pleasing surroundings ;
“(3) attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment without degradation, risk to health or safety, or other undesirable and unintended consequences;
“(4) preserve important historic, cultural, and natural aspects of our national heritage, and maintain, wherever possible, an environment which supports diversity and variety of individual choice;
“(5) achieve a balance between population and resource use which will permit high standards of living and a wide sharing of life’s amenities; and
“(6) enhance the quality of renewable resources and approach the maximum attainable recycling of depletable resources.” 83 Stat. 852, 42 U. S. C. §4331 (b).
Of course, an EIS need not be promulgated unless an agency’s planning ripens into a “recommendation or report on proposals for legislation [or] other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.” 42 U. S. C. § 4332 (2) (C). See Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U. S. 390 (1976). Moreover, although NEPA requires compliance “to the fullest extent possible,” we have held that the duty to prepare an EIS must yield before “a clear and unavoidable conflict in statutory authority.” Flint Ridge Development Co. v. Scenic Rivers Assn., 426 U. S. 776, 788 (1976).
CEQ regulations state that “[t]he primary purpose of an environmental impact statement is to serve as an action-forcing device to insure that the policies and goals defined in [NEPA] are infused into the ongoing programs and actions of the Federal Government.... An environmental impact statement is more than a disclosure document. It shall be used by Federal officials in conjunction with other relevant material to plan actions and make decisions.” 43 Fed. Reg. 55994 (1978) (to be codified at 40 CFR § 1502.1).
In Exec. Order No. 11991, President Carter required the CEQ to issue regulations that included procedures “for the early preparation of environmental impact statements.” 3 CFR 124 (1978). As a consequence, CEQ regulations provide:
“An agency shall commence preparation of an environmental impact statement as close as possible to the time the agency is developing or is presented with a proposal... so that preparation can be completed in time for the final statement to be included in any recommendation or report on the proposal. The statement shall be prepared early enough so that it can serve practically as an important contribution to the decisionmaldng process and will not be used to rationalize or justify decisions already made.... For instance:
“(a) For projects directly undertaken by Federal agencies the environmental impact statement shall be prepared at the feasibility analysis (go-no go) stage and may be supplemented at a later stage if necessary....” 43 Fed. Reg. 55995 (1978) (to be codified at 40 CFR § 1502.5).
Respondents are the Sierra Club, the National Parks and Conservation Association, and the Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
CEQ regulations define an “environmental impact statement” to mean “a detailed written statement as required by See. 102 (2) (C) of [NEPA].” 43 Fed. Reg. 56004 (1978) (to be codified at 40 CFR § 1508.11).
See United States Fish and Wildlife Service, Final Environmental Statement: Operation of the National Wildlife Refuge System 1-8 to 1-9 (Nov. 1976).
The System is administered according to the provisions of several statutes. The most significant of these are the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 401, as amended, 72 Stat. 563, 16 U. S. C. § 661 et seq.; the Fish and Wildlife Act of 1956, 70 Stat. 1119,16 U. S. C. § 742a et seq.; the Migratory Bird Conservation Act, ch. 257, 45 Stat. 1222, as amended, 16 U. S. C. § 715 et seq.; and the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 884, 16 U. S. C. § 1531 et seq.
Respondents brought suit on behalf of themselves, claiming that they had organizational interests in monitoring and publicizing the management of the NWRS, and on behalf of their members, alleging that the latter used the NWRS for recreational and other purposes and would be affected by the proposed budget curtailments.
Respondents alleged that OMB had “significantly reduced the Interior Department’s request for appropriations for the operation of the National Wildlife Refuge System during fiscal year 1974 and during other years without preparing or considering the environmental-impact statement required by NEPA.” Complaint ¶ 25.
Respondents also contended that § 102 (2) (B) of NEPA required OMB to develop procedures to assure consideration of environmental factors in the budget process. Section 102 (2) (B) requires all federal agencies to "identify and develop methods and procedures, in consultation with the Council on Environmental Quality established by title II of this Act, which will insure that presently unquantified environmental amenities and values may be given appropriate consideration in decisionmaking along with economic and technical considerations.” 83 Stat. 853, 42 U. S. C. §4332 (2) (B).
At that time, CEQ was authorized by Exec. Order No. 11514, § 3 (h), to issue nonbinding “guidelines to Federal agencies for the preparation of detailed statements on proposals for legislation and other Federal actions affecting the environment.” 3 CFR 904 (1966-1970 Comp.). These guidelines stated that the “major Federal actions” to which § 102 (2) (C) applied included “[recommendations or favorable reports relating to legislation including requests for appropriations.” 40 CFR § 1500.5 (a) (1) (1974). See § 1500.3.
At that time the Department of the Interior’s Manual, following CEQ’s proposed guidelines, provided:
“The following criteria are to be used in deciding whether a proposed action requires the preparation of an environmental statement:
“A. Types of Federal actions to be considered include, but are not limited to:
“(1) Recommendations or favorable reports to the Congress relating to legislation, including appropriations.” Department of the Interior Manual, §516.5, 36 Fed. Reg. 19344 (1971).
Without additional discussion, the District Court also stated that the Director of OMB was required “to develop formal methods and procedures which will, with respect to [OMB]’s own administrative actions and proposals, identify those agency actions requiring environmental statements to be prepared, considered, and disseminated.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 62a. See n. 9, supra.
Respondents do not now challenge this holding.
The Court of Appeals also affirmed what it took to be the District Court’s declaratory relief requiring OMB “to adopt procedures and appropriate regulations to comply with the obligations NEPA imposes on the budget process... 189 U. S. App. D. C., at 127, 581 F. 2d, at 905. See n. 12, supra.
CEQ had taken this position from the first draft of its guidelines. CEQ was required by President Nixon to issue guidelines on March 5, 1970. See Exec. Order No. 11514, 3 CPR 902 (1966-1967 Comp.). On April 30, 1970, CEQ promulgated interim guidelines which provided that “major Federal actions” included “[r]ecommendations or reports relating to legislation and appropriations.” Council on Environmental Quality, First Annual Report: Environmental Quality 288 (1970). On April 23, 1971, the guidelines were revised to state that “major Federal actions” included “[recommendations or favorable reports relating to legislation including that for appropriations.” 36 Fed. Reg. 7724 (1971). On August 1, 1973, the guidelines were once again revised, this time to the form noted by the Court of Appeals. 38 Fed. Reg. 20551 (1973).
Relying on the CEQ guidelines, two prior decisions by Courts of Appeals have both interpreted “proposals for legislation” to include appropriation requests. See Environmental Defense Fund v. TVA, 468 F. 2d 1164, 1181 (CA6 1972); Scientists’ Institute for Public Information, Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 156 U. S. App. D. C. 395, 404, 481 F. 2d 1079, 1088 (1973).
These regulations become effective July 30, 1979. 43 Fed. Reg. 55978 (1978).
The CEQ also noted that “[n]othing in the Council’s determination, however, relieves agencies of responsibility to prepare statements when otherwise required on the underlying program or other actions.” Id., at 55989.
The Congressional Budget Act of 1974 directs the Comptroller General of the United States, “in cooperation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and the Director of the Congressional Budget Office, [to] develop, establish, maintain, and publish standard terminology, definitions, classifications, and codes for Federal fiscal, budgetary, and program-related data and information.” 88 Stat. 327, 31 U. S. C. § 1152 (a) (1). Pursuant to this statutory authority, the Comptroller General has published definitions distinguishing “authorizing legislation” from “appropriation.” Authorizing legislation is defined in the following manner:
“Basic substantive legislation enacted by Congress which sets up or continues the legal operation of a Federal program or agency either indefinitely or for a specific period of time or sanctions a particular type of obligation or expenditure within a program. Such legislation is normally a prerequisite for subsequent appropriations or other kinds of budget authority to be contained in appropriations acts. It may limit the amount of budget authority to be provided subsequently or may authorize the appropriation of'such sums as may be necessary.’ ” Comptroller General of the United States, Terms Used in the Budgetary Process 4 (1977).
Appropriation, on the other hand, is defined as:
“An authorization by an act of the Congress that permits Federal agencies to incur obligations and to make payments out of the Treasury for specified purposes. An appropriation usually follows.enactment of authorizing legislation.... Appropriations do not represent cash actually set aside in the Treasury for purposes specified in the appropriation act; they represent limitations of amounts which agencies may obligate during the time period specified in the respective appropriations acts.” Id., at 3.
Congressional enactments employ this distinction between appropriation and legislation. For example, the Budget and Accounting Act requires the President to include in the proposed budget he submits to Congress
“with respect to each- proposal in the Budget for new or additional legislation which would create or expand any function, activity, or authority, in addition to those functions, activities, and authorities then existing or as then being administered and operated, a tabulation showing—
“(A) the amount proposed in the Budget for appropriation and for expenditure in the ensuing fiscal year on account of such proposal; and
“(B) the estimated appropriation required on account of such proposal in each of the four fiscal years, immediately following that ensuing fiscal year, during which such proposal is to be in effect....” As added, 84 Stat. 1169, 31 U. S. C. § 11 (a) (12) (emphasis supplied).
See also 18 TJ. S. C. § 1913; 22 U. S. C. § 2394 (c).
The Executive Branch also recognizes the distinction between appropriation and legislation. For example, OMB distinguishes its function “[t]o supervise and control the administration of the budget” from its task of assisting “the President by clearing and coordinating departmental advice on proposed legislation.” Requiring Confirmation of Future Appointments of the Director and Deputy Director of the Office of Management and Budget, H. R. Rep. No. 93-697, p. 18 (1973). See Neustadt, Presidency and Legislation: The Growth of Central Clearance, 48 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 641 (1954). OMB Circular No. A-19 (1972) establishes OMB’s procedures for “legislative coordination and clearance,” whereas OMB Circular No. A-ll (1978) sets out OMB’s guidelines for the “Preparation and Submission of Budget Estimates.” OMB Circular No. A-19, §6 (a), requires each federal agency to “prepare and submit to OMB annually its proposed legislative program for the next session of Congress. These programs must be submitted at the same time as the initial submissions of an agency’s annual budget request as required by OMB Circular A-ll.” OMB Circular A-ll, § 13.2, on the other hand, provides:
“If, in addition to the regular appropriation requests, it appears probable that proposals for new legislation may require a further budget request or result in a change in revenues or outlays, a tentative forecast of the supplemental estimate will be set forth separately.... Such proposed supplemental must be consistent with items appearing in the agency’s legislative program as required by OMB Circular No. A-19....”
L. Deschler, Procedure in the U. S. House of Representatives §26-1.2 (1977) states that “[¡language in an appropriation bill changing existing law is legislation and not in order.” Conversely, “ [restrictions against the inclusion of appropriations in legislative bills are provided for by House rule....” Id., §25-3.1.
CEQ regulations define “major Federal action” in the following manner:
“ 'Major Federal action’ includes actions with effects that may be major and which are potentially subject to Federal control and responsibility. Major reinforces but does not have a meaning independent of significantly.... Actions include the circumstance where the responsible oifi-cials fail to act and that failure to act is reviewable by courts or administrative tribunals under the Administrative Procedure Act or other applicable law as agency action.
“(a) Actions include new and continuing activities, including projects and programs entirely or partly financed, assisted, conducted, regulated, or approved by federal agencies; new or revised agency rules, regulations, plans, policies, or procedures; and legislative proposals....
“(b) Federal actions tend to fall within one of the following categories:
“(1) Adoption of official policy, such as rules, regulations, and interpretations adopted pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. 651 et seq.; treaties and international conventions or agreements; formal documents establishing an agency's policies which will result in or substantially alter agency programs.
“(2) Adoption of formal plans, such as official documents prepared or approved by federal agencies which guide or prescribe alternative uses of federal resources, upon which future agency actions will be based.
“(3) Adoption of programs, such as a group of concerted actions to implement a specific policy or plan; systematic and connected agency decisions allocating agency resources to implement a specific statutory program or executive directive.
“(4) Approval of specific projects, such as construction or management activities located in a defined geographic area. Projects include actions approved by permit or other regulatory decision as well as federal and federally assisted activities.” 43 Fed. Reg. 56004-56005 (1978) (to be codified at 40 CFR § 1508.18).
“[M]ajor Federal actions” include the “expansion or revision of ongoing programs.” S. Rep. No. 91-296, p. 20 (1969).
For example, if an agency were to seek an appropriation to initiate a major new program that would significantly affect the quality of the human environment, or if it were to decline to ask for funding so as to terminate a program with a similar effect, the agency would have been required to include EIS’s in the recommendations or reports on the proposed underlying programmatic decisions.
The Court of Appeals held that EIS’s need be included in appropriation requests for “major Federal actions” only if major changes that would significantly affect the quality of the human environment are proposed in the underlying programs for which funding is sought. See 189 U. S. App. D. C., at 125, 581 F. 2d, at 903. But an appropriation request applies not only to major changes in a federal program
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
H
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
After finding that the primary employer was not in commerce and ruling that the pre-emption rule of San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U. S. 236, was therefore not applicable, the state court enjoined picketing at the premises of the secondary employer. The judgment must be reversed. The jurisdictional standards established by the National Labor Relations Board (see 23 N. L. R. B. Ann. Rep. 8 (1958)) may be satisfied by reference to the business operations of either the primary or the secondary employer. Truck Drivers Local No. 649, 93 N. L. R. B. 386; Teamsters Local No. 554, 110 N. L. R. B. 1769; Madison Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 134 N. L. R. B. 517. Here, as the record clearly shows, the secondary employer’s operations met the jurisdictional requirements. Since the union’s activities in this case were arguably an unfair labor practice, Sailors’ Union of the Pacific, 92 N. L. R. B. 547, the state court had no jurisdiction to issue the injunction. San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U. S. 236; Construction Laborers v. Curry, 371 U. S. 542. Accordingly, the petition for certiorari is granted and the judgment is reversed.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
J
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
William Jack Hammett, the petitioner in this case, has been convicted of murder and sentenced to death. The conviction and sentence were affirmed by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, 578 S. W. ~2d 699 (1979). The petitioner states, and his attorney does not deny, that he informed his counsel that he did not wish to pursue any further appeals in his case. Nevertheless, counsel filed a petition requesting review by this Court.
Petitioner now moves for dismissal of the petition, stating under oath that he “made this decision voluntarily and with full knowledge of the consequences, only after due consideration of all facts and circumstances regarding the case.” Affidavit of June 3, 1980. Under Rule 60 of the Rules of the Supreme Court (1970), a petitioner or appellant may withdraw a petition or appeal. In response to this motion, petitioner’s counsel does not question petitioner’s competence. The State of Texas does not oppose petitioner’s motion. In the absence of any issue as-to petitioner’s competence to withdraw the petition filed against his will, there is no basis under Rule 60 for denying this motion. See Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U. S. 1012, 1014 (1976) (Burger, C. J., concurring). Moreover, withdrawal of the petition will not foreclose an appropriate application for collateral relief. Accordingly, the motion to withdraw the petition is granted.
It is so ordered.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice White
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question in this case is this: When a power company that sells electricity at both wholesale and retail seeks to raise its wholesale rates, does the Federal Power Commission (Commission) have jurisdiction to consider the allegations of the company’s wholesale customers that the proposed wholesale rates, which are within the Commission's jurisdiction, are discriminatory and noncompetitive when considered in relation to the company’s retail rates, which are not within the jurisdiction of the Commission? We hold that it does.
I
Arkansas Power & Light Co. (Company) is a public utility engaged .in the sale of electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce under the meaning of § 201 of the Federal Power Act (Act), as added, 49 Stat. 847, 16 U. S. C. § 824. Its wholesale rates are thus within reach of the Commission’s powers under § 206 (a) of the Act to establish rates which are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory. 16 U. S. C. § 824e (a). The Company also sells at retail and seeks industrial sales in competition with some of its wholesale customers. These wholesale customers include the seven municipally owned electric systems and the two electric power cooperatives which are respondents here. Each of these respondents (Customers) operates in the State of Arkansas and each borders on or is surrounded by the territory served by the Company.
In June 1973, the Company filed with the Commission a wholesale rate increase pursuant to §205 (d). The Customers sought to intervene before the Commission, urging that the rate increase be rejected. Among other grounds, it was asserted that the Customers and the Company were in competition for industrial retail accounts and that the rate increase was “an attempt to squeeze [the Customers] or some of them out of competition and to make them more susceptible to the persistent attempts of the company to take over the public [ly] owned systems in the State.” App. 6. It was alleged that the proposed wholesale rates would make it “impossible for the [Customers] to sell power to an industrial load of any size at a competitive price with [the Company], since, in many cases, the revenues therefrom would not even cover the incremental power costs to [the Customers].” Id., at 7. It was also asserted that the rate filing was “plainly discriminatory against the single class of customer which [the Company] has historically attempted to drive out of business, without justification on any ordinary cost of service basis . . . Id., at 19.
The Company opposed the petition. The Commission permitted the Customers to intervene but ruled that it would “limit Customers' participation in this proceeding to matters other than the alleged anti-competitive activities” because the Customers had failed to demonstrate that the relief sought was “within this Commission’s authority to direct.” Id., at 35. The Commission also denied the Customers’ amended petition to intervene, again refusing to consider the tendered anticompetitive and discrimination issues. Inasmuch as the Commission’s authority is limited to wholesale rates and does not reach sales at retail, the Commission’s opinion was that “the relief sought by [the Customers] is beyond the authority granted to us under the Federal Power Act.” Id., at 53. In later denying the Customers’ petition for rehearing, the Commission stated that in considering the Company’s cost base for its proposed wholesale rates, it would of course put aside those costs properly allocable to the Company’s retail business; but it again ruled that the anticompetitive issue presented by the Customers was “beyond the scope of this Commission’s jurisdiction, contrary to the purposes of the Federal Power Act and inappropriate in this proceeding, the purpose of which is to review the justness and reasonableness of the [Company’s] proposed wholesale rates.” Id., at 55.
The Customers sought review of the Commission’s action in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The Court of Appeals, disagreeing with the Commission’s view as to the reach of its powers, held that the Commission’s jurisdiction over wholesale rates for electricity sold in interstate commerce furnished the necessary authority to consider the alleged discriminatory and anticompetitive effects of the requested increase. The Company’s retail rates, the court held, “in a market in which it is competing with its own customers are part of the factual context in which the proposed wholesale rate will function . . and should be considered in determining whether or not the rate increase was just and reasonable. 167 U. S. App. D. C. 43, 52, 510 F. 2d 1264, 1273 (1975). The case was therefore remanded to the Commission for further proceedings.
We granted the Commission’s petition for certiorari to consider the question whether the Court of Appeals had correctly construed the statutes controlling the Commission’s jurisdiction. 423 U. S. 945 (1975). We now affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
II
Section 201 (b) of the Act, 16 U. S. C. § 824 (b), confers jurisdiction on the Commission with respect to the sale of electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce. The prohibition against discriminatory or preferential rates or services imposed by § 205 (b) and the Commission’s power to set just and reasonable rates under § 206 (a) are accordingly limited to sales “subject to. the jurisdiction of the Commission,” that is, to sales of electric energy at wholesale. The Commission has no power to prescribe the rates for retail sales of power companies. Nor, accordingly, would it have power to remedy an alleged discriminatory or anticompetitive relationship between wholesale and retail rates by ordering the company to increase its retail rates.
As the Commission is at great pains to establish, this is the proper construction of the Act, the legislative history of § 205 indicating that the section was expressly limited to jurisdictional sales to foreclose the possibility that the Commission would seek to correct an alleged discriminatory relationship between wholesale and retail rates by raising or otherwise regulating the nonjurisdic-tional, retail price. Insofar as we are advised, no party to this case contends otherwise.
Building on this history, the Commission makes a skillful argument that it may neither consider nor remedy any alleged discrimination resting on a difference between jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional rates. But the argument, in the end, is untenable. Section 205 (b) forbids the maintenance of any “unreasonable difference in rates” or service “with respect to any . . . sale subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission.” A jurisdictional sale is necessarily implicated in any charge that the difference between wholesale and retail rates is unreasonable or anticompetitive. If the undue preference or discrimination is in any way traceable to the level of the jurisdictional rate, it is plain enough that the section would to that extent apply; and to that extent the Commission would have power to effect a remedy under § 206 by an appropriate order directed to the jurisdictional rate. This was the view of the Court of Appeals, and we agree with it.
The Commission appears to insist that a just and reasonable wholesale rate can never be a contributing factor to an undue discrimination: Once the jurisdictional rate is determined to be just and reasonable, inquiry into discrimination is irrelevant for § 206 (a) purposes, for if the discrimination continues to exist, it is traceable wholly to the non jurisdictional, retail rate. This argument assumes, however, that ratemaking is an exact science and that there is only one level at which a wholesale rate can be said to be just and reasonable and that any attempt to remedy a discrimination by lowering the jurisdictional rate would always result in an unjustly low rate that would fail to recover fully allocated wholesale costs. As the Court of Appeals pointed out and as this Court has held, however, there is no single cost-recovering rate, but a zone of reasonableness: “Statutory reasonableness is an abstract quality represented by an area rather than a pinpoint. It allows a substantial spread between what is unreasonable because too low and what is unreasonable because too high.” Montana-Dakota Util. Co. v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U. S. 246, 251 (1951). The Commission itself explained the matter in In re Otter Tail Power Co., 2 F. P. C. 134, 149 (1940):
“It occurs to us that one rate in its relation to another rate may be discriminatory, although each rate per se, if considered independently, might fall within the zone of reasonableness. There is considerable latitude within the zone of reasonableness insofar as the level of a particular rate is concerned. The relationship of rates within such a zone, however, may result in an undue advantage in favor of one rate and be discriminatory insofar as another rate is concerned. When such a situation exists, the discrimination found to exist must be removed.”
The Commission thus cannot so easily satisfy its obligation to eliminate unreasonable discriminations or put aside its duty to consider whether a proposed rate will have anticompetitive effects. The exercise by the Commission of powers otherwise within its jurisdiction “clearly carries with it the responsibility to consider, in appropriate circumstances, the anticompetitive effects of regulated aspects of interstate utility operations pursuant to . .. directives contained in §§ 205, 206 ....” Gulf States Util. Co. v. FPC, 411 U. S. 747, 758-759 (1973). The Commission must arrive at a rate level deemed by it to be just and reasonable, but in doing so it must consider the tendered allegations that the proposed rates are discriminatory and anticompetitive in effect.
We think the Court of Appeals was quite correct in concluding:
“When costs are fully allocated, both the retail rate and the proposed wholesale rate may fall within a zone of reasonableness, yet create a price squeeze between themselves. There would, at the very least, be latitude in the FPC to put wholesale rates in the lower range of the zone of reasonableness, without concern that overall results would be impaired, in view of the utility’s own decision to depress certain retail revenues in order to curb the retail competition of its wholesale customers.” 167 U. S. App. D. C., at 53, 510 F. 2d, at 1274. (Footnote omitted.)
Because the Commission had raised a jurisdictional barrier and refused to consider or hear evidence concerning the Customers’ allegations, the Court of Appeals could not determine whether a wholesale rate, if set low enough partially or wholly to abolish any discriminatory effects found to exist, would fail to recover wholesale costs. The case was therefore remanded to the Commission for further proceedings.
We agree with this disposition. It does not invade a non jurisdictional area. The remedy, if any, would operate only against the rate for jurisdictional sales. Whether that rate would be affected at all would involve, as the Court of Appeals indicated, an examination of the entire “factual context in which the proposed wholesale rate will function.” Id., at 52, 510 F. 2d, at 1273. These facts will naturally include those related to non jurisdictional transactions, but consideration of such facts would appear to be an everyday affair. As the Commission concedes, in determining whether the proposed wholesale rates are just and reasonable, it would in any event be necessary to determine which of the Company’s costs are allocable to its non jurisdictional, retail sales and which to its jurisdictional, wholesale sales — this in order to insure that the wholesale rate is paying its way, but no more. In this sense, consideration of the relationship between jurisdictional and non jurisdictional rate structures is commonplace, and is nothing more than is required by Colorado Interstate Co. v. FPC, 324 U. S. 581 (1945), and by Panhandle Co. v. FPC, 324 U. S. 635 (1945).
Furthermore, § 206 (a) provides that whenever the Commission finds that
“any rate, charge, or classification, demanded, observed, charged, or collected by any public utility for any transmission or sale subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, or that any rule, regulation, practice, or contract affecting such rate, charge, or classification is unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory or preferential, the Commission shall determine the just and reasonable rate, charge, classification, rule, regulation, practice, or contract to be thereafter observed and in force, and shall fix the same by order.” (Emphasis added.)
The rules, practices, or contracts “affecting” the jurisdictional rate are not themselves limited to the jurisdictional context. In the Panhandle case, supra, decided under the almost identical provision of the Natural Gas Act, 15 U. S. C. § 717d (a), the Court emphasized the same aspect of the section, and went on to hold that because it was “clear” that a gas company’s “contracts covering direct industrial sales” are contracts “affecting” jurisdictional rates,
“[t]he Commission, while it lacks authority to fix rates for direct industrial sales, may take those rates into consideration when it fixes the rates for interstate wholesale sales which are subject to its jurisdiction.” 324 U. S., at 646.
The Court of Appeals’ construction of the Act is sound and its judgment is affirmed.
So ordered.
Section 206 (a) provides:
“Whenever the Commission, after a hearing had upon its own motion or upon complaint, shall find that any rate, charge, or classification, demanded, observed, charged, or collected by any public utility for any transmission or sale subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, or that any rule, regulation, practice, or contract affecting such rate, charge, or classification is unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory or preferential, the Commission shall determine the just and reasonable rate, charge, classification, rule, regulation, practice, or contract to be thereafter observed and in force, and shall fix the same by order.” 49 Stat. 852,16 U. S. C. § 824e (a).
Section 205 (b) forbids rates that are preferential or discriminatory:
“No public utility shall, with respect to any transmission or sale subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, (1) make or grant any undue preference or advantage to any person or subject any person to any undue prejudice or disadvantage, or (2) maintain any unreasonable difference in rates, charges, service, facilities, or in any other respect, either as between localities or as between classes of service.” 49 Stat. 851, 16 U. S. C. § 824d (b).
The respondent customers are Conway Corp. (Conway, Ark.); Benton Municipal Light & Water Works; Hope Water & Light Commission; city of North Little Rock; city of Osceola; city of Prescott; city of West Memphis; Farmers Electric Cooperative Corp.; and Mississippi County Electric Cooperative, Inc.
Section 205 (d) provides:
“Unless the Commission otherwise orders, no change shall be made by any public utility in any such rate, charge, classification, or service, or in any rule, regulation, or contract relating thereto, except after thirty days’ notice to the Commission and to the public. Such notice shall be given by filing with the Commission and keeping open for public inspection new schedules stating plainly the change or changes to be made in the schedule or schedules then in force and the time when the change or changes will go into effect. The Commission, for good cause shown, may allow changes to take effect without requiring the thirty days’ notice herein provided for by an order specifying the changes so to be made and the time when they shall take effect and the manner in which they shall be filed and published.” 49 Stat. 851, 16 U. S. C. § 824d (d).
Section 201 (b) provides in relevant part:
“The provisions of this Part shall apply to the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce and to the sale of electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce, but shall not apply to any other sale of electric energy or deprive a State or State commission of its lawful authority now exercised over the exportation of hydroelectric energy which is transmitted across a State line.”
Under the Act to Regulate Commerce of 1887, it was held that the Interstate Commerce Commission was empowered to order that a nonjurisdictional, intrastate freight rate be raised to eliminate a discrimination. Houston & Texas R. Co. v. United States, 234 U. S. 342, 356-359 (1914).
“The function which an allocation of costs (including return) is designed to perform in a rate case of this character is clear. The amount of gross revenue from each class of business is known. Some of those revenues are derived from sales at rates which the Commission has no power to fix. The other part of the gross revenues comes from the interstate wholesale rates which are under the Commission’s jurisdiction. The problem is to allocate to each class of the business its fair share of the costs. It is of course immaterial that the revenues from the intrastate sales or the direct industrial sales may exceed their costs, since the authority to regulate those phases of the business is lacking. To the extent, however, that the revenues from the interstate wholesale business exceed the costs allocable to that phase of the business, the interstate wholesale rates are excessive.” 324 U. S., at 588.
“We agree that the Commission must make a separation of the regulated and unregulated business when it fixes the interstate wholesale rates of a company whose activities embrace both. Otherwise the profits or losses, as the case may be, of the unregulated business would be assigned to the regulated business and the Commission would transgress the jurisdictional lines which Congress wrote into the Act. The Commission recognizes this necessity. As it stated in Re Cities Service Gas Co., 50 P. U. R. (N. S.) 65, 89: ‘The company’s facilities and operations are devoted in part to natural gas service which is not subject to our jurisdiction. This service consists principally of gas sales made directly to large industrial consumers. The necessity arises, therefore, for making an allocation of costs as between the jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional sales.’ The question is whether a formal allocation was necessary under the exceptional circumstances of this case.” 324 U. S., at 641-642. (Footnote omitted.)
Eor the proposition that there is no room within the Act to consider any discriminatory or anticompetitive relationship between a jurisdictional and a nonjurisdictional rate, the Commission relies upon the statement in the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Jackson in Colorado Interstate Co. v. FPC, 324 U. S., at 615: “It is true that the Natural Gas Act forbids discrimination only as between regulated rates and does not forbid discriminations between the regulated and unregulated ones.” But the Justice went on to make clear that a nonjurisdictional price could be used in determining what is the “just and reasonable” jurisdictional rate. “By use of the unregulated price as a basis for comparison I think a reduction in the wholesale rates for resale to the public is in order. If this makes low price industrial business less desirable, it will be in the long-range public interest for reasons more fully stated by me m [FPC v. Hope Gas Co., 320 U. S. 591 (1944)].” Ibid.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
H
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Opinion PER CURIAM.
Federal courts may grant habeas corpus relief if the underlying state-court decision was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by" this Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Here, the Sixth Circuit held that respondent Cory Donald's attorney provided per seineffective assistance of counsel under United States v. Cronic,466 U.S. 648, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984), when he was briefly absent during testimony concerning other defendants. Because no decision from this Court clearly establishes that Donald is entitled to relief under Cronic,we reverse.
I
After a day of drinking and smoking marijuana, Cory Donald and four others-Seante Liggins, Rashad Moore, Dewayne Saine, and Fawzi Zaya-decided to rob a drug dealer named Mohammed Makki. Donald, Moore, and Liggins drove to Makki's home in Dearborn, Michigan, wearing black skull caps and coats. Moore and Donald entered the house, while Liggins waited in the car.
Michael McGinnis, one of Makki's drug runners, was in the house at the time. When Donald and Moore came through the door, McGinnis raised his hands and dropped face-down to the floor. He heard a scuffle in the kitchen and two gunshots as someone said, " '[L]et it go.' " Donald v. Rapelje,580 Fed.Appx. 277, 279 (C.A.6 2014). After that, McGinnis felt a gun on the back of his head while someone rifled through his pockets saying, " '[W]hat you got, what you got?' " Donald v. Rapelje,2012 WL 6047130, *3 (E.D.Mich., Dec. 5, 2012). He also heard one of the two men whisper to the other, " 'I got shot, I got shot.' " 580 Fed.Appx., at 279. After Moore and Donald left, McGinnis found Makki slumped against the refrigerator dying.
About seven minutes after they entered the house, Moore and Donald returned, guns in hand, to Liggins' car. Donald told the others that he had stolen $320 and that Moore had accidentally shot him during the crime. That night, Donald checked into a hospital for a gunshot woundto his foot. Police arrested him about three weeks later.
The State charged Donald with one count of first-degree felony murder and two counts of armed robbery. Liggins and Zaya pleaded guilty, and Donald was tried with Moore and Saine. His defense theory was that he was present at the scene of the crime but he did not participate. At trial, the government sought to admit a chart chronicling phone calls from the day of the crime among Moore, Saine, and Zaya. Moore and Saine's attorneys objected, but Donald's attorney declined, saying: " 'I don't have a dog in this race. It does not affect me at all.' " Id., at 280. The court admitted the exhibit and took a short recess.
When the trial resumed, Donald's counsel was not in the courtroom. At first, the judge indicated that he would wait for the attorney. But he then decided to proceed because Donald's counsel had already indicated that the exhibit and testimony did not apply to his client. About 10 minutes later, the lawyer returned. The judge informed him that " 'up until that point we only were discussing the telephone chart,' " to which the attorney replied, " '[Y]es, your Honor, and as I had indicated on the record, I had no dog in the race and no interest in that.' " Ibid.
The jury found Donald guilty on all three counts. He was sentenced to life imprisonment for the felony-murder count and to concurrent prison terms of 10 ½ to 20 years for each of the armed robbery counts. On appeal, Donald argued that he was entitled to a new trial because his attorney's absence during the phone call testimony denied him his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. The Michigan Court of Appeals rejected his claim, and the Michigan Supreme Court denied review.
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted federal habeas relief, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Sixth Circuit held that the Michigan Court of Appeals' decision was both contrary to and involved an unreasonable application of this Court's decision in Cronic. In the normal course, defendants claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must satisfy the familiar framework of Strickland v. Washington,466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), which requires a showing that "counsel's performance was deficient" and "that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense." And when reviewing an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, "a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Id.,at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052.
In Cronic,however, we held that courts may presume that a defendant has suffered unconstitutional prejudice if he "is denied counsel at a critical stage of his trial." 466 U.S., at 659, 104 S.Ct. 2039. And in Bell v. Cone,535 U.S. 685, 696, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002), we characterized a "critical stage" as one that "held significant consequences for the accused." According to the Sixth Circuit, these statements should have compelled the Michigan court to hold that the phone call testimony was a "critical stage" and that counsel's absence constituted per seineffective assistance. Without identifying any decision from this Court directly in point, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the relevant testimony in this case was "similar to" our cases applying Cronic. 580 Fed.Appx., at 284.
II
A
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 110 Stat. 1214, a federal court may grant habeas relief only when a state court's decision on the merits was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by" decisions from this Court, or was "based on an unreasonable determination of the facts." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Donald does not argue that the state-court decision in his case was factually erroneous. Instead, he argues that the decision was both contrary to and involved an unreasonable application of this Court's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel cases.
AEDPA's standard is intentionally " ' "difficult to meet." ' " White v. Woodall,572 U.S. ----, ----, 134 S.Ct. 1697, 1702, 188 L.Ed.2d 698 (2014)(quoting Metrish v. Lancaster,569 U.S. ----, ----, 133 S.Ct. 1781, 1786, 185 L.Ed.2d 988 (2013)). We have explained that " 'clearly established Federal law' for purposes of § 2254(d)(1)includes only the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of this Court's decisions." White,572 U.S., at ----, 134 S.Ct., at 1702(some internal quotation marks omitted). "And an 'unreasonable application of' those holdings must be objectively unreasonable, not merely wrong; even clear error will not suffice." Id.,at ----, 134 S.Ct., at 1702(same). To satisfy this high bar, a habeas petitioner is required to "show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." Harrington v. Richter,562 U.S. 86, 103, 131 S.Ct. 770, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011).
Adherence to these principles serves important interests of federalism and comity. AEDPA's requirements reflect a "presumption that state courts know and follow the law." Woodford v. Visciotti,537 U.S. 19, 24, 123 S.Ct. 357, 154 L.Ed.2d 279 (2002)(per curiam). When reviewing state criminal convictions on collateral review, federal judges are required to afford state courts due respect by overturning their decisions only when there could be no reasonable dispute that they were wrong. Federal habeas review thus exists as "a guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, not a substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal." Harrington, supra,at 102-103, 131 S.Ct. 770(internal quotation marks omitted). This is especially true for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, where AEDPA review must be " ' "doubly deferential" ' " in order to afford "both the state court and the defense attorney the benefit of the doubt." Burt v. Titlow,571 U.S. ----, ----, 134 S.Ct. 10, 13, 187 L.Ed.2d 348 (2013)(quoting Cullen v. Pinholster,563 U.S. 170, ----, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1403, 179 L.Ed.2d 557 (2011)).
B
The Sixth Circuit should not have affirmed the Cronic-based grant of habeas relief in this case. The Michigan Court of Appeals' decision was not contrary to any clearly established holding of this Court. We have never addressed whether the rule announced in Cronicapplies to testimony regarding codefendants' actions. In Cronicitself, we rejected the defendant's claim that his counsel's lack of experience and short time for preparation warranted a presumption of prejudice, not a claim based on counsel's absence. See 466 U.S., at 663-666, 104 S.Ct. 2039. When announcing the rule in Cronic,we cited earlier cases finding prejudice where "counsel was either totally absent, or prevented from assisting the accused during a critical stage of the proceeding." Id.,at 659, n. 25, 104 S.Ct. 2039. But none of those cases dealt with circumstances like those present here. And Belldid not involve the absence of counsel; instead, we declined to presume prejudice where a capital defendant's counsel "failed to 'mount some case for life' after the prosecution introduced evidence in the sentencing hearing and gave a closing statement." 535 U.S., at 696, 122 S.Ct. 1843.
Because none of our cases confront "the specific question presented by this case," the state court's decision could not be "contrary to" any holding from this Court. Lopez v. Smith,574 U.S. ----, ----, 135 S.Ct. 1, 4, 190 L.Ed.2d 1 (2014)(per curiam). The most that the Sixth Circuit could muster was that "[t]he testimony of a government witness is similar to the trial events that th[is] Court has deemed to be critical stages." 580 Fed.Appx., at 284. But that conclusion is doubly wrong. First, if the circumstances of a case are only "similar to" our precedents, then the state court's decision is not "contrary to" the holdings in those cases. See, e.g., Carey v. Musladin,549 U.S. 70, 76-77, and n. 2, 127 S.Ct. 649, 166 L.Ed.2d 482 (2006). Second, the Sixth Circuit framed the issue at too high a level of generality. See, e.g.,Lopez, supra,at ----, 135 S.Ct., at 3-4. The relevant testimony was not merely "testimony of a government witness"; it was prosecution testimony about other defendants. To be sure, the Sixth Circuit considered the testimony relevant to Donald because he was being prosecuted on an aiding-and-abetting theory for felony murder. But Donald's position was that he had nothing to do with the planning among his codefendants. And none of our holdings address counsel's absence during testimony that is irrelevant within the defendant's own theory of the case.
Nor was the state court's decision an unreasonable application of our cases. The Sixth Circuit stated "that a critical stage of trial is a 'step of a criminal proceeding ... that h[olds] significant consequences for the accused.' " 580 Fed.Appx., at 284(quoting Bell, supra,at 696, 122 S.Ct. 1843). And it held that the Michigan Court of Appeals' decision was "objectively unreasonable" because the phone call evidence might have indirectly inculpated Donald in the eyes of the jury. But that holding is not correct. Just last Term we warned the Sixth Circuit that "where the ' "precise contours" ' of [a] right remain ' "unclear," ' state courts enjoy 'broad discretion' in their adjudication of a prisoner's claims." White,572 U.S., at ----, 134 S.Ct., at 1705, (quoting Lockyer v. Andrade,538 U.S. 63, 76, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 155 L.Ed.2d 144 (2003), in turn quoting Harmelin v. Michigan,501 U.S. 957, 998, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991)(KENNEDY, J., concurring in part and in judgment)). Within the contours of Cronic,a fairminded jurist could conclude that a presumption of prejudice is not warranted by counsel's short absence during testimony about other defendants where that testimony was irrelevant to the defendant's theory of the case.
Cronicapplies in "circumstances that are so likely to prejudice the accused that the cost of litigating their effect in a particular case is unjustified." 466 U.S., at 658, 104 S.Ct. 2039. The Michigan Court of Appeals' refusal to apply it to these circumstances was not the "extreme malfunction" required for federal habeas relief. Harrington,562 U.S., at 102, 131 S.Ct. 770.
III
Because we consider this case only in the narrow context of federal habeas review, we "expres[s] no view on the merits of the underlying Sixth Amendment principle." Marshall v. Rodgers,569 U.S. ----, ----, 133 S.Ct. 1446, 1451, 185 L.Ed.2d 540 (2013)(per curiam). All that matters here, and all that should have mattered to the Sixth Circuit, is that we have not held that Cronicapplies to the circumstances presented in this case. For that reason, federal habeas relief based upon Cronicis unavailable.
The petition for a writ of certiorari and respondent's motion to proceed in forma pauperisare granted. The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice O’Connor
delivered the opinion of the Court.
We must decide today what limits the operation of the federal patent system places on the States’ ability to offer substantial protection to utilitarian and design ideas which the patent laws leave otherwise unprotected. In Interpart Corp. v. Italia, 777 F. 2d 678 (1985), the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit concluded that a California law prohibiting the use of the “direct molding process” to duplicate unpat-ented articles posed no threat to the policies behind the federal patent laws. In this case, the Florida Supreme Court came to a contrary conclusion. It struck down a Florida statute which prohibits the use of the direct molding process to duplicate unpatented boat hulls, finding that the protection offered by the Florida law conflicted with the balance struck by Congress in the federal patent statute between the encouragement of invention and free competition in unpatented ideas. 515 So. 2d 220 (1987). We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict, 486 U. S. 1004 (1988), and we now affirm the judgment of the Florida Supreme Court.
I
In September 1976, petitioner Bonito Boats, Inc. (Bonito), a Florida corporation, developed a hull design for a fiberglass recreational boat which it marketed under the trade name Bonito Boat Model 5VBR. App. 5. Designing the boat hull required substantial effort on the part of Bonito. A set of engineering drawings was prepared, from which a hardwood model was created. The hardwood model was then sprayed with fiberglass to create a mold, which then served to produce the finished fiberglass boats for sale. The 5VBR was placed on the market sometime in September 1976. There is no indication in the record that a patent application was ever filed for protection of the utilitarian or design aspects of the hull, or for the process by which the hull was manufactured. The 5VBR was favorably received by the boating public, and “a broad interstate market” developed for its sale. Ibid.
In May 1983, after the Bonito 5VBR had been available to the public for over six years, the Florida Legislature enacted Fla. Stat. §559.94 (1987). The statute makes “[i]t... unlawful for any person to use the direct molding process to duplicate for the purpose of sale any manufactured vessel hull or component part of a vessel made by another without the written permission of that other person.” § 559.94(2). The statute also makes it unlawful for a person to “knowingly sell a vessel hull or component part of a vessel duplicated in violation of subsection (2).” §559.94(3). Damages, injunctive relief, and attorney’s fees are made available to “[a]ny person who suffers injury or damage as the result of a violation” of the statute. §559.94(4). The statute was made applicable to vessel hulls or component parts duplicated through the use of direct molding after July 1, 1983. §559.94(5).
On December 21, 1984, Bonito filed this action in the Circuit Court of Orange County, Florida. The complaint alleged that respondent here, Thunder Craft Boats, Inc. (Thunder Craft), a Tennessee corporation, had violated the Florida statute by using the direct molding process to duplicate the Bonito 5VBR fiberglass hull, and had knowingly sold such duplicates in violation of the Florida statute. Bonito sought “a temporary and permanent injunction prohibiting [Thunder Craft] from continuing to unlawfully duplicate and sell Bonito Boat hulls or components,” as well as an accounting of profits, treble damages, punitive damages, and attorney’s fees. App. 6, 7. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, arguing that under this Court’s decisions in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U. S. 225 (1964), and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U. S. 234 (1964), the Florida statute conflicted with federal patent law and was therefore invalid under the Supremacy Clause of the Federal Constitution. App. 8-9. The trial court granted respondent’s motion, id,., at 10-11, and a divided Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of petitioner’s complaint. 487 So. 2d 395 (1986).
On appeal, a sharply divided Florida Supreme Court agreed with the lower courts’ conclusion that the Florida law impermissibly interfered with the scheme established by the federal patent laws. See 515 So. 2d 220 (1987). The majority read our decisions in Sears and Compco for the proposition that “when an article is introduced into the public domain, only a patent can eliminate the inherent risk of competition and then but for a limited time.” 516 So. 2d, at 222. Relying on the Federal Circuit’s decision in the Interpart case, the three dissenting judges argued that the Florida antidirect molding provision “does not prohibit the copying of an unpatented item. It prohibits one method of copying; the item remains in the public domain.” 515 So. 2d, at 223 (Shaw, J., dissenting).
HH ► — I
Article I, §8, cl. 8, of the Constitution gives Congress the ‘ power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries. ” The Patent Clause itself reflects a balance between the need to encourage innovation and the avoidance of monopolies which stifle competition without any concomitant advance in the “Progress of Science and useful Arts.” As we have noted in the past, the Clause contains both a grant of power and certain limitations upon the exercise of that power. Congress may not create patent monopolies of unlimited duration, nor may it “authorize the issuance of patents whose effects are to remove existent knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free access to materials already available.” Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U. S. 1, 6 (1966).
From their inception, the federal patent laws have embodied a careful balance between the need to promote innovation and the recognition that imitation and refinement through imitation are both necessary to invention itself and the very lifeblood of a competitive economy. Soon after the adoption of the Constitution, the First Congress enacted the Patent Act of 1790, which allowed the grant of a limited monopoly of 14 years to any applicant that “hath... invented or discovered any useful art, manufacture,... or device, or any improvement therein not before known or used.” 1 Stat. 109, 110. In addition to novelty, the 1790 Act required that the invention be “sufficiently useful and important” to merit the 14-year right of exclusion. Ibid. Section 2 of the Act required that the patentee deposit with the Secretary of State, a specification and if possible a model of the new invention, “which specification shall be so particular, and said models so exact, as not only to distinguish the invention or discovery from other things before known and used, but also to enable a workman or other person skilled in the art or manufacture... to make, construct, or use the same, to the end that the public may have the full benefit thereof, after the expiration of the patent term.” Ibid.
The first Patent Act established an agency known by self-designation as the “Commissioners for the promotion of Useful Arts,” composed of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Department of War, and the Attorney General, any two of whom could grant a patent. Thomas Jefferson was the first Secretary of State, and the driving force behind early federal patent policy. For Jefferson, a central tenet of the patent system in a free market economy was that “a machine of which we were possessed, might be applied by every man to any use of which it is susceptible.” 13 Writings of Thomas Jefferson 335 (Memorial ed. 1904). He viewed a grant of patent rights in an idea already disclosed to the public as akin to an ex post facto law, “obstructing] others in the use of what they possessed before.” Id., at 326-327. Jefferson also played a large role in the drafting of our Nation’s second Patent Act, - which became law in 1793. The Patent Act of 1793 carried over the requirement that the subject of a patent application be “not known or used before the application.” Ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318, 319. A defense to an infringement action was created where “the thing, thus secured by patent, was not originally discovered by the patentee, but had been in use, or had been described in some public work anterior to the supposed discovery of the patentee.” Id., at 822. Thus, from the outset, federal patent law has been about the difficult business “of drawing a line between the things which are worth to the public the embarrassment of an exclusive patent, and those which are not.” 13 Writings of Thomas Jefferson, supra, at 335.
Today’s patent statute is remarkably similar to the law as known to Jefferson in 1793. Protection is offered to “[whoever.invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof.” 35 U. S. C. §101. Since 1842, Congress has also made protection available for “any new,-original and ornamental design for an article of manufacture.” 35 U. S. C. § 171. To qualify for protection, a design must present an aesthetically pleasing appearance that is not dictated by function alone, and must satisfy the other criteria of patentability. The novelty requirement of pat-entability is presently expressed in 35 U. S. C. §§ 102(a) and (b), which provide:
“A person shall be entitled to a patent unless —
“(a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent, or
“(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country more than one year prior to the date of application for patent in the United States....”
Sections 102(a) and (b) operate in tandem to exclude from consideration for patent protection knowledge that is already available to the public. They express a congressional determination that the creation of a monopoly in such information would not only serve no socially useful purpose, but would in fact injure the public by removing existing knowledge from public use. From the Patent Act of 1790 to the present day, the public sale of an unpatented article has acted as a complete bar to federal protection of the idea embodied in the article thus placed in public commerce.
In the case of Pennock v. Dialogue, 2 Pet. 1 (1829), Justice Story applied these principles under the patent law of 1800. The patentee had developed a new technique for the manufacture of rubber hose for the conveyance of air and fluids. The invention was reduced to practice in 1811, but letters patent were not sought and granted until 1818. In the interval, the patentee had licensed a third party to market the hose, and over 13,000 feet of the new product had been sold in the city of Philadelphia alone. The Court concluded that the patent was invalid due to the prior public sale, indicating that, “if [an inventor] suffers the thing he invented to go into public use, or to be publicly sold for use” “[h]is voluntary act or acquiescence in the public sale and use is an abandonment of his right. ” Id., at 23-24. The Court noted that under the common law of England, letters patent were unavailable for the protection of articles in public commerce at the time of the application, id., at 20, and that this same doctrine was immediately embodied in the first patent laws passed in this country. Id., at 21-22.
As the holding of Pennock makes clear, the federal patent scheme creates a limited opportunity to obtain a property right in an idea. Once an inventor has decided to lift the veil of secrecy from his work, he must choose the protection of a federal patent or the dedication of his idea to the public at large. As Judge Learned Hand once put it: “[I]t is a condition upon the inventor’s right to a patent that he shall not exploit his discovery competitively after it is ready for patenting; he must content himself with either secrecy or legal monopoly.” Metallizing Engineering Co. v. Kenyon Bearing &Auto Parts Co., 153 F. 2d 516, 520 (CA2), cert. denied, 328 U. S. 840 (1946).
In addition to the requirements of novelty and utility, the federal patent law has long required that an innovation not be anticipated by the prior art in the field. Even if a particular combination of elements is “novel” in the literal sense of the term, it will not qualify for federal patent protection if its contours are so traced by the existing technology in the field that the “improvement is the work of the skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor.” Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 11 How. 248, 267 (1851). In 1952, Congress codified this judicially developed requirement in 35 U. S. C. § 103, which refuses protection to new developments where “the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person of ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.” The nonobviousness requirement extends the field of unpat-entable material beyond that which is known to the public under § 102, to include that which could readily be deduced from publicly available material by a person of ordinary skill in the pertinent field of endeavor. See Graham, 383 U. S., at 15. Taken together, the novelty and nonobviousness requirements express a congressional determination that the purposes behind the Patent Clause are best served by free competition and exploitation of either that which is already available to the public or that which may be readily discerned from publicly available material. See Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U. S. 257, 262 (1979) (“[T]he stringent requirements for patent protection seek to ensure that ideas in the public domain remain there for the use of the public”).
The applicant whose invention satisfies the requirements of novelty, nonobviousness, and utility, and who is willing to reveal to the public the substance of his discovery and “the best mode... of carrying out his invention,” 35 U. S. C. § 112, is granted “the right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the invention throughout the United States,” for a period of 17 years. 35 U. S. C. § 154. The federal patent system thus embodies a carefully crafted bargain for encouraging the creation and disclosure of new, useful, and non-obvious advances in technology and design in return for the exclusive right to practice the invention for a period of years. “[The inventor] may keep his invention secret and reap its fruits indefinitely. In consideration of its disclosure and the consequent benefit to the community, the patent is granted. An exclusive enjoyment is guaranteed him for seventeen years, but upon expiration of that period, the knowledge of the invention inures to the people, who are thus enabled without restriction to practice it and profit by its use.” United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U. S. 178, 186-187 (1933).
The attractiveness of such a bargain, and its effectiveness in inducing creative effort and disclosure of the results of that effort, depend almost entirely on a backdrop of free competition in the exploitation of unpatented designs and innovations. The novelty and nonobviousness requirements of pat-entability embody a congressional understanding, implicit in the Patent Clause itself, that free exploitation of ideas will be the rule, to which the protection of a federal patent is the exception. Moreover, the ultimate goal of the patent system is to bring new designs and technologies into the public domain through disclosure. State law protection for techniques and designs whose disclosure has already been induced by market rewards may conflict with the very purpose of the patent laws by decreasing the range of ideas available as the building blocks of further innovation. The offer of federal protection from competitive exploitation of intellectual property would be rendered meaningless in a world where substantially similar state law protections were readily available. To a limited extent, the federal patent laws must determine not only what is protected, but also what is free for all to use. Cf. Arkansas Electric Cooperative Corp. v. Arkansas Public Service Comm’n, 461 U. S. 375, 384 (1983) (“[A] federal decision to forgo regulation in a given area may imply an authoritative federal determination that the area is best left zmregu-lated, and in that event would have as much pre-emptive force as a decision to regulate”) (emphasis in original).
Thus our past decisions have made clear that state regulation of intellectual property must yield to the extent that it clashes with the balance struck by Congress in our patent laws. The tension between the desire to freely exploit the full potential of our inventive resources and the need to create an incentive to deploy those resources is constant. Where it is clear how the patent laws strike that balance in a particular circumstance, that is not a judgment the States may second-guess. We have long held that after the expiration of a federal patent, the subject matter of the patent passes to the free use of the public as a matter of federal law. See Coats v. Merrick Thread Co., 149 U. S. 562, 572 (1893) (“[Plaintiffs’ right to the use of the embossed periphery expired with their patent, and the public had the same right to make use of it as if it had never been patented”); Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U. S. 111 (1938); Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U. S. 169 (1896). Where the public has paid the congressionally mandated price for disclosure, the States may not render the exchange fruitless by offering patent-like protection to the subject matter of the expired patent. “It is self-evident that on the expiration of a patent the monopoly created by it ceases to exist, and the right to make the thing formerly covered by the patent becomes public property.” Singer, supra, at 185.
In our decisions in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U. S. 225 (1964), and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U. S. 234 (1964), we found that publicly known design and utilitarian ideas which were unprotected by patent occupied much the same position as the subject matter of an expired patent. The Sears case involved a pole lamp originally designed by the plaintiff Stiffel, who had secured both design and mechanical patents on the lamp. Sears purchased unauthorized copies of the lamps, and was able to sell them at a retail price practically equivalent to the wholesale price of the original manufacturer. Sears, supra, at 226. Stiffel brought an action against Sears in Federal District Court, alleging infringement of the two federal patents and unfair competition under Illinois law. The District Court found that Stiffel’s patents were invalid due to anticipation in the prior art, but nonetheless enjoined Sears from further sales of the duplicate lamps based on a finding of consumer confusion under the Illinois law of unfair competition. The Court of Appeals affirmed, coming to the conclusion that the Illinois law of unfair competition prohibited product simulation even in the absence of evidence that the defendant took. some further action to induce confusion as to source.
This Court reversed, finding that the unlimited protection against copying which the Illinois law accorded an unpatentable item whose design had been fully disclosed through public sales conflicted with the federal policy embodied in the patent laws. The Court stated:
“In the present case the ‘pole lamp’ sold by Stiffel has been held not to be entitled to the protection of either a mechanical or a design patent. An unpatentable article, like an article on which the patent has expired, is in the public domain and may be made and sold by whoever chooses to do so. What Sears did was to copy Stiffel’s design and sell lamps almost identical to those sold by Stiffel. This it had every right to do under the federal patent laws.” 376 U. S., at 231.
A similar conclusion was reached in Compco, where the District Court had extended the protection of Illinois’ unfair competition law to the functional aspects of an unpatented fluorescent lighting system. The injunction against copying of an unpatented article, freely available to the public, imper-missibly “interfere[d] with the federal policy, found in Art. I, § 8, cl. 8, of the Constitution and in the implementing federal statutes, of allowing free access to copy whatever the federal patent and copyright laws leave in the public domain.” Compco, supra, at 237.
The pre-emptive sweep of our decisions in Sears and Compeo has been the subject of heated scholarly and judicial debate. See, e. g., Symposium, Product Simulation: A Right or a Wrong?, 64 Colum. L. Rev. 1178 (1964); Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U. S. 653, 676 (1969) (Black, J,, concurring in part and dissenting in part). Read at their highest level of generality, the two decisions could be taken to stand for the proposition that the States are completely disabled from offering any form of protection to articles or processes which fall within the broad scope of patentable subject matter. See id., at 677. Since the potentially patentable includes “anything under the sun that is made by man,” Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U. S. 303, 309 (1980) (citation omitted), the broadest reading of Sears would prohibit the States from regulating the deceptive simulation of trade dress or the tor-tious appropriation of private information.
That the extrapolation of such a broad pre-emptive principle from Sears is inappropriate is clear from the balance struck in Sears itself. The Sears Court made it plain that the States “may protect businesses in the use of their trademarks, labels, or distinctive dress in the packaging of goods so as to prevent others, by imitating such markings, from misleading purchasers as to the source of the goods.” Sears, supra, at 232 (footnote omitted). Trade dress is, of course, potentially the subject matter of design patents. See W. T. Rogers Co. v. Keene, 778 F. 2d 334, 337 (CA7 1985). Yet our decision in Sears clearly indicates that the States may place limited regulations on the circumstances in which such designs are used in order to prevent consumer confusion as to source. Thus, while Sears speaks in absolutist terms, its conclusion that the States may place some conditions on the use of trade dress indicates an implicit recognition that all state regulation of potentially patentable but unpatented subject matter is not ipso facto pre-empted by the federal patent laws.
What was implicit in our decision in Sears, we have made explicit in our subsequent decisions concerning the scope of federal pre-emption of state regulation of the subject matter of patent. Thus, in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U. S. 470 (1974), we held that state protection of trade secrets did not operate to frustrate the achievement of the congressional objectives served by the patent laws. Despite the fact that state law protection was available for ideas which clearly fell within the subject matter of patent, the Court concluded that the nature and degree of state protection did not conflict with the federal policies of encouragement of patentable invention and the prompt disclosure of such innovations.
Several factors were critical to this conclusion. First, because the public awareness of a trade secret is by definition limited, the Court noted that “the policy that matter once in the public domain must remain in the public domain is not incompatible with the existence of trade secret protection.” Id., at 484. Second, the Kewanee Court emphasized that “[tirade secret law provides far weaker protection in many respects than the patent law.” Id., at 489-490. This point was central to the Court’s conclusion that trade secret protection did not conflict with either the encouragement or disclosure policies of the federal patent law. The public at large remained free to discover and exploit the trade secret through reverse engineering of products in the public domain or by independent creation. Id., at 490. Thus, the possibility that trade secret protection would divert inventors from the creative effort necessary to satisfy the rigorous demands of patent protection was remote indeed. Ibid. Finally, certain aspects of trade secret law operated to protect non-economic interests outside the sphere of congressional concern in the patent laws. As the Court noted, “[A] most fundamental human right, that of privacy, is threatened when industrial espionage is condoned or is made profitable.” Id., at 487 (footnote omitted). There was no indication that Congress had considered this interest in the balance struck by the patent laws, or that state protection for it would interfere with the policies behind the patent system.
We have since reaffirmed the pragmatic approach which Kewanee takes to the pre-emption of state laws dealing with the protection of intellectual property. See Aronson, 440 U. S., at 262 (“State law is not displaced merely because the contract relates to intellectual property which may or may not be patentable; the states are free to regulate the use of such intellectual property in any manner not inconsistent with federal law”). At the same time, we have consistently reiterated the teaching of Sears and Compco that ideas once placed before the public without the protection of a valid patent are subject to appropriation without significant restraint. Aronson, supra, at 263.
At the heart of Sears and Compco is the conclusion that the efficient operation of the federal patent system depends upon substantially free trade in publicly known, unpatented design and utilitarian conceptions. In Sears, the state law offered “the equivalent of a patent monopoly,” 376 U. S., at 233, in the functional aspects of a product which had been placed in public commerce absent the protection of a valid patent. While, as noted above, our decisions since Sears have taken a decidedly less rigid view of the scope of federal pre-emption under the patent laws, e. g., Kewanee, supra, at 479-480, we believe that the Sears Court correctly concluded that the States may not offer patent-like protection to intellectual creations which would otherwise remain unprotected as a matter of federal law. Both the novelty and the nonobviousness requirements of federal patent law are grounded in the notion that concepts within the public grasp, or those so obvious that they readily could be, are the tools of creation available to all. They provide the baseline of free competition upon which the patent system’s incentive to creative effort depends. A state law that substantially interferes with the enjoyment of an unpatented utilitarian or design conception which has been freely disclosed by its author to the public at large impermissibly contravenes the ultimate goal of public disclosure and use which is the centerpiece of federal patent policy. Moreover, through the creation of patent-like rights, the States could essentially redirect inventive efforts away from the careful criteria of patentability developed by Congress over the last 200 years. We understand this to be the reasoning at the core of our decisions in Sears and Compco, and we reaffirm that reasoning today.
III
We believe that the Florida statute at issue m this case so substantially impedes the public use of the otherwise unprotected design and utilitarian ideas embodied in unpatented boat hulls as to run afoul of the teaching of our decisions in., Sears and Compco. It is readily apparent that the Florida* statute does not operate to prohibit “unfair competition” in the usual sense that the term is understood. The law of unfair competition has its roots in the common-law tort of deceit: its general concern is with protecting consumers from confusion as to source. While that concern may result in the creation of “quasi-property rights” in communicative symbols, the focus is on the protection of consumers, not the protection of producers as an incentive to product innovation. Judge Hand captured the distinction well in Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn & Bishop Co., 247 F. 299, 301 (CA2 1917), where he wrote:
“[T]he plaintiff has the right not to lose his customers through false representations that those are his wares which in fact are not, but he may not monopolize any design or pattern, however trifling. The defendant, on the other hand, may copy plaintiff’s goods slavishly down to the minutest detail: but he may not represent himself as the plaintiff in their sale.”
With some notable exceptions, including the interpretation of the Illinois law of unfair competition at issue in Sears and Compco, see Sears, supra, at 227-228, n. 2, the common-law tort of unfair competition has been limited to protection against copying of nonfunctional aspects of consumer products which have acquired secondary meaning such that they operate as a designation of source. See generally P. Kauf-mann, Passing Off and Misappropriation, in 9 International Review of Industrial Property and Copyright Law, Studies in Industrial Property and Copyright Law 100-109 (1986). The “protection” granted a particular design under the law of unfair competition is thus limited to one context where consumer confusion is likely to result; the design “idea” itself may be freely exploited in all other contexts.
In contrast to the operation of unfair competition law, the Florida statute is aimed directly at preventing the exploitation of the design and utilitarian conceptions embodied in the product itself. The sparse legislative history surrounding its enactment indicates that it was intended to create an inducement for the improvement of boat hull designs. See Tr. of Meeting of Transportation Committee, Florida House of Representatives, May 3, 1983, reprinted at App. 22 (“[T]here is no inducement for [a] quality boat manufacturer to improve these designs and secondly, if he does, it is immediately copied. This would prevent that and allow him recourse in circuit court”). To accomplish this goal, the Florida statute endows the original boat hull manufacturer with rights against the world, similar in scope and operation to the rights accorded a federal patentee. Like the patentee, the beneficiary of the Florida statute may prevent a competitor from “making” the product in what is evidently the most efficient manner available and from “selling” the product when it is produced in that fashion. Compare 35 U. S. C. §154. The Florida scheme offers this protection for an unlimited number of years to all boat hulls and their component parts, without regard to their ornamental or technological merit. Protection is available for subject matter for which patent protection has been denied or has expired, as well as for designs which have been freely revealed to the consuming public by their creators.
In this case, the Bonito 5VBR fiberglass hull has been freely exposed to the public for a period in excess of six years. For purposes of federal law, it stands in the same stead as an item for which a patent has expired or been denied: it is unpatented and unpatentable. See 35 U. S. C. § 102(b). Whether because of a determination of unpat-entability or other commercial concerns, petitioner chose to expose its hull design to the public in the marketplace, eschewing the bargain held out by the federal patent system of disclosure in exchange for exclusive use. Yet, the Florida statute allows petitioner to reassert a substantial property right in the idea, thereby constricting the spectrum of useful public knowledge. Moreover, it does so without the careful protections of high standards of innovation and limited monopoly contained in the federal scheme. We think it clear that such protection conflicts with the federal policy “that all ideas in general circulation be dedicated to the common good unless they are protected by a valid patent.” Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U. S., at 668.
That the Florida statute does not remove all means of reproduction and sale does not eliminate the conflict with the federal scheme. See Kellogg, 305 U. S., at 122. In essence, the Florida law prohibits the entire public from engaging in a form of reverse engineering of a product in the public domain. This is clearly one of the rights vested in the federal patent holder, but has never been a part of state protection under the law of unfair competition or trade secrets. See Kewanee, 416 U. S., at 476 (“A trade secret law, however, does not offer protection against discovery by... so-called reverse engineering, that is by starting with the known product and working backward to divine the process which aided in its development or manufacture”); see also Chicago Lock Co. v. Fanberg, 676 F. 2d 400, 405 (CA9 1982) (“A lock purchaser’s own reverse-engineering of his own lock, and subsequent publication of the serial number-key code correlation, is an example of the independent invention and reverse engineering expressly allowed by trade secret doctrine”). The duplication of boat hulls and their component parts may be an essential part of innovation in the field of hydrodynamic design. Variations as to size and combination of various elements may lead to significant advances in the field. Reverse engineering of chemical and mechanical articles in the public domain often leads to significant advances in technology. If Florida may prohibit this particular method of study and recomposition of an unpatented article, we fail to see the principle that would prohibit a State from banning the use of chromatography in the reconstitution of unpatented chemical compounds, or the use of robotics in the duplication of machinery in the public domain.
Moreover, as we noted in Keivanee, the competitive reality of reverse engineering may act as a spur to the inventor, creating an incentive to develop inventions that meet the rigorous requirements of patentability. 416 U. S., at 489-490. of property in ideas, and the great power such property has to cause harm to the competitive policies which underlay the federal patent laws, the demarcation of broad zones of public and private right is “the type of regulation that demands a uniform national rule.” Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U. S. 151, 179 (1978). Absent such a federal rule, each State could afford patent-like protection to particularly favored home industries, effectively insulating them from competition from outside the State.
Petitioner and its supporting amici place great weight on the contrary decision of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Interpart Corp. v. Italia. In upholding the application of the California “antidirect molding” statute to the duplication of unpatented automobile mirrors, the Federal Circuit stated: “The statute prevents unscrupulous competitors from obtaining a product and using it as the ‘plug’ for making a mold. The statute does not prohibit copying the design of the product in any other way; the latter if in the public domain, is free for anyone to make, use or sell.” 777 F. 2d, at 685. The court went on to indicate that “the patent laws ‘say nothing about the right to copy or the right to use, they speak only in terms of the right to exclude.’” Ibid., quoting Mine Safety Appliances Co. v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 56 C. C. P. A. (Pat.) 863, 864, n. 2, 405 F. 2d 901, 902, n. 2 (1969).
We find this reasoning defective in several respects. The Federal Circuit apparently viewed the direct molding statute at issue
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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J
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Harlan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
A federal grand jury alleged in an indictment, returned in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, that on April 13, 1962, the appellees had kidnaped at gunpoint the pilot of a private Cessna 172 airplane and compelled him to transport them from Florida to Cuba. Count 1 of the indictment charged appellees with having violated 18 U. S. C. § 1201, the Federal Kidnaping Act. Under Count 2, appellees were charged with the commission of “aircraft piracy” in contravention of a 1961 amendment to § 902 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 75 Stat. 466, 49 U. S. C. (Supp. IV) § 1472 (i).
The District Court dismissed the indictment on September 17, 1962-, before trial. It held that a kidnaping is not “for ransom or reward or otherwise,” as required by § 1201 (a), unless committed for the pecuniary benefit of the defendant and that a private airplane is not “an aircraft in flight in air commerce” within the meaning of the aircraft piracy provision, which it read as limited to commercial airliners. The Government’s petition for rehearing, filed October 17, was denied on November 8. On December 5, the Government filed a notice of appeal to this Court under 18 U. S. C. § 3731, permitting direct appeal when the dismissal of an indictment is based on construction of the statute upon which the indictment is founded. We noted probable jurisdiction, 372 U. S. 963. We conclude that the judgment of dismissal must be reversed.
I.
Appellees contend that this Court is without jurisdiction and is thereby precluded from considering the case on its merits. They argue that, absent authorization by statute or rule, the filing of a petition for rehearing by the Government in a criminal case cannot extend the time for appeal. Rule 11 (2) of this Court provides:
“An appeal permitted by law from a district court to this court in a criminal case shall be in time when the notice of appeal prescribed by Rule 10 is filed with the clerk of the district court within thirty days after entry of the judgment or order appealed from.”
It is undisputed that the notice of appeal was filed by the United States within 30 days from the denial of the petition for rehearing, although not within 30 days of the original entry of judgment. Since the petition for rehearing was filed within 30 days of the judgment, we are not faced with an attempt to rejuvenate an extinguished right to appeal. Cf. Allegrucci v. United States, 372 U. S. 954. The question, therefore, is simply whether in a criminal case a timely petition for rehearing by the Government filed within the permissible time for appeal renders the judgment not final for purposes of appeal until the court disposes of the petition — in other words whether in such circumstances the 30-day period prescribed by Rule 11 (2) begins to run from the date of entry of judgment or the denial of the petition for rehearing.
The latter is the well-established rule in civil cases, whether brought here by appeal or certiorari, e. g., United States v. Ellicott, 223 U. S. 524, 539; Morse v. United States, 270 U. S. 151, 153-154; Bowman v. Loperena, 311 U. S. 262, 264-266. That a rehearing petition, at least when filed within the original period for review, may also extend the time for filing a petition for certiorari by a criminal defendant is the unarticulated premise on which the Court has consistently proceeded. See, e. g., Panico v. United States, 375 U. S. 29 (order extending time for filing entered 19 days after denial of petition for rehearing en banc, 45 days after original judgment of Court of Appeals); Corey v. United States, 375 U. S. 169 (petition for certiorari filed 30 days after denial of rehearing, 45 days after original judgment of Court of Appeals); Genovese v. United States, decided with Evola v. United States, 375 U. S. 32 (order extending time for filing entered 16 days after denial of rehearing and rehearing en banc, 49 days after entry of original judgment). In Craig v. United States, 298 U. S. 637, this Court dismissed an application for a writ of certiorari as premature, “without prejudice to a renewal of the application within thirty days after action by the Circuit Court of Appeals on the petition for rehearing.” This summary disposition plainly reflects an advertent decision that criminal judgments are nonfinal for purposes of appeal so long as timely rehearing petitions are pending.
We have recently recognized the appropriateness of petitions for rehearing by the United States in criminal cases, Forman v. United States, 361 U. S. 416, 425-426. The practice of the Court has been to treat such petitions as having the same effect on the permissible time for seeking review as do similar petitions in civil cases and in criminal cases in which the Government has won below. United States v. Williams, 341 U. S. 58 (appeal from dismissal of indictment by District Court; notice of appeal filed 29 days after denial of motion for rehearing, 44 days after entry of original order); United States v. Smith, 342 U. S. 225 (appeal from dismissal of indictment by District Court; notice of appeal filed 28 days after denial of petition for rehearing, 109 days after entry of original order); United States v. Calderon, 348 U. S. 160 (petition for certiorari from Court of Appeals; order extending time for filing entered 28 days after denial of rehearing, 88 days after entry of original judgment).
Appellees place great reliance on the absence of any statute or rule governing the effect of rehearing petitions of the Government, but both the civil and criminal procedural doctrines lack such a foundation. The wording of Rule 11 (2) of this Court, as unilluminating on this issue as it may be standing alone, is virtually identical to that of Rule 22 (2), which encompasses petitions for certiorari both by criminal defendants and the Government. The inference is compelling that no difference in treatment is intended between appealable judgments and those reviewable by certiorari, or between criminal defendants and the United States. We are constrained to read these rules as consistent with a traditional and virtually unquestioned practice.
Rule 37 (a) (2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure does not alter this conclusion, since it sheds no light on the relevance of a petition for rehearing. Nor can the principle of strict construction of statutes permitting governmental appeals in criminal cases, Carroll v. United States, 354 U. S. 394, be utilized to undermine a well-established procedural rule for criminal, as well as civil, litigation. No persuasive considerations of policy dictate a deviant standard for government appeals.
Of course speedy disposition of criminal cases is desirable, but to deprive the Government of the opportunity to petition a lower court for the correction of errors might, in some circumstances, actually prolong the process of litigation — since plenary consideration of a question of law here ordinarily consumes more time than disposition of a petition for rehearing — and could, in some cases, impose an added and unnecessary burden of adjudication upon this Court. It would be senseless for this Court to pass on an issue while a motion for rehearing is pending below, and no significant saving of time would be achieved by altering the ordinary rule to the extent of compelling a notice of appeal to be filed while the petition for rehearing is under consideration.
We conclude that this appeal was timely filed and that the Court has jurisdiction to determine the case on its merits.
II.
By interpreting 18 U. S. C. § 1201 to require a motive of pecuniary profit, the District Court disregarded the plain holding of Gooch v. United States, 297 U. S. 124, in which the defendant, who had seized and carried away a state peace officer attempting to effectuate his arrest, was held subject to prosecution under the statute. Prior to a 1934 amendment, the Federal Kidnaping Act had been applicable only if the person transported was held for ransom or reward. The wording was then changed to encompass persons held “for ransom or reward or otherwise, except, in the case of a minor, by a parent thereof,” 48 Stat. 781. (Emphasis added.) The Court in Gooch, noting the ambiguity of the word “reward,” found convincing evidence in the amendment’s legislative history that the addition of “otherwise” was intended to make clear that a nonpecuniary motive did not preclude prosecution under the statute. The Senate Judiciary Committee, which quoted from a memorandum of the Justice Department, and the House Judiciary Committee both had reported that the bill was designed to extend federal jurisdiction under the Act to cases of persons kidnaped and held “not only for reward, but for any other reason.” The Court’s conclusion that the amended statute covered the facts before it was clearly in accord with the congressional purpose.
The Courts of Appeals have consistently followed Gooch, e. g., United States v. Parker, 103 F. 2d 857; Brooks v. United States, 199 F. 2d 336; Hayes v. United States, 296 F. 2d 657, and appellees do not challenge the authority of that case. While recognizing that the statute is not limited to kidnapings for pecuniary gain, they assert that it is restricted to kidnapings for an otherwise illegal purpose. This contention is without support in the language of the provision, its legislative history, judicial decisions, or reason. The wording certainly suggests no distinction based on the ultimate purpose of a kidnaping; were one intended, the exclusion of parent-child kidnapings would have been largely superfluous, since such conduct is rarely the result of an intrinsically illegal purpose. Nothing in the reports or debates supports appellees’ position. In two cases, Wheatley v. United States, 159 F. 2d 599, 600; Bearden v. United States, 304 F. 2d 532 (judgment vacated on another ground, 372 U. S. 252), Courts of Appeals have assumed that the applicability of the statute does not turn on the illegality of the ultimate purpose of the kidnaper. No policy considerations support appellees’ strained reading of 18 U. S. C. § 1201. A murder committed to accelerate the accrual of one’s rightful inheritance is hardly less heinous than one committed to facilitate a theft; by the same token, we find no compelling correlation between the propriety of the ultimate purpose sought to be furthered by a kidnaping and the undesirability of the act of kidnaping itself. Appellees rely on the principle of strict construction of penal statutes, but that maxim is hardly a directive to this Court to invent distinctions neither reflective of the policy behind congressional enactments nor intimated by the words used to implement the legislative goal.
We hold that the District Court improperly dismissed the first count of the indictment.
III.
The 1961 “aircraft piracy” amendment to the Federal Aviation Act makes it a federal crime, inter alia, to exercise control, by threat of force with wrongful intent, of “an aircraft in flight in air commerce,” § 902 (i), 75 Stat. 466, 49 U. S. C. (Supp. IY) § 1472 (i). Examination of the provision itself and its relation to the rest of the statute, apart from reference to the legislative history, stands against the conclusion of the court below. The Cessna 172 was “an aircraft”; it was “in flight”; it was in flight “in air commerce.” Appellees assert that had Congress intended to include private airplanes it could have referred to “any aircraft,” but, standing alone, the phrase “an aircraft” is on its face an all-inclusive term. Appellees’ contention that the statutory language refers only to commercial airlines is contradicted by the definition of air commerce in the original act, § 101 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 737, 49 U. S. C. (Supp. IV) § 1301:
“(4) 'Air commerce’ means interstate, overseas, or foreign air commerce or the transportation of mail by aircraft or any operation or navigation of aircraft within the limits of any Federal airway or any operation or navigation of aircraft which directly affects, or which may endanger safety in, interstate, overseas, or foreign air commerce.”
Without question, this definition covers the facts alleged in the indictment in this case. That the relation between the language of the ''aircraft piracy” amendment and the above definition was not overlooked by the drafters is indicated by the different phraseology used in a contemporaneous amendment concerning concealed weapons. Section 902 (1) of the amended act, 75 Stat. 466, 49 U. S. C. (Supp. IV) § 1472 (1), makes it a crime to carry such a weapon “while aboard an aircraft being operated by an air carrier in air transportation.” Thus Congress knew how to choose words to refer solely to commercial airliners when it wished to do so.
The conclusions drawn from the statute itself are confirmed by the legislative history. The House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce reported, H. R. Rep. No. 958, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., that the term “air commerce” was used by design because of its broad scope as defined in existing law, p. 8. It specifically cited “the urgent need for stronger Federal laws applicable to criminal acts committed aboard commercial and private aircraft,” p. 3, and noted that the subsection regarding weapons “would be limited to aircraft being used in air carrier commercial operations, whereas these other subsections [including that relating to aircraft piracy] would apply also in the case of private aircraft,” p. 15.
Comments during House debate accord with the Committee’s understanding, see remarks of Congressman Harris (107 Cong. Rec. 16545) and Congressman Williams (107 Cong. Rec. 16547-16548). The remarks of Senator Engle, the sponsor of the aircraft piracy provisions in the Senate, during debate are explicit: “Yes; it applies to all airplanes in air commerce, which includes, of course, not only commercial aircraft, but private airplanes as well.” (107 Cong. Rec. 15243). The statements of members of Congress evincing a concern for the protection of passengers aboard commercial airlines, see, e. g., remarks of Congressman Rostenkowski (107 Cong. Rec. 16552), do not reflect any intent to put private aircraft beyond the scope of the provision. Indeed, since one of the often-expressed purposes of the aircraft piracy amendment was to provide a solution to the jurisdictional problems involved in fixing a locus for a crime committed in transit and in arresting a deplaning passenger who may have engaged in criminal activity over the territory of a different State, see, e. g., H. R. Rep. No. 958, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 3-5, one would suppose, absent any other evidence, a design to include private aircraft; these problems are as pertinent to acts committed aboard them as to those done on commercial airliners. Finding that the plainly expressed intent of Congress, as manifested both in the statutory language and legislative history, was to include private aircraft within the scope of § 902 (i), we conclude that dismissal of the second count of the indictment was also incorrect.
The judgment below is reversed and the case is remanded to the District Court with instructions to reinstate both counts of the indictment.
It is so ordered.
“(a) Whoever knowingly transports in interstate or foreign commerce, any person who has been unlawfully seized, confined, inveigled, decoyed, kidnaped, abducted, or carried away and held for ransom or reward or otherwise, except, in the case of a minor, by a parent thereof, shall be punished . . . .”
“(1) Whoever commits or attempts to commit aircraft piracy, as herein defined, shall be punished ....
“(2) As used in this subsection, the term 'aircraft piracy’ means any seizure or exercise of control, by force or violence or threat of force or violence and with wrongful intent, of an aircraft in flight in air commerce.”
“Time for Taking Appeal. An appeal by a defendant may be taken within 10 days after entry of the judgment or order appealed from, but if a motion for a new trial or in arrest of judgment has been made within the 10-day period an appeal from a judgment of conviction may be taken within 10 days after entry of the order denying the motion. When a court after trial imposes sentence upon a defendant not represented by counsel, the defendant shall be advised of his right to appeal and if he so requests, the cleric shall prepare and file forthwith a notice of appeal on behalf of the defendant. An appeal by the government when authorized by statute may be taken within 30 days after entry of the judgment or order appealed from.”
In this case, the record and legal issues plainly indicate the good faith of the Government in petitioning for rehearing. We would, of course, not countenance the United States’ using such petitions simply as a delaying tactic in criminal litigation; there is, however, not the slightest basis for believing that it would try to do so.
S. Rep. No. 534, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., Mar. 20, 1934; H. R. Rep. No. 1457, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., May 3, 1934, p. 2.
Chatwin v. United States, 326 U. S. 455, which involved the transporting of a girl to maintain a "celestial” marriage, is inapposite. There the element of coercion or deception, central to the crime of kidnaping, was absent.
Our disposition of this issue relieves us from considering whether appellees’ ultimate purpose was unlawful and, if so, whether illegality of purpose, if not obvious, is a necessary element in the indictment. However, it may be observed that a trip to Cuba would have been lawful only if appellees had had passports specifically endorsed for travel to Cuba. See Presidential Proclamations No. 2914, Dee. 16, 1950 (64 Stat. A454); and No. 3004, Jan. 17, 1953 (67 Stat. C31); §215 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 163, 190, 8 U. S. C. §1185; Department of State Public Notice 179, 26 Fed. Reg. 492, Jan. 16, 1961. Appellees, without claiming lawfulness of purpose, argue that the burden of showing that they had not complied with the regulations governing travel to Cuba rests with the United States and that noncompliance has to be specifically alleged in an indictment.
The discussion concerning the legality of travel to Cuba points up how untenable is appellees’ basic position. It would surely be anomalous were application of the Kidnaping Act made to turn on whether existing regulations permit travel to the point of destination without a passport, with an ordinary passport, or only with a passport specially endorsed.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice SOTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA) grants foreign states and their agencies and instrumentalities immunity from suit in the United States (called jurisdictional immunity) and grants their property immunity from attachment and execution in satisfaction of judgments against them. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1604, 1609. But those grants of immunity are subject to exception.
Petitioners hold a judgment against respondent Islamic Republic of Iran pursuant to one such exception to jurisdictional immunity, which applies where the foreign state is designated as a state sponsor of terrorism and the claims arise out of acts of terrorism. See § 1605A. The issue presented in this case is whether certain property of Iran, specifically, a collection of antiquities owned by Iran but in the possession of respondent University of Chicago, is subject to attachment and execution by petitioners in satisfaction of that judgment. Petitioners contend that the property is stripped of its immunity by another provision of the FSIA, § 1610(g), which they maintain provides a blanket exception to the immunity typically afforded to the property of a foreign state where the party seeking to attach and execute holds a § 1605A judgment.
We disagree. Section 1610(g) serves to identify property that will be available for attachment and execution in satisfaction of a § 1605A judgment, but it does not in itself divest property of immunity. Rather, the provision's language "as provided in this section" shows that § 1610(g) operates only when the property at issue is exempt from immunity as provided elsewhere in § 1610. Petitioners cannot invoke § 1610(g) to attach and execute against the antiquities at issue here, which petitioners have not established are exempt from immunity under any other provision in § 1610.
I
A
On September 4, 1997, Hamas carried out three suicide bombings on a crowded pedestrian mall in Jerusalem, resulting in the deaths of 5 people and injuring nearly 200 others. Petitioners are United States citizens who were either wounded in the attack or are the close relatives of those who were injured. In an attempt to recover for their harm, petitioners sued Iran in the District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging that Iran was responsible for the bombing because it provided material support and training to Hamas. At the time of that action, Iran was subject to the jurisdiction of the federal courts pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (1994 ed., Supp. II), which rescinded the immunity of foreign states designated as state sponsors of terrorism with respect to claims arising out of acts of terrorism. Iran did not appear in the action, and the District Court entered a default judgment in favor of petitioners in the amount of $71.5 million.
When Iran did not pay the judgment, petitioners brought this action in the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois to attach and execute against certain Iranian assets located in the United States in satisfaction of their judgment. Those assets-a collection of approximately 30,000 clay tablets and fragments containing ancient writings, known as the Persepolis Collection-are in the possession of the University of Chicago, housed at its Oriental Institute. University archeologists recovered the artifacts during an excavation of the old city of Persepolis in the 1930's. In 1937, Iran loaned the collection to the Oriental Institute for research, translation, and cataloging.
Petitioners maintained in the District Court, inter alia, that § 1610(g) of the FSIA renders the Persepolis Collection subject to attachment and execution. The District Court concluded otherwise and held that § 1610(g) does not deprive the Persepolis Collection of the immunity typically afforded the property of a foreign sovereign. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. 830 F.3d 470 (2016). As relevant, the Seventh Circuit held that the text of § 1610(g) demonstrates that the provision serves to identify the property of a foreign state or its agencies or instrumentalities that are subject to attachment and execution, but it does not in itself divest that property of immunity. The Court granted certiorari to resolve a split among the Courts of Appeals regarding the effect of § 1610(g). 582 U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 2326, 198 L.Ed.2d 754 (2017). We agree with the conclusion of the Seventh Circuit, and therefore affirm.
B
We start with a brief review of the historical development of foreign sovereign immunity law and the statutory framework at issue here, as it provides a helpful guide to our decision. This Court consistently has recognized that foreign sovereign immunity "is a matter of grace and comity on the part of the United States." Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486, 103 S.Ct. 1962, 1967, 76 L.Ed.2d 81 (1983) ; Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 7 Cranch 116, 136, 3 L.Ed. 287 (1812). In determining whether to exercise jurisdiction over suits against foreign sovereigns, courts traditionally "deferred to the decisions of the political branches ... on whether to take jurisdiction over actions against foreign sovereigns." Verlinden, 461 U.S., at 486, 103 S.Ct. 1962.
Prior to 1952, the State Department generally held the position that foreign states enjoyed absolute immunity from all actions in the United States. See ibid. But, as foreign states became more involved in commercial activity in the United States, the State Department recognized that such participation "makes necessary a practice which will enable persons doing business with them to have their rights determined in the courts." J. Tate, Changed Policy Concerning the Granting of Sovereign Immunity to Foreign Governments, 26 Dept. State Bull. 984, 985 (1952). The Department began to follow the "restrictive" theory of foreign sovereign immunity in advising courts whether they should take jurisdiction in any given case. Immunity typically was afforded in cases involving a foreign sovereign's public acts, but not in "cases arising out of a foreign state's strictly commercial acts." Verlinden, 461 U.S., at 487, 103 S.Ct. 1962.
In 1976, Congress enacted the FSIA in an effort to codify this careful balance between respecting the immunity historically afforded to foreign sovereigns and holding them accountable, in certain circumstances, for their actions. 90 Stat. 2891, as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1602 et seq. "For the most part, the Act" tracks "the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity." Verlinden, 461 U.S., at 488, 103 S.Ct. 1962. As a default, foreign states enjoy immunity "from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the States." § 1604. But this immunity is subject to certain express exceptions. For example, in line with the restrictive theory, a foreign sovereign will be stripped of jurisdictional immunity when a claim is based upon commercial activity it carried out in the United States. See, e.g., § 1605(a)(2). The FSIA also provides that a foreign state will be subject to suit when it is designated as a state sponsor of terrorism and damages are sought as a result of acts of terrorism. See § 1605A(a).
With respect to the immunity of property, the FSIA similarly provides as a default that "the property in the United States of a foreign state shall be immune from attachment arrest and execution." § 1609. But, again, there are exceptions, and § 1610 outlines the circumstances under which property will not be immune. See § 1610. For example, subsection (a) expressly provides that property "shall not be immune" from attachment and execution where, inter alia, it is "used for a commercial activity in the United States" and the "judgment relates to a claim for which the foreign state is not immune under section 1605A or section 1605(a)(7) (as such section was in effect on January 27, 2008), regardless of whether the property is or was involved with the act upon which the claim is based." § 1610(a)(7).
Prior to 2008, the FSIA did not address expressly under what circumstances, if any, the agencies or instrumentalities of a foreign state could be held liable for judgments against the state. Faced with that question in First Nat. City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 103 S.Ct. 2591, 77 L.Ed.2d 46 (1983) (Bancec ), this Court held that "government instrumentalities established as juridical entities distinct and independent from their sovereign should normally be treated as such." Id., at 626-627, 103 S.Ct. 2591. Thus, as a default, those agencies and instrumentalities of a foreign state were to be considered separate legal entities that cannot be held liable for acts of the foreign state. See id., at 628, 103 S.Ct. 2591.
Nevertheless, the Court recognized that such a stringent rule should not be without exceptions. The Court suggested that liability would be warranted, for example, "where a corporate entity is so extensively controlled by [the state] that a relationship of principal and agent is created," id., at 629, 103 S.Ct. 2591, or where recognizing the state and its agency or instrumentality as distinct entities "would work fraud or injustice," ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). See id., at 630, 103 S.Ct. 2591. But the Court declined to develop a "mechanical formula for determining" when these exceptions should apply, id., at 633, 103 S.Ct. 2591, leaving lower courts with the task of assessing the availability of exceptions on a case-by-case basis. Over time, the Courts of Appeals coalesced around the following five factors (referred to as the Bancec factors) to aid in this analysis:
"(1) the level of economic control by the government;
"(2) whether the entity's profits go to the government;
"(3) the degree to which government officials manage the entity or otherwise have a hand in its daily affairs;
"(4) whether the government is the real beneficiary of the entity's conduct; and
"(5) whether adherence to separate identities would entitle the foreign state to benefits in United States courts while avoiding its obligations." Walter Fuller Aircraft Sales, Inc. v. Republic of Philippines, 965 F.2d 1375, 1380, n. 7 (C.A.5 1992) ; see also Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 308 F.3d 1065, 1071, n. 9 (C.A.9 2002).
In 2008, Congress amended the FSIA and added § 1610(g). See NDAA § 1083(b)(3)(D), 122 Stat. 341-342. Section 1610(g)(1) provides:
"(g) Property in Certain Actions.-
"(1) In general. [T]he property of a foreign state against which a judgment is entered under section 1605A, and the property of an agency or instrumentality of such a state, including property that is a separate juridical entity or is an interest held directly or indirectly in a separate juridical entity, is subject to attachment in aid of execution, and execution, upon that judgment as provided in this section, regardless of-
"(A) the level of economic control over the property by the government of the foreign state;
"(B) whether the profits of the property go to that government;
"(C) the degree to which officials of that government manage the property or otherwise control its daily affairs;
"(D) whether that government is the sole beneficiary in interest of the property; or
"(E) whether establishing the property as a separate entity would entitle the foreign state to benefits in United States courts while avoiding its obligations."
Subparagraphs (A) through (E) incorporate almost verbatim the five Bancec factors, leaving no dispute that, at a minimum, § 1610(g) serves to abrogate Bancec with respect to the liability of agencies and instrumentalities of a foreign state where a § 1605A judgment holder seeks to satisfy a judgment held against the foreign state. The issue at hand is whether § 1610(g) does something more; whether, like the commercial activity exception in § 1610(a)(7), it provides an independent exception to immunity so that it allows a § 1605A judgment holder to attach and execute against any property of the foreign state, regardless of whether the property is deprived of immunity elsewhere in § 1610.
II
We turn first to the text of the statute. Section 1610(g)(1) provides that certain property will be "subject to attachment in aid of execution, and execution, upon [a § 1605A ] judgment as provided in this section ." (Emphasis added.) The most natural reading is that "this section" refers to § 1610 as a whole, so that § 1610(g)(1) will govern the attachment and execution of property that is exempted from the grant of immunity as provided elsewhere in § 1610. Cf.
Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 487, 119 S.Ct. 936, 945, 142 L.Ed.2d 940 (1999) (noting that the phrase "[e]xcept as provided in this section" in one subsection serves to incorporate "the rest of" the section in which the subsection appears).
Other provisions of § 1610 unambiguously revoke the immunity of property of a foreign state, including specifically where a plaintiff holds a judgment under § 1605A, provided certain express conditions are satisfied. For example, subsection (a) provides that "property in the United States ... used for a commercial activity in the United States ... shall not be immune" from attachment and execution in seven enumerated circumstances, including when "the judgment relates to a claim for which the foreign state is not immune under section 1605A...." § 1610(a)(7). Subsections (b), (d), and (e) similarly set out circumstances in which certain property of a foreign state "shall not be immune." And two other provisions within § 1610 specifically allow § 1605A judgment holders to attach and execute against property of a foreign state, "[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law," including those provisions otherwise granting immunity, but only with respect to assets associated with certain regulated and prohibited financial transactions. See § 1610(f)(1)(A) ; Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA), § 201(a), 116 Stat. 2337, note following 28 U.S.C. § 1610.
Section 1610(g) conspicuously lacks the textual markers, "shall not be immune" or "notwithstanding any other provision of law," that would have shown that it serves as an independent avenue for abrogation of immunity. In fact, its use of the phrase "as provided in this section" signals the opposite: A judgment holder seeking to take advantage of § 1610(g)(1) must identify a basis under one of § 1610's express immunity-abrogating provisions to attach and execute against a relevant property.
Reading § 1610(g) in this way still provides relief to judgment holders who previously would not have been able to attach and execute against property of an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state in light of this Court's decision in Bancec . Suppose, for instance, that plaintiffs obtain a § 1605A judgment against a foreign state and seek to collect against the assets located in the United States of a state-owned telecommunications company. Cf. Alejandre v. Telefonica Larga Distancia de Puerto Rico, Inc., 183 F.3d 1277 (C.A.11 1999). Prior to the enactment of § 1610(g), the plaintiffs would have had to establish that the Bancec factors favor holding the agency or instrumentality liable for the foreign state's misconduct. With § 1610(g), however, the plaintiffs could attach and execute against the property of the state-owned entity regardless of the Bancec factors, so long as the plaintiffs can establish that the property is otherwise not immune (e.g., pursuant to § 1610(a)(7) because it is used in commercial activity in the United States).
Moreover, our reading of § 1610(g)(1) is consistent "with one of the most basic interpretive canons, that [a] statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant." Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314, 129 S.Ct. 1558, 1566, 173 L.Ed.2d 443 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Section 1610 expressly references § 1605A judgments in its immunity-abrogating provisions, such as 28 U.S.C. §§ 1610(a)(7), (b)(3), (f)(1), and § 201 of the TRIA, showing that those provisions extend to § 1605A judgment holders' ability to attach and execute against property. If the Court were to conclude that § 1610(g) establishes a basis for the withdrawal of property immunity any time a plaintiff holds a judgment under § 1605A, each of those provisions would be rendered superfluous because a judgment holder could always turn to § 1610(g), regardless of whether the conditions of any other provision were met.
The Court's interpretation of § 1610(g) is also consistent with the historical practice of rescinding attachment and execution immunity primarily in the context of a foreign state's commercial acts. See Verlinden, 461 U.S., at 487-488, 103 S.Ct. 1962. Indeed, the FSIA expressly provides in its findings and declaration of purpose that
"[u]nder international law, states are not immune from the jurisdiction of foreign courts insofar as their commercial activities are concerned, and their commercial property may be levied upon for the satisfaction of judgments rendered against them in connection with their commercial activities." § 1602.
This focus of the FSIA is reflected within § 1610, as subsections (a), (b), and (d) all outline exceptions to immunity of property when that property is used for commercial activity. The Court's reading of § 1610(g) means that individuals with § 1605A judgments against a foreign state must primarily invoke other provisions revoking the grant of immunity for property related to commercial activity, including § 1610(a)(7), unless the property is expressly carved out in an exception that applies "[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law," § 1610(f)(1)(A) ; § 201(a) of the TRIA. That result is consistent with the history and structure of the FSIA.
Throughout the FSIA, special avenues of relief to victims of terrorism exist, even absent a nexus to commercial activity. Where the FSIA goes so far as to divest a foreign state or property of immunity in relation to terrorism-related judgments, however, it does so expressly. See §§ 1605A, 1610(a)(7), (b)(3), (f)(1)(A) ; § 201(a) of the TRIA. Out of respect for the delicate balance that Congress struck in enacting the FSIA, we decline to read into the statute a blanket abrogation of attachment and execution immunity for § 1605A judgment holders absent a clearer indication of Congress' intent.
III
A
Petitioners resist that the phrase "as provided in this section" refers to § 1610 as a whole and contend that Congress more likely was referencing a specific provision within § 1610 or a section in the NDAA. That explanation is unpersuasive.
Petitioners first assert that "this section" might refer to procedures contained in § 1610(f). Section 1610(f) permits § 1605A judgment holders to attach and execute against property associated with certain regulated and prohibited financial transactions, § 1610(f)(1), and it provides that the United States Secretary of State and Secretary of the Treasury will make every effort to assist in "identifying, locating, and executing against the property of [a] foreign state or any agency or instrumentality of such state," § 1610(f)(2). Petitioners point out that paragraph (1) of subsection (f) has never come into effect because it was immediately waived by the President after it was enacted, pursuant to § 1610(f)(3). So, the argument goes, it would make sense that Congress created § 1610(g) as an alternative mechanism to achieve a similar result.
This is a strained and unnatural reading of the phrase "as provided in this section." In enacting § 201(a) of the TRIA, which, similar to 28 U.S.C. § 1610(f), permits attachment and execution against blocked assets, Congress signaled that it was rescinding immunity by permitting attachment and execution "[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law." See § 201(a) of the TRIA. Had Congress likewise intended § 1610(g) to have such an effect, it knew how to say so. Cf. Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 578 U.S. ----, ----, n. 2, 136 S.Ct. 1310, 1318, n. 2, 194 L.Ed.2d 463 (2016) (noting that "[s]ection 1610(g) does not take precedence over 'any other provision of law,' as the TRIA does").
Petitioners fare no better in arguing that Congress may have intended "this section" to refer only to the instruction in § 1610(f)(2) that the United States Government assist in identifying assets. Section 1610(f)(2) does not provide for attachment or execution at all, so petitioners' argument does not account for the lack of textual indicators that exist in provisions like §§ 1610(a)(7) and (f)(1) that unambiguously abrogate immunity and permit attachment and execution.
Finally, petitioners assert that "this section" could possibly reflect a drafting error that was intended to actually refer to § 1083 of the NDAA, the Public Law in which § 1610(g) was enacted. This interpretation would require not only a stark deviation from the plain text of § 1610(g), but also a departure from the clear text of the NDAA. Section 1083(b)(3) of the NDAA provides that " Section 1610 of title 28, United States Code, is amended ... by adding at the end" the new subsection "(g)." 122 Stat. 341. The language "this section" within (g), then, clearly and expressly incorporates the NDAA's reference to " Section 1610" as a whole. There is no basis to conclude that Congress' failure to change "this section" in § 1610(g) was the result of a mere drafting error.
B
In an effort to show that § 1610(g) does much more than simply abrogate the Bancec factors, petitioners argue that the words "property of a foreign state," which appear in the first substantive clause of § 1610(g), would otherwise be rendered superfluous because the property of a foreign state will never be subject to a Bancec inquiry. By its plain text, § 1610(g)(1) permits enforcement of a § 1605A judgment against both the property of a foreign state and the property of the agencies or instrumentalities of that foreign state. Because the Bancec factors would never have applied to the property of a foreign state, petitioners contend, those words must signal something else: that § 1610(g) provides an independent basis for the withdrawal of immunity.
The words "property of a foreign state" accomplish at least two things, however, that are consistent with the Court's understanding of the effect of § 1610(g). First, § 1610(g) serves to identify in one place all the categories of property that will be available to § 1605A judgment holders for attachment and execution, whether it is "property of the foreign state" or property of its agencies or instrumentalities, and commands that the availability of such property will not be limited by the Bancec factors. So long as the property is deprived of its immunity "as provided in [ § 1610 ]," all of the types of property identified in § 1610(g) will be available to § 1605A judgment holders.
Second, in the context of the entire phrase, "the property of a foreign state against which a judgment is entered under section 1605A," the words "foreign state" identify the type of judgment that will invoke application of § 1610(g) ; specifically, a judgment held against a foreign state and entered under § 1605A. Without this opening phrase, § 1610(g) would abrogate the Bancec presumption of separateness in all cases, not just those involving terrorism judgments under § 1605A. The words, "property of a foreign state," thus, are not rendered superfluous under the Court's reading because they do not merely identify a category of property that is subject to § 1610(g) but also help inform when § 1610(g) will apply in the first place. Indeed, § 1610(g) would make no sense if those words were removed.
C
All else aside, petitioners contend that any uncertainty in § 1610(g) should be resolved by giving full effect to the legislative purpose behind its enactment. Petitioners posit that Congress enacted § 1610(g)"with the specific purpose of removing the remaining obstacles to terrorism judgment enforcement." Brief for Petitioners 26. In support of that position, they reference a brief discussion of § 1610(g) in a footnote to the Court's decision in Bank Markazi, 578 U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 1310, 194 L.Ed.2d 463 that notes that Congress "expand[ed] the availability of assets for postjudgment execution" when it added § 1610(g) by making "available for execution the property (whether or not blocked) of a foreign state sponsor of terrorism, or its agency or instrumentality, to satisfy a judgment against that state." Id., at ----, n. 2, 136 S.Ct., at 1318, n. 2. But Bank Markazi 's characterization of § 1610(g) simply mirrors the text of § 1610(g) and is entirely consistent with the Court's holding today that § 1610(g) expands the assets available for attachment and execution by abrogating this Court's decision in Bancec with respect to judgments held under § 1605A. Beyond their citation to Bank Markazi, petitioners have not directed us to any evidence that supports their position that § 1610(g) was intended to divest all property of a foreign state or its agencies or instrumentalities of immunity.
IV
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that 28 U.S.C. § 1610(g) does not provide a freestanding basis for parties holding a judgment under § 1605A to attach and execute against the property of a foreign state, where the immunity of the property is not otherwise rescinded under a separate provision within § 1610. The judgment of the Seventh Circuit is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
Justice KAGAN took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Congress amended the FSIA in 2008 and replaced 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) with a separate, more expansive provision addressing the foreign sovereign immunity of foreign states that are designated as state sponsors of terrorism, § 1605A. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (NDAA), § 1083(a), 122 Stat. 338-341. Shortly thereafter, petitioners moved in the District Court for an order converting their judgment under § 1605(a)(7) to one under the new provision, § 1605A, which the District Court granted. See Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 563 F.Supp.2d 38, 39, n. 3 (D.D.C.2008).
Petitioners also sought to execute the judgment against three other collections that are no longer at issue in this case: the Chogha Mish Collection, the Oriental Institute Collection, and the Herzfeld Collection. The Chogha Mish Collection has been removed from the territorial jurisdiction of the federal courts, and the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit determined that the Oriental Institute Collection and Herzfeld Collection are not property of Iran. See 830 F.3d 470, 475-476 (2016). Petitioners do not challenge that decision here.
Compare Bennett v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 825 F.3d 949, 959 (C.A.9 2016) (holding that § 1610(g) provides a freestanding exception to attachment and execution immunity); Weinstein v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 831 F.3d 470, 483 (C.A.D.C.2016) (same); Kirschenbaum v. 650 Fifth Avenue and Related Properties, 830 F.3d 107, 123 (C.A.2 2016) (same), with 830 F.3d, at 481 (concluding that § 1610(g) does not create a freestanding exception to immunity).
Section 1610(b), for example, provides that "any property ... of [the] agency or instrumentality of a foreign state engaged in commercial activity in the United States shall not be immune" from attachment and execution in satisfaction of a judgment on a claim for which the agency or instrumentality is not immune under § 1605A. § 1610(b)(3).
To the extent petitioners suggest that those references to § 1605A were inadvertent, see Brief for Petitioners 41-44, the statutory history further supports the conclusion that § 1610(a)(7) applies to § 1605A judgment holders, as the reference to § 1605A was added to § 1610(a)(7) in the same Act that created §§ 1605A and 1610(g). See NDAA §§ 1083(a), (b)(3), 122 Stat. 338-342.
Section 1610(f)(3) authorizes the President to waive paragraph (1) of subsection (f) "in the interest of national security." President Clinton immediately waived the provision, and the waiver has never been withdrawn. See Pres. Determ. No. 99-1, 63 Fed.Reg. 59201 (1998) ; Pres. Determ. No. 2001-03, 65 Fed.Reg. 66483 (2000).
Petitioners reference the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Bennett, 825 F.3d 949, in support of this position.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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H
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sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter
delivered the opinion of the Court.
These are two suits brought under the Tucker Act (Judicial Code § 24 (20), 28 U. S. C. § 41 (20)) to recover the value of property claimed to have been taken by the Government. The suits were consolidated for purposes of the trial and though they present minor differentiating factors they may here, as below, be disposed of by a single opinion.
In order to improve the navigability of the Kanawha River, West Virginia, Congress authorized construction of the Winfield Dam, South Charleston. Act of August 30, 1935, 49 Stat. 1028, 1035, in connection with H. Doc. No. 31, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 2-4. The water above the dam was to be impounded to create a deeper channel and to raise the river pool level in that area. Notice of the proposed pool elevation was given to abutting landowners on July 1, 1936, and the dam was completed and officially accepted by the United States on August 20, 1937. The river was to be raised by successive stages from 554.65 feet to 566 feet above sea level. That level was not reached until September 22, 1938. As a result of the raising of the river the land belonging to the respondents was permanently flooded. In addition, erosion attributable to the improvement damaged the land which formed the new bank of the pool.
Respondents recovered judgments for the value of easements taken by the United States to flood permanently lands belonging to them. Damages were also awarded for the erosion, based on the cost of protective measures which the landowners might have taken to prevent the loss. In addition, the court found that the United States had also acquired an easement for intermittent flooding of part of the land belonging to the defendants, and allowed judgment for the value of such an easement. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s judgment. 152 F. 2d 865. We granted certiorari, 328 U. S. 828, because important questions were raised relevant to the determination of just compensation for the taking of private property by the Government.
First. The principal attack by the United States against the judgments is that both actions were outlawed. The applicable statute of limitations is six years. The complaints were filed on April 1, 1943. The Government argues that the statute began to run on October 21, 1936, when the dam began to impound water. In any event, it maintains that the six years began to run not later than on May 30, 1937, when the dam was fully capable of operation, the water was raised above its former level, and the property of the respondents was partially submerged for the first time. While on the latter view the time for taking had not run under the statute, Dickinson’s claim would be barred because he acquired the land after that date.
The Government could, of course, have taken appropriate proceedings to condemn as early as it chose both land and flowage easements. By such proceedings it could have fixed the time when the property was “taken.” The Government chose not to do so. It left the taking to physical events, thereby putting on the owner the onus of determining the decisive moment in the process of acquisition by the United States when the fact of taking could no longer be in controversy. These suits against the Government are authorized by the Tucker Act either as claims “founded upon the Constitution of the United States” or as arising upon implied contracts with the Government. (See the discussion of jurisdiction both in the opinion of the Court and in the concurring opinion in United States v. Lynah, 188 U. S. 445, and in Tempel v. United States, 248 U. S. 121.) But whether the theory of these suits be that there was a taking under the Fifth Amendment, and that therefore the Tucker Act may be invoked because it is a claim founded upon the Constitution, or that there was an implied promise by the Government to pay for it, is immaterial. In either event, the claim traces back to the prohibition of the Fifth Amendment, “nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” The Constitution is “intended to preserve practical and substantial rights, not to maintain theories.” Davis v. Mills, 194 U. S. 451, 457. One of the most theory-ridden of legal concepts is a “cause of action.” This Court has recognized its “shifting meanings” and the danger of determining rights based upon definitions of “a cause of action” unrelated to the function which the concept serves in a particular situation. United States v. Memphis Cotton Oil Co., 288 U. S. 62, 67 et seq.
Property is taken in the constitutional sense when inroads are made upon an owner’s use of it to an extent that, as between private parties, a servitude has been acquired either by agreement or in course of time. The Fifth Amendment expresses a principle of fairness and not a technical rule of procedure enshrining old or new niceties regarding “causes of action” — when they are born, whether they proliferate, and when they die. We are not now called upon to decide whether in a situation like this a landowner might be allowed to bring suit as soon as inundation threatens. Assuming that such an action would be sustained, it is not a good enough reason why he must sue then or have, from that moment, the statute of limitations run against him. If suit must be brought, lest he jeopardize his rights, as soon as his land is invaded, other contingencies would be running against him — for instance, the uncertainty of the damage and the risk of res judicata against recovering later for damage as yet uncertain. The source of the entire claim — the overflow due to rises in the level of the river— is not a single event; it is continuous. And as there is nothing in reason, so there is nothing in legal doctrine, to preclude the law from meeting such a process by postponing suit until the situation becomes stabilized. An owner of land flooded by the Government would not unnaturally postpone bringing a suit against the Government for the flooding until the consequences of inundation have so manifested themselves that a final account may be struck.
When dealing with a problem which arises under such diverse circumstances procedural rigidities should be avoided. All that we are here holding is that when the Government chooses not to condemn land but to bring about a taking by a continuing process of physical events, the owner is not required to resort either to piecemeal or to premature litigation to ascertain the just compensation for what is really “taken.” Accordingly, we find that the taking which was the basis of these suits was not complete six years prior to April 1, 1943, nor at a time preceding Dickinson’s ownership. In this conclusion we are fortified by the fact that the two lower courts reached the same conclusion on what is after all a practical matter and not a technical rule of law.
Nothing heretofore ruled by the Court runs counter to what we have said. The Government finds comfort in Portsmouth Co. v. United States, 260 U. S. 327. But in that case the problem was whether by putting a gun battery into permanent position with a view to converting an area, for all practical purposes, into an artillery range, the Government inevitably took an easement in the land over which the guns were to be fired. The issue was not when a suit must be brought on a claim in respect to land taken by the United States, which is the issue before us, but whether there had been a taking at all.
Second. The Government challenges the compensation awarded for damage to the land due to erosion. It regards this damage as consequential, to be borne without any right to compensation. Peabody v. United States, 231 U. S. 530. Of course, payment need only be made for what is taken, but for all that the Government takes it must pay. When it takes property by flooding, it takes the land which it permanently floods as well as that which inevitably washes away as a result of that flooding. The mere fact that all the United States needs and physically appropriates is the land up to the new level of the river, does not determine what in nature it has taken. If the Government cannot take the acreage it wants without also washing away more, that more becomes part of the taking. This falls under a principle that in other aspects has frequently been recognized by this Court. It was thus put in Bauman v. Ross, 167 U. S. 548, 574: “when part only of a parcel of land is taken for a highway, the value of that part is not the sole measure of the compensation or damages to be paid to the owner; but the incidental injury or benefit to the part not taken is also to be considered. When the part not taken is left in such shape or condition as to be in itself of less value than before, the owner is entitled to additional damages on that account.” So, also, United States v. Welch, 217 U. S. 333; United States v. Grizzard, 219 U. S. 180. Compare Sharp v. United States, 191 U. S. 341, 355; Campbell v. United States, 266 U. S. 368. Congress has recognized that damage to the owner is assessed not only for the value of the part taken but also “for any injury to the part not taken.” See § 6 of the Act of July 18, 1918, 40 Stat. 911, 33 U. S. C. 595. If the resulting erosion which, as a practical matter, constituted part of the taking was in fact preventable by prudent measures, the cost of that prevention is a proper basis for determining the damage, as the courts below held.
Third. At considerable expense, and with the consent of the War Department, Dickinson reclaimed most of his land which the Government originally took by flooding. The Government claims that this disentitled him to be paid for the original taking. The courts below properly rejected this defense. When the property was flooded the United States acquired the land and it became part of the river. By his reclamation, Dickinson appropriated part of what belonged to the United States. Whether the War Department could legally authorize Dickinson’s reclamation or whether it was in fact a trespass however innocent, is not before us. But no use to which Dickinson could subsequently put the property by his reclamation efforts changed the fact that the land was taken when it was taken and an obligation to pay for it then arose.
Fourth. Judgment was also allowed against the United States for taking an easement for intermittent flooding of land above the new permanent level, and a value for such easements was assessed. We find nothing in this record to justify our setting aside these concurrent findings by two courts. United States v. O’Donnell, 303 U. S. 501, 508; Allen v. Trust Co., 326 U. S. 630, 636.
Judgments affirmed.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
D
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Scalia
announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which The Chief Justice, Justice White, and Justice Stevens join.
In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that a state social-services agency could not lawfully treat personal injury awards as income when determining the eligibility of families seeking Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) benefits. Reed v. Health & Human Services, 774 F. 2d 1270 (1985). The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has reached the opposite conclusion. Watkins v. Blinzinger, 789 F. 2d 474 (1986). We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict. 477 U. S. 903 (1986).
I
Under the AFDC program, participating States that provide financial assistance to families with needy, dependent children are partially reimbursed by the Federal Government. 49 Stat. 627, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §§601-615 (1982 ed. and Supp. III). Although the States are largely free to determine the appropriate standard of need and the level of assistance, they must administer their assistance plans in conformity with applicable federal statutes and with regulations promulgated by the United States Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Those statutes require States to consider a family’s “income and resources” when determining whether or not it is needy, 53 Stat. 1379, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §602(a)(7)(A) (1982 ed., Supp. Ill), and prohibit them from providing AFDC benefits for any month in which either income or resources exceed state-prescribed limits (subject to a federal ceiling), 95 Stat. 844, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §§ 602(a)(7)(B), 602(a)(17), 602(a)(18) (1982 ed., Supp. III).
Because income eligibility and resource eligibility are separately computed (and also because state limits for the two generally differ), whether and for how long a family that acquires a sum of money is rendered ineligible for AFDC benefits may depend on whether the sum is classified as income or as a resource. Prior to 1981, however, the importance of the classification was minimized by an HHS requirement that States treat any income received in a given month as a resource in following months. Thus, a family that received an amount of income that exceeded the State’s income limit would be automatically ineligible for one month; whether or not it remained ineligible in subsequent months would depend on whether the amount of that income that had not yet been spent, combined with the value of the family’s other resources, exceeded the State’s resource limit. The Secretary of HHS became concerned that AFDC recipients who acquired a large amount of income had an incentive to spend it as rapidly as possible, in order to regain eligibility by reducing their resources to a level beneath the State’s resource limit. To solve this problem, the Secretary proposed and Congress passed an amendment to the AFDC statute. Under that amendment, AFDC recipients who receive an amount of income that exceeds the State’s standard of need are rendered ineligible for as many months as that income would last if the recipients spent an amount equal to the State’s standard of need each month. Section 2304 of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 (OBRA), 95 Stat. 845, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §602(a)(17) (1982 ed., Supp. III).
Because the OBRA amendment applies by its terms only to income, the distinction between income and resources took on new importance. If a given sum of money were treated as a resource, the family that received the sum would be ineligible only until it spent enough of the sum to bring its resources down to the State’s resource limit; but if the sum were treated as income, no matter how much was spent, the family would remain ineligible for the statutory period. In response to the OBRA amendment, the Virginia Department of Social Services (the agency responsible for administering Virginia’s AFDC program) revised its regulations to treat various lump-sum payments, including personal injury awards, as income rather than as resources. Virginia Department of Social Services, ADC Manual (Va. ADC Manual) §305.4C (Jan. 1983), App. to Pet. for Cert. 71. It did not, however, alter its policy of treating the proceeds of the sale or conversion of real or personal property — including property damage awards — as resources. §303.3, App. 25.
Respondents, who had received personal injury awards and were disqualified from Virginia’s AFDC program for varying periods pursuant to Virginia’s revised regulations, filed a class action against the Secretary and petitioner Lukhard, the Commissioner of the Virginia Department of Social Services, in the United States District Court for the District of Western Virginia. They alleged that treating personal injury awards as income was inconsistent with the federal AFDC statute, and they sought monetary, injunc-tive, and declaratory relief under Rev. Stat. §1979, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §1983, 5 U. S. C. §§701-706, and 28 U. S. C. §§2201-2202. After certifying a class of those whose AFDC benefits had been or would be decreased as a result of Virginia’s revised regulations, the District Court granted summary judgment in the class’ favor. It held that the common meaning of the term “income” precluded application of that term to personal injury awards, and that it was irrational for Virginia to treat personal injury awards as income but at the same time treat awards for property loss as resources. The District Court therefore issued an injunction forbidding Lukhard to apply the revised regulations to recipients of personal injury awards, ordering him to begin paying AFDC benefits to the named plaintiffs and other class members who would presently have been receiving them but for application of the revised regulations, and requiring him to notify AFDC recipients who had been deprived of past AFDC benefits as a result of the revised regulations. The court declined, however, to order Lukhard to pay retroactive AFDC benefits, and stayed the injunction pending appeal except insofar as it required Lukhard to begin paying AFDC benefits to the named plaintiffs. Lukhard and the Secretary appealed and the respondents cross-appealed. After the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the judgment in all respects, Reed v. Health & Human Services, 774 F. 2d 1270 (1985), Lukhard filed this petition. The Secretary did not file a separate petition but supported Lukhard’s petition and supports Lukhard’s position on the merits.
r-H ) — I
Respondents principal contention is that Virginia’s revised regulations are inconsistent with the meaning of “income” and “resources” as those terms are used in the AFDC statute. To support this argument they first advance the broader proposition that it does violence to common usage to interpret “income” to include personal injury awards. This argument begins from the premise that since personal injury awards are purely compensatory, they do not result in any gain to their recipients. And since both general and legal sources define “income” as involving gain, see, e. g., Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1143 (1976) (“a gain or recurrent benefit that is usu. measured in money . . .”); 42 C. J. S., Income, p. 531 (1944) (“In common speech ‘income’ generally is understood as gain or profit. . .” (footnote omitted)); Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189, 207 (1920) (“‘Income may be defined as the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined/ provided it be understood to include profit gained through a sale or conversion of capital assets ...” (quoting Stratton’s Independence, Ltd. v. Howbert, 231 U. S. 399, 415 (1913); Doyle v. Mitchell Brothers Co., 247 U. S. 179, 185 (1918))), respondents conclude that personal injury awards cannot fairly be characterized as income. But the premise that personal injury awards cannot involve gain is obviously false, since they often are intended in significant part to compensate for the loss of gain, e. g., lost wages. See Watkins v. Blinzinger, 789 F. 2d, at 476. Since the gain would have been income, surely at least that part of a personal injury award that replaces it must also be income. More importantly, however, as Lukhard and the Secretary point out, general and legal sources also commonly define “income” to mean “any money that comes in,” without regard to any related expenses incurred and without any requirement that the transactions producing the money result in a net gain. See, e. g., 5 Oxford English Dictionary 162 (1933) (“That which comes in. . . (considered in reference to its amount, and commonly expressed in money); ... receipts . . .”); 42 C. J. S., Income, p. 529 (1944) (“Generally or ordinarily the term means all that comes in; . . . something which is paid over and delivered to the recipient;. . . without reference to the outgoing expenditures ...” (footnotes omitted)); Heckler v. Turner, 470 U. S. 184 (1985) (“income” under the AFDC statute means gross income, without reference to expenses reasonably attributable to its earning). Heckler is particularly significant, since there we indicated that the part of an employee’s salary that is allocated to work-related expenses — clearly not a gain in the sense that term is used by respondents —is properly treated as “income” under the AFDC statute. Id., at 202. Although that con-elusion was based in part on a provision not involved in this case, it demonstrates that the AFDC statute itself contradicts the theory that payments that do not constitute gain (as respondents use the term) to their recipients cannot reasonably be described as “income.” Thus, contrary to respondents’ assertion, Virginia’s revised regulations are consistent with a perfectly natural use of “income.”
Respondents also seek to derive support from the fact that personal injury awards are not treated as income under the Internal Revenue Code, the Food Stamp program, or the HHS poverty guidelines. See 26 U. S. C. § 104(a); 91 Stat. 962, 7 U. S. C. § 2014(d)(8); 48 Fed. Reg. 7010, 7011 (1983). But in each of these instances there is an express provision that personal injury awards are not to be treated as income— which causes them not only to fail to support the proposition that the term “income” automatically excludes personal injury awards, but to support the opposite proposition that absent express exclusion it embraces them. Moreover, the fact that Congress was silent in the AFDC statute but has elsewhere been explicit when it wished to exclude personal injury awards from income tends to refute rather than support a legislative intent to exclude them from AFDC computations. Cf. Russello v. United States, 464 U. S. 16, 23 (1983). Nor is there any merit to respondents’ slightly different argument that since the relevant provisions of the Food Stamp program, the HHS poverty guidelines, and the AFDC statute have the common goal of defining who is needy, they should be presumed to have a common definition of “income” — one that necessarily excludes personal injury awards. The explicit differences between the definition of “income” in the Food Stamp program and the HHS poverty guidelines on the one hand and the AFDC statute on the other are simply too great to permit any such presumption. Compare 91 Stat. 962, 7 U. S. C. § 2014(d)(8) (Food Stamp program excludes all nonrecurring lump-sum payments, including retroactive lump-sum Social Security benefits), and 48 Fed. Reg. 7010, 7011 (1983) (HHS poverty guidelines exclude capital gains, gifts, and lump-sum inheritances), with Brief for Respondents 47 (conceding that retroactive Social Security benefits and other lump-sum payments that represent a true gain are income under the AFDC statute).
Respondents’ next contention is that Virginia’s treatment of personal injury awards is inconsistent with the administrative and legislative history of the AFDC statute. They first argue that for many years, and at least until 1981, HHS in fact took the position that personal injury awards were not “income” under the AFDC statute. But the materials upon which respondents rely do not support this contention, and indicate at most that HHS took no position on the question. See HHS Handbook of Public Assistance Administration, Part IV, S-3120, Supplement for Administrative Use (Sept. 6, 1957), App. 58 (retroactive Social Security payments are income, but an award to compensate for the loss of a hand or foot might not be); HHS Memorandum of June 7, 1973, App. 55-56 (retroactive Social Security payments are income); Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in Lockhart v. Harden, No. C74-390A (ND Ga.), App. 61 (HHS regulations require that retroactive Social Security payments be treated as income but do not require that awards for damages be so treated). In fact, as Lukhard and the Secretary point out, there is evidence that HHS has for many years interpreted the AFDC statute to at least 'permit States to treat personal injury awards as income. See, e. g., 51 Fed. Reg. 9191, 9196 (1986) (“[U]nder longstanding federal policy . . . , a State agency has had the option to treat [e. g., personal injury awards] as resources instead of as income”); HHS Letter of October 17, 1983, App. 66 (“Based on longstanding precedent, States have historically had the option to consider nonrecurring lump-sum payments as either unearned income or resources. With the implementation of [the OBRA amendment], States continued to exercise this latitude”); HHS Memorandum of July 6, 1983, App. 47 (under current HHS policy, States are free to treat insurance settlements either as income or as resources; California apparently treats them as income); HHS Letter of April 8, 1982, App. 62-63 (States are free to treat damage claim settlements as income or as resources). See also Brief for State of Illinois et al. as Amici Curiae 5 (HHS has permitted States to treat personal injury awards as income under the OBRA amendment). Thus, the Secretary’s interpretation of the AFDC statute— which is entitled to deference, see, e. g., Chemical Manufacturers Assn. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 470 U. S. 116, 126 (1986) — actually undermines rather than supports respondents’ claim that Virginia cannot lawfully treat personal injury awards as income.
Respondents also make two arguments based upon the legislative history of the 1981 OBRA amendment. First, they argue that the Congress that passed the OBRA amendment must have been aware of HHS’ longstanding position that “income” excluded personal injury awards, and that its use of “income” in the OBRA amendment therefore necessarily indicated an intent that the term be interpreted in that manner. It is of course not true that whenever Congress enacts legislation using a word that has a given administrative interpretation it means to freeze that administrative interpretation in place. See Helvering v. Wilshire Oil Co., 308 U. S. 90, 100-101 (1939). But if that were the case here, it would damage rather than aid respondents’ cause, since, as we have seen, HHS’ position at the time of the OBRA amendment was that it was permissible for States to treat personal injury awards as income.
At oral argument, respondents sought to derive support from a legislative hearing conducted while the OBRA amendment was under consideration, in which the Secretary submitted to the House Ways and Means Committee a document estimating that the amendment would eliminate 5,000 families from the AFDC rolls each year. Hearings on Tax Aspects of the President’s Economic Program before the House Committee on Ways and Means, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, pp. 266-266 (1981), App. 75-76. The record suggests that Virginia has been terminating over 400 families each year under the revised regulations it promulgated to implement the OBRA amendment. Since Virginia has only 1.6% of the national AFDC caseload, respondents argue, it should only be terminating 80 families each year according to the Secretary’s estimate. But even granting the accuracy of respondents’ numerical analysis —which petitioner and the Secretary have had no opportunity to contest — and ignoring the dubious authority of an unexplained forecast made during a committee hearing, the disparity respondents note does not provide the faintest support for an inference that the Congress which passed the OBRA amendment understood the AFDC statute to exclude personal injury awards from income. The record indicates that only about one-third of the families removed from the rolls in Virginia were removed as a result of personal injury awards; since the number of remaining terminations still far exceeds the Secretary’s forecast (about 270 instead of 80), the disparity certainly is not explicable by Virginia’s decision to treat personal injury awards as income. One is left with the suspicion that the error was in the Secretary’s forecast. Nothing respondents have identified in the legislative history of the OBRA amendment supports the conclusion that Virginia’s revised regulations are unlawful.
Respondents’ penultimate argument is that logic requires personal injury awards to be treated as resources rather than income. The argument rests upon the following syllogism: (1) healthy bodies are resources; (2) personal injury awards merely compensate for damage to healthy bodies; and therefore (3) personal injury awards necessarily are resources too. We have already noted that the minor premise of this syllogism is false, see supra, at 375-376. More importantly, however, so is the major premise. Although there is a sense in which a healthy body can be said to be a resource, it certainly is not one within the meaning of the AFDC statute and regulations, which count only real and personal property (including liquid assets). See 95 Stat. 844, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 602(a)(7)(B) (1982 ed., Supp. III); 45 CFR §§ 233.20(a)(3)(i)(B), (ii)(E) (1986). Since healthy bodies are worth far more than the statute’s $1,000 family resource limit, 42 U. S. C. § 602(a)(7)(B), acceptance of respondents’ major premise would render every family ineligible for AFDC benefits. The fact that the AFDC statute and its implementing regulations consider only real and personal property in determining families’ resources permits (if it does not indeed require) the conclusion that personal injury awards are compensation for diminution of well-being of a kind not covered by the AFDC statute, except to the extent they compensate for lost wages (to which extent they clearly are gain, see supra, at 375) or for economic expenses caused by the injury (to which extent Virginia permits them to be in large part offset, see n. 1, supra). Thus, personal injury awards are almost entirely a gain in well-being, as well-being is measured under the AFDC statute, and can reasonably be treated as income even on respondents’ definition of the term.
Once this is understood, it is clear that Virginia’s policy of treating personal injury awards as income but property damages awards as resources is also reasonable. The former can be viewed as increasing their recipients’ pecuniary well-being, and the latter as merely restoring resources to previous levels. The existence of this distinction, coupled with the substantial deference owed to the Secretary’s conclusion that Virginia’s revised regulations are consistent with HHS’ regulations, see, e. g., Lyng v. Payne, 476 U. S. 926, 939 (1986), leads us to reject respondents’ argument that the difference in treatment violates HHS’ regulation requiring that “eligibility conditions imposed must not exclude individuals or groups on an arbitrary or unreasonable basis, and must not result in inequitable treatment of individuals or groups_” 45 CFR § 233.10(a)(1) (1986).
It is of course true that, by considering only real and personal property as the measure of well-being, the AFDC program evaluates need in a way that does not reflect the fullness of life. That portion of a personal injury award which constitutes compensation for loss of earnings will not result in a loss of eligibility, since it merely replaces future income that would otherwise have been earned; but the portion attributable to pain and suffering replaces no other economic income, and will reduce AFDC payments. It can reasonably be urged that a family with monthly pain-and-suffering-award income but with a family member in physical and emotional pain is not better off than the family without that additional income but also without that suffering. Physical and emotional well-being, however, is not what the AFDC statute is designed to take into account — as is evident from the fact that there is no argument for increasing AFDC payments above the normal income limit where pain and suffering exists without a tortfeasor who is compensating it. Compensating for the noneconomic inequities of life is a task daunting in its complexity, and the AFDC statute is neither designed nor interpreted unreasonably if it leaves them untouched.
Finally, we do not agree with the dissent’s contention that our holding “‘override[s] the States’ traditional power to define the measure of damages applicable to state-created causes of action.’” Post, at 389 (quoting Norfolk & Western R. Co. v. Liepelt, 444 U. S. 490, 500, n. 3 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)). That could not possibly be so, since in this case Virginia wants to treat the proceeds of personal injury awards as income. It is a peculiar solicitude for States’ prerogatives that would prevent Virginia from striking its own balance between directing limited AFDC funds to the least wealthy and compensating tort victims. It is true that the Secretary has now promulgated a regulation requiring States to treat personal injury awards as income under the AFDC statute. See n. 5, supra. But since this is not a case in which a State challenges that regulation, the dissent’s objection is simply irrelevant.
Ill
Respondents have not demonstrated that Virginia’s policy of treating personal injury awards as income is inconsistent with the AFDC statute or HHS’ regulations. The contrary judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Reversed.
The revised regulations also permitted recipients to deduct from such a payment any directly related expenses that were incurred prior to or within 30 days after receipt of the payment. Va. ADC Manual § 305.4C (Jan. 1983), App. to Pet. for Cert. 72. During the pendency of this law1 suit, Congress amended the OBRA amendment to give States the option of reducing the period of ineligibility otherwise mandated so as to take into account various expenditures related to the lump-sum payment. Section 2632(a) of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, 98 Stat. 1141, 42 U. S. C. § 602(a)(17) (1982 ed., Supp. III). Virginia has since availed itself of this option. Va. ADC Manual § 305.4C (Oct. 1984), App. to Pet. for Cert. 83-86.
Moreover, as we discuss below, see infra, at 380-383, other typical components of personal injury awards, including compensation for pain and suffering, can reasonably be treated as gain under the AFDC statute.
The dissent apparently thinks it appropriate to speculate upon what Congress would have said if it had spoken. Post, at 389 (“[I]f Congress had considered the question, it is reasonable to believe that it would have . . . excluded [personal injury awards] from income”). As we demonstrate below, it also is reasonable to believe that Congress would have included personal injury awards in income. More importantly, however, the legality of Virginia’s policy must be measured against the AFDC statute Congress passed, not against the hypothetical statute it is most “reasonable to believe” Congress would have passed had it considered the question of personal injury awards. For the purpose of determining the application of an existing agency-interpreted statute to a point on which “Congress did not actually have an intent,” Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 845 (1984), we have held that “a court may not substitute its own construction... for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency.” Id., at 844. As we note below, see infra this page and 378-379, Virginia’s policy is consistent with the Secretary’s interpretation.
Respondents observe that none of the evidence relied upon by Luk-hard and the Secretary antedates the passage of the OBRA amendment. Although true, the observation is of dubious significance. Older documents demonstrating the existence of a longstanding interpretation would of course be better evidence than are recent documents asserting its existence. But in the absence of any contrary evidence, the latter form of evidence is certainly sufficient to support a conclusion that the interpretation existed. Similarly, although respondents observe that the record does not reveal whether any States actually availed themselves of the option allegedly given them prior to passage of the OBRA amendment, we see no reason to draw any inference at all from that lacuna.
After this suit was filed, the Secretary proposed a rule requiring States to treat all lump-sum payments as income. 49 Fed. Reg. 46558, 45568 (1984). Such a rule has since been promulgated. 45 CFR § 233.20(a)(3)(ii)(F) (1986). Lukhard and the Secretary argue that the Secretary’s determination that this rule is consistent with the AFDC statute and the OBRA amendment is entitled to deference, while respondents argue that the rule was invalidly promulgated and is in any event due no deference. Since we uphold Virginia’s practice without reference to the new HHS regulation, we need not reach these questions.
As has already been noted, since this suit was filed Virginia has altered its treatment of personal injury awards by adopting a regulation reducing the ineligibility period established by the OBRA amendment to take into account various expenditures related to the award and other equitable considerations. Va. ADC Manual §305.4C (Oct. 1984), App. to Pet. for Cert. 83-86. Moreover, the Secretary contends that a new regulation he has promulgated, 45 CFR § 233.20(a)(3)(ii)(F1) (1986), requires Virginia to treat property damages awards as income, thus rendering prospectively moot respondents’ claim that Virginia’s disparate treatment violates the HHS regulation. Respondents claim, however, that the new regulation is invalid because improperly promulgated, that it does not require Virginia to alter its treatment of property damages awards, and that even if it did it would not result in equal treatment of personal injury awards and property damages awards. We need not consider the consequences of these subsequent developments. The legality of the original disparity in treatment is still a live issue, since its resolution will determine whether respondents were entitled to the AFDC benefits they have received under the injunction issued by the District Court. And our conclusion that the original disparity was not unreasonable necessarily implies that the diminished disparity created by Virginia’s subsequently more lenient treatment of personal injury awards is not unreasonable.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Douglas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondent, a Missouri corporation, owns a leasehold of a plot of ground together with an office building erected on it. In 1942 the Commissioner assessed deficiencies against respondent for the taxable years 1933, 1938, and 1939, determining that it had claimed an excessive value as its basis for depreciating the property. These deficiencies were predicated on a basis of $385,000 amortized over the life of the lease. Respondent, who claimed a base of $860,000 amortized over a shorter period, filed petitions for review with the Tax Court. Meanwhile respondent filed a petition under ch. X of the Bankruptcy Act which ended in a confirmed plan of reorganization. Although the Collector filed proof of claim for the deficiencies in those proceedings, he later withdrew the claim under a stipulation that the withdrawal was "without prejudice” and did not constitute a determination of or prejudice the rights of the United States to any taxes with respect to any year other than those involved in the claim. Shortly thereafter respondent and the Commissioner filed stipulations in the pending Tax Court proceedings stating that "there is no deficiency in Federal income tax due” from respondent for the taxable years in question, that the tax liability for each of the years was nil, and that the jeopardy assessment was abated. The Tax Court, pursuant to the stipulation, entered formal decisions that there were no deficiencies for the taxable years in question. The Tax Court, however, held no hearing; no stipulations of fact were entered into; no briefs were filed or argument had. The issue as to the correctness of the basis of depreciation used by respondent was, however, the basis of its appeal to the Tax Court. And so, when the Commissioner in 1948 ■ assessed deficiencies for the years 1943, 1944, and 1945, challenging once more the correctness of the basis of depreciation, respondent paid the deficiencies and brought this suit to recover, alleging inter alia that the decisions of the Tax Court for the years 1933, 1938, and 1939 were res judicata of the fact that the basis for depreciation was $860,000. The District Court held against respondent. 97 F. Supp. 595. The Court of Appeals reversed. 199 F. 2d 12'. Because of a conflict between that decision and Trapp v. United States, 177 F. 2d 1, decided by the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, we granted certiorari. 344 U. S. 927.
The governing principle is stated in Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U. S. 351, 352-353. A judgment is an absolute bar to a subsequent action on the same claim.
“But where the second action between the same parties is upon a different claim or demand, the judgment in the prior action operates as an estoppel only as to those matters in issue or points controverted, upon the determination of which the finding or verdict was rendered. In all cases, therefore, where it is sought to apply the estoppel of a judgment rendered upon one cause of action to matters arising in a suit upon a different cause of action, the inquiry must always be as to the point or question actually litigated and determined in the original action, not what might have been thus litigated and determined. Only upon such matters is the judgment conclusive in another action.”
And see Tait v. Western Md. R. Co., 289 U. S. 620, 623; Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Co., 320 U. S. 661, 671; Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U. S. 591, 597-598. Estoppel by judgment, or collateral estoppel as it is often called, is applicable in the federal income tax field. Tait v. Western Md. R. Co., supra, at 624; Commissioner v. Sunnen, supra, at 598.
We conclude that the decisions entered by the Tax Court for the years 1933, 1938, and 1939 were only a pro forma acceptance by the Tax Court of an agreement between the parties to settle their controversy for reasons undisclosed. There is no showing either in the record or by extrinsic evidence (see Russell v. Place, 94 U. S. 606, 608) that the issues raised by the pleadings were submitted to the Tax Court for determination or determined by that court. They may or may not have been agreed upon by the parties. Perhaps, as the Court of Appeals inferred, the parties did agree on the basis for depreciation. Perhaps the settlement was made for a different reason, for some exigency arising out of the bankruptcy proceeding. As the case reaches us, we are unable to tell whether the agreement of the parties was based on the merits or on some collateral consideration. Certainly the judgments entered are res judicata of the tax claims for the years 1933, 1938 and 1939, whether or not the basis of the agreements on which they rest reached the merits. But unless we can say that they were an adjudication of the merits, the doctrine of estoppel by judgment would serve an unjust cause: it would become a device by which a decision not shown to be on the merits would forever foreclose inquiry into the merits. Estoppel by judgment includes matters in a second proceeding which were actually presented and determined in an earlier suit. See Commissioner v. Sunnen, supra, at 598. A judgment entered with the consent of the parties may involve a determination of questions of fact and law by the court. But unless a showing is made that that was the case, the judgment has no greater dignity, so far as collateral estop-pel is concerned, than any judgment entered only as a compromise of the parties.
Reversed.
The stipulation for the year 1933, which is typical, reads as follows:
“It is hereby stipulated that there is no deficiency in Federal income tax due from the petitioner for the taxable year 1933 and that the following statement shows the petitioner’s Federal income tax liability for the taxable year 1933:
“Tax liability. None
“Assessment (Jeopardy):
“January 23, 1942 (not paid). $2,188.12
“Assessment to be abated. $2,188.12”
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
I
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Jackson
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This suit in equity, under §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U. S. C. §§ 1 and 2, originally included three charges of violation: (1) conspiracy to restrain and monopolize transportation of interstate travelers by taxicab between Chicago railroad stations and their homes, offices and hotels; (2) conspiracy to eliminate competition for the business of transporting passengers between different Chicago railroad stations; and (3) conspiracy to restrain and monopolize the sale of taxicabs by control of the principal companies operating them in Chicago, New York, Pittsburgh and Minneapolis. On a previous appeal this Court held the first of the charges not to state a case within the statute, and that charge no longer concerns us. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U. S. 218. The court below found that the Government failed to prove the second charge and no appeal is taken from that part of the judgment, so that charge has been eliminated. We have held that the residue of the complaint, embodying the third charge, alleges a cause of action within the statute, but only on the expressed assumption that the facts alleged are true, United States v. Yellow Cab Company, supra, at 224; but the trial court has found that the Government, at the trial, has failed on all the evidence to prove its case. 80 F. Supp. 936. The cause is before us by a direct appeal under the Expediting Act, 15 U. S. C. § 29, and not by an exercise of our discretionary jurisdiction.
The first question proposed by the Government is whether the evidence sustains the findings of fact by the District Court. This is the basic issue, and the Government raises no question of law that has an existence independent of it. This issue of fact does not arise upon the trial court’s disregard or misunderstanding of some definite and well-established fact. It extends to almost every detail of the decision, the Government saying that the trial court “ignored . . . substantially all of the facts which the Government deemed significant.”
What the Government asks, in effect, is that we try the case de novo on the record, reject nearly all of the findings of the trial court, and substitute contrary findings of our own. Specifications of error which are fundamental to its case ask us to reweigh the evidence and review findings that are almost entirely concerned with imponderables, such as the intent of parties to certain 1929 business transactions, whether corporate officers were then acting in personal or official capacities, what was the design and purpose and intent of those who carried out twenty-year-old transactions, and whether they had legitimate business motives or were intending to restrain trade of their competitors in car manufacture, such as General Motors, Ford, Chrysler and Packard.
These were the chief fact issues in a trial of three weeks’ duration. The Government relied in large part on inferences from its 485 exhibits, introduced by nine witnesses. The defendants relied heavily on oral testimony to contradict those inferences. The record is before us in 1,674 closely-printed pages.
The Government suggests that the opinion of the trial court “seems to reflect uncritical acceptance of defendants’ evidence and of defendants’ views as to the facts to be given consideration in passing upon the legal issues before the court.” We see that it did indeed accept defendants’ evidence and sustained defendants’ view of the facts. But we are unable to discover the slightest justification for the accusation that it did so “uncritically.” Also, it rejected the inferences the Government drew from its documents, but we find no justification for the statement that it “ignored” them. The judgment below is supported by an opinion, prepared with obvious care, which analyzes the evidence and shows the reasons for the findings. To us it appears to represent the considered judgment of an able trial judge, after patient hearing, that the Government’s evidence fell short of its allegations- — a not uncommon form of litigation casualty, from which the Government is no more immune than others.
Only last term we accepted the view then advanced by the Government that for triers of fact totally to reject an opposed view impeaches neither their impartiality nor the propriety of their conclusions. We said, “We are constrained to reject the court’s conclusion that an objective finder of fact could not resolve all factual conflicts arising in a legal proceeding in favor of one litigant. The ordinary lawsuit, civil or criminal, normally depends for its resolution on which version of the facts in dispute is accepted by the trier of fact. . . .” Labor Board v. Pittsburgh Steamship Co., 337 U. S. 656, 659.
Rule 52, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provides, among other things:
“Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses.”
Findings as to the design, motive and intent with which men act depend peculiarly upon the credit given to witnesses by those who see and hear them. If defendants’ witnesses spoke the truth, the findings are admittedly justified. The trial court listened to and observed the officers who had made the records from which the Government would draw an inference of guilt and concluded that they bear a different meaning from that for which the Government contends.
It ought to be unnecessary to say that Rule 52 applies to appeals by the Government as well as to those by other litigants. There is no exception which permits it, even in an antitrust case, to come to this Court for what virtually amounts to a trial de novo on the record of such findings as intent, motive and design. While, of course, it would be our duty to correct clear error, even in findings of fact, the Government has failed to establish any greater grievance here than it might have in any case where the evidence would support a conclusion either way but where the trial court has decided it to weigh more heavily for the defendants. Such a choice between two permissible views of the weight of evidence is not “clearly erroneous.”
Judgment affirmed.
Me. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Clabk took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
H
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for a writ of certiorari are granted. The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to the Supreme Court of California for further consideration in light of Douglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353.
Mr. Justice Harlan, for the reasons stated in Daegele v. Kansas, ante, p. 1, would have withheld disposition of this petition for certiorari until the disposition, after argument, of that case.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Rehnquist
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioners are the six maritime unions which appeared before this Court as respondents in Windward Shipping v. American Radio Assn., 415 U. S. 104 (1974). We granted their petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court of Alabama, 415 U. S. 947, in order to review their contentions that this case was distinguishable from Windward on the pre-emption issue, and that the temporary injunction upheld by that court had infringed rights guaranteed to them under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
As in Windward, this ease arises from picketing designed to publicize the adverse impact on American seamen of the operations of foreign-flag carriers which employ foreign crewmen at wages substantially below those paid to American seamen. As in Windward, the picketing occurred during 1971, but in this case it took place in Mobile, Ala., and was directed against the Aqua Glory, a ship of Liberian registry. The pickets displayed the same signs and distributed the same literature as they did in Windward, and they were subject to the same instructions.
The picketing in each case also had similar results. In Windward, we observed: “The picketing, although neither obstructive nor violent, was not without effect. Longshoremen and other port workers refused to cross the picket lines to load and unload petitioners’ vessels.” 415 U. S., at 108. Here, the Supreme Court of Alabama, in affirming a temporary injunction issued by the Alabama Circuit Court, said of petitioners’ activities in Mobile:
“Posting the pickets, as was done on the dock adjacent to the Aqua Glory, brought about an immediate refusal by the stevedore workers of the locals of International Longshoremen’s Association to cross the picket line of the appellant unions. About eighty percent of the cargo ships that enter the Port of Mobile, sail under a foreign-flag and are manned by alien crews.”
I
It is apparent from the facts already stated that the Houston picketing in Windward and the Mobile picketing here were for all practical purposes identical. Petitioners refer to Windward as “involving the union petitioners in the identical national picketing dispute as part of the Committee’s program . . . .” Brief for Petitioners 7 n. 1. But petitioners contend that since the state-court plaintiffs in this cáse are not the foreign owners of a picketed ship, as they were in Windward, but are instead stevedoring companies which seek to service the ship and a shipper who wishes to have his crops loaded on it, the question of pre-emption of state-court jurisdiction by the National Labor Relations Act should be answered differently than it was in Windward. Petitioners reason that respondents could have charged them with an unfair labor practice under the secondary boycott provision of the National Labor Relations Act, §8 (b)(4), 49 Stat.' 452, as amended, 29 U. S. C. §158 (b)(4), and that since petitioners’ activities were arguably prohibited under that section, the respondents’ exclusive remedy was to seek relief from the National Labor Relations Board. Cf. San Diego Building Trades Councils. Garmon, 359 U. S. 236 (1959).
Petitioners’ position in this respect contrasts markedly with their posture in the Windward litigation. There petitioners, as respondents in this Court, urged that “peaceful and truthful primary picketing, non obstructive and without trespass upon private property, by American workers protesting substandard wages and benefits paid,” are activities “actually protected by the Act.” Brief for Respondents in No. 72-1061, O. T. 1973, p. 15. They also urged that “the American seamen’s activities at bar constitutes [sic] typical lawful primary picketing, sanctioned and protected by the Act, Garner [v. Teamsters Union, 346 U. S. 485 (1953),] and [Longshoremen v.] Ariadne [Co.], 397 U. S. [195,] 202 [(1970)].” Brief for Respondents in No. 72-1061, O. T. 1973, p. 16. Petitioners apparently urged the same arguments in the Texas Court of Civil Appeals, whose judgment we reviewed in Windward, because that court stated:
“[Ajppellees’ picketing carefully remained within the guidelines for permissible picketing on the premises of a secondary employer promulgated in Sailor’s Union of the Pacific, 92 N. L. R. B. 547 and adopted in Local 761, Inter. Union of Elec., Radio and Mach. Wkrs. v. NLRB, 366 U. S. 667 .. . (1961).”
Petitioners, having failed to persuade this Court in Windward that their Houston picketing was protected under § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. § 157, now contend that their Mobile picketing was at least arguably a secondary boycott prohibited by § 8 (b) (4)(B) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 158 (b)(4)(B). They would have us hold not only that there is an independent controversy between petitioner unions, representing American seamen, and the contracting stevedores represented by respondent, but also that this independent dispute is subject to the jurisdiction of the Board.
Acceptance of petitioners’ argument would result in a rule whereby a state court had jurisdiction over a complaint for injunction filed by a foreign-ship owner claiming that picketing activities of a union were interfering with his business relationships with a contract stevedore, but the same court would have no jurisdiction where the contract stevedore sought an injunction on precisely the same grounds. The anomaly of such a result is reason enough to question it, but we believe that there is a more fundamental flaw in petitioners’ claim.
Even if there is a dispute between petitioners and respondents which is, in some semantic sense, independent of petitioners’ dispute with foreign-flag ships, that dispute is subject to state-court disposition unless it satisfies the jurisdictional requirements of the NLRA. In this regard, we note that a necessary predicate for a finding by the Board of an unfair labor practice under § 8 (b) (4) (i) is that the individual induced or encouraged must be employed by a “person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce.” Similarly, a necessary predicate for finding an unfair labor practice under § 8 (b) (4) (ii) is that the person threatened, coerced, or restrained must have been engaged in “commerce or in an industry affecting commerce,” and a necessary predicate for Board jurisdiction of unfair labor practices under § 10 (a) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 160 (a) is that they be practices “affecting commerce.”
Petitioners interpret Windward as having done nothing more than establish that the maritime operations of foreign ships are not “in commerce.” They assume that Windward said nothing about either the business activities of persons seeking to deal with such ships, or about whether, for these purposes, those activities are “in commerce” or “affecting commerce.” Petitioners therefore are able to state that the requirements of §§ 8 (b) (4) and 10 are satisfied because:
“Unquestionably, the Association, constituting stevedoring companies employing longshoremen to load and discharge vessels at the port of Mobile, Alabama, is an 'employer’ engaged in ‘commerce’ under the Act, and equally unquestionably, respondent Malone, delivering his soybeans to the dock elevator, is a ‘person’ engaged in ‘commerce,’ under the Act.” Brief for Petitioners 15-16.
We do not believe, however, that the line of cases commencing with Benz and culminating in Windward permit such a bifurcated view of the effects of a single group of pickets at a single site.
In Windward we stated that our task was to determine “whether the activities . . . complained of were activities ‘affecting commerce’ within the meaning of . . . the National Labor Relations Act,” and we concluded that they were not. 415 U. S., at 105-106. We recognized that the picketing activities did not involve the inescapable intrusion into the affairs of . foreign ships that was present in Benz and Inores, but we went on to say that the latter cases “do not purport to fully delineate the threshold of interference with the maritime operations of foreign vessels which makes the LMRA inapplicable.” 415 U. S., at 114. We further observed:
“At the very least, the pickets must have hoped to exert sufficient pressure so that foreign vessels would be forced to raise their operating costs to levels comparable to those of American shippers, either because of lost cargo resulting from the longshoremen’s refusal to load or unload the vessels, or because of wage increases awarded as a virtual self-imposed tariff to regain entry to American ports. Such a large-scale increase in operating costs would have more than a negligible impact on the ‘maritime operations’ of these foreign ships, and the effect would be by no means limited to costs incurred while in American ports. Unlike Ariadne, the protest here could not be accommodated by a wage decision on the part of the shipowners which would affect only wages paid within this country.” Ibid. (Emphasis supplied.)
While we thus spoke in Windward of the effect of the Houston pickets on the maritime operations of foreign ships, the quoted passage shows that we fully recognized that this effect would not be produced solely by the pickets and the messages carried by their signs. It would be produced in large part by the refusal of American workmen employed by domestic stevedoring companies to cross the picket line in order to load and unload cargo coming to or from the foreign ships. Since Windward held that the Houston picketing was not in or affecting commerce, it would be wholly inconsistent to now hold, insofar as concerns Board jurisdiction over a complaint by respondents, that the employer of the longshoremen who honored the picket line, or the shipper whose goods they did not handle, was in or affecting commerce.
That we found it unnecessary to expressly state this conclusion in Windward suggests not that the point is an undecided one, but that such a conclusion inevitably flows from the fact that the response of the employees of the American stevedores was a crucial part of the mechánism by which the maritime operations of the foreign ships were to be affected. The exaction of the “self-imposed tariff to regain entry to American ports” does not depend upon American shippers heeding the message on the picket signs and declining to ship their cargoes in foreign bottoms. The same pressure upon the foreign-flag owners will result if longshoremen refuse to load or unload their ships. The effect of the picketing on the operations of the stevedores and shippers, and thence on these maritime operations, is precisely the same whether it be complained of by the foreign-ship owners or by persons seeking to service and deal with the ships. The fact that the jurisdiction of the state courts in this case is invoked by stevedores and shippers does not convert into “commerce” activities which plainly were not such in Windward.
Our dissenting Brethren contend that our disposition is inconsistent with the Court’s decision in Hattiesburg Building & Trades Council v. Broome, 377 U. S. 126 (1964), and with the Board’s decision in Sailors’ Union of the Pacific (Moore Dry Dock), 92 N. L. R. B. 547 (1950). Hattiesburg dealt with the quite different question of applying the Board’s own limitation of its statutory jurisdiction to those cases which have “a substantial effect on commerce.” 23 N. L. R. B. Ann. Rep. 7 (1958) (emphasis added). The Board had promulgated a series of administratively established standards, in effect ceding to state courts and agencies disputes involving entities which admittedly “affected commerce,” but whose volume of interstate business was not “sufficiently substantial to warrant the exercise of [Board] jurisdiction.” 29 U. S. C. § 164 (c). The standards provided that they could be “satisfied by reference to the business operations of either the primary or the secondary employer.” Hattiesburg, supra, at 126. Because of this provision, the Board had not in fact ceded its jurisdiction over the particular dispute that had been presented to the Mississippi courts. In Hattiesburg this Court did no more than enforce the natural consequence of this fact by holding that Garmon deprived the state courts of jurisdiction. We find nothing in that holding inconsistent with what we say or hold here. Certainly Hattiesburg does not, as Mr. Justice Stewart’s dissent would have it, stand for the proposition that a secondary employer’s domestic business activities may be the basis for Board jurisdiction where the primary dispute is beyond its statutory authority over unfair labor practices “affecting commerce.” 29 U. S. C. § 160 i,a).
That dissent’s treatment of Moore Dry Dock, supra, reads a great deal more into that 1950 Board decision than its language and analysis can support. The decision itself contains no reference whatever to the jurisdiction of the Board over the primary employer, the foreign-flag vessel Phopho, and neither the decision nor the Trial Examiner’s report considered the jurisdictional challenge presently confronting this Court. The Trial Examiner’s report, from which that dissenting opinion quotes, did state that the Board, in an apparently unreported determination, had previously dismissed a petition for election aboard the Phopho, 92 N. L. R. B. 547, 560-561. The report later acknowledged that the Board had “left somewhat obscure the precise legal basis” of its jurisdictional ruling, a comment which was evoked by the contention that because the primary employer was “clearly engaged in commerce,” the ruling must have been based on a different jurisdictional defect. Id., at 568. This Court in Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, 353 U. S. 138 (1957), not only noted that Moore Dry Dock involved a different situation, but also rather pointedly stated: “We need only say that these cases are inapposite, without, of course, intimating any view as to their result.” 353 U. S., at 143 n. 5. A 1950 Board precedent such as this can scarcely be regarded as controlling when it is clearly contrary to the thrust of this Court’s Benz-Windward line of cases.
Petitioners rely on Teamsters Union v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. Co., 350 U. S. 155 (1956), and Plumbers’ Union v. Door County, 359 U. S. 354 (1959), for the proposition that even though the Board may not have jurisdiction over the primary labor relations of a party which is excluded from the Act’s definition of “employer,” it is nonetheless competent to consider secondary disputes involving such a party. In Teamsters Union, supra, a railroad was held to be barred from seeking relief in the state courts against a secondary boycott. The Court held that while the railroad was not a statutory “employer,” it was nonetheless a “person” protected by § 8 (b)(4). A similar result was reached in Door County, supra, in which a non-“employer” county sought state court relief, not with respect to activities of its own employees, but with respect to a claimed secondary boycott arising from picketing against a nonunion subcontractor working on an addition to the county courthouse. While these cases establish the proposition that an entity which is not within the Act’s definition of “employer” may nonetheless be a “person” for purposes of protection against secondary boycotts, neither they nor any other case decided by this Court suggests that the Board has jurisdiction of § 8 (b) (4) complaints if the alleged unfair labor practice does not affect commerce. Indeed, in Door' County, supra, the Court pointedly inquired whether the out-of-state origin of construction materials was sufficient to establish the jurisdictionally required effect on interstate commerce. 359 U. S., at 356.
Here, neither the farmer seeking to ship his soybeans, the stevedores who contracted to unload the cargo of the foreign-flag vessel, nor the longshoremen whom the stevedores employed to carry out this undertaking, were for these purposes engaged in or affecting commerce within the purview of the National Labor Relations Act. Therefore the petitioners’ picketing did not even “arguably” violate § 8 (b) (4) (B) of that Act. Since Congress did not intend to strain through the filament of the NLRA picketing activities which so directly affect the maritime operations of foreign vessels, we hold that the Alabama courts were competent to apply their own law in resolving the dispute between petitioners and respondents unless, as petitioners claim, such a resolution violated petitioners’ rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
II
After concluding that the state courts had jurisdiction, the Supreme Court of Alabama considered whether the picketing was protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Relying on Teamsters Union v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U. S. 284 (1957), it concluded that if the picketing compromised valid public policies, it was not protected by its putative purpose of conveying information. The court therefore thought that the matter narrowed to whether or not the picketing had a purpose or objective to “wrongfully interfere” with respondents’ businesses. Recognizing that the unions were appealing a temporary injunction, issued as a matter of equitable discretion to preserve the status quo pending final resolution of the dispute, the court inquired only whether there was evidence of a prohibited purpose sufficient to establish that the trial judge had not abused the “wide discretion” he possesses in such matters. The court found such evidence in the testimony of a local union official charged with carrying out the picketing. He had expressed the hope that union men would not cross the lines, that the port would become cluttered with foreign ships unable to load or unload, and that the docks would be shut down. On this basis the court concluded that a substantial question was presented as to whether the picketing had a prohibited purpose, and that the trial judge had not abused his discretion.
Petitioners repeat their First and Fourteenth Amendment arguments before this Court. They contend that the picketing was expressive conduct informing the public of the injuries they suffer at the hands of foreign ships, and “imploring the public” to “ ‘Buy American’ or ‘Ship American.’ ” Brief for Petitioners 21. This conduct, they contend, constitutes “the lawful exercise of protected fundamental rights of free speech,” and is thus not subject to injunction.
We think this line of argument is foreclosed by our holding in Vogt, supra. There the Court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, reviewed the cases in which we had dealt with disputes involving the interests of pickets in disseminating their message and of the State in protecting various competing economic and social interests. Vogt endorsed the view that picketing involves more than an expression of ideas, 354 U. S., at 289, and referred to our “growing awareness that these cases involved not so much questions of free speech as review of the balance struck by a State between picketing that involved more than ‘publicity’ and competing interests of state policy.” Id., at 290. The Court con-eluded that our cases “established a broad field in which a State, in enforcing some public policy, whether of its criminal or its civil law, and whether announced by its legislature or its courts, could constitutionally enjoin peaceful picketing aimed at preventing effectuation of that policy.” Id., at 293. We believe that in the case now before us Alabama’s interference with petitioners’ picketing is well within that “broad field.”
Petitioners seek to escape from Vogt in three ways. First, they contend that this case is squarely controlled by Food Employees v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U. S. 308 (1968). In that case, claim petitioners, picketing “identical as at bar, [designed] to peacefully and truthfully publicize substandard wages and concomitantly request the public not to patronize the picketed entity,” was held to be protected. Brief for Petitioners 20. In rejecting this contention, we need only point out that Logan Valley concerned the location of picketing, not its purpose; indeed, it was on exactly this basis that the Logan Valley Court distinguished the line of cases culminating in Vogt. 391 U. S., at 314. Logan Valley established only that in some circumstances private business property can be so thoroughly clothed in the attributes of public property that it may not be completely closed as a public forum to those who wish to present otherwise lawful communications.
Petitioners’ second argument is that the injunction here is not supported by a “valid public policy,” as required by Vogt. They point out that while the Alabama Supreme Court stated the public policy to be the prevention of “wrongful interference” with respondents’ businesses, it did not expressly define that term. We, however, think it obvious that in this context “wrongful interference” refers to efforts by third parties to induce employees to cease performing services essential to the conduct of their employer’s business. That third-party participation is critical to picketing being categorized as “wrongful interference” is clear from Pennington v. Birmingham Baseball Club, 277 Ala. 336, 170 So. 2d 410 (1964), a case cited by the Alabama Supreme Court in its opinion in this case.
In Pennington the Supreme Court of Alabama indicated that the state policy against “wrongful interference” is quite analogous to the federal policy of prohibiting secondary boycotts, and is based on similar considerations. The State’s policy also appears to be based on the state interest in preserving its economy against the stagnation that could be produced by pickets’ disruption of the businesses of employers with whom they have no primary dispute. At Mobile the picketing threatened to eliminate the 70% to 80% of the stevedores’ business that depended on foreign shipping, and to cause serious losses for farmers whose agricultural crops required immediate harvesting and shipping. Under Vogt, supra, the State may prefer these interests over petitioners’ interests in conveying their “ship American” message through the speech-plus device of dockside picketing.
Petitioners’ final contention is that the record fails to support the conclusion that a substantial question existed as to whether the picketing constituted “wrongful interference” under Alabama law. The question of whether evidence is sufficient to make out a cause of action created by state law and tried in the state courts is a matter for decision by those courts. Insofar as petitioners’ argument on this score may be read to suggest that the evidence before the Alabama court would not support-a finding that their activities were such as could be enjoined under Vogt, supra, we reject it. Petitioners seem to argue that the Alabama courts were bound by the statements of purpose appearing on the pickets’ signs and literature, and that in any event one local official’s statements of his hopes and expectations as to the picketing’s effect could not override those stated purposes. This argument ignores the wide latitude open to triers of fact to make factual determinations on the basis of rational inferences which arise from the nature, location, and effect of picketing. See Vogt, supra, at 286, 295; Plumbers Union v. Graham, 345 U. S. 192, 197-200 (1953).
Concluding that the jurisdiction of the Alabama courts in this case was not pre-empted by the National Labor Relations Act, and that the action of those courts in enjoining the picketing at Mobile violated no right conferred upon petitioners by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, we affirm the judgment of the Supreme Court of Alabama.
Affirmed.
The decision of the Supreme Court of Alabama is reported at 291 Ala. 201, 279 So. 2d 467 (1973). Because that court validated only a temporary injunction, and remanded for trial on the merits, an issue has been raised as to our jurisdiction to consider this case. We think that Construction Laborers v. Curry, 371 U. S. 542 (1963), is conclusive of the finality of the judgment below for the purposes of 28 U. S. C. § 1257.
The pickets carried signs which read:
“ATTENTION TO THE PUBLIC THE WAGES AND BENEFITS PAID ABOARD THE VESSEL SS [name of vessel] ARE SUBSTANDARD TO THOSE OF THE AMERICAN SEAMEN. THIS RESULTS IN EXTREME DAMAGE TO OUR WAGE STANDARD AND THE LOSS OF OUR JOBS. PLEASE DO NOT PATRONIZE [THIS VESSEL] j HELP THE AMERICAN SEAMEN. WE HAVE NO DISPUTE WITH OTHER VESSELS AT THIS SITE.”
[Printed names of the six unions.] App. 6a.
They distributed literature which stated:
“To the Public — American Seamen have lost approximately 50% of their jobs in the past few years to foreign flag ships employing seamen at a fraction of the wages of American Seamen.
“American dollars flowing to these foreign shipowners operating ships at wages and benefits substandard to American Seamen, are hurting our balance of payments in addition to hurting our economy by the loss of jobs.
“A strong American Merchant Marine is essential to our national defense. The fewer American flag ships there are, the weaker our position will be in a period of national emergency.
“PLEASE PATRONIZE AMERICAN FLAG VESSELS, SAVE OUR JOBS, HELP OUR ECONOMY AND SUPPORT OUR NATIONAL DEFENSE BY HELPING TO CREATE A STRONG AMERICAN MERCHANT MARINE.
“Our dispute here is limited to the vessel picketed at this site, the S. S.-” Id., at 7a.
[Printed names of the six unions.]
291 Ala., at 205, 279 So. 2d, at 470.
The stevedoring companies appear here through their bargaining representative, Mobile Steamship Association, Inc.
Petitioners also suggest that the result should be different because Windward did not involve vessels which, while flying foreign flags, were American owned. Petitioners do not, however, direct our attention to any evidence in the record as to the ownership of the Aqua Glory. In any event, we think this factor irrelevant, in light of McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional, 372 U. S. 10, 19 (1963).
Windward Shipping v. American Radio Assn., 482 S. W. 2d 675, 678 (1972).
Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, 353 U. S. 138 (1957); McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional, 372 U. S. 10 (1963); Incres S. S. Co. v. Maritime Workers, 372 U. S. 24 (1963).
The relevant definitions appear in 29 U. S. C. §§ 152 (6) and (7):
“(6) The term 'commerce’ means trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, or communication among the several States, or between the District of Columbia or any Territory of the United States and any State or other Territory, or between any foreign country and any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia, or within the District of Columbia or any Territory, or between points in the same State but through any other State or any Territory or the District of Columbia or any foreign country.
“(7) The term ‘affecting commerce’ means in commerce, or burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce, or having led or tending to lead to a labor dispute burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce.”
Our Brother Stewart suggests in dissent that Longshoremen v. Ariadne Co., 397 U. S. 195 (1970), requires reversal here, because in that case it was held that longshoremen servicing foreign-flag vessels in American ports are in “commerce” within the meaning of the Act. But the Ariadne court, in distinguishing Benz, supra, and McCulloch, supra, stated that “[t]he considerations that informed the Court’s construction of the statute” in those cases “are clearly inapplicable to the situation presented here. The participation of some crew members in the longshore work does not obscure the fact that this dispute centered on the wages to be paid American residents, who were employed by each foreign ship not to serve as members of its crew but rather to do casual longshore work.” 397 U. S., at 199. The Court in Windward reiterated that distinction:
“The pickets in Ariadne, unlike the pickets in Benz or lucres, were primarily engaged in a dispute as to whether an employer should hire unionized or nonunionized American workers to perform longshoremen’s work, and the substandard wages which they were protesting were being paid to fellow American workers.” 415 U. S., at 112.
Here the picketing which triggered the dispute was not directed toward any wages or conditions of employment of the longshoremen. It was instead directed to substandard wages being paid to the crews of foreign-flag vessels throughout those vessels’ worldwide maritime operations. In Ariadne, on the contrary, the picketing was directed toward requiring a foreign-flag vessel to hire unionized American workers, rather than nonunionized American workers, to service vessels berthed in American ports. That the latter effect does not surpass “the threshold of interference with the maritime operations of foreign vessels which makes the LMRA inapplicable,” Windward, supra, at 114, certainly provides no support for the proposition that the former effect also does not surpass that threshold.
In so holding, we need cast no doubt on those cases which hold that the Board has jurisdiction under § 8 (b) (4) of domestic secondary activities which are in commerce, even though the primary employer is located outside the United States. See Madden v. Grain Elevator Workers Local 418, 334 F. 2d 1014 (CA7 1964), cert. denied, 379 U. S. 967 (1965); Grain Elevator Workers Local 418 v. NLRB, 126 U. S. App. D. C. 219, 376 F. 2d 774, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 932 (1967).
The definition appears in 29 U. S. C. § 152 (2):
“(2) The term ‘employer’ includes any person acting as an agent of an employer, directly or indirectly, but shall not include the United States or any wholly owned Government corporation, or any Federal Reserve Bank, or any State or political subdivision thereof, or any corporation or association operating a hospital, if no part of the net earnings inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual, or any person subject to the Railway Labor Act, as amended from time to time, or any labor organization (other than when acting as an employer), or anyone acting in the capacity of officer or agent of such labor organization.”
The record indicates that all grain storage facilities in the Mobile area were full. Additional soybeans could be harvested only as those already stored were transferred to waiting vessels. App. 77a-80a.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
J
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Douglas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Tucson, Arizona, has only two daily newspapers of general circulation, the Star and the Citizen. The Citizen is the oldest, having been founded before 1900, and is an evening paper published six times a week. The Star, slightly younger than the Citizen, has a Sunday as well as a daily issue. Prior to 1940 the two papers vigorously competed with each other. While their circulation was about equal, the Star sold 50% more advertising space than the Citizen and operated at a profit, while the Citizen sustained losses. Indeed the Star’s annual profits averaged about $25,825, while the Citizen’s annual losses averaged about $23,550.
In 1936 the stock of the Citizen was purchased by one Small and one Johnson for $100,000 and they invested an additional $25,000 of working capital. They sought to interest others to invest in the Citizen but were not successful. Small increased his investment in the Citizen, moved from Chicago to Tucson, and was prepared to finance the Citizen’s losses for at least awhile from his own resources. It does not appear that Small and Johnson sought to sell the Citizen; nor was the Citizen about to go out of business. The owners did, however, negotiate a joint operating agreement between the two papers which was to run for 25 years from March 1940, a term that was extended in 1953 until 1990. By its terms the agreement may be canceled only by mutual consent of the parties.
The agreement provided that each paper should retain its own news and editorial department, as well as its corporate identity. It provided for the formation of Tucson Newspapers, Inc. (TNI), which was to be owned in equal shares by the Star and Citizen and which was to manage all departments of their business except the news and editorial units. The production and distribution equipment of each paper was transferred to TNI. The latter had five directors — two named by the Star, two by the Citizen, and the fifth chosen by the Citizen out of three named by the Star.
The purpose of the agreement was to end any business or commercial competition between the two papers and to that end three types of controls were imposed. First was price fixing. The newspapers were sold and distributed by the circulation department of TNI; commercial advertising placed in the papers was sold only by the advertising department of TNI; the subscription and advertising rates were set jointly. Second was profit pooling. All profits realized were pooled and distributed to the Star and the Citizen by TNI pursuant to an agreed ratio. Third was a market control. It was agreed that neither the Star nor the Citizen nor any of their stockholders, officers, and executives would engage in any other business in Pima County — the metropolitan area of Tucson — in conflict with the agreement. Thus competing publishing operations were foreclosed.
All commercial rivalry between the papers ceased. Combined profits before taxes rose from $27,531 in 1940 to $1,727,217 in 1964.
The Government’s complaint charged an unreasonable restraint of trade or commerce in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 1, and a monopoly in violation of § 2, 15 U. S. C. § 2. The District Court, after finding that the joint operating agreement contained provisions which were unlawful per se under § 1, granted the Government’s motion for summary judgment.
The case went to trial on the § 2 charge and also on a charge brought under § 7 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 18. The latter charge arose out of the acquisition of the stock of the Star by the shareholders of the Citizen pursuant to an option in the joint operating agreement. Arden Publishing Company was formed as the vehicle of acquisition and it now publishes the Star.
At the end of the trial the District Court found that the joint operating agreement in purpose and effect monopolized the only newspaper business in Tucson in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act.
As respects the Clayton Act charge the District Court found that in Pima County, the appropriate geographic market, the Citizen’s acquisition of the Star stock had the effect of continuing in a more permanent form a substantial lessening of competition in daily newspaper publishing that is condemned by § 7.
The decree does not prevent all forms of joint operation. It requires, however, appellants to submit a plan for divestiture and re-establishment of the Star as an independent competitor and for modification of the joint operating agreement so as to eliminate the price-fixing, market control, and profit-pooling provisions. 280 F. Supp. 978. The case is here by way of appeal. Expediting Act, § 2, 32 Stat. 823, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 29.
We affirm the judgment. The § 1 violations are plain beyond peradventure. Price-fixing is illegal per se. United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U. S. 265, 276. Pooling of profits pursuant to an inflexible ratio at least reduces incentives to compete for circulation and advertising revenues and runs afoul of the Sherman Act. Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U. S. 197, 328. The agreement not to engage in any other publishing business in Pima County was a division of fields also banned by the Act. Timken Co. v. United States, 341 U. S. 593. The joint operating agreement exposed the restraints so clearly and unambiguously as to justify the rather rare use of a summary judgment in the antitrust field. See Northern Pac. R. Co. v. United States, 356 U. S. 1, 5.
The only real defense of appellants was the “failing company” defense — a judicially created doctrine. The facts tendered were excluded on the § 1 charge but were admitted on the § 2 charge as well as on the § 7 charge under the Clayton Act. So whether or not the District Court/was correct in excluding the evidence under the § 1 charge, it is now before us; and a consideration of it makes plain that the requirements of the failing company jioctrine were not met. That defense was before the Court in International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U. S. 291, where § 7 of the Clayton Act was in issue. The evidence showed that the resources of one company were so depleted and the prospect of rehabilitation so remote that “it faced the grave probability of a business failure.” 280 U. S., at 302. There was, moreover, “no other prospective purchaser.” Ibid. It was in that setting that the Court held that the acquisition of that company by another did not substantially lessen competition within the meaning of § 7. 280 U. S., at 302-303.
In the present case the District Court found:
“At the time Star Publishing and Citizen Publishing entered into the operating agreement, and at the time the agreement became effective, Citizen Publishing was not then on the verge of going out of business, nor was there a serious probability at that time that Citizen Publishing would terminate its business and liquidate its assets unless Star Publishing and Citizen Publishing entered into the operating agreement.” 280 F. Supp., at 980.
The evidence sustains that finding. There is no indication that the owners of the Citizen were contemplating a liquidation. They never sought to sell the Citizen and there is no evidence that the joint operating agreement was the last straw at which the Citizen grasped. Indeed the Citizen continued to be a significant threat to the Star. How otherwise is one to explain the Star’s willingness to enter into an agreement to share its profits with the Citizen? Would that be true if as now claimed the Citizen was on the brink of collapse?
The failing company doctrine plainly cannot be applied in a merger or in any other case unless it is established that the company that acquires the failing company or brings it under dominion is the only available purchaser. For if another person or group could be interested, a unit in the competitive system would be preserved and not lost to monopoly power. So even if we assume, arguendo, that in 1940 the then owners of the Citizen could not long keep the enterprise afloat, no effort was made to sell the Citizen; its properties and franchise were not put in the hands of a broker; and the record is silent on what the market, if any, for the Citizen might have been. Cf. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U. S. 654, 655.
Moreover, we know from the broad experience of the business community since 1930, the year when the International Shoe case was decided, that companies reorganized through receivership, or through Chapter X or Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act often emerged as strong competitive companies. The prospects of reorganization of the Citizen in 1940 would have had to be dim or nonexistent to make the failing company doctrine applicable to this case.
The burden of proving that the conditions of the failing company doctrine have been satisfied is on those who seek refuge under it. That burden has not been satisfied in this case.
We confine the failing company doctrine to its present narrow scope.
The restraints imposed by these private arrangements have no support from the First Amendment as Associated Press v. United States, 326 U. S. 1, 20, teaches.
Neither news gathering nor news dissemination is being regulated by the present decree. It deals only with restraints on certain business or commercial practices. The restraints on competition with which the present decree deals comport neither with the antitrust laws nor with the First Amendment. As we stated in the Associated Press case:
“It would be strange indeed ... if the grave concern for freedom of the press which prompted adoption of the First Amendment should be read as a command that the government was without power to protect that freedom. The First Amendment, far from providing an argument against application of the Sherman Act, here provides powerful reasons to the contrary. That Amendment rests on the assumption that the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public, that a free press is a condition of a free society. Surely a command that the government itself shall not impede the free flow of ideas does not afford nongovernmental combinations a refuge if they impose restraints upon that constitutionally guaranteed freedom. Freedom to publish means freedom for all and not for some. Freedom to publish is guaranteed by the Constitution, but freedom to combine to keep others from publishing is not. Freedom of the press from governmental interference under the First Amendment does not sanction repression of that freedom by private interests. The First Amendment affords not the slightest support for the contention that a combination to restrain trade in news and views has any constitutional immunity.” 326 U. S., at 20.
The other points mentioned are too trivial for discussion. Divestiture of the Star seems to us quite proper. At least there is no showing of that abuse of discretion which authorizes us to recast the decree. See United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U. S. 173, 185.
Affirmed.
Mr. Justice Fortas took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Section 7 provides in part:
“[N]o corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital ... of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.”
See Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 226, 339 (1960); Hale & Hale, Failing Firms and the Merger Provisions of the Antitrust Laws, 52 Ky. L. J. 597, 607 (1964); Connor, Section 7 of the Clayton Act: The “Failing Company” Myth, 49 Geo. L. J. 84, 96 (1960).
The failing company doctrine was held to justify mergers in United States v. Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers Assn., 167 F. Supp. 799, aff’d, 362 U. S. 458, and in Union Leader Corp. v. Newspapers of New England, 284 F. 2d 582.
For cases where the failing company doctrine was not allowed as a defense see United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U. S. 654; United States v. El Paso Gas Co., 376 U. S. 651; United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U. S. 270; United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U. S. 321, 372, n. 46; United States v. Third National Bank, 390 U. S. 171.
It should be noted that at the time the International Shoe Co. case was decided § 7 of the Clayton Act provided: “[N]o corporation . . . shall acquire . . . stock or other share capital of another corporation . . . where the effect of such acquisition may be to substantially lessen competition between the corporation whose stock is so acquired and the corporation making the acquisition ....’’ (Emphasis supplied.) Consequently, where the acquired company was “such as to necessitate liquidation,” and where “the prospect for future competition . . . was entirely eliminated,” it may have been reasonable to conclude that there was no more existing competition between the companies to be lessened by acquisition. 280 U. S., at 294. In 1950, however, § 7 was amended to make the measure of anticompetitive acquisitions the extent to which they lessened competition “in any line of commerce,” rather than the extent to which they lessened competition “between” the two companies.
We have no occasion, however, to determine what changes, if any, that amendment had on the failing company doctrine.
Bills-were introduced both in the 90th Congress (S. 1312 by Senator Hayden and H. R. 19123 by Mr. Edmondson) and in the 91st Congress (H. R. 279 by Mr. Matsunaga and H. R. 5199 by Mr. Johnson) to exempt from the antitrust laws joint operating agreements between newspapers because of economic distress. Extensive hearings were held in 1967 and 1968. See Hearings on S. 1312 before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pts. 1-6; Hearings on H. R. 19123 and Related Bills before the Antitrust Subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 25. The hearings reflect all shades of opinion. As stated by the House Subcommittee:
“The antitrust laws embody concepts and principles which long have been considered to be the bedrock of our economic institutions. Piecemeal exemptions from the antitrust laws to cope with problems of particular industries have been given reluctantly and only after there has been a clear showing of overriding need.” Hearings, supra, ser. 25, p. 2. See Roberts, Antitrust Problems in the Newspaper Industry, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 319, 344-352 (1968); Flynn, Antitrust and the Newspapers, A Comment on S. 1312, 22 Vand. L. Rev. 103 (1968).
As of this date Congress has taken no action on any of those bills.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
H
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter
delivered the opinion of the Court.
These three cases bring before us the validity of an order of the Secretary of Agriculture, issued by him on the basis of the Sugar Act of 1948. It is claimed that the Secretary disobeyed the requirements of that Act. If it be found that the Secretary brought himself within the Act, the power of Congress to give him the authority he exercised is challenged. By a series of enactments Congress addressed itself to what it found to be serious evils resulting from an uncontrolled sugar market. The central aim of this legislation was to rationalize the mischievous fluctuations of a free sugar market by the familiar device of a quota system. The Jones-Costigan Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 670, the Sugar Act of 1937, 50 Stat. 903, and the Sugar Act of 1948, 61 Stat. 922, 7 U. S. C. (Supp. II, 1949) §§ 1100-60.
The volume of sugar moving to the continental United States market was controlled to secure a harmonious relation between supply and demand. To adapt means- to the purpose of the sugar legislation, the Act of 1948 defines five domestic sugar-producing areas; two in the continental United States and one each in Hawaii, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. To each area is allotted an annual quota of sugar, specifying the maximum number of tons which may be marketed on the mainland from that area. § 202 (a). A quota is likewise assigned to the Philippines. §202 (b). The balance of the needs of consumers in the continental United States, to be determined each year by the Secretary, § 201, is met by importation from foreign countries, predominantly from Cuba, of the requisite amount of sugar. § 202 (c).
The quotas thus established apply to sugar in any form, raw or refined. In addition, § 207 of the Act establishes fixed limits on the tonnage of “direct-consumption” or refined sugar which may be marketed annually on the mainland from the offshore areas as part of their total sugar quotas. But mainland refiners are not subject to quota limitations upon the marketing of refined sugar.
The Puerto Rican quota for “direct-consumption” sugar is 126,033 tons. This figure had its genesis in the Jones-Costigan Act of 1934, which provided that the quota for each offshore area was to be the largest amount shipped to the mainland in any one of the three preceding years. 48 Stat. 670, 672-73. In the case of Puerto Rico this was computed by the Secretary at 126,033 tons. General Sugar Quota Regulations, Ser. 2, Rev. 1, p. 4, August 17, 1935. By the Sugar Acts of 1937 and 1948, Congress embedded this amount in legislation. All the details for the control of a commodity like sugar could not, of course, be legislatively predetermined. Administrative powers are an essential part of such a regulatory scheme. The powers conferred by § 205 (a) upon the Secretary of Agriculture raise some of the serious issues in this litigation. By that section Congress authorized the Secretary to allot the refined sugar quota as well as the inclusive allowance of a particular area among those marketing the sugar on the mainland from that area. The section provides that “Allotments shall be made in such manner and in such amounts as to provide a fair, efficient, and equitable distribution of such quota or proration thereof, by taking into consideration” three factors: (1) “processings of sugar ... to which proportionate shares . . . pertained”; (2) past marketings; and (3) ability to market the amount allotted.
On January 21, 1948, the Secretary issued Puerto Rico Sugar Order No. 18, 13 Fed. Reg. 310, allotting the 1948 Puerto Rican refined sugar quota among the various refineries of the island. Having satisfied himself of the need for an allotment, the Secretary, in conformity with the procedural requirements of § 205 (a), apportioned the quota among the individual refiners, setting forth in appropriate findings the manner in which he applied the three statutory standards for allotment.
As to “past marketings” he found that the proper measure was the average of the highest five years of marketings during the seven-year period of 1935-1941. While recognizing that ordinarily the most recent period of marketings furnished the appropriate data, he concluded that the period 1942-1947 was unrepresentative in that the war needs made those years abnormal and not a fair basis for purposes of the economic stabilization which was the aim of the 1948 Act. Shortages as to transportation, storage and materials, caused by the war, led to special government control. These circumstances resulted in hardships or advantages in varying degrees to different refiners, quite unrelated to a fair system of quotas for the post-war period.
Likewise as to “the ability ... to market,” the Secretary recognized that marketings during a recent period ordinarily furnished the best measure. But again he found that the derangements of the war years served to make that measure abnormal. He therefore concluded that a fairer guide to his judgment came from the highest marketings of any year during the 1935-1947 period, using, however, present plant capacity as a corrective.
The Secretary duly considered “the processings of sugar” to which proportionate shares pertained, but concluded that this factor could not fairly be applied. This was so because it referred to processings of raw sugar from sugar cane, whereas the three largest Puerto Rican refining concerns restricted themselves to refining raw sugar after it had already been processed. He felt bound, therefore, to give no weight to this factor in the sum he finally struck, and gave equal weight to past marketings and ability to market.
Availing themselves of § 205 (b), respondents, Central Roig Refining Company and Western Sugar Refining Company, two of the three largest refiners in Puerto Rico, appealed from the Secretary’s order to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. They charged the Secretary with disregard of the standards which Congress imposed by § 205 (a) for his guidance in making allotment of quotas; they challenged the validity of the Act itself under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Porto Rican American Sugar Refinery, Inc., petitioner in No. 30, the largest of the Puerto Rican refiners, intervened to defend the Secretary’s order against the statutory attack. The Government of Puerto Rico, petitioner in No. 32, intervened to urge the unconstitutionality of the statute, while the American Sugar Refining Company and other mainland refiners intervened to meet this attack. Being of opinion that the Secretary’s order was not authorized by the Act, the Court of Appeals reversed it. 84 U. S. App. D. C. 161, 171 F. 2d 1016. Since the order failed on statutory grounds, a majority of that court did not deem it proper to decide the constitutional question. Because of the obvious importance of the decision below in the administration of the Sugar Act we granted certiorari. 336 U. S. 959.
I. In making quota allotments the Secretary of Agriculture must of course keep scrupulously within the limits set by the Sugar Act of 1948. In devising the framework of control Congress fixed the flat quotas for the sugar-producing areas. Congress could not itself, as a practical matter, allot the area quotas among individual marketers. The details on which fair judgment must be based are too shifting and judgment upon them calls for too specialized understanding to make direct congressional determination feasible. Almost inescapably the function of allotting the area quotas among individual marketers becomes an administrative function entrusted to the member of the Cabinet charged with oversight of the agricultural economy of the nation. He could not be left at large and yet he could not be rigidly bounded. Either extreme would defeat the control system. They could be avoided only by laying down standards of such breadth as inevitably to give the Secretary leeway for his expert judgment. Its exercise presumes a judgment at once comprehensive and conscientious. Accordingly, Congress instructed the Secretary to make allotments “in such manner and in such amounts as to provide a fair, efficient, and equitable distribution” of the quota.
In short, Congress gave the Secretary discretion commensurate with the legislative goal. Allocation of quotas to individual marketers was deemed an essential part of the regulatory scheme. The complexity of problems affecting raw and refined sugar in widely separated and economically disparate areas, accentuated by the instability of the differentiating factors, must have persuaded Congress of the need for continuous detailed administrative supervision. In any event, such is the plain purport of the legislation.
By way of guiding the Secretary in formulating a fair distribution of individual allotments, Congress directed him to exercise his discretion “by taking into consideration” three factors: past marketings, ability to market, and processings to which proportionate shares pertained. Plainly these are not mechanical or self-defining standards. They in turn imply wide areas of judgment and therefore of discretion. ' The fact that the Secretary’s judgment is finally expressed arithmetically gives an illusory definiteness to the process of reaching it. Moreover, he is under a duty merely to take “into consideration” the particularized factors. The Secretary cannot be heedless of these factors in the sense, for instance, of refusing to hear relevant evidence bearing on them. But Congress did not think it was feasible to bind the Secretary as to the part his “consideration” of these three factors should play in his final judgment — what weight each should be given, or whether in a particular situation all three factors must play a quantitative share in his computation.
It was evidently deemed fair that in a controlled market each producer should be permitted to retain more or less the share of the market which he had acquired in the past. Accordingly, past marketings were to be taken into consideration in the Secretary’s allotments. But the past is relevant only if it furnishes a representative index of the relative positions of different marketers. And there is no calculus available for determining whether a base period for measurement is fairly representative. Whether conditions have been so unusual as to make a period unrepresentative is not a matter of counting figures but of weighing imponderables. If he is to exercise the function of allotting a limited supply among avid contenders for it, the Secretary cannot escape the necessity of passing judgment on their relative competitive positions. For Congress announced that one of the main purposes justifying the making of allotments is “to afford all interested persons an equitable opportunity to market sugar.” § 205 (a).
In directing the Secretary to take into consideration ability to market, Congress in effect charged the Secretary with making a forecast of the marketers’ capacity to perform in the immediate future. Such a forecast no doubt draws heavily on experience, but history never quite repeats itself even in the vicissitudes of industry. Whether ability to market is most rationally measured by plant capacity or by past performance, whether, if the latter, the base period should be a year and what year or a group of years and what group — these are not questions to be dealt with as statistical problems. They require a disinterested, informed judgment based on circumstances themselves difficult of prophetic interpretation.
The proper mode of ascertaining “processings of sugar . . . to which proportionate shares . . . pertained” is not here in controversy. Perhaps this factor too implies choice. But the question common to all three standards is whether the Secretary may conclude, after due consideration, that in the particular situation before him it is not essential that each of the three factors be quantitatively reflected in the final allotment formula. Concededly, § 205 (a) empowers the Secretary to attribute different influences to the three factors. Obviously one factor may be more influential than another in the sense of furnishing a better means of achieving a “fair, efficient, and equitable distribution.” But it is not consonant with reason to authorize the Secretary to find in the context of the situation before him that a criterion has little value and is entitled to no more than nominal weight, but to find it unreasonable for him to conclude that this factor has no significance and therefore should not be at all reflected quantitatively.
Congress did not predetermine the periods of time to which the standards should be related or the respective weights to be accorded them. In this respect the sugar-quota scheme differs from the quotas designed by Congress for tobacco, wheat, cotton and rice, respectively. See §§ 313 (a), 334 (a), 344 (a) and 353 (a) of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 47, 53, 57, 61, as amended, 7 U. S. C. §§ 1313 (a), 1334 (a), 1344 (a), 1353 (a). Nor do the bare words of § 205 (a) confine the Secretary in the responsible exercise of discretion beyond the limitation inherent upon such delegated authority. He is not free to be capricious, to act without reason, that is, in relation to the attainment of the objects declared by § 205 (a). The very standards for his conduct, the attainment of “fair, efficient, and equitable distribution” preclude abstract or doctrinaire categories. A variety of plans of allotment may well conform to the statutory standards. But the choice among permissive plans is necessarily the Secretary’s; he is the agency entrusted by Congress to make the choice.
These considerations dispose of this phase of the case. We would have to replace the Secretary’s judgment with our own to hold that on the record before us he acted arbitrarily in reaching the conviction that the years 1935-1941 furnished a fairer measure of past marketings than the war years 1942-1947. Nor can we hold that it was baseless for him to decide that increased marketings during the war years may be taken to mean improved ability to market but decreased marketings do not justify the opposite conclusion. And it was within his province to exclude from his determination the processings of sugar to which proportionate shares pertained. It is not for us to reject the balance he struck on consideration of all the factors unless we can say that his judgment is not one that a fair-minded tribunal with specialized knowledge could have reached. This we cannot say. We conclude, therefore, that in issuing Order No. 18 the Secretary did not exceed the authority given him by Congress.
II. We must therefore face the challenge to the constitutionality of the Act of 1948. This objection to the order in support of their judgment below is clearly open to respondents in Nos. 27 and 30. The Government of Puerto Rico likewise challenges the constitutionality of the Act. But its status in this litigation raises a distinct issue, consideration of which will be postponed for the moment.
The sugar problem of the country is an old and obstinate one. For fourteen years Congress grappled with it through the mechanism of quotas. Three enactments, culminating in the Sugar Act of 1948, represented an effort to deal with what were deemed to be the harmful effects on interstate and foreign commerce of progressively depressed sugar prices of earlier years created by world surpluses, or, if one prefers it, by the conditions that reflected the imbalance between production and consumption. The legislation presupposes a finding by Congress that producers and marketers of sugar could not adequately respond to market changes merely through the mechanism of a free market and that the public interest, insofar as the Commerce Clause may be drawn upon to meet it, needed controls to supplement and replace the haggling of the market.
Congress might of course have limited its intervention to the raw sugar market, trusting that thereby stability in the refined sugar market would be produced. Congress thought otherwise; it evidently felt that competition among refiners for a legally limited supply of raw sugar, in a period of overexpanded refining capacity, ought not to be left at large. In any event, Congress had the constitutional right to think otherwise and to bring the refining of sugar within its regulatory scheme. See Mulford v. Smith, 307 U. S. 38; United States v. Rock Royal Co-operative, Inc., 307 U. S. 533; Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U. S. 111.
It is a commonplace that reforms may bring in their train new difficulties. In any scheme of reform, their prevention or mitigation becomes a proper legislative concern. While ameliorating the effect of disorderly competition, market controls generate problems of their own, not encountered under a competitive system. Such new problems are not outside the comprehensive scope of the great Commerce Clause. Nor does the Commerce Clause impose requirements of geographic uniformity. (Compare Art. I, § 8, cl. 1 and cl. 4.) Congress may devise, as it has done in the Sugar Act of 1948, a national policy with due regard for the varying and fluctuating interests of different regions. See e. g., Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland R. Co., 242 U. S. 311; Kentucky Whip & Collar Co. v. Illinois Central R. Co., 299 U. S. 334; Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U. S. 408. And since the Act of 1948 does not even remotely impinge on any of the specific limitations upon the Commerce Clause (Art. I, § 9, cl. 5 and cl. 6), we are not concerned with the vexing problem of the applicability of these clauses to Puerto Rico. Compare Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 244; Dooley v. United States, 183 U. S. 151; Alaska v. Troy, 258 U. S. 101; Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U. S. 652, 670, n. 5.
However, not even resort to the Commerce Clause can defy the standards of due process. We assume that these standards extend to regulations of commerce that enmesh Puerto Rico. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 148-51; United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100, 125-26; Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U. S. 298, 313. The Sugar Act of 1948 is claimed to offend the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment because of the alleged discriminatory character and the oppressive effects of the refined sugar quota established by the Act. If ever claims of this sort carried plausibility, they seem to us singularly belated in view of the unfolding of the Commerce Clause.
The use of quotas on refined sugar, legislatively apportioned to different geographic areas and administratively allocated to individual beneficiaries, is a device based on the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 31, as amended, 7 U. S. C. § 1281 et seq., and sanctioned by this Court in Mulford v. Smith, supra. The problem which confronted Congress was not the setting of quotas abstractly considered but so to fix their amount as to achieve approximate justice in the shares allotted to each area and the persons within it. To recognize the problem is to acknowledge its perplexities.
Congress was thus confronted with the formulation of policy peculiarly within its wide swath of discretion. It would be a singular intrusion of the judiciary into the legislative process to extrapolate restrictions upon the formulation of such an economic policy from those deeply rooted notions of justice which the Due Process Clause expresses. ' To fix quotas on a strict historical basis is hard on latecomers into the industry or on those in it who desire to expand. On the other hand, to the extent that newcomers are allowed to enter or old-timers to expand there must either be an increase in supply or a reduction in the quotas of others. Many other factors must plague those charged with the formulation of policy — the extent to which projected expansion is a function of efficiency or becomes a depressant of wage standards; the wise direction of capital into investments and the economic waste incident to what may be on the short or the long pull overexpansion of industrial facilities; the availability of a more suitable basis for the fixing of quotas, etc., etc. The final judgment is too apt to be a hodge-podge of considerations, including considerations that may well weigh with legislators but which this Court can hardly disentangle.
Suffice it to say that since Congress fixed the quotas on a historical basis it is not for this Court to reweigh the relevant factors and, perchance, substitute its notion of expediency and fairness for that of Congress. This is so even though the quotas thus fixed may demonstrably be disadvantageous to certain areas or persons. This Court is not a tribunal for relief from the crudities and inequities of complicated experimental economic legislation. See Wickard v. Filburn, supra at 129.
Congress, it is insisted, has not established refined sugar quotas for the mainland refiners as it has for the offshore areas. Whatever inequalities may thereby be created, this is not the forum for their correction for the all-sufficient reason that the extent and nature of inequalities are themselves controversial matters hardly meet for judicial solution. Thus, while the mainland refiners are legally free to purchase and refine all sugar within the raw sugar quota and Puerto Rican refiners are limited to their shares of the refined sugar quota, Congress apparently thought that Puerto Rican refiners operated at costs sufficiently low to insulate them from mainland competition. In addition, it is claimed that since the total supply of raw sugar permitted to enter the mainland market is limited the mainland refiners are in effect also subject to the refined sugar quota, although in contrast to the unchanging quotas of the territories the mainland quota will vary with changes in the total consumer demand. Because this demand tends to be stable, however, the mainland refiners’ share of the refined sugar has not, it is urged, greatly expanded during the years when quotas were in effect. Congress might well have thought that relatively minor contractions and expansions in supply from year to year should thus be absorbed.
Plainly it is not the business of judges to sit in judgment on the validity or the significance of such views. The Act may impose hardships here and there; the incidence of hardship may shift in location and intensity. It is not for us to have views on the merits of this legislation. It suffices that we cannot say, as we cannot, that there is “discrimination of such an injurious character as to bring into operation the due process clause.” Currin v. Wallace, 306 U. S. 1, 14. Expressions of dissatisfaction by the Executive and in some quarters of Congress that the refined sugar quotas were “arbitrary,” “discriminatory,” and “unfair” may reflect greater wisdom or greater fairness than the collective wisdom of Congress which put this Act on the statute books. But the issue was thrashed out in Congress; Congress is the place for its reconsideration.
III. There remains Puerto Rico’s right to participate in this litigation. Puerto Rico can have no better standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Sugar Act of 1948 than if it were a full-fledged State. The right of a State to press such a claim raises familiar difficulties. Compare Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447; Florida v. Mellon, 273 U. S. 12; Jones ex rel. Louisiana v. Bowles, 322 U. S. 707, with Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U. S. 230; New York v. New Jersey, 256 U. S. 296; Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 324 U. S. 439. Whatever rights Puerto Rico has as a polity, see Porto Rico v. Rosaly, 227 U. S. 270; Puerto Rico v. Shell Co., 302 U. S. 253; Puerto Rico v. Rubert Hermanos, Inc., 309 U. S. 543, the Island is not a State. Additional legal questions are raised whether Puerto Rico can press the interests that it is here pressing. In view of the conclusion that we have reached on the constitutional issues which had to be met apart from any jurisdictional question, it would entail an empty discussion to decide whether Puerto Rico has a standing as a party in this case. It would in effect be merely an advisory opinion on a delicate subject. Since the real issues raised by Puerto Rico have already been decided in Nos. 27 and 30, it becomes unnecessary to decide the question of Puerto Rico’s standing to sue. Wickard v. Filburn, supra at 114, n. 3.
Nos. 27 and 30 reversed.
No. 32 dismissed.
Mr. Justice Black would affirm the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for the reasons given in that court’s opinion. 84 U. S. App. D. C. 161, 171 F. 2d 1016.
Mr. Justice Douglas took no part in the consideration or disposition of these cases.
In the course of this opinion all expressions of an economic character are to be attributed to those who have authority to make such economic judgments — the Congress and the Secretary of Agriculture — and are not to be deemed the independent judgments of the Court. It is not our right to pronounce economic views; we are confined to passing on the right of the Congress and the Secretary to act on the basis of entertainable economic judgments.
With minor exceptions not relevant here, the term “direct-consumption” sugar in the Act refers to refined sugar.
The full text of §205 (a) is as follows:
“Whenever the Secretary finds that the allotment of any quota, or proration thereof, established for any area pursuant to the provisions of this Act, is necessary to assure an orderly and adequate flow of sugar or liquid sugar in the channels of interstate or foreign commerce, or to prevent disorderly marketing or importation of sugar or liquid sugar, or to maintain a continuous and stable supply of sugar or liquid sugar, or to afford all interested persons an equitable opportunity to market sugar or liquid sugar within any area’s quota, after such hearing and upon such notice as he may by regulations prescribe, he shall make allotments of such quota or proration thereof by allotting to persons who market or import sugar or liquid sugar, for such periods as he may designate, the quantities of sugar or liquid sugar which each such person may market in continental United States, the Territory of Hawaii, or Puerto Rico, or may import or bring into continental United States, for consumption therein. Allotments shall be made in such manner and in such amounts as to provide a fair, efficient, and equitable distribution of such quota or proration thereof, by taking into consideration the processings of sugar or liquid sugar from sugar beets or sugarcane to which proportionate shares, determined pursuant to the provisions of subsection (b) of section 302, pertained; the past marketings or importations of each such person; and the ability of such person to market or import that portion of such quota or proration thereof allotted to him. The Secretary may also, upon such hearing and notice as he may by regulations- prescribe, revise or amend any such allotment upon the same basis as the initial allotment was made.” 61 Stat. 926, 7 U. S. C. § 1115.
To help effectuate the marketing controls, § 301 of the Act provides that certain payments will be made to farmers only if they limit the marketing of sugar cane or beets grown on their farms to a “proportionate share” of the quantity necessary to fill the area’s quota, plus a normal carry-over. The relevance of this provision here is that processings of sugar grown within the “proportionate share” restriction are one of the three factors to be considered by the Secretary in the making of allotments under § 205 (a).
With respect to the Secretary’s comparable function of fixing proportionate shares for farms under § 302 of the Act, the House Committee on Agriculture stated: “In view of the differences in conditions of production obtaining in the various sugar-producing areas, the committee has not attempted to specify the exact manner in which the Secretary shall use production history. It is the judgment of the committee that considerable discretion should be left to the Secretary to deal with the varied and changing conditions in the various producing areas, in order to establish fair and equitable proportionate shares for farms in such areas.” H. R. Rep. No. 796, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 8.
The average price per pound of duty-paid raw sugar gradually declined from 6.98 cents in 1923 to 2.80 cents in early 1932. United States Tariff Comm’n, Report to the President on Sugar, Report No. 73, 2d Ser., p. 46. See also Dalton, Sugar, A Case Study of Government Control, cc. IV, V, especially p. 41; 16 Dept. State Bull. 44.
It was estimated that the mainland refineries alone had a capacity in excess of demand of from one-third to one-half. See United States Tariff Comm’n, Report to the President on Sugar, Report No. 73, 2d Ser., p. 91; cf. Sugar Institute, Inc. v. United States, 297 U. S. 553, 574.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
I
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Blackmun
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this admiralty case, we must decide whether a cause of action in tort is stated when a defective product purchased in a commercial transaction malfunctions, injuring only the product itself and causing purely economic loss. The case requires us to consider preliminarily whether admiralty law, which already recognizes a general theory of liability for negligence, also incorporates principles of products liability, including strict liability. Then, charting a course between products liability and contract law, we must determine whether injury to a product itself is the kind of harm that should be protected by products liability or left entirely to the law of contracts.
I
In 1969, Seatrain Shipbuilding Corp. (Shipbuilding), a wholly owned subsidiary of Seatrain Lines, Inc. (Seatrain), announced it would build the four oil-transporting supertankers in issue — the T. T. Stuyvesant, T. T. Williamsburgh, T. T. Brooklyn, and T. T. Bay Ridge. Each tanker was constructed pursuant to a contract in which a separate wholly owned subsidiary of Seatrain engaged Shipbuilding. Shipbuilding in turn contracted with respondent, now known as Transamerica Delaval Inc. (Delaval), to design, manufacture, and supervise the installation of turbines (costing $1.4 million each, see App. 163) that would be the main propulsion units for the 225,000-ton, $125 million, ibid., supertankers. When each ship was completed, its title was transferred from the contracting subsidiary to a trust company (as trustee for an owner), which in turn chartered the ship to one of the petitioners, also subsidiaries of Seatrain. Queensway Tankers, Inc., chartered the Stuyvesant; Kingsway Tankers, Inc., chartered the Williamsburgh; East River Steamship Corp. chartered the Brooklyn; and Richmond Tankers, Inc., chartered the Bay Ridge. Each petitioner operated under a bareboat charter, by which it took full control of the ship for 20 or 22 years as though it owned it, with the obligation after-wards to return the ship to the real owner. See G. Gilmore & C. Black, Admiralty §§4-1, 4-22 (2d ed. 1975). Each charterer assumed responsibility for the cost of any repairs to the ships. Tr. of Oral Arg. 11, 16-17, 35.
The Stuyvesant sailed on its maiden voyage in late July 1977. On December 11 of that year, as the ship was about to enter the Port of Valdez, Alaska, steam began.to escape from the casing of the high-pressure turbine. That problem was temporarily resolved by repairs, but before long, while the ship was encountering a severe storm in the Gulf of Alaska, the high-pressure turbine malfunctioned. The ship, though lacking its normal power, was able to continue on its journey to Panama and then San Francisco. In January 1978, an examination of the high-pressure turbine revealed that the first-stage steam reversing ring virtually had disintegrated and had caused additional damage to other parts of the turbine. The damaged part was replaced with a part from the Bay Ridge, which was then under construction. In April 1978, the ship again was repaired, this time with a part from the Brooklyn. Finally, in August, the ship was permanently and satisfactorily repaired with a ring newly designed and manufactured by Delaval.
The Brooklyn and the Williamsburgh were put into service in late 1973 and late 1974, respectively. In 1978, as a result of the Stuyvesant’s problems, they were inspected while in port. Those inspections revealed similar turbine damage. Temporary repairs were made, and newly designed parts were installed as permanent repairs that summer.
When the Bay Ridge was completed in early 1979, it contained the newly designed parts and thus never experienced the high-pressure turbine problems that plagued the other three ships. Nonetheless, the complaint appears to claim damages as a result of deterioration of the Bay Ridge’s ring that was installed in the Stuyvesant while the Bay Ridge was under construction. In addition, the Bay Ridge experienced a unique problem. In 1980, when the ship was on its maiden voyage, the engine began to vibrate with a frequency that increased even after speed was reduced. It turned out that the astern guardian valve, located between the high-pressure and low-pressure turbines, had been installed backwards. Because of that error, steam entered the low-pressure turbine and damaged it. After repairs, the Bay Ridge resumed its travels.
II
The charterers’ second amended complaint, filed in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, invokes admiralty jurisdiction. It contains five counts alleging tortious conduct on the part of respondent Delaval and seeks an aggregate of more than $8 million in damages for the cost of repairing the ships and for income lost while the ships were out of service. The first four counts, read liberally, allege that Delaval is strictly liable for the design defects in the high-pressure turbines of the Stuyvesant, the Williams-burgh, the Brooklyn, and the Bay Ridge, respectively. The fifth count alleges that Delaval, as part of the manufacturing process, negligently supervised the installation of the astern guardian valve on the Bay Ridge. The initial complaint also had listed Seatrain and Shipbuilding as plaintiffs and had alleged breach of contract and warranty as well as tort claims. But after Delaval interposed a statute of limitations defense, the complaint was amended and the charterers alone brought the suit in tort. The nonrenewed claims were dismissed with prejudice by the District Court. Delaval then moved for summary judgment, contending that the charterers’ actions were not cognizable in tort.
The District Court granted summary judgment for De~ laval, and the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed. East River S.S. Corp. v. Delaval Turbine, Inc., 752 F. 2d 903 (1985). The Court of Appeals held that damage solely to a defective product is actionable in tort if the defect creates an unreasonable risk of harm to persons or property other than the product itself, and harm materializes. Disappointments over the product’s quality, on the other hand, are protected by warranty law. Id., at 908, 909-910. The charterers were dissatisfied with product quality: the defects involved gradual and unnoticed deterioration of the turbines’ component parts, and the only risk created was that the turbines would operate at a lower capacity. Id., at 909. See Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 652 F. 2d 1165, 1169-1170 (CA3 1981). Therefore, neither the negligence claim nor the strict-liability claim was cognizable.
Judge Garth concurred on “grounds somewhat different,” 752 F. 2d, at 910, and Judge Becker, joined by Judge Higginbotham, concurred in part and dissented in part. Id., at 913. Although Judge Garth agreed with the majority’s analysis on the merits, he found no strict-liability claim presented because the charterers had failed to allege unreasonable danger or demonstrable injury.
Judge Becker largely agreed with the majority’s approach, but would permit recovery for a “near miss,” where the risk existed but no calamity occurred. He felt that the first count, concerning the Stuyvesant, stated a cause of action in tort. The exposure of the ship to a severe storm when the ship was unable to operate at full power due to the defective part created an unreasonable risk of harm.
We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals sitting in admiralty. 474 U. S. 814 (1985).
Ill
A
Initially, we conclude that the fourth count should have been dismissed because Richmond Tankers, Inc., the charterer of the Bay Ridge, lacks standing to bring a claim relating to the defective ring that was removed from the Bay Ridge when it was still under construction. The ring was installed in the Stuyvesant where it remained until April 1978, when it was removed due to disintegration. Richmond did not charter the Bay Ridge until May 1979, after the ship was completed with a newly designed, nondefective, high-pressure turbine. See Plaintiffs’ Answers to First Set of Interrogatories of Defendants, No. 42. Richmond therefore can allege no cognizable injury. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 501 (1975). Richmond, of course, has standing to bring the claim raised in the fifth count, as the damage from the reverse installation of the astern guardian valve allegedly occurred after Richmond chartered the Bay Ridge.
B
The torts alleged in the first, second, third, and fifth counts clearly fall within the admiralty jurisdiction. The claims satisfy the traditional “locality” requirement — that the wrong must have occurred on the high seas or navigable waters. See, e. g., The Plymouth, 3 Wall. 20, 35-36 (1866). The first and fifth counts allege that the injury to the Stuyvesant’s high-pressure turbine and the Bay Ridge’s low-pressure turbine occurred while the ships were sailing on the high seas. The damage to the Williamsburgh and the Brooklyn, alleged in the second and third counts, occurred at sea, and was discovered in port, also a maritime locale. See Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U. S. 31, 41 (1942).
When torts have occurred on navigable waters within the United States, the Court has imposed an additional requirement of a “maritime nexus” — that the wrong must bear “a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity.” See Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. Cleveland, 409 U. S. 249, 268 (1972); Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U. S. 668 (1982). We need not reach the question whether a maritime nexus also must be established when a tort occurs on the high seas. Were there such a requirement, it clearly was met here, for these ships were engaged in maritime commerce, a primary concern of admiralty law.
C
With admiralty jurisdiction comes the application of substantive admiralty law. See Executive Jet Aviation, 409 U. S., at 255. Absent a relevant statute, the general maritime law, as developed by the judiciary, applies. United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U. S. 397, 409 (1975); Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U. S. 149, 160-161 (1920). Drawn from state and federal sources, the general maritime law is an amalgam of traditional common-law rules, modifications of those rules, and newly created rules. See Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U. S. 625, 630 (1959); Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U. S. 354, 373-375 (1959). This Court has developed a body of maritime tort principles, see, e. g., Kermarec, supra, at 632; see generally Currie, Federalism and the Admiralty: “The Devil’s Own Mess,” 1960 S. Ct. Rev. 158, 164, and is now asked to incorporate products-liability concepts, long a part of the common law of torts, into the general maritime law. See Igneri v. Cie. de Transports Oceaniques, 323 F. 2d 257, 260 (CA2 1963), cert. denied, 376 U. S. 949 (1964).
The Courts of Appeals sitting in admiralty overwhelmingly have adopted concepts of products liability, based both on negligence, Sieracki v. Seas Shipping Co., 149 F. 2d 98, 99-100 (CA3 1945), aff’d on other grounds, 328 U. S. 85 (1946), and on strict liability, Pan-Alaska Fisheries, Inc. v. Marine Constr. & Design Co., 565 F. 2d 1129, 1135 (CA9 1977) (adopting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965)). Indeed, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit previously had stated that the question whether principles of strict products liability are part of maritime law “is no longer seriously contested.” Ocean Barge Transport Co. v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp., 726 F. 2d 121, 123 (1984) (citing cases).
We join the Courts of Appeals in recognizing products liability, including strict liability, as part of the general maritime law. This Court’s precedents relating to injuries of maritime workers long have pointed in that direction. See Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U. S. 85, 94 (1946) (strict liability for unseaworthiness); Italia Societa per Azioni di Navigazione v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., 376 U. S. 315, 322 (1964) (strict liability for breach of implied warranty of workmanlike service). The Court’s rationale in those cases —that strict liability should be imposed on the party best able to protect persons from hazardous equipment — is equally applicable when the claims are based on products liability. Compare Sieracki, 328 U. S., at 93-94, with Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P. 2d 436, 441 (1944) (concurring opinion). And to the extent that products actions are based on negligence, they are grounded in principles already incorporated into the general maritime law. See Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U. S., at 632. Our incorporation of products liability into maritime law, however, is only the threshold determination to the main issue in this case.
IV
Products liability grew out of a public policy judgment that people need more protection from dangerous products than is afforded by the law of warranty. See Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 15, 403 P. 2d 145, 149 (1965). It is clear, however, that if this development were allowed to progress too far, contract law would drown in a sea of tort. See G. Gilmore, The Death of Contract 87-94 (1974). We must determine whether a commercial product injuring itself is the kind of harm against which public policy requires manufacturers to protect, independent of any contractual obligation.
A
The paradigmatic products-liability action is one where a product “reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril,” distributed without reinspection, causes bodily injury. See, e. g., MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N. Y. 382, 389, 111 N. E. 1051, 1053 (1916). The manufacturer is liable whether or not it is negligent because “public policy demands that responsibility be fixed wherever it will most effectively reduce the hazards to life and health inherent in defective products that reach the market.” Escola v. Coca Cola Bot tling Co. of Fresno, 24 Cal. 2d, at 462, 150 P. 2d, at 441 (opinion concurring in judgment).
For similar reasons of safety, the manufacturer’s duty of care was broadened to include protection against property damage. See Marsh Wood Products Co. v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 207 Wis. 209, 226, 240 N. W. 392, 399 (1932); Genesee County Patrons Fire Relief Assn. v. L. Sonneborn Sons, Inc., 263 N. Y. 463, 469-473, 189 N. E. 551, 553-555 (1934). Such damage is considered so akin to personal injury that the two are treated alike. See Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d, at 19, 403 P. 2d, at 152.
In the traditional “property damage” cases, the defective product damages other property. In this case, there was no damage to “other” property. Rather, the first, second, and third counts allege that each supertanker’s defectively designed turbine components damaged only the turbine itself. Since each turbine was supplied by Delaval as an integrated package, see App. 162-163, each is properly regarded as a single unit. “Since all but the very simplest of machines have component parts, [a contrary] holding would require a finding of ‘property damage’ in virtually every case where a product damages itself. Such a holding would eliminate the distinction between warranty and strict products liability.” Northern Power & Engineering Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 623 P. 2d 324, 330 (Alaska 1981). The fifth count also alleges injury to the product itself. Before the high-pressure and low-pressure turbines could become an operational propulsion system, they were connected to piping and valves under the supervision of Delaval personnel. See App. 78, 162-163, 181. Delaval’s supervisory obligations were part of its manufacturing agreement. The fifth count thus can best be read to allege that Delaval’s negligent manufacture of the propulsion system — by allowing the installation in reverse of the astern guardian valve — damaged the propulsion system. Cf. Lewis v. Timco, Inc., 736 F. 2d 163, 165-166 (CA5 1984). Obviously, damage to a product itself has certain attributes of a products-liability claim. But the injury suffered — the failure of the product to function properly — is the essence of a warranty action, through which a contracting party can seek to recoup the benefit of its bargain.
B
The intriguing question whether injury to a product itself may be brought in tort has spawned a variety of answers. At one end of the spectrum, the case that created the majority land-based approach, Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P. 2d 145 (1965) (defective truck), held that preserving a proper role for the law of warranty precludes imposing tort liability if a defective product causes purely monetary harm. See also Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 626 F. 2d 280, 287, and n. 13 (CA3 1980) (citing cases).
At the other end of the spectrum is the minority land-based approach, whose progenitor, Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N. J. 52, 66-67, 207 A. 2d 305, 312-313 (1965) (marred carpeting), held that a manufacturer’s duty to make nondefective products encompassed injury to the product itself, whether or not the defect created an unreasonable risk of harm. See also LaCrosse v. Schubert, Schroeder & Associates, Inc., 72 Wis. 2d 38, 44-45, 240 N. W. 2d 124, 127-128 (1976). The courts adopting this approach, including the majority of the Courts of Appeals sitting in admiralty that have considered the issue, e. g., Emerson G. M. Diesel, Inc. v. Alaskan Enterprise, 732 F. 2d 1468 (CA9 1984), find that the safety and insurance rationales behind strict liability apply equally where the losses are purely economic. These courts reject the Seely approach because they find it arbitrary that economic losses are recoverable if a plaintiff suffers bodily injury or property damage, but not if a product injures itself. They also find no inherent difference between economic loss and personal injury or property damage, because all are proximately caused by the defendant’s conduct. Further, they believe recovery for economic loss would not lead to unlimited liability because they think a manufacturer can predict and insure against product failure. See Emerson G. M. Diesel, Inc. v. Alaskan Enterprise, 732 F. 2d, at 1474.
Between the two poles fall a number of cases that would permit a products-liability action under certain circumstances when a product injures only itself. These cases attempt to differentiate between “the disappointed users... and the endangered ones,” Russell v. Ford Motor Co., 281 Ore. 587, 595, 575 P. 2d 1383, 1387 (1978), and permit only the latter to sue in tort. The determination has been said to turn on the nature of the defect, the type of risk, and the manner in which the injury arose. See Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 652 F. 2d, at 1173 (relied on by the Court of Appeals in this case). The Alaska Supreme Court allows a tort action if the defective product creates a situation potentially dangerous to persons or other property, and loss occurs as a proximate result of that danger and under dangerous circumstances. Northern Power & Engineering Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 623 P. 2d 324, 329 (1981).
We find the intermediate and minority land-based positions unsatisfactory. The intermediate positions, which essentially turn on the degree of risk, are too indeterminate to enable manufacturers easily to structure their business behavior. Nor do we find persuasive a distinction that rests on the manner in which the product is injured. We realize that the damage may be qualitative, occurring through gradual deterioration or internal breakage. Or it may be calamitous. Compare Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 548 P. 2d 279 (Alaska 1976), with Cloud v. Kit Mfg. Co., 563 P. 2d 248, 251 (Alaska 1977). But either way, since by definition no person or other property is damaged, the resulting loss is purely economic. Even when the harm to the product itself occurs through an abrupt, accident-like event, the resulting loss due to repair costs, decreased value, and lost profits is essentially the failure of the purchaser to receive the benefit of its bargain — traditionally the core concern of contract law. See E. Farnsworth, Contracts § 12.8, pp. 839-840 (1982).
We also decline to adopt the minority land-based view espoused by Santor and Emerson. Such cases raise legitimate questions about the theories behind restricting products liability, but we believe that the countervailing arguments are more powerful. The minority view fails to account for the need to keep products liability and contract law in separate spheres and to maintain a realistic limitation on damages.
C
Exercising traditional discretion in admiralty, see Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U. S. 406, 409 (1953), we adopt an approach similar to Seely and hold that a manufacturer in a commercial relationship has no duty under either a negligence or strict products-liability theory to prevent a product from injuring itself.
“The distinction that the law has drawn between tort recovery for physical injuries and warranty recovery for economic loss is not arbitrary and does not rest on the ‘luck’ of one plaintiff in having an accident causing physical injury. The distinction rests, rather, on an understanding of the nature of the responsibility a manufacturer must undertake in distributing his products.” Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d, at 18, 403 P. 2d, at 151. When a product injures only itself the reasons for imposing a tort duty are weak and those for leaving the party to its contractual remedies are strong.
The tort concern with safety is reduced when an injury is only to the product itself. When a person is injured, the “cost of an injury and the loss of time or health may be an overwhelming misfortune,” and one the person is not prepared to meet. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d, at 462, 150 P. 2d, at 441 (opinion concurring in judgment). In contrast, when a product injures itself, the commercial user stands to lose the value of the product, risks the displeasure of its customers who find that the product does not meet their needs, or, as in this case, experiences increased costs in performing a service. Losses like these can be insured. See 10A G. Couch, Cyclopedia of Insurance Law §§42:385-42:401, 42:414-417 (2d ed. 1982);-7 E. Benedict, Admiralty, Form No. 1.16-7, p. 1-239 (7th ed. 1985); 5A J. Appleman & J. Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice §3252 (1970). Society need not presume that a customer needs special protection. The increased cost to the public that would result from holding a manufacturer liable in tort for injury to the product itself is not justified. Cf. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F. 2d 169, 173 (CA2 1947).
Damage to a product itself is most naturally understood as a warranty claim. Such damage means simply that the product has not met the customer’s expectations, or, in other words, that the customer has received “insufficient product value.” See J. White & R. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code 406 (2d ed. 1980). The maintenance of product value and quality is precisely the purpose of express and implied warranties. See UCC §2-313 (express warranty), §2-314 (implied warranty of merchantability), and § 2-315 (warranty of fitness for a particular purpose). Therefore, a claim of a nonworking product can be brought as a breach-of-warranty action. Or, if the customer prefers, it can reject the product or revoke its acceptance and sue for breach of contract. See UCC §§2-601, 2-608, 2-612.
Contract law, and the law of warranty in particular, is well suited to commercial controversies of the sort involved in this case because the parties may set the terms of their own agreements. The manufacturer can restrict its liability, within limits, by disclaiming warranties or limiting remedies. See UCC §§2-316, 2-719. In exchange, the purchaser pays less for the product. Since a commercial situation generally does not involve large disparities in bargaining power, cf. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N. J. 358, 161 A. 2d 69 (1960), we see no reason to intrude into the parties’ allocation of the risk.
While giving recognition to the manufacturer’s bargain, warranty law sufficiently protects the purchaser by allowing it to obtain the benefit of its bargain. See White & Summers, supra, ch. 10. The expectation damages available in warranty for purely economic loss give a plaintiff the full benefit of its bargain by compensating for forgone business opportunities. See Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1, 46 Yale L. J. 52, 60-63 (1936); R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law §4.8 (3d ed. 1986). Recovery on a warranty theory would give the charterers their repair costs and lost profits, and would place them in the position they would have been in had the turbines functioned properly. See Hawkins v. McGee, 84 N. H. 114, 146 A. 641 (1929). Thus, both the nature of the injury and the resulting damages indicate it is more natural to think of injury to a product itself in terms of warranty.
A warranty action also has a built-in limitation on liability, whereas a tort action could subject the manufacturer to damages of an indefinite amount. The limitation in a contract action comes from the agreement of the parties and the requirement that consequential damages, such as lost profits, be a foreseeable result of the breach. See Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854). In a warranty action where the loss is purely economic, the limitation derives from the requirements of foreseeability and of privity, which is still generally enforced for such claims in a commercial setting. See UCC §2-715; White & Summers, swpra, at 389, 396, 406-410.
In products-liability law, where there is a duty to the public generally, foreseeability is an inadequate brake. Cf. Kinsman Transit Co. v. City of Buffalo, 388 F. 2d 821 (CA2 1968). See also Perlman, Interference with Contract and Other Economic Expectancies: A Clash of Tort and Contract Doctrine, 49 U. Chi. L. Rev. 61, 71-72 (1982). Permitting recovery for all foreseeable claims for purely economic loss could make a manufacturer liable for vast sums. It would be difficult for a manufacturer to take into account the expectations of persons downstream who may encounter its product. In this case, for example, if the charterers — already one step removed from the transaction — were permitted to recover their economic losses, then the companies that subchartered the ships might claim their economic losses from the delays, and the charterers’ customers also might claim their economic losses, and so on. “The law does not spread its protection so far.” Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U. S. 303, 309 (1927).
And to the extent that courts try to limit purely economic damages in tort, they do so by relying on a far murkier line, one that negates the charterers’ contention that permitting such recovery under a prcducts-liability theory enables admiralty courts to avoid difficult line drawing. Cf. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N. Y. 170, 174 N. E. 441 (1931); Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank, 752 F. 2d 1019, 1046-1052 (CA5 1985) (en banc) (dissenting opinion), cert. pending sub nom. White v. M/V Testbank, No. 84-1808.
D
For the first three counts, the defective turbine components allegedly injured only the turbines themselves. Therefore, a strict products-liability theory of recovery is unavailable to the charterers. Any warranty claims would be subject to Delaval’s limitation, both in time and scope, of its warranty liability. App. 78-79. The record indicates that Seatrain and Delaval reached a settlement agreement. Deposition of Stephen Russell, p. 32. We were informed that these charterers could not have asserted the warranty claims. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 36. Even so, the charterers should be left to the terms of their bargains, which explicitly allocated the cost of repairs.
In the charterers’ agreements with the owners, the charterers took the ships in “as is” condition, after inspection, and assumed full responsibility for them, including responsibility for maintenance and repairs and for obtaining certain forms of insurance. Id., at 11, 16-17, 35; App. 86, 88, 99, 101, 112, 114, 125-126, 127. In a separate agreement between each charterer and Seatrain, Seatrain agreed to guarantee certain payments and covenants by each charterer to the owner. Id., at 142-156. The contractual responsibilities thus were clearly laid out. There is no reason to extricate the parties from their bargain.
Similarly, in the fifth count, alleging the reverse installation of the astern guardian valve, the only harm was to the propulsion system itself rather than to. persons or other property. Even assuming that Delaval’s supervision was negligent, as we must on this summary judgment motion, Delaval owed no duty under a products-liability theory based on negligence to avoid causing purely economic loss. Cf. Flintkote Co. v. Dravo Corp., 678 F. 2d 942 (CA11 1982); S. M. Wilson & Co. v. Smith International, Inc., 587 F. 2d 1363 (CA9 1978). Thus, whether stated in negligence or strict liability, no products-liability claim lies in admiralty when the only injury claimed is economic loss.
While we hold that the fourth count should have been dismissed, we affirm the entry of judgment for Delaval.
It is so ordered.
Compare East River S.S. Corp. v. Delaval Turbine, Inc., 752 F. 2d 903 (CA3 1985) (en bane) (this case), with Ingram River Equipment, Inc. v. Pott Industries, Inc., 756 F. 2d 649 (CA8 1985), cert. pending, No. 85-12; Miller Industries v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 733 F. 2d 813 (CA11 1984); Emerson G. M. Diesel, Inc. v. Alaskan Enterprise, 732 F. 2d 1468 (CA9 1984). See also Pan-Alaska Fisheries, Inc. v. Marine Constr. & Design Co., 565 F. 2d 1129 (CA9 1977); and Jig The Third Corp. v. Puritan Marine Ins. Underwriters Corp., 519 F. 2d 171 (CA5 1975). Cf. Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank, 752 F. 2d 1019 (CA5 1985) (en bane), cert. pending sub nom. White v. M/V Testbank, No. 84-1808.
The charterers do not ask us to defer to the law of New Jersey, the forum State. Nor is application of state-law principles required here. New Jersey lacks any “pressing and significant” interest in the tort action. See Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U. S. 731, 739 (1961). In any event, reliance on state law would not help the charterers’ case, since it mandates the same conclusion reached by the District Court and the Court of Appeals: that Delaval had no tort duty to the charterers. See Spring Motors Distributors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 98 N. J. 555, 579, 489 A. 2d 660, 672 (1985).
The question is not answered by the Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 395 and 402A (1965), or by the Uniform Commercial Code, see Wade, Is Section 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts Preempted by the UCC and Therefore Unconstitutional?, 42 Tenn. L. Rev. 123 (1974).
Congress, which has considered adopting national products-liability legislation, also has been wrestling with the question whether economic loss should be recoverable under a products-liability theory. See 1 L. Frumer & M. Friedman, Products Liability § 4C (1986). When S. 100, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (the Product Liability Act) was introduced, it excluded, § 2(6), recovery for commercial loss. Suggestions have been made for revising this provision. See Amendment 16, 131 Cong. Rec. 5461 (1985); Amendment 100, id., at
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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H
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Douglas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this case Bentex and some 20 other firms that market drugs containing pentylenetetrazol filed this suit for a declaratory judgment that their drugs containing pentylenetetrazol are generally recognized as safe and effective, and thus not “new drugs” within the meaning of §201 (p) (1) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, as amended, 76 Stat. 781, 21 U. S. C. § 321 (p) (1). They also sought exemption from the new effectiveness requirements by reason of § 107 (c) (4) of the 1962 amendments to the Act, known as the “grandfather” clause.
As part of the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA’s) Drug Efficacy Study Implementation program, three separate National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council (NAS-NRC) panels reviewed the evidence concerning these drugs, and each concluded that the drug was “ineffective” for the indicated use. The Commissioner concluded there was a lack of substantial evidence that these drugs were effective for their intended uses and gave notice of his intention to initiate proceedings to withdraw approval of the new drug applications (NDA’s). FDA had taken the position that withdrawal of approval of an NDA would operate to remove marketing approval for all drugs of similar composition, known as “me-too” drugs, whether or not they were expressly covered by an effective NDA. Aecord-ingly, the notice invited the holders of the NDA’s for drugs containing pentylenetetrazol, “and any interested person who might be adversely affected by their removal from the market/’ to submit “adequate and well-controlled studies” to establish the effectiveness of the drugs. See § 505 (d), 21 U. S. C. § 355 (d). Only one NDA holder submitted further evidence, which the Commissioner held did not satisfy the statutory standard. He thereupon gave notice of intent to issue an order withdrawing approval of the NDA’s under § 505 (e), 21 U. S. C. § 355 (e). Again, all those who might be adversely affected by withdrawal of the NDA’s were given the opportunity to participate. Only one NDA holder requested a hearing but filed no data to support it. The Commissioner issued orders withdrawing approval of the three NDA’s (35 Fed. Reg. 14412); no appeal was taken. This suit in the District Court followed. It appears that all of the parties to this suit market “me-too” drugs, none of which was expressly covered by an effective NDA.
The District Court held that although it could determine whether the drugs were “new” or “grandfathered” drugs, its jurisdiction was concurrent with that of FDA and that FDA should resolve the “new drug” issue in an administrative proceeding. It entered an injunction to preserve the status quo and ruled that if FDA should decline to hold a hearing it would determine the issue. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded with directions that the District Court determine whether the challenged drugs may lawfully be marketed without approved NDA’s. 463 F. 2d 363. It held that FDA has no jurisdiction, either primary or concurrent, to decide in an administrative proceeding what is a “new drug” for which an NDA is required. In its view the 1962 Act established two forums for the regulation of drugs: an administrative one for premarketing clear-anees for “new drugs” or withdrawal of previously approved NDA’s, with the right of appeal; and, second, a judicial one for enforcement of the requirement that “new drugs” be cleared as safe and effective before marketing by providing the Government with judicial remedies of seizure, injunction, and criminal prosecution available solely in the District Court. Id., at 371-372.
We reverse the Court of Appeals.
FDA, as a result of an NAS-NRC study and after due notice, faced up to the problem of proposing withdrawal of drugs found to be lacking in substantial evidence of effectiveness. One method would be to have 1,000 withdrawal hearings — perhaps as many as 3,500, each one lasting probably for weeks. The cost in time and budget would be enormous. Accordingly, FDA issued regulations, already discussed in Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., ante, p. 609, defining the “scientific principles which characterize an adequate and well-controlled clinical investigation,” which elaborates on the statutory “substantial evidence” test. And, as we held in Hynson, no basis for a hearing under these regulations would be laid unless a party seeking a hearing proffered at least some evidence of that nature and quality.
By May 1972, 102 final orders effecting withdrawal of approval for 452 NDA's had been issued; and they resulted in the removal from the market of an additional 1,473 “me-too” drugs. FDA was still troubled because under the 1962 Act no census of the marketplace was authorized. That is why Congress enacted the Drug Listing Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 559, 21 U. S. C. §§ 331 (p), 335 (e), 360 (e), (f), (c), (d) (1970 ed., Supp. II). That Act requires manufacturers to submit to FDA a list of all drugs they market, including data showing their composition, labeling, and advertising. The Senate Report stated:
“The effective enforcement of the drug provisions of the Act requires the ready availability of a current inventory of all marketed drugs. The Secretary is just completing a thorough review of the effectiveness of drugs marketed pursuant to new drug applications during the period 1938-1962, as required by the Drug Amendments of 1962. Application of the results of this important review to related drugs would be frustrated if a list of all marketed drugs were not easily obtained.”
FDA also realized that it is impossible to apply the 1962 amendments to over-the-counter (OTC) drugs on a case-by-case basis. There are between 100,000 and 500,000 of these products, few of which were previously approved by FDA. In May 1972 FDA adopted a procedure for determining whether particular OTC products, not covered by NDA’s are safe products, not ineffective, and not misbranded. 37 Fed. Reg. 9464. The procedure involves the establishment of independent expert panels for different categories of OTC drugs (e. g., antacids, laxatives, analgesics) which would review all available data and prepare monographs prescribing drug composition, labeling, and manufacturing controls. OTC’s conforming to the monograph will not be considered either misbranded or a “new drug” requiring an NDA. The regulation provides for a hearing before the expert panel, comments and rebuttal comments on the monograph, and finally a hearing before the Commissioner and judicial review. Id., at 9475.
This case, like the cross-petition in the Hynson case (No. 72-414) raises the question whether FDA has authority to decide in an administrative hearing whether a drug satisfies the new effectiveness requirements of the Act. As noted, the Commissioner ordered that three NDA’s for the drugs in question be withdrawn. Review of the order was not sought in the Court of Appeals as provided in § 505 (h), 21 U. S. C. § 355 (h). Rather, the aggrieved manufacturers of “me-too” drugs filed suit in the District Court, with the results we have already detailed. The narrow question is whether the FDA may decide whether a drug is a “new drug” on referral from a district court.
As already noted, an order denying an NDA or withdrawing one is reviewable by the Court of Appeals, § 505 (h); and we see no reason why Congress could not make one method of review the exclusive one. Certainly an order that does not deny or withdraw an NDA is reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act, if it declares a “new drug” status. See Hynson, supra, at 627. In bolstering that conclusion we should note in passing that Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136, 144, said that the provisions stated in this Act for judicial review do not manifest “a congressional purpose to eliminate judicial review of other kinds of agency action.” While § 505 (h) would appear to be the exclusive method of obtaining judicial review of FDA’s order withdrawing an NDA covering the instant drugs, the Government apparently did not oppose the District Court’s taking jurisdiction, or appeal from its action, and presents no objection to the exercise by the courts of jurisdiction in this case. It does, however, strenuously oppose the conclusions reached by the Court of Appeals.
That court, in holding that FDA has no jurisdiction to determine the “new drug” status of a drug, stated that the question of “new drug” status is never presented when an application of a manufacturer for approval is filed. Parties, of course, cannot confer jurisdiction; only Congress can do so. The line sought to be drawn by the Court of Appeals is FDA action on NDA’s pursuant to § 505 (d) and § 505 (e), on the one hand, and the question of “new drug” determination on the other. We can discern no such jurisdictional line under the Act. The FDA, as already stated, may deny an NDA where there is a lack of “substantial evidence” of the drug’s effectiveness, based, as we have outlined, on clinical investigation by experts. But the “new drug” definition under § 201 (p) encompasses a drug “not generally recognized, among experts qualified by scientific training and experience to evaluate the safety and effectiveness of drugs, as safe and effective for use.” Whether a particular drug is a “new drug,” depends in part on the expert knowledge and experience of scientists based on controlled clinical experimentation and backed by substantial support in scientific literature. One function is not peculiar to judicial expertise, the other to administrative expertise. The two types of cases overlap and strongly suggest that Congress desired that the administrative agency make both kinds of determination. Even where no such administrative determination has been made and the issue arises in a district court in enforcement proceedings, it would be commonplace for the court to await an appropriate administrative declaration before it acted. See Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U. S. 41, 50-51; FPC v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 406 U. S. 621, 647. It may, of course, be true that in some cases general recognition that a drug is efficacious might be made without the kind of scientific support necessary to obtain approval of an NDA. But, as we indicate in Hynson, supra, at 631, the reach of scientific inquiry under both § 505 (d) and § 201 (p) is precisely the same.
We think that it is implicit in the regulatory scheme, not spelled out in haec verba, that FDA has jurisdiction to decide with administrative finality, subject to the types of judicial review provided, the “new drug” status of individual drugs or classes of drugs. The deluge of litigation that would follow if “me-too” drugs and OTC drugs had to receive de novo hearings in the courts would inure to the interests of manufacturers and merchants in drugs, but not to the interests of the public that Congress was anxious to protect by the 1962 amendments, as well as OTC drugs and drugs covered by the 1972 Act. We are told that FDA is incapable of handling a caseload of more than perhaps 10 or 15 de novo judicial proceedings in a year. Clearly, if FDA were required to litigate, on a case-by-case basis, the “new drug” status of each drug now marketed, the regulatory scheme of the Act would be severely undermined, if not totally destroyed. Moreover, a case-by-case approach is inherently unfair because it requires compliance by one manufacturer while his competitors marketing similar drugs remain free to violate the Act. In a case much more clouded with doubts than this one, we held that we would not “in the absence of compelling evidence that such was Congress’ intention . . . prohibit administrative action imperative for the achievement of an agency’s ultimate purposes.” Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U. S. 747, 780. And see Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exchange, 409 U. S. 289, 304-306.
We conclude that the District Court’s referral of the “new drug” and the “grandfather” issues to FDA was appropriate, as these are the kinds of issues peculiarly suited to initial determination by the FDA. As the District Court said: “Evaluation of conflicting reports as to the reputation of drugs among experts in the field is not a matter well left to a court without chemical or medical background.” The determination whether a drug is generally recognized as safe and effective within the meaning of §201(p)(l) necessarily implicates complex chemical and pharmacological considerations. Threshold questions within the peculiar expertise of an administrative agency are appropriately routed to the agency, while the court stays its hand. As we stated in Far Eastern Conference v. United States, 342 U. S. 570, 574-575: “[I]n cases raising issues of fact not within the conventional experience of judges or cases requiring the exercise of administrative discretion, agencies created by Congress for regulating the subject matter should not be passed over. This is so even though the facts after they have been appraised by specialized competence serve as a premise for legal consequences to be judicially defined. Uniformity and consistency in the regulation of business entrusted to a particular agency are secured, and the limited functions of review by the judiciary are more rationally exercised, by preliminary resort for ascertaining and interpreting the circumstances underlying legal issues to agencies that are better equipped than courts by specialization, by insight gained through experience, and by more flexible procedure.” And see Port of Boston Marine Terminal Assn. v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic, 400 U. S. 62, 68; Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exchange, supra, at 304-306.
Reversed.
MR. Justice Brennan took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Mr. Justice Stewart took no part in the decision of this case.
Volume 37 Fed. Reg. 23187, adding § 130.40 to 21 CFR, defines “identical, related, or similar drug” as used in this Act to include “other brands, potencies, dosage forms, salts, and esters of the same drug moiety as well as of any drug moiety related in chemical structure or known pharmacological properties.” It also provides all persons with an interest in such drugs an opportunity for hearing on any proposed withdrawal of NDA approval for the basic drug. A district court order directing FDA to apply the NAS-NRC evaluation to all “me-too” drugs is reproduced in 37 Fed. Reg. 26623-26624.
35 Fed. Reg. 3073 and 7250.
See the Appendix in Hynson, ante, p. 634.
Hearings on the Present Status of Competition in the Pharmaceutical Industry before the Subcommittee on Monopoly of the Senate Select Committee on Small Business, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 22, p. 8525.
Filings are due in June 1973. 37 Fed. Reg. 26432.
S. Rep. No. 92-924, p. 2.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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H
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Jackson
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondent Stone owned a house in Mooresville, Indiana which he rented to one Locke for $75 per month beginning on or about August 1, 1944. As this was the first rental of the premises, the applicable law and regulations imposed on the owner a duty to file a registration statement within thirty days.
The respondent failed to register the property. He sold it in April 1945 and registration by the new owner brought notice to the Area Rent Director of respondent’s prior renting of the property without complying with the registration requirement. On June 28, 1945, the Director, pursuant to the regulations, reduced the rental from $75 to $45 per month, effective from the first rental, and ordered the excess refunded within thirty days thereafter. Respondent failed to refund, the tenant did not sue and this action was instituted by the Price Administrator. The District Court and the Court of Appeals, among other things, held that the one-year statute of limitations ran from the dates of payment of the rentals. 163 F. 2d 393. This conflicted with the holding of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit which, under similar circumstances, held that the limitation period started upon default in refunding the excess within thirty days after the refund order. Creedon v. Babcock, 163 F. 2d 480. We granted certiorari limited to this question. 332 U.S. 835.
No question is raised, and none could have been raised in this proceeding, as to the validity of the relevant regulations and the refund order, either on the ground of retroactivity or otherwise, because any challenge to the validity of either would have to go to the Emergency Court of Appeals. 50 U. S. C. App. (Supp. V, 1946) §924; Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U. S. 503. See also Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U. S. 138. Taking the legislation, the regulations and the order to be valid exercises of governmental power, as we are thus required to do, the only question before us is when do excessive collections by the landlord begin to enjoy the shelter of the statute of limitations?
Under the system of rent control as established, a landlord is required to register rented accommodations within thirty days after they are first devoted to that use. This brings notice to the control authority that the premises are within its official responsibility and provides data for quick, if tentative, determination as to whether the rental exacted exceeds the level permitted by the policy of Congress set out in the statute.
But when, as in this case, the landlord does not comply with this requirement, there is likelihood that, as happened here, his transaction will be overlooked for some time or perhaps escape scrutiny entirely. But the landlord is not allowed thus to profit from his own disobedience of the law. If he could keep the excess collections by thus retarding or preventing scrutiny of his contract, he would gain an advantage over all landlords who complied with the Act as well as over tenants whose necessity for shelter is too pressing to admit of bargaining over price. The plan therefore provides that, despite his failure to register, the landlord may continue to collect his unapproved price, but only on condition that it is subject to revision by the public authority and to a refund of anything then found to have been excessive.
The plan of the statute and the regulations issued pursuant to it was applied in this case. The landlord failed to register the property. His rental operations escaped notice of the authorities until fortuitously disclosed. He collected as he had a right to do, but subject to readjustment, a rental fixed by himself that was found on inquiry to exceed by 66-2/3% what was fair rental value of the property. He was ordered to refund the excess. He now contends that he can keep all of it that he collected upwards of a year before the action was commenced, upon the ground that the one-year statute of limitations runs, not from the date of his default in obeying the refund order, but from the date of each collection of rental.
We cannot sustain his contention. The statute and regulations made his rentals tentative but not unlawful. Until the contingency of readjustment occurred, the tenant could have had no cause of action for recovery of any part of the rental exacted by the landlord. The cause of action now does not rest upon, and hence cannot date from, mere collection. The duty to refund was created and measured by the refund order and was not breached until that order was disobeyed. It would be unusual, to say the least, if a statutory scheme were to be construed to include a period during which an action could not be commenced as a part of the time within which it would become barred. United States v. Wurts, 303 U. S. 414. We think no such result was expressed or intended. It was from the violation which occurred when the order was not obeyed within the required time that the statute of limitations commenced to run. Cf. Rawlings v. Ray, 312 U. S. 96; Fisher v. Whiton, 317 U. S. 217; Cope v. Anderson, 331 U. S. 461.
It is now suggested that no cause of action can be based on a refund order, irrespective of its validity. As we have pointed out, the validity of the regulation and order are conclusive upon us here. This cause of action is based upon violation of an “order . . . prescribing a maximum [rent] . . . The command to refund cannot be treated as a thing apart, but must be taken in its setting as an integral and necessary part of the order fixing the maximum rent. It was this order that was disobeyed. It would be a strange situation if there were authority to order the landlord to make a refund but no legal obligation on his part to pay it. We think it clear that default in obedience to the requirement of refund gives rise to the cause of action sued upon herein.
It is also suggested that the refund order applies the law to the landlord retroactively. Quite apart from the fact that this is an objection to the order itself rather than to the question of limitation of time, we think the suggestion to be without merit. This is not the case of a new law reaching backwards to make payments illegal that were free of infirmity when made. By legislation and regulation in force before the collections were made, the landlord’s own default in registering had rendered these payments conditional, subject to revision and to refund. Readjustment under these conditions cannot be said to be retroactive law making.
We hold that the one-year statute of limitations began to run on the date that a duty to refund was breached, and on this point only we reverse the judgment of the court below.
Reversed.
Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, 56 Stat. 23, as amended by Stabilization Extension Act of 1944, 58 Stat. 632, 50 U. S. C. App. (Supp. V, 1946) § 901 et seq.
Section 7, Rent Regulations for Housing, 8 Fed. Reg. 14663, 10 Fed. Reg. 3436, providing in part as follows: “Registration — (a) Registration statement. On or before the date specified in Schedule A of this regulation, or within 30 days after the property is first rented, whichever date is the later, every landlord of housing accommodations rented or offered for rent shall file in triplicate a written statement on the form provided therefor to be known as a registration statement. The statement shall identify each dwelling unit and specify the maximum rent provided by this regulation for such dwelling unit and shall contain such other information as the Administrator shall require. The original shall remain on file with the Administrator and he shall cause one copy to be delivered to the tenant and one copy, stamped to indicate that it is a correct copy of the original, to be returned to the landlord. . .
Section 4, Rent Regulations for Housing, 8 Fed. Reg. 14663, 10 Fed. Reg. 3436, providing in part as follows: “Maximum rents. . . . (e) First rent after effective date. For (1) newly constructed housing accommodations without priority rating first rented on or after the effective date of regulation, or (2) housing accommodations changed on or after such effective date so as to result in an increase or decrease of the number of dwelling units in such housing accommodations, or (3) housing accommodations not rented at any time during the two months ending on the maximum rent date nor between that date and the effective date, the first rent for such accommodations after the change or the effective date, as the case may be, but in no event more than the maximum rent provided for such accommodations by any order of the Administrator issued prior to September 22, 1942. Within 30 days after so renting the landlord shall register the accommodations as provided in section 7. The Administrator may order a decrease in the maximum rent as provided in section 5 (c).
“If the landlord fails to file a proper registration statement within the time specified (except where a registration statement was filed prior to October 1, 1943), the rent received for any rental period commencing on or after the date of the first renting or October 1, 1943, whichever is the later, shall be received subject to refund to the tenant of any amount in excess of the maximum rent which may later be fixed by an order under section 5 (c) (1). Such amount shall be refunded to the tenant within 30 days after the date of issuance of the order. . . .”
Section 205 (e) of the Act as amended, 50 U. S. C. App. (Supp. Y, 1946) § 925 (e) provides: “If any person selling a commodity violates a regulation, order, or price schedule prescribing a maximum price or maximum prices, the person who buys such commodity for use or consumption other than in the course of trade or business may, within one year from the date of the occurrence of the violation, except as hereinafter provided, bring an action against the seller on account of the overcharge. ... For the purposes of this section the payment or receipt of rent for defense-area housing accommodations shall be deemed the buying or selling of a commodity, as the case may be ... . If any person selling a commodity violates a regulation, order, or price schedule prescribing a maximum price or maximum prices, and the buyer either fails to institute an action under this subsection within thirty days from the date of the occurrence of the violation or is not entitled for any reason to bring the action, the Administrator may institute such action on behalf of the United States within such one-year period. . . .”
The functions of the Administrator were subsequently transferred to the Housing Expediter who appears as petitioner here.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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H
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Chief Justice Burger
delivered the opinion of the Court.
These appeals present the questions whether under the Compensation Clause, Art. Ill, § 1, Congress may repeal or modify a statutorily defined formula for annual cost-of-living increases in the compensation of federal judges, and, if so, whether it must act before the particular increases take effect.
I
Congress has enacted an interlocking network of statutes to fix the compensation of high-level officials in the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Branches, including federal judges. It provides for quadrennial review of overall salary levels and annual cost-of-living adjustments determined in the same fashion as those for federal employees generally. In four consecutive fiscal years, Congress, with respect to these high-level Executive Branch, Legislative, and Judicial salaries, enacted statutes to stop or to reduce previously authorized cost-of-living increases initially intended to be automatically operative under that statutory scheme, once the Executive had determined the amount. In two of these years, the legislation was signed by the President and became law before the start of the fiscal year; in the other two years, on or after the first day of the fiscal year.
A
The salaries of high-level Executive, Legislative, and Judicial officials are set under the Postal Revenue and Federal Salary Act of 1967, 81 Stat. 642, as amended, 2 U. S. C. §§351-361 (1976 ed. and Supp. III). The Salary Act provides for a quadrennial review, starting in 1969, of these officials compensation. A Commission on Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Salaries periodically examines the salary levels for these positions in relation to one another and to the General Schedule (GS), the matrix of grades and steps that determines the salaries of most federal employees. Its recommendations are submitted to the President, who in turn submits that report with his recommendations to Congress in the next budget. Each House of Congress must vote on the President’s proposal within 60 days. If both Houses approve, the adjustment takes effect at the start of the first pay period beginning 30 days thereafter.
In 1975, Congress adopted the Executive Salary Cost-of-Living Adjustment Act, Pub. L. 94-82, 89 Stat. 419. The Adjustment Act subjects the salaries covered by the Salary Act to the same annual adjustment made in the General Schedule under the Federal Pay Comparability Act of 1970, 5 U. S. C. §§ 5305-5306. The Comparability Act requires that each year the President designate an agent to compare federal salaries to data on private-sector salaries compiled by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The agent must undertake certain steps in his investigation and, ultimately, submit a report to the President recommending adjustments as deemed appropriate to bring federal employees’ salaries in line with prevailing rates in the private sector. A separate Advisory Committee on Federal Pay then reviews that report and makes its own independent recommendation. Thereafter, the President issues an order ádjusting the salaries of federal employees and submits a report to Congress listing the overall percentage of the adjustment and including the reports and recommendations submitted to him on the subject. If the President believes that economic conditions or conditions of national emergency' make the planned adjustment inappropriate, he may submit to Congress before September 1 an alternative plan for adjusting federal employees’ salaries. This alternative plan controls unless within 30 days of continuous legislative session either House of Congress adopts a resolution disapproving of the President’s proposed plan.'If one House disapproves, the agent’s recommendation governs. The increases take effect with the start of the first pay period starting on or after the beginning of the federal fiscal year on October 1.
This complex web of base salaries adjusted annually for civil service employees and again quadrennially for higher-rank positions has led to the following statutory definition of a United States district judge’s compensation:
“Each judge of a district court of the United States shall receive a salary at an annual rate determined under section 225 of the Federal Salary Act of 1967 (2 U. S. C. 351-361), as adjusted by section 461 of this title.” 28 U. S. C. § 135.
Similarly phrased statutes apply to all other Article III judges. Title 28 U. S. C. § 461 in turn provides that the annual GS adjustment, rounded to the nearest multiple of $100, shall apply to salaries subject to that section, effective at the start of the next pay period. Compensation of judges is set at an annual figure and paid monthly, with each pay period coinciding with the calendar month. See 5 U. S. C. § 5505. Accordingly, any annual change in salary under the Adjustment Act takes effect at the beginning of October, the start of the fiscal year.
B
In October 1975, GS salaries were increased by an average of 5% under the terms of the Comparability Act. Federal judges and the other officials covered by the Adjustment Act received similar increases. In each of the following four years, however, Congress adopted a statute that altered the application of the Adjustment Act for the officials of the three branches subject to it. To avoid the confusion generated by a fiscal year’s having a number different from the calendar year in which it begins, we refer to these as Years 1, 2, 3, and 4. We turn now to the specific actions taken for each of the four years in question.
Year 1
In October 1976, GS salaries were increased by an average of 4.8% under the procedures of the Comparability Act outlined earlier. On October 1, the first day of the new fiscal year and the first day of the relevant pay period, the President signed the Legislative Branch Appropriation Act, 1977, Pub. L. 94 440, 90 Stat. 1439. Title II of that statute provided:
“[N]one of the funds contained in this Act shall be used to increase salaries of Members of the House of Representatives.... No part of the funds appropriated in this Act or any other Act shall be used to pay the salary of an individual in a position or office referred to in section 225 (f) of the Federal Salary Act of 1967, as amended (2 U. S. C. 356), including a Delegate to the House of Representatives, at a rate which exceeds the salary rate in effect on September 30, 1976, for such position or office...
By virtue of the reference to the Salary Act, this statute applied to federal judges; its import, therefore, was to prohibit paying the 4.8% raise on October 1, 1976, under the Adjustment Act to federal judges, as well as Members of Congress and high-level officials in the Executive Branch.
In March 1977, Members of Congress, federal judges, and high-ranking employees in the Executive Branch received raises pursuant to the quadrennial review under the Salary Act. The salary of a United States district judge, for example, increased to $54,500; circuit judges and special appellate judges, to $57,500; Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, to $72,000. 42 Fed. Reg. 10297 (1977).
Year 2
In October 1977, GS salaries, which generally are not subject to the quadrennial review under the Salary Act, were increased an average of 7.1% under the Comparability Act. On July 11, 1977, the President signed Pub. L. 95-66, 91 Stat. 270, which provided:
“[T]he first adjustment which, but for this Act, would be made after the date of enactment of this Act under the following provisions of law in the salary or rate of pay of positions or individuals to which such provisions apply [the 7.1% in October 1977], shall not take effect:
“(3) section 461 of title 28, United States Code, relating to comparability adjustments in the salary and rate of pay of justices, judges, commissioners, and referees...
Parallel subdivisions applied to the other officials under the Salary Act. According to the House Report on this measure, an Adjustment Act increase would be inappropriate following the Comparability Act increase earlier in the same calendar year. H. R. Rep. No. 95-458, p. 2 (1977). The effect of this statute was to nullify the contemplated 7.1% increase for these high-level executive employees, Members of Congress, and federal judges.
Year 3
For the fiscal year beginning October 1, 1978, the President approved the recommendation to increase GS salaries an average of 5.5%. On September 30, 1978, the final day of the preceding fiscal year, however, the President signed the Legislative Branch Appropriation Act, 1979, Pub. L. 95-391, 92 Stat. 763. Section 304 (a) of that Act stated:
“No part of the funds appropriated for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1979, by this Act or any other Act may be used to pay the salary or pay of any individual in any office or position in the legislative, executive, or judicial branch, or in the government of the District of Columbia, at a rate which exceeds the rate (or maximum rate, if higher) of salary or basic pay payable for such office or position for September 30, 1978....”
The effect of this.provision was to prohibit paying the 5.5% increase authorized by the Adjustment Act for the fiscal year beginning October 1, 1978.
Year 4
For the fiscal year beginning October 1, 1979, the President’s statutory agent transmitted a recommendation for an average increase of 10.41%. However, on August 31, the President invoked his power under the Comparability Act to alter this rate; he reduced the proposed increase to 7% from the 10.41% recommended. These increases, the Government concedes, took effect on October 1, 1979. Moreover, because the September 30, 1978, statute (Year 3) prohibited paying the 5.5% increase only during fiscal year 1979, that increase took effect as well; along with the 7% adjustment, this brought the total to 12.9%. Nevertheless, the Government now contends that this increase was in effect for only 11 days, since on October 12, the President signed Pub. L. 96-86, 93 Stat. 656. Section 101 (c) of this statute stated, in relevant part:
“For fiscal year 1980, funds available for payment to executive employees, which includes Members of Congress, who under existing law are entitled to approximately 12.9 percent increase in pay, shall not be used to pay any such employee or elected or appointed official any sum in excess of 5.5 percent increase in existing pay and such sum if accepted shall be in lieu of the 12.9 percent due for such fiscal year.”
None of the appellees have exercised the statutory option to accept the 5.5% increase pursuant to the final clause of this statute; in terms that statute provides such acceptance of the 5.5% operates as a waiver of all claims to rates higher than the 5.5%. The Government concedes the 5.5% increase has continued in effect.
C
On February 7, 1978, 13 United States District Judges filed an action (No. 79-983 in this Court) in the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The complaint, which named the United States as defendant, challenged the validity of the statutes in Years 1 and 2 under the Compensation Clause, U. S. Const., Art. III, § 1. The plaintiff judges were certified as representatives of two classes of Article III judges, the classes defined with reference to Years 1 and 2. The Government, while not opposing certification of the classes, defended the validity of both statutes.
In an opinion filed August 29, 1979, the District Court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs, appellees here. 478 F. Supp. 621. A corresponding judgment order was entered September 24. On appeal by the Government, we postponed decision on jurisdiction to the hearing on the merits and directed the parties to address the effect of 28 U. S. C. § 455, if any, on the jurisdiction of the District Court and this Court. 444 U. S. 1068 (1980).
No. 79-1689 comes to us from a similar complaint filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois on October 19, 1979, after the District Court had entered judgment in No. 79-983. At issue this time were the statutes in Years 3 and 4. The same 13 judges, joined by one other, again sought to represent two classes of Article III judges defined by the years. The United States is defendant. The case was referred to the same member of the District Court who had presided over the proceedings in No. 79-983.
On January 31, 1980, the District Court entered an order certifying the classes and granting summary judgment for the plaintiffs, appellees in No. 79-1689. Based on its decision in No. 79-983, the court held that the statute in Year 3 violated the Compensation Clause. The court noted with respect to Year 4 that the relevant statute referred only to “executive employees.” It then held that while it was doubtful Congress intended the statute to apply to judges, the statute would be unconstitutional if Congress did so intend. In either case, the Adjustment Act increase for Year 4 took effect.' Judgment for appellees was formally entered February 12. On the Government’s appeal to this Court, we postponed consideration of jurisdiction to the merits and consolidated this case with No. 79-983 for briefing and oral argument. 447 U. S. 919 (1980).
II
A
Jurisdiction
Although it is clear that the District Judge and all Justices of this Court have an interest in the outcome of these cases, there is no doubt whatever as to this Court’s jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1252 or that of the District Court under 28 U. S. C. § 1346 (a) (2) (1976 ed., Supp. III). Section 455 of Title 28 neither expressly nor by implication purports to deal with jurisdiction. On its face § 455 provides for disqualification of individual judges under specified circumstances; it does not affect the jurisdiction of a court. Nothing in the text or the history of § 455 suggests that Congress intended, by that section, to amend the vast array of statutes conferring jurisdiction over certain matters on various federal courts.
B
Disqualification
Jurisdiction being clear, our next inquiry is whether 28 U. S. C. § 455 or traditional judicial canons operate to disqualify all United States judges, including the Justices of this Court, from deciding these issues. This threshold question reaches us with both the Government and the appellees in full agreement that § 455 did not require the District Judge, and does not now require each Justice of this Court, to disqualify himself. Rather, they agree the ancient Rule of Necessity prevails over the disqualification standards of § 455. Notwithstanding this concurrence of views resulting from the Government’s concession, the sensitivity of the issues leads us to address the applicability of § 455 with the same degree of care and attention we would employ if the Government asserted that the District Court lacked jurisdiction or that § 455 mandates disqualification of all judges and Justices without exception.
In federal courts generally, when an individual judge is disqualified from a particular case by reason of § 455, the disqualified judge simply steps aside and allows the normal administrative processes of the court to assign the case to another judge not disqualified. In the cases now before us, however, all Article III judges have an interest in the outcome; assignment of a substitute District Judge was not possible. And in this Court, when one or more Justices are recused but a statutory quorum of six Justices eligible to act remains available, see 28 U. S. C. § 1, the Court may continue to hear the case. Even if all Justices are disqualified in a particular case under § 455, 28 U. S. C. § 2109 authorizes the Chief Justice to remit a direct appeal to the Court of Appeals for final decision by judges not so disqualified. However, in the highly unusual setting of these cases, even with the authority to assign other federal judges to sit temporarily under 28 U. S. C. §§ 291-296 (1976 ed. and Supp. Ill), it is not possible to convene a division of the Court of Appeals with judges who are not subject to the disqualification provisions of § 465. It was precisely considerations of this kind that gave rise to the Rule of Necessity, a well-settled principle at common law that, as Pollack put it, “although a judge had better not, if it can be avoided, take part in the decision of a case in which he has any personal interest, yet he not only may but must do so if the case cannot be heard otherwise.” F. Pollack, A First Book of Jurisprudence 270 (6th ed. 1929).
C
Rule of Necessity
The Rule of Necessity had its genesis at least five and a half centuries ago. Its earliest recorded invocation was in 1430, when it was held that the Chancellor of Oxford could act as judge of a case in which he was a party when there was no provision for appointment of another judge. Y. B. Hil. 8 Hen. VI, f. 19, pi. 6. Early cases in this country confirmed the vitality of the Rule.
The Rule of Necessity has been consistently applied in this country in both state and federal courts. In State ex rel. Mitchell v. Sage Stores Co., 157 Kan. 622, 143 P. 2d 652 (1943), the Supreme Court of Kansas observed:
“[I]t is well established that actual disqualification of a member of a court of last resort will not excuse such member from performing his official duty if failure to do so would result in a denial of a litigant’s constitutional right to have a question, properly presented to such court, adjudicated.” Id., at 629, 143 P. 2d, at 656.
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held:
“The true rule unquestionably is that wherever it becomes necessary for a judge to sit even where he has an interest — where no provision is made for calling another in, or where no one else can take his place — it is his duty to hear and decide, however disagreeable it may be.” Philadelphia v. Fox, 64 Pa. 169, 185 (1870).
Other state and federal courts also have recognized the Rule.
The concept of the absolute duty of judges to hear and decide cases within their jurisdiction revealed in Pollack, supra, and Philadelphia v. Fox, supra, is reflected in decisions of this Court. Our earlier cases dealing with the Compensation Clause did not directly involve the compensation of Justices or name them as parties, and no express reference to the Rule is found. See, e. g., O’Malley v. Woodrough, 307 U. S. 277 (1939); O’Donoghue v. United States, 289 U. S. 516 (1933); Evans v. Gore, 253 U. S. 245 (1920). In Evans, however, an action brought by an individual judge in his own behalf, the Court by clear implication dealt with the Rule:
“Because of the individual relation of the members of this court to the question..., we cannot but regret that its solution falls to us.... But jurisdiction of the present case cannot be declined or renounced. The plaintiff was entitled by law to invoke our decision on the question as respects his own compensation, in which no other judge can have any direct personal interest; and there was no other appellate tribunal to which under the law he could go.” Id., at 247-248.
It would appear, therefore, that this Court so took for granted the continuing validity of the Rule of Necessity that no express reference to it or extended discussion of it was needed.
D
Limited Purpose of Section 455
The objective of § 455 was to deal with the reality of a positive disqualification by reason of an interest or the appearance of possible bias. The House and Senate Reports on § 455 reflect a constant assumption that upon disqualification of a particular judge, another would be assigned to the case. For example:
“[I]f there is [any] reasonable factual basis for doubting the judge’s impartiality, he should disqualify himself and let another fudge preside over the case.” S. Rep. No. 93-419, p. 5 (1973) (emphasis added); H. R. Rep. No. 93-1453, p. 5 (1973) (emphasis added).
The Reports of the two Houses continued:
“The statutes contain ample authority for chief judges to assign other judges to replace either a circuit or district court judge who become disqualified [under §455].” S. Rep. No. 93-419, supra, at 7 (emphasis added); H. R. Rep. No. 93-1453, supra, at 7 (emphasis added).
The congressional purpose so clearly expressed in the Reports gives no hint of altering the ancient Rule of Necessity, a doctrine that had not been questioned under prior judicial disqualification statutes. The declared purpose of § 455 is to guarantee litigants a fair forum in which they can pursue their claims. Far from promoting this purpose, failure to apply the Rule of Necessity would have a contrary effect, for without the Rule, some litigants would be denied their right to a forum. The availability of a forum becomes especially important in these cases. As this Court has observed elsewhere, the Compensation Clause is designed to benefit, not the judges as individuals, but the public interest in a competent and independent judiciary. Evans v. Gore, supra, at 253. The public might be denied resolution of this crucial matter if first the District Judge, and now all the Justices of this Court, were to ignore the mandate of the Rule of Necessity and decline to answer the questions presented. On balance, the public interest would not be served by requiring disqualification under § 455.
We therefore hold that § 455 was not intended by Congress to alter the time-honored Rule of Necessity. And we would not casually infer that the Legislative and Executive Branches sought by the enactment of § 455 to foreclose federal courts from exercising “the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803).
Ill
The Compensation Clause
The Compensation Clause has its roots in the longstanding Anglo-American tradition of an independent Judiciary. A Judiciary free from control by the Executive and the Legislature is essential if there is a right to have claims decided by judges who are free from potential domination by other branches of government. Our Constitution promotes that independence specifically by providing:
“The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.” Art. Ill, § 1.
Hamilton, in The Federalist No. 79, p. 491 (1818) (emphasis deleted), emphasized the importance of protecting judicial compensation:
“In the general course of human nature, a power over a man’s subsistence amounts to a power over his will.”
The relationship of judges’ compensation to their independence was by no means a new idea initiated by the authors of the Constitution. The Act of Settlement in 1701, designed to correct abuses prevalent under the reign of the Stuart Kings, includes a provision that, upon the accession of the successor to then Princess Anne,
“Judges Commissions be made Quamdiu se bene gesserint [during good behavior], and their Salaries ascertained and established....” 12 & 13 Will. III, ch. 2, § III, cl. 7 (1701).
This English statute is the earliest legislative acknowledgment that control over the tenure and compensation of judges is incompatible with a truly independent judiciary, free of improper influence from other forces within government. Later, Parliament passed, and the King assented to, a statute implementing the Act of Settlement providing that a judge’s salary would not be decreased “so long as the Patents and Commissions of them, or any of them respectively, shall continue and remain in force.” 1 Geo. Ill, ch. 23, § III (1760). These two statutes were designed “to maintain both the dignity and independence of the judges.” 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *267.
Originally, these same protections applied to colonial judges as well. In 1761, however, the King converted the tenure of colonial judges to service at his pleasure. The interference this change brought to the administration of justice in the Colonies soon became one of the major objections voiced against the Crown. Indeed, the Declaration of Independence, in listing the grievances against the King, complained:
“He has made Judges dependent on his Will alone, for the tenure of their offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries.”
Independence won, the colonists did not forget the reasons that caused them to separate from the Mother Country. Thus, when the Framers met in Philadelphia in 1787 to draft our organic law, they made certain that in the judicial articles both the tenure and the compensation of judges would be protected from one of the evils that had brought on the Revolution and separation.
Madison’s notes of the Constitutional Convention reveal that the draftsmen first reached a tentative arrangement whereby the Congress could neither increase nor decrease the compensation of judges. Later, Gouverneur Morris succeeded in striking the prohibition on increases; with others, he believed the Congress should be at liberty to raise salaries to meet such contingencies as inflation, a phenomenon known in that day as it is in ours. Madison opposed the change on the ground judges might tend to defer unduly to the Congress when that body was considering pay increases.
The concern for the ravages of inflation is revealed in Madison’s comment:
“The variations in the value of money, may be guarded agst. by taking for a standard wheat or some other thing of permanent value. 2 M. Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, p. 45 (1911).
Morris criticized the proposal for overlooking changes in the state of the economy; the value of wheat may change, he said, and leave the judges undercompensated. The Convention finally adopted Morris’ motion to allow increases by the Congress, thereby accepting a limited risk of external influence in order to accommodate the need to raise judges’ salaries when times changed. As Hamilton later explained:
“It will readily be understood, that the fluctuations in the value of money, and in the state of society, rendered a fixed rate of compensation [of judges] in the Constitution inadmissible. What might be extravagant to-day might in half a century become penurious and inadequate. It was therefore necessary to leave it to the discretion of the legislature to vary its provisions in conformity to the variations in circumstances; yet under such restrictions as to put it out of the power of that body to change the condition of the individual for the worse.” The Federalist No. 79, pp. 49H92 (1818).
This Court has recognized that the Compensation Clause also serves another, related purpose. As well as promoting judicial independence, it ensures a prospective judge that, in abandoning private practice — more often than not more lucrative than the bench — the compensation of the new post will not diminish. Beyond doubt, such assurance has served to attract able lawyers to the bench and thereby enhances the quality of justice. Evans v. Gore, 253 U. S., at 253; 1 J. Kent, Commentaries on American Law 276. (1826).
IV
The four statutes now before us present an issue never before addressed by this Court: when, if ever, does the Compensation Clause prohibit the Congress from repealing salary increases that otherwise take effect automatically pursuant to a formula previously enacted? We must decide when a salary increase authorized by Congress under such a formula “vests” — i. e., becomes irreversible under the Compensation Clause. Is the protection of the Clause first invoked when the formula is enacted or when increases take effect?
A
Appellees argue that we need not reach this constitutional question. They contend that Congress intended these four statutes do no more than halt funding for the salary increases under the Adjustment Act. If, as appellees contend, the statutes are appropriations measures that do not alter substantive law, the increases in all four years nevertheless are now in effect and the Government is obliged to pay them; it has simply to authorize that payment. Accordingly, appellees submit, these congressional actions violate the Compensation Clause regardless of whether Congress could have rescinded increases previously passed.
As a general rule, “repeals by implication are not favored.” Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U. S. 497, 503 (1936). See also TV A v. Hill, 437 U. S. 153, 189 (1978), and Morton v. Mancari, 417 U. S. 535, 549 (1974). This rule applies with especial force when the provision advanced as the repealing measure was enacted in an appropriations bill. TV A v. Hill, supra, at 190. Indeed, the rules of both Houses limit the ability to change substantive law through appropriations measures. See Senate Standing Rule XVI (4); House of Representatives Rule XXI (2). Nevertheless, when Congress desires to suspend or repeal a statute in force, “[t]here can be no doubt that... it could accomplish its purpose by an amendment to an appropriation bill, or otherwise.” United States v. Dickerson, 310 U. S. 554, 555 (1940). "The whole question depends on the intention of Congress as expressed in the statutes.” United States v. Mitchell, 109 U. S. 146, 150 (1883). See also Belknap v. United States, 150 U. S. 588, 594 (1893).
In the cases now before us, we conclude that in each of the four years in question Congress intended to repeal or postpone previously authorized increases. In the statute for Year 2, Congress expressly stated that the Adjustment Act increase due the following October “shall not take effect.” Pub. L. 95-66, 91 Stat. 270. Thus, the plain words of the statute reveal an intention to repeal the Adjustment Act insofar as it would increase salaries in October 1977. This reading finds support in the House Report on the bill, which repeatedly uses language such as “eliminate the expected October 1977 comparability adjustment.” See H. R. Rep. No. 95-458, pp. 1, 3 (1977). The floor remarks of Senators and Representatives confirm that this construction was generally understood.
The statutes in Years 1, 3, and 4, although phrased in terms of limiting funds, see supra, at 205-206, 207, 208, nevertheless were intended by Congress to block the increases the Adjustment Act otherwise would generate. Representative Shipley introduced the rider in relation to Year 1 to “preven [t] the automatic cost-of-living pay increase... 122 Cong. Rec. 28872 (1976). Floor remarks in both Houses reflected this view. In Year 3, the House Report characterized the statute as a “change [in] the application of existing law,” H. R. Rep. No. 95-1254, p. 31 (1978), and described its effect as creating a one-year “pay freeze,” id., at 35. The Senate Report stated that the statute would “continu[e]... the so called ‘cap’ ” on salaries for the next fiscal year. S. Rep. No. 95-1024, p. 50 (1978). Floor debate once again expressed agreement with this construction. The House Report on the statute for Year 4 characterized it.as “reducing] Federal executive pay increases from the mandatory entitlement of 12.9 per centum to 5.5 per centum.” H. R. Rep. No. 96-500, p. 7 (1979). The Report referred to the bill as a change in existing law. See id., at 3. Later the Conference Report stated that the statute “restricts Cost-of-Living increases- to 5.5 percent” for the fiscal year just begun. H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 96-513, p. 3 (1979). The floor debates also confirm this understanding.
These passages indicate clearly that Congress intended to rescind these raises entirely, not simply to consign them to the fiscal limbo of an account due but not payable. The clear intent of Congress in each year was to stop for that year the application of the Adjustment Act. The issue thus resolves itself into whether Congress could do so without violating the Compensation Clause.
B
Year 1
The statute applying to Year 1 was signed by the President during the business day of October 1, 1976. By that time, the 4.8% increase under the Adjustment Act already had taken effect, since it was operative with the start of the month — and the new fiscal year — at the beginning of the day. The statute became law only upon the President’s signing it on October 1; it therefore purported to repeal a salary increase already in force. Thus it “diminished” the compensation of federal judges.
The Government contends that Congress could reduce compensation as long as it did not “discriminate” against judges, as such, during the process. That the “freeze” applied to various officials in the Legislative and the Executive Branches, as well as judges, does not save the statute, however. This is quite different from the situation in O’Malley v. Woodrough, 307 U. S. 277 (1939). There the Court held that the Compensation Clause was not offended by an income tax levied on Article III judges as well as on all other taxpayers; there was no discrimination against the plaintiff judge. Federal judges, like all citizens, must share “the material burden of the government....” Id., at 282. The inclusion in the freeze of other officials who are not protected by the Compensation Clause does not insulate a direct diminution in judges’ salaries from the clear mandate of that Clause; the Constitution makes no exceptions for “nondiscriminatory” reductions. Accordingly, we hold that the statute with respect to Year 1, as applied to compensation of members of the certified class, violates the Compensation Clause of Art. III.
Year 2
Unlike the statute for Year 1, the statute for Year 2 was signed by the President before October 1, when the 7.1% raise under the Comparability Act was due to take effect. Year 2 thus confronts us squarely with the question of whether Congress may, before the effective date of a salary increase, rescind such an increase scheduled to take effect at a later date. The District Court held that by including an annual cost-of-living adjustment in the statutory definitions of the salaries of Article III judges, see supra, at 204, and n. 2, Congress made the annual adjustment, from that moment on, a part of judges’ compensation for constitutional purposes. Subsequent action reducing those adjustments “diminishes” compensation within the meaning of the Compensation Clause. Relying on Evans v. Gore, 253 U. S., at 254, the District Court held that such action reduces the amount “a judge... has been promised,” and all amounts thus
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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M
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court.
The University of Texas at Austin considers race as one of various factors in its undergraduate admissions process. Race is not itself assigned a numerical value for each applicant, but the University has committed itself to increasing racial minority enrollment on campus. It refers to this goal as a "critical mass." Petitioner, who is Caucasian, sued the University after her application was rejected. She contends that the University's use of race in the admissions process violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The parties asked the Court to review whether the judgment below was consistent with "this Court's decisions interpreting the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, including Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 123 S.Ct. 2325, 156 L.Ed.2d 304 (2003)." Pet. for Cert. i. The Court concludes that the Court of Appeals did not hold the University to the demanding burden of strict scrutiny articulated in Grutter and Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 305, 98 S.Ct. 2733, 57 L.Ed.2d 750 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.). Because the Court of Appeals did not apply the correct standard of strict scrutiny, its decision affirming the District Court's grant of summary judgment to the University was incorrect. That decision is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings. I
A
Located in Austin, Texas, on the most renowned campus of the Texas state university system, the University is one of the leading institutions of higher education in the Nation. Admission is prized and competitive. In 2008, when petitioner sought admission to the University's entering class, she was 1 of 29,501 applicants. From this group 12,843 were admitted, and 6,715 accepted and enrolled. Petitioner was denied admission.
In recent years the University has used three different programs to evaluate candidates for admission. The first is the program it used for some years before 1997, when the University considered two factors: a numerical score reflecting an applicant's test scores and academic performance in high school (Academic Index or AI), and the applicant's race. In 1996, this system was held unconstitutional by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. It ruled the University's consideration of race violated the Equal Protection Clause because it did not further any compelling government interest. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 955 (1996).
The second program was adopted to comply with the Hopwood decision. The University stopped considering race in admissions and substituted instead a new holistic metric of a candidate's potential contribution to the University, to be used in conjunction with the Academic Index. This "Personal Achievement Index" (PAI) measures a student's leadership and work experience, awards, extracurricular activities, community service, and other special circumstances that give insight into a student's background. These included growing up in a single-parent home, speaking a language other than English at home, significant family responsibilities assumed by the applicant, and the general socioeconomic condition of the student's family. Seeking to address the decline in minority enrollment after Hopwood, the University also expanded its outreach programs. The Texas State Legislature also responded to the Hopwood decision. It enacted a measure known as the Top Ten Percent Law, codified at Tex. Educ.Code Ann. § 51.803 (West 2009). Also referred to as H.B. 588, the Top Ten Percent Law grants automatic admission to any public state college, including the University, to all students in the top 10% of their class at high schools in Texas that comply with certain standards.
The University's revised admissions process, coupled with the operation of the Top Ten Percent Law, resulted in a more racially diverse environment at the University. Before the admissions program at issue in this case, in the last year under the post-Hopwood AI/PAI system that did not consider race, the entering class was 4.5% African-American and 16.9% Hispanic. This is in contrast with the 1996 pre-Hopwood and Top Ten Percent regime, when race was explicitly considered, and the University's entering freshman class was 4.1% African-American and 14.5% Hispanic.
Following this Court's decisions in Grutter v. Bollinger, supra, and Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 123 S.Ct. 2411, 156 L.Ed.2d 257 (2003), the University adopted a third admissions program, the 2004 program in which the University reverted to explicit consideration of race. This is the program here at issue. In Grutter, the Court upheld the use of race as one of many "plus factors" in an admissions program that considered the overall individual contribution of each candidate. In Gratz, by contrast, the Court held unconstitutional Michigan's undergraduate admissions program, which automatically awarded points to applicants from certain racial minorities.
The University's plan to resume race-conscious admissions was given formal expression in June 2004 in an internal document entitled Proposal to Consider Race and Ethnicity in Admissions (Proposal). Supp. App. 1a. The Proposal relied in substantial part on a study of a subset of undergraduate classes containing between 5 and 24 students. It showed that few of these classes had significant enrollment by members of racial minorities. In addition the Proposal relied on what it called "anecdotal" reports from students regarding their "interaction in the classroom." The Proposal concluded that the University lacked a "critical mass" of minority students and that to remedy the deficiency it was necessary to give explicit consideration to race in the undergraduate admissions program.
To implement the Proposal the University included a student's race as a component of the PAI score, beginning with applicants in the fall of 2004. The University asks students to classify themselves from among five predefined racial categories on the application. Race is not assigned an explicit numerical value, but it is undisputed that race is a meaningful factor.
Once applications have been scored, they are plotted on a grid with the Academic Index on the x-axis and the Personal Achievement Index on the y-axis. On that grid students are assigned to so-called cells based on their individual scores. All students in the cells falling above a certain line are admitted. All students below the line are not. Each college-such as Liberal Arts or Engineering-admits students separately. So a student is considered initially for her first-choice college, then for her second choice, and finally for general admission as an undeclared major.
Petitioner applied for admission to the University's 2008 entering class and was rejected. She sued the University and various University officials in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. She alleged that the University's consideration of race in admissions violated the Equal Protection Clause. The parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The District Court granted summary judgment to the University. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. It held that Grutter required courts to give substantial deference to the University, both in the definition of the compelling interest in diversity's benefits and in deciding whether its specific plan was narrowly tailored to achieve its stated goal. Applying that standard, the court upheld the University's admissions plan. 631 F.3d 213, 217-218 (2011).
Over the dissent of seven judges, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's request for rehearing en banc. See 644 F.3d 301, 303 (C.A.5 2011) (per curiam ). Petitioner sought a writ of certiorari. The writ was granted. 565 U.S. ----, 132 S.Ct. 1536, 182 L.Ed.2d 160 (2012).
B
Among the Court's cases involving racial classifications in education, there are three decisions that directly address the question of considering racial minority status as a positive or favorable factor in a university's admissions process, with the goal of achieving the educational benefits of a more diverse student body: Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 98 S.Ct. 2733, 57 L.Ed.2d 750; Gratz,supra ; and Grutter, 539 U.S. 306, 123 S.Ct. 2325, 156 L.Ed.2d 304. We take those cases as given for purposes of deciding this case.
We begin with the principal opinion authored by Justice Powell in Bakke, supra . In Bakke, the Court considered a system used by the medical school of the University of California at Davis. From an entering class of 100 students the school had set aside 16 seats for minority applicants. In holding this program impermissible under the Equal Protection Clause Justice Powell's opinion stated certain basic premises. First, "decisions based on race or ethnic origin by faculties and administrations of state universities are reviewable under the Fourteenth Amendment." Id., at 287, 98 S.Ct. 2733 (separate opinion). The principle of equal protection admits no "artificial line of a 'two-class theory' " that "permits the recognition of special wards entitled to a degree of protection greater than that accorded others." Id., at 295, 98 S.Ct. 2733. It is therefore irrelevant that a system of racial preferences in admissions may seem benign. Any racial classification must meet strict scrutiny, for when government decisions "touch upon an individual's race or ethnic background, he is entitled to a judicial determination that the burden he is asked to bear on that basis is precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest." Id., at 299, 98 S.Ct. 2733.
Next, Justice Powell identified one compelling interest that could justify the consideration of race: the interest in the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body. Redressing past discrimination could not serve as a compelling interest, because a university's "broad mission [of] education" is incompatible with making the "judicial, legislative, or administrative findings of constitutional or statutory violations" necessary to justify remedial racial classification. Id., at 307-309, 98 S.Ct. 2733.
The attainment of a diverse student body, by contrast, serves values beyond race alone, including enhanced classroom dialogue and the lessening of racial isolation and stereotypes. The academic mission of a university is "a special concern of the First Amendment." Id., at 312, 98 S.Ct. 2733. Part of " 'the business of a university [is] to provide that atmosphere which is most conducive to speculation, experiment, and creation,' " and this in turn leads to the question of " 'who may be admitted to study.' " Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263, 77 S.Ct. 1203, 1 L.Ed.2d 1311 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in judgment).
Justice Powell's central point, however, was that this interest in securing diversity's benefits, although a permissible objective, is complex. "It is not an interest in simple ethnic diversity, in which a specified percentage of the student body is in effect guaranteed to be members of selected ethnic groups, with the remaining percentage an undifferentiated aggregation of students. The diversity that furthers a compelling state interest encompasses a far broader array of qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a single though important element." Bakke, 438 U.S., at 315, 98 S.Ct. 2733 (separate opinion).
In Gratz, 539 U.S. 244, 123 S.Ct. 2411, 156 L.Ed.2d 257, and Grutter, supra, the Court endorsed the precepts stated by Justice Powell. In Grutter, the Court reaffirmed his conclusion that obtaining the educational benefits of "student body diversity is a compelling state interest that can justify the use of race in university admissions." Id., at 325, 123 S.Ct. 2325.
As Gratz and Grutter observed, however, this follows only if a clear precondition is met: The particular admissions process used for this objective is subject to judicial review. Race may not be considered unless the admissions process can withstand strict scrutiny. "Nothing in Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke signaled that a university may employ whatever means it desires to achieve the stated goal of diversity without regard to the limits imposed by our strict scrutiny analysis." Gratz, supra, at 275, 123 S.Ct. 2411."To be narrowly tailored, a race-conscious admissions program cannot use a quota system," Grutter, 539 U.S., at 334, 123 S.Ct. 2325, but instead must "remain flexible enough to ensure that each applicant is evaluated as an individual and not in a way that makes an applicant's race or ethnicity the defining feature of his or her application," id., at 337, 123 S.Ct. 2325. Strict scrutiny requires the university to demonstrate with clarity that its "purpose or interest is both constitutionally permissible and substantial, and that its use of the classification is necessary ... to the accomplishment of its purpose." Bakke, 438 U.S., at 305, 98 S.Ct. 2733 (opinion of Powell, J.) (internal quotation marks omitted).
While these are the cases that most specifically address the central issue in this case, additional guidance may be found in the Court's broader equal protection jurisprudence which applies in this context. "Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people," Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 517, 120 S.Ct. 1044, 145 L.Ed.2d 1007 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted), and therefore "are contrary to our traditions and hence constitutionally suspect," Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499, 74 S.Ct. 693, 98 L.Ed. 884 (1954). " '[B]ecause racial characteristics so seldom provide a relevant basis for disparate treatment,' " Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 505, 109 S.Ct. 706, 102 L.Ed.2d 854 (1989) (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 533-534, 100 S.Ct. 2758, 65 L.Ed.2d 902 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting)), "the Equal Protection Clause demands that racial classifications ... be subjected to the 'most rigid scrutiny.' " Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11, 87 S.Ct. 1817, 18 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1967).
To implement these canons, judicial review must begin from the position that "any official action that treats a person differently on account of his race or ethnic origin is inherently suspect." Fullilove, supra, at 523, 100 S.Ct. 2758 (Stewart, J., dissenting); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192, 85 S.Ct. 283, 13 L.Ed.2d 222 (1964). Strict scrutiny is a searching examination, and it is the government that bears the burden to prove " 'that the reasons for any [racial] classification [are] clearly identified and unquestionably legitimate,' " Croson, supra, at 505, 109 S.Ct. 706 (quoting Fullilove, supra, 448 U.S., at 533-535, 100 S.Ct. 2758 (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
II
Grutter made clear that racial "classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored to further compelling governmental interests." 539 U.S., at 326, 123 S.Ct. 2325. And Grutter endorsed Justice Powell's conclusion in Bakke that "the attainment of a diverse student body ... is a constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher education." 438 U.S., at 311-312, 98 S.Ct. 2733 (separate opinion). Thus, under Grutter, strict scrutiny must be applied to any admissions program using racial categories or classifications.
According to Grutter, a university's "educational judgment that such diversity is essential to its educational mission is one to which we defer." 539 U.S., at 328, 123 S.Ct. 2325.Grutter concluded that the decision to pursue "the educational benefits that flow from student body diversity," id., at 330, 123 S.Ct. 2325, that the University deems integral to its mission is, in substantial measure, an academic judgment to which some, but not complete, judicial deference is proper under Grutter . A court, of course, should ensure that there is a reasoned, principled explanation for the academic decision. On this point, the District Court and Court of Appeals were correct in finding that Grutter calls for deference to the University's conclusion, " 'based on its experience and expertise,' " 631 F.3d, at 230 (quoting 645 F.Supp.2d 587, 603 (W.D.Tex.2009) ), that a diverse student body would serve its educational goals. There is disagreement about whether Grutter was consistent with the principles of equal protection in approving this compelling interest in diversity. See post, at 2422 (SCALIA, J., concurring); post, at 2423 - 2424 (THOMAS, J., concurring); post, at 2432 - 2433 (GINSBURG, J., dissenting). But the parties here do not ask the Court to revisit that aspect of Grutter 's holding.
A university is not permitted to define diversity as "some specified percentage of a particular group merely because of its race or ethnic origin." Bakke, supra, at 307, 98 S.Ct. 2733 (opinion of Powell, J.). "That would amount to outright racial balancing, which is patently unconstitutional." Grutter, supra, at 330, 123 S.Ct. 2325."Racial balancing is not transformed from 'patently unconstitutional' to a compelling state interest simply by relabeling it 'racial diversity.' " Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 732, 127 S.Ct. 2738, 168 L.Ed.2d 508 (2007).
Once the University has established that its goal of diversity is consistent with strict scrutiny, however, there must still be a further judicial determination that the admissions process meets strict scrutiny in its implementation. The University must prove that the means chosen by the University to attain diversity are narrowly tailored to that goal. On this point, the University receives no deference. Grutter made clear that it is for the courts, not for university administrators, to ensure that "[t]he means chosen to accomplish the [government's] asserted purpose must be specifically and narrowly framed to accomplish that purpose." 539 U.S., at 333, 123 S.Ct. 2325 (internal quotation marks omitted). True, a court can take account of a university's experience and expertise in adopting or rejecting certain admissions processes. But, as the Court said in Grutter, it remains at all times the University's obligation to demonstrate, and the Judiciary's obligation to determine, that admissions processes "ensure that each applicant is evaluated as an individual and not in a way that makes an applicant's race or ethnicity the defining feature of his or her application." Id ., at 337, 123 S.Ct. 2325.
Narrow tailoring also requires that the reviewing court verify that it is "necessary" for a university to use race to achieve the educational benefits of diversity. Bakke, supra, at 305, 98 S.Ct. 2733 This involves a careful judicial inquiry into whether a university could achieve sufficient diversity without using racial classifications. Although "[n]arrow tailoring does not require exhaustion of every conceivable race-neutral alternative," strict scrutiny does require a court to examine with care, and not defer to, a university's "serious, good faith consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives." See Grutter, 539 U.S., at 339-340, 123 S.Ct. 2325 (emphasis added). Consideration by the university is of course necessary, but it is not sufficient to satisfy strict scrutiny: The reviewing court must ultimately be satisfied that no workable race-neutral alternatives would produce the educational benefits of diversity. If " 'a nonracial approach ... could promote the substantial interest about as well and at tolerable administrative expense,' " Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Ed ., 476 U.S. 267, 280, n. 6, 106 S.Ct. 1842, 90 L.Ed.2d 260 (1986) (quoting Greenawalt, Judicial Scrutiny of "Benign" Racial Preference in Law School Admissions, 75 Colum. L.Rev. 559, 578-579 (1975) ), then the university may not consider race. A plaintiff, of course, bears the burden of placing the validity of a university's adoption of an affirmative action plan in issue. But strict scrutiny imposes on the university the ultimate burden of demonstrating, before turning to racial classifications, that available, workable race-neutral alternatives do not suffice.
Rather than perform this searching examination, however, the Court of Appeals held petitioner could challenge only "whether [the University's] decision to reintroduce race as a factor in admissions was made in good faith." 631 F.3d, at 236. And in considering such a challenge, the court would "presume the University acted in good faith" and place on petitioner the burden of rebutting that presumption. Id., at 231-232. The Court of Appeals held that to "second-guess the merits" of this aspect of the University's decision was a task it was "ill-equipped to perform" and that it would attempt only to "ensure that [the University's] decision to adopt a race-conscious admissions policy followed from [a process of] good faith consideration." Id., at 231. The Court of Appeals thus concluded that "the narrow-tailoring inquiry-like the compelling-interest inquiry-is undertaken with a degree of deference to the Universit[y]." Id., at 232. Because "the efforts of the University have been studied, serious, and of high purpose," the Court of Appeals held that the use of race in the admissions program fell within "a constitutionally protected zone of discretion." Id., at 231.
These expressions of the controlling standard are at odds with Grutter 's command that "all racial classifications imposed by government 'must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.' " 539 U.S., at 326, 123 S.Ct. 2325 (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Penã, 515 U.S. 200, 227, 115 S.Ct. 2097, 132 L.Ed.2d 158 (1995) ). In Grutter, the Court approved the plan at issue upon concluding that it was not a quota, was sufficiently flexible, was limited in time, and followed "serious, good faith consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives." 539 U.S., at 339, 123 S.Ct. 2325. As noted above, see supra, at 2415, the parties do not challenge, and the Court therefore does not consider, the correctness of that determination.
Grutter did not hold that good faith would forgive an impermissible consideration of race. It must be remembered that "the mere recitation of a 'benign' or legitimate purpose for a racial classification is entitled to little or no weight." Croson, 488 U.S., at 500, 109 S.Ct. 706. Strict scrutiny does not permit a court to accept a school's assertion that its admissions process uses race in a permissible way without a court giving close analysis to the evidence of how the process works in practice.
The higher education dynamic does not change the narrow tailoring analysis of strict scrutiny applicable in other contexts. "[T]he analysis and level of scrutiny applied to determine the validity of [a racial] classification do not vary simply because the objective appears acceptable.... While the validity and importance of the objective may affect the outcome of the analysis, the analysis itself does not change." Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724, n. 9, 102 S.Ct. 3331, 73 L.Ed.2d 1090 (1982).
The District Court and Court of Appeals confined the strict scrutiny inquiry in too narrow a way by deferring to the University's good faith in its use of racial classifications and affirming the grant of summary judgment on that basis. The Court vacates that judgment, but fairness to the litigants and the courts that heard the case requires that it be remanded so that the admissions process can be considered and judged under a correct analysis. See Adarand, supra, at 237, 115 S.Ct. 2097. Unlike Grutter, which was decided after trial, this case arises from cross-motions for summary judgment. In this case, as in similar cases, in determining whether summary judgment in favor of the University would be appropriate, the Court of Appeals must assess whether the University has offered sufficient evidence that would prove that its admissions program is narrowly tailored to obtain the educational benefits of diversity. Whether this record-and not "simple ... assurances of good intention," Croson, supra, at 500, 109 S.Ct. 706 -is sufficient is a question for the Court of Appeals in the first instance.
* * *
Strict scrutiny must not be " 'strict in theory, but fatal in fact,' " Adarand, supra, at 237, 115 S.Ct. 2097; see also Grutter, supra, at 326, 123 S.Ct. 2325. But the opposite is also true. Strict scrutiny must not be strict in theory but feeble in fact. In order for judicial review to be meaningful, a university must make a showing that its plan is narrowly tailored to achieve the only interest that this Court has approved in this context: the benefits of a student body diversity that "encompasses a ... broa[d] array of qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a single though important element." Bakke, 438 U.S., at 315, 98 S.Ct. 2733 (opinion of Powell, J.). The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice KAGAN took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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B
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Minton
delivered the opinion of the Court.
These five cases present questions of the extent of coverage of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, as amended.
Petitioner, an interstate common carrier by railroad, owns and operates a large carshop, known as Shop No. 9, at Sacramento, California. This shop contains a department for repair of petitioner’s cars temporarily removed from service and a department engaged in the construction of new cars for use in interstate commerce by petitioner and a subsidiary.
Respondents Gileo, Eufrazia and Eelk were employed by petitioner in Shop No. 9. Gileo worked on repair of petitioner’s cars already in service for almost 10 years prior to his transfer to new car construction 5 months before he was injured. Eufrazia did repair work for 9 months before he was assigned to new car construction a month prior to his injury. Eelk had worked a month on repairs, was transferred to new car construction for 5 weeks, was reassigned to repair work for a month and had been back on new car construction for 3 months when he incurred his injury. Thus, all three of these respondents had at one time worked on repair jobs in Shop No. 9, but there is no dispute that they were engaged exclusively in new car construction when their injuries were incurred.
Respondents brought separate suits against petitioner for recovery under the F. E. L. A. Respondent Gileo sued in the Superior Court for the City and County of San Francisco, and respondents Eufrazia and Eelk sued in the Superior Court for the County of Sacramento. In all three suits, petitioner claimed that the F. E. L. A. did not apply because neither it nor respondents were engaged in interstate commerce and that therefore the courts were without jurisdiction to entertain the actions, the exclusive remedy for injured employees in these circumstances resting with the Industrial Accident Commission under the California Workmen’s Compensation Act. This challenge to the jurisdiction of the court was rejected in the Qileo case, the court ruling as a matter of law that the F. E. L. A. governed the situation before it. Petitioner having stipulated the issues of negligence and the amount of damages, judgment was entered for Gileo. The trial court in the Eufrazia and Eelk cases ruled in favor of petitioner’s contention that it lacked jurisdiction because the F. E. L. A. was not applicable, and judgment was entered for petitioner before trial was had on the issues of negligence and damages. The Supreme Court of California held, in separate decisions, that the Act applied to each of the respondents. We granted certiorari, 350 U. S. 818, because the cases involve interpretation of an important federal statute governing railroad employer obligations to its injured employees.
In the Eufrazia and Eelk cases, the Supreme Court of California simply entered an order reversing the decisions of the trial court. Unlike Gileo, petitioner did not stipulate with respect to the issues of negligence and damages. There were no trials of these issues, and, under California practice, the effect of the Supreme Court of California’s unqualified reversal is to remand the cases to the trial court. See Gospel Army v. Los Angeles, 331 U. S. 543, 546. Since the issues of negligence and damages remain to be tried, there is no final judgment in the highest court of the State, and this Court, therefore, lacks jurisdiction to review the Eufrasia and Eelk cases. 28 U. S. C. § 1257. We therefore dismiss the writs in those two cases.
The sole question which the Gileo case presents is whether or not an employee of an interstate rail carrier who is injured while performing work on new cars to be used in interstate commerce by the carrier and its subsidiary can maintain an action for damages against his employer under the F. E. L. A., as amended.
Section 1 of the F. E. L. A., with which we are here concerned, originally provided that “every common carrier by railroad while engaging in commerce” between the States “shall be liable in damages to any person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier in such commerce” for injury or death resulting wholly or partly from the negligence of the carrier. This Court early construed the statute to require that the employee be “at the time of the injury engaged in interstate transportation or in work so closely related to it as to be practically a part of it” in order to qualify for coverage under the Act. Shanks v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 239 U. S. 556, 558. Later, in Raymond v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 243 U. S. 43, 45, and New York Central R. Co. v. White, 243 U. S. 188, 192, this Court held that employees engaged in or connected with new construction for their railroad employers were not engaged in interstate commerce within the meaning of the Act and were therefore not entitled to its benefits. See also Pedersen v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 229 U. S. 146, 152. The “moment of injury” and “new construction” doctrines were the source of much confusion to the railroads, their employees and the courts, with the result that the reports were replete with decisions drawing very fine distinctions in determining whether an employee was engaged in interstate commerce within the contemplation of the Act so as to entitle him to bring suit for damages thereunder for injuries incurred while in the carrier’s employ. The uncertainty had grown to such proportions that Congress, in 1939, added the following paragraph to § 1 of the Act:
“Any employee of a carrier, any part of whose duties as such employee shall be the furtherance of interstate or foreign commerce; or shall, in any way directly or closely and substantially, affect such commerce as above set forth shall, for the purposes of this Act, be considered as being employed by such carrier in such commerce and shall be considered as entitled to the benefits of this Act and of an Act entitled ‘An Act relating to the liability of common carriers by railroad to their employees in certain cases’ (approved April 22, 1908), as the same has been or may hereafter be amended.”
The Senate, in its report on the amendments to the Act, characterized one aim of the amendment in this manner: “1. It broadens and clarifies the law in its application to employees who may be killed or injured while in the service of a railroad company engaged in interstate or foreign commerce.” Petitioner concedes that the 1939 amendment abolishes the “moment of injury” rule of the Shanks case, supra. But it vigorously contends that, because Congress, in amending the Act, did not alter the first paragraph of § 1, it is liable only for employee injuries incurred while the railroad is “engaging in commerce” between the States. It is argued that, since the railroad was here engaged in the construction of new cars, which activity, under the “new construction” doctrine of Raymond and White, supra, is not commerce between the States, employees injured while engaging in new construction are not covered by the 1939 amendment. With this we cannot agree.
The 1939 amendment to § 1 of the Act provides that “[a]ny employee of a carrier, any part of whose duties as such employee shall be the furtherance of interstate or foreign commerce; or shall, in any way directly or closely and substantially, affect such commerce,” as described in the first paragraph of § 1, “shall, for the purposes of this Act, be considered as being employed by such carrier in such commerce and shall be considered as entitled to the benefits” of the Act. This amendatory language makes it plain that if a railroad employee either furthers interstate commerce in the performance of any part of his duties or in any way “directly or closely and substantially” affects such commerce, Congress has placed such an employee on an equal footing, for purposes of coverage under the Act, with those employees who, prior to the 1939 amendment, were held to be employed by the railroads in commerce between the States. Therefore, in determining whether respondent Gileo is entitled to the benefits of the F. E. L. A., the pertinent inquiry is not whether “new construction” is interstate commerce under the test of Raymond and White. Rather, the crucial question is whether any part of Gileo’s duties as a railroad employee furthers interstate commerce or in any way directly or closely and substantially affects such commerce.
Petitioner is engaged in the manufacture of its own railroad cars for use in performing its transportation function in interstate commerce. Such new construction is an integral element in the carrier’s total operations, and it follows that workmen employed to build these new cars perform duties which are in “furtherance” of interstate commerce. Furthermore, in carrying out these duties, such employees affect interstate commerce “directly or closely and substantially.” Failure to perform their duties would preclude delivery to the railroad of cars which it considers essential to its transportation needs and would substantially impede the carrier’s performance of its transportation function and thus the interstate commerce in which it is engaged. This interpretation is consistent with the letter and spirit of the 1939 amendment, which Congress enacted to cure the evils of hypertechnical distinctions which had developed in over 30 years of F. E. L. A. litigation. Whatever justification there may have been before the amendment for holding that employees working on repairs of a railroad’s instrumen-talities were engaged in interstate commerce and therefore entitled to the benefits of the Act, Pedersen v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., supra, while those who were working on construction of new railroad facilities were not engaged in interstate commerce and therefore were not covered by the Act, Raymond and White, supra, has been swept away by the 1939 amendment. This Court recently rejected the “new construction” doctrine in determining whether an employee is “engaged in commerce” within the meaning of a like provision in the Fair Labor Standards Act. Mitchell v. C. W. Vollmer & Co., 349 U. S. 427. We hold that § 1 of the F. E. L. A., as amended, covers respondent Gileo.
Respondent Aranda was injured while employed by petitioner as a wheel molder in its wheel foundry at Sacramento, California. There wheels are made to be joined to axles which form the truck base for the petitioner’s cars, both new and those already in interstate service. Since wheels which wear out cannot be repaired, they must be recast or remolded and, as a result, worn wheels are continually shipped from all points on petitioner’s rail network to its Sacramento foundry for remolding and eventual return to petitioner’s rolling stock. A certain level of inventory is indispensable to effective utilization of this mode of operation. The operation itself is a vital link in the chain of petitioner’s function as an interstate rail carrier. It is thus plain that Aranda’s duties as a wheel molder both served to further interstate commerce and directly or closely and substantially affected such commerce. We therefore hold that he is entitled to the benefits of the Act.
Respondent Moreno was employed as a laborer and was injured while laying rails in a retarder yard which petitioner was constructing for the purpose of facilitating the movement of freight trains in interstate commerce by use of a new “switching” method. The yard was to be used in connection with petitioner’s main line of track. It was opened to interstate traffic 4 months after Moreno was injured. Passage of the 1939 amendment makes unnecessary indulgence in nice distinctions relating to whether Moreno was engaged in new construction or construction which, although new, was merely a substitute for petitioner’s existing method of switching cars. Cf. Agostino v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 50 F. Supp. 726. In view of what we have said above, it is clear that Moreno, in the performance of his duties, was furthering interstate commerce and that his work directly or closely and substantially affected commerce, within the meaning of the 1939 amendment.
The judgments in
Gileo v. Southern Pacific Co.,
Aranda v. Southern Pacific Co.,
Moreno v. Southern Pacific Co., are
Affirmed.
The writs in
Eufrazia v. Southern Pacific Co.,
Eelk v. Southern Pacific Co., are
Dismissed.
Mr. Justice Harlan concurs in the result.
Mr. Justice Reed and Mr. Justice Frankfurter agree that the writs in Southern Pacific Co. v. Eujrazia and Southern Pacific Co. v. Eelk must be dismissed because they were improvidently granted for want of final state court judgments. Regarding Southern Pacific Co. v. Gileo, Southern Pacific Co. v. Aranda, and Southern Pacific Co. v. Moreno, they disagree with the Court’s theory in applying the Act of 1939, for the reasons set forth in Mr. Justice Frankfurter’s dissent in Reed v. Pennsylvania R. Co., post, p. 508.
35 Stat. 65, as amended, 53 Stat. 1404, 45 U. S. C. § 51.
Gileo v. Southern Pacific Co., 44 Cal. 2d 539, 282 P. 2d 872; Eufrazia v. Southern Pacific Co., 44 Cal. 2d 881, 282 P. 2d 879; Eelk v. Southern Pacific Co., 44 Cal. 2d 882, 282 P. 2d 880. The decisions below holding the two remaining respondents covered by the Act are reported in Aranda v. Southern Pacific Co., 44 Cal. 2d 543, 282 P. 2d 875, and Moreno v. Southern Pacific Co., 44 Cal. 2d 547, 282 P. 2d 877.
35 Stat. 65:
“That every common carrier by railroad while engaging in commerce between any of the several States or Territories, or between any of the States and Territories, or between the District of Columbia and any of the States or Territories, or between the District of Columbia or any of the States or Territories and any foreign nation or nations, shall be liable in damages to any person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier in such commerce, or, in case of the death of such employee, to his or her personal representative, for the benefit of the surviving widow or husband and children of such employee; and, if none, then of such employee's parents; and, if none, then of the next of kin dependent upon such employee, for such injury or death resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees of such carrier, or by reason of any defect or insufficiency, due to its negligence, in its cars, engines, appliances, machinery, track, roadbed, works, boats, wharves, or other equipment.”
53 Stat. 1404.
S. Rep. No. 661, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 2.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
H
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Powell
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issue in this case is whether Title XIX of the Social Security Act, as added, 79 Stat. 343, and amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1396 et seq. (1970 ed. and Supp. V), requires States that participate in the Medical Assistance (Medicaid) program to fund the cost of nontherapeutic abortions.
I
Title XIX establishes the Medicaid program under which participating States may provide federally funded medical assistance to needy persons. The statute requires participating States to provide qualified individuals with financial assistance in five general categories of medical treatment. 42 U. S. C. §§ 1396a (a) (13) (B) (1970 ed., Supp. V), 1396d (a) (l)-(5) (1970 ed. and Supp. V). Although Title XIX does not require States to provide funding for all medical treatment falling within the five general categories, it does require that state Medicaid plans establish “reasonable standards ... for determining . . . the extent of medical assistance under the plan which . . . are consistent with the objectives of [Title XIX] ” 42 U. S. C. § 1396a (a) (17) (1970 ed., Supp. V).
Respondents, who are eligible for medical assistance under Pennsylvania’s federally approved Medicaid plan, were denied financial assistance for desired abortions pursuant to Pennsylvania regulations limiting such assistance to those abortions that are certified by physicians as medically necessary. When respondents’ applications for Medicaid assistance were denied because of their failure to furnish the required certificates, they filed this action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania seeking declaratory and in-junctive relief. Their complaint alleged that Pennsylvania’s requirement of a certificate of medical necessity contravened relevant provisions of Title XIX and denied them equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
A three-judge District Court was convened pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2281. After resolving the statutory issue against respondents, the District Court held that Pennsylvania’s medical-necessity restriction denied respondents equal protection of the laws. Doe v. Wohlgemuth, 376 F. Supp. 173 (1974). Accordingly, the court granted a declaratory judgment that the Pennsylvania requirement was unconstitutional as applied during the first trimester. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed on the statutory issue, holding that Title XIX prohibits participating States from requiring a physician’s certificate of medical necessity as a condition for funding during both the first and second trimesters of pregnancy. 523 F. 2d 611 (1975). The Court of Appeals therefore did not reach the constitutional issue.
We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the federal courts as to the requirements of Title XIX. 428 U. S. 909 (1976).
II
The only question before us is one of statutory construction : whether Title XIX requires Pennsylvania to fund under its Medicaid program the cost of all abortions that are permissible under state law. “The starting point in every case involving construction of a statute is the language itself.” Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 756 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring). Title XIX makes no reference to abortions, or, for that matter, to any other particular medical procedure. Instead, the statute is cast in terms that require participating States to provide financial assistance with respect to five broad categories of medical treatment. See n. 2, supra. But nothing in the statute suggests that participating States are required to fund every medical procedure that falls within the delineated categories of medical care. Indeed, the statute expressly provides:
“A State plan for medical assistance must . . . include reasonable standards ... for determining eligibility for and the extent of medical assistance under the plan which . . . are consistent with the objectives of this [Title] . . . 42 U. S. C. § 1396a (a) (17) (1970 ed., Supp. V).
This language confers broad discretion on the States to adopt standards for determining the extent of medical assistance, requiring only that such standards be “reasonable” and “consistent with the objectives” of the Act.
Pennsylvania’s regulation comports fully with Title XIX’s broadly stated primary objective to enable each State, as far as practicable, to furnish medical assistance to individuals whose income and resources are insufficient to meet the costs of necessary medical services. See 42 U. S. C. §§ 1396, 1396a (10) (C) (1970 ed., Supp. V). Although serious statutory questions might be presented if a state Medicaid plan excluded necessary medical treatment from its coverage, it is hardly inconsistent with the objectives of the Act for a State to refuse to fund unnecessary — though perhaps desirable— medical services.
The thrust of respondents’ argument is that the exclusion of nontherapeutic abortions from Medicaid coverage is unreasonable on both economic and health grounds. The economic argument is grounded on the view that abortion is generally a less expensive medical procedure than childbirth. Since a pregnant woman normally will either have an abortion or carry her child full term, a State that elects not to fund nontherapeutic abortions will eventually be confronted with the greater expenses associated with childbirth. The corresponding health argument is based on the view that an early abortion poses less of a risk to the woman’s health than childbirth. Consequently, respondents argue, the economic and health considerations that ordinarily support the reasonableness of state limitations on financing of unnecessary medical services are not applicable to pregnancy.
Accepting respondents’ assumptions as accurate, we do not agree that the exclusion of nontherapeutic abortions from Medicaid coverage is unreasonable under Title XIX. As we acknowledged in Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973), the State has a valid and important interest in encouraging childbirth. We expressly recognized in Roe the “important and legitimate interest [of the State] ... in protecting the potentiality of human life.” Id., at 162. That interest alone does not, at least until approximately the third trimester, become sufficiently compelling to justify unduly burdensome state interference with the woman’s constitutionally protected privacy interest. But it is a significant state interest existing throughout the course of the woman’s pregnancy. Respondents point to nothing in either the language or the legislative history of Title XIX that suggests that it is unreasonable for a participating State to further this unquestionably strong and legitimate interest in encouraging normal childbirth. Absent such a showing, we will not presume that Congress intended to condition a State’s participation in the Medicaid program on its willingness to undercut this important interest by subsidizing the costs of nontherapeutic abortions.
Our interpretation of the statute is reinforced by two other relevant considerations. First, when Congress passed Title XIX in 1965, nontherapeutic abortions were unlawful in most States. In view of the then-prevailing state law, the contention that Congress intended to require — rather than permit — participating States to fund nontherapeutic abortions requires far more convincing proof than respondents have offered. Second, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, the agency charged with the administration of this complicated statute, takes the position that Title XIX allows — but does not mandate — funding for such abortions. “[W]e must be mindful that The construction of a statute by those charged with its execution should be followed unless there are compelling indications that it is wrong New York Dept. of Soc. Services v. Dublino, 413 U. S. 405, 421 (1973), quoting Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367, 381 (1969). Here, such indications are completely absent.
We therefore hold that Pennsylvania’s refusal to extend Medicaid coverage to nontherapeutic abortions is not inconsistent with Title XIX. We make clear, however, that the federal statute leaves a State free to provide such coverage if it so desires.
HH t-H HH
There is one feature of the Pennsylvania Medicaid program, not addressed by the Court of Appeals, that may conflict with Title XIX. Under the Pennsylvania program, financial assistance is not provided for medically necessary abortions unless two physicians in addition to the attending physician have examined the patient and have concurred in writing that the abortion is medically necessary. See n. 3, supra. On this record, we are unable to determine the precise role played by these two additional physicians, and consequently we are unable to ascertain whether this requirement interferes with the attending physician’s medical judgment in a manner not contemplated by the Congress. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore reversed, and the case is remanded for consideration of this requirement.
It is so ordered.
Title XIX establishes two groups of needy persons: (1) the “categorically” needy, which includes needy persons with dependent children and the aged, blind, and disabled, 42 U. S. C. § 1396a (a) (10) (A) (1970 ed., Supp. V); and (2) the “medically” needy, which includes other needy persons, § 1396a (a) (10) (C) (1970 ed., Supp. V). Participating States are not required to extend Medicaid coverage to the “medically” needy, but Pennsylvania has chosen to do so.
The general categories of medical treatment enumerated are:
“(1) inpatient hospital services (other than services in an institution for tuberculosis or mental diseases) ;
“(2) outpatient hospital services;
“(3) other laboratory and X-ray services;
“(4) (A) skilled nursing facility services (other than services in an institution for tuberculosis or mental diseases) for individuals 21 years of age or older (B) effective July 1, 1969, such early and periodic screening and diagnosis of individuals who are eligible under the plan and are under the age of 21 to ascertain their physical or mental defects, and such health care, treatment, and other measures to correct or ameliorate defects and chronic conditions discovered thereby, as may be provided in regulations of the Secretary; and (C) family planning services and supplies furnished (directly or under arrangements with others) to individuals of childbearing age (including minors who can be considered to be sexually active) who are eligible under the State plan and who desire such services and supplies;
“(5) physicians’ services furnished by a physician (as defined in section 1395x (r) (1) of this title), whether furnished in the office, the patient’s home, a hospital, or a skilled nursing facility, or elsewhere.” 42 U. S. C. § 1396d (a) (1970 ed. and Supp. V).
Participating States that elect to extend coverage to the “medically” needy, see n. 1, supra, have the option of providing somewhat different categories of medical services to those individuals. 42 U. S. C. § 1396a (a) (13) (C) (ii) (1970 ed., Supp. V).
An abortion is deemed medically necessary under the Pennsylvania Medicaid program if:
“(1) There is documented medical evidence that continuance of the pregnancy may threaten the health of the mother;
“ (2) There is docmnented medical evidence that an infant may be born with incapacitating physical deformity or mental deficiency; or
“(3) There is documented medical evidence that continuance of a pregnancy resulting from legally established statutory or forcible rape or incest, may constitute a threat to the mental or physical health of a patient; and
“(4) Two other physicians chosen because of their recognized professional competency have examined the patient and have concurred in writing; and
“ (5) The procedure is performed in a hospital accredited by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals.” Brief for Petitioners 4, citing 3 Pennsylvania Bulletin 2207, 2209 (Sept. 29, 1973).
In Doe v. Bolton, 410 U. S. 179, 192 (1973), this Court indicated that “[wjhether ‘an abortion is necessary’ is a professional judgment that . . . may be exercised in the light of all factors — physical, emotional, psychological, familial, and the woman’s age — relevant to the well-being of the patient. All these factors may relate to health. This allows the attending physician the room he needs to make his best medical judgment.” We were informed during oral argument that the Pennsylvania definition of medical necessity is broad enough to encompass the factors specified in Bolton. Tr. of Oral Arg. 7-8.
The dissent of MR. Justice Brennan emphasizes the “key” role of the physician within the Medicaid program, noting that “[t]he Medicaid statutes leave the decision as to the choice among pregnancy procedures exclusively with the doctor and his patient . . . .” Post, at 449-450. This is precisely what Pennsylvania has done. Its regulations provide for the funding of abortions upon certification of medical necessity, a determination that the physician is authorized to make on the basis of all relevant factors.
The District Court was of the view that the regulation creates “an unlawful distinction between indigent women who choose to carry their pregnancies to birth, and indigent women who choose to terminate their pregnancies by abortion.” 376 F. Supp., at 191. In Maher v. Roe, post, p. 464, we today conclude that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not prevent a State from making the policy choice to fund costs incident to childbirth without providing similar funding for costs incident to nontherapeutic abortions.
Petitioners appealed the District Court’s declaratory judgment to the Court of Appeals. Respondents cross-appealed from the denial of declaratory relief with respect to the second and third trimesters of pregnancy. Since respondents did not seek review of the District Court’s denial of injunctive relief, the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over the appeals. Gerstein v. Coe, 417 U. S. 279 (1974).
As a result of the decision of the Court of Appeals, petitioners issued a Temporary Revised Policy on September 25, 1975. This interim policy allows financial assistance for abortions without regard to medical necessity. Brief for Petitioners 3 n. 3.
Two other Courts of Appeals have concluded that the federal statute does not require participating States to fund the cost of nontherapeutic abortions. Roe v. Norton, 522 F. 2d 928 (CA2 1975); Roe v. Ferguson, 515 F. 2d 279 (CA6 1975). See also, e. g., Doe v. Westby, 402 F. Supp. 140 (WDSD 1975) (three-judge court) (Title XIX requires funding of nontherapeutic abortions), appeal docketed, No. 75-813; Doe v. Stewart, Civ. No. 74-3197 (ED La., Jan. 26, 1976) (three-judge court) (Title XIX does not require funding of nontherapeutic abortions), appeal docketed, No. 75-6721.
Respondents concede that Title XIX “indicates that the states will have wide discretion in determining the extent of services to be provided.” Brief for Respondents 9.
Respondents also contend that Pennsylvania’s restriction on coverage is unreasonable within the meaning of Title XIX in that it interferes with the physician’s professional judgment concerning appropriate treatment. With one possible exception addressed in Part III, infra, the Pennsylvania program does not interfere with the physician’s medical judgment concerning his patient’s needs. If a physician certifies that an abortion is medically necessary, see n. 3, supra, the medical expenses are covered under the Pennsylvania Medicaid program. If, however, the physician concludes that the abortion is not medically necessary, but indicates a willingness to perform the abortion at the patient’s request, the expenses are not covered. The decision whether to fund the costs of the abortion thus depends solely on the physician’s determination of medical necessity. Respondents point to nothing in the Pennsylvania Medicaid plan that indicates state interference with the physician’s initial determination.
Respondents rely heavily on the fact that in amending Title XIX in 1972 to include “family planning services” within the five broad categories of required medical treatment, see n. 2, supra, Congress did not expressly exclude abortions as a covered service. Since Congress had expressly excluded abortions as a method of family planning services in prior legislation, see 42 U. S. C. § 300a-6, respondents conclude that the failure of Congress to exclude coverage of abortions in the 1972 amendments to Title XIX “strongly indicates” an intention to require coverage of abortions. This fine of reasoning is flawed. The failure to exclude abortions from coverage indicates only that Congress intended to allow such coverage, not that such coverage is mandatory for nontherapeutic abortions.
The Court of Appeals concluded that Pennsylvania’s regulations also violated the equality provisions of Title XIX requiring that an individual’s medical assistance “shall not be less in amount, duration, or scope than the medical assistance made available to any other such individual.” 42 U. S. C. § 1396a (a) (10) (B) (1970 ed., Supp. V). See § 1396a (a) (10) (C) (1970 ed., Supp. V). According to the Court of Appeals, the Pennsylvania regulation “force[s] pregnant women to use the least voluntary method of treatment, while not imposing a similar requirement on other persons who qualify for aid.” 523 F. 2d 611, 619 (1975). We find the Pennsylvania regulation to be entirely consistent with the equality provisions of Title XIX. Pennsylvania has simply decided that there is reasonable justification for excluding from Medicaid coverage a particular medically unnecessary procedure — nontherapeutic abortions.
At the time of our 1973 decision in Roe, some eight years after the enactment of Title XIX, at least 30 States had statutory prohibitions against nontherapeutic abortions. 410 U. S. 113, 118 n. 2 (1973).
Federal funds are made available only to those States whose Medicaid plans have been approved by the Secretary of HEW. 42 U. S. C. § 1396 (1970 ed., Supp. V).
Congress by statute has expressly prohibited the use during fiscal year 1977 of federal Medicaid funds for abortions except when the life of the mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried to term. Departments of Labor and Health, Education, and Welfare Appropriation Act, 1977, § 209, Pub. L. 94-439, 90 Stat. 1434.
Our dissenting Brothers, in this case and in Maher v. Roe, post, p. 482, express in vivid terms their anguish over the perceived impact of today’s decisions on indigent pregnant women who prefer abortion to carrying the fetus to childbirth. We think our Brothers misconceive the issues before us, as well as the role of the judiciary.
In these cases we have held merely that (i) the provisions of the Social Security Act do not require a State, as a condition of participation, to include the funding of elective abortions in its Medicaid program; and (ii) the Equal Protection Clause does not require a State that elects to fund expenses incident to childbirth also to provide funding for elective abortions. But we leave entirely free both the Federal Government and the States, through the normal processes of democracy, to provide the desired funding. The issues present policy decisions of the widest concern. They should be resolved by the representatives of the people, not by this Court.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
E
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Black
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Like Bouie v. City of Columbia, post, p. 347, this case involves a “sit-in” demonstration in Columbia, South Carolina, this one at the Taylor Street Pharmacy. Negroes and whites alike are invited to come and buy goods in all the store’s departments, but the lunch counter, while it sells food to Negroes to take out, has a policy of refusing to let them sit there and eat. Petitioners, five Negro college students, entered the store and after some of them had made purchases in the front part proceeded to the lunch counter at the rear, where they sat down and waited for service. The store manager had arranged the day before for the police to come and arrest any “sit-in” demonstrators who might refuse to leave after being requested to do so. As a result, three officers were waiting at the store when petitioners arrived. The manager announced to petitioners that he would not serve them and that they would have to leave; then, at the request of one of the officers, he went with the officer to each petitioner and asked each petitioner individually to leave. When petitioners remained seated at the counter, they were arrested and charged with criminal trespass and breach of the peace. The Recorder’s Court convicted them on both charges, the County Court affirmed in an unreported opinion, and the Supreme Court of South Carolina also affirmed. 239 S. C. 395, 123 S. E. 2d 521. Like the petitioners in Borne, post, these petitioners claim that their convictions violate the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, and as in Bouie we granted certiorari. 374 U. S. 804.
We consider first the question whether petitioners’ convictions for breach of the peace are constitutionally valid. Apart from the fact that petitioners remained in the store after having been asked to leave, there is a complete and utter lack of any evidence, and no suggestion in the opinions of any of the courts below, that any of the petitioners did anything disorderly or did anything other than politely ask for service. Petitioners argue that either the breach-of-peace statute as applied to their conduct was unconstitutionally vague for failure to give fair warning, cf. Lametta v. New Jersey, 306 U. S. 451, or there was no evidence to support convictions for violation of that statute, cf. Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U. S. 199. The city replies that, because the Supreme Court of South Carolina refused to pass on objections to the breach-of-peace conviction on the ground that the exceptions taken below were “too general to be considered,” we are precluded from considering petitioners’ constitutional objections. The exceptions on this point read:
“1. The Court erred in refusing to hold that the City failed to prove a prima facie case.
“2. The Court erred in refusing to hold that the City failed to establish the corpus delicti.”
We cannot accept the city’s argument, since in City of Columbia v. Bouie, 239 S. C. 570, 124 S. E. 2d 332, rev’d on another point, post, p. 347, decided only a few weeks after the present case, the State Supreme Court had before it the identical two exceptions, and relying on them reversed for- insufficiency of evidence the conviction of a peaceful and quiet sit-in demonstrator who had been convicted on a charge of resisting arrest. In three other cases decided in the two-month period preceding the present decision it likewise considered these same exceptions enough to raise the question of sufficiency of evidence, and in one of those three cases, decided the day before the present one, it reversed on that ground a conviction for interfering with an officer. We have often pointed out that state procedural requirements which are not strictly or regularly followed cannot deprive us of the right to review. See, e. g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Flowers, 377 U. S. 288; Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 376 U. S. 339; Wright v. Georgia, 373 U. S. 284; NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U. S. 449. We conclude that there is no adequate state ground barring our review of the breach-of-peace convictions.
Turning to the merits, the only evidence to which the city refers to justify the breach-of-peace convictions here, and the only possibly relevant evidence which we have been able to find in the record, is a suggestion that petitioners’ mere presence seated at the counter might possibly have tended to move onlookers to commit acts of violence. As we pointed out above, it is undisputed ini the record that petitioners were polite, quiet, and peaceful from the time they entered the store to the time they left. And as the city concedes, “it cannot be said that the South Carolina Supreme Court has, upon proper presentation and proper briefing, held that the acts of the Petitioners are clearly within the prohibitions of the statutes involved.” Accordingly, we are unwilling to assume and find it hard to believe that the State Supreme Court if it had passed on the point would have held that petitioners could be punished for trespass and for breach of the peace as well, based on the single fact that they had remained after they had been ordered to leave. And further, because of the frequent occasions on which we have reversed under the Fourteenth Amendment convictions of peaceful individuals who were convicted of breach of the peace because of the acts of hostile onlookers, we are reluctant to assume that the breach-of-peace statute covers petitioners’ conduct here. Cf., e. g., Henry v. City of Rock Hill, 376 U. S. 776; Wright v. Georgia, supra; Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U. S. 229; Taylor v. Louisiana, 370 U. S. 154; Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U. S. 157; Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U. S. 1. Since there was no evidence to support the breach-of-peace convictions, they should not stand. Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U. S. 199.
The judgments of conviction for breach of the peace are reversed and the case is remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Per Curiam.
With respect to the criminal trespass convictions, those judgments are also reversed and the case remanded for the reasons stated in Bouie v. City of Columbia, post, p. 347.
Mr. Justice Douglas would reverse for the reasons stated in his opinion in Bell v. Maryland, post, p. 242.
Mr. Justice Goldberg, with whom The Chief Justice joins, would, while joining in the opinion and judgments of the Court, also reverse for the reasons stated in the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Goldberg in Bell v. Maryland, post, p. 286.
Mr. Justice Black, with whom Mr. Justice Harlan and Mr. Justice White join, dissenting from the reversal of the trespass convictions.
We have stated in our opinions in Bouie v. City of Columbia, post, p. 363, and Bell v. Maryland, post, p. 318, our belief that the mere fact that policé responded to the call of a storekeeper and arrested people who were remaining in the store over his protest was not enough to constitute “state action” within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. A review of the evidence in the case before us convinces us that the officers here did nothing which would justify a holding that they were acting for the State in any capacity except to arrest people who violated the trespass statute by remaining on the property of another after having been asked to leave. Petitioners’ other objections relating to vagueness of the trespass statute and alleged absence of evidence to support the trespass convictions are identical to those which we considered and rejected in our opinion in Bouie. We believe therefore that the trespass convictions should stand.
Section 16-386, Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1952 (1960 Supp.).
Section 15-909, Code of Laws of Sbuth Carolina, 1952, provides:
“Disorderly conduct, etc. — The mayor or intendant and any aider-man, councilman or warden of any city or town in this State may in person arrest or may authorize and require any marshal or constable especially appointed for that purpose to arrest any person who, within the corporate limits of such city or town, may be engaged in a breach of the peace, any riotous or disorderly conduct, open obscenity, public drunkenness or any other conduct grossly indecent or dangerous to the citizens of such city or town or any of them. Upon conviction before the mayor or intendant or city or town council such person may be committed to the guardhouse which the mayor or intendant or city or town council is authorized to establish or to the county jail or to the county chaingang for a term not exceeding thirty days and if such conviction be for disorderly conduct such person may also be fined not exceeding one hundred dollars; -provided, that this section shall not be construed to prevent trial by jury.”
239 S. C., at 399, 123 S. E. 2d, at 523.
City of Charleston v. Mitchell, 239 S. C. 376, 123 S. E. 2d 512, rev’d on another point, post, p. 551. See also State v. Edwards, 239 S. C. 339, 123 S. E.. 2d 247, rev’d on another point sub nom. Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U. S. 229; City of Greenville v. Peterson, 239 S. C. 298, 122 S. E. 2d 826, rev’d on another point, 373 U. S. 244 (allegation of failure to establish corpus delicti only).
The city cites no decision of the Supreme Court of South Carolina which supports its position on this issue. State v. Edwards, 239 S. C. 339, 123 S. E. 2d 247, rev’d sub nom. Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U. S. 229, from which the city quotes, did not involve this statute and is not otherwise persuasive.
We do not reach petitioners’ contention that their breach-of-peace convictions were void for vagueness under the doctrine of Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U. S. 451.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Stevens
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Since its enactment during the Civil War, the False Claims Act, 31 U. S. C. §§ 3729-3733, has authorized both the Attorney General and private qui tam relators to recover from persons who make false or fraudulent claims for payment to the United States. The Act now contains a provision barring qui tam actions based upon the public disclosure of allegations or transactions in certain specified sources. § 3730(e)(4)(A). The question before us is whether the reference to “administrative” reports, audits, and investigations in that provision encompasses disclosures made in state and local sources as well as federal sources. We hold that it does.
I
In 1995 the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) entered into contracts with two counties in North Carolina authorizing them to perform, or to hire others to perform, cleanup and repair work in areas that had suffered extensive flooding. The Federal Government agreed to shoulder 75 percent of the contract costs. Respondent Karen T. Wilson was at that time an employee of the Graham County Soil and Conservation District, a special-purpose government body that had been delegated partial responsibility for coordinating and performing the remediation effort. Suspecting possible fraud in connection with this effort, Wilson voiced her concerns to local officials in the summer of 1995. She also sent a letter to, and had a meeting with, agents of the USD A.
Graham County officials began an investigation. An accounting firm hired by the county performed an audit and, in 1996, issued a report (Audit Report) that identified several potential irregularities in the county’s administration of the contracts. Shortly thereafter, the North Carolina Department of Environment, Health, and Natural Resources issued a report (DEHNR Report) identifying similar problems. The USDA’s Office of Inspector General eventually issued a third report that contained additional findings.
In 2001 Wilson filed this action, alleging that petitioners, the Graham County and Cherokee County Soil and Water Conservation Districts and a number of local and federal officials, violated the False Claims Act (FCA) by knowingly submitting false claims for payment pursuant to the 1995 contracts. She further alleged that petitioners retaliated against her for aiding the federal investigation of those false claims. Following this Court's review of the statute of limitations applicable to Wilson’s retaliation claim, Graham County Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson, 545 U. S. 409 (2005), the Court of Appeals ordered that that claim be dismissed as time barred. 424 F. 3d 437 (CA4 2005). On remand, the District Court subsequently dismissed Wilson’s qui tarn action for lack of jurisdiction. App. to Pet. for Cert. 95a-105a. The court found that Wilson had failed to refute that her action was based upon allegations publicly disclosed in the Audit Report and the DEHNR Report. Id., at 95a-98a. Those reports, the District Court determined, constituted “administrative... report[s],... audit[s], or investigation[s]” within the meaning of the FCA’s public disclosure bar, 31 U. S. C. § 3730(e)(4)(A).
The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the District Court because the reports had been generated by state and local entities. “[O]nly federal administrative reports, audits or investigations,” the Fourth Circuit concluded, “qualify as public disclosures under the FCA.” 528- F. 3d 292, 301 (2008) (emphasis added). The Circuits having divided over this issue, we granted certiorari to resolve the conflict. 557 U. S. 918 (2009).
II
We have examined the FCA’s qui tam provisions in several recent opinions. At issue in this case is the FCA’s public disclosure bar, which deprives courts of jurisdiction over qui tam suits when the relevant information has already entered the public domain through certain channels. The statute contains three categories of jurisdiction-stripping disclosures. Following the example of the Court of Appeals, see 528 F. 3d, at 300-301, we have inserted Arabic numerals to identify these categories:
“No court shall have jurisdiction over an action under this section based upon the public disclosure of allegations or transactions [1] in a criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, [2] in a congressional, administrative, or Government Accounting Office [(GAO)] report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or [3] from the news media, unless the action is brought by the Attorney General or the person bringing the action is an original source of the information.” § 3730(e)(4)(A) (footnote omitted).
This dispute turns on the meaning of the adjective “administrative” in the second category (Category 2): whether it embraces only forums that are federal in nature, as respondent alleges, or whether it extends to disclosures made in state and local sources such as the DEHNR Report and the Audit Report, as petitioners allege.
In debating this question, petitioners have relied primarily on the statute's text whereas respondent and the Solicitor General, as her amicus, have relied heavily on considerations of history and policy. Although there is some overlap among the three types of argument, it is useful to discuss them separately. We begin with the text.
III
The term “administrative” “may, in various contexts, bear a range of related meanings,” Chandler v. Judicial Council of Tenth Circuit, 398 U. S. 74, 103, n. 8 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in denial of writ), pertaining to private bodies as well as to governmental bodies. When used to modify the nouns “report, hearing, audit, or investigation,” in the context of a statutory provision about “the public disclosure” of fraud on the United States, the term is most naturally read to describe the activities of governmental agencies. See Black’s Law Dictionary 49 (9th ed. 2009) (hereinafter Black’s) (defining “administration,” “[i]n public law, [as] the practical management and direction of the executive department and its agencies”). Given that “administrative” is not itself modified by “federal,” there is no immediately apparent textual basis for excluding the activities of state and local agencies (or their contractors) from its ambit. As the Court of Appeals recognized, “the statute by its express terms does not limit its reach to federal administrative reports or investigations.” 528 F. 3d, at 301. “[T]here is nothing inherently federal about the word ‘administrative,’ and Congress did not define the term in the FCA.” Id., at 302.
The Court of Appeals’ conclusion that “administrative” nevertheless reaches only federal sources rested on its application of the interpretive maxim noscitur a sociis. See id., at 302-305. This maxim, literally translated as “ ‘it is known by its associates,’” Black’s 1160, counsels lawyers reading statutes that “a word may be known by the company it keeps,” Russell Motor Car Co. v. United States, 261 U. S. 514, 519 (1923). All participants in this litigation acknowledge that the terms “congressional” and “[GAO]” are federal in nature; Congress is the Legislative Branch of the Federal Government, and the GAO is a federal agency. Relying on our opinions in S. D. Warren Co. v. Maine Bd. of Environmental Protection, 547 U. S. 370 (2006), and Beecham v. United States, 511 U. S. 368 (1994), the Court of Appeals reasoned that “the placement of ‘administrative’ squarely in the middle of a list of obviously federal sources strongly suggests that ‘administrative’ should likewise be restricted to federal administrative reports, hearings, audits, or investigations.” 528 F. 3d, at 302. In so holding, the Court of Appeals embraced what we might call the Sandwich Theory of the Third Circuit. Both courts ‘“f[ou]nd it hard to believe that the drafters of this provision intended the word “administrative” to refer to both state and federal reports when it lies sandwiched between modifiers which are unquestionably federal in character.’” Ibid, (quoting United States ex rel. Dunleavy v. County of Delaware, 123 F. 3d 734, 745 (CA3 1997)).
We find this use of noscitur a sociis unpersuasive. A list of three items, each quite distinct from the other no matter how construed, is too short to be particularly illuminating. Although this list may not be “completely disjunctive,” 528 F. 3d, at 302 — it refers to “congressional, administrative, or [GAO]” sources, § 3730(e)(4)(A), rather than “congressional, or administrative, or [GAO]” sources — neither is it completely harmonious. The substantive connection, or fit, between the terms “congressional,” “administrative,” and “GAO” is not so tight or so self-evident as. to demand that we “rob” any one of them “of its independent and ordinary significance.” Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U. S. 330, 338-339 (1979); see also Russell, 261 U. S., at 519 (“That a word may be known by the company it keeps is... not an invariable rule, for the word may have a character of its own not to be submerged by its association”). The adjectives in Category 2 are too few and too disparate to qualify as “a string of statutory terms,” S. D. Warren Co., 547 U. S., at 378, or “items in a list,” Beecham, 511 U. S., at 371, in the sense that we used those phrases in the cited cases.
More importantly, we need to evaluate “administrative” within the larger scheme of the public disclosure bar. Both parties acknowledge, as they must, that “Statutory language has meaning only in context,” Graham County Soil, 545 U. S., at 415; where they differ is in determining the relevant context. The Sandwieh Theory presupposes that Category 2 is the only piece of § 3730(e)(4)(A) that matters. We agree with petitioners, however, that all of the sources listed in § 3730(e)(4)(A) provide interpretive guidance. All of these sources drive at the same end: specifying the types of disclosures that can foreclose qui tarn actions. In light of the public disclosure bar's grammatical structure, it may be convenient and even clarifying to parse the list of sources into three categories. But it does not follow that we should treat these categories as islands unto themselves. Courts have a “duty to construe statutes, not isolated provisions.” Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U. S. 561, 568 (1995).
When we consider the entire text of the public disclosure bar, the case for limiting “administrative” to federal sources becomes significantly weaker. The “news media” referenced in Category 3 plainly have a broader sweep. The Federal Government fluids certain media outlets, and certain private outlets have a national focus; but no one contends that Category 3 is limited to these sources. There is likewise no textual basis for assuming that the “criminal, civil, or administrative hearing[s]” listed in Category 1 must be federal hearings. Of the numerous types of sources that serve a common function in § 3730(e)(4)(A), then, only two are distinctly federal in nature, while one (the news media) is distinctly nonfederal in nature.
If the Court of Appeals was correct that the term “administrative” encompasses state and local sources in Category 1, see 528 F. 3d, at 303, it becomes even harder to see why the term would not do the same in Category 2. See Erlenbaugh v. United States, 409 U. S. 239, 243 (1972) (“[A] legislative body generally uses a particular word with a consistent meaning in a given context”). Respondent and the Solicitor General assert that § 3730(e)(4)(A)’s two references to “administrative” can be distinguished because Category 1 is best understood to refer to adjudicative proceedings, whereas Category 2 is best understood to refer to legislative or quasi-legislative activities such as rulemaking, oversight, and investigations. See Brief for Respondent 16-18; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 25-26 (hereinafter Brief for United States). Yet even if this reading were correct, state and local administrative reports, hearings, audits, and investigations of a legislative-type character are presumably just as public, and just as likely to put the Federal Government on notice of a potential fraud, as state and local administrative hearings of an adjudicatory character.
Respondent and the Solicitor General try to avoid this inference, and to turn a weakness into a strength, by further averring that the sources listed in Category 1 are themselves only federal. See Brief for Respondent 23-24; Brief for United States 25-26. No court has ever taken such a view of these sources. See 528 F. 3d, at 303 (citing cases from the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits and stating that “[t]he courts have easily concluded that [Category 1] applies to state-level hearings”); Sylvia § 11:37, at 643, n. 1 (citing additional cases). The arguments in favor of reading a federal limitation into Category 1 are supported, if at all, by legislative history and policy; they find no support in the statute’s text.
Moving from the narrow lens of the Sandwich Theory to a bird’s-eye view, respondent and the Solicitor General also maintain that the “exclusively federal focus” of the FCA counsels against reading the public disclosure bar to encompass nonfederal sources. Brief for Respondent 10,18; Brief for United States 13. The FCA undoubtedly has a federal focus. But so does every other federal statute. And as respondent and the Solicitor General elsewhere acknowledge, quite a few aspects of the FCA, including a reference to “administrative” proceedings in § 3733(i)(7)(A) and the reference to “news media” in § 3730(e)(4)(A) itself, are not just federal. In any event, the “federal focus” of the statute, as a whole, does not shine light on the specific question whether the public disclosure bar extends to certain nonfederal contexts. It is the fact of “public disclosure” — not Federal Government creation or receipt — that is the touchstone of § 3730(e)(4)(A).
Respondent and the Solicitor General make one last argument grounded in the statutory text: It would be anomalous, they say, for state and local administrative reports to count as public disclosures, when state legislative reports do not. See Brief for Respondent 15; Brief for United States 15-16. Yet neither respondent nor the Solicitor General disputes the contention of petitioners and their amici that, at the time the public disclosure bar was enacted in 1986, Congress rarely gave state legislatures a meaningful role in administering or overseeing federally funded programs. See Brief for Petitioners 36-39; Brief for National League of Cities et al. as Amici Curiae 8-13. As in the instant ease, the Federal Government was far more likely to enter into contracts with, and to provide moneys to, state and local executive agencies. Whether or not state legislative sources should have been included in § 3730(e)(4)(A), their exclusion therefore carries no clear implications for the status of state administrative sources.
In sum, although the term “administrative” may be sandwiched in Category 2 between terms that are federal in nature, those terms are themselves sandwiched between phrases that have been generally understood to include non-federal sources; and one of those phrases, in Category 1, contains the exact term that is the subject of our inquiry. These textual clues negate the force of the noscitur a sociis canon, as it was applied by the Court of Appeals. We are not persuaded that the associates with which “administrative” keeps company in § 3730(e)(4)(A) endow it with an exclusively federal character.
IV
As originally enacted, the FCA did not limit the sources from which a relator could acquire the information to bring a qui tam action. In United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U. S. 537 (1943), we upheld the relator’s recovery even though he had discovered the fraud by reading a federal criminal indictment — a quintessential “parasitic” suit. Id., at 545-548; see id., at 545 (“Even if, as the government suggests, the petitioner has contributed nothing to the discovery of this crime, he has contributed much to accomplishing one of the purposes for which the Act was passed”). Congress promptly reacted to that decision by amending the statute to preclude qui tam actions “based upon evidence or information in the possession of the United States, or any agency, officer or employee thereof, at the time such suit was brought.” Act of Dec. 23, 1943, 57 Stat. 609 (codified at 31 U. S. C. § 232(C) (1946 ed.)). This amendment erected what came to be known as a Government knowledge bar: “[0]nce the United States learned of a false claim, only the Government could assert its rights under the FCA against the false claimant.” Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U. S. 939, 949 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). In the years that followed the 1943 amendment, the volume and efficacy of qui tam litigation dwindled. “Seeking the golden mean between adequate incentives for whistle-blowing insiders with genuinely valuable information and discouragement of opportunistic plaintiffs who have no significant information to contribute of their own,” United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal R. Co. v. Quinn, 14 F. 3d 645, 649 (CADC 1994), Congress overhauled the statute once again in 1986 “to make the FCA a ‘more useful tool against fraud in modern times,’ ” Cook County v. United States ex rel. Chandler, 538 U. S. 119, 133 (2003) (quoting S. Rep. No. 99-345, p. 2 (1986) (hereinafter S. Rep.)).
The present text of § 3730(e)(4) was enacted in 1986 as part of this larger reform. Congress apparently concluded that a total bar on qui tam actions based on information already in the Government’s possession thwarted a significant number of potentially valuable claims. Rather than simply repeal the Government knowledge bar, however, Congress replaced it with the public disclosure bar in an effort to strike a balance between encouraging private persons to root out fraud and stifling parasitic lawsuits such as the one in Hess. How exactly § 3730(e)(4) came to strike this balance in the way it did is a matter of considerable uncertainty. The House and Senate Judiciary Committees each reported bills that contained very different public disclosure bars from the one that emerged in the Statutes at Large; the Senate bill, for example, did not include the words “administrative,” “audit,” or “investigation” in its version of Category 2, nor did it contain an original source exception. See S. Rep., at 42-43 (text of proposed § 3730(e)(4)).
In respondent and her amici’s view, this background counsels in favor of an exclusively federal interpretation of “administrative” for three separate reasons. First, the drafting history of the public disclosure bar suggests that Congress intended such a result. Second, a major aim of the 1986 amendments was to limit the scope of the Government knowledge bar, and “[cjonstruing [§ 3730(e)(4)(A)] as limited to disclosures in federal proceedings furthers Congress’s purpose 'to encourage more private enforcement suits.’ ” Brief for United States 21 (quoting S. Rep., at 23-24). Third, whereas federal administrative proceedings can be presumed to provide the Attorney General with a fair opportunity to decide whether to bring an FCA action based on revelations made therein, the Attorney General is much less likely to learn of fraud disclosed in state proceedings. Respondent and her amici further maintain that it would be perverse to include nonfederal sources in Category 2, as local governments would then be able to shield themselves from qui tarn liability by discretely disclosing evidence of fraud in “public” reports.
These arguments are reasonable so far as they go, but they do not go very far. As many have observed, the drafting history of the public disclosure bar raises more questions than it answers. Significant substantive changes — including the introduction of the term we are construing in this case — were inserted without floor debate, as “technical” amendments. That the original Senate bill mentioned only congressional and GAO sources in Category 2 is therefore of little moment. Neither the House nor the Senate Committee Report explained why a federal limitation would be appropriate, and the subsequent addition of “administrative” sources to this Category might be taken as a sign that such a limitation was rejected by the full Chambers.
Respondent and her amici place particular emphasis on a remark made by the lead sponsor of the Senate bill, Senator Grassley. See Brief for Respondent 29; Brief for United States 20; Brief for American Center for Law and Justice as Amicus Curiae 13-14; Brief for Taxpayers Against Fraud Education Fund as Amicus Curiae 30-31. In a floor statement, Grassley said that “the term ‘Government’ in the definition of original source is meant to include any Government source of disclosures cited in [the public disclosure bar]; that is, Government includes Congress, the General Accounting Office, any executive or independent agency as well as all other governmental bodies that may have publicly disclosed the allegations.” 132 Cong. Rec. 20536 (1986). Yet even if a single sentence by a single legislator were entitled to any meaningful weight, Senator Grassley’s remark merely begs the question before us. His formulation fails to indicate whether the “other governmental bodies” may be state or local bodies. It also turns on a term, “Government” with a capital “G,” that does not appear in the codified version of the public disclosure bar, which Congress subsequently revised in numerous respects prior to passage.
There is, in fact, only one item in the legislative record that squarely corroborates respondent’s reading of the statute: a letter sent by the primary sponsors of the 1986 amendments to the Attorney General in 1999. See 145 Cong. Rec. 16032 (1999) (reproducing text of letter in which Rep. Berman and Sen. Grassley state: “We did intend, and any fair reading of the statute will confirm, that the disclosure must be in a federal criminal, civil or administrative hearing. Disclosure in a state proceeding of any kind should not be a bar to a subsequent qui tam suit”). Needless to say, this letter does not qualify as legislative “history,” given that it was written 13 years after the amendments were enacted. It is consequently of scant or no value for our purposes.
We do not doubt that Congress passed the 1986 amendments to the FCA “to strengthen the Government’s hand in fighting false claims,” Cook County, 538 U. S., at 133-134, and “to encourage more private enforcement suits,” S. Rep., at 23-24. It is equally beyond cavil, however, that Congress passed the public disclosure bar to bar a subset of those suits that it deemed unmeritorious or downright harmful. The question before us concerns the precise scope of that subset; and on this matter, the record is all but opaque. While “the absence of specific legislative history in no way modifies the conventional judicial duty to give faithful meaning to the language Congress adopted in the light of the evident legislative purpose in enacting the law in question,” United States v. Bornstein, 423 U. S. 303, 310 (1976), there is no “evident legislative purpose” to guide our resolution of the discrete issue that confronts us.
V
Respondent and her amici likewise fail to prove their case that petitioners’ reading of the statute will lead to results that Congress could not have intended. Their argument rests on an empirical proposition: “While federal inquiries and their outcomes are readily available to Department of Justice [(DOJ)] attorneys, many state and local reports and investigations never come to the attention of federal authorities.” Brief for United States 22; see also 528 F. 3d, at 306 (“Because the federal government is unlikely to learn about state and local investigations, a large number of fraudulent claims against the government would go unremedied without the financial incentives offered by the qui tarn provisions of the FCA”). This proposition is not implausible, but it is sheer conjecture. Numerous federal investigations may be occurring at any given time, and DOJ attorneys may not reliably learn about their findings. DOJ attorneys may learn about quite a few state and local inquiries, especially when the inquiries are conducted pursuant to a joint federal-state program financed in part by federal dollars, such as the program at issue in this case. Just how accessible to the Attorney General a typical state or local source will be, as compared to a federal source, is an open question. And it is not even the right question. The statutory touchstone, once again, is whether the allegations of fraud have been “public[ly] disclosed],” § 3730(e)(4)(A), not whether they have landed on the desk of a DOJ lawyer.
Respondent’s argument also gives insufficient weight to Congress’ decision to bar qui tam actions based on disclosures “from the news media.” Ibid. Because there was no such bar prior to 1986, the addition of the news media as a jurisdiction-stripping category forecloses the suggestion that the 1986 amendments implemented a single-minded intent to increase the availability of qui tam litigation. And since the “news media” include a large number of local newspapers and radio stations, this category likely describes a multitude of sources that would seldom come to the attention of the Attorney General.
As for respondent and her amici’s concern that local governments will insulate themselves from qui tam liability “through careful, low key ‘disclosures’” of potential fraud, Brief for American Center for Law and Justice as Amicus Curiae 17, this argument rests not just on speculation but indeed on rather strained speculation. Any such disclosure would not immunize the local government from FCA liability in an action brought by the United States, see Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. United States, 549 U. S. 457, 478 (2007) — and to the contrary it could tip off the Attorney General that such an action might be fruitful. It seems to us that petitioners have the more clear-eyed view when they assert that, “[g]iven the fact that the submission of a false claim to the United States subjects a defendant to criminal liability, fines, debarment, treble damages and attorneys’ fees, no rational entity would prepare a report that self-discloses fraud with the sole purpose of cutting off qui tam actions.” Reply Brief for Petitioners 19; see also United States ex rel. Bly-Magee v. Premo, 470 F. 3d 914, 919 (CA9 2006) (“The fear [of self-insulating disclosures] is unfounded in general because it is unlikely that an agency trying to cover up its fraud would reveal the requisite 'allegations or transactions’ underlying the fraud in a public document”).
Our conclusion is buttressed by the fact that Congress carefully preserved the rights of the most deserving qui tam plaintiffs: those whistle-blowers who qualify as original sources. Notwithstanding public disclosure of the allegations made by a qui tam plaintiff, her case may go forward if she is “an original source of the information.” § 3730(e)(4)(A). It is therefore flat wrong to suggest that a finding for petitioners will “ 'in effect return us to the unduly restrictive “government knowledge” standard’” that prevailed prior to 1986. Brief for United States 31 (quoting Dunleavy, 123 F. 3d, at 746); see Brief for Respondent 34 (asserting that “petitioners’ construction would reimpose a form of the 'government knowledge’ bar” (capitalization omitted)). Today’s ruling merely confirms that disclosures made in one type of context — a state or local report, audit, or investigation — may trigger the public disclosure bar. It has no bearing on disclosures made in other contexts, and it leaves intact the ability of original sources to prosecute qui tam actions irrespective of the state of Government knowledge. Whether respondent can qualify as an “original source,” as that term is defined in § 3730(e)(4), is one of many issues that remain open on remand.
VI
Respondent and the Solicitor General have given numerous reasons why they believe their reading of the FCA moves it closer to the golden mean between an inadequate and an excessive scope for private enforcement. Congress may well have endorsed those views in its recent amendment to the public disclosure bar. See n. 1, supra. With respect to the version of § 3730(e)(4)(A) that is before us, however, we conclude that the term “administrative” in Category 2 is not limited to federal sources.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
On March 23, 2010, the President signed into law the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119. Section 10104(j)(2) of this legislation replaces the prior version of 31 U. S. C. 13730(e)(4) with new language. The legislation makes no mention of retroactivity, which would be necessary for its application to pending cases given that it eliminates petitioners’ claimed defense to a qui tam suit. See Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U. S. 939, 948 (1997). Throughout this opinion, we use the present tense in discussing the statute as it existed at the time this case was argued.
Compare 528 P. 3d, at 301-307 (limiting this portion of the public disclosure bar to federal sources), and United States ex rel. Dunleavy v. County of Delaware, 123 P. 3d 734, 745-746 (CA3 1997) (same), with United States ex rel. Bly-Magee v. Premo, 470 P. 3d 914, 918-919 (CA9 2006) (concluding that state and local sources may qualify), cert. denied, 552 U. S. 1165 (2008), and Battle v. Board of Regents for State of Ga., 468 P. 3d 755, 762 (CA11 2006) (per curiam) (assuming without analysis that state audits may qualify). The Eighth Circuit appears to have taken a “middle road” on this issue, 528 F. 3d, at 301, holding that disclosures made in nonfederal forums may count as “ ‘administrative... report[s]’ ” or “ ‘audit[s]’ ” under § 3730(e)(4)(A) in some instances, as when they relate to “a cooperative federal-state program through which the federal government provides financial assistance,” Hays v. Hoffman, 325 F. 3d 982, 989, cert. denied, 540 U. S. 877 (2003).
See, e. g., Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. United States, 549 U. S. 457 (2007) (construing § 3730(e)(4)(A)’s original source exception); Cook County v. United States ex rel. Chandler, 538 U. S. 119 (2003) (holding that local governments are subject to qui tam liability); Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U. S. 765 (2000) (holding that States are not subject to private FCA actions).
A separate statutory provision defines an “original source” as “an individual who has direct and independent knowledge of the information on which the allegations are based and has voluntarily provided the information to the Government before filing an action under this section which is based on the information.” 31 U. S. C. § 3730(e)(4)(B).
See U. S. Const., Art. I, §1; id., §4, cl. 1 (distinguishing “State... Legislature[sJ” from “the Congress”).
The statute refers to the GAO, mistakenly, as the “Government Accounting Office.” It is undisputed that the intended referent was the General Accounting Office, now renamed the Government Accountability Office. See 31 U. S. C. § 3730, p. 254, n. 2 (compiler’s note); 528 F. 3d 292, 300, n. 4 (CA4 2008); United States ex rel. Mistick PBT v. Housing Authority of Pittsburgh, 186 F. 3d 376, 387 (CA3 1999) (Alito, J.), cert. denied, 529 U. S. 1018 (2000); see also Mistick, 186 F. 3d, at 398 (Becker, C. J., dissenting) (noting that courts have “frequently” made the same scrivener’s error). We have described the GAO as “an independent agency within the Legislative Branch that exists in large part to serve the needs of Congress.” Bowsher v. Merck & Co., 460 U. S. 824, 844 (1983).
In Jarecki v. G. D. Searle & Co., 367 U. S. 303 (1961), the Court applied the noscitur a sociis maxim in construing a statutory provision that referred to ‘“[i]ncome resulting from exploration, discovery, or prospecting,’” id., at 305 (quoting §456(a)(2)(B) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939). Justice Sotomayor contends that “the three terms in Category 2 are no more ‘distinct’ or ‘disparate’ than the phrase at issue in Jarecki.” Post, at 305-306 (dissenting opinion) (citation omitted). We disagree. Whether taken in isolation or in context, the phrase “congressional, administrative, or GAO” is not as cohesive as the phrase “exploration, discovery, or prospecting. ” That is one reason why noscitur a sociis proved illuminating in Jarecki, and why it is less helpful in this case. On their “face,” the terms “exploration,” “discovery,” and “prospecting” all describe processes of searching, seeking, speculating; the centrality of such activities to “the oil and gas and mining industries” gave a due that it was those industries Congress had in mind when it drafted the provision. 367 U. S., at 307 (internal quotation marks omitted). The terms “congressional,” “administrative,” and “GAO” do not share any comparable core of meaning — or indeed any “common feature” at all, post, at
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
H
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Clark
delivered the opinion of the Court.
These companion cases, involving the same facts, question the coverage of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 61 Stat. 136, 73 Stat. 641, 29 U. S. C. §§ 151 et seq. A corporation organized and doing business in the United States beneficially owns seagoing vessels which make regular sailings between United States, Latin American and other ports transporting the corporation’s products and other supplies; each of the vessels is legally owned by a foreign subsidiary of the American corporation, flies the flag of a foreign nation, carries a foreign crew and has other contacts with the nation of its flag. The question arising is whether the Act extends to the crews engaged in. such a maritime operation. The National Labor Relations Board in a representation proceeding on the application of the National Maritime Union held that it does and ordered an election. 134 N. L. R. B. 287. The vessels’ foreign owner sought to enjoin the Board’s Regional Director from holding the election, but the District Court for the Southern District of New York denied the requested relief. 200 F. Supp. 484. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding that the Act did not apply to the maritime operations here and thus the Board had no power to direct the election. 300 F. 2d 222. The N. M. U. had intervened in the proceeding, and it petitioned for a writ of certiorari (No. 93), as did the Regional Director (No. 91). Meanwhile, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, on application of the foreign bargaining agent of the vessels’ crewmen, enjoined the Board members in No. 107. 201 F. Supp. 82. We granted each of the three petitions for certiorari, 370 U. S. 915, and consolidated the cases for argument.
We have concluded that the jurisdictional provisions of the Act do not extend to maritime operations of foreign-flag ships employing alien seamen.
I.
The National Maritime Union of America, AFL-CIO, filed a petition in 1959 with the National Labor Relations Board seeking certification under § 9 (c) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 159 (c), as the representative of the unlicensed seamen employed upon certain Honduran-flag vessels owned by Empresa Hondurena de Vapores, S. A., a Honduran corporation. The petition was filed against United Fruit Company, a New Jersey corporation which was alleged to be the owner of the majority of Empresa’s stock. Empresa intervened and on hearing it was shown that United Fruit owns all of its stock and elects its directors, though no officer or director of Empresa is an officer or director of United Fruit and all are residents of Honduras. In turn the proof was that United Fruit is owned by citizens of the United States and maintains its principal office at Boston. Its business was shown to be the cultivation, gathering, transporting and sale of bananas, sugar, cacao and other tropical produce raised in Central and South American countries and sold in the United States.
United Fruit maintains a fleet of cargo vessels which it utilizes in this trade. A portion of the fleet consists of 13 Honduran-registered vessels operated by Empresa and time chartered to United Fruit, which vessels were included in National Maritime Union’s representation proceeding. The crews on these vessels are recruited by Empresa in Honduras. They are Honduran citizens (save one Jamaican) and claim that country as their residence and home port. The crew are required to sign Honduran shipping articles, and their wages, terms and condition of employment, discipline, etc., are controlled by a bargaining agreement between Empresa and a Honduran union, Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras. Under the Honduran Labor Code only a union whose “juridic personality” is recognized by Honduras and which is composed of at least 90% of Honduran citizens can represent the seamen on Honduran-registered ships. The N. M. U. fulfils neither requirement. Further, under Honduran law recognition of Sociedad as the bargaining agent compels Empresa to deal exclusively with it on all matters covered by the contract. The current agreement in addition to recognition of Sociedad provides for a union shop, with a no-strike-or-lockout provision, and sets up wage scales, special allowances, maintenance and cure provisions, hours of work, vacation time, holidays, overtime, accident prevention, and other details of employment as well.
United Fruit, however, determines the ports of call of the vessels, their cargoes and sailings, integrating the same into its fleet organization. While the voyages are for the most part between Central and South American ports and those of the United States, the vessels each call at regular intervals at Honduran ports for the purpose of taking on and discharging cargo and, where necessary, renewing the ship’s articles.
II.
The Board concluded from these facts that United Fruit operated a single, integrated maritime operation within which were the Empresa vessels, reasoning that United Fruit was a joint employer with Empresa of the seamen covered by N. M. U.’s petition. Citing its own West India Fruit & Steamship Co. opinion, 130 N. L. R. B. 343 (1961), it concluded that the maritime operations involved substantial United States contacts, outweighing the numerous foreign contacts present. The Board held that Empresa was engaged in “commerce” within the meaning of §2(6) of the Act and that the maritime operations “affected commerce” within § 2 (7), meeting the jurisdictional requirement of § 9 (c) (l). It therefore ordered an election to be held among the seamen signed on Empresa’s vessels to determine whether they wished N. M. U., Sindicato Maritimo Nacional de Honduras, or no union to represent them.
As we have indicated, both Empresa and Sociedad brought suits in Federal District Courts to prevent the election, Empresa proceeding in New York against the Regional Director — Nos. 91 and 93 — and Sociedad in the District of Columbia against the members of the Board— No. 107. In Nos. 91 and 93 the jurisdiction of the District Court was challenged on two grounds: first, that review of representation proceedings is limited by § 9 (d) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 169 (d), to indirect review as part of a petition for enforcement or review of an order entered under § 10 (c), 29 U. S. C. § 160 (e); and, second, that the Board members were indispensable parties to the action. The challenge based upon § 9 (d) was not raised or adjudicated in Sociedad’s action against the Board members — No. 107 — and the indispensable-parties challenge is of course not an issue. Sociedad is not a party in Nos. 91 and 93, although the impact of the Board order— the same order challenged in No. 107 — is felt by it. That order has the effect of canceling Sociedad’s bargaining agreement with Empresa’s seamen, since Sociedad is not on the ballot called for by the Board. No. 107, therefore, presents the question in better perspective, and we have chosen it as the vehicle for our adjudication on the merits. This obviates our passing on the jurisdictional questions raised in Nos. 91 and 93, since the disposition of those cases is controlled by our decision in No. 107.
We are not of course precluded from reexamining the jurisdiction of the District Court in Sociedad’s action, merely because no challenge was made by the parties. Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U. S. 237, 244 (1934). Having examined the question whether the District Court had jurisdiction at the instance of Sociedad to enjoin the Board’s order, we hold that the action falls within the limited exception fashioned in Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U. S. 184 (1958). In that case judicial intervention was permitted since the Board’s order was “in excess of its delegated powers and. contrary to a specific prohibition in the Act.” Id., at 188. While here the Board has violated no specific prohibition in the Act, the overriding consideration is that the Board’s assertion of power to determine the representation of foreign seamen aboard vessels under foreign flags has aroused vigorous protests from foreign governments and created international problems for our Government. Important interests of the immediate parties are of course at stake. But the presence of public questions particularly high in the scale of our national interest because of their international complexion is a uniquely compelling justification for prompt judicial resolution of the controversy over the Board’s power. No question of remotely comparable urgency was involved in Kyne, which was a purely domestic adversary situation. The exception recognized today is therefore not to be taken as an enlargement of the exception in Kyne.
III.
Since the parties all agree that the Congress has constitutional power to apply the National Labor Relations Act to the crews working foreign-flag ships, at least while they are in American waters, The Exchange, 7 Cranch 116, 143 (1812); Wildenhus’s Case, 120 U. S. 1, 11 (1887) ; Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, 353 U. S. 138, 142 (1957), we go directly to the question whether Congress exercised that power. Our decision on this point being dispositive of the case, we do not reach the other questions raised by the parties and the amici curiae.
The question of application of the laws of the United States to foreign-flag ships and their crews has arisen often and in various contexts. As to the application of the National Labor Relations Act and its amendments, the Board has evolved a test relying on the relative weight of a ship’s foreign as compared with its American contacts. That test led the Board to conclude here, as in West India Fruit & Steamship Co., supra, that the foreign-flag ships’ activities affected “commerce” and brought them within the coverage of the Act. Where the balancing of the vessel’s contacts has resulted in a contrary finding, the Board has concluded that the Act does not apply.
Six years ago this Court considered the question of the application of the Taft-Hartley amendments to the Act in a suit for damages “resulting from the picketing of a foreign ship operated entirely by foreign seamen under foreign articles while the vessel [was] temporarily in an American port.” Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, supra, at 139. We held that the Act did not apply, searching the language and the legislative history and concluding that the latter “inescapably describes the boundaries of the Act as including only the workingmen of our own country and its possessions.” Id., at 144. Subsequently, in Marine Cooks & Stewards v. Panama S. S. Co., 362 U. S. 365 (1960), we held that the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U. S. C. § 101, deprived a Federal District Court of jurisdiction to enjoin picketing of a foreign-flag ship, specifically limiting the holding to the jurisdiction of the court “to issue the injunction it did under the circumstances shown.” Id., at 372. That case cannot be regarded as limiting the earlier Benz holding, however, since no question as to “whether the picketing . . . was tortious under state or federal law” was either presented or decided. Ibid. Indeed, the Court specifically noted that the application of the Norris-LaGuardia Act “to curtail and regulate the jurisdiction of courts” differs from the application of the Taft-Hartley Act “to regulate the conduct of people engaged in labor disputes.” Ibid.; see Comment, 69 Yale L. J. 498, 523-525 (1960).
It is contended that this case is nonetheless distinguishable from Benz in two respects. First, here there is a fleet of vessels not temporarily in United States waters but operating in a regular course of trade between foreign ports and those of the United States; and, second, the foreign owner of the ships is in turn owned by an American corporation. We note that both of these points rely on additional American contacts and therefore necessarily presume the validity of the “balancing of contacts” theory of the Board. But to follow such a suggested procedure to the ultimate might require that the Board inquire into the internal discipline and order of all foreign vessels calling at American, ports. Such activity would raise considerable disturbance not only in the field of maritime law but in our international relations as well. In addition, enforcement of Board orders would project the courts into application of the sanctions of the Act to foreign-flag ships on a purely ad hoc weighing of contacts basis. This would inevitably lead to embarrassment in foreign affairs and be entirely infeasible in actual practice. The question, therefore, appears to us more basic; namely, whether the Act as written was intended to have any application to foreign registered vessels employing alien seamen.
Petitioners say that the language of the Act may be read literally as including foreign-flag vessels within its coverage. But, as in Benz, they have been unable to point to any specific language in the Act itself or in its extensive legislative history that reflects such a congressional intent. Indeed, the opposite is true as we found in Benz, where we pointed to the language of Chairman Hartley characterizing the Act as “a bill of rights both for American workingmen and for their employers.” 353 U. S., at 144. We continue to believe that if the sponsors of the original Act or of its amendments conceived of the application now sought by the Board they failed to translate such thoughts into describing the boundaries of the Act as including foreign-flag vessels manned by alien crews. Therefore, we find no basis for a construction which would exert United States jurisdiction over and apply its laws to the internal management and affairs of the vessels here flying the Honduran flag, contrary to the recognition long afforded them not only by our State Department but also by the Congress. In addition, our attention is called to the well-established rule of international law that the law of the flag state ordinarily governs the internal affairs of a ship. See Wildenhus’s Case, supra, at 12; Colombos, The International Law of the Sea (3d rev. ed. 1954), 222-223. The possibility of international discord cannot therefore be gainsaid. Especially is this true on account of the concurrent application of the Act and the Honduran Labor Code that would result with our approval of jurisdiction. Sociedad, currently the exclusive bargaining agent of Empresa under Honduran law, would have a head-on collision with N. M. U. should it become the exclusive bargaining agent under the Act. This would be aggravated by the fact that under Honduran law N. M. U. is prohibited from representing the seamen on Honduran-flag ships even in the absence of a recognized bargaining agent. Thus even though Socie-dad withdrew from such an intramural labor fight — a highly unlikely circumstance — questions of such international import would remain as to invite retaliatory action from other nations as well as Honduras.
The presence of such highly charged international circumstances brings to mind the admonition of Mr. Chief Justice Marshall in The Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch 64, 118 (1804), that “an act of congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains . . . .” We therefore conclude, as we did in Benz, that for us to sanction the exercise of local sovereignty under such conditions in this “delicate field of international relations there must be present the affirmative intention of the Congress clearly expressed.” 353 U. S., at 147. Since neither we nor the parties are able to find any such clear expression, we hold that the Board was without jurisdiction to order the election. This is not to imply, however, “any impairment of our own sovereignty, or limitation of the power of Congress” in this field. Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U. S. 571, 578 (1953). In fact, just as we directed the parties in Benz to the Congress, which “alone has the facilities necessary to make fairly such an important policy decision,” 353 U. S., at 147, we conclude here that the arguments should be directed to the Congress rather than to us. Cf. Lauritzen v. Larsen, supra, at 593.
The judgment of the District Court is therefore affirmed in No. 107. The judgment of the Court of Appeals in Nos. 91 and 93 is vacated and the cases are remanded to that court, with instructions that it remand to the District Court for dismissal of the complaint in light of our decision in No. 107. It is so ordered.
Mr. Justice Goldberg took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases.
In No. 107, appeal was perfected to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, to which court we granted a writ of certiorari before judgment.
Ten of the 13 vessels are owned and operated by Empresa. Three are owned by Balboa Shipping Co., Inc., a Panamanian subsidiary of United Fruit. Empresa acts as an agent for Balboa in the management of the latter vessels.
29 U. S. C. § 152 (6):
“The term ‘commerce’ means trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, or communication among the several States, or between the District of Columbia or any Territory of the United States and any State or other Territory, or between any foreign country and any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia, or within the District of Columbia or any Territory, or between points in the same State but through any other State or any Territory or the District of Columbia or any foreign country.”
29 U. S. C. § 152 (7):
“The term ‘affecting commerce’ means in commerce, or burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce, or having led or tending to lead to a labor dispute burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce.”
29 U. S. C. §159 (c)(1):
“Whenever a petition shall have been filed . . . the Board shall investigate such petition and if it has reasonable cause to believe that a question of representation affecting commerce exists shall provide for an appropriate hearing . . . .”
Section 10 (a) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 160 (a), imposes the same requirement, empowering the Board to “prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice . . . affecting commerce.”
Sindicato, a Honduran union, had intervened in the proceeding. Sociedad was invited to intervene but declined to do so.
See generally Comment, 69 Yale L. J. 498, 506-511 (1960); Boczek, Flags of Convenience (1962).
E. g., Dalzell Towing Co., 137 N. L. R. B. No. 48, 50 L. R. R. M. 1164 (1962).
Our conclusion does not foreclose such a procedure in differeiit contexts, such as the Jones Act, 46 U. S. C. § 688, where the pervasive regulation of the internal order of a ship may not be present. As regards application of the Jones Act to maritime torts on foreign ships, however, the Court has stated that “[p]erhaps the most venerable and universal rule of maritime law relevant to our problem is that which gives cardinal importance to the law of the flag.” Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U. S. 571, 584 (1953); see Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U. S. 354, 381-384 (1959); Boczek, op. cit., supra, note 7, at 178-180.
In 1959 Congress enacted § 14 (c)(1) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. (Supp. II) §164 (c)(1), granting the Board discretionary power to decline jurisdiction over labor disputes with insubstantial effects, with a proviso that:
“. . . the Board shall not decline to assert jurisdiction over any labor dispute over which it would assert jurisdiction under the standards prevailing upon August 1, 1959.”
It is argued that the Board would have exerted jurisdiction over Empresa’s vessels and crewmen under those “standards,” as illustrated by its action in Peninsular & Occidental Steamship Co., 120 N. L. R. B. 1097 (1958), about which case the Congress is presumed to have known. Aside from the fact that Congress presumably was aware also of our decision in Benz, the argument is unconvincing. Nothing in the language or the legislative history of the 1959 amendments to the Act clearly indicates a congressional intent to apply the Act to foreign-flag ships and their crews. The “standards” to which § 14 (c) (1) refers are the minimum dollar amounts established by the Board for jurisdictional purposes, and the problem to which § 14 (c) is addressed is the “no-man’s land” created by Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board, 353 U. S. 1 (1957). See 25 N. L. R. B. Ann. Rep. 18-19 (1960); II Legislative History of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (1959), 1153-1154, 1720; 105 Cong. Rec. 6548-6549, 18134.
State Department regulations provide that a foreign vessel includes “any vessel regardless of ownership, which is documented under the laws of a foreign country.” 22 CFR § 81.1 (f).
Article X of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights between Honduras and the United States, 45 Stat. 2618 (1927), provides that merchant vessels flying the flags and having the papers of either country “shall, both within the territorial waters of the other High Contracting Party and on the high seas, be deemed to be the vessels of the Party whose flag is flown.”
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
G
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Blackmun
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In the Court’s most recent opinion in this extended litigation, see 470 U. S. 93 (1985), Mississippi Sound was determined to be a historic bay under the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, [1964] 15 U. S. T. (pt. 2) 1607, T. I. A. S. No. 5639. The waters of that Sound, therefore, are inland waters, and Alabama and Mississippi own their respective portions of the bed of Mississippi Sound. The Court, as is customary in cases of this kind, stated:
“The parties are directed promptly to submit to the Special Master a proposed appropriate decree for this Court’s consideration; if the parties are unable to agree upon the form of the decree, each shall submit its proposal to the Master for his consideration and recommendation.” 470 U. S., at 115.
Jurisdiction was retained to entertain such further proceedings as might be determined to be necessary or advisable to effectuate and supplement the decree and to determine the rights of the parties. Ibid.
The Supplemental Report dated March 16, 1987, of the Special Master, the Honorable Walter P. Armstrong, Jr., now has been filed and is before us. The Master notes therein, p. 2, that no disagreement remains among the parties with respect to the coastline and seaward boundary of Alabama. That much has been decided and is clear. The Master further notes, however, id., at 3, that Mississippi and the United States are in disagreement as to the “seaward boundary” of Mississippi “at two points.” Attached to the Report, as exhibits, are forms of a supplemental decree proposed respectively by the United States and by Mississippi. Id., at 31 and 38. The Special Master ends his Report with conclusions and recommendations. Id., at 26. Mississippi has noted exceptions. The United States is in opposition to those exceptions. Alabama at this point, of course, stands mute. Briefs have been filed and oral argument has been presented.
The Special Master concluded (a) that the decree proposed by Mississippi should not. be entered, ibid., and (b) that, while “the line proposed by the United States,” would be “a preferable solution,” it “would amount to a modification of the Court’s opinion of February 26, 1985,” because it “would be beyond the scope of the reference” to the Master. Id., at 27. He has recommended that the Court “enter an order directing the parties to prepare and submit to the Special Master a decree” defining the seaward boundaries of Alabama and Mississippi “to the extent agreed upon”; defining Mississippi’s seaward boundary between Petit Bois Island and Horn Island “as proposed in the decree submitted by the United States”; and, despite his expressed reservation noted above, defining the portion of Mississippi’s seaward boundary from West Ship Island westward as a described line intersecting at its westernmost point with the already-determined Louisiana border. Ibid.
I
The specific proceeding that culminated in this Court’s opinion of February 26, 1985, reported at 470 U. S. 93, ‘concerned, we thought, only Mississippi Sound and its boundary. See id., at 94; Tr. of Oral Arg. 3. The Special Master’s Report and his stated reservation as to the scope of the reference to him also appear to reflect that understanding. But in its. argument to the Master and in its present exceptions, Mississippi seeks to extend the scope of this litigation to include its interest in seabed south of Mississippi Sound. The State’s current arguments bear little relation to earlier proceedings unless one engrafts upon our 1985 opinion, and upon our direction therein for a proposed decree fixing the southern boundary of Mississippi Sound, an implication that Mississippi’s rights, if any, south of that Sound’s boundary are to be definitively determined in this phase of the litigation.
To the south of the western part of Mississippi Sound lies Chandeleur Sound, a body of water east of Louisiana’s mainland and west of the offshore Chandeleur Islands that run north and south. Chandeleur Sound and Mississippi Sound generally lie perpendicular to each other. They are separated by Cat Island, West Ship Island, and East Ship Island. The latter two at one time formed a single island but became divided by hurricane action some years ago.
An earlier phase of this litigation led to the entry of a supplemental decree issued June 16, 1975, see United States v. Louisiana (Louisiana Boundary Case), 422 U. S. 13, fixing the coastline (baseline) of Louisiana pursuant to the Court’s decision of March 17, 1975, see 420 U. S. 529. Embodied in that decree is a line then stipulated to by the United States and the State of Louisiana delimiting Louisiana’s interest in Chandeleur Sound north of the Chandeleur Islands. The Solicitor General advises us that the United States, in this litigation with Mississippi, offered to recognize Mississippi’s rights “in the vicinity of Chandeleur Sound on the basis of an extension of the line stipulated” in the litigation between the United States and Louisiana (a line running from the location at that time of the northernmost of the Chandeleur Islands to a point near the middle of West Ship Island), but that Mississippi rejected that offer. Brief for United States 2-3. Mississippi acknowledges the rejection. Tr. of Oral Arg. 6. Thus, that easy solution to the controversy between the United States and Mississippi as to waters south of Mississippi Sound and in the vicinity of Chandeleur Sound proved to be unattainable. What remains in dispute is an area of about 150 square miles. Id., at 16.
II
As has been stated above, the current phase of the litigation up to this point, so far as Mississippi is concerned, has dealt only with Mississippi Sound. It has not focused on Mississippi’s interest south of Mississippi Sound. This being so, we sympathize with the Special Master’s unease about the scope of the reference to him. With the case in its present somewhat confused posture, we are unwilling on the present record to determine the extent of Mississippi’s rights south of Mississippi Sound without the parties’ complete agreement and the Special Master’s ready acquiescence.
Because Mississippi’s exceptions to the Special Master’s Supplemental Report do not relate at all to Mississippi Sound, and do not contest the validity of that Sound’s closing lines recommended by' the Master, we are left with a situation where all parties are in agreement as to that Sound and its boundary. The exceptions of Mississippi, as presented to us at this time, therefore are overruled but without prejudice to the advancement of such claims as any party might have with respect to the area south of Mississippi Sound and in the vicinity of Chandeleur Sound in an appropriate separate chapter of these proceedings. The Supplemental Report dated March 16, 1987, of the Special Master and his recommendations, to the extent — and only to the extent — they are consistent with this opinion, are adopted and confirmed.
The parties once again are directed promptly to submit to the Special Master a proposed appropriate decree for this Court’s consideration defining the claims of Alabama and Mississippi with respect to Mississippi Sound. If the parties are unable to agree upon the form of the decree, each shall submit its proposal to the Special Master for his consideration and recommendation. Each party shall bear its own costs; the actual expenses of the Special Master incurred with respect to this litigation since February 26, 1985, shall.be borne half by the United States and half by Mississippi.
The Court retains jurisdiction to entertain such further proceedings, enter such orders, and issue such -writs as from time to time may be determined to be necessary or advisable to effectuate and supplement the forthcoming decree and to determine the rights of the respective parties.
In order to facilitate the resolution of any question that might remain as to Chandeleur Sound, leave is granted the State of Mississippi and the United States, respectively, without further motion, to file a complaint with this Court setting forth its claim to any undecided portion of Chandeleur Sound. The complaint may be filed within 60 days of the date this opinion is filed. An opposing party shall have 45 days to respond. It is expected that all concerned -will cooperate in expediting this remaining aspect of this phase of the litigation.
It is so ordered.
Justice Marshall and Justice Kennedy took no part in the consideration or decision of this litigation.
We necessarily assume that, by his repeated use of the term “seaward boundary,” the Master is referring to Mississippi’s coastline and not to its ultimate offshore boundary.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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J
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Chief Justice Rehnquist
delivered the opinion of the Court.
During the course of respondent Robinson’s mail fraud trial in the Middle District of Tennessee, his counsel urged in closing argument that the Government had not allowed respondent to explain his side of the story. The prosecutor during his summation informed the jury that respondent “could have taken the stand and explained it to you. . . .” App. 27. We hold that the comment by the prosecutor did not violate respondent’s privilege to be free from compulsory self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Following a jury trial in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, respondent was convicted of two counts of mail fraud, 18 U. S. C. § 1341; both counts involved arson-related insurance claims. The evidence at trial showed that respondent leased a truck stop in Guthrie, Kentucky, in 1979. The business deteriorated over the next several months. Two days after respondent increased the insurance coverage on the truckstop an explosion and fire destroyed the premises. A number of unusual circumstances suggested arson. Respondent subsequently submitted an insurance claim of $80,000.
Approximately one year later, respondent’s home in Clarksville, Tennessee, was badly damaged by arson an hour after respondent had departed for California in a large truck filled with household furnishings. When interviewed by investigators, respondent denied setting fire to his house and explained that he had removed the household furnishings to take them to his daughter in California. Respondent filed with his insurance company a proof of loss claim of $200,000, including a $106,500 personal property claim. Certain property included in this claim was later discovered by authorities in respondent’s California home.
Respondent did not testify at trial. In his closing argument to the jury, the theme of respondent’s counsel was that the Government had breached its “duty to be fair.” Several different times, counsel charged that the Government had unfairly denied respondent the opportunity to explain his actions. Counsel concluded by informing the jury that respondent was not required to testify, and that although it would be natural to draw an adverse inference from respondent’s failure to take the stand, the jury could not and should not do so.
Following this closing and out of the presence of the jury, the prosecution objected to the remarks of defense counsel and contended that the defense had “opened the door.” The court agreed, stating:
"... I will tell you what, the Fifth Amendment ties the Government’s hands in terms of commenting upon the defendant’s failure to testify. But that tying of hands is not putting you into a boxing match with your hands tied behind your back and allowing him to punch you in the face.
“That is not what it was intended for and not fair. I will let you say that the defendants had every opportunity, if they wanted to, to explain this to the ladies and gentlemen of the jury.” App. 25.
Respondent did not object.
Following a short recess, the prosecutor gave his rebuttal summation. He began by stating that the Government had an obligation to “play fair” and had complied with that obligation in this case. Specifically, he stated:
“[Defense counsel] has made comments to the extent the Government has not allowed the defendants an opportunity to explain. It is totally unacceptable.
“He explained himself away on tape right into an indictment. He explained himself to the insurance investigator, to the extent that he wanted to.
“He could have taken the stand and explained it to. you, anything he wanted to. The United States of America has given him, throughout, the opportunity to explain.” Id., at 27.
Defense counsel did not object to this closing and did not request a cautionary instruction. Nonetheless, the court included in the jury instruction the admonition that “no inference whatever may be drawn from the election of a defendant not to testify.” Tr. 694.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed respondent’s convictions, finding that the prosecutor’s comment had “deprived the defendant ... of a fair trial under the Fifth Amendment and 18 U. S. C. §3481.” 716 F. 2d 1095, 1096, 1097 (1983) (citing Griffin v. California, 380 U. S. 609 (1965), and Wilson v. United States, 149 U. S. 60 (1893)). The court held that because the prosecution’s reference to respondent’s failure to testify had been “direct,” it did not matter that it was made in response to remarks by defense counsel. This Court granted certiorari, vacated that judgment of the Court of Appeals, and remanded for reconsideration in light of United States v. Young, 470 U. S. 1 (1985). 470 U. S. 1025 (1985). There we held that improper remarks by the prosecutor — in which he expressed his personal belief that the defendant was guilty — did not constitute reversible error under the standard properly applicable. On remand, a divided panel of the Court of Appeals reinstated its prior judgment. 794 F. 2d 1132 (1986). We granted certiorari, 479 U. S. 1083 (1987), to consider whether the remarks violated the Fifth Amendment, and if so, whether the violation constituted plain error. Because we conclude that there was no constitutional error at all, we do not reach the plain-error issue.
In Griffin v. California, supra, the defendant, who had not testified, was found guilty by a jury of first-degree murder. The prosecution had emphasized to the jury in closing argument that the defendant, who had been with the victim just prior to her demise, was the only person who could provide information as to certain details related to the murder, and yet, he had “ ‘not seen fit to take the stand and deny or explain.’” Id., at 611. In accordance with the California Constitution, the trial court had instructed the jury that although the defendant had a constitutional right not to testify, the jury could draw an inference unfavorable to the defendant as to facts within his knowledge about which he chose not to testify. Id., at 610. This Court reversed the conviction ruling that the prosecutor’s comments and the jury instruction impermissibly infringed upon the defendant’s Fifth Amendment right to remain silent:
“[Comment on the refusal to testify] is a penalty imposed by courts for exercising a constitutional privilege. It cuts down on the privilege by making its assertion costly. It is said, however, that the inference of guilt for failure to testify as to facts peculiarly within the accused’s knowledge is in any event natural and irresistible, and that comment on the failure does not magnify that inference into a penalty for asserting a constitutional privilege. What the jury may infer, given no help from the court, is one thing. What it may infer when the court solemnizes the silence of the accused into evidence against him is quite another.” Id., at 614 (citations omitted).
The Court said that the Fifth Amendment “forbids either comment by the prosecution on the accused’s silence or instructions by the court that such silence is evidence of guilt.” Id., at 615.
We think that the Court of Appeals’ holding in this case rests both upon too broad a reading of Griffin and upon too restrictive a reading of the closing comments of respondent’s counsel. Taking up the second of these points first, we think the reasoning of the opinion of the Court of Appeals necessarily rests on the assumption that the references by respondent’s counsel to the Government’s failure to provide respondent an opportunity to “explain” were directed only to the period during which the offenses were being investigated, and not the trial itself. Respondent understandably mirrors this position in his brief here. While we agree that defense counsel’s remarks could have been interpreted in this manner, we do not think that an appellate court may substitute its reading of ambiguous language for that of the trial court and counsel. The colloquy quoted earlier shows that the trial court, immediately after hearing counsel’s comment, understood them to mean that the Government had not allowed respondent to explain his side of the story either before or during trial. While respondent now contends that this interpretation is incorrect, he did not offer, while the matter was being considered by the trial judge, the explanation which he now supports. If counsel’s remarks were, as respondent now argues, so clearly limited to the pretrial period, we think it unusual, to say the least, that counsel would have stood silently by when the trial court made clear its contrary interpretation. We accept what we regard as a reasonable interpretation of the remarks adopted by the trial court.
We hold that the prosecutor’s statement that respondent could have explained to the jury his story did not in the light of the comments by defense counsel infringe upon respondent’s Fifth Amendment rights. The Court of Appeals and respondent apparently take the view that any “direct” reference by the prosecutor to the failure of the defendant to testify violates the Fifth Amendment as construed in Griffin. We decline to give Griffin such a broad reading, because we think such a reading would be quite inconsistent with the Fifth Amendment, which protects against compulsory self-incrimination. The Griffin court addressed prosecutorial comment which baldly stated to the jury that the defendant must have known what the disputed facts were, but that he had refused to take the stand to deny or explain them. We think there is considerable difference for purposes of the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination between the sort of comments involved in Griffin and the comments involved in this case.
In Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U. S. 308, 319 (1976), we stated that “Griffin prohibits the judge and prosecutor from suggesting to the jury that it may treat the defendant’s silence as substantive evidence of guilt.” See also Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U. S. 333, 338 (1978). In the present case it is evident that the prosecutorial comment did not treat the defendant’s silence as substantive evidence of guilt, but instead referred to the possibility of testifying as one of several opportunities which the defendant was afforded, contrary to the statement of his counsel, to explain his side of the case. Where the prosecutor on his own initiative asks the jury to draw an adverse inference from a defendant’s silence, Griffin holds that the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination is violated. But where as in this case the prosecutor’s reference to the defendant’s opportunity to testify is a fair response to a claim made by defendant or his counsel, we think there is no violation of the privilege.
“Under Griffin ... it is improper for either the court or the prosecutor to ask the jury to draw an adverse inference from a defendant’s silence. But I do not believe the protective shield of the Fifth Amendment should be converted into a sword that cuts back on the area of legitimate comment by the prosecutor on the weaknesses in the defense case.” United States v. Hasting, 461 U. S. 499, 515 (1983) (STEVENS, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
The principle that prosecutorial comment must be examined in context is illustrated by our treatment of a Fifth Amendment claim in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586 (1978). We quickly dismissed the argument that the prosecutor had violated the defendant’s right to remain silent when he repeatedly remarked that the evidence was uncontradicted. We did not need to decide whether such comment was generally improper, because in that case “Lockett’s own counsel had clearly focused the jury’s attention on her silence, first, by outlining her contemplated defense in his opening statement and, second, by stating to the court and jury near the close of the case, that Lockett would be the ‘next witness.’” Id., at 595. We concluded: “When viewed against this background, it seems clear that the prosecutor’s closing remarks added nothing to the impression that had already been created by Lockett’s refusal to testify after the jury had been promised a defense by her lawyer and told that Lockett would take the stand.” Ibid.; cf. United States v. Young, 470 U. S. 1 (1985); Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U. S. 168 (1986).
“[The] central purpose of a criminal trial is to decide the factual question of the defendant’s guilt or innocence, United States v. Nobles, 422 U. S. 225 (1975) . . . .” Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U. S. 673, 681 (1986). To this end it is important that both the defendant and the prosecutor have the opportunity to meet fairly the evidence and arguments of one another. The broad dicta in Griffin to the effect that the Fifth Amendment “forbids . . . comment by the prosecution on the accused’s silence,” 380 U. S., at 615, must be taken in the light of the facts of that case. It is one thing to hold, as we did in Griffin, that the prosecutor may not treat a defendant’s exercise of his right to remain silent at trial as substantive evidence of guilt; it is quite another to urge, as defendant does here, that the same reasoning would prohibit the prosecutor from fairly responding to an argument of the defendant by adverting to that silence. There may be some “cost” to the defendant in having remained silent in each situation, but we decline to expand Griffin to preclude a fair response by the prosecutor in situations such as the present one.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Reversed.
Justice Kennedy took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Respondent was acquitted on two counts of making false statements to a bank for purposes of obtaining a loan, 18 U. S. C. § 1014, and the District Court dismissed at the close of the evidence two counts of making and possessing a destructive device, 26 U. S. C. § 5861.
“By the way, all of those statements, I don’t know how many statements we heard of Mr. Robinson, they were all about the arson. Did they ever give him a chance to explain about those sorts of things, about mail fraud?
“Did they ever give this man an opportunity in their many, many statements they took at the time to say, “Well, I had two bedroom sets.’” App. 18.
“The furniture and clothing, all that clothing out on the lawn, . . -. ‘What about your clothing?’ They never gave him a chance to explain.” Id., at 19.
“Now, would you like to get indicted for that, without the Government being fair, and being able to explain, have him explain before you, members of your own community, rather than before the agents?” Ibid.
“Now, here is what the Government, to be fair with the jury, should have done. They should have taken those items in the Kentucky inventory and just proved them. Why let the defendant disprove them, give him an opportunity to explain?” Id., at 21.
“In trial of all persons charged with the commission of offense against the United States . . . the person charged shall, at his own request, be a competent witness. His failure to make such a request shall not create any presumption against him.” 18 U. S. C. § 3481.
Concomitant with the protections of the Fifth Amendment are those afforded by § 3481. See n. 3, supra. For many years, the prohibition on adverse comment concerning a defendant’s failure to testify was grounded solely in § 3481. See Wilson v. United States, 149 U. S. 60 (1893). Since that time, however, the scope of the Fifth Amendment has been expanded to encompass in large part the terrain previously occupied solely by § 3481. See Griffin v. California, 380 U. S. 609 (1965). In circumstances such as these, the two provisions are generally construed in a parallel fashion. Id., at 613-614 (quoting a passage from Wilson and concluding: “If the words ‘Fifth Amendment’ are substituted for ‘act’ and for ‘statute,’ the spirit of the Self-Incrimination Clause is reflected”); see also United States v. Hasting, 461 U. S. 499, 504-508 (1983).
In United States v. Young and Darden v. Wainwright, we concluded that statements by the prosecutor which inflamed the jury, vouched for the credibility of witnesses, or offered the prosecutor’s personal opinion as to the defendant’s guilt were improper, but we held that, in context, those statements did not necessitate reversal. In contrast, a reference to the defendant’s failure to take the witness stand may, in context, be perfectly proper.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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A
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is an action brought in a United States District Court to enjoin interference with a business, and the question is whether the complaint subjects that court to the limitations imposed by the Norris-LaGuardia Act upon its equity jurisdiction.
This is the substance of the complaint. Respondent owns a delicatessen store which sells food and serves meals. She obtained bread for the delicatessen store from Hinkle's bakery. Deliveries were made by a driver, an employee of Hinkle and a member of Local Union No. 33, one of the petitioners. The driver delivered the bread at noon, which inconvenienced the respondent, since the checking of deliveries at that hour interfered with the serving of lunches. Respondent “required” the driver to bring the bread at another hour. Shortly thereafter, Hinkle informed the respondent that it would no longer furnish her with bakery products. And so, respondent made arrangements with another bakery, which delivered at a more convenient hour.
Three weeks later, the petitioner Andre, president of the union, visited the delicatessen store and stated that the respondent owed the driver approximately $150 and requested immediate payment. Respondent replied that she had never had dealings with the driver, but had paid Hinkle directly by check, and would pay the bill in due course. Andre replied that the payment would have to be made to the driver in full; furthermore, that if the respondent did not cease carrying a certain non-union article of food he noticed on display, delivery of bread, milk, and other products necessary to the respondent’s business would be cut off. Shortly thereafter the respondent sent a check to Hinkle for the balance of her bill. It was returned by the union, with a letter signed by Andre asserting that the payment was owed to its member, the driver, and could not be accepted. The following day, the bakery which had been serving respondent after Hinkle had stopped doing so, ceased to deal with her, explaining that the union had threatened otherwise “to pull out all its drivers.” Through an effective boycott, the union kept the respondent from obtaining bread from other bakeries or retail stores. The delicatessen store was also picketed.
The complaint prayed for temporary and permanent injunctions against the boycott and other interference with respondent’s business, the payment of damages, and the usual catch-all relief. Petitioners moved to dismiss the action on the ground that the controversy as set forth in the complaint involved a “labor dispute” under the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70, 29 U. S. C. §§ 101 et seg. Respondent filed an “answer to motion to dismiss,” attached to which were affidavits, including one of Benjamin Wagshal, manager of the delicatessen store, elaborating the' incidents narrated in the complaint. Among other matters set forth, he stated that payment for bread purchased from Hinkle had always been made by check sent directly to Hinkle and was never made to a driver, and that neither the union nor any of its drivers had ever previously questioned this practice; that Andre had asserted by mail and at the delicatessen store that the check which the respondent had sent to Hinkle was $12.22 short of the amount owed; and that the non-union item on sale to which Andre had objected was not a subject of controversy but merely an excuse for Andre’s attempt, on his visit to the delicatessen store, to enforce his demands concerning the bill, and that in any event its sale had been discontinued.
The District Court granted an injunction pendente lite, restraining the petitioners from interfering with respondent’s business or preventing sale and delivery of bakery products to the respondent, by boycott and picketing. At the same time, it denied the petitioners’ motion to dismiss. Petitioners filed a notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, and respondents moved to dismiss the appeal.
If this case does not involve a “labor dispute” under the Norris-LaGuardia Act, an appeal as of right could not be had in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. 31 Stat. 1189, 1225, as amended, D. C. Code (1940) § 17-101. However, § 10 of the Norris-La-Guardia Act, 47 Stat. 70, 72, 29 U. S. C. § 110, provides for immediate review of an order granting or denying “any temporary injunction in a case involving or growing out of a labor dispute . ...” The Court of Appeals, one justice dissenting, held that this was not such a case, and dismissed the appeal. 161 F. 2d 380. Because of asserted conflict between this decision and prior decisions of this Court on the scope of “labor dispute” within the meaning of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, we granted certiorari. 332 U. S. 756.
A preliminary claim must be met, that the case has become moot. The short answer to the argument that the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 136, 149, § 10 (h), has removed the limitations of the Norris-LaGuardia Act upon the power to issue injunctions against what are known as secondary boycotts, is that the law has been changed only where an injunction is sought by the National Labor Relations Board, not where proceedings are instituted by a private party. The claim of mootness is also based on an affidavit stating that after dismissal of the appeal by the Court of Appeals, the union lifted its boycott. Since the record does not show that a stay of the injunction was granted pending action in this Court, we must assume that the union’s action was merely obedience to the judgment now here for review. We therefore turn to the merits.
The petitioners attach significance to three incidents for their claim that a “labor dispute” is here involved.
1. The controversy over the hour of delivery. The petitioners claim that this was a dispute “concerning terms or conditions of [the driver’s] employment,” thereby raising a labor dispute, “whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee.” § 13 (c) of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. But the respondent had nothing to do with the working conditions of Hinkle’s employees, individually or collectively. Her only desire was to have the bread come at an hour suitable for her business, and she had no interest in what arrangements Hinkle made to satisfy that desire rather than run the risk of losing her trade — to have the bread delivered by the same driver at a different hour, or by another driver, by an independent contractor, or through some other resourceful contrivance. To hold that under such circumstances a failure of two businessmen to come to terms created a labor dispute merely because what one of them sought might have affected the work of a particular employee of the other, would be to turn almost every controversy between sellers and buyers over price, quantity, quality, delivery, payment, credit, or any other business transaction into a “labor dispute.” Cf. Columbia River Packers Assn. v. Hinton, 315 U. S. 143. Furthermore, on the basis of what we have before us, respondent’s disagreement with Hinkle over the delivery hour was a dead controversy, not involved in the subsequent dispute with the union, or in the boycott against which the injunction was directed.
2. The controversy over the bill. The petitioners regard both the question whether payment was to be made to the driver rather than to Hinkle, and the disagreement over the disputed sum of $12.22, as a matter concerning the driver’s wages, and therefore a condition of his employment. But, on the allegations now here, respondent had nothing to do with the payment of the driver’s wages. The delicatessen store was Hinkle’s customer. On the basis of the allegations to be considered, the driver would receive his pay whether or not respondent paid her bill. It is immaterial that the driver may have been the conduit for payment — as drivers who deliver packages normally are. The same is true as to the disputed item of $12.22. The mere fact that it is a labor union representative rather than a bill collector who, with or without the creditor’s consent, seeks to obtain payment of an obligation, does not transmute a business controversy into a Norris-LaGuardia “labor dispute.” Cf. Dorchy v. Kansas, 272 U. S. 306, 311.
3. The non-union item on sale in the delicatessen store. Sale by a merchant of non-union commodities is, no doubt, a traditional source of labor disputes within the scope of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. While the complaint itself did not indicate the history of this matter after Andre’s visit, the affidavit attached to the “answer to motion to dismiss” sets forth that it was not a bona fide bone of contention, but a mere pretext, and, further, that the respondent thereafter withdrew the item from sale. While the conclusion of the incident giving rise to a controversy may not necessarily terminate a labor dispute (cf. Hunt v. Crumboch, 325 U. S. 821), what is before us leaves no doubt that the subsequent boycott was addressed only to the question of payment of the bill. Petitioners suggest that since no injunction may issue in a case growing out of a labor dispute, except upon oral testimony, determination whether there is a labor dispute should not rest on affidavits. But in this case the affidavits were merely a gloss on the complaint and as such constituted an informal amendment. They serve here as allegations, not proof.
This case was decided on a motion to dismiss. All that was determined was that on the basis of the respondent’s claims, which the petitioners chose not to controvert, the Norris-LaGuardia Act did not apply. Since the only issue before the court below, and therefore before us, was the appealability of the order for an injunction pendente lite, which in turn depended on the applicability of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, other questions raised are not now open here.
Affirmed.
Mr. Justice Black, Mr. Justice Douglas, and Mr. Justice Murphy dissent. Mr. Justice Rutledge took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Section 13 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70, 73, 29 U. S. C. § 113, reads as follows:
“Sec. 13. When used in this Act, and for the purposes of this Act — (a) A case shall be held to involve or to grow out of a labor dispute when the case involves persons who are engaged in the same industry, trade, craft, or occupation; or have direct or indirect interests therein; or who are employees of the same employer; or who are members of the same or an affiliated organization of employers or employees; whether such dispute is (1) between one or more employers or associations of employers and one or more employees or associations of employees; (2) between one or more employers or associations of employers and one or more employers or associations of employers; or (3) between one or more employees or associations of employees and one or more employees or associations of employees; or when the case involves any conflicting or competing interests in a ‘labor dispute’ (as hereinafter defined) of ‘persons participating or interested’ therein (as hereinafter defined).
“(b) A person or association shall be held to be a person participating or interested in a labor dispute if relief is sought against him or it, and if he or it is engaged in the same industry, trade, craft, or occupation in which such dispute occurs, or has a direct or indirect interest therein, or is a member, officer, or agent of any association composed in whole or in part of employers or employees engaged in such industry, trade, craft, or occupation.
“ (c) The term ‘labor dispute’ includes any controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment, or concerning the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee.
“(d) The term 'court of the United States’ means any court of the United States whose jurisdiction has been or may be conferred or defined or limited by Act of Congress, including the courts of the District of Columbia.”
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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G
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
In 1964 the petitioner was tried and convicted in an Alabama state court for first-degree murder. He was sentenced to death. The conviction was based in large part on written confessions that he had signed five days after his arrest. The petitioner objected to the introduction at trial of these confessions. But the trial court and the Alabama Supreme Court held that the confessions were made voluntarily and were properly received into evidence.
In 1967 this Court summarily reversed that judgment of the Alabama Supreme Court. Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U. S. 35. We said:
“The uncontradicted facts of record are these. Tennessee police officers saw the petitioner as he fled into an open field and fired a bullet into his right leg. He fell, and the local Chief of Police pressed a loaded gun to his face while another officer pointed a rifle against the side of his head. The Police Chief asked him whether he had raped and killed a white woman. When he said that he had not, the Chief called him a liar and said, 'If you don’t tell the truth I am going to kill you.’ The other officer then fired his rifle next to the petitioner’s ear, and the petitioner immediately confessed. Later the same day he received an injection to ease the pain in his leg. He signed something the Chief of Police described as ‘extradition papers’ after the officers told him that ‘it would be best. . . to sign the papers before the gang of people came there and killed’ him. He was then taken by ambulance from Tennessee to Kilby Prison in Montgomery, Alabama. By June 22, the petitioner’s right leg, which was later amputated, had become so swollen and his wound so painful that he required an injection of morphine every four hours. Less than an hour after one of these injections, two Alabama investigators visited him in the prison hospital. The medical assistant in charge told the petitioner to ‘cooperate’ and, in the petitioner’s presence, he asked the investigators to inform him if the petitioner did not ‘tell them what they wanted to know.’ The medical assistant then left the petitioner alone with the State’s investigators. In the course of a 90-minute ‘conversation,’ the investigators prepared two detailed statements similar to the confession the petitioner had given five days earlier at gunpoint in Tennessee. Still in a ‘kind of slumber’ from his last morphine injection, feverish, and in intense pain, the petitioner signed the written confessions thus prepared for him.” Id., at 36-37.
We were led to “the inescapable conclusion that the petitioner’s confessions were involuntary.” Id., at 38. For “[t]he petitioner, already wounded by the police, was ordered at gunpoint to speak his guilt or be killed. From that time until he was directed five days later to tell Alabama investigators 'what they wanted to know,’ there was 'no break in the stream of events,’ Clewis v. Texas, 386 U. S. 707, 710. For he was then still in pain, under the influence of drugs, and at the complete mercy of the prison hospital authorities.” Ibid. Because the confessions ''were the product of gross coercion,” we held that their use at the petitioner’s trial violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Ibid.
Only three months after this Court’s decision, the petitioner was reindicted and retried for the same crime. Again, a confession was introduced in evidence. Again, it was a confession made by the petitioner shortly after he had been shot and arrested and shortly after he had been given a large dose of morphine. Again, the petitioner was convicted and sentenced to death.
The confession used at the second trial was not exactly the same as the ones that had been used against the petitioner at his first trial. It was not one of the written confessions made by the petitioner in an Alabama hospital five days after his arrest. Instead, it was an oral confession that the petitioner had made in a Tennessee hospital only one hour after his arrest.
One hour after the arrest, in extreme pain from the gunshot that had blown most of the bone out of one leg, the petitioner was brought by police to a Tennessee hospital. There, a doctor gave him two large injections of morphine. The petitioner testified that the morphine “kinda made me feel like I wanted to love somebody; took the pain away; made me feel relaxed.” From then on, the petitioner said, he could remember nothing. But the doctor testified at trial that he had asked the petitioner “why he did it [the crime].” According to the doctor, the petitioner then made an oral confession. Although police were in the area guarding the petitioner, the confession was made only to the doctor.
The Alabama Supreme Court held that this oral confession was made voluntarily and was admissible in evidence against the petitioner.. Beecher v. State, 288 Ala. 1, 256 So. 2d 154. We do not agree. We held five years ago that the confession elicited from the petitioner at the scene of his arrest was plainly involuntary. We also held that his written confessions five days later, while in custody and under the influence of morphine, were part of the “stream of events” beginning with the arrest and were infected with “gross coercion.” 389 U. S., at 38. The oral confession, made only an hour after the arrest and upon which the State now relies, was surely a part of the same “stream of events.”
We hold now — as we held before — that a “realistic appraisal of the circumstances of this case compels the conclusion that this petitioner’s [confession was] the product of gross coercion. Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, no conviction tainted by a confession so obtained can stand.” Ibid.
Accordingly, the motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for certiorari are granted. The judgment is
Reversed.
Although at the second trial the Chief of Police who arrested the petitioner denied having made an explicit threat to kill him if he did not confess at that time, the fact that the petitioner was surrounded by a very angry mob and that police were holding guns on him and even fired one shot by his head is enough to support our original conclusion as to the grossly coercive nature of the police questioning at the scene of the arrest.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
A
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sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
Petitioner Mrs. Ida Phillips commenced an action in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida under Title YII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 alleging that she had been denied employment because of her sex. The District Court granted summary ■judgment for Martin Marietta Corp. (Martin) on the basis of the following showing: (1) in 1966 Martin informed Mrs. Phillips that it was not accepting job applications from women with pre-school-age children; (2) as of the time of the motion for summary judgment, Martin employed men with pre-school-áge children; (3) At the time Mrs. Phillips applied, 70-75 % of the applicants for the position she sought were women; 75-80% of those hired for the position, assembly trainee, were women,, hence no question of bias against women as such was presented.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, 411 F. 2d 1, and denied a rehearing en banc, 416' F. 2d 1257 (1969). We granted certiorari. 397 U. S.. 960 (1970).
Section 703 (a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 requires that persons of like qualifications be given employment opportunities irrespective of their sex. The Court of Appeals therefore erred, in reading this section as permitting one hiring policy for women and another for men— each having pre-school-age children. The existence of such conflicting family obligations, if demonstrably more relevant to job performance for a woman than for a man, could arguably be a basis for distinction under § 703 (e) of the Act. But that is a matter of evidence tending to show that the' condition in question “is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise.” The record before us, however, is not adequate for resolution of these important issues. See Kennedy v. Silas Mason Co., 334 U. S. 249, 256-257 (1948). Summary judgment was therefore improper and we remand for fuller development of the record and for further consideration.
Vacated and remanded.
Section 703 of the Act, 78 Stat. 255, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2, provides as follows:
“(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an em-. ployer—
“(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of .such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin ....
“(e) Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, (1) • it shall not be'an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and employ employees ... on the basis of . . . religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the. normal operation of that particular business: or enterprise . . ,
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Marshall
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this appeal, we must decide whether the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), 67 Stat. 462, 43 U. S. C. § 1331 et seq. (1982 ed. and Supp. Ill), prevents Iowa from including income earned from the sale of oil and gas extracted from the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) in the apportionment formula it uses to calculate in-state taxable income. We hold that it does not.
I
Shell Oil Company (Shell) is a unitary business, incorporated in Delaware. Its activities include producing, transporting, and marketing oil and gas and the products that are made from them. Shell extracts oil and gas not only within various States but also on the OCS, which is defined by the OCSLA as all those submerged lands three or more geographical miles from the United States coastline. Between 1977 and 1980, the tax years at issue in this case, a portion of Shell’s gross revenues was derived from the sale of oil and gas extracted from the OCS and the sale of products made from OCS oil and gas.
During the years at issue, Shell sold all of its OCS natural gas directly at the wellhead platform located above the OCS. Nearly all of its OCS crude oil, by contrast, was transferred via pipelines to the continental United States, where Shell either sold it to third parties or refined it. The refining process typically involves the commingling of OCS crude oil with crude oil purchased or drawn by Shell from other places. Thus, the original source of oil in any Shell-refined product is indeterminable.
Shell’s principal business in the State of Iowa during the years at issue was the sale of oil and chemical products which it had manufactured and refined outside of Iowa. These products included OCS crude oil that had been commingled with non-OCS crude oil.
Iowa imposes an income tax on corporations doing business in Iowa. Iowa Code §422.33(2) (1987). For a unitary business like Shell, that income tax is determined by a single-factor apportionment formula based on sales. Under that formula, Iowa taxes the share of a corporation’s overall net income that is “reasonably attributable to the trade or business within the state.” Ibid. We have previously upheld Iowa’s sales-based apportionment formula against Due Process and Commerce Clause challenges in Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. Bair, 437 U. S. 267 (1978).
Between 1977 and 1980, Shell filed Iowa tax returns in which it adjusted the Iowa formula to exclude a figure which it stated reflected “income earned” from the OCS. The Iowa Department of Revenue audited Shell’s returns and rejected this modification. Accordingly, the Iowa Department of Revenue found Shell’s tax payment deficient. Shell challenged that determination, claiming at a hearing before the Iowa Department of Revenue that inclusion of OCS-derived income in the tax base of Iowa’s apportionment formula violated the OCSLA. The hearing officer rejected that contention. Shell appealed to the Polk County District Court, which affirmed the administrative decision, No. AA952 (Oct. 3, 1986), App. to Juris. Statement 15a (Polk County opinion), and to the Iowa Supreme Court, which also affirmed. Kelly-Springfield Tire Co. v. Iowa State Board of Tax Review, 414 N. W. 2d 113 (1987). Both courts concluded, based upon an examination of the text and history of the OCSLA, that the OCSLA did not pre-empt Iowa’s apportionment formula. We noted probable jurisdiction, 484 U. S. 1058 (1988), and now affirm.
II
We have previously held that Iowa’s apportionment formula is permissible under the Commerce Clause. Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. Bair, supra. Shell’s argument here is purely one of federal statutory pre-emption. It contends that, in passing the OCSLA, Congress intended to impose stricter requirements on a taxing State’s apportionment formula than those imposed by the operation of the Commerce Clause alone. Shell points to the text and history of the OCSLA which it believes evince a clear congressional intent to preclude States from including in their apportionment , formulas income arising from the sale of OCS oil and gas. In assessing this claim, we review first the text and then the history of the OCSLA.
Shell’s argument is that the plain language of the OCSLA enacts an “absolute and categorical” prohibition on state taxation of income arising from sales of OCS gas and oil. Brief for Appellant 13. Shell relies specifically on subsections 1333(a)(2)(A) and (a)(3) which provide, in pertinent part, as follows:
“(2)(A) To the extent that they are applicable and not inconsistent with this subchapter or with other Federal laws and regulations . . . , the civil and criminal laws of each adjacent State . . . are declared to be the law of the United States for that portion of the subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf, and artificial islands and fixed structures erected thereon, which would be within the area of the State if its boundaries were extended seaward to the outer margin of the outer Continental Shelf .... All of such applicable laws shall be administered and enforced by the appropriate officers and courts of the United States. State taxation laios shall not apply to the outer Continental Shelf.
“(3) The provisions of this section for adoption of State law as the law of the United States shall never be interpreted as a basis for claiming any interest in or jurisdiction on behalf of any State for any purpose over the seabed and subsoil of the outer Continental Shelf, or the property and natural resources thereof or the revenues therefrom.” 43 U. S. C. §§ 1333(a)(2)(A) and (a)(3) (emphasis added).
It is, of course, well settled that “when a federal statute unambiguously forbids the States to impose a particular kind of tax . . . , courts need not look beyond the plain language of the federal statute to determine whether a state statute that imposes such a tax is pre-empted.” Aloha Airlines, Inc. v. Director of Taxation of Hawaii, 464 U. S. 7, 12 (1983). But the meaning of words depends on their context. Shell reads the italicized language above without reference to the statutory context when it argues that these statutory words ban States from including income from OCS oil and gas in an apportionment formula.
We believe that § 1333(a)(2)(A), read in its entirety, supports a narrower interpretation. Subsection 1333(a)(2)(A) begins by clarifying which laws will apply to offshore activity on the OCS. It declares that the civil and criminal laws of the States adjacent to OCS sites will apply. Subsection 1333(a)(2)(A) goes on to create an exception to this general incorporation. It is highly significant to us that § 1333(a)(2)(A) refers specifically to “adjacent State[s],” 43 U. S. C. § 1333(a)(2)(A) (emphasis added). The subsequent reference in the subsection to “state taxation laws” can only be read in light of this antecedent reference to “adjacent State[s].” It is clearly included lest this federal incorporation be deemed to incorporate as well the tax codes of adjacent States.
The ensuing subsection, 1333(a)(3), was similarly drafted to prevent tax claims by adjacent States. It states that the incorporation of state law “as the law of the United States” is never to be interpreted by the States whose law has been incorporated to give them jurisdiction over the property or revenues of the OCS. Reading the statutory provisions in the context of the entire section in which they appear, we therefore believe that in enacting subsections 1333(a)(2)(A) and 1333(a)(3), Congress had the more limited purpose of prohibiting adjacent States from claiming that it followed from the incorporation of their civil and criminal law that their tax codes were also directly applicable to the OCS.
The background and legislative history of the OCSLA confirm this textual reading and refute Shell’s view of broader pre-emption. The OCSLA grew out of a dispute, which first developed in the 1930’s, between the adjacent States and the Federal Government over territorial jurisdiction and ownership of the OCS and, particularly, the right to lease the submerged lands for oil and gas exploration. S. Rep. No. 133, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 21 (1953). The adjacent States claimed jurisdiction over the submerged lands and their rich oil, gas, and mineral deposits, id., at 6, and some had even extended their territorial boundaries as far as the outer edge of the OCS. Id., at 11. After this Court, in a series of opinions, ruled that the Federal Government, and not the adjacent States, had exclusive jurisdiction over the OCS, United States v. Louisiana, 339 U. S. 699, 705 (1950); United States v. Texas, 339 U. S. 707, 717-718 (1950); United States v. California, 332 U. S. 19, 38-39 (1947), Congress, in 1953, passed the OCSLA.
In passing the OCSLA, Congress intended to provide “for the orderly development of offshore resources.” United States v. Maine, 420 U. S. 515, 527 (1975). Congress was concerned with defining territorial jurisdiction between the adjacent States and the Federal Government as to the submerged lands, particularly with reference to leasing oil and gas rights. The OCSLA states that “the subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf appertain to the United States and are subject to its jurisdiction, control, and power of disposition . . . .” 43 U. S. C. § 1332. Thus, “[b]y passing the OCS Act, Congress ‘emphatically implemented its view that the United States has paramount rights to the seabed beyond the three-mile limit . . . Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U. S. 725, 752-753, n. 26 (1981) (quoting United States v. Maine, supra, at 526).
Once the Court ruled that the OCS was subject to the exclusive jurisdiction and control of the Federal Government, Congress was faced with the problem of which civil and criminal laws should govern activity on the OCS sites. The Constitution and the laws of the United States were extended to cover the OCS. 43 U. S. C. § 1333(a)(2)(A). Congress recognized, however, that because of its interstitial nature, federal law would not provide a sufficiently detailed legal framework to govern life on “the miraculous structures which will rise from the sea bed of the [OCS].” Christopher, The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act: Key to a New Frontier, 6 Stan. L. Rev. 23, 37 (1953). The problem before Congress was to incorporate the civil and criminal laws of the adjacent States, and yet, at the same time, reflect the strong congressional decision against allowing the adjacent States a direct share in the revenues of the OCS, by making it clear that state taxation codes were not to be incorporated. Id., at 37, 41.
In debates over the OCSLA, representatives of the adjacent States had argued that, despite exclusive federal jurisdiction over the OCS, their States should retain an interest in direct revenues from the OCS, and that they should be allowed the power to tax OCS production and activity extra-territorially. In particular, Senator Long of Louisiana argued that the adjacent States should have a share of OCS revenues since they would be providing services to OCS workers. S. Rep. No. 411, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 67 (1953) (minority report of Sen. Long); see also 99 Cong. Rec. 7261 (1953) (remarks of Sen. Long).
Opponents of such adjacent-state extraterritorial taxation argued that extending the adjacent States’ power to tax beyond their borders would be “unconstitutional,” 99 Cong. Rec. 2506 (1953) (remarks of Rep. Celler); id., at 2524 (remarks of Rep. Machrowicz); id., at 2571-2572 (remarks of Rep. Keating), and that it would confer a windfall benefit upon the few adjacent States at the expense of the inland States. Id., at 2523 (remarks of Rep. Rodino); id., at 2524 (remarks of Rep. Machrowicz).
In the House, the Representatives of the adjacent States pressed for the inclusion of language in the OCSLA authorizing them to collect severance and production taxes. The House version of the bill, as reported out of Subcommittee No. 1 of the House Judiciary Committee, contained the present language prohibiting direct taxation by adjacent States. See 99 Cong. Rec. 2571 (1953) (remarks of Rep. Keating). The House Judiciary Committee amended the subsection to allow adjacent States to collect severance and production taxes. Ibid. See also, H. R. 4198, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. §8(a) (1953). On the House floor, however, that provision was deleted and replaced by the prohibition on state taxation which appears in 43 U. S. C. § 1333(a)(2)(A). 99 Cong. Rec. 2569, 2571-2573 (1953).
There is no reliable support in the legislative history of the OCSLA for Shell’s view that state income taxes are pre-empted. During a long speech criticizing the OCSLA because it prevented the adjacent States from imposing severance and production taxes, Senator Long mentioned, in passing, that employers on the OCS would not be subject to the state corporate profits tax. See S. Rep. No. 411, supra, at 67; see also 99 Cong. Rec. 7261 (1953). Shell, however, is unable to point to any other reference in the legislative history to corporate income taxes beyond this one remark by a vocal opponent of the OCSLA. This Court does not usually accord much weight to the statements of a bill’s opponents. “ ‘[T]he fears and doubts of the opposition are no authoritative guide to the construction of legislation.’ ” Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U. S. 473, 483 (1981) (quoting Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U. S. 384, 394 (1951)). Moreover, Senator Long’s remarks were apparently premised on the assumption that the private lessees on the OCS would not also engage in business activities within the taxing State’s borders. See 99 Cong. Rec. 7261 (1953); S. Rep. No. 411, supra, at 67. Finally, it is entirely possible that Senator Long was referring to a corporate income tax which, unlike Iowa’s, was not measured by an apportionment formula. See Texas Co. v. Cooper, 236 La. 380, 107 So. 2d 676 (1958) (Louisiana tax collector has statutory power to determine an oil company’s income by separate accounting rather than statutory apportionment method). We therefore find that Shell’s reliance on an isolated statement by Senator Long is misplaced.
In sum, the language, background, and history of the OCSLA leave no doubt that Congress was exclusively concerned with preventing the adjacent States from asserting, on the basis of territorial claims, jurisdiction to assess direct taxes on the OCS. We believe that Congress primarily intended to prohibit those direct taxes commonly imposed by States adjacent to offshore production sites: for example, severance and production taxes. See Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U. S., at 753, n. 26 (“It is clear that a State has no valid interest in imposing a severance tax on federal OCS land”). This prohibition is a far cry from prohibiting a State from including income from OCS-derived oil and gas in a constitutionally permissible apportionment scheme.
Shell’s argument hinges on the mistaken premise that including OCS-derived income in the preapportionment tax base is tantamount to the direct taxation of OCS production. But income that is included in the preapportionment tax base is not, by virtue of that inclusion, taxed by the State. Only the fraction of total income that the apportionment formula determines (by multiplying the income tax base by the apportionment fraction) to be attributable to Iowa’s taxing jurisdiction is taxed by Iowa. As our Commerce Clause analysis of apportionment formulas has made clear, the inclusion of income in the preapportioned tax base of a state apportionment formula does not amount to extraterritorial taxation. This Court has repeatedly emphasized that the function of an apportionment formula is to determine the portion of a unitary business’ income that can be fairly attributed to in-state activities. Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue, 447 U. S. 207, 219 (1980); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes of Vermont, 445 U. S. 425, 440 (1980). Thus, Shell’s claim that Iowa is taxing income attributable to the OCS cannot be squared with its concession that Iowa’s apportionment formula is consistent with the Commerce Clause.
A contrary result — forbidding the inclusion of income from OCS-derived oil and gas in Iowa’s apportionment formula— would give oil companies doing business on the OCS a significant exemption from corporate income taxes in all States which measure corporate income with an apportionment formula. Congress has the power to confer such an exemption, of course, but we find no evidence that it intended to do so in the OCSLA.
Finally, we reject a secondary argument made by Shell. It argues that even if the OCSLA allows a State to include in its preapportioned tax base the sales of OCS crude oil which occur off the OCS, the taxing State may not include in that base income from the natural gas sales made at the OCS wellhead. On its face, the OCSLA makes no such distinction and, in general, it is irrelevant for the makeup of the apportionment formula’s unitary tax base that third-party sales occur outside of the State. See Exxon Corp., supra, at 228-229. Actual sales on the OCS (as opposed to internal accounting sales) are not taxed directly by any State because they are not included in the numerator of the sales ratio. See n. 3, supra. From the inclusion of such sales in the apportionment formula’s tax base, it does not follow that the dollar amount derived from the formula (which is a fraction of the unitary tax base) includes income not fairly attributable to Iowa.
Ill
For the reasons set out above, we reject Shell’s argument that Congress intended, when it passed the OCSLA, to prohibit the inclusion, in a constitutionally permissible apportionment formula, of income from OCS oil and gas. We hold that the OCSLA prevents any State, adjacent or inland, from asserting extraterritorial taxing jurisdiction over OCS lands but that the inclusion of income derived from the OCS in the unitary tax base of a constitutionally permissible apportionment formula does not amount to extraterritorial taxation by the taxing State. Accordingly, the judgment of the Iowa Supreme Court is hereby affirmed.
It is so ordered.
The Iowa Code defines a unitary business as one which is “carried on partly within and partly without a state where the portion of the business carried on within the state depends on or contributes to the business outside the state.” Iowa Code §422.32(5) (1987).
The OCS includes “all submerged lands lying seaward and outside of the area of lands beneath navigable waters as defined in section 1301 of this title.” 43 U. S. C. §1331. “[L]ands beneath navigable waters” include all submerged lands within three geographical miles of the coastline of the United States. § 1301.
Iowa Code §422.33(2) (1987) provides, in pertinent part, as follows: “(2) If the trade or business of the corporation is carried on entirely within the state, the tax shall be imposed on the entire net income, but if the trade or business is carried on partly within and partly without the state, the tax shall be imposed only on the portion of the net income reasonably attributable to the trade or business within the state, said net income attributable to the state to be determined as follows:
“(b)(4) Where income is derived from the manufacture or sale of tangible personal property, the part thereof attributable to business within the state shall be in that proportion which the gross sales made within the state bear to the total gross sales.”
Iowa defines income by reference to federal taxable income which it then adjusts under Iowa law. Iowa Code §§422.32(6) and (11) (1987).
Described as a formula, the method for calculating the portion of Shell’s total income which is subject to Iowa income tax is as follows:
Shell adjusted the Iowa formula, set out above, see n. 3, as follows:
The OCS “sales” which Shell sought to deduct from the denominator of the sales ratio included both actual sales at the wellhead, which occur only in the ease of gas, and, “sales” of oil, which, measured by an internal Shell accounting technique, record transfers between Shell divisions. Shell also sought to deduct the income from such sales from the income multiplier.
Shell’s appeal before the Iowa Supreme Court was consolidated with a tax appeal by Kelly-Springfield Tire.
As Judge Learned Hand so eloquently noted: “Words are not pebbles in alien juxtaposition; they have only a communal existence; and not only does the meaning of each interpenetrate the other, but all in their aggregate take their purport from the setting in which they are used . . . .” NLRB v. Federbush. Co., 121 F. 2d 954, 957 (CA2 1941).
There is, in any event, evidence that the Senate thought that § 1333(a)(2)(A) was intended to duplicate § 1333(a)(3)’s prohibition on adjacent state claims of interest in or jurisdiction over the OCS. The floor manager of the Senate bill, Senator Cordon, explained that the language of § 1333(a)(2)(A) stating that “[sjtate taxation laws shall not apply to the outer Continental Shelf” was requested by the House conferees “in a superabundance of caution.” 99 Cong. Rec. 10471-10472 (1953). According to Senator Cordon, the language “adds nothing to and took nothing from the bill as it passed the Senate.” Ibid.
Christopher noted that the “whole circle of legal problems" typically resolved under state law could arise on the OCS, because the large crews working on the great offshore structures would “die, leave wills, and pay taxes. They will fight, gamble, borrow money, and perhaps even kill. They will bargain over their working conditions and sometimes they will be injured on the job." 6 Stan. L. Rev., at 37.
Shell’s reliance on the fact that the OCS is an exclusive federal enclave is misplaced. Iowa is not attempting to tax property within the OCS. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracken, 448 U. S. 136 (1980). Nor does any policy of the OCSLA prevent States from including OCS-derived income in a constitutionally permissible apportionment formula. Ramah Navajo School Bd., Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue of New Mexico, 458 U. S. 832 (1982).
Although aimed specifically at the adjacent States, the prohibition against direct taxes obviously also applies to inland States, like Iowa. Before this Court’s rulings and passage of the OCSLA, the adjacent States could conceivably have claimed the right to impose a severance or production tax based on oil and gas removed from the OCS, on the grounds that their territorial boundaries extended, or should be deemed to extend, far out into the ocean. Iowa, or any landlocked State, wmuld have appeared foolish in making such a claim. After the passage of the OCSLA, both the adjacent and the landlocked States are precluded from imposing such taxes on OCS activities. See Polk County opinion, at 4. Likewise, both adjacent and landlocked States may include income from OCS-derived oil and gas in an otherwise constitutionally permissible apportionment formula.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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J
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Blackmun
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the issue whether it is constitutional for a county to take as its own, under the authority of a state statute, the interest accruing on an interpleader fund deposited in the registry of the county court, when a fee, prescribed by another statute, is also charged for the clerk’s services in receiving the fund into the registry. The statute which is the object of the constitutional challenge here is Fla. Stat. §28.33 (1977).
I
On February 12, 1976, appellant Eckerd’s of College Park, Inc., entered into an agreement to purchase for $1,812,145.77 substantially all the assets of Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. Both Eckerd’s and Webb’s are Florida corporations. At the closing, Webb’s debts appeared to be greater than the purchase price. Accordingly, in order to protect itself and as permitted by the Florida Bulk Transfers Act, Fla. Stat. § 676.106 (4) (1977), Eckerd’s filed a complaint of inter-pleader in the Circuit Court of Seminole County, Fla., inter-pleading as defendants both Webb’s and Webb’s creditors (almost 200 in number) and tendering the purchase price to the court.
Pursuant to § 676.106 (4), the Circuit Court thereupon ordered that the amount tendered be paid to the court’s clerk and that the clerk deposit it “in an assignable interest-bearing account at the highest interest.” App. 4a. The court specifically reserved decision on the issue of entitlement, as between the clerk and Webb’s creditors, to the interest earned on the fund while so deposited, stating that the transfer to the clerk was without prejudice to the creditors’ claims to that interest. Id., at 4a-5a. Eekerd’s tendered the sum to the clerk on July 13, 1976, id., at 6a, and that official proceeded to make the required investment.
The clerk deducted from the interpleader fund so deposited the sum of $9,228.74 as his fee, prescribed by Fla. Stat. § 28.24 (14) (1977), “for services rendered” for “receiving money into the registry of court.” The fee, as the statute directed, was calculated upon the amount placed in the registry, that is, 1% of the first $500, and y2% of the remainder.
On July 5, 1977, almost a year after the tender and payment, the Circuit Court upon its own motion appointed a receiver for Webb’s. Among the receiver’s stated duties were the determination of the number and amount of claims filed against the interpleader fund and the preparation and filing with the court of a list of those claims. App. 9a. The receiver filed a motion for an order directing the clerk to deliver the fund to him. Id., at 12a. The motion was granted, id., at 14a, and the principal of the fund, reduced by the $9,228.74 statutory fee and by $40,200 that had been paid out pursuant to court order, was paid to the receiver on July 21. The interest earned on the interpleader fund while it was held by the clerk, but which was not turned over to the receiver, then exceeded $90,000. Interest earned thereafter on the amount so retained brought the total to more than $100,000. Tr. of Oral Arg. 34. It is this aggregate interest that is the subject matter of the present litigation. Appellants make no objection to the clerk’s statutorv fee of $9,228.74 taken pursuant to § 28.24 (14). Tr. of Oral Arg. 6: Brief for Appellants 6, 9.
The receiver then moved that the court direct the clerk to pay the accumulated interest to the receiver. App. 22a, 26a, 33a. The Circuit Court ruled favorably to the receiver, holding that the clerk “is not entitled to any interest earned, accrued or received on monies deposited in the registry of this Court pursuant to the Court’s order . . . ; the creditors herein are the rightful parties entitled to all such interest earned on the interpleader fund while it is held by the Clerk of this Court.” Id., at 35a.
Seminole County and the clerk appealed to the Florida District Court of Appeal. That court transferred the cause to the Supreme Court of Florida. The Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion with one justice dissenting in part, ruled that § 28.33 was “constitutional” and reversed the judgment of the Circuit Court. 374 So. 2d 951 (1979). The stated rationale was that a fund so deposited is “considered ‘public money’ ” from the date of deposit until it leaves the account: that “the statute takes only what it creates”; and that “[tjhere is no unconstitutional taking because interest earned on the clerk of the circuit court’s registry account is not private property.” Id., at 952-953.
Because it had been held elsewhere that a county’s appropriation of the interest earned on private funds deposited in court in an interpleader action is an unconstitutional taking, Sellers v. Harris County, 483 S. W. 2d 242 (Tex. 1972); see McMillan v. Robeson County, 262 N. C. 413, 137 S. E. 2d 105 (1964), we noted probable jurisdiction. 445 U. S. 925 (1980).
II
It is at once apparent that Florida’s statutes would allow respondent Seminole County to exact two tolls while the inter-pleader fund was held by the clerk of the court. The first was the statutory fee of $9,228.74 “for services rendered,” as § 28.24 recites, by the clerk’s office for “receiving money into the registry of court.” That fee was determined by the amount of the principal deposited.
The second would be the retention of the amount, in excess of $100,000, consisting of “[a] 11 interest accruing from moneys deposited.” This toll would be exacted because of § 28.33’s provision that the interest “shall be deemed income of the office of the clerk of the circuit court.”
An initial reading of § 28.33 might prompt one to conclude that, so far as it concerns entitlement to interest, the statute applies only to interest on funds clearly owned by the county (such as charges for certifications) and that it does not apply to interest on private funds deposited under the direction of another statute. The Florida Supreme Court, however, has read § 28.33 otherwise and has ruled that it applies to interest earned on deposited private funds. That reading of the State’s statute is within the Florida court’s competency, and we must take the statute as so read and interpreted.
Ill
The pertinent words of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States are the familiar ones: “nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” That prohibition, of course, applies against the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226, 239 (1897); Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U. S. 104, 122 (1978). Our task is to determine whether the second exaction by Seminole County amounted to a “taking”— it was obviously uncompensated — within the Amendment’s proscription.
The principal sum deposited in the registry of the court plainly was private property, and was not the property of Seminole County. This is the rule in Florida, Phipps v. Watson, 108 Fla. 547, 551, 147 So. 234, 235 (1933), as well as elsewhere. See Coudert v. United States, 175 U. S. 178 (1899); Branch v. United States, 100 U. S. 673 (1880); Sellers v. Harris County, 483 S. W. 2d, at 243. We do not understand that the appellees contend otherwise so far as the fund’s principal is concerned.
Appellees submit, Tr. of Oral Arg. 26, 29 — and we accept the proposition — that, apart from statute, Florida law does not require that interest be earned on a registry deposit. See 374 So. 2d, at 953. We, of course, also accept the further proposition, pressed upon us by the appellees, that “[property interests . .. are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law . . . .” Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564, 577 (1972). But a mere unilateral expectation or an abstract need is not a property interest entitled to protection. See, for example, Fox River Paper Co. v. Railroad Comm’n, 274 U. S. 651 (1927); United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U. S. 499 (1945). See also Penn Central Transportation Có. v. New York City, supra; Andrus v. Allard, 444 U. S. 51 (1979).
Webb’s creditors, however, had more than a unilateral expectation. The deposited fund was the amount received as the purchase price for Webb’s assets. It was property held only for the ultimate benefit of Webb’s creditors, not for the benefit of the court and not for the benefit of the county. And it was held only for the purpose of making a fair distribution among those creditors. Eventually, and inevitably, that fund, less proper charges authorized by the court, would be distributed among the creditors as their claims were recognized by the court. The creditors thus had a state-created property right to their respective portions of the fund.
It is true, of course, that none of the creditor claimants had any right to the deposited fund until their claims were recognized and distribution was ordered. See Aron v. Snyder, 90 U. S. App. D. C. 325, 327, 196 F. 2d 38, 40, cert. denied, 344 U. S. 854 (1952). That lack of immediate right, however, does not automatically bar a claimant ultimately determined to be entitled to all or a share of the fund from claiming a proper share of the interest, the fruit of the fund’s use, that is realized in the interim. To be sure, § 28.33 establishes as a matter of Florida law that interest is to be earned on deposited funds. But the State’s having mandated the .accrual of interest does not mean the State or its designate is entitled to assume ownership of the interest.
We therefore turn to the interest issue. What would justify the county’s retention of that interest? It is obvious that the interest was not a fee for services, for any services obligation to the county was paid for and satisfied by the substantial fee charged pursuant to § 28.24 and described specifically in that statute as a fee “for services” by the clerk’s office. Section 28.33, in contrast, in no way relates the interest of which it speaks to “services rendered.” Indeed, if the county were entitled to the interest, its officials would feel an inherent pressure and possess a natural inclination to defer distribution, for that interest return would be greater the longer the fund is held; there would be, therefore, a built-in disincentive against distributing the principal to those entitled to it.
The usual and general rule is that any interest on an inter-pleaded and deposited fund follows the principal and is to be allocated to those who are ultimately to be the owners of that principal. See, e. g., James Taleott, Inc. v. Allahabad Bank, Ltd., 444 F. 2d 451, 463 (CA5), cert. denied sub nom. City Trade & Industries, Ltd. v. Allahabad Bank, Ltd., 404 U. S. 940 (1971); Murphy v. Travelers Ins. Co., 534 F. 2d 1155, 1165 (CA5 1976); In re Brooks & Woodington, Inc., 505 F. 2d 794, 799 (CA7 1974); McMillan v. Robeson County, 262 N. C., at 417, 137 S. E. 2d, at 108; Sellers v. Harris County, 483 S. W. 2d, at 243; Southern Oregon Co. v. Gage, 100 Ore. 424, 433, 197 P. 276, 279 (1921); Board of Law Library Trustees v. Lowery, 67 Cal. App. 2d 480, 154 P. 2d 719 (1945); Kiernan v. Cleland, 47 Idaho 200, 273 P. 938 (1929).
The Florida Supreme Court, in ruling contrary to this long established general rule, relied on the words of § 28.33 and then proceeded on the theory that without the statute the clerk would have no authority to invest money held in the registry, that in some way the fund assumes temporarily the status of “public money” from the time it is deposited until it leaves the account, and that the statute “takes only what it creates.” Then follows the conclusion that the interest “is not private property.” 374 So. 2d, at 952-953.
This Court has been permissive in upholding governmental action that may deny the property owner of some beneficial use of his property or that may restrict the owner’s full exploitation of the property, if such public action is justified as promoting the general welfare. See, e. g., Andrus v. Allard, 444 U. S., at 64-68; Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U. S., at 125-129.
Here, however, Seminole County has not merely “adjust [ed] the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.” Id., at 124. Rather, the exaction is a forced contribution to general governmental revenues, and it is not reasonably related to the costs of using the courts. Indeed, “[t]he Fifth Amendment’s guarantee . . . was designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.” Armstrong v. United States, 364 U. S. 40, 49 (1960).
No police power justification is offered for the deprivation. Neither the statute nor appellees suggest any reasonable basis to sustain the taking of the interest earned by the interpleader fund. The county’s appropriation of the beneficial use of the fund is analogous to the appropriation of the use of private property in United States v. Causby, 328 U. S. 256 (1946). There the Court found a “taking” in the Government’s use of air space above the claimant’s land as part of the flight pattern for military aircraft, thus destroying the use of the land as a chicken farm. “Causby emphasized that Government had not 'merely destroyed property [but was] using a part of it for the flight of its planes.’ ” Penn Central, 438 U. S., at 128, quoting from Causby, 328 U. S., at 262-263, n. 7.
Neither the Florida Legislature by statute, nor the Florida courts by judicial decree, may accomplish the result the county seeks simply by recharacterizing the principal as “public money” because it is held temporarily by the court. The earnings of a fund are incidents of ownership of the fund itself and are property just as the fund itself is property. The state statute has the practical effect of appropriating for the county the value of the use of the fund for the period in which it is held in the registry.
To put it another way: a State, by ipse dixit, may not transform private property into public property without compensation, even for the limited duration of the deposit in court. This is the very kind of thing that the Taking Clause of the Fifth Amendment was meant to prevent. That Clause stands as a shield against the arbitrary use of governmental power.
IV
We hold that under the narrow circumstances of this case— where there is a separate and distinct state statute authorizing a clerk’s fee “for services rendered” based upon the amount of principal deposited; where the deposited fund itself con-cededly is private; and where the deposit in the court’s registry is required by state statute in order for the depositor to avail itself of statutory protection from claims of creditors and others — Seminole County’s taking unto itself, under § 28.33 and 1973 Fla. Laws, ch. 73-282, the interest earned on the interpleader fund while it was in the registry of the court was a taking violative of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. We express no view as to the constitutionality of a statute that prescribes a county’s retention of interest earned, where the interest would be the only return to the county for services it renders.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Florida is reversed.
It is so ordered.
Section 28.33, enacted as 1973 Fla. Laws, ch. 73-282, § 1, reads in pertinent part:
“The clerk of the circuit court in each county shall make an estimate of his projected financial needs for the county and shall invest any funds in designated depository banks in interest-bearing certificates or in any direct obligations of the United States in compliance with federal laws relating to receipt of and withdrawal of deposits. . . . Moneys deposited in the registry of the court shall be deposited in interest-bearing certificates at the discretion of the clerk, subject to the above guidelines. . . . All interest accruing from moneys deposited shall he deemed income of the office of the clerk of the circuit court investing such moneys and shall be deposited in the same accounts as are other fees and commissions of the clerk’s office. Each clerk shall, as soon as is practicable after the end of the fiscal year, report to the county governing authority the total interest earned on all investments during the preceding year.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Section 676.106 (4), which derives from the Uniform Commercial Code, reads:
“A transferee may within ten days after taking possession of the goods, discharge his obligations under this section by an action in the circuit court for the county where the transferor had his principal place of business in this state interpleading all creditors in the list of creditors required by [§] 676.104. In such event the court shall require the consideration to be deposited into the registry of the court and thereupon shall decree the goods to be free and clear of the claims of such creditors and that such creditors should file their claims with the court.”
Section 28.24, as then in force, read in pertinent part:
“The clerk of the circuit court shall make the following charges for services rendered by his office in recording documents and instruments and in performing the duties enumerated:
“(14) For receiving money into the registry of court:
“(a) First $500.00, percent. 1
“(b) Each subsequent $100.00, percent. %”
The statute has since been amended in ways not relevant to the present litigation.
The appellants suggest that the court acted sua sponte because of the continuing insistence of the clerk and Seminole County that the county was entitled to the interest being earned on the fund, and to bring the interest period in controversy to an end. Brief for Appellants 10.
Although it is not entirely clear that the federal constitutional issue was presented to the Circuit Court, the propriety of the clerk’s claim to the interest was clearly raised there as an issue under the Florida Constitution. See p. 6 of the receiver’s memorandum in support of his motion for direction to the clerk to remit (p. 77 of the Original Record on Appeal). That memorandum, however, contains at least one reference to “pertinent provisions of the Florida Constitution and its Federal counterpart” (emphasis in original), ibid., and there are “due process” arguments beginning at p. 4 of the receiver’s reply memorandum. Furthermore, the Circuit Court, in granting the receiver’s motion for a nunc pro tunc order correcting an omission from the record, specificafiy stated that § 28.33 and 1973 Fla. Laws, ch. 73-282, “are unconstitutional to the extént that the provisions thereof pertain to private monies held in the registry of the court in pending litigation and specifically to those monies held in the registry of the court in this case.” App. 40a-41a.
In any event, the federal constitutional issue appears to have been raised in the Supreme Court of Florida. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 4. While there is no specific reference to the Federal Constitution in the court’s per curiam opinion, the court spoke specifically of the receiver’s argument that the statute “constitutes either a taking without due process of law or an unlawful tax,” 374 So. 2d, at 952, and ruled that there was “no unconstitutional taking.” Id., at 953. We are satisfied that the Supreme Court of Florida upheld the statute against both federal and state constitutional challenges. This is a sufficient base for this Court’s consideration of the federal issue.
The appellees at oral argument conceded that if coupon bonds, rather than cash, had been deposited in the registry, the coupons would follow the principal and could not be claimed by the county under § 28.33. Tr. of Oral Arg. 31.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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D
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
MR. Chief Justice Vinson
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This employee suit was brought in the District Court to recover overtime compensation, liquidated damages, and a reasonable attorney’s fee pursuant to §§ 7 (a) and 16 (b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. Recovery was allowed in the District Court, 65 F. Supp. 385, and that judgment was affirmed in the Circuit Court of Appeals. 156 F. 2d 139. We granted certiorari to consider the important questions presented relating to the application of the overtime provisions of the above-mentioned statute.
Respondents are service and maintenance employees who, during the period in question, worked in a loft building owned by petitioner 149 Madison Avenue Corporation and managed by petitioner Williams & Co. It has been stipulated that respondents were engaged in the production of goods for commerce. We are here concerned with the period of employment extending from April 21, 1942, to December 10,1943.
Prior to April 21, 1942, employment relations between the petitioners and respondents were governed by a collective wage agreement, known as the Sloan Agreement. According to its terms, employees were paid flat weekly wages for workweeks of specified length which, in the case of most of the respondents, amounted to $25 for 47 hours of weekly employment. No hourly rates were specified, nor was any attempt made to compensate employees at the rate of time and one-half for hours worked in excess of 40 in any week.
As the expiration date of the Sloan Agreement drew near, negotiations between the interested parties were initiated for the purpose of reaching agreement on a new contract. After preliminary conferences proved fruitless, the case was certified to the War Labor Board. That agency stated its recommendations in a directive order issued July 29,1942; and on September 1,1942, the parties entered into the agreement in question, known as the National War Labor Board Agreement. It had been agreed that the terms of the new contract were to be made retroactive to April 20, 1942, the expiration date of the Sloan agreement.
The new contract provided for a workweek of 54 hours applicable to watchmen and a workweek of 46 hours for other regular employees. Weekly wages were established to compensate the 54 or 46 hours of labor, which sums were stated to include both payments for the regular hours of employment and time and one-half for the hours in excess of 40. To derive the hourly rate from the weekly wage, the following formula was included:
“The hourly rates for those regularly employed more than forty (40) hours per week shall be determined by dividing their weekly earnings by the number of hours employed plus one-half the number of hours actually employed in excess of forty (40) hours.”
Although a literal reading of the above language might seem to indicate the establishment of a variable hourly rate dependent upon the number of hours actually worked in any given week, such was not the practical construction of the parties. Instead of making use of the number of hours actually worked, only the hours the employee was scheduled to work and the weekly wage for such scheduled workweek entered into the calculation of the non-overtime hourly rate. The hourly rate as derived from the formula remained constant, therefore, regardless of whether the employee worked the scheduled number of hours during the week or a greater or lesser number. In effect, the agreement instead of directly stating a fixed hourly rate in terms of a stipulated amount per hour provided a formula whereby such a fixed hourly rate could be calculated.
Under the agreement, weekly compensation varied according to the number of hours worked in that week. Thus, in case an employee was unable to work all his scheduled hours due to an “excusable cause,” he was paid at the formula rate with the provision, however, that six of the hours worked should be compensated as overtime regardless of whether the total of hours actually worked was greater or less than 40 in that week. If the employee’s absence was not excusable, he was apparently paid a sum for the week obtained by multiplying the number of hours actually worked times the formula rate, being given credit for overtime only in case the number of hours worked exceeded 40. The agreement provided that all regular employees except watchmen should be compensated at a rate one and three-quarters times the hourly rate derived from the formula for hours worked in excess of 46. Watchmen were to be paid twice the formula rate for hours worked in excess of 54. Part-time workers employed for less than the scheduled workweek were hired at a specified schedule of hourly rates obtained by dividing the weekly wage paid the regular employees by the number of hours in the regular workweek.
It was not the purpose of Congress in enacting the Pair Labor Standards Act to impose upon the almost infinite variety of employment situations a single, rigid form of wage agreement. Walling v. Belo Corp., 316 U. S. 624 (1942). Section 7 (a) of the Act requires, however, that any wage agreement falling within its purview must establish an hourly “regular rate” not less than the statutory minimum and provide for overtime payments of at least one and one-half times the “regular rate.” A wage plan is not rendered invalid simply because, instead -of stating directly an hourly rate of pay in an amount consistent with the statutory requirements, the parties have seen fit to stipulate a weekly wage inclusive of regular and overtime compensation for a workweek in excess of 40 hours and have provided a formula whereby the appropriate hourly rate may be derived therefrom. The crucial questions in this case, however, are whether the hourly rate derived from the formula here presented was, in fact, the “regular rate” of pay within the statutory meaning and whether the wage agreement under consideration, in fact, made adequate provision for overtime compensation.
We have held that the words “regular rate,” while not expressly defined in the statute, “. . . mean the hourly rate actually paid for the normal, non-overtime workweek.” Walling v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc., 323 U. S. 37, 40 (1944). The regular rate is thus an “actual fact,” and in testing the validity of a wage agreement under the Act the courts are required to look beyond that which the parties have purported to do. Walling v. Youngerman-Reynolds Hardwood Co., 325 U. S. 419, 424 (1945). It is the contention of the respondents that the rate derived by the use of the contract formula was not the regular rate of pay; that the regular rate actually paid was substantially that obtained by dividing the weekly wage payable for the working of the scheduled workweek by the number of hours in such scheduled workweek; and that, consequently, the plan made no adequate provision for overtime compensation until employees regularly hired as watchmen had worked a total of 54 hours in one week and until other regular employees had worked a total of 46 hours. We believe that the record provides ample support for that view.
Thus, in determining a schedule of hourly rates payable to part-time workers employed less than 40 hours a week, no use whatsoever was made of the hourly rate derived from the formula. Part-time workers were paid a rate determined by dividing the weekly wage paid to the regular employees by the number of hours in the regular workweek despite the fact that, according to the terms of the formula, the weekly wage included both regular and overtime pay. Insofar as part-time workers were concerned, the agreement clearly indicated an intention to compensate an hour’s labor by payment of a pro-rata share of the weekly wage.
Nor was there consistent application of the hourly rate as determined by the formula to the work of regular employees hired for a full 46-hour week. Where such an employee was absent for an “excusable cause,” his weekly compensation was not determined by multiplying the formula rate by the hours worked. Rather, six of the hours the employee worked were always treated as overtime and compensated at the rate of one and one-half times the formula rate regardless of the total hours actually worked, thus resulting in average hourly compensation considerably in excess of the formula rate. The payment of “overtime” compensation for non-overtime work raises strong doubt as to the integrity of the hourly rate upon the basis of which the “overtime” compensation is calculated. Cf. Walling v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc., supra. While the average hourly rate actually received by the employee in this situation was not precisely that which would have resulted from dividing the weekly wage by 46, it ordinarily approached that figure much more closely than it did the so-called hourly rate established by the formula. This method of payment reveals further evidence of an attempt to pay a pro-rata share of the weekly wage for an hour’s labor regardless of the number of hours worked up to 46.
The agreement provided that hours worked in excess of the scheduled 46-hour week should be compensated at the rate of one and three-quarters of the formula rate. While the formula rate seems to have been consistently applied in such situations, it is significant to observe that the amount received by the worker under these circumstances approximates very closely that which he would have received had he been paid an hourly rate determined by dividing the weekly wage payable for the scheduled workweek by 46 with payment of time and one-half for hours worked in excess of 46. This approximation was not fortuitous. In the directive order of the National War Labor Board the origin and purpose of these provisions are discussed, and the following statement is made: “Overtime over forty-six (46) hours is paid at a rate of time and three-quarters in an effort approximately to equal the overtime to which an employee would ordinarily be entitled, if it were computed on the basis of time and a half after a forty-six (46) hour week.”
Petitioners have argued that none of these provisions provides a conclusive demonstration that the formula rate was not the actual regular rate of pay. It is said that part-time employees were paid a pro-rata hourly rate since they had no opportunity to earn overtime compensation ; that the method of paying regular employees in case of excusable absences was merely a laudable effort on the part of the employer to compensate more fully than the Act requires when an employee failed to work his scheduled week because of illness or like causes; and that the time and three-quarters provision represented an additional premium for employees called upon to work hours substantially in excess of the non-overtime week. We cannot ignore the fact, however, that the agreement on its face fails to provide for the consistent application of the formula rates in those situations where such rates should be expected to control. These deviations take on additional significance when it is observed that in every situation, with the relatively unimportant exception of that involving unexcused absences, the amount paid was either precisely or substantially that which employees would have been paid had the contract called for employment on a straight 46-hour week with payment of time and one-half only for hours worked in excess of 46.
Further light is thrown upon the nature of the wage agreement by a consideration of the plan in actual operation. During the period between April 21 and September 1, 1942, when the contract in question was the subject of negotiation, it was understood that the old Sloan Agreement should remain in effect but that the terms of the new contract should be given retroactive application to April 20. The Sloan Agreement provided for a minimum wage of $25 for a workweek of 47 hours with no provision for overtime for hours worked in excess of 40. It is obvious, therefore, that between the above-mentioned dates the employees were paid on a basis clearly repugnant to the requirements of § 7 (a) of the Fair Labor Standards Act. Petitioners urge, however, that by making the retroactive payments as required by the agreement, any illegality in the method of payment during the period of negotiations was eliminated. But in attempting to satisfy the retroactive liability, petitioners completely ignored the formula rates and paid each of the respondents $2.50 for each week worked during the period, representing the increase in the minimum weekly wage for the scheduled workweek established by the new agreement, without attempting further adjustment. Petitioners admit that “Undoubtedly some employees who worked no overtime in certain weeks were overpaid; other who worked beyond the scheduled workweek of 47 hours then prevailing may not have been paid enough.” It is apparent that the amount of wages paid the respondents for work performed during the period of negotiations was in no sense determined by application of hourly rates derived from the formula.
The parties have called our attention to much other evidence which, it is asserted, reveals the practical construction given to the terms of the agreement in question. We do not feel that it is necessary to review these matters at length. It is sufficient to state that, after considering the terms of the agreement and the operation of the plan in actual practice, we have come to the conclusion that the agreement in this case was one calling for a workweek in excess of 40 hours without effective provision for overtime pay until the employees had completed the scheduled workweek and that the “hourly rate” derived from the use of the contract formula was not the “regular rate” of pay within the meaning of the Fair Labor Standards Act. This is not a case like Walling v. Belo Corp., supra, or Walling v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co., 331 U. S. 17 (1947). Unlike those cases, there was here no provision for a guaranteed weekly wage with a stipulation of an hourly rate which under the circumstances presented could properly be regarded as the actual regular rate of pay.
We hold for the reasons stated above that the District Court and the Circuit Court of Appeals properly determined that the wage agreement in question failed to satisfy the statutory requirements. Walling v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc., supra; Walling v. Youngerman-Reynolds Hardwood Co., supra; Walling v. Harnischfeger Corp., 325 U.S. 427 (1945).
Affirmed.
52 Stat. 1060, 29 U. S. C. § 201 et seq. Insofar as pertinent, §7 (a) provides:
“No employer shall, except as otherwise provided in this section, employ any of his employees who is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce—
“(3) for a workweek longer than forty hours after the expiration of the second year from such date, unless such employee receives compensation for his employment in excess of the hours above specified at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed.”
Section 16 (b) provides in part:
“Any employer who violates the provisions of section 6 or section 7 of this Act shall be liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount of their unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation, as the case may be, and in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages. . . .”
Petitioners have raised no objection as to the amount of the recovery allowed the respondents by the District Court if it be assumed that the lower courts otherwise correctly determined their liability.
The Sloan Agreement was negotiated between the Realty Advisory Board on Labor Relations, Incorporated, as agent for various owners of loft, office and apartment buildings located in the Borough of Manhattan in the City of New York, and Local 32-B of the Building Service Employees International Union on behalf of its members. The same parties negotiated the agreement in question.
In case of an employee hired for a regular 46 hour week at a weekly wage of $27.50, the “hourly rate” was derived from the formula by means of the following calculation: $27.50-^[46+½(46 — 40)]= $.561 per hour. In effect, the formula rate is obtained, not by dividing the weekly wage by 46, the number of hours scheduled to be worked, but by dividing that sum by 49, a divisor determined by the formula. In the case of a watchman hired for a 54 hour week at the same weekly wage, the formula rate was determined by this calculation: $27.50-^[54+½ (54-40)] =$.4508 per hour.
The agreement made no specific provision for situations involving unexcused absences. The above-described procedure seems to have been applied in practice, however.
Thus the employee Anderson worked only 39 hours in the week of Feb. 14, 1943, the 7 hours of absence apparently being due to an “excusable cause.” Under the agreement, which would entitle him to six hours of “overtime” pay, he should have received weekly compensation in the amount of $23.56. The actual average hourly rate during that week accordingly would be $.604. If Anderson had been paid on an hourly basis determined by dividing the weekly wage paid for a scheduled workweek by the number of hours in such workweek, he would have received $.598, whereas, had he been paid the straight formula rate he would have received $.561 per hour. So also, the petitioner Peterson in the week of Dec. 13, 1942, was absent 16 hours for excusable causes. The payroll records reveal he earned $18.50 or an actual average hourly rate of $.617 as compared to $.598, the average rate for a scheduled workweek, and to $.561, the formula rate.
In the case of watchmen, who were assigned a scheduled week of 54 hours, twice the formula rate was paid for hours worked in excess of 54.
Thus if an employee hired for a regular workweek of 46 hours at $27.50 worked 50 hours in one week, his total weekly compensation would amount to $31.43 if compensated in accordance with the terms of the agreement. If, instead, the employee were hired on a straight weekly basis at the same weekly wage with provision for time and one-half the average hourly rate, for hours worked in excess of 46, he would receive $31.09 as total weekly compensation for 50 hours of work. If a watchman, scheduled to work a 54-hour week at $27.50 actually worked 58 hours he would receive $31.11 weekly compensation if calculated according to the agreement, or $30.55 if calculated on a straight weekly basis with time and one-half for hours worked in excess of 54.
(Emphasis supplied.) The agreement in question also contained the following provision: “Per diem rates of pay of any employee shall be arrived at by dividing the applicable weekly wage by the normal number of days per week worked by that employee in the building in question.” This provision is obviously at odds with the statement in the agreement that the weekly wage stipulated for a scheduled workweek included both regular pay and overtime for hours worked over 40. There is nothing in the record, however, to indicate that the per diem provisions were actually applied. Petitioner explains its presence in the agreement as an inadvertent hold-over from the earlier Sloan Agreement.
See note 5 supra.
A somewhat similar situation prevailed with respect to an increase of $1.40 in the weekly wage granted on October 10, 1943, and made retroactive to April 21, 1943. It appears that petitioners made some effort to make adjustments consistent with the formula in payment to employees who had worked hours in excess of the scheduled workweek. It is conceded, however, that no such adjustments were made with respect to those who worked less than their scheduled hours in weeks during the retroactive period, such employees being paid the full weekly increase for each week employed regardless of hours actually worked.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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G
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Stevens
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner asks us to authorize a new nonstatutory damages remedy for federal employees whose First Amendment rights are violated by their superiors. Because such claims arise out of an employment relationship that is governed by comprehensive procedural and substantive provisions giving meaningful remedies against the United States, we conclude that it would be inappropriate for us to supplement that regulatory scheme with a new judicial remedy.
Petitioner Bush is an aerospace engineer employed at the George C. Marshall Space Flight Center, a major facility operated by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration in Alabama. Respondent Lucas is the Director of the Center. In 1974 the facility was reorganized and petitioner was twice reassigned to new positions. He objected to both reassignments and sought formal review by the Civil Service Commission. In May and June 1975, while some of his administrative appeals were pending, he made a number of public statements, including two televised interviews, that were highly critical of the agency. The news media quoted him as saying that he did not have enough meaningful work to keep him busy, that his job was “a travesty and worthless,” and that the taxpayers’ money was being spent fraudulently and wastefully at the Center. His statements were reported on local television, in the local newspaper, and in a national press release that appeared in newspapers in at least three other States.
In June 1975 respondent, in response to a reporter’s inquiry, stated that he had conducted an investigation and that petitioner’s statements regarding his job had “no basis in fact.” App. 15. In August 1975 an adverse personnel action was initiated to remove petitioner from his position. Petitioner was charged with “publicly makfing] intemperate remarks which were misleading and often false, evidencing a malicious attitude towards Management and generating an environment of sensationalism demeaning to the Government, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the personnel of the George C. Marshall Space Flight Center, thereby impeding Government efficiency and eeon-omy and adversely affecting public confidence in the Government service.” He was also informed that his conduct had undermined morale at the Center and caused disharmony and disaffection among his fellow employees. Petitioner had the opportunity to file a written response and to make an oral presentation to agency officials. Respondent then determined that petitioner’s statements were false and misleading and that his conduct would justify removal, but that the lesser penalty of demotion was appropriate for a “first offense.” Ibid. He approved a reduction in grade from GS-14 to GS-12, which decreased petitioner’s annual salary by approximately $9,716.
Petitioner exercised his right to appeal to the Federal Employee Appeals Authority. After a 3-day public hearing, the Authority upheld some of the charges and concluded that the demotion was justified. It specifically determined that a number of petitioner’s public statements were misleading and that, for three reasons, they “exceeded the bounds of expression protected by the First Amendment.” First, petitioner’s statements did not stem from public interest, but from his desire to have his position abolished so that he could take early retirement and go to law school. Second, the statements conveyed the erroneous impression that the agency was deliberately wasting public funds, thus discrediting the agency and its employees. Third, there was no legitimate public interest to be served by abolishing petitioner’s position.
Two years after the Appeals Authority’s decision, petitioner requested the Civil Service Commission’s Appeals Review Board to reopen the proceeding. The Board reexamined petitioner’s First Amendment claim and, after making a detailed review of the record and the applicable authorities, applied the balancing test articulated in Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U. S. 563 (1968). On the one hand, it acknowledged the evidence tending to show that petitioner’s motive might have been personal gain, and the evidence that his statements caused some disruption of the agency’s day-today routine. On the other hand, it noted that society as well as the individual had an interest in free speech, including “a right to disclosure of information about how tax dollars are spent and about the functioning of government apparatus, an interest in the promotion of the efficiency of the government, and in the maintenance of an atmosphere of freedom of expression by the scientists and engineers who are responsible for the planning and implementation of the nation’s space program.” Because petitioner’s statements, though somewhat exaggerated, “were not wholly without truth, they properly stimulated public debate.” Thus the nature and extent of proven disruption to the agency’s operations did not “justify abrogation of the exercise of free speech.” The Board recommended that petitioner be restored to his former position, retroactively to November 30,1975, and that he receive backpay. That recommendation was accepted. Petitioner received approximately $30,000 in backpay.
While his administrative appeal was pending, petitioner filed an action against respondent in state court in Alabama seeking to recover damages for defamation and violation of his constitutional rights. Respondent removed the lawsuit to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, which granted respondent’s motion for summary judgment. It held, first, that the defamation claim could not be maintained because, under Barr v. Matteo, 360 U. S. 564 (1959), respondent was absolutely immune from liability for damages for defamation; and second, that petitioner’s demotion was not a constitutional deprivation for which a damages action could be maintained. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. 598 F. 2d 958 (1979). We vacated that court’s judgment, 446 U. S. 914 (1980), and directed that it reconsider the case in the light of our intervening decision in Carlson v. Green, 446 U. S. 14 (1980). The Court of Appeals again affirmed the judgment against petitioner. It adhered to its previous conclusion that “plaintiff had no cause of action for damages under the First Amendment for retaliatory demotion in view of the available remedies under the Civil Service Commission regulations.” 647 F. 2d 573, 574 (1981). It explained that the relationship between the Federal Government and its civil service employees was a special factor counselling against the judicial recognition of a damages remedy under the Constitution in this context.
We assume for purposes of decision that petitioner’s First Amendment rights were violated by the adverse personnel action. We also assume that, as petitioner asserts, civil service remedies were not as effective as an individual damages remedy and did not fully compensate him for the harm he suffered. Two further propositions are undisputed. Congress has not expressly authorized the damages remedy that petitioner asks us to provide. On the other hand, Congress has not expressly precluded the creation of such a remedy by declaring that existing statutes provide the exclusive mode of redress.
Thus, we assume, a federal right has been violated and Congress has provided a less than complete remedy for the wrong. If we were writing on a clean slate, we might answer the question whether to supplement the statutory scheme in either of two quite simple ways. We might adopt the common-law approach to the judicial recognition of new causes of action and hold that it is the province of the judiciary to fashion an adequate remedy for every wrong that can be proved in a case over which a court has jurisdiction. Or we might start from the premise that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction whose remedial powers do not extend beyond the granting of relief expressly authorized by Congress. Under the former approach, petitioner would obviously prevail; under the latter, it would be equally clear that he would lose.
Our prior cases, although sometimes emphasizing one approach and sometimes the other, have unequivocally rejected both extremes. They establish our power to grant relief that is not expressly authorized by statute, but they also remind us that such power is to be exercised in the light of relevant policy determinations made by the Congress. We therefore first review some of the cases establishing our power to remedy violations of the Constitution and then consider the bearing of the existing statutory scheme on the precise issue presented by this case.
I
The federal courts’ power to grant relief not expressly authorized by Congress is firmly established. Under 28 U. S. C. § 1331, the federal courts have jurisdiction to decide all cases “arising] under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” This jurisdictional grant provides not only the authority to decide whether a cause of action is stated by a plaintiff’s claim that he has been injured by a violation of the Constitution, Bell v. Hood, 327 U. S. 678, 684 (1946), but also the authority to choose among available judicial remedies in order to vindicate constitutional rights. This Court has fashioned a wide variety of nonstatutory remedies for violations of the Constitution by federal and state officials. The cases most relevant to the problem before us are those in which the Court has held that the Constitution itself supports a private cause of action for damages against a federal official. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971); Davis v. Passman, 442 U. S. 228 (1979); Carlson v. Green, supra.
In Bivens the plaintiff alleged that federal agents, without a warrant or probable cause, had arrested him and searched his home in a manner causing him great humiliation, embarrassment, and mental suffering. He claimed damages on the theory that the alleged violation of the Fourth Amendment provided an independent basis for relief. The Court upheld the sufficiency of his complaint, rejecting the argument that a state tort action in trespass provided the only appropriate judicial remedy. The Court explained why the absence of a federal statutory basis for the cause of action was not an obstacle to the award of damages:
“That damages may be obtained for injuries consequent upon a violation of the Fourth Amendment by federal officials should hardly seem a surprising proposition. Historically, damages have been regarded as the ordinary remedy for an invasion of personal interests in liberty. See Nixon v. Condon, 286 U. S. 73 (1932); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U. S. 536, 540 (1927); Swafford v. Templeton, 185 U. S. 487 (1902); Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U. S. 58 (1900); J. Landynski, Search and Seizure and the Supreme Court 28 et seq. (1966); N. Lasson, History and Development of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 43 et seq. (1937); Katz, The Jurisprudence of Remedies: Constitutional Legality and the Law of Torts in Bell v. Hood, 117 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 8-33 (1968); cf. West v. Cabell, 153 U. S. 78 (1894); Lammon v. Feusier, 111 U. S. 17 (1884). Of course, the Fourth Amendment does not in so many words provide for its enforcement by an award of money damages for the consequences of its violation. But ‘it is... well settled that where legal rights have been invaded, and a federal statute provides for a general right to sue for such invasion, federal courts may use any available remedy to make good the wrong done.’ Bell v. Hood, 327 U. S., at 684 (footnote omitted). The present case involves no special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress. We are not dealing with a question of ‘federal fiscal policy/ as in United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U. S. 301, 311 (1947).” 403 U. S., at 395-396.
The Court further noted that there was “no explicit congressional declaration that persons injured by a federal officer’s violation of the Fourth Amendment may not recover money damages from the agents, but must instead be remitted to another remedy, equally effective in the view of Congress.” Id., at 397.
In his separate opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Harlan also thought it clear that the power to authorize damages as a remedy for the vindication of a federal constitutional right had not been placed by the Constitution itself exclusively in Congress’ hands. Id., at 401-402. Instead, he reasoned, the real question did not relate to “whether the federal courts have the power to afford one type of remedy as opposed to the other, but rather to the criteria which should govern the exercise of our power.” Id., at 406. In resolving that question he suggested that “the range of policy considerations we may take into account is at least as broad as the range of those a legislature would consider with respect to an expressed] statutory authorization of a traditional remedy.” id., at 407. After weighing the relevant policies he agreed with the Court’s conclusion that the Government had not advanced any substantial policy consideration against recognizing a federal cause of action for violation of Fourth Amendment rights by federal officials.
In Davis v. Passman, supra, the petitioner, former deputy administrative assistant to a Member of Congress, alleged that she had been discharged because of her sex, in violation of her constitutional right to the equal protection of the laws. We held that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment gave her a federal constitutional right to be free from official discrimination and that she had alleged a federal cause of action. In reaching the conclusion that an award of damages would be an appropriate remedy, we emphasized the fact that no other alternative form of judicial relief was available. The Court also was persuaded that the special concerns which would ordinarily militate against allowing recovery from a legislator were fully reflected in respondent’s affirmative defense based on the Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution. Id., at 246. We noted the absence of any explicit congressional declaration that persons in petitioner’s position may not recover damages from those responsible for their injury. Id., at 246-247.
Carlson v. Green, 446 U. S. 14 (1980), involved a claim that a federal prisoner’s Eighth Amendment rights had been violated. The prisoner’s mother brought suit on behalf of her son’s estate, alleging that federal prison officials were responsible for his death because they had violated their constitutional duty to provide him with proper medical care after he suffered a severe asthmatic attack. Unlike Bivens and Davis, the Green case was one in which Congress had provided a remedy, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, against the United States for the alleged wrong. 28 U. S. C. § 2671 et seq. As is true in this case, that remedy was not as completely effective as a Bivens-type action based directly on the Constitution.
The Court acknowledged that a Bivens action could be defeated in two situations, but found that neither was present. First, the Court could discern “ ‘no special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress.’ ” 446 U. S., at 18-19, citing Bivens, 403 U. S., at 396, and Davis, supra, at 245. Second, there was no congressional determination foreclosing the damages claim and making the Federal Tort Claims Act exclusive. 446 U. S., at 19, and n. 5. No statute expressly declared the FTCA remedy to be a substitute for a Bivens action; indeed, the legislative history of the 1974 amendments to the FTCA “made it crystal clear that Congress views FTCA and Bivens as parallel, complementary causes of action.” 446 U. S., at 19-20.
This much is established by our prior cases. The federal courts’ statutory jurisdiction to decide federal questions confers adequate power to award damages to the victim of a constitutional violation. When Congress provides an alternative remedy, it may, of course, indicate its intent, by statutory language, by clear legislative history, or perhaps even by the statutory remedy itself, that the courts’ power should not be exercised. In the absence of such a congressional directive, the federal courts must make the kind of remedial determination that is appropriate for a common-law tribunal, paying particular heed, however, to any special factors coun-selling hesitation before authorizing a new kind of federal litigation.
Congress has not resolved the question presented by this case by expressly denying petitioner the judicial remedy he seeks or by providing him with an equally effective substitute. There is, however, a good deal of history that is relevant to the question whether a federal employee’s attempt to recover damages from his superior for violation of his First Amendment rights involves any “special factors counselling hesitation.” When those words were first used in Bivens, supra, at 396, we illustrated our meaning by referring to United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U. S. 301, 311, 316 (1947), and United States v. Gilman, 347 U. S. 507 (1954).
In the Standard Oil case the Court had been asked to authorize a new damages remedy for the Government against a tortfeasor who had injured a soldier, imposing hospital expenses on the Government and depriving it of his services. Although, as Justice Jackson properly noted in dissent, the allowance of recovery would not have involved any usurpation of legislative power, 332 U. S., at 318, the Court nevertheless concluded that Congress as “the custodian of the national purse” should make the necessary determination of federal fiscal policy. The Court refused to create a damages remedy, which would be “the instrument for determining and establishing the federal fiscal and regulatory policies which the Government’s executive arm thinks should prevail in a situation not covered by traditionally established liabilities.” Id., at 314.
Similarly, in Gilman, the Court applied the Standard Oil rationale to reject the Government’s attempt to recover indemnity from one of its employees after having been held liable under the FTCA for the employee’s negligence. As the Court noted: “The relations between the United States and its employees have presented a myriad of problems with which the Congress over the years has dealt.... Government employment gives rise to policy questions of great import, both to the employees and to the Executive and Legislative Branches.” 347 U. S., at 509. The decision regarding indemnity involved questions of employee discipline and morale, fiscal policy, and the efficiency of the federal service. Hence, the Court wrote, the reasons for deferring to congressional policy determinations were even more compelling than in Standard Oil.
“Here a complex of relations between federal agencies and their staffs is involved. Moreover, the claim now asserted, though the product of a law Congress passed, is a matter on which Congress has not taken a position. It presents questions of policy on which Congress has not spoken. The selection of that policy which is most advantageous to the whole involves a host of considerations that must be weighed and appraised. That function is more appropriately for those who write the laws, rather than for those who interpret them.” 347 U. S., at 511-513.
The special factors counselling hesitation in the creation of a new remedy in Standard Oil and Gilman did not concern the merits of the particular remedy that was sought. Rather, they related to the question of who should decide whether such a remedy should be provided. We should therefore begin by considering whether there are reasons for allowing Congress to prescribe the scope of relief that is made available to federal employees whose First Amendment rights have been violated by their supervisors.
t — H HH
Unlike Standard Oil and Gilman, this case concerns a claim that a constitutional right has been violated. Nevertheless, just as those cases involved “federal fiscal policy” and the relations between the Government and its employees, the ultimate question on the merits in this case may appropriately be characterized as one of “federal personnel policy.” When a federal civil servant is the victim of a retaliatory demotion or discharge because he has exercised his First Amendment rights, what legal remedies are available to him?
The answer to that question has changed dramatically over the years. Originally the answer was entirely a matter of Executive discretion. During the era of the patronage system that prevailed in the Federal Government prior to the enactment of the Pendleton Act in 1883, 22 Stat. 403, the federal employee had no legal protection against political retaliation. Indeed, the exercise of the First Amendment right to support a political candidate opposing the party in office would routinely have provided an accepted basis for discharge. During the past century, however, the job security of federal employees has steadily increased.
In the Pendleton Act Congress created the Civil Service Commission and provided for the selection of federal civil servants on a merit basis by competitive examination. Although the statute did not address the question of removals in general, it provided that no employee in the public service could be required to contribute to any political fund or fired for refusing to do so, and it prohibited officers from attempting to influence or coerce the political actions of others.
Congressional attention to the problem of politically motivated removals was again prompted by the issuance of Executive Orders by Presidents Roosevelt and Taft that forbade federal employees to communicate directly with Congress without the permission of their supervisors. These “gag orders,” enforced by dismissal, were cited by several legislators as the reason for enacting the Lloyd-La Follette Act in 1912, 37 Stat. 539, 555, § 6. That statute provided that “no person in the classified civil service of the United States shall be removed therefrom except for such cause as will promote the efficiency of said service and for reasons given in writing....” Moreover, it explicitly guaranteed that the right of civil servants “to furnish information to either House of Congress, or to any committee or member thereof, shall not be denied or interfered with.” As the House Report explained, this legislation was intended “to protect employees against oppression and in the right of free speech and the right to consult their representatives.” In enacting the Lloyd-La Follette Act, Congress weighed the competing policy considerations and concluded that efficient management of Government operations did not preclude the extension of free speech rights to Government employees.
In the ensuing years, repeated consideration of the conflicting interests involved in providing job security, protecting the right to speak freely, and maintaining discipline and efficiency in the federal work force gave rise to additional legislation, various Executive Orders, and the promulgation of detailed regulations by the Civil Service Commission. Federal civil servants are now protected by an elaborate, comprehensive scheme that encompasses substantive provisions forbidding arbitrary action by supervisors and procedures — administrative and judicial — by which improper action may be redressed. They apply to a multitude of personnel decisions that are made daily by federal agencies. Constitutional challenges to agency action, such as the First Amendment claims raised by petitioner, are fully cognizable within this system. As the record in this case demonstrates, the Government’s comprehensive scheme is costly to administer, but it provides meaningful remedies for employees who may have been unfairly disciplined for making critical comments about their agencies.
A federal employee in the competitive service may be removed or demoted “only for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service.” The regulations applicable at the time of petitioner’s demotion in 1975, which are substantially similar to those now in effect, required that an employee be given 30 days’ written notice of a proposed discharge, suspension, or demotion, accompanied by the agency’s reasons and a copy of the charges. The employee then had the right to examine all disclosable materials that formed the basis of the proposed action, 5 CFR § 752.202(a) (1975), the right to answer the charges with a statement and supporting affidavits, and the right to make an oral noneviden-tiary presentation to an agency official. § 752.202(b). The regulations required that the final agency decision be made by an official higher in rank than the official who proposed the adverse action, § 752.202(f). The employee was entitled to notification in writing stating which of the initial reasons had been sustained. Ibid.; 5 U. S. C. § 7501(b)(4).
The next step was a right to appeal to the Civil Service Commission’s Federal Employee Appeals Authority. 5 CFR §§752.203, 772.101 (1975). The Appeals Authority was required to hold a trial-type hearing at which the employee could present witnesses, cross-examine the agency’s witnesses, and secure the attendance of agency officials, § 772.307(c), and then to render a written decision, §772.-309(a). An adverse decision by the FEAA was judicially reviewable in either federal district court or the Court of Claims. In addition, the employee had the right to ask the Commission’s Appeals Review Board to reopen an adverse decision by the FEAA. §772.310.
If the employee prevailed in the administrative process or upon judicial review, he was entitled to reinstatement with retroactive seniority. § 752.402. He also had a right to full backpay, including credit for periodic within-grade or step increases and general pay raises during the relevant period, allowances, differentials, and accumulated leave. §550.803. Congress intended that these remedies would put the employee “in the same position he would have been in had the unjustified or erroneous personnel action not taken place.”
Given the history of the development of civil service remedies and the comprehensive nature of the remedies currently available, it is clear that the question we confront today is quite different from the typical remedial issue confronted by a common-law court. The question is not what remedy the court should provide for a wrong that would otherwise go un-redressed. It is whether an elaborate remedial system that has been constructed step by step, with careful attention to conflicting policy considerations, should be augmented by the creation of a new judicial remedy for the constitutional violation at issue. That question obviously cannot be answered simply by noting that existing remedies do not provide complete relief for the plaintiff. The policy judgment should be informed by a thorough understanding of the existing regulatory structure and the respective costs and benefits that would result from the addition of another remedy for violations of employees’ First Amendment rights.
The costs associated with the review of disciplinary decisions are already significant — not only in monetary terms, but also in the time and energy of managerial personnel who must defend their decisions. Respondent argues that supervisory personnel are already more hesitant than they should be in administering discipline, because the review that ensues inevitably makes the performance of their regular duties more difficult. Brief for Respondent 37-41. Whether or not this assessment is accurate, it is quite probable that if management personnel face the added risk of personal liability for decisions that they believe to be a correct response to improper criticism of the agency, they would be deterred from imposing discipline in future cases. In all events, Congress is in a far better position than a court to evaluate the impact of a new species of litigation between federal employees on the efficiency of the civil service. Not only has Congress developed considerable familiarity with balancing governmental efficiency and the rights of employees, but it also may inform itself through factfinding procedures such as hearings that are not available to the courts.
Nor is there any reason to discount Congress’ ability to make an evenhanded assessment of the desirability of creating a new remedy for federal employees who have been demoted or discharged for expressing controversial views. Congress has a special interest in informing itself about the efficiency and morale of the Executive Branch. In the past it has demonstrated its awareness that lower-level Government employees are a valuable source of information, and that supervisors might improperly attempt to curtail their subordinates’ freedom of expression.
Thus, we do not decide whether or not it would be good policy to permit a federal employee to recover damages from a supervisor who has improperly disciplined him for exercising his First Amendment rights. As we did in Standard Oil, we decline “to create a new substantive legal liability without legislative aid and as at the common law,” 332 U. S., at 302, because we are convinced that Congress is in a better position to decide whether or not the public interest would be served by creating it.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
The record indicates that petitioner filed two appeals from the first reassignment and three appeals from the second. App. to Pet. for Cert, e-3 to e-4. He asserts that he had previously made unsuccessful attempts within the Center to obtain redress. App. 30.
App. to Pet. for Cert, d-2 to d-3 (memorandum opinion of District Court); id., at e-19 (opinion of Federal Employee Appeals Authority).
Id., at f-2 to f-3, e-19, e-7.
Id., at e-38 to e-39. Petitioner could have obtained judicial review of the Authority’s determination by filing suit in a federal district court or in the United States Court of Claims, but did not do so.
Id., at f-23 to f-25.
Id., at d-2 to d-17.
Competent decisionmakers may reasonably disagree about the merits of petitioner’s First Amendment claim. Compare the opinion of the District Court, App. D to Pet. for Cert., and the opinion of the Atlanta Field Office of the Federal Employees Appeal Authority issued on August 12, 1976, App. E, both rejecting petitioner’s claims, with the opinion of the Appeals Review Board issued on July 14, 1978, App. F, finding that the First Amendment had been violated. This question is not before us.
See Carlson v. Green, 446 U. S. 14, 20-23 (1980) (factors making Federal Tort Claims Act recovery less “effective” than an action under the Constitution to recover damages against the individual official). Petitioner contends that, unlike a damages remedy against respondent individually, civil service remedies against the Government do not provide for punitive damages or a jury trial and do not adequately deter the unconstitutional exercise of authority by supervisors. Brief for Petitioner 27-29.
His attorney’s fees were not paid by the Government, and he claims to have suffered uncompensated emotional and dignitary harms. Id., at 24-26. In light of our disposition of this case, we do not need to decide whether such costs could be recovered as compensation in an action brought directly under the Constitution.
In Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 163 (1803), Chief Justice Marshall invoked the authority of Blackstone’s Commentaries in support of this proposition. Blackstone had written: “[I]t is a general and indisputable rule, that where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy by suit, or action at law, whenever that right is invaded.... [I]t is a settled and invariable principle in the laws of England, that every right, when withheld, must have a remedy, and every injury its proper redress.” 3 Commentaries *23, *109.
See Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388, 428 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting).
See, e. g., United States v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196 (1882) (ejectment action against federal officers to enforce Takings Clause of Fifth Amendment); Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U. S. 58, 64-65 (1900) (damages against state officer for denying plaintiff’s right to vote in federal election); Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908) (injunctive relief against state official for violation of Fourteenth Amendment); Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383, 398 (1914) (exclusion in federal criminal case of evidence seized in violation of Fourth Amendment); Jacobs v. United States, 290 U. S. 13, 16 (1933) (award of interest as well as principal in just compensation claim founded on the Fifth Amendment); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Education, 402 U. S. 1, 15-16 (1971) (school busing to remedy unconstitutional racial segregation). See generally Hill, Constitutional Remedies, 69 Colum. L. Rev. 1109, 1124-1127 (1969).
“Moreover, since respondent is no longer a Congressman, see n. 1, supra, equitable relief in the form of reinstatement would be unavailing. And there are available no other alternative forms of judicial relief. For Davis, as for Bivens, ‘it is damages or nothing.’ Bivens, supra, at 410 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment).” 442 U. S., at 245.
We need not reach the question whether the Constitution itself requires a judicially fashioned damages remedy in the absence of any other remedy to vindicate the underlying right, unless there is an express textual command to the contrary. Cf. Davis v. Passman, 442 U. S. 228, 246 (1979). The existing civil service remedies for a demotion in retaliation for protected speech are clearly constitutionally adequate. See infra, at 386-388.
“Whatever the merits of the policy, its conversion into law is a proper subject for congressional action, not for any creative power of ours. Congress, not this Court or the other federal courts, is the custodian of the national purse. By the same token it is the primary and most often the exclusive arbiter of federal fiscal affairs. And these comprehend, as we have said, securing the treasury or the government against financial losses however inflicted, including requiring reimbursement for injuries creating them, as well as filling the treasury itself.” 332 U. S., at 314-316.
The Court further noted that the type of harm for which the Executive sought judicial redress was not new, and that Congress presumably knew of it but had not exercised its undoubted power to authorize a damages action. Id., at 315-316.
The Report of the Committee on Civil Service and Retrenchment submitted by Senator Pendleton on May 15,1882, contained a vivid description of the patronage system, reading in part as follows:
“The fact is confessed by all observers and commended by some that ‘to the victors belong the spoils;’ that with each new administration comes the business of distributing patronage among its friends.... [The President] is to do what some predecessor of his has left undone, or to undo what others before him have done; to put this man up and that man down, as the system of political rewards and punishments shall seem to him to demand.” S. Rep. No. 576, 47th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1882).
See generally House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, History of Civil Service Merit Systems of the United States and Selected Foreign Countries, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 26-173 (1976).
See S. Rep. No. 576, supra, n. 16, at 9; cf. H. R. Rep. No. 1826, 47th Cong., 2d Sess., 1-2 (1882) (rejected provisions of House bill permitting removals only for cause).
Section 13 provided:
“No officer or employee of the United States mentioned in this act shall discharge, or promote, or degrade, or in manner change the official rank or compensation of any other officer or employee, or promise or threaten so to do, for giving or withholding or neglecting to make any contribution of money or other valuable thing for any political purpose.” 22 Stat. 407.
Other sections made it unlawful for Government employees to solicit political contributions from, and to give such contributions to, other Government employees, §§ 11, 14, and to receive any political contributions on Government premises, § 12. Section 2 required the Civil Service Commission to promulgate rules providing, inter alia, “that no person in the public service is for that reason under any obligations to contribute to any political fund, or to render any political service, and that he will not be removed or otherwise prejudiced for refusing to do so,” and also “that no person in said service has any right to use his official authority or influence to coerce the political action of any person or body.” 22 Stat. 404. See 5 U. S. C. § 2302(b)(3) (1982 ed.); 5 U. S. C. §§7321-7323.
In 1906 President Roosevelt issued Executive Order No. 1142, which provided:
“All officers and employees of the United States of every description, serving in or under any of the Executive Departments or independent Government establishments, and whether so serving in or out
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
H
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Chief Justice Roberts
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This “suit has, in course of time, become so complicated, that... no two... lawyers can talk about it for five minutes, without coming to a total disagreement as to all the premises. Innumerable children have been born into the cause: innumerable young people have married into it;” and, sadly, the original parties “have died out of it.” A “long procession of [judges] has come in and gone out” during that time, and still the suit “drags its weary length before the Court.”
Those words were not written about this case, see C. Dickens, Bleak House, in 1 Works of Charles Dickens 4-5 (1891), but they could have been. This is the second time we have had occasion to weigh in on this long-running dispute between Vickie Lynn Marshall and E. Pierce Marshall over the fortune of J. Howard Marshall II, a man believed to have been one of the richest people in Texas. The Marshalls’ litigation has worked its way through state and federal courts in Louisiana, Texas, and California, and two of those courts— a Texas state probate court and the Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California — have reached contrary decisions on its merits. The Court of Appeals below held that the Texas state decision controlled, after concluding that the Bankruptcy Court lacked the authority to enter final judgment on a counterclaim that Vickie brought against Pierce in her bankruptcy proceeding. To determine whether the Court of Appeals was correct in that regard, we must resolve two issues: (1) whether the Bankruptcy Court had the statutory authority under 28 U. S. C. § 157(b) to issue a final judgment on Vickie’s counterclaim; and (2) if so, whether conferring that authority on the Bankruptcy Court is constitutional.
Although the history of this litigation is complicated, its resolution ultimately turns on very basic principles. Article III, § 1, of the Constitution commands that “[tjhe judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.” That Article further provides that the judges of those courts shall hold their offices during good behavior, without diminution of salary. Ibid. Those requirements of Article III were not honored here. The Bankruptcy Court in this case exercised the judicial power of the United States by entering final judgment on a common law tort claim, even though the judges of such courts enjoy neither tenure during good behavior nor salary protection. We conclude that, although the Bankruptcy Court had the statutory authority to enter judgment on Vickie’s counterclaim, it lacked the constitutional authority to do so.
I
Because we have already recounted the facts and procedural history of this case in detail, see Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U. S. 293, 300-305 (2006), we do not repeat them in full here. Of current relevance are two claims Vickie filed in an attempt to secure half of J. Howard’s fortune. Known to the public as Anna Nicole Smith, Vickie was J. Howard’s third wife and married him about a year before his death. Id., at 300; see In re Marshall, 392 F. 3d 1118, 1122 (CA9 2004). Although J. Howard bestowed on Vickie many monetary and other gifts during their courtship and marriage, he did not include her in his will. 547 U. S., at 300. Before J. Howard passed away, Vickie filed suit in Texas state probate court, asserting that Pierce — J. Howard's younger son — fraudulently induced J. Howard to sign a living trust that did not include her, even though J. Howard meant to give her half his property. Pierce denied any fraudulent activity and defended the validity of J. Howard's trust and, eventually, his will. 392 F. 3d, at 1122-1123,1125.
After J. Howard's death, Vickie filed a petition for bankruptcy in the Central District of California. Pierce filed a complaint in that bankruptcy proceeding, contending that Vickie had defamed him by inducing her lawyers to tell members of the press that he had engaged in fraud to gain control of his father's assets. 547 U. S., at 300-301; In re Marshall, 600 F. 3d 1037,1043-1044 (CA9 2010). The complaint sought a declaration that Pierce's defamation claim was not dis-chargeable in the bankruptcy proceedings. Ibid.) see 11 U. S. C. § 523(a). Pierce subsequently filed a proof of claim for the defamation action, meaning that he sought to recover damages for it from Vickie's bankruptcy estate. See § 501(a). Vickie responded to Pierce’s initial complaint by asserting truth as a defense to the alleged defamation and by filing a counterclaim for tortious interference with the gift she expected from J. Howard. As she had in state court, Vickie alleged that Pierce had wrongfully prevented J. Howard from taking the legal steps necessary to provide her with half his property. 547 U. S., at 301.
On November 5, 1999, the Bankruptcy Court issued an order granting Vickie summary judgment on Pierce’s claim for defamation. On September 27, 2000, after a bench trial, the Bankruptcy Court issued a judgment on Vickie’s counterclaim in her favor. The court later awarded Vickie over $400 million in compensatory damages and $25 million in punitive damages. 600 P. 3d, at 1045; see 253 B. R. 550, 561-562 (Bkrtcy. Ct. CD Cal. 2000); 257 B. R. 35, 39-40 (Bkrtcy Ct. CD Cal. 2000).
In post-trial proceedings, Pierce argued that the Bankruptcy Court lacked jurisdiction over Vickie’s counterclaim. In particular, Pierce renewed a claim he had made earlier in the litigation, asserting that the Bankruptcy Court's authority over the counterclaim was limited because Vickie’s counterclaim was not a “core proceeding” under 28 U. S. C. § 157(b)(2)(C). See 257 B. R., at 39. As explained below, bankruptcy courts may hear and enter final judgments in “core proceedings” in a bankruptcy case. In noncore proceedings, the bankruptcy courts instead submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district court, for that court’s review and issuance of final judgment. The Bankruptcy Court in this case concluded that Vickie’s counterclaim was “a core proceeding” under § 157(b)(2)(C), and the court therefore had the “power to enter judgment” on the counterclaim under § 157(b)(1). Id., at 40.
The District Court disagreed. It recognized that “Vickie’s counterclaim for tortious interference falls within the literal language” of the statute designating certain proceedings as “core,” see § 157(b)(2)(C), but understood this Court’s precedent to “suggest[] that it would be unconstitutional to hold that any and all counterclaims are core.” 264 B. R. 609, 629-630 (CD Cal. 2001) (citing Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U. S. 50, 79, n. 31 (1982) (plurality opinion)). The District Court accordingly concluded that a “counterclaim should not be characterized as core” when it “is only somewhat related to the claim against which it is asserted, and when the unique characteristics and context of the counterclaim place it outside of the normal type of set-off or other counterclaims that customarily arise.” 264 B. R., at 632.
Because the District Court concluded that Vickie’s counterclaim was not core, the court determined that it was required to treat the Bankruptcy Court’s judgment as “proposed^] rather than final,” and engage in an “independent review” of the record. Id., at 633; see 28 U. S. C. § 157(c)(1). Although the Texas state court had by that time conducted a jury trial on the merits of the parties’ dispute and entered a judgment in Pierce’s favor, the District Court declined to give that judgment preclusive effect and went on to decide the matter itself. 271 B. R. 858, 862-867 (CD Cal. 2001); see 275 B. R. 5, 56-58 (CD Cal. 2002). Like the Bankruptcy Court, the District Court found that Pierce had tortiously interfered with Vickie’s expectancy of a gift from J. Howard. The District Court awarded Vickie compensatory and punitive damages, each in the amount of $44,292,767.33. Id., at 58.
The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court on a different ground, 392 P. 3d, at 1137, and we — in the first visit of the case to this Court — reversed the Court of Appeals on that issue. 547 U. S., at 314-315. On remand from this Court, the Court of Appeals held that §157 mandated “a two-step approach” under which a bankruptcy judge may issue a final judgment in a proceeding only if the matter both “meets Congress’ definition of a core proceeding and arises under or arises in title 11,” the Bankruptcy Code. 600 F. 3d, at 1055. The court also reasoned that allowing a bankruptcy judge to enter final judgments on all counterclaims raised in bankruptcy proceedings “would certainly run afoul” of this Court’s decision in Northern Pipeline. 600 F. 3d, at 1057. With those concerns in mind, the court concluded that “a counterclaim under § 157(b)(2)(C) is properly a ‘core’ proceeding ‘arising in a case under’ the [Bankruptcy] Code only if the counterclaim is so closely related to [a creditor’s] proof of claim that the resolution of the counterclaim is necessary to resolve the allowance or disallowance of the claim itself.” Id., at 1058 (internal quotation marks omitted; second brackets added). The court ruled that Vickie’s counterclaim did not meet that test. Id., at 1059. That holding made “the Texas probate court’s judgment... the earliest final judgment entered on matters relevant to this proceeding,” and therefore the Court of Appeals concluded that the District Court should have “afford[ed] preclusive effect” to the Texas “court’s determination of relevant legal and factual issues.” Id., at 1064-1065.
We again granted certiorari. 561 U. S. 1058 (2010).
II
A
With certain exceptions not relevant here, the district courts of the United States have “original and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under title 11.” 28 U. S. C. § 1334(a). Congress has divided bankruptcy proceedings into three categories: those that “aris[e] under title 11”; those that “aris[e] in” a Title 11 case; and those that are “related to a case under title 11.” § 157(a). District courts may refer any or all such proceedings to the bankruptcy judges of their district, ibid., which is how the Bankruptcy Court in this case came to preside over Vickie’s bankruptcy proceedings. District courts also may withdraw a case or proceeding referred to the bankruptcy court “for cause-shown.” § 157(d). Since Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 (1984 Act), bankruptcy judges for each district have been appointed to 14-year terms by the courts of appeals for the circuits in which their district is located. § 152(a)(1).
The manner in which a bankruptcy judge may act on a referred matter depends on the type of proceeding involved. Bankruptcy judges may hear and enter final judgments in “all core proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in a case under title 11.” § 157(b)(1). “Core proceedings include, but are not limited to,” 16 different types of matters, including “counterclaims by [a debtor’s] estate against persons filing claims against the estate.” § 157(b)(2)(C). Parties may appeal final judgments of a bankruptcy court in core proceedings to the district court, which reviews them under traditional appellate standards. See § 158(a); Fed. Rule Bkrtcy. Proc. 8013.
When a bankruptcy judge determines that a referred “proceeding... is not a core proceeding but... is otherwise related to a ease under title 11,” the judge may only “submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district court.” § 157(c)(1). It is the district court that enters final judgment in such cases after reviewing de novo any matter to which a party objects. Ibid.
B
Vickie’s counterclaim against Pierce for tortious interference is a “core proceeding” under the plain text of § 157(b)(2)(C). That provision specifies that core proceedings include “counterclaims by the estate against persons filing claims against the estate.” In past cases, we have suggested that a proceeding’s “core” status alone authorizes a bankruptcy judge, as a statutory matter, to enter final judg-. ment in the proceeding. See, e. g., Granfinanciera, S. A. v. Nordberg, 492 U. S. 33, 50 (1989) (explaining that Congress had designated certain actions as “ 'core proceedings,’ which bankruptcy judges may adjudicate and in which they may issue final judgments, if a district court has referred the matter to them” (citations omitted)). We have not directly addressed the question, however, and Pierce argues that a bankruptcy judge may enter final judgment on a core proceeding only if that proceeding also “aris[es] in” a Title 11 case or “aris[es] under” Title 11 itself. Brief for Respondent 51 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Section 157(b)(1) authorizes bankruptcy courts to “hear and determine all cases under title 11 and all core proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in a case under title 11.” As written, § 157(b)(1) is ambiguous. The “arising under” and “arising in” phrases might, as Pierce suggests, be read as referring to a limited category of those core proceedings that are. addressed in that section. On the other hand, the phrases might be read as simply describing what core proceedings are: matters arising under Title 11 or in a Title 11 ease. In this case the structure and context of § 157 contradict Pierce’s interpretation of § 157(b)(1).
As an initial matter, Pierce’s reading of the statute necessarily assumes that there is a category of core proceedings that neither arise under Title 11 nor arise in a Title 11 case. The manner in which the statute delineates the bankruptcy courts’ authority, however, makes plain that no such category exists. Section 157(b)(1) authorizes bankruptcy judges to enter final judgments in “core proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in a case under title 11.” Section 157(c)(1) instructs bankruptcy judges to instead submit proposed findings in “a proceeding that is not a core proceeding but that is otherwise related to a case under title 11.” Nowhere does § 157 specify what bankruptcy courts are to do with respect to the category of matters that Pierce posits — core proceedings that do not arise under Title 11 or in a Title 11 case. To the contrary, § 157(b)(3) only instructs a bankruptcy judge to “determine, on the judge’s own motion or on timely motion of a party, whether a proceeding is a core proceeding under this subsection or is a proceeding that is otherwise related to a case under title 11.” Two options. The statute does not suggest that any other distinctions need be made.
Under our reading of the statute, core proceedings are those that arise in a bankruptcy case or under Title 11. The detailed list of core proceedings in § 157(b)(2) provides courts with ready examples of such matters. Pierce’s reading of § 157, in contrast, supposes that some core proceedings will arise in a Title 11 case or under Title 11 and some will not. Under that reading, the statute provides no guidance on how to tell which are which.
We think it significant that Congress failed to provide any framework for identifying or adjudicating the asserted category of core but not “arising” proceedings, given the otherwise detailed provisions governing bankruptcy court authority. It is hard to believe that Congress would go to the trouble of cataloging 16 different types of proceedings that should receive “core” treatment, but then fail to specify how to determine whether those matters arise under Title 11 or in a bankruptcy case if — as Pierce asserts — the latter inquiry is determinative of the bankruptcy court's authority.
Pierce argues that we should treat core matters that arise neither under Title 11 nor in a Title 11 case as proceedings “related to” a Title 11 case. Brief for Bespondent 60 (internal quotation marks omitted). We think that a contradiction in terms. It does not make sense to describe a “core” bankruptcy proceeding as merely “related to” the bankruptcy case; oxymoron is not a typical feature of congressional drafting. See Northern Pipeline, 458 U. S., at 71 (plurality opinion) (distinguishing “the restructuring of debtor-creditor relations, which is at the core of the federal bankruptcy power,... from the adjudication of state-created private rights”); 1 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 3.02[2], p. 3-26, n. 5 (16th ed. 2010) (“The terms 'non-core' and ‘related’ are synonymous”); see also id., at 3-26 (“The phraseology of section 157 leads to the conclusion that there is no such thing as a core matter that is ‘related to’ a case under title 11. Core proceedings are, at most, those that arise in title 11 cases or arise under title 11” (footnote omitted)). And, as already discussed, the statute simply does not provide for a proceeding that is simultaneously core and yet only related to the bankruptcy case. See § 157(c)(1) (providing only for “a proceeding that is not a core proceeding but that is otherwise related to a case under title 11”).
As we explain in Part III, we agree with Pierce that designating all counterclaims as “core” proceedings raises serious constitutional concerns. Pierce is also correct that we will, where possible, construe federal statutes so as “to avoid serious doubt of their constitutionality.” Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U. S. 833, 841 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). But that “canon of construction does not give [us] the prerogative to ignore the legislative will in order to avoid constitutional adjudication.” Ibid. In this case, we do not think the plain text of § 157(b)(2)(C) leaves any room for the canon of avoidance. We would have to “rewrit[e]” the statute, not interpret it, to bypass the constitutional issue § 157(b)(2)(C) presents. Id., at 841 (internal quotation marks omitted). That we may not do. We agree with Vickie that § 157(b)(2)(C) permits the bankruptcy court to enter a final judgment on her tortious interference counterclaim.
C
Pierce argues, as another alternative to reaching the constitutional question, that the Bankruptcy Court lacked jurisdiction to enter final judgment on his defamation claim. Section 157(b)(5) provides that “[t]he district court shall order that personal injury tort and wrongful death claims shall be tried in the district court in which the bankruptcy case is pending, or in the district court in the district in which the claim arose.” Pierce asserts that his defamation claim is a “personal injury tort,” that the Bankruptcy Court therefore had no jurisdiction over that claim, and that the court therefore necessarily lacked jurisdiction over Vickie’s counterclaim as well. Brief for Respondent 65-66.
Vickie objects to Pierce’s statutory analysis across the board. To begin, Vickie contends that § 157(b)(5) does not address subject matter jurisdiction at all, but simply specifies the venue in which “personal injury tort and wrongful death claims” should be tried. See Reply Brief for Petitioner 16-17,19; see also Tr. of Oral Arg. 23 (Deputy Solicitor General) (Section “157(b)(5) is, in [the United States’] view, not jurisdictional”). Given the limited scope of that provision, Vickie argues, a party may waive or forfeit any objections under § 157(b)(5), in the same way that a party may waive or forfeit an objection to the bankruptcy court finally resolving a noncore claim. Reply Brief for Petitioner 17-20; see § 157(c)(2) (authorizing the district court, “with the consent of all the parties to the proceeding,” to refer a “related to” matter to the bankruptcy court for final judgment). Vickie asserts that in this case Pierce consented to the Bankruptcy Court's adjudication of his defamation claim, and forfeited any argument to the contrary, by failing to seek withdrawal of the claim until he had litigated it before the Bankruptcy Court for 27 months. Id., at 20-23. On the merits, Vickie contends that the statutory phrase “personal injury tort and wrongful death claims” does not include nonphysical torts such as defamation. Id., at 25-26.
We need not determine what constitutes a “personal injury tort” in this case because we agree with Vickie that § 157(b)(5) is not jurisdictional, and that Pierce consented to the Bankruptcy Court's resolution of his defamation claim. Because “[bjranding a rule as going to a court's subject-matter jurisdiction alters the normal operation of our adversarial system,” Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U. S. 428, 434 (2011), we are not inclined to interpret statutes as creating a jurisdictional bar when they are not framed as such. See generally Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U. S. 500, 516 (2006) (“when Congress does not rank a statutory limitation on coverage as jurisdictional, courts should treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional in character”).
Section 157(b)(5) does not have the hallmarks of a jurisdictional decree. To begin, the statutory text does not refer to either district court or bankruptcy court “jurisdiction,” instead addressing only where personal injury tort claims “shall be tried.”
The statutory context also belies Pierce’s jurisdictional claim. Section 157 allocates the authority to enter final judgment between the bankruptcy court and the district court. See §§ 157(b)(1), (c)(1). That allocation does not implicate questions of subject matter jurisdiction. See § 157(c)(2) (parties may consent to entry of final judgment by bankruptcy judge in noncore case). By the same token, § 157(b)(5) simply specifies where a particular category of cases should be tried. Pierce does not explain why that statutory limitation may not be similarly waived.
We agree with Vickie that Pierce not only could but did consent to the Bankruptcy Court’s resolution of his defamation claim. Before the Bankruptcy Court, Vickie objected to Pierce’s proof of claim for defamation, arguing that Pierce’s claim was unenforceable and that Pierce should not receive any amount for it. See 29 Court of Appeals Supplemental Excerpts of Record 6031, 6035 (hereinafter Supplemental Record). Vickie also noted that the Bankruptcy Court could defer ruling on her objection, given the litigation posture of Pierce’s claim before the Bankruptcy Court. See id., at 6031. Vickie’s filing prompted Pierce to advise the Bankruptcy Court that “[a]ll parties are in agreement that the amount of the contingent Proof of Claim filed by [Pierce] shall be determined by the adversary proceedings” that had been commenced in the Bankruptcy Court. 31 id., at 6801. Pierce asserted that Vickie’s objection should be overruled or, alternatively, that any ruling on the objection “should be continued until the resolution of the pending adversary proceeding litigation.” Ibid. Pierce identifies no point in the record where he argued to the Bankruptcy Court that it lacked the authority to adjudicate his proof of claim because the claim sought recompense for a personal injury tort.
Indeed, Pierce apparently did not object to any court that § 157(b)(5) prohibited the Bankruptcy Court from resolving his defamation claim until over two years — and several adverse discovery rulings — after he filed that claim in June 1996. The first filing Pierce cites as raising that objection is his September 22, 1998 motion to the District Court to withdraw the reference of the case to the Bankruptcy Court. See Brief for Respondent 26-27. The District Court did initially withdraw the reference as requested, but it then returned the proceeding to the Bankruptcy Court, observing that Pierce “implicated the jurisdiction of that bankruptcy court. He chose to be a party to that litigation.” App. 129. Although Pierce had objected in July 1996 to the Bankruptcy Court’s exercise of jurisdiction over Vickie’s counterclaim, he advised the court at that time that he was “happy to litigate [his] claim” there. 29 Supplemental Record 6101. Counsel stated that even though Pierce thought it was “probably cheaper for th[e] estate if [Pierce’s claim] were sent back or joined back with the State Court litigation,” Pierce “did choose” the Bankruptcy Court forum and “would be more than pleased to do it [t]here.” Id., at 6101-6102; see also App. to Pet. for Cert. 266, n. 17 (District Court referring to these statements).
Given Pierce’s course of conduct before the Bankruptcy Court, we conclude that he consented to that court’s resolution of his defamation claim (and forfeited any argument to the contrary). We have recognized “the value of waiver and forfeiture rules” in “complex” cases, Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U. S. 471, 487-488, n. 6 (2008), and this case is no exception. In such cases, as here, the consequences of “a litigant... ‘sandbagging’ the court — remaining silent about his objection and belatedly raising the error only if the case does not conclude in his favor,” Puckett v. United States, 556 U. S. 129, 134 (2009) (some internal quotation marks omitted) — can be particularly severe. If Pierce believed that the Bankruptcy Court lacked the authority to decide his claim for defamation, then he should have said so — and said so promptly. See United States v. Olano, 507 U. S. 725, 731 (1993) (“‘No procedural principle is more familiar to this Court than that a constitutional right,’ or a right of any other sort, ‘may be forfeited... by the failure to make timely assertion of the right before a tribunal having jurisdiction to determine it’ ” (quoting Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414, 444 (1944))). Instead, Pierce repeatedly stated to the Bankruptcy Court that he was happy to litigate there. We will not consider his claim to the contrary, now that he is sad.
III
Although we conclude that § 157(b)(2)(C) permits the Bankruptcy Court to enter final judgment on Vickie’s counterclaim, Article III of the Constitution does not.
A
Article III, § 1, of the Constitution mandates that “[t]he judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.” The same section provides that the judges of those constitutional courts “shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour” and “receive for their Services[] a Compensation ] [that] shall not be diminished” during their tenure.
As its text and our precedent confirm, Article III is “an inseparable element of the constitutional system of checks and balances” that “both defines the power and protects the independence of the Judicial Branch.” Northern Pipeline, 458 U. S., at 58 (plurality opinion). Under “the basic concept of separation of powers... that flow[s] from the scheme of a tripartite government” adopted in the Constitution, “the ‘judicial Power of the United States’... can no more be shared” with another branch than “the Chief Executive, for example, can share with the Judiciary the veto power, or the Congress share with the Judiciary the power to override a Presidential veto.” United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 704 (1974) (quoting U. S. Const., Art. III, § 1).
In establishing the system of divided power in the Constitution, the Framers considered it essential that “the judiciary remain[] truly distinct from both the legislature and the executive.” The Federalist No. 78, p. 466 (C. Eossiter ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton). As Hamilton put it, quoting Montesquieu, “ ‘there is no liberty if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive powers.’” Ibid, (quoting 1 Montesquieu, Spirit of Laws 181).
We have recognized that the three branches are not hermetically sealed from one another, see Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U. S. 425, 443 (1977), but it remains true that Article III imposes some basic limitations that the other branches may not transgress. Those limitations serve two related purposes. “Separation-of-powers principles are intended, in part, to protect each branch of government from incursion by the others. Yet the dynamic between and among the branches is not the only object of the Constitution’s concern. The structural principles secured by the separation of powers protect the individual as well.” Bond v. United States, ante, at 222.
Article III protects liberty not only through its role in implementing the separation of powers, but also by specifying the defining characteristics of Article III judges. The colonists had been subjected to judicial abuses at the hand of the Crown, and the Framers knew the main reasons why: because the King of Great Britain “made Judges dependent on his Will alone, for the tenure of their offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries.” The Declaration of Independence ¶ 11. The Framers undertook in Article III to protect citizens subject to the judicial power of the new Federal Government from a repeat of those abuses. By appointing judges to serve without term limits, and restricting the ability of the other branches to remove judges or diminish their salaries, the Framers sought to ensure that each judicial decision would be rendered, not with an eye toward currying favor with Congress or the Executive, but rather with the “[c]lear heads... and honest hearts” deemed “essential to good judges.” 1 Works of James Wilson 363 (J. Andrews ed. 1896).
Article III could neither serve its purpose in the system of checks and balances nor preserve the integrity of judicial decisionmaking if the other branches of the Federal Government could confer the Government's “judicial Power” on entities outside Article III. That is why we have long recognized that, in general, Congress may not “withdraw from judicial cognizance any matter which, from its nature, is the subject of a suit at the common law, or in equity, or admiralty.” Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 18 How. 272, 284 (1856). When a suit is made of “the stuff of the traditional actions at common law tried by the courts at Westminster in 1789,” Northern Pipeline, 458 U. S., at 90 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment), and is brought within the bounds of federal jurisdiction, the responsibility for deciding that suit rests with Article III judges in Article III courts. The Constitution assigns that job — resolution of “the mundane as well as the glamorous, matters of common law and statute as well as constitutional law, issues of fact as well as issues of law” — to the Judiciary. Id., at 86-87, n. 39 (plurality opinion).
B
This is not the first time we have faced an Article III challenge to a bankruptcy court’s resolution of a debtor’s suit. In Northern Pipeline, we considered whether bankruptcy judges serving under the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 — appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, but lacking the tenure and salary guarantees of Article III— could “constitutionally be vested with jurisdiction to decide [a] state-law contract claim” against an entity that was not otherwise part of the bankruptcy proceedings. Id., at 53, 87, n. 40 (plurality opinion); see id., at 89-92 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment). The Court concluded that assignment of such state law claims for resolution by those judges “violates Art. Ill of the Constitution.” Id., at 52, 87 (plurality opinion); id., at 91 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment).
The plurality in Northern Pipeline recognized that there was a category of cases involving “public rights” that Congress could constitutionally assign to “legislative” courts for resolution. That opinion concluded that this “public rights” exception extended “only to matters arising between” individuals and the Government “in connection with the performance of the constitutional functions of the executive or legislative departments... that historically could have been determined exclusively by those” branches. Id., at 67-68 (internal quotation marks omitted). A full majority of the Court, while not agreeing on the scope of the exception, concluded that the doctrine did not encompass adjudication of the state law claim at issue in that case. Id., at 69-72; see id., at 90-91 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment) (“None of the [previous cases addressing Article III power] has gone so far as to sanction the type of adjudication to which Marathon will be subjected.... To whatever extent different powers granted under [the 1978] Act might be sustained under the 'public rights’ doctrine of Murray’s Lessee... and succeeding cases, I am satisfied that the adjudication of Northern's lawsuit cannot be so sustained”).
A full majority of Justices in Northern Pipeline also rejected the debtor's argument that the bankruptcy court’s exercise of jurisdiction was constitutional because the bankruptcy judge was acting merely as an adjunct of the district court or court of appeals. Id., at 71-72, 81-86 (plurality opinion); id., at 91 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment) (“the bankruptcy court is not an ‘adjunct’ of either the district court or the court of appeals”).
After our decision in Northern Pipeline, Congress revised the statutes governing bankruptcy jurisdiction and bankruptcy judges. In the 1984 Act, Congress provided that the judges of the new bankruptcy courts would be appointed by the courts of appeals for the circuits in which their districts are located. 28 U. S. C. § 152(a). And, as we have explained, Congress permitted the newly constituted bankruptcy courts to enter final judgments only in “core” proceedings. See supra, at 473-475.
With respect to such “core” matters, however, the bankruptcy courts under the 1984 Act exercise the same powers they wielded under the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 (1978 Act), 92 Stat. 2549. As in Northern Pipeline, for example
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
N
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Clark
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a declaratory judgment action, 28 U. S. C. § 2201 and § 2202 (1958 ed.), attacking the constitutionality of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 241, 243. In addition to declaratory relief the complaint sought an injunction restraining the enforcement of the Act and damages against appellees based on allegedly resulting injury in the event compliance was required. Appellees counterclaimed for enforcement under § 206 (a) of the Act and asked for a three-judge district court under § 206 (b). A three-judge court, empaneled under § 206 (b) as well as 28 U. S. C. § 2282 (1958 ed.), sustained the validity of the Act and issued a permanent injunction on appellees’ counterclaim restraining appellant from continuing to violate the Act which remains in effect on order of Mr. Justice Black, 85 S. Ct. 1. We affirm the judgment.
1. Tihe Factual Background and Contentionss of the Parties.
The case comes here on admissions and stipulated facts. Appellant owns and operates the Heart of Atlanta Motel which has 216 rooms, available to transient guests. The motel is located on Courtland Street, two blocks from downtown Peachtree Street. It is readily accessible to interstate highways 75 and 85 and state highways 23 and 41. Appellant solicits patronage from outside the State of Georgia through various national advertising media, including magazines of national circulation; it maintains over 50 billboards and highway signs within the State, soliciting patronage for the motel; it accepts convention trade from outside Georgia and approximately 75% of its registered guests are from out of State. Prior to passage of the Act the motel had followed a practice of refusing to rent rooms to Negroes, and it alleged that it intended to continue to do so. In an effort to perpetuate that policy this suit was filed.
The appellant contends that Congress in passing this Act exceeded its power to regulate commerce under Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, of the Constitution of the United States; that the Act violates the Fifth Amendment because appellant is deprived of the right to choose its customers and operate its business as it.wishes, resulting in a taking of its liberty and property without due process of law and a taking of its property without just compensation; and, finally, that by requiring appellant to rent available rooms to Negroes against its will, Congress' is subjecting it to involuntary servitude in contravention of the Thirteenth Amendment.
The appellees counter that the unavailability to Negroes of adequate accommodations interferes significantly with interstate travel, and that Congress, under the Commerce Clause, has power to remove such obstructions and restraints; that the Fifth Amendment does not forbid reasonable regulation and that consequential damage does not constitute a “taking” within the meaning of that amendment; that the Thirteenth Amendment claim fails because it is entirely frivolous to say that an amendment directed to the abolition of human bondage and the removal of widespread disabilities associated with slavery places discrimination in public accommodations beyond the reach of both federal and state law.
At the trial the appellant offered no evidence, submitting the casé on the pleadings, admissions and stipulation of facts; however, appellees proved the refusal of the motel to accept Negro transients after the passage of thé Act. The District Court, sustained the constitutionality of the sections of the Act under attack (§§ 201 (a), (b) (1) and (c) (1)) and issued a permanent injunction on the counterclaim of the appellees. It restrained the appellant from “[Refusing to accept Negroes as guests in the motel by reason of their race or color” and from “[mjaking any distinction whatever upon the basis of race or color in the availability of the goods, services, 'facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations offered or made available to the guests of the motel, or to the general public, within or upon any of the premises of the Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc.”
2. The History of the Act.
Congress first evidenced its interest in civil rights legislation in the Civil Rights or Enforcement Act of April 9, 1866. There followed four Acts, with a fifth, the Civil Rights Act of March 1, 1875, culminating the series. In 1883 this Court struck down the public accommodations sections of the 1875 Act in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3. No major legislation in this field had been enacted by Congress for 82 years when the Civil Rights Act of 1957 became law. It was followed by the Civil Rights Act of I960. Three years later, on June 19,1963, the late President Kennedy called for civil rights legislar tion in a message to Congress to which he attached a proposed bill. Its stated purpose was
“to promote the general welfare by eliminating discrimination based on race, color, religion, or national origin in... public accommodations through the exercise by Congress of the powers conferred upon it... to enforce the provisions of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments, to regulate commerce among the several States, and to make laws necessary and proper to execute the powers conferred upon it by the Constitution.” H. R. Doc. No. 124, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., at 14.
Bills were introduced in each House of the Congress, embodying the President’s suggestion, one in the Senate being S. 1732 and one in the House, H. R. 7152. However, it was not until July 2, 1964, upon the recommendation of President Johnson, that the Civil Rights Act of 1964, here under attack, was finally passed.
After extended hearings each of these bills was favorably reported to its respective house, H. R. 7152 on November 20, 1963, H. R. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., and S. 1732 on February 10, 1964, S. Rep. No. 872, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. Although each bill originally incorporated extensive findings of fact these were eliminated from the bills as they were reported. The House passed its bill in January 1964 and sent it to the Senate. Through a bipartisan coalition of Senators Humphrey and Dirksen, together with other Senators, a substitute was worked out in informal conferences. This substitute was-adopted by the Senate and sent to the House where it was adopted without change. This expedited procedure prevented the usual report on the substitute bill in the Senate as well as a Conference Committee report ordinarily filed in such matters. Our only frame of reference as to the legislative history of the Act is, therefore, the hearings, reports and debates on the respective bills in each house.
The Act as finally adopted was most comprehensive, undertaking to prevent through peaceful and voluntary séttlement discrimination in voting,, as well as in places of accommodation and public facilities, federally secured programs and in employment. Since Title II is the only portion under attack here, we confine our consideration to those public accommodation provisions.
3. Title II oj the Act.
This Title is divided into seven sections beginning with § 201 (a) which provides that:
“All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public accommodation, as defined in this section, without discrimination, or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin.”
There are listed in § 201 (b) four classes of business establishments, each of which “serves the public” and “is a place of public accommodation” within the meaning of § 201 (a) “if its operations affect commerce, or if discrimination or segregation by it is supported by State action.” The covered establishments are:
“(1) any inn, hotel, motel, or other establishment which provides lodging to transient guests, other than an establishment located within a building which contains not more than five rooms for rent or hire and which is actually occupied by the proprietor of such establishment as his residence;
“(2) any restaurant, ■ cafeteria... [not here involved];
“(3) any motion picture house... [not here involved];
“(4) any establishment... which is physically located within the premises of any establishment otherwise covered by this subsection, or... within the premises of which is physically located any such covered establishment.... [not here involved].”.
Section 201 (c) defines the phrase “affect commerce” as applied to the above establishments. It first declares that “any inn, hotel, motel, or other establishment which provides lodging to transient guests” affects commerce per se. Restaurants, cafeterias, etc., in. class two affect commerce only if they serve or offer to serve interstate travelers or if a substantial portion of the food which they serve or products which they sell have “moved in commerce.” Motion picture houses and other places listed in class three affect commerce if they customarily present films, performances, etc., “which move in commerce.” And the establishments listed in class four affect commerce if they are within, or include within their own premises, an establishment “the operations of which affect commerce.” Private clubs are excepted under certain conditions.. See § 201 (e).
Section 201 (d) declares that “discrimination or segregation” is supported by state action when carried on under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation or any custom or usage required or enforced by officials of the State or any of its subdivisions.
In addition, § 202 affirmatively declares that all persons- “shall be entitled to be free, at any establishment or place, from discrimination or segregation of any kind on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin, if. such discrimination or segregation is or purports to be required by any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, rule, or order of a State or any agency or political subdivision thereof.”
Finally, § 203 prohibits the withholding or denial, etc., of any right or privilege secured by § 201 and § 202 or the intimidation, threatening or coercion of any person with the purpose of interfering with any such right or the punishing, etc., of any person for exercising or attempting to exercise any such right.
The remaining sections of the Title are remedial ones for violations of any of the previous sections. Remedies are limited to civil actions for preventive relief. The Attorney General may bring suit where he has “reasonable cause to believe that any person or group of persons is engaged in a pattern or practice of resistance to the full enjoyment of any of the rights secured by this title, and that the pattern or practice is of such a nature and is intended to deny the full exercise of the rights herein described....” 1206 (a)..
A person aggrieved may bring suit, in which the Attorney General may be permitted to intervene. Thirty days’ written notice before filing any such action must be given to the appropriate authorities of a State or subdivision the law of which prohibits the act complained of and which has established an authority which may grant relief therefrom. § 204 (c). In States where such condition does not exist the court after a case is filed may refer it to the Community Relations Service which is established under Title X of the Act. § 204 (d). This Title establishes such service in the Department of Commerce, provides for a Director to be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate and grants it certain powers, including the power to hold hearings, with reference to matters coming to its attention by reference from the court or between communities and persons involved in disputes arising under the Act.
4. Application of Title II to Heart of Atlanta Motel.
It is admitted that the operation of the motel brings it within the provisions of § 201 (a) of the Act and that appellant refused to provide lodging for transient Negroes because of their race or color and that it intends to continue that policy unless restrained.
The sole question posed is, therefore, the constitutionality of ühe Civil Right's Act of 1964 as applied to these facts. The legislative history of the Act indicates that Congress based the Act on § 5 and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as well as its power to regulate interstate commerce under Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, of the Constitution.
The Senate Commerce Committee made it quite clear that the fundamental object of Title II was to vindicate “the deprivation of personal dignity that surely accompanies denials of equal access to public establishments.” At the same time, however, it noted that such an objective has been and could be readily achieved “by congressional action based on the commerce power of the Constitution.” S. Rep. No. 872, supra, at 16-17. Our study of the legislative record, made in the light of prior cases, has brought us to the conclusion that Congréss possessed ample power in this regard, and we have therefore not considered the other grounds relied upon. This is not to say that the remaining authority upon which it acted was not adequate, a question upon which we do not pass, but merely that since the commerce power is sufficient for our decision here we have considered it alone. Nor is § 201 (d) or § 202, having to do with state action, involved here and we do not pass upon either of those sections.
5. 'The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 8 (1888), and their Application.
In light of our ground for decision, it might be well at the outset to discuss the Civil Rights Cases, supra, which declared provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 unconstitutional. 18 Stat. 335, 336.- We think that decision inapposite, and without precedential value in determining the constitutionality of the present Act. Unlike Title II of the present legislation, the 1875 Act broadly proscribed discrimination in “inns, public conveyances on land or water, theaters, and other places of public amusement,” without limiting the categories of affected businesses to those impinging upon interstate commerce. In contrast, the applicability of Title II is carefully limited to enterprises having a direct and substantial relation to the interstate flow of goods and peo-pie, except where state action is involved. Further, the fact that certain kinds of businesses may not in 1875 have been sufficiently involved in interstate commerce to warrant bringing them within the ambit of the commerce power is not necessarily dispositive of the same question.today. Our populace had not reached its present mobility,. nor were facilities, goods and services circulating as readily in interstate commerce as they are today. Although the principles which we apply today are those first formulated by Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 (1824), the conditions of transportation and commerce have changed dramatically, and we must apply those principles to the present state of commerce. The sheer increase in volume of interstate traffic alone would give discriminatory practices which inhibit travel a far larger impact upon the Nation’s com-. merce than such practices had on the economy of another day. Finally, there is language in the Civil Rights Cases which indicates that the Court did not fully consider whether the 1875 Act could be sustained as an exercise of the commerce power. Though the Court observed that “no one will contend that the power to pass it was contained in the Constitution before the adoption of the last, three amendments [Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth],” the Court went on specifically to note that the Act was not “conceived” in terms of the commerce power and expressly pointed out:
“Of course, these remarks [as to lack of congressional power] do not apply to those cases in which Congress is clothed with direct and plenary powers of legislation over the whole subject, accompanied with an. express or implied denial of such power to the States, as in. the regulation of commerce with foreign nations, among the several States, and with the Indian tribes.... In these cases Congress has power to pass laws for regulating the subjects specified in every detail, and the conduct and transactions of individuals in respect thereof.” At 18.
Since the commerce power was not relied on by the Government and was without support in the record it is understandable that the Court narrowed its inquiry and excluded the Commerce Clause as a possible source of power. In any event, it is clear that such a limitation renders the opinion devoid of authority for.the proposition that the Commerce Clause gives no power to Congress to regulate discriminatory practices now found substantially to affect interstate commerce. We, therefore, conclude that the Civil Rights Cases have no relevance to the basis of decision here where the Act explicitly relies upon the commerce power, and where the. record is filled with testimony of obstructions and restraints resulting from the discriminations found to be existing. We now pass to that phase of the case.
6. The Basis of Congressional Action.
While the Act as adopted carried no congressional findings the record of its passage through each house is replete with evidence of the burdens that discrimination by race or color places upon interstate commerce. See Hearings before Senate Committee on Commerce on S. 1732, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.; S. Rep. No. 872, supra-, Hearings before Senate Committee on the Judiciary on S. 1731, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.; Hearings before House Subcommittee No. 5 of the Committee on the Judiciary on miscellaneous proposals regarding Civil Rights, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 4; H. R. Rep. Ño. 914, supra. This testimony included the fact that our people have become increasingly mobile with millions of people of all races traveling from State to State; that Negroes in particular have been the subject of discrimination in transient" accommodations, having to travel gréat distances to secure the same; that often they have been unable to obtain accommodations and have had to call upon friends to put them up overnight, S. Rep. No. 872, supra, at 14-22; and that these.conditions had become so acute as to require the listing of available lodging for Negroes in a special guidebook which was itself “dramatic testimony to the difficulties” Negroes encounter in travel. Senate Commerce Committee Hearings, supra, at 692-694. These exclusionary practices were found to be nationwide, the Under Secretary of Commerce testifying that there is “no question that this discrimination in the North still exists to a large degree” and in the West and Midwest as well. Id.. at 735, 744. This testimony indicated a qualitative as.well as quantitative effect on interstate travel by Negroes. The former was the obvious impairment of the Negro traveler’s pleasure and convenience that resulted when he continually was uncertain of finding lodging. As for the latter, there was evidence that this uncertainty stemming from racial discrimination had the effect of discouraging travel on the part of a substantial portion of the Negro community. Id., at 744. This was the conclusion not only of the Under Secretary of Commerce but also of the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Agency who wrote the Chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee that it was his “belief that air commerce is adversely affected by the denial to a substantial segment of the traveling public of adequate and desegregated public accommodations.” Id., at. 12-13. We shall not burden this opinion with further details since the voluminous testimony presents overwhelming evidence that discrimination by hotels and motels impedes interstate travel.
7. The Power of Congress Over Interstate Travel.
The power of Congress to deal with these obstructions depends on the meaning of the Commerce Clause. Its meaning was first enunciated 140 years ago by the great. Chief Justice. John Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 (1824), in these words:
“The subject to be regulated is commerce; and to ascertain the extent of the power, it becomes necessary to settle the meaning of the word. The counsel for the appellee would limit it to traffic, to buying and selling, or the interchange of commodities... but it is something more: it is intercourse... between nations, and parts of nations, in all its branches, and is regulated by prescribing rules for carrying on that intercourse. [At 189-190.]
“To what commerce does this power extend? The constitution informs us, to commerce ‘with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes.’
“It has, we believe, been universally admitted, that these words comprehend every species of commercial intercourse.... No sort of trade can be carried on... to which this power does not extend. [At 193-194.]
“The subject to which the power is next applied, is to commerce ‘among the several States.’ The word ‘among’ means intermingled....
“... [I] t may very properly be restricted to that commerce which concerns more States than one.... The genius and character of the whole government seem to be, that its action is to be applied to all the... internal concerns [of the Nation] which affect the States generally; but not to those which are completely within a particular State, which do not affect other States, and with which it is not necessary to interfere, for the purpose of executing some of the general powers of the government. [At 194-195.]
“We are now arrived at the inquiry — What is this power?
“It is the power to regulate; that is, to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed. This power, like all others vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the constitution. -... If, as has always been understood, the sovereignty of Congress... is. plenary as to those objects [specified in the Constitution], the power over commerce... is vested in Congress as absolutely as it would be in a single government, having in its constitution the same restrictions on the exercise of the power as are found in the constitution of the United States. The wisdom and the discretion of Congress, their identity with the people,.and the influence which their constituents possess at elections, are, in this, as in many other instances, as that, for example, of declaring war, the sole restraints on which they have relied, to secure them from its abuse. They are the restraints" on which the people must often rely solely, in all representative governments. [At 196-197.]”
In short, the determinative test of the exercise of power by. the Congress undér the Commerce Clause is simply whether the activity sought to be regulated is “commerce which concerns more States than one” and has a real and substantial relation to the national interest. Let us now turn to this facet of the problem.
That the “intercourse” of which the Chief Justice spoke included the movement of persons through more States than one was settled as early as 1849, in the Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283, where Mr. Justice McLean stated: “That the transportation of passengers is a part of commerce is not now an open question.” At 401. Again in 1913 Mr. Justice McKenna, speaking for the Court, said: “Commerce among the States, we have said, consists of intercourse and traffic between their citizens, and includes the transportation of persons and property.” Hoke v. United States, 227 U. S. 308, 320. And only four years later in 1917 in Caminetti v. United States, 242 U. S. 470, Mr. Justice Day held for the Court:
“The transportation of passengers in interstate commerce, it has long been settled, is within the regulatory, power of Congress, under the commerce clause of the-Constitution, and the authority of Congress to keep the channels of interstate commerce free from immoral and injurious uses has been frequently sustained, and is no longer open to. quéstion.” At 491.
Nor does it make any difference whether the transportation is commercial in character. Id.,,at 484r-486. In Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U. S. 373 (1946), Mr. Justice Reed observed as to the modern movement of persons among the States:
“The recent changes in transportation brought about by the coming of automobiles [do] not seem of great significance in the problem. People of all races travel today more extensively than- in 1878 when this Court first passed upon state regulation of racial segregation in commerce. [It but] emphasizes the soundness of this Court’s early conclusion in Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U. S. 485.” At 383.
The same interest in protecting interstate commerce which led Congress to deal with segregation in interstate carriers and the white-slave traffic has prompted it to extend the exercise of its power to gambling, Lottery Case, 188 U. S. 321 (1903); to criminal enterprises, Brooks v. United States, 267 U. S. 432 (1925); to deceptive practices in the sale of products, Federal Trade Comm’n v. Mandel Bros., Inc., 359 U. S. 385 (1959); to fraudulent security transactions, Securities & Exchange Comm’n v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U. S. 119 (1953); to misbranding of drugs, Weeks v. United States, 245 U. S. 618 (1918); to wages and hours, United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100 (1941); to members of labor unions, Labor Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1 (1937); to crop control, Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U. S. 111 (1942); to discrimination against shippers,. United States v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 333 U. S. 169 (1948); to the protection of small business from injurious price cutting, Moore v. Mead’s Fine Bread Co., 348 U. S. 115 (1954); to resale price maintenance, Hudson Distributors, Inc. v. Eli Lilly Co., 377 U. S. 386 (1964), Schwegmann v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U. S. 384 (1951); to professional football, Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U. S. 445 (1957); and to racial discrimination by.owners and managers of terminal restaurants, Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U. S. 454 (1960).
That Congress was legislating against moral wrongs in many of these areas rendered its enactments no less valid. In framing Title II of this Act Congress was also dealing with what it considered a moral problem. But that fact does not detract from the overwhelming evidence of the fbsruptive effect that racial discrimination has had on commercial intercourse. It was this burden which empowered Congress to enact appropriate legislation, and, given this basis for the exercise of its power,. Congress was not restricted by the fact that the particular obstruction to interstate commerce with which it was dealing was also, deemed a moral and social wrong.
It is said that the operation of the motel here is of a purely local character. But, assuming this to be true, “[i]f it is interstate commerce that feels the pinch, it does not matter how local the operation which applies the squeeze.” United States v. Women’s Sportswear Mfrs. Assn., 336 U. S. 460, 464 (1949). See Labor Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., supra. As Chief Justice Stone put it in United States v. Darby, supra:
“The power of Congress over interstate commerce is not confined to the regulation of commerce among the states. It extends to those activities intrastate which so affect interstate commerce or the exercise of the power of Congress over it as to make regulation of them appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate end, the exercise of the granted power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 421.” At 118.
Thus the power of Congress to promote interstate commerce also includes the power to regulate the local incidents thereof, including local activities in both the States of origin and destination, which might have a substantial and harmful effect upon that commerce. One need only examine the evidence which we have discussed above to see that Congress may — as it has — prohibit racial discrimination by motels' serving travelers, however “local” their operations may appear.
. Nor does the Act deprive appellant of liberty or property under the Fifth Amendment. The commerce power invoked here by the Congress is a specific and plenary one authorized by the Constitution itself. The only questions are: (1) whether Congress had a rational basis for finding that racial discrimination by motels affected commerce, and (2) if it had such a basis, whether the. means it selected to eliminate that evil are reasonable and appropriate. If they are, appellant has no “right” to select its guests as it sees fit, free from governmental regulation.
There is nothing novel about such legislation. Thirty-two States now have it on their books either by statute or executive order and many cities provide such regulation. Some of these Acts go back fourscore years. It has been repeatedly held by this Court that such laws do not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Perhaps the first such holding was in the Civil Rights Cases themselves, where Mr. Justice Bradley for the Court inferentially found that innkeepers, “by the laws of all the States, so far as we are aware, are bound, to the. extent of their facilities, to furnish proper accommodation to all unobjectionable persons who in good faith apply for them.” At 25.
As we have pointed out, 32 States now have such provisions and no case has been cited to us where the attack on a state statute has been successful, either in federal or state courts. Indeed, in some cases the Due Process and Equal Protection Clause objections have been specifically discarded in this Court. Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 333 U. S. 28, 34, n. 12 (1948). As a result.the constitutionality of such state statutes stands unquestioned. “The authority of thé Federal Government over interstate commerce does not differ,” it was held in United States v. Rock Royal Co-op., Inc., 307 U. S. 533 (1939), “in extent or character from that retained by the states over intrastate commerce.” At 569-570. See also Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U. S. 503 (1944).
It is doubtful if in the long run appellant will suffer economic loss as a result of the Act. • Experience is to the contrary where discrimination is completely obliterated as to all public accommodations. But whether this be true or not is of no consequence since this Court has specifically held that the fact that a “member of the class which is regulated may suffer economic losses not shared by others... has never been a barrier” to such legislation. Bowles v. Willingham, supra, at 518. Likewise in a long line of cases this Court has rejected the claim that the prohibition of racial discrimination in public accommodations interferes with personal liberty. See District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson Co., 346 U. S. 100 (1953), and cases there cited, where we concluded that Congress had delegated law-making pov:°r to the District of Columbia “as broad as the police power of a state” which included the power to adopt “a law prohibiting discriminations against Negroes by the owners and managers of restaurants in the District of Columbia.” At 110. Neither do we find any merit in the claim that the Act is a taking of property without just compensation. The cases are to the contrary. See Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457, 551 (1870); Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States, 261 U. S. 502 (1923); United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U. S. 155 (1958).
We find no merit in the remainder of appellant’s contentions, including that of “involuntary servitude.” As'* we have seen, 32 States prohibit racial discrimination in public accommodations. These laws but codify the common-law innkeeper rule which long predated the Thirteenth Amendment.' It is difficult to believe that the Amendment was intended to abrogate this principle. Indeed, the opinion of the Court in the Civil Rights _ Cases is to the contrary as we have seen, it having noted with approval the laws of “all the States” prohibiting discrimination. We could not say that the requirements of the Act in this regard are in any way “akin to African slavery.” Butler v. Perry, 240 U. S. 328, 332 (1916).
We, therefore, conclude that the action of the Congress in the adoption of the Act as applied here to a motel which concededly serves interstate travelers is within the power granted it by the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, as interpreted by this Court for 140 years. It may be argued that Congress could have pursued other methods to eliminate the obstructions it found in interstate commerce caused by racial discrimination. But this is a matter of policy that rests entirely with the Congress not with the courts. How obstructions in commerce may be removed — what means are to be employed — is within the sound and exclusive discretion of the Congress. It is subject only to one caveat — that the means chosen.by it must be reasonably adapted to the end permitted by the Constitution. We cannot say that its choice here was not so adapted. The Constitution requires no more.
Affirmed.
APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT.
“TITLE II — INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN PLACES OF PUBLIC ACCOMMODATION
“Sec. 201. (a) All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public accommodation, as defined in this section, without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin.
“(b) Each of the following establishments which serves the public is a place of public accommodation within the meaning of this title if its operations affect commerce, or if discrimination or segregation by it is supported by State action;
“(1) any inn, hotel, motel, or other establishment which provides lodging to transient guests, other than an establishment located within a building which contains not more than five rooms for rent or hire and which is actually occupied by the proprietor of such establishment as his residence;
“(2) any restaurant, cafeteria, lunchroom, lunch counter, soda fountain, or other facility principally engaged in selling food for consumption on the premises, including, but not limited to, any such, facility located on the premises of any retail establishment; or any gasoline station;
“(3) any motion picture house, theater, concert hall, sports arena, stadium or other place of exhibition or entertainment; and
“(4) any establishment (A) (i) which is physically located within the premises of any establishment otherwise covered by this subsection, or (ii) within the premises of which is physically located any such covered establishment, and (B) which holds itself out as serving patrons of such covered establishmént.
“(c) The operations of an establishment affect commerce within the meaning of this title if (1) it is one of the establishments described in paragraph (1) of subsection (b); (2) in the case of an establishment described in paragraph (2) of subsection (b), it serves or offers to serve interstate travelers or a substantial portion of the food which it serves, or gasoline or other products which it sells, has moved in..commerce; (3) in the case of an establishment described in.paragraph (3) of-subsection (b), it customarily presents films, performances, athletic teams, exhibitions, or other sources of entertainment which move in commerce; and (4) in the case of an establishment described in paragraph (4) of subsection (b), -it is physically located within the premises of, or there is physically located within its premises, an establishment the operations of which affect commerce within the meaning of this subsection. For purposes of this section, ‘commerce’ means travel,, trade, traffic,
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Goldberg
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents questions concerning the constitutional requirements for obtaining a state search warrant.
Two Houston police officers applied to a local Justice of the Peace for a warrant to search for narcotics in petitioner's home. In support of their application, the officers submitted an affidavit which, in relevant part, recited that:
“Affiants have received reliable information from a credible person and do believe that heroin, marijuana, barbiturates and other narcotics and narcotic paraphernalia are being kept at the above described premises for the purpose of sale and use contrary to the provisions of the law.”
The search warrant was issued.
In executing the warrant, the local police, along with federal officers, announced at petitioner’s door that they were police with a warrant. Upon hearing a commotion within the house, the officers forced their way into the house and seized petitioner in the act of attempting to dispose of a packet of narcotics.
At his trial in the state court, petitioner, through his attorney, objected to the introduction of evidence obtained as a result of the execution of the warrant. The objections were overruled and the evidence admitted. Petitioner was convicted of illegal possession of heroin and sentenced to serve 20 years in the state penitentiary. On appeal to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, the conviction was affirmed, 172 Tex. Cr. R. 629, 362 S. W. 2d 111, affirmance upheld on rehearing, 172 Tex. Cr. R. 631, 362 S. W. 2d 112. We granted a writ of certiorari to consider the important constitutional questions involved. 375 U. S. 812.
In Ker v. California, 374 U. S. 23, we held that the Fourth “Amendment’s proscriptions are enforced against the States through the Fourteenth Amendment,” and that “the standard of reasonableness is the same under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.” Id., at 33. Although Ker involved a search without a warrant, that case must certainly be read as holding that the standard for obtaining a search warrant is likewise “the same under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.”
An evaluation of the constitutionality of a search warrant should begin with the rule that “the informed and deliberate determinations of magistrates empowered to issue warrants . . . are to be preferred over the hurried action of officers . . . who may happen to make arrests.” United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U. S. 452, 464. The reasons for this rule go to the foundations of the Fourth Amendment. A contrary rule “that evidence sufficient to support a magistrate’s disinterested determination to issue a search warrant will justify the officers in making a search without a warrant would reduce the Amendment to a nullity and leave the people’s homes secure only in the discretion of police officers.” Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 14. Under such a rule “resort to [warrants] would ultimately be discouraged.” Jones v. United States, 362 U. S. 257, 270. Thus, when a search is based upon a magistrate’s, rather than a police officer’s, determination of probable cause, the reviewing courts will accept evidence of a less “judicially competent or persuasive character than would have justified an officer in acting on his own without a warrant,” ibid., and will sustain the judicial determination so long as “there was substantial basis for [the magistrate] to conclude that narcotics were probably present . . . .” Id., at 271. As so well stated by Mr. Justice Jackson:
“The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.” Johnson v. United States, supra, at 13-14.
Although the reviewing court will pay substantial deference to judicial determinations of probable cause, the court must still insist that the magistrate perform his “neutral and detached” function and not serve merely as a rubber stamp for the police.
In Nathanson v. United States, 290 U. S. 41, a warrant was issued upon the sworn allegation that the affiant “has cause to suspect and does believe” that certain merchandise was in a specified location. Id., at 44. The Court, noting that the affidavit “went upon a mere affirmation of suspicion and belief without any statement of adequate supporting facts,” id., at 46 (emphasis added), announced the following rule:
“Under the Fourth Amendment, an officer may not properly issue a warrant to search a private dwelling unless he can find probable cause therefor from facts or circumstances presented to him under oath or affirmation. Mere affirmance of belief or suspicion is not enough.” Id., at 47. (Emphasis added.)
The Court, in Giordenello v. United States, 357 U. S. 480, applied this rule to an affidavit similar to that relied upon here. Affiant in that case swore that petitioner “did receive, conceal, etc., narcotic drugs . . . with knowledge of unlawful importation . . . .” Id., at 481. The Court announced the guiding principles to be:
“that the inferences from the facts which lead to the complaint '[must] be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime/ Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 14. The purpose of the complaint, then, is to enable the appropriate magistrate . . . to determine whether the 'probable cause’ required to support a warrant exists. The Commissioner must judge for himself the persuasiveness of the facts relied on by a complaining officer to show probable cause. He should not accept without question the complainant’s mere conclusion . . . .” 357 U. S., at 486.
The Court, applying these principles to the complaint in that case, stated that:
“it is clear that it does not pass muster because it does not provide any basis for the Commissioner’s determination . . . that probable cause existed. The complaint contains no affirmative allegation that the affiant spoke with personal knowledge of the matters contained therein; it does not indicate any sources for the complainant’s belief; and it does not set forth any other sufficient basis upon which a finding of probable cause could be made.” Ibid.
The vice in the present affidavit is at least as great as in Nathanson and Giordenello. Here the “mere conclusion” that petitioner possessed narcotics was not even that of the affiant himself; it was that of an unidentified informant. The affidavit here not only “contains no affirmative allegation that the affiant spoke with personal knowledge of the matters contained therein,” it does not even contain an “affirmative allegation” that the affiant’s unidentified source “spoke with personal knowledge.” For all that appears, the source here merely suspected, believed or concluded that there were narcotics in petitioner’s possession. The magistrate here certainly could not “judge for himself the persuasiveness of the facts relied on ... to show probable cause.” He necessarily accepted “without question” the informant’s “suspicion,” “belief” or “mere conclusion.”
Although an affidavit may be based on hearsay information and need not reflect the direct personal observations of the affiant, Jones v. United States, 362 U. S. 257, the magistrate must be informed of some of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that the narcotics were where he claimed they were, and some of the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that the informant, whose identity need not be disclosed, see Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U. S. 528, was “credible”or his information “reliable.” Otherwise, “the inferences from the facts which lead to the complaint” will be drawn not “by a neutral and detached magistrate,” as the Constitution requires, but instead, by a police officer “engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime,” Giordenello v. United States, supra, at 486; Johnson v. United States, supra, at 14, or, as in this case, by an unidentified informant.
We conclude, therefore, that the search warrant should not have been issued because the affidavit did not provide a sufficient basis for a finding of probable cause and that the evidence obtained as a result of the search warrant was inadmissible in petitioner’s trial.
The judgment of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed and the case remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
The record does not reveal, nor is it claimed, that any other information was brought to the attention of the Justice of the Peace. It is elementary that in passing on the validity of a warrant, the reviewing court may consider only information brought to the magistrate’s attention. Giordenello v. United States, 357 U. S. 480, 486; 79 C. J. S. 872 (collecting cases). In Giordenello, the Government pointed out that the officer who obtained the warrant “had kept petitioner under surveillance for about one month prior to the arrest.” The Court of course ignored this evidence, since it had not been brought to the magistrate’s attention. The fact that the police may have kept petitioner’s house under surveillance is thus completely irrelevant in this ease, for, in applying for the warrant, the police did not mention any surveillance. Moreover, there is no evidence in the record that a surveillance was actually set up on petitioner’s house. Officer Strickland merely testified that “we wanted to set up surveillance on the house.” If the fact and results of such a surveillance had been appropriately presented to the magistrate, this would, of course, present an entirely different case.
Petitioner was also indicted on charges of conspiring to violate the federal narcotics laws, Act of February 9, 1909, c. 100, 35 Stat. 614, § 2, as amended, 21 U. S. C. § 174; Internal Revenue Code of 1954, §7237 (b), as amended, 26 U. S. C. §7237 (b). He was found not guilty by the jury. His codefendants were found guilty and their convictions affirmed on appeal. Garcia v. United States, 315 F. 2d 679.
In Giordenello, although this Court construed the requirement of “probable cause” contained in Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, it did so “in light of the constitutional” requirement of probable cause which that Rule implements. Id., at 485. The case also involved an arrest warrant rather than a search warrant, but the Court said: “The language of the Fourth Amendment, that ‘. . . no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . .’ of course applies to arrest as well as search warrants.” Id., at 485-486. See Ex parte Burford, 3 Cranch 448; McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U. S. 135, 154-157. The principles announced in Giordenello derived, therefore, from the Fourth Amendment, and not from our supervisory power. Compare Jencks v. United States, 353 U. S. 657. Accordingly, under Ker v. California, 374 U. S. 23, they may properly guide our determination of “probable cause” under the Fourteenth Amendment.
To approve this affidavit would open the door to easy circumvention of the rule announced in Nathanson and Giordenello. A police officer who arrived at the “suspicion,” “belief” or “mere conclusion” that narcotics were in someone’s possession could not obtain a warrant. But he could convey this conclusion to another police officer, who could then secure the warrant by swearing that he had “received reliable information from a credible person” that the narcotics were in someone’s possession.
Such an affidavit was sustained by this Court in Jones v. United, States, 362 U. S. 257. The affidavit in that case reads as follows:
“Affidavit in Support of a U. S. Commissioners Search Warrant for Premises 1436 Meridian Place, N. W., Washington, D. C., apartment 36, including window spaces of said apartment. Occupied by Cecil Jones and Earline Richardson.
“In the late afternoon of Tuesday, August 20, 1957, I, Detective Thomas Didone, Jr. received information that Cecil Jones and Earline Richardson were involved in the illicit narcotic traffic and that they kept a ready supply of heroin on hand in the above mentioned apartment. The source of information also relates that the two aforementioned persons kept these same narcotics either on their person, under a pillow, on a dresser or on a window ledge in said apartment. The source of information goes on to relate that on many occasions the source of information has gone to said apartment and purchased narcotic drugs from the above mentioned persons and that the nar-eotics were secreated [sic] in the above mentioned places. The last time being August 20, 1957.
“Both the aforementioned persons are familiar to the undersigned and other members of the Narcotic Squad. Both have admitted to the use of narcotic drugs and display needle marks as evidence of same.
“This same information, regarding the illicit narcotic traffic, conducted by Cecil Jones and Earline Richardson, has been given to the undersigned and to other officers of the narcotic squad by other sources of information.
“Because the source of information mentioned in the opening paragraph has given information to the undersigned on previous occasion and which was correct, and because this same information is given by other sources does believe that there is now illicit narcotic drugs being secreated [sic] in the above apartment by Cecil Jones and Earline Richardson.
“Det. Thomas Didone, Jr., Narcotic Squad, MPDC.
“Subscribed and sworn to before me this 21 day of August, 1957.
“James F. Splain, U. S. Commissioner, D. C.” Id., at 267-268, n. 2.
Compare, e. g., Hernandez v. People,-Colo.-, 385 P. 2d 996, where the Supreme Court of Colorado, accepting a confession of error by the State Attorney General, held that a search warrant similar to the one here in issue violated the Fourth Amendment. The court said:
“Before the issuing magistrate can properly perform his official function he must be apprised of the underlying facts and circumstances which show that there is probable cause . . ...” Id., at -, 385 P. 2d, at 999.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
A
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sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
In United States v. Capital Transit Co., 325 U. S. 357, we upheld the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission to regulate certain of Capital Transit’s bus and streetcar rates. The rates involved were in two different categories. Transit operated, as it still does, a bus and streetcar system within the District connecting the residential area with the central business area. It was also one of four bus companies carrying passengers from that central business area to the Pentagon Building and other Defense establishments located just across the Potomac in Virginia. Each day thousands of Government employees living in the District boarded Transit’s streetcars near their residences, rode to the District’s business area, and there transferred to one of the Virginia busses for carriage to the nearby Virginia establishments. In the above case we sustained a Commission order fixing a through fare for the entire trip between the District residential area and the Virginia governmental installations. Transit had strongly urged that its bus and streetcar transportation between residential and business areas, being wholly within the District, could not be treated as part of an interstate movement. For reasons stated in our former opinion we rejected Transit’s contention, holding that the daily stream of Government workers from the District to Virginia and back again was an interstate movement and therefore subject to regulation by the Commission. This holding applied to Transit carriage even where Transit passengers traveled between the District and Virginia on other bus lines. Transit also contended that jurisdiction of the Commission was precluded by a proviso in §216 (e) of the Motor Carrier Act exempting “intrastate transportation” of motor carriers from regulation by the Commission. This contention was repeated on motion for rehearing. We rejected it. Our holding that Transit’s part of the District-Virginia movements was “interstate transportation” necessarily-made the § 216 (e) exemption inapplicable.
After our holding the Commission entered a new order putting into effect the rate order we had sustained. In the present cases, here on appeal from a three-judge District Court under 28 U. S. C. §§ 1253 and 2101 (b), the new order was enjoined on the ground that Transit’s transportation, which we had held to be interstate, had now become “intrastate.” On the same ground, that court also held that Transit was exempt from Commission jurisdiction under the proviso in § 216 (e). The District Court also cited to support its ruling our recent decision in United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U. S. 218.
The District Court apparently took the position that changed conditions since our decision in the prior Transit case had deprived the Commission of its jurisdiction. When we sustained the Commission’s order in that case, Transit was itself operating one of the four bus lines carrying Government workers from the District central business area to Virginia. It issued transfers to passengers on its busses and streetcars between the District business and residential areas. These transfers were good for rides on Transit’s own District-Virginia busses, but Transit would not give transfers good on the three competitive lines. We adverted to and relied on this situation as one of the reasons supporting the Commission’s requirement that Transit make similar arrangements for through fares with the other lines. April 1, 1947, Transit abandoned its District-Virginia bus line. Because of this the District Court held that since that date all of Transit’s carriage of Virginia-bound passengers has been “intrastate transportation.”
The District. Court’s annulment of the Commission’s order on the above ground cannot stand. Our previous holding was that all of Transit’s intra-District carriage of passengers bound to and from the Virginia establishments was part of an “interstate” movement and therefore subject to Commission regulation throughout, upon proper Commission findings. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., supra, does not conflict with our prior holding that Transit’s transportation was part of a continuous stream of interstate transportation. We adhere to that holding. Transit’s intra-District streetcar and bus transportation of passengers going to and from the Virginia establishments is an integral part of an interstate movement.
In support of the District Court’s judgment it is urged that there was no substantial evidence to support the Commission’s findings that its exercise of jurisdiction was necessary to a national transportation system “adequate to meet the needs of . . . the national defense.” The argument seems to be that the Commission should have altered this finding made in the prior proceedings because the nation is no longer at war. Another factor pointed out is that there are now fewer Army and Navy workers who work in the Virginia installations. Neither of these arguments is sufficient to justify setting aside findings made by the Commission on this point. The evidence before the Commission in the two proceedings indicates that the same reasons exist for Commission action now as before. And despite attempted interference with the Commission’s power by the Public Utilities Commission of the District, it is still true that neither the District nor Virginia has adequate power to regulate the through rates for this daily stream of interstate travel.
It is also argued here that the orders should be set aside because they are confiscatory. But the record fails to show that this issue was properly presented to the Commission for its determination. Therefore the question of confiscation is not ripe for judicial review.
We have examined other contentions urged in support of the District Court’s judgments and find that all are without merit.
The judgments of the District Court in these cases are reversed and the causes are remanded to it with directions to dismiss these actions.
It is so ordered.
Mr. Justice Douglas took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
The District Court simultaneously enjoined enforcement of two subsequent related Commission orders. One order declined to permit cancellation of the prescribed through rates and schedules. 47 M. C. C. 205. The other increased the former prescribed maximum rates and provided for divisions of through fares among the companies carrying the District-Virginia passengers. 270 I. C. C. 651.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
H
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
Petitioner was convicted of robbery and kidnaping for the purpose of robbery. The victim, one Carl Arthur Dunston, testified against petitioner at a preliminary hearing; there was evidence that at the time of the trial Dunston was in Colorado. A state investigator tried to contact Dunston on the telephone; he got through to some of Dunston’s relatives and to his employer, but not to Dunston himself. Although two telegrams were received, allegedly from Dunston, no subpoena was served. At trial, the transcript of Dunston’s preliminary hearing testimony was introduced into evidence. On appeal, the Court of Appeal for the Second Appellate District of California held that this procedure did not deny petitioner his Sixth Amendment right to be confronted with the witnesses against him since Dunston was absent from the State of his own free will and since petitioner’s counsel had had an adequate opportunity to cross-examine Dunston at the preliminary hearing. 258 Cal. App. 2d 622, 66 Cal. Rptr. 213 (1968). The California Supreme Court denied petitioner a hearing on April 4, 1968. Nineteen days later we held in the case of Barber v. Page, 390 U. S. 719, that the absence of a witness from the jurisdiction would not justify the use at trial of preliminary hearing testimony unless the State had made a good-faith effort to secure the witness’ presence. The sole question in this case is whether the holding of Barber v. Page should be given retroactive application. We think that it should.
Clearly, petitioner’s inability to cross-examine Dunston at trial may have had a significant effect on the “integrity of the fact-finding process.” Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618, 639 (1965); cf. Roberts v. Russell, 392 U. S. 293 (1968); McConnell v. Rhay, ante, p. 2 (1968). As we pointed out in Barber v. Page, one of the important objects of the right of confrontation was to guarantee that the fact finder had an adequate opportunity to assess the credibility of witnesses. 390 U. S., at 721. And California’s claim of a significant countervailing interest based upon its reliance on previous standards, see Stovall v. Denno, 388 U. S. 293, 297 (1967), is most unpersuasive. Barber v. Page was clearly foreshadowed, if not preordained, by this Court’s decision in Pointer v. Texas, 380 U. S. 400 (1965), which was handed down more than a year before petitioner’s trial. Accordingly, we can see no reason why Barber v. Page should not be given fully retroactive application.
The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for writ of certiorari are granted. The judgment of the Court of Appeal is vacated and the case is remanded for reconsideration in light of this Court’s decision in Barber v. Page, 390 U. S. 719 (1968).
It is so ordered.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
On February 17, 1980, appellant Barbara Paulussen filed a paternity and child support petition in a Bucks County, Pennsylvania, court on behalf of her daughter, who was then seven years old. The petition alleged that the daughter had been born out of wedlock, that appellee George Herion was her natural father, and that he had ceased making contributions to her support in April 1975. Appellee offered as a defense the time bar of the Pennsylvania statute of limitations, which at the time required that paternity actions be commenced within six years of the child’s birth or within two years of the putative father’s last voluntary support contribution or written acknowledgment of paternity. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann., § 6704(e) (Purdon 1982) (repealed). The defense was sustained against appellant’s contention that the statute violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. The Superior Court affirmed, 334 Pa. Super. 585, 483 A. 2d 892 (1985), and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania denied discretionary review. Appellant sought appeal in this Court, and, on October 15, 1985, we noted probable jurisdiction. 474 U. S. 899 (1985).
On October 30, 1985, Pennsylvania enacted 1985 Pa. Laws, Act No. 66, to be codified as 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 4343(b), which provides that a child born out of wedlock may commence a paternity action, at any time within 18 years of birth. Appellee now concedes that he is subject to § 4343(b) and that, upon a showing of paternity, he would be liable for child support payments from the date paternity was established. Brief for Appellee 5. He contends, however, that, even on such a showing, he would not be liable for payments dating back to the date the initial petition was filed in 1980.
Our examination of Pennsylvania law leaves us uncertain as to the legal consequences of the enactment of the new 18-year statute of limitations. If, however, Pennsylvania were to interpret § 4343(b) to require support payments dating back to the filing of the original petition, the constitutionality of the 6-year statute of limitations would be irrelevant. Because Pennsylvania should have an opportunity in the first instance to resolve this issue of state law, and because we are reluctant to address a federal constitutional question until it is clearly necessary to do so, we vacate the judgment below and remand for further consideration in light of the intervening change in state law.
It is so ordered.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
I
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Stevens
delivered the opinion of the Court.
A member of the Crow Tribe of Indians filed suit against the Lodge Grass School District No. 27 (School District) in the Crow Tribal Court and obtained a default judgment. Thereafter, the School District and its insurer, National Farmers Union Insurance Companies (National), commenced this litigation in the District Court for the District of Montana; that court was persuaded that the Crow Tribal Court had no jurisdiction over a civil action against a non-Indian and entered an injunction against further proceedings in the Tribal Court. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the District Court had no jurisdiction to enter such an injunction. We granted certiorari to consider whether the District Court properly entertained petitioners’ request for an injunction under 28 U. S. C. § 1331. 469 U. S. 1032 (1984).
The facts as found by the District Court are not substantially disputed. On May 27, 1982, Leroy Sage, a Crow Indian minor, was struck by a motorcycle in the Lodge Grass Elementary School parking lot while returning from a school activity. The school has a student body that is 85% Crow Indian. It is located on land owned by the State within the boundaries of the Crow Indian Reservation. Through his guardian, Flora Not Afraid, Sage initiated a lawsuit in the Crow Tribal Court against the School District, a political subdivision of the State, alleging damages of $153,000, including medical expenses of $3,000 and pain and suffering of $150,000.
On September 28, 1982, process was served by Dexter Falls Down on Wesley Falls Down, the Chairman of the School Board. For reasons that have not been explained, Wesley Falls Down failed to notify anyone that a suit had been filed. On October 19, 1982, a default judgment was entered pursuant to the rules of the Tribal Court, and on October 25, 1982, Judge Roundface entered findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a judgment for $158,000 against the School District. Sage v. Lodge Grass School District, 10 Indian L. Rep. 6019 (1982). A copy of that judgment was hand-delivered by Wesley Falls Down to the school Principal who, in turn, forwarded it to National on October 29, 1982.
On November 3, 1982, National and the School District (petitioners) filed a verified complaint and a motion for a temporary restraining order in the District Court for the District of Montana. The complaint named as defendants the Crow Tribe of Indians, the Tribal Council, the Tribal Court, judges of the court, and the Chairman of the Tribal Council. It described the entry of the default judgment, alleged that a writ of execution might issue on the following day, and asserted that a seizure of school property would cause irreparable injury to the School District and would violate the petitioners’ constitutional and statutory rights. The District Court entered an order restraining all the defendants “from attempting to assert jurisdiction over plaintiffs or issuing writs of execution out of Cause No. Civ. 82-287 of the Crow Tribal Court until this court orders otherwise.”
In subsequent proceedings, the petitioners filed an amendment to their complaint, invoking 28 U. S. C. §1331 as a basis for federal jurisdiction, and added Flora Not Afraid and Leroy Sage as parties defendant. After the temporary restraining order expired, a hearing was held on the defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint and on the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. On December 29, 1982, the District Court granted the plaintiffs a permanent injunction against any execution of the Tribal Court judgment. 560 F. Supp. 213, 218 (1983). The basis “for the injunction was that the Crow Tribal Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the tort that was the basis of the default judgment.” Id., at 214.
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. 736 F. 2d 1320 (1984). Without reaching the merits of petitioners’ challenge to the jurisdiction of the Tribal Court, the majority concluded that the District Court’s exercise of jurisdiction could not be supported on any constitutional, statutory, or common-law ground. Id., at 1322-1323. One judge dissented in part and concurred in the result, expressing the opinion that petitioners stated a federal common-law cause of action involving a substantial federal question over which subject-matter jurisdiction was conferred by 28 U. S. C. § 1331. He concluded, however, that the petitioners had a duty to exhaust their Tribal Court remedies before invoking the jurisdiction of a federal court, and therefore concurred in the judgment directing that the complaint be dismissed. Id., at 1324-1326.
I
Section 1331 of the Judicial Code provides that a federal district court “shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” It is well settled that this statutory grant of “jurisdiction will support claims founded upon federal common law as well as those of a statutory origin.” Federal common law as articulated in rules that are fashioned by court decisions are “laws” as that term is used in § 1331.
Thus, in order to invoke a federal district court’s jurisdiction under § 1331, it was not essential that the petitioners base their claim on a federal statute or a provision of the Constitution. It was, however, necessary to assert a claim “arising under” federal law. As Justice Holmes wrote for the Court, a “suit arises under the law that creates the cause of action.” Petitioners contend that the right which they assert — a right to be protected against an unlawful exercise of Tribal Court judicial power — has its source in federal law because federal law defines the outer boundaries of an Indian tribe’s power over non-Indians.
As we have often noted, Indian tribes occupy a unique status under our law. At one time they exercised virtually unlimited power over their own members as well as those who were permitted to join their communities. Today, however, the power of the Federal Government over the Indian tribes is plenary. Federal law, implemented by statute, by treaty, by administrative regulations, and by judicial decisions, provides significant protection for the individual, territorial, and political rights of the Indian tribes. The tribes also retain some of the inherent powers of the self-governing political communities that were formed long before Europeans first settled in North America.
This Court has frequently been required to decide questions concerning the extent to which Indian tribes have retained the power to regulate the affairs of non-Indians. We have also been confronted with a series of questions concerning the extent to which a tribe’s power to engage in commerce has included an immunity from state taxation. In all of these cases, the governing rule of decision has been provided by federal law. In this case the petitioners contend that the Tribal Court has no power to enter a judgment against them. Assuming that the power to resolve disputes arising within the territory governed by the Tribe was once an attribute of inherent tribal sovereignty, the petitioners, in essence, contend that the Tribe has to some extent been divested of this aspect of sovereignty. More particularly, when they invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court under § 1331, they must contend that federal law has curtailed the powers of the Tribe, and thus afforded them the basis for the relief they seek in a federal forum.
The question whether an Indian tribe retains the power to compel a non-Indian property owner to submit to the civil jurisdiction of a tribal court is one that must be answered by reference to federal law and is a “federal question” under §1331. Because petitioners contend that federal law has divested the Tribe of this aspect of sovereignty, it is federal law on which they rely as a basis for the asserted right of freedom from Tribal Court interference. They have, therefore, filed an action “arising under” federal law within the meaning of § 1331. The District Court correctly concluded that a federal court may determine under § 1331 whether a tribal court has exceeded the lawful limits of its jurisdiction.
“Their incorporation within the territory of the United States, and their acceptance of its protection, necessarily divested them of some aspects of the sovereignty which they had previously exercised. ... In sum, Indian tribes still possess those aspects of sovereignty not withdrawn by treaty or statute, or by implication as a necessary result of their dependent status.
“The areas in which such implicit divestiture of sovereignty has been held to have occurred are those involving the relations between an Indian tribe and nonmembers of the tribe. Thus, Indian tribes can no longer freely alienate to non-Indians the land they occupy. Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U. S. 661, 667-668; Johnson v. M’Intosh,
II
Respondents’ contend that, even though the District Court’s jurisdiction was properly invoked under § 1331, the Court of Appeals was correct in ordering that the complaint be dismissed because the petitioners failed to exhaust their remedies in the tribal judicial system. They further assert that the underlying tort action “has turned into a procedural and jurisdictional nightmare” because petitioners did not pursue their readily available Tribal Court remedies. Petitioners, in response, relying in part on Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U. S. 191 (1978), assert.that resort to exhaustion as a matter of comity “is manifestly inappropriate.”
In Oliphant we held that the Suquamish Indian Tribal Court did not have criminal jurisdiction to try and to punish non-Indians for offenses committed on the reservation. That holding adopted the reasoning of early opinions of two United States Attorneys General, and concluded that federal legislation conferring jurisdiction on the federal courts to try non-Indians for offenses committed in Indian Country had implicitly pre-empted tribal jurisdiction. We wrote:
“While Congress never expressly forbade Indian tribes to impose criminal penalties on non-Indians, we now make express our implicit conclusion of nearly a century ago that Congress consistently believed this to be the necessary result of its repeated legislative actions.” Id., at 204.
If we were to apply the Oliphant rule here, it is plain that any exhaustion requirement would be completely foreclosed because federal courts would always be the only forums for civil actions against non-Indians. For several reasons, however, the reasoning of Oliphant does not apply to this case. First, although Congress’ decision to extend the criminal jurisdiction of the federal courts to offenses committed by non-Indians against Indians within Indian Country supported the holding in Oliphant, there is no comparable legislation granting the federal courts jurisdiction over civil disputes between Indians and non-Indians that arise on an Indian reservation. Moreover, the opinion of one Attorney General on which we relied in Oliphant, specifically noted the difference between civil and criminal jurisdiction. Speaking of civil jurisdiction, Attorney General Cushing wrote:
“But there is no provision of treaty, and no statute, which takes away from the Choctaws jurisdiction of a case like this, a question of property strictly internal to the Chocktaw nation; nor is there any written law which confers jurisdiction of such a case in any court of the United States.
“The conclusion seems to me irresistible, not that such questions are justiciable nowhere, but that they remain subject to the local jurisdiction of the Chocktaws.
“Now, it is admitted on all hands . . . that Congress has ‘paramount right to legislate in regard to this question, in all its relations. It has legislated, in so far as it saw fit, by taking jurisdiction in criminal matters, and omitting to take jurisdiction in civil matters. ... By all possible rules of construction the inference is clear that jurisdiction is left to the Choctaws themselves of civil controversies arising strictly within the Chocktaw Nation.” 7 Op. Atty. Gen. 175, 179-181 (1855) (emphasis added).
Thus, we conclude that the answer to the question whether a tribal court has the power to exercise civil subject-matter jurisdiction over non-Indians in a case of this kind is not automatically foreclosed, as an extension of Oliphant would require. Rather, the existence and extent of a tribal court’s jurisdiction will require a careful examination of tribal sovereignty, the extent to which that sovereignty has been altered, divested, or diminished, as well as a detailed study of relevant statutes, Executive Branch policy as embodied in treaties and elsewhere, and adminstrative or judicial decisions.
We believe that examination should be conducted in the first instance in the Tribal Court itself. Our cases have often recognized that Congress is committed to a policy of supporting tribal self-government and self-determination. That policy favors a rule that will provide the forum whose jurisdiction is being challenged the first opportunity to evaluate the factual and legal bases for the challenge. Moreover the orderly administration of justice in the federal court will be served by allowing a full record to be developed in the Tribal Court before either the merits or any question concerning appropriate relief is addressed. The risks of the kind of “procedural nightmare” that has allegedly developed in this case will be minimized if the federal court stays its hand until after the Tribal Court has had a full opportunity to determine its own jurisdiction and to rectify any errors it may have made. Exhaustion of tribal court remedies, moreover, will encourage tribal courts to explain to the parties the precise basis for accepting jurisdiction, and will also provide other courts with the benefit of their expertise in such matters in the event of further judicial review.
h — I I — I I — I
Our conclusions that § 1331 encompasses the federal question whether a tribal court has exceeded the lawful limits of its jurisdiction, and that exhaustion is required before such a claim may be entertained by a federal court, require that we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Until petitioners have exhausted the remedies available to them in the Tribal Court system, n. 4, supra, it would be premature for a federal court to consider any relief. Whether the federal action should be dismissed, or merely held in abeyance pending the development of further Tribal Court proceedings, is a question that should be addressed in the first instance by the District Court. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Record, Doc. No. 6.
Record, Doc. No. 14. In their original complaint, petitioners relied on 25 U. S. C. § 1302 and on 28 U. S. C. § 1343 as bases for federal jurisdiction.
The Court of Appeals believed that the petitioners’ due process and equal protection claims had no merit because Indian tribes are not constrained by the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. Further, although recognizing that the Tribe is bound by the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U. S. C. § 1301 et seq., the Court of Appeals held that a federal court has no jurisdiction to enjoin violations of that Act. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U. S. 49 (1978). Finally, although the majority assumed that a complaint alleging that a tribe had abused its regulatory jurisdiction would state a claim arising under federal common law, it concluded that a claim that a tribe had abused its adjudicatory jurisdiction could not be recognized because Congress, by enacting the Indian Civil Rights Act, had specifically restricted federal court interference with tribal court proceedings to review on petition for habeas corpus.
After the District Court’s injunction was vacated, tribal officials issued a writ of execution on August 1, 1984, and seized computer terminals, other computer equipment, and a truck from the School District. A sale of the property was scheduled for August 22, 1984. On that date, the School District appeared in the Tribal Court, attempting to enjoin the sale and to set aside the default judgment. App. to Brief in Opposition 1a-9a. The Tribal Court stated that it could not address the default-judgment issue “without a full hearing, research, and briefs by counsel,” id., at 4a; that it would consider a proper motion to set aside the default judgment; and that the sale should be postponed. Petitioners also proceeded before the Court of Appeals, which denied an emergency motion to recall the mandate on August 20, 1984. The next day Justice Rehnquist granted the petitioners’ application for a temporary stay. On September 10, 1984, he continued the stay pending disposition of the petitioners’ petition for certiorari. 469 U. S. 1032 (1984). On September 19, the Tribal Court entered an order postponing a ruling on the motion to set aside the default judgment until after final review by this Court. App. to Brief in Opposition 15a. Subsequently, the Court of Appeals stayed all proceedings in the District Court. On April 24, 1985, Justice Rehnquist denied an application to “dissolve” the Court of Appeals’ stay. Post, p. 1301.
28 U. S. C. §1331.
Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U. S. 91, 100 (1972).
See Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U. S. 354, 392-393 (1959) (opinion of Brennan, J.); cf. County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U. S. 226, 235-236 (1985); Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U. S. 630, 640 (1981); United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U. S. 580, 592-593 (1973); Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 78-79 (1938).
American Well Works Co. v. Layne and Bowler Co., 241 U. S. 257, 260 (1916).
See, e. g., United States v. Wheeler, 435 U. S. 313, 323 (1978); United States v. Mazurie, 419 U. S. 544, 557 (1975); cf. Turner v. United States, 248 U. S. 354, 354-355 (1919).
Escondido Mutual Water Co. v. La Jolla Bands of Mission Indians, 466 U. S. 765, 788, n. 30 (1984) (“[A]ll aspects of Indian sovereignty are subject to defeasance by Congress”); Rice v. Rehner, 463 U. S. 713, 719 (1983); White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U. S. 136, 143 (1980); United States v. Wheeler, 435 U. S., at 323.
White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U. S., at 142; Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U. S., at 55-56.
Thus, in recent years we have decided whether a tribe has the power to regulate the sale of liquor on a reservation, Rice v. Rehner, supra; the power to impose a severance tax on oil and gas production by non-Indian lessees, Merrion v. Jicarilia Apache Tribe, 455 U. S. 130 (1982); the power to regulate hunting and fishing, Montana v. United States, 450 U. S. 544 (1981), Puyallup Tribe v. Washington Dept. of Game, 433 U. S. 165 (1977); and the power to tax the sale of cigarettes to non-Indians, Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U. S. 134 (1980).
See, e. g., Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U. S. 145 (1973); cf. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, supra.
We have recognized that federal law has sometimes diminished the inherent power of Indian tribes in significant ways. As we stated in United States v. Wheeler, 435 U. S., at 323-326: 8 Wheat. 543, 574. They cannot enter into direct commercial or governmental relations with foreign nations. Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, 559; Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet., at 17-18; Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 147 (Johnson, J., concurring). And, as we have recently held, they cannot try nonmembers in tribal courts. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe [435 U. S. 191 (1978)].”
We stated:
“Faced by attempts of the Chocktaw Tribe to try non-Indian offenders in the early 1800’s the United States Attorneys General also concluded that the Choctaws did not have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians absent congressional authority. See 2 Op. Atty. Gen. 693 (1834); 7 Op. Atty. Gen. 174 (1855). According to the Attorney General in 1834, tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians is, inter alia, inconsistent with treaty provisions recognizing the sovereignty of the United States over the territory assigned to the Indian nation and the dependence of the Indians on the United States.” 435 U. S., at 198-199.
F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 253 (1982) (“The development of principles governing civil jurisdiction in Indian Country has been markedly different from the development of rules dealing with criminal jurisdiction”).
A leading treatise on Indian law suggests strongly that Congress has had a similar understanding:
“In the civil field, however, Congress has never enacted general legislation to supply a federal or state forum for disputes between Indians and non-Indians in Indian country. Furthermore, although treaties between the federal government and Indian tribes sometimes required tribes to surrender non-Indian criminal offenders to state or federal authorities, Indian treaties did not contain provision for tribal relinquishment of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians.” Id., at 253-254.
Cf. Kennerly v. District Court of Montana, 400 U. S. 423 (1971); Williams v. Lee, 358 U. S. 217 (1959).
See, e. g., New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U. S. 324, 331-332 (1983); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U. S., at 137; Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U. S., at 152.
New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U. S., at 332; Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U. S., at 138, n. 5; White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U. S., at 143-144, and n. 10; Morton v. Mancari, 417 U. S. 535, 551 (1974); Williams v. Lee, 358 U. S., at 223.
We do not suggest that exhaustion would be required where an assertion of tribal jurisdiction “is motivated by a desire to harass or is conducted in bad faith,” cf. Juidice v. Vail, 430 U. S. 327, 338 (1977), or where the action is patently violative of express jurisdictional prohibitions, or where exhaustion would be futile because of the lack of an adequate opportunity to challenge the court’s jurisdiction.
Four days after receiving notice of the default judgment, petitioners requested that the District Court enter an injunction. Crow Tribal Court Rule of Civil Procedure 17(d) provides that a party in a default may move to set aside the default judgment at any time within 30 days. App. 17. Petitioners did not utilize this legal remedy. It is a fundamental principle of long standing that a request for an injunction will not be granted as long as an adequate remedy at law is available. See, e. g., Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U. S. 49, 57 (1975); Sampson v. Murray, 415 U. S. 61, 88 (1974).
C. Wright, Handbook of the Law of Federal Courts § 16 (1976).
Cf. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749, 765 (1975).
Ibid.; see, e. g., North Dakota ex rel. Wefald v. Kelly, 10 Indian L. Rep. 6059 (1983); Crow Creek Sioux Tribe v. Buum, 10 Indian L. Rep. 6031 (1983).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
I
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Section 514 of the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act of 1940, 56 Stat. 777, as amended, provides a nonresident serviceman present in a State in compliance with military orders with a broad immunity from that State’s personal property and income taxation. Section 514 (2) (b) of the Act further provides that
“the term ‘taxation’ shall include but not be limited to licenses, fees, or excises imposed in respect to motor vehicles or the use thereof: Provided, That the license, fee, or excise required by the State . . . of which the person is a resident or in which he is domiciled has been paid.”
The respondent here, Captain Lyman E. Buzard, was a resident and domiciliary of the State of Washington stationed at Castle Air Force Base in California. He had purchased an Oldsmobile while on temporary duty in Alabama, and had obtained Alabama license plates for it by registering it there. On his return, California refused to allow him to drive the car on California highways with the Alabama plates, and, since he had not registered or obtained license tags in his home State, demanded that he register and obtain license plates in California. When he sought to do so, it was insisted that he pay both the registration fee of $8 imposed by California’s Vehicle Code and the considerably larger “license fee” imposed by its Revenue and Taxation code. The license fee is calculated at “two (2) percent of the market value of the vehicle,” § 10752, and is “imposed ... in lieu of all taxes according to value levied for State or local purposes on vehicles . . . subject to registration under the Vehicle Code . . . .” § 10758. Captain Buzard refused to pay the 2% fee, and was prosecuted and convicted for violating Vehicle Code § 4000, which provides that “[N]o person shall drive . . . any motor vehicle . . . upon a highway unless it is registered and the appropriate fees have been paid under this code.” The conviction, affirmed by the District Court of Appeal, 38 Cal. Rptr. 63, was reversed by the Supreme Court of California, 61 Cal. 2d 833, 395 P. 2d 593. We granted certiorari, 380 U. S. 931, to consider whether § 514 barred California from exacting the 2% tax as a condition of registering and licensing Captain Buzard’s car. We conclude that it did, and affirm.
The California Supreme Court’s reversal of Captain Buzard’s conviction depended on its reading of the words “required by” in the proviso of § 514 (2)(b). In the context of the entire statute and its prior construction, it gave those words the effect of barring the host State from imposing a motor vehicle “license, fee, or excise” unless (1) there was such a tax owing to and assessed by the home State and (2) that tax had not been paid by the serviceman. The mandatory registration statute of Washington, as of most States, imposes the duty to register only as to cars driven on its highways, and Captain Buzard had not driven his car in Washington during the registration year. The court reasoned that there was thus no “license, fee, or excise” owing to and assessed by his home State. Since there was on this view no tax “required by” Washington, the court concluded that California could not impose its tax, even though Captain Buzard had not paid any Washington tax.
If this reading of the phrase “required by” in the proviso were correct, no host State could impose any tax on the licensing or registration of a serviceman’s motor vehicle unless he had not paid taxes actually owing to and assessed by his home State. If the serviceman were under no obligation to his home State, and payment of taxes was a prerequisite of registration or licensing under the host State statutes, the host State authorities might consider themselves precluded from registering and licensing his car. The California court did not confront this consequence of its construction, because it regarded the relevant provisions of California statutes as allowing registration and licensing whether or not taxes were paid; hence, the possibility of unregistered cars using the California highways was thought not to be at issue. The court’s construction, however, pertained to the federal, not the state, statute; if correct, it would similarly restrict the imposition of other host States’ registration and licensing tax provisions, whether or not they are as flexible as California’s. We must therefore consider the California court’s construction in the light of the possibility that in at least some host States, it would permit servicemen to escape registration requirements altogether.
Thus seen, the California court’s construction must be rejected. Although little appears in the legislative history to explain the proviso, Congress was clearly concerned that servicemen stationed away from their home State should not drive unregistered or unlicensed motor vehicles. Every State required in 1944, and requires now, that motor vehicles using its highways be registered and bear license plates. Such requirements are designed to facilitate the identification of vehicle owners and the investigation of accidents, thefts, trafile violations and other violations of law. Commonly, if not universally, the statutes imposing the requirements of registration or licensing also prescribe fees which must be paid to authorize state officials to issue the necessary documents and plates. To assure that servicemen comply with the registration and licensing laws of some State, whether of their home State or the host State, we construe the phrase “license, fee, or excise required by the State . . as equivalent to “license, fee, or excise of the State. . . .” Thus read, the phrase merely indicates Congress’ recognition that, in one form or another, all States have laws governing the registration and licensing of motor vehicles, and that such laws impose certain taxes as conditions thereof. The serviceman who has not registered his car and obtained license plates under the laws “of” his home State, whatever the reason, may be required by the host State to register and license the car under its laws.
The proviso is to be read, at the least, as assuring that § 514 would not have the effect of permitting servicemen to escape the obligation of registering and licensing their motor vehicles. It has been argued that §514(2)(b) also represents a congressional judgment that servicemen should contribute to the costs of highway maintenance, whether at home or where they are stationed, by paying whatever taxes the State of registration may levy for that purpose. We conclude, however, that no such purpose is revealed in the section or its legislative history and that its intent is limited to the purpose of assuring registration. Since at least the 2% tax here involved has been held not essential to that purpose as a matter of state law, we affirm the California Supreme Court’s judgment.
It is plain at the outset that California may collect the 2% tax only if it is a “license, fee, or excise” on a motor vehicle or its use. The very purpose of § 514 in broadly freeing the nonresident serviceman from the obligation to pay property and income taxes was to relieve him of the burden of supporting the governments of the States where he was present solely in compliance with military orders. The statute operates whether or not the home State imposes or assesses such taxes against him. As we said in Dameron v. Brodhead, 345 U. S. 322, 326, “. . . though the evils of potential multiple taxation may have given rise to this provision, Congress appears to have chosen the broader technique of the statute carefully, freeing servicemen from both income and property taxes imposed by any state by virtue of their presence there as a result of military orders. It saved the sole right of taxation to the state of original residence whether or not that state exercised the right.” Motor vehicles were included as personal property covered by the statute. Even if Congress meant to do more by the proviso of § 514 (2) (b) than insure that the car would be registered and licensed in one of the two States, it would be inconsistent with the broad purposes of § 514 to read subsection (2)(b) as allowing the host State to impose taxes other than “licenses, fees, or excises” when the “license, fee, or excise” of the home State is not paid.
Although the Revenue and Taxation Code expressly denominates the tax “a license fee,” § 10751, there is no persuasive evidence Congress meant state labels to be conclusive; therefore, we must decide as a matter of federal law what “licenses, fees, or excises” means in the statute. See Storaasli v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 57, 62. There is nothing in the legislative history to show that Congress intended a tax not essential to assure registration, such as the California “license fee,” to fall within the category of “licenses, fees, or excises” host States might impose if home State registration was not effected. While it is true that a few state taxes in effect in 1944, like the California 2% “license fee,” were imposed solely for revenue purposes, the great majority of state taxes also served to enforce registration and licensing statutes. No discussion of existing state laws appears in the Committee Reports. There is thus no indication that Congress was aware that any State required that servicemen contribute to the costs of highway maintenance without regard to the relevance of such requirements to the non-revenue purposes of state motor vehicle laws.
The conclusion that Congress lacked information about the California practice does not preclude a determination that it meant to include such taxes, levied only for revenue, as “licenses, fees, or excises.” But in deciding that question in the absence of affirmative indication of congressional meaning, we must consider the overall purpose of § 514 as well as the words of subsection (2)(b). Taxes like the California 2%> “license fee” serve primarily a revenue interest,, narrower in purpose but no different in kind from taxes raised to defray the general expenses of government. It is from the burden of taxes serving such ends that nonresident servicemen were to be freed, in the main, without regard to whether their home States imposed or sought to collect such taxes from them. Dameron v. Brodhead, supra. In recent amendments, Congress has reconfirmed this basic purpose. We do not think that subsection (2)(b) should be read as impinging upon it. Rather, reading the Act, as we must, “with an eye friendly to those who dropped their affairs to answer their country’s call,” Le Maistre v. Leffers, 333 U. S. 1, 6, we conclude that subsection (2)(b) refers only to those taxes which are essential to the functioning of the host State’s licensing and registration laws in their application to the motor vehicles of nonresident servicemen. Whether the 2% tax is within the reach of the federal immunity is thus not to be tested, as California argues, by whether its inclusion frustrates the administration of California’s tax policies. The test, rather, is whether the inclusion would deny the State power to enforce the nonrevenue provisions of state motor vehicle legislation.
Whatever may be the case under the registration and licensing statutes of other States, California authorities have made it clear that the California 2% tax is not imposed as a tax essential to the registration and licensing of the serviceman’s motor vehicle. Not only did the California Supreme Court regard the statutes as permitting registration without payment of the tax, but the District Court of Appeal, in another case growing out of this controversy, expressly held that “[t]he registration statute has an entirely different purpose from the license fee statutes, and it is clearly severable from them.” Buzard v. Justice Court, 198 Cal. App. 2d 814, 817, 18 Cal. Rptr. 348, 349-350. The California Supreme Court also held, in effect, that invalidity of the “license fee” as applied was a valid defense to prosecution under Vehicle Code § 4000. In these circumstances, and since the record is reasonably to be read as showing that Captain Buzard would have registered his Oldsmobile but for the demand for payment of the 2%. tax, the California Supreme Court’s reversal of his conviction is
Affirmed.
50 U. S. C. App. §574 (2)(b). Section 514, 50 U. S. C. App. § 574, reads in relevant part as follows :
“(1) For the purposes of taxation in respect of any person, or of his 'personal property, income, or gross income, by any State, . . . such person shall not be deemed to have lost a residence or domicile in any State, . . . solely by reason of being absent therefrom in compliance with military or naval orders, or to have acquired a residence or domicile in, or to have become resident in or a resident of, any other State, . . . while, and solely by reason of being, so absent. For the purposes of taxation in respect of the personal property, income, or gross income of any such person by any State, ... of which such person is not a resident or in which he is not domiciled, . . . personal property shall not be deemed to be located or present in or to have a situs for taxation in such State, Territory, possession, or political subdivision, or district. . . .
“(2) When used in this section, (a) the term ‘personal property’ shall include tangible and intangible property (including motor vehicles), and (b) the term ‘taxation’ shall include but not be limited to licenses, fees, or excises imposed in respect to motor vehicles or the use thereof: Provided, That the license, fee, or excise required by the State ... of which the person is a resident or in which he is domiciled has been paid.’’ (50 U. S. C. App. § 574.)
The unitalicized text was enacted in 1942, 56 Stat. 777. Concern whether nonresident servicemen were sufficiently protected from personal property taxation by host States led to a clarifying amendment in 1944, 58 Stat. 722. That amendment gave § 514 its two subsections. The italicized words in subsection (1) are the relevant additions to the original section. Subsection (2) was entirely new.
The relevant provisions of the Vehicle Code, enacted in 1935, and recodified in 1959, are §§ 4000, 4750 and 9250.
The relevant provisions of the Revenue and Taxation Code, enacted in 1939, are §§ 10751, 10752 and 10758.
Captain Buzard did not have sufficient cash to pay the $8 registration fee and the approximately $100 demanded in payment of the 2% tax and penalties. He testified without contradiction that at that time he “didn’t refuse to pay” the tax. “He [the registration officer] said, ‘Do you want to pay it now?’ and I said, T don’t have the money in cash with me, will you accept a check?’ and he said, ‘No.’” It was thereafter that Captain Buzard asserted his contention that the tax could not legally be assessed.
“Defendant does not contend that California may not, as an exercise of its police power, require him to register his automobile. In fact, his attempt to register the vehicle independently of the payment of fees and penalties was frustrated by the department. Defendant’s position is simply that the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act of 1940 . . . prohibits the collection of such fees as an incident to a proper exercise of the police power or otherwise. As a consequence of the narrow question thus raised by the defendant, contentions which look to the purpose of registration in furtherance of proper law enforcement and administration fail to address themselves to the issue.” 61 Cal. 2d, at 835, 395 P. 2d, at 594.
The statutory scheme severs the 2% tax provision of the Revenue and Taxation Code from the flat registration fee of |8 requirement in the Vehicle Code. Vehicle Code § 4000, under which respondent was prosecuted, refers only to payments of “the appropriate fees . . . under this code” and Vehicle Code § 4750 refers only to “the required fee.” (Emphasis supplied.) The severability clause of the Revenue and Taxation Code, § 26, provides that if application of any provision of that Code to “any person or circumstance, is held invalid . . . the application of the provision to other persons or circumstances, is not affected.”
H. R. Rep. No. 1514, 78th Cong., 2d Sess.; S. Rep. No. 959, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. There were no debates.
Contra, Whiting v. City of Portsmouth, 202 Va. 609, 118 S. E. 2d 505; Snapp v. Neal, 250 Miss. 597, 164 So. 2d 752, reversed today, post, p. 397.
Most States in 1944, as now, conditioned registration and the issuance of license plates upon the payment of a registration fee measured by horsepower, weight or some combination of these factors. See, e. g., Del. Rev. Code 1935, § 5564 (weight); Page’s Ohio Gen. Code (1945 Repl. Vol.), § 6292 (weight); Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. 1942, §8369 (horsepower); N. J. Rev. Stat. 1937, §39:3-8 (horsepower) ; Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. 1930, § 1578 (cubic displacement); Iowa Code 1939, § 5008.05 (value and weight); Digest Ark. Stat. 1937, § 6615 (horsepower and weight).
Other States charged a flat fee. See, e. g., Ore. Comp. Laws 1940, §§ 115-105, 115-106; Ariz. Code 1939, § 66-256; Alaska Comp. Laws 1933, § 3151.
A few States, such as California, charged both a flat registration fee and a larger, variable “license fee” measured by vehicle value. See, e. g., Cal. Vehicle Code 1935, §§ 140, 148, 370, Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code 1939, §§ 10751-10758; Remington’s Wash. Rev. Stat. (1937 Repl. Vol.), §§6312-16, 6312-102; compare Miss. Code 1942, §§ 9352-19, 9352-03 (certificate of payment of ad valorem tax required of those who must pay it); Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945, §§ 60-103, 60-104 (flat fee plus ad valorem fee; ad valorem fee to be paid only by persons actually driving in the State).
The statutes commonly recited that these fees, whatever their measure, were imposed for the privilege of using the State’s highways; the proceeds were usually devoted to highway purposes. Even where property value was the measure of the fees, they were characterized as privilege, not property, taxes. See, e. g., Ingels v. Riley, 5 Cal. 2d 154, 53 P. 2d 939 (1936).
Indeed, the 2% “license fee” was adopted in 1935 as a substitute for local ad valorem taxation of automobiles, which had proved administratively impractical. Stockwell, Studies in California State Taxation, 1910-1935, at pp. 108-110 (1939); Final Report of the California Tax Commission 102 (1929). Its basis remains the location of the automobile in the State.
Pub. L. § 87-771, 76 Stat. 768.
It is not clear from the California courts’ opinions whether they regard the $8 registration fee as a fee essential to the registration and licensing of the motor vehicle. Therefore that question remains open for determination in the state courts.
See note 5, supra.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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B
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Chief Justice Burger
delivered the opinion of the Court.
We granted certiorari to decide whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to discretionary parole-release determinations made by the Nebraska Board of Parole, and, if so, whether the procedures the Board currently provides meet constitutional requirements.
I
Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex brought a class action under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 claiming that they had been unconstitutionally denied parole by the Board of Parole. The suit was filed against the individual members of the Board. One of the claims of the inmates was that the statutes and the Board’s procedures denied them procedural due process.
The statutes provide for both mandatory and discretionary parole. Parole is automatic when an inmate has served his maximum term, less good-time credits. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 83-1,107 (1)(b) (1976). An inmate becomes eligible for discretionary parole when the minimum term, less good-time credits, has been served. §83-1,110 (1). Only discretionary parole is involved in this case.
The procedures used by the Board to determine whether to grant or deny discretionary parole arise partly from statutory provisions and partly from the Board’s practices. Two types of hearings are conducted: initial parole review hearings and final parole hearings. At least once each year initial review hearings must be held for every inmate, regardless of parole eligibility. §83-192 (9). At the initial review hearing, the Board examines the inmate’s entire preconfinement and postconfinement record. Following that examination it provides an informal hearing; no evidence as such is introduced, but the Board interviews the inmate and considers any letters or statements that he wishes to present in support of a claim for release.
If the Board determines from its examination of the entire record and the personal interview that he is not yet a good risk for release, it denies parole, informs the inmate why release was deferred and makes recommendations designed to help correct any deficiencies observed. It also schedules another initial review hearing to take place within one year.
If the Board determines from the file and the initial review hearing that the inmate is a likely candidate for release, a final hearing is scheduled. The Board then notifies the inmate of the month in which the final hearing will be held; the exact day and time is posted on a bulletin board that is accessible to all inmates on the day of the hearing. At the final parole hearing, the inmate may present evidence, call witnesses and be represented by private counsel of his choice. It is not a traditional adversary hearing since the inmate is not permitted to hear adverse testimony or to cross-examine witnesses who present such evidence. However, a complete tape recording of the hearing is preserved. If parole is denied, the Board furnishes a written statement of the reasons for the denial within 30 days. § 83-1,111 (2).
II
The District Court held that the procedures used by the Parole Board did not satisfy due process. It concluded that the inmate had the same kind of constitutionally protected “conditional liberty” interest, recognized by this Court in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471 (1972), held that some of the procedures used by the Parole Board fell short of constitutional guarantees, and prescribed several specific requirements.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit agreed with the District Court that the inmate had a Morrissey - type, conditional liberty interest at stake and also found a statutorily defined, protectible interest in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 83-1,114 (1976). The Court of Appeals, however, 576 F. 2d 1274, 1285, modified the procedures required by the District Court as follows:
(a) When eligible for parole each inmate must receive a full formal hearing;
(b) the inmate is to receive written notice of the precise time of the hearing reasonably in advance of the hearing, setting forth the factors which may be considered by the Board in reaching its decision ;
(c) subject only to security considerations, the inmate may appear in person before the Board and present documentary evidence in his own behalf. Except in unusual circumstances, however, the inmate has no right to call witnesses in his own behalf;
(d) a record of the proceedings, capable of being reduced to writing, must be maintained; and
(e) within a reasonable time after the hearing, the Board must submit a full explanation, in writing, of the facts relied upon and reasons for the Board’s action denying parole.
The court’s holding mandating the foregoing procedures for parole determinations conflicts with decisions of other Courts of Appeals, see, e. g., Brown v. Lundgren, 528 F. 2d 1050 (CA5), cert. denied, 429 U. S. 917 (1976); Scarpa v. United States Board of Parole, 477 F. 2d 278 (CA5) (en banc), vacated as moot, 414 U. S. 809 (1973); Scott v. Kentucky Parole Board, No. 74-1899 (CA6 Jan. 15, 1975), vacated and remanded to consider mootness, 429 U. S. 60 (1976). See also Franklin v. Shields, 569 F. 2d 784, 800 (CA4 1977), cert. denied, 435 U. S. 1003 (1978); United States ex rel. Richerson v. Wolff, 525 F. 2d 797 (CA7 1975), cert. denied, 425 U. S. 914 (1976). We granted certiorari to resolve the Circuit conflicts. 439 U. S. 817.
III
The Due Process Clause applies when government action deprives a person of liberty or property; accordingly, when there is a claimed denial of due process we have inquired into the nature of the individual’s claimed interest.
“[T]o determine whether due process requirements apply in the first place, we must look not to the 'weight’ but to the nature of the interest at stake.” Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564, 570-571 (1972).
This has meant that to obtain a protectible right
“a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.” Id., at 577.
There is no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence. The natural desire of an individual to be released is indistinguishable from the initial resistance to being confined. But the conviction, with all its procedural safeguards, has extinguished that liberty right: “[G]iven a valid conviction, the criminal defendant has been constitutionally deprived of his liberty.” Meachum v. Fano, 427 U. S. 215, 224, (1976).
Decisions of the Executive Branch, however serious their impact, do not automatically invoke due process protection; there simply is no constitutional guarantee that all executive decisionmaking must comply with standards that assure error-free determinations. See Id., at 225; Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U. S. 236 (1976); Moody v. Daggett, 429 U. S. 78, 88 n. 9 (1976). This is especially true with respect to the sensitive choices presented by the administrative decision to grant parole release.
A state may, as Nebraska has, establish a parole system, but it has no duty to do so. Moreover, to insure that the state-created parole system serves the public-interest purposes of rehabilitation and deterrence, the state may be specific or general in defining the conditions for release and the factors that should be considered by the parole authority. It is thus not surprising that there is no prescribed or defined combination of facts which, if shown, would mandate release on parole. Indeed, the very institution of parole is still in an experimental stage. In parole releases, like its siblings probation release and institutional rehabilitation, few certainties exist. In each case, the decision differs from the traditional mold of judicial decisionmaking in that the choice involves a synthesis of record facts and personal observation filtered through the experience of the decisionmaker and leading to a predictive judgment as to what is best both for the individual inmate and for the community. This latter conclusion requires the Board to assess whether, in light of the nature of the crime, the inmate’s release will minimize the gravity of the offense, weaken the deterrent impact on others, and undermine respect for the administration of justice. The entire inquiry is, in a sense, an “equity” type judgment that cannot always be articulated in traditional findings.
IV
Respondents suggest two theories to support their view that they have a constitutionally protected interest in a parole determination which calls for the process mandated by the Court of Appeals. First, they claim that a reasonable entitlement is created whenever a state provides for the possibility of parole. Alternatively, they claim that the language in Nebraska’s statute, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 83-1,114 (1) (1976), creates a legitimate expectation of parole, invoking due process protections.
A
In support of their first theory, respondents rely heavily on Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471 (1972), where we held that a parole-revocation determination must meet certain due process standards. See also Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U. S. 778 (1973). They argue that the ultimate interest at stake both in a parole-revocation decision and in a parole determination is conditional liberty and that since the underlying interest is the same the two situations should be accorded the same constitutional protection.
The fallacy in respondents’ position is that parole release and parole revocation are quite different. There is a crucial distinction between being deprived of a liberty one has, as in parole, and being denied a conditional liberty that one desires. The parolees in Morrissey (and probationers in Gagnon) were at liberty and as such could “be gainfully employed and [were] free to be with family and friends and to form the other enduring attachments of normal life.” 408 U. S., at 482. The inmates here, on the other hand, are confined and thus subject to all of the necessary restraints that inhere in a prison.
A second important difference between discretionary parole release from confinement and termination of parole lies in the nature of the decision that must be made in each case. As we recognized in Morrissey, the parole-revocation determination actually requires two decisions: whether the parolee in fact acted in violation of one or more conditions of parole and whether the parolee should be recommitted either for his or society’s benefit. Id., at 479-480. “The first step in a revocation decision thus involves a wholly retrospective factual question.” Id., at 479.
The parole-release decision, however, is more subtle and depends on an amalgam of elements, some of which are factual but many of which are purely subjective appraisals by the Board members based upon their experience with the difficult and sensitive task of evaluating the advisability of parole release. Unlike the revocation decision, there is no set of facts which, if shown, mandate a decision favorable to the individual. The parole determination, like a prisoner-transfer decision, may be made
“for a variety of reasons and often involve [s] no more than informed predictions as to what would best serve [correctional purposes] or the safety and welfare of the inmate.” Meachum v. Fano, 427 U. S., at 225.
The decision turns on a “discretionary assessment of a multiplicity of imponderables, entailing primarily what a man is and what he may become rather than simply what he has done.” Kadish, The Advocate and the Expert — Counsel in the Peno-Correctional Process, 45 Minn. L. Rev. 803, 813 (1961).
The differences between an initial grant of parole and the revocation of the conditional liberty of the parolee are well recognized. In United States ex rel. Bey v. Connecticut Board of Parole, 443 F. 2d 1079, 1086 (1971), the Second Circuit took note of this critical distinction:
“It is not sophistic to attach greater importance to a person’s justifiable reliance in maintaining his conditional freedom so long as he abides by the conditions of his release, than to his mere anticipation or hope of freedom.”
Judge Henry Friendly cogently noted that “there is a human difference between losing what one has and not getting what one wants.” Friendly, “Some Kind of Hearing,” 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1267, 1296 (1975). See also Brown v. Lundgren, 528 F. 2d, at 1053; Scarpa v. United States Board of Parole, 477 F. 2d, at 282; Franklin v. Shields, 569 F. 2d, at 799 (Field, J., dissenting); United States ex rel. Johnson v. Chairman, New York State Board of Parole, 500 F. 2d 925, 936 (CA2 1974) (Hay, J., dissenting).
That the state holds out the possibility of parole provides no more than a mere hope that the benefit will be obtained. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S., at 577. To that extent the general interest asserted here is no more substantial than the inmate’s hope that he will not be transferred to another prison, a hope which is not protected by due process. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U. S., at 225; Montanye v. Haymes, supra.
B
Respondents’ second argument is that the Nebraska statutory language itself creates a protectible expectation of parole. They rely on the section which provides in part:
“Whenever the Board of Parole considers the release of a committed offender who is eligible for release on parole, it shall order his release unless it is of the opinion that his release should be deferred because:
“(a) There is a substantial risk that he will not conform to the conditions of parole;
“(b) His release would depreciate the seriousness of his crime or promote disrespect for law;
“(c) His release would have a substantially adverse effect on institutional discipline; or
“(d) His continued correctional treatment, medical care, or vocational or other training in the facility will substantially enhance his capacity to lead a law-abiding life when released at a later date.” Neb. Rev. Stat. §83-1,114 (1) (1976).
Respondents emphasize that the structure of the provision together with the use of the word “shall” binds the Board of Parole to release an inmate unless any one of the four specifically designated reasons are found. In their view, the statute creates a presumption that parole release will be granted, and that this in turn creates a legitimate expectation of release absent the requisite finding that one of the justifications for deferral exists.
It is argued that the Nebraska parole-determination provision is similar to the Nebraska statute involved in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539 (1974), that granted good-time credits to inmates. There we held that due process protected the inmates from the arbitrary loss of the statutory right to credits because they were provided subject only to good behavior. We held that the statute created a liberty interest protected by due process guarantees. The Board argues in response that a presumption would be created only if the statutory conditions for deferral were essentially factual, as in Wolff and Morrissey, rather than predictive.
Since respondents elected to litigate their due process claim in federal court, we are denied the benefit of the Nebraska courts' interpretation of the scope of the interest, if any, the statute was intended to afford to inmates. See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U. S. 341, 345 (1976). We can accept respondents’ view that the expectancy of release provided in this statute is entitled to some measure of constitutional protection. However, we emphasize that this statute has unique structure and language and thus whether any other state statute provides a protectible entitlement must be decided on a case-by-case basis. We therefore turn to an .examination of the statutory procedures to determine whether they provide the process that is due in these circumstances.
It is axiomatic that due process “is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S., at 481; Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886, 895 (1961); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123, 162-163 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). The function of legal process, as that concept is embodied in the Constitution, and in the realm of factfinding, is to minimize the risk of erroneous decisions. Because of the broad spectrum of concerns to which the term must apply, flexibility is necessary to gear the process to the particular need; the quantum and quality of the process due in a particular situation depend upon the need to serve the purpose of minimizing the risk of error. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 335 (1976).
Here, as we noted previously, the Parole Board’s decision as defined by Nebraska’s statute is necessarily subjective in part and predictive in part. Like most parole statutes, it vests very broad discretion in the Board. No ideal, error-free way to make parole-release decisions has been developed; the whole question has been and will continue to be the subject of experimentation involving analysis of psychological factors combined with fact evaluation guided by the practical experience of the actual parole decisionmakers in predicting future behavior. Our system of federalism encourages this state experimentation. If parole determinations are encumbered by procedures that states regard as burdensome and unwarranted, they may abandon or curtail parole. Cf. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 34, §§ 1671-1679 (1964), repealed, 1975 Me. Acts, ch. 499, § 71 (repealing the State’s parole system).
It is important that we not overlook the ultimate purpose of parole which is a component of the long-range objective of rehabilitation. The fact that anticipations and hopes for rehabilitation programs have fallen far short of expectations of a generation ago need not lead states to abandon hopes for those objectives; states may adopt a balanced approach in making parole determinations, as in all problems of administering the correctional systems. The objective of rehabilitating convicted persons to be useful, law-abiding members of society can remain a goal no matter how disappointing the progress. But it will not contribute to these desirable objectives to invite or encourage a continuing state of adversary relations between society and the inmate.
Procedures designed to elicit specific facts, such as those required in Morrissey, Gagnon, and Wolff, are not necessarily appropriate to a Nebraska parole determination. See Board of Curators, Univ. of Missouri v. Horowitz, 435 U. S. 78, 90 (1978); Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers v. McElroy, supra, at 895. Merely because a statutory expectation exists cannot mean that in addition to the full panoply of due process required to convict and confine there must also be repeated, adversary hearings in order to continue the confinement. However, since the Nebraska Parole Board provides at least one and often two hearings every year to each eligible inmate, we need only consider whether the additional procedures mandated by the Court of Appeals are required under the standards set out in Mathews v. Eldridge, supra, at 335, and Morrissey v. Brewer, supra, at 481.
Two procedures mandated by the Court of Appeals are particularly challenged by the Board: the requirement that a formal hearing be held for every inmate, and the requirement that every adverse parole decision include a statement of the evidence relied upon by the Board.
The requirement of a hearing as prescribed by the Court of Appeals in all cases would provide at best a negligible decrease in the risk of error. See D. Stanley, Prisoners Among Us 43 (1976). When the Board defers parole after the initial review hearing, it does so because examination of the inmate’s file and the personal interview satisfies it that the inmate is not yet ready for conditional release. The parole determination therefore must include consideration of what the entire record shows up to the time of the sentence, including the gravity of the offense in the particular case. The behavior record of an inmate during confinement is critical in the sense that it reflects the degree to which the inmate is prepared to adjust to parole release. At the Board’s initial interview hearing, the inmate is permitted to appear before the Board and present letters and statements on his own behalf. He is thereby provided with an effective opportunity first, to insure that the records before the Board are in fact the records relating to his case; and second, to present any special considerations demonstrating why he is an appropriate candidate for parole. Since the decision is one that must be made largely on the basis of the inmate’s files, this procedure adequately safeguards against serious risks of error and thus satisfies due process. Cf. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U. S. 389, 408 (1971).
Next, we find nothing in the due process concepts as they have thus far evolved that requires the Parole Board to specify the particular “evidence” in the inmate’s file or at his interview on which it rests the discretionary determination that an inmate is not ready for conditional release. The Board communicates the reason for its denial as a guide to the inmate for his future behavior. See Franklin v. Shields, 569 F. 2d, at 800 (en banc). To require the parole authority to provide a summary of the evidence would tend to convert the process into an adversary proceeding and to equate the Board’s parole-release determination with a guilt determination. The Nebraska statute contemplates, and experience has shown, that the parole-release decision is, as we noted earlier, essentially an experienced prediction based on a host of variables. See Dawson, The Decision to Grant or Deny Parole: A Study of Parole Criteria in Law and Practice, 1966 Wash. U. L. Q. 243, 299-300. The Board’s decision is much like a sentencing judge’s choice — provided by many states — to grant or deny probation following a judgment of guilt, a choice never thought to require more than what Nebraska now provides for the parole-release determination. Cf. Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U. S. 424 (1974). The Nebraska procedure affords an opportunity to be heard, and when parole is denied it informs the inmate in what respects he falls short of qualifying for parole; this affords the process that is due under these circumstances. The Constitution does not require more.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT
The statutory factors that the Board is required to take into account in deciding whether or not to grant parole are the following:
(a) The offender’s personality, including his maturity, stability, sense of responsibility and any apparent development in his personality which may promote or hinder his conformity to law;
(b) The adequacy of the offender’s parole plan;
(c) The offender’s ability and readiness to assume obligations and undertake responsibilities;
(d) The offender’s intelligence and training;
(e) The offender’s family status and whether he has relatives who display an interest in him or whether he has other close and constructive associations in the community;
(f) The offender’s employment history, his occupational skills, and the stability of his past employment;
(g) The type of residence, neighborhood or community in which the offender plans to live;
(h) The offender’s past use of narcotics, or past habitual and excessive use of alcohol;
(i) The offender’s mental or physical makeup, including any disability or handicap which may affect his conformity to law;
(j) The offender’s prior criminal record, including the nature and circumstances, recency and frequency of previous offenses;
(k) The offender’s attitude toward law and authority;
(l) The offender’s conduct in the facility, including particularly whether he has taken advantage of the opportunities for self-improvement, whether he has been punished for misconduct within six months prior to his hearing or reconsideration for parole release, whether any reductions of term have been forfeited, and whether such reductions have been restored at the time of hearing or reconsideration ;
(m) The offender’s behavior and attitude during any previous experience of probation or parole and the recency of such experience; and
(n) Any other factors the board determines to be relevant. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 83-1,114 (2) (1976).
The statute defines the scope of the initial review hearing as follows: "Such review shall include the circumstances of the offender's offense, the presentence investigation report, his previous social history and criminal record, his conduct, employment, and attitude during commitment, and the reports of such physical and mental examinations as have been made. The board shall meet with such offender and counsel him concerning his progress and his prospects for future parole . . . Neb. Rev. Stat. §83-192 (9) (1976).
Apparently, over a 23-month period, there were eight cases with letters of denial that did not include a statement of reasons for the denial. A representative of the Board of Parole testified at trial that these were departures from standard practice. There is nothing to indicate that these inmates could not have received a statement if they had requested one or that a direct challenge to this departure from the statute would not have produced relief. See Neb. Rev. Stat. §25-1901 et seq. (1975).
These are the traditional justifications advanced to support the adoption of a system of parole. See generally A. von Hirsch & K. Hanrahan, Abolish Parole? 3 (1978); N. Morris, The Future of Imprisonment 47 (1974); J. Wilson, Thinking About Crime 171 (1975); D. Stanley, Prisoners Among Us 59, 76 (1976); Dawson, The Decision to Grant or Deny Parole: A Study of Parole Criteria in Law and Practice, 1966 Wash. U. L. Q. 243, 249.
See Stanley, supra n. 3, at 50-55; Dawson, supra n. 3, at 287-288.
The statute also provides a list of 14 explicit factors and one catchall factor that the Board is obligated to consider in reaching a decision. Neb. Rev. Stat. §§83-1,114 (2)(a)-(n) (1976). See Appendix to this opinion.
The Board also objects to the Court of Appeals’ order that it provide written notice reasonably in advance of the hearing together with a list of factors that might be considered. At present the Board informs the inmate in advance of the month during which the hearing will be held, thereby allowing time to secure letters or statements; on the day of the hearing it posts notice of the exact time. There is no claim that either the timing of the notice or its substance seriously prejudices the inmate’s ability to prepare adequately for the hearing. The present notice is constitutionally adequate.
The only other possible risk of error is that relevant adverse factual information in the inmate’s file is wholly inaccurate. But the Board has discretion to make available to the inmate any information “[w]henever the board determines that it will facilitate the parole hearing.” Neb. Rev. Stat. § 83-1,112 (1) (1976). Apparently the inmates are satisfied with the way this provision is administered since there is no issue before us regarding access to their files.
The Court of Appeals in its order required the Board to permit all inmates to appear and present documentary support for parole. Since both of these requirements were being complied with prior to this litigation, the Board did not seek review of those parts of the court’s order and the validity of those requirements is not before us. The Court of Appeals also held that due process did not provide a right to cross-examine adverse witnesses or a right to present favorable witnesses. The practice of taping the hearings also was declared adequate. Those issues are not before us and we express no opinion on them.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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D
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Me. Justice Stevens
announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which The Chief Justice and Me. Justice Stewaet joined and in Parts I, II, III-A, III-B, III-C, and III-E of which Me. Justice Powell joined.
The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (Act), 84 Stat. 1590, 29 U. S. C. § 651 et seq., was enacted for the purpose of ensuring safe and healthful working conditions for every working man and woman in the Nation. This litigation concerns a standard promulgated by the Secretary of Labor to regulate occupational exposure to benzene, a substance which has been shown to cause cancer at high exposure levels. The principal question is whether such a showing is a sufficient basis for a standard that places the most stringent limitation on exposure to benzene that is technologically and economically possible.
The Act delegates broad authority to the Secretary to promulgate different kinds of standards. The basic definition of an “occupational safety and health standard” is found in § 3 (8), which provides:
“The term ‘occupational safety and health standard’ means a standard which requires conditions, or the adoption or use of one or more practices, means, methods, operations, or processes, reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment and places of employment.” 84 Stat. 1591, 29 U. S. C. § 652 (8).
Where toxic materials or harmful physical agents are concerned, a standard must also comply with § 6 (b)(5), which provides:
“The Secretary, in promulgating standards dealing with toxic materials or harmful physical agents under this subsection, shall set the standard which most adequately assures, to the.extent feasible, on the basis of the best available evidence, that no employee will suffer material impairment of health or functional capacity even if such employee has regular exposure to the hazard dealt with by such standard for the period of his working life. Development of standards under this subsection shall be based upon research, demonstrations, experiments, and such other information as may be appropriate. In addition to the attainment of the highest degree of health and safety protection for the employee, other considerations shall be the latest available scientific data in the field, the feasibility of the standards, and experience gained under this and other health and safety laws.” 84 Stat. 1594, 29 U. S. C. § 655 (b)(5).
Wherever the toxic material to be regulated is a carcinogen, the Secretary has taken the position that no safe exposure level can be determined and that § 6 (b) (5) requires him to set an exposure limit at the lowest technologically feasible level that will not impair the viability of the industries regulated. In this case, after having determined that there is a causal connection between benzene and leukemia (a cancer of the white blood cells), the Secretary set an exposure limit on airborne concentrations of benzene of one part benzene per million parts of air (1 ppm), regulated dermal and eye contact with solutions containing benzene, and imposed complex monitoring and medical testing requirements on employers whose workplaces contain 0.5 ppm or more of benzene. 29 CFR §§ 1910.1028 (c), (e) (1979).
On pre-enforcement review pursuant to 29 U. S. C. § 655 (f), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held the regulation invalid. American Petroleum Institute v. OSHA, 581 F. 2d 493 (1978). The court concluded that the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (QSHA) had exceeded its standard-setting authority because it had not shown that the new benzene exposure limit was “reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment” as required by § 3 (8), and because § 6 (b)(5) does “not give OSHA the unbridled discretion to adopt standards designed to create absolutely risk-free workplaces regardless of costs.” Reading the two provisions together, the Fifth Circuit held that the Secretary was under a duty to determine whether the benefits expected from the new standard bore a reasonable relationship to the costs that it imposed. Id., at 503. The court noted that OSHA had made an estimate of the costs of compliance, but that the record lacked substantial evidence of any discernible benefits.
We agree with the’ Fifth Circuit's holding that § 3 (8) requires the Secretary to find, as a threshold matter, that the toxic substance in question poses a significant health risk in the workplace and that a new, lower standard is therefore “reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment and places of employment.” Unless^ and until such a finding is made, it is not necessary to address the further question whether the Court of Appeals correctly held that there must be a reasonable correlation between costs/ and benefits, or whether, as the federal parties argue, the Secretary is then required by §6 (b)(5) to promulgate a standard that goes as far as technologically and economically possible to eliminate the risk.
Because these are unusually important cases of first impression, we have reviewed the record with special care. In this opinion, we (1) describe the benzene standard, (2) analyze the Agency’s rationale for imposing a 1 ppm exposure limit, (3) discuss the controlling legal issues, and (4) comment briefly on the dermal contact limitation.
I
Benzene is a familiar and important commodity. It is a colorless, aromatic liquid that evaporates rapidly under ordinary atmospheric conditions. Approximately 11 billion pounds of benzene were produced in the United States in 1976. Ninety-four percent of that total was produced by the petroleum and petrochemical industries, with the remainder produced by the steel industry as a byproduct of coking operations. Benzene is used in manufacturing a variety of products including motor fuels (which may contain as much as 2% benzene), solvents, detergents, pesticides, and other organic chemicals. 43 Fed. Reg. 5918 (1978).
The entire population of the United States is exposed to small quantities of benzene, ranging from a few parts per billion to 0.5 ppm, in the ambient air. Tr. 1029-1032. Over one million workers are subject to additional low-level exposures as a consequence of their employment. The majority of these employees work in gasoline service stations, benzene production (petroleum refineries and coking operations), chemical processing, benzene transportation, rubber manufacturing, and laboratory operations.
Benzene is a toxic substance. Although it could conceivably cause harm to a person who swallowed or touched it, the principal risk of harm comes from inhalation of benzene vapors. When these vapors are inhaled, the benzene diffuses through the lungs and is quickly absorbed into the blood. Exposure to high concentrations produces an almost immediate effect on the central nervous system. Inhalation of concentrations of 20,000 ppm can be fatal within minutes; exposures in the range of 250 to 500 ppm can cause vertigo, nausea, and other symptoms of mild poisoning. 43 Fed. Reg. 5921 (1978). Persistent exposures at levels above 25-40 ppm may lead to blood deficiencies and diseases of the blood-forming organs, including aplastic anemia, which is generally fatal.
Industrial health experts have long been aware that exposure to benzene may lead to various types of nonmalignant diseases. By 1948 the evidence connecting high levels of benzene to serious blood disorders had become so strong that the Commonwealth of Massachusetts imposed a 35 ppm limitation on workplaces within its jurisdiction. In 1969 the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) adopted a national consensus standard of 10 ppm averaged over an 8-hour period with a ceiling concentration of 25 ppm for 10-minute periods or a maximum peak concentration of 50 ppm. Id., at 5919. In 1971, after the Occupational Safety and Health Act was passed, the Secretary adopted this consensus standard as the federal standard, pursuant to 29 U. S. C. § 655 (a).
As early as 1928, some health experts theorized that there might also be a connection between benzene in the workplace and leukemia. In the late 1960’s and early 1970’s a number of epidemiological studies were published indicating that workers exposed to high concentrations of benzene were subject to a significantly increased risk of leukemia. In a 1974 report recommending a permanent standard for benzene, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), OSHA’s research arm, noted that these studies raised the “distinct possibility” that benzene caused leukemia. But, in light of the fact that all known cases had occurred at very high exposure levels, NIOSH declined to recommend a change in the 10 ppm standard, which it considered sufficient to protect against nonmalignant diseases. NIOSH suggested that further studies were necessary to determine conclusively whether there was a link between benzene and leukemia and, if so, what exposure levels were dangerous.
Between 1974 and 1976 additional studies were published which tended to confirm the view that benzene can cause leukemia, at least when exposure levels are high. In an August 1976 revision of its earlier recommendation, NIOSH stated that these studies provided “conclusive” proof of a causal connection between benzene and leukemia. 1 Record, Ex. 2-5, p. 100. Although it acknowledged that none of the intervening studies had provided the dose-response data it had found lacking two years earlier, id., at 9, NIOSH nevertheless recommended that the exposure limit be set as low as possible. As a result of this recommendation, OSHA contracted with a consulting firm to do a study on the costs to industry of complying with the 10 ppm standard then in effect or, alternatively, with whatever standard would be the lowest feasible. Tr. 505-506.
In October 1976, NIOSH sent another memorandum to OSHA, seeking acceleration of the rulemaking process and “strongly” recommending the issuance of an emergency temporary standard pursuant to § 6 (c) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 655 (c), for benzene and two other chemicals believed to be carcinogens. NIOSH recommended that a 1 ppm exposure limit be imposed for benzene. 1 Record, Ex. 2-6. Apparently because of the NIOSH recommendation, OSHA asked its consultant to determine the cost of complying with a 1 ppm standard instead of with the “minimum feasible” standard. Tr. 506-507. It also issued voluntary guidelines for benzene, recommending that exposure levels be limited to 1 ppm on an 8-hour time-weighted average basis wherever possible. 2 Record, Ex. 2-44.
In the spring of 1976, NIOSH had selected two Pliofilm plants in St. Marys and Akron, Ohio, for an epidemiological study of the link between leukemia and benzene exposure. In April 1977, NIOSH forwarded an interim report to OSHA indicating at least a fivefold increase in the expected incidence of leukemia for workers who had been exposed to benzene at the two plants from 1940 to 1949. The report submitted to OSHA erroneously suggested that exposures in the two plants had generally been between zero and 15 ppm during the period in question. As a result of this new evidence and the continued prodding of NIOSH, 1 Record, Ex. 2-7, OSHA did issue an emergency standard, effective May 21. 1977, reducing the benzene exposure limit from 10 ppm to 1 ppm, the ceiling for exposures of up to 10 minutes from 25 ppm to 5 ppm, and eliminating the authority for peak concentrations of 50 ppm. 42 Fed. Reg. 22516 (1977). In its explanation accompanying the emergency standard, OSHA stated that benzene had been shown to cause leukemia at exposures below 25 ppm and that, in light of its consultant’s report, it was feasible to reduce the exposure limit to 1 ppm. Id., at 22517, 22521.
On May 19, 1977, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit entered a temporary restraining order preventing the emergency standard from taking effect. Thereafter, OSHA abandoned its efforts to make the emergency standard effective and instead issued a proposal for a permanent standard patterned almost entirely after the aborted emergency standard. Id., at 27452.
In its published statement giving notice of the proposed permanent standard, OSHA did not ask for comments as to whether or not benzene presented a significant health risk at exposures of 10 ppm or less. Rather, it asked for comments as to whether 1 ppm was the minimum feasible exposure limit. Ibid. As OSHA’s Deputy Director of Health Standards, Grover Wrenn, testified at the hearing, this formulation of the issue tó be considered by the Agency was consistent with OSHA’s general policy with respect to carcinogens. Whenever a carcinogen is involved, OSHA will presume that no safe level of exposure exists in the absence of clear proof establishing such a level and will accordingly set the exposure limit at the lowest level feasible. The proposed 1 ppm exposure limit in this case thus was established not on the basis of a proven hazard at 10 ppm, but rather on the basis of “OSHA’s best judgment at the time of the proposal of the feasibility of compliance with the proposed standard by the [a]ffected industries.” Tr. 30. Given OSHA’s cancer policy, it was in fact irrelevant whether there was any evidence at all of a leukemia risk at 10 ppm. The important point was that there was no evidence that there was not some risk, however small, at that level. The fact that OSHA did not ask for comments on whether there was a safe level of exposure for benzene was indicative of its further view that a demonstration of such absolute safety simply could not be made.
Public hearings were held on the proposed standard, commencing on July 19, 1977. The final standard was issued on February 10, 1978. 29 CFR § 1910.1028 (1979). In its final form, the benzene standard is designed to protect workers from whatever hazards are associated with low-level benzene exposures by requiring employers to monitor workplaces to determine the level of exposure, to provide medical examinations when the level rises above 0.5 ppm, and to institute whatever engineering or other controls are necessary to keep exposures at or below 1 ppm.
In the standard as originally proposed by OSHA, the employer’s duty to monitor, keep records, and provide medical examinations arose whenever any benzene was present in a workplace covered by the rule. Because benzene is omnipresent in small quantities, NIOSH and the President’s Council on- Wage and Price Stability recommended the use of an “action level” to trigger monitoring and medical examination requirements. Tr. 1030-1032; App. 121-133. OSHA accepted this recommendation, providing under the final standard that, if initial monitoring discloses benzene concentrations below 0.5 ppm averaged over an 8-hour work day, no further action is required unless there is a change in the company’s practices. If exposures are above the action level, but below the 1 ppm exposure limit, employers are required to monitor exposure levels on a quarterly basis and to provide semiannual medical examinations for their exposed employees. Neither the concept of an action level, nor the specific level selected by OSHA, is challenged in this proceeding.
Whenever initial monitoring indicates that employees are subject to airborne concentrations of benzene above 1 ppm averaged over an 8-hour workday, with a ceiling of 5 ppm for any 15-minute period, employers are required to modify their plants or institute work practice controls to reduce exposures within permissible limits. Consistent with OSHA’s general policy, the regulation does not allow respirators to be used if engineering modifications are technologically feasible. Employers in this category are also required to perform monthly monitoring so long as their workplaces remain above 1 ppm, provide semiannual medical examinations to exposed workers, post signs in and restrict access to “regulated areas” where the permissible exposure limit is exceeded, and conduct employee training programs where necessary.
The standard also places strict limits on exposure to liquid benzene. As originally framed, the standard totally prohibited any skin or eye contact with any liquid containing any benzene. Ultimately, after the standard was challenged, OSHA modified this prohibition by excluding liquids containing less than 0.5% benzene. After three years, that exclusion will be narrowed to liquids containing less than 0.1% benzene.
The permanent standard is expressly inapplicable to the storage, transportation, distribution, sale, or use of gasoline or other fuels subsequent to discharge from bulk terminals. This exception is particularly significant in light of the fact that over 795,000 gas station employees, who are exposed to an average of 102,700 gallons of gasoline (containing up to 2% benzene) annually, are thus excluded from the protection of the standard.
As presently formulated, the benzene standard is an expensive way of providing some additional protection for a relatively small number of employees. According to OSHA’s figures, the standard will require capital investments in engineering controls of approximately $266 million, first-year operating costs (for monitoring, medical testing, employee training, and respirators) of $187 million to $205 million and recurring annual costs of approximately $34 million. 43 Fed. Reg. 5934 (1978). The figures outlined in OSHA’s explanation of the costs of compliance to various industries indicate that only 35,000 employees would gain any benefit from the regulation in terms of a reduction in their exposure to benzene. Over two-thirds of these workers (24,450) are employed in the rubber-manufacturing industry. Compliance costs in that industry are estimated to be rather low with no capital costs and initial operating expenses estimated at only $34 million ($1,390 per employee); recurring annual costs would also be rather low, totaling less than $1 million. By contrast, the segment of the petroleum refining industry that produces benzene would be required to incur $24 million in capital costs and $600,000 in first-year operating expenses to provide additional protection for 300 workers.($82,000 per employee), while the petrochemical industry would be required to incur $20.9 million in capital costs and $1 million in initial operating expenses for the benefit of 552 employees ($39,675 per employee). Id., at 5936-5938.
Although OSHA did not quantify the benefits to each category of worker in terms of decreased exposure to benzene, it appears from the economic impact study done at OSHA’s direction that those benefits may be relatively small. Thus, although the current exposure limit is 10 ppm, the actual exposures outlined in that study are often considerably lower. For example, for the period 1970-1975 the petrochemical industry reported that, out of a total of 496 employees exposed to benzene, only 53 were exposed to levels between 1 and 5 ppm and only 7 (all at the same plant) were exposed to between 5 and 10 ppm. 1 Economic Impact Statement, p. 4-6, Table 4-2, 11 Record, Ex. 5A, p. 4-6, Table 4-2. See also id., Tables 4.3-4.8 (indicating sample exposure levels in various industries).
II
The critical issue at this point in the litigation is whether the Court of Appeals was correct in refusing to enforce the 1 ppm exposure limit on the ground that it was not supported by appropriate findings.
Any discussion of the 1 ppm exposure limit must, of course, begin with the Agency’s rationale for imposing that limit. The written explanation of the standard fills 184 pages of the printed appendix. Much of it is devoted to a discussion of the voluminous evidence of the adverse effects of exposure to benzene at levels of concentration well above 10 ppm. This discussion demonstrates that there is ample justification for regulating occupational exposure to benzene and that the prior limit of 10 ppm, with a ceiling of 25 ppm (or a peak of 50 ppm) was reasonable. It does not, however, provide direct support for the Agency’s conclusion that the limit should be reduced from 10 ppm to 1 ppm.
The evidence in the administrative record of adverse effects of benzene exposure at 10 ppm is sketchy at best. OSHA noted that there was “no dispute” that certain nonmalignant blood disorders, evidenced by a reduction in the level of red or white cells or platelets in the blood, could result from exposures of 25-40 ppm. It then stated that several studies had indicated that relatively slight changes in normal blood values could result from exposures below 25 ppm and perhaps below 10 ppm. OSHA did not attempt to make any estimate based on these studies of how significant the risk of nonmalignant disease would be at exposures of 10 ppm or less. Rather, it stated that because of the lack of data concerning the linkage between low-level exposures and blood abnormalities, it was impossible to construct a dose-response curve at this time. OSHA did conclude, however, that the studies demonstrated that the current 10 ppm exposure limit was inadequate to ensure that no single worker would suffer a nonmalignant blood disorder as a result of benzene exposure. Noting that it is “customary” to set a permissible exposure limit by applying a safety factor of 10-100 to the lowest level at which adverse effects had been observed, the Agency stated that the evidence supported the conclusion that the limit should be set at a point “substantially less than 10 ppm” even if benzene’s leukemic effects were not considered. 43 Fed. Reg. 5924-5925 (1978). OSHA did not state, however, that the nonmalignant effects of benzene exposure justified a reduction in the permissible exposure limit to 1 ppm.
OSHA also noted some studies indicating an increase in chromosomal aberrations in workers chronically exposed to concentrations of benzene “probably less than 25 ppm.” However, the Agency took no definitive position as to what these aberrations meant in terms of demonstrable health effects and stated that no quantitative dose-response relationship had yet been established. Under these circumstances, chromosomal effects were categorized by OSHA as an “adverse biological event of serious concern which may pose or reflect a potential health risk and as such, must be considered in the larger purview of adverse health effects associated with benzene. Id., at 5932-5934.
With respect to leukemia, evidence of an increased risk (i. e., a risk greater than that borne by the general population) due to benzene exposures at or below 10 ppm was even sketchier. Once OSHA acknowledged that the NIOSH study it had relied upon in promulgating the emergency standard did not support its earlier view that benzene had been shown to cause leukemia at concentrations below 25 ppm, see n. 12, supra, there was only one study that provided any evidence of such an increased risk. That study, conducted by the Dow Chemical Co., uncovered three leukemia deaths, versus 0.2 expected deaths, out of a population of 594 workers; it appeared that the three workers had never been exposed to more than 2 to 9 ppm of benzene. The authors of the study, however, concluded that it could not be viewed as proof of a relationship between low-level benzene exposure and leukemia because all three workers had probably been occupationally exposed to a number of other potentially carcinogenic chemicals at other points in their careers and because no leukemia deaths had been uncovered among workers who had been exposed to much higher levels of benzene. In its explanation of the permanent standard, OSHA stated that the possibility that these three leukemias had been caused by benzene exposure could not be ruled out and that the study, although not evidence of an increased risk of leukemia at 10 ppm, was therefore “consistent with the findings of many studies that there is an excess leukemia risk among benzene exposed employees.” 43 Fed. Reg. 5928 (1978). The Agency made no finding that the Dow study, any other empirical evidence, or any opinion testimony demonstrated that exposure to benzene at or below the 10 ppm level had ever in fact caused leukemia. See 581 F. 2d, at 503, where the Court of Appeals noted that OSHA was “unable to point to any empirical evidence documenting a leukemia risk at 10 ppm....”
In the end OSHA’s rationale for lowering the permissible exposure limit to 1 ppm was based, not on any finding that leukemia has ever been caused by exposure to 10 ppm of benzene and that it will not be caused by exposure to 1 ppm, but rather on a series of assumptions indicating that some leuke-mias might result from exposure to 10 ppm and that the number of cases might be reduced by reducing the exposure level to 1 ppm. In reaching that result, the Agency first unequivocally concluded that benzene is a human carcinogen. Second, it concluded that industry had failed to prove that there is a safe threshold level of exposure to benzene below which no excess leukemia cases would occur. In reaching this conclusion OSHA rejected industry contentions that certain epidemiological studies indicating no excess risk of leukemia among workers exposed at levels below 10 ppm were sufficient to establish that the threshold level of safe exposure was at or above 10 ppm. It also rejected an industry witness’ testimony that a dose-response curve could be constructed on the basis of the reported epidemiological studies and that this curve indicated that reducing the permissible exposure limit from 10 to 1 ppm would prevent at most one leukemia and one other cancer death every six years.
Third, the Agency applied its standard policy with respect to carcinogens, concluding that, in the absence of definitive proof of a safe level, it must be assumed that any level above zero presents some increased risk of cancer. As the federal parties point out in their brief, there are a number of scientists and public health specialists who subscribe to this view, theorizing that a susceptible person may contract cancer from the absorption of even one molecule of a carcinogen like benzene. Brief for Federal Parties 18-19.
Fourth, the Agency reiterated its view of the Act, stating that it was required by § 6 (b) (5) to set the standard either at the level that has been demonstrated to be safe or at the lowest level feasible, whichever is higher. If no safe level is established, as in this case, the Secretary’s interpretation of the statute automatically leads to the selection of an exposure limit that is the lowest feasible. Because of benzene’s importance to the economy, no one has ever suggested that it would be feasible to eliminate its use entirely, or to try to limit exposures to the small amounts that are omnipresent. Rather, the Agency selected 1 ppm as a workable exposure level, see n. 14, supra, and then determined that compliance with that level was technologically feasible and that “the economic impact of... [compliance] will not be such as to threaten the financial welfare of the affected firms or the general economy.” 43 Fed. Reg. 5939 (1978). It therefore held that 1 ppm was the minimum feasible exposure level within the meaning of § 6 (b)(5) of the Act.
Finally, although the Agency did not refer in its discussion of the pertinent legal authority to any duty to identify the anticipated benefits of the new standard, it did conclude that some benefits were likely to result from reducing the exposure limit from 10 ppm to 1 ppm. This conclusion was based, again, not on evidence, but rather on the assumption that the risk of leukemia will decrease as exposure levels decrease. Although the Agency had found it impossible to construct a dose-response curve that would predict with any accuracy the number of leukemias that could be expected to result from exposures at 10 ppm, at 1 ppm, or at any intermediate level, it nevertheless “determined that the benefits of the proposed standard are likely to be appreciable.” 43 Fed. Beg. 5941 (1978). In light of the Agency’s disavowal of any ability to determine the numbers of employees likely to be adversely affected by exposures of 10 ppm, the Court of Appeals held this finding to be unsupported by the record. 581 F. 2d, at 503.
It is noteworthy that at no point in its lengthy explanation did the Agency quote or even cite § 3 (8) of the Act. It made no finding that any of the provisions of the new standard were “reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment and places of employment.” Nor did it allude to the possibility that any such finding might have been appropriate.
Ill
Our resolution of the issues in these cases turns, to a large extent, on the meaning of and the relationship between § 3 (8), which defines a health and safety standard as a standard that is “reasonably necessary and appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment/’ and § 6 (b)(5), which directs the Secretary in promulgating a health and safety standard for toxic materials to “set the standard which most adequately assures, to the extent feasible, on the basis of the best available evidence, that no employee will suffer material impairment of health or functional capacity....”
In the Government’s view, § 3 (8)’s definition of the term “standard” has no legal significance or at best merely requires that a standard not be totally irrational. It takes the position that § 6 (b) (5) is controlling and that it requires OSHA to promulgate a standard that either gives an absolute assurance of safety for each and every worker or reduces exposures to the lowest level feasible. The Government interprets “feasible” as meaning technologically achievable at a cost that would not impair the viability of the industries subject to the regulation. The respondent industry representatives, on the other hand, argue that the Court of Appeals was correct in holding that the “reasonably necessary and appropriate” language of § 3 (8), along with the feasibility requirement of § 6 (b) (5), requires the Agency to quantify both the costs and the benefits of a proposed rule and to conclude that they are roughly commensurate.
In our view, it is not necessary to decide whether either the Government or industry is entirely correct. For we think it is clear that § 3 (8) does apply to all permanent standards promulgated under the Act and that it requires the Secretary, before issuing any standard, to determine that it is reasonably necessary and appropriate to remedy a significant risk of material health impairment. Only after the Secretary has made the threshold determination that such a risk exists with respect to a toxic substance, would it be necessary to decide whether § 6 (b)(5) requires him to select the most protective standard he can consistent with economic and technological feasibility, or whether, as respondents argue, the benefits of the regulation must be commensurate with the costs of its implementation. Because the Secretary did not make the required threshold finding in these cases, we have no occasion to determine whether costs must be weighed against benefits in an appropriate case
A
Under the Government’s view, §3 (8), if it has any substantive content at all, merely requires OSHA to issue standards that are reasonably calculated to produce a safer or more healthy work environment. Tr. of Oral Arg. 18, 20. Apart from this minimal requirement of rationality, the Government argues that § 3 (8) imposes no limits on the Agency’s power, and thus would not prevent it from requiring employers to do whatever would be “reasonably necessary” to eliminate all risks of any harm from their workplaces. With respect to toxic substances and harmful physical agents, the Government takes an even more extreme position. Relying on § 6 (b) (5)’s direction to set a standard “which most adequately assures... that no employee will suffer material impairment of health or functional capacity,” the Government contends that the Secretary is required to impose standards that either guarantee workplaces that are free from any risk of material health impairment, however small, or that come as close as possible to doing so without ruining entire industries.
If the purpose of the statute were to eliminate completely and with absolute certainty any risk of serious harm, we would agree that it would be proper for the Secretary to interpret §§ 3 (8) and 6 (b) (5) in this fashion. But we think it is clear that the statute was not designed to require employers to provide absolutely risk-free workplaces whenever it is technologically feasible to do so, so long as the cost is not great enough to destroy an entire industry. Rather, both the language and structure of the Act, as well as its legislative history, indicate that it was intended to require the elimination, as far as feasible, of significant risks of harm.
B
By empowering the Secretary to promulgate standards that are “reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment and places of employment,” the Act implies that, before promulgating any standard, the Secretary must make a finding that the workplaces in question are not safe. But “safe” is not the equivalent of “risk-free.” There are many activities that we engage in every day — such as driving a car or even breathing city air — that entail some risk of accident or material health impairment; nevertheless, few people would consider these activities “unsafe.” Similarly, a workplace can hardly be considered “unsafe” unless it threatens the workers with a significant risk of- harm.
Therefore, before he can promulgate any permanent health or safety standard, the Secretary is required to make a threshold finding that a place of employment is unsafe — in the sense that significant risks are present and can be eliminated or lessened by a change in practices. This requirement applies to permanent standards promulgated pursuant to § 6 (b)(5), as well as to other types of permanent standards. For there is no reason why § 3 (8)’s definition of a standard should not be deemed incorporated by reference into § 6 (b)(5). The standards promulgated pursuant to § 6 (b)(5) are just one species of the genus of standards governed by the basic requirement. That section repeatedly uses the term “standard” without suggesting any exception from, or qualification of, the general definition; on the contrary, it directs the Secretary to select “the standard” — that is to say, one of various possible alternatives that satisfy the basic definition in § 3 (8) — that is most protective. Moreover, requiring the Secretary to make a threshold finding of significant risk is consistent with the scope of the regulatory power granted to him by §6 (b)(5), which empowers the Secretary to promulgate standards, not for chemicals and physical agents generally, but for “toxic materials” and “harmful physical agents.”
This interpretation of §§ 3 (8) and 6 (b)(5) is supported by the other provisions of the Act. Thus, for example, § 6 (g) provides in part that
“[i]n determining the priority for establishing standards under this section, the Secretary shall give due regard to the urgency of the need for mandatory safety and health standards for particular industries, trades, crafts, occupations, businesses, workplaces or work environments.”
The Government has expressly acknowledged that this section requires the Secretary to undertake some cost-benefit analysis before he promulgates any standard, requiring the elimination of the most serious hazards first. If such an analysis must precede the promulgation of any standard, it seems manifest that Congress intended, at a bare minimum, that the Secretary find a significant risk of harm and therefore a probability of significant benefits before establishing a new standard.
Section 6 (b)(8) lends additional support to this analysis. That subsection requires that, when the Secretary substantially alters an existing consensus standard, he must explain how the new rule will “better effectuate” the purposes of the Act. If this requirement was intended to be more than a meaningless formality, it must be read to impose upon the Secretary the duty to find that an existing national consensus standard is not adequate to protect workers from a continuing and significant risk of harm. Thus, in this case, the Secretary was required to find that exposures at the current permissible exposure level of 10 ppm present a significant risk of harm in
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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G
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Marshall
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner was convicted of possessing a firearm in violation of Title YII of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Omnibus Crime Control Act), 18 U. S. C. App. §§ 1201-1203. The statute provides, in pertinent part:
“Any person, who—
“(1) has been convicted by a court of the United States or of a State or any political subdivision, thereof of a felony . . .
“and who receives, possesses, or transports in commerce or affecting commerce . . . any firearm shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than two years, or both.” 18 U. S. C. App. § 1202 (a) ,
The issue in this case is whether proof that the possessed firearm previously traveled in interstate commerce is sufficient to satisfy the statutorily required nexus between the possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and commerce.
I
In 1972 petitioner pleaded guilty in the Circuit Court of Fairfax County, Va., to the felony of possession of narcotics with intent to distribute. A year later, in August 1973, law enforcement officials, in the execution of a search warrant for narcotics, seized four firearms from petitioner’s bedroom. Petitioner was subsequently charged with both receipt and possession of the four firearms in violation of 18 U. S. C. App. § 1202(a)(1).
In a jury trial in the Eastern District of Virginia, the Government offered evidence to show that all of the seized weapons had traveled in interstate commerce. All the dates established for such interstate travel were prior to the date petitioner became a convicted felon. The Government made no attempt to prove that the petitioner acquired these weapons after his conviction. Holding such proof necessary for a receipt conviction, the judge, at the close of the Government’s case, granted petitioner’s motion for a judgment of acquittal on that part of the indictment charging receipt.
Petitioner’s defense to the possession charge was twofold. As a matter of fact, he contended that by the time of his conviction he no longer possessed the firearms. His claim was that, to avoid violating this statute, he had transferred these guns to his wife prior to pleading guilty to the narcotics felony. Secondly, he argued that, as a matter of law, proof that the guns had at some time traveled in interstate commerce did not provide an adequate nexus between the possession and commerce. In furtherance of this defense, petitioner requested that the jury be instructed as follows:
“In order for the defendant to be found guilty of the crime with which he is charged, it is incumbent upon the Government to demonstrate a nexus between the 'possession’ of the firearms and interstate commerce. For example, a person 'possesses’ in commerce or affecting commerce if at the time of the offense the firearms were moving interstate or on an interstate facility, or if the 'possession’ affected commerce. It is not enough that the Government merely show that the firearms at some time had travelled in interstate commerce. . . .” App. 12-13.
The judge rejected this instruction. Instead he informed the jury:
• “The government may meet its burden of proving a connection between commerce and the possession of a firearm by a convicted felon if it is demonstrated that the firearm possessed by a convicted felon had previously travelled in interstate commerce.
“It is not necessary that the government prove that the defendant purchased the gun in some state other than that where he was found with it or that he carried it aeross the state line, nor must the government prove who did purchase the gun.” Id., at 14.
Petitioner was found guilty and he appealed. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. 539 F. 2d 331. It held that the interstate commerce nexus requirement of the possession offense was satisfied by proof that the firearm petitioner possessed had previously traveled in interstate commerce. In view of the split among the Circuits on this issue, we granted certiorari. 429 U. S. 815 (1976). We affirm.
II
Our first encounter with Title VII of the Omnibus Crime Control Act came in United States v. Bass, 404 U. S. 336 (1971). There we had to decide whether the statutory phrase “in commerce or affecting commerce” in § 1202 (a) applied to “possesses” and “receives” as well as to “transports.” We noted that the statute was not a model of clarity. On the one hand, we found “significant support” in the legislative history for the contention that the statute “reaches the mere possession of guns without any showing of an interstate commerce nexus” in individual cases. 404 U. S., at 345-346. On the other hand, we could not ignore Congress’ inserting the phrase “in commerce or affecting commerce” in the statute. Id., at 345. The phrase clearly modified “transport” and we could find no sensible explanation for requiring a nexus only for transport. Id., at 340. Faced with this ambiguity, the Court adopted the narrower reading that the phrase modified all three offenses. We found this result dictated by two principles of statutory interpretation: First, that “ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity,” Rewis v. United States, 401 U. S. 808, 812 (1971), and second, that “unless Congress conveys its purpose clearly, it will not be deemed to have significantly changed the federal-state balance,” Bass, supra, at 349. Since “[a]bsent proof of some interstate commerce nexus in each case § 1202 (a) dramatically intrudes upon traditional state criminal jurisdiction,” 404 U. S., at 350, we were-unwilling to conclude, without a “clearer statement of intention,” ibid., that Congress meant to dispense entirely with a nexus requirement in individual cases.
It was unnecessary in Bass for ,us to decide what would constitute an adequate nexus with commerce as the Government had made no attempt to show any nexus at all. While we did suggest some possibilities, the present case presents the first opportunity to focus on the question with the benefit of full briefing and argument.
The Government’s position is that to establish a nexus with interstate commérce it need prove only that the firearm possessed by the convicted felon traveled at some time in interstate commerce. The petitioner contends, however, that the nexus must be “contemporaneous” with the possession, that the statute proscribes “only crimes with a present connection to commerce.” Brief for Petitioner 9. He suggests that at the time of the offense the possessor must be engaging in commerce or must be carrying the gun at an interstate facility. Tr. of Oral Arg. 11. At oral argument he suggested an alternative theory — that one can be convicted for possession without any proof of a present connection with commerce so long as the firearm was acquired after conviction. Id., at 15.
In our effort to resolve the dispute, we turn first to the text of the statute. Petitioner contends that the meaning can be readily determined from the face of the statute, at least when it is contrasted with Title IV of the Omnibus Crime Control Act, another title dealing with gun control. He points to one section of Title IV, 18 U. S. C. § 922 (h), arguing, in reliance on our decision in Barrett v. United States, 423 U. S. 212 (1976), that this section shows how Congress can, if it chooses, specify an offense based on firearms that have previously traveled in commerce. In § 922 (h), Congress employed the present perfect tense, as it prohibited a convicted felon from receiving a firearm “which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.” This choice of tense led us to conclude in Barrett that Congress clearly “denot[ed] an act that has been completed.” 423 U. S., at 216. Thus, petitioner argues, since Congress knows how to specify completed transactions, its failure to use that language in the present statute must mean that it wanted to reach only ongoing transactions.
The essential difficulty with this argument is that it is not very meaningful to compare Title VII with Title IV. See Bass, 404 U. S., at 344. Title VII was a last-minute amendment to the Omnibus Crime Control Act enacted hastily with little discussion and no hearings. The statute, as we noted in Bass, is not the product of model legislative deliberation or draftsmanship. Id., at 339, 344. Title IV, on the other hand, is a carefully constructed package of gun control legislation. It is obvious that the tenses used throughout Title IV were chosen with care. For example, in addition to the prohibition in § 922 (h) on receipt by convicted felons, Congress also made it illegal in § 922 (g) for such person to “ship or transport any firearm or ammunition in interstate or foreign commerce.” In § 922 (j), Congress made it unlawful for “any person to receive, conceal, store, barter, sell or dispose of any stolen firearm . . . , which is moving as, which is part of, or which constitutes, interstate or foreign commerce.” And § 922 (k) makes it illegal for “any person knowingly to transport, ship, or receive, in interstate or foreign commerce, any firearm which has had [its] serial number removed, obliterated or altered.” In view of such fine nuances in the tenses employed in the statute, the Court could easily conclude in Barrett that “Congress knew the significance and meaning of the language it employed.” 423 U. S., at 217. The language it chose was “without ambiguity.” Id., at 216. “Had Congress intended to confine § 922 (h) to direct interstate receipts, it would have so provided, just as it did in other sections of [Title IV].” Id., at 217.
In the present case, by contrast, Congress’ choice of language was ambiguous at best. While it is true that Congress did not choose the precise language used in § 922 (h) to indicate that a present nexus with commerce is not required, neither did it use the language of § 922 (j) to indicate that the gun must have a contemporaneous connection with commerce at the time of the offense. Thus, while petitioner is correct in noting that Congress has the skills to be precise, the fact that it did not employ those skills here helps us not at all.
While Congress’ choice of tenses is not very revealing, its findings and its inclusion of the phrase “affecting commerce” are somewhat more helpful. In the findings at the beginning of Title VII, Congress expressly declared that “the receipt, possession, or transportation of a firearm by felons . . . constitutes ... a burden on commerce or threat affecting the free flow of commerce,” 18 U. S. C. App. § 1201 (1). It then implemented those findings by prohibiting possessions “in commerce and affecting commerce.” As we have previously observed, Congress is aware of the “distinction between legislation limited to activities fin commerce’ and an assertion of its full Commerce Clause power so as to cover all activity substantially affecting interstate commerce.” United States v. American Bldg. Maintenance Industries, 422 U. S. 271, 280 (1975); see also NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Corp., 371 U. S. 224, 226 (1963). Indeed, that awareness was explicitly demonstrated here. In arguing that Congress could, consistent with the Constitution, “outlaw the mere possession of weapons,” Senator Long, in introducing Title VII, pointed to the fact that “many of the items and transactions reached by the broad swath of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 were reached by virtue of the power of Congress to regulate matters affecting commerce, not just to regulate interstate commerce itself.” 114 Cong. Rec. 13868 (1968). He advised a similar reliance on the power to regulate matters affecting commerce and urged that “Congress simply [find] that the possession of these weapons by the wrong kind of people is either a burden on commerce or a threat that affects the free flow of commerce.” Id., at 13869. While in Bass we noted that we could not be sure that Congress meant to do away entirely with a nexus requirement, it does seem apparent that in implementing these findings by prohibiting both possessions in commerce and those affecting commerce, Congress must have meant more than to outlaw simply those possessions that occur in commerce or in interstate facilities. And we see no basis for contending that a weapon acquired after a conviction affects commerce differently from one acquired before and retained.
The legislative history in its entirety, while brief, further supports the view that Congress sought to rule broadly — to keep guns out of the hands of those who have demonstrated that “they may not be trusted to possess a firearm without becoming a threat to society.” Id., at 14773. There is simply no indication of any concern with either the movement of the gun or the possessor or with the time of acquisition.
In introducing the amendment, Senator Long stated:
“I have prepared an amendment which I will offer at an appropriate time, simply setting forth the fact that anybody who has been convicted of a felony ... is not permitted to possess a firearm ....
“It might be well to analyze, for a moment, the logic involved. When a man has been convicted of a felony, unless — as this bill sets forth — he has been expressly pardoned by the President and the pardon states that the person is to be permitted to possess firearms in the future, that man would have no right to possess firearms. He would be punished criminally if he is found in possession of them.
“It seems to me that this simply strikes at the possession of firearms by the wrong kind of people. It avoids the problem of imposing on an honest hardware store owner the burden of keeping a lot of records and trying to keep up with the ultimate disposition of weapons sold. It places the burden and the punishment on the kind of people who have no business possessing firearms in the event they come into possession of them.” Id., at 13868-13869.
The purpose of the amendment was to complement Title IV. Id., at 14774; see also id., at 16286. Senator Long noted:
“Of all the gun bills that have been suggested, debated, discussed and considered, none except this Title VII attempts to bar possession of a firearm from persons whose prior behaviors have established their violent tendencies. . . .
“. . . Under Title VII, every citizen could possess a gun until the commission of his first felony. Upon his conviction, however, Title VII would deny every assassin, murderer, thief and burglar of [sic] the right to possess a firearm in the future ....
“Despite all that has been said about the need for controlling firearms in this Country, no other amendment heretofore offered would get at the Oswalds or the Gaits. They are the types of people at which Title VII is aimed.” Id., at 14773-14774.
He proposed this amendment to remedy what he thought was an erroneous conception of the drafters of Title IV that there was “a constitutional doubt that the Federal Government could outlaw the mere possession of weapons.” Id., at 13868.
The intent to outlaw possession without regard to movement and to apply it to a case such as petitioner’s could not have been more clearly revealed than in a colloquy between Senators Long and McClellan:
“Mr. McClellan. I have not had an opportunity to study the amendment. . . . The thought that occurred to me, as the Senator explained it, is that if a man had been in the penitentiary, had been a felon, and had been pardoned, without any condition in his pardon to which the able Senator referred, granting him the right to bear arms, could that man own a shotgun for the purpose of hunting?
“Mr. Long of Louisiana. No, he could not. He could own it, but he could not possess it.
“Mr. McClellan. I beg the Senator’s pardon?
“Mr. Long of Louisiana. This amendment does not seek to do anything about who owns a firearm. He could not carry it around; he could not have it.
“Mr. McClellan. Could he have it in his home?
“Mr. Long of Louisiana. No, he could not.” Id., at 14774 (emphasis added).
It was after this colloquy that Senator McClellan suggested that the amendment be taken to conference for “further thought.” Ibid. While that appeared to be its destination, the House, after Senate passage of the bill, defeated a motion to go to conference and adopted the entire Senate bill, including Title VII, without alteration. Id., at 16077-16078, 16299-16300. Title VII thus became law without modification.
It seems apparent from the foregoing that the purpose of Title VII was to proscribe mere possession but that there was some concern about the constitutionality of such a statute. It was that observed ambivalence that made us unwilling in Bass to find the clear intent necessary to conclude that Congress meant to dispense with a nexus requirement entirely. However, we see no indication that Congress intended to require any more than the minimal nexus that the firearm have been, at some time, in interstate commerce. In particular, we find no support for petitioner’s theories.
Initially, we note our difficulty in fully comprehending petitioner’s conception of a nexus with commerce. In his view, if an individual purchases a gun before his conviction, the fact that the gun once traveled in commerce does not provide an adequate nexus. It is necessary, in addition, that the person also carry it in an interstate facility. If, however, one purchases the same gun from the same dealer one day after the conviction as opposed to one day before, somehow the nexus magically appears, regardless of whether the purchaser carries the gun in any particular place. Such an interpretation strains credulity. We find no evidence in either the language or the legislative history for such a construction.
More significantly, these theories create serious loopholes in the congressional plan to “make it unlawful for a firearm . . . to be in the possession of a convicted felon.” 114 Cong. Rec. 14773 (1968). A person who obtained a firearm prior to his conviction can retain it forever so long as he is not caught with it in an interstate facility. Indeed, petitioner’s interpretation allows an individual to go out in the period between his arrest and conviction and purchase and stockpile weapons with impunity. In addition, petitioner’s theories would significantly impede enforcement efforts. Those who do acquire guns after their conviction obviously do so surreptitiously and, as petitioner concedes, Tr. of Oral Arg. 19, it is very difficult as a practical matter to prove that such possession began after the possessor’s felony conviction.
Petitioner responds that the Government’s reading of the statute fails to give effect to all three terms of the statute— receive, possess, transport. He argues that someone guilty of receipt or transport will necessarily be guilty of possession and that, therefore, there was no need to include the other two offenses in the statute. While this contention is not frivolous, the fact is that petitioner’s theory is similarly vulnerable. By his proposed definitions, there are essentially only two crimes — receipt and transport. The possessor who acquires the weapon after his conviction is guilty of receipt and the one who is carrying the gun in commerce or at an interstate facility presumably is guilty of transporting. Thus, the definitions offered by both sides fail to give real substance to all three terms. The difference, however, is that the Government’s definition captures the essence of Congress’ intent, striking at the possession of weapons by people “who have no business possessing [them].” 114 Cong. Rec. 13869 (1968). Petitioner’s version, on the other hand, fails completely to fulfill the congressional purpose. It virtually eliminates the one offense on which Congress focused in enacting the law.
Finally, petitioner seeks to invoke the two principles of statutory construction relied on in Bass — lenity in construing criminal statutes and caution where the federal-state balance is implicated. Petitioner, however, overlooks the fact that we did not turn to these guides in Bass until we had concluded that “[a]fter 'seizing every thing from which aid can be derived,’... we are left with an ambiguous statute.” 404 U. S., at 347. The principles are applicable only when we are uncertain about the statute’s meaning and are not to be used “in complete disregard of the purpose of the legislature.” United States v. Bramblett, 348 U. S. 503, 510 (1955). Here, the intent of Congress is clear. We do not face the conflicting pull between the text and the history that confronted us in Bass. In this case, the history is unambiguous and the text consistent with it. Congress sought to reach possessions broadly, with little concern for when the nexus with commerce occurred. Indeed, it was a close question in Bass whether § 1202 (a) even required proof of any nexus at all in individual cases. The only reason we concluded it did was because it was not" “plainly and unmistakably” clear that it did not. 404 U. S., at 348. But there is no question that Congress intended no more than a minimal nexus requirement.
Since the District Court and the Court of Appeals employed the proper standard, we affirm the conviction of petitioner.
It is so ordered.
Mr. Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Section 1202 (a) reads in full:
“(a) Any person who—
“(1) has been convicted by a court of the United States or of a State or any political subdivision thereof of a felony, or
“(2) has been discharged from the Armed Forces under dishonorable conditions, or
“(3) has been adjudged by a court of the United States or of a State or any political subdivision thereof of being mentally incompetent, or
“(4) having been a citizen of the United States has renounced his citizenship, or
“(5) being an alien is illegally or unlawfully in the United States, “who receives, possesses, or transports in commerce or affecting commerce, after the date of enactment of this Act, any firearm shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than two years, or both.”
The Government’s evidence showed that the Colt revolver was shipped from Connecticut to North Carolina in 1969 and entered Virginia by unknown means, App. 6-7; that the Universal Enforcer came from Florida to Virginia in 1969 and was purchased by petitioner in 1970, id., at 7-8; that the M-l carbine rifle was sent to Maryland from Illinois in 1966, coming to Virginia by unknown means, id., at 8-9; and that the St. Etienne Ordinance revolver was manufactured in France in the 19th century and was somehow later brought into Virginia, id., at 9-10.
The Government showed that petitioner bought the Enforcer in 1970. The only evidence regarding acquisition of the other weapons came from petitioner. He claimed he purchased the Colt revolver in 1970, Tr. 88, and the M-l rifle in 1968, id., at 108. The French revolver, he claimed, was left in his house shortly before the state conviction but he was not sure by whom. Id., at 88,105.
Agreeing with the Fourth Circuit that proof of previous interstate movement of the firearm provides a sufficient commerce nexus for the possession offense are the Sixth Circuit, United States v. Jones, 533 F. 2d 1387 (1976), and the Tenth Circuit, United States v. Bumphus, 508 F. 2d 1405 (1975) (dictum). Three other Circuits have indicated that .such proof is adequate for a receipt offense but that the possession offense requires that the possession have a contemporaneous nexus with commerce. United States v. Ressler, 536 F. 2d 208 (CA7 1976); United States v. Bell, 524 F. 2d 202 (CA2 1975); United States v. Steeves, 525 F. 2d 33 (CA8 1975) (dictum). The Ninth Circuit apparently has an intra-Circuit conflict. Compare United States v. Malone, 538 F. 2d 250 (1976), and United States v. Cassity, 509 F. 2d 682 (1974), with United States v. Burns, 529 F. 2d 114 (1975).
The grant of the petition was limited to the question “[w]hether the Court erred in holding that a conviction under 18 U. S. C. App. § 1202 (a) for possession of a firearm in commerce or affecting commerce by a convicted felon is sustainable merely upon a showing that the possessed firearm has previously at any time however remote travelled in interstate commerce.” Petitioner’s Fourth Amendment claim was excluded.
As one commentator described our dilemma: “[T]he legislative history looked one way and the logic and structure of the statute another, while the language was not clear.” Stern, The Commerce Clause Revisited— The Federalization of Intrastate Crime, 15 Ariz. L. Rev. 271, 281 (1973).
See n. 11, infra.
The provisions of Title IV of the Omnibus Crime Control Act were re-enacted later that year without relevant change in the Gun Control Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 1213. For convenience, those provisions are referred to here collectively as Title IV.
Senator Long introduced it on the floor of the Senate on May 17, 1968. About a week later he explained his amendment again; there was brief debate; a vote was called; and the amendment was agreed to without having been referred to any committee. Accordingly, there were no legislative hearings and no committee reports. The amendment received only passing mention in the House discussion of the bill and never received committee consideration there either.
Title 18 U. S. C. App. § 1201 reads in its entirety:
“Congressional findings and declaration.
“The Congress hereby finds and declares that the receipt, possession, or transportation of a firearm by felons, veterans who are discharged under dishonorable conditions, mental incompetents, aliens who are illegally in the country, and former citizens who have renounced their citizenship, constitutes—
“(1) a burden on commerce or threat affecting the free flow of commerce,
“(2) a threat to the safety of the President of the United States and Vice President of the United States,
“(3) an impediment or a threat to the exercise of free speech and the free exercise of a religion guaranteed by the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and
“(4) a threat to the continued and effective operation of the Government of the United States and of the government of each State guaranteed by article IV of the Constitution.”
In Bass, the Court suggested that there might be a distinction between receipt and possession and that possession might require a stricter nexus with commerce. While such a requirement would make sense, see United States v. Bell, 524 F. 2d, at 209, further consideration has persuaded us that that was not the choice Congress made. Congress was not particularly concerned with the impact on commerce except as a means to insure the constitutionality of Title VII. State gun control laws were found “inadequate to bar possession of firearms from those most likely to use them for unlawful purposes” and Congress sought to buttress the States’ efforts. 114 Cong. Rec. 14774 (1968). All indications are that Congress meant to reach possessions broadly.
The argument sounds more like an effort to define possession, but the only issue before us is the nexus requirement. Petitioner has raised no objections to the trial court’s definition of possession. Even as a proposed definition of possession, however, there is no support for it in the history or text. While Senator Long used the word “acquire” a few times in discussing the amendment, it is clear his concern was with the dangers of certain people having guns, not with when they obtained them. Furthermore, his use of the term “acquire” is better explained as a synonym for “receive” than for “possess.” See United States v. Kelly, 519 F. 2d 251, 253 n. 3 (CA8 1975).
We note, however, that it is also arguable that one could receive and perhaps transport a weapon without necessarily exercising dominion and control over it.
Petitioner suggests that a possessor’s simply waiting in an interstate facility is not transporting. Even if that is true, we find it inconceivable, in view of the legislative history, that Congress intended the possession offense to have so limited a scope.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Powell
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondents are the representative plaintiffs in a class action brought under Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23 (b)(3). They sought to require petitioners, the defendants below, to help compile a list of the names and addresses of the members of the plaintiff class from records kept by the transfer agent for one of petitioners so that the individual notice required by Rule 23 (c) (2) could be sent. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the federal discovery rules, Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 26-37, authorize the District Court to order petitioners to assist in compiling the list and to bear the $16,000 expense incident thereto. We hold that Rule 23 (d), which concerns the conduct of class actions, not the discovery rules, empowers the District Court to direct petitioners to help compile such a list. We further hold that, although the District Court has some discretion in allocating the cost of complying with such an order, that discretion was abused in this case. We therefore reverse and remand.
I
Petitioner Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. (Fund), is an open-end diversified investment fund registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U. S. C. § 80a-l et seg. (1976 ed.). The Fund and its agents sell shares to the public at their net asset value plus a sales charge. Petitioner Oppenheimer Management Corp. (Management Corp.) manages the Fund’s investment. portfolio. Pursuant to an investment advisory agreement, the Fund pays Management Corp. a fee which is computed in part as a percentage of the Fund’s net asset value. Petitioner Oppenheimer & Co. is a brokerage firm that owns 82% of the stock of Management Corp., including all of its voting stock. The individual petitioners are directors or officers of the Fund or Management Corp., or partners in Oppenheimer & Co.
Respondents bought shares in the Fund at various times in 1968 and 1969. On March 26, May 12, and June 18, 1969, they filed three separate complaints, later consolidated, which alleged that the petitioners, other than the Fund, had violated federal securities laws in 1968 and 1969 by issuing or causing to be issued misleading prospectuses and annual reports about the Fund. In particular, respondents alleged that the prospectuses and reports failed to disclose the fact that the Fund invested in “restricted” securities, the risks involved in such investments, and the method used to value the restricted securities on the Fund’s books. They also alleged that the restricted securities had been overvalued on the Fund’s books, causing the Fund’s net asset value, and thus the price of shares in the Fund, to- be inflated artificially. On behalf of themselves and a class of purchasers, respondents sought to recover from petitioners, other than the Fund, the amount by which the price they paid for Fund shares exceeded the shares’ value.
In April 1973, respondents moved pursuant to Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23 (b) (3) for an order allowing them to'represent a class of plaintiffs consisting of all persons who bought shares in the Fund between March 28, 1968, and April 24, 1970. Relying on Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 54 F. R. D. 565 (SDNY 1972), respondents also sought an order directing petitioners to pay for the notice to absent class members required by Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23 (c)(2). On May 1, 1973, however, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the District Court in Eisen erred in ordering the defendants to pay 90% of the cost of notifying members of a Rule 23 (b)(3) plaintiff class. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin (Eisen III), 479 F. 2d 1005. Respondents thereupon deposed employees of the Fund’s transfer agent, which kept records from which the class members’ names and addresses could be derived, in order to develop information relevant to issues of manageability, identification, and methods of notice upon which the District Court would have to pass. These employees’ statements, together with information supplied by the Fund, established that the class proposed by respondents numbered about 121,000 persons. About 103,000 still held shares in the Fund, while some 18,000 had sold their shares after the end of the class period. Since about 171,000 persons currently held shares in the Fund, it appeared that approximately 68,000 current Fund shareholders were not members of the class.
The transfer agent’s employees also testified that in order to compile a list of the class members’ names and addresses, they would have to sort manually through a considerable volume of paper records, keypunch between 150,000 and 300,000 computer cards, and create eight new computer programs for use with records kept on computer tapes that either are in existence or would have to be created from the paper records. See App. 163-212. The cost of these operations was estimated in 1973 to exceed $16,000.
Having learned all this, and in the face of Eisen III, respondents moved to redefine the class to include only those persons who had bought Fund shares between March 28, 1968, and April 24, 1970, and who still held shares in the Fund. Respondents also proposed that the class notice be inserted in one of the Fund’s periodic mailings to its current shareholders, and they offered to pay the cost of printing and inserting the notices, which was about $5,000. App. 146. These proposals would have made it unnecessary to compile a separate list of the members of the redefined class in order to notify them. Petitioners opposed redefinition of the class on the ground that it arbitrarily would exclude about 18,000 former Fund shareholders who had bought shares during the relevant period, possibly to their prejudice. They also opposed including the class notice in a Fund mailing which would reach the 68,000 current shareholders who were not class members. This, petitioners feared, could set off a wave of selling to the detriment of the Fund.
On May 15, 1975, more than six years after the litigation began, the District Court ruled on the motions then pending. Sanders v. Levy, 20 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d 1218 (SDNY 1975). The court first held that the suit met the requirements for class-action treatment under Rule 23(b)(3). Id., at 1220-1221. It then rejected respondents’ proposed redefinition of the class because it “would involve an arbitrary reduction in the class.” Id., at 1221.' At the same time, however, the court held that “the cost of culling out the list of class members... is the responsibility of defendants.” Ibid. The only explanation given was that “the expense is relatively modest and it is defendants who are seeking to have the class defined in a manner which appears to require the additional expense.” Ibid. Finally, the court rejected respondents’ proposal that the class notice be included in a regular Fund mailing. Noting that the mailing would reach many current Fund shareholders who were not members of the class, the District Judge said that his “solution to this problem starts with my earlier ruling that it is the responsibility of defendants to cull out from their records a list of all class members and provide this list to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs will then have the responsibility to prepare the necessary notice and mail it at their expense.” Id., at 1222.
On petitioners’ appeal, a divided panel of the Court of Appeals reversed the District Court’s order insofar as it required petitioners to bear the cost required for the transfer agent to compile a list of the class members’ names and addresses. Sanders v. Levy, 558 F. 2d 636 (CA2 1976). The majority thought that Eisen IV, which had affirmed Eisen III in pertinent part, required respondents to pay this cost because the identification of class members is an integral step in the process of notifying them. 558 F. 2d, at 642. On rehearing en banc, however, the Court of Appeals reversed the panel’s decision and affirmed the District Court’s order by a vote of seven to three. Id., at 646. It thought that Eisen IV did not control this case because respondents might obtain the class members’ names and addresses under the federal discovery rules, Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 26-37. The en banc court further held that although Rule 26 (c) protects parties from “undue burden or expense” in complying with discovery requests, the District Court did not abuse its discretion under that Rule in requiring petitioners to bear this expense. 558 F. 2d, at 649-650.
By holding that the discovery rules apply to this case, the en banc court brought itself into conflict with the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which recently had held:
“The time and expense of gathering, [class members’] names and addresses is a necessary predicate to providing each with notice of the action’s pendency without which the action may not proceed [citing Bisen TV~\. Viewed in this context, it becomes strikingly clear that rather than being controlled by the federal civil discovery rules, identification of absentee class members’ names and addresses is part and parcel of rule 23 (c)(2)’s mandate that the class members receive The best notice practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort.’ ” In re Nissan Motor Corp. Antitrust Litigation, 552 F. 2d 1088, 1102 (1977).
In the Fifth Circuit’s view, Rule 23 (d), which empowers district courts to enter appropriate orders in the handling of class actions, is the procedural device by which a district court may enlist the aid of a defendant in identifying class members to whom notice must be sent. The Nissan court found it unnecessary to decide whether Bisen IV requires a representative plaintiff always to bear the cost of identifying class members. Since the representative plaintiffs could perform the required search through the defendants’ records as readily as the defendants themselves^ and since the search had to be performed in order to advance the representative plaintiffs’ case, they were required to perform it and thus to bear its cost. See 552 F. 2d, at 1102-1103.
We granted certiorari in the instant case to resolve the conflict that thus has arisen and to consider the underlying cost-allocation problems. 434 U. S. 919 (1977).
II
The issues in this case arise because of the notice requirement of Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23(c)(2), which provides in part:
“In any class action maintained under subdivision (b) (3), the court shall direct to the members of the class the best notice practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort.”
In Eisen IV, the Court held that the plain language of this Rule “requires that individual notice be sent to all class members who can be identified with reasonable effort.” 417 U. S., at 177. The Court also found no authority for a district court to hold a preliminary hearing on the merits of a suit in order to decide which party should bear the cost required to prepare and mail the class notice. Id., at 177-178. Instead, it held:
“In the absence of any support under Rule 23, [the representative plaintiff’s] effort to impose the cost of notice on [defendants] must fail. The usual rule is that a plaintiff must initially bear the cost of notice to the class.... Where, as here, the relationship between the parties is truly adversary, the plaintiff must pay for the cost of notice as part of the ordinary burden of financing his own suit.” Id., at 178-179.
In Eisen IV, the defendants had offered to provide a list of many of the class members’ names and addresses at their own expense in the first instance, if the representative plaintiff would prepare and mail individual notice to these class members. Eisen IV therefore did not present issues concerning either the procedure by which a representative plaintiff might require a defendant to help identify class members, or whether costs may be allocated to the defendant in such a case. The specific holding of Eisen IV is that where a representative plaintiff prepares and mails the class notice himself, he must bear the cost of doing so.
The parties in the instant case center much of their argument on the questions whether the discovery rules authorize a district court to order a defendant to help identify the members of a plaintiff class SO' that individual notice can be sent and, if so, which rule applies in this case. For the reasons stated in Part A below, we hold that Rule 23 (d), not the discovery rules, is the appropriate source of authority for such an order. This conclusion, however, is not dispositive of the cost-allocation question. As we explain in Part B, we think that where a defendant can perform one of the tasks necessary to send notice, such as identification, more efficiently than the representative plaintiff, the district court has discretion to order him to perform the task under Rule 23 (d). In such cases, the district court also has some discretion in allocating the cost of complying with its order. In Part C, however, we conclude that the District Court abused its discretion in this case.
A
Although respondents’ request resembles discovery in that it seeks to obtain information, we are convinced that it more properly is handled under Rule 23(d). The critical point is that the information is sought to facilitate the sending of notice rather than to define or clarify issues in the case.
The general scope of discovery is defined by Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 26 (b)(1) as follows:
“Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party, including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter. It is not ground for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”
The key phrase in this definition — “relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action” — has been construed broadly to encompass any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U. S. 495, 501 (1947). Consistently with the notice-pleading system established by the Rules, discovery is not limited to issues raised by the pleadings, for discovery itself is designed to help define and clarify the issues. Id., at 500-501. Nor is discovery limited to the merits of a case, for a variety of fact-oriented issues may arise during litigation that are not related to the merits.
At the same time, “discovery, like all matters of procedure, has ultimate and necessary boundaries.” Id., at 507. Discovery of matter not “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence” is not within the scope of Rule 26 (b)(1). Thus, it is proper to deny discovery of matter that is relevant only to claims or defenses that have been stricken, or to events that occurred before an applicable limitations period, unless the information sought is otherwise relevant to issues in the case. For the same reason, an amendment to Rule 26 (b) was required to bring within the scope of discovery the existence and contents of insurance agreements under which an insurer may be liable to satisfy a judgment against a defendant, for that information ordinarily cannot be considered, and would not lead to information that could be considered, by a court or jury in deciding any issues.
Respondents’ attempt to obtain the class members’ names and addresses cannot be forced into the concept of “relevancy” described above. The difficulty is that respondents do not seek this information for any bearing that it might have on issues in the case. See 558 F. 2d, at 653 (en banc dissent), If respondents had sought the information because of its relevance to the issues, they would not have been willing, as they were, to abandon their request if the District Court would accept their proposed redefinition of the class and method of sending notice. Respondents argued to the District Court that they desired this information to enable them to send the class notice, and not for any other purpose. Taking them at their word, it would appear that respondents’ request is not within the scope of Rule 26 (b)(1).
The en banc majority avoided holding that the class members’ names and addresses are "relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action” within the meaning of Rule 26 (b) (1) simply because respondents need this information in order to send the class notice. Tacitly acknowledging that discovery must be aimed at illuminating issues in the case, the court instead hypothesized that there is “a potential issue in all [Rule 23 (b) (3) class-action] litigation whether the required notice has properly been sent. A list of the names and addresses of the class members would of course be essential to the resolution of that issue.” 558 F. 2d, at 648. But aside from the fact that respondents themselves never pretended to be anticipating this “potential issue,” it is apparent that the “potential issue” cannot arise until respondents already have obtained the very information they seek. Nor do we perceive any other “potential issues” that could bring respondents’ request within the scope of legitimate discovery. In short, we do not think that the discovery rules are the right tool for this job.
Rule 23, on the other hand, deals comprehensively with class actions, and thus is the natural place to look for authority for orders regulating the sending of notice. It is clear that Rule 23 (d) vests power in the district court to order one of the parties to perform the tasks necessary to send notice.' Moreover, district courts sometimes have found it appropriate to order a defendant, rather than a representative plaintiff, to perform tasks other than identification that are necessary to the sending of notice. Since identification simply is another task that must be performed in order to send notice, we agree with the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit that Rule 23 (d) also authorizes a district court in appropriate circumstances to require a defendant’s cooperation in identifying the class members to whom notice must be sent. We therefore turn to a consideration of the circumstances in which such an order is appropriate and of how the cost of the defendant’s complying with such an order should be allocated.
B
Although the Fifth Circuit held that Rule 23 (d), not the discovery rules, authorizes a district court to order a defendant to provide information needed to identify class members to whom notice must be sent, it also suggested that principles embodied in the discovery rules for allocating the performance of tasks and payment of costs might be relevant to a district court’s exercise of discretion under Rule 23 (d). See Nissan, 552 F. 2d, at 1102. Petitioners and the en banc dissent, on the other hand, argue that Eisen IV always requires a representative plaintiff to pay all costs incident to sending notice, whether he or the defendant performs the required tasks. Eisen IV does not compel this latter conclusion, for it did not involve a situation where a defendant properly was ordered under Rule 23 (d) to perform any of the tasks necessary to sending the notice.
The first question that a district court must consider under Rule 23 (d) is which party should perform particular tasks necessary to send the class notice. The general rule must be that the representative plaintiff should perform the tasks, for it is he who seeks to maintain the suit as a class action and to represent other members of his class. In Eisen IV we noted the general principle that a party must bear the “burden of financing his own suit,” 417 U. S., at 179. Thus ordinarily there is no warrant for shifting the cost of the representative plaintiff’s performance of these tasks to the defendant.
In some instances, however, the defendant may be able to perform a necessary task with less difficulty or expense than could the representative plaintiff. In such cases, we think that the district court properly may exercise its discretion under Rule 23 (d) to order the defendant to perform the task in question. As the Nissan court recognized, in identifying the instances in which such an order may be appropriate, a rough analogy might usefully be drawn to practice under Rule 33 (c) of the discovery rules. Under that Rule, when one party directs an interrogatory to another party which can be answered by examination of the responding party’s business records, “it is a sufficient answer to such interrogatory to specify the records from which the answer may be derived or ascertained and to afford to the party serving the interrogatory reasonable opportunity to” examine and copy the records, if the burden of deriving the answer would be “substantially the same” for either party. Not unlike Eisen IV, this provision is intended to place the “burden of discovery upon its potential benefitee.” The holding of Nissan represents application of a similar principle, for when the court concluded that the representative plaintiffs could derive the names and addresses of the class members from the defendants’ records with substantially the same effort as the defendants, it required the representative plaintiffs to perform this task and hence to bear the cost. See supra, at 348. But where the burden of deriving the answer would not be “substantially the same,” and the task could be performed more efficiently by the responding party, the discovery rules normally require the responding party to derive the answer itself.
In those cases where a district court properly decides under Rule 23 (d) that a defendant rather than the representative plaintiff should perform a task necessary to send the class notice, the question that then will arise is which party should bear the expense. On one hand, it may be argued that this should be borne by the defendant because a party ordinarily must bear the expense of complying with orders properly issued by the district court; but Eisen IV strongly suggests that the representative plaintiff should bear this expense because it is he who seeks to maintain the suit as a class action. In this situation, the district court must exercise its discretion in deciding whether to leave the cost of complying with its order where it falls, on the defendant, or place it on the party that benefits, the representative plaintiff. Once again, a rough analogy might usefully be drawn to practice under the discovery rules. Under those rules, the presumption is that the responding party must bear the expense of complying with discovery requests, but he may invoke the district court’s discretion under Rule 26 (c) to grant orders protecting him from “undue burden or expense” in doing so, including orders conditioning discovery on the requesting party’s payment of the costs of discovery. The analogy necessarily is imperfect, however, because in the Rule 23 (d) context, the defendant’s own case rarely will be advanced by his having performed the tasks. Cf. n. 30, infra. Thus, one of the reasons for declining to shift costs under Rule 26 (c) usually will be absent in the Rule 23 (d) context. For this reason, a district court exercising its discretion under Rule 23 (d) should be considerably more ready to place the cost of the defendant’s performing an ordered task on the representative plaintiff, who derives the benefit, than under Rule 26 (c). In the usual case, the test should be whether the expense is substantial, rather than, as under Rule 26 (c), whether it is "undue.”
Nevertheless, in some instances, the expense involved maybe so insubstantial as not to warrant the effort required to calculate it and shift it to the representative plaintiff. In Nissan, for example, the court did not find it necessary to direct the representative plaintiffs to reimburse the defendants for the expense of producing their files for inspection. In other cases, it may be appropriate to leave the cost where it falls because the task ordered is one that the defendant must perform in any event in the ordinary course of its business. Although we do not attempt to catalogue the instances in which a district court might be justified in placing the expense on the defendant, we caution that courts must not stray too far from the principle underlying Eisen TV that the representative plaintiff should bear all costs relating to the sending of notice because it is he who seeks to maintain the suit as a class action.
C
In this case, we think the District Court abused its discretion in requiring petitioners to bear the expense of identifying class members. The records containing the needed information are kept by the transfer agent, not petitioners. Since petitioners apparently have the right to control these records, and since the class members can be identified only by reference to them, the District Court acted within its authority under Rule 23 (d) in ordering petitioners to direct the transfer agent to make the records available to respondents. The preparation of the desired list requires, as indicated above, the manual sorting out of names and addresses from old records maintained on paper, the keypunching of up to 300,000 computer cards, and the creation of new computer programs for use with extant tapes and tapes that would have to be created from the paper records. It appears that neither petitioners nor respondents can perform these tasks, for both sides assume that the list can be generated only by hiring the services of a third party, the transfer agent, for a sum exceeding $16,000. As the expense of hiring the transfer agent would be no greater for respondents, who seek the information, than for petitioners, respondents should bear the expense. See Nissan, 552 F. 2d, at 1102-1103.
The District Court offered two reasons why petitioners should pay the transfer agent, but neither is persuasive. First, the court thought that petitioners should bear this cost because it was their opposition to respondents’ proposed redefinition of the class and method of sending notice that made it necessary to incur the cost. A district court necessarily has some discretion in deciding the composition of a proper class and how notice should be sent. Nor is it improper for the court to consider the potential impact that rulings on these issues may have on the expense that the representative plaintiff must bear in order to send the notice. See Eisen IV, 417 U. S., at 179 n. 16; id., at 179-181 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part). But it is neither fair nor good policy to penalize a defendant for prevailing on an argument against a representative plaintiff’s proposals. If a defendant’s argument has merit, it should be accepted regardless of his willingness to bear the extra expense that its acceptance would require. Otherwise, a defendant may be discouraged from advancing arguments entirely appropriate to the protection of his rights or the rights of absent class members.
The potential for inequity appears to have been realized in this case. The District Court seems to have agreed with petitioners that respondents' proposed redefinition of the class was improper. Otherwise its actions would be difficult to fathom, for its rejection of the proposed redefinition increased the cost to respondents as well as petitioners. By the same token, if the District Court believed that sending the notice to current Fund shareholders who were not class members might harm the Fund, it should not have required the Fund to buy protection from this threat. Yet it must have believed that the Fund would be harmed, for otherwise there was no reason to reject respondents' proposal and thus increase the cost that respondents themselves would have to bear. For these reasons, we hold that the District Court erred in linking the questions of class definition and method of notice to the cost-allocation question.
The second reason advanced by the District Court was that $16,000 is a “relatively modest” sum, presumably in comparison to the Fund's total assets, which exceed $500 million. Although in some circumstances the ability of a party to bear a burden may be a consideration, the test in this respect normally should be whether the cost is substantial; not whether it is “modest” in relation to ability to pay. In the context of a lawsuit in which the defendants deny all liability, the imposition on them of a threshold expense of $16,000 to enable the plaintiffs to identify their own class hardly can be viewed as an insubstantial burden. Cf. Eisen IV, supra, at 176. As the expenditure would benefit only respondents, we think that the amount of money involved here would cut strongly against the District Court’s holding, even if the principle of Nissan did not control.
The panel dissent and the en banc majority suggested several additional reasons to justify the District Court’s order, none of which we find persuasive. Both opinions suggest that the fact that part of these records are kept on computer tapes justifies imposing a greater burden on petitioners than might be imposed on a party whose records are kept in another form. Thus, the panel dissent warned that potential defendants may be tempted to use computers “irretrievably [to bury] information to immunize business activity from later scrutiny,” 558 F. 2d, at 645 n, 1, and the en banc majority argued that even where no bad motive is present, “complex electronic processes may be required to extract information which might have been obtainable through a minimum of effort had different systems been used.” Id., at 649.
We do not think these reasons justify the order in this case. There is no indication or contention that these petitioners have acted in bad faith to conceal information from respondents. In addition, although it may be expensive to retrieve information stored in computers when no program yet exists for the particular job, there is no reason to think that the same information could be extracted any less expensively if the records were kept in less modern forms. Indeed, one might expect the reverse to be true, for otherwise computers would not have gained such widespread use in the storing and handling of information. Finally, the suggestion that petitioners should have used “different systems” to keep their records borders on the frivolous. Apart from the fact that no one has suggested what “different systems” petitioners should have used, we do not think a defendant should be penalized for not maintaining his records in the form most convenient to some potential future litigants whose identity and perceived needs could not have been anticipated. See id., at 654 (en banc dissent).
Respondents also contend that petitioners should be required to bear the identification expense because they are alleged to have breached a fiduciary duty to respondents and their class. See also id., at 645-646 (panel dissent). Although we had no occasion in Eisen IV to consider this argument, see 417 U. S., at 178, and n. 15, suggestions to this effect have met with trenchant criticism elsewhere. A bare allegation of wrongdoing, whether by breach of fiduciary duty or otherwise, is not a fair reason for requiring a defendant to undertake financial burdens and risks to further a plaintiff’s case. Nor would it be in the interests of the class of persons to whom a fiduciary duty is owed to require them, through the fiduciary, to help finance every suit by one of their number that alleges a breach of fiduciary duty, without regard to whether the suit has any merit.
Ill
Given that respondents can obtain the information sought here by paying the transfer agent the same amount that petitioners would have to pay, that the information must be obtained to comply with respondents’ obligation to provide notice to their class, and that no special circumstances have been shown to warrant requiring petitioners to bear the expense, we hold that the District Court abused its discretion in not requiring respondents to pay the transfer agent to identify the members of their own class. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
The complaints alleged violations of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U. S. C. § 77a et seq. (1976 ed.), the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U. S. C. §78a et seq. (1976 ed.), the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U. S. C. § 80a-l et seq. (1976 ed.), and rules promulgated under these Acts. They also alleged pendent state-law claims of fraud and breach of fiduciary duty.
“Restricted” securities are “securities acquired directly or indirectly from the issuer thereof, or from an affiliate of such issuer, in a transaction or chain of transactions not involving any public offering....” 17 CFR § 230.144 (a) (3) (1977). The public sale or distribution of such securities is restricted under the Securities Act of 1933 until the securities are registered or an exemption from registration becomes available. See 15 U. S. C. §§ 77d, 77e (1976 ed.).
Later in the proceedings respondents’ counsel estimated that the average recovery per class member would be about $15, and that the aggregate recovery might be $1% million.
In a separate count of their complaints, respondents also sought derivative relief on behalf of the Fund to recover excessive management fees paid by the Fund to Management Corp. as a result of the Fund’s allegedly inflated net asset value.
Petitioners denied the material allegations of the complaints. In addition, they alleged a setoff against respondents and their class to the extent that the price paid by the Fund to redeem shares had exceeded their value. The non-Fund petitioners also alleged that if they were liable to respondents and their class for overvaluation of Fund shares, then the Fund would be liable to them for excess amounts received by the Fund as a result of the overvaluation.
Petitioners submitted the sworn affidavit of Robert Galli, Secretary of the Fund and Administrative Vice President and Secretary of Management Corp., which stated that this was a real possibility in light of “the current loss of investor confidence in the stock market and the uncertain conditions under which that market exists at this time.” App. 130-131.
The District Court also rejected a proposal by petitioners to set April 25, 1969, as the closing date of the class period, holding that respondents had raised triable claims of misrepresentations after that date. 20 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d, at 1221-1222.
The court subsequently modified this order to allow the notice to class members who still were Fund shareholders to be inserted in the envelopes of a periodic Fund mailing, “provided that the notices are sent only to class members and that plaintiffs pay in full the Fund’s extra costs of mailing, including the costs of segregating the envelopes going to the class members from the envelopes going to other Fund shareholders.” At the same time,, the court held that the Fund should bear the identification costs in the first instance, “without prejudice to the right of this defendant, at the conclusion of the action, to make whatever claim it would be legally entitled to make regarding reimbursement by another party.” The court denied the Fund’s request that respondents be required to post bond for the identification costs.
All three members of the panel agreed that the order allocating the expense of identification was appealable under the collateral-order doctrine of Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541 (1949). 558 F. 2d, at 638-639; id,., at 643 (Hays, J., dissenting in part). We agree. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin (Eisen IV), 417 U. S. 156, 171-172 (1974). The panel also unanimously affirmed the District Court’s ruling that the suit could proceed as a class action. 558 F. 2d, at 642-643; id., at 643 (Hays, J., dissenting in part). This issue is not before us.
The panel majority also suggested that the Fund should not be required to bear this expense because it, unlike the other petitioners, was not named as a defendant in the class-action portion of this suit. See id., at 640. The Fund itself, which is in the position of a defendant because it ultimately may be liable for any damages that respondents and their class recover, see n
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
I
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
We review in this case the validity of the proposition that there is under the Fourth Amendment a “distinction between merely evidentiary materials, on the one hand, which may not be seized either under the authority of a search warrant or during the course of a search incident to arrest, and on the other hand, those objects which may validly be seized including the instrumentalities and means by which a crime is committed, the fruits of crime such as stolen property, weapons by which escape of the person arrested might be effected, and property the possession of which is a crime.”
A Maryland court sitting without a jury convicted respondent of armed robbery. Items of his clothing, a cap, jacket,- and trousers, among other things, were seized during a search of his home, and were admitted in evidence without objection. After unsuccessful state court proceedings, he sought and was denied federal habeas corpus relief in the District Court for Maryland. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed. 363 F. 2d 647. The Court of Appeals believed that Harris v. United States, 331 U. S. 145, 154, sustained the validity of the search, but held that respondent was correct in his contention that the clothing seized was improperly admitted in evidence because the items had “evidential value only” and therefore were not lawfully subject to seizure. We granted certiorari. 385 U. S. 926. We reverse.
I.
About 8 a. m. on March 17, 1962, an armed robber entered the business premises of the Diamond Cab Company in Baltimore, Maryland. He took some $363 and ran. Two cab drivers in the vicinity, attracted by shouts of “Holdup,” followed the man to 2111 Cocoa Lane. One driver notified the company dispatcher by radio that the man was a Negro about 5'8" tall, wearing a light cap and dark jacket, and that he had entered the house on Cocoa Lane. The dispatcher relayed the information to police who were proceeding to the scene of the robbery. Within minutes, police arrived at the house in a number of patrol cars. An officer knocked and announced their presence. Mrs. Hayden answered, and the officers told her they believed that a robber had entered the house, and asked to search the house. She offered no objection.
The officers spread out through the first and second floors and the cellar in search of the robber. Hayden was found in an upstairs bedroom feigning sleep. He was arrested when the officers on the first floor and in the cellar reported that no other man was in the house. Meanwhile an officer was attracted to an adjoining bathroom by the noise of running water, and discovered a shotgun and a pistol in a flush tank; another officer who, according to the District Court, “was searching the cellar for a man or the money” found in a washing machine a jacket and trousers of the type the fleeing man was said to have worn. A clip of ammunition for the pistol and a cap were found under the mattress of Hayden’s bed, and ammunition for the shotgun was found in a bureau drawer in Hayden’s room. All these items of evidence were introduced against respondent at his trial.
II.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that neither the entry without warrant to search for the robber, nor the search for him without warrant was invalid. Under the circumstances of this case, “the exigencies of the situation made that course imperative.” McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451, 456. The police were informed that an armed robbery had taken place, and that the suspect had entered 2111 Cocoa Lane less than five minutes before they reached it. They acted reasonably when they entered the house and began to search for a man of the description they had been given and for weapons which he had used in the robbery or might use against them. The Fourth Amendment does not require police officers to delay in the course of an investigation if to do so would gravely endanger their lives or the lives of others. Speed here was essential, and only a thorough search of the house for persons and weapons could have insured that Hayden was the only man present and that the police had control of all weapons which could be used against them or to effect an escape.
We do not rely upon Harris v. United States, supra, in sustaining the validity of the search. The principal issue in Harris was whether the search there could properly be regarded as incident to the lawful arrest, since Harris was in custody before the search was made and the evidence seized. Here, the seizures occurred prior to or immediately contemporaneous with Hayden’s arrest, as part of an effort to find a suspected felon, armed, within the house into which he had run only minutes before the police arrived. The permissible scope of search must, therefore, at the least, be as broad as may reasonably be necessary to prevent the dangers that the suspect at large in the house may resist or escape.
It is argued that, while the weapons, ammunition, and cap may have been seized in the course of a search for weapons, the officer who seized the clothing was searching neither for the suspect nor for weapons when he looked into the washing machine in which he found the clothing. But even if we assume, although we do not decide, that the exigent circumstances in this case made lawful a search without warrant only for the suspect or his weapons, it cannot be said on this record that the officer who found the clothes in the washing machine was not searching for weapons. He testified that he was searching for the man or the money, but his failure to state explicitly that he was searching for weapons, in the absence of a specific question to that effect, can hardly be accorded controlling weight. He knew that the robber was armed and he did not know that some weapons had been found at the time he opened the machine. In these circumstances the inference that he was in fact also looking for weapons is fully justified.
III.
We come, then, to the question whether, even though the search was lawful, the Court of Appeals was correct in holding that the seizure and introduction of the items of clothing violated the Fourth Amendment because they are “mere evidence.” The distinction made by some of our cases between seizure of items of evidential value only and seizure of instrumentalities, fruits, or contraband has been criticized by courts and commentators. The Court of Appeals, however, felt “obligated to adhere to it.” 363 F. 2d, at 655. We today reject the distinction as based on premises no longer accepted as rules governing the application of the Fourth Amendment.
We have examined on many occasions the history and purposes of the Amendment. It was a reaction to the evils of the use of the general warrant in England and the writs of assistance in the Colonies, and was intended to protect against invasions of “the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life,” Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 630, from searches under indiscriminate, general authority. Protection of these interests was assured by prohibiting all “unreasonable” searches and seizures, and by requiring the use of warrants, which particularly describe “the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized,” thereby interposing “a magistrate between the citizen and the police,” McDonald v. United States, supra, 335 U. S., at 455.
Nothing in the language of the Fourth Amendment supports the distinction between “mere evidence” and instrumentalities, fruits of crime, or contraband. On its face, the provision assures the “right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects . . . ,” without regard to the use to which any of these things are applied. This “right of the people” is certainly unrelated to the “mere evidence” limitation. Privacy is disturbed no more by a search directed to a purely evidentiary object than it is by a search directed to an instrumentality, fruit, or contraband. A magistrate can intervene in both situations, and the requirements of probable cause and specificity can be preserved intact. Moreover, nothing in the nature of property seized as evidence renders it more private than property seized, for example, as an instrumentality; quite the opposite may be true. Indeed, the distinction is wholly irrational, since, depending on the circumstances, the same “papers and effects” may be “mere evidence” in one case and “instrumentality” in another. See Comment, 20 U. Chi. L. Rev. 319, 320-322 (1953).
In Gouled v. United States, 255 U. S. 298, 309, the Court said that search warrants “may not be used as a means of gaining access to a man’s house or office and papers solely for the purpose of making search to secure evidence to be used against him in a criminal or penal proceeding . . . .” The Court derived from Boyd v. United States, supra, the proposition that warrants “may be resorted to only when a primary right to such search and seizure may be found in the interest which the public or the complainant may have in the property to be seized, or in the right to the possession of it, or when a valid exercise of the police power renders possession of the property by the accused unlawful and provides that it may be taken,” 255 U. S., at 309; that is, when the property is an instrumentality or fruit of crime, or contraband. Since it was “impossible to say, on the record . . . that the Government had any interest” in the papers involved “other than as evidence against the accused . . . ,” “to permit them to be used in evidence would be, in effect, as ruled in the Boyd Case, to compel the defendant to become a witness against himself.” Id., at 311.
The items of clothing involved in this case are not “testimonial” or “communicative” in nature, and their introduction therefore did not compel respondent to become a witness against himself in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757. This case thus does not require that we consider whether there are items of evidential value whose very nature precludes them from being the object of a reasonable search and seizure.
The Fourth Amendment ruling in Gouled was based upon the dual, related premises that historically the right to search for and seize property depended upon the assertion by the Government of a valid claim of superior interest, and that it was not enough that the purpose of the search and seizure was to obtain evidence to use in apprehending and convicting criminals. The common law of search and seizure after Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029, reflected Lord Camden’s view, derived no doubt from the political thought of his time, that the “great end, for which men entered into society, was to secure their property.” Id., at 1066. Warrants were “allowed only where the primary right to such a search and seizure is in the interest which the public or complainant may have in the property seized.” Lasson, The History and Development of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 133-134. Thus stolen property — the fruits of crime — was always subject to seizure. And the power to search for stolen property was gradually extended to cover “any property which the private citizen was not permitted to possess,” which included instrumentalities of crime (because of the early notion that items used in crime were forfeited to the State) and contraband. Kaplan, Search and Seizure: A No-Man’s Land in the Criminal Law, 49 Calif. L. Rev. 474, 475. No separate governmental interest in seizing evidence to apprehend and convict criminals was recognized; it was required that some property interest be asserted. The remedial structure also reflected these dual premises. Trespass, replevin, and the other means of redress for persons aggrieved by searches and seizures, depended upon proof of a superior property interest. And since a lawful seizure presupposed a superior claim, it was inconceivable that a person could recover property lawfully seized. As Lord Camden pointed out in Entick v. Carrington, supra, at 1066, a general warrant enabled “the party’s own property [to be] seized before and without conviction, and he has no power to reclaim his goods, even after his innocence is cleared by acquittal.”
The premise that property interests control the right of the Government to search and seize has been discredited. Searches and seizures may be “unreasonable” within the Fourth Amendment even though the Government asserts a superior property interest at common law. We have recognized that the principal object of the Fourth Amendment is the protection of privacy rather than property, and have increasingly discarded fictional and procedural barriers rested on property concepts. See Jones v. United States, 362 U. S. 257, 266; Silverman v. United States, 365 U. S. 505, 511. This shift in emphasis from property to privacy has come about through a subtle interplay of substantive and procedural reform. The remedial structure at the time even of Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383, was arguably explainable in property terms. The Court held in Weeks that a defendant could petition before trial for the return of his illegally seized property, a proposition not necessarily inconsistent with Adams v. New York, 192 U. S. 585, which held in effect that the property issues involved in search and seizure are collateral to a criminal proceeding. The remedial structure finally escaped the bounds of common law property limitations in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U. S. 385, and Gouled v. United States, supra, when it became established that suppression might be sought during a criminal trial, and under circumstances which would not sustain an action in trespass or replevin. Recognition that the role of the Fourth Amendment was to protect against invasions of privacy demanded a remedy to condemn the seizure in Silverthorne, although no possible common law claim existed for the return of the copies made by the Government of the papers it had seized. The remedy of suppression, necessarily involving only the limited, functional consequence of excluding the evidence from trial, satisfied that demand.
The development of search and seizure law since Silver-thorne and Gouled is replete with examples of the transformation in substantive law brought about through the interaction of the felt need to protect privacy from unreasonable invasions and the flexibility in rulemaking made possible by the remedy of exclusion. We have held, for example, that intangible as well as tangible evidence may be suppressed, Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471, 485-486, and that an actual trespass under local property law is unnecessary to support a remediable violation of the Fourth Amendment, Silverman v. United States, supra. In determining whether someone is a “person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure” we have refused “to import into the law . . . subtle distinctions, developed and refined by the common law in evolving the body of private property law which, more than almost any other branch of law, has been shaped by distinctions whose validity is largely historical.” Jones v. United States, supra, 362 U. S., at 266. And with particular relevance here, we have given recognition to the interest in privacy despite the complete absence of a property claim by suppressing the very items which at common law could be seized with impunity: stolen goods, Henry v. United States, 361 U. S. 98; instrumentalities, Beck v. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89; McDonald v. United States, supra; and contraband, Trupiano v. United States, 334 U. S. 699; Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108.
The premise in Gouled that government may not seize evidence simply for the purpose of proving crime has likewise been discredited. The requirement that the Government assert in addition some property interest in material it seizes has long been a fiction, obscuring the reality that government has an interest in solving crime. Schmerber settled the proposition that it is reasonable, within the terms of the Fourth Amendment, to conduct otherwise permissible searches for the purpose of obtaining evidence which would aid in apprehending and convicting criminals. The requirements of the Fourth Amendment can secure the same protection of privacy whether the search is for “mere evidence” or for fruits, instrumentalities or contraband. There must, of course, be a nexus — automatically provided in the case of fruits, instrumentalities or contraband — between the item to be seized and criminal behavior. Thus in the case of “mere evidence,” probable cause must be examined in terms of cause to believe that the evidence sought will aid in a particular apprehension or conviction. In so doing, consideration of police purposes will be required. Cf. Kremen v. United States, 353 U. S. 346. But no such problem is presented in this case. The clothes found in the washing machine matched the description of those worn by the robber and the police therefore could reasonably believe that the items would aid in the identification of the culprit.
The remedy of suppression, moreover, which made possible protection of privacy from unreasonable searches without regard to proof of a superior property interest, likewise provides the procedural device necessary for allowing otherwise permissible searches and seizures conducted solely to obtain evidence of crime. For just as the suppression of evidence does not entail a declaration of superior property interest in the person aggrieved, thereby enabling him to suppress evidence unlawfully seized despite his inability to demonstrate such an interest (as with fruits, instrumentalities, contraband), the refusal to suppress evidence carries no declaration of superior property interest in the State, and should thereby enable the State to introduce evidence lawfully seized despite its inability to demonstrate such an interest. And, unlike the situation at common law, the owner of property would not be rendered remediless if “mere evidence” could lawfully be seized to prove crime. For just as the suppression of evidence does not in itself necessarily entitle the aggrieved person to its return (as, for example, contraband), the introduction of “mere evidence” does not in itself entitle the State to its retention. Where public officials “unlawfully seize or hold a citizen’s realty or chattels, recoverable by appropriate action at law or in equity . . . ,” the true owner may “bring his possessory action to reclaim that which is wrongfully withheld.” Land v. Dollar, 330 U. S. 731, 738. (Emphasis added.) See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U. S. 465, 474.
The survival of the Gouled distinction is attributable more to chance than considered judgment. Legislation has helped perpetuate it. Thus, Congress has never authorized the issuance of search warrants for the seizure of mere evidence of crime. See Davis v. United States, 328 U. S. 582, 606 (dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter). Even in the Espionage Act of 1917, where Congress for the first time granted general authority for the issuance of search warrants, the authority was limited to fruits of crime, instrumentalities, and certain contraband. 40 Stat. 228. Gouled concluded, needlessly it appears, that the Constitution virtually limited searches and seizures to these categories. After Gouled, pressure to test this conclusion was slow to mount. Rule 41 (b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure incorporated the Gouled categories as limitations on federal authorities to issue warrants, and Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, only recently made the “mere evidence” rule a problem in the state courts. Pressure against the rule in the federal courts has taken the form rather of broadening the categories of evidence subject to seizure, thereby creating considerable confusion in the law. See, e. g., Note, 54 Geo. L. J. 593, 607-621 (1966).
The rationale most frequently suggested for the rule preventing the seizure of evidence is that “limitations upon the fruit to be gathered tend to limit the quest itself.” United States v. Poller, 43 F. 2d 911, 914 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1930). But privacy “would be just as well served by a restriction on search to the even-numbered days of the month. . . . And it would have the extra advantage of avoiding hair-splitting questions . . . .” Kaplan, op. cit. supra, at 479. The “mere evidence” limitation has spawned exceptions so numerous and confusion so great, in fact, that it is questionable whether it affords meaningful protection. But if its rejection does enlarge the area of permissible searches, the intrusions are nevertheless made after fulfilling the probable cause and particularity requirements of the Fourth Amendment and after the intervention of “a neutral and detached magistrate . . . .” Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 14. The Fourth Amendment allows intrusions upon privacy-under these circumstances, and there is no viable reason to distinguish intrusions to secure “mere evidence” from intrusions to secure fruits, instrumentalities, or contraband.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Reversed.
Mr. Justice Black concurs in the result.
Harris v. United States, 331 U. S. 145, 154; see also Gouled v. United States, 255 U. S. 298; United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U. S. 452, 465-466; United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56, 64, n. 6; Abel v. United States, 362 U. S. 217, 234-235.
Hayden did not appeal from his conviction. He first sought relief by an application under the Maryland Post Conviction Procedure Act which was denied without hearing. The Maryland Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a hearing. 233 Md. 613, 195 A. 2d 692. The trial court denied relief after hearing, concluding “that the search of his home and the seizure of the articles in question were proper.” His application for federal habeas corpus relief resulted, after hearing in the District Court, in the same conclusion.
The State claims that, since Hayden failed to raise the search and seizure question at trial, he deliberately bypassed state remedies and should be denied an opportunity to assert his claim in federal court. See Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U. S. 443; Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391. Whether or not the Maryland Court of Appeals actually intended, when it reversed the state trial court’s denial of post-conviction relief, that Hayden be afforded a hearing on the merits of his claim, it is clear that the trial court so understood the order of the Court of Appeals. A hearing was held in the state courts, and the claim denied on the merits. In this circumstance, the Fourth Circuit was correct in rejecting the State’s deliberate-bypassing claim. The deliberate-bypass rule is applicable only “to an applicant who has deliberately by-passed the orderly procedure of the state courts and in so doing has forfeited his state court remedies.” Fay v. Noia, supra, 372 U. S., at 438. (Emphasis added.) But see Nelson v. California, 346 F. 2d 73, 82 (C. A. 9th Cir. 1965).
The state postconviction court found that Mrs. Hayden “gave the policeman permission to enter the home.” The federal habeas corpus court stated it “would be justified in accepting the findings of historical fact made by Judge Sodaro on that issue but concluded that resolution of the issue would be unnecessary, because the officers were “justified in entering and searching the house for the felon, for his weapons and for the fruits of the robbery.”
The officer was asked in the District Court whether he found the money. He answered that he did not, and stated: “By the time I had gotten down into the basement I heard someone say upstairs, 'There’s a man up here.’ ” He was asked: “What did you do then?” and answered: “By this time I had already discovered some clothing which fit the description of the clothing worn by the subject that we were looking for . . . .” It is clear from the record and from the findings that the weapons were found after or at the same time the police found Hayden.
People v. Thayer, 63 Cal. 2d 635, 408 P. 2d 108, cert. denied, 384 U. S. 908; State v. Bisaccia, 45 N. J. 504, 213 A. 2d 185. Compare United States v. Poller, 43 F. 2d 911, 914 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1930).
E. g., Chafee, The Progress of the Law, 1919-1922, 35 Harv. L. Rev. 673 (1922); Kamisar, The Wiretapping-Eavesdropping Problem: A Professor’s View, 44 Minn. L. Rev. 891, 914-918 (1960); Kaplan, Search and Seizure: A No-Man’s Land in the Criminal Law, 49 Calif. L. Rev. 474, 478 (1961); Comment, 45 N. C. L. Rev. 512 (1967); Comment, 66 Col. L. Rev. 355 (1966); Comment, 20 U. Chi. L. Rev. 319 (1953); Comment, 31 Yale L. J. 518 (1922). Compare, e. g., Fraenkel, Concerning Searches and Seizures, 34 Harv. L. Rev. 361 (1921); Note, 54 Geo. L. J. 593 (1966).
This Court has approved the seizure and introduction of items having only evidential value without, however, considering the validity of the distinction rejected today. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757; Cooper v. California, 386 U. S. 58.
E. g., Stanford v. Texas, 379 U. S. 476, 481-485; Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U. S. 717, 724-729; Frank v. Maryland, 359 U. S. 360, 363-365. See generally Lasson, The History and Development of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution (1937); Landynski, Search and Seizure and the Supreme Court (1966).
Both Weeks and Adams were written by Justice Day, and joined by several of the same Justices, including Justice Holmes.
At common law the Government did assert a superior property interest when it searched lawfully for stolen property, since the procedure then followed made it necessary that the true owner swear that his goods had been taken. But no such procedure need be followed today; the Government may demonstrate probable cause and lawfully search for stolen property even though the true owner is unknown or unavailable to request and authorize the Government to assert his interest. As to instrumentalities, the Court in Gouled allowed their seizure, not because the Government had some property interest in them (under the ancient, fictitious forfeiture theory), but because they could be used to perpetrate further crime. 255 U. S., at 309. The same holds true, of course, for “mere evidence”; the prevention of crime is served at least as much by allowing the Government to identify and capture the criminal, as it is by allowing the seizure of his instrumentalities. Finally, contraband is indeed property in which the Government holds a superior interest, but only because the Government decides to vest such an interest in itself. And while there may be limits to what may be declared contraband, the concept is hardly more than a form through which the Government seeks to prevent and deter crime.
Gouled was decided on certified questions. The only question which referred to the Espionage Act of 1917 stated: “Are papers of . . . evidential value . . . , when taken under search warrants issued pursuant to Act of June 15, 1917, from the house or office of the person so suspected, — seized and taken in violation of the 4th amendment?” Gouled v. United States, No. 250, Oct. Term, 1920, Certificate, p. 4. Thus the form in which the case was certified made it difficult if not impossible “to limit the decision to the sensible proposition of statutory construction, that Congress had not as yet authorized the seizure of purely evidentiary material.” Chafee, op. cit. supra, at 699. The Government assumed the validity of petitioner’s argument that Entick v. Carrington, Boyd v. United States, and other authorities established the constitutional illegality of seizures of private papers for use as evidence. Gouled v. United States, supra, Brief for the United States, p. 50. It argued, complaining of the absence of a record, that the papers introduced in evidence were instrumentalities of crime. The Court ruled that the record before it revealed no government interest in the papers other than as evidence against the accused. 255 U. S., at 311.
Significantly, Entick v. Carrington itself has not been read by the English courts as making unlawful the seizure of all papers for use as evidence. See Dillon v. O’Brien, 20 L. R. Ir. 300; Elias v. Pasmore, [1934] 2 K. B. 164. Although Dillon, decided in 1887, involved instrumentalities, the court did not rely on this fact, but rather on “the interest which the State has in a person guilty (or reasonably believed to be guilty) of a crime being brought to justice . . . .” 20 L. R. Ir., at 317.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
A
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Stevens
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented is whether a defendant’s acceptance of a prosecutor’s proposed plea bargain creates a constitutional right to have the bargain specifically enforced.
In the late evening of May 22, 1970, three members of a family returned home to find a burglary in progress. Shots were exchanged resulting in the daughter’s death and the wounding of the father and respondent — one of the burglars. Respondent was tried and convicted on three charges: burglary, assault, and murder. The murder conviction was set aside by the Arkansas Supreme Court, Johnson v. State, 252 Ark. 1113, 482 S. W. 2d 600 (1972). Thereafter, plea negotiations ensued..
At the time of the negotiations respondent was serving his concurrent 21- and 12-year sentences on the burglary and assault convictions. On Friday, October 27, 1972, a deputy prosecutor proposed to respondent’s attorney that in exchange for a plea of guilty to the charge of accessory after a felony murder, the prosecutor would recommend a sentence of 21 years to be served concurrently with the burglary and assault sentences. On the following day, counsel communicated the offer to respondent who agreed to accept it. On the next Monday the lawyer called the prosecutor “and communicated [respondent’s] acceptance of the offer.” App. 10. The prosecutor then told counsel that a mistake had been made and withdrew the offer. He proposed instead that in exchange for a guilty plea he would recommend a sentence of 21 years to be served consecutively to respondent’s other sentences.
Respondent rejected the new offer and elected to stand trial. On the second day of trial, the judge declared a mistrial and plea negotiations resumed, ultimately resulting in respondent’s acceptance of the prosecutor’s second offer. In accordance with the plea bargain, the state trial judge imposed a 21-year sentence to be served consecutively to the previous sentences.
After exhausting his state remedies, respondent filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U. S. C. §2254. The District Court dismissed the petition, finding that respondent had understood the consequences of his guilty plea, that he had received the effective assistance of counsel, and that because the evidence did not establish that respondent had detrimentally relied on the prosecutor’s first proposed plea agreement, respondent had no right to enforce it. The Court of Appeals reversed, 707 F. 2d 323 (CA8 1983), over Judge John R. Gibson’s dissent. The majority concluded that “fairness” precluded the prosecution’s withdrawal of a plea proposal once accepted by respondent. Because of a conflict in the Circuits, coupled with our concern that an important constitutional question had been wrongly decided, we granted certiorari, 464 U. S. 1017 (1983). We now reverse.
Respondent can obtain federal habeas corpus relief only if his custody is in violation of the Federal Constitution. A plea bargain standing alone is without constitutional significance; in itself it is a mere executory agreement which, until embodied in the judgment of a court, does not deprive an accused of liberty or any other constitutionally protected interest. It is the ensuing guilty plea that implicates the Constitution. Only after respondent pleaded guilty was he convicted, and it is that conviction which gave rise to the deprivation of respondent’s liberty at issue here.
It is well settled that a voluntary and intelligent plea of guilty made by an accused person, who has been advised by competent counsel, may not be collaterally attacked. It is also well settled that plea agreements are consistent with the requirements of voluntariness and intelligence — because each side may obtain advantages when a guilty plea is exchanged for sentencing concessions, the agreement is no less voluntary than any other bargained-for exchange. It is only when the consensual character of the plea is called into question that the validity of a guilty plea may be impaired. In Brady v. United States, 397 U. S. 742 (1970), we stated the applicable standard:
“‘[A] plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences, including the actual value of any commitments made to him by the court, prosecutor, or his own counsel, must stand unless induced by threats (or promises to discontinue improper harassment), misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises), or perhaps by promises that are by their nature improper as having no proper relationship to the prosecutor’s business (e. g. bribes).”’ Id., at 755 (quoting Shelton v. United States, 246 F. 2d 571, 572, n. 2 (CA5 1957) (en banc) (in turn quoting 242 F. 2d 101, 115 (Tuttle, J., dissenting to panel opinion)), rev’d on other grounds, 356 U. S. 26 (1958).
Thus, only when it develops that the defendant was not fairly apprised of its consequences can his plea be challenged under the Due Process Clause. Santobello v. New York, 404 U. S. 257 (1971), illustrates the point. We began by acknowledging that the conditions for a valid plea “presuppose fairness in securing agreement between an accused and a prosecutor. . . . The plea must, of course, be voluntary and knowing and if it was induced by promises, the essence of those promises must in some way be made known.” Id., at 261-262. It follows that when the prosecution breaches its promise with respect to an executed plea agreement, the defendant pleads guilty on a false premise, and hence his conviction cannot stand: “[W]hen a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.” Id., at 262.
Santobello demonstrates why respondent may not successfully attack his plea of guilty. Respondent’s plea was in no sense induced by the prosecutor’s withdrawn offer; unlike Santobello, who pleaded guilty thinking he had bargained for a specific prosecutorial sentencing recommendation which was not ultimately made, at the time respondent pleaded guilty he knew the prosecution would recommend a 21-year consecutive sentence. Respondent does not challenge the District Court’s finding that he pleaded guilty with the advice of competent counsel and with full awareness of the consequences — he knew that the prosecutor would recommend and that the judge could impose the sentence now under attack. Respondent’s plea was thus in no sense the product of governmental deception; it rested on no “unfulfilled promise” and fully satisfied the test for voluntariness and intelligence.
Thus, because it did not impair the voluntariness or intelligence of his guilty plea, respondent’s inability to enforce the prosecutor’s offer is without constitutional significance. Neither is the question whether the prosecutor was negligent or otherwise culpable in first making and then withdrawing his offer relevant. The Due Process Clause is not a code of ethics for prosecutors; its concern is with the manner in which persons are deprived of their liberty. Here respondent was not deprived of his liberty in any fundamentally unfair way. Respondent was fully aware of the likely consequences when he pleaded guilty; it is not unfair to expect him to live with those consequences now.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Reversed.
The petition was referred to a Magistrate who conducted an evidentiary-hearing and made recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law, which the District Court subsequently adopted.
Compare Virgin Islands v. Scotland, 614 F. 2d 360 (CA3 1980), and United States v. Greenman, 700 F. 2d 1377 (CA11), cert. denied, 464 U. S. 992 (1983), with Cooper v. United States, 594 F. 2d 12 (CA4 1979).
This ease is not moot despite the fact that respondent has been paroled. Respondent remains in the “custody” of the State, see Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U. S. 236 (1963); see generally Justices of Boston Municipal Court v. Lydon, 466 U. S. 294, 300-302 (1984); Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U. S. 345 (1973); and whether respondent must serve the sentence now under attack consecutively to his prior sentences will affect the date at which his parole will expire under state law, see Ark. Stat. Ann. § 43-2807(c) (Supp. 1983). Respondent’s challenge to the duration of his custody therefore remains live.
E. g., Townsend v. Sain, 372 U. S. 293, 312 (1963). In pertinent part, the habeas statute provides:
“The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U. S. C. § 2254(a).
Under Arkansas law, there is no entitlement to have the trial court impose a recommended sentence since a negotiated sentence recommendation does not bind the court, see Varnedare v. State, 264 Ark. 596, 599, 573 S. W. 2d 57, 60 (1978); Marshall v. State, 262 Ark. 726, 561 S. W. 2d 76 (1978); Ark. Rule Crim. Proc. 25.3(c); there is a critical difference between an entitlement and a mere hope or expectation that the trial court will follow the prosecutor’s recommendation, see Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U. S. 238, 248-251 (1983); Jago v. Van Curen, 454 U. S. 14, 19-21 (1981) (per curiam); Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U. S. 458, 465-467 (1981); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U. S. 215, 226-227 (1976).
See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U. S. 238 (1969); Kercheval v. United States, 274 U. S. 220, 223 (1927).
See Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U. S. 258, 266-267 (1973); North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U. S. 25, 31 (1970); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U. S. 790, 797-798 (1970); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U. S. 759, 772 (1970); Brady v. United States, 397 U. S. 742, 747-748 (1970). See also Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U. S. 637 (1976); Menna v. New York, 423 U. S. 61 (1975) (per curiam).
See Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U. S. 212, 219-220, 222-223 (1978); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U. S. 357, 363 (1978); Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U. S. 63, 71 (1977); Santobello v. New York, 404 U. S. 257, 260-261 (1971). For example, in Brady v. United States we wrote:
“For a defendant who sees slight possibility of acquittal, the advantages of pleading guilty and limiting the probable penalty are obvious — his exposure is reduced, the correctional processes can begin immediately, and the practical burdens of a trial are eliminated. For the State there are also advantages — the more promptly imposed punishment after an admission of guilt may more effectively attain the objectives of punishment; and with the avoidance of trial, scarce judicial and prosecutorial resources are conserved for those cases in which there is a substantial issue of the defendant’s guilt or in which there is substantial doubt that the State can sustain its burden of proof. It is this mutuality of advantage that perhaps explains the fact that at present well over three-fourths of the criminal convictions in this country rest on pleas of guilty, a great many of them no doubt motivated at least in part by the hope or assurance of a lesser penalty than might be imposed if there were a guilty verdict after a trial to judge or jury.” 397 U. S., at 752 (footnotes omitted).
See also 404 U. S., at 266 (Douglas, J., concurring); id., at 269 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Respondent suggests that the prosecutor’s withdrawal of the initial offer undermined his confidence in defense counsel, in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. This argument is simply at odds with reason. Prosecutors often come to view an offense more seriously during the course of pretrial investigation for reasons entirely unrelated to what defense counsel has done or is likely to do. See United States v. Goodwin, 457 U. S. 368, 381 (1982). We fail to see how an accused could reasonably attribute the prosecutor’s change of heart to his counsel any more than he could have blamed counsel had the trial judge chosen to reject the agreed-upon recommendation, or, for that matter, had he gone to trial and been convicted. The District Court and the Court of Appeals concluded that counsel effectively advised respondent; that is all the Constitution requires. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U. S. 648, 656-657, n. 19 (1984); Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U. S., at 266-268; Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U. S., at 797-798; McMann v. Richardson, 397 U. S., at 770-771.
Indeed, even if respondent’s plea were invalid, Santobello expressly declined to hold that the Constitution compels specific performance of a broken prosecutorial promise as the remedy for such a plea; the Court made it clear that permitting Santobello to replead was within the range of constitutionally appropriate remedies. See 404 U. S., at 262-263; see also id., at 268-269 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). It follows that respondent’s constitutional rights could not have been violated. Because he pleaded after the prosecution had breached its “promise” to him, he was in no worse position than Santobello would have been had he been permitted to replead.
Santobello itself rejected the relevance of prosecutorial culpability: “It is now conceded that the promise to abstain from a recommendation was made, and at this stage the prosecution is not in a good position to argue that its inadvertent breach of agreement is immaterial. The staff lawyers in a prosecutor’s office have the burden of ‘letting the left hand know what the right hand is doing’ or has done. That the breach of agreement was inadvertent does not lessen its impact.” Id., at 262. Cf. United States v. Agurs, 427 U. S. 97, 110 (1976).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Kennedy
delivered the opinion of the Court.
We decide in this case whether an alien who has requested and been granted voluntary departure from the United States, a form of discretionary relief that avoids certain statutory penalties, must adhere to that election and depart within the time prescribed, even if doing so causes the alien to forgo a ruling on a pending, unresolved motion to reopen the removal proceedings. The case turns upon the interaction of relevant provisions of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (IIRIRA or Act). The Act provides that every alien ordered removed from the United States has a right to file one motion to reopen his or her removal proceedings. See 8 U. S. C. § 1229a(c)(7) (2000 ed., Supp. V). The statute also provides, however, that if the alien’s request for voluntary departure is granted after he or she is found removable, the alien is required to depart within the period prescribed by immigration officials, which cannot exceed 60 days. See §1229c(b)(2) (2000 ed.). Failure to depart within the prescribed period renders the alien ineligible for certain forms of relief, including adjustment of status, for a period of 10 years. § 1229c(d)(1) (2000 ed., Supp. V). Pursuant to regulation, however, departure has the effect of withdrawing the motion to reopen. See 8 CFR § 1003.2(d) (2007).
Without some means, consistent with the Act, to reconcile the two commands — one directing voluntary departure and the other directing termination of the motion to reopen if an alien departs the United States — an alien who seeks reopening has two poor choices: The alien can remain in the United States to ensure the motion to reopen remains pending, while incurring statutory penalties for overstaying the voluntary departure date; or the alien can avoid penalties by prompt departure but abandon the motion to reopen.
The issue is whether Congress intended the statutory right to reopen to be qualified by the voluntary departure process. The alien, who is petitioner here, urges that filing a motion to reopen tolls the voluntary departure period pending the motion’s disposition. We reject this interpretation because it would reconfigure the voluntary departure scheme in a manner inconsistent with the statutory design. We do not have the authority to interpret the statute as petitioner suggests. Still, the conflict between the right to file a motion to reopen and the provision requiring voluntary departure no later than 60 days remains untenable if these are the only two choices available to the alien. Absent a valid regulation resolving the dilemma in a different way, we conclude the alien must be permitted an opportunity to withdraw the motion for voluntary departure, provided the request is made before the departure period expires. Petitioner attempted to avail himself of this opportunity below. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit did not disturb the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA or Board) denial of petitioner’s request to withdraw the voluntary departure election. We now reverse its decision and remand the case.
I
Petitioner Samson Taiwo Dada, a native and citizen of Nigeria, came to the United States in April 1998 on a temporary nonimmigrant visa. He overstayed it. In 1999, petitioner alleges, he married an American citizen. Petitioner’s wife filed an 1-130 Petition for Alien Relative on his behalf. The necessary documentary evidence was not provided, however, and the petition was denied in February 2003.
In 2004, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) charged petitioner with being removable under § 237(a)(1)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), as redesignated by IIRIRA § 305(a)(2), 110 Stat. 3009-598, and as amended, 8 U. S. C. § 1227(a)(1)(B) (2000 ed., Supp. V), for overstaying his visa. Petitioner’s wife then filed a second 1-130 petition. The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied petitioner’s request for a continuance pending adjudication of the newly filed 1-130 petition and noted that those petitions take an average of about three years to process. The IJ found petitioner to be removable but granted the request for voluntary departure under § 1229c(b) (2000 ed.). The BIA affirmed on November 4, 2005, without a written opinion. It ordered petitioner to depart within 30 days or suffer statutory penalties, including a civil fine of not less than $1,000 and not more than $5,000 and ineligibility for relief under §§ 240A, 240B, 245, 248, and 249 of the INA for a period of 10 years. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 5-6.
Two days before expiration of the 30-day period, on December 2, 2005, petitioner sought to withdraw his request for voluntary departure. At the same time he filed with the BIA a motion to reopen removal proceedings under 8 U. S. C. § 1229a(c)(7) (2000 ed., Supp. V). He contended that his motion recited new and material evidence demonstrating a bona fide marriage and that his case should be continued until the second 1-130 petition was resolved.
On February 8, 2006, more than two months after the voluntary departure period expired, the BIA denied the motion to reopen on the ground that petitioner had overstayed his voluntary departure period. Under § 240B(d) of the INA, 8 U. S. C. § 1229c(d) (2000 ed. and Supp. V), the BIA reasoned, an alien who has been granted voluntary departure but fails to depart in a timely fashion is statutorily barred from applying for and receiving certain forms of discretionary relief, including adjustment of status. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 3-4. The BIA did not address petitioner’s motion to withdraw his request for voluntary departure.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. Dada v. Gonzales, 207 Fed. Appx. 425 (2006) (per curiam). Relying on its decision in Banda-Ortiz v. Gonzales, 445 F. 3d 387 (2006), the court held that the BIA’s reading of the applicable statutes as rendering petitioner ineligible for relief was reasonable. The Fifth Circuit joined the First and Fourth Circuits in concluding that there is no automatic tolling of the voluntary departure period. See Chedad v. Gonzales, 497 F. 3d 57 (CA1 2007); Dekoladenu v. Gonzales, 459 F. 3d 500 (CA4 2006). Four other Courts of Appeals have reached the opposite conclusion. See, e. g., Kanivets v. Gonzales, 424 F. 3d 330 (CA3 2005); Sidikhouya v. Gonzales, 407 F. 3d 950 (CA8 2005); Marte v. Ashcroft, 394 F. 3d 1278 (CA9 2005); Ugokwe v. United States Atty. Gen., 453 F. 3d 1325 (CA11 2006).
We granted certiorari, see Dada v. Keisler, 551 U. S. 1188 (2007), to resolve the disagreement among the Courts of Appeals. After oral argument we ordered supplemental briefing, see 552 U. S. 1138 (2008), to address whether an alien may withdraw his request for voluntary departure before expiration of the departure period. Also after oral argument, on January 10, 2008, petitioner’s second 1-130 application was denied by the IJ on the ground that his marriage is a sham, contracted solely to obtain immigration benefits.
II
Resolution of the questions presented turns on the interaction of two statutory schemes — the statutory right to file a motion to reopen in removal proceedings and the rules governing voluntary departure.
A
Voluntary departure is a discretionary form of relief that allows certain favored aliens — either before the conclusion of removal proceedings or after being found deportable — to leave the country willingly. Between 1927 and 2005, over 42 million aliens were granted voluntary departure; almost 13 million of those departures occurred between 1996 and 2005 alone. See Dept. of Homeland Security, Aliens Expelled: Fiscal Years 1892 to 2005, Table 38 (2005), online at http:// Avww.dhs.gov/ximgtn/statistics/publications/YrBk05En.shtm (all Internet materials as visited June 13, 2008, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file).
Voluntary departure was “originally developed by administrative officers, in the absence of a specific mandate in the statute.” 6 C. Gordon, S. Mailman, & S. Yale-Loehr, Immigration Law and Procedure § 74.02[1], p. 74-15 (rev. ed. 2007) (hereinafter Gordon). The practice was first codified in the Alien Registration Act of 1940, § 20, 54 Stat. 671. The Alien Registration Act amended §19 of the Immigration Act of Feb. 5,1917,39 Stat. 889, to provide that an alien “deportable under any law of the United States and who has proved good moral character for the preceding five years” may be permitted by the Attorney General to “depart the United States to any country of his choice at his OAvn expense, in lieu of deportation.” § 20(c), 54 Stat. 672.
In 1996, perhaps in response to criticism of immigration officials who had expressed frustration that aliens granted voluntary departure were “permitted to continue their illegal presence in the United States for months, and even years,” Letter from Benjamin G. Habberton, Acting Commissioner on Immigration and Naturalization, to the Executive Director of the President’s Commission on Immigration and Naturalization, reprinted in Hearings before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 1954 (Comm. Print 1952), Congress curtailed the period of time during which an alien may remain in the United States pending voluntary departure. The Act, as pertinent to voluntary departures requested at the conclusion of removal proceedings, provides:
“The Attorney General may permit an alien voluntarily to depart the United States at the alien’s own expense if, at the conclusion of a proceeding under section 1229a of this title, the immigration judge enters an order granting voluntary departure in lieu of removal and finds that—
“(A) the alien has been physically present in the United States for a period of at least one year immediately preceding the date the notice to appear was served under section 1229(a) of this title;
“(B) the alien is, and has been, a person of good moral character for at least 5 years immediately preceding the alien’s application for voluntary departure;
“(C) the alien is not deportable under section 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) or section 1227(a)(4) of this title; and
“(D) the alien has established by clear and convincing evidence that the alien has the means to depart the United States and intends to do so.” 8 U. S. C. § 1229c(b)(l).
See also § 1229c(a)(1) (“The Attorney General may permit an alien voluntarily to depart the United States at the alien’s own expense under this subsection” in lieu of being subject to removal proceedings or prior to the completion of those proceedings; the alien need not meet the requirements of § 1229c(b)(1) if removability is conceded).
When voluntary departure is requested at the conclusion of removal proceedings, as it was in this case, the statute provides a voluntary departure period of not more than 60 days. See § 1229c(b)(2). The alien can receive up to 120 days if he or she concedes removability and requests voluntary departure before or during removal proceedings. See § 1229c(a)(2)(A). Appropriate immigration authorities may extend the time to depart but only if the voluntary departure period is less than the statutory maximum in the first instance. The voluntary departure period in no event may exceed 60 or 120 days for §§ 1229c(b) and 1229c(a) departures, respectively. See 8 CFR § 1240.26(f) (2007) (“Authority to extend the time within which to depart voluntarily specified initially by an immigration judge or the Board is only within the jurisdiction of the district director, the Deputy Executive Associate Commissioner for Detention and Removal, or the Director of the Office of Juvenile Affairs.... In no event can the total period of time, including any extension, exceed 120 days or 60 days as set forth in section 240B of the Act”).
The voluntary departure period typically does not begin to run until administrative appeals are concluded. See 8 U. S. C. § 1101(47)(B) (“The order... shall become final upon the earlier of — (i) a determination by the [BIA] affirming such order; or (ii) the expiration of the period in which the alien is permitted to seek review of such order by the [BIA]”); § 1229c(b)(1) (Attorney General may permit voluntary departure at conclusion of removal proceedings); see also 8 CFR § 1003.6(a) (2007) (“[T]he decision in any proceeding... from which an appeal to the Board may be taken shall not be executed during the time allowed for the filing of an appeal... ”). In addition some Federal Courts of Appeals have found that they may stay voluntary departure pending consideration of a petition for review on the merits. See, e. g., Thapa v. Gonzales, 460 F. 3d 323, 329-332 (CA2 2006); Obale v. Attorney General of United States, 453 F. 3d 151, 155-157 (CA3 2006). But see Ngarurih v. Ashcroft, 371 F. 3d 182, 194 (CA4 2004). This issue is not presented here, however, and we leave its resolution for another day.
Voluntary departure, under the current structure, allows the Government and the alien to agree upon a quid pro quo. From the Government’s standpoint, the alien’s agreement to leave voluntarily expedites the departure process and avoids the expense of deportation — including procuring necessary documents and detaining the alien pending deportation. The Government also eliminates some of the costs and burdens associated with litigation over the departure. With the apparent purpose of ensuring that the Government attains the benefits it seeks, the Act imposes limits on the time for voluntary departure, see supra, at 10, and prohibits judicial review of voluntary departure decisions, see 8 U. S. C. §§ 1229c(f) and 1252(a)(2)(B)(i).
Benefits to the alien from voluntary departure are evident as well. He or she avoids extended detention pending completion of travel arrangements; is allowed to choose when to depart (subject to certain constraints); and can select the country of destination. And, of great importance, by departing voluntarily the alien facilitates the possibility of readmission. The practice was first justified as involving “no warrant of deportation... so that if [the alien reapplies] for readmission in the proper way he will not be barred.” 2 National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement: Report on the Enforcement of the Deportation Laws of the United States 57, 102-103 (1931) (Report No. 5). The current statute likewise allows an alien who voluntarily departs to sidestep some of the penalties attendant to deportation. Under the current Act, an alien involuntarily removed from the United States is ineligible for readmission for a period of 5, 10, or 20 years, depending upon the circumstances of removal. See 8 U. S. C. §1182(a)(9)(A)(i) (“Any alien who has been ordered removed under section 1225(b)(1) of this title or at the end of proceedings under section 1229a of this title initiated upon the alien’s arrival in the United States and who again seeks admission within 5 years of the date of such removal (or within 20 years in the case of a second or subsequent removal...) is inadmissible”); § 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii) (“Any alien not described in clause (i) who — (I) has been ordered removed under section [240] or any other provision of law, or (II) departed the United States while an order of removal was outstanding, and who seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien’s departure or removal... is inadmissible”). An alien who makes a timely departure under a grant of voluntary departure, on the other hand, is not subject to these restrictions — although he or she otherwise may be ineligible for readmission based, for instance, on an earlier unlawful presence in the United States, see § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i).
B
A motion to reopen is a form of procedural relief that “asks the Board to change its decision in light of newly discovered evidence or a change in circumstances since the hearing.” 1 Gordon §3.05[8][c], at 3-76.32. Like voluntary departure, reopening is a judicial creation later codified by federal statute. An early reference to the procedure was in 1916, when a Federal District Court addressed an alien’s motion to reopen her case to provide evidence of her marriage to a United States citizen. See Ex parte Chan Shee, 236 F. 579 (ND Cal.); see also Chew Hoy Quong v. White, 244 F. 749, 750 (CA9 1917) (addressing an application to reopen to correct discrepancies in testimony). “The reopening of a case by the immigration authorities for the introduction of further evidence” was treated then, as it is now, as “a matter for the exercise of their discretion”; where the alien was given a “full opportunity to testify and to present all witnesses and documentary evidence at the original hearing,” judicial interference was deemed unwarranted. Wong Shong Been v. Proctor, 79 F. 2d 881, 883 (CA9 1935).
In 1958, when the BIA was established, the Attorney General promulgated a rule for the reopening and reconsideration of removal proceedings, 8 CFR § 3.2, upon which the current regulatory provision is based. See 23 Fed. Reg. 9115, 9118-9119 (1958), final rule codified at 8 CFR § 3.2 (1959) (“The Board may on its own motion reopen or reconsider any case in which it has rendered a decision” upon a “written motion”); see also BIA: Powers; and Reopening or Reconsideration of Cases, 27 Fed. Reg. 96-97 (1962). Until 1996, there was no time limit for requesting the reopening of a case due to the availability of new evidence.
Then, in 1990, “fear[ful] that deportable or excludable aliens [were] try[ing] to prolong their stays in the U. S. by filing one type of discretionary relief... after another in immigration proceedings,” Justice Dept. Finds Aliens Not Abusing Requests for Relief, 68 Interpreter Releases 907, 908 (July 22, 1991) (No. 27), Congress ordered the Attorney General to “issue regulations with respect to... the period of time in which motions to reopen... may be offered in deportation proceedings,” including “a limitation on the number of such motions that may be filed and a maximum time period for the filing of such motions,” Immigration Act of 1990, § 545(d)(1), 104 Stat. 5066. The Attorney General found little evidence of abuse, concluding that requirements for reopening are a disincentive to bad faith filings. See 68 Interpreter Releases, supra. Because “Congress... neither rescinded [n]or amended its mandate to limit the number and time frames of motions,” however, the Department of Justice (DOJ) issued a regulation imposing new time limits and restrictions on filings. The new. regulation allowed the alien to file one motion to reopen within 90 days. Executive Office for Immigration Review; Motions and Appeals in Immigration Proceedings, 61 Fed. Reg. 18900, 18901, 18905 (1996); see 8 CFR § 3.2 (1996).
With the 1996 enactment of the Act, Congress adopted the recommendations of the DOJ with respect to numerical and time limits. The current provision governing motions to reopen states:
“(A) In general
“An alien may file one motion to reopen proceedings under this section....
“(B) Contents
“The motion to reopen shall state the new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted, and shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.
“(C) Deadline
“(i) In general
“Except as provided in this subparagraph, the motion to reopen shall be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final administrative order of removal.” 8 U. S. C. § 1229a(c)(7) (2000 ed., Supp. V).
To qualify as “new,” § 1229a(c)(7)(B), the facts must be “material” and of the sort that “could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing,” 8 CFR § 1003.2(c)(1) (2007); 1 Gordon § 3.05[8][c], at 3-76.34 (“Evidence is not previously unavailable merely because the movant chose not to testify or to present evidence earlier, or because the IJ refused to admit the evidence”). There are narrow exceptions to the 90-day filing period for asylum proceedings and claims of battered spouses, children, and parents, see 8 U. S. C. §§ 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii), (iv) (2000 ed., Supp. V), which are not applicable here.
The Act, to be sure, limits in significant ways the availability of the motion to reopen. It must be noted, though, that the Act transforms the motion to reopen from a regulatory procedure to a statutory form of relief available to the alien. Nowhere in § 1229c(b) or § 1229a(c)(7) did Congress discuss the impact of the statutory right to file a motion to reopen on a voluntary departure agreement. And no legislative history indicates what some Members of Congress might have intended with respect to the motion’s status once the voluntary departure period has elapsed. But the statutory text is plain insofar as it guarantees to each alien the right to file “one motion to reopen proceedings under this section.” § 1229a(c)(7)(A) (2000 ed., Supp. V).
Ill
The Government argues that, by requesting and obtaining permission to voluntarily depart, the alien knowingly surrenders the opportunity to seek reopening. See Brief for Respondent 29-30. Further, according to the Government, petitioner’s proposed rule for tolling the voluntary departure period would undermine the “carefully crafted rules governing voluntary departure,” including the statutory directive that these aliens leave promptly. Id., at 18, 46-47.
To be sure, 8 U. S. C. § 1229c(b)(2) contains no ambiguity: The period within which the alien may depart voluntarily “shall not be valid for a period exceeding 60 days.” See also 8 CFR § 1240.26(f) (2007) (“In no event can the total period of time, including any extension, exceed” the statutory periods prescribed by 8 U. S. C. §§ 1229c(a) and 1229c(b)); § 1229c(d) (2000 ed. and Supp. V) (imposing statutory penalties for failure to depart). Further, § 1229a(c)(7) does not forbid a scheme under which an alien knowingly relinquishes the right to seek reopening in exchange for other benefits, including those available to the alien under the voluntary departure statute. That does not describe this case, however. Nothing in the statutes or past usage with respect to voluntary departure or motions to reopen indicates they cannot coexist. Neither § 1229a(c)(7) nor § 1229e(b)(2) says anything about the filing of a motion to reopen by an alien who has requested and been granted the opportunity to voluntarily depart. And there is no other statutory language that would place the alien on notice of an inability to seek the case’s reopening in the event of newly discovered evidence or changed circumstances bearing upon eligibility for relief.
In reading a statute we must not “look merely to a particular clause,” but consider “in connection with it the whole statute.” Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U. S. 642, 650 (1974) (quoting Brown v. Duchesne, 19 How. 183, 194 (1857); internal quotation marks omitted); see also Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 498 U. S. 395,407 (1991) (“ 'In determining the meaning of the statute, we look not only to the particular statutory language, but to the design of the statute as a whole and to its object and policy’” (quoting Crandon v. United States, 494 U. S. 152, 158 (1990))); United States v. Heirs of Boisdoré, 8 How. 113, 122 (1850) (“[W]e must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy”).
Reading the Act as a whole, and considering the statutory scheme governing voluntary departure alongside the statutory right granted to the alien by 8 U. S. C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A) (2000 ed., Supp. V) to pursue “one motion to reopen proceedings,” the Government’s position that the alien is not entitled to pursue a motion to reopen if the alien agrees to voluntarily depart is unsustainable. It would render the statutory right to seek reopening a nullity in most cases of voluntary departure. (And this group is not insignificant in number; between 2002 and 2006,897,267 aliens were found removable, of which 122,866, or approximately 13.7%, were granted voluntary departure. See DOJ, Executive Office for Immigration Review, FY 2006 Statistical Year Book, p. Q1 (Feb. 2007).) It is foreseeable, and quite likely, that the time allowed for voluntary departure will expire long before the BIA issues a decision on a timely filed motion to reopen. See Proposed Rules, DOJ, Executive Office for Immigration Review, Voluntary Departure: Effect of a Motion To Reopen or Reconsider or a Petition for Review, 72 Fed. Reg. 67674, 67677, and n. 2 (2007) (“As a practical matter, it is often the case that an immigration judge or the Board cannot reasonably be expected to adjudicate a motion to reopen or reconsider during the voluntary departure period”). These practical limitations must be taken into account. In the present case the BIA denied petitioner’s motion to reopen 68 days after he filed the motion — and 66 days after his voluntary departure period had expired. Although the record contains no statistics on the average disposition time for motions to reopen, the number of BIA proceedings has increased over the last two decades, doubling between 1992 and 2000 alone; and, as a result, the BIA’s backlog has more than tripled, resulting in a total of 63,763 undecided cases in 2000. See Dorsey & Whitney LLP, Study Conducted for: the American Bar Association Commission on Immigration Policy, Practice and Pro Bono Re: Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms To Improve Case Management 13 (2003), online at http://www.dorsey.com/files/upload/Dorsey StudyABA_8mgPDF.pdf.
Since 2000, the BIA has adopted new procedures to reduce its backlog and shorten disposition times. In 2002, the DOJ introduced rules to improve case management, including an increase in the number of cases referred to a single Board member and use of summary disposition procedures for cases without basis in law or fact. See BIA: Procedural Reforms To Improve Case Management, 67 Fed. Reg. 54878 (2002), final rule codified at 8 CFR § 1003.1 et seq. (2006); see also § 1003.1(e)(4) (summary affirmance procedures). Nevertheless, on September 30,2005, there were 33,063 cases pending before the BIA, 18% of which were more than a year old. See FY 2006 Statistical Year Book, supra, at Ul. On September 30,2006, approximately 20% of the cases pending had been filed during fiscal year 2005. See ibid. Whether an alien’s motion will be adjudicated within the 60-day statutory period in all likelihood will depend on pure happenstance — namely, the backlog of the particular Board member to whom the motion is assigned. Cf. United States v. Wil son, 503 U. S. 329, 334 (1992) (arbitrary results are “not to be presumed lightly”).
Absent tolling or some other remedial action by the Court, then, the alien who is granted voluntary departure but whose circumstances have changed in a manner cognizable by a motion to reopen is between Scylla and Charybdis: He or she can leave the United States in accordance with the voluntary departure order; but, pursuant to regulation, the motion to reopen will be deemed withdrawn. See 8 CFR § 1003.2(d); see also 23 Fed. Reg. 9115, 9118, final rule codified at 8 CFR § 3.2 (1958). Alternatively, if the alien wishes to pursue reopening and remains in the United States to do so, he or she risks expiration of the statutory period and ineligibility for adjustment of status, the underlying relief sought. See 8 U. S. C. § 1229c(d)(1) (2000 ed., Supp. V) (failure to timely depart renders alien “ineligible, for a period of 10 years,” for cancellation of removal under § 240A, adjustment of status under §245, change of nonimmigrant status under § 248, and registry under § 249 of the INA); see also App. to Pet. for Cert. 3-4 (treating petitioner’s motion to reopen as forfeited for failure to depart).
The purpose of a motion to reopen is to ensure a proper and lawful disposition. We must be reluctant to assume that the voluntary departure statute was designed to remove this important safeguard for the distinct class of deportable aliens most favored by the same law. See 8 U. S. C. §§ 1229c(a)(1), (b)(1)(C) (barring aliens who have committed, inter alia, aggravated felonies or terrorism offenses from receiving voluntary departure); § 1229c(b)(1)(B) (requiring an alien who obtains voluntary departure at the conclusion of removal proceedings to demonstrate “good moral character”). This is particularly so when the plain text of the statute reveals no such limitation. See Costello v. INS, 376 U. S. 120, 127-128 (1964) (counseling long hesitation “before adopting a construction of [the statute] which would, with respect to an entire class of aliens, completely nullify a procedure so intrinsic a part of the legislative scheme”); see also Stone v. INS, 514 U. S. 386, 399 (1995) (“Congress might not have wished to impose on the alien” the difficult choice created by treating a motion to reopen as rendering the underlying order nonfinal for purposes of judicial review); INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U. S. 289, 320 (2001) (recognizing “ ‘the longstanding principle of construing any lingering ambiguities in deportation statutes in favor of the alien’ ” (quoting INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U. S. 421, 449 (1987))).
IV
A
It is necessary, then, to read the Act to preserve the alien’s right to pursue reopening while respecting the Government’s interest in the quid pro quo of the voluntary departure arrangement.
Some solutions, though, do not conform to the statutory design. Petitioner, as noted, proposes automatic tolling of the voluntary departure period during the pendency of the motion to reopen. We do not find statutory authority for this result. Voluntary departure is an agreed-upon exchange of benefits, much like a settlement agreement. In return for anticipated benefits, including the possibility of readmission, an alien who requests voluntary departure represents that he or she “has the means to depart the United States and intends to do so” promptly. 8 U. S. C. § 1229c(b)(1)(D); 8 CFR §§ 1240.26(c)(1)-(2) (2007); cf. § 1240.26(c)(3) (the judge may impose additional conditions to “ensure the alien’s timely departure from the United States”). Included among the substantive burdens imposed upon the alien when selecting voluntary departure is the obligation to arrange for departure, and actually depart, within the 60-day period. Cf. United States v. Brockamp, 519 U. S. 347, 352 (1997) (substantive limitations are not subject to equitable tolling). If the alien is permitted to stay in the United States past the departure date to wait out the adjudication of the motion to reopen, he or she cannot then demand the full benefits of voluntary departure; for the benefit to the Government — a prompt and costless departure — would be lost. Furthermore, it would invite abuse by aliens who wish to stay in the country but whose cases are not likely to be reopened by immigration authorities.
B
Although a statute or regulation might be adopted to resolve the dilemma in a different manner, as matters now stand the appropriate way to reconcile the voluntary departure and motion to reopen provisions is to allow an alien to withdraw the request for voluntary departure before expiration of the departure period.
The DOJ, which has authority to adopt regulations relevant to the issue at hand, has made a preliminary determination that the Act permits an alien to withdraw an application for voluntary departure before expiration of the departure period. According to this proposal, there is nothing in the Act or the implementing regulations that makes the grant of voluntary departure irrevocable. See 72 Fed. Reg. 67679. Accordingly, the DOJ has proposed an amendment to 8 CFR § 1240.26 that, prospectively, would “provide for the automatic termination of a grant of voluntary departure upon the timely filing of a motion to reopen or reconsider, as long as the motion is filed prior to the expiration of the voluntary departure period.” 72 Fed. Reg. 67679, Part IV-D; cf. id., at 67682, Part VI (“The provisions of this proposed rule will be applied prospectively only, that is, only with respect to immigration judge orders issued on or after the effective date of the final rule that grant a period of voluntary departure”). Although not binding in the present case, the
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Kennedy
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner, Joseph Massaro, was indicted on federal racketeering charges, including murder in aid of racketeering, 18 U. S. C. § 1962(d), in connection with the shooting death of Joseph Fiorito. He was tried in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The day before Massaro’s trial was to begin, prosecutors learned of what appeared to be a critical piece of evidence: a bullet allegedly recovered from the car in which the victim’s body was found. They waited for several days, however, to inform defense counsel of this development. Not until the trial was underway and the defense had made its opening statement did they make this disclosure. After the trial court and the defense had been informed of the development but still during the course of trial, defense counsel more than once declined the trial court’s offer of a continuance so the bullet could be examined. Massaro was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment.
On direct appeal new counsel for Massaro argued the District Court had erred in admitting the bullet in evidence, but he did not raise any claim relating to ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the conviction. Judgt. order reported at 57 F. 3d 1063 (1995).
Massaro later filed a motion under 28 U. S. C. §2255, seeking to vacate his conviction. As relevant here, he claimed that his trial counsel had rendered ineffective assistance in failing to accept the trial court’s offer to grant a continuance. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York found this claim procedurally defaulted because Massaro could have raised it on direct appeal.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. 27 Fed. Appx. 26 (1995). The court acknowledged that ineffective-assistance claims usually should be excused from procedural-default rules because an attorney who handles both trial and appeal is unlikely to raise an ineffective-assistance claim against himself. Nevertheless, it adhered to its decision in Billy-Eko v. United States, 8 F. 3d 111 (1993). Under Billy-Eko, when the defendant is represented by new counsel on appeal and the ineffective-assistance claim is based solely on the record made at trial, the claim must be raised on direct appeal; failure to do so results in procedural default unless the petitioner shows cause and prejudice. Finding that Massaro was represented by new counsel on appeal, that his trial counsel’s ineffectiveness was evident from the record, and that he had failed to show cause or prejudice, the Court of Appeals held him procedurally barred from bringing the ineffective-assistance claim on collateral review.
We granted certiorari. 536 U. S. 990 (2002). Petitioner now urges us to hold that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel need not be raised on direct appeal, whether or not there is new counsel and whether or not the basis for the claim is apparent from the trial record. The Federal Courts of Appeals are in conflict on this question, with the Seventh Circuit joining the Second Circuit, see Guinan v. United States, 6 F. 3d 468 (CA7 1993), and 10 other Federal Courts of Appeals taking the position that there is no procedural default for failure to raise an ineffective-assistance claim on direct appeal, see, e. g., United States v. Cofske, 157 F. 3d 1, 2 (CA1 1998), cert. denied, 526 U. S. 1059 (1999); United States v. Jake, 281 F. 3d 123, 132, n. 7 (CA3 2002); United States v. King, 119 F. 3d 290, 295 (CA4 1997); United States v. Rivas, 157 F. 3d 364, 369 (CA5 1998); United States v. Neuhausser, 241 F. 3d 460, 474 (CA6), cert. denied, 534 U. S. 879 (2001); United States v. Evans, 272 F. 3d 1069, 1093 (CA8 2001), cert. denied, 535 U. S. 1029 (2002); United States v. Rewald, 889 F. 2d 836, 859 (CA9 1989), cert. denied, 498 U. S. 819 (1990); United States v. Galloway, 56 F. 3d 1239, 1240 (CA10 1995) (en banc); United States v. Griffin, 699 F. 2d 1102, 1107-1109 (CA11 1983); United States v. Richardson, 167 F. 3d 621, 626 (CADC), cert. denied, 528 U. S. 895 (1999). We agree with the majority of the Courts of Appeals, and we reverse.
The background for our discussion is the general rule that claims not raised on direct appeal may not be raised on collateral review unless the petitioner shows cause and prejudice. See United States v. Frady, 456 U. S. 152, 167-168 (1982); Bousley v. United States, 523 U. S. 614, 621-622 (1998). The procedural-default rule is neither a statutory nor a constitutional requirement, but it is a doctrine adhered to by the courts to conserve judicial resources and to respect the law’s important interest in the finality of judgments. We conclude that requiring a criminal defendant to bring ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims on direct appeal does not promote these objectives.
As Judge Easterbrook has noted, “[r]ules of procedure should be designed to induce litigants to present their contentions to the right tribunal at the right time.” Guinan, supra, at 474 (concurring opinion). Applying the usual procedural-default rule to ineffective-assistance claims would have the opposite effect, creating the risk that defendants would feel compelled to raise the issue before there has been an opportunity fully to develop the factual predicate for the claim. Furthermore, the issue would be raised for the first time in a forum not best suited to assess those facts. This is so even if the record contains some indication of deficiencies in counsel’s performance. The better-reasoned approach is to permit ineffective-assistance claims to be brought in the first instance in a timely motion in the district court under §2255. We hold that an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim may be brought in a collateral proceeding under § 2255, whether or not the petitioner could have raised the claim on direct appeal.
In light of the way our system has developed, in most cases a motion brought under §2255 is preferable to direct appeal for deciding claims of ineffective assistance. When an ineffective-assistance claim is brought on direct appeal, appellate counsel and the court must proceed on a trial record not developed precisely for the object of litigating or preserving the claim and thus often incomplete or inadequate for this purpose. Under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (1984), a defendant claiming ineffective counsel must show that counsel’s actions were not supported by a reasonable strategy and that the error was prejudicial. The evidence introduced at trial, however, will be devoted to issues of guilt or innocence, and the resulting record in many cases will not disclose the facts necessary to decide either prong of the Strickland analysis. If the alleged error is one of commission, the record may reflect the action taken by counsel but not the reasons for it. The appellate court may have no way of knowing whether a seemingly unusual or misguided action by counsel had a sound strategic motive or was taken because the counsel’s alternatives were even worse. See Guinan, supra, at 473 (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (“No matter how odd or deficient trial counsel’s performance may seem, that lawyer may have had a reason for acting as he did. ... Or it may turn out that counsel’s overall performance was sufficient despite a glaring omission . . .”). The trial record may contain no evidence of alleged errors of omission, much less the reasons underlying them. And evidence of alleged conflicts of interest might be found only in attorney-client correspondence or other documents that, in the typical criminal trial, are not introduced. See, e. g., Billy-Eko, supra, at 114. Without additional factual development, moreover, an appellate court may not be able to ascertain whether the alleged error was prejudicial.
Under the rule we adopt today, ineffective-assistance claims ordinarily will be litigated in the first instance in the district court, the forum best suited to developing the facts necessary to determining the adequacy of representation during an entire trial. The court may take testimony from witnesses for the defendant and the prosecution and from the counsel alleged to have rendered the deficient performance. See, e. g., Griffin, 699 F. 2d, at 1109 (In a §2255 proceeding, the defendant “has a full opportunity to prove facts establishing ineffectiveness of counsel, the government has a full opportunity to present evidence to the contrary, the district court hears spoken words we can see only in print and sees expressions we will never see, and a factual record bearing precisely on the issue is created”); Beaulieu v. United States, 930 F. 2d 805 (CA10 1991) (partially rev’d on other grounds, United States v. Galloway, 56 F. 3d 1239 (CA10 1995). In addition, the §2255 motion often will be ruled upon by the same district judge who presided at trial. The judge, having observed the earlier trial, should have an advantageous perspective for determining the effectiveness of counsel’s conduct and whether any deficiencies were prejudicial.
The Second Circuit’s rule creates inefficiencies for courts and counsel, both on direct appeal and in the collateral proceeding. On direct appeal it puts counsel into an awkward position vis-á-vis trial counsel. Appellate counsel often need trial counsel’s assistance in becoming familiar with a lengthy record on a short deadline, but trial counsel will be unwilling to help appellate counsel familiarize himself with a record for the purpose of understanding how it reflects trial counsel’s own incompetence.
Subjecting ineffective-assistance claims to the usual eause- and-prejudice rule also would create perverse incentives for counsel on direct appeal. To ensure that a potential ineffective-assistance claim is not waived — and to avoid incurring a claim of ineffective counsel at the appellate stage— counsel would be pressured to bring claims of ineffective trial counsel, regardless of merit.
Even meritorious claims would fail when brought on direct appeal if the trial record were inadequate to support them. Appellate courts would waste time and resources attempting to address some claims that were meritless and other claims that, though colorable, would be handled more efficiently if addressed in the first instance by the district court on collateral review. See, e. g., United States v. Galloway, supra, at 1241 (“threat of... procedural bar has doubtless resulted in many claims being asserted on direct appeal only to protect the record . . . unnecessarily burdening] both the parties and the court . . .”)• This concern is far from speculative. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in light of its rule applying procedural default to ineffective-assistance claims, has urged counsel to “err on the side of inclusion on direct appeal,” Billy-Eko, 8 F. 3d, at 116.
On collateral review, the Second Circuit’s rule would cause additional inefficiencies. Under that rule a court on collateral review must. determine whether appellate counsel is “new.” Questions may arise, for example, about whether a defendant has retained new appellate counsel when different lawyers in the same law office handle trial and appeal. The habeas court also must engage in a painstaking review of the trial record solely to determine if it was sufficient to support the ineffectiveness claim and thus whether it should have been brought on direct appeal. A clear rule allowing these claims to be brought in a proceeding under §2255, by contrast, will eliminate these requirements. Although we could “require the parties and the district judges to search for needles in haystacks — to seek oút the rare claim that could have been raised on direct appeal, and deem it waived,” Guinan, 6 F. 3d, at 475 (Easterbrook, J., concurring) — we do not see the wisdom in requiring a court to spend time on exercises that, in most instances, will produce no benefit. It is a better use of judicial resources to allow the district court on collateral review to turn at once to the merits.
The most to be said, for the rule in the Second Circuit is that it will speed resolution of some ineffective-assistance claims. For the reasons discussed, however, we think few such claims will be capable of resolution on direct appeal and thus few will benefit from earlier resolution. And the benefits of the Second Circuit’s rule in those rare instances are outweighed by the increased judicial burden the rule would impose in many other cases, where a district court on collateral review would be forced to conduct the cause-and-prejudice analysis before turning to the merits. The Second Circuit’s rule, moreover, does not produce the benefits of other rules requiring claims to be raised at the earliest opportunity — such as the contemporaneous objection rule— because here, raising the claim on direct appeal does not permit the trial court to avoid the potential error in the first place.
A growing majority of state courts now follow the rule we adopt today. For example, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania recently changed its position to hold that “a claim raising trial counsel ineffectiveness will no longer be considered waived because new counsel on direct appeal did not raise a claim related to prior counsel’s ineffectiveness.” Commonwealth v. Grant, 572 Pa. 48, 67, 813 A. 2d 726, 738 (2002); see also id., at 62-67, and n. 13, 813 A. 2d, at 735-738, and n. 13 (cataloging other States’ case law adopting this position).
Although the Government now urges us to adopt the rule of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the Government took the opposite approach in some previous cases, arguing not only that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel could be brought in the first instance in a motion under § 2255, but that they must be brought in such a motion proceeding and not on direct appeal. See, e. g., United States v. Cronic, 466 U. S. 648, 667, n. 42 (1984). We do not go this far. We do not hold that ineffective-assistance claims must be reserved for collateral review. There may be cases in which trial counsel’s ineffectiveness is so apparent from the record that appellate counsel will consider it advisable to raise the issue on direct appeal. There may be instances, too, when obvious deficiencies in representation will be addressed by an appellate court sua sponte. In those cases, certain questions may arise in subsequent proceedings under § 2255 concerning the conclusiveness of determinations made on the ineffective-assistance claims raised on direct appeal; but these matters of implementation are not before us. We do hold that failure to raise an ineffective-assistance-of-eounsel claim on direct appeal does not bar the claim from being brought in a later, appropriate proceeding under § 2255.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted.
Petitioner was convicted of armed robbery. He contends that his confession should have been suppressed because it was the product of an illegal arrest. The South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s rejection of his motion to suppress the confession:
“Assuming, without deciding, that Lanier’s arrest was illegal, we nevertheless hold his confession was admissible. A confession made while the accused is in custody before any warrant for his arrest has been issued is not per se inadmissible. State v. Funchess, 255 S. C. 385, 179 S. E. 2d 25, cert. denied, 404 U. S. 915, 92 S. Ct. 236, 30 L. Ed. 2d 189 (1971). Voluntariness remains as the test of admissibility. Id. Even if the arrest was illegal, the confession will be admissible if it is freely and voluntarily given. State v. Plath, 277 S. C. 126, 284 S. E. 2d 221 (1981). Since Lanier does not claim his confession was not voluntary, his argument that the confession was inadmissible is without merit.” App. to Pet. for Cert. A-2.
The South Carolina Supreme Court declined further review.
Under well-established precedent, “the fact that [a] confession may be ‘voluntary’ for purposes of the Fifth Amendment, in the sense that Miranda warnings were given and understood, is not by itself sufficient to purge the taint of the illegal arrest. In this situation, a finding of ‘voluntariness’ for purposes of the Fifth Amendment is merely a threshold requirement for Fourth Amendment analysis.” Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U. S. 687, 690 (1982). See also Dunaway v. New York, 442 U. S. 200, 217-218 (1979); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U. S. 590, 602 (1975). . The reasoning of the South Carolina Court of Appeals is inconsistent with those cases. We therefore vacate the judgment and remand the case to that court for further proceedings.
It is so ordered.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Thomas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Bankruptcy Code permits debtors to exempt certain property from the bankruptcy estate, allowing them to retain those assets rather than divide them among their creditors. 11 U. S. C. § 522. The question in this case is whether debtors can exempt assets in their Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) from the bankruptcy estate pursuant to § 522(d)(10)(E). We hold that IRAs can be so exempted.
I
Petitioners Richard and Betty Jo Rousey were formerly employed at Northrup Grumman Corp. At the termination of their employment, Northrup Grumman required them to take lump-sum distributions from their employer-sponsored pension plans. In re Rousey, 283 B. R. 265, 268 (Bkrtcy. App. Panel CA8 2002); Brief for Petitioners 2. The Rouseys deposited the lump sums into two IRAs, one in each of their names. 283 B. R., at 268.
The Rouseys’ accounts qualify as IRAs under a number of requirements imposed by the Internal Revenue Code. Each account is “a trust created or organized in the United States for the exclusive benefit of an individual or his beneficiaries.” 26 U. S. C. § 408(a) (2000 ed. and Supp. II). The Internal Revenue Code limits the types of assets in which IRA-holders may invest their accounts, §§ 408(a)(3), (a)(5), and provides that the balance in IRAs is nonforfeitable, § 408(a)(4). It also caps yearly contributions to IRAs. §408(o)(2). Withdrawals made before the accountholder turns 5914 are, with limited exceptions, subject to a 10-percent tax penalty. § 72(t).
IRA contributions receive favorable tax treatment. In particular, the Internal Revenue Code generally defers taxation of the money placed in IRAs and the income earned from those sums until the assets are withdrawn. See § 219(a) (contributions to IRAs are tax deductible); § 408(e)(1) (IRA is tax exempt). Moreover, within a certain timeframe accountholders can, as the Rouseys did here, roll over distributions received from other retirement plans. § 408(a)(1). The Internal Revenue Code encourages such rollovers by making them nontaxable. §§ 408(d)(3), 402(c)(1), 403(b)(8), and 457(e)(16).
The Rouseys’ IRA agreements, as well as relevant regulations, provide that their “entire interest in the custodial account must be, or begin to be, distributed by” April 1 following the calendar yearend in which they reach age 7014. In re Rousey, 275 B. R. 307, 310 (Bkrtcy. Ct. WD Ark. 2002). The IRA agreements permit withdrawal prior to age 5914, but note the federal tax penalties applicable to such distributions. Id., at 311.
Several years after establishing their IRAs, the Rouseys filed a joint Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Arkansas. In the schedules and statements accompanying their petition, the Rouseys sought to shield portions of their IRAs from their creditors by claiming them as exempt from the bankruptcy estate pursuant to 11 U. S. C. § 522(d)(10)(E). This exemption provides that a debtor may withdraw from the bankruptcy estate his “right to receive—
“(E) a payment under a stock bonus, pension, profit-sharing, annuity, or similar plan or contract on account of illness, disability, death, age, or length of service, to • the extent reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and any dependent of the debtor ....”
The Bankruptcy Court appointed respondent Jill R. Jacoway as the Chapter 7 Trustee. As Trustee, Jacoway is responsible for overseeing the liquidation of the bankruptcy estate and the distribution of the proceeds. She objected to the Rouseys’ claim for the exemption of their IRAs and moved for turnover of those sums to her. The Bankruptcy Court sustained Jacoway’s objection and granted her motion. 275 B. R., at 309.
The Rouseys appealed. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) agreed with the Bankruptcy Court that the Rouseys could not exempt their IRAs under § 522(d)(10)(E). It concluded that the IRAs were not “‘similar plants] or contract[s]’” to stock bonus, pension, profitsharing, or annuity plans, because, by contrast to the limited access permitted in such plans, the Rouseys had “unlimited access” to the funds held in their IRAs. 283 B. R., at 272. That access also meant, the BAP reasoned, that the Rouseys had complete control over the funds in their IRAs, “subject only to a ten percent tax penalty.” Id., at 273. Because they had such control, the payments from the IRAs were not “on account of any factor listed in 11 U. S. C. §522(d)(10)(E).” Ibid.
The Rouseys again appealed, and the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. The Court of Appeals concluded that, even if the Rouseys’ IRAs were “ ‘similar plans or contracts’ ” to stock bonus, pension, profitsharing, or annuity plans, their IRAs gave them no right to receive payment “‘on account of age.’” In re Rousey, 347 F. 3d 689, 693 (2003). Like the BAP, the Court of Appeals reasoned that the Rouseys’ right to payment was conditioned neither on age nor on any of the other statutory factors. Their IRAs were instead “readily accessible savings accounts of which the debtors may easily avail themselves (albeit with some discouraging tax consequences) at any time for any purpose.” Ibid. The Court of Appeals recognized that several of its sister Circuits had reached a contrary result. Ibid. See In re Brucher, 243 F. 3d 242, 243-244 (CA6 2001); In re McKown, 203 F. 3d 1188, 1190 (CA9 2000); In re Dubroff, 119 F. 3d 75, 78 (CA2 1997); In re Carmichael, 100 F. 3d 375, 378 (CA5 1996).
We granted certiorari to resolve this division among the Courts of Appeals regarding whether debtors can exempt IRAs from the bankruptcy estate under 11 U. S. C. § 522(d)(10)(E). 541 U. S. 1085 (2004).
II
As a general matter, upon the filing of a petition for bankruptcy, “all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property” become the property of the bankruptcy estate and will be distributed to the debtor’s creditors. § 541(a)(1). To help the debtor obtain a fresh start, the Bankruptcy Code permits him to withdraw from the estate certain interests in property, such as his car or home, up to certain values. See, e. g., § 522(d); United States v. Security Industrial Bank, 459 U. S. 70, 72, n. 1 (1982). In this case, the Rouseys claimed their IRAs as exempt under § 522(d)(10)(E). Under the terms of the statute, see supra, at 323-324, the Rouseys’ right to receive payment under their IRAs must meet three requirements to be exempted under this provision: (1) The right to receive payment must be from “a stock bonus, pension, profitsharing, annuity, or similar plan or contract”; (2) the right to receive payment must be “on account of illness, disability, death, age, or length of service”; and (3) even then, the right to receive payment may be exempted only “to the extent” that it is “reasonably necessary [to] support” the accountholder or his dependents. § 522(d)(10)(E).
The dispute in this case is whether the Rouseys’ IRAs fulfill the first and second requirements. This Court implied that IRAs like the Rouseys’ satisfy both elements in Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U. S. 753 (1992). There, in construing another section of the Bankruptcy Code, this Court stated that IRAs could be exempted pursuant to § 522(d)(10)(E). Id., at 762-763 (“Although a debtor’s interest [in an IRA] could not be excluded under § 541(c)(2) . . . , that interest nevertheless could be exempted under § 522(d)(10)(E)” (footnote omitted)). We now reaffirm that statement and conclude that IRAs can be exempted from the bankruptcy estate pursuant to § 522(d)(10)(E).
A
We turn first to the requirement that the payment be “on account of illness, disability, death, age, or length of service.” Ibid. We have interpreted the phrase “on account of” elsewhere within the Bankruptcy Code to mean “because of,” thereby requiring a causal connection between the term that the phrase “on account of” modifies and the factor specified in the statute at issue. Bank of America Nat. Trust and Sav. Assn. v. 203 North LaSalle Street Partnership, 526 U. S. 434, 450-451 (1999). In reaching that conclusion, we noted that “because of” was “certainly the usage méant for the phrase at other places in the [bankruptcy] statute,” including the provision at issue here — § 522(d)(10)(E). Ibid. This meaning comports with the common understanding of “on account of.” See, e.g., Random House Dictionary of the English Language 13 (2d ed. 1987) (listing as definitions “by reason of,” “because of”); Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 13 (1981) (hereinafter Webster’s 3d) (same). The context of this provision does not suggest that Congress deviated from the term’s ordinary meaning. Thus, “on account of” in § 522(d)(10)(E) requires that the right to receive payment be “because of” illness, disability, death, age, or length of service.
Jacoway argues that the Rouseys’ right to receive payment from their IRAs is not “because of” these listed factors. In particular, she asserts that the Rouseys can withdraw funds from their IRAs for any reason at all, so long as they are willing to pay a 10-percent penalty. Thus, Jacoway maintains that there is no causal connection between the Rouseys’ right to payment and age (or any other factor), because their IRAs provide a right to payment on demand.
We disagree. The statutes governing IRAs persuade us that the Rouseys’ right to payment from IRAs is causally connected to their age. Their right to receive payment of the entire balance is not in dispute. Because their accounts qualify as IRAs under 26 U. S. C. § 408(a) (2000 ed. and Supp. II), the Rouseys have a nonforfeitable right to the balance held in those accounts, § 408(a)(4). That right is restricted by a 10-percent tax penalty that applies to withdrawals from IRAs made before the accountholder turns 59Vz. Contrary to Jaco way’s contention, this tax penalty is substantial. The deterrent to early withdrawal it creates suggests that Congress designed it to preclude early access to IRAs. The low rates of early withdrawals are consistent with the notion that this penalty substantially deters early withdrawals from such accounts. Because the 10-percent penalty applies proportionally to any amounts withdrawn, it prevents access to the 10 percent that the Rouseys would forfeit should they withdraw early, and thus it effectively prevents access to the entire balance in their IRAs. It therefore limits the Rouseys’ right to “payment” of the balance of their IRAs. And because this condition is removed when the account-holder turns age 5914, the Rouseys’ right to the balance of their IRAs is a right to payment “on account of” age. The Rouseys no more have an unrestricted right to payment of the balance in their IRAs than a contracting party has an unrestricted right to breach a contract simply because the price of doing so is the payment of damages. Accordingly, we conclude that the Rouseys’ IRAs provide a right to payment on account of age.
B
In addition to requiring that the IRAs provide a right to payment “on account of” age or one of the other factors listed in the statute, 11 U. S. C. § 522(d)(10)(E) also requires the Rouseys’ IRAs to be “stock bonus, pension, profitsharing, annuity, or similar plan[s] or contract^].” No party contends that the Rouseys’ IRAs are stock bonus, pension, profit-sharing, or annuity plans or contracts. The issue, then, is whether the Rouseys’ IRAs are “similar plants] or contract[s]” within the meaning of § 522(d)(10)(E). To be “similar,” an IRA must be like, though not identical to, the specific plans or contracts listed in § 522(d)(10)(E), and consequently must share characteristics common to the listed plans or contracts. See American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1206 (1981) (hereinafter Am. Hert.); Webster’s 3d 2120.
The Rouseys contend that IRAs are “similar” to stock bonus, pension, profitsharing, or annuity plans or contracts, in that they have the same “primary purpose,” namely, “en-abí[ing] Americans to save for their retirement.” Reply Brief for Petitioners 13. Jacoway counters that IRAs are unlike the listed plans because those plans provide “deferred compensation,” Brief for Respondent 22, whereas IRAs allow complete access to deposited funds and are therefore not deferred at all, id., at 22-24. We agree with, the Rouseys that IRAs are similar to the plans specified in the statute. Those plans, like the Rouseys’ IRAs, provide a substitute for wages (by wages, for present purposes, we mean compensation earned as hourly or salary income), and are not mere savings accounts. The Rouseys’ IRAs are therefore “similar plants] or contract^]” within the meaning of § 522(d)(10)(E).
We turn first to the characteristics the specific plans and contracts listed in § 522(d)(10)(E) share. The Bankruptcy Code does not define the terms “profitsharing,” “stock bonus,” “pension,” or “annuity.” Accordingly, we. look to the ordinary meaning of these terms. United States v. LaBonte, 520 U. S. 751, 757 (1997); Perrin v. United States, 444 U. S. 37, 42 (1979). A “profitsharing” plan, of course, is “[a] system by which employees receive a share of the profits of a business enterprise.” Am. Hert. 1045. Profitsharing plans may provide deferred compensation, but they may also be “cash plans” in which a predetermined percentage of the profits is distributed to employees at set intervals. J. Langbein & B. Wolk, Pension and Employee Benefit Law 48 (3d ed. 2000). A stock bonus plan is like a profitsharing plan, except that it distributes company stock rather than cash from profits. Id., at 49. A pension is defined as “a fixed sum . . . paid under given conditions to a person following his retirement from service (as due to age or disability) or to the surviving dependents of a person entitled to such a pension.” Webster’s 3d 1671. Finally, an annuity is “an amount payable yearly or at other regular intervals ... for a certain or uncertain period (as for years, for life, or in perpetuity).” Id., at 88.
The common feature of all of these plans is that they provide income that substitutes for wages earned as salary or hourly compensation. This understanding of the plans’ similarities comports with the other types of payments that a debtor may exempt under § 522(d)(10) — all of which concern income that substitutes for wages. See, e. g., § 522(d)(10)(A) (“social security benefit, unemployment compensation, or a local public assistance benefit”); § 522(d)(10)(B) (“a veterans’ benefit”); § 522(d)(10)(C) (“disability, illness, or unemployment benefit”); § 522(d)(10)(D) (“alimony, support, or separate maintenance”). But the plans are dissimilar in other respects: Employers establish and contribute to stock bonus, profitsharing, and pension plans or contracts, whereas an individual can establish and contribute to an annuity on terms and conditions he selects. Moreover, pension plans and annuities provide deferred payment, whereas profitsharing or stock bonus plans may or may not provide deferred payment. And while a pension provides retirement income, none of these other- plans necessarily provides retirement income. What all of these plans have in common is that they provide income that substitutes for wages.
Several considerations convince us that the income the Rouseys will derive from their IRAs is likewise income that substitutes for wages. First, the minimum distribution requirements, as discussed above, require distribution to begin at the latest in the calendar year after the year in which the accountholder turns 701/2. Thus, accountholders must begin to withdraw funds when they are likely to be retired and lack wage income. Second, the Internal Revenue Code defers taxation of money held in accounts qualifying as IRAs under 26 U. S. C. § 408(a) (2000 ed. and Supp. II) until the year in which it is distributed, treating it as income only in such years. §§219, 408(e) (2000 ed. and Supp. II). This tax treatment further encourages accountholders to wait until retirement to withdraw the funds: The later withdrawal occurs, the longer the taxes on the amounts are deferred. Third, absent the applicability of other exceptions discussed above, withdrawals before age 591/2 are subject to a tax penalty, restricting preretirement access to the funds. Finally, to ensure that the beneficiary uses the IRA in his retirement years, an accountholder’s failure to take the requisite minimum distributions results in a 50-percent tax penalty on funds improperly remaining in the account. § 4974(a). All of these features show that IRA income substitutes for wages lost upon retirement and distinguish IRAs from typical savings accounts.
We find unpersuasive Jacoway’s contention that the IRAs cannot be similar plans or contracts because the Rouseys have complete access to them. At bottom, this contention rests, as did her “on account of” argument, on the premise that the tax penalty imposed for early withdrawal is modest and hence not a true limit on the withdrawal of funds. As explained above, however, that penalty erects a substantial barrier to early withdrawal. Supra, at 327-328. Funds in a typical savings account, by contrast, can be withdrawn without age-based penalty.
We also reject Jacoway’s argument that the availability of IRA withdrawals exempt from the 10-percent penalty renders the Rouseys’ IRAs more like savings accounts. While Jaco way is correct that the Internal Revenue Code permits penalty-free early withdrawals in certain limited circumstances, 26 U. S. C. § 72(t)(2), these exceptions do not reduce the IRAs to savings accounts.
The exceptions are narrow. For example, penalty-free early distributions for health insurance premiums are limited to unemployed individuals who have received unemployment compensation for at least 12 consecutive weeks and have taken those distributions during the same year in which the unemployment compensation is made. § 72(t)(2)(D). These payments are further limited to the actual amount paid for insurance for the accountholder, his spouse, and his dependents. § 72(t)(2)(D)(iii). The Internal Revenue Code likewise caps the amount of, and sets qualifications for, both the higher education expenses and first-time home purchases for which penalty-free early distributions can be taken. §§72(t)(2)(E), 72(t)(7) (higher education expenses); §§72(t) (2)(F), 72(t)(8) (home purchases). The Internal Revenue Code also permits penalty-free distributions to a beneficiary on the death of the accountholder or in the event that the accountholder becomes disabled. §§72(t)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii).
These exceptions are limited in amount and scope. Even with these carveouts, an early withdrawal without penalty remains the exception, rather than the rule. And as we explained in discussing the “on account of” requirement, withdrawals from other retirement plans receive similar tax treatment.
Our conclusion that the Rouseys’ IRAs can be exempt under 11 U. S. C. § 522(d)(10)(E) finds support in clauses (i)(iii) of § 522(d)(10)(E). These clauses bring into the estate certain rights to payment that otherwise would be exempt under § 522(d)(10)(E). They provide that a right to receive payment cannot be exempt if:
“(i) such plan or contract was established by or under the auspices of an insider that employed the debtor at the time the debtor’s rights under such plan or contract arose;
“(ii) such payment is on account of age or length of service; and
“(iii) such plan or contract does not qualify under section 401(a), 403(a), 403(b) or 408 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.”
Thus, clauses (i) — (iii) preclude the debtor from using this exemption if an insider established his plan or contract; the right to receive payment is on account of age or length of service; and the plan does not qualify under the specified Internal Revenue Code sections, including the section that governs IRAs, 26 U. S. C. § 408 (2000 ed. and Supp. II).
As a general matter, it makes little sense to exclude from the exemption plans that fail to qualify under §408, unless all plans that do qualify under § 408, including IRAs, are generally within the exemption. If IRAs were not within 11 U. S. C. § 522(d)(10)(E), Congress would not have referred to them in its exception. McKown, 203 F. 3d, at 1190. More specifically, clause (iii) suggests that plans qualifying under 26 U. S. C. §408 (2000 ed. and Supp. II), including IRAs, are similar plans or contracts. The other sections of the Internal Revenue Code cited in clause (iii) — §§ 401(a), 403(a), and 403(b) — all establish requirements for tax-qualified retirement plans that take the form of, among other things, annuities, profitsharing plans, and stock bonus plans. By grouping § 408 with these other plans that are of the specific types listed in subparagraph (E), clause (iii) suggests that IRAs are similar to them. Thus, the text of these clauses not only suggests generally that the Rouseys’ IRAs are exempt, but also supports our conclusion that they are “similar plan[s] or contract[s]” under 11 U. S. C. § 522(d)(10)(E).
* * *
In sum, the Rouseys’ IRAs fulfill both of § 522(d)(10)(E)’s requirements at issue here — they confer a right to receive payment on account of age, and they are similar plans or contracts to those enumerated in § 522(d)(10)(E). The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
See Amromin & Smith, What Explains Early Withdrawals from Retirement Accounts? Evidence From a Panel of Taxpayers, 56 Nat. Tax J, 595, 602 (Sept. 2003) (Table 1) (3.4 percent of IRA-holders took penalized withdrawals in 1996); In re Cilek, 115 B. R. 974, 988, n. 15 (Bkrtcy. Ct. WD Wis. 1990) (“[0]f the $6,457,306,674 deposited in IRAs in the nation’s credit unions, only 1.2% was withdrawn early and suffered a tax penalty during 1987, and only 1.27% was withdrawn during 1988”); see also Sabel-haus, Projecting IRA Balances and Withdrawals, 20 Employee Benefit Research Institute Notes 1, 3 (May 1999) (finding that “[t]he pattern in both [1993 and 1996] suggests infrequent withdrawals from IRAs” by those under 59V2 and noting the consistency of this pattern with the view that the penalty “has a big impact on withdrawal behavior”).
We need not and do not reach the question whether penalties of less than 10 percent or of a fixed amount would also be a sufficient barrier to early withdrawal.
The Rouseys are entitled to penalty-free distributions because of factors apart from age in certain circumstances. See 26 U. S. C. §§72(t)(2)(A)(ii)-(iv) (permitting penalty-free distributions due to the death of or disability of the IRA-holder, or as substantially equal periodic payments for the life expectancy of the accountholder); § 72(t)(2)(B) (medical expenses); §§72(t)(2)(D)-(F) (health insurance premiums, certain higher education expenses, and first-time home purchase). But these circumstances are confined to specific and narrow uses. See infra, at 332-334. Thus, that there are other circumstances in which the Rouseys can receive payment does not change our conclusion that they have a right to payment on account of age, for these exceptions do not undermine the fact that they cannot obtain unrestricted use of their funds until age 59 1/2. Moreover, § 522(d)(10)(E) requires that the right to payment be on account of age — not that it be solely on account of this factor.
O’Gilvie v. United States, 519 U. S. 79 (1996), and Commissioner v. Schleier, 515 U. S. 323 (1995), upon which Jacoway relies, Brief for Respondent 17-19, are consistent with our conclusion that petitioners’ IRAs satisfy the statute’s “on account of” requirement. Those cases involved the meaning of the phrase “on account of” in a tax provision that permitted the exclusion from income of damages received “ ‘on account’ of personal injuries.” O’Gilvie, supra, at 81 (emphasis deleted); Schleier, supra, at 329. In both cases, we rejected the claim that damages that were punitive in nature were on account of personal injuries, since such damages did not compensate for the personal injuries. O’Gilvie, supra, at 83-84; Schleier, supra, at 331-332. In so holding in O’Gilvie, we expressly rejected a “but for” causation reading of the statute. See 519 U. S., at 82-83. We instead concluded, as we have here, that the phrase “on account of” means “ ‘by reason of[, or] because of.’ ” Id., at 83.
See also 12 Oxford English Dictionary 580 (2d ed. 1989) (OED) (“[T]he sharing of profits, spec, between employer and employed”); Webster’s 3d 1811 (“[A] system or process under which employees receive a part of the profits of an industrial or commercial enterprise”).
See also id., at 2247 (defining “stock bonus” as “a bonus paid to corporation executives and employees in shares of stock”).
See also Am. Hert. 970 (“sum of money paid regularly as a retirement benefit or by way of patronage”).
See also id., at 54 (“[T]he annual payment of an allowance or income”; “[t]he interest or dividends paid annually on an investment of money”); 1 OED 488 (“[a] yearly grant, allowance, or income,” or “[a]n investment of money, whereby the investor becomes entitled to receive a series of equal annual payments, which, except in the case of perpetual annuities, includes the ultimate return of both principal and interest”).
The statute also permits penalty-free early withdrawal in the form of substantially equal periodic payments made for the life expectancy of the accountholder. 26 U. S. C. § 72(t)(2)(iv). This exception is likewise limited. If these payments are modified before the accountholder turns 59V2 or within five years of the start of those payments, the accountholder must pay not only the taxes that would have been imposed on those previous payments, including the 10-percent penalty, but also interest for the period in which the tax payment was deferred. §72(q)(3). As a result, if an accountholder uses this exception, he must use only this form of early withdrawal, lest he pay the penalty, taxes, and interest. The statute permits penalty-free withdrawals for medical expenses, which is likewise limited. § 72(t)(2)(B). The amount that can be withdrawn is capped by the amount that can be deducted in a given year. Ibid.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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H
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
PER CURIAM.
A criminal defendant "shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. Const., Amdt. 6. We have held that this right requires effective counsel in both state and federal prosecutions, even if the defendant is unable to afford counsel. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963). Counsel is unconstitutionally in effective if his performance is both deficient, meaning his errors are "so serious" that he no longer functions as "counsel," and prejudicial, meaning his errors deprive the defendant of a fair trial. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Applying this standard in name only, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that James Kulbicki's defense attorneys were unconstitutionally ineffective. We summarily reverse.
In 1993, Kulbicki shot his 22-year-old mistress in the head at pointblank range. The two had been ensnarled in a paternity suit, and the killing occurred the weekend before a scheduled hearing about unpaid child support. At Kulbicki's trial, commencing in 1995, Agent Ernest Peele of the FBI testified as the State's expert on Comparative Bullet Lead Analysis, or CBLA. In testimony of the sort CBLA experts had provided for decades, Peele testified that the composition of elements in the molten lead of a bullet fragment found in Kulbicki's truck matched the composition of lead in a bullet fragment removed from the victim's brain; a similarity of the sort one would " 'expect' " if " 'examining two pieces of the same bullet.' " 440 Md. 33, 41, 99 A.3d 730, 735 (2014). He further testified that a bullet taken from Kulbicki's gun was not an "exac[t]" match to the bullet fragments, but was similar enough that the two bullets likely came from the same package. Id., at 42-44, 99 A.3d, at 735-736. After considering this ballistics evidence, additional physical evidence from Kulbicki's truck, and witness testimony, the jury convicted Kulbicki of first-degree murder.
Kulbicki then filed a petition for postconviction relief, which lingered in state court until 2006 when Kulbicki added a claim that his defense attorneys were ineffective for failing to question the legitimacy of CBLA. By then, 11 years after his conviction, CBLA had fallen out of favor. Indeed, Kulbicki supplemented his petition once more in 2006 after the Court of Appeals of Maryland held for the first time that CBLA evidence was not generally accepted by the scientific community and was therefore inadmissible. See Clemons v. State, 392 Md. 339, 371, 896 A.2d 1059, 1078 (2006).
Kulbicki lost in the lower state courts and appealed to the Court of Appeals of Maryland. At that point, Kulbicki abandoned his claim of ineffective assistance with respect to the CBLA evidence, but the high court vacated Kulbicki's conviction on that ground alone. Kulbicki's counsel, according to the court, should have found a report coauthored by Agent Peele in 1991 that "presaged the flaws in CBLA evidence." 440 Md., at 40, 99 A.3d, at 734. One of the many findings of the report was that the composition of lead in some bullets was the same as that of lead in other bullets packaged many months later in a separate box. Rather than conduct "further research to explain the existence of overlapping compositions," the authors "speculated" that coincidence (or, in one case, the likelihood that separately packaged bullets originated from the same source of lead) caused the overlap. Id., at 49, 99 A.3d, at 739. The Court of Appeals opined that this lone finding should have caused the report's authors to doubt "that bullets produced from different sources of lead would have a unique chemical composition," the faulty assumption that ultimately led the court to reject CBLA evidence 15 years later. Ibid. ; see Clemons, supra, at 369-370, 896 A.2d, at 1077. The authors' "failure to fully explore the variance," the Court of Appeals concluded, was "at odds with the scientific method." 440 Md., at 50, 99 A.3d, at 740.
In the Court of Appeals' view, any good attorney should have spotted this methodological flaw. The court held that counsel's failure to unearth the report, to identify one of its findings as "at odds with the scientific method," and to use this methodological flaw to cast doubt on CBLA during counsel's cross-examination of Peele, "fell short of prevailing professional norms." Id., at 50-53, 99 A.3d, at 740-742. Concluding that counsel's supposed deficiency was prejudicial, the court set aside the conviction and ordered a new trial. Id., at 56, 99 A.3d, at 743-744.
We reverse. The Court of Appeals offered no support for its conclusion that Kulbicki's defense attorneys were constitutionally required to predict the demise of CBLA. Instead, the court indulged in the "natural tendency to speculate as to whether a different trial strategy might have been more successful." Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 372, 113 S.Ct. 838, 122 L.Ed.2d 180 (1993). To combat this tendency, we have "adopted the rule of contemporary assessment of counsel's conduct." Ibid . Had the Court of Appeals heeded this rule, it would have "judge[d] the reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct ... viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct." Strickland, supra, at 690, 104 S.Ct., at 2066
At the time of Kulbicki's trial in 1995, the validity of CBLA was widely accepted, and courts regularly admitted CBLA evidence until 2003. See United States v. Higgs, 663 F.3d 726, 738 (C.A.4 2011). As the Court of Appeals acknowledged, even the 1991 report itself did not question the validity of CBLA, concluding that it was a valid and useful forensic tool to match suspect to victim. 440 Md., at 51, n. 11, 99 A.3d, at 740, n. 11. Counsel did not perform deficiently by dedicating their time and focus to elements of the defense that did not involve poking methodological holes in a then-uncontroversial mode of ballistics analysis.
That is especially the case here, since there is no reason to believe that a diligent search would even have discovered the supposedly crucial report. The Court of Appeals offered a single citation in support of its sweeping statement that the report "was available" to Kulbicki's counsel in 1995-a Government Printing Office Web page accessed by the Court of Appeals, apparently conducting its own Internet research nearly two decades after the trial. Id., at 51, and n. 12, 99 A.3d, at 741, and n. 12 ; see also Brief in Opposition 14. The Web page indicates that a compilation of forensic studies that included the report was "distributed to various public libraries in 1994." 440 Md., at 51, n. 12, 99 A.3d, at 741, n. 12. But which ones? And in an era of card catalogues, not a worldwide web, what efforts would counsel have had to expend to find the compilation? And had they found it, would counsel really have combed through the entire compilation, and have identified the one (of many) findings in one of the reports, the disregard of which counsel would have recognized to be "at odds with the scientific method"? And then, would effective counsel really have brought to the attention of the jury a report whose conclusion was that CBLA was a valid investigative technique in cases just like Kulbicki's? Neither the Court of Appeals nor Kulbicki has answers. Given the uncontroversial nature of CBLA at the time of Kulbicki's trial, the effect of the judgment below is to demand that lawyers go "looking for a needle in a haystack," even when they have "reason to doubt there is any needle there." Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 389, 125 S.Ct. 2456, 162 L.Ed.2d 360 (2005). The Court of Appeals demanded something close to "perfect advocacy"-far more than the "reasonable competence" the right to counsel guarantees. Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 8, 124 S.Ct. 1, 157 L.Ed.2d 1 (2003) (per curiam ).
Kulbicki's trial counsel did not provide deficient performance when they failed to uncover the 1991 report and to use the report's so-called methodological flaw against Peele on cross-examination. (We need not, and so do not, decide whether the supposed error prejudiced Kulbicki.) The petition for writ of certiorari is granted, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals for Maryland is reversed.
It is so ordered.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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A
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This appeal requires us to construe the provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act that establish exclusive tribal jurisdiction over child custody proceedings involving Indian children domiciled on the tribe’s reservation.
I
A
The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA), 92 Stat. 3069, 25 U. S. C. §§ 1901-1963, was the product of rising concern in the mid-1970’s over the consequences to Indian children, Indian families, and Indian tribes of abusive child welfare practices that resulted in the separation of large numbers of Indian children from their families and tribes through adoption or foster care placement, usually in non-Indian homes. Senate oversight hearings in 1974 yielded numerous examples, statistical data, and expert testimony documenting what one witness called “[t]he wholesale removal of Indian children from their homes,... the most tragic aspect of-Indian life today.” Indian Child Welfare Program, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Indian Affairs of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (statement of William Byler) (hereinafter 1974 Hearings). Studies undertaken by the Association on American Indian Affairs in 1969 and 1974, and presented in the Senate hearings, showed that 25 to 35% of all Indian children had been separated from their families and placed in adoptive families, foster care, or institutions. Id., at 15; see also H. R. Rep. No. 95-1386, p. 9 (1978) (hereinafter House Report). Adoptive placements counted significantly in this total: in the State of Minnesota, for example, one in eight Indian children under the age of 18 was in an adoptive home, and during the year 1971-1972 nearly one in every four infants under one year of age was placed for adoption. The adoption rate of Indian children was eight times that of non-Indian children. Approximately 90% of the Indian placements were in non-Indian homes. 1974 Hearings, at 75-83. A number of witnesses also testified to the serious adjustment problems encountered by such children diming adolescence, as well as the impact of the adoptions on Indian parents and the tribes themselves. See generally 1974 Hearings.
Further hearings, covering much the same ground, were held during 1977 and 1978 on the bill that became the ICWA. While much of the testimony again focused on the harm to Indian parents and their children who were involuntarily separated by decisions of local welfare authorities, there was also considerable emphasis on the impact on the tribes themselves of the massive removal of their children. For example, Mr. Calvin Isaac, Tribal Chief of the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians and representative of the National Tribal Chairmen’s Association, testified as follows:
“Culturally, the chances of Indian survival are significantly reduced if our children, the only real means for the transmission of the tribal heritage, are to be raised in non-Indian homes and denied exposure to the ways of their People. Furthermore, these practices seriously undercut the tribes’ ability to continue as self-governing communities. Probably in no area is it more important that tribal sovereignty be respected than in an area as socially and culturally determinative as family relationships.” 1978 Hearings, at 193.
See also id., at 62. Chief Isaac also summarized succinctly what numerous witnesses saw as the principal reason for the high rates of removal of Indian children:
“One of the most serious failings of the present system is that Indian children are removed from the custody of their natural parents by nontribal government authorities who have no basis for intelligently evaluating the cultural and social premises underlying Indian home life and childrearing. Many of the individuals who decide the fate of our children are at best ignorant of our cultural values, and at worst contemptful of the Indian way and convinced that removal, usually to a non-Indian household or institution, can only benefit an Indian child.” Id., at 191-192.
The congressional findings that were incorporated into the ICWA reflect these sentiments. The Congress found:
“(3) that there is no resource that is more vital to the continued existence and integrity of Indian tribes than their children... ;
“(4) that an alarmingly high percentage of Indian families are broken up by the removal, often unwarranted, of their children from them by nontribal public and private agencies and that an alarmingly high percentage of such children are placed in non-Indian foster and adoptive homes and institutions; and
“(5) that the States, exercising their recognized jurisdiction over Indian child custody proceedings through administrative and judicial bodies, have often failed to recognize the essential tribal relations of Indian people and the cultural and social standards prevailing in Indian communities and families.” 25 U. S. C. §1901.
At the heart of the ICWA are its provisions concerning jurisdiction over Indian child custody proceedings. Section 1911 lays out a dual jurisdictional scheme. Section 1911(a) establishes exclusive jurisdiction in the tribal courts for proceedings concerning an Indian child “who resides or is domiciled within the reservation of such tribe,” as well as for wards of tribal courts regardless of domicile. Section 1911(b), on the other hand, creates concurrent but presumptively tribal jurisdiction in the case of children not domiciled on the reservation: on petition of either parent or the tribe, state-court proceedings for foster care placement or termination of parental rights are to be transferred to the tribal court, except in cases of “good cause,” objection by either parent, or declination of jurisdiction by the tribal court.
Various other provisions of ICWA Title I set procedural and substantive standards for those child custody proceedings that do take place in state court. The procedural safeguards include requirements concerning notice and appointment of counsel; parental and tribal rights of intervention and petition for invalidation of illegal proceedings; procedures governing voluntary consent to termination of parental rights; and a full faith and credit obligation in respect to tribal court decisions. See §§ 1901-1914. The most important substantive requirement imposed on state courts is that of § 1915(a), which, absent “good cause” to the contrary, mandates that adoptive placements be made preferentially with (1) members of the child’s extended family, (2) other members of the same tribe, or (3) other Indian families.
The ICWA thus, in the words of the House Report accompanying it, “seeks to protect the rights of the Indian child as an Indian and the rights of the Indian community and tribe in retaining its children in its society.” House Report, at 23. It does so by establishing “a Federal policy that, where possible, an Indian child should remain in the Indian community,” ibid., and by making sure that Indian child welfare determinations are not based on “a white, middle-class standard which, in many cases, forecloses placement with [an] Indian family.” Id., at 24.
B
This case involves the status of twin babies, known for our purposes as B. B. and G. B., who were born out of wedlock on December 29, 1985. Their mother, J. B., and father, W. J., were both enrolled members of appellant Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians (Tribe), and were residents and domiciliaries of the Choctaw Reservation in Neshoba County, Mississippi. J. B. gave birth to the twins in Gulfport, Harrison County, Mississippi, some 200 miles from the reservation. On January 10, 1986, J. B. executed a consent-to-adoption form before the Chancery Court of Harrison County. Record 8-10. W. J. signed a similar form. On January 16, appellees Orrey and Vivian Holyfield filed a petition for adoption in the same court, id., at 1-5, and the chancellor issued a Final Decree of Adoption on January 28. Id., at 13-14. Despite the court’s apparent awareness of the ICWA, the adoption decree contained no reference to it, nor to the infants’ Indian background.
Two months later the Tribe moved in the Chancery Court to vacate the adoption decree on the ground that under the ICWA exclusive jurisdiction was vested in the tribal court. Id., at 15-18. On July 14,1986, the court overruled the motion, holding that the Tribe “never obtained exclusive jurisdiction over the children involved herein... The court’s one-page opinion relied on two facts in reaching that conclusion. The court noted first that the twins’ mother “went to some efforts to see that they were born outside the confines of the Choctaw Indian Reservation” and that the parents had promptly arranged for the adoption by the Holyfields. Second, the court stated: “At no time from the birth of these children to the present date have either of them resided on or physically been on the Choctaw Indian Reservation.” Id., at 78.
The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed. 511 So. 2d 918 (1987). It rejected the Tribe’s arguments that the state court lacked jurisdiction and that it, in any event, had not applied the standards laid out in the ICWA. The court recognized that the jurisdictional question turned on whether the twins were domiciled on the Choctaw Reservation. It answered that question as follows:
“At no point in time can it be said the twins resided on or were domiciled within the territory set aside for the reservation. Appellant’s argument that living within the womb of their mother qualifies the children’s residency on the reservation may be lauded for its creativity; however, apparently it is unsupported by any law within this state, and will not be addressed at this time due to the far-reaching legal ramifications that would occur were we to follow such a complicated tangential course.” Id., at 921.
The court distinguished Mississippi cases that appeared to establish the principle that “the domicile of minor children follows that of the parents,” ibid.; see Boyle v. Griffin, 84 Miss. 41, 36 So. 141 (1904); Stubbs v. Stubbs, 211 So. 2d 821 (Miss. 1968); see also In re Guardianship of Watson, 317 So. 2d 30 (Miss. 1976). It noted that “the Indian twins... were voluntarily surrendered and legally abandoned by the natural parents to the adoptive parents, and it is undisputed that the parents went to some efforts to prevent the children from being placed on the reservation as the mother arranged for their birth and adoption in Gulfport Memorial Hospital, Harrison County, Mississippi.” 611 So. 2d, at 921. Therefore, the court said, the twins’ domicile was in Harrison County and the state court properly exercised jurisdiction over the adoption proceedings. Indeed, the court appears to have concluded that, for this reason, none of the provisions of the ICWA was applicable. Ibid. (“[T]hese proceedings... actually escape applicable federal law on Indian Child Welfare”). In any case, it rejected the Tribe’s contention that the requirements of the ICWA applicable in state courts had not been followed: “[T]he judge did conform and strictly adhere to the minimum federal standards governing adoption of Indian children with respect to parental consent, notice, service of process, etc.” Ibid.
Because of the centrality of the exclusive tribal jurisdiction provision to the overall scheme of the ICWA, as well as the conflict between this decision of the Mississippi Supreme Court and those of several other state courts, we granted plenary review. 486 U. S. 1021 (1988). We now reverse.
r — i I — I
Tribal jurisdiction over Indian child custody proceedings is not a novelty of the ICWA. Indeed, some of the ICWA’s jurisdictional provisions have a strong basis in pre-ICWA case law in the federal and state courts. See, e. g., Fisher v. District Court, Sixth Judicial District of Montana, 424 U. S. 382 (1976) (per curiam) (tribal court had exclusive jurisdiction over adoption proceeding where all parties were tribal members and reservation residents); Wisconsin Potowatomies of Hannahville Indian Community v. Houston, 393 F. Supp. 719 (WD Mich. 1973) (tribal court had exclusive jurisdiction over custody of Indian children found to have been domiciled on reservation); Wakefield v. Little Light, 276 Md. 333, 347 A. 2d 228 (1975) (same); In re Adoption of Buehl, 87 Wash. 2d 649, 555 P. 2d 1334 (1976) (state court lacked jurisdiction over custody of Indian children placed in off-reservation foster care by tribal court order); see also In re Lelah-puc-ka-chee, 98 F. 429 (ND Iowa 1899) (state court lacked jurisdiction to appoint guardian for Indian child living on reservation). In enacting the ICWA Congress confirmed that, in child custody proceedings involving Indian children domiciled on the reservation, tribal jurisdiction was exclusive as to the States.
The state-court proceeding at issue here was a “child custody proceeding.” That term is defined to include any “ ‘adoptive placement’ which shall mean the permanent placement of an Indian child for adoption, including any action resulting in a final decree of adoption.” 25 U. S. C. §1903 (l)(iv). Moreover, the twins were “Indian children.” See 25 U. S. C. § 1903(4). The sole issue in this case is, as the Supreme Court of Mississippi recognized, whether the twins were “domiciled” on the reservation.
A
The meaning of “domicile” in the ICWA is, of course, a matter of Congress’ intent. The ICWA itself does not define it. The initial question we must confront is whether there is any reason to believe that Congress intended the ICWA definition of “domicile” to be a matter of state law. While the meaning of a federal statute is necessarily a federal question in the sense that its construction remains subject to this Court’s supervision, see P. Bator, D. Meltzer, P. Mishkin, & D. Shapiro, Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal System 566 (3d ed. 1988); cf. Reconstruction Finance Corporation v. Beaver County, 328 U. S. 204, 210 (1946), Congress sometimes intends that a statutory term be given content by the application of state law. De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U. S. 570, 580 (1956); see also Beaver County, supra; Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U. S. 154, 161-162 (1942). We start, however, with the general assumption that “in the absence of a plain indication to the contrary,... Congress when it enacts a statute is not making the application of the federal act dependent on state law.” Jerome v. United States, 318 U. S. 101, 104 (1943); NLRB v. Natural Gas Utility Dist. of Hawkins County, 402 U. S. 600, 603 (1971); Dickerson v. New Banner Institute, Inc., 460 U. S. 103, 119 (1983). One reason for this rule of construction is that federal statutes are generally intended to have uniform nationwide application. Jerome, supra, at 104; Dickerson, supra, at 119-120; United States v. Pelzer, 312 U. S. 399, 402-403 (1941). Accordingly, the cases in which we have found that Congress intended a state-law definition of a statutory term have often been those where uniformity clearly was not intended. E. g., Beaver County, supra, at 209 (statute permitting States to apply their diverse local tax laws to real property of certain Government corporations). A second reason for the presumption against the application of state law is the danger that “the federal program would be impaired if state law were to control.” Jerome, supra, at 104; Dickerson, supra, at 119-120; Pelzer, 312 U. S., at 402-403. For this reason, “we look to the purpose of the statute to ascertain what is intended.” Id., at 403.
In NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U. S. 111 (1944), we rejected an argument that the term “employee” as used in the Wagner Act should be defined by state law. We explained our conclusion as follows:
“Both the terms and the purposes of the statute, as well as the legislative history, show that Congress had in mind no... patchwork plan for securing freedom of employees’ organization and of collective bargaining. The Wagner Act is... intended to solve a national problem on a national scale.... Nothing in the statute’s background, history, terms or purposes indicates its scope is to be limited by... varying local conceptions, either statutory or judicial, or that it is to be administered in accordance with whatever different standards the respective states may see fit to adopt for the disposition of unrelated, local problems.” Id., at 123.
See also Natural Gas Utility Dist., supra, at 603-604. For the two principal reasons that follow, we believe that what we said of the Wagner Act applies equally well to the ICWA.
First, and most fundamentally, the purpose of the ICWA gives no reason to believe that Congress intended to rely on state law for the definition of a critical term; quite the contrary. It is clear from the very text of the ICWA, not to mention its legislative history and the hearings that led to its enactment, that Congress was concerned with the rights of Indian families and Indian communities vis-a-vis state authorities. More specifically, its purpose was, in part, to make clear that in certain situations the state courts did not have jurisdiction over child custody proceedings. Indeed, the congressional findings that are a part of the statute demonstrate that Congress perceived the States and their courts as partly responsible for the problem it intended to correct. See 25 U. S. C. §1901(5) (state “judicial bodies... have often failed to recognize the essential tribal relations of Indian people and the cultural and social standards prevailing in Indian communities and families”). Under these circumstances it is most improbable that Congress would have intended to leave the scope of the statute’s key jurisdictional provision subject to definition by state courts as a matter of state law.
Second, Congress could hardly have intended the lack of nationwide uniformity that would result from state-law definitions of domicile. An example will illustrate. In a case quite similar to this one, the New Mexico state courts found exclusive jurisdiction in the tribal court pursuant to § 1911(a), because the illegitimate child took the reservation domicile of its mother at birth — notwithstanding that the child was placed in the custody of adoptive parents 2 days after its off-reservation birth and the mother executed a consent to adoption 10 days later. In re Adoption of Baby Child, 102 N. M. 735, 737-738, 700 P. 2d 198, 200-201 (App. 1985). Had that mother traveled to Mississippi to give birth, rather than to Albuquerque, a different result would have obtained if state-law definitions of domicile applied. The same, presumably, would be true if the child had been transported to Mississippi for adoption after her off-reservation birth in New Mexico. While the child’s custody proceeding would have been subject to exclusive tribal jurisdiction in her home State, her mother, prospective adoptive parents, or an adoption intermediary could have obtained an adoption decree in state court merely by transporting her across state lines. Even if we could conceive of a federal statute under which the rules of domicile (and thus of jurisdiction) applied differently to different Indian children, a statute under which different rules apply from time to time to the same child, simply as a result of his or her transport from one State to another, cannot be what Congress had in mind.
We therefore think it beyond dispute that Congress intended a uniform federal law of domicile for the ICWA.
B
It remains to give content to the term “domicile” in the circumstances of the present case. The holding of the Supreme Court of Mississippi that the twin babies were not domiciled on the Choctaw Reservation appears to have rested on two findings of fact by the trial court: (1) that they had never been physically present there, and (2) that they were “voluntarily surrendered” by their parents. 511 So. 2d, at 921; see Record 78. The question before us, therefore, is whether under the ICWA definition of “domicile” such facts suffice to render the twins nondomiciliaries of the reservation.
We have often stated that in the absence of a statutory definition we “start with the assumption that the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used.” Richards v. United States, 369 U. S. 1, 9 (1962); Russello v. United States, 464 U. S. 16, 21 (1983). We do so, of course, in the light of the “‘object and policy’” of the statute. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U. S. 270, 285 (1956), quoting United States v. Heirs of Boisdoré, 8 How. 113, 122 (1849). We therefore look both to the generally accepted meaning of the term “domicile” and to the purpose of the statute.
That we are dealing with a uniform federal rather than a state definition does not, of course, prevent us from drawing on general state-law principles to determine “the ordinary meaning of the words used.” Well-settled state law can inform our understanding of what Congress had in mind when it employed a term it did not define. Accordingly, we find it helpful to borrow established common-law principles of domicile to the extent that they are not inconsistent with the objectives of the congressional scheme.
“Domicile” is, of course, a concept widely used in both federal and state courts for jurisdiction and conflict-of-laws purposes, and its meaning is generally uncontroverted. See generally Restatement §§ 11-23; R. Leflar, L. McDougal, & R. Felix, American Conflicts Law 17-38 (4th ed. 1986); R. Weintraub, Commentary on the Conflict of Laws 12-24 (2d ed. 1980). “Domicile” is not necessarily synonymous with “residence,” Perri v. Kisselbach, 34 N. J. 84, 87, 167 A. 2d 377, 379 (1961), and one can reside in one place but be domiciled in another, District of Columbia v. Murphy, 314 U. S. 441 (1941); In re Estate of Jones, 192 Iowa 78, 80, 182 N. W. 227, 228 (1921). For adults, domicile is established by physical presence in a place in connection with a certain state of mind concerning one’s intent to remain there. Texas v. Florida, 306 U. S. 398, 424 (1939). One acquires a “domicile of origin” at birth, and that domicile continues until a new one (a “domicile of choice”) is acquired. Jones, supra, at 81, 182 N. W., at 228; In re Estate of Moore, 68 Wash. 2d 792, 796, 415 P. 2d 653, 656 (1966). Since most minors are legally incapable of forming the requisite intent to establish a domicile, their domicile is determined by that of their parents. Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U. S. 202, 211 (1933). In the case of an illegitimate child, that has traditionally meant the domicile of its mother. Kowalski v. Wojtkowski, 19 N. J. 247, 258, 116 A. 2d 6, 12 (1955); Moore, supra, at 796, 415 P. 2d, at 656; Restatement § 14(2), § 22, Comment c; 25 Am. Jur. 2d, Domicil § 69 (1966). Under these principles, it is entirely logical that “[o]n occasion, a child’s domicil of origin will be in a place where the child has never been.” Restatement § 14, Comment b.
It is undisputed in this case that the domicile of the mother (as well as the father) has been, at all relevant times, on the Choctaw Reservation. Tr. of Oral Arg. 28-29. Thus, it is clear that at their birth the twin babies were also domiciled on the reservation, even though they themselves had never been there. The statement of the Supreme Court of Mississippi that “[a]t no point in time can it be said the twins... were domiciled within the territory set aside for the reservation,” 511 So. 2d, at 921, may be a correct statement of that State’s law of domicile, but it is inconsistent with generally accepted doctrine in this country and cannot be what Congress had in mind when it used the term in the ICWA.
Nor can the result be any different simply because the twins were “voluntarily surrendered” by their mother. Tribal jurisdiction under § 1911(a) was not meant to be defeated by the actions of individual members of the tribe, for Congress was concerned not solely about the interests of Indian children and families, but also about the impact on the tribes themselves of the large numbers of Indian children adopted by non-Indians. See 25 U. S. C. §§ 1901(3) (“[T]here is no resource that is more vital to the continued existence and integrity of Indian tribes than their children”), 1902 (“promote the stability and security of Indian tribes”). The numerous prerogatives accorded the tribes through the ICWA’s substantive provisions, e. g., §§ 1911(a) (exclusive jurisdiction over reservation domiciliaries), 1911(b) (presumptive jurisdiction over nondomiciliaries), 1911(c) (right of intervention), 1912(a) (notice), 1914 (right to petition for invalidation of state-court action), 1915(c) (right to alter presumptive placement priorities applicable to state-court actions), 1915(e) (right to obtain records), 1919 (authority to conclude agreements with States), must, accordingly, be seen as a means of protecting not only the interests of individual Indian children and families, but also of the tribes themselves.
In addition, it is clear that Congress’ concern over the placement of Indian children in non-Indian homes was based in part on evidence of the detrimental impact on the children themselves of such placements outside their culture. Congress determined to subject such placements to the ICWA’s jurisdictional and other provisions, even in cases where the parents consented to an adoption, because of concerns going beyond the wishes of individual parents. As the 1977 Final Report of the congressionally established American Indian Policy Review Commission stated, in summarizing these two concerns, “[rjemoval of Indian children from their cultural setting seriously impacts a long-term tribal survival and has damaging social and psychological impact on many individual Indian children.” Senate Report, at 52.
These congressional objectives make clear that a rule of domicile that would permit individual Indian parents to defeat the ICWA’s jurisdictional scheme is inconsistent with what Congress intended. See In re Adoption of Child of Indian Heritage, 111 N. J. 155, 168-171, 543 A. 2d 925, 931-933 (1988). The appellees in this case argue strenuously that the twins’ mother went to great lengths to give birth off the reservation so that her children could be adopted by the Holyfields. But that was precisely part of Congress’ concern. Permitting individual members of the tribe to avoid tribal exclusive jurisdiction by the simple expedient of giving birth off the reservation would, to a large extent, nullify the purpose the ICWA was intended to accomplish. The Supreme Court of Utah expressed this well in its scholarly and sensitive opinion in what has become a leading case on the ICWA:
“To the extent that [state] abandonment law operates to permit [the child’s] mother to change [the child’s] domicile as part of a scheme to facilitate his adoption by non-Indians while she remains a domiciliary of the reservation, it conflicts with and undermines the operative scheme established by subsections [1911(a)] and [1913(a)] to deal with children of domiciliaries of the reservation and weakens considerably the tribe’s ability to assert its interest in its children. The protection of this tribal interest is at the core of the ICWA, which recognizes that the tribe has an interest in the child which is distinct from but on a parity with the interest of the parents. This relationship between Indian tribes and Indian children domiciled on the reservation finds no parallel in other ethnic cultures found in the United States. It is a relationship that many non-Indians find difficult to understand and that non-Indian courts are slow to recognize. It is precisely in recognition of this relationship, however, that the ICWA designates the tribal court as the exclusive forum for the determination of custody and adoption matters for reservation-domiciled Indian children, and the preferred forum for nondomiciliary Indian children. [State] abandonment law cannot be used to frustrate the federal legislative judgment expressed in the ICWA that the interests of the tribe in custodial decisions made with respect to Indian children are as entitled to respect as the interests of the parents.” In re Adoption of Halloway, 732 P. 2d 962, 969-970 (1986).
We agree with the Supreme Court of Utah that the law of domicile Congress used in the ICWA cannot be one that permits individual reservation-domiciled tribal members to defeat the tribe’s exclusive jurisdiction by the simple expedient of giving birth and placing the child for adoption off the reservation. Since, for purposes of the ICWA, the twin babies in this case were domiciled on the reservation when adoption proceedings were begun, the Choctaw tribal court possessed exclusive jurisdiction pursuant to 25 U. S. C. § 1911(a). The Chancery Court of Harrison County was, accordingly, without jurisdiction to enter a decree of adoption; under ICWA § 104, 25 U. S. C. § 1914, its decree of January 28, 1986, must be vacated.
Ill
We are not unaware that over three years have passed since the twin babies were born and placed in the Holyfield home, and that a court deciding their fate today is not writing on a blank slate in the same way it would have in January 1986. Three years’ development of family ties cannot be undone, and a separation at this point would doubtless cause considerable pain.
Whatever feelings we might have as to where the twins should live, however, it is not for us to decide that question. We have been asked to decide the legal question of who should make the custody determination concerning these children — not what the outcome of that determination should be. The law places that decision in the hands of the Choctaw tribal court. Had the mandate of the ICWA been followed in 1986, of course, much potential anguish might have been avoided, and in any case the law cannot be applied so as automatically to “reward those who obtain custody, whether lawfully or otherwise, and maintain it during any ensuing (and protracted) litigation.” Halloway, 732 P. 2d, at 972. It is not ours to say whether the trauma that might result from removing these children from their adoptive family should outweigh the interest of the Tribe — and perhaps the children themselves — in having them raised as part of the Choctaw community. Rather, “we must defer to the experience, wisdom, and compassion of the [Choctaw] tribal courts to fashion an appropriate remedy.” Ibid.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Mississippi is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
For example, Dr. Joseph Westermeyer, a University of Minnesota social psychiatrist, testified about his research with Indian adolescents who experienced difficulty coping in white society, despite the fact that they had been raised in a purely white environment:
“[Tjhey were raised with a white cultural and social identity. They are raised in a white home. They attended, predominantly white schools, and in almost all cases, attended a church that was predominantly white, and really came to understand very little about Indian culture, Indian behavior, and had virtually no viable Indian identity. They can recall such things as seeing cowboys and Indians on TV and feeling that Indians were a historical figure but were not a viable contemporary social group.
“Then during adolescence, they found that society was not to grant them the white identity that they had. They began to find this out in a number of ways. For example, a universal experience was that when they began to date white children, the parents of the white youngsters were against this, and there were pressures among white children from the parents not to date these Indian children....
“The other experience was derogatory name calling in relation to their racial identity....
“[T]hey were finding that society was putting on them an identity which they didn’t possess and taking from them an identity that they did possess.” 1974 Hearings, at 46.
Hearing on S. 1214 before the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (hereinafter 1977 Hearings); Hearings on S. 1214 before the Subcommittee on Indian Affairs and Public Lands of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) (hereinafter 1978 Hearings).
These sentiments were shared by the ICWA’s principal sponsor in the House, Rep. Morris Udall, see 124 Cong. Rec. 38102 (1978) (“Indian tribes and Indian people are being drained of their children and, as a result, their future as a tribe and a people is being placed in jeopardy”), and its minority sponsor, Rep. Robert Lagomarsino, see ibid. (“This bill is directed at conditions which... threaten... the future of American Indian tribes...”).
One of the particular points of concern was the failure of non-Indian child welfare workers to understand the role of the extended family in Indian society. The House Report on the ICWA noted: “An Indian child may have scores of, perhaps more than a hundred, relatives who are counted as close, responsible members of the family. Many social workers, untutored in the ways of Indian family life or assuming them to be socially irresponsible, consider leaving the child with persons outside the nuclear family as neglect and thus as grounds for terminating parental rights.” House Report, at 10. At the conclusion of the 1974 Senate hearings, Senator Abourezk noted the role that such extended families played in the care of children: “We’ve had testimony here that in Indian communities throughout the Nation there is no such thing as an abandoned child because when a child does have a need for parents for one reason or another, a relative or a friend will take that child in. It’s the extended family concept.” 1974 Hearings, at 473. See also Wisconsin Potowatomies of Hannahville Indian Community v. Houston, 393 F. Supp. 719 (WD Mich. 1973) (discussing custom of extended family and tribe assuming responsibility for care of orphaned children).
Section 1911(a) reads in full:
“An Indian tribe shall have jurisdiction exclusive as to any State over any child custody proceeding involving an
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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B
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
We must decide in this case what authority the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit have to review decisions of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in bar admission matters. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, reversing the United States District Court, held that the District Court had jurisdiction to review the District of Columbia Court of Appeals’ denials of the respondents’ requests for waivers of a bar admission rule that requires applicants to have graduated from an approved law school. We vacate the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit and remand the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
M
We have discussed in detail in earlier opinions the changes in the structure of the District of Columbia court system effected by the District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970. Pub. L. 91-358, 84 Stat. 473. See Key v. Doyle, 434 U. S. 59 (1977); Palmore v. United States, 411 U. S. 389 (1973). For purposes of this case, three provisions of that legislation are crucial. One provision made “[f]inal judgments and decrees of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals... reviewable by the Supreme Court of the United States in accordance with section 1257 of title 28, United States Code.” § 111, 84 Stat. 475 (codified at D. C. Code § 11-102 (1981)). Another provision amended 28 U. S. C. § 1257 to specify that the term “highest court of a State” as used in §1257 includes the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. § 172(a)(1), 84 Stat. 590. These provisions make the judgments of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, like the judgments of state courts, directly reviewable in this Court. Cases no longer have to proceed from the local courts to the United States Court of Appeals and then to this Court under 28 U. S. C. § 1254. See Key v. Doyle, supra, at 64. The third provision authorized the District of Columbia Court of Appeals to “make such rules as it deems proper respecting the examination, qualification, and admission of persons to membership in its bar, and their censure, suspension, and expulsion.” §111, 84 Stat. 521 (codified at D. C. Code § ll-2501(a) (1981)). This provision divested the United States District Court of its former authority to supervise admission to the District of Columbia Bar.
Pursuant to its new rulemaking authority, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals adopted, as part of its general rules, Rule 461 (1973), which governs admission to the bar. Rule 461(b)(3) states:
“(3) Proof of Legal Education. An applicant who has graduated from a law school that at the time of graduation was approved by the American Bar Association or who shall be eligible to be graduated from an approved law school within 60 days of the date of the examination will be permitted to take the bar examination. Under no circumstances shall an applicant be admitted to the bar without having first submitted to the Secretary to the Committee [on Admissions] a certificate verifying that he has graduated from an approved law school.”
Neither of the respondents graduated from an approved law school. Their efforts to avoid the operation of Rule 461(b)(3) form the foundation of this case.
A
Respondent Feldman did not attend law school. Instead, he pursued an alternative path to a legal career provided by the State of Virginia involving a highly structured program of study in the office of a practicing attorney. See Va. Code §54-62 (1982). In addition to his work and study at a law firm in Charlottesville, Va., Feldman formally audited classes at the University of Virginia School of Law. For the final six months of his alternative course of study, Feldman served as a law clerk to a United States District Judge.
Having passed the Virginia bar examination, Feldman was admitted to that State’s Bar in April 1976. In March of that year he had begun working as a staff attorney for the Baltimore, Md., Legal Aid Bureau. He continued in that job until January 1977. Like the District of Columbia, Maryland has a rule limiting access to the bar examination to graduates of ABA-approved law schools, but the Maryland Board of Law Examiners waived the rule for Feldman. Feldman passed the Maryland examination and later was admitted to that State’s Bar.
In November 1976, Feldman applied to the Committee on Admissions of the District of Columbia Bar for admission to the District Bar under a rule which, prior to its recent amendment, allowed a member of a bar in another jurisdiction to seek membership in the District Bar without examination. In January 1977, the Committee denied Feldman’s application on the ground that he had not graduated from an approved law school. Initially, the Committee stated that waivers of Rule 461(b)(3), or exceptions to it, were not authorized. Following further contact with the Committee, however, Feldman was granted an informal hearing. After the hearing, the Committee reaffirmed its denial of Feld-man’s application and stated that only the District of Columbia Court of Appeals could waive the requirement of graduation from an approved law school.
In June 1977, Feldman submitted to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals a petition for admission to the bar without examination. App. la. Alternatively, Feldman requested that he be allowed to sit for the bar examination. Id., at 5a. In his petition, Feldman described his legal training, work experience, and other qualifications. He suggested that his professional training and education were “equal to that received by those who have attended an A. B. A. approved law school.” Id., at 4a. In view of his training, experience, and success in passing the bar examinations in other jurisdictions, Feldman stated that “the objectives of the District of Columbia’s procedures and requirements for admission to the Bar will not be frustrated by granting this petition.” Ibid.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals did not act on Feldman’s petition for several months. In March 1978, Feldman’s counsel wrote to the Chief Judge of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals to urge favorable action on Feld-man’s petition. The letter stated that Feldman had “abundantly demonstrated his fitness to practice law” and suggested that “it would be a gross injustice to exclude him from the Bar without even considering his individual qualifications.” Id., at 6a. The letter went on to state that “[i]n the unique circumstances of his case, barring Mr. Feldman from the practice of law merely because he has not graduated from an accredited law school would raise important questions under the United States Constitution and the federal antitrust laws — questions that Mr. Feldman is prepared to pursue in the United States District Court if necessary.” Id., at 6a-7a. In support of Feldman’s position, the letter again stressed the strength of his training and the breadth of his experience. While acknowledging that a strict reading of Rule 461(b)(3) prevented Feldman from taking the bar examination, Feldman’s counsel suggested that the court was not precluded from considering “Mr. Feldman’s application on its merits.” Id., at 9a. The court has plenary power to regulate the licensing of attorneys, which, in the view of Feld-man’s counsel, includes the discretion to waive the requirements of Rule 461 in a deserving case. In view of Feldman’s “unusually high qualifications for admission” his case provided “an ideal occasion for the exercise of such discretion.” Ibid.
Feldman’s counsel also pointed out that the court had granted waivers of the rule in the past and suggested that a “failure to consider Mr. Feldman’s application would be highly arbitrary and would raise serious questions about the fairness and even-handedness of the Court’s policies regarding bar admissions.” Id., at 10a. He went on to state that “serious questions under the United States Constitution are raised by any bar admissions procedure which automatically rejects applicants who have not graduated from an A. B. A. accredited law school, without any opportunity to show that their experience and education provide equivalent evidence of their fitness to practice law.” Id., at 10a-lla. Feldman’s counsel cited case authority in support of his position. Finally, Feldman’s counsel stated that “[t]he federal antitrust laws provide an alternative basis for questioning the legality of a bar admissions procedure which presumes applicants to be unqualified if they lack a law degree and denies them any opportunity to show that their individual training and experience still qualify them to practice law.” Id., at 12a. Feld-man’s counsel also cited cases in support of this position.
In late March 1978, the Chief Judge of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals responded to the letter from Feldman’s counsel. Id., at 16a. The Chief Judge stated that while the Committee on Admissions had recognized Mr. Feldman’s “exceptional opportunity for training” and his fine personal qualities, the purpose of the rule at issue was “to prevent the Committee and the Court from assuming the practicably impossible task of making separate subjective evaluations of each applicant’s training and education; hence, an objective and reasonable standard as prescribed by the rule must be utilized.” Ibid. In this light, the court decided not to waive the rule and upheld the Committee’s denial of Feldman’s application.
On March 30, 1978, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals issued a per curiam order denying Feldman’s petition. Id., at 18a. The order stated simply that “[o]n consideration of the petition of Marc Feldman to waive the provisions of Rule 46 of the General Rules of this Court, it is ORDERED that applicant’s petition is denied.” Ibid.
In May 1978, Feldman filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia challenging the District of Columbia Court of Appeals’ refusal to waive Rule 461(b)(3) on his behalf. Id., at 35a. The complaint stated that the “[defendants’ refusal to consider plaintiff’s individual qualifications to practice law is unlawful in view of his demonstrated fitness and competence, as well as the prior admission to the D. C. bar of several other individuals who did not attend an accredited law school.” Id., at 36a. Feld-man sought “a declaration that defendants’ actions have violated the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution and the Sherman Act, and... an injunction requiring defendants either to grant plaintiff immediate admission to the District of Columbia bar or to permit him to sit for the bar examination as soon as possible.” Ibid'
The District Court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss on the ground that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the action. Id., at 78a, 79a. The court found that the District of Columbia Court of Appeals’ order denying Feld-man’s petition was a judicial act “which fully encompassed the constitutional and statutory issues raised.” Id., at 82a. The court stated that if it were “to assume jurisdiction over the subject matter of this lawsuit, it would find itself in the unsupportable position of reviewing an order of a jurisdiction’s highest court.” Ibid.
B
Respondent Hickey began the study of law in March 1975 at the Potomac School of Law, Washington, D. C., after concluding a distinguished 20-year career as a pilot in the United States Navy. At the time he entered Potomac, Hickey was aware that it had not been accredited by the ABA, but he thought that he could transfer at some later date to an ABA-approved school. Shortly after Hickey started his studies, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals granted waivers of Rule 461(b)(3) to graduates of the International School of Law, a new and unapproved school in the area. The court granted waivers to members of the 1975, 1976, and 1977 graduating classes of International. This practice encouraged Hickey to believe that he also would be able to obtain a waiver of the rule. In November 1977, however, the Court of Appeals denied Potomac’s petition for a temporary waiver of the rule and announced that it would no longer grant waivers to future International graduates.
In April 1978, Hickey submitted to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals a petition for waiver of Rule 461(b)(3) so that he could sit for the bar examination. Id., at 19a. In his petition, Hickey described his career in the Navy and his law school record. He also submitted affidavits from four law professors attesting to his competence in his legal studies. Hickey went on to suggest that it would be unfair to deny him, or other students currently enrolled at Potomac, a waiver after they had pursued three years of legal education in reliance on the court’s previous policy of granting waivers to International graduates. Hickey pointed out that denying his petition for waiver would impose an especially severe burden on him in view of his age and his status as a husband and father.
Hickey also suggested that it would be burdensome for him to attempt to comply with Rule 461(b)(4), which permits graduates of unapproved law schools to sit for the bar examination after completing 24 credit hours at an approved law school. Furthermore, Hickey contended that he would be unable to comply with the rule because the ABA had instructed approved law schools in the District of Columbia to deny admission to nondegree candidates for completion of the 24-credit-hour requirement.
Finally, Hickey stated that his 20 years of military service had demonstrated “far beyond that of the average bar exam candidate, that he possesses the qualities essential to a good lawyer, including: judgment, maturity, courage in the face of adversity, concern for his fellow man, commitment to our society and attention to detail.” App. 24a. He suggested that “[f ]ar more than most, [he had] earned the right to sit for the bar examination.” Ibid.
On June 12, 1978, the court issued a per curiam order denying Hickey’s petition for a waiver. Id., at 49a. The order stated that the court had considered the petition and Hickey’s contention that the ABA had instructed approved law schools in the District of Columbia to deny admission to nondegree candidates for completion of the 24-credit-hour requirement. The court stated: “The American Bar Association Standards and Rules of Procedure, as amended — 1977, permit enrollment of persons in petitioner’s category under Standard 506(ii) if they can satisfy the requirement for admission set forth in Standard 502.” Ibid.
In July 1978, Hickey filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia challenging the District of Columbia Court of Appeals’ denial of his waiver petition. Id., at 60a. Hickey alleged that the denial of his petition violated the Fifth Amendment and the federal antitrust laws. Id., at 64a-65a. The allegations and prayer for relief in Hickey’s complaint were virtually identical to the allegations and prayer for relief in Feldman’s complaint, see n. 3, supra, except that Hickey simply sought an order requiring the defendants to allow him to sit for the bar examination at the earliest possible date. App. 66a.
The District Court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss Hickey’s complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Id., at 142a. In this regard, the court stated that “[i]t is well settled that the admission and exclusion of attorneys by the members of the highest court of a state is the exercise of a judicial function which may be reviewed only by the United States Supreme Court.” Id., at 143a. In the District Court’s view, Hickey was seeking review of the defendants’ denial of his petition for admission to the bar examination. The court suggested that “[t]he constitutional challenge to that denial is wholly and directly intertwined with plaintiff’s efforts to secure an exemption from Rule 46, and the allegations of the complaint and the relief requested concern essentially the application of the Rule to his own particular case.” Ibid. In this light the court concluded that “there is no basis for the extraordinary attempt to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court on a matter entrusted by the Congress to the D. C. Court of Appeals.” Ibid.
c
Both Hickey and Feldman appealed the dismissals of their complaints to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the dismissals of Hickey’s and Feldman’s antitrust claims on the ground that they were insubstantial. Feldman v. Gardner, 213 U. S. App. D. C. 119, 122, 661 F. 2d 1295, 1298 (1981). The court, however, concluded that the waiver proceedings in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals “were not judicial in the federal sense, and thus did not foreclose litigation of the constitutional contentions in the District Court.” Ibid. The court therefore reversed the dismissals of the constitutional claims and remanded them for consideration on the merits. Ibid.
Although the District of Columbia Circuit acknowledged that “review of a final judgment of the highest judicial tribunal of a state is vested solely in the Supreme Court of the United States,” id., at 134, 661 F. 2d, at 1310 (footnote omitted), and that the United States District Court therefore is without authority to review determinations by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in judicial proceedings, the court found that the District Court has jurisdiction over these cases because the proceedings in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals “were not judicial....” Ibid. The court based this conclusion on a finding that neither Feldman nor Hickey asserted in their waiver petitions “any sort of right to be admitted to the District of Columbia bar, or even to take the examination therefor.” Id., at 139, 661 F. 2d, at 1315 (emphasis in original). Feldman and Hickey simply sought an exemption from the rule. In particular, Hickey did not present any legal arguments nor did “he demand admission to the examination as a matter of legal entitlement. ” Ibid. He “merely asked the court to exercise its administrative discretion to permit him to take the test.” Ibid. This amounted to a request that the court “make a policy decision equating his personal qualities with accredited legal education, not an adjudication requiring resort to legal principles.” Ibid. (footnote omitted).
The District of Columbia Circuit found Feldman’s case more difficult, id., at 140, 661 F. 2d, at 1316, but still concluded that the proceedings on his waiver petition were not judicial in nature because the “claim-of-right element” was lacking. Ibid. Feldman’s petition did not “claim that a refusal of his waiver request would deny him any right at all.” Ibid. Instead, the petition “invoked the administrative discretion of [the court], simply asking that it temper its rule in his favor, for personal and not legal reasons.” Ibid. The District of Columbia Circuit rejected the argument that the letter from Feldman’s counsel, which raised certain legal arguments, changed the nature of the proceedings. Id., at 140-141, 661 F. 2d, at 1316-1317. The District of Columbia Circuit stated: “We are unable to discern in the letter any desire that the court consider Feldman’s legal criticisms of the rule on their merits, or hand down a decision dealing with them. The letter made unmistakably clear that these criticisms would be litigated, if at all, in the District Court....” Ibid, (footnotes omitted).
II
The District of Columbia Circuit properly acknowledged that the United States District Court is without authority to review final determinations of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in judicial proceedings. Review of such determinations can be obtained only in this Court. See 28 U. S. C. § 1257. See also Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Locomotive Engineers, 398 U. S. 281, 296 (1970); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U. S. 413, 415, 416 (1923). A crucial question in this case, therefore, is whether the proceedings before the District of Columbia Court of Appeals were judicial in nature.
A
This Court has considered the distinction between judicial and administrative or ministerial proceedings on several occasions. In Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U. S. 210 (1908), railroads challenged in federal court the constitutionality of rail passenger rates set by the State Corporation Commission. The question presented by the case was whether the federal court was free to enjoin implementation of the rate order. Id., at 223. In considering this question, we assumed that the State Corporation Commission was, at least for some purposes, a court. Id., at 224. We held, however, that the federal court could enjoin implementation of the rate order because the Commission had acted in a legislative as opposed to a judicial capacity in setting the rates. Id., at 226. In reaching this conclusion, we stated:
“A judicial inquiry investigates, declares and enforces liabilities as they stand on present or past facts and under laws supposed already to exist. That is its purpose and end. Legislation on the other hand looks to the future and changes existing conditions by making a new rule to be applied thereafter to all or some part of those subject to its power. The establishment of a rate is the making of a rule for the future, and therefore is an act legislative not judicial in kind....” Ibid.
We went on to suggest that the nature of a proceeding “depends not upon the character of the body but upon the character of the proceedings.” Ibid. See generally Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U. S. 15, 20-22 (1972); Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U. S. 820, 827 (1961); Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Wallace, 288 U. S. 249, 259 (1933); Public Service Co. v. Corboy, 250 U. S. 153, 161-162 (1919).
In In re Summers, 325 U. S. 561 (1945), we considered the petitioner’s challenge to the constitutionality of a State Supreme Court’s refusal to admit him to the practice of law. At the outset, we noted that the record was not in the “customary form” because the state court had not treated the proceeding as “judicial.” Id., at 563. In fact, the state court contested our certiorari jurisdiction on the ground that the state-court proceedings had not been judicial in nature and that no case or controversy therefore existed in this Court under Art. Ill of the Federal Constitution. Id., at 564-565. In considering this contention, we conceded that the state-court proceedings might not have been judicial under state law and that the denial of the petitioner’s application for admission to the bar was treated “as a ministerial act which is performed by virtue of the judicial power, such as the appointment of a clerk or bailiff or the specification of the requirements of eligibility or the course of study for applicants for admission to the bar, rather than a judicial proceeding.” Id., at 566. We stated, however, that in determining the nature of the proceedings “we must for ourselves appraise the circumstances of the refusal.” Ibid.
In conducting this appraisal, we first stated:
“A case arises, within the meaning of the Constitution, when any question respecting the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States has assumed ‘such a form that the judicial power is capable of acting on it.’... A declaration on rights as they stand must be sought, not on rights which may arise in the future, and there must be an actual controversy over an issue, not a desire for an abstract declaration of the law. The form of the proceeding is not significant. It is the nature and effect which is controlling.” Id., at 566-567, quoting Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 819 (1824) (citations omitted).
Applying this standard, we noted that the state court had concluded that the report of the Committee on Character and Fitness, which refused to issue a favorable certificate, should be sustained. The state court, therefore, considered the petitioner’s petition “on its merits.” 325 U. S., at 567. Although “no entry was placed by the Clerk in the file, on a docket, or in a judgment roll,” ibid., we found that the state court had taken “cognizance of the petition and passed an order which [was] validated by the signature of the presiding officer.” Ibid, (footnote omitted). We stated:
“Where relief is thus sought in a state court against the action of a committee, appointed to advise the court, and the court takes cognizance of the complaint without requiring the appearance of the committee or its members, we think the consideration of the petition by the Supreme Court, the body which has authority itself by its own act to give the relief sought, makes the proceeding adversary in the sense of a true case or controversy.
“A claim of a present right to admission to the bar of a state and a denial of that right is a controversy. When the claim is made in a state court and a denial of the right is made by judicial order, it is a case which may be reviewed under Article III of the Constitution when federal questions are raised and proper steps taken to that end, in this Court.” Id., at 567-569 (footnote omitted).
B
These precedents clearly establish that the proceedings in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals surrounding Feldman’s and Hickey’s petitions for waiver were judicial in nature. The proceedings were not legislative, ministerial, or administrative. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals did not “loo[k] to the future and chang[e] existing conditions by making a new rule to be applied thereafter to all or some part of those subject to its power.” Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U. S., at 226. Nor did it engage in rulemaking or specify “the requirements of eligibility or the course of study for applicants for admission to the bar....” In re Summers, swpra, at 566. Nor did the District of Columbia Court of Appeals simply engage in ministerial action. Instead, the proceedings before the District of Columbia Court of Appeals involved a “judicial inquiry” in which the court was called upon to investigate, declare, and enforce “liabilities as they [stood] on present or past facts and under laws supposed already to exist.” Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., supra, at 226.
In his petition to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, discussed in detail, supra, at 466-468, Feldman contended that he possessed “the requisite fitness and good moral character necessary to practice law in this jurisdiction.” App. la. In support of his position, he described in detail his legal training and experience. He asserted that his professional education and training were “equal to that received by those who have attended an A. B. A. approved law school.” Id., at 4a. He further argued that granting his petition would not frustrate the objectives of the District of Columbia’s procedures and requirements for admission to the bar. In his later letter, see supra, at 466-467, Feldman pointed out that the court’s former practice of granting waivers to graduates of unaccredited law schools raised questions about the fairness of denying his petition. He also made explicit legal arguments against the rule based both on the Constitution and on the federal antitrust laws. All of this was done against the background of an existing rule.
In essence, Feldman argued on policy grounds that the rule should not be applied to him because he had fulfilled the spirit, if not the letter, of Rule 461(b)(3). Alternatively, he argued in his letter that the rule was invalid. In short, he was seeking “a declaration on rights as they [stood]... not on rights which [might] arise in the future....” In re Summers, 325 U. S., at 567. This required the District of Columbia Court of Appeals to determine in light of existing law and in light of Feldman’s qualifications and arguments whether Feldman’s petition should be granted. The court also had before it legal arguments against the validity of the rule. When it issued a per curiam order denying Feldman’s petition, it determined as a legal matter that Feldman was not entitled to be admitted to the bar without examination or to sit for the bar examination. The court had adjudicated Feldman’s “claim of a present right to admission to the bar,” id., at 568, and rejected it. This is the essence of a judicial proceeding.
The same conclusion obtains with respect to the proceedings on Hickey’s petition for waiver. In his petition, see supra, at 471-472, Hickey asserted that he was substantively qualified to sit for the bar examination. In support of his position, he submitted affidavits supporting his competence and described in detail his military service and legal education. He also argued that he had relied on the court’s former policy of granting waivers to graduates of unaccredited law schools in developing a reasonable expectation that he would be granted a waiver as well. Moreover, he suggested that ABA policy made it impossible for him to pursue the alternative route under the rules to being permitted to sit for the bar examination. Finally, he argued, based on equitable considerations such as his age, military service, and status as a father and husband, that he should be granted a waiver. He stated that “[f]ar more than most,” he had “earned the right to sit for the bar examination.” App. 24a.
As in Feldman’s case, Hickey’s petition called upon the District of Columbia Court of Appeals to consider policy and equitable arguments in deciding whether to waive the rule. The fact that Hickey did not cite case authority in support of his arguments or make any explicitly legal contentions does not render the proceedings nonjudicial. The court still was required to determine if Hickey’s qualifications and background fulfilled the basic purposes of the rule sufficiently to justify a waiver and, if not, whether equitable considerations compelled a waiver. These are essentially judicial inquiries. They resulted in a per curiam order that denied Hickey’s petition and explicitly rejected his contention that ABA policy prevented him from acquiring 24 credit hours from an accredited law school.
Admittedly, the proceedings in both Feldman’s case and Hickey’s case did not assume the form commonly associated with judicial proceedings. As we said in In re Summers, supra, however, “[tjhe form of the proceeding is not significant. It is the nature and effect which is controlling.” Id., at 567.
III
A
A determination that the proceedings on Feldman’s and Hickey’s petitions were judicial does not finally dispose of this case. As we have noted, supra, at 476, a United States District Court has no authority to review final judgments of a state court in judicial proceedings. Review of such judgments may be had only in this Court. Therefore, to the extent that Hickey and Feldman sought review in the District Court of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals’ denial of their petitions for waiver, the District Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over their complaints. Hickey and Feld-man should have sought review of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals’ judgments in this Court. To the extent that Hickey and Feldman mounted a general challenge to the constitutionality of Rule 461(b)(3), however, the District Court did have subject-matter jurisdiction over their complaints.
The difference between seeking review in a federal district court of a state court’s final judgment in a bar admission matter and challenging the validity of a state bar admission rule has been recognized in the lower courts and, at least implicitly, in the opinions of this Court.
In Doe v. Pringle, 550 F. 2d 596 (CA10 1976), the plaintiff challenged in United States District Court the constitutionality of a state-court decision denying his application for admission to the bar. In concluding that the District Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the action, the Court of Appeals stated: “We concur in the district court’s finding that it is without subject matter jurisdiction to review a final order of the [State] Supreme Court denying a particular application for admission to the [state bar]. This rule applies even though, as here, the challenge is anchored to alleged deprivations of federally protected due process and equal protection rights.” Id., at 599 (emphasis in original). During the course of its opinion, the Court of Appeals stated:
“The United States District Court, in denying [the plaintiff] relief, declared that there is a subtle but fundamental distinction between two types of claims which a frustrated bar applicant might bring to federal court: The first is a constitutional challenge to the state’s general rules and regulations governing admission; the second is a claim, based on constitutional or other grounds, that the state has unlawfully denied a particular applicant admission. The Court held that while federal courts do exercise jurisdiction over many constitutional claims which attack the state’s power to license attorneys involving challenges to either the rule-making authority or the administration of the rules,... such is not true where review of a state court’s adjudication of a particular application is sought. The Court ruled that the latter claim may be heard, if at all, exclusively by the Supreme Court of the United States.” Id., at 597 (emphasis in original).
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Doe v. Pringle, supra, properly emphasized the distinction between general challenges to state bar admission rules and claims that a state court has unlawfully denied a particular applicant admission. We have recognized that state supreme courts may act in a nonjudicial capacity in promulgating rules regulating the bar. See, e. g., Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union, 446 U. S. 719, 731 (1980); Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U. S., at 827 (plurality opinion); In re Summers, 325 U. S., at 566. Challenges to the constitutionality of state bar rules, therefore, do not necessarily require a United States district court to review a final state-court judgment in a judicial proceeding. Instead, the district court may simply be asked to assess the validity of a rule promulgated in a nonjudicial proceeding. If this is the case, the district court is not reviewing a state-court judicial decision. In this regard, 28 U. S. C. § 1257 does not act as a bar to the district court’s consideration of the case and because the proceedings giving rise to the rule are nonjudicial the policies prohibiting United States district court review of final state-court judgments are not implicated. United States district courts, therefore, have subject-matter jurisdiction over general challenges to state bar rules, promulgated by state courts in nonjudicial proceedings, which do not require review of a final state-court judgment in a particular case. They do not have jurisdiction, however, over challenges to state-court decisions in particular cases arising out of judicial proceedings even if those challenges allege that the state court’s action was unconstitutional. Review of those decisions may be had only in this Court. 28 U. S. C. § 1257.
B
Applying this standard to the respondents’ complaints, it is clear that their allegations that the District of Columbia Court of Appeals acted arbitrarily and capriciously in denying their petitions for waiver and that the court acted unreasonably and discriminatorily in denying their petitions in view of its former policy of granting waivers to graduates of unaccredited law schools, see n. 3, supra, required the District Court to review a final judicial decision of the highest court of a jurisdiction in a particular case. These allegations are inextricably intertwined with the District of Columbia Court of Appeals’ decisions, in judicial proceedings, to deny the respondents’ petitions. The District Court, therefore, does not have jurisdiction over these elements
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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I
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Certiorari, 348 U. S. 813, to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
Per Curiam:
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U. S. 517; Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 U. S. 564; Phillips Co. v. Walling, 324 U. S. 490. The judgment of the District Court is affirmed, and the case is remanded to the District Court. The motion of the petitioner to make Goldblatt Bros., Inc., a party in this Court is denied without prejudice to the right of the petitioner to renew said motion in the District Court, or to take such other proceedings for enforcement of the judgment as the petitioner may deem advisable and proper in the circumstances. See Walling v. Reuter, Inc., 321 U. S. 671.
With her on the brief were Solicitor General Sobeloff, Sylvia S. Ellison and Harold S. Saxe. Stanford Clinton argued the cause for respondent.
With him on the brief was Robert A. Sprecher.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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G
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sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Blackmun
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the narrow but important question whether a State may impose a nondiscriminatory ad valorem property tax on imported goods stored under bond in a customs warehouse and destined for domestic manufacture and sale.
I
Appellant R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company is a New Jersey corporation with its principal office in Winston-Salem, N. C. Reynolds manufactures finished tobacco products for sale to distributors and other authorized purchasers. App. to Juris. Statement 26a. Virtually all its products are consumed in the United States. Id., at 31a. Its only manufacturing facilities are in Winston-Salem, where it blends imported tobacco with domestic tobacco in its manufacturing process.
The foreign tobacco is shipped to a port of entry in the United States and is placed under customs bond given by Reynolds to secure the payment of federal import duties. See 19 U. S. C. §1555 (1982 ed., Supp. III). The tobacco is then transported by truck or rail to one or more of the 88 customs-bonded warehouses owned and maintained by Reynolds in Forsyth and Durham Counties, N. C. Because nearly all imported tobacco requires aging, it is usually in the warehouses for two years. Reynolds pays the required customs duties upon withdrawal of tobacco from the warehouses. Reynolds stores its domestic tobacco in nonbonded warehouses in the same two counties. It receives identical city and county police, fire, and other public services at its customs-bonded and nonbonded warehouses. App. to Juris. Statement 32a.
Tobacco present in North Carolina on January 1 of each year is subject to an ad valorem property tax in the amount of 60% of the rate generally applicable to other property. See N. C. Gen. Stat. §§105-277(a) and 105-285 (1985). Counties and municipalities are authorized to levy and collect property taxes, but they must do so in a manner uniform throughout the State. See § 105-272. In listing its taxable personal property for 1983 in Durham and Forsyth Counties, Reynolds claimed that, under this Court’s ruling in Xerox Corp. v. County of Harris, 459 U. S. 145 (1982), its imported tobacco in customs-bonded warehouses was immune from taxation on federal constitutional grounds. App. 4-13. The tax supervisors for the respective counties denied this claim, and the County Boards of Equalization and Review upheld the denials. Id., at 15-23.
Reynolds then filed appeals (consolidated for hearing) with the North Carolina Property Tax Commission, sitting as the State Board of Equalization and Review. Reynolds again contended that the taxation of the imported tobacco was at odds with Xerox. The Commission, however, found Xerox distinguishable because the warehoused goods under consideration in that case were destined for foreign markets and were lodged only temporarily in customs-bonded warehouses in this country, whereas Reynolds’ tobacco was not so destined and had “nothing temporary about its existence in this country.” App. to Juris. Statement 35a-36a. The Commission, id., at 36a, likened the Reynolds facts, instead, to those of American Smelting & Refining Co. v. County of Contra Costa, 271 Cal. App. 2d 437, 77 Cal. Rptr. 570 (1969), appeal dism’d, 396 U. S. 273 (1970), where a nondiscriminatory tax on imported goods stored in customs-bonded warehouses and destined for domestic consumption was upheld.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the Commission’s decision. In re R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 73 N. C. App. 475, 326 S. E. 2d 911 (1985). The court first rejected Reynolds’ contention that the tax violated the Import-Export Clause, because the tax was clearly not an impost or duty. Id., at 478-480, 326 S. E. 2d, at 914-915. The court then distinguished Xerox, reasoning that it prohibited state taxation only of goods stored under bond and awaiting export, not of those destined for domestic manufacture and consumption. 73 N. C. App., at 482-483, 326 S. E. 2d, at 916-917. Following the California Court of Appeal’s conclusion in American Smelting that customs-bonded warehouses were not meant to create a “warehouse enclave” for foreign goods destined to be sold and consumed in domestic commerce, the North Carolina court observed that it would be unfair to “exempt imported tobacco aging in customs bonded warehouses from property taxation while imposing these taxes on domestically-grown tobacco aging in ordinary warehouses.” 73 N. C. App., at 483-484, 326 S. E. 2d, at 917. Finally, the court dismissed Reynolds’ due process claim, finding that the appropriate test was “‘whether the taxing power exerted by the state bears fiscal relation to protection, opportunities and benefits given by the state.’” Id., at 485, 326 S. E. 2d, at 918, quoting Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U. S. 435, 444 (1940). Because there was no dispute that the imported tobacco received the benefit of local services, the imposition of the ad valorem tax did not constitute a due process violation. 73 N. C. App., at 485-486, 326 S. E. 2d, at 918.
Reynolds then filed with the North Carolina Supreme Court a notice of appeal and a petition for discretionary review. The Supreme Court granted the counties’ subsequent motion to dismiss for lack of a substántial constitutional question and denied Reynolds’ petition. In re R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 314 N. C. 540, 335 S. E. 2d 21 (1985).
Reynolds appealed to this Court. We postponed consideration of our jurisdiction to the hearing on the merits. 475 U. S. 1009 (1986).
II
Under 28 U. S. C. § 1257, appellate jurisdiction lies in this Court to review a “final” judgment “rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had... (2)... where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of any state on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, and the decision is in favor of its validity.”
A
The initial jurisdictional question presented here is whether Reynolds properly challenged the validity of North Carolina’s ad valorem property tax and whether there was a final judgment in favor of validity. Because the North Carolina Court of Appeals sustained the tax against Reynolds’ claim that, as applied to its imported tobacco, the tax was repugnant to the Import-Export, Supremacy, and Due Process Clauses, and the North Carolina Supreme Court concluded that no substantial constitutional question was raised by the appeal, our appellate jurisdiction would seem to be assured. Appellees contend, however, that jurisdiction under § 1257(2) has not been established because Reynolds failed to make “‘an explicit and timely insistence’” in the North Carolina courts that the State’s tax statute, as applied to it, violated the Federal Constitution. Brief for Appellees 12, quoting Charleston Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. Alderson, 324 U. S. 182, 185 (1945). Appellees argue that Reynolds challenged merely the assessment or levy of the tax by North Carolina authorities, a situation where appellate jurisdiction does not lie. We find the argument unpersuasive.
In Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U. S. 434 (1979), this Court was faced with a similar challenge to appellate jurisdiction. Appellees in that case asserted that Japanese shipping companies had been denied only a constitutional immunity from taxation for their shipping containers and that the California courts had not sustained the tax statute against federal constitutional attack. See id., at 440. Contrary to that suggestion, this Court found that the appellants had challenged the constitutionality of the tax statute, as applied, and that the California courts had sustained the statute’s validity. Id., at 441. We further observed that “a state statute is sustained within the meaning of § 1257(2) when a state court holds it applicable to a particular set of facts as against the contention that such application is invalid on federal grounds.” Ibid.
The situation presented by the present case is like that in Japan Line: Reynolds explicitly drew the ad valorem property tax, as applied to its imported tobacco, into constitutional question, and the North Carolina courts upheld the validity of the tax. See also Xerox Corp. v. County of Harris, 459 U. S., at 149; McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U. S. 210, 219, n. 12 (1981). Thus, under § 1257(2), there was a final state-court judgment in favor of the validity of the tax, and Reynolds properly challenged it.
B
Reynolds draws our attention to a jurisdictional detail that is unresolved. It has not been made clear which North Carolina court, in circumstances like those present here, is the “highest court” from which an appeal lies under § 1257. North Carolina, with exceptions not pertinent here, gives a litigant an appeal of right to its Supreme Court from any decision of its Court of Appeals that “directly involves a substantial question arising under the Constitution of the United States or of this State.” N. C. Gen. Stat. §7A-30 (Supp. 1985). As Reynolds explains, the grant of appellees’ motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of a substantial federal constitutional question by the North Carolina Supreme Court could be interpreted as a decision on the merits affirming the Court of Appeals’ judgment, or it could be viewed as a determination by that court that it lacked jurisdiction over the appeal. See Brief for Appellant 11. Depending upon how the dismissal is to be characterized, appeal here would properly lie from the Supreme Court or, on the other hand, from the Court of Appeals.
We have resolved that we should decide this jurisdictional question so that practitioners may be certain of their ground. In the absence of positive assurance to the contrary from the North Carolina Supreme Court, we consider that court’s dismissal of Reynolds’ appeal to be a decision on the merits. Cf. Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032, 1037-1044 (1983). With no such contrary assurance in the present record, we conclude that it is the appeal from that court that is the proper one under § 1257.
When confronted with a comparable situation arising from Ohio, this Court ruled that the appeal lies from the Ohio Supreme Court and not from that State’s Court of Appeals. See Matthews v. Huwe, 269 U. S. 262, 265 (1925); Hetrick v. Village of Lindsey, 265 U. S. 384, 386 (1924). See also Turney v. Ohio, 273 U. S. 510, 515 (1927). In Matthews, Chief Justice Taft, an Ohioan writing for the Court, explained the appropriateness of the appeal from the Ohio Supreme Court:
“It is one of those not infrequent cases in which decision of the merits of the case also determines jurisdiction. The petition was dismissed, not because the court was really without jurisdiction, for it could have taken it, but because the question was regarded as frivolous, which is a different thing from finding that the petition was not in character one which the Court could consider.” 269 U. S., at 265.
This reasoning is applicable to the present case: there is no question that the North Carolina Supreme Court had jurisdiction to hear Reynolds’ appeal, but it determined not to do so in light of its conclusion that the appeal raised no substantial constitutional question.
We therefore regard the appeal in No. 85-1021 (from the Supreme Court of North Carolina) as the proper one, and we dismiss the appeal in No. 85-1022 (from the North Carolina Court of Appeals) for want of jurisdiction.
I — I HH I — I
On the merits, the crucial issue is whether Congress has exercised its power under the Supremacy Clause to pre-empt ad valorem state taxation of imported goods that are stored in customs-bonded warehouses and that are destined for domestic markets. Under this Clause the “Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof... shall be the supreme Law of the Land.” U. S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2. In determining whether Congress has invoked this pre-emption power, we give primary emphasis to the ascertainment of congressional intent. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218, 230 (1947). This may be manifested in several ways. Ibid.; Louisiana Public Service Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U. S. 355 (1986). Chief among the indications of an intent to pre-empt is where Congress has legislated so comprehensively that it has left no room for supplementary state legislation. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., supra. Pre-emption may also be found where state legislation would impede the purposes and objectives of Congress. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 67 (1941). In undertaking this analysis, however, we must be mindful of the principle that “federal regulation of a field of commerce should not be deemed preemptive of state regulatory power in the absence of persuasive reasons — either that the nature of the regulated subject matter permits no other conclusion, or that the Congress has unmistakably so ordained.” Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U. S. 132, 142 (1963); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U. S. 117, 127 (1973) (“So here, we may not overlook the body of law relating to the sensitive interrelationship between statutes adopted by the separate, yet coordinate, federal and state sovereignties”). See Brown v. Hotel Employees, 468 U. S. 491, 500-501 (1984).
In Xerox Corp. v. County of Harris, 459 U. S. 145 (1982), this Court recently dealt with the issue of pre-emption of state taxation on imported goods stored in customs-bonded warehouses. It there examined the narrow question “whether a state may impose nondiscriminatory ad valorem personal property taxes on imported goods stored under bond in a customs warehouse and destined for foreign markets.” Id., at 146. At the outset of its pre-emption analysis, the Court in Xerox, examined the legislative history of the Warehousing Act of 1846, 9 Stat. 53, the forerunner of the present statutory scheme, in order to uncover the objectives behind the customs-bonded warehouse. The Court observed: “The Act stimulated foreign commerce by allowing goods in transit in foreign commerce to remain in secure storage, duty free, until they resumed their journey in export.” 459 U. S., at 150. The Court further noted that making this country a center of world commerce was a desired and conceivable goal in light of our favorable geographic location between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans that would facilitate the “transshipment of goods.” Id., at 150-151. Moreover, for the drafters of the Act, the promotion of foreign commerce went hand in hand with the growth of American shipping and mercantile industries. Id., at 151. The Court concluded: “To these ends, Congress was willing to waive all duty on goods that were reexported from the warehouse, and to defer, for a prescribed period, the duty on goods destined for American consumption.” Ibid.
The Court, therefore, had to determine whether state taxation of the copiers destined for export would contradict the purpose of promoting foreign commerce and the related goal of aiding certain sectors of American economic life. It limited its pre-emption analysis to whether taxation would impede the congressional objectives. It particularly relied upon its earlier decision in McGoldrick v. Gulf Oil Corp., 309 U. S. 414 (1940), where it had found that the federal warehouse scheme pre-empted a New York City sales tax on oil imported under customs bond, refined in a customs-bonded warehouse, and sold as ships’ stores for vessels destined for abroad. As the Court in Xerox noted, the tax at issue in McGoldrick would detract from the benefit American refiners received in their freedom from customs duties on the oil and thus undermined the advantage they gained in the competition with their foreign counterparts. 459 U. S., at 152 (citing McGoldrick, 309 U. S., at 429). Applying this reasoning to the case before it, the Xerox Court concluded that the waiver of customs duties benefited those merchants who used American ports “as transshipment centers,” gave them a competitive advantage over importers using storage facilities in other countries, and thus promoted foreign commerce to the United States. 459 U. S., at 153. Because the waiver so clearly furthered the Act’s purposes, any attempt to remove its benefit, such as would occur through state taxation, was incompatible with these goals. The Court thus ruled that state property tax on the copiers was pre-empted.
In a summary of its holding, however, this Court rather broadly stated that “state property taxes on goods stored under bond in a customs warehouse are pre-empted by Congress’ comprehensive regulation of customs duties.” Id., at 154. Reynolds would conclude from that sentence that the holding in Xerox precludes state taxation of any goods in a customs warehouse, regardless of their destination. As is clear from what has been said above, however, we accept Xerox’s holding and the quoted sentence as limited to the factual situation presented in that case, that is, where the goods are intended for transshipment.
It is difficult, moreover, to believe that the purposes in forming the customs-bonded warehouse scheme identified by the Court in Xerox would be disserved by the imposition of ad valorem property taxes on Reynolds’ imported tobacco. It makes sense to conclude that state property taxation may discourage an importer whose goods are destined for transshipment in foreign commerce from using American ports and facilities, particularly when the same importer is granted an exemption from customs duties on all goods exported. Similar taxation would hardly deter an importer who, like Reynolds, stores goods in customs-bonded warehouses for up to two years for domestic manufacture and consumption, the storage period arguably being part of the manufacturing process because the tobacco requires aging. Unlike Xerox, moreover, Reynolds is not completely free of import duties on its goods but simply has them deferred. Thus, rather than being a charge that detracts from the absolute benefit of the waiver of duties, the state tax here is in addition to the payment of duties and might well be considered as nothing more than an expected cost of doing business. See Xerox Corp. v. County of Harris, 459 U. S., at 156 (Powell, J., dissenting). Furthermore, while the tax on goods destined for foreign markets would have harmful effects on American industry and workers by discouraging importers from using American ships and ports, to invalidate the North Carolina tax would place domestic tobacco, which is subject to the ad valorem property tax while aging, at a distinct disadvantage to the imported tobacco. Domestic producers and local taxpayers would thus “subsidize” the growers of imported tobacco. See In re R. J. Reynolds, 73 N. C. App., at 484, 326 S. E. 2d, at 917 (“Also, since this imported tobacco receives the same local governmental services, such as police and fire protection, as domestic tobacco, local taxpayers would be forced to provide a subsidy in excess of a million dollars to Reynolds”). Permitting imposition of a tax thus leads to equal treatment for imported and domestic tobacco.
One of the Warehousing Act’s major goals, manifested in its scheme of deferral and waiver of duties, was to promote the importer’s flexibility with respect to his goods. Under the system in place prior to the Warehousing Act, an importer was required to pay the duties in cash when the goods were unloaded from the vessel; if no duties were paid, interest on them would immediately accrue and would have to be satisfied, or the customs officials would sell the goods for the charges. See Cong. Globe, 29th Cong., 1st Sess., App. 790 (1846) (remarks of Sen. Dix). What this meant for the merchant who did not have a ready source of funds was that he would be forced to part with a portion of his goods, often in an unfavorable market, in order to raise money to pay the duties. Id., at 792; see also H. R. Rep. No. 411, 29th Cong., 1st Sess., 1-8 (1846). Moreover, an importer who was unsure about the ultimate destination of the goods would be penalized by keeping them in warehouses in this country, for he would lose the benefit of the use of the money that had been paid for the customs duties. See Cong. Globe, 29th Cong., 1st Sess., App. 792 (1846) (remarks of Sen. Dix). By permitting an importer to defer duties for a set period of time and to have a waiver of duties on reexported goods, the Warehousing Act enabled the importer, without any threat of financial loss, to place his goods in domestic markets or to return them to foreign commerce and, by this flexibility, encouraged importers to use American facilities.
It is difficult to discern how imposition of an ad valorem tax will affect an importer’s flexibility in a situation where, as here, goods are destined for domestic markets. Given that the tobacco is aging in the customs-bonded warehouses in preparation for domestic manufacture and sale in this country, Reynolds does not occupy the position of an importer looking for the best market, domestic or foreign, in which to place the stored goods. In any event, Reynolds clearly benefits from the flexibility created by the Warehousing Act. By being allowed to defer customs duties on the imported tobacco for up to five years, Reynolds is able to decide how much imported tobacco to use in its manufacturing process at any given time, depending upon the demand for its products in the domestic market.
Nor is there any suggestion that taxation here would conflict with the central purpose behind the customs-bonded warehouses: to ensure that federal customs duties are collected. See Xerox Corp. v. County of Harris, 459 U. S., at 155 (Powell, J., dissenting). Not only is the present statutory and regulatory framework sufficient to permit customs officials to monitor the entrance and removal of goods from warehouses and thus to guarantee collection of federal revenue, but Reynolds does not explain how, on the facts of this case, imposition of the North Carolina tax will prevent customs officials from receiving the duties. See n. 3, supra. And the present statutes and regulations that guide this monitoring and the warehouse proprietor’s own conduct with respect to the imported goods are not so comprehensive as to leave no room for North Carolina’s assessment of ad valorem taxes. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S., at 230; Louisiana Public Service Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U. S., at 370. Although the regulations are not themselves controlling on the pre-emption issue, see Xerox Corp. v. County of Harris, 459 U. S., at 152, n. 8, where, as in this case, Congress has entrusted an agency with the task of promulgating regulations to carry out the purposes of a statute, see 19 U. S. C. § 1556, as part of the pre-emption analysis we must consider whether the regulations evidence a desire to occupy a field completely. See Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U. S. 141, 153-154 (1982). Preemption should not be inferred, however, simply because the agency’s regulations are comprehensive. See Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 U. S. 707, 716-718 (1985). In this case, the current regulations, while detailed, appear to contemplate some concurrent state regulation and, arguably, even state taxation.
Finally, we agree with the North Carolina Court of Appeals that this case presents a factual situation similar to that in American Smelting and that the California Court of Appeal’s reasoned decision is therefore pertinent. The Court of Appeal considered whether metal-bearing ores and concentrates to be treated in a customs-bonded smelting and refining warehouse, some to be reexported and others to be used in domestic markets, were subject to a local property tax. Relying upon McGoldrick v. Gulf Oil Corp., 309 U. S. 414 (1940), the Court of Appeal concluded that the refined materials destined to reenter the exportation stream were exempt from local taxation. 271 Cal. App. 2d, at 481, 77 Cal. Rptr., at 601. With respect to similar materials intended for domestic consumption, however, the court concluded that “neither the laws, nor the regulations, nor the precedents... show a congressional intent to interfere with the right of the state to tax goods which have been imported for, and have been appropriated to, processing for domestic consumption.” Ibid. The Court of Appeal could see no reason why-state taxation on such goods would interfere with the primary benefit to be given the importer — deferral of the duties, and the Federal Government’s concern with collecting its customs duties. It thus concluded that there was no reason why this taxation should depend upon when the goods were withdrawn from the warehouses. Id., at 469-470, 77 Cal. Rptr., at 593-594. A customs-bonded warehouse was not to become an “enclave of foreign commerce,” id., at 470, 77 Cal. Rptr., at 594, nor was it to give the operator of the smelter a “bounty” that would enable it to prevail in its competition over “domestic smelters refining domestic ores.” Id., at 474, 77 Cal. Rptr., at 596-597. So also here, regardless of the imposition of the North Carolina ad valorem tax, Reynolds will be able to defer payment of the customs duties; the Federal Government will receive its customs revenue; and domestic producers of tobacco will not suffer in their competition with the imported tobacco.
We therefore hold that, consistent with the Supremacy Clause, a State may impose a nondiscriminatory ad valorem property tax on imported goods stored in a customs-bonded warehouse and destined for domestic manufacture and sale.
IV
We turn to Reynolds’ remaining constitutional arguments that the North Carolina ad valorem property tax violates the Import-Export and Due Process Clauses. The Court has stated that its decision in Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U. S. 276 (1976), “adopted a fundamentally different approach to cases claiming the protection of the Import-Export Clause.” Limbach v. Hooven & Allison Co., 466 U. S. 353, 359 (1984); see also Washington Revenue Dept. v. Association of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U. S. 734, 752-754 (1978). We explained this approach, and its distinction from the earlier analysis, in Limbach:
“To repeat: we think it clear that this Court in Michelin specifically abandoned the concept that the Import-Export Clause constituted a broad prohibition against all forms of state taxation that fell on imports. Michelin changed the focus of Import-Export Clause cases from the nature of the goods as imports to the nature of the tax at issue. The new focus is not on whether the goods have lost their status as imports but is, instead, on whether the tax sought to be imposed is an ‘Impost or Duty.’” 466 U. S., at 360.
In Michelin, we concluded that a Georgia nondiscriminatory ad valorem property tax, which had been assessed upon imported tires and tubes stored in a warehouse, was not the kind of tax prohibited by the Import-Export Clause, inasmuch as it did not offend the policies behind the Clause: concern that an impost or duty might interfere with the Federal Government’s regulation of commercial relations with foreign governments; fear that on account of such state taxation the Federal Government would lose an important source of revenue; and a desire to maintain harmony among the States, which would be disturbed if seaboard States could tax goods “merely flowing through their ports” to other States not so favorably situated. 423 U. S., at 285-286.
The nondiscriminatory ad valorem property tax at issue here seems indistinguishable from the tax in Michelin in terms of these policies. The North Carolina tax does not interfere with the Federal Government’s regulation of foreign commerce, for, as we have seen, it falls on imported and domestic goods alike and does not single out imported goods for unfavorable treatment. See id., at 286. Having concluded that the tax does not impede the collection of customs duties, it follows that it neither impairs an important source of revenue for the Federal Government nor replaces the federal duty with one of its own. Ibid. Rather, the property tax is nothing more than a means “by which a State apportions the cost of such services as police and fire protection among the beneficiaries according to their respective wealth.” Id., at 287. If imposition of the tax happens to have the “incidental effect,” ibid., of discouraging some importation of foreign goods, prohibiting this result is not a function of the Import-Export Clause. Finally, in light of the services provided in exchange for this tax, it hardly constitutes the kind of exaction by the seaboard States on goods destined for inland States that the Framers sought to prevent by the Clause. Id., at 288. A failure to assess the tax would shift the tax burden from Reynolds and the ultimate consumers of its tobacco products to the local taxpayers of North Carolina — a result completely at odds with Michelin. See id., at 289. Accordingly, we conclude that the application of the tax to Reynolds’ imported tobacco does not violate the Import-Export Clause.
This Court has observed that in Michelin it limited its holding to the imported goods ‘“no longer in transit.’” Washington Revenue Dept., 435 U. S., at 755 (quoting Michelin, 423 U. S., at 302). Reynolds contends that, because goods stored in customs-bonded warehouses are by definition “in transit,” this case does not fall within the scope of Michelin’ s holding. This reasoning, however, is unpersuasive. The imported tobacco here, we repeat, has nothing transitory about it: it has reached its State — indeed, its county — of destination and only the payment of the customs duty, after the appropriate aging, separates it from entrance into the domestic market. More importantly, an automatic “in transit” status for goods stored in customs-bonded warehouses can be inferred only if Congress intended to confer it upon all goods stored in customs-bonded warehouses. See Xerox Corp. v. County of Harris, 459 U. S., at 157 (Powell, J., dissenting). As we have seen, state taxation of such goods destined for domestic markets is contrary to none of the purposes for which Congress established the customs-bonded warehouse scheme. It strains reason to think that, although Congress could have directly pre-empted state taxation in this situation by declaring it to be in conflict with the purposes of customs-bonded warehouses or by directing the United States Customs Service to issue regulations governing taxation of stored goods, Congress decided to achieve the same effect in a more roundabout fashion by giving the goods the talismanic “in transit” status.
We also find no merit in Reynolds’ due process claim. As noted by the North Carolina Court of Appeals, it is well settled that a state tax comports with the Due Process Clause if “the taxing power exerted by the state bears fiscal relation to protection, opportunities and benefits given by the state.” Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U. S., at 444; see 1 R. Rotunda, J. Nowak, & J. Young, Treatise on Constitutional Law § 13.2, p. 669 (1986). In light of the police, fire, and other services provided to Reynolds’ imported tobacco by the North Carolina counties and cities, such a “fiscal relation” clearly exists in this case. Although Reynolds contends that goods located in customs-bonded warehouses are outside the taxing jurisdiction of the State because of their “in transit” status, for the reasons given above this argument no more succeeds in the due process context than it does when addressed to the Import-Export Clause analysis.
In No. 85-1021, the judgment of the Supreme Court of North Carolina is affirmed. The appeal in No. 85-1022 is dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
It is so ordered.
Although there are two appeals (by the same appellant), there is but one case. See Part II, infra.
The imported tobacco comes from Bulgaria, Syria, Lebanon, Brazil, and a few other places. App. to Juris. Statement 29a.
Pursuant to federal regulation, a private party may have a building or part of a building designated as a customs-bonded warehouse for the purpose of storing imported goods. See 19 U. S. C. §§ 1555-1565 (1982 ed. and Supp. III); 19 CFR §§ 19.1-19.12 (1986). A customs officer supervises the operation of the warehouse, although labor on the stored merchandise is performed by the proprietor. The regulations prescribe, among other things, the manner in which goods enter and leave the warehouse, § 19.6, the records the proprietor must keep, §19.12, and the supervision the customs officer is to perform, § 19.4.
Customs warehouses are divided into eight classes. § 19.1(a). Reynolds has two types, Class 2 and Class 8. Its Class 8 warehouses are storage sheds for the cleaning, sorting, and repacking of tobacco. See § 19.1(a)(8). Its Class 2 warehouses are used exclusively for the storage of tobacco. See § 19.1(a)(2). It is customary for Reynolds in the course of its manufacturing process to move imported tobacco from storage in its Class 8 warehouses to its Class 2 warehouses located in Reynolds’ manufacturing areas. App. to Juris. Statement 30a. Reynolds owns these warehouses and the land thereunder, is their sole user, and pays all maintenance expenses and property taxes on them. Id,., at 30a, 32a.
Goods may remain in a customs-bonded warehouse for up to five years from the date of importation without payment of customs duties. 19 U. S. C. § 1557(a). Once goods are withdrawn, however, duties are due unless the goods are to be exported. Ibid. When Reynolds is ready to use imported tobacco, its practice is to pay the duty and to move the tobacco out of the Class 2 areas in order to process it with domestic tobacco. App. 90. "When this move has been made, the imported tobacco is incorporated in the finished tobacco products within two weeks. Id., at 91.
There is no equal protection issue in this case.
Reynolds took care to file one appeal (No. 85-1021) from the North Carolina Supreme Court and another (No. 85-1022) from the North Carolina Court of Appeals. See App. to Juris. Statement 39a, 41a.
Although Reynolds has informed this Court that the Clerk of the
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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H
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Clark
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Once again we are called upon to consider the scope of the provision of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution which declares that' “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or-prohibiting the free exercise thereof....” These companion cases present the issues in the context of state action requiring that schools begin each day with readings from the Bible.'While raising the basic questions under slightly different factual situations, -the cases permit of joint treatment. In light of the history of the First Amendment and of our cases interpreting and applying its requirements, we hold that the practices at issue and the laws requiring them are unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause, 'as applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.
I.
The Facts in Each Case: No. 142. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania by law, 24 Pa. Stat. § 15-1516, as amended, Pub. Law' 1928 (Supp. 1960) Dec. 17, 1959, requires that “At least ten verses from the Holy Bible shall be read, without comment, at the opening of each public school on each school day. Any child shall be excused from such Bible reading, or attending such Bible reading, upon the written request of' his parent or. guardian.” The Schempp family, husband and wife and two of their three children, brought suit to enjoin enforcement of the statute, contending that their rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to-the Constitution of the United States are, have been, and will continue to be violated unless this statute be declared unconstitutional as violative of these provisions of the First Amendment. They sought to enjoin the appellant school district, wherein the Schempp children attend school, and its officers and the Superintendent of Public Instruction of the Commonwealth from continuing to conduct such readings and recitation of the Lord’s Prayer in the public schools of the-district pursuant to the statute. A three-judge statutory District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that the statute is violative of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment as applied to the States by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and directed that appropriate injunctive relief issue. 201 F. Supp. 815. On appeal by the District, its officials and the Superintendent, under 28 U. S. C. § 1253, we noted probable jurisdiction. 371 U. S. 807.
The appellees Edward Lewis Schempp, his wife Sidney, and their children, Roger and Donna, are of the Unitarian faith and are members of the Unitarian Church in Germantown, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, where they, as well as another son, Ellory,' regularly attend religious services. The latter was originally a party but having graduated from the school system pendente lite was voluntarily dismissed from the action. The other children attend the Abington Senior High School, which is a public school operated by appellant district.
On each school day at the Abington Senior High School between 8:15 and 8:30 a. m., while the pupils are attending their home rooms or advisory sections, opening exercises are'conducted pursuant to the statute. The exercises are broadcast into each room in the school building through an intercommunications system and are conducted under the supervision, of a teacher by students attending the school’s radio and television workshop. Selected students from this course gather each morning in the school’s workshop, studio for the exercises, which include' readings by one of the students of 10 verses of the Holy Bible, broadcast to each room in the building. This is followed by the recitation of the Lord’s Prayer, likewise over th' intercommunications system, but- also by the studer, m the various classrooms, who are asked to stand and join in repeating the prayer in unison. The exercises are closed with the flag salute and such pertinent announcements as are of interest to the students. Participation in the opening exercises, as directed by the statute, is voluntary. The student reading the verses from the Bible may select the passages and read from any version he chooses, although the only copies furnished by the school are the King James version, copies of which were circulated to each teacher by the school district. During the period in which the exercises have been, conducted the King James, the Douay and the Revised Standard versions of the Bible have been used-, as well as the Jewish Holy Scriptures., There are no prefatory statements, no questions asked or solicited, no comments or explanations made and no interpretations given at or during the exercises. The students and parents are advised that the student may absent himself from the classroom or, should he elect to remain, not participate in the exercises.
It appears from the record that in schools not having an intercommunications system the Bible reading and the recitation of the Lord’s Prayer were conducted by the home-room teacher, who chose the text of the verses and read them herself or had students read them in rotation or by volunteers. This was followed by a standing recitation of the Lord’s Prayer, together with the Pledge of Allegiance to the Flag by the class in unison and a closing announcement of routine school items of interest.
At the first trial Edward Schempp and the children testified as to specific religious doctrines purveyed by a literal reading of the Bible “which were contrary to the religious beliefs which they held and to their familial teaching.” 177 F. Supp. 398, 400. The children testified that all of the doctrines to which they referred were read to them at various times as part of the exercises. Edward Schempp testified at the second trial that he had considered having Roger and Donna excused from attendance at the exercises but decided against it for several reasons, including his belief that the children’s relationships with their teachers and classmates would be adversely affected.
Expert testimony was introduced by both appellants and appellees at the first trial, which testimony was summarized by the trial court as follows:
“Dr. Solomon Grayzel testified that there were marked differences between the Jewish Holy Scriptures and the Christian Holy Bible, the most obvious of which was the absence of the New Testament in the Jewish Holy Scriptures. Dr. Grayzel testified that portions of the New Testament were offensive to Jewish tradition and that, from the standpoint of Jewish faith, the concept of Jesus Christ as the Son of God was ‘practically blasphemous.’ He cited instances in the New Testament which, assertedly, were not only sectarian in nature but tended to bring the Jews into ridicule or scorn. Dr. Grayzel gave as his expert opinion that such material from the New Testament could be explained to Jewish children in such a way as to do no harm to them. But if portions of the New Testament were read without explanation, they could be, and in his specific experience with children Dr. Grayzel observed, had been, psychologically harmful to the child and had caused a divisive force within the social media of the school.
“Dr. Grayzel also testified that there was significant difference in attitude with regard to the respective Books of the Jewish and Christian Religions in that Judaism attaches no special significance to the reading of the Bible per se and that the Jewish Holy Scriptures are source materials to be studied. But Dr. Grayzel did state that many portions of the New, as well as of the Old, Testament contained passages of great literary and moral value.
“Dr. Luther A. Weigle, an expert witness for the defense, testified in some detail as to the reasons for and the methods employed in developing the King James and the Revised Standard Versions of the Bible. On direct examination, Dr. Weigle stated that the Bible was non-sectarian. He later stated that the phrase ‘non-sectarian’ meant to him non-' sectarian within the Christian faiths. Dr. Weigle stated that his definition of the Holy Bible would include the Jewish Holy Scriptures, but also stated that the ‘Holy Bible’ would not be complete without the New Testament. He stated that the New Testament ‘conveyed the message of Christians.’ In his opinion, reading of the Holy Scriptures to the exclusion of the New Testament would be a sectarian practice. Dr. Weigle ^tated that the Bible was of great moral, historical and literary value. This is conceded by all the parties and is also the view of the court.” 177 F. Supp. 398, 401-402.
The trial court, in striking down the practices and the statute requiring them, made specific findings of fact that the children’s attendance at Abington Senior High School is compulsory and that the practice of reading 10 verses from the Bible is also compelled by law. It also found that:
“The reading of the verses, even without comment, possesses a devotional and religious character and constitutes in effect a religious observance. The devotional and religious nature of the morning exercises is made all the more apparent by the fact that the Bible reading is followed immediately by a recital in unison by the' pupils of the Lord’s Prayer. The fact that some pupils, or theoretically all pupils, might be excused.from attendance at the exercises does not mitigate the obligatory nature of the ceremony for... Section 1516... unequivocally requires the exercises to be held every school day in every school in the Commonwealth. The exercises are held in the school buildings and perforce are conducted by and under the authority of the local school authorities and during school sessions. Since the statute requires the reading of the ‘Holy Bible,’ a Christian document, the practice... prefers the. Christian religion. The record demonstrates ‘that it was the intention of... the Commonwealth... to introduce a religious ceremony into the public schools of the Commonwealth.” 201 P. Supp., at 819.
No. 119. In 1905 the Board of School Commissioners of Baltimore City adopted a rule pursuant to Art. 77, § 202 of the Annotated Code of Maryland. The rule provided for the holding of opening exercises in the schools of the city, consisting primarily of the “reading, without comment, of a chapter in the Holy Bible and/or the use of the Lord’s Prayer.” The petitioners, Mrs. Madalyn Murray and her son,- William J. Murray III, are both professed atheists. Following unsuccessful attempts to have the respondent school board rescind the rule, this suit was filed for mandamus to compel its rescission and cancellation. It was alleged that William was a student in a public school of the city and Mrs. Murray, his mother, was a taxpayer therein; that it was the practice under the rule to have a reading on each, school morning from the King James version of the-Bible; that at petitioners’ insistence the rule was amended to permit children to be excused from the exercise on request of the parent and that William had been excused pursuant thereto; that nevertheless the rule as amended was in violation of the petitioners’ rights “to freedom of religion under the First and Fourteenth Amendments” and in violation of “the principle of separation between church and state, contained therein...,” The petition particularized the petitioners’ atheistic beliefs, and stated that the rule, as practiced,.violated their" rights.
“in that it threatens their religious liberty by placing a premium on belief as against non-belief and subjects their freedom of conscience to the rule of the majority; it pronounces belief in God as the source of all moral and spiritual values, equating these values with religious values,, and thereby renders sinister, alien and suspect the beliefs and ideals of your Petitioners; promoting doubt and question of their morality, good citizenship and good faith.”
The respondents demurred and the. trial court, recognizing that the demurrer admitted all facts well pleaded, sustained it without leave to amend. The Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed, the majority of four justices holding the exercise not in "violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, with three justices dissenting. 228 Md. 239, 179 A. 2d 698. We granted certiorari. 371 U. S. 809.
II.
It is true that religion has been closely identified with our history, and government. As we said in Engel v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421, -434 (1962), “The history of man is inseparable from the history of religion. And... since the beginning of that history many people have devoutly believed that ‘More things are wrought by prayer than' this world dreams of.’” In Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U. S. 306, 313 (1952), we gave specific recognition to the proposition that “[w]e are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being.” The fact that the Founding Fathers believed devotedly that there was a God and that the unalienable rights of man were rooted in Him is clearly evidénced in their writings, from the Mayflower Compact to the Constitution itself. This background is evidenced today in our public life through the continuance in our. oaths of office from the Presidency to the Alderman of the final supplication, “So help mé God.” Likewise each House of the Congress provides through its Chaplain an opening prayer, and the sessions of this Court are declared open by the crier in a short ceremony, the final phrase of which invokes the grace of God. Again, there are such manifestations in our military forces, where those of our citizens who are under the restrictions of military service wish to engage in voluntary worship. Indeed, only last year an official survey of the country indicated that 64% of our people have church membership, Bureau of the Census, U. S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States (83d ed. 1962), 48, while less than 3% profess no religion whatever. Id., at p. 46. It can be truly said, therefore, that today, as in the beginning, our national life reflects a religious people who, in the words of Madison, are “earnestly praying, as... in duty bound, that the Supreme Lawgiver of the Universe... guide them into every measure which may be worthy of his [blessing....]” Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, quoted in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1, 71-72 (1947) (Appendix to dissenting opinion of Rutledge, J.).
This is not to say, however, that religion has been so identified with our history and government that religious freedom is not likewise as strongly imbedded in our public and private life. Nothing but the most telling of personal experiences in religious persecution suffered by our forebears, see Everson v. Board of Education, supra, at 8-11, could have planted our belief in liberty of religious opinion any more deeply in our heritage. It is true that this liberty frequently was not realized by the colonists, but this is readily accountable by their close ties to the Mother Country. However, the views of Madison and Jefferson, preceded by Roger. Williams, came to be incorporated not only in the Federal Constitution but likewise in those of most of our States. This freedom to worship was indispensable in a country whose people came from the four quarters of the earth and brought with them a diversity of religious opinion. Today authorities list 83 separate religious bodies, each with membership exceeding 50,000, existing among our people, as well as innumerable smaller groups. Bureau of the Census, op. cit., supra, at. 46-47.
III.
Almost a hundred years ago in Minor v. Board of Education of Cincinnati, Judge Alphonso Taft, father of the revered Chief Justice, in an unpublished opinion stated the ideal of our people as to religious freedom as one of
“absolute equality before the law, of all religious-opinions and sects....
.....
“The government is neutral, and, while protecting all, it prefers none, and it disparages none.”
Before examining this “neutral” position in which the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment place our Government it is well that we discuss the reach of the Amendment under the cases of this Court.
First, this Court has decisively settled that the.First Amendment’s mandate that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof” has been made wholly applicable to the' States, by the Fourteenth Amendment. Twenty-three years ago in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 303 (1940), this Court, through Mr. Justice Roberts, said:
“The fundamental concept of liberty embodied in that [Fourteenth] Amendment embraces the liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment. The First Amendment declares that Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The Fourteenth Amendment has rendered the legislatures of the states as incompetent as Congress to enact such laws....”
In a series of cases since Cantwell the Court has repeatedly reaffirmed that doctrine, and we do so now. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105, 108 (1943); Everson v. Board of Education, supra; Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of. Education, 333 U. S. 203, 210-211 (1948); Zorach v. Clauson, supra; McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420 (1961); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U. S. 488 (1961); and Engel v. Vitale, supra.
Second, this Court has rejected unequivocally the contention that the Establishment Clause forbids only governmental preference of one religion over another. Almost 20 years ago in Everson, supra, at 15, the Court said that “[n] either a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.”. And Mr. Justice Jackson, dissenting, agreed:
“There is no answer to the proposition... that the effect of the religious freedom Amendment to our Constitution was to take every form of propagation of religion out of the realm of things which could directly or indirectly be made public business and thereby be supported in whole or in part at taxpayers’ expense.... This freedom was first in the Bill of Rights because it was first in the forefathers’ minds; it was set forth in absolute terms, and its strength is its rigidity.” Id., at 26.
Further, Mr. Justice Rutledge, joined by Justices Frankfurter, Jackson and Burton, declared:
“The [First] Amendment’s purpose was not to strike merely at the official establishment of a single sect, creed or religion, outlawing only a formal relation such as had prevailed in England and some of the colonies. Necessarily it was to uproot all such relationships. But the object was broader than separating church and state in this narrow sense. It was to create a complete and permanent separation of the spheres of religious activity and civil authority by comprehensively forbidding every form of public aid or support for religion.” Id., at 31-32.
The same conclusion has been firmly maintained ever since that time, see Illinois ex rel. McCollum, supra, at pp. 210-211; McGowan v. Maryland, supra, at 442-443; Torcaso v. Watkins, supra, at 492-493, 495, and we reaffirm it now.
While none of the parties to either of these cases has questioned these basic conclusions of the Court, both of which have been long established, recognized and consistently reaffirmed, others continue to question their history, logic and efficacy. Such contentions, in the light of the consistent interpretation in cases of this Court, seem entirely untenable and of value only as academic exercises.
IV.
The interrelationship of. the Establishment and the Free Exercise Clauses was first touched upon by Mr. Justice Roberts for the Court in Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra, at 303-304, where it was said that their “inhibition of legislation” had
“a double aspect. On the one hand, it forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship. Freedom of conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious organization or form of worship as the individual may choose cannot be restricted by law. On the other hand, it safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form of religion. Thus the Amendment embraces two concepts, — freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be.”
A half dozen, years later in Everson v. Board of Education, supra, at 14-15, this Court, through Me. Justice Black, stated that the “scope of the First Amendment... was designed forever to suppress” the establishment of religion or the prohibition, of the free exercise thereof. In short, the Court held that the Amendment
“requires the state to be a neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers; it does not require the state to be their adversary. State power is no more to be used so as to handicap religions than it is to favor them.” Id., at 18.
And Mr, Justice Jackson, in dissent, declared that public schools are organized
“on the premise that secular education can be isolated from all religious teaching so that the school can inculcate all needed temporal knowledge and also maintain a strict and lofty neutrality as to religion. The assumption is that after the individual has been instructed in worldly wisdom he will be better fitted to choose his religion.” Id., at 23-24.
Moreover, all of the four dissenters, speaking through Mr. Justice Rutledge, agreed that
“Our constitutional policy... does not deny the value or the necessity for religious training, teaching or observance. Rather it secures their free exercise. But to that end it does deny that the state can undertake or sustain them in any form or degree. For this reason the sphere of religious activity, as distinguished from the secular intellectual liberties, has been given the twofold protection and, „as the state cannot forbid, neither can it perform or'aid in'performing the religious function.' The dual prohibition makes that function altogether private.” Id., at 52.
Only one year later the Court was asked to reconsider and repudiate the doctrine of these cases in McCollum v. Board of Education. It was argued that “historically the'First Amendment was intended to forbid only government preference of one religion over another.... In addition they ask that we distinguish or overrule our holding in the Everson case that the Fourteenth Amendment made the ‘establishment of religion’ clause of the First Amendment applicable as a prohibition against the States.” 333 U. S., at 211.. The Court, with Mr: Justice Reed alone dissenting, was unable to “accept either of these contentions.” Ibid. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, joined by Justices Jackson, Rutledge and Burton, wrote a very comprehensive and scholarly concurrence in which he said that “[separation is a requirement to abstain from fusing functions of Government and of religious sects, not merely to treat them all equally.” Id., at 227. Continuing, he stated that:
“the Constitution... prohibited the Government common to all from becoming embroiled, however innocently, in the destructive religious conflicts of which the history of even this country records some dark pages.” Id., at 228.
In 1952 in Zorach v. Clauson, supra, Mr. Justice Douglas for the Court reiterated:
“There cannot be the slightest doubt that the First Amendment reflects the philosophy that Church and State should be separated. And so far as interference with the ‘free exercise’ of religion and an ‘establishment’ of religion are concerned, the separation must be complete and unequivocal. The First Amendment within the scope of its coverage permits no exception; the prohibition is absolute. The First Amendment, however, does not say that in every and all respects there shall be a separation of Church and State. Rather, it studiously defines the manner, the specific ways, in which there shall be no concert or union or dependency one on the other..That is the common sense of the matter.” 343 U. S., at 312.
And then in 1961 in McGowan v. Maryland and in Torcaso v. Watkins each of these cases was discussed and approved. Chief Justice Warren in McGowan, for a unanimous Court on this point, said:
“But, the First Amendment, in its final form, did not simply bar a congressional enactment establishing a church; it forbade all laws respecting an establishment of religion. Thus, this Court has given the Amendment a ‘broad interpretation... in the light of its history and the evils it was designed forever to suppress....’” 366 U. S., at 441-442.
And Mr. Justice Black for the Court in Torcaso, without dissent but with Justices Frankfurter and Harlan concurring in the result, used this language:
“We repeat and again reaffirm that neither a State nor the Federal Government can constitutionally force a person ‘to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion.’ Neither can constitutionally pass laws or impose requirements which aid all religions as against non-believers, and neither can aid those religions based on a belief in the existence of God as against those religions founded on different beliefs.” 367 U. S., at 496.
Finally, in Engel v. Vitale, only last year, these principles were so universally recognized that the Court, without the citation of a single case and over the sole dissent of Mr. Justice Stewart, reaffirmed them. The Court found the 22-word prayer used in “New York’s program of daily classroom invocation of God’s blessings as prescribed in the Regents’ prayer... [to. be] a religious activity.” 370 U. S., at 424. It held that “it is no part of the business of government to compose official prayers for any group of the American people to recite as a part of a religious program carried on by government.” Id., at 425. In discussing the reach of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment the Court said:
“Although these two clauses may in certain instances overlap, they forbid two quite different kinds of governmental- encroachment upon religious freedom. The Establishment Clause, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does not depend upon any showing of direct governmental compulsion and is violated by the enactment of laws which establish an official religion whether those laws operate directly to coerce non-observing individuals or not. This is not to say, of course, that laws officially prescribing a particular form of religious worship do not involve coercion of such individuals. When the power, prestige and financial support of government is placed behind a particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved religion is plain.” Id., at 430-431.
And in further elaboration the Court found that the “first and most immediate purpose [of the Establishment Clause] rested on the belief that a union of government and religion tends to destroy government and to degrade religion.” Id., at 431. When government, the Court said, allies itself with one particular form of religion, the inevitable result is that it incurs “the hatred, disrespect and even contempt of those who held contrary beliefs.”
Ibid.
V.
The wholesome “neutrality” of which this Court’s cases speak thus stems from a recognition of the teachings of history that powerful sects or groups might bring about a fusion of governmental and religious functions or a concert or dependency of one upon the other to the end that official support of the State or Federal Government would be placed behind the tenets of one or of all orthodoxies. This the Establishment Clause prohibits. And a further reason for neutrality is found in the Free Exercise Clause, which recognizes the value of religious training, teaching and observance and, more particularly, the right of every person to freely choose his own course with reference thereto, free of any compulsion from the state. This the Free Exercise Clause guarantees. Thus, as we have seen, the two clauses may overlap. As we have indicated, the Establishment Clause has been directly considered by this Court eight times in the past score of years and, with only one Justice dissenting on the point, it has consistently held that the clause withdrew all legislative power respecting religious belief or the expression thereof. The test may be stated as follows:, what are the purpose and the primary effect of the enactment? If either is the advancement or inhibition of religion then the enactment exceeds the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by the Constitution. That is to say that to withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause there must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion. Everson v. Board of Education, supra; McGowan v. Maryland, supra, at 442. The Free Exercise Clause, likewise considered many times here, withdraws from legislative power, state and federal, the exertion of any restraint on the free exercise of religion. Its purpose is to secure religious liberty in the individual by prohibiting any invasions thereof by civil authority. Hence it is necessary in a free exercise case for one to show the coercive effect of the enactment as it operates against him in the practice of his religion. The distinction between the two clauses is apparent — a violation of the Free Exercise Clause is predicated on coercion while the Establishment Clause violation need not be so attended.
Applying the Establishment Clause principles to the cases at bar we find that the States are requiring the selection and reading at the opening of the school day of verses from the Holy Bible and the recitation of the Lord’s Prayer by the students in unison. These exercises are prescribed as part of the curricular activities of students who are required by law to attend school. They are held in the school buildings under the supervision and with the participation of teachers employed in those schools. None of these factors, other than compulsory school attendance, was present in the program upheld in Zorach v. Clauson. The trial court in No. 142 has found that such an opening exercise is a religious ceremony and was intended by the State to be so. We agree with the trial court’s finding as to the religious character of the exercises. Given that finding, the exercises and the law requiring them are in violation of the Establishment Clause.
There is no such specific finding as to the religious character of the exercises in No. 119, and the State contends (as does the State in No. 142) that the program is an effort to extend its benefits to all public school children without regard to their religious belief. Included within its secular purposes, it says, are the promotion of moral values, the contradiction to the materialistic trends of our times, the perpetuation of our institutions and the teaching of literature. The case came up on demurrer, of course, to a petition which alleged that the uniform practice under the rule had been to read from the King James version of the Bible and that the exercise was sectarian. Thé. short answer, therefore, is that the religious character of the exercise was admitted by the State. But even if its purpose is not strictly religious, it is sought to be accomplished through readings, without comment, from the Bible. Surely the place of the Bible as an instrument of religion cannot be gainsaid, and the State’s recognition of the pervading religious character of the ceremony is evident from the rule’s specific permission of the alternative use of the Catholic Douay version as-well as the recent amendment permitting nonattendance at the exercises. None of these factors is consistent with the contention that the Bible is here used either as an instrument for nonreligious moral inspiration or as a reference for the teaching of secular subjects.
The conclusion follows that in both cases the laws require religious exercises and such exercises are being conducted in direct violation of the rights of the appellees and petitioners. Nor are these required exercises mitigated by the fact that individual students may absent themselves upon parental request, for that fact furnishes no defense to a claim of unconstitutionality under the Establishment Clause. See Engel v. Vitale, supra, at 430. Further, it is no defense to urge that the religious practices here may be relatively minor encroachments on the First Amendment. The breach of neutrality that is today a trickling stream may all too soon become a raging torrent and, in the words of Madison, “it is proper to take alarm at the first experiment on our liberties.” Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, quoted in Everson, supra, at 65..
It is insisted that unless these religious exercises are permitted a “religion of secularism” is established in the schools. We agree of course that the State may not establish, a “religion of secularism” in the sense of affirmatively opposing or showing hostility to religion, thus “preferring those who believe in no religion over those who do believe.” Zorach v. Clauson, supra, at 314. We do not agree, however, that this decision in any sense has that effect. In addition, it might well be said that one’s education is not complete without a study of comparative religion or the history of religion and its relationship to the advancement of civilization. It certainly may be said that the Bible is worthy of study for its literary and historic qualities. Nothing we have said here indicates that such study of the Bible or of religion, when presented objectively as part of a secular program of education, may not be effected consistently with the First Amendment. But the exercises here do not fall into those categories. They are religious exercises, required by the States in violation of the command of the First Amendment that the Government maintain strict neutrality, neither aiding nor opposing religion.
Finally, we cannot accept that the concept of neutrality, which does not permit a State to require a religious exercise even with. the consent of the majority of those affected, collides with the majority’s right to free exercise of religion. While the Free Exercise Clause clearly prohibits the use of state action to deny the rights of free exercise to anyone, it has never meant that a majority could use the machinery of the State to practice its beliefs. Such a contention was effectively answered by Mr. Justice Jackson for the Court in West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 638 (1943):
“The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One’s right to.... freedom of worship... and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.”
The place of religion in our society is an exalted one, ¿chieved through a long tradition of reliance on the home, the church and the inviolable citadel of the individual heart and mind. We have come to recognize through bitter experience that it is not within the power of government to invade that citadel, whether its purpose or effect be to aid or oppose, to advance, or retard. In the relationship between man and religion, the State is firmly committed to á position of neutrality. Though the application of that rule requires interpretation of a delicate sort, the rule itself is clearly and concisely stated in the words of the First Amendment. Applying that rule to the facts of these cases, we affirm the judgment in No. 142. In No. 119, the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded to the Maryland Court of Appeals for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
The action was brought in 1958, prior to the 1959 amendment of § 15-1516 authorizing a child’s nonattendance at the exercises upon parental request. The three-judge court held the statute and the practices coihplained of unconstitutional under both the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. 177 F. Supp. 398. Pending appeal to this Court by the school district, the statute was so amended, and we vacated the judgment and remanded for further proceedings. 364 U. S. 298. The same three-judge court granted appellees’ motion to amend the pleadings, 195 F. Supp. 518, held a hearing on the amended pleadings and rendered the judgment, 201 F. Supp. 815, from which appeal is now taken.
The statute as amended imposes no penalty upon a teacher refusing to obey its mandate. However, it remains to be seen whether one refusing
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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C
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Stevens
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Both the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), enacted on April 24,1996, 110 Stat. 1214, and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), enacted on September 30, 1996, 110 Stat. 3009-546, contain comprehensive amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 66 Stat. 163, as amended, 8 U. S. C. § 1101 et seq. This case raises two important questions about the impact of those amendments. The first question is a procedural one, concerning the effect of those amendments on the availability of habeas corpus jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. §2241. The second question is a • substantive one, concerning the impact of the amendments on conduct that occurred before their enactment and on the availability of discretionary relief from deportation.
Respondent, Enrico St. Cyr, is a citizen of Haiti who was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident in 1986. Ten years later, on March 8, 1996, he pleaded guilty in a state court to a charge of selling a controlled substance in violation of Connecticut law. That conviction made him deportable. Under pre-AEDPA law applicable at the time of his conviction, St. Cyr would have been eligible for a waiver of deportation at the discretion of the Attorney General. However, removal proceedings against him were not commenced until April 10, 1997, after both AEDPA and IIRIRA became effective, and, as the Attorney General interprets those statutes, he no longer has discretion to grant such a waiver.
In his habeas corpus petition, respondent has alleged that the restrictions on discretionary relief from deportation contained in the 1996 statutes do not apply to removal proceedings brought against an alien who pleaded guilty to a de-portable crime before their enactment. The District Court accepted jurisdiction of his application and agreed with his submission. In accord with the decisions of four other Circuits, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. 229 F. 3d 406 (2000). The importance of both questions warranted our grant of certiorari. 531 U. S. 1107 (2001).
I
The character of the pre-AEDPA and pre-IIRIRA law that gave the Attorney General discretion to waive deportation in certain cases is relevant to our appraisal of both the substantive and the procedural questions raised by the petition of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). We shall therefore preface our discussion of those questions with an overview of the sources, history, and scope of that law.
Subject to certain exceptions, § 3 of the Immigration Act of 1917 excluded from admission to the United States several classes of aliens, including, for example, those who had committed crimes “involving moral turpitude.” 39 Stat. 875. The seventh exception provided “[t]hat aliens returning after a temporary absence to an unrelinquished United States domicile of seven consecutive years may be admitted in the discretion of the Secretary of Labor, and under such conditions as he may prescribe.” Id., at 878. Although that provision applied literally only to exclusion proceedings, and although the deportation provisions of the statute did not contain a similar provision, the INS relied on §3 to grant relief in deportation proceedings involving aliens who had departed and returned to this country after the ground for deportation arose. See, e. g., Matter of L, 1 I. & N. Dec. 1, 2 (1940).
Section 212 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, which replaced and roughly paralleled § 3 of the 1917 Act, excluded from the United States several classes of aliens, including those convicted of offenses involving moral turpitude or the illicit traffic in narcotics. See 66 Stat. 182-187. As with the prior law, this section was subject to a proviso granting the Attorney General broad discretion to admit excludable aliens. See id., at 187. That proviso, codified at 8 U. S. C. § 1182(c), stated:
“Aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence who temporarily proceeded abroad voluntarily and not under an order of deportation, and who are returning to a lawful unrelinquished domicile of seven consecutive years, may be admitted in the discretion of the Attorney General....”
Like § 3 of the 1917 Act, § 212(c) was literally applicable only to exclusion proceedings, but it too has been interpreted by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) to authorize any permanent resident alien with “a lawful unrelinquished domicile of seven consecutive years” to apply for a discretionary waiver from deportation. See Matter of Silva, 16 I. & N. Dec. 26, 30 (1976) (adopting position of Francis v. INS, 532 F. 2d 268 (CA2 1976)). If relief is granted, the deportation proceeding is terminated and the alien remains a permanent resident.
The extension of § 212(c) relief to the deportation context has had great practical importance, because deportable offenses have historically been defined broadly. For example, under the INA, aliens are deportable upon conviction for two crimes of “moral turpitude” (or for one such crime if it occurred within five years of entry into the country and resulted in a jail term of at least one year). See 8 U. S. C. §§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)-(ii) (1994 ed., Supp. V). In 1988, Congress further specified that an alien is deportable upon conviction for any “aggravated felony,” Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, 102 Stat. 4469-4470, § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), which was defined to include numerous offenses without regard to how long ago they were committed. Thus, the class of aliens whose continued residence in this country has depended on their eligibility for § 212(c) relief is extremely large, and not surprisingly, a substantial percentage of their applications for § 212(c) relief have been granted. Consequently, in the period between 1989 and 1995 alone, § 212(c) relief was granted to over 10,000 aliens.
Three statutes enacted in recent years have reduced the size of the class of aliens eligible for such discretionary relief. In 1990, Congress amended § 212(c) to preclude from discretionary relief anyone convicted of an aggravated felony who had served a term of imprisonment of at least five years. §511, 104 Stat. 5052 (amending 8 U. S. C. § 1182(c)). In 1996, in § 440(d) of AEDPA, Congress identified a broad set of offenses for which convictions would preclude such relief. See 110 Stat. 1277 (amending 8 U. S. C. § 1182(c)). And finally, that same year, Congress passed IIRIRA. That statute, inter alia, repealed § 212(c), see § 304(b), 110 Stat. 3009-597, and replaced it with a new section that gives the Attorney General the authority to cancel removal for a narrow class of inadmissible or deportable aliens, see id., at 3009-594 (creating 8 U. S. C. § 1229b (1994 ed., Supp. V)). So narrowed, that class does not include anyone previously “convicted of any aggravated felony.” §1229b(a)(3) (1994 ed., Supp. V).
In the Attorney General’s opinion, these amendments have entirely withdrawn his § 212(c) authority to waive deportation for aliens previously convicted of aggravated felonies. Moreover, as a result of other amendments adopted in AEDPA and IIRIRA, the Attorney General also maintains that there is no judicial forum available to decide whether these statutes did, in fact, deprive him of the power to grant such relief. As we shall explain below, we disagree on both points. In our view, a federal court does have jurisdiction to decide the merits of the legal question, and the District Court and the Court of Appeals decided that question correctly in this case.
1 — 4 K-<
The first question we must consider is whether the District Court retains jurisdiction under the general habeas corpus statute, 28 U. S. C. § 2241, to entertain St. Cyr’s challenge. His application for a writ raises a pure question of law. He does not dispute any of the facts that establish his deport-ability or the conclusion that he is deportable. Nor does he contend that he would have any right to have an unfavorable exercise of the Attorney General’s discretion reviewed in a judicial forum. Rather, he contests the Attorney General’s conclusion that, as a matter of statutory interpretation, he is not eligible for discretionary relief.
The District Court held, and the Court of Appeals agreed, that it had jurisdiction to answer that question in a habeas corpus proceeding. The INS argues, however, that four sections of the 1996 statutes — specifically, § 401(e) of AEDPA and three sections of IIRIRA (8 U. S. C. §§ 1252(a)(1), 1252(a)(2)(C), and 1252(b)(9) (1994 ed., Supp. V)) — stripped the, courts of jurisdiction to decide the question of law presented by respondent’s habeas corpus application.
For the INS to prevail it must overcome both the strong presumption in favor of judicial review of administrative action and the longstanding rule requiring a clear statement of congressional intent to repeal habeas jurisdiction. See Ex parte Yerger, 8 Wall. 85, 102 (1869) (“We are not at liberty to except from [habeas corpus jurisdiction] any cases not plainly excepted by law”); Felker v. Turpin, 518 U. S. 651, 660-661 (1996) (noting that “[n]o provision of Title I mentions our authority to entertain original habeas petitions,” and the statute “makes no mention of our authority to hear habeas petitions filed as original matters in this Court”). Implications from statutory text or legislative history are not sufficient to repeal habeas jurisdiction; instead, Congress must articulate specific and unambiguous statutory directives to effect a repeal. Ex parte Yerger, 8 Wall., at 105 (“Repeals by implication are not favored. They are seldom admitted except on the ground of repugnancy; and never, we think, when the former act can stand together with the new act”).
In this case, the plain statement rule draws additional reinforcement from other canons of statutory construction. First, as a general matter, when a particular interpretation of a statute invokes the outer limits of Congress’ power, we expect a clear indication that Congress intended that result. See Edward J DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U. S. 568, 575 (1988). Second, if an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, and where an alternative interpretation of the statute is “fairly possible,” see Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 62 (1932), we are obligated to construe the statute to avoid such problems. See Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 341, 345-348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring); United States ex rel. Attorney General v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U. S. 366, 408 (1909).
A construction of the amendments at issue that would entirely preclude review of a pure question of law by any court would give rise to substantial constitutional questions. Article I, § 9, cl. 2, of the Constitution provides: “The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.” Because of that Clause, some “judicial intervention in deportation cases” is unquestionably “required by the Constitution.” Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U. S. 229, 235 (1953).
Unlike the provisions of AEDPA that we construed in Felker v. Turpin, 518 U. S. 651 (1996), this case involves an alien subject to a federal removal order rather than a person confined pursuant to a state-court conviction. Accordingly, regardless of whether the protection of the Suspension Clause encompasses all cases covered by the 1867 Amendment extending the protection of the writ to state prisoners, cf. id., at 663-664, or by subsequent legal developments, see LaGuerre v. Reno, 164 F. 3d 1035 (CA7 1998), at the absolute minimum, the Suspension Clause protects the writ “as it existed in 1789.” Felker, 518 U. S., at 663-664.
At its historical core, the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections have been strongest. See, e. g., Swain v. Pressley, 430 U. S. 372, 380, n. 13 (1977); id., at 385-386 (Burger, C. J., concurring) (noting that “the traditional Great Writ was largely a remedy against executive detention”); Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S. 443, 533 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring in result) (“The historic purpose of the writ has been to relieve detention by executive authorities without judicial trial”). In England prior to 1789, in the Colonies, and in this Nation during the formative years of our Government, the writ of habeas corpus was available to nonenemy aliens as well as to citizens. It enabled them to challenge Executive and private detention in civil cases as well as criminal. Moreover, the issuance of the writ was not limited to challenges to the jurisdiction of the custodian, but encompassed detentions based on errors of law, including the erroneous application or interpretation of statutes. It was used to command the discharge of seamen who had a statutory exemption from impressment into the British Navy, to emancipate slaves, and to obtain the freedom of apprentices and asylum inmates. Most important, for our purposes, those early cases contain no suggestion that habeas relief in cases involving Executive detention was only available for constitutional error.
Notwithstanding the historical use of habeas corpus to remedy unlawful Executive action, the INS argues that this case falls outside the traditional scope of the writ at common law. It acknowledges that the writ protected an individual who was held without legal authority,' but argues that the writ would not issue where “an official had statutory authorization to detain the individual... but... the official was not properly exercising his discretionary power to determine whether the individual should be released.” Brief for Respondent in Colcano-Martinez v. INS, O. T. 2000, No. 00-1011, p. 33. In this case, the INS points out, there is no dispute that the INS had authority in law to hold St. Cyr, as he is eligible for removal. St. Cyr counters that there is historical evidence of the writ issuing to redress the improper exercise of official discretion. See n. 23, supra; Hafetz, The Untold Story of Noncriminal Habeas Corpus and the 1996 Immigration Acts, 107 Yale L. J. 2609 (1998).
St. Cyr’s constitutional position also finds some support in our prior immigration cases. In Heikkila v. Barber, the Court observed that the then-existing statutory immigration scheme “had the effect of precluding judicial intervention in deportation cases except insofar as it was required by the Constitution,” 345 U. S., at 234-236 (emphasis added) — and that scheme, as discussed below, did allow for review on habeas of questions of law concerning an alien’s eligibility for discretionary relief. Therefore, while the INS’ historical arguments are not insubstantial, the ambiguities in the scope of the exercise of the writ at common law identified by St. Cyr, and the suggestions in this Court’s prior decisions as to the extent to which habeas review could be limited consistent with the Constitution, convince us that the Suspension Clause questions that would be presented by the INS’ reading of the immigration statutes before us are difficult and significant.
In sum, even assuming that the Suspension Clause protects only the writ as it existed in 1789, there is substantial evidence to support the proposition that pure questions of law like the one raised by the respondent in this case could have been answered in 1789 by a common-law judge with power to issue the writ of habeas corpus. It necessarily follows that a serious Suspension Clause issue would be presented if we were to accept the INS’ submission that the 1996 statutes have withdrawn that power from federal judges and provided no adequate substitute for its exercise. See Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1362, 1395-1397 (1953). The necessity of resolving such a serious and difficult constitutional issue — and the desirability of avoiding that necessity — simply reinforce the reasons for requiring a clear and unambiguous statement of congressional intent.
Moreover, to conclude that the writ is no longer available in this context would represent a departure from historical practice in immigration law. The writ of habeas corpus has always been available to review the legality of Executive detention. See Felker, 518 U. S., at 663; Swain v. Pressley, 430 U. S., at 380, n. 13; id., at 385-386 (Burger, C. J., concurring); Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S., at 533 (Jackson, J., concurring in result). Federal courts have been authorized to issue writs of habeas corpus since the enactment of the Judiciary Act of 1789, and §2241 of the Judicial Code provides that federal judges may grant the writ of habeas corpus on the application of a prisoner held “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U. S. C. § 2241. Before and after the enactment in 1875 of the first statute regulating immigration, 18 Stat. 477, that jurisdiction was regularly invoked on behalf of noncitizens, particularly in the immigration context. See, e. g., In re Kaine, 14 How. 103 (1853); United States v. Jung Ah Lung, 124 U. S. 621, 626-632 (1888).
Until the enactment of the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act, the sole means by which an alien could test the legality of his or her deportation order was by bringing a habeas corpus action in district court. See, e. g., United States v. Jung Ah Lung, 124 U. S. 621 (1888); Heikkila, 345 U. S., at 235; Chin Yow v. United States, 208 U. S. 8 (1908); Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U. S. 276, 284 (1922). In such cases, other than the question whether there was some evidence to support the order, the courts generally did not review factual determinations made by the Executive. See Ekiu v. United States, 142 U. S. 651, 659 (1892). However, they did review the Executive’s legal determinations. See Gegiow v. Uhl, 239 U. S. 3, 9 (1915) (“The statute by enumerating the conditions upon which the allowance to land may be denied, prohibits the denial in other cases. And when the record shows that a commissioner of immigration is exceeding his power, the alien may demand his release upon habeas corpus”); see also Neuman, Jurisdiction and the Rule of Law after the 1996 Immigration Act, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1963, 1965-1969 (2000). In case after case, courts answered questions of law in ha-beas corpus proceedings brought by aliens challenging Executive interpretations of the immigration laws.
Habeas courts also regularly answered questions of law that arose in the context of discretionary relief. See, e. g., United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U. S. 260 (1964); United States ex rel. Hintopoulos v. Shaughnessy, 353 U. S. 72, 77 (1957). Traditionally, courts recognized a distinction between eligibility for discretionary relief, on the one hand, and the favorable exercise of discretion, on the other.hand. See Neuman, 113 Harv. L. Rev., at 1991 (noting the “strong tradition in habeas corpus law... that subjects the legally erroneous failure to exereise discretion, unlike a substantively unwise exercise of discretion, to inquiry on the writ”). Eligibility that was “governed by specific statutory standards” provided “a right to a ruling on an applicant’s eligibility,” even though the actual granting of relief was “not a matter of right under any circumstances, but rather is in all cases a matter of grace.” Jay v. Boyd, 351 U. S. 345, 353-354 (1956). Thus, even though the actual suspension of deportation authorized by § 19(c) of the Immigration Act of 1917 was a matter of grace, in United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U. S. 260 (1954), we held that a deportable alien had a right to challenge the Executive’s failure to exercise the discretion authorized by the law. The exercise of the District Court’s habeas corpus jurisdiction to answer a pure question of law in this case is entirely consistent with the exercise of such jurisdiction in Accardi. See also United States ex rel. Hintopoulos v. Shaughnessy, 353 U. S., at 77.
Thus, under the pre-1996 statutory scheme — and consistent with its common-law antecedents — it is clear that St. Cyr could have brought his challenge to the BIA’s legal determination in a habeas corpus petition under 28 U. S. C. § 2241. The INS argues, however, that AEDPA and IIRIRA contain four provisions that express a clear and unambiguous statement of Congress’ intent to bar petitions brought under §2241, despite the fact that none of them mention that section. The first of those provisions is AEDPA’s § 401(e).
While the title of § 401(e) — “Elimination of Custody Review by Habeas Corpus” — would seem to support the INS’ submission, the actual text of that provision does not. As we have previously noted, a title alone is not controlling. Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U. S. 206, 212 (1998) (“ ‘[T]he title of a statute... cannot limit the plain meaning of the text. For interpretive purposes, [it is] of use only when [it] shed[s] light on some ambiguous word or phrase’ ” (quoting Trainmen v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 331 U. S. 519, 528-529 (1947))). The actual text of § 401(e), unlike its title, merely repeals a subsection of the 1961 statute amending the judicial review provisions of the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act. See n. 31, supra. Neither the title nor the text makes any mention of 28 U. S. C. §2241.
Under the 1952 Act, district courts had broad authority to grant declaratory and injunctive relief in immigration cases, including orders adjudicating deportability and those denying suspensions of deportability. See Foti v. INS, 375 U. S. 217, 225-226 (1963). The 1961 Act withdrew that jurisdiction from the district courts and provided that the procedures set forth in the Hobbs Act would be the "sole and exclusive procedure” for judicial review of final orders of deportation, subject to a series of exceptions. See 75 Stat. 651. The last of those exceptions stated that "any alien held in custody pursuant to an order of deportation may obtain review thereof by habeas corpus proceedings.” See id., at 652, codified at 8 U. S. C. § 1105a(10) (repealed Sept. 30, 1996).
The INS argues that the inclusion of that exception in the 1961 Act indicates that Congress must have believed that it would otherwise have withdrawn the pre-existing habeas corpus jurisdiction in deportation cases, and that, as a result, the repeal of that exception in AEDPA in 1996 implicitly achieved that result. It seems to us, however, that the 1961 exception is best explained as merely confirming the limited scope of the new review procedures. In fact, the 1961 House Report provides that this section "in no way disturbs the Habeas Corpus Act.” H. R. Rep. No. 1086, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 29 (1961). Moreover, a number of the courts that considered the interplay between the general habeas provision and INA § 106(a)(10) after the 1961 Act and before the enactment of AEDPA did not read the 1961 Act’s specific habeas provision as supplanting jurisdiction under §2241. Orozco v. INS, 911 F. 2d 539, 541 (CA11 1990); United States ex rel. Marcello v. INS, 634 F. 2d 964, 967 (CA5 1981); Sotelo Mondragon v. Ilchert, 653 F. 2d 1254, 1255 (CA9 1980).
' In any case, whether § 106(a)(10) served as an independent grant of habeas jurisdiction or simply as an acknowledgment of continued jurisdiction pursuant to §2241, its repeal cannot be sufficient to eliminate what it did not originally grant— namely, habeas jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §2241. See Ex parte Yerger, 8 Wall., at 105-106 (concluding that the repeal of “an additional grant of jurisdiction” does not “operate as a repeal of jurisdiction theretofore allowed”); Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506, 515 (1869) (concluding that the repeal of portions of the 1867 statute conferring appellate jurisdiction on the Supreme Court in habeas proceedings did “not affect the jurisdiction which was previously exercised”).
The INS also relies on three provisions of IIRIRA, now codified at 8 U. S. C. §§ 1252(a)(1), 1252(a)(2)(C), and 1252(b)(9) (1994 ed., Supp. V). As amended by §306 of IIRIRA, 8 U. S. C. § 1252(a)(1) (1994 ed., Supp. V) now provides that, with certain exceptions, including those set out in subsection (b) of the same statutory provision, “[j]udicial review of a final order of removal... is governed only by” the Hobbs Act’s procedures for review of agency orders in the courts of appeals. Similarly, § 1252(b)(9), which addresses the “ [consolidation of questions for judicial review,” provides that “[judicial review of all questions of law and fact, including interpretation and application of constitutional and statutory provisions, arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United States under this subchapter shall be available only in judicial review of a final order under this section.” Finally, § 1252(a)(2)(C), which concerns “[mjatters not subject to judicial review,” states: “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court shall have jurisdiction to review any final order of removal against an alien who is removable by reason of having committed” certain enumerated criminal offenses.
The term “judicial review” or “jurisdiction to review” is the focus of each of these three provisions. In the immigration context, “judicial review” and “habeas corpus” have historically distinct meanings. See Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U. S. 229 (1953). In Heikkila, the Court concluded that the finality provisions at issue “precluded] judicial review” to the maximum extent possible under the Constitution, and thus concluded that the APA was inapplicable. Id., at 235. Nevertheless, the Court reaffirmed the right to habeas corpus. Ibid. Noting that the limited role played by the courts in habeas corpus proceedings was far narrower than the judicial review authorized by the APA, the Court concluded that “it is the scope of inquiry on habeas corpus that differentiates” habeas review from “judicial review.” Id., at 236; see also, e. g., Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U. S. 270, 278 (1902) (noting that under the extradition statute then in effect there was “no right of review to be exercised by any court or judicial officer,” but that limited review on habeas was nevertheless available); Ekiu, 142 U. S., at 663 (observing that while a decision to exclude an alien was subject to inquiry on habeas, it could not be “impeached or reviewed”). Both §§ 1252(a)(1) and (a)(2)(C) speak of “judicial review”— that is, full, nonhabeas review. Neither explicitly mentions habeas, or 28 U. S. C. § 2241. Accordingly, neither provision speaks with sufficient clarity to bar jurisdiction pursuant to the general habeas statute.
The INS also makes a separate argument based on 8 U. S. C. § 1252(b)(9) (1994 ed., Supp. V). We have previously described § 1252(b)(9) as a “zipper clause.” A ADC, 525 U. S. 471, 483 (1999). Its purpose is to consolidate “judicial review” of immigration proceedings into one action in the court of appeals, but it applies only “[wjith respect to review of an order of removal under subsection (a)(1).” 8 U. S. C. § 1252(b) (1994 ed., Supp. V). Accordingly, this provision, by its own terms, does not bar habeas jurisdiction over removal orders not subject to judicial review under § 1252(a)(1) — including orders against aliens who are removable by reason of having committed one or more criminal offenses. Subsection (b)(9) simply provides for the consolidation of issues to be brought in petitions for “[jjudicial review,” which, as we note above, is a term historically distinct from habeas. See Mahadeo v. Reno, 226 F. 3d 3, 12 (CA1 2000); Flores-Miramontes v. INS, 212 F. 3d 1133, 1140 (CA9 2000). It follows that § 1252(b)(9) does not clearly apply to actions brought pursuant to the general habeas statute, and thus cannot repeal that statute either in part or in whole.
If it were clear that the question of law could be answered in another judicial forum, it might be permissible to accept the INS’ reading of § 1252. But the absence of such a forum, coupled with the lack of a clear, unambiguous, and express statement of congressional intent to preclude judicial consideration on habeas of such an important question of law, strongly counsels against adopting a construction that would raise serious constitutional questions. Cf. Felker, 518 U. S., at 660-661. Accordingly, we conclude that habeas jurisdiction under §2241 was not repealed by AEDPA and IIRIRA.
Ill
The absence of a clearly expressed statement of congressional intent also pervades our review of the merits of St. Cyr’s claim. Two important legal consequences ensued from respondent’s entry of a guilty plea in March 1996: (1) He became subject to deportation, and (2) he became eligible for a discretionary waiver of that deportation under the prevailing interpretation of § 212(c). When IIRIRA went into effect in April 1997, the first consequence was unchanged except for the fact that the term “removal” was substituted for “deportation.” The issue that remains to be resolved is whether IIRIRA § 304(b) changed the second consequence by eliminating respondent’s eligibility for a waiver.
The INS submits that the statute resolves the issue because it unambiguously communicates Congress’ intent to apply the provisions of IIRIRA’s Title III-A to all removals initiated after the effective date of the statute, and, in any event, its provisions only operate prospectively and not retrospectively.,The Court of Appeals, relying primarily on the analysis in our opinion in Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U. S. 244 (1994), held, contrary to the INS’ arguments, that Congress’ intentions concerning the application of the “Cancellation of Removal” procedure are ambiguous and that the statute imposes an impermissible retroactive effect on aliens who, in reliance on the possibility of § 212(c) relief, pleaded guilty to aggravated felonies. See 229 F. 3d, at 416, 420. We agree.
Retroactive statutes raise special concerns. See Land-graf, 511 U. S., at 266. “The Legislature’s unmatched powers allow it to sweep away settled expectations suddenly and without individualized consideration. Its responsivity to political pressures poses a risk that it may be tempted to use retroactive legislation as a means of retribution against unpopular groups or individuals.” Ibid. Accordingly, “congressional enactments... will not be construed to have retroactive effect unless their language requires this result.” Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hospital, 488 U. S. 204, 208 (1988).
“[This] presumption against retroactive legislation is deeply rooted in our jurisprudence, and embodies a legal doctrine centuries older than our Republic. Elementary considerations of fairness dictate that individuals should have an opportunity to know what the law is and to conform their conduct accordingly; settled expectations should not be lightly disrupted. For that reason, the 'principle that the legal effect of conduct should ordinarily be assessed under the law that existed when the conduct took place has timeless and universal human appeal.’ Kaiser, 494 U. S., at 855 (Scalia, J., concurring). In a free, dynamic society, creativity in both commercial and artistic endeavors is fostered by a rule of law that gives people confidence about the legal consequences of their actions.” Landgraf, 511 U. S., at 265-266 (footnote omitted).
Despite the dangers inherent in retroactive legislation, it is beyond dispute that, within constitutional limits, Congress has the power to enact laws with retrospective effect. See id., at 268. A statute may not be applied retroactively, however, absent a clear indication from Congress that it intended such a result. “Requiring clear intent assures that Congress itself has affirmatively considered the potential unfairness of retroactive application and determined that it is an acceptable price to pay for the countervailing benefits.” Id., at 272-273. Accordingly, the first step in determining whether a statute has an impermissible retroactive effect is to ascertain whether Congress has directed with the requisite clarity that the law be applied
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
B
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sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for writ of certiorari are granted. The judgment is reversed. Douglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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B
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court.
By granting federal courts jurisdiction over maritime and admiralty cases, the Constitution implicitly directs federal courts sitting in admiralty to proceed "in the manner of a common law court." Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 489-490, 128 S.Ct. 2605, 171 L.Ed.2d 570 (2008). Thus, where Congress has not prescribed specific rules, federal courts must develop the "amalgam of traditional common-law rules, modifications of those rules, and newly created rules" that forms the general maritime law. East River S. S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 864-865, 106 S.Ct. 2295, 90 L.Ed.2d 865 (1986). But maritime law is no longer solely the province of the Federal Judiciary. "Congress and the States have legislated extensively in these areas." Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 27, 111 S.Ct. 317, 112 L.Ed.2d 275 (1990). When exercising its inherent common-law authority, "an admiralty court should look primarily to these legislative enactments for policy guidance." Ibid. We may depart from the policies found in the statutory scheme in discrete instances based on long-established history, see, e.g., Atlantic Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 424-425, 129 S.Ct. 2561, 174 L.Ed.2d 382 (2009), but we do so cautiously in light of Congress's persistent pursuit of "uniformity in the exercise of admiralty jurisdiction." Miles, supra, at 26, 111 S.Ct. 317 (quoting Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 401, 90 S.Ct. 1772, 26 L.Ed.2d 339 (1970) ).
This case asks whether a mariner may recover punitive damages on a claim that he was injured as a result of the unseaworthy condition of the vessel. We have twice confronted similar questions in the past several decades, and our holdings in both cases were based on the particular claims involved. In Miles, which concerned a wrongful-death claim under the general maritime law, we held that recovery was limited to pecuniary damages, which did not include loss of society. 498 U.S. at 23, 111 S.Ct. 317. And in Atlantic Sounding, after examining centuries of relevant case law, we held that punitive damages are not categorically barred as part of the award on the traditional maritime claim of maintenance and cure. 557 U.S. at 407, 129 S.Ct. 2561. Here, because there is no historical basis for allowing punitive damages in unseaworthiness actions, and in order to promote uniformity with the way courts have applied parallel statutory causes of action, we hold that punitive damages remain unavailable in unseaworthiness actions.
I
In order to determine the remedies for unseaworthiness, we must consider both the heritage of the cause of action in the common law and its place in the modern statutory framework.
A
The seaman's right to recover damages for personal injury on a claim of unseaworthiness originates in the admiralty court decisions of the 19th century. At the time, "seamen led miserable lives." D. Robertson, S. Friedell, & M. Sturley, Admiralty and Maritime Law in the United States 163 (2d ed. 2008). Maritime law was largely judge-made, and seamen were viewed as "emphatically the wards of the admiralty." Harden v. Gordon, 11 F.Cas. 480, 485 (No. 6,047) (CC Me. 1823). In that era, the primary responsibility for protecting seamen lay in the courts, which saw mariners as "peculiarly entitled to"-and particularly in need of-judicial protection "against the effects of the superior skill and shrewdness of masters and owners of ships." Brown v. Lull, 4 F.Cas. 407, 409 (No. 2,018) (CC Mass. 1836) (Story, J.).
Courts of admiralty saw it as their duty not to be "confined to the mere dry and positive rules of the common law" but to "act upon the enlarged and liberal jurisprudence of courts of equity; and, in short, so far as their powers extend[ed], they act[ed] as courts of equity." Ibid. This Court interpreted the Constitution's grant of admiralty jurisdiction to the Federal Judiciary as "the power to... dispose of [a case] as justice may require." The Resolute, 168 U.S. 437, 439, 18 S.Ct. 112, 42 L.Ed. 533 (1897).
Courts used this power to protect seamen from injury primarily through two causes of action. The first, maintenance and cure, has its roots in the medieval and renaissance law codes that form the ancient foundation of maritime common law. The duty of maintenance and cure requires a ship's master "to provide food, lodging, and medical services to a seaman injured while serving the ship." Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438, 441, 121 S.Ct. 993, 148 L.Ed.2d 931 (2001). This duty, "which arises from the contract of employment, does not rest upon negligence or culpability on the part of the owner or master, nor is it restricted to those cases where the seaman's employment is the cause of the injury or illness." Calmar S. S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525, 527, 58 S.Ct. 651, 82 L.Ed. 993 (1938) (citations omitted).
The second claim, unseaworthiness, is a much more recent development and grew out of causes of action unrelated to personal injury. In its earliest forms, an unseaworthiness claim gave sailors under contract to sail on a ship the right to collect their wages even if they had refused to board an unsafe vessel after discovering its condition. See, e.g., Dixon v. The Cyrus, 7 F.Cas. 755, 757 (No. 3,930) (Pa. 1789) ; Rice v. The Polly & Kitty, 20 F.Cas. 666, 667, (No. 11754) (Pa. 1789). Similarly, unseaworthiness was a defense to criminal charges against seamen who refused to obey a ship master's orders. See, e.g., United States v. Nye, 27 F.Cas. 210, 211, (No. 15906) (CC Mass. 1855); United States v. Ashton, 24 F.Cas. 873, 874-875, (No. 14470) (CC Mass. 1834). A claim of unseaworthiness could also be asserted by a shipper to recover damages or by an insurer to deny coverage when the poor condition of the ship resulted in damage to or loss of the cargo. See The Caledonia, 157 U.S. 124, 132-136, 15 S.Ct. 537, 39 L.Ed. 644 (1895) (cataloging cases).
Only in the latter years of the 19th century did unseaworthiness begin a long and gradual evolution toward remedying personal injury. Courts began to extend the cases about refusals to serve to allow recovery for mariners who were injured because of the unseaworthy condition of the vessel on which they had served. These early cases were sparse, and they generally allowed recovery only when a vessel's owner failed to exercise due diligence to ensure that the ship left port in a seaworthy condition. See, e.g., The Robert C. McQuillen, 91 F. 685, 686-687 (Conn. 1899) ; The Lizzie Frank, 31 F. 477, 480 (SD Ala. 1887) ; The Tammerlane, 47 F. 822, 824 (ND Cal. 1891).
Unseaworthiness remained a suspect basis for personal injury claims until 1903, when, in dicta, this Court concluded that "the vessel and her owner are... liable to an indemnity for injuries received by seamen in consequence of the unseaworthiness of the ship." The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 175, 23 S.Ct. 483, 47 L.Ed. 760 (1903). Although this was the first recognition of unseaworthiness as a personal injury claim in this Court, we took pains to note that the claim was strictly cabined. Ibid. Some of the limitations on recovery were imported from the common law. The fellow-servant doctrine, in particular, prohibited recovery when an employee suffered an injury due to the negligent act of another employee without negligence on the part of the employer. Ibid. ; see, e.g., The Sachem, 42 F. 66 (EDNY 1890) (denying recovery based on fellow-servant doctrine). Because a claimant had to show that he was injured by some aspect of the ship's condition that rendered the vessel unseaworthy, a claim could not prevail based on "the negligence of the master, or any member of the crew."
The Osceola, supra, at 175, 23 S.Ct. 483 ; see also The City of Alexandria, 17 F. 390 (SDNY 1883) (no recovery based on negligence that does not render vessel unseaworthy). Instead, a seaman had to show that the owner of the vessel had failed to exercise due diligence in ensuring the ship was in seaworthy condition. See generally Dixon v. United States, 219 F.2d 10, 12-14 (C.A.2 1955) (Harlan, J.) (cataloging evolution of the claim).
B
In the early 20th century, then, under "the general maritime law... a vessel and her owner... were liable to an indemnity for injuries received by a seaman in consequence of the unseaworthiness of the ship and her appliances; but a seaman was not allowed to recover an indemnity for injuries sustained through the negligence of the master or any member of the crew." Pacific S. S. Co. v. Peterson, 278 U.S. 130, 134, 49 S.Ct. 75, 73 L.Ed. 220 (1928) ; see also Plamals v. S. S. "Pinar Del Rio," 277 U.S. 151, 155, 48 S.Ct. 457, 72 L.Ed. 827 (1928) (vessel was not unseaworthy when mate negligently selected defective rope but sound rope was available on board). Because of these severe limitations on recovery, "the seaman's right to recover damages for injuries caused by unseaworthiness of the ship was an obscure and relatively little used remedy." G. Gilmore & C. Black, The Law of Admiralty § 6-38, p. 383 (2d ed. 1975) (Gilmore & Black).
Tremendous shifts in mariners' rights took place between 1920 and 1950. First, during and after the First World War, Congress enacted a series of laws regulating maritime liability culminating in the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, § 33, 41 Stat. 1007 (Jones Act), which codified the rights of injured mariners and created new statutory claims that were freed from many of the common-law limitations on recovery. The Jones Act provides injured seamen with a cause of action and a right to a jury. 46 U.S.C. § 30104. Rather than create a new structure of substantive rights, the Jones Act incorporated the rights provided to railway workers under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq. 46 U.S.C. § 30104. In the 30 years after the Jones Act's passage, "the Act was the vehicle for almost all seamen's personal injury and death actions." Gilmore & Black § 6-20, at 327.
But the Jones Act was overtaken in the 1950s by the second fundamental change in personal injury maritime claims-and it was this Court, not Congress, that played the leading role. In a pair of decisions in the late 1940s, the Court transformed the old claim of unseaworthiness, which had demanded only due diligence by the vessel owner, into a strict-liability claim. In Mahnich v. Southern S. S. Co., 321 U.S. 96, 64 S.Ct. 455, 88 L.Ed. 561 (1944), the Court stated that "the exercise of due diligence does not relieve the owner of his obligation" to provide a seaworthy ship and, in the same ruling, held that the fellow-servant doctrine did not provide a defense. Id., at 100, 101, 64 S.Ct. 455. Mahnich's interpretation of the early cases may have been suspect, see Tetreault 397-398 ( Mahnich rests on "startling misstatement" of relevant precedents), but its assertion triggered a sea-change in maritime personal injury. Less than two years later, we affirmed that the duty of seaworthiness was "essentially a species of liability without fault... neither limited by conceptions of negligence nor contractual in character. It is a form of absolute duty owing to all within the range of its humanitarian policy." Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 94-95, 66 S.Ct. 872, 90 L.Ed. 1099 (1946) (citations omitted). From Mahnich forward, "the decisions of this Court have undeviatingly reflected an understanding that the owner's duty to furnish a seaworthy ship is absolute and completely independent of his duty under the Jones Act to exercise reasonable care." Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 549, 80 S.Ct. 926, 4 L.Ed.2d 941 (1960). As a result of Mahnich and Sieracki, between the 1950s and 1970s "the unseaworthiness count [was] the essential basis for recovery with the Jones Act count preserved merely as a jury-getting device." Gilmore & Black § 6-20, at 327-328.
The shifts in plaintiff preferences between Jones Act and unseaworthiness claims were possible because of the significant overlap between the two causes of action. See id., § 6-38, at 383. One leading treatise goes so far as to describe the two claims as "alternative 'grounds' of recovery for a single cause of action." 2 R. Force & M. Norris, The Law of Seamen § 30:90, p. 30-369 (5th ed. 2003). The two claims are so similar that, immediately after the Jones Act's passage, we held that plaintiffs could not submit both to a jury. Plamals, supra, at 156-157, 48 S.Ct. 457 ("Seamen may invoke, at their election, the relief accorded by the old rules against the ship, or that provided by the new against the employer. But they may not have the benefit of both"). We no longer require such election. See McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U.S. 221, 222, n. 2, 78 S.Ct. 1201, 2 L.Ed.2d 1272 (1958). But a plaintiff still cannot duplicate his recovery by collecting full damages on both claims because, "whether or not the seaman's injuries were occasioned by the unseaworthiness of the vessel or by the negligence of the master or members of the crew,... there is but a single wrongful invasion of his primary right of bodily safety and but a single legal wrong." Peterson, 278 U.S. at 138, 49 S.Ct. 75 ; see also 2 Force, supra, §§ 26:73, 30:90.
II
Christopher Batterton worked as a deckhand and crew member on vessels owned and operated by the Dutra Group. According to Batterton's complaint, while working on a scow near Newport Beach, California, Batterton was injured when his hand was caught between a bulkhead and a hatch that blew open as a result of unventilated air accumulating and pressurizing within the compartment.
Batterton sued Dutra and asserted a variety of claims, including negligence, unseaworthiness, maintenance and cure, and unearned wages. He sought to recover general and punitive damages. Dutra moved to strike Batterton's claim for punitive damages, arguing that they are not available on claims for unseaworthiness. The District Court denied Dutra's motion, 2014 WL 12538172 (CD Cal., Dec. 15, 2014), but agreed to certify an interlocutory appeal on the question, 2015 WL 13752889 (CD Cal., Feb. 6, 2015).
The Court of Appeals affirmed. 880 F.3d 1089 (C.A.9 2018). Applying Circuit precedent, see Evich v. Morris, 819 F.2d 256, 258-259 (C.A.9 1987), the Court of Appeals held that punitive damages are available for unseaworthiness claims. 880 F.3d at 1096. This holding reaffirmed a division of authority between the Circuits. Compare McBride v. Estis Well Serv., L. L. C., 768 F.3d 382, 391 (C.A.5 2014) (en banc) (punitive damages are not recoverable), and Horsley v. Mobil Oil Corp., 15 F.3d 200, 203 (C.A.1 1994) (same), with Self v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 832 F.2d 1540, 1550 (C.A.11 1987) ("Punitive damages should be available in cases where the shipowner willfully violated the duty to maintain a safe and seaworthy ship..."). We granted certiorari to resolve this division. 586 U.S. ----, 139 S.Ct. 627, 202 L.Ed.2d 454 (2018).
III
Our resolution of this question is governed by our decisions in Miles and Atlantic Sounding. Miles establishes that we "should look primarily to... legislative enactments for policy guidance," while recognizing that we "may supplement these statutory remedies where doing so would achieve the uniform vindication" of the policies served by the relevant statutes. 498 U.S. at 27, 111 S.Ct. 317. In Atlantic Sounding, we allowed recovery of punitive damages, but we justified our departure from the statutory remedial scheme based on the established history of awarding punitive damages for certain maritime torts, including maintenance and cure. 557 U.S. at 411-414, 129 S.Ct. 2561 (discussing cases of piracy and maintenance and cure awarding damages with punitive components). We were explicit that our decision represented a gloss on Miles rather than a departure from it. Atlantic Sounding, supra, at 420, 129 S.Ct. 2561 ("The reasoning of Miles remains sound"). And we recognized the importance of viewing each claim in its proper historical context. " '[R]emedies for negligence, unseaworthiness, and maintenance and cure have different origins and may on occasion call for application of slightly different principles and procedures.' " 557 U.S. at 423, 129 S.Ct. 2561.
In accordance with these decisions, we consider here whether punitive damages have traditionally been awarded for claims of unseaworthiness and whether conformity with parallel statutory schemes would require such damages. Finally, we consider whether we are compelled on policy grounds to allow punitive damages for unseaworthiness claims.
A
For claims of unseaworthiness, the overwhelming historical evidence suggests that punitive damages are not available. Batterton principally relies on two cases to establish that punitive damages were traditionally available for breach of the duty of seaworthiness. Upon close inspection, neither supports this argument.
The Rolph, 293 F. 269, 271 (ND Cal. 1923), involved a mate who brutally beat members of the crew, rendering one seaman blind and leaving another with impaired hearing. The central question in the case was not the form of damages, but rather whether the viciousness of the mate rendered the vessel unseaworthy. The Rolph, 299 F. 52, 54 (C.A.9 1924). The court concluded that the master, by staffing the vessel with such an unsuitable officer, had rendered it unseaworthy. Id., at 55. To the extent the court described the basis for the damages awarded, it explained that the judgment was supported by testimony as to "the expectation of life and earnings of these men." 293 F. at 272. And the Court of Appeals discussed only the seamen's entitlement "to recover an indemnity" for their injuries. 299 F. at 56. These are discussions of compensatory damages-nowhere does the court speak in terms of an exemplary or punitive award.
The Noddleburn, 28 F. 855, 857-858 (Ore. 1886), involved an injury to a British seaman serving on a British vessel and was decided under English law. The plaintiff in the case was injured when he fell to the deck after being ordered aloft and stepping on an inadequately secured line. Id., at 855. After the injury, the master neglected the man's wounds, thinking the injury a mere sprain. Id., at 856. The leg failed to heal and the man had to insist on being discharged to a hospital, where he learned that he would be permanently disabled. Ibid. As damages, the court awarded him accrued wages, as well as $ 1,000 to compensate for the loss in future earnings from his disability and $ 500 for his pain and suffering. Id., at 860. But these are purely compensatory awards-the only discussion of exemplary damages comes at the very close of the opinion, and it is clear that they were considered because of the master's failure to provide maintenance and cure. Ibid. (discussing additional award "in consideration of the neglect and indifference with which the libelant was treated by the master after his injury " (emphasis added)).
Finally, Batterton points to two other cases, The City of Carlisle, 39 F. 807 (Ore. 1889), and The Troop, 118 F. 769 (Wash. 1902). But these cases, like The Noddleburn, both involve maintenance and cure claims that rest on the willful failure of the master and mate to provide proper care for wounded sailors after they were injured. 39 F. at 812 ("master failed and neglected to procure or provide any medical aid or advice... and was contriving and intending to get rid of him as easily as possible"); 118 F. at 771 (assessing damages based on provision of Laws of Oleron requiring maintenance). Batterton characterizes these as unseaworthiness actions on the theory that the seamen could have pursued that claim. But, because courts award damages for the claims a plaintiff actually pleads rather than those he could have brought, these cases are irrelevant.
The lack of punitive damages in traditional maritime law cases is practically dispositive. By the time the claim of unseaworthiness evolved to remedy personal injury, punitive damages were a well-established part of the common law. Exxon Shipping, 554 U.S. at 491, 128 S.Ct. 2605. American courts had awarded punitive (or exemplary) damages from the Republic's earliest days. See, e.g., Genay v. Norris, 1 S. C. L. 6, 7 (1784) ; Coryell v. Colbaugh, 1 N.J.L. 77, 78 (1791). And yet, beyond the decisions discussed above, Batterton presents no decisions from the formative years of the personal injury unseaworthiness claim in which exemplary damages were awarded. From this we conclude that, unlike maintenance and cure, unseaworthiness did not traditionally allow recovery of punitive damages.
B
In light of this overwhelming historical evidence, we cannot sanction a novel remedy here unless it is required to maintain uniformity with Congress's clearly expressed policies. Therefore, we must consider the remedies typically recognized for Jones Act claims.
The Jones Act adopts the remedial provisions of FELA, and by the time of the Jones Act's passage, this Court and others had repeatedly interpreted the scope of damages available to FELA plaintiffs. These early decisions held that "[t]he damages recoverable [under FELA] are limited... strictly to the financial loss... sustained." American R. Co. of P. R. v. Didricksen, 227 U.S. 145, 149, 33 S.Ct. 224, 57 L.Ed. 456 (1913) ; see also Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. McGinnis, 228 U.S. 173, 175, 33 S.Ct. 426, 57 L.Ed. 785 (1913) (FELA is construed "only to compensate... for the actual pecuniary loss resulting" from the worker's injury or death); Michigan Central R. Co. v. Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59, 68, 33 S.Ct. 192, 57 L.Ed. 417 (1913) (FELA imposes "a liability for the pecuniary damage resulting to [the worker] and for that only"). In one particularly illuminating case, in deciding whether a complaint alleged a claim under FELA or state law, the Court observed that if the complaint "were read as manifestly demanding exemplary damages, that would point to the state law." Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Koennecke, 239 U.S. 352, 354, 36 S.Ct. 126, 60 L.Ed. 324 (1915). And in the years since, Federal Courts of Appeals have unanimously held that punitive damages are not available under FELA. Miller v. American President Lines, Ltd., 989 F.2d 1450, 1457 (CA6 1993) ; Wildman v. Burlington No. R. Co., 825 F.2d 1392, 1395 (C.A.9 1987) ; Kozar v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co., 449 F.2d 1238, 1243 (C.A.6 1971).
Our early discussions of the Jones Act followed the same practices. We described the Act shortly after its passage as creating "an action for compensatory damages, on the ground of negligence." Peterson, 278 U.S. at 135, 49 S.Ct. 75. And we have more recently observed that the Jones Act "limits recovery to pecuniary loss." Miles, 498 U.S. at 32, 111 S.Ct. 317. Looking to FELA and these decisions, the Federal Courts of Appeals have uniformly held that punitive damages are not available under the Jones Act. McBride, 768 F.3d at 388 ("[N]o cases have awarded punitive damages under the Jones Act"); Guevara v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 59 F.3d 1496, 1507, n. 9 (C.A.5 1995) (en banc); Horsley, 15 F.3d at 203 ; Miller, supra, at 1457 ("Punitive damages are not... recoverable under the Jones Act"); Kopczynski v. The Jacqueline, 742 F.2d 555, 560 (C.A.9 1984).
Batterton argues that these cases are either inapposite or wrong, but because of the absence of historical evidence to support punitive damages-evidence that was central to our decision in Atlantic Sounding -we need not reopen this question of statutory interpretation. It is enough for us to note the general consensus that exists in the lower courts and to observe that the position of those courts conforms with the discussion and holding in Miles. Adopting the rule urged by Batterton would be contrary to Miles's command that federal courts should seek to promote a "uniform rule applicable to all actions" for the same injury, whether under the Jones Act or the general maritime law. 498 U.S. at 33, 111 S.Ct. 317.
C
To the extent Batterton argues that punitive damages are justified on policy grounds or as a regulatory measure, we are unpersuaded. In contemporary maritime law, our overriding objective is to pursue the policy expressed in congressional enactments, and because unseaworthiness in its current strict-liability form is our own invention and came after passage of the Jones Act, it would exceed our current role to introduce novel remedies contradictory to those Congress has provided in similar areas. See id., at 36, 111 S.Ct. 317 (declining to create remedy "that goes well beyond the limits of Congress' ordered system of recovery"). We are particularly loath to impose more expansive liabilities on a claim governed by strict liability than Congress has imposed for comparable claims based in negligence. Ibid. And with the increased role that legislation has taken over the past century of maritime law, we think it wise to leave to the political branches the development of novel claims and remedies.
We are also wary to depart from the practice under the Jones Act because a claim of unseaworthiness-more than a claim for maintenance and cure-serves as a duplicate and substitute for a Jones Act claim. The duty of maintenance and cure requires the master to provide medical care and wages to an injured mariner in the period after the injury has occurred. Calmar S. S. Corp., 303 U.S. at 527-528, 58 S.Ct. 651. By contrast, both the Jones Act and unseaworthiness claims compensate for the injury itself and for the losses resulting from the injury. Peterson, supra, at 138, 49 S.Ct. 75. In such circumstances, we are particularly mindful of the rule that requires us to promote uniformity between maritime statutory law and maritime common law. See Miles, supra, at 27, 111 S.Ct. 317. See also Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625, 98 S.Ct. 2010, 56 L.Ed.2d 581 (1978) (declining to recognize loss-of-society damages under general maritime law because that would "rewrit[e the] rules that Congress has affirmatively and specifically enacted").
Unlike a claim of maintenance and cure, which addresses a situation where the vessel owner and master have "just about every economic incentive to dump an injured seaman in a port and abandon him to his fate," in the unseaworthiness context the interests of the owner and mariner are more closely aligned. McBride, supra, at 394, n. 12 (Clement, J., concurring). That is because there are significant economic incentives prompting owners to ensure that their vessels are seaworthy. Most obviously, an owner who puts an unseaworthy ship to sea stands to lose the ship and the cargo that it carries. And if a vessel's unseaworthiness threatens the crew or cargo, the owner risks losing the protection of his insurer (who may not cover losses incurred by the owner's negligence) and the work of the crew (who may refuse to serve on an unseaworthy vessel). In some instances, the vessel owner may even face criminal penalties. See, e.g., 46 U.S.C. § 10908.
Allowing punitive damages on unseaworthiness claims would also create bizarre disparities in the law. First, due to our holding in Miles, which limited recovery to compensatory damages in wrongful-death actions, a mariner could make a claim for punitive damages if he was injured onboard a ship, but his estate would lose the right to seek punitive damages if he died from his injuries. Second, because unseaworthiness claims run against the owner of the vessel, the ship's owner could be liable for punitive damages while the master or operator of the ship-who has more control over onboard conditions and is best positioned to minimize potential risks-would not be liable for such damages under the Jones Act. See Sieracki, 328 U.S. at 100, 66 S.Ct. 872 (The duty of seaworthiness is "peculiarly and exclusively the obligation of the owner. It is one he cannot delegate").
Finally, because "[n]oncompensatory damages are not part of the civil-code tradition and thus unavailable in such countries," Exxon Shipping, 554 U.S. at 497, 128 S.Ct. 2605, allowing punitive damages would place American shippers at a significant competitive disadvantage and would discourage foreign-owned vessels from employing American seamen. See Gotanda, Punitive Damages: A Comparative Analysis, 42 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 391, 396, n. 24 (2004) (listing civil-law nations that restrict private plaintiffs to compensatory damages). This would frustrate another "fundamental interest" served by federal maritime jurisdiction: "the protection of maritime commerce." Norfolk Southern R. Co. v. James N. Kirby, Pty Ltd., 543 U.S. 14, 25, 125 S.Ct. 385, 160 L.Ed.2d 283 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis deleted).
Against this, Batterton points to the maritime doctrine that encourages special solicitude for the welfare of seamen. But that doctrine has its roots in the paternalistic approach taken toward mariners by 19th century courts. See, e.g., Harden, 11 F.Cas. at 485 ; Brown, 4 F.Cas. at 409. The doctrine has never been a commandment that maritime law must favor seamen whenever possible. Indeed, the doctrine's apex coincided with many of the harsh common-law limitations on recovery that were not set aside until the passage of the Jones Act. And, while sailors today face hardships not encountered by those who work on land, neither are they as isolated nor as dependent on the master as their predecessors from the age of sail. In light of these changes and of the roles now played by the Judiciary and the political branches in protecting sailors, the special solicitude to sailors has only a small role to play in contemporary maritime law. It is not sufficient to overcome the weight of authority indicating that punitive damages are unavailable.
IV
Punitive damages are not a traditional remedy for unseaworthiness. The rule of Miles -promoting uniformity in maritime law and deference to the policies expressed in the statutes governing maritime law-prevents us from recognizing a new entitlement to punitive damages where none previously existed. We hold that a plaintiff may not
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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H
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
Petitioner, a native and national of Canada, filed a petition for naturalization under the provisions of § 310 (b) of the Nationality Act of 1940, 8 U. S. C. (1946 ed.) § 710 (b), now 8 U. S. C. § 1430. On April 18, 1962, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois entered a final order denying the petition on the ground that petitioner had failed to establish his attachment to the United States Constitution. Twelve days later, on April 30, 1962, petitioner served notice on the Immigration and Naturalization Service that he would appear before the trial judge on May 2, 1962, with post-trial motions “to amend certain findings of fact pursuant to Rule 52 F. R. C. P. and for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59 F. R. C. P.” The Government raised no objection as to the timeliness of these motions, and the trial court specifically declared that the “motion for a new trial” was made “in ample time.” On October 16, 1962, these motions were denied. On December 6, 1962, within 60 days of the denial of the post-trial motions but not within 60 days of the original entry of judgment by the District Court, petitioner filed a notice of appeal. The Government then moved in the Court of Appeals to dismiss the appeal on the ground that notice of appeal had not been filed within the 60-day period prescribed by Rule 73 (a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and that petitioner’s post-trial motions were untimely and hence did not toll the running of the time for appeal. The Court of Appeals granted the motions. Petitioner now seeks review by certiorari of the dismissal of his appeal.
Rule 73 (a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure designates “the time within which an appeal may be taken” in this type of case as “60 days” from “the entry of the judgment appealed from . . . .” The Rule also declares that:
“the full time for appeal fixed in this subdivision commences to run and is to be computed from the entry of any of the following orders made upon a timely motion under such rules: . . . granting or denying a motion under Rule 52 (b) to amend or make additional findings of fact ... ; or granting or denying a motion under Rule 59 to alter or amend the judgment; or denying a motion for a new trial-under Rule 59.” (Emphasis added.)
It is clear that if petitioner’s post-trial motions were “timely,” then the appeal, which was filed within 60 days of the disposition of the motions, was timely. The Government alleges, however, that the post-trial motions were not timely since the applicable rules provide that they must be “served not later than 10 days after the entry of the judgment,” and these motions were served 12 days after the entry of judgment. The Government concludes, therefore, that since there was no “timely motion” under the rules designated in Rule 73 (a), the appeal must be, but was not, filed within 60 days of the entry of the original judgment.
Although petitioner admits that the post-trial motions were not served until 12 days after the entry of judgment, he claims that they should be deemed timely since they were served 10 days “from receipt of notice of entry of the judgment” by his lawyers who were not in court on the day the judgment was entered. He claims, moreover, that he relied on the Government’s failure to raise a claim of untimeliness when the motions were filed and on the District Court’s explicit statement that the motion for a new trial was made “in ample time”; for if any question had been raised about the timeliness of the motions at that juncture, petitioner could have, and presumably would have, filed the appeal within 60 days of the entry of the original judgment, rather than waiting, as he did, until after the trial court had disposed of the post-trial motions.
In a recent case involving a closely related issue, we recognized “the obvious great hardship to a party who relies upon the trial judge’s finding of ‘excusable neglect’ prior to the expiration of the [applicable period for filing an appeal] and then suffers reversal of the finding . . .” after the time for filing the appeal has expired. Harris Truck Lines, Inc., v. Cherry Meat Packers, Inc., 371 U. S. 215, 217. In that case petitioner had, within the applicable period for filing his appeal, received from the trial court a 30-day extension on the time for filing his appeal on the ground of “excusable neglect based on a failure of a party to learn of the entry of the judgment.” Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., 73 (a). Petitioner then filed his appeal within the period of the extension but beyond the original period. The Court of Appeals, concluding that there had been no “excusable neglect” within the meaning of Rule 73 (a), held that the District Court had erred in granting the extension and dismissed the appeal. We reversed the dismissal and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals “so that petitioner’s appeal may be heard on its merits.” Ibid. See also Lieberman v. Gulf Oil Corp., 315 F. 2d 403, cert. denied, 375 U. S. 823.
The instant cause fits squarely within the letter and spirit of Harris. Here, as there, petitioner did an act which, if properly done, postponed the deadline for the filing of his appeal. Here, as there, the District Court concluded that the act had been properly done. Here, as there, the petitioner relied on the statement of the District Court and filed the appeal within the assumedly new deadline but beyond the old deadline. And here, as there, the Court of Appeals concluded that the District Court had erred and dismissed the appeal. Accordingly, in view of these “unique circumstances,” Harris Truck Lines, Inc., v. Cherry Meat Packers, Inc., supra, at 217, we grant the writ of certiorari, vacate the judgment, and remand the case to the Court of Appeals so that petitioner’s appeal may be heard on the merits.
It is so ordered.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
A
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
Respondent Robert Douglas Smith was convicted in 1982 of first-degree murder, kidnaping, and sexual assault. He was sentenced to death on the murder count, and consecutive 21-year prison terms for the other counts. After a series of unsuccessful petitions for state postconviction relief, respondent filed a federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U. S. C. §2254 (1994 ed. and Supp. V) in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona. The petition alleged that his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to challenge various trial errors. Respondent had previously brought these ineffective-assistance claims in 1995 in a petition for state postconviction relief pursuant to Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32 (West 2000). The Pima County Superior Court denied his claims, finding them waived under Arizona Rule 32.2(a)(3) because respondent failed to raise them in his previous two Rule 32 petitions. In doing so, it rejected as “outrageous” respondent’s argument that his failure to raise these claims was also due to ineffective assistance — in particular, that his prior appellate and Rule 32 counsel, who are members of the Arizona Public Defender’s office, refused to file ineffeetive-assistance-of-counsel claims because his trial counsel was also a member of the Public Defender’s office. App. D to Pet. for Cert. 1.
On federal habeas, the United States District Court held respondent’s claims barred by the Pima County Superior Court’s procedural ruling. The court rejected respondent’s allegations that a conflict between his appellate and Rule 32 counsel’s responsibility toward respondent and their allegiance to the Public Defender’s office was cause for his procedural default in state court. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the state procedural default was not independent of federal law and thus did not bar federal review of the merits of respondent’s claim, 241 F. 3d 1191,1196 (2001) (citing Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U. S. 68, 75 (1985)). It reasoned that Arizona Rule 32.2(a)(3) applies a different standard for waiver depending on whether the claim asserted in a Rule 32 petition was of “sufficient constitutional magnitude,” Ariz. Rule Crim. Proc. 32.2(a)(3), comment (West 2000), and that determination whether a claim is of sufficient magnitude required, at the time the Superior Court ruled on respondent’s ineffective-assistance claims, consideration of the merits of the claim, 241 F. 3d, at 1197 (citing State v. French, 198 Ariz. 119, 121-122, 7 P. 3d 128, 130-131 (App. 2000); State v. Curtis, 185 Ariz. 112, 115, 912 P. 2d 1341, 1344 (App. 1995)).
We hereby grant certiorari to review the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ determination that the Pima County Superior Court’s procedural ruling was not independent of the merits of respondent’s claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel under the Sixth Amendment. In order to determine whether the District Court may review these claims, we first must know whether the Court of Appeals properly interpreted Arizona law concerning Rule 32.2(a)(3). Therefore, we certify the following question to the Arizona Supreme Court pursuant to that court’s rule concerning Certification of Questions of Law from Federal and Tribal Courts (Ariz. Sup. Ct. Rule 27 (West 2000)):
At the time of respondent’s third Rule 32 petition in 1995, did the question whether an asserted claim was of “sufficient constitutional magnitude” to require a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver for purposes of Rule 32.2(a)(3), see Ariz. Rule Crim. Proc. 32.2(a)(3), comment (West 2000), depend upon the merits of the particular claim, see State v. French, 198 Ariz. 119, 121-122, 7 P. 3d 128, 130-131 (App. 2000); State v. Curtis, 185 Ariz. App. 112, 115, 912 P. 2d 1341, 1344 (1995), or merely upon the particular right alleged to have been violated, see State v. Espinosa, 200 Ariz. 503, 505, 29 P. 3d 278, 280 (App. 2001)?
We respectfully request that the Arizona Supreme Court accept our certification petition. That court’s answer to this question will help determine the proper state-law predicate for our determination of the federal constitutional questions raised in this ease.
The Clerk of this Court is directed to transmit to the Supreme Court of Arizona an original and six certified copies of this opinion, the briefs and records filed in this Court in this case, and a list of the counsel appearing in this matter along with their addresses and telephone numbers, pursuant to Ariz. Sup. Ct. Rules 27(a)(3)(c) and (a)(4) (West 2000). Judgment and further proceedings in this case are reserved pending our receipt of a response from the Supreme Court of Arizona.
It is so ordered.
We also grant respondent’s motion for leave to proceed informa pau-peris and the motion of the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
I
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Chief Justice Rehnquist
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Title 18 U. S. C. § 3585(b) provides that a defendant generally must “be given credit toward the service of a term of imprisonment for any time he has spent in official detention prior to the date the sentence commences.” Before the commencement of respondent’s federal sentence, a Federal Magistrate Judge “released” him on bail pursuant to the Bail Reform Act of 1984 and ordered him confined to a community treatment center. The question presented is whether respondent was in “official detention,” and thus entitled to a sentence credit under § 3585(b), during the time he spent at the treatment center. We hold that he was not.
On April 23, 1991, respondent Ziya Koray was arrested for laundering monetary instruments in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1956(a)(1). On June 18, 1991, he pleaded guilty to that charge in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. One week later, on June 25, 1991, a Federal Magistrate Judge entered a “release order” pursuant to 18 U. S. C. § 3142(c), ordering respondent released on bail, pending sentencing, into the custody of the Pretrial Services Agency. The order required that he be “confined to [the] premises” of a Volunteers of America community treatment center without “authoriz[ation] to leave for any reason unless accompanied” by a Government special agent. On October 22, 1991, the District Court sentenced respondent to 41 months’ imprisonment. Respondent remained at the Volunteers of America facility until November 25, 1991, the day he reported to the Allenwood Federal Prison Camp to serve his sentence.
Respondent requested the Bureau of Prisons (BOP or Bureau) to credit toward his sentence of imprisonment the approximately 150 days he spent at the Volunteers of America community treatment center between June 25 and November 25, 1991. Relying on its established policy, BOP refused to grant the requested credit. After exhausting his administrative remedies, respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania seeking credit under 18 U. S. C. § 3585 for the time he spent at the community treatment center. The District Court denied the petition, finding that respondent’s stay at the center did not constitute “official detention” within the meaning of 18 U. S. C. § 3585(b).
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed. 21 F. 3d 558 (1994). It acknowledged that the overwhelming majority of the Courts of Appeals “have concluded that section 3585 . . . does not require the Bureau to credit presen-tenced defendants whose bail conditions allowed them to be confined outside of Bureau of Prison[s] facilities.” Id., at 561. The court declined, however, to defer to the Bureau’s view — that time spent under highly restrictive conditions while “released” on bail is not “‘official detention’” under § 3585(b) because a “ ‘released’ ” defendant is not subject to the Bureau’s control. Id., at 562-565. Instead, the court reasoned that § 3585(b)’s “ ‘official detention’ ” language need not be read “as if it provided ‘official detention by the Attorney General or the Bureau of Prisons, ’ ” since “there is nothing in the statute which requires or suggests that a defendant must be under the detention of the Bureau,” and since “[a] court may ‘detain’ a person as ‘offlcial[ly]’ as the Attorney General.” Id., at 563-564. Concluding that “‘official detention’ for purposes of credit under 18 U. S. C. § 3585 includes time spent under conditions of jail-type confinement,” id., at 567, the Court of Appeals remanded the case for a determination whether respondent was in “jail-type confinement” during his stay at the Volunteers of America community treatment center.
We granted the Government’s petition for certiorari to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals on the question whether a federal prisoner is entitled to credit against his sentence under § 3585(b) for time when he was “released” on bail pursuant to the Bail Reform Act of 1984. 513 U. S. 1106 (1995). We now reverse.
Title 18 U. S. C. § 3585 determines when a federal sentence of imprisonment commences and whether credit against that sentence must be granted for time spent in “official detention” before the sentence began. It states:
“Calculation of a term of imprisonment
“(a) Commencement of Sentence. — A sentence to a term of imprisonment commences on the date the defendant is received in custody awaiting transportation to, or arrives voluntarily to commence service of sentence at, the official detention facility at which the sentence is to be served.
“(b) Credit for Prior Custody — A defendant shall be given credit toward the service of a term of imprisonment for any time he has spent in official detention prior to the date the sentence commences—
“(1) as a result of the offense for which the sentence was imposed; or
“(2) as a result of any other charge for which the defendant was arrested after the commission of the offense for which the sentence was imposed;
“that has not been credited against another sentence.” 18 U. S. C. § 3585 (emphasis added).
In United States v. Wilson, 503 U. S. 329, 337 (1992), we specifically noted Congress’ use of the term “ ‘official detention’ ” in § 3585(b), but we had no occasion to rule on the meaning of that term. We must do so today.
The Government contends that the phrase “official detention” in § 3585(b) refers to a court order detaining a defendant and committing him to the custody of the Attorney General for confinement. Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the phrase “official detention” includes the restrictive conditions of his release on bail because the Federal Magistrate’s bail order was “official” and significantly curtailed his liberty. Viewing the phrase in isolation, it may be said that either reading is plausible. But it is a “fundamental principle of statutory construction (and, indeed, of language itself) that the meaning of a word cannot be determined in isolation, but must be drawn from the context in which it is used.” Deal v. United States, 508 U. S. 129, 132 (1993). After examining the phrase “official detention” in this light, we believe the Government’s interpretation is the correct one.
Section 3585(b) provides credit for time “spent in official detention prior to the date the sentence commences,” 18 U. S. C. § 3585(b) (emphasis added), thus making clear that credit is awarded only for presentence restraints on liberty. Because the Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U. S. C. § 3141 et seq., is the body of law that authorizes federal courts to place presentence restraints on a defendant’s liberty, see § 3142(a) (authorizing courts to impose restraints on the defendant “pending trial”); § 3143(a) (authorizing courts to impose restraints while the defendant “is waiting imposition or execution of sentence”), the “official detention” language of § 3585(b) must be construed in conjunction with that Act. This is especially so because the Bail Reform Act of 1984 was enacted in the same statute as the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, of which § 3585 is a part. See Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 498 U. S. 395, 407-408 (1991) (“It is not uncommon to refer to other, related legislative enactments when interpreting specialized statutory terms,” since Congress is presumed to have “legislated with reference to” those terms).
The Bail Reform Act of 1984 provides a federal court with two choices when dealing with a criminal defendant who has been “charged with an offense” and is awaiting trial, 18 U. S. C. § 3142(a), or who “has been found guilty of an offense and ... is awaiting imposition or execution of sentence,” 18 U. S. C. § 3143(a)(1) (1988 ed., Supp. V). The court may either (1) “release” the defendant on bail or (2) order him “detained” without bail. A court may “release” a defendant subject to a variety of restrictive conditions, including residence in a community treatment center. See §§ 3142(c) (1)(B)(i), (x), and (xiv). If, however, the court “finds that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other person and the community,” § 3142(e), the court “shall order the detention of the person,” ibid., by issuing a “detention order” “direct[ing] that the person be committed to the custody of the Attorney General for confinement in a corrections facility,” § 3142(i)(2). Thus, under the language of the Bail Reform Act of 1984, a defendant suffers “detention” only when committed to the custody of the Attorney General; a defendant admitted to bail on restrictive conditions, as respondent was, is “released.” See Dawson v. Scott, 50 F. 3d 884, 889-890, and nn. 11-12 (CA11 1995); Moreland v. United States, 968 F. 2d 655, 659-660 (CA8), cert. denied, 506 U. S. 1028 (1992); 968 F. 2d, at 661-663 (Loken, J., concurring); United States v. Becak, 954 F. 2d 386, 388 (CA6), cert. denied, 504 U. S. 945 (1992).
Section 3585(a) and related sentencing provisions confirm this interpretation. Section 3585(a) provides that a federal sentence “commences” when the defendant is received for transportation to or arrives at “the official detention facility at which the sentence is to be served.” Title 18 U. S. C. §3621, in turn, provides that the sentenced defendant “shall be committed to the custody of the Bureau of Prisons,” § 3621(a), which “may designate any available penal or correctional facility . . . , whether maintained by the Federal Government or otherwise . . . , that the Bureau determines to be appropriate and suitable,” § 3621(b) (emphasis added). The phrase “official detention facility” in § 3585(a) therefore must refer to a correctional facility designated by the Bureau for the service of federal sentences, where the Bureau retains the discretion to “direct the transfer of a prisoner from one penal or correctional facility to another.” § 3621(b).
This reading of § 3585(a) is reinforced by other provisions governing the administration of federal sentences. For example, §3622 gives the Bureau authority to release a prisoner from the place of his imprisonment for a limited period to “participate in a training or educational program in the community while continuing in official detention at the prison facility,” § 3622(b), or to “work at paid employment in the community while continuing in official detention at the penal or correctional facility,” § 3622(c). Because the words “official detention” should bear the same meaning in subsections (a) and (b) of §3585 as they do in the above related sentencing statutes, see Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U. S. 469, 479 (1992) (“[T]he basic canon of statutory construction [is] that identical terms within an Act bear the same meaning”), credit for time spent in “official detention” under § 3585(b) is available only to those defendants who were detained in a “penal or correctional facility,” § 3621(b), and who were subject to BOP’s control.
The context and history of § 3585(b) also support this view. As for context, § 3585(b) reduces a defendant’s “imprisonment” by the amount of time spent in “official detention” before his sentence, strongly suggesting that the period of presentence “detention” must be equivalent to the “imprisonment” itself. It would be anomalous to interpret § 3585(b) to require sentence credit for time spent confined in a community treatment center where the defendant is not subject to BOP’s control, since Congress generally views such a restriction on liberty as part of a sentence of “probation,” see 18 U. S. C. §§ 3563(b)(10), (12), and (14), or “supervised release,” see § 3583(d), rather than part of a sentence of “imprisonment.” See United States v. Zackular, 945 F. 2d 423, 425 (CA1 1991).
With respect to history, § 3585(b)’s predecessor, 18 U. S. C. §3568 (1982 ed.) (repealed), required the Attorney General to award sentence credit for “any days spent in custody in connection with the offense or acts for which sentence was imposed.” (Emphasis added.) The Courts of Appeals uniformly held that the phrase “in custody” did not allow sentence credit because of restrictions placed on a defendant’s liberty as a condition of release on bail. See Polakoff v. United States, 489 F. 2d 727, 730 (CA5 1974) (time spent on “highly restricted bond” not creditable as “‘custody’”); United States v. Robles, 563 F. 2d 1308, 1309 (CA9 1977) (“[T]ime spent on bail or on bond pending appeal is not time served ‘in custody’”), cert. denied, 435 U. S. 925 (1978); Ortega v. United States, 510 F. 2d 412, 413 (CA10 1975) (“‘custody’” refers to “actual custodial incarceration,” not “the time a criminal defendant is free on bond”); United States v. Peterson, 507 F. 2d 1191, 1192 (CADC 1974) (“ ‘in custody’ ” does “not refer to the stipulations imposed when a defendant is at large on conditional release”). In 1984, Congress enacted § 3585(b) and altered §3568 by, inter alia, “replac[ing] the term ‘custody’ with the term ‘official detention.’ ” Wilson, 503 U. S., at 337; see also 18 U. S. C. § 3585(b). In thus rewording the credit statute, however, nothing suggests that Congress disagreed with the Courts of Appeals’ rule denying credit to defendants who had been released on bail. To the contrary, Congress presumably made the change to conform the credit statute to the nomenclature used in related sentencing provisions, see 18 U. S. C. §§ 3585(a) and 3622, and in the Bail Reform Act of 1984. See Moreland, 968 F. 2d, at 662, and n. 5 (Loken, J., concurring).
The Bureau, as the agency charged with administering the credit statute, see Wilson, supra, at 334-335, likewise has interpreted § 3585(b)’s “official detention” language to require credit for time spent by a defendant under a § 3142(e) “detention order,” but not for time spent under a § 3142(c) “release order,” ho matter how restrictive the conditions. As we have explained, see supra, at 56-60, the Bureau’s interpretation is the most natural and reasonable reading of § 3585(b)’s “official detention” language. It is true that the Bureau’s interpretation appears only in a “Program Statement] ” — an internal agency guideline — rather than in “published regulations subject to the rigors of the Administrative Procedure] Act, including public notice and comment.” 21 F. 3d, at 562. But BOP’s internal agency guideline, which is akin to an “interpretive rule” that “do[es] not require notice and comment,” Shalala v. Guernsey Memorial Hospital, 514 U. S. 87, 99 (1995), is still entitled to some deference, cf. Martin v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm’n, 499 U. S. 144, 157 (1991), since it is a “permissible construction of the statute,” Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 843 (1984).
Respondent, as we have indicated, disagrees with the above interpretation of § 3585(b). He contends that the “plain meaning” of the phrase “official detention” includes the restrictive conditions of his confinement, even though he was released on bail. This contention is a plausible one if the phrase is read in isolation: respondent was subjected to restrictive conditions when released on bail, these conditions were imposed by a court order, and his sojourn in the community treatment center therefore amounted to “official detention.” But even without reference to the context of the language and the history of the statute, respondent’s is not the only plausible interpretation of the language; it would be too much to say that the statute “cannot bear the interpretation adopted by” the Bureau. Sullivan v. Everhart, 494 U. S. 83, 91-92 (1990). And in light of the foregoing textual and historical analysis, the initial plausibility of respondent’s reading simply does not carry the day.
Respondent also argues it is improper to focus on the release/detention dichotomy of the Bail Reform Act of 1984 to construe §3585(b)’s “official detention” language because a defendant “released” on bail may be subjected to conditions (under 18 U. S. C. § 3142(c)(1)(B)(xiv)) that are just as onerous as those faced by “detained” defendants. In addition, he asserts that his confinement as a “released” defendant in the Volunteers of America community treatment center constituted “official detention” because “sentenced” prisoners are deemed to be in “official detention” when BOP authorizes them to serve the last part of their sentences in a community treatment center, see U. S. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Prisons Program Statement No. 7310.02 (Oct. 19, 1993) (interpreting 18 U. S. C. § 3624(c) to allow BOP to place sentenced prisoners in community corrections centers, since such centers meet 18 U. S. C. § 3621(b)’s definition of a “penal or correctional facility”), or to serve their sentences on educational or work release, see 18 U. S. C. §§ 3622(b) and (c).
It is quite true that under the Government’s theory a defendant “released” to a community treatment center could be subject to restraints which do not materially differ from those imposed on a “detained” defendant committed to the custody of the Attorney General, and thence assigned to a treatment center. But this fact does not undercut the remaining distinction that exists between all defendants committed to the custody of the Attorney General on the one hand, and all defendants released on bail on the other. Unlike defendants “released” on bail, defendants who are “detained” or “sentenced” always remain subject to the control of the Bureau. See Randall v. Whelan, 938 F. 2d 522, 525 (CA4 1991). This is an important distinction, as the identity of the custodian has both legal and practical significance. A defendant who is “released” is not in BOP’s custody, and he cannot be summarily reassigned to a different place of confinement unless a judicial officer revokes his release, see 18 U. S. C. § 3148(b), or modifies the conditions of his release, see § 3142(c)(3). A defendant who is “detained,” however, is completely subject to BOP’s control. And “[t]hat single factor encompasses a wide variety of restrictions.” Randall, supra, at 525. “Detained” defendants are subject to BOP’s disciplinary procedures; they are subject to summary reassignment to any other penal or correctional facility within the system, cf. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U. S. 215, 224-229 (1976); and, being in the legal custody of BOP, the Bureau has full discretion to control many conditions of their confinement. See Moody v. Daggett, 429 U. S. 78, 88, n. 9 (1976); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 544-548 (1979).
It may seem unwise policy to treat defendants differently for purposes of sentence credit under § 3585(b) when they are similarly situated in fact — the one is confined to a community treatment center after having been “detained” and committed to the Bureau’s custody, while the other is “released” to such a center on bail. But the alternative construction adopted by the Court of Appeals in this case has its own grave difficulties. To determine in each case whether a defendant “released” on bail was subjected to “jail-type confinement” would require a fact-intensive inquiry into the circumstances of confinement, an inquiry based on information in the hands of private entities not available to the Bureau as a matter of right. Even were such information more readily available, it seems certain that the phrase “jail-type confinement” would remain sufficiently vague and amorphous so that much the same kind of disparity in treatment for similarly situated defendants would arise. The Government’s construction of § 3585(b), on the other hand, provides both it and the defendant with clear notice of the consequences of a § 3142 “release” or “detention” order.
Respondent finally suggests that the rule of lenity requires adoption of the “jail-type confinement” test for purposes of calculating credit under § 3585(b) because “there is a split of authority in the Circuits concerning the reach of ‘official detention,’” Brief for Respondent 34, n. 13, and because there is ambiguity as to which forms of custody fall within the meaning of “‘official detention.’” See id., at 34. Respondent misconstrues the doctrine. A statute is not “ ‘ambiguous’ for purposes of lenity merely because” there is “a division of judicial authority” over its proper construction. Moskal v. United States, 498 U. S. 103, 108 (1990). The rule of lenity applies only if, “after seizing everything from which aid can be derived,” Smith v. United States, 508 U. S. 223, 239 (1993) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted), we can make “no more than a guess as to what Congress intended.” Ladner v. United States, 358 U. S. 169, 178 (1958). That is not this case.
We hold that the time respondent spent at the Volunteers of America community treatment center while “released” on bail pursuant to the Bail Reform Act of 1984 was not “official detention” within the meaning of 18 U. S. C. § 3585(b). Respondent therefore was not entitled to a credit against his sentence of imprisonment. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Compare Dawson v. Scott, 50 F. 3d 884, 887-888 (CA11 1995) (time spent in halfway house and safe house while released on bond not creditable toward sentence); Moreland v. United States, 968 F. 2d 655, 657-660 (CA8) (en banc) (time spent in halfway house while released on bond not creditable toward sentence), cert. denied, 506 U. S. 1028 (1992); United States v. Edwards, 960 F. 2d 278, 282-283 (CA2 1992) (time spent in home confinement under electronic monitoring while released on bond not creditable toward sentence); Pinedo v. United States, 955 F. 2d 12, 14 (CA5 1992) (per curiam) (time spent on bail prior to trial not creditable toward sentence); United States v. Becak, 954 F. 2d 386, 387-388 (CA6) (time spent at mother’s house under conditions of release while released on bond not creditable toward sentence), cert. denied, 504 U. S. 945 (1992); United States v. Zackular, 945 F. 2d 423, 425 (CA1 1991) (time spent in home confinement prior to sentencing not creditable toward sentence); United States v. Insley, 927 F. 2d 185, 186 (CA4 1991) (time spent in home confinement while released on appeal bond not creditable toward sentence); United States v. Woods, 888 F. 2d 653, 655-656 (CA10 1989) (time spent at halfway house while released on bond not creditable toward sentence), cert. denied, 494 U. S. 1006 (1990), with Mills v. Taylor, 967 F. 2d 1397, 1400 (CA9 1992) (time spent in community treatment center while released on bail creditable toward sentence where “conditions of release approached] those of incarceration”).
Our task is strictly one of statutory interpretation. Respondent argued in the District Court that §3585 violated equal protection principles by treating pretrial defendants differently than postsentenced defendants. App. 23. The District Court rejected this argument. App. to Pet. for Cert. A-28. Respondent waived his equal protection argument in the Third Circuit, see 21 F. 3d 558, 559, n. 1 (1994), and he has not renewed it here. In an amicus curiae brief filed with this Court, University of Southern California Law Center’s Post-Conviction Justice Project raises a similar equal protection argument, see Brief for USC Law Center’s Post-Conviction Justice Project as Amicus Curiae 20-23, but that argument is not properly before the Court. See United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U. S. 56, 60, n. 2 (1981) (noting that this Court does not decide issues raised by amici that were not decided by the court of appeals or argued by the.interested party); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 531, n. 13 (1979) (same).
See Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-473, Tit. II, 98 Stat. 1976. The provisions of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 relating to bail are known as the Bail Reform Act of 1984. Pub. L. 98-473, Tit. II, ch. 1,98 Stat. 1976. The provisions relating to sentencing, including the credit provision of § 3585(b), are known as the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. Pub. L. 98-473, Tit. II, ch. II, 98 Stat. 1987.
The Bureau’s view of § 3685(b) is explained in U. S. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Prisons Program Statement No. 5880.28(c) (July 29, 1994), which reads as follows:
“Prior Custody Time Credit. The [Sentencing Reform Act] includes a new statutory provision, 18 U. S. C. § 3585(b), that pertains to ‘credit for prior custody’ and is controlling for making time credit determinations for sentences imposed under the SR A ...
“Definitions:
“Official detention. ‘Official detention’ is defined, for purposes of this policy, as time spent under a federal detention order. This also includes time spent under a detention order when the court has recommended placement in a less secure environment or in a community based program as a condition of presentence detention. A person under these circumstances remains in ‘official detention,’ subject to the discretion of the Attorney General and the U. S. Marshals Service with respect to the place of detention. Those defendants placed in a program and/or residence as a condition of detention are subject to removal and return to a more secure environment at the discretion of the Attorney General and the U. S. Marshals Service, and further, remain subject to prosecution for escape from detention for any unauthorized absence from the program/residence. Such a person is not similarly situated with persons conditionally released from detention with a requirement of program participation and/or residence.
“A defendant is not eligible for any credits while released from detention. Time spent in residence in a community corrections center as a result of the Pretrial Services Act of 1982 (18 U. S. C. § 3152-3164), or as a result of a condition of bail or bond (18 U. S. C. §3141-3143), is not creditable as presentence time. A condition of bail or bond which is ‘highly restrictive,’ and that includes ‘house arrest’, ‘electronic monitoring’ or ‘home confinement’; or such as requiring the defendant to report daily to the U. S. Marshal, U. S. Probation Service, or other person; is not considered as time in official detention. Such a defendant is not subject to the discretion of the U. S. Attorney General, the Bureau of Prisons, or the U. S. Marshals Service, regarding participation, placement, or subsequent return to a more secure environment, and therefore is not in a status which would indicate an award of credit is appropriate (see Randall v. Whelan, 938 F. 2d 522 (4th Cir. 1991) and U. S. v. Insley, 927 F. 2d 186 (4th Cir. 1991). Further, the government may not prosecute for escape in the case of an unauthorized absence in such cases, as the person has been lawfully released from ‘official detention.’” (Emphasis in original.)
In some cases, a defendant will be arrested, denied bail, and held in custody pursuant to state law, being turned over later to the Federal Government for prosecution. In these situations, BOP often grants credit under § 3585(b) for time spent in state custody, see, e.g., U. S. Dept. of Justice, Federal Bureau of Prisons, Operations Memorandum (Oct. 23, 1989); U. S. Dept. of Justice, Federal Bureau of Prisons, Sentence Computation Manual CCCA (1992 and Supp. 1994), even though the defendant was not subject to the control of BOP. These situations obviously are not governed by reference to a § 3142 “release” or “detention” order. But because the only question before us is whether a defendant is in “official detention” under § 3585(b) during the time he is “released” on bail pursu ant to the Bail Reform Act of 1984., we need not and do not rule here on the propriety of BOP’s decision to grant credit under § 3585(b) to a defendant who is denied bail pursuant to state law and held in the custody of state authorities. Thus, the dissent is simply wrong when it states that we have “adopt[ed] an interpretation that the Bureau of Prisons itself has rejected” by not allowing any ‘“credit for time spent in state custody.’” Post, at 67, 68.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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A
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sc_issuearea
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